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Country-specific dietary shifts to mitigate climate and water crises

Brent F.Kimab,Raychel E.SantoabAllysan P.ScatterdayaJillian P.FryabcdColleen M.SynkaShannon R.CebronaMesfin M.MekonneneArjen Y.HoekstrafgSaskiade PeehMartin W.BloemabRoni A.NeffabiKeeve E.Nachmanabij

a Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, 21202, United States
b Department of Environmental Health & Engineering, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, 21205, United States
c Department of Health, Behavior and Society, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, 21205, United States
d Department of Health Sciences, Towson University, Towson, MD, 21252, United States
e Robert B. Daugherty Water for Food Global Institute, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE, 68508, United States
f University of Twente, 7522 NB, Enschede, Netherlands
g Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Singapore, 259772, Singapore
h United Nations World Food Programme, Rome, 00148, Italy
i Department of Health Policy and Management, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, 21205, United States
j Risk Sciences and Public Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, 21205, United States
Under a Creative Commons license.

Abstract

Undernutrition, obesity, climate change, and freshwater depletion share food and agricultural systems as an underlying driver. Efforts to more closely align dietary patterns with sustainability and health goals could be better informed with data covering the spectrum of countries characterized by over- and undernutrition. Here, we model the greenhouse gas (GHG) and water footprints of nine increasingly plant-forward diets, aligned with criteria for a healthy diet, specific to 140 countries. Results varied widely by country due to differences in: nutritional adjustments, baseline consumption patterns from which modeled diets were derived, import patterns, and the GHG- and water-intensities of foods by country of origin. Relative to exclusively plant-based (vegan) diets, diets comprised of plant foods with modest amounts of low-food chain animals (i.e., forage fish, bivalve mollusks, insects) had comparably small GHG and water footprints. In 95 percent of countries, diets that only included animal products for one meal per day were less GHG-intensive than lacto-ovo vegetarian diets (in which terrestrial and aquatic meats were eliminated entirely) in part due to the GHG-intensity of dairy foods. The relatively optimal choices among modeled diets otherwise varied across countries, in part due to contributions from deforestation (e.g., for feed production and grazing lands) and highly freshwater-intensive forms of aquaculture. Globally, modest plant-forward shifts (e.g., to low red meat diets) were offset by modeled increases in protein and caloric intake among undernourished populations, resulting in net increases in GHG and water footprints. These and other findings highlight the importance of trade, culture, and nutrition in diet footprint analyses. The country-specific results presented here could provide nutritionally-viable pathways for high-meat consuming countries as well as transitioning countries that might otherwise adopt the Western dietary pattern.

Keywords

Sustainable diet
Dietary change
Nutrition
Food systems
Greenhouse gas emissions
Water footprint

1. Introduction

Undernutrition, obesity, and climate change have been described as a synergy of pandemics (Swinburn et al., 2019). Together with freshwater depletion and other related ecological harms, these intersecting global challenges share food and agricultural systems as an underlying driver. Leveraging those patterns presents an opportunity to address multiple challenges in tandem, with an eye toward avoiding the unintended consequences of making progress in some areas at the expense of others. For many low- and middle-income countries, for example, messaging about sustainable diets is complicated by a persistent high prevalence of all forms of undernutrition (Development Initiatives, 2018). Accounting for these and other factors at a country-specific level could help inform efforts among high-meat consuming countries to better align diets with public health and ecological goals, while providing nutritionally-viable strategies for transitioning countries that might otherwise adopt the Western dietary pattern, particularly among their urban population.

Shifts toward plant-forward diets are essential for meeting climate change mitigation targets (Bajzelj et al., 2014; Bryngelsson et al., 2016; Hedenus et al., 2014) and remaining within planetary boundaries (Willett et al., 2019). These and other concerns have fueled efforts—proposed and enacted—to reduce animal product consumption through approaches including behavior change campaigns (de Boer et al., 2014d; Morris et al., 2014), environmental impact labeling (Leach et al., 2016), dietary recommendations (Fischer and Garnett, 2016), and taxes (Säll and Gren, 2015; Springmann et al., 2017; Wirsenius et al., 2011). At the same time, animals raised for food can provide a range of agro-economic benefits, including converting inedible crop residues and by-products into human-edible food, and utilizing the share of grassland unsuitable for crop production (Mottet et al., 2017). Furthermore, animal-source foods are a valuable source of protein and bioavailable micronutrients, especially for young children (de Pee and Bloem, 2009d; Semba, 2016; Swinburn et al., 2019).

Policy and behavioral interventions aimed at promoting sustainable diets could be better informed with evidence about where they could offer the greatest potential benefits, the nutritional status of different populations, and the relative environmental impacts of each diet in each country. Previous studies documenting ecological impacts of dietary scenarios have called for greater geographic specificity (Aleksandrowicz et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2016), as most have examined only one or a few—almost exclusively industrialized—countries, or a regional or global aggregate (Appendix A, Table A1).

To help address these gaps, we modeled the greenhouse gas (GHG) footprint and blue and green water footprint (WF) of baseline consumption patterns and nine increasingly plant-forward diets with varying levels of animal products for 140 individual countries and territories (henceforth: “countries”). Diets were modeled in accordance with health criteria, offering nutritionally-viable scenarios (to the extent possible without accounting for micronutrients) that adjust for over- and under-consumption. We account for blue water (surface and groundwater, e.g., for irrigation) and green water (soil moisture from precipitation); the latter is often excluded from similar studies on the rationale that it does not directly impact water scarcity (e.g., by depleting aquifers). Green water accounting is important, however, because efficient use of green water in rainfed agriculture can lessen reliance on blue water elsewhere. In an internationally-traded economy, one cannot be considered independently of the other, and both are part of an increasingly scarce global pool (Hoekstra, 2016; Schyns et al., 2019). We also incorporate footprints of aquatic animals, nuts, and seeds—common protein alternatives to terrestrial animal products—which most prior studies excluded or only narrowly considered (Appendix A, Table A1).

By accounting for import patterns and associated differences in the GHG and water footprints of food items based on the production practices unique to items’ countries of origin (COO), the study model satisfies recent appeals (Heller and Keoleian, 2015; Wellesley et al., 2015) to incorporate trade flows when measuring the environmental impacts associated with national consumption patterns. Moreover, international accounting systems commonly attribute environmental impacts associated with imported foods to producing countries rather than the countries in which they are consumed, thereby displacing accountability away from the populations responsible for changing demand (Dario et al., 2014; de Ruiter et al., 2016; Peters and Hertwich, 2008).

This research identifies a range of country-specific scenarios in which dietary patterns could better align with climate change mitigation, freshwater conservation, and nutrition guidelines.

2. Methods

We developed a model to estimate the annual per capita and whole country GHG, blue water, and green water footprints for baseline consumption patterns and nine increasingly plant-forward diets specific to 140 countries. We also estimate the per-serving, per-kilocalorie, per-gram of protein, and per-kilogram edible weight footprints of common food groups. The model was developed in Python version 3.6. Model input and output are available in Mendeley Data (Kim et al., 2019).

2.1. Baseline consumption patterns

To characterize baseline consumption patterns for each country, we averaged data over the 2011–2013 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) food balance sheets (FBS) (FAO, 2017a), which provide estimates of per capita domestic food supplies after accounting for imports, exports, losses (where data are available), animal feed, and other non-food uses (FAO, 2001). Quantities reported in FBS reflect food availability and thus overestimate quantities actually consumed. Bovine meat supplies, for example, are reported in dressed carcass weight, which includes bones and other parts typically considered inedible. These data are appropriate for diet footprint modeling, however, because they reflect the amount of production involved in feeding populations (e.g., we measure the footprint of the carcass required to produce the edible portion of beef in the diet). Food balance sheets are also well-suited for comparing consumption patterns across countries (Fehrenbach et al., 2016) and have precedent in the literature for measuring diet footprints across regions (Hedenus et al., 2014; Popp et al., 2010; Pradhan et al., 2013; Tukker et al., 2011) and globally (Bajzelj et al., 2014; Stehfest et al., 2009; Tilman and Clark, 2014).

2.2. Food losses and waste

For some items in some countries, where sufficient data were available, FBS subtracted supply chain losses from food supply estimates. We added these quantities back in to food supplies for two reasons: First, estimates of diet footprints should reflect the fact that some amount of waste inevitably occurs between the producer and the consumer, thus for footprint modeling purposes we needed the original quantities of FBS items prior to supply chain losses. Second, in cases where it was appropriate to subtract supply chain losses—i.e., when dealing with amounts of calories or nutrients actually consumed (Section 2.4)—we used a more comprehensive source for food losses and waste (Gustavsson et al., 2011); combining this with FBS estimates would have resulted in double-counting. Detailed methods for estimating food losses and waste are provided in Appendix B.1.

2.3. Food items

Study diets were comprised of 74 items in FBS (Mendeley Data input/item_parameters). Twenty-four additional FBS items were excluded due to the small quantities in which they are typically consumed (e.g., spices), limited footprint data (e.g., game meats), and/or because they are not typically considered food (e.g., alcohols, cottonseed). Most FBS items are expressed in terms of primary equivalents, i.e., the quantity of a raw commodity required to produce a given quantity of processed goods. For example, wheat products (e.g., wheat flour and bread) are quantified in terms of the unprocessed wheat required for their production, and dairy products, except for butter and cream, are quantified as whole milk equivalents (FAO, 2001; 2017b). FBS items range from specific (e.g., bananas) to broad (e.g., freshwater fish). Other model inputs, including trade data and item footprints, were expressed in terms of specific items (e.g., walnuts), so we developed schemas to match them to the associated FBS items (e.g., nuts and products).

For modeling purposes, we added several custom items to represent foods either not included in FBS (e.g., edible insects) or more specific than those in FBS. The custom item for forage fish, for example, includes small, schooling pelagic fish such as sardines and herring that are prey for larger species, and unlike the FBS item “Pelagic Fish” it does not include larger species such as tuna. In Mendeley Data, custom items are identifiable by an FBS item code of 9000 or greater.

2.4. Modeled diets

For each of the 140 study countries, we modeled nine increasingly plant-forward diets that adhered to parameters for a healthy diet (summarized in Fig. 1; see also Mendeley Data input/item_parameters). Each diet used the country’s baseline consumption pattern as the starting point. In all steps where groups of FBS items (e.g., protein foods) were scaled up or down, the relative proportions of items within each group were preserved, reflecting each country’s unique dietary pattern. For example, the residents of South Korea consume relatively little dairy, so if they removed red meat from their diet we would not expect milk products to be a popular protein substitute. When comparing FBS item quantities with nutritional criteria (e.g., the target for caloric intake described below), we first subtracted region- and food group-specific losses occurring during processing and packaging, distribution, and consumption (Gustavsson et al., 2011). This step ensures that criteria are met based on quantities that are closer to amounts actually consumed, versus quantities in the food supply.

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Fig. 1. Parameters for study diets. Partial shading indicates food groups that were included only on selected days/meals, e.g., meat was included in six of seven days for meatless day, and in one of three meals for two-thirds vegan.

aRed meat includes bovine, sheep, goat, and pig meat.

bWhen dairy products were scaled to meet the protein floor, only the FBS item “Milk, Excluding Butter” (which also includes some milk-derived products such as cheese and yogurt) was scaled. The FBS items “Butter, Ghee” and “Cream” were not scaled for protein.

cThe fruits and vegetables floor and added sugars cap for meatless day were only applied for one day of the week, reflecting one day of the lacto-ovo vegetarian diet and six days of the adjusted baseline.

dThe 2/3 vegan diet reflects the vegan diet for two out of three meals per day and the adjusted baseline for the third. The fruits and vegetables floor and added sugars cap were only applied to the two vegan meals.

eFor the low-food chain diet, protein from insects replaced 10% of the protein from terrestrial animal products, and protein from forage fish and bivalve mollusks replaced 70% and 30%, respectively, of the protein from aquatic animals.

* * *

Diets were modeled as follows. First, to adjust for over- and under-consumption, the baseline pattern was scaled to 2300 kilocalories—the upper bound of average per capita energy requirements calculated by Springmann et al. (2016). We held caloric intake constant across all modeled diets for consistency when making cross-country comparisons. In the steps described below (e.g., removing animal foods), the caloric content of the diet underwent further changes and subsequently had to be adjusted back to 2300, but performing this step first kept the relative proportions of FBS items closer to the baseline. Following the initial adjustment for caloric intake, amounts of nuts, seeds, and oils were held constant for all diets.

Where applicable, selected animal foods were removed (Fig. 1); e.g., terrestrial and aquatic meats were removed from the lacto-ovo vegetarian diet. Modeled diets were then adjusted to meet two health guidelines from the World Health Organization and FAO (2003): Fruits and vegetables (excluding starchy roots, e.g., potatoes, yams) were scaled up to a floor of 400 g per day, or approximately five servings; and added sugars were capped to contribute no more than 10% of total energy intake. For diets in which meat was eliminated, the fruit and vegetable floor was raised to six or seven servings per day (Fig. 1), based on the rationale that healthy vegetarian and vegan dietary patterns tend to include more of these items (Springmann et al., 2016). Note that we use the term “vegan” to refer to exclusively plant-based diets, without reference to other behaviors sometimes associated with the term, such as avoidance of leather products.

The low red meat diet additionally included a cap on red meat (i.e., bovine, sheep, goat, pig) of 350 g cooked weight per week, or roughly three servings, as per recommendations (World Cancer Research Fund and American Institute for Cancer Research, 2018). We converted the 350 g cap from cooked to raw weight (467 g) using the same conversion factors we used for per-serving footprints (Section 2.8, Mendeley Data input/per_unit_serving_sizes), and from raw weight to carcass weight (648 g) using the average of FAO extraction rates for bovine and pig meat (FAO, 2017). Taken together with adjustments for added sugars, fruits and vegetables, calories, and protein, this diet is intended to approximate the adoption of dietary recommendations.

For the low food chain diet, protein from insects replaced 10% of the protein from terrestrial animal products, and protein from forage fish and bivalve mollusks replaced 70% and 30%, respectively, of the protein from aquatic animals. Insects are not included in FBS, so nutritional content was derived from Payne et al. (2016). Forage fish and bivalve mollusks are included in FBS but grouped with other items (e.g., “Molluscs, Other” includes snails), so nutrient content was derived from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) food composition database (USDA, 2017). See Mendeley Data input/nutrient_comp_custom_items for details.

Following these adjustments, selected energy staples, i.e., FBS items in the grains and starchy roots groups, were scaled up or down to return to the 2300 kilocalorie target. Selected protein groups (Fig. 1) were then scaled up as needed to meet a protein floor of 69 g per day—12% of total energy intake, within the recommended range of 10–15% (World Health Organization and FAO, 2003). To hold calories constant while scaling up protein, caloric increases from protein foods were counter-balanced with commensurate reductions in calories from energy staples. The equation for this step is provided in Appendix B.2.

We also modeled an adjusted variant of the baseline pattern, scaled to 2300 kcal and the protein floor (Figs. 1, 5b, 6). When comparing plant-forward modeled diets with baseline consumption patterns, the adjusted baseline allows for isolating the effects of food substitutions independent of adjustments for over- and under-consumption.

The meatless day and two-thirds vegan diets were modeled as combinations of two diets. Meatless day was patterned after behavior change campaigns promoting one day of the week without meat (e.g., Meatless Monday) and assumes a lacto-ovo vegetarian diet for one day per week and the adjusted baseline for the other six days. We included this diet because it can serve as an entry point toward more plant-forward diets. Two-thirds vegan was patterned loosely after “Vegan Before 6” (Bittman, 2013) and assumes a vegan diet for two out of three meals per day and the adjusted baseline for the third, with each meal providing equal caloric content. This approach does not account for the possibility that people in some countries may consume more animal products at dinner, for example, compared to breakfast and lunch.

We also included a hypothetical scenario in which all study countries adopt the average baseline consumption pattern of high-income OECD countries (The World Bank, 2018; Figs. 1, 6 and 8a–d), illustrating potential outcomes of the Western diet becoming more widespread. Furthermore, by holding diet composition constant across countries, this scenario isolates the effects of import patterns and COOs on GHG and water footprints.

2.5. Countries

We ran the model for the 140 countries with sufficiently robust trade and food supply data for inclusion in the 2011–2013 FAO detailed trade matrices and FBS (FAO, 2017a).

2.6. Import patterns and countries of origin

An item’s footprint varies based on the conditions and practices specific to its COOs (e.g., Fig. 3, Fig. 4). To account for these differences, for each country and diet, we traced the supply of each FBS item back to the countries in which it was produced. Of Japan’s pig meat supply, for example, 48% was produced domestically over 2011–2013, 22% was imported from the United States (US), 10% from Canada, 7% from Denmark, and so on. For total imports by importing country and FBS item, we used trade data averaged over 2011–2013 FBS, and to allocate the share of total imports among COOs, we used 2011–2013 FAO detailed trade matrices (FAO, 2017a). Detailed methods are provided in Appendix B.3. Note that for this study, COOs were only relevant in cases where sufficient country-specific item footprint data were available.

2.7. Diet footprints

2.7.1. Overview

Contributions of FBS items to diet footprints were modeled using two approaches. The first method used country-specific footprints, i.e., for the items consumed in a given country, the GHG and water footprints were specific to the COOs from which each item was imported. Since we did not have sufficient country-specific data to apply this method in all cases, it was limited to the GHG and water footprints of terrestrial animal products (excluding insects), WFs of plant foods, and all land use change (LUC) CO2 footprints. After adapting country-specific footprint data to FBS items, this method yielded 16 009 footprint data points (available in Mendeley Data input/item_footprints_by_coo). These were then multiplied by the corresponding quantities of each item, allocated over COOs, in each country-diet combination. This method and the associated data sources are described in Sections 2.7.22.7.4 with technical details covered in Appendix B.4.

The second method was used in cases where we did not have sufficient country-specific data to differentiate footprints by COO, i.e., for the GHG and water footprints of aquatic animals and insects, and the GHG footprints of plant foods. For this method we performed a literature search and adapted results from 114 peer-reviewed studies, yielding 764 data points (available in Mendeley Data input/item_footprints_distributions). For these item-footprint pairs, we used a bootstrapping approach to reflect the heterogeneity across the countries and production systems examined in the 114 studies. The bootstrapping approach is described in Sections 2.7.52.7.6, with the literature search described in Appendix B.5.

All results reflect cradle-to-farm gate activities only, and thus do not account for GHG and water footprints associated with processing, transportation, retail and preparation. This limitation is discussed in Section 3.3.

While most FBS items are expressed in terms of primary equivalents, there were some cases where we needed to allocate shares of GHG and water footprints among processed items originating from the same root product, e.g., butter and cream from milk. We adapted the economic allocation method described in Hoekstra et al. (2011). The method and how it was applied in each case are described in Appendix B.6.

2.7.2. GHG and land-use change CO2 footprints of terrestrial animal products, by COO

For GHG footprints of terrestrial animal products (excluding insects), we adapted data from FAO’s Global Livestock Environmental Assessment Model GLEAM-i tool (FAO, 2017c). The tool applies a consistent, transparent approach to quantifying production data and GHG emissions associated with terrestrial animal production specific to 235 different countries, accounting for differences in feed composition, feed conversion ratios, manure management techniques, and other parameters associated with the various species and production systems (e.g., grasslands cattle, feedlot cattle, broiler chickens, layer chickens) unique to each setting. The level of granularity provided by GLEAM-i further allowed us to report CO2 emissions from deforestation-driven LUC separately from other emissions sources. These qualities made GLEAM-i a robust choice for differentiating GHG footprints based on COO.

Although GLEAM-i accounts for soil carbon fluxes associated with land use change, e.g., conversion from forest to grassland, it does not account for the effects of livestock management practices on soil carbon losses or sequestration—an important limitation that should be addressed in future research (see Section 3.3). Furthermore, GLEAM-i does not allocate GHG emissions to offals and other slaughter byproducts, thus overestimating the GHG footprints of meat and underestimating those of offals (see Appendix B.6).

With the exception of offals, the GLEAM-i tool allocates GHG emissions from each production system among the associated animal products (e.g., cattle meat and milk from grassland systems in Brazil) based on protein content. The GHG footprints of these items, as reported by GLEAM-i, are specific to country, production system, and item but are not specific to the emissions source (i.e., LUC for soy feed, LUC for palm kernel cake feed, LUC for pasture expansion, and all other sources of GHG emissions). One of our study aims was to highlight the contributions of deforestation to GHG footprints. To this end, we allocated the GHG footprints of items among emissions sources based on the assumption that within a given a country and production system, the relative shares of source-specific GHG emissions among the items from that system is the same as the relative shares of total GHG emissions among those items, which was provided by GLEAM-i. For example, for United Kingdom (UK) layer systems, based on GLEAM-i data, 82% of the total GHG footprint was allocated to eggs and 18% was allocated to poultry meat. Thus, we applied the same percentages to allocate LUC CO2 emissions from the use of soy feed in UK layer systems (also reported by GLEAM-i) between eggs and meat. The equations for this method are detailed in Appendix B.4.

Since GLEAM-i reports GHG footprints per kilogram of protein, we converted to per-kilogram primary weight footprints (e.g., carcass weight for meat, whole milk for dairy) as follows. For each GLEAM-i item g produced in country c, the primary weight GHG footprint GHG was calculated as

where GHGP is the GHG footprint per kilogram of protein, PP is the annual production in kilograms of protein, and P is the annual production in kilograms primary weight.

Footprints of GLEAM-i items (e.g., buffalo meat, cattle meat) then needed to be translated to footprints of FBS items (e.g., bovine meat). We developed schemas matching GLEAM-i countries and items to those used in FBS. For each FBS item f produced in country c, we then calculated the primary weight GHG footprint as the average footprint of the associated GLEAM-i item(s) g produced in c, weighted by the tonnages produced P:

If there were no GLEAM-i footprint data for an FBS item in a given country, we used a regional average, weighted by the tonnage of the FBS item produced in each country (FAO, 2017a), as follows:

Finally, if there were no footprint data for f in r, a weighted global average was used.

2.7.3. Land-use change CO2 footprints of soy and palm oils intended for human consumption, by COO

Soybeans, soybean oil, palm oil, and palm kernel oil reported in FBS food supply data reflect uses for human consumption; GHG footprints of soy and palm as animal feed are described in Section 2.7.2. Land-use change CO2 footprints for the former items were adapted from FAO GLEAM documentation (FAO, 2017d), which provides per-hectare LUC CO2 footprints associated with soy and palm production for 92 (soy) and 14 (palm) countries. Per-hectare footprints were converted to per-kilogram footprints using country-specific crop yields from FAOSTAT, averaged over 2011–2013. The LUC CO2 footprints of soy and palm oils were then derived from their root products using the economic allocation method described in Appendix B.6. If there were no LUC CO2 footprint data associated with soy or palm production in a given country, the LUC CO2 footprint was assumed to be zero.

2.7.4. Water footprints of plant foods and terrestrial animal products, by COO

We adapted data from literature quantifying the blue and green WFs of plant foods (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2010a) and terrestrial animal products (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2010b) specific to over 200 countries. We developed schemas matching countries and items from these datasets to their FBS counterparts. Parallel to our approach for GHG footprints, for each FBS item f produced in country c, we calculated the WFs as the average footprint of the associated water dataset item(s) w produced in c, weighted by the tonnages produced P (FAO, 2017a):

If there were no country production data for an item w, an unweighted country average was used. If there were no WF data matching FBS item f produced in country c, a weighted regional or global average footprint was used, following the method described above for GLEAM-i.

One FBS item (honey) had no associated WF data and was thus excluded from WF calculations. Mekonnen and Hoekstra’s datasets did not include insects, so the WF of insects was taken from Miglietta et al. (2015) and used for insect production in all countries.

Note that this method does not account for levels of water scarcity in countries of origin. While we acknowledge that there are differing perspectives regarding the need for scarcity-weighted WFs, our approach is informed by Hoekstra (2016), which argues that WFs have implications for freshwater conservation wherever withdrawal occurs. In an internationally-traded economy, all freshwater is part of an increasingly scarce global pool. Even in regions with abundant freshwater availability, if water is used inefficiently in agriculture or aquaculture, wasted water is water that could have otherwise been used to produce more food—thus lessening the need for other, potentially water-scarce, regions to produce as much.

2.7.5. Bootstrapping approach for GHG footprints of plant foods, aquatic animals, and insects

In contrast to the datasets used for footprints by COO—which used uniform methods across FBS items and countries—plant food, aquatic animal, and insect GHG footprints from the literature search reflected a diversity of studies with varied methods, and represented some countries more than others. To maximize consistency across studies and with the country-specific data describe above, we applied strict inclusion/exclusion criteria and standardized results to the degree possible (described in Appendix B.5); however, the practices under study still varied greatly, e.g., by fertilizer and pesticide application rates, use of organic practices, irrigation method, crop rotations, use of protected cultivation (e.g., greenhouses), fish stocking density, and fishing method (e.g., long-lining, trawling). These may not be representative of the prevailing practices for a given country-item combination.

To account for this heterogeneity, we create a weighted probability distribution for each FBS item’s footprint observations. When a study provided results for multiple scenarios involving the production of the same item in the same country, e.g., for five GHG footprint observations for Spanish wheat with varying levels of nitrogen fertilizer inputs, we assigned a weight to each observation equal to the reciprocal of the number of observations, e.g., 1/5, preventing studies with multiple observations from being overrepresented. If there were no observations for an FBS item, proxies were used, e.g., a distribution of all grains footprints was used for sorghum and products, and a distribution of all citrus fruit footprints was used for grapefruit and products. All item footprint distributions used in the model are provided in Mendeley Data input/item_footprints_distributions.

To calculate the contributions of plant foods, aquatic animals, and insects to the GHG footprint of a country-diet combination, we used a bootstrapping approach designed to capture the distribution of item footprint values from the literature. The weighted distribution of GHG footprint values for tomatoes, for example, was skewed right; simply using the median or average would ignore this important detail. For our approach, we 1) selected 10 000 random samples from each FBS item footprint distribution, e.g., 10 000 samples from 23 weighted GHG footprint values (kg CO2e/kg) for barley; 2) multiplied each sampled footprint value by the corresponding quantity of the FBS item in the diet, e.g., 46 kg barley/capita/year in the Moroccan vegetarian diet; and 3) summed the resulting values for FBS items within the same group, e.g., resulting in a distribution of 10 000 values for the kg CO2e/capita/year associated with grains in the Moroccan vegetarian diet. Summing the median value from each distribution with results by COO (Sections 2.7.22.7.4) yielded the total per capita footprint of a given country diet. We also present interquartile ranges (error bars in Fig. 7, also provided in Mendeley Data output) to convey variations across bootstrapped outputs. Note that these ranges apply only to items for which bootstrapping was used, as the COO-specific method does not account for uncertainty and is deterministic, returning a single footprint value for each permutation of inputs (e.g., FBS item, diet, country, and COO).
2.7.6. Bootstrapping approach for water footprints of aquatic animals

Aquatic animal WFs were limited to farmed species and accounted for blue and green WFs associated with feed production and, where applicable, blue water used to replace evaporative losses from freshwater ponds and to dilute seawater in brackish production. Water footprints of wild-caught aquatic animals were assumed to be negligible.

For feed-associated WFs, we created a distribution of WF values adapted from Pahlow et al. (2015) for each FBS item associated with farmed species. We did not have information about the share consumed in a given country that was farmed versus wild-caught, so we made assumptions based on 2014 global production patterns, e.g., 79% of harvests associated with the FBS item “Freshwater Fish” were from aquaculture (FAO, 2017e), so when this item was included in diets, we only applied the feed-associated WF to 79% of the amount consumed regardless of the country.

For freshwater pond aquaculture, we created a distribution of blue WF values for each of the FBS items “Freshwater Fish” and “Crustaceans” (Gephart et al., 2017; Henriksson et al., 2017; Verdegem and Bosma, 2009). For “Crustaceans” we created an additional distribution of blue WF values for brackish water pond aquaculture (Henriksson et al., 2017; Verdegem and Bosma, 2009). Both distributions were weighted using the method described in Section 2.7.5, except for the 31 values for freshwater production in China from Gephart et al. (2017), which were weighted by the percentage of Chinese freshwater production represented by each data point. We did not have information about the shares consumed in a given country that were from freshwater or brackish ponds, so as per our method for feed-associated WFs, we made assumptions based on 2014 global production patterns (FAO, 2017e; Mendeley Data input/aquaculture_percent_ponds).

Contributions of aquatic animals to country-diet WFs were calculated as follows, using the bootstrapping approach described in Section 2.7.5. We (1) selected 10 000 random samples from each FBS item-footprint distribution, e.g., for “Crustaceans” we selected 10 000 samples each from the distributions for feed blue WF, feed green WF, freshwater pond blue WF, and brackish water pond blue WF; (2) multiplied each sampled footprint value by the corresponding quantity of the FBS item in the diet; and (3) summed the resulting values for FBS items within the same group, i.e., “Aquatic animals,” keeping results for each water footprint type separate.

2.8. Footprints of individual food items

In addition to calculating diet footprints, we presented per-serving, per-kilocalorie, per-gram of protein, and per-kilogram edible weight footprints associated with grouped FBS items (Figs. 2, S1–S3). For per-kilogram footprints, we converted carcass weight and whole aquatic animal footprints of terrestrial and aquatic meats to edible weight equivalents (FAO, 1989, n.d.; Nijdam et al., 2012; Waterman, 2001). Where nut footprints were expressed in terms of in-shell, we converted them to shelled. Although the model handled dairy products in terms of whole milk equivalents (except for butter and cream), for comparative purposes we added the footprints of cheese and yogurt, derived from milk using economic allocation (see Appendix B.6). Per-kilogram edible weight footprints were then converted to per-serving footprints using US standards (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2016). Serving sizes and conversion factors are provided in Mendeley Data input/per_unit_serving_sizes.

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Fig. 2. Average per serving (a) GHG, (b) blue water, and (c) green water item footprints. For items with sufficient country-specific footprint data (i.e., GHG and water footprints of terrestrial animal products excluding insects, WFs of plant foods, and LUC CO2 footprints), footprints were averaged across countries and weighted by the tonnage produced in each country. For all other items (i.e., from the literature search), see Section 2.7.5 for how averages were weighted. Most items shown here are grouped (e.g., grains); footprints associated with specific items used in the study model (e.g., maize, millet, barley) are provided in Mendeley Data input. Diamonds represent medians and error bars show interquartile ranges. See Mendeley Data input/per_unit_serving_sizes for primary weight to serving size conversions.

Forage fish GHG footprints are based on sardines and herring. Pond-raised WFs largely reflect tilapia, carp and catfish. Blue WFs for brackish pond aquaculture reflect freshwater used to dilute seawater. Water footprints of wild-caught aquatic animals were assumed to be negligible.

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Fig. 3. Per-kilogram GHG footprints of bovine meat, by producing country, shown for countries that produced over 100 000 metric tons in 2011–2013.

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Fig. 4. Per-kilogram blue and green WFs of rice, by producing country, shown for countries that produced over 1 000 000 metric tons (1 megaton) in 2011–2013.

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Fig. 5. Potential per capita changes in diet-related GHG, blue water, and green water footprints across all 140 study countries, calculated as the average Δfootprint weighted by the population of each country. Shown for the nine modeled diets relative to (a) baseline consumption patterns and (b) an adjusted variant of each country’s baseline, scaled to 2300 kcal with a 69 g/capita/day protein floor. The adjusted baseline allows for comparisons between plant-forward diets and baseline patterns independent of adjustments for over- and under-consumption, isolating the effects of food substitutions. Diamonds represent medians and error bars show interquartile ranges.

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Fig. 6. Greenhouse gasfootprints for selected diets, by country, (a) per capita and (b) for whole country populations. Countries are sorted by baseline footprint. Due to space constraints, of the 140 study countries, only the following are shown here: (a) the 59 countries above the 58th percentile for whole country baseline footprint, and (b) the 11 countries above the 92nd percentile for whole country baseline footprint.

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Fig. 7. Per capita diet-related GHG footprints by country, diet, and food group. Shown for the top four countries with the largest whole-country diet-related baseline GHG footprints: (1 st) mainland China, (2nd) India, (3rd) Brazil and (4th) the United States. Indonesia, ranked 7th for whole-country footprint, is also shown as an example of a country with high consumption of aquatic animals. Most items shown here are broadly grouped (e.g., plant foods); diet footprints are provided with greater specificity in Mendeley Data output. Error bars show interquartile ranges and apply only to items for which bootstrapping was used, i.e., plant foods, aquatic animals, and insects (see Section 2.7.5).

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Fig. 8. Water footprints by country (a) per capita, blue WF only; (b) per capita, combined blue plus green WFs; (c) for whole countries, blue WF only; (d) for whole countries, combined blue plus green WFs; and (e) per capita, for baseline diets only, separated by blue and green WF. Countries are sorted by (a–d) baseline footprint or (e) blue WF. Due to space constraints, of the 140 study countries, only the following are shown here: (a, b, e) the 35 countries above the 75th percentile for whole country baseline footprint, and (c, d) the 14 countries above the 90th percentile for whole country baseline footprint.

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In addition to presenting the median and interquartile range for each group footprint, for groups with footprints specific to COO, we calculated global averages weighted by the mass produced in each country. For groups with footprints from our literature search, averages were weighted by the reciprocal of the number of observations from each study to prevent studies with multiple observations from being overrepresented (consistent with the weighting method described in Section 2.7.5).

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Footprints of individual food items

Our study model incorporated 3850 GHG, 5402 blue water, and 7521 green water data points (Mendeley Data input/item_footprints_by_coo, input/item_footprints_distributions) reflecting cradle-to-farm gate footprints of the individual food items comprising diets, spanning diverse production practices and conditions unique to COO. These are presented per serving (Fig. 2), per kilocalorie (Fig. S1), per gram of protein (Fig. S2) and per kilogram edible weight (Fig. S3) as global averages weighted by the tonnage produced in each country (where sufficient country-specific data were available). These figures show footprint values aggregated over common food groups (e.g., grains), whereas the study model handled items with greater specificity (e.g., maize, millet, barley).

Whether by serving, energy content, protein, or mass, ruminant meats (i.e., bovine, sheep, goat) were by far the most GHG-intensive items. Per serving, bovine meat (weighted average: 6.54 kg CO2e/serving) was 316, 115, and 40 times more GHG-intensive than pulses, nuts and seeds, and soy, respectively. Insects (e.g., mealworms, crickets) and forage fish (e.g., sardines, herring) were among the more climate-friendly animal products, much more so than dairy. Plant foods were generally the least GHG-intensive overall, often by an order of magnitude, even after accounting for GHGs associated with deforestation for palm oils and soy.

Blue WFs of pond-raised fish (e.g., carp, tilapia, catfish; weighted average: 698 L/serving) and farmed crustaceans (e.g., shrimp, prawns, crayfish; weighted average: 1184 L/serving) exceeded those of other item groups by an order of magnitude. Our model accounted for water used in production ponds and crop production for aquaculture feed. Re-filling ponds to replace evaporative losses, together with freshwater used to dilute seawater in brackish production, accounted for 94.7% and 95.1% of the blue WFs for pond-raised fish and farmed crustaceans, respectively.

Bovine meat was the only item group for which the weighted average blue WF was greater than the 75th percentile blue WF. This suggests that most bovine meat production occurs in countries where blue water use for bovine meat is particularly high.

The wide interquartile ranges of country-specific item footprints (error bars in Figs. 2, S1–S3; see also Fig. 3, Fig. 4) illustrate variations in the conditions and practices unique to where items are produced. The per-kilogram GHG footprints of bovine meat from Paraguay and Brazil, for example, were 17 and five times higher, respectively, than that of Danish bovine meat (Fig. 3). These differences were largely attributable to deforestation for grazing lands and higher methane emissions from ruminant eructation (belching). While there were insufficient data to account for COO in all cases, we did so for most of the items with the greatest magnitude and variance in footprints, e.g., GHG footprints of terrestrial animal products (excluding insects).

3.2. Footprints of whole diets

We modeled scenarios illustrating the potential per capita and whole-country footprints of nine plant-forward diets. These in part reflect modeling choices; they represent potential outcomes for consideration and may not reflect actual consumption behaviors. Scenarios involving country-wide shifts to a particular diet, for example, are unlikely to occur, but can reveal opportunities where policy and behavioral interventions could have the broadest effect, particularly in populous countries (Figs. 6b, 8c and d).

3.2.1. Global implications of adopting the OECD diet

In a scenario in which all 140 study countries adopted the average consumption pattern of high-income OECD countries, per capita diet-related GHG and consumptive (blue plus green) water footprints increased by an average of 135 and 47 percent, respectively, relative to the baseline (shown for selected countries in Figs. 6, 8a–d). These findings echo prior literature (e.g., Bajzelj et al., 2014; Willett et al., 2019) on the climate implications of rising meat and dairy intake, and the importance of both reducing animal-product intake in high-consuming countries and providing viable plant-forward strategies for transitioning countries.

3.2.2. Global implications of adjusting for under-consumption

We modeled scenarios in which dietary patterns could better align with ecological goals alongside nutrition guidelines—while also identifying some of the challenges in doing so. For example, baseline protein and caloric availability were below recommended levels (Section 2.4) in 49 and 36 percent of countries, respectively. The resulting adjustments for under-consumption attenuated—and in some cases completely offset—the GHG and water footprint reductions associated with dietary shifts. For a scenario in which all 140 study countries adopted either the low red meat or meatless day diet, our model projected an average net increase in diet-related GHG, blue water, and green water footprints relative to the baseline (Fig. 5a). Populous countries characterized by under-consumption were the largest contributors to this phenomenon, namely India and to a lesser degree Pakistan and Indonesia (Fig. 6, Fig. 7, Fig. 8); loss-adjusted baseline protein availability in these countries was 14, 9, and 12 g below the recommended minimum of 69 g, respectively. Thus, interventions that aim to address both sustainability and health goals must ensure plant-forward shifts are ambitious enough to offset the potential ecological burdens associated with providing adequate nutrition.

By contrast, if we hold caloric intake constant—that is, independent of adjustments for over- and under-consumption (i.e., relative to an adjusted variant of the baseline pattern, scaled to 2300 kcal and the protein floor)—shifting to the low red meat or meatless day diets resulted in an average net 4% or 3% reduction in diet-related GHG footprints, respectively (Fig. 5b). Regardless of their effectiveness in climate change mitigation, these modest shifts may offer an accessible starting point toward more plant-forward dietary patterns.

3.2.3. Importance of country-specific analyses, trade, and countries of origin

The global aggregates shown in Fig. 5 are limited insofar as they obscure the considerable variation across countries, illustrated by the interquartile ranges. This variation was attributable to differences in food supply composition (e.g., the degree to which the aquatic animals group is comprised of pond-raised species), how animal products are replaced when shifting diets, adjustments for over- and under-consumption, and import patterns and the associated production practices (e.g., pasture-based vs. intensive; irrigated vs. rainfed) and climatic conditions (e.g., precipitation, evapotranspiration) unique to COOs. A country-specific analysis reveals, for example, that shifting to the meatless day diet reduced GHG and water footprints in 47% and 57% of study countries, respectively—with some of the greatest per capita reductions in Paraguay, Israel, and Brazil—even though the average net effect was an increase in footprints. Fig. 7 further illustrates the degree to which the relative environmental benefits among diets varied across countries, along with the relative contributions of different food groups. Notably, of the 140 individual countries examined in this study, most—including those identified as having the most GHG- and water-intensive diets—have been vastly underrepresented in the literature (Appendix A, Table A1).

The scenario in which countries adopt the average baseline consumption pattern of high-income OECD countries (Figs. 6, 8a–d) isolates the effects of import patterns and COO on GHG and water footprints. Holding diet composition constant across the 140 study countries, the GHG and consumptive (blue plus green) water footprints associated with this scenario showed substantial variation (averaging 2.5 ± 0.9 metric tons CO2e/capita/year and 1.5 ± 0.5 megaliters/capita/year, respectively).

A number of country governments, including Brazil (Ministry of Health of Brazil, 2014) and more recently Canada (Health Canada, 2019), have put forth dietary guidelines emphasizing predominantly plant-based foods. While this is a critical step toward aligning domestic consumption patterns with public health and ecological goals, countries’ production and export patterns merit additional attention. Brazil, for example, was the top exporter of bovine meat (based on an average of 2011–2013 data) and was in the top quartile for GHG-intensity of bovine meat production (Fig. 3). Together with other major GHG-intensive exporters such as India and Paraguay, Brazilian bovine meat exports contributed to the large GHG footprints of diets in importing countries like Chile, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Venezuela, and Israel. In a hypothetical scenario in which the share of Hong Kong’s bovine meat imports from Brazil came from Denmark instead, Hong Kong’s per capita GHG footprint for the baseline pattern was 18% lower. While not necessarily feasible or desirable, this scenario further illustrates the importance of accounting for trade patterns and COO.

3.2.4. Per capita GHG footprints of whole diets

The countries with the most GHG-intensive baseline consumption patterns (Fig. 6)—and the greatest potential GHG reductions from shifting toward plant-forward diets—included those with the highest per capita intake of bovine meat (Argentina, Brazil, Australia), the most GHG-intensive bovine meat production (Paraguay, Chile; Fig. 3), and the greatest contributions of deforestation to the GHG footprints of diets (Paraguay, Chile, Brazil; Brazil is shown in Fig. 7). Deforestation accounted for 61% of the GHG footprint for the Paraguayan baseline consumption pattern, and over 10% of the GHG footprints for 32 countries’ baseline patterns.

Over all 140 study countries, a theoretical shift to vegan diets reduced per capita diet-related GHG footprints by an average of 70%, relative to the baseline (Fig. 5a). Vegan diets had the lowest per capita GHG footprints in 97% of study countries. Given the low per-kilocalorie GHG footprints of most plant foods (Fig. S1), even substantial increases in consumption had only modest effects on GHG emissions of diets. For the US vegan diet, for example, scaling up plant foods recouped 100% of the calories and protein from animal foods with only 16% of the GHG emissions relative to the adjusted baseline (Fig. 7).

Relative to vegan diets, low-food chain diets (i.e., predominantly plant-based plus forage fish, bivalve mollusks, and insects) offer greater flexibility by allowing for modest animal product intake with comparable environmental benefits (Fig. 5). Low-food chain diets also met the recommended intake of vitamin B12 for adults (2.4 μg/day; Institute of Medicine Food and Nutrition Board, 1998) in 49% of study countries, illustrating that there may be ways to mitigate this potential limitation of plant-forward diets even without supplementation, at least for the general population.

Mostly plant-based diets were generally less GHG-intensive than lacto-ovo vegetarian diets, in part due to the relatively high GHG footprint of dairy (and eggs, depending on the basis of comparison; Figs. 2, S1–S3) and the reliance on dairy as one of only three food groups in the lacto-ovo vegetarian diet used to meet the protein floor (Fig. 1). This phenomenon was particularly notable for India (Fig. 6, Fig. 7). In 95% of countries, two-thirds vegan diets were less GHG-intensive than lacto-ovo vegetarian (e.g., Fig. 6, Fig. 7). Countries where this was not the case included those with some of the most GHG-intensive baseline consumption patterns (i.e., Paraguay, Chile, Argentina), largely because of the GHG-intensity of ruminant meat in those countries. In 64% of countries, the GHG footprints of no dairy diets were lower than those of lacto-ovo vegetarian diets (e.g., India and Indonesia, Fig. 7; also Fig. 6). In 91% of countries, the GHG footprints of low-food chain diets were less than half those of lacto-ovo vegetarian diets. These findings suggest populations could do far more to reduce their climate impact by eating mostly plants with a modest amount of low-impact meat than by eliminating meat entirely and replacing a large share of the meat’s protein and calories with dairy.

3.2.5. Per capita water footprints of whole diets

Per capita blue WFs of diets (Fig. 8a, e) were in many cases largest in countries with 1) low annual precipitation, increasing reliance on irrigation for domestic crops; and 2) climatic factors such as high temperatures that contribute to high evapotranspiration rates, and thereby decrease crop water productivity (i.e., crop output per unit of water consumed). These included Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Domestically-produced rice was among the top contributors in high-blue WF countries, four of which (Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran) were also among the most blue water-intensive rice-producing countries (e.g., Fig. 4; rice WFs for all countries are provided in Mendeley Data input/item_footprints_by_coo). For blue WF reductions, the most impactful per capita dietary shifts were in Egypt, in part due to the high blue water intensity of Egyptian bovine meat and dairy.

For baseline consumption patterns, the consumptive (blue plus green) WF was highest for Niger (Fig. 8b, e), 98% of which was attributable to green water. Domestically-grown millet was the largest single contributor (40%) to the consumptive WF of the baseline consumption pattern. Niger had by far the highest per capita millet supply of any country, and was the 3rd largest producer and 8th most water-intensive millet-producing country. The low water productivity of millet in Niger was attributable to low edible yield and high evapotranspiration rates. Inedible millet crop residues, however, provide fuel, construction materials, and livestock fodder (Sadras et al., 2009), illustrating how sociocultural and economic provisions of agricultural goods must be considered alongside ecological outcomes (see Section 3.3).

Potential reductions in per capita consumptive WFs from shifting to vegan diets were largest in Bolivia, Israel, and Brazil. Bovine meat, poultry, and dairy together accounted for over half of the consumptive WFs of the baseline consumption patterns in each of these countries. In Israel, for example, the per capita consumptive WFs of the low-food chain and vegan diets were 66% and 67% lower, respectively, than that of the baseline consumption pattern. Bolivia was the most water-intensive producer of bovine meat and the second for dairy, and most of the country’s supply of these items was produced domestically. Bolivia also has a high prevalence of anemia (Development Initiatives, 2018), thus efforts to mitigate high WFs through dietary interventions must give this careful consideration.

For many countries, the blue WFs of low and no red meat, no dairy, and pescetarian diets were higher than those of baseline consumption patterns (Figs. 5a, 8a). These diets scaled up aquatic animals, of which the FBS items “Freshwater Fish” and “Crustaceans” were highly blue water-intensive when raised in ponds (Figs. 2, S1–S3). Contributions of aquatic animals to the blue WFs of baseline, low red meat, and no red meat diets exceeded those from terrestrial meat in 29%, 34%, and 69% of countries, respectively. In mainland China and Indonesia, for example, aquatic animals contributed 29% and 26%, respectively, to the blue WFs of baseline consumption patterns. In both countries, a substantial share of domestic fish production was from aquaculture (72% and 38%, respectively), predominantly for domestic consumption and not export (Belton et al., 2018). Replacing water-intensive pond-raised species with forage fish and bivalve mollusks, as in the low-food chain diet, could reduce both water and GHG footprints (see Section 3.3 regarding limits to increased aquatic animal intake).

Note that we did not have information about the shares of freshwater fish and crustaceans consumed in a given country that were farmed in ponds, so we made assumptions based on global production patterns (see Section 2.7.6). This method overestimates blue WFs of countries that source a large share of these species from wild fisheries or non-pond aquaculture, while underestimating blue WFs of countries for which the converse is true.

3.2.6. Targeting dietary interventions and whole-country footprints of diets

All else being equal, optimal interventions would promote dietary shifts in countries with large potential reductions in both per capita and whole country GHG and water footprint (acknowledging that “optimal” depends on a wide range of factors, including many not considered here; see Section 3.3). Based on shifting to a two-thirds vegan diet for purely illustrative purposes, only three countries—Brazil, the US, and Australia—were in the highest quintile for all four of the following criteria: greatest potential per capita and whole-country reductions in both GHG and consumptive water footprints (Fig. S4).

3.3. Limitations and opportunities for future research

There is much variability and uncertainty in accounting for post-farm gate activities (e.g., processing, transportation, retail) and soil carbon fluxes, and accordingly, they are rarely included in the scope of item footprint studies. Both were thus excluded from this study. We do not expect the former to affect our overall conclusions, as the majority (80–86%) of diet-related GHG emissions have been attributed to the production stage (Vermeulen et al., 2012).

Accounting for soil carbon sequestration has been shown to lower estimates of the GHG footprints of ruminant products, particularly those from management-intensive grazing systems (e.g., Pelletier et al., 2010; Tichenor et al., 2017). Further research is needed to measure the potential for soil carbon sequestration to reduce ruminant GHG footprints over a broad geographic and temporal scale, given it is time-limited; reversible; and highly context-specific based in part on soil composition, climate, and livestock management (Garnett et al., 2017). Conversely, the potential for soil carbon losses (e.g., from overgrazing or feed crop production) to increase ruminant GHG footprints should also be considered. Regardless of the uncertain role of well-managed grazing systems in carbon sequestration, the potential benefits for soil health, biodiversity, animal welfare, and other dimensions independent of climate change should also be taken into consideration. Apart from livestock production, carbon fluxes in crop and polyculture systems should also be further explored.

Aside from shifting consumption patterns, our study model holds other factors constant over time, including climatic conditions, population dynamics, food wastage, trade patterns, and the GHG- and water-intensity of production. Over the gradual course of changing diets, these factors will change in ways that are difficult to anticipate, e.g., as a result of rising incomes, evolving technology, changing trade policies, and economic feedback effects. Furthermore, we assume a proportional relationship between shifting demand and supply-side impacts, whereas the impact of dietary shifts on blue water conservation, for example, may be limited without policies promoting sustainable withdrawal rates (Weindl et al., 2017). Similarly, reducing animal product intake cannot reverse CO2 emissions from deforestation unless land is taken out of production and reforested (Searchinger et al., 2018). Given their uncertain potential, dietary shifts should be complemented with other behavioral and policy interventions.

Further research is needed to examine dietary shifts in the context of social, economic, ecological, and agronomic feasibility, particularly in low- and middle-income countries (Kiff et al., 2016), as well as the effects on other health, social, and ecological measures not considered here (e.g., producers’ livelihoods, land availability, biodiversity, and eutrophication potential). Shifts to plant-forward diets, for example, must ensure target populations have sufficient physical and economic access to a variety of nutrient-dense plant-based foods. Agricultural systems would need to scale up production of fruits, vegetables, and proteins to meet the nutritional needs of the current population (KC et al., 2018), concurrent with a more equitable redistribution of available food. Dietary scenarios that increase aquatic animal consumption, meanwhile, raise concerns regarding depletion of wild stocks and ecological issues associated with increasing production of certain farmed species (Thurstan and Roberts, 2014). The feasibility of sustainable diets may further depend on how well proposed eating patterns align with historical and cultural context. Van Dooren and Aiking (2016) demonstrate a method for balancing several of these domains by simultaneously optimizing modeled diets for nutrition, climate change mitigation, land use, and cultural acceptability. Our use of baseline consumption patterns as a reference point helped to preserve countries’ eating patterns when modeling diets (Section 2.4); cultural receptivity could be further refined, however, by using national food-based dietary guidelines (FBDGs) to define criteria for healthy diets for individual countries, as in Vanham et al. (2018), rather than global recommendations (Section 2.4). Alternatively, or in cases where countries do not have FBDGs, this research could help define FBDGs that are healthy, sustainable, and culturally appropriate. Country-specific analyses that account for cultural acceptability could then be placed within the context of the planetary boundaries for food systems proposed by the EAT-Lancet Commission (Willett et al., 2019). The need to better characterize the impacts of, viability of, and strategies for shifting toward plant-forward diets, however, must be balanced against the preponderance of evidence calling for immediate action.

4. Conclusion

We evaluated nine plant-forward diets aligned with nutrition guidelines, specific to 140 individual countries, for their potential roles in climate change mitigation and freshwater conservation. Accounting for country-specific differences in over- and under-consumption, trade and baseline consumption patterns, and the GHG- and water-intensities of foods by COO can help tailor policy and behavioral interventions. Using this approach, we present a range of flexible options for each country that better align dietary patterns with public health and ecological goals, including viable alternatives for low- and middle-income countries that might otherwise adopt the consumption patterns of OECD countries.

Declaration of Interest Statement

None.

Contributions

B.F.K and S.R.C. developed the model with guidance and contributions from all co-authors; J.P.F. provided guidance and expertise on the modeling and analysis of aquatic animal footprints; M.M.M. and A.Y.H. provided guidance and expertise on water footprints and coproduct allocation; S.D.P. and M.W.B. provided guidance and expertise on modelling healthy diets; A.P.S., B.F.K., R.E.S., and C.M.S. performed the search and standardization of item footprint studies; R.E.S. performed the literature review of other diet footprint studies; B.F.K. and R.E.S. wrote the manuscript; and K.E.N. and R.A.N. provided guidance and expertise on all facets of and supervised the project. All authors reviewed and contributed to manuscript drafts.

Acknowledgements

We thank Danielle Edwards and Emily Hu for research assistance; Rebecca Ramsing, Alana Ridge, and Marie Spiker for general guidance and discussions; Tomasz Filipczuk from the Crops, Livestock & Food Statistics Team of the FAO Statistics Division for guidance on the use and interpretation of FAO data; and Ruth Burrows, Bailey Evenson, Carolyn Hricko, Shawn McKenzie, Matthew Kessler, Rebecca Ramsing, Marie Spiker, and James Yager for comments on the manuscript. This work was supported by the Columbus Foundation. The funders had no role in study design; data collection, analysis, or interpretation; preparation of the manuscript; or decision to publish.

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Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Badness, candidate, crookedness, delinquency, election, evaluation, expropriate, goodness, leadership, political party, responsibility, scenario, wrongdoings,

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 4

1.1. Introduction

This study is a continuation of the previous article (Article 9, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)”. This article (Article 10, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)”], is, as previously mentioned, the second part in the sequence of three articles on the roles of the three main political parties at the moment in the country, namely the EFF, the DA and the ANC. It intends to analyse and further discuss the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the DA to be able to effect land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its CVs and attestations.

1.2. Aims of Articles 9 to 11 (Continued)

The primary aim of this article (Part Two: Article 10) in the sequence of three articles is thus to continue the reflection upon the profile of the DA on the same basis as was done with the previous article (Part One: Article 9). Prominent here is the ability of the DA to be able to take care of the land expropriation matter, should it have been elected on May 8, 2019 into government. At the same time, its ability and integrity is evaluated, in order to see how it is positioned, as an opposition party, to be able to successfully handle the land matter until 2024. This also includes the capability of the DA as a partner of the ruler, the ANC, should such an outcome manifest. Important here is the saying: the test of the pudding is in the eating thereof.

In the context of much manipulation and misleading around the South African land expropriation matter by political parties in terms of how they are going to execute it should they become the ruler, is it important to note that Chomsky1 points out that modern politics is often hampered by the parties’ leadership’s poor personal and political integrity. This unfortunate contaminated political setup of parties in the end blocks the pursuit of their previously agreed on mandate with the voters, who have given them permission to take decisions upon their behalves, as well as the development of the critical role of leaders of integrity and the independent creative actions of the party as a whole. This notion is applicable to the thinking, planning and action of South Africa’s land ownership matter. Central here is the intention of the researcher to unmask a political party as a failure.1

For Chomsky1 it goes much further and deeper: politically mandated people in terms of the Constitution, for instance those who are MPS and MPLs and chief executives at state enterprises, must at all times reflect integrity, goodwill and the intention of order in their thinking, planning and action. He postulates that it is not enough for these political and executive leaders to be able to think “cleanly” and critically, but that ethnic imagination and an immense sense of social responsibility and accountability are characteristics that are imperative for them. Undoubtably the main intention of many delinquent politicians is to exploit the South Africans who are fighting with regard to land ownership. The lack of knowledge and cognitive understanding of many of the ordinary Black and White South Africans on the land matter, is absolutely misused by these delinquent politicians in steering the country’s demanding land ownership issue in such a way that it exclusively benefits the interests of the top brass of their party.1

By the critical evaluation of the CVs and attestations of political parties and their leaders, the mass of political crooks and gangsters are shaken out, leaving the few political knights standing out clearly. Such a shake-out of possible masked crooks and gangsters amongst leaders in the DA is the primary intention of the undertaking of an evaluation and conclusion in this article. It will be in line with the intention of the evaluation and conclusion of the previous article (Article 9) on the EFF.

The single aim in this context of evaluation and conclusion is to accept or to reject the DA as a potential candidate (political party) to be able to successfully effect land reform as part of its political mandate in post-2019 South Africa.

2. Method (Continued)

The research was been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case about the abilities of political parties to successfully effect land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us so as to steer successful land reform from 2019 in South Africa.

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

3. Results and Discussion (Continued)

3.1. Overview

The successful execution of the post-2019 land reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and action of a so-called “good” government. This means a regime that is not blindly on a “path of try and come to” to be able to reach an end result on the matter, notwithstanding whether it is a success or a failure. This requires a regime that honestly serves the interests of all its people by its use of a good road map on an orderly land reform initiative so as to steer it into reality.

The essential question here is thus whether the DA can theoretically be a candidate to be shortlisted due to its potential to assure the successful implementation and completion of the post-2019 plan on land expropriation.

3.1.1. Evaluation guidelines of political parties

The evaluation guidelines of political parties, as were already used in the previous Article 9, will be precisely replicated in order to evaluate the DA as national, provincial and municipal rulers. These guidelines for the DA are:

  1. Its general policies, as well as specific standpoints on aspects such as the respect of law and order, the fighting of corruption and state capture, the behavioural delinquency of its MPs, MPLs and its top brass leaders, as well as the party’s and its leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put in perspective through its manifesto for the 2019-election.
  2. The public critics for the period 1994 to 2019 in newspapers, etc. These include evaluations and reflections by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the party as a political organisation, its members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behavioural delinquency of MPs, MPLs and top brass leaders, and their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the party’s internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions.
3.1.1.1. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018

For the quantitative classification and measurment of the political records of the DA, the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,2 was used again . The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s’ manifesto and to the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees it applicable. For guiding the gathering of the information on the DA, the approach used with the EFF, is again as follows reflected for better understanding, namely:

1) The Curriculum Vitae (CV) in order to obtain insight into the candidates’ qualifications, experiences, extraordinary skills, etc; and

2) The letters of the referees, the attestations, to offer firstly further insight into the qualifications, experiences, etc. of the candidate; and secondly, at the same time, to tell us confidentially about good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate, that were well-masked in or absent from the CV. This referee data mostly informs us of the “goodness” and “badness” of a candidate, which in the end can make him a failure or a success in the execution of the responsibilities of the post.

In this research the manifesto and self-description offered by the DA and its leaders will be seen as their CVs. The public reporting by journalists and other sources will be seen as the letters of referees/reference or attestations.2

3.2. The manifestos, self-descriptions and public references of the three parties (Continued)

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) were already reflected upon in the previous Article 9 (Part 1 of three articles) under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. This article (Article 10: Part 2) will reflected specifically on the Democratic Alliance (DA) under the title of “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. In the next article (Article 11: Part 3) reflection on the African National Congress (ANC) will take place.

3.2.1. The Democratic Alliance
3.2.1.1. Introduction

In his post mortem of the DA’s so-called successes versus its so-called failures in the recent May election, and how the party must be rated in the post-2019 South African politics, the editor of Beeld, Barnard Beukman, on the 17th May 2019 offered an in-depth and critical analysis on the present day DA. This is far removed from those of some of the populist political commentators who ignore long term politics and suffer cognitive clear-sightedness away from the propaganda of the ANC. An in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the dynamic and important role that the DA can play in the mainstream politics of post-2019 is offered by Beukman3 when he writes3”11:

Met net vier LP’s minder – 85 pleks van 89 – en ‘n stemdaling van minder as 2 persentasiepunte, moet die DA beslis voel hy word onbillik behandel deur ontleders wat hom op die daad as die “groot verloorder” van die verkiesing brandmerk.

Hy kan tereg so voel as hy sy uitslag met byvoorbeeld die ANC s’n vergelyk word. Alles in ag geneem, is die DA se verkiesingsuitslag eindelik heel redelik en voel hy oorwegend sekerlik verligting. As sommige meningspeilings reg was – dat hy net ‘n maand voor die verkiesing minder as 20%-steun gehad het – het hy beslis in die pylvak steun teruggekry of onseker kiesers oorreed.

Die groot teleurstelling is eerder met sy vertoning in vergelyking met die wat hy wou en moontlik kon reggekry het en dat hy nie gewys het dat hy minstens die 30%-vlak aanval nie, want ‘n tweede party met meer as 30%-steun sou die eerste tasbare bewys van ‘n komende politieke herskikking gewees het.

3.2.1.1.1. The voter outcome at the ballot box on May 8, 2019 tells much

Beukman’s3 profile on the post-2019 DA firstly forces us to look critically at the facts pinpointing the May elections’ outcome in terms of voter participation. Of particular importance is his reference to a so-called necessary 30% vote count for the DA, to enable it to be a possibly dominant role-player in South Africa. This was seemingly the minimum requirement for it to successfully participate in the country’s ruling in the near future. This needs attention. It again brings us to the playing off of myths and lies versus facts and truths in South African politics and the absolute need of the Solomon wisdom approach to get myths and lies refuted. Thus, before any further evaluation of the DA as a political party with the assumed potential to be able to be the ruler in terms of its CV and attestations can proceed, is it necessary to look at the legitimacy of the May 2019 election in terms of a democratic voter mandate which truly represents the total contingent of legal voters.

Firstly, of paramount importance is the number of voters who gave the parties their support at the ballot box. This consideration is also fully applicable to the ANC, the EFF, as well as the eleven dwarf parties that arrived in Parliament at the end of May 2019 to take their seats.3

Secondly, also of importance is the total number of voters who participated in the election versus the total number of registered voters who stayed away from the ballot box.

Thirdly, and probably the most ignored fact by most of the so-called political wise men on the so-called “true politics” of present day South Africa, is the amount of citizens who qualified to be voters, but refused to register as such for specific reasons.

An analysis of the May voting shows the seats of the 14 parties which made it, as follows4:

  1. ANC: 230
  2. DA: 84
  3. EFF: 44
  4. IFP: 14
  5. FF+: 10
  6. ACDP: 4
  7. NFP: 2
  8. UDM: 2
  9. Good:2
  10. Cope: 2
  11. ATM: 2
  12. AIC: 2
  13. PAC: 1
  14. Aljama: 1

It is also reflected by statistics that there were 35.9 million South Africans who were eligible to register as voters for the May 2019 election, but that only 26 756 649 had formally registered. This means that only 74.5% of those who could register had registered (thus leaving ±9 million outside the voting system). From the 26.7 million formally registered voters, only 17 671 616 actually voted (again leaving ±9.3 million eligible voters further out of the system). This means that the 17.6 million voters active at the ballot box, only represent 49% of the total eligible voters in South Africa, while 51% of potential voters (±18.2 million) did not bring out a vote (consisting of ±9.1 million non-registered voters and ±9.1 million stay-away voters). Although it was the 18.2 million abstaining voters own choice not to vote, this comprehensive passivity places in the first place a question mark on the applicability of the legal status of 14 parties which were selected to Parliament by a “passive no-voting” (which is nothing else than a rejection choice by 51% of the voting population).4-7

What is worrying is that these 14 parties are going to be with South Africans as the so-called “chosen law-makers’, notwithstanding their rejection or at least being ignored by at least 51% of the voters-corp. Furthermore, seeing the overall decline since 2014 of trust in and support for political parties selected into Parliament, the chances are good that this decline is going to continue after 2019, leaving a far higher rejection than the present 51% by the voters. The outcome can with time become an immense resistance to the empowerment of the ruling party, the ANC, up to 2024. This will not only make its reign impossible, but in the process of the rejection of the ANC, the situation can activate immense unrest, anarchy and revolution as a final outcome.4-7

It is not without good reason that Mthombothi8, eleven days after the May election, put his finger directly on the sore of this voting passivity when he wrote8:19: “The outcome of the elections will be debated and analysed for some time to come, but what is clear is that many South Africans were not particularly impressed or satisfied with what was on offer. After 25 years of democracy, many voters are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable.” He continues further8:19: “The menu [parties] on the table is obviously not appetising for the voter. The prevailing conditions are therefore probably ripe for a realignment of political forces or a new political party altogether. We may have reached a typical Gramscian interregnum where “the old is dying and the new cannot be born”. We are at a standstill, and rot tends to set in if there is no movement.”

However, in second place, is the question of Beukman’s3 when he referred to the “ideal of the collection of 30% votes for the DA to make it a party to notice in the South African politics”. Here emerges the next question, namely on the presence of true democracy under which the ANC rules the country at the moment up until 2024.3

Once again on democracy and the constitutional rights of its citizens (and thus eligible voters), Mthombothi8 reflects a warning when he writes8:19: “We may still be cock-a-hoop about our democracy – best constitution in the world and all that! – But the enthusiasm is apparently no longer widely shared. Voter turnout has shown a calamitous decline in recent years, from 88% in 1999 to 65% this year – a drop of more than 20 percentage points in 20 years. Such figures should jolt us out of our complacency. Our democracy is not at all in rude health.”

But, when Mthombothi8 speaks of a “65% voter turnout for the 2019 election”, he failed to say how this percentage was reached. The answer is that it was the 17.6 million voters who had voted out of a possible 26.7 million voters on the voter role. This 65% is a political myth: the fact is that the turnout should be calculated in terms of the 17.6 million voters who had voted versus the 35.9 million South Africans who were eligible to vote. This gives a turnout of only 49% (which is 16% lower than the “official” voting account. This means that South Africans’ democratic interests are politically and statutorily managed by 386 law-makers in Parliament who were sent to it by the minority (49%) of eligible voters. This is not democracy! Mthombothi8 would be jolted himself if he knew that the 65% voter turnout is an complete myth. The hard truth is that it is only 49%. But this truth has another more sinister outcome for the ANC’s so-called democratic empowerment via the May election, and their ability to rule South Africa from 2019 to 2024: the ANC’s 10 026 475 votes at the ballot box (out of a possible 35.9-million) means that it only received approval from 28% of the eligible voters to be the government of the day. For the ANC and its leaders such as Cyril Ramaphosa and his cronies to claim that they have the peoples’ mandate to effect land expropriation without compensation, is a falsity. It is a myth and a great one!4-8

This is not democracy and it is an excellent example of a well-masked illegal reign of South Africa by the ANC.4-8

Taking into perspective the true voter support of the DA and the EFF, in terms of the total eligible voters of 35.9-million, their factorial support is only 10% and 5% respectively.4-8|

It must thus be clear that the ANC is faultily observed as a strong and untouchable political force, which seems to represent (but falsely) 57.5% of the population in terms of its more or less 60% formal voting count. In reality, the ANC is a minority and a hung regime (legally put into Parliament as the ruler by a 28% voters mandate out of a 100% voter population) when we are looking to the indirect suppression of the democratic right of the individual citizens’ passive votes. In this environment, South Africa’s present inauspicious political setup (and thus its political ruling-system based on democracy where the so-called “majority” became the ruler on a minority vote), is excellently described by Labuschagne when he posits9:6: “Suid-Afrika kan in wese, de jure en de facto, as ‘n eenpartystaat bestempel word”.

The abovementioned outcome is a situation that can and must only be accepted firstly as a temporary situation, which can change dramatically overnight when the ±18-million (51% unrepresented) passive voters take a stand at the ballot box or in an alternative way which may be unconstitutional. The DA and the other opposition parties know that this unreal setup provides the possibility that they can at the right time bite away the ANC’s Achilles heel.9

The decline in empowerment of the ANC and its possible phasing out of the mainstream of politics is a reality, even in the mindsets of the ANC’s top brass. It was already before the May election echoed by the Head of the ANC Election, Fikile Mbalula10 when he admitted10:4: “…the ANC is not going to regain all the lost ground overnight, with its image having suffered immensely in the previous decade.”

Mthombothi8 is with good reason worried about the outcome after 2019 of the Mandela-democracy of 1994. The reality is that South Africa is going to be governed from 2019 to 2024 by an illegal autocratic regime with mostly no respect for the voters, while there is also no respect for them by 51% of the voters who did not vote for them. The ANC’s politics are driven and practised exclusively for the ANCs top brass’ interests: it was so in the past and it will be so in the future. The abovementioned reality not only declares the arrogance and political recklessness of the ANC in its practice of delinquent politics since 1994, but also the arrogance and political recklessness of the EFF (See Article 9). The EFF knows very well that they will never, in a true democracy with only their 5% voter mandate, be of importance or receive the attention as a so-called third party in the top rank of parties. In a true democracy their political and personal antics, as well as their extreme irresponsibility and delinquency would not be endured: they would long ago have been put into permanent safe-care.4,6,7,10

Looking from another perspective at the very unstable South African politics – which intensely contaminated its democracy – it must it be clear that things can change – also sometimes very fast – in the post-2019 politics, to end for instance the ANC regime’s formation of new political groupings overnight. Marriam11 quotes the view of the CSIR on the profiles of the various parties’ vote receiving in the past elections and the unknown future around politics. She reports, from another perspective to that of the traditional political analysis11:4:

The CSIR does say things could change before 2021 [local elections]: “It should be kept in mind that the quantitative patterns cannot be counted on to capture all the sentiment behind the votes [2019 elections], it may just provide some warning signs for parties as to what could happen if nothing changes. Many things could change between 2019 and 2021 – there could be changes in the general economics and political climate, but a difference in voter turnout rates could also affect changes in the patterns.

Johnston12, on this fast-changing post-2019 political climate writes12:4-5: “Ten spyte van die oënskynlike stabiliteit van die ANC se oorheersing, vind groot verskuiwings plaaas. Die kieserskorps word baie meer vloeibaar en minder partyvas. Ons he gevind dat meer as 25% van al ons respondent óf van party verander het óf besluit hey om nie te stem nie. Die grootste vloei vloeibaarheid is onder swart kiesers gevind, waar 17.1% van party verander het.” Johnson12, in this context of change, also writes12:4-5: “Daarbenewens is die ANC-stem toenemend broos. Onder alle swart kiesers het slegs een derde gesê hulle sal ANC stem ongeag wie die leier was. 27,3% het gesê hulle sal nooit ANC stem nie terwyl 19,4% gesê het sal ANC stem omdat hulle vetroue in Ramaphosa het, alhoewel daar baie skelms op die ANC-lys is.”

The question, in light of the abovementioned information, is how has the DA in terms of its true voter mandate of only 10% handled its politics in the past, is handling it at present and can be expected to handle it in future in our much quoted “country of milk and honey”. The primary counter-question is: is it similarly irresponsible and arrogant, with the same signs of autocratic and delinquent actions, as the EFF? This question will be evaluated further in this article. [In the next article (Article 11) the same evaluation approach will be followed with regard to the ANC].

3.2.1.2. The DA manifesto of 2019

Reading the DA manifesto, it is clear that it differs from the previous one of the EFF, as it avoids ridiculous promises and “nonsense-speaking”. It is totally focused on concrete action during the pre-2019 years and undertakes in terms of this good record (strongly confirmed by its CV and attestations) to make a constructive input to post-2019 South Africa. Reality is taken into account and examples of good political management on provincial and local levels are offered. Looking at the DA’s track record, it stands head and shoulders above those of the EFF which was previously evaluated.

In terms of the DA manifesto, the leader of the DA, Mmusi Maimane13, in his writings to the public, reflects as follows13:18:

Election 2019 is our chance to effect real change. And when deciding on a new bus, the only thing that matters is a party’s track record.

Thirteen years in Cape Town, 10 years in the Western Cape and two years in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay have given the DA a chance to demonstrate the DA difference, and not just to talk about it. The results – the ones that really matter when it comes to closing the gap between economic insiders and outsiders – speak for themselves. On all the objective indicators, the DA runs the best government in the country.

The DA-run Western Cape leads on every measure of good provincial governance. Over the past year, over half the jobs created in SA were in the Western Cape, thanks to an obsessive focus on attracting investment, growing tourism and supporting a farm sector hard hit by drought.

The Western Cape Government got 83% clean audits in the last Auditor-General Report. Our track record says that we don’t tolerate corruption and mismanagement of public funds.

Maimane continues14:22:

The DA can deliver to the whole country what we have delivered in the Western Cape, which accounted for half of net job creation in the past year (95,000 out of 188,000 jobs, Q3 2017 – Q3 2018) and where broad unemployment (23%) is 14 percentage points lower than the national average (37%).

The DA strives to provide everyone with access to opportunities. For example, the Western Cape has the highest percentage of households living within 30 minutes of a health facility and we retain by far the most children in school between Grades 10 and Matric (64%), whereas no other province retains the abovementioned.

You will find solutions to getting the basics right, such as our action steps to provide schoolchildren with teachers who can actually teach them to read and do arithmetic. The SACMEQ 4 Report showed that the Western Cape achieved 72.7% in advanced reading, compared to 36.1% nationally.

We don’t tolerate corruption. The Western Cape achieved 83% clean audits in the last financial year, well ahead of second placed Gauteng at 52%. The DA-led Coalition in Nelson Mandela Bay Metro took it from the second least to second most trusted city in SA (after Cape Town). In the DA-run Johannesburg, the value of investigations into corrupt tenders under the former ANC administration is R23.6bn.

3.2.1.3. The pre-2019 road-mapping of the DA
3.2.1.3.1. The DA’s original birth-certificate in perspective

The answer to the question as to why the DA did not overtake the ANC in the last election and is still in a gradual process to win votes from the ANC and the other smaller parties, must be seen to be cemented in its many foundations. Professor Pieter Labuschagne9 guides us hereunder to understand why opposition against the ANC reflects a low voter outcome for all those opposing parties since 1994. This can be likened to the previous mighty NP’s only 20.4% in 1994 and the 22.3% and 20% of the DA respectively in 2014 and 2019.9

Firstly, the founding model of the ANC stands out here, namely its anti-Apartheid ideology, through which it initially became an inclusive “catch-up” party for all those pre-1994 suppressed persons and groups who opposed the wrongful politics of the NP (and the Afrikaners/Whites). All types gathered in this potpourri-ANC from before 1994. It varied from hard core communists, socialists, anti-capitalists, anti-White and anti-Afrikaner, pro-Black, pro-African, democrats and anti-democrats, as well as hard-core terrorists, etc. These were persons and groups mostly seeing the ANC as an entrance ticket for their personal gains and to satisfy their ambitions. Most of the ambition and opportunism have stayed on until 2019 in some way within some of these groupings, such as the communists and the unionists.12

In its start-up process, the DA was in the first place an exclusively White-orientated party with a political ideology based on a narrow liberal-democracy, but with roots still entrenched in White-supremacy. The immense hard-line stand of the maintainence of exclusive White capitalism was prominent, and the mass of poor and landless Blacks would never get entrance thereto. For the Blacks, their inequality and poverty (±30 million out of a population of ±60 million) is a direct result of the White supremacy of pre-1994. The DA as a cum Black-cum White political party became from day-one an easy target for the Black revolutionaries in the ANC, who labelled it as anti-Black with the intention to promote and uphold only White interests. This is a process that is ongoing and will only be eroded if the DA becomes overwhelmingly Black in members and in leadership.

3.2.1.3.2. The DA’s policy not to subsidise and enrich the poor

Entrenched in the ANC’s revolutionary ideology of uplifting the people and freeing them from oppression, is its policy of taking from the rich and giving to the poor, which the DA opposes. This characteristic of the ANC is well reflected by its actions such as state capture, the mismanagement of finance and the botched-up 1994 to 2019 land redistribution, the obtaining of “compensations, gratifications and bait” through the misuse of BEE and other instruments under the propaganda of “enriching” the people (Black). Here the ANC’s top brass and their cronies stand out as priority beneficiaries. The ANC’s actions, when compared to those of the DA, are a complete contradiction in terms of the “case of the constant and ongoing illegal compensation” of the so-called “freedom fighters” and those who “suffered under Apartheid”, directly and indirectly in every possible way from the state coffers.

Within this exclusive ideology of uplifting of the ANC, the immense group of poor and landless Black people were kept in embargo by the ANC, without progress or improvement of their circumstances. This setup of continuous, immense poverty and financial dependence of the mass of poor Blacks, fast became a handle for the ANC’s top brass to keep a large contingent of dependent voters, who were daily in need of the ANC’s help, on its list of supporters. This was firstly obtained by keeping these Black voters without training and work opportunities, so as to create not only further poverty and unemployment, but to enlarge this sector constantly, in order to ensure political empowerment via the “ANC’s helping hand of the poor Blacks”.12,13-22

Secondly, this “Black question” was in-depth and broadly propagated by the ANC as a sole White outcome from Apartheid: not only to establish sympathy for them in the minds of the poor, in that the ANC “knew” of their immense, constant needs and was doing as much as possible for them, but at the same time to create ongoing hostility against any White presence in the post-2019 politics. Prominent in this regard was Apartheid’s wrongdoings and the reflection by the ANC of a repeat of such suffering at the hands of Whites in future politics; a process wherein the “White” DA was pertinently positioned as the main culprit. With regard to the needs of the mass of poor Blacks, reflected as the so-called exclusive sufferers of Apartheid, the ANC effectively responded through the state coffers by paying mass contributions to them. These financial contributions are still growing. The ANC, as the ruler and the holder of the state’s purse, entrenched itself within the “greater and higher” tasks of doing good by the hand-out of free awards, grants and other subsidies from the tax-payers’ hard earned money.

This made these “dependent” voters work shy and absolutely dependent on the ANC’s so-called goodness, while the vicious circle of growing poverty and joblessness was aggressively upheld. At the same time a policy of fear was created in this mass of poor and jobless minds that any regime change, such as the coming to power of the DA, would lead to the recall of these comprehensive free awards, grants and subsidies paid from the taxpayers.

The DA’s vague policy on the doubtful existence in future of these awards, grants and subsidies, if they come into power, only strengthened the ANC’s political mesmerising of this mass of poor people with misleading falsehoods. This served as an excellent empowerment vehicle for the ANC to block votes away from the DA. Johnson‘s12 recent research confirms this well, as he found that 40% of the Black respondents indeed believe this rumour of the ANC of the DA as a “danger” to their subsidies.12

The DA and the ANC both know that this unlimited system of subsidising the poor without the simultaneous development of a mass of jobs and good training to replace it, cannot be upheld for much longer into the future. This has so far been ignored by the ANC’s top elite, notwithstanding that the continuation of the scheme will bankrupt the country’s funds and spells out a human disaster in waiting. The outright failure of the DA on the other hand to immediately put an alternative in place to this immense politically opportunistic subsidising scheme, besides saying that they will create jobs in time and offer training, has totally isolated them from the mass of poor people, who constantly and immediately need these subsidies. It does not matter for the poor if the system is wrong or unsustainable – for them it is about immediate survival and voting for the party that upholds and improves this subsidy system.10,12,23-25

3.2.1.3.3. BBBEE and its vehicles of land expropriation

As mentioned above, the ANC’s policy on BBBEE also forced the DA into reverse. This is due to the portrayal of the DA as White capitalists and the safe-guarding of their immediate interests. This obvious hostility to Black upliftment pushed the DA away from the mass of poor and landless Blacks.

It is evident that the DA’s dislike for BBBEE must be changed in some way with regard to its solid rejection policy thereof. What is urgently needed is the implementation of an acceptable change to the DA’s present model of outright rejection, in order to bring about balanced nation-building and to improve the already tense racial relations. It is necessary to create an environment to support a reasonable form of BBBEE. The DA’s clear policy of a racially free society must reflect Black upliftment as a primary principle. BBBEE is unavoidable and was implemented in many countries to benefit the unprivileged and the poor. It was not an extraordinary action in South Africa by the ANC, but so far the DA under its White right-wing blindly rejects it. There must be some confirmation of support of BBBEE as fast as possible by the DA. Maimane’s reference to the DA pushing for the tabling of a private members’ bill on intelligence-related matters and jobs may be the first constructive step, but it is doubtful whether this is enough, and it is far from the BBBEE offered by the ANC.21,26,27

BBBEE is seen by most Whites as extreme discrimination after 25 years of so-called “democracy”, as Bachtis26 writes with justification26:13: “BEE is a racist, exclusionary mechanism designed to destroy any vestiges of whiteness.” BBBEE, in contrast to its primary aims, was undoubtedly applied by the ANC with outmost dishonesty and corruption in order to benefit mostly the ANC top brass, bringing riches to them and their cronies between 1994 and 2019. Billions of rand were also stolen via state capture and other crooked schemes by politicians, government officials and private citizens under the ANC regime, which was in value far more than the total collected by BBBEE for the so-called upliftment of the so-called poor Blacks’ suffering under Apartheid. This confirms that there are many other acceptable ways (besides corruption and dishonesty) to uplift the mass of poor Blacks.

The misuse of BBBEE is furthermore seen by many Whites as pure revenge-taking on Whites for the past.

Other, better ways must be found by the DA to get involved in BBBEE and to directly uplift the poor. Firstly, the present experience by Whites of BBBEE as a punishment to impoverish Whites, especially the White youth, must be counteracted by the DA with reasoned actions. Whites must be allowed to compete freely within the South African business and employment environment, without the direct and indirect “punishment”. As policy, the DA must firstly support an ongoing strictly managed BBBEE system for at most the duration of another term, after which it must be totally erased from the statute books. Secondly, the planned land redistribution scheme, wherein the transferring of state-owned land and buildings, etc., is central, must be a direct replacement for BBBEE inside the DA’s policy of a “helping hand to the Blacks in the post-2019 politics”. Included in this BBBEE scheme must be the free training of Black farmers and the free provision of equipment and produce such as cattle and grain for the mass of incoming Black farmers to make a living on the farms.

3.2.1.3.4. The DA’s policy of land expropriation without compensation

The policy standpoint of the DA was until now to reject the ANC’s land reform of expropriation without compensation. Prominent therein is the the DA’s perception of the ANC’s foundation of confused political radicalism, beset by neo-Marxism, specifically as part of the ANC’s opportunistic elite’s driving of the ANC’s land expropriation policy. In addition, the failed 1994 to 2019 land redistribution programme of the ANC is an indication for the DA of how unplanned, undemocratic and populist land reform can get. This has lead to the passivity of the DA to in any way, either on its own or with the ANC, get involved in constructive land redistribution. The fact that the DA is not shying away from even going to the highest court in South Africa to nullify any ANC legislation on land transformation if needed, does not sit well with the mass of landless Blacks.

The DA believes that there is not a need to tamper with the present Constitution, because the state’s land is available in large amounts, waiting for redistribution directly to the mass of poor and landless people. Indeed, for the DA, this state land is so massive in size and its redistribution potential so overwhelming, that any initiative with private land cannot be addressed successfully before 2025, if not later. The DA notes in this concern that the state at present has a property portfolio of more than 93 000 buildings and more than 1.9 million hectares of land. Just to create an orderly official institution to oversee the handing out and assurance of legal rights of the land and buildings to new private owners, would take up to three to five years to complete by a well managed government. Then there is a further timetable to stretch over another three to five years to establish the infrastructure and award the property to the applicants in waiting, to do training and to supply finance to the mass of incoming farmers. The so-called “White land expropriation”, even with compensation, can only take place after twenty or more years from 2019.10,16,20,28

But, from a critical statutory as well as political and socio-economic point, is it clear that the DA’s land redistribution policy is vague and clearly practised in terms of White interests. It is window dressing and empty rhetoric. It is unavoidable for the DA to get directly involved in the land ownership matter in the post-2019 politics. The DA’s leadership must stop allowing the right-wing of Whites in the DA, who are guided effectively with great political contamination by the so-called Afrikaners/Whites rescuers and saviours, to handle the matter in public and with the government. The DA did shed most of these white hardliners and their sympathisers successfully in the May election – possibly not only at the ballot box, but also on their list of membership. This is now allowing the true DA to come out of the closet with its Black members’ wishes, thinking, planning and action on balancing land redistribution for Blacks.

Firstly, the FF+ must openly be confronted with a public stand by the DA, demonstrating the falsity of the empowerment that the FF+ can help the Whites farmers to hang onto their land. The reality must be delivered to White farmers and the White community that if not enough land is peacefully redistributed fast to the mass of Blacks, land will physically be confiscated from them in a revolution which can happen very soon.29,30 The DA must find a declaration, matching fully and effectively the following declaration by the FF+-leader in Kwazulu-Natal, Duncan Du Bois, which reads30:7: “I think they [FF+] were beneficiaries of people dumping the DA because of the DA’s policy on affirmative action and BEE and also because the FF Plus is very clear on its land policy and the DA is not quite as sharp on that.”

The DA urgently needs a public reference, reading: “The DA is a beneficiary of votes because it is clear on its land policy, with the Freedom Charter declaration as its manifesto on land ownership that all South Africans have the right to own land and that land must be owned racially proportionally before 2024.” 29,30

For Maimane, such a change would be easy and a small step, especially in light of the pronouncement by Johnson12 of him “as a previous ANC supporter who still thinks in terms of the politics of the ANC.” The fact that Maimane, as alluded to by Johnson12, had already estranged the Brown and White Afrikaans speakers, as well as his failure to defend the Afrikaans language and culture rights, forced thousand of angry and dissatisfied Afrikaans and White people out of the DA, makes this step easy if true.12,29,30

3.2.1.3.5. The proof of the DA pudding is not always in the eating

The DA is mostly worried about present day South Africa. It developed, where in charge, styles and approaches, in an effort to fix most of the enormous failures created by the ANC reign. Where the DA was put in to govern, it did not panic and has addressed immense challenges with duty, pride and success.15

The actions of the DA were sometimes deliberately blown up by the press and their political opposition. The ANC propagandists used this to distract attention from their own serious and comprehensive delinquency. In some cases, however, alleged activities of the DA made them no better than the ANC and need the same condemnation.15-20

Seeing that political oversight by the broad public and media is a priority for all public figures and parties, and the fact that it is the criteria on which a mandate to rule has been issued, these accusations need to be highlightened and evaluated. It is important to see if there is proof in the DA pudding after eating it. This will be done hereunder.

3.2.1.3.5.1. The DA’s seemingly ongoing own internal strife

Prominent for instance, but indeed a small matter in the end, was the allegation that Helen Zille of the DA leadership had in 2014 contravened the Constitution and the Ethical Code for Members of the Executive due to an alleged tablet issued to her son who worked as a teacher for the Western Cape Education Department in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. This action against her, brought onto the books by the controversial Public Protector (PP) Busiswe Mkhwebane, in an attempt to prosecute her, failed. (This PP action was nullified by an interdict against the PP in the Johannesburg high court. The PP was also shown to be wrong by the courts in two other cases).15-20

Then there was Helen Zille’s so-called #taxrevolt-plan, which attracted critics from the ANC and some sectors of the public. But, in light of the failed prosecution for theft, corrupt ANC politicians and state officials, racketeers, crooks and tax-avoiders in the ANC, this actually attracted much strong support from law-abiding citizens as an instrument to punish the useless ANC regime.15-20

Furthermore, there was the so-called Patricia De Lille saga wherein the DA was initially accused of racism, etc., because De Lille was allegedly forced out of DA politics by its leadership. This criticism seems to have been contradicted by an independent investigation which alleged that De Lille deliberately misled the Cape Town City Council and triggered a further allegation against her, namely to have interfered with and manipulated city tenders, reports Malatsi31. In nullifying the DA’s and Maimane’s so-called “record of wrongdoing” against De Lille, Malatsi31 writes31:18: “De Lille and her chief lieutenant, Brett Herron, are facing criminal charges for their involvement in these instances of serious maladministration or worse.”

But the De Lille case’s handling by the DA cost them much honour in the eyes of the general voting public and was undoubtedly one of the reasons for the exodus of a strong contingent of votes from the DA to Good. Nyatsumba32 foregrounds the immense negative impact on the DA and the idea of a flawed leadership left by the De Lille case, when he writes that many inside the party in the Western Cape had their daggers drawn at her and wanted her out summarily, ignoring, in his opinion, the right firing process. After a vote of no confidence in the Cape Town City Council failed, the process of her ousting continues, writes Nyatsumba32. He further reflects32:25: “…they continued to manufacture lies about her and to throw mud at her in the hope that some of it would stick. To their chagrin, De Lille emerged victorious each time and they ended up with bloodied noses. And yet, still they continued to lie to the public, right until the elections, that they fired De Lille as a member when, in fact, she had resigned.”

Then there were two other controversial recent cases in the DA household before the May election. Both were fully described in the Sunday Times of the 17th March 2019. From the reports it seems that the DA was in the accused box. In the one a woman member was left off the party’s parliamentary list after accusing a colleague of sexual harassment, while in the other case a senior woman member accused of racism and xenophobia was kept on the list of the DA’s candidates for the sixth Parliament.33

In the first case a DA councillor in Ekurhuleni, a said Thina Bambeni, was alleged to be delisted on the recommendation of the party’s Gauteng leader, John Moodey, after she accused the council’s caucus chair, Shadow Shabangu, of sexual harassment. A provincial disciplinary committee cleared Shabangu due to a lack of evidence and advised the provincial executive to charge Bambeni instead, as reported by Mvumvu and Makinana33. (Note: It is the same said Shabangu who is alleged further on in this reflection to have contravened Section 4 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act because it is alleged that he received a R1 220 000 kickback from the developers of the Springs Mall). In the end Bambeni was removed from the list of candidates, together with Siphesihle Dube (a spokesperson for the MEC of Transport in the Western Cape, due to posting pictures which he took with Patrica De Lille). Dube and Bambeni’s exclusions from the candidate list led to court actions against the DA.33

Regarding the second case within the DA’s inner circle, it was reported by Mvumvu and Makinana33 that Louw Nel, the DA’s parliamentary operations director, had taken legal action against Kohler Barnard after the party bosses allegedly failed to act against her. This is an outcome that follows after Barnard allegedly made racist remarks at a strategy meeting of the DA. It is also alleged that Barnard made offensive statements against Zimbabweans in South Africa (Note: Kohler Barnard was accused of racist behaviour in 2015 and her DA membership terminated in 2015 over a Facebook posting calling for the Apartheid president PW Botha’s “comeback”. Her expulsion was overturned and the DA retained her as an MP on condition that she was not found guilty of a similar offence, according to Mvumvu and Makinana33). It is further reported by Mvumvu and Makinana33 that Louw Nel had been suspended after taking the matter to the Equality Court (because he allegedly did not follow the party’s so-called “procedures” to call Barnard to book). He was however then reinstated.

It seems as though the DA is frequently characterised by unnecessary and doubtful senior level conflicts. Many seem to be unclear about the reasons and motives, while others contend that this is due to much self-empowerment and self-love by individuals inside the party’s structure. The racial factor seems to frequently also to be a culprit. For instance, the exit of the policy head, Gwen Ngwenya, of the DA from the leadership before the May election seems to reflect such a political struggle around the leadership. Professor Kotze22 claimed that the resignation of Ngwenya, who is alleged to have become disillusioned with the DA’s unsteady stance on a pro-Black policy, contributed further to existing uncertainty in the DA as a future political home for Blacks. This is seen as one of the various possible catalysts for Black voters moving from the DA in the past election. There were and are still also sagas around the persons of Helen Zille, Patricia de Lille and Lindiwe Mazibuko – wherein the “Black colour” factor seems not always so very innocent.16,17,19,22,24,31,34

For the DA to qualify as “good” in terms of the referees’ letters of reference, it must undoubtedly settle these kinds of internal leadership issues effectively, without negative roots of doubt. However, it would have been best if they were totally avoided from day-one by the appointment of the correct persons in its leadership. The De Lille saga for instance could have been avoided if sound selection principles were applied and she was never allowed into the DA as a member nor promoted to a leader’s position.16,17,19,22,24,31,34

The writings of the political analyst Muzi Kuzwayo35 in April 2019 on Patricia de Lille’s politics, including her present-day party named Good, and her appointment as an honourable minister in the Ramaphosa regime of post-2019, seems to be a good guideline to follow and to use before making an appointment. Kuzwayo writes35:2: “She first cashed in a few years after she started her party which became defunct and moved over to the DA and became Mayor of Cape Town in return – good deal. Who knows what loot Good will brings her.” Indeed, the loot is there! As a minister in the Ramphosa regime, facing the post-2019 politics, she is receiving a salary of R2.4-million yearly (besides many other allowances such as free flights, subsidised luxury cars, etc.)!35

3.2.1.3.5.2. The DA’s merry men and their alleged hands in the cookie jar

Although it seems that the DA prides itself to not hesitate to call political, economic and social delinquents in the party to book, notwithstanding their seniority or empowerment in the party, it seems that this is not always the true case, as alleged by critics. Looking critically at the DA’s attestations, it seems that although the amount, level and intensity of the delinquencies in the DA are far less than those characterising the ANC, it must be noted on the other hand that when it comes to any wrongdoing and the required appropriate handling thereof, the criteria of punishment must be on an equal level required in public from the ANC to act against its delinquents. The basis cannot and must not be the allowing of any kind of wrongdoing. A single case is as evil as one hundred delinquencies. This, it seems, the DA has missed out on sometimes.15-20

Prominent here are the allegations that the DA lacks fast and decisive actions on the expulsion of delinquents in its executive circle. The so-called Shadow Shabangu case, which echoes seemingly the same failing of the ANC to act against its culprits, is noteable. Shadow Shabangu, the DA’s caucus chair of the Ekurhuleni Council, was before the end of the fifth Parliament accused that he received a R1 220 000 kickback from the developers of the Springs Mall. Immense data was offered in the case.15-20

On the alleged wrongdoing by Shabangu, as specifically spelled out by a report of the Ekurhuleni Council, Mvumvu writes19:4: “The contract required him [Shabangu] to protect the interests of the developer instead of those of the municipality and those of his constituents, which is a direct conflict of interest. Furthermore, it was found that there might be an existence of a corrupt relationship between the developer and Shabangu, under the veil of the so-called facilitation agreement.”

The report alleged that Shabangu’s actions were in contravention of Section 4 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. It has also been alleged that Shabangu received a gift of a hotel payment worth about R1 720 – R2 290 from a friend of the developers of the mall that he did not declare to the council. So far the accused is alleged to still be active in DA party politics, equalling the Ace Magashule and others’ “not guilty till sentenced” stand-off.15-20

The failure of the DA to act decisively and strictly on the allegations against Shabangu undoubtedly made them in the eyes of potential voters in the recent May elections not an acceptable and a good ruler, empowered to be able to take on rumours of corruption in its own circle and respond with criminal prosecution. It seems for the critical voter as though the DA follows the same kind of “stretched” policy as the ANC, notwithstanding their preaching of a so-called “clean character” of the party and its leaders.

It is old news of the DA’s co-operation at three metros with the controversial EFF. It has been alleged that this “DA-EFF-brotherhood” has led thereto that the EFF’s practice of politics has become part of the DA’s thinking, planning and action. This “DA-EFF-brotherhood” is alleged to be driven inside an alleged opportunistic way of functioning and surviving for the DA. It is alleged in a report that the recent support for Moeketsi Mosolo of the EFF, to be an ongoing member of the Tshwane Council, notwithstanding serious allegations, was the outcome of this contaminated DA-EFF-brotherhood. The allegation is that alleged misconduct by Mosolo was ignored by the DA, primarily to bolster and to assure the DA’s empowerment in the council. The perception by the broad public of the good ethics of the DA and their strong showing up of the alleged corruption of the ANC elite, was thereby nullified. On the Mosolo case it is evident that the DA indeed recently wanted him ousted from the council, due to his alleged part in the awarding of a contract valued at R12 billion by the Tshwane Metro Council to the construction group GladAfrica, to manage all the Metro Council’s infrastructure projects. Hereafter, it is alleged, the DA suddenly made a fast turnaround on Mosolo to keep him on the council. The basis for this, it is alluded, was not to offend the EFF because the DA needed the EFF’s support in the council against the ANC at a time when the DA’s empowerment may have been erased. On Mosolo’s alleged wrongdoing, the Auditor-General’s Report alleged that Mosola took unauthorised control as a council member of the appointment of GladAfrica as a service provider, which was is in the first place in conflict with municipal legislation. Secondly, there was the allegation of the presence of corruption via the contract of the City of Tshwane with GladAfrica. As recently as 25 January 2019 the then DA Executive Mayor of Tshwane, Solly Msimanga, alleged that a payment of R317 million to GladAfrica was “irregular” under the management of Mosolo. The existence of a damaging formal report on Mosolo by the firm Bowmans, seemingly reflecting extremely negatively on the R12 billion contract, is alleged to have been ignored by the DA in their continued support of Mosolo in the council.9,36-38

In this context of an allegedly contaminated “DA-EFF-brotherhood”, it has also been alleged that Solly Msimanga, representing the DA as Executive Mayor in Tshwane, was pushed out of the mayoral post by his own DA party, because his efforts to oust Mosolo had angered the EFF and endangered the empowerment environment in the council for the DA with the EFF.9,36-38

The investigative journalist Marrian39 also took the GladAfrica scandal to the door of Solly Msimanga, the DA’s previous mayor, by recently alleging that he is now facing investigation with Moeketsi Mosolo over the multi-billion rand contract which the Auditor General found was awarded irregularly. She further alleged that he had jumped ship at Tshwane City and failed to see through his first mayoral term after he was seemingly “selected” by the DA to be its premier candidate and the face of its campaign to win Gauteng (which did not help the DA much). Marriam39 also alleged that Msimanga faced allegations of nepotism and that his brother had allegedly stolen 100 computers from the City of Tshwane.39

Marrian,39, as well as the political commentator Peter Bruce,40 focused on the actions of the DA’s Johannesburg Mayor, Herman Mashaba. Marrian39 alleged that shortly after he was elected and had formed a government, allegations emerged that a member of his mayoral committee, a said Sharon Peetz, had taken her mother along on an official trip to Spain. Marrian39 reports that this alleged wrongdoing was met with profuse denials by Mashaba and the city council, and that Mashaba even provided evidence that the trip was legal. But he then suddenly fired Peetz some months later after alleged irrefutable evidence of wrongdoing in the case surfaced. Marrian39 also showed the presence of failed service delivery under the mayoral oversight of Mashaba. She alludes that this happened after the city failed to renew a contract with Avis SA for vehicles to collect street rubbish. According to a report by the investigative journalism unit amaBhungane, Marrian reports that the Avis contract was cancelled and the fleet management deal was handed to Afrirent which allegedly in return paid kickbacks to an account belonging to the EFF. Bruce40 further reports that many of Mashaba’s DA causus members insist that he is closer to the EFF than he is to the DA. These members alleged that he allowed the EFF to influence contracts and appointments. This allegation, reading Marrian’s earlier allegations on the Afrirent contract, seem to can make some sense somewhere.39-40

3.2.1.3.5.3. The Marrian test case of the DA as an effective ruler in metros

There are other prominent critics that the DA’s political planning and action on the metro-level reflect widespread lack of constructive and dynamic action and that it does not offer its voters and the inhabitants of the metros where it is in charge, any better services than its opponents, the ANC or the EFF. It seems thus to be a prerequisite to see if the DA pudding has taste.16,17,20

An article by Marrian39 on the 17th May 2019 about the DA reflects it as a party that is unsuccessfully executing its municipal mandate. This requires a frame of reference. A short analysis and description to measure the article’s value in political standing is offered to get some insight as to whether the allegations hold water. The article’s introduction title reads39:32: “The Democratic Alliance’s unsatisfactory performance in the 2019 general elections reflects its poor governance record in the metros it took control of in the 2016 local government election.”

Looking firstly at her reference to the DA’s so-called “unsatisfactory performance in the 2019 elections”, Marrian39 is clearly missing out on all of the primary reasons for the decline of 2% in votes for the DA. Political analysts posit that the 2% decline was clearly a normal and long overdue shedding of the White ultra-conservatives. These drop-outs are now starting to run away because land expropriation is going to be a reality that the DA has to face from 2019 and must constructively handle in reality politics (other than these DA drop-outs’ seemingly new political home, the FF+, which blindly refuses to recognise this reality and promises them false land security). Nullifying Marrian’s 39 postulation is the well-defined and -reasoned opinion of the editor of the Beeld3 offered earlier, which put it clearly that the DA indeed did well in the election with its 20% voter outcome.3,39

Regarding her reference to the DA’s so-called “poor governance record in the metros it took control of in the 2016 local government election”, it is a postulation without roots: the only way to make an analysis of poor performance, is to compare it with the ruling ANC’s outputs in the various municipalities since 2016 (and the EFF which is basically missing in this context). In this context of governance it must be noted that not a single municipality under the DA management failed to obtain a clean audit, while most of the municipalities run by the ANC are contaminated by the lack of clean audits and the presence of constant corruption, fraud and theft, etc.9,16,17,20,39

The chaos in some of these ANC run metros is echoed by the recent arrest of the ANC Durban Mayor Zandile Gumede, chair of the powerful eThekwini region. Together with her, 62 ANC councillors of the eThekwini region stand accused of R208 million tender fraud. (For the record: she has already appeared in court and is out on R50 000 bail).41,42

For Marrian39 to speak vaguely as follows39:32: “…the DA did not live up to its own promise of better and clean governance in the metros it won in 2016. There are ample examples in Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay and Johannesburg of a party out of its depth in governing complex cities”, is plain mischief-making. Marrian39 failed to offer facts besides generalisations, meaning that her evidence is missing to put the DA in the dog box. As it has been offered it is fake news! Firstly, it needs to be noted that the DA only took over these entities three years ago and they had been messed up before by the ANC. The DA’s first tasks were to put remedial actions in place to get them working once again. This was mostly achieved in the three years, as the overall successes in these municipalities confirm.9,16,17,20,39

Marrian39 remarks that the DA had taken over the crown jewels of South Africa’s city scape, namely the big budget Johannesburg, the administrative capital of Pretoria in Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay in coalition deals and informal agreements with the EFF. She simplified the outcomes of these three metro’s complex management, which is prominently reflected by her unconvincing focus on Nelson Mandela Bay, with a specific outcome which she describes in political jargon as39:23: “Three years later, two of the three DA mayors have been removed and the party lost control of Nelson Mandela Bay”. Her “focus” clearly reflects a lack of understanding of the pre-2016 contaminations in all three of the metros which the DA has been trying to rectify since 2016 with the EFF. Secondly, which she knows well, but failed to pinpoint, is the political instability of the EFF as a co-partner and the party’s extreme customs and habits of mischief-making. This mischief-making intention and inclination by the EFF is evident where there is the opportunity for it, where it can scurrilously deviate from normal and orderly politics, even with the other mischief-maker, the ANC, in order to obstruct good governance. The constant change of DA mayors in PE was such an outcome and was not a public rejection of the DA’s mayor.39

To associate the DA’s Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba’s so-called popularity with the decline in DA votes there in the May elections, does not hold water: Marrian39 herself states that the DA’s decline was all over the country, and not only located in Johannesburg; so where does Mashaba really come into the picture, besides his random and subjective selection as a so-called “culprit”? Her postulations39:32: “…that last year bins in Johannesburg’s streets overflowed with rubbish”, and that: “Johannesburg entities, from City Power to Pikitup, degenerated under Mashaba’s watch…”, do not hold any specific evidence of outright and continuous political failure or misdoing by the DA or Mashaba. Marrian, as a salted political analyst, must know this. Her remarks are primarily nothing more than generalised political allegations, failing to bring the DA or Mashaba to book with specific and confirmatory evidence on the specific story of rubbish bins. Furthermore, these claims, if they should be true, are seemingly the extraordinary to the ordinary of every day. Strikes, which are a general phenomenon in all the metros and lead unavoidably to streets overflowing with rubbish, are mostly run by Cosatu and its affiliates, which are alliance members to the ANC regime. Furthermore, the country-wide daily road blocks of burning tyres and unrest, etc., are basically due to the municipalities under the ANC’s management’s constant and ongoing failures for the delivery of services. In the failed service delivery at ANC-run municipalities, the presence of rubbish which overflows the streets is only one problem of many more serious failures to the inhabitants, of which Marrian seems oblivious or prefers not to mention.39

Marrian’s39 overview of the DA’s so-called fight with the then Cape Town mayor Patricia de Lille, seemingly lacks an understanding of the background to the alleged matter, which forced the DA to react with serious steps against her. It seems to be a matter that the DA is still investigating although she has left the party. Her remark39:23: “The electorate clearly turned up their noses at the DA’s antics in the metros over the past three years…”, is an effort by Marrian39 to pinpoint the story behind the so-called “noses-up” of the electorate.. However, it lacks any evidence or political commentator’s depth. In perspective, it seems to be a reflection of a kind of political mischief against the DA. Again, on the “antics” of the DA – as done in all her other reflections on the DA’s so-called many failures in her article – she failed to offer a comparison of the DA’s “bad” antics with the ANC’s “good” antics in all the metros where it is active, knowing that the DA would come first as the best ruler.39

In conclusion, many critics are inclined to say “where there is smoke there is fire”. 39 Viewpoints must be lent an ear. The evidence of poor management and corruption in municipalities all over the country is plentiful: from the smallest village to the biggest metro. What really is needed is that the Cape Town, Johannesburg, eThekwini, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay municipalities must be scrutinised for corruption, theft and nepotism, etc., by commissions such as those of Zondo and Mpati. This will show not only possible wrongdoings by the ANC’s cronies, but also possibly those of the DA’s cronies. Such an outcome may put flesh to Marrian’s39 present vague and unconvincing allegations on the failures of the DA. It will also test the DA’s manifesto for truth and see whether its promises are going to hold water. South Africa needs to see which of the three dominant political parties and their leaders are sufficiently capable and skilled to solve the demanding land redistribution issue. Most of all, we must ascertain which of the three parties’ politics are characterised by poor governance and serious delinquencies.

3.2.1.3.6. The DA’s horse-trading with extreme oppositions as partners

A prominent critic, which could have also played a role in the loss of voters in the 2019 elections, is the opposition of conservative voters (mostly Whites) of the DA’s association with the EFF. Indeed any association with a radical opposition, even the ANC, seems unacceptable for this sector.39,40,43

No-one can escape the hard fact that the DA’s coalition and informal co-operation with the EFF has cost them support. The fiasco in their loss of control of Nelson Mandela Bay and the removal of the DA’s mayors there, has become more than a black mark on the DA’s record of integrity and good governance.39,40,43

This kind of DA-EFF cooperation is seen as nothing more than horse-trading, to use the excellent coining of a phrase by Bruce. It seems for some critics to be extreme opportunism by the DA’s leadership to stay in power and to reap benefits, instead of truly putting the country and its voters’ interests as a priority.39,40,43

At the moment there are a lot of rumours of a repeated coalition with the EFF in the metro councils of Tshwane and Johannesburg. The EFF alleged that such consultations and discussions with the DA are ongoing. But on this outcome, as with the DA’s pre-2019 politics, Maimane43 has thrown cold water by stating43:1-2:

…the DA would co-operate only with parties that shared its values of non-racialism, a capable state, eradication of corruption and a market-based economy that was inclusive of those who were left out.

This discussion on co-operation with the EFF must be based on those principles, and if ultimately parties do not agree on the principles we will not sell those out. We will stand firm and move on from there.

The DA’s pre-2019 association with the EFF and its leaders has, as mentioned, with good reason placed a question mark on the DA’s integrity.34,39,43 Further contamination of the DA’s character by the EFF can make Marrian’s39 remark that39:32: “…the DA did not live up to its own promise of better and clean governance in the metros it won in 2016”, suddenly and irrevocably meaningful. In addition here is Marrian’s request that the DA must do some introspection. It seems to be necessary, not only with regard to its association with the EFF, but also on many of the other so-called “delinquencies” of the DA, of which Marrian39 has spoken many times with a tongue in her cheek.

A fact which cannot be ignored: as a result of its initial construction as a party, the DA has many times been characterised by outright opportunism which has nurtured the party’s unfortunate “EFF-love”. It must be phased out, together with the EFF contamination.27,39,43,44

The DA cannot honestly call itself a unique party: a party free from racism, corruption, state capture, revolutionary politics, etc., as long the EFF is part of its inner circle. The past EFF association has cost the DA as many Black right-wing votes as it did to drive its White right-wing’s departure. Selisho34 quoted the political commentator Leeto Nthoba who said that the DA’s initial loss of voters to the FF+ in the May elections was strongly driven by the DA’s previous association with the EFF. The loss of more Whites from the DA will further be speeded up by a new alliance with the EFF. There is not a single good principle to support the DA to again be involved with the EFF in a future co-operation.34

In this context is it clear that Maimane has started (seemingly for the moment) to cold shoulder the EFF and confirms that the DA’s intention is only that of a positive co-operation with “equal-value” parties to the DA in the post-2019 politics. Maimane reflects further that the DA wants to establish a “caucus of the opposition” with parties that share their values and are identified with the centre of politics. In this context the DA already has a kind of “alliance” with the FF+, the ACDP, the IFP and the UDM, while the EFF is not a member, but is seemingly supported sometimes.27,44-46

However, for the DA to come clean in the post-2019 politics from their previous serious EFF-contamination, remains to be seen. The first prerequisite to be clean is integrity; something that no-one can cheer about in the DA if the EFF is its bed-partner. If the stream goes against Maimane’s cold shouldering of the EFF, the DA is sleeping at the same time with the right-wing FF+ and underwriting the dominant voice of the aggrieved, conservative White and Coloured minorities, while at the same time sleeping with the left-wing EFF and underwriting the voice of the discontented, impatient and even angry Black majority. This is not what is called middle-ground politics: it is political schizophrenia and political psychopathy, two serious psychoses, intertwined in one single party. The end result will be the DA’s ongoing Black-versus-White conflict, but in extreme form. This would also confirm the views of many critics that it lacks a sound political policy in any area of politics. As a party it will fit in nowhere, because it is not positively repositioned. Most of all, it will be without supporters and its rich funders.32,47

For the DA to argue that the previous backing of the DA by the EFF and vice versa has not been without benefit, for instance in Johannesburg, holds no water. There is no fact to contradict the statement that all the inhabitants of Johannesburg would benefit if the ANC alone was the boss, possibly more than the DA-EFF alliance. One thing is clear (and a great concern for a corruption free DA) and that is the enormous benefit for the DA-EFF councillors in pay and their political empowerment. When John Mendelsohn46, a DA councillor, postulates that the DA alliance with the EFF was a “precariously positioned one wich required skilful management by Mashaba” it seems as though both Bruce40 and Marrion,39 seemingly with good reason, frowned on it. The DA would benefit from a little introspection, as Marrian advises.39,40,46

The public have the right to be sceptical on any DA-EFF brotherhood. Mendelsohn’s46 reflection on Bruce’s40 critique on the DA’s actions in the Johannesburg City Council, with specifically the EFF as a prominent empowered partner, read46:18: “The message to Bruce is that the arrangement with the EFF was not entered into simply as a “greedy decision”. It was done for the best of reasons, namely to rid the city of corruption and get some growth going in the local economy.”This has just too much reference to the words “greedy, corruption, best of reasons”, as if coming directly from the Zuma period. It is not convincing. 39,40,46

Postscript: On the 29th May 2019 the Citizen reports that the DA had given the ANC the Chair-position of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa)4 in the Western Cape Provincial Legislature. As motivation for this offering the DA said it was done in the interests of transparency, accountability, cooperative governance and good democratic practice (characteristics the DA constantly accuses the ANC of lacking!). Notwithstanding the DA’s argument that the chair is given traditionally to a member of the strongest opposition party in the government (which the ANC is in the stern Cape), it is in conflict with Maimane’s earlier promises that the DA would stay away from any future cooperation with doubtful partners.49

The advent of post-2019 Malema cooperation with the DA in metros can steer the DA back to its practice of dishonourable horse trading. This does not seem impossible. On the 28th May the Star48 reported that it looks set that the DA is going to do a power-sharing deal again with the EFF in Tshwane and Johannesburg.48

3.2.1.3.8. The DA’s use of the Malloch-Brown model for provincial and municipal political empowerment

There are some serious critics of the opinion that to speak of the DA as a national regime, to in any way be able to govern South Africa after the May election 2019, must be handled with care. The DA, it was felt, just could not brag of doing so, because this experience is totally missing from their CV. There are even critics that believe that on provincial and local level the DA seems to falter. The emergence of various small political groupings and so-called community parties in the Western Cape, the DA’s stronghold, is offered as dissatisfaction with the DA by communities and the inhabitants of regions where the DA is strongly active. Given that these groupings did not make much inroad into the DA’s domain in the Western Cape or Cape Town in the past elections, this contradicts a general indication of poor DA ruling or unpopularity with the broad society of the DA on specific municipal level.22,25,36,50

This outcome erases the critique that the DA does not have the ability or will to be the national ruler in the post-2019 politics. The results of the May election contradict thus firstly the lack of interest of the DA in national politics, and secondly that the DA has neglected the national issue. What most of the critics have missed is that the DA, with very good reason, is focusing its political intentions and role-playing on provincial level to tackle local issues, instead of over-addressing the national issues of South Africa.22,25,36,50

Looking to the arguments and modus operandi of the DA’s leadership since 2014, it becomes clear that there exists cognition inside the party that the first step to be able to move into national government successfully requires the pre-step of a well established provincial level involvement and empowerment by the DA all over the country. Included here is the local level of governmental occupation by the DA in an effort to firstly repair the integrity of municipalities and to again obtain clean audits, and secondly to serve the inhabitants’ needs and demands through this improved system. This will allow them to obtain and establish a foundation to move into provincial and then on into national levels of government. Only after this double stage has successfully been mastered, based on a sound governance foundation, experience and empowerment, can the DA move aggressively into the national sphere from 2024 onward .22,25,36,50

This double stage intention and approach on provincial and local levels of government establishment was evident from the words of Makashule Gana50 of the DA national campaign team for the recent May 2019 election, when he pinpointed that the party was primarily and specifically campaigning on community issues that were close to the ordinary peoples’ daily lives50:15: “We stand more chance of being in government if we pour our hearts into the provinces and grow our votes there.” Prominent here are the constructive efforts of the DA to explain on local level major national issues in such terms that help voters to understand how bad or good decisions taken in the top echelons of government affect their day-to-day lives, write Matiwane and Deklerk25.

How much the quality of the DA’s political structure and know-how are on the standard of international politics, and how intensively they apply the principles of good governance on all levels of their strategy and planning, is especially reflected and confirmed by their insight to go as an opposition in the first place for local and domestic politics. Their aim is mostly, other than some of the ANC top brass like Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, to find an international solution for local problems. No-one can reject the important role of international politics, but if a local policy of management is absent and the basic grievances of the local people on village level are ignored and fail to be addressed – as the ANC mostly did for over 25 years with their minds occupied by national government – international politics not only fails to have an impact, but, where it is applied randomly, brings in most cases only further chaos to an existing local problem. Their exclusive local focus with the use of local approaches, is working positively where the DA is strongly involved in the local level of government. This is not only to repair the local mess at municipalities previously run by the ANC, but at the same time to start to bring about the much needed basic facilities and contacts that are prominently lacking on local level and whereto international solutions mostly are not applicable.

In this context, wherein the DA’s local orientation to politics is correctly focusing on the single aim to altruistically serve the individuals’ needs above personal gains and self-empowerment, an inclination that is at the moment negatively overwhelming the country’s politics on national level, is the supportive narrative of Mark Malloch-Brown51 with regard to the DA’s initiative on local level politics. For the record, Malloch-Brown51 is undoubtedly one of the most qualified internationally recognised persons to understand and evaluate the actions and qualities of political parties and governments worldwide. The insight of Malloch-Brown51, an experienced political correspondent for the Economist, the Vice-President of External Affairs of the World Bank, Head of the United Nations Development Programme, the UN Deputy Secretary-General under Koffi Annan, and later Minister of State at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who worked closely within the Middle East and African political turmoil, is fully echoing the DA’s practise of politics. He can speak of successes and failures and hard lessons to learn from local to national governance, especially on the British environment.51

Malloch-Brown51, writes about Gordon Brown’s hard lesson to learn on the importance of local politics when he became the UK Prime-Minister51:221:

Hit in his early months in office by credit, food and energy crises that were clearly international in origin, he publicly sought international solutions, only to be confronted…with complaints that he was not sensitive enough to people and their problems. Why, the British people asked, was he talking about all these irrelevant international matters?

The dilemma of the modern politician is that the answers are abroad but the votes at home. And so Brown, like Blair before him, had to find a language and narrative of politics that is deeply rooted in the at-home. Among political leaders, neither the natural globalisers nor the nationalists are able to cut themselves free from the strings of domestic politics. That is the forum to which they all remain beholden.

Malloch-Brown51 also writes in this context of the importance of local government about his own experience (and another hard lesson to learn) as a UK minister. He reports51:221: “And local is a tough taskmaster. Coming back to the U.K. as a minister to help Brown drive his internationalist agenda, I was brought down to earth by the weekend’s newspaper headlines that blamed the government for uncollected garbage in London’s streets. It does not get much more local than that.”

How sensitive the DA is in its encircling of good politics and its following every letter of the principles to obtain the best empowerment through addressing the local issue, is clear in their aim to take over city metros as a first step to a later national takeover. Noteworthy here is the DA’s insight to put forward strong leaders of quality in order to lead excellent cities and by doing so, to win the hearts of the local people. Malloch-Brown51, on the empowerment of local government through the installation of persons of integrity in care of these municipalities, writes51:221: “… mayors solve problems that are close to home: violent crime, drugs, public infrastructure. They have to care about schools, social services, police and public investment.”

On the immense empowerment of the local entities and their empowering energy-streaming, not only into the provincial and national levels of a country, but also into the international sphere, because their excellence and know-how can be exported, Malloch-Brown51 writes further51:222: “The world looks good for mayors and other local leaders. The fortunes of cities like Moscow, Cape Town, and Chicago have often been countercyclical to those of their region or country, often due to the leadership of strong mayors.”

The DA’s successful pre-2019 occupation and management of Cape Town (as well as the Western Cape region in which it is anchored) reflects such counter action to erase poor governance and leadership, standing out from the ANC’s failed South African state and its municipalities where they reign.51

In addition, the DA’s political successes, again at the provincial level, especially in the Western Cape in the May election, are a confirmation of their ongoing political manifesto of an orderly taking of power in South Africa, even if it must wait until the 2024 election.22

3.2.1.3.9. The DA as a party of everything for everyone, pre-and post-2019
3.2.1.3.9.1. The DA’s White dilemma

Post-election critics bring various reasons to the door of the DA as to why it did not make a dramatic inroad on the voters. Prominent here is its seeming inability to properly handle the various forces, both positive and negative, active in the DA’s own dynamics. It is often suggested that it tries to be a party of everything for everybody. This is an approach which is seemingly not working anymore. The party’s open kind of politics in which they try to satisfy both the Black interests as well as the White interests seem not to work in 2019 and are not going to work in future. This is damaging to both sides. The basis here is a policy ambiguity, mostly activated by the conservative NP remnants of the White sector of the DA. This opposition, and fear by the doves in the DA of losing White support if they took them on, led to not only a vague but many times an absolute lack of a clearly declared policy on Black empowerment and affirmative action, driving away the middle class and even the lower economic classes of Blacks. On the other hand, there is the suspicion by White DA members of Maimane to have sympathy for dramatic land reform, which echos in many aspects that of the ANC doves. This is a direct reason for a DA internal power struggle. This was also well-reflected by critics as the so-called driving out of Whites as members and supporters in the May elections. This in-house power struggle is immense, although well hidden. It frequently equals the present in-fighting in the ANC on the self-empowerment of individuals. The Black racism within a certain sector of the ANC is in reverse echoed by White racism in the DA.28,32 Nyatsumba writes25:25: “The harder Mmusi Maimane tried to position the DA as a social democratic party that would appeal to black voters, the more conservatives “fought back” against him and his ideals.

Naki, in quoting Professor Dirk Kotze22 of Unisa on this conflicting context and the fight for the soul of the DA, reports22:4: “Blacks wanted reform, but conservative whites opposed liberal policies, which put the DA in a dilemma. Both the constituencies abandoned the party at the polls in favour of the ANC and the FF+.”

This indication is undoubtedly true: as many as 470 396 voters left their DA home and contributed undoubtedly to the FF+ gaining 249 093 votes since the 2014 election. These DA voters who absconded to the ANC also helped the ANC to limit its’ loss to only 1 410 446 votes in the May election.5-8

The post-2019 politics make it clear that the DA has reached its peak of White voters and supporters, but the loss of more or less 249 093 White DA voters to the FF+ was an unavoidable outcome. It was part of the ultra-conservative Whites’ build-up against Black empowerment that could never be solved reasonably inside the DA of the future. Most of these ultra-conservative Whites, a political mix between NPs, ABs and Herstigte-NPs, have opportunistically hung on to the DA for years after losing their own political homes, doing more harm than good to the DA’s political soul.28,52 Mokone, Deklerk and Hunter52, quoting a DA insider on these seemingly politically confused and estranged Whites in the DA, write52:22: “Yes, we have lost support to the Freedom Front Plus, but perhaps it’s about time we lost the right-wing conservatives in the party because we are trying to build a party that represents the interests of all South Africans. Perhaps that will also help us to continue increasing support in black areas, which is what we did in this election.”

3.2.1.3.9.2. A Black ex-ANC as the present leader of the DA

How much these right-wing conservatives have penetrated the soul of the DA with their White racial contamination, was clearly reflected by their efforts to sack Maimane for what they see as his “Black liberation” inside the DA. Other DA right-wingers allude that he is an ex-ANC walking around with the ANC manifesto under his right arm. The intention to oust him at present is very clear. Indeed, it seems that they tried to do this at the DA’s Federal Executive (Fedex) on the 13th May, without success. It seems that they are also gearing up to try to oust him later in June at the DA’s Federal Council’s meeting. (The FC is the DA’s highest decision-making structure between conferences). There are also rumours of a call for an early national congress next year, instead of the scheduled congress of 2021, to muster enough votes to be able to topple Maimane12,52

Mokone, Deklerk and Hunter52 describe these detractors of Maimane to include current and former MPs and MPLs from the DA’s neo-conservative grouping, known in the DA’s circles as the “old guard”, which does not agree with the DA’s “blacking” politics and a more responsible view on true democracy, as opposed to the one catering exclusively to White privilege. A spokesperson on the inside of the DA says52:6: “They are gloating. Even before the results started coming in, there were so many of them that were waiting for Mmusi to fail.”

How focused and poisonous these attacks are on Maimane, especially from the Afrikaner right-wing, is well reflected by Pelser53 when he, without a factual base, writes53:6:

Danksy Maimane se oorhaastige kantkiesery in rassetwiste wat gewissel het van Ashwin Willemse tot Schweizer-Reneke, kry die DA 472 000 stemme minder op 8 Mei, want hoewel sy party se prestasie in regering gerespekteer word, verstaan veral wit kiesers ook wat Maimane wil doen, naamlik om klokslag op sosiale media sy eie onberispelike bona fides wat betref ant-swart rassisme ten toon te stel nog voordat hy al die feite het.”

The double standards of these White right-wingers applied to the correctness and indeed the prescribed duty of Maimane to punish deviant behaviour of party members, especially of the top brass of the DA, knowing it is inappropriate and delinquent – is again reflected by Pelser’s53 public down-playing (seemingly because their political antics fit him) of the seriousness of the deviances of three DA seniors who Maimane (after consultation with his top brass) recently called to book for contravening the party’s media rules and for getting involved in racial politics. Pelser writes53:6:

Die DA-LP Ghaleb Cachalia, seun van die struggle-ikone Amina en Yusuf Cachalia, is weer onder ‘n tipe sensuur geplaas as ‘n ongedissiplineerde kader omdat hy dit gedurf waag het het om die uitgesproke Radio 702–aanbieder Eusebius McKaiser te belg.

Ook Helen Zille, wat as premier die doeltreffendste regering gebou het wat Suid-Afrika in 25 jaar gesien het, en wat nou ‘n gewone DA-lid is, sal na die DA se federale uitvoerende raad verwys word nadat sy op Twitter geskryf het dat daar ook deesdae iets soos “black privileges” is (sy stel dit onder meer gelyk aan grootskeepse geplunder sonder gevolge).

These growing and well-planned attacks on the “Black priest” Maimane as DA leader, are not done alone by single persons or a small group of White right-wing-went-off-DAs, but are also as mentioned done from inside by the mostly White “old guard” of the DA top brass where these attacks are less expected. These attacks are spreading to all the intimate members of Maimane’s team. Important to note is the focus on the DA’s head of elections Jonathan Moakes, and the chief executive Paul Boughey, seemingly also with the intention to oust them for the “alleged” poor performance of the DA in the 2019 elections12,39,53

Moakes did indeed resign recently and referred to the internal fights in the DA, wherein seemingly the detractors of Maimane are central, as: “…’toksiese, abnormal omgewing’ waar ‘interne gevegte, vertrouensbreuk, (en) onenigheid …die norm geword het’,” reports Boonzaaier.54:1

Bringing the fight closer to Maimane and his intimate cronies, Marrian writes39:4: “Knives are said to be out for the young leader, despite him getting ‘a round of applause; as he entered the Fedex meeting on Monday.”

3.2.1.3.9.3. The DA present-day leadership saturation by right-wing Old Guards

The knives of the “old guard” are out for the wrong “emperor” and these detractors of Maimane, similar to those who stabbed Julius Ceasar, learned later that a hefty price needs to be paid in the end.

From a political analysis point of view, it seems more and more that the DA’s drop in share in the national votes from the 22.23% under Helen Zille to 20.77% in 2019, bringing a decrease from 89 to 84 MPs in the National Assembly, was to a great extent directly as a result of the negative impact of these “old guard’” “white-politics” inside the DA, specifically about Maimane’s “Black” presence as its leader. One prominent root of these DA neo-conservatives’ ultra-politics, is their association with the so-called antagonists against land expropriation in any form – and the fighting off of any form of upliftment for the mass of the poor and landless. They are clearly aligned to the so-called and mostly self-styled “Afrikaners/White rescuers and saviours”, such as the FF+, AfriForum, AgriSA, Solidarity and other obstructionists of the unavoidable and much needed land reform plan. The future planning and political model of this “old guard” for the DA does not include the intention to build a party that represents the interests of all South Africans. Prominent here is their exclusive safe-guarding of an imbalanced White land ownership and exclusive White capital at the cost of ±30 million poor and landless Blacks. 21,28,47,52

Critically considered, is it clear that they do not represent the view of most of the ±5 million White South Africans. Moreover, they do not have the majority support of these Whites for their racial politics inside or outside the DA. They can cost the DA a split, but, as said, this split needs to occur as fast as possible under the leadership of Maimane, in order to make the DA a party of the people of South Africa.21,28,47,52

But political analyst Ralph Mathekgo55, quoted by Naki55, contends that the flight of White voters from the DA must also be interpreted from another angle and not outright because they are all against the DA’s so-called activation of a process of “blacking” itself. They were forced out by fear of the EFF’s extreme anti-White and land grabbing policy (and their own selfishness to be rich, empowered and to have unlimited White privilege), and thus ran to the FF+ as their only rescuer in this unfortunate setup. This opinion is confirmed by various other political analysts.21,28,32,47,52,55

Mathekgo55, in line with the above findings, writes55:5: “The EFF helped the Freedom Front Plus to consolidate the white voters. It positioned itself as an opponent of the EFF policies, including the expropriation of land without compensation.”

The exit of the White antagonists (who, as mentioned, did not really belong from day one to the DA’s Black orientated political culture), has undoubtedly on the other hand opened the door in reverse for the influx of the middle and lower classes of Black supporters. This positive and growing process will start to erase the White shortfall in members and the White funding of the party (which also seems to have become a leverage of how these right-wing Whites, especially the White capitalists, have manipulated and captured the DA’s soul for a long time). 21,28,32,47,52,55

To be a party of the future, the DA will need to increase their drive for the collection into the DA of Blacks to make it an overwhelmingly moderate Black party. This is a dramatic move away from the contaminated presence of the (mostly departed) right-wing Whites which have so far blocked any “black-liberalism”. This was done in-house by them, at the cost of the status of Maimane’s leadership, by their internal propaganda to profile him as a poor leader. In this process the media was thoroughly used, especially the Afrikaans media.21,28,32,47,52,55

3.2.1.3.9.4. Good management for change politics

The abovementioned change in politics of the DA from White to Black can bring about enormous winnings for the DA in the next local urban elections of 2021. This political acceptance could be extended to the rural areas wherein the DA so far has been under-performing against the ANC and the EFF. (In the 2019 elections, of the 3.6 million votes which the DA received, 2.9 million came from urban areas, with 152 000 from rural areas, 500 000 from farm areas and 9 000 from mixed areas). This means that the DA has to be progressive in order to improve its position locally.22,56 Marrian56 is correct when she says that the DA’s results in the metros in 2019 show that it will have to work hard to retain control of them in 2021, particularly in the Tshwane and Johannesburg metros which it now governs through unstable coalitions. This includes their sole governing in Cape Town, where their support has dropped from 67% to 56%. However, on the other side, the decrease in votes for the ANC is much more significant, confirming the presence of various negative determinants and not a sole one such as leadership per se.56

With regard to the future politics of the FF+ in the post-2019 politics (which has enlarged its presence in Parliament from 4 to 10 MPs) – it is the party to which the DA shed an assumend ±250 000 voters – there is, besides obstruction together with the various White/Afrikaner rescuers and savers such as Solidarity, AfriForum, the IRR, etc., very little hope. The FF+ is an artificial political setup, still saturated in racism, and as the election outcome reflects, it is not popular with the majority of South Africans who stand strongly against racism. Also for the 250 000 DA members, fleeing the ship to the FF+, the future looks doomed there and they knew very well that the DA is the only party that can bring about ordered and balanced land reform. The failed Pieter Mulder escapade as deputy minister of the FF+ in the Zuma cabinet was an expensive lesson to learn for Whites who tried to channel their politics and interests exclusively through the FF+.5-8

The chance is good that many of these disloyal (and many times displaced) DA supporters, who turned to the FF+ as voters, are going to return to the DA. Kotze22 reflects22:4: “The FF+ support is artificial, caused by DA supporters upset with the way the party was managed at the top.” The question must be asked as to whether the DA wants them back? To argue that the DA is stripped of its White voters/supporters with the departure of the 250 000 right-wing jumpers to the EFF+, is a myth. It must be noted that most of the DA members/supporters are still White and are undoubtedly satisfied. Moreover: the fact is that the Whites (including Afrikaners), especially the youth, have very little sympathy for right-wing Whites and their opportunistic Afrikaner/White saviours and rescuers. The same passivity against the right-wing is present within the 5 million Whites with regard to the political trouble-making of the ±35 000 White farmers and their farms. Although it is impossible to calculate precisely the number of White supporters of the DA, the voting totals of the 2019 statics of the eligible voters (±36 miilion) as well as the total voters (±18 million) at the ballot box out of a total population of ±58 million, can be brought into calculation with the White population of ±5 million. If the eligible White voters are calculated, as many as 3 miilion Whites can support the DA. If the passive vote, as reflected in the 2019 voting, is brought into calculation, as many as 1.5 million Whites can still be supporters of the DA. (The total vote for the DA in 2019 was 3.6 million). This calculation means that the loss of ±250 000 White votes reflects basically a loss of between ±8% and 17% Whites by the DA, which can easily be replaced with Black votes.5-8

It can be expected that many of the Black and Brown voters who jumped ship will return as soon as the ANC restarts its tricks. The politics of the ANC, the SACP and Cosatu, are still bordering on radicalism with regard to race, economics and land reform, etc. This politically radical thinking just does not fit into the mindset of established DAs. 22,63

For South African politics in general, which includes the DA’s future planning, thinking and action, there lurk serious consequences as a result of the right-wing FF+ successes in the May election (a warning also applicable to the EFF’s danger). This holds political dangers, which somewhere in the future, the government of the day may be forced to curb, even by dramatic intervention. On this racial polarisation and risky outcome, Mondi Makhanya,64 the editor of City Press, writes a clear warning64:11: “Pieter Groenewald, VF Plus-leier, het ná die verkiesing in ‘n onderhoud hieroor gekraai. “Mense begin nou besef dat jy toegelaat word om wit te wees, ‘n minderheidsgroep, ‘n Afrikaner, sonder om ‘n rassis te wees.”

On the above response of Groenewald, Makhanya64:11continues:

Deur dit te sê, het hy die terugtrek van ‘n aansienlike deel van die wit bevolking – meestal Afrikaanssprekendes – in ‘n rasse-laer van waar hulle hulself as afsonderlik van hul medeburgers beskou, as lofwaardig beskou.

Die ongelukkige aspek van demokrasie is dat dit elke nou en dan uitslae soos dié bewerkstellig. As demokrasie moet ons dit respekteer.

Suid-Afrikaners moet egter nou reeds die realiteit konfronteer dat ‘n giftige nasionalisme aan die regterkant van ons politieke spektrum herrys. Die goeie ding is dat dit binne die grense van ons grondwetlike bedeling geskied.

Dit kan steeds op demokraties wyse ontman word – mits diegene wat ons republiek lei dit herken en dit met breinkrag eerder as spierkrag beveg.

It is now the duty of the DA to rid itself of the Groenewalds, the racial AfriForums and its associated organisations. There is no place to fire up White resistance and poisonous ultra-White nationalism in the DA. The opportunity is now there for the DA to rid itself of racial domination and contamination. This can be done fast and successfully. For that the DA needs a tough, but balanced Black leader.64

It is clear that Maimane and his intimate cronies are very sure of themselves in the post-2019 DA with their future “blacking”. He is not hesitating to take on the White ultra-conservatives in the party’s top brass. It seems Maimane successfully bottled them together with persons such as Helen Zille and “her regrets of promoted Black leaders in the DA”.43,53,65,66

Maimane43, on this future path of DA politics, said43:1-2: “We have set the direction of the organisation and that is the route we will go”.

His growing success was seen with the recent appointment of his preferred candidate Jacques Julius as deputy chief whip in the place of Mike Waters, who is regarded by Maimane and his cronies as part of the conservatives who obstruct the change of the DA. It shows strong support for Maimane from senior DA MPs. This direct vote within the party’s caucus was undoubtedly the victory Maimane needed to continue fast with his diversity of the racial composition of the DA’s higher echelons. It is also clear that the DA MP Phumzile van Damme is successfully leading a progressive group to dislodge many of Maimane’s detractors.65

Mokone and Deklerk65, quoting DA inside sources, say that Julius not only strengthened Maimane’s empowerment on the DA’s Fedex, but that the support of the senior DA MPs show65:4: “… that there are people in the party who support the vision he’s laid out, who want to continue with the vision of our SA for all.”

This clear and decisive policy finality arriving at last, the previous lack of which cost the DA votes in the recent elections, was concretely demonstrated on the 21st May 2019 when Maimane took on Helen Zille in public (an action long overdue). This clearly reflects his assertion of power in the post-2019 DA politics. He has at last obtained his grip on the party. His undermentioned public speaking shows this clearly.43

Firstly, he recommitted the DA to being the South African party of the centre, with the sole intention to serve every citizen43:1-2: “We will not pander to the right or pander to the left. That is not the space we want to occupy. We are in the centre of politics and we must lay out that stall. Populism and nationalism are on the rise. It doesn’t change the fact that our historical mission to get all South Africans working together is an ideal worth fighting for.”

Secondly, in fighting off the attacks on him as leader, as driven by the ill-disciplined comments of some high profile DA members on Twitter, he initiated disciplinary actions against three prominent DA members, namely Helen Zille and the two DA MPs Galeb Cachalia and Michael Cardo.43,67

Maimane43,67 taking a clear position on the DA”s centre politics and how this will be driven, as well as how he is going to erase the right-wing Whites, has responded as follows43:9 and 67:1-2:

I do not agree with the views that have been put forward by the former premier of the Western Cape.

The discussion about privilege in this country is a function not only of our history which advantaged a particular race over another, but it’s also that in the last number of years in government here, we have failed to create access to opportunities for South Africans and ensure that more can be included in our economy .

White South Africans needed to be “cognisant of the fact that the majority of people who are left out are black South Africans.”

On the conflicting racial matter, also prominent in the DA and which was clearly put into the foreground by the Zille tweets, Maimane67 comments as follows67:9: “Any view that seeks to polarise South Africans on the basis of race is not a view I will support. Our focus must be working together as South Africans, black and white, to recognise those injustices and work to address them.”

3.2.1.3.9.5. The DA is finally at the centre of politics and is laying out its stall

To be honest, the DA was before and still is after the election (as shown by the arrogance of Zille’s tweets), undoubtedly saturated in the belief capture of some right-wing Whites seeing themselves as the sole rescuers of the party (undoubtedly true in terms of funding) when it seems to be in trouble. The pertinent use of Helen Zille and Tony Leon to collect votes, but surely only White votes, was an excellent example of this mistaken perception of these right-wing Whites of their future importance in the DA. The presence of people such as Zille and Leon activated immense Black anger. It was planned belittlement. It was for White empowerment.64,66,68 A DA member of the party’s campaign team reflects68:7: “Why in the dying days were the fossils rolled out? Because they wanted to focus on the white vote. That vote was already gone, it was clear even in by-elections.”

There is a false belief that a Black DA is doomed, which may be true if it is solely entrusted to a future of White voters and putting them first. But the intention is clear to keep only those Whites who are committed to an open society, free from the present DA racial undertones. For Johnson12 to write as follows on this White remedy of the post-2019 DA is pie in the sky12:4-5: “Daar is eise dat die koppe van al die topleiers moet rol en vrese dat, tensy die skip vinnig omgedraai word, verdere verliese in 2021 se munisipale verkiesing die party in die gesig staar.” Firstly, it is doubtful whether people such as Johnston are welcome on the post-2019 DA ship. Secondly, if the Black top leaders of the party are now fired, the White racial DA will in 2019 already face losses and be diminished to the FF+’s status (into which its White right-wing fits very well with their extreme racial ideology).

The immense presence of doubt on the so-called “expert leadership” of Whites in the DA’s top echelons and with good reason the growing rejection of persons (who Malema called the pensioner-politicians) such as Helen Zille, who totally overstayed her welcome in formal DA politics, and her present actions of enormous damage to the DA and to Maimane, is confirmed by her growing anti-DA writings and recent utterances. Specific in this respect were her recent admissions of her seemingly “own fault” as the previous DA leader to “blacken” the DA. Even the DA’s top brass intended to crash her “political profile” to get rid of its White image before the May election (which she named “vernietige Zille-stategie). Zille66, on the 26th May 2019 in the Rapport on these “facts and others”, reflecting back to her so-called ousting in 2017 about her “colonialism-tweets”, writes as follows66:7:

Diegene verantwoordelik vir die DA se verkiesingstrategie (ironies genoeg, die meeste van hulle wit) het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat as hulle my in die openbaar sou verpletter, die DA uitendelik sy beeld as ‘n “wit party” sou verloor. Dit is nie ‘n samesweringsteorie nie. Ek het ‘n dokument wat na die party se federale uitvoerende raad gestuur is, wat dit verduidelik.

Ek is tydelik geskors, en toe dit nog nie werk nie, het hulle my prober aanmoedig om Suid-Afrika te verlaat. Die DA het selfs ‘n skenker gevind om hul strategie te financier. As ek verdwyn, so het hul gereken, sal die party uiteindelik as “getransformeer” beskou word.Toe ek beleef weier om as premier van die Wes-Kaap te bedank en die land te verlaat, is ek verbied uit alle party-aktiwiteite.

With regard to the above – which sounds like pages from the chronicles of the FBI and the KGB! – the DA top brass offers some contradictory facts, such as that they never offered her a job overseas, but that the job offer was made independently by two British universities, and that she was indeed asked to leave the premiership due to the damage done by her view on colonialism and race (as she is doing again). To make her an eminent exile to St Helena, similar to Napoleon, seems to be in her dreams. What is clear is that Zille has her own agenda to do the DA as much harm as possible. She has become her own destroyer in the DA’s politics, as well as the county’s politics. Thankfully for her there is a place and sympathy for a pensioned joker in politics, even world-wide.54

For Maimane the above, namely the possible presence still today of a small but strong empowered group of right-wing mischief-makers in the DA who not only can oust him, but can also send him overseas in the near future or to St Helena! Be aware!

What is clear, Maimane and also the DA’s other leaders learned well from the recent elections, is that a party cannot be unlimited everything for everyone: you can be a party for everyone, but one based on clear moral principles, free from racism and free from the sheltering of politically contaminated opportunists whose foundations rest in pre-1994 racial and self-centred South Africa. A centre party or a social democratic party requires clear borders to the left as well as to the right, far away from the vague bordering on political policy of the present DA. Furthermore, there are signs of stagnation in the DA, as its election results in the May elections reflect. This is due, again as abovementioned, to a certain extent because of the DA’s circling around its middle ground position in politics wherein its’ fine, clear value proposition to voters, after their years of exposure to the ANC’s rude politics, did not always come through correctly or was appreciated.32,45,67

To be a winner in the post-2019 politics, the DA’s ideal composition of members must be proportionally 10 Blacks to 1 White. This ideal is also appropriate for its leadership. In its Constitution the Freedom Charter must be central.

3.2.1.3.9. Pastor Mmusi Maimane: a perspective
3.2.1.3.9.1. The “Poor” leader

There are some very strong critics of the leadership of Mmusi Maimane of the DA. Pivotal here is the allegation of his lack of a so-called “Zille-driving motivation-politics”. Many see him as another failed so-called “Tony Leon with his fight-back-strategy”, without bringing constructive politics to the table, other than constantly showing up Jacob Zuma’s and Cyril Ramaphosa’s failures and their empty promises.36

Descriptions of Maimane as a kind of sub-standard leader, a directionless leader, a powerless leader, a poor leader, etc., became prominent references since 2018 by some journalistic sectors. Included in this “Maimane-bashing”, frequently ignoring the modus operandi of Maimane and the present 2019 politics of the DA, is it important to note that the DA underwent a dramatic metamorphosis since 2014, writes Tabane.77 Maimane undoubtedly inherited a sometimes confused party, one leg in Black politics as well as one leg in White politics. It is still undergoing change today. It is a process wherein White empowerment was shifted to Black empowerment to a certain, but limited, extent. This was a shift that angered many of the White-NP-remnants in the DA, who has moved over to it when the NP passed away. This ongoing change in the DA’s identity brought the much needed activation into its foundation (as well as conflict) of more Black rights. Prominent here was also the erosion of exclusive White capitalism and the activation of inclusive capital, the fighting in some ways of Black inequality, poverty and landlessness of the mass of Blacks, the effort to phase out White supremacy in the party’s structure and policy, etc. This has so far not really been successfully done in terms of a clear one-White-citizen versus one-Black-citizen plan. This outcome is not a result of Maimane’s failure, but of White DA obstructionists and underminers trying to torpedo the party’s unity, potential and growth, and to make Maimane the scapegoat for everything that is wrong in the DA.12,22,36

Maimane, to make the DA a viable and sustainable party, undoubtedly tried in the past and is trying presently to challenge the upholding of White privilege and empowerment inside the DA’s structure, although not always openly and with the aggression so characteristic of persons such as Julius Malema, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma. He is starting to eye the shortcomings of the 1994 Dispensation, which was forced down on all Black South Africans. This intention is aimed at resettling the stagnant situation of the DA, coming from 1994. This gradual, but dramatic activation, Maimane handled and is still handling with grace. But it seems that there is not only outside the DA, but also inside the DA much dislike for his so-called “mild” approach to politics. Inside the DA both its left wing (Blacks) and its right wing (Whites) reflect hostility: the Blacks feel that his efforts to reform the DA are political diminutives while the Whites see his reforms as a threat to their “citizens’ rights” and this is in line with the so-called “discrimination” they have experienced since 1994 under the ANC. This “confused and projected anger” by the DA’s opposing groups seemingly activated their decision not to vote for the DA in the May 2019 election (470 396), but instead voted either for the FF+ (mostly Whites) and the ANC (mostly Blacks).12,24

The fact that the DA was doing to a certain extent better on the provincial level than on the national level has nothing to do with the leadership of Maimane, as some journalists tried to reflect. In declaring this tendency they must first look at the intention of the DA to go firstly for the provincial and municipality levels, before they aim for the national level. The differentiation in votes on national and provincial levels — wherein the DA did less well on the national level than on the provincial level and where the poor national outcome is blamed on Maimane as leader, is far fetched. The truth lies in the fact that two different kind of leaders were standing for the DA and two different political setups present for the DA in the recent elections. Kotze24 puts this misleading by mischief of political commentators to “label” Maimane a poor leader in terms of the post 2019 elections results in perspective when he writes24:11: “DA supporters might have voted for the party at provincial level and for someone else at national level.”

What most of the critics of Maimane ignore in their constant attacks on his “poor” leadership, is their own faulty mindsets, which became contaminated by the ANC top brass’ character and leadership and what is meant by a “poor” and “good” leader. Prominent here is some of the ANC leaders’ alleged involvement with stealing, bribery, corruption, state capture, mismanagement, nepotism, crookery, self-enrichment, hostile and aggressive behaviour against anyone opposing their actions and murder, etc., which have it seems become “accepted” and “correct” characteristics of the present-day leadership politics (the so-called “good” leaders) of South Africa. These are delinquent leaders, many of which would be locked up in other so-called “democracies” and indeed would end their lives before a firing squad in China or North Korea if they committed the same crimes there. The intense moral and political degeneration of the executive leadership of South Africa since 1994 wherein the “bad” instead of the “good” became the criteria, is confirmed by the election as parliamentarians and top brass leaders of the ANC with serious allegations against them to the sixth Parliament. Maimane, in this environment, stands out for his integrity, but at the same time, his extraordinary difference makes him a clear target for vicious attacks.24

3.2.1.3.9.2. The who is who of Mmusi Maimane

Maimane comes from a totally different culture of moral cleanliness, leaving the impression indeed of Maimane as the reluctant politician in the present South African politics. This may be true to a certain extent, but this contaminated political setup undoubtedly also already caused other would-be-politicians of his moral quality and character to shy away, unwilling to get involved in such a political mess which seems incurable. But Pastor Maimane undoubtedly sees a call to provide an example of better quality than the political leadership examples of the ANC which the country’s citizens have been forced to endure since 1994. Undoubtedly, South Africans need him, as they needed the late Sir De Villiers Graaff as leader of the opposition to counter the political evils and actions of the leaders of the NP and the AB from 1948 to 1994. Maimane’s political maturity, vision, leadership, focused strategy and balanced planning for the country’s future, are not only found in his good upbringing and cultural lifestyle, his career as a reverend and years on the pulpit, but are also evident in his advanced studies and training in theology and psychology (he holds masters degrees in both disciplines). Furthermore, his mindset is free from the murderous contamination of the revolutionary setup and the disorder of grabbing and plundering which seems to have become a permanent fixture in many of the ANC’s top brass, especially those coming from pre-1994.12,24

Maimane’s leadership is undoubtedly not characterised by the so-called weakness and shortcomings, as Jason Lloyd24 has tried to reflect in his undermentioned writing on Maimane before the May 2019 election. It seems as though Lloyd has a limited understanding of quality executive leadership (outside that of the EFF and the BLF). He wrote in February 2019 without fact as follows24:35: “The Democratic Alliance (DA) has had a very incompetent and weak leader in Mmusi Maimane.”

In this context Lloyd continues24:35:

The DA is currently rudderless and without any useable ideas or policy to provide answers to the complex post-apartheid political, social and economic challenges.

The latest Ipsos opinion survey indicates that the DA will receive only 14% of votes in the upcoming elections – compared with 22.23% in 2014 – which is possible proof of Maimane’s inadequate leadership.

Maimane has also failed to command authority and respect from mainstream black political parties such as the ANC and the EFF. Worse, he has failed to maintain authority in the DA itself. Against this background, it is probably not difficult or unfair to conclude that this must be at least partly because Maimane is black.

It is very important to look in depth at Lloyd’s myth writing. When studying Lloyds’s article24:35: “The rise and fall of Mmusi Maimane,” it seems to be saturated with political subjectivity wherein White supremacy seems to have a strong founding and driving force. On what the characteristics are of the ideal executive political leader (here seemingly a Black one), there is a total lack of description to use to make comparisons. The only leadership guideline offered by Lloyd seems to be an indirect comparison of Maimane with Ramaphosa and Zuma, who both failed the test of the ideal executive political leader. To contradict Lloyd’s postulation that the DA would only receive 14% of the votes in the May election due to Maimane’s presence as leader, the DA received 20% with Maimane as leader! On the indirect assumtion that Ramaphosa as number one would save the ANC and would bring it a 70% vote outcome in the election, only an ANC outcome of 57.7% arrived! (This outcome that was far worse than that under Jacob Zuma in 2014!) To hint that the DA lost 2% or 470 396 votes in the election under Maimane, he missed that the ANC under their “wonder boy” and messianic leader Ramaphosa, shed three times more votes, namely 1 410 446 votes! So from whence did Lloyd’s condemning classification of Maimane as a poor leader come?1-8,21,56-62

With regard to the reference to the “command of the ANC’s leadership” by Lloyd24 — undoubtedly a hint by Lloyd24 of the presence of a “respected ANC leadership from 1994 to 2019”– which disrespects Maimane, is it important in the first place to point out that such a characteristic of goodness, activating respect to the outside world by the ANC top brass, was absolutely absent from 1994 to 2019. (Forget that he further speaks of a “respected” EFF leadership, as a comparison with that of Maimane. Such respect has not for one day been present in the EFF since its foundation, as was well reflected by the only 10% of voters who supported the EFF at the ballot box). With reference to the so-called absence of “ideas” of Maimane (and the DA) versus the assumed ideas of the ANC and the EFF on ruling, these ideas of the ANC are saturated in political opportunism, anarchy and revolution, while the present-day ideas of the ANC were already present in its terrorist days. Thus: when Lloyd remarked on a lack of credible leaders in the DA, the question is: who is credible in the ANC or the EFF? What are his criteria of credibility? Since 1994 the ruling party’s leaders had only one, including the credibility of Nelson Mandela, as a credible leader, and that was Motlanthe. Ramaphosa is now trying his best, but it seems that since 2017 that success is missing out on him. Where did the chaos in the ANC as a ruler start?: In 1994 with Mandela and the introduction of corruption by a sector of the ANC top brass that forced the late Nelson Mandela to pinpoint it when he was president. Just listen to the witnesses at the Zondo- and Mpati- (and the other) commissions now underway, to see that there are very few of the ANC top brass that are “clean” and who’s respect Maimane longs for. The complex post-1994 political, social and economic problems were created and are today still further created exclusively by the ANC elite, not the DA or Maimane. To measure or compare Maimane’s leadership in terms of the ANC’s or EFF’s sick leaderships is extreme foolishness.16,17,20,24,70,71

The accusation that Maimane “is not respected by the black parties such as the ANC and the EFF” is incorrect or better yet, it is political confusion as to what respect, leadership and politics, per se mean. Firstly, neither the ANC’s or the EFF’s leadership are a criteria of status for Maimane against which to evaluate his leadership, or for the public to evaluate Maimane. Maimane, in absolute contrast to many of the ANC top brass, is free from extra-marital affairs, stealing, state capture, murder or terrorism, etc. The article by Lloyd24 is, as is much of the critique against him, seemingly intended and designed to personally take on Maimane, specifically before the May election. Studying it critically, it seems to be driven and orchestrated by the intention of character assasination, instead of an honest personal and leadership evaluation. Undoubtedly before the election there was a well orchestrated intention to curb the power of Maimane and the DA, for fear of their positive impact on the then upcoming election by way of demoralising possible DA supporters. These kinds of “attacks” are well reflected before the election by the execution of reports such as “Cyril’s appeal prompts DA to lower its poll ambitions”, “ DA poll a setback to coalition ambitions”, “The rise and fall of Mmusi Maimane”, and “Cyril more popular than ANC – poll”. Another political cliché in the Afrikaanspress reads: “Mmusi Maimane is nie juis baie gewild onder DA-lede in Gauteng nie. Tog pryk sy foto op die meeste DA-straatplakkate in die provinsie.” Another one reads “’n netto syfer van [net] 19% [IRR-poll] van DA -lede het boonop aangedui Maimane kom die mas op as opposieleier.” 16,1720,24,69-71,73-75

It seems as though the intention of some of these critical anti-Maimane journalists (especially Whites), with specific advice that Whites must vote for the ANC and Ramaphosa instead of the DA and Maimane, is centred in White self-interest. Some of them are seemingly deeply politically confused (and highly frightened) by their own position in post-2019 South Africa. 16,17,20,24,69-71,73-74

With the criticism of Maimane as leader of the DA, it is clear that most of the fight is specifically because Maimane is Black and that the DA’s continuation must be stopped at all costs. The White Zilles and White Leons must come back to be the boss of the DA. These White supremacists seem to believe that there are still going to be 5 million Whites (more: even 30 million!!) living in South Africa in a century’s time and thus that Whites still have “to be catered for as extraordinary” at present (together with their White capital and traditional rights to drive and steer the DA) at their will. The reality is that the Whites, by their lack of breeding and natural dying out, will be between 10 000 and 30 000 left in a century’s time. Maimane knows this well and is in the process not only of bringing the mass of poor and landless Blacks a better life, but also to assure the Whites a part in the country’s future by his transformation of the ultra-White politics inside the DA to equality politics.16,17,20,24,69-71,73-76

It is true that in the South African voting context the personality of the leader counts sometimes more than his party’s policy and popularity. The intention with the “popular giant Ramaphosa” was to take the “dying” ANC in the election away from the brink of death. But Ramaphosa’s magic did not work, as evidenced by the ANC’s 57.7% in the May election. It must be remembered that Nelson Mandela, far more popular even than the so-called popularity of Ramaphosa, and his ANC party of 1994 could not get beyond 63% of the votes. Ramaphosa failed to make it higher than 57.7%. It is important to note that Ramaphosa’s popularity declined in three month’s time from 73% to only 58% in April 2019, losing 15% in weight. This 58% popularity of Ramaphosa seems to be in line with the 57.7% of votes which the ANC received in the election, making the Ramaphosa factor as an exclusive “election-power” basically zero. It also confirms and emphasises Motlanthe’s view that Ramaphosa is not a political or messianic leader, nor that he can improve an ailing ANC. The blind hero-position constantly awarded to Ramaphosa above Maimane in most of the anti-Maimane rhetoric, as well as the comparison of bad (Maimane) versus good (Ramaphosa), with the view that Ramaphosa is the messianic leader of South Africa, is the evidence that firstly, Ramaphosa is not such a gifted messianic leader, and secondly that his name will be remembered as outstanding in the South African political history. Maimane’s chances are excellent to become a formidable leader in the near future. The phrase: “In South Africa’s voting setup the personality of the leader counts sometimes more than his party’s policy and popularity”, can await Maimane in post-2019.70,77

To describe Maimane as24:35: “…inexperienced in politics, a reluctant political participant who has never really had a well-seasoned political strategy and vision, operating (like most clergymen) from a theological reference frame that has little or no space for other social influences” against the “credible modern technocrat Ramaphosa who is getting rid of the Zuma baggage and building a new ANC”, is nonsense. It reflects not only political “short-sightedness”, but the inability to read future politics. For a political commentator, this is a serious defect in his or her political dynamics. 24,76

In line with the above clichés or allegations of “poor leadership” around Maimane, is it not a surprise when RW Johnson12 also rates him low. But what is a surprise, is his personal attack, perhaps not so extreme as the one reflected by Lloyd. But what needs to be reported, is the religious foundation of the attack. It needs to be reflected, specifically because it can border on the introduction of religious intolerance in South Africa.12,24 Johnston writes12:4-5: “Die feit dat die 38-jarige Maimane jonk en onervare is, ‘n voormalige ANC-ondersteuner wat steeds in ANC-terme dink en ‘n prediker in ‘n fundamentalistiese kerk wat evolusie verwerp, het ook nie gehelp onder die DA se tradisionele liberale Engelse basis nie.” What on earth Maimane’s Christian religious preferences and church-affiliation in a Christian society, as well as a secular state, have to do which his leadership, without reflecting on it with the seeming intention of mischief, is totally unclear. Also the unasked “English contamination” in Maimane’s leadership is neither fish nor flesh. It seems to reflect back to Johnston’s long stay in Britain and the internalising of unfit cognition there which he now applies here. It only brings us back to one clear fact and that is how intensely the “Christian Black” Maimane is under attack, because he accepted the leadership of the till now exclusively pro-White DA.12,24

3.2.1.3.9.3. The good “Graaff characteristics” of Maimane

Maimane has the “Graaff characteristics” to pull the DA and the social democrats into the government of the day. Not so much immediately post-May 2019, but before the 2021 local elections. Maimane, similar to Sir de Villiers Graaff, is also one of the few top politician-gentlemen ever to sit in Parliament. Moreover, other than Graaff who could not bring down the despotic NP in his life, Maimane and his political grouping can be successful in bringing down the ANC.24,78-82

To bring the (poor) leadership of Maimane in line with the DA’s (poor) performance in the past election, as done by many political analysts in the postmortem of the May elections, is absolutely unscientific and nothing but mischief-making speculation. The chair of the DA’s Fedex, Athol Trollip, explains that the reason that the ANC won the election over the DA with 57.5% versus 20%, is the fact that the South Africans will vote ANC come hell or high water. It is seated in the revolutionary background of the ANC. The DA is still a White party for them, hostile to Black interests. The fault is not with the DA, requiring them to soul-search with regard to their performance under Maimane and their future in post-2019 politics, but with these South Africans who support the ANC and who blindly vote for such a corrupt bunch and who are prepared to accept mediocrity and maladministration over and over. Closely aligned herewith is the outdated Apartheid ticket which is still used by the hypocratic ANC who swims together with radicals such as the EFF in a tide of racial nationalism and populism. With regard to the critique that the DA under Maimane did not made inroads for instance in the Eastern Cape with only a 15% voter outcome, it is clear that none of the other parties made an inroad there either. Indeed, the DA increased its votes in Soweto from 5% to 13%. The DA under Maimane is still the second largest party, twice the size of the EFF.28,83

On the foolish efforts and suggestions of the removal of Maimane, various political commentators and analysts, such as Sefara86, Nyuatsamba32, Beukman3,84 and Essop85 are much more direct when guiding us than most political commentators, who are used to sit on two chairs. Their statements are uniform: he must stay on.3,84-86

Firstly, Sefara86 reflects on the loss in votes for the DA in the recent election, by showing that, as many other commentators have already indicated, it was to a great extent indeed a direct outcome after Mainane started to draw the line on greater Black empowerment in the DA that some right-wingers fled to the FF+. There is indeed an incomplete spelling out of strong affirmative action and the land ownership matter in the DA. But Maimane’s activation of a clear policy on land ownership and speaking out as a Black on the DA’s critical affairs was limited by the right-wing in the DA. Their internal mischief in the DA’s racial politics led to the flow of right-wing Whites to the FF+ (±150 000 votes) and not Maimane’s inability as leader. The public missed that the right-wingers assured that Maimane was not fully in charge of the DA’s leadership and the party’s politics, to be able to take much needed significant and sometimes dramatic decisions on Black interests. This was an identity crisis which the DA, as well as Maimane, innocently as the new appointed head, ran into before the May election, costing the DA both Black and White voters.

Secondly, pinpointing this present crisis wherein the DA is still functioning two months after the election, Sefara writes86:26: “And therein lies the DA’s existential question: will the removal of Maimane and his replacement by a white leader help the DA grow beyond 22% in the next polls? Is the loss of conservative white voters to the FF+ a necessary catharsis for the DA to start positioning itself as a genuine alternative – not a party of right-wingers with a black leader at the top?

Sefara86 and Beukman3,84 are fully correct in their opinion that to remove Maimane, without firstly addressing the DA’s policy incoherence, will hurt the DA and can spell its end. It will be a statement of impatience with its first Black leader, as well as the reflection of an unchangeable White party and a party which lacks internal dynamics, either as an opposition or as a ruler, to be able to constructively change South Africa. Maimane, for Sefara86 as for Beukman3,84 and Essop85, must be retained as the party’s top leader with the full power to reposition the party further and where necessary, dramatically. He must be allowed to unrestrictedly sell his vision to the broad public.3,84-86

On Maimane in future politics, Beukman3,84 contends that he is not long in the post and was forced to address the immense growing pains of the last five years. He is not a light-weight and learned a lot and is clearly focused not only on making the DA a better party, but also contributing to a better post-2019 South Africa. Beukman concludes84:11: “Baie meer ervare leiers wêreldwyd het al slegter as hy daarvan afgekom.”

Thombothi87 puts his finger possibly best on Pastor Mmusi Maimane’s leadership dilemma in South African society, where since 1994, bad became gradually intertwined with good to overwhelm it fully in the end, making bad ultimately good. Secondly, bad became the norm. The phasing out of the traditional bi-polar division of good versus bad lead to the evaluation of all behaviour in terms of the grading of bad, worse and worst, with bad the most reflected and acceptable behaviour. On Maimane’s leadership dilemma, he was caught up in this normalised bad culture of the South African politics wherein corruption, theft, murder and specifically land expropriation without compensation, are central and have became the rule of the day. Thombothi writes87:11: “Maybe Mmusi Maimane, in his opposition to expropriation, was judged not to have been sufficiently gung-ho. But Maimane is a pastor. He can’t preach compassion on Sunday and hatred every other day. He also doesn’t seem to have a nasty bone in his body, which appears to be a prerequisite in politics these days. Slaan terug would not sit well in his studio.”

But, it must be emphasised, this dilemma is not unique to Maimane as leader of the DA. It is also part of the dilemma of the DA as a centrist party, which cannot reflect hatred to one of its factions while at the same time bathing another faction in compassion. Not the best and most god-begging prayer can really help Maimane or his DA in this dilemma. Thankfully we have still the Solomon wisdom approach to cognitively handle our immediate crises in the New Dawn South Africa, until goodness is reborn somewhere in the future.

3.2.1.3.10. Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018

The count awarded to the DA and its leadership in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, is 59 (72%) out of a possible maximum of 82. 3,79

Our initial decision to allow the application of the DA onto the list to be considered as a possible candidate to be able to rule South Africa after the 8th May 2019 was correct and appropriate. Its application qualifies to be allowed onto the shortlist of candidates.

5. Conclusions

Looking in retrospect at the DA’s political history, it is clear that millions of South Africans have seen their communities improved under the DA’s good governance. They have also watched the DA take up the fight in Parliament and hold the ANC government to account for every community which has had their rights denied by the ANC government. The people have appreciated the DA’s fight for justice.

The DA and its leaders’ overall evaluation shows that they are still short of 23 (28%) points out of a possible 82 to be the ideal candidate for appointment as the capable ruler to execute land redistribution. Although their CV shows that their qualifications are excellent and comprehensively obtained from top accredited institutions, and their attestations show that they are trustworthy, with immense integrity and that their leader, Mmusi Maimane, has the character and overall potential to run as president of the land, are there shortcomings in their experience due to their youth in politics. Important here is their lack of experience on land reform – and specifically on land expropriation without compensation. Where the issue of the land matter emerges in the DA’s politics, it seems to be determined and driven by White interests, rather than the interests of the poor and landless Blacks. There seems here to be strong signs of a White-stan mentality, very much like the dreadful Bantustans which were run from the Cape Parliament by the National Party and its Afrikaner nationalists.21,57-62,79-91

The critics’ mention of the country having been poorly served on the land ownership matter by the DA and that the party over the past two to three years has frequently stumbled is true. This allowed the ANC a free pass again in the May elections to without obstruction redeliver its past mischief up to 2024. The critics’ view is that the DA’s inclination to oppose the government by any means in some instances stopped progress in the country. The issue of land expropriation, with or without compensation, is an inappropriate fight by the DA. The failure by the DA to write a mandate to serve the citizens of South Africa on just and balanced land ownership within a democratic plan for instance with the ANC as a partner, has lead to the present conflict around land ownership and the possibility of immediate land expropriation that can spell land grabbing and revolution.

The DA must take some advice and criticism to heart: South Africans are looking for a change in a social, economic and political direction, not just public relations branding or window-dressing. In this hopefully new direction, the DA must not mind about its right flank streaming to the confused FF+, which since 1994 has been travelling in circles in the desert, or that its left flank is running to a temporary revitalized ANC, which is trying hard to climb back from its deathbed. There are enough good people at the centre — people who can go nowhere else and who do not want to go anywhere else — to change and to build up the DA.

It is time for the DA to accept that the landownership matter has been exaggerated for a long time by the ±35 000 White farmers (of which only between 5 000 and 7 000 really contribute to the country’s essential daily food supply). The opportunistic group of the rest of the ±30 000 White farmers, with their self-appointed White rescuers and saviours, represent less than 0.1% of the total South African population and less than 1% of the White population. If the mesmerised White sympathisers with the White rescuers and saviours movement are taken into account, the number is far lower than 300 000 of the White population of 5 million, representing at most 6%. It is time for the DA to purify itself from this 300 000 White individuals’ contamination. They must be repositioned to where they belong: outside the DA. The other nearly 5-million Whites also have citizen-interests but are sidelined and ignored outside the 35 000 White farmers’ priority-interests. This priority granted to 35 000 White farmers and there land led also to the ignoring of the interests of nearly 30-million poor and landless Blacks in the post-1994 Democracy. It just can go on this way.4-8

Although the DA was allowed onto the shortlist of candidates, it needs still 28% (a lack of nearly 30%) to reach the maximum points of 100% for the final evaluation of the next national election in 2024. It is up to the DA to improve its experience and know-how, and to reposition its attestations to reach the 100% mark. A clear policy on land redistribution must be formulated. The ability to effect land redistribution with justice and balance needs to be improved by the DA.

In this context the DA must take note of three important facts. First the words of Mthombothi’s8 when he said many South Africans are not particularly impressed or satisfied with the present political parties and that they, after 25 years of democracy, are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable. The second is the fact that 18.2-million potential voters (51% of the total voters’ population) stayed away from the ballot box in the 8th May 2019 elections.4-8 They are waiting and hungry to support and to vote for the correct party. The third, enclosing to the second fact, is that most South Africans are looking sincere for that extraordinary party of goodness, as Mthombothi said8:19: “regardless of race, want the same thing – a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for themselves and their families. They’ll support a party with a unifying message that will make a genuine stab at it. Time may have come for a new party that will inspire fresh hope in a disillusioned electorate.” Why can this party not be the reformed DA?

Maimane can be just too optimistic about the future soul of the DA when he said92:4: “We must occupy the centre. We cannot pursue the left or the right. This election has confirmed more than ever that the centre is where we need to be. We just need to be clearer about who we are and what we are about.” But to be the future ruler it goes far beyond the centre of politics in present-day South Africa. It requires an understanding of existential politics to can make sense of centric politics. It goes thus far beyond left or right politics versus central politics. It is about the life-long permanent fused-in of Black and White conflict-politics, like the issue of land-grabbing and -terrorism coming from 1671. It means far more than just the practice of adapt or die politics to can survive for a party. It can mean the “killing” of a nation’s personality.

In its present form the DA does not exhibit the ability to be able immediately to affect successfully land reform on its own. It has the potential to do it with an experienced and seasoned political partner, within an orderly framework. Otherwise it must change itself immediately to a basically new party; one that can, as a dynamic party, brings at last the peace, security and prosperity for what South Africans are longing for so much

The journey to the 2024 elections for the DA may be easy, but it can also never be reached without an immediate and dramatic turnaround in its politics. Time will tell.

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  61. Louw GP. 2019. Ensovoort, 39: 1(1): 1-61: Perspectives on the background to the land ownership dispute (2).
  62. Louw GP. 2018. Ensovoort, 38: 12(1): 1-25: Who are colonists and who are indigenous people in South Africa (1).
  63. Sokutu B. Socialism fails to appeals at the polls. The Citizen (News). 2019 May 16; p. 8.
  64. Makhanya M. SA gee (regse) stappie agteruit. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 May 26; p. 11.
  65. Mokone Ď, Deklerk A. Mmusi cracks whip on DA old guard. Sunday Times (News). 2019 May 2; p. 4.
  66. Zille H. Dít was my fout. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 May 26; p. 7.
  67. Maqhina M. Zille in hot water over ‘black privilege’ rant. The Star (Nation). 2019 May 22; p. 9.
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  70. Mvumvu Z. Cyril more popular than ANC -poll. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Febr. 24; p. 4.
  71. Matiwane Z, Deklerk A. Cyril’s appeal prompts DA to lower its poll ambitions. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March.24; p. 4.
  72. Mkhondo R. Let’s put it to a vote – referendums would rejuvenate our jaded democracy. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 June 3; p. 18.
  73. Mvumvu Z, Makinana A. New race row rocks DA. Sunday Times 2019 March 17; pp. 1, 4.
  74. Ed-EFF as koalisievennoot skrik minderheidskiesers af – peilong. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 10.
  75. Matiwane Z, Deklerk A. Cyril’s appeal prompts DA to lower its poll ambitions. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March.24; p. 4
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  80. Louw GP. 2018. Ensovoort, 38 (2018): 7(1): 1-54: An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of the South Africa: 1652 to 2018. Part 3: Factors that influence the development of executive political leaders.
  81. Louw GP. 2018. Ensovoort, 38: 6(2): 1-44: An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652 to 2018. Part 2: The entities in government and society that executive political leaders used to aid their political behaviour.
  82. Louw GP. 2018. Ensovoort, 38: 6(1): 1-31: An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652-2018. Part 1: Leadership characteristics in perspective.
  83. Trollip A. Question & Answer. Sunday Times. 2019 May 12; p. 25.
  84. Beukman B. Twee ‘groot verloorders. Beeld (Middelblad). 2019 May 17; p. 11.
  85. Essop P. Maimane ‘verdien nog ‘n termyn’. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 May 15; p. 2.
  86. Sefara M. A stern electorate gives the major parties one more chance to do what they promised. Sunday Times. 2019 May 12; p. 26.
  87. Mthomboti B. Ramaphosa’s hand has been strengthened, now he must use it to slap down corruption. Sunday Times. 2019 May 12; p. 25.
  88. South Africa. Kommissie vir die Sosio-ekonomiese Ontwikkeling van die Bantoegebiede binne die Unie van Suid-Afrika (Tomlinson Commission – U.G. 61/1955). Pretoria: Government Press; 1955.
  89. Van der Walt AJ. Die Eeu van die Veeboer-pionier. In: Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika. Cape Town: NASOU; Anon.
  90. Afrikaners are Black. [Internet]. [Cited 2018 July 8]. Available from http://www.news24/Afrikaners-are-black-20130223
  91. Greeff J. Deconstructing Jaco: Genetic Heritage of one Afrikaner. Annals of Human Genetics, 2007:71(5); 674-688. [Internet]. [Cited 2018 Dec. 5]. Available from https://DOI:10.1111/j.1469-1809.2007.00363.X
  92. Mokone T. Adapt or die. Sunday Times (News). 2019 June 9; p. 4.

PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa. (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanisation and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan or Khois (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Badness, candidate, crookedness, delinquency, election, evaluation, expropriate, goodness, leadership, political party, responsibility, scenario, wrong-doings,

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 3

1. Background

1.1.   Introduction

It is clear from studying the previous two continuous articles (Articles 7 and 8) that myths and lies played an enormous role in misinforming the mindsets of South Africans on the intended land expropriation and the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution. Prominent in this environment of misinformation are the promises during the May 8, 2019 election of the various political parties contesting the place of the utmost ruler for post-2019. Of great importance here are the promises of the three top political parties which emerged from the election on how they are going to address the land expropriation issue — including how they are going to “solve” the many other demanding political, social and economic issues in post-2019 South Africa. But, as the political history of South Africa, coming from as far back as 1652, tells us over and over, there is a massive difference between promises and deeds, especially good deeds. These deeds are required from the voters in exchange for their mandate to the ruler to “think and do” upon their behalf, and the empty promises of politicians and their parties.1

1.1.1 Lack of understanding of political responsibility by political parties and their leaders

The abovementioned outcome is basically because political parties in present-day South Africa do not understand the immense responsibility around the local-global-plan of governance. Every task entrusted to the executive political leader, his top brass and his party as a government, should be successfully executed by him in terms of the voters’ mandate to be a good leader, as well as for the country to be able to fit into the local-global plan of governance. As a pre-requisite included here is the guarantee to be able to be trusted by the voters to deliver only goodness and goodwill to them in the future. Malloch-Brown2 emphasises that South Africa’s invidious local-global prescriptions for good governance will not go away, and neither will the demand for positive change. It is a hard task to master for a political party cum regime, as it always tests the actions of a regime and the correctness of the state by its society. Even the honourable Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma3 during his presidency had to admit in public that it was far more difficult for him as president and the ANC as a regime to run South Africa, than it was for them to fight for its freedom. He failed to deliver such a mandate as leader of an elected regime, which was forced suddenly to act outside the setup of the revolutionaries’ rhetoric, promises and delinquent actions.2,3

This disconnection of the ANC from the voters, allowing them as a regime to act delinquently outside their election promises and their agreed mandate from the voters to only do good to them, is to a great extent cemented in the present corrupt Electoral Act which fully erased direct responsibility to the voters from MPs and MPLs. In this situation, which the ANC fully optimised and misused only for its top brass’ interest, the response and responsibility of MPs and MPLs were relayed only to the party and its top brass, while the top brass drove their own interests far away from that of the voters’ interests, needs and wishes.4-10

There is at the moment a legal action to change the Act in order to make MPs and MPLs directly responsible to voters. This will be the end of the favouring of the ANC to be able to manipulate the voters and to continue their spree of crooked candidates without a say by the ordinary people. Moreover, the indication is that this can bring the ANC down in the next election, if it has not fallen on its own sword already after the May election.4-10

The extent to which the ANC failed the voters was exclusively as a result of serious wrong-doing due to a lack of direct responsibility to the voters. This was not only confirmed by the public admission thereof before the May 9 Election by its top brass, but also the “begging” at the same time by the ANC’s top brass (including Cyril Ramaphosa) for “forgiveness” of the ANC as a party and its leadership, for its crookedness and delinquency since 1994.11-16

Ramphosa even extended his previous begging for forgiveness to the ANC supporters by his admission again after the election to these many ANC-wrong-doings. Prominent here is his confession, seemingly after immense emotional self-torture, of which Munusamy writes17:20:

Ramaphosa arrived at the election results ceremony [of the May 8 election] last Saturday looking like his dog had died rather than the person who had just rescued his party from having to share power in order to govern. But at the ANC’s victory celebration outside Luthuli House the next day, Ramaphosa conceded that the party had been chastened. He promised that the ANC was no longer an arrogant party and had heard the candid message from the electorate.

With honesty it must be acknowledged that the above kinds of political, social and economic failures of the ANC are inherited from most of the South African regimes coming from 1910. We see it in the failures of the various White political parties’ and party-alliances’ reigns between 1910 and 1948, wherein the Blacks’ interests were not only insignificant but criminally treated, equalling the mass wrong-doings of the post-1994 regime of the ANC. The same delinquency and failure were reflected by the DF Malan regime between 1948 and 1950. This period reflects, as does that of the ANC, that the National Party did not have the slightest idea of good governance, besides political mischief in their creation of the post-1950 Apartheid and its immense evils.1

The South African politics inside the post-1994’s so-called First Democracy has been tough on political aspirants and opportunists at the same time (and thus not only on the ANC in highlighting its faults, as well as its inabilities to not be able to survive in troubled situations). This is reflected by the failed outcomes and disappearance of the many political parties that had enrolled for the recent May election in their fight for a place in Parliament. Mvumvu reports18:1: “A record number of political parties contested the elections, but at the end it was the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that smiled all the way to the bank. Of 48 parties that appeared on the national ballot, only 13 will likely see a return on their investment of R200,000, which the IEC requires to register for elections nationally.”

1.1.2. The madness of 48 political parties and 10 000 candidates in the 8th May 2019 National Election

Firstly, it must be noted that for the May election 48 parties were registered, with more than 10 000 national candidates (2 089 in 2014) and 8 000 provincial candidates (6 562 in 2014). All of the 48 parties and the 10 000 national candidates had more than offered to solve the land debacle: they promised solely to solve it if they were elected as the regime. Of these 48 aspirants, as many as 35 failed the test to obtain a seat in the national elections, while of the 13 left as the so-called “winners”, basically only three can be given attention. The three are the ANC, the DA and the EFF.10  

With regard to the more or less 10 insignificant parties which made it to Parliament, together with the ANC, the DA and the EFF, political commentator Tabane19 gave us a good pre-evaluation already in February 2019 (three months before the May election), based on his “charismatic requirement of the leadership” of a party to be able to survive, when he wrote19:1:

Derhalwe sal die 2019-verkiesing waarskynlik die doodsklok vir Azapo, die PAC en Agang lui omdat hulle nie charismatiese leiers het nie. Maar Mosiuoa Lekota se Cope, wat eintlik op sy sterfbed moet wees weens gebrekkige organisaie, sal waarskynlik bloot weens Lekota se sterk persoonlikheid ‘n setel of twee behou. Good sal ook baat vind by die blote teenwoordigheid van sy leier, De Lille. Haar naam en vorige pos as burgemeester van Kaapstad sal verseker dat Good ‘n klein teenwoordigheid in die Wes-Kaap en dalk Gauteng en Noord-Kaap sal hê.

The political analyst Muzi Kuzwayo20 writes hereto in April 2019 on Paricia de Lille’s politics, up to her present-day party, named Good20:2: “She first cashed in a few years after she started, her party defunct and moving over to the DA and becoming mayor of Cape Town in return – good deal. Who knows what loot Good will bring her.”

Botha21, in January 2019, wrote on the UDM and its charismatic leader Bantu Holomisa. Botha21 reflects that Holomisa played a prominent role in exposing the alleged corruption in the PIC and was indirectly responsible for the exit of its executive, Dan Matjila. Botha’s21 gut feeling in January was that Holomisa would still play a role in Parliament after May. He postulates21:18:

“Holomisa se integriteit maak van hom ‘n blywende figuur. Hou hom dop.”

Holomisa’s and the UDM’s chances were critically analysed before the May election, due to their popularity within the Xhosa-tribe. It was surmised that they were good to win a seat, or mostly two, in Parliament. The pre-May view was that the Minority Front (MF) which was founded by the late Amichand Rajbansi, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IVP), the Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus), the National Freedom Party (NFP) and the ACDP were all insignificant with regard to gaining a prominent number of seats. They are on their deathbeds.21-23

On the FF Plus’s political future as an entity in Black South Africa, Khumalo24 in April 2019 quoted with good reason the opinion of the BLF leader, Andile Mngxitama24:4:

“You should look at their leadership and tell me if there is any diversity. That party only uses a few black stooges to belie the fact that it is still a racist Afrikaans party. Look at the party’s history: leaders from the former Conservative Party, a party that wished to preserve many aspects of apartheid in its DNA, were assimilated into the FF Plus…”

The false image created by the FF+ as a possible future role-player in the country’s politics by its taking of the fifth-most seats in the National Assembly in the May 2019 election, mostly from the DA, was a temporary outcome of the old NPs “rebellion votes”. This group was until now part of the DA supporters, but had become aggravated by “black rule” inside the DA, and decided to vote for the FF+. Hereto is the FF+ for many political strategists nothing more than a false mirage on the horizon for these old NPs as their new rescuer and saviour. The FF+, as is the EFF, extremely racially orientated, making it a post-2019 failure in waiting.24-25

That Andile Mngxitama’s viewpoint on the FF+ may be correct, is confirmed by Buccus’s view. He writes26:26: “

It is true that the crude racial populism of the EFF and the Freedom Front Plus made some gains, but in the overall picture they remain a minority. Mandela’s vision of racial reconciliation clearly still has the support of the majority of South Africans.”

What the boosters and hopefuls of the FF+ forget, or are not familiar with, is that the Whites as a tribe are diminishing yearly at nearly 100 000, and can thus be phased out in a century’s time. Neither the FF+, Solidarity, AfriForum nor AgriSA are true White rescuers and saviours. They can only by their anti-African standpoint (as seen in their actions on the land reform matter), contaminate the Whites’ future in South Africa.1

To shed more light on the many other opportunists who tried in vain to go to Parliament to eat out of its enormous food trough (and also to change silently and unnoticed from tough freedom fighters to freedom eaters) – a scenario which Kuzwayo20:2 aptly described before the May 8 election as an “alphabet soup on the menu in this election” — there are the African Transformation Movement (ATM) with the crowd-puller Mzwanele Manyi on its staff, the joker party the African Content Movement (ACM) of Hlaudi Motsoeneng, and the Economic Emanicipation Forum  (EEF) to outdo the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in radicalism and racism.20,27,28

The final reflection on the May 8 election outcomes confirm Kuzwayo’s20 above reference to the alphabetic failure of a mass with the evidence that 35 parties did not make it further than the ballot box on the voting day.18,29

Munusamy30 also comments about the final end-results of some of the parties when she writes30:26:

“The era of veteran personalities in politics is now waning. The UDM leader Bantu Holomisa, COPE’s Mosiuoa Lekota and the IFP’s Mangosuthu Buthelezi ought to exit the political stage, as the country is clearly seeking fresh talent. Patricia de Lille, however, has proved to be the Meryl Streep of South African politics, able to steal the show in whatever role she appears.”

Okoye31 brings the leader of the African Content Movement (ACM), Hlaudi Motsoeneng, the former SABC Chief Operating Officer, into clear perspective after the May election as a good example of some of the “political leaderships” at our top governmental institutions under the ANC, and of the leaderships of the various political parties which competed in the election (mostly to fail miserably). On Motsoeneng’s so-called “personality as a leader”, Okoye31 reports his alleged words about himself31:6: “He said he refused to hide the fact that he wanted to be president and that leadership was in his blood.” In particular, she quoted his self-praise by using of his own words, namely31:6: “I need to be a person who’s taking decisions. I know how to run South Africa! I have managed a [multimillion-rand] company.” [This of a multimillion-rand company referring to the financially crippled public broadcaster the SABC, which analysts say he helped to run into the ground]. In reaction to Motsoeneng praising himself as the “future president in waiting”, the two political analysts Zamikhaya Maseti and Ralph Mathekga, writes Okoye, labelled him as a31:6:  “political comedy that was not to be taken seriously”, that there was “no legitimate cause to appeal,” and that he “bankrupted the SABC” so it was a bad example to refer to his leadership there.”

But this “labelling” must not be seen as exclusive only to Motsoeneng, but indeed inclusive to most of the leaders of the 48 parties that took part in the election and their self-praise of false excellence31:6:  “I am a person who’s taking decisions, I know how to run South Africa, I have managed a multimillion-rand company, I have leadership in my blood, I want and am going to be the president.”

It is thus with good reason that Ben Trovato32 could write to the leaders, at least, of these manifold failed parties, as follows32:14: “Dear leaders of the 34 parties that never won a seat, it really is a crying shame that you did so poorly. Let me put that another way. I am crying with laughter at your shame. I do apologise”, and: “How can anyone be filled with so much hubris that they misjudge their popularity this badly?”

But Trovato’s32 above comment of “no-good” for the 34 “losers” is even applicable to the 13 “winners” that have made it to Parliament. This includes the ANC and the three nearest winners to the ANC. The question is: Are these 13 winners truly deserving winners with the potential to better South Africans’ poor, even desperate, circumstances, as well as to solve the land-ownership conflict?15,32

The answer is an emphatic NO, when just looking at the top winner’s most recent classification by the imminent ex-president Kgalema Motlanthe12, namely that the ANC is on its deathbed. Motlanthe12 (the Interim President from September 2008 to May 2009 and also Secretary-General of the ANC from 1997 to 2007 and the party’s Deputy President from 2007 to 2012), says that the ANC is now in a far worse shape than it was before the 2017 Nasrec Conference, that elected Cyril Ramaphosa. This view was confirmed by the poor performance of the ANC in the May election.11,12,14,15

This is an opinion echoed by many political analysts.11,14,15 Motlanthe12 comments on the ANC’s  doubtful future, specifically its viability and sustainability, when he says12:4: “The ANC is not in great shape… I think to strengthen the ANC it needs a surgical overhaul from where it is now. It is worse than it was in 2017 [before the Nasrec Conference]”, and: “…that [the] ANC could only change if it died in its current form and was reborn as a grassroots movement”.

1.1.3. The presence of an able political party to successfully steer the land reform initiative

The abovementioned outcome moves me to ask again, as in the Conclusion of the previous Article 8, the prominent question as to whether there is at the moment any capable South African political party, which, either as a sole ruling party or as a partner-party in an alliance, can steer the initiative of land expropriation into the near future with success.

This is a very complex question to answer, but the political analyst Mamokgethi Molopyane33 tries to do so for us, in some way at least, when he writes that the three main political parties, the ANC, the DA and the EFF, were all, after the election, left at a crossroads. In this context the two lower ranking parties, the IFP and the FF+, are ignored: their immediate future in the country’s politics, as significant parties, is zero).24-26,33                                                                                                                                                                          All three of the main parties were unmasked to have immense political weaknesses by the election. Prominent in this regard is their arrogance and their foolishness, as reflected by their thinking that they could in the past and still today solely think on behalf of the population and that this thinking was 100 percent correct. In particular in this chaotic setup is their disconnection from the people whom they assumed supported their ideologies and actions. Pertinent here in their confusion, is the matter of extreme land expropriation without compensation and the negative racial context thereof by land grabbing and nationalising of White assets.33

The above postulation of Molopyane33 is in line with the general postulations of various other political analysts and strategists that were quoted earlier, especially the ANC’s troubled position.11,12,14,15

In reflecting on the three main political parties and their possible failure to fulfil to the standards to be a ruler of quality versus the poor status and condition of their present political constitution, Molopyane33 gives further good insight. He writes as follows33:21: “The coinciding decline of the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), contrasted with the below-expectations growth of the Economic Freedom Fighters EFF), are unsurprising developments with far-reaching, unique consequences for each.”

Molopyane33 pinpoints a stern warning when he writes33:21: “Political parties must adapt or reinvent themselves or they’ll find little or no support from SA’s dynamic populance.”

This undoubtedly puts my question: “…are there able South African political parties who can fast steer the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future?”  into the foreground. This is a question that not the ANC, the DA or the EFF can escape and must answer themselves. Not one of them honestly can or will do so, however. It is up to the political analysts, strategists and commentators to do it on their behalves, however much they like it or not.

In this context of doubt on the future abilities specific to the ANC as the post-2019 ruler, Molopyane posits33:21:

“The ANC’s support is waning. It’s proving to be devoid of freshness, with leaders who have been in politics for so long they may be reluctant to envision change. The party must undergo a makeover of its leaders and change the perceptions they’ve created. If a credible, attractive opposition emerged, its hold on power would fail. Its biggest hurdle is itself.”

On the DA he writes33:21:

“These elections have shown that having a black man in charge doesn’t translate into resonance with black voters. The DA’s crisis may not be as apparent as that of the ANC, but it’s similarly struggling to contemplate change. Worse, it’s riddled with the fear that it might alienate its white supporters.”

With reference to the EFF, Molopyane postulates33:21:

“We tend to forget the enthusiasm and political cult of youth doesn’t offer value for voters. Populism in the age of social media doesn’t mean the same in real life. The election showed that the red party will have to come up with a new approach. Its change in direction must reflect the challenges faced by a society in an ever-changing globalised economy. Although appearing to make the right noises, voters denied the EFF that 15%. Was it a case of dislike, distrust or low turnout?”

This clear warning by Molopyane33 of the possible diminishing from the political scene in the near future by even the three top “winners” of the recent May election, must not be taken lightly and must be read with Louw’s1 opinion that manipulating and under-performing regimes had only the slightest idea of what they were doing and what the outcome of their political self-empowerment would activate in the end for themselves, as well as for the country they ruled. He writes that these sub-standard regimes’ shelf life is limited. This is confirmed by the various European Empire states of the 20th Century, which mostly collapsed due to their wrong-doings after the duration of an average 45 years. Hereto the corrupt and racial-discriminative NP and its nationalist Afrikaners’ self-styled “mini-empire of multi-nations” (or the unofficially managed “NP Union”) only lasted from 1948 to 1961 (13 years), and their “mini-empire for multi-states” (Republic) from 1961 to 1994 (33 years), while the Union of South Africa (exclusively British-orientated under pro-British Whites), lasted from 1910 to 1948 (38 years). This reflects an average of 24 years for the three regimes in office.1,33

On the limiting-build-in to the reigning of political parties in South Africa, especially in terms of Louw’s1 reference to a maximum period of 24 years in office, Mthombothi34 also speaks in the same context when he, in a short post-mortem of the May 8 2019 election, refers to the “possible limited” status of the ANC in the present-day and future politics of the country after a 25 year reign. His overview and insight need full reference. He comprehensively writes34:19:

The outcome of the elections will be debated and analysed for some time to come, but what is clear is that many South Africans were not particularly impressed or satisfied with what was on offer. After 25 years of democracy, many voters are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable.

There is general disillusionment with the political establishment that seems to cut across all age groups. This seems to be mainly related to, or caused by, the government party. In fact the decline in voter turnout, and even the increasing number of people who failed to register to vote, seems to be in line with the steady decrease in ANC support. The ANC reached its apogee in the 2004 elections when it took 69.7% of the vote, and has been declining since. So has overall voter turnout.

There’s no doubt that the ANC is on a downward slope, even a death spiral. It’s on life support. That 57.5% share of the vote it won could be deceptive. Many gave their vote grudgingly. The only thing keeping the party together and alive is power. President Cyril Ramaphosa saved its bacon in these elections. It could have been condemned to the opposition benches. It’s not clear if there is anything that the ANC can do to stem the tide or reverse it. It seems to have overstayed its welcome. Most liberation movements, in Africa especially, do not survive in power for more than 25 years; unless they declare a one-party dictatorship to save their skins, as in Zimbabwe. The ANC is also hobbled by the fact that it is a broad church, and with its alliance partners it becomes truly ungovernable. Such an approach served it well as a liberation movement, but as a government it needs to be specific in its policy direction.

And of course there’s the corruption en grande that has pitted the pro- and anti-Zuma factions against each other. That, one suspects, is going to be the story of the next five years.

Were the ANC to be judged on its performance, which has been abysmal, even hideous in some instances, it would have been consigned to the political wilderness long ago. Our unique history, the race issue and the poverty of opposition have been its saving grace.

SA, given its past, is not always an easy country to govern. But most people, regardless of race, want the same thing – a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for themselves and their families. They’ll support a party with a unifying message that will make a genuine stab at it.

The time may have come for a new party that will inspire fresh hope in a disillusioned electorate.

Practically speaking, the reigning ANC is a dying party; all the fatal signs are there. It seems to have become suddenly suicidal after 25 years in power. It does not matter if the national voters’ turnout for the ANC in the May 2019 election was 70% or 80%, as Mthombothi34 and Louw1 put it. The ANC has lost its appeal with the mass of poor and landless Blacks. The Piet Promise of the NP became the Jacob Promise and the Cyril Promise of the ANC. Promises are not food, they lack trust and are contemptable.1,11,14,34,35

The above unstable setup makes it very hard to reflect precisely on how the ANC is going to handle the land expropriation matter from 2019 to the next election in 2024, and of course, if it is going to complete its term as mandated by the 2019 election. Here time will tell, but for this article the official status quo of the ANC as the regime until 2024 must be accepted and reflected upon. The cut-off date for the cooperation and the collection of information to evaluate and to discuss the land matter and the ANC as a regime’s role in it was chosen as the 31st May 2019.

But, in terms of the political upheaval inside the present-day ANC, it was decided to also focus on the EFF’s and the DA’s political agendas and actions, in case one of them became overnight the new ruler or a partner in an alliance of the governing regime. These two parties seem also to be caught in political upheavals and insecurity, rendering their inputs to the post-2019 politics open to scrunity.11,13,14,34,35  

The land expropriation issue, together with the question of the trustworthiness and the integrity of the three parties, not only to be able to govern the country effectively and properly, but also to  successfully execute a comprehensive and justified balanced land expropriation programme, is prominent here. Some political analysts believe that where the DA successfully resists radical politics, its ultra-conservative land reform policy is a loser for the mass of poor and landless Blacks. They believe that both the EFF and the ANC show revolutionary thinking on the assets of the White population, while the ANC furthermore has shown an absolute lack in integrity and trustworthiness in its 25 years of rule. These views will be evaluated further hereunder.26,30,33,34,36

1.1.4. Aims of Articles 9 to 11

Articles 9 to11 form part of the research project on the matter of land expropriation, which was already introduced to the reader by eight previously published articles.

This article [Article 9, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)”], is the Part 1 (reflecting on the EFF) of three articles on the roles played by the three main political parties in the politics of South Africa. The theoretical point of focus here is their capability to be effective regimes in South Africa, if certain limitations, such as voters’ ignorance and prejudice, etc. on politics and confusion with regard to their right to empowerment, do not play a role. In this article the focus is specifically on the EFF.

In the next two sequential articles (Articles 10 and 11) the focus will be respectively on the DA and the ANC. Article 10 represents: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2- The DA in perspective (10)”. Article 11 represents: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3- The ANC in perspective (11)”.

Although the ANC won the right to be the country’s ruler until 2024 with a national majority of 57.7% for a sixth term, and thus seems to be going to be the sole executor to effect land expropriation in terms of its promises made in its political manifesto (its so-called “political CV”) presented for the May 8, 2019 election on land expropriation (which seemingly can include expropriation without compensation in certain appropriate cases), is it an absolute pre-requisite to also reflect on the two strongest opposition parties’ political manifestos for the May 8, 2019 election regarding their promises and abilities to effect land expropriation successfully. The intention here is to see how these two opposition parties (the EFF and the DA) can theoretically be evaluated as good versus bad regimes, should they have won the ruler’s throne in the May 2019 election. This approach will also give a preview of their potential as good versus bad opposition parties on the land expropriation matter, specifically for the period up to 2024).1,11,14,34,35

Closely aligned to these political manifestos (or “political CVs”) in the description of the three parties’ “political characters, qualifications and experience”, are the public’s arguments, opinions and viewpoints as a further descriptive guide to the three parties’ “political characters and potential”. These public arguments, opinions and viewpoints are best reflected by the reporting by investigative and informative journalists, as well as political analysts, strategists, commentators and critics (the so-called “political letter referees or their attestations”). These mentioned “letters of the referees” are seen by many political scientists as the most (and only) decisive guide to be used for the true description of a political party’s and its leaders’ quality and integrity. They are seen as far more trustworthy than the so-called “trust for the party” brought out by the voters at the ballot-box, or as the election manifestos issued by political parties.

The aim of this article is to evaluate the potential of the EFF in terms of its theoretical capability to be an effective regime.

2. Method

The research was been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case with ownership of South African soil for the period 1652 to 2018. The sources included articles from 2018 to 2019, books for the period 1980 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide and steer us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the EFF as a ruler of South Africa to be able to successfully effect land reform from 2019.

The research findings are presented in a narrative format.

3. Results

3.1. Overview

The successful execution of the post-2019 land reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and action of a so-called “good” government. Such an elected government is not allowed to blindly travel a path of trying to come to reach an end-result, but is obliged to use the existing, well-guided informative guidelines and drivers to steer the land reform aims into reality. These existing informative guidelines and drivers, to steer land reform post-2019, will be reflected upon in the following Subdivision 3.2.

3.2. Existing informative guidelines and drivers to steer land reform post-2019

The land expropriation initiative is not without a foundation. There are prominent informative guidelines and drivers to steer the whole process constructively and in an orderly fashion, far away from the blind “land grabbing from White colonists”, as propagated and promised by some political and racial radicals in their political manifestos. These existing informative guidelines and drivers need to be high-lighted.

3.2.1. The Freedom Charter is an indisputable marker and driver of the post-2019 land reform

The ANC’s Freedom Charter’s land clause, dated 1955 and the ANC’s Tanzania-document on future land ownership, issued in 1969, reflect, although indirectly, on the justified comparability and redistribution of land ownership in terms of the South African race-numbers and legal holding of land ownership, as guided by a democracy, for the rights of the individual South African. The indication is clear that all races can be and must be allowed to be land owners, but equally in terms of the proportional numbers of the various racial groups. The present-day South African numbering of ±83% White land owners versus ±13% Black land owners is an immense imbalance, representing inequality, it and needs rectification. It leaves even the moderates in the ANC no other choice but to activate land expropriation with great urgency immediately.37-42

3.2.2. South Africa’s orderly democracy requires and justifies land expropriation

True democracy allows orderly statutory change by righteous actions in order to rectify injustice of the past or present. The implementation thereof can take time, especially when democracy is new born to a country; especially one which had suffered for centuries under autocracy and fascism. Political, social and economic transformations thus require time and patience. Shortcomings in the 1994-Constitution are coming to the foreground, forcing daring challenges to be faced and solved, as previously mentioned, the addressing of the imbalance between the races on land ownership. The 1994 final settlement on land redistribution is, in terms of the prescription of the country’s democracy, far from a fait accompli and is still in a process of evolution.43-47

3.2.3. Land redistribution within post-2019 Black empowerment is a normal process

Uhuru South Africa, with all its many out-branches, such as land ownership, is an unavoidable and non-debateable process. It is presently driven exclusively because the economic upliftment of Blacks through BBBEE since 1994 was not enough. There are very serious consequences which can follow, if a justified transfer of mass land to the poor and landless Blacks is not activated fast. The present-day land reform initiative is thus not in dispute. The inequality, poverty and landlessness of the mass of non-Whites, living and working for generations as poor farm-labourers in the countryside, demand immediate action.37-42

In theory there is very little difference in the present South African thought-process on land occupation as those reflected and practised by the VOC, the British, the Boers, the Apartheid Government and that of Robert Mugabe. All these institutions were overshadowed by lengthy histories of murder, genocide, injustice, impoverishment and suppression of the previous land owners (who were also mostly land grabbers themselves, coming from an earlier period) who had lost their acquired land to new migrants, intruders and conquerors through multiple atrocities. In light of the above background, it is important to note that the present setup of a mass of South African landless Blacks is basically the same: an immense group of people who have been enormously frustrated mostly since the1994-democracy by the lack of improvement to their lifestyle. Land reform, whether it is a Zimbabwe-style act of violence or a democratic and balanced process without conflict or bloodletting, is, as said, a clearly unavoidable and normal process to balance the land ownership process that will have to happen from after the May 2019 elections.1

The decisions on whether certain elements and parts of the intended land reform programme should be with or without compensation, clearly constitutes a democratic act and is, as said, based on majority consultation and decision of the Parliament, as guided by the population, to benefit the country’s interests. This is an essential democratic principle that the Blacks and Whites endorsed with the 1994 Political Dispensation.38

3.2.4. A post-2019 primary land redistribution plan already in place

Notwithstanding the many draconic statements on the land expropriation process, as likely to be exclusive land grabbing, or that there is not any plan in guiding the post-2019 land expropriation, there are actually clear primary guidelines on how the process is going to be activated and steered. Prominent for selection between truth and myth on the issue of land ownership, is the King Solomon’s wisdom approach, wherein  the final decisions on what is fact and myth and the process on how land expropriation must and will be logically executed, are solely led by compassion, a good moral compass, and logical thinking and action. An in-depth understanding of the present-day suffering of all South Africans, anchored and driven by a leadership of good characteristics, which is freed from racial, religious and political contamination, are pre-requisites. Prominently, as a guideline, is President Cyril Ramaphosa’s repeatedly assurance of South Africans that the process of “land correction” will be done within the present-day laws and the Constitution.48

3.2.4.1. The land expropriation’s primary guidelines

Notwithstanding the initial immense hot headed rhetoric, commissions, committees, much senseless and opportunistic talk and argument, and ongoing threats by radicals, for instance in the Northern Cape ANC, such as the compilation of lists of productive farms to be expropriated immediately before changes to Section 25 are even approved, etc., it seems that other positive outcomes have manifested.

Firstly, it seems that the EFF, which had mainly activated the process on land reform in Parliament, was before the dissolution of the 2019-outgoing Parliament basically absent from attending the Parliamentary Committee on Land reform, which is the primary body doing research, publishing information, and deciding on the outcome of the final process. Only the members of the DA and the ANC attended as many as 50% of the meetings, while the three members of the EFF only attended the first meeting, bringing in a total of only 20% EFF-attendance. Cope, the UDM, the APC, the DSA, the VF+ and the NFP did not attend a single meeting. This passivity and lack of responsibility to the voters, led thereto that the committee failed to deliver a report before the closing of the present Parliament. This means that the issue will have to be run by the new legislature again from June 2019.49

The above undoubtedly reflects a growing detachment and disinterest by the main role-players in the so-called “land grabbing intentions” of parliamentary radicals.49

It seems furthermore that from the ANC side, as specifically reflected in the first hectic Parliament debate on land expropriation without compensation, there developed an observable passivity by the majority of ANC parliamentarians to the whole matter. This passivity is however seen as an opportunistic safeguarding by some ANC parliamentarians: here stands the fact that some of the ANC MPs and MPLs own more than two properties and thus they can, in some way, also be negatively  affected if a radical land policy is implemented. This outcome shifted the whole thinking process and final responsibility on land expropriation of the ANC’s greater inner-circle. This seems to have already put strain on the ANC’s top brass, making it clear to them that extreme land radicalism is not the average member’s wish. On the other side there is a genuine opinion with some ANC parliamentarians that the whole land expropriation process must be toned down in order to balance land reform.49

Based on the “unofficial” opinions and viewpoints of the ANC’s inner-circle – as reflected by some trustworthy “inside rumours”, “unofficial evaluations” and “leaks” by the lesser radicals of the ANC elite – clear primary guidelines seem already to have been compiled by the ANC to guide us. The basis of this post-2019 land redistribution primary plan is shortly described in the following eleven subdivisions:

1) Land reform and redistribution is unavoidable and prescribes an immediate constitutional prescription to be implemented. It needs to be implemented fast, but in well-planned phases, without any disturbance of the racial, political, social and economic stability.49,50  About the many failures on land reform in the past, which need now to be avoided, Nortje maintains that50:9: “Like it or not, SA’s existing land reform policy has not been effective in achieving its goals. In terms of the acquisition of land by the state, there has been partial success, but redistribution and transformation of the agricultural sector have by and large been a failure”.

2) Future land ownership must reflect proportionately the ethnicity and races of South Africa. These same ethnic and racial proportions should reflect in the farming sector, with relation to farmers and labourers. In this context the editor of the Sunday Times on the 10th March 2019 wrote the following under the heading51:18: “Quotas not wrong, those who oppose them are,” with regard to a very well-balanced description of the correct post-2019 South Africa. He put it clearly for himself and the greater Black society, which includes the ANC regime that future land transformation doesn’t seek to replace White with Black, but to ensure all races are included, to ensure that there’s an accurate representation of society. The editor of the Sunday Times further writes51:18: “If there’s something Solidarity needs to understand, it’s that transformation targets are here to stay – and they’re not just about numbers. They form part of a heart-and-minds approach that seeks to address the imbalances of the past”.

This balanced representation on land ownership was indeed, in terms of equality and human rights, a prescribed pre-requisite from 1652 with the arrival of Whites in South Africa. The intended equalisation of land ownership after 2019 must thus not be seen as a “favour” which the Whites are now doing to Blacks through so-called quotas in land ownership, work-placement, sport or education, etc. The centuries long outstanding initiative to erase the imbalance in land ownership in South Africa (read together with the imbalance in wealth and inequality), has led to an immense discrepancy between White land owners and Black land owners, making an immediate large scale equalisation within an orderly political dispensation basically impossible. The editor51 of the Sunday Times is clear on this gradual process of transformation, especially in land ownership, where food production, the need for finance to buy out farms, etc., are central. Transformation is not the central problem here, but the issue is those who (mainly Whites) steadfastly refuse to understand the future of South Africa’s politics after 2019. Prominent for the editor51 of Sunday Times is the main obstruction to phase out the inequality and proportional land ownership which is exclusively vested in White hands.51-54

Obstructive alleged role-players are seen to be Solidarity, AgriSA, AfriForum, the Freedom Front Plus, together with the White exclusive capitalists and the White farmer community. They form a contingent of obstructionists, to which one writer, in his despair on the conflicting and seemingly unchangeable land ownership matter, refers to as “remnants of verkramptes and rooineks resisting change”.51-54

In the context of the ANC’s good intentions on a moderate land reform outcome, Khumalo55 writes specifically of a clear differentiation by the international rating agency Standard and Poor (S&P) between the radical concept of a policy of land expropriation with or without compensation (which has become the antagonists “wildcat”-vehicle of attack on the ANC in pinpointing them as political radicals) versus the ANC’s true intention of the introduction of a conservative policy of land reform. On the S&P opinion of the introduction of a conservative land reform plan by the ANC after 2019, Khumalo posits55:15: “On land expropriation, we think that in as much as the discourse talks about expropriation, we believe it has to do more with land reform. We think the ANC have been conservative in the past. They will remain conservative in the way they manage the land issue.”

3) The land reform plan will be interpreted and implemented as described by the ANC’s Freedom Charter, which reflects a strict implementation of democratic principles on land ownership and rights around land ownership. The intention is clear that the whole land transformation plan must not be radical and will be far from the postulated outcome predicted by the antagonists. It will not be in line, for instance, with the delinquent actions of the White NP between 1970 and 1979 when 240 555 Blacks were removed from so-called “Black spots” located in White land bought by Afrikaner communities prior to the controversial land legislation of 1913. In addition, land expropriation will not again form the type of removal of Blacks as was done with the NP’s social engineering wherein Blacks were removed from so-called “legitimate White land” and relocated to “Bantustans” and other so-called “Black-areas”. In this process more or less 3.5-million people (described by Malan as the “Surplus People”), some 10% of the entire population, were subjected to forced removal.53,56

4) The general prescription that only certain categories of land will be expropriated without compensation refers specifically to abandoned buildings, unutilized land, commercial property held unproductively and purely for speculative purposes owned privately by South Africans and the state, as well as under-utilised property owned by the state, and land farmed by labour tenants with an absentee titleholder (irrespective of race), agricultural land owned by Church groups, and the land owned by closed-down mines. In addition to the abovementioned categories is the free-will handing-over of land by private owners/businesses, etc. to the state for land expropriation.

5) These above categories of land will be expropriated with compensation in terms of realistic and balanced market prices.56

6)  Rural families living under traditional leadership in the former Transkei and rural KwaZulu-Natal will get title to the land upon which they live and work.

7) Land expropriation will be done in various steps or phases, to assure minimum political, personal and racial conflict. The first phase will be of the less conflicting land of the state and the surrendered land from the private sector. The State will in Phase One make a lot of its own land available free of cost to new Black farmers and to other homeless Blacks, as serviced plots with title deeds to build their own homes near their work places in or nearby urban centres.56

8) The reference to “race” in terms of present-day South Africa’s richness, poverty, inequality and landlessness are prominent in the land expropriation initiative. These imbalances, specifically regarding land ownership, will be addressed, but only with justice, empathy and correctness. Prominent here is the declaration by the Deputy President, David Mabuza, in March 2019 in Parliament that it is not the intention of the ANC regime to push out the White farming community and that they must stay to produce food. Clearly there is no intention of revenge for the past on the White owners of land.56

9) The base for land relocation is that every South African citizen has the right to own land in the country, as guided by the Freedom Charter. This ownership needs to reflect in equality the proportions (numbers) of races and ethnicities (guided by the various Black tribal orientations,  as well as so-called other non-White orientations, like Coloured, Indian, etc.), as represented by the present population statistics.1,57.58.59

Statistics reflect the present total population of South Africa as ±57.5-million, represented by the following races numbers: Blacks: ±44.5-million; Coloureds: ±4.8-million; Whites: ±4.5-million; Indian/Asians/Other: ±1.5-million. The various proportional statistical ratios (calculated out of 100) are as follows: Blacks 80; Coloureds 9; Whites 8 and Indian/Asians/Other 3. The primary intention is to bring the present more than 80% of the land in White hands (a group forming only 8% of the total population), gradually down as far as possible in terms of a democratic reform, to only 8%, while the Blacks, Coloureds and Indian/Asians/Other need respectively to own 80%, 9% and 3% of the land.1,57,58,59

The process of majority consultation and decision-making, to be able to activate the intended land reform, is a principle that the NP regime on behalf of the Whites endorsed when they transferred their political power in 1994 to the Black majority and is thus not disputable. The only fault was that this endorsed agreement was not fully and truly activated from 1994.1

A prominent fact here, which is been mostly ignored due to political opportunism and Marxist-revolution orientation by a minority of radicals in the politics, is that the “Blacks” are not one single group to be served by land reform, but are represented by various tribes and further sub-tribes. These tribal and sub-tribal people are mostly established in certain parts of South Africa as majority groups there. (It is only the White tribe, specifically the Afrikaners as a sub-trlbe, that is basically spread over the whole country. The Afrikaners can themselves be divided into at least six sub-groups). Land redistribution will thus, in terms of this tribal-region-orientation be done. This means for instance that the placement of Zulus on traditional Venda land and vice versa can be catastrophic, as were the old “Bantustans” and Apartheid’s other foolishnesses. The First and Second Black Colonisations, with their resulting bloodshed, will be the outcome. The fact that the Zulus before 1994 fought for federalism and the present stand and propaganda of a “physical separation” from the Republic by the King of the Zulus, must serve here as a sharp warning. The growing political demands of traditional leaders’ (especially the kings with their own regimes and traditional empowerment) inside this tribal-regional system, as well as the greater South Africa as a region, also nullifies any argument inside the ANC of one Black Nation, which is to be treated to a simple land reform approach. This so-called Black-unity was a pre-1994 short-term approach to bring Apartheid down, but has now gradually been over-run by tribal nationalism and patriotism, as the EFF’s 10% vote in the May election confirms. Note must also be taken of the claims from the so-called “indigenous Brown people” (KhoiSan, Griqwa, Namakwa) that the land expropriation policy of post-2019 must also favour them fully.1,60,61

The constant declaration and blind acceptance of a “South African democracy” which is exclusively underwritten, driven and promoted by a sole Blackness,  seems to be out of contact with the country’s political, social and cultural realities, as well as Africa’s comprehensive confrontation at the ballot box by the many ethnicities and the tribalism of the Black voters. The so-called “Pure Black nationalists” may be in for a surprise – and a most deadly surprise – in South Africa in the future, due to  the advent of real Black tribal separation and Black tribal nationalism.62 In this regard, Monyae and Matambo write62:19: “They also do not help entrench democracy on a continent where voting along ethnic and tribal lines is common. The most ideal circumstances for democracy’s success in Africa [and South Africa] could be reconciling voters to the ideas rather than identity sensibilities.”

The EFF’s last mentioned outcome on an exclusive Black-nationalism will not easily be blocked if we look to the growth of the EFF after the May election in votes in some of the northern parts of South Africa — a party whose policy is undoubtedly, besides White-bashing, characterised and steered by deadly Black ethnicity and tribalism and the division, including the break-up, of the so-called “pre-1994 Black Nation”. It is important to note that the EFF’s radical cultural and political empowerment has now slowly spread from Limpopo to Mpumalanga and the North West Provinces, making it the official oppositions there.34,63,64

On these delinquent ethnic and tribal manifestations in the EFF, to capture its deprived and political poor and often times under-developed supporters’ planning in the doubtful and devastating elements of ethnicity and tribalism, Trovato writes64:14: “Nice work, though. It doesn’t matter if all three have a combined GDP of R28.50 and a bit of a witchcraft problem.”

Mthombothi34 also pinpoints this deadly foundation after the May election in the EFF, especially its leadership’s immense fault-line when he postulates34:19: “…the EFF’s existence and its survival depend largely on the whims of its leader. It often appears as though it’s a meteor that will rise but ultimately burn itself into oblivion. Also, its propensity for race-bating rules it out as a genuine contender for real power.”

10) The land expropriation is planned to be executed in such a way that it will not harm the economic or political status of the South African State, albeit in the short or long term. Although the implementation of the primary plan will require an enormous financial input by the government, this cost will be balanced in five to ten years’ time, hopefully bringing profits to the country after ten to fifteen years.

11) The first stage of land transfers must be complete before but not later than 2022 (whereby state rural land is been handed to Black farmers and their establishment on these farms ins in place). Included in this time-limit is the transfer of privately-owned abandoned buildings and under-utilised property and land in urban areas (without or with compensation), together with the transfer of the State’s abandoned buildings, under-utilised property and land in urban areas, to the poor and landless Blacks, to be owned by them for accommodation, and upon which to farm and build homes.

3.2.5. A post-2019 secondary land distribution guideline already in place
3.2.5.1. Land grabbing not an issue

There is no intention to grab well-functioning White private property and land without compensation, without clear reasons to benefit the people of the country and the balanced consideration of the loss to the disposed owner. Neither is the intended land transfer scheme going to target even all the so-called more than 80% of the present land of Whites, which radicals are alleging to be “stolen” from Blacks. That would be undemocratic. Neither is the intention the exclusive grabbing of land from one race group while leaving others untouched. The State’s own high-potential land of multiple millions of hectares of agricultural land, which has not been collateralised and is not productive, will, as already said, firstly become part of the intended land expropriation. Land cases under dispute before 2019 will be the prominent focus for settlement. Primarily there is no intention to  travel back in history to punish any so-called “White culprits” for their so-called “alleged stealing of land from Blacks”.48

In this context Nortje confirms50:9: “The good news is that, behind all the noise and political positioning around land reform, the ANC has been consistent in its intentions. The December [2018] policy document does say that expropriation without compensation ‘should be among the key mechanisms available to the government’, but this is followed by an even stronger statement that land reform interventions ‘should focus on government-owned land’ and ‘prioritise the distribution of vacant, unused and underutilised state land’.”

This consistency in the ANC regime’s expropriation plan will not to harm the private White land owner by confiscating his land without compensation, and is further confirmed by Nortje’s pinpointing that only state land will directly be incorporated in the first phase of land redistribution. In co-operation with the redistribution of state land, will also be the buy-out of a new group of White land and the buy-out of White land under dispute. Of the good intention of not to do land grabbing by the ANC regime, notwithstanding the antagonists roaring statements and the political noise of radicals within the ANC itself, and especially within the EFF, there is clear evidence in the February 2019 budget on the buy-out of White land and the immense funds made available to be able to do it.65,66

Hleko, in his analysis of the budget of 2019, writes65:16:

The linkage between the President’s State of the Nation address (Sona) and the Minister of Finance’s Budget speech created a proportionate posture that the government is hard at work making South Africa a better place for all who live in it.

The budget speech planted anew and sowed the seed of renewal. The R3.7 billion set aside to assist emerging farmers seeking to acquire land for farming, is a seed that the government is sowing today to propel emerging farmers to prosper in future.

This allocation will assist the 250 000 emerging farmers, whom the president referred to in his Sona, that are working the land and need support to fully develop their businesses.

The R1.8bn that is allocated for the implementation of 262 priority land reform projects over the next three years will be a shot in the arm for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform to expedite land reform projects.

This further echoes the president’s remark that an accelerated programme of land reform has the potential to expand agricultural output and promote inclusion.

On the 10th April 2019, Ramaphosa himself (who is again the President in the Sixth Parliament), to reign in all the false noises around the land matter, assured White farmers that they did not have to fear land reform48:1:

“I can assure you that the land reform process is something we should never fear. It is to be done in accordance with the rule of law and the Constitution. It is not going to be land grabs where land is grabbed outside of the parameters of the law. We need to look at the practical reality.”

Specific to the Expropriation Amendment Bill, which will be finalised after May 2019 by the new incoming Parliament, Ramaphosa puts it that the Act’s intentions are, as was already well-spelled out in governance and ANC papers, to look at land owned by the state, land owned by state-owned entities, land not used and land sometimes illegally acquired.48:1:

“There is a great future for all farming people, be it workers or farm owners. We need to address the key challenges. We must address some of the sensitive issues – evictions and where the people have no land. We want consensual solutions.”

The secondary good intention of not to land grabb, is further the announcement that the Land Bank will financially support smallholders and leverage partnerships with other financial institutions in their start-up of new incoming Black farmers and to develop existing Black farmers. The main aim here is to disburse R3-billion in the next fiscal year to the farming sector, with more Land Bank financial input later to be facilitated for the farming community.66

3.2.5.2. The 1994 Political Dispensation: a worrying issue which needs urgent comprehensive readdressing

The South African land ownership matter was ignored outright since 1994 and silently shelved in terms of the 1994 Political Dispensation. The 1994 Political Dispensation masked main intention was clear: to exclusively serve the White land owners and farmers, as well as the exclusive capitalists who include Whites as well as Blacks, especially those who misused BBBEE to get rich. South Africa’s economic evolution did not work because it offered nothing to the mass of the poor since 1994. The rise of unrest, acute anarchy and the possibility of a revolution by the mass of poor and landless Blacks, and of course the mass poverty of ±29-million Blacks, served as a wake-up call to a small group of concerned South African politicians, humanists and citizens to take on the matter.48,50

3.2.5.2.1 The neglect and unrepaired situation of ±29-million landless and poor Blacks within the present empowerment of 257 municipalities to be able to do land expropriation

With regard to the abovementioned post-1994 ongoing negligence and unrepaired situation of ±29-million landless and poor Blacks’, Nortje50 can with honesty, with great doubt on the ANC regime’s initial intention to uplift this mass of Blacks, write50:9:

The bad news is that expropriation without compensation will remain a high-stakes political bargaining chip. Indeed, had Ramaphosa‘s hand not been forced at the national elective conference in December 2017, I wonder if our land reform policy would have been re-examined at all. In this case the EFF and factions within the ANC have done South Africans a massive favour by forcing us to scrutinise and improve policy that has massive potential for social redress, job creation and economic development”.

The time-frame left for the ANC to institute and to physically activate a clear, final plan and scheme after 25 years of failure since 1994, is at most two years. Politicians from all of the parties, White land owners and exclusive holders of White capital, must accept it unconditionally. This eye-opening and political life-change includes the DA, the FF Plus, Solidarity, AfriForum and AgriSA.50,60,67

Any delay holds serious consequences, specifically for the ANC as a regime to be able to  bring about justified land reform and in general for South Africa in the form of anarchy, unrest and revolution. This instituting of a final plan comprises the definite establishment of a permanent caretaker deeds statutory body (separate from the present deeds office) which will stand free from political and party influences. It will specifically handle the transfer of land to the state and the registering of the deeds of these properties initially in the name of the State, the compilation of clear legal guidelines for the rights of citizens to receive land, and the pre-as well as post-prescriptions to be able to farm, to take ownership of this land, the describing of a proof period as a candidate-farmer, directing the reselling and estranging of the property after allocation to Black owners. It will need to limit opportunistic profit-taking, state-capture and racketeering, as well as corruption around these allocated properties. The allocation of full ownership, and thus the transfer of title deeds, can be subjected to five years. Although private loans on the properties and lands will be allowed (specifically to be able to make debts for development and the running of the farms), this will be subordinate to the permission of the State as the first loan-holder and thus allocated with the right of the first call to buy-back or to reposess expropriated land when necessary. To control over-debt and the exploitstion of the poor new farmers against loan sharks, the intention is to provide comprehensive loans/other funding via the State to the incoming farmers for up to 20 years. This approach will overcome the many failures of the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution plan, because the State failed many times to supply funding or ancillary agricultural services to the incoming farmers who lacked their own capital. This will also phase out the unrealistic short periods required from the incoming Black farmers to become profitable. (Prominent in this respect, in order to guide stable future ownership of expropriated land, the ANC regime already put the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy in place, which was adopted in 2006, to stop beneficiaries of land reform from selling opportunistic properties which they had acquired. In terms of this ruling, land was leased since 2006 to the majority of beneficiaries while the state retained ownership).50

Another outcome foreseen in the post-2019 empowerment of the incoming Black farmers is that the type of farming production will be steered by the government to assure maximum profit and the needed products for the local, and where possible, for foreign markets. Funding and the training of the new farmers will be steered in terms of the produce on the allocated land.50

It is clear that this Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy adopted in 2006 will be “improved” with new legislation, such as the fundamental restructuring of institutions such as the Land Claims Commission and the Land Claims Court, etc., not only to safeguard those losing their property through land reform, but also to protect those poor Blacks in line to receive land. The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) will also be improved. The rule of law in the process of land reform will be maintained in order to avoid Zimbabwe’s lack of accountability or the Zuma-state-capture. An example thereof is Ngcukaitobi’s68 opinion of the establishment of a land ombudsman or land-rights protector (with the same powers as the present public protector). The state custodianship (temporary) of expropriated land will be spelled out clearly in the post-2019 proposed land redistribution and agrarian reform legislation. In addition, how the process of land transfer will be activated and upheld, will be executed through the creation of various new legislation, such as a Land Acquisition Act as well as a Land Redistribution Act, wherein the suggested land ombudsman or the land-rights protector, is central as the supervisor.68,69

3.2.5.2.2. The present empowerment of 257 municipalities to do land expropriation

The present anomaly in the change to Section 25 of the draft expropriation bill, which can give 257 municipalities the right to expropriate property without compensation, is at the moment under consideration. The seeming intention is to remove their rights and to make the empowerment of land and other property expropriation seated in a single statutory body on national level.69,70

With reference to the concerns of the bill’s empowerment of the local government municipalities, as well as that of the central government bodies, is it important to note that the biggest need for land is in urban areas under municipalities where there is a vast corruption problem. Evidence shows that only 33 municipalities of the total of 257 obtained clean audits in 2018. As such, the municipalities cannot be trusted to implement land expropriation without compensation fairly and to execute administrative justice, as demanded by the constitution.69,70

Furthermore, the clause will address the intended empowerment of the local and central government, wherein the bill gives five examples where nil compensation would be justified and states that expropriation without compensation can be “stretched”, which can allow invalid grabbing of land. In addition, the definition on land (located in municipalities) for speculation (which undoubtedly has financial value for the present owner and is mostly acquired at a cost), is unclearly defined. Lacking a legal description to state clearly what  land for future expansion means — which seems to stand outside the expropriation without compensation clause – is a further point of concern that will be addressed. The concept-definition of what is property in the bill seems to apply also on the confiscation of anything, varying from intellectual property to shares in a company, if it is in the so-called “interests of the public”. This therefore needs a revist, in order to clear confusion and possible capture.69,70

3.2.5.2.3. The mandate of the Land Bank needs immediate attention

To activate land expropriation successfully, the lack of finance to start up and run a farm stands out specifically. Here, in financing the incoming Black farmers, is the commitment of the ANC-regime to change the mandate of the Land Bank so that it is truly development-orientated and financial-friendly to the mass of poor Blacks.68,69 This will be done without “nationalising” it, as some of the antagonists and White capitalists try to argue when the mandate of the Land Bank is put forward as a possible financial vehicle to successfully expropriate land and facilitate the urgent uplifting of 29-million poor and landless Blacks. Own government financial support is just too little to change the present landscape of under-funding of Black farmers. Ngcukaiboti69 writes, on the reason for the present passivity (and isolation) of the Land Bank to be able to support the mass of poor incoming, aspirant Black farmers, as follows69:20-21:

“In 2002, the ANC changed the mandate of the Land Bank  so that, for all practical purposes, it operates like any ordinary commercial bank. In Section 26 of the Land and Agricultural Bank Act, the bank’s mandate is to provide land and agricultural finance ‘against security’. It can be safely assumed that the persons who need Land Bank finance the most have no security.”

3.2.5.2.4. The farming-styles, culture and intentions of new Black and other non-White farmers

The farming-styles, culture and intentions of new Black and other non-White farmers will be prominent in guiding the execution of the land reform programme. In this context,  the candidate-farmers — not as during the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution where pre-training training and constant mentoring were absent – will first be pre-selected on certain characteristics, abilities, skills and interests to assure maximum success as potential candidate-farmers and then pre-trained (as was done in the 1930s with the poor Whites at the Kakamas- and Keimoes-schemes by the government and the DRC). The intention is to extend the Agricultural Colleges training to district-centres countrywide, with the offering of an initial six months as a start-up course for the learner-farmers, while further continuous learning and training will be provided after the establishment of the new farmers for a minimum period of five years. The post-2019 exploitation of agricultural-export potential is a first priority through the small farmers’ setup.1,69

The entire country will be divided into various regions for land transfer, meaning thus concentrated small farms in the more water-rich areas, with the more spread out of larger farms in the dryer regions. Developments beside constant flowing rivers and near established transport and other facilities will form the first phase of the start-up.1

One of the most important oversights in the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution under the 1994 Dispensation were the absence of homesteads, other much needed farm-buildings and infrastructure and equipment to support farming production and activities  by the new farmers. There was frequently outright neglect in this regard from the government’s side even to install any infrastructure and the offer of working equipment at the time of the handing over of farms to the new farmers. Funding to support these enterprises was also lacking most of the time, while constant monitoring, in order to identify shortcomings and failures over time, as well as the development of new needs of the new-farmers-model, were also absent.  These pre-requirements will be put in place before allowing farmers to take up their farmer-appointments.69

Other infrastructure needed is the upfront founding of marketing instruments, such as own markets, the installation of entities for farmer-community-businesses to build and run independent Black farming centres for the selling of the surplus of their produce, as well as the creation of community business-bodies to buy farming equipment and which will deliver services to small farmers to make it possible for them to get their farms working and functioning at affordable costs.69

One of the most hampering elements to land ownership in South Africa has so far been the Western custom and tradition that land can for an unlimited amount of time be owned by a certain person and his immediate family. The ownership of land came under exclusive White capitalism and politics as the untouchable right of the individual (mostly Whites) to be able own land and to do with it as the owner saw fit. Included here is, as said, the untouchable present right of inheritance from generation to generation. The utmost exploitationof this model is well-illustrated by the selective upkeep of the exclusive White ownership (8% of the population) of at least 60% of the South African land. Firstly, in stopping this thinking, it is important to note that land is a national asset and not a personal asset, to be separated from the State and society. Secondly, the occupation of any land, as sealed by a deed of conveyance, is only for the purpose of improving the land and making a living from it – it is always only a solely temporary right issued to the individual of care-taking of the state’s assets. Included hereto stands the effective management of land as a democratic and civil right by the individual who holds the deed of conveyance. This legal setup is solely based on majority consultation and decision-making by the population of South Africa via Parliament, as primarily guided by the country’s Constitution. There is thus in modern-day South Africa a clear pre-requirement emerging on the ongoing legal ownership of land: it is temporary and open to change by the State at any time. This is now what is planned with the process of land expropriation.1

There is already a process in place to re-install the old hereditary tenure with a time-limit, better known as the tenure by long lease, as already activated in Namibia, Zimbabwe and Malawi for the period of 99-years of lease. This was also done at the early Cape. This model of time-limiting of land ownership is by far a better one for the State, as well as the individual citizen. Indeed specific to the South African setup around ownership per se, data shows that very few of the present farms are owned for 99 years or more by the same (White) family. Although data is scarce on the matter, it seems that most (White) owners and their families hang on to land for less than 49 years.1

In terms of the development of a new land culture, South Africa thus also undoubtedly needs a total repositioning of the so-called model of endless-land ownership to the model of tenure by long lease of 49 year-land ownership. Such a model will help to support the intended land expropriation initiative and to dismantle an imbalanced racial and economic-privilege farming community, free from monopolies and the exclusive benefit of certain groups and families.

The intended land expropriation programme to establish the poor and landless Blacks will be far removed from the 1994 to 2019 rigid programme and be easily adaptable to new circumstances as prescribed by the country’s economic, political and civil rights. Much was learned from the 1994 to 2019 failures. Future success lies in the re-examination of the old land reform processes from pre- as well post-1994.50 Nortje posits50:9: “These failures are frustrating but it is encouraging – and indeed correct – that existing land reform policy is being re-examined. Policy by its nature should be a process rather than a prescript. Good policymakers measure the actual and intended outcomes of their policies regularly in order to make adjustments when necessary”.

What is most worrying at the moment is the fact that the Ramaphosa-regime had in the mean time shifted seemingly successfully the land reform matter before the May 8 election from the “urgent” national agenda. This led thereto that to a great extent the debate died down. Notwithstanding the finding of Ramaphosa’s 10-member advisory panel on land reform (appointed in September 2018), which is now to be followed-up and enlightened by the post-May 8 Parliament, the present problematic setup around poverty and landlessness of a mass of Blacks can become extreme, with acute unrest.  Anarchy, moving into a chronic stage, can make revolution a prominent feature later in the 2019-2024 ruling-mandate of the ANC.50

3.2.5. The antagonists are unrealistic and opportunistic to already demand in 2019 a fully-fledged land expropriation plan from the ANC

Too offer a more precise plan as the above theoretical one at this stage, is impossible, seeing that Section 25 is still to be amended. Further consultations by all the lawmakers of the Parliament with the general public, must firstly be held and funding allocated, to be able to start up the project and to turn it from theoretical to practical. Furthermore, the above theoretical plan must and cannot be seen as a final, absolute one. As discussions and outcomes follow during the rest of 2019-2020, changes, adjustments, additions, further descriptions and definitions, etc., can follow. There is no doubt that before any land expropriation will be activated, further land redistribution and agrarian reform legislation will be introduced.50,69

It must be clear that the current agricultural monopolies will have to be dismantled or reigned in, see at present the overpowering of the agricultural sector by the extremely well-established South Africa White agribusinesses and their exclusive White capital. There will be cooperation with the White agribusinesses in the activation of the Black agricultural sector, but away from and outside their White dominance of every sector in agriculture. Land expropriation, its planning and action and its benefits, will be shifted from the few White rich to the mass Black poor. It will be the rule, not the aim. The present exclusive marginalisation of the Black farming communities and Black small-scale farmers will be ended. Ngcukaitobi69 misreads the “un-breakability” of the White empowerment and dominance of the country’s agriculture in the ANC’s planned land expropriation programme when he writes69:20-21: “We can expect that these monopolies will, with the support of the State, multiply their profits, while giving a “helping hand. More of the same. Large agricultural entities, it seems, will be “nudged” to support emerging and small-scale farmers.”

Doubts about the present theoretical plan are unfounded. Firstly, the registration of title deeds of the expropriated land will be handled the same way as the present-day title deeds, although this will preferably be done on a separate register to oversee the land expropriation process. This will be done precisely to avoid corruption, state-capture, etc. and to make the re-registration of land to the new Black farmers easy to control, and to oversee the constant management and execution of the end-part of land expropriation and the success of each of the individual cases.50,69

It must be clear that the transfer and registration of land to the new Black farmers will not be more complicated or strange than that of the starting-up in the 1890s of the Vanwyksvlei Dam’s Agricultural and Farming Settlement of Whites. Here the so-called Crown land (which was also occupied by the Cape Government as “uninhabited land”, but was indeed for a long time the land of the driven-out KhoiSan) was transferred to Whites as private property under certain pre-requirements to work and to inhabit it permanently. The same principal of ownership was repeated after the Second World War when White soldiers of the South African Armed Forces were, after their demobilisation, established as farmers on so-called “free farms”, again on Crown land, in areas such as the districts of Vanwyksvlei and Kenhardt situated in today’s Northern Cape Province.1,71-74

4. Discussion

4.1. A short perspective

From the above is it at this stage clear that there is already in some way a theoretical plan in place on how land expropriation will and can be executed. But here are two clear energies in opposition: it is one thing to theoretically argue a plan, but it is totally something else to implement such a plan in practive with success. South Africa’s political history, since the first day of Jan van Riebeecks’s arrival, is drenched with many political failures. Prominent in this context is the ANC’s somewhat failed post-1994 land reform initiative to establish Black farmers.1,75-80

The essential question is thus who can now after May 8, 2019 be the role-player(s) to assure the successful implementation and completion of the plan on land expropriation.

The May 8, 2019 election’s outcome leaves us with only three significant parties: the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the African Nationalist Congress (ANC). On the third level of significance stands the EFF, in second place the DA and on the first level the ruling ANC. An indication of the potential of the EFF or the DA to be declared a “good” or “bad” ruler, is  the fact that they have never ruled South Africa nationally. of the two the EFF is the most inexperienced one. It has a very limited alliance in municipality management as compared to the DA, and was most of the time less successful and too conflicting to assure an evaluation of outright good. The DA was in the past and is still very successfull after the May election, with regard to governing on provincial level in the Western Cape, as well as with municipal management countrywide.26,30,34,36

4.1.1 Evaluation guidelines of political parties

To evaluate the three parties’ potential as national, provincial and municipal rulers, the following guidelines will be used respectively:

Their general policies as well as specific standpoints on aspects such as the respectof law and order, and the fighting of corruption, state capture, behavioural delinquency of MPs and MPLs, as well as their top brass leaders, the party’s and leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put in perspective through their manifestos for the 2019-election.

The public critique in newspapers, etc., by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the three parties as political organisations, their members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behavioural  delinquency of MPs and MPLs and top brass leaders, their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the parties’ internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions, especially on land expropriation, evaluated and reflected for the period 1994 to 2019.

In this subdivision of the research project the interpretations will be done solely in terms of the interpretation of facts and truths. The information gathered will be evaluated in terms of the Solomon’s wisdom approach and will not be guided by religious and legal/statutory contamination.  The focus of the discussion will be to determine, theoretically in terms of a so-called “clean and constructive political record” of each of the three parties, which of them are the best qualified to effect the land expropriation plan from 2019 and onwards. For this classification and measuring of political records of each party, the under-mentioned Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, will be used.81-84

4.1.1.1. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201881

As an evaluation instrument to quantitatively classify the three political organisations, their members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action, the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, will be used.81 The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, were applied to all information collected in the literature review of the parties’ manifestos and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and will be interpreted as the researcher deems it applicable.81

In light of the political sensitivity of this study, the researcher assured at all times, as prescribed by the Checklist, that the political-historical data were carefully reviewed and coded. Generalisations were not made beyond the capability of the data to support statements. The researcher guarded against his own expectations, misperceptions and the need to find answers that would support his preconceived notions. For the basis of interpretation and evaluation of the data, the Solomon wisdom approach serves throughout as a guideline.81-84

4.1.1.3. The use of election manifestos of political parties as Curriculum Vitae and public reporting on political parties by journalists and other sources such as Letters of Referee/Attestations to determine  the governmental abilities of political parties

When any candidate applies for a responsible post in the top level of an organisation, there are two primary elements to guide the employer in making an appointment or not. These two elements are:

1) The Curriculum Vitae (CV) to obtain insight into the candidate’s qualifications, experiences and extraordinary skills, etc; and

2) The letters of the referees, the attestations, to offer firstly further insight into the qualifications, experiences, etc. of the candidate;  and secondly at the same time to tell us confidentially about good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate that are well-masked by or absent from the CV. This referee data mostly informs us of the “goodness” and “badness” of a candidate, which can make him a failure or a success in the end in the executionof the responsibilities of the post.

In this research the manifestos and self-description offered by the political parties and their leaders will be seen as their CVs. Hereto will the public reporting by journalists and other sources be seen as the letters of referees/reference or attestations.

4.1.1.3.1. Evaluation-criteria for a party and its leadership to be short-listed

In terms of the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, the three parties will be awarded points in terms of an evaluation-criteria of a maximum of 82 points. To qualify for the shortlist as a so-called candidate (party), the candidate (party) must receive 58 points (70%) and higher.81

With specific reference to a retrospective evaluation and description of the political history of political leaders in terms of the Checklist, it is true that information obtained from newspapers, political and historical books, authorised and unauthorised biographies and autobiographies can be seen as subjective, but subjectivity is an inherent part of any text on politics. We cannot escape this reality. Such sources are consulted in terms of the Solomon wisdom approach for this subdivision, with the single aim of building a viewpoint on the party from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is commonly used in modern historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research, as is the case with the quality of the current political leadership of South Africa and the political parties’ functioning with regard to integrity. The information offered in the literature review has not been empirically tested. It relies on the independent opinion of the public as reflected by the independent media and has been accepted by the public as a good reflection of reality.81-84

The research does not offer a comprehensive statistical model to make advanced statistical inferences to be able to test a hypothesis, but the information (data) can be subjected quantitatively to the statistical cycle of research to make it comparable with other research and to evaluate it with hypothesis testing in the end. Advanced statistical inference is outside the intent of the study.81

There has never been such a collection, evaluation and description of information on the actions of the political leaders and regimes of South Africa with the primary focus on their ability to be able to steer land reform for the period 1994 to 2019. Despites the limitations of the various sources, it is a pioneering study that addresses a mostly ignored subject.81-84

4.2. The manifestos, self-descriptions and public references of the three parties

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) will be reflected in this article (Article 9) as Part 1 of three articles under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. In Part 2 (Article 10) and Part 3 (Article 11) the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the African National Congress (ANC) will respectively be reflected as sequence articles under the main title of “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”.

4.2.1. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)
4.2.1.1. Introduction

In the recent May election, the EFF nearly doubled its political power by winning 44 seats in Parliament (rising from 6% to 10%). One the first utterances by Julius Malema, the Commander-in-Chief of the EFF after obtaining this win, was to clearly spell out that the EFF’s immediate task in the Sixth Parliament would be the completion of the work that could not be done by the Fifth Democratic Parliament and of which the Amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution, to allow for expropriation of land without compensation and the amendment of the SA Reserve Bank Act to discontinue private shareholders in the bank, would be central. In this context of political radicalism, is it old news that the EFF believes that the state should be the custodian of land and that full-out nationalisation without compensation is the way to go.85,86

In this environment a new role is foreseen by some political commentators  for the EFF in the post-2019 politics, directly within the ANC regime to assist the ANC to get the two-thirds majority vote which it needed to enact the ANC’s December 2017 resolution to amend Section 25 to be able to expropriate land without compensation (EWC). There is doubt on the outcome of such an alliance, given that a strong sector (the Ramaphosa-faction) in the ANC does not share the Malema hunger for extreme land expropriation and radical politics. They prefer a watered down window-dressed-version of the status quo on the land matter, writes Hlatshaneni.85:4

Furthermore, it seems that there is still after the May election a kind of “brotherly love” between the EFF and the DA on municipal-level cooperation, which can also put it in a strong position of political empowerment. On the 17th May 2019 the Beeld reports on this possibility after seeming talks between the EFF and the DA. Selebano writes87:1: “Die Tshwane-metroraad in Pretoria kan ‘n EFF-lid as burgemeester kry, terwyl Herman Mashaba [DA] in sy pos as burgemeester van Johannesburg bly.”  Malema himself reports as follows on the matter of a new post-2019 alliance with the DA on municipal-level87:1: “Ons praat reeds met die DA, ons deel die mag in Johannesburg en Tshwane. Kom ons doen dit op ‘n manier wat nie ontwrigtend is nie.”

It is thus of great importance to see how the EFF can play out its role in the post-2019 politics in general and specifically in the solving of the so-called “White-occupation” of Black land. The question is: can the EFF be a significant role-player in the post-2019 politics? To answer this question is it important to study the EFF’s CV and Attestations in-depth and to evaluate its performance on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018.81

4.2.1.2. Overview
4.2.1.2.1. The EFF manifesto

In the EFF’s manifesto under the heading: “The EFF is ready to govern as demonstrated by the detailed blueprint for economic emancipation as set out in its manifesto”, Julius Malema, as in his daily politics, tries to play the card of “African nationalism”.  But the “Malema-African nationalism” is an exclusive new version: one belonging to and driven by the South African post-1994 born Blacks, who are jobless, poor and most of all: landless. Excluded from his group of “African nationalists” are clearly the so-called BEE-marked and other successful Blacks who were born before 1994. Prominent of course are also the Whites in general as the culprits in his radical-Marxism as the sole origin of these Black youth’s poverty, landlessness and unhappiness (and undoubtedly seemingly also Malema’s “own poverty” and unhappiness!). To grasp this absurdity, and by times seemingly confused political mindset, just read the following from his propaganda88:19:

“We are not part of the 1994 elite pact. We are a completely new generation, with new demands. And our demands, unlike those of the 1994 generation, will not be postponed. We refuse to be silenced with so-called reconciliation. We want justice now. We want our land now. We want jobs now. We demand the economy now!

On his so-called “White-problem” philosophy and solution, note the following88:19:

The economy in SA continues today to be under the ownership and control of white minority settlers, whose ownership and control of land, in particular, were gained through settler colonialism and its corollary, the dispossession of the black colonised.

Other sectors of the economy, such as retail chains, industry and the financial sector, are also owned and controlled by the white minority in SA. All the means of economic survival and existence continue to be controlled by the white minority.

Imraan Buccus89, a seasoned researcher and academic, and a well-respected political analyst, after he studied the EFF’s manifesto for the May 2019 election and the party’s practice of politics since its foundation, reflects in-depth in his writing the characteristics of the EFF’s politics if it should had win the election or form a senior partnership in an alliance to be a ruler. Its ruling seems for Buccus to be characterised by the following89:18:

“The manifesto from the EFF is about as ridiculous as it is long. It veers, incoherently, from far right neoliberal economics measures, like export processing zones, to classic far-left politics, like radical land reform. Wildly outlandish promises are made – R1m payments to successful PhD students and orthodontists in every school, for instance – that are impossible to implement in reality.”

In reality the EFF’s election promises, if they are to be implemented in political madness (besides that it is just impossible!), will bring total bankruptcy and steer the country into the same hole as Venezuala and Zimbabwe, writes Buccus89. Moreover: immense poverty, hunger, unrest, violence, to be followed by revolution, will fast be the outcomes. This will end in the mass suppression of the population and dictatorship. Inequality would become out of hand, which, looking critically at the EFF’s politics, seems to be Malema’s main intention and plan. The speaking by the EFF of the creation of a sovereign wealth fund means just another state capture and a looting again of the SAA, Eskom, the PIC and various kinds of VBS Mutual Banks to be robbed again by the EFF-kind of political elite. Buccus89 is very clear when he, on the involvement and trustworthiness per se of the EFF in the management for instance of a sovereign wealth funds, says89:18:

“But, as we all know, the EFF has been closely associated with cross forms of corruption, and is openly defending individuals known to have been at the centre of the state capture project. The EFF simply could not be trusted to run a sovereign wealth fund.”

Bell90, in reference to the EFF’s promises, describes them as absurd, bizarre and outlandish. He writes in this context: “An EFF government, they promised, would provide every informal settlement dweller with a proper house with flushing toilets, and hot and cold running water, within two years.” On the land issue and the EFF, Bell reports90:2:

“Here it is that some of the more  – no pun intended – outlandish comments are made, including an EFF promise to ‘immediately’ give away to ‘the people 50% of all government land’.”

The EFF promises and political, economic, racial and social thinking are plainly bordering on fantasy; they are drowned in populism and cognitive dissonance. The EFFs are more than just crude opportunists; their political madness, as reflected in their promises, will take South Africa not like Jacob Zuma to the brink of a complete collapse: they will immediately bring about a total collapse of the country. The political dysfunctional mindset of its leaders have already been reflected in their weird public behaviour. Their violence and unruly behaviour and dislike of order are well reflected by their violent and disrespectful actions in Parliament, as well as at council meetings where they participated in municipalities. This cognitive chaos inside the EFF leadership is understandable when noting that the EFF hailed Robert Mugabe as a hero. In this utmost political instability of the EFF is it understandable why its MP Zolile Xalisa had no other choice but to leave it for the African Transformation Movement (ATM).The political instability in the EFF also drove out the EFF-MP Thembinkosi Rawula.89,91

4.1.1.2.2. The EFF’s performance after the May 2019 election

To now call the EFF one of the major parties in South Africa due to its so-called third position (ranking) of voters’ representation, which it obtained mostly by our imbalanced indirect Electoral Act, is misleading. Some so-called political analysts became mixed-up between ranking and statistics: the EFF only obtained 10% of the votes in the 2019 elections (and 6% of the votes in the 2014 election), meaning that at most 10% or a 10th of the total votes. Seen from a political analyst’s view, neither did the EFF really successfully master the so-called SWOT characteristic of the “political MBA” to bring them into the league of “good” parties. They misused and exploited the serious conflicting political, social and economic issues of the country which have already put the country into paralysis many times. As a party it fails to offer constructive solutions or ideas, and misuses empty populism to activate aggression and hostility with a 10% sector of the voters as an empowerment vehicle to stay upright. They do not understand basic politics and democracy, neither how to govern even the simplest social organisation. They cannot even can manage the ethics of their own party, as is evident from their support of the looting of the VBS Mutual Bank.85,86,89,92

Their involvement with the DA in municipal affairs shows one thing: destabilisation of good order. Their constant attacks on the ANC seems from the outside a strong and winning outcome for the EFF. But it is far from the truth. Firstly, is it misleading and secondly, there is a good reason for the EFF’s so-called successful attack on the ANC. In this context it must firstly be remembered that their parent-party, the ANC, is in a vegetative state, with a 50% part cemented with the EFF into political-radicalism. This ANC failure had a negative impact over 25 years on the mass of poor and landless Blacks. It is the same deprived group who the EFF also not could enrich and uplift since its founding as a “party of the people”. In addition, it placed them directly into conflict with the authorities and law and order. The creation of unrest, anarchy and revolution seems the ultimate intention of the EFF here.85,86,89,92

Secondly, there is not a single fact in the EFF’s actions to associate it with the positivity which characterised the political ideology of Nelson Mandela. To describe the EFF, as Kanyane92 tried to do, as the new don of South Africa politics, is wishful thinking. The correct reference is: new mischief-monger. Kanyane’s92 insight and thus also his propaganda, are lacking understanding of the principles of basic politics and sound political thinking. There is not a hunger by the mass of South African Blacks for a so-called “liberation”, or revolution in terms of land ownership or races. We saw the improper infusion thereof already in Venezuela and Zimbabwe, as well as the Zuma-regime of state capture under the mantle of “Black-African/African-Black liberation”. Eugene Terreblanche and his AWB tried the same kind of “political joke of mischief” with Afrikaner-liberation, as what Malema and his cronies are now trying to do, just to be rejected at the end. This rejection was not by the Black population, but by the Afrikaner/White population. This happens the same way with the ultra Afrikaner-nationalist leader Hans van Rensburg and his Ossewa-Brandwag (underwriting Nazism and extreme White nationalism) in the White politics of the 1940s. It failed miserably.1,85,86,89,92

4.1.1.2.3. The post-2019 erasing of the EFF’s founding aims and intentions

The May 2019 election shows that radical racial parties such as Andile Mngxitama’s Black First Land First (BLF), the African Content Movement (ACM) led by Hlaudi Motsoeneng and the Social Revolutionary Workers Party (SRWP) of Irvin Jim lost voter support and recognition, writes Mvumvu18. But this loss of voters’ support goes broader, affecting also the two other racial radical parties, namely the EFF and the FF+. Mthombothi93 highlights the dilemma wherein the bitter-ender radical parties such as the EFF, the ACM, the BLF and the ATM had run in the May election due to their expectation that their pushing of the expropriation of land without compensation would reap rich rewards for them (a misconception, which also swayed the ANC to join that bandwagon). It did not work. The racial radical parties of the EFF and the FF+ vote increase in the May 2019, is further misleading. There is no evidence of black voters excitedly flocking to proponents of amending the Constitution with the sole purpose of grabbing other people’s property on which both the EFF and the FF+ build their politics (although that of the FF+ politics is in reverse by their fuelling the Whites with a fear for land grabbing and an outcome which the FF+ has falsely positioned itself to be able to prevent it). This outcome means that there is no role to play in the near future for the EFF. For the EFF (as for that of the ACM, the BLF and the ATM) its primary founding aim and intention to effect exclusive land grabbing from Whites specifically, is firstly nullified. Secondly, its sole purpose of exclusive land grabbing, which held the party on the road and assured its members’ enrolment, is erased.  It is indeed the spelling out in the near future of the end of what a party such as the EFF saw initially as a new, but false beginning in the May elections’ with its gains in Parliamentary seats. The South African grassroots politics of post-2019 is no more established in the racial radicalism that characterised the manifestos of parties such as the EFF, the BKF, the ACM, the SRWP, the ATM and the FF+. The combined might of the South African capitalist class from all racial groups and the respect for democracy by most Blacks, notwithstanding their suffering under Apartheid had nipped in the bud permanently the popularity and empowerment of these racial radicals, leading to the EFF’s, FF+’s and ATM’s insignificant positions in the Sixth Parliament.93,94

A good example (similar to that of the EFF’s winning of votes from short term disgruntled ANC members and voters), is the said sudden “increase” for example of the right-wing Freedom Front Plus (FF+) in the May election. Its rise in votes is also simply the result of disgruntled White DA-voters who respond foolishly to the FF+’s slogan of “Fight Back”, seeing the FF+ as a rescuer of their so-called “eroded White-rights”. It is not a radical, lasting political improved outcome waiting for the disgruntled Whites. It holds the same limitations and a phasing-out in waiting as for the EFF. It is equal to those reflected by radical Afrikaners in the short-lived days of the AWB. Both the “growths” of the EFF and FF+ are the same racial contamination.36

It is important to critically look further at the belief that socialism is favoured by the mass of South Africans; a direction Malema seemingly wants now to steer his EFF into after the voters’ rejection of his exclusive Black-nationalism, land grabbing and nationalising of every citizen’s assets. The absolute failure of the SRWP which was undoubtedly a nasty shock for socialist supporters of the change away from socialism and radicalism in political thinking on grassroot-level is prominent here. This party, initiated by the 370 000-strong National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) and supported by its affiliated federation, the more or less 800 000-strong South African Federation of Trade Unions (Saftu), received only 24 439 votes (meaning a miniscule 0.14% of the total vote).26

This reflects the dilemma of a dark future waiting for the EFF. Its political foundation is precisely that of the doomed BLF, the ACM, the SRWP and the FF+. Botha95 pinpoints that the above outcome of rejection of the land expropriation without compensation and its racial radicalism, was evidence that the populist and socialist opinion about politics, as held until the May election by the labour-unions [but surly also the BLF, the ACM, the SRWP and the EFF], is presently without standing and a myth.95

On the failed racial radical politics coming from the past election around land expropriation and the parties caught up in it, Botha95 refers specifically as an example to the racial radical BHF [whose policy is openly a combination of Marxism and Leninism (an ideology to which the EFF prominently also lends itself) and the implication which had led to the immense financial chaos in Zimbabwe and Venezuela]. Botha95, in a comparison of the EFF with the BHF, writes as follows on the BLF95:10:

Die…Black First Land First (BLF), wie se leier hom gereeld skuldig maak aan onsinnigheid in die algemeen en haatspraak in die besonder en ook sy volgelinge (wat maar dun gesaai is) aanhits tot onwettige optrede, veral oor die besetting van grond.

Dié party het sowat 0.11% van die stemme  ontvang, wat beteken dat sy steun vir ‘n radikale benadering tot nasionalisering van eiendom beperk is tot slegs een persoon uit 1 000 wat gestem het.

Thus in comparing the EFF and its leaders’ racial radicalism with that of the BLF above in how both are driving their politics, there is no real difference, besides the foolish arrogance and self-orientation of the two group’s leaders, thankfully blocking the formation of a foolish alliance. There seems, as for the failed BLF, that the EFF also has a limitation to be able to move into the future, namely as a hindrance, besides its contaminated racial inclinations, its unpredictable and strange leadership. To survive the post-2019 politics, the EFF is now forced to make a drastic change in its politics if it wants to survive until 2024. But, for the EFF to move more racially and economically radical to the left on nationalising the public’s private assets, there is no more space in post-2019 South Africa. To move right and moderately, there is also no place for the EFF: there are already well functioning parties here which will fast gobble up the EFF. Both outcomes are going to leave “Kaiser Julius Malema” walking naked out of Parliament very near in the future. Neither would an alliance with the other radicals such as the BLF, the SRWP and the ACM save the day. As mentioned, these parties are already basically phased out from the post-2019 politics due to their racial, political and economic radicalism, especially on the matter of land. To go to bed with the ATM for Malema’s EFF in a last dying compulsion, will be a fatal coupling for the EFF. It is clear that the ATM, born out of sympathy for Jacob Zuma because of his ousting from the presidency, is just another diminutive party which made it with “luck from somewhere” to Parliament. It is of political insignificance and only costs the taxpayers money by their sitting in Parliament.95

It must be noted that Malema is the EFF and the EFF is Malema. Stripping Malema from his EFF-clothing indeed means the forever departure from politics of Julius Malema, as well as his absurd political ambitions and aspirations. Taking Malema out of the EFF means the outright collapse of the EFF. It will thus take a far more constructive change inside the EFF and its leadership’s mindset to make it and them more acceptable as a party with moderate Blacks and Whites. Malema’s latest political rhetoric-trick after the post-2019 election, as with the many other political jokes, strangeness and obscurities uttered in his politic career, reflects excellenty the EFF’s and Malema’s political confusion and in-depth cementing already into the political wilderness. Prominent is his recent senseless and confused political title-tattle which undoubtedly reflects a serious memory loss on what he extremely racial-radically had said before on Whites and their assets – rhetoric which included serious threats to their property as well as their personal security. His senseless and confused political title-tattle tells us a lot when he said96:7: “We are focusing on all voters generally, not a specific race group. The only issue with white people and our policies is not that they are anti-white. Our policies are anti-white privilege and white people tend to enjoy white privilege at the expense of black people.”

In the face of this false “new good politics”, including a sudden and confusing “White love” as recently declared publically by Malema on behalf of himself and the EFF, Buccus26 guides and warns us on the dark, masked side of the EFF and Malema. Buccus posits26:26: “The EFF is clearly aligned to the mixture of crude nationalism, authoritarianism and gross looting of the state that has characterised the Zuma faction of the ANC.”  Buccus26 takes further this unchangeable racial radicalism politics of the EFF (and that of the FF+ from the White side of racial radicals) in the post -2019 politics when he writes26:26: “It is true that the crude racial populism of the EFF and the Freedom Front Plus made some gains, but in the overall picture they remain a minority. Mandela’s vision of racial reconciliation clearly still has the support of the majority of South Africans.”

For the EFF to move into an alliance with the ANC in an effort to block the EFF’s erasing as an entity from the country’s politics, can only possibly happen if the Zuma-faction overtakes the general ANC. But this outcome also seems also impossible, in terms of the EFF’s radical ideology, for any alliance if the doves of the Ramaphosa-clan obtain the upper hand. Even if the present status of internal conflicting-politics activated by the Zuma faction stays on within the ANC, the May 8 election shows that the ANC in general has successfully forced down for the moment the radicals inside it and had already disowned the Zuma-aligned ACM, the BLF and the ATM as possible future partners. Munusamy30 writes specifically in this context on the EFF’s radicalism and racial-contaminated shortcomings, making it already unacceptable as a possible partner to the ANC. Munusamy postulates30:26: “The EFF could have used its popularity on the ground to partner with the ANC in government. But its politics are underlined by malice and brutish behaviour, making a working relationship with any party unfeasible.

Buccus26, on the outcome of the election results of only a 10% stake instead of 15% and more which has forced down an empowerment cap on the EFF, as well as that of its possible radical partners in the ANC, in terms of their further practising of radical politics, writes26:26: “This outcome means that SA is doing relatively well in avoiding the curse of populism. The populists in the ANC have been seriously weakened by Ramaphosa’s success. They will be further weakened by the now much more credible criminal justice system.”

Indeed, the advent of a post-2019 credible criminal justice system may be the strongest eraser of the leadership of the EFF, together with the basically already invisible political movements such as those of the ACM, the ATM, the BLF, by their calling to book for political delinquency.26

4.1.1.2.4. Alleged inner-circle mischief at the EFF home

When it comes to the measuring of the integrity of a political party and its leadership, it is unavoidable to reflect on the EFF’s inner-circle’s politics and the allegations around it. Important to note in this respect are fresh allegations of financial impropriety against Julius Malema by members of his central command, according to Harper98. In his resignation letter, the previous EFF-MP, Zolile Xalisa, accused Malema of failingto account for R2-million a month collected in levies from councillors, MPLs and MPs. It is also alleged that Malema did not account for about R20-million which the party received from the legislatures every quarter.91,97,98

In this context Harper98 reports that in his public resignation, Xalisa also accused Malema of not accounting for about R1.7-million a month collected in levies specific from the EFF’s 825 councillors. It is alleged that since the 2016 elections, each councillor had paid a levy of almost R2 000 a month. Xalisa said98:10: “You [Malema] never reported about this money in the CCT [central team] and the war council. You refuse to be held accountable nor account for these funds.”

Regarding the levies of the 61 MPs and MPLs, Xalisa reports that just under R7 000 a person a month – which totals R427 000 a month for the 61 members, were collected – and there was no proper accounting done by Malema. All of the abovementioned money was meant to go into a constituency fund for EFF parliamentarians to do their constituency work. Furthermore, Malema is accused by Xalisa of forcing the central command team to themselves pay weekly deployment costs, including car hire, accommodation, party T-shirts and food for supporters.91,98

The other EFF-MP that resigned, Thebinosi Rawula, also accused Malema of alleged financial irregularities.91,97,98

In addition is the fact that Julius Malema has not yet been cleared from prosecution of earlier corruption charges in connection with government tenders in Limpopo. Now that the NPA is renewed and the Zuma-capture thereof it is starting to be cleared, Malema can become a point of focus.97

The madman-looting of the VBS Mutual Bank by many political fools and their cronies is now ready for prosecution. In this context, writes Bruce99, the fraud and pillage at the VBS Mutual Bank and the demonstrable benefit from the looting of it by Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu, which indeed forced their arrest, handcuffing, perp-walking, charging and then releasing on bail before the May 8 election is a clear and easy case for the law-enforcment agencies. Besides this, there is the allegation against the EFF of the receipt of funding from the tobacco underworld that needs the attention of the NPA, SARS and the SAPS, posits Munusamy.100

The arrest of Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu – Bruce’s99 description of “their handcuffing, perp-walking, charging and then releasing on bail before the May 8 election”, which was the moral and politically correct action — was seemingly only to avoid by the ANC’s opportunism not to lose some votes to the EFF for these arrests before the election and/or of a possible partnership between the ANC and EFF after the election. Notwithstanding all this political covering against their earlier arrest, Shamila Batohi and some trustworthy and law-abiding members in the Hawks, the NPA and the SAPS are hopefully waiting patiently for them. Bruce postulates that hopefully their arrests will come during 2019, with the possible outcome of leaving the EFF leaderless already in 2019.99-102

It seems that criminal law has at last arrived at the EFF’s door. It was reported that the EFF MP Marshall Dlamini had appeared on the 15th April 2019 in the magistrate’s court of Cape Town, due to his alleged assault of a police officer in Parliament on the 7th February. It seems that the deputy leader of the EFF, Floyd Shivambu, will also appear in court about his alleged assault of a journalist in March on the Parliament terrain. The 4% rise and glory of the last election can fast make place for the erasing of the EFF and its leaders, if the law is properly executed. The need to take them to court for past wrong–doings is highlighted by various investigative journalists.99-102

4.1.1.2.5. Julius Malema is an acolyte of Peter Mokaba in his underwriting of narrow African nationalism

Julius Malema, the EFF’s top leader, is “an acolyte of Peter Mokaba”, reflects the seasoned political analyst and the political editor of the Sunday Times, Sibongakonke Shoba103, in March 2009. This Malema political inclination is well-illustrated by Shoba103 by clearly showing Malema’s focus of his politics on a narrow “African nationalism”; a political ideology that had already failed to gain ground in the ANC and even the broader South African community. (Narrow White-nationalism was also the reason for the failure of the Afrikaners as a tribe in South Africa and brought down the NP with its racial and discriminative Apartheid; a party which was intimately built around it and its wrong-doings).1,103

Malema and his EFF, writes Shoba103, are a product of Mokaba’s teachings. He had undoubtedly become a believer in and a supporter of the worst form of African nationalism. Shoba writes103:19: “He has hijacked the political space once occupied by the PAC and the Azanian People’s Organisation. Even though Malema may, on occasion, invoke the names of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo, his politics have been inspired by Pan-Africanist rhetoric. His attacks on white people and South Africans of Indian origin show that his idea of African nationalism is extreme, and has an element of right-wing demagoguery.”

What Shoba103 missed out on and also needs to say, is that Malema’s ideology of the “encircling of a greater South African African-nationalism” has been cemented into a well-masked “Venda-African-nationalism” or plain “Venda-tribalism”. It is a deadly, abnormal Black ethnicity and tribalism. This Venda-nationalism-tribalism carries in ordinary South African politics absolutely no empowerment or status and will go nowhere. To underwrite and propagate it would let Malema remain for ever faceless, unknown and powerless in South African politics, and of course, out of Parliament and its feed-trough. The reflection of and presentation thus of a “greater” South African African-nationalism”, is nothing more than masterminded-politics by Malema, purely for opportunistic reasons and his personal gain. (This “Malema-initiative” is to a certain extent a pure mimicing of the Zuma clan’s failed policy through which they  tried to represent “African-Black nationalism” or “Black-African nationalism” away from African-nationalism for their political gain, such as activating and upholding of state capture, land grabbing and the nationalising of White capital, etc.).34,63,64,103

Prominent in Malema’s attacks on so-called “non-Africans” (meaning “non-Black” Africans) are the names of Pravin Gordhan (also a target of Mokaba) and Shamila Batohi. And then there are the Afrikaners/Whites, especially the farm owners and White-capitalists.99,104 Excellent examples here are the many politically and racially delinquent utterances of Malema between 2016 and 2018, such as: “We are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now” and his statement that: “…people of Indian decent tend to mistreat black workers” – both utterances which the South African Human Rights Commission found to be OK!104,105 Then there is Malema’s nonchalant pronouncement of Pravin Gordhan as a “…dog of white monopoly capital who hates Africans”, as well as Shivambu’s authored blog post, accusing as follows: “Gordhan of running a cabal and operating a parallel state”.104,105 These kinds of utterances, if used by a White, undoubtedly would mean a jail sentence plus.

The allegation of the “future that the EFF is seising” and the “freshness and creativeness” that the EFF  allegedly is bringing to the so-called “South African old politics of liberation”- as seen and propagated by Kanyane92 – is going to be very short-lived. The EFF has gained temporarily more votes in the May-election through racism and extreme radical-politics, only because the greater ANC as well as the DA shy away from this kind of political delinquency. But it is going to cost the EFF dearly in post-2019 politics. It must be noted, on the other side, that this political and racial contamination which has beset the EFF will spread into its co-partners if the EFF is successful in misleading either the DA or the ANC into a post-2019 trap of cooperation.103

An exclusive and selective African nationalism (equal to the one which Malema propagates) cost the PAC and Azapo dearly, putting them into permanent regression as groups after 1994, writes Shoba103. The “struggle of Africans” in South Africa, as Malema with great mischief reflects, is not limited to small group of African-Blacks, but includes all the racial groups who are a permanent part of South Africa and thus Africa. It is clear that with regard to the ultra-African nationalism, it is today only Malema and a very small group of remnants of the old revolutionaries that are still stuck with this cognitive idea. The EFF’s propagation and spreading of it spells revolution and genocide that are not part of the thinking of the majority of South Africans. Looking at this delinquent-internalised mindset of Julius Malema, is it undoubtedly with a tongue in his cheek that Shoba fatherly advises Malema103:19: “If Malema is serious about realising his childhood ambition to ascend to the highest office in the land, he will have to change tack.” From experience Shoba103 must know very well that Malema cannot change; neither does he understand the meaning “tack”, or what it means to be responsible after ascending to the highest office.

4.1.1.2.6. Malema and his merry men mostly dressed in Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits

On Julius Malema’s bi-polar presence in the South African politics — and surely an effort to give us insight into the many colours a chameleon can take, even those in the South African politics — De Waal writes106:33:

Thabo Mbeki at the Rand Easter Show! How thrilling. The diminutive former statesman was wheeled out of retirement by the ANC to counter the presence of his former foe, Julius Malema, who now leads the ANC’s external ultra-left wing, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). First, though, a little back ground. It was Malema, then leading the ANC Youth League, who said he would kill for Jacob Zuma, who was then challenging Mbeki for the ANC leadership. Later, in one of those historical ironies one can only relish, Malema himself was booted out of the ANC – by his former patron and glorious leader, Zuma, for comparing him unfavourably with his predecessor, Mbeki!

How we chuckled.

It’s rather odd that, now, with both Mbeki and Zuma out of power, Malema is backing Zuma’s bagman, Tom Moyane, to the hilt, and demonetising Pravin Gordhan, Zuma’s bête noir, for all he’s worth. But that’s a puzzle for another day.

To unlock the above puzzle around the specific Julius Malema political mindset and actions is very easy and does not need another day. We just have to look back to his yesterday and his not so far-back history of politically delinquent actions and how easily he changes from his Dr Jekyll suit to his Mister Hyde suit when the situation opportunistically fits him.

Firstly, witness his delinquent political action excellently reflected when Cosatu, under his leadership in 2002, unleashed chaos in the Johannesburg CBD, leading to loses by pedestrians, vendors and shopkeepers who were mugged and robbed during the rowdy illegal march.107This kind of unleashing of chaos-behaviour in public was alleged again to be caused by his EFF’s involvement at the more recent unrest in the township of Alexandra on land occupation. It was prominently alleged at the last sitting of the Alexandra Inquiry in May 2019 that the EFF was directly involved. At a meeting of the Inquiry, the Alexandra councillor, Teffo Raphadu, said that the EFF perpetrates land invasions in Alexandra in such a delinquent way “that [it] put people’s lives in danger,” according to Okoye.108

Furthermore, it seems, that there is only one approach for Malema109 to obtain land reform (especially the transfer of White “settlers’ so called stolen land” to the landless and poor Blacks, and that is through violence, anarchy and revolution. He declares himself open to the use of violence, anarchy and revolution in the settling of the land matter, ignoring the fact that a mandated black government, the ANC, is reigning and he himself is a MP of the respected South African Parliament and not a non-conforming member of a bush-bar. He is supposed to be a role-model and is expected to promote integrity. The intention to incite unlawful violence, anarchy and revolution in order to overthrow the government of the day is well illustrated by his following writing on the 22 July 2018109:22:

There is simply no way Parliament can retreat on this question any longer. After all these consultations, one thing is clear: to retreat and betray our people on the demand for land expropriation will be to risk a direct revolution, which they will conduct on their own, wherever they are.

On that day, when our people take the land by force, the EFF will join in because the power of the day would have refused to co-ordinate a peaceful, democratic and inclusive process that empowers the previously oppressed to have access to the land.

When further examining his EFF Manifesto presented for the recent election, the same kind of disorder politics is preached by him. The basis is over and over the threatening of the order of society and the instigation of anarchy, constantly and continuously. It reads89:18:

“We are not part of the 1994 elite pact. We are a completely new generation, with new demands. And our demands, unlike those of the 1994 generation, will not be postponed. We refuse to be silenced with so-called reconciliation. We want justice now. We want our land now. We want jobs now. We demand the economy now!”

But there are more than just the Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits that Malema and his cronies from the EFF seem to dress themselves in daily: there are seemingly also their witch-hunter suits that need to be highlighted, because this also, as Teffo Raphadu said of the EFF’s alleged delinquent activities in Alexandra, “puts peoples’ lives in danger.”108,110

At the end of this article the Citizen of the 29th May 2019 reports on the politics of the bizarre that comes from the EFF leader Malema’s alleged death threats towards the Scorpio’s investigative journalist Pauli van Wyk.110 This reaction followed after her report on the 28th May 2019 on how the EFF had apparently benefitted from the looting of the now defunct VBS Mutual Bank, as well as the EFF’s deflection from claims of corruption to a spirited defence of the public protector. Watson110, on these alleged actions of the EFF-cronies, writes110:2: “When the story – titled “Cruising nicely on VBS: EFF’s Parties, Lies and Looted Money” – was released on Monday night, Malema’s response on Twitter was: “We are still cruising nicely, bana ba balei [children of witches] are not happy. Go for kill fighters, hit hard…[sic]”. ▼

Watson110 writes that Van Wyk110 allegedly had noted in her article that the EFF’s fourth birthday bash in Durban in July 2017 was seemingly funded by a part of the money of the illegal R16.1-million Brian Shivambu’s company Sgameka Projects received from VBS that was ultimately channelled to the EFF. Watson also writes that it is alleged by Scorpio that it has so far isolated about R4.13-million in VBS loot paid to the EFF. Watson110 reflects that the article of Van Wyk is currently (29th May 2019) on the Daily Maverick with apparent copies of bank statements around these payments. He writes110:2: “…which, on the face of it, explain the flow of cash in “a scheme designed to mask the origin and ultimate beneficiaries of the funds. VBS money flowed through companies over which Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu have ultimate control”.”

In response to further enquiries to Malema by Van Wyk110 about the leadership of the EFF and its treasurer-general Leigh-Ann Mathys, alleged Watson110 that had Malema said110:2: “I won’t be answering any questions from the moloi [witch]; she can write anything she wants to write. I’ve responded to all her questions before and won’t be doing it going forward. She is extraordinarily personal [sic] and I’m not answerable to a white madam. She can go to the nearest hell.” ▼

Watson110 reports further that, in a seeming effort at deflecting from the VBS Bank matter, the EFF Deputy President Shivambu110 compared Van Wyk to a lizard and Pravin Gordhan to a crocodile110:2: “We really have no time fighting lizards when the crocodiles are the real enemy forces.” This brings us again to the foreground of Van Wyk’s110 earlier note in the Scorpio on the “strange” and for “what unknown” reason, the “spirited defence of the public protector” by the EFF who is herself at the moment under scrutiny by the various political bodies for  her actions.

How far the politically delinquent actions, especially on the contamination of good racial-relations, of persons such as Malema and his intimate cronies in their Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits have tragically already penetrated a sector of the Black society mindsets with their dangerous anti-White culture and radicalism, was well-illustrated by the crowd’s booing of ex-President FW de Klerk (the man who puts Blacks – and thus also Julius Malema and his cronies – in charge of South Africa in 1994) at the recent inauguration of President Cyril Ramaphosa.111  Bachtis111 writes as follows on this indication of the vile racial tensions that exist in the country111:13:

This was a naked display of intolerance of one race group against another. Sickening in the extreme, as white people in this country were given notice that they are abhorred, and regarded as undesirable.

It took the master of ceremonies some time to bring the crowd to order. Sadly, many in that crowd were dignitaries from countries across the African continent, witnessing vitriolic sentiments.

This show of disrespect heralds the new South Africa, a country where white-skinned people, born in this country, are regarded as being of no importance.

The white diaspora will continue, and this country will continue to entrench reverse racism and apartheid.

That the Whites must start to fear for their lives if Malema and his cronies win the empowerment of the country’s politics, is further confirmed by his racially delinquent utterance of:

“We are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now”.103-105

The above words, which echo perfectly Julius Malema’s history of racial rhetoric, have excellently put in the foreground Julius Malema’s and the EFF’s all-over political mischief of agitation and the instigation of disrespect for the individual’s rights, democracy, and political order. This negativity is not only applicable to the Whites, but also to the greater Black population.89,107,108,110,111

Political jokers and clowns bring laughter and can sometimes change for the good, even inside the political circus, but political fools can, masked as jokers and clowns, be very dangerous in the short and long run for the minorities and a country’s stability: remember Idi Amin and Adolf Hitler. Thankfully, the delinquencies and foolishnesses of these political fools’ mostly disable themselves in the end.99-102

Malema and his cronies at the EFF will hopefully soon learn that their outdated and poor fitting Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits do not fit into today’s respectable politics. Neither can their witch-hunter suits qualifying them for jokers and clowns. To be dressed in these outfits much longer can cost them dearly.99-102

▲ It is important for Julius Malema with regard to his alleged calling Pauli van Wyk a witch, to take note of the main aims of the Witchcraft Suppression Act No 3 of 1957, namely112:

To prevent any person or a community to identify a specific person (notwithstanding his position or doing, to justify such an identification) to be a “”wizard”” through witch-finding;

To prevent that this identified person (“wizard”) is harmed (threatened, terrorised, victimised or even murdered) in any way by the “witch-finder” or the community;

To prevent a person to call himself a ‘wizard’ by prohibiting such self-naming / declaration as a crime, with the sole aim to safeguard him against harm by his own wrong-doing, to be identified as a ‘wizard’ by the ‘witch-finder’ and the community. [For full text see Section 1(a) to (f) (i) – (iv) of the Act].

This means that Malema’s alleged calling of Ms Pauli Van Wyk a moloi (witch) and the alleged use of the words: bana ba balei [children of witches] are not good. Go for kill fighters, hit hard…[sic]”, can be a serious matter and lead to his criminal prosecution and being sent to jail. It can be as serious as looting the VBS Bank’s money and committing high treason.110,112

4.1.1.2.7. The EFF is a boys’ club of dinky-toy players

The EFF is a boys club of dinky toy players; it does not have political potential, quality or maturity. The majority of democracy-loving South Africans know it well. It is only the politically poorly informed voters and some present-day confused and disillusioned ANC members, together with a pocket of political radicals, that still believe in the EFF’s kindergarten stories and their so-called “saviour and messianic” leaders, the honourable MPs Malema and Shivambu, to bring about their Utopia.12,92,99,100,113-115

The EFF’s Manifesto, propagated by Julius Malema under the heading: “The EFF is ready to govern as demonstrated by the detailed blueprint for economic emancipation as set out in its manifesto”, is not worth the paper on which it has been written. There is an immense difference between a detailed manifesto of plain nonsense and a detailed record of an excellent practice of politics. The last mentioned is a good characteristic which the EFF is totally lacking. Prominent from the reading of the EFF Manifesto is Malema’s instigation of violence, racism, minority-bashing and radical-Marxism and the solving of politics and economics with the typical chaos-revolutionary business model where the ruler does not create new economic growth, prosperity and richness, but only transfers the assets of the one group to the so-called poor and landless people, who, at the end, stay landless and poverty-stricken. At the end of such a chaotic regime, when the economics come to a standstill and poverty and chaos reigns, the ruler collapses and escapes the scene with his loot.33,88,103,114,115

The EFF is, in its juvenile stage of development, already a failed political experience. Hopefully, if the NPA at last starts to do its work, Malema and his immediate cronies will be out of circulation in 2019.88,110,114 The heartbreak which Julius Malema experienced when he mourned the death of his grandmother115:7: “I am broken, finished” may be his same words in the future with his departure and that of his beloved EFF from the country’s politics.

History can be hard and cruel on foolish politicians and their parties. This punishment can be harder for an irresponsible boys club of dinky toy players. Sorely for the EFF, it seems to be one of these historical cases.

4.1.1.2.8. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018

On the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, the EFF is awarded eight points out of a possible 82 points.81

This measure shows that the EFF does not have the ability or a single talent to take on a simple government task or duty; forget the implementation of the nationalising and the grabbing of land. The EFF and its politics is like a dog chasing a car for years and then one day the car stops, giving the dog the opportunity to try to bite the tyres and to take the car captive, but without success, leaving it with the enormous problem of what to do with the stranded car it was chasing for years. The EFF has indeed been stranded between its inciting, foolish and hostile rhetoric and its lack of knowhow to be able to do constructive deeds. And then there is its extremely unpredictable politics, bordering on political insanity. The EFF’s mastery to distract the attention from their own delinquencies and inabilities through the excellent misuse of social media are also thankfully diminishing fast under the onslaught of investigative and constructive journalists. The fact is, and the public is beginning to learn this well, that the EFF and its leaders’ political warts on their hands and faces make them just too visible.12,92,99,100,108,113-116

5. Conclusions

On the decision to vote for the EFF or not in the recent May 2019 election, Munusamy118 gave the voters before the election clear, advice: “…holding our noses to vote for the least-odious party” when she guides118:20: “To make a decision to vote requires that law-abiding, conscientious people ask themselves which political party is least offensive to their own values and principles.” When the “is least offensive” requirement has been applied, it could not be the EFF. Thankfully also, to support Munusamy’s118 guideline, most of the voters have excellent values and principles. They showed it clearly in the election by their isolation of the EFF, together with its cronies, such as the ATM, the ACM and the BLF, from future serious politics. Indeed, the voters put the lid on radical racial politicians. The EFF’s politics, reflected by its contaminated political thinking, planning and action, spell only disaster all over for the county’s well-being.116,118

If people are disgusted by the possible inclusion of some of the 22 listed disgraced ANC top brass as parliamentarians, they must be just as disgusted to see Malema and Shivambu back in Parliament as MPs.92,99,100,113,114,116 But, on the other hand, to be noted on this uncommon phenomenon, people must remember, as Retief119 says, this is Africa. Seemingly this country now has its own style of the practice of politics and the underwriting of political integrity.

All South Africans, especially the Whites, know that serious land reform is absolutely needed; it is an immediate imperative and there is a strong contingent of Whites willing to participate in reasonable land transfer to Blacks. The EFF and its leaders’ incoherent land grabbing policy, together with their cognitive political mal-thinking, spell revolution and can lead to the cost of thousands of innocent lives. Mandela’s sole reason for entrance into the 1994-Dispensation was because too much blood of the Black majority had been spilled. The EFF wants a Rwanda in South Africa. The EFF and the Malema-crowd are on the way, if they get the opportunity, to spill blood again, but this time a mass of Black, Coloured, Indian and White blood.75-80

It is clear that the EFF’s CV is very thin. It lacks the prescribed qualifications and documents as well as the prescribed experience to be a ruler. They played off this meaningless CV very well  in the May election, without anyone really contacting their referees. The Attestations or letters of the referees on the EFF’s and its leaders’ trustworthiness, integrity and qualities – besides one or two subjective, uninformed and unqualified referees — are totally rejecting the EFF as a ruler or partner to a ruler for post-2019 South Africa. The referees of the EFF, in evaluating it as the ideal government to activate, steer and finalise land expropriation, with (or without) compensation, erases them summarily from the list of candidates.

The count awarded to EFF and its leadership in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201881, is a mere 8 (9%) out of a possible maximum of 82 (100%). This means, together with its leadership, an outright failure as a political institution of stature.75-80

Mischief-doing is the only ability of the EFF and its leadership. The present holding of mass land ownership by Whites is basically the only initiative left to the EFF to be able to perpetuate mischief too, basically because it can be contaminated unobstructedly through the EFF’s Parliament privilege racial relations without the taking of responsibility or the calling to book if a fiasco follows. Coetzee120 warns on this post-2019 possibility and the serious consequences for the country by these dinky-toy players’ actions120:14: “Die moedswillige skade wat die Julius Malemas, Magashules and Mlamleli’s met hul opruiery van grondbesetters aanrig, is onberekenbaar.”

The ANC’s own radical racism is strengthening the opportunity for the EFF’s boys club to make some noise, as in the past, in Parliament on the land matter. Coetzee writes120:14: “Naas die korrupsiestryd, gaan die grondkwessie in dié vyfjaar-termyn ‘n brandpunt wees. Die arena waar die wetlike stryd hom grootliks gaan uitspeel, is in die parlement, waar die ad hoc-kommittee vir die wysiging van die Grondwet  se art.25 deurgedryf gaan word.” It is the same Parliament where the EFF had shown in the past its unlimited political gangsters and violence. The land reform matter can, if the EFF is not favoured and supported by the other parliamentarians in doing it in “Malema-style”, change to serious Parliamentary conflict and violence.

The EFF cannot be trusted in any way to be in charge of land expropriation. Moreover, they totally lack the experience to handle such a project.

The applicant status of the EFF, to be considered as an able candidate to be able to rule South Africa after May 8, and thus to  successfully activate land expropriation (with or without compensation), is so low that it and its leadership should not ever be considered and be allowed on the first list of applicants to be a ruler. The application of the EFF must be completely rejected and its application papers should be sent back. It cannot be shortlisted.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa. (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanisation and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

Land ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 1 (7)

Title: Landownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 1 (7)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Age-old custom, colonist, frontiersman, humanity, impoverishment, indigenous people, land grabbing, landless, landownership, land redistribution, political history, radicalism, terrorism, unemployment

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 1

1. Background

1.1.   Introduction

Our entry into this world may be arbitrary, but the world that greets us is not. Numerous forces vie for our attention and loyalty. Our minds are a battleground for competing ideas. The outcome of this battle determines who we become and the society we create. But the forces that win out are not necessarily the ones that serve us best. Over the course of human history, countless people have been conditioned to defend oppressive ideologies, support destructive regimes and believe downright lies.

Although the ideological, cultural and religious labels that divide us are not inherent in our nature, history suggests that the capacity to identify with them for arbitrary reasons is. This capacity enables the easy transmission of bias, prejudice and ignorance from one generation to the next. If we are to expand our freedom, we need to question our beliefs and values and the forces that brought them about. Why do we hold the beliefs that we do? Why have we formed the habits that we possess? And, crucially, whose interests do they serve? Questioning the religious, economic, social and political paradigms of our time is as urgent as it has ever been. To shape identities is to fashion the future — but what future are we creating? Today the world is scarred by war, extreme inequality and environmental devastation. If we are to create an alternative future, we can’t just reproduce the thinking that shaped the past.1:26

Seen in perspective, the matter of expropriation of land (with or without compensation) from Whites in South Africa, as presently driven by the ANC regime, seems to be fully enveloped in a history of White-Black conflict in which the racial factor is prominent. In this history, as already analysed in depth in the published articles 1 to 6 of the project on land-ownership and expropriation, bad behaviour-conditioning — to serve and to uphold exclusively oppressive ideologies and to support destructive regimes, as well as to believe downright lies and myths on the matter — stand out pertinently. The dividing forces of bad ideology, culture and religion, stretching over years, enable the inculcation of bias, prejudice and ignorance in many South Africans’ mindsets.  Prominent is the role played by such negative ideology, culture and religion that still inform our current beliefs, habits and values as active forces in seeking to mislead and to abuse us with one single object: to make us serve the interests of a delinquent master. The 1994 South African Political Dispensation and its Constitution are viewed more and more by the large mass of poor and landless Blacks to be serving only the disguised, self-centred and selfish aims and interests of the opportunistic religious, juridical and political masters of the country. It does not matter if these masters are Black or White.

The pertinent use and role of religion, law and politics, especially from 1913 until today, in an effort to bring a so-called “final solution” to the South African land-ownership dispute, need to be elucidated.

1.1.1. The failed divinely-ordained approach

From the beginning, Christianity played a very decisive role in South African efforts to solve or to address major problems when its people arrived at personal, political, social and economic obstacles and crises which seemed unsolvable to them. Prominent were also the immense personal, political, social and economic obstacles and crises central to the Blacks’ reconciliation process with Whites when the 1994 Political Dispensation arrived. Side-by-side, with the creation of juridical and political foundations for activating reconciliation and to start the new post-1994 democracy, stood the Christian religion and its message of forgiveness for the immense human and political sins of the past in a direct effort to heal and to solve especially the distrust, suspicion and hatred of Blacks for Whites and their Apartheid. The role of Christian religious ministers, from all the races and denominations, played a prominent role after the 1994 Political Dispensation to institute the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), totally outside the traditional juridical and political frameworks, in an effort to heal the emotional and spiritual wounds of Apartheid and to bring personal, psychological and spiritual reconciliation between Blacks and Whites. A religious salvation was seen as a kind of anointed solution by the leaders of the various religious denominations. Two prominent ministers of religion (one Black and one White) took the lead here, namely Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu as chairman, with Dr Alex Borraine as deputy chair of the TRC.2

But this religious inclination to solve personal, group and national hindrances and crises (and politics) was not limited to the direct impact of reverends, but also part of the opportunistic thinking and actions of South African political leaders in 1994; although indirect and faceless, they were active from a distance in an effort to sidestep their own guilt and responsibilities, as well as to prolong their wrongdoing. The long political history of South Africa shows that much (if not all) of these so-called “god-anointed” outcomes of salvation, as those that the TRC religious leaders prayed for, stayed unanswered. Very striking is the phenomenon that most of South Africans’ “religious interactions” with “their Christian God”, stretching from the early years until today, were mostly not successful, leaving many of these “anointed role-players” dead in the end or at least highly aggravated “their God” had not answered their prayers. The examples are manifold, such as Jacob Zuma’s slogan “ruling safely till Jesus comes”.2-7

Prominent here regarding such anointed-outcomes-going-bad is Chief Kgosi Mamphoku Makgoba of Limpopo, who, filled with “god-anointing” in the maintenance of his tribal land in the old Boer Transvaal, summarily lost his head in the end at the hands of another “blessed servant” of the seemingly same “Christian God”, General Piet Joubert of the ZAR. Joubert himself, notwithstanding his so-called initial “god-anointed, divinely-ordained, god-willed and god-favoured” status, was also politically eliminated when the British forces demolished the ZAR in 1902,  grabbing his fatherland, and left more than 30 000 Transvaal’s burghers dead, seemingly because “their God had changed his mind on them”.5

HF Verwoerd, in his heyday of the practitioner of Apartheid and land grabbing from non-Whites, also believed on the 6th September 1966 that “his God” was solely on his side in the practice of racism, missing out on the reality that “his God” also in the meantime had changed his mind, allowing an assassin to freely put a knife to his heart.2,3,6

Even one of the two prominent ministers who founded the TRC (with duration April 1996 to October 1998) was not so sure if “his God” was really always with the TRC and the victims of Apartheid. Pertinent stands out here the doubt of the reverend Dr Alex Borraine. In this context Chris Barron7 writes on Borraine’s gut feeling, reflecting the absence of the supposed “ever-present of his God to steer justice and godlike honesty”, as follows7:17:

He felt the TRC failed to uncover the full truth about the violations committed during apartheid, particularly by the security forces in the 1980s. The generals were “evasive and smart” and treated the TRC with “disdain and contempt.”

He said the TRC did not secure even a minimal amount of justice for those who drew up the policies of apartheid that resulted in death squads, torture, detention without trial and assassinations.

Because many of the incriminating documents were destroyed in the run-up to negotiations there was no paper trail linking senior politicians and generals to their crimes.

He said the TRC had failed to persuade the ANC government to grant swift and adequate reparations to the victims.

He thought the TRC’s demands for action against apartheid perpetrators should have been stronger.

It is clear for the critical observer that God in South African history (in this case the Jewish God/Christian God/South African Christian God) does not always (or ever?) intervene or interfere in people’s political, social and economic crises and sufferings, especially around the unique issue of land grabbing in South Africa. This, notwithstanding their intense “talking to” and their constant public praising of “their own  God”, and their often seemingly “schizophrenic” claim to be his “anointed servants”, blessed to be able to execute certain actions which they see as so-called “anointed actions”. This outcome has been reflected over many years in the so-called Christian communities of South Africa (and which, it seems, for the late reverend Alex Borraine, was also lacking in overseeing a “godsent justice” during the TRC). The false “god-besottedness” of many persons since pre- and post-1994 South Africa to address the country’s political problems as well as theirs through a “divinely-ordained solution” as the only correct one,  was in reality an action which had taken away their own cognitive reasoning and responsibility in finding constructive solutions to their crises and sufferings. On this kind of “solution” of problems the historian and philosopher Yuval Noah Harari gives a clear guideline on how to target and regain exclusively our “political sanity”, and thus to overcome the many dangers of “religious vanity” (and religious insanity) which lacks trustworthiness and seems never to have solved South Africa’s political problems.8,9

Michele Magwood9 describes in terms of Harari’s philosophy the falsity around the exclusive application of religion as “an only remedy” by people to solve their problems — which gives us insight into how many naive South Africans have messed up their politics and thus may also find it enlightening as regards the present landownership debacle — as follows9:61:

When you have the power to reengineer life, your views on “right” and “wrong” acquire cosmic importance. But you don’t need religion in order to have a good moral compass. For morality doesn’t mean “obeying God” — morality means “reducing suffering”. In order to act morally, you just need to develop a deep appreciation of suffering.

Secular people abstain from murder not because some god forbids it, but because killing inflicts suffering on sentient beings. There is something deeply troubling and dangerous about people who avoid killing just because “God says so”. Such people are motivated by obedience rather than compassion, and what will they do if they come to believe that their god commands them to kill heretics, witches or gays?

And it is noteworthy that secular morality really works. The most peaceful and prosperous countries in the world such as Canada, New Zealand and the Netherlands are secular. In contrast, deeply religious countries such as Iraq and Pakistan tend to be violent and poor.

The above warning of Harari8 about the danger of a so-called “holy inspiration to obey God just because God says so” must be seen in terms of his own biblical knowledge of the immense murder spree in old Israel under the two Jewish leaders Joshua and Moses (the last-mentioned being a cold-blooded fugitive murderer and savage from Egypt) when they started to occupy early Palestine on behalf of the so-called “Jewish nation” by “order” of their so-called “exclusively Jewish God”. This murdering occupation of the Palestinians by the Jewish leaders Joshua and Moses took place immediately after they became emotionally and cognitively “grabbed by their Jewish God” to “cleanse” Palestine of so-called non-Jews and infidel Arabs.8,9

On this madness and murder as part of a divinely-ordained “grabbing” in their effort to justify political and personal self-enrichment by the Jews of the Old Testament (and  in modern politics still today), Louw writes as follows10:2:

The Jews of the Old Testament perpetrated violence tantamount to a rape of humanity, shedding the blood of the innocent. It did not matter if the victims were men, women and children in their own homeland. Their actions were justified as a divine command. Today these murderous biblical acts of ethnic and racial cleansing and land grabbing would be classified as psychopathic and mentally disturbed behaviour on the part of political and religious leaders.

It is this same “Jewish demanding” God who also became the “demanding” God of the Christians worldwide and who, in terms of Harari’s metaphorical example, is asking, it seems, them again by times today to “obey him just because he says so”, for example in their murderous warfare in the Middle East.

In this context of dangerous anointment (and much in line with the TRC “anointed” drive), is also to be found the example of the American ex-president George Bush’s murderous thinking and doing equal to Moses’s and Joshua’s decision-making  on “god-grabbing of others’ land”, which bordered on dangerous hallucinations and delusions. Chomsky11 prominently focussed on Bush’s blind “quasi-political-religious infections”, or better “his holy inspiring to obey God just because God says so”.  In this context, doing the same murdering for his “Jewish God cum Christian God”, as did Moses and Josua for their “Jewish God”, Chomsky11 reports that Bush proclaimed11:108: “God told him to strike at al Qaida,” which he then did, and then “…again that God instructed him to strike at Saddam,” which he again did. Chomsky11 reports further that Bush said he11:108: “…received the command of the Lord of Hosts, the War God, to fight the problems of the Middle East.” What is prominent in this case of Bush’s “anointment”, besides possible psychopathological thinking, is that the Iraqi political problems are today more severe than in the times of Bush, with ISIS/al Qaida in a very strong position.11,12,23

Reading the above, it cannot escape the mind that the same “Jewish God”, as with the American Bush and his men, was transferred to the proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners’ mindsets as their “South African Christian God”, which, it seems they many times “obeyed just because he said so”, resulting as often in their murderous actions beginning in 1652 in South Africa. Louw writes13:19:

The “goodness” or “badness” of political leaders is often linked to the racial or ethnic tension that accompanies the person’s reign. Such tensions re-awaken people’s sense of belonging to either the majority or the minority group. It also rekindles feelings of revenge. Conflicts that had been over rise again (think for example of the Great Trek and how these ideas were rekindled during the First and Second Anglo-Boer Wars). Past conflicts and ideas are rekindled however inapplicable they may be, because followers want to go back to what worked in the past. This happened in 1948 with the Afrikaner Nationalists. They were guided by outdated and dangerous ideas. The immoral ideas that led to the changes in 1948 dated from 1908. The founding fathers of Afrikanerism felt strong resentment directed at English-speaking White South Africans, dissident Afrikaners and Black South Africans par excellence. Outdated racist ideas with their foundation in the Cape of the 1700s were invigorated by the nationalist Afrikaners’ executive political leaders (persons like DF Malan, HF Verwoerd and BJ Vorster, with a smack of religion and/or Nazism in their political mindsets) and such ideas became engrained in the mindsets of many very naïve Afrikaners. They used these ideas and emotional appeals to gain power.

It is clear that for South Africans, in many ways similar in terms of violence, poverty and extreme religious adherence to those of the deeply religious Iraq and Pakistan, that the TRC and other exercises, wherein religion is used as an instrument to cleanse the country’s “bad past” and to “bring harmony” between Black and White, was an outright failure and a mistake. Other approaches are needed to address the country’s serious constitutional and political-historical problems. Land expropriation is such a demanding problem which needs a lasting solution on future landownership.14-22

1.1.2.   Failed judicial and political approach

On the other hand, it is clear that a pure juridical foundation to address crises like the ongoing land issue around its exclusive White ownership, has also failed the test of quality, effectiveness, justice and honesty, as the inappropriate present Constitution confirms. The use of court cases, based on an existing faulty Constitution to solve these kinds of troubles, only works in the short term when the political and military power is concentrated in autocratic, dictatorial or fascist regimes, as the NP regime’s behaviour from 1948 to 1994 reflects. When the minority loses political and military power, as the Whites in Magube’s Zimbabwe, the Constitution and the law-enforcement system failed many times, not just in its overall decisions, but also to hear the objecting minority. In this case the process reverses to autocratic, dictatorial or fascist (unconstitutional) ruling, changing a political, cultural and historic matter such as land expropriation into land grabbing.23-27

In this context we are seeing at the moment the legal conundrum surrounding the banning of displays of the old South African flag as such an outcome, where the law suffers under the pressure of the politics of the majority who do not view the rights of the minority positively (and where revenge sometimes seems to be a prominent driver of behaviour). This flag case, brewing since the late 2017s, has now, besides the involvement of various prominent social and political organisations has now also attracted the minister of justice’s attention. The intense endangering of the legal rights of the minority of Whites is well illustrated by the CEO of the Nelson Mandela Foundation (NMF), a said Sello Hatang, when he blindly and bluntly said that any gratuitous displays of the flag constituted so-called “hate speech against and harassment” of Blacks under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (Pepuda). Within this overtly political grouping is also to be found the South African Human Rights Commission, a body which must be impartial but supports the same criminalisation of the flag. This is tantamout to planned legal censorship on any White response to attacks on their role in South African history. For them, the flag has also become a symbol of objection against discriminatory Black rule and the delinquent acts of the ANC. In response to the flag which Whites see their constitutional right to object and to exercise free speech, and thus as equal to the judicial right of Whites to their present land, we find the one-sided argumentation of the NMF28:9:

“On its face, the 1928 flag itself was a vivid symbol of white supremacy and black disenfranchisement. Displaying the flag of apartheid South Africa represents support for that crime… a total rejection of tolerance, reconciliation and all of the values underlying the constitution.”

Concomitant to this kind of juridical failure to safeguard the minority’s interests, is the failing of the South African Parliament and its lawmakers when a political party such as the ANC, notwithstanding its majority legal mandate, becomes ineffective through its criminal delinquency to rule properly. Its elite lacks the abilities and skills of statesmen to steer land expropriation in an orderly and legal way with the single aim to benefit every citizen, including the correct decisions on landownership.

Judging from the current insufficient tackling of land transformation and the continuing failed and conflicting approach by the antagonists and the propagandists, the present land matter can and will never be justly and successfully solved by the present-day Constitution, nor by its lawmakers in the Parliament. The South African courts may play at the outset a certain role to solve the matter but, as seen above in the flag issue, never really bring an acceptable and lasting solution. As with the religious approach, it is doomed to failure, leaving South Africa even in a worse situation at present in 2019, with the ANC regime unable to address and to solve the issue of landownership.

1.1.3.    King Solomon’s wisdom approach

A totally new approach is needed to address the South African landownership matter and to bring a lasting solution, free from the negative impact of racism or contaminated religious, judicial  and political solutions. The primary need here is an in-depth reflection on the facts and truths, and separating the emotive from the cognitive, in order to arrive at at reasoned solution. An evaluation of the present-day situation, freed from any remnants of the past, is required.

In reflecting on the past and its negativism in order to completely overcome it, an overview of articles 1 to 6 would suffice to gain a perspective on a cognitive approach to finding a lasting solution to the South African land-ownership matter. Articles 3 to 4 reflect in-depth on the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists versus the counter arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the propagandists in articles 5 and 6, pointing specifically to the impact of the contamination of the truth by myths and lies. This offers an applicable and appropriate approach to screening the lies and myths (the rootedness of which is shown in articles 3 to 6), leaving pure facts and truth at the end in order to reach conclusions and a dictum on the land-ownership matter. It is an absolute pre-requirement that the “judgement” must be guided by compassion and an in-depth understanding of the present suffering of the masses of Blacks plagued by poverty, inequality, landlessness and unemployment. For a correct “judgement” it is essential that it be guided and steered by a good moral compass, as well as logical thinking which may result in a “responsible, human and logical” solution, one which is uncontaminated by the falsities of religion, juridical and political influence and manipulation.8,9

When taking the contents of articles three to six into account, it seems, to make sound conclusions and to deliver a wise dictum, we need old King Solomon’s wise judgements here: it seems as if one step too much to the left or one step too much to the right, may spell immense conflict and bring utmost failure.  For the “judge” can draw a wrong conclusion and deliver a wrong judgment which would not only mean the end of his “honourable seat on the bench”, but also the end of his “certification” regarding his virtue, wisdom, integrity and trustworthiness. Solomon’s proverbial reputation was unique and is described as follows I Kings 16-27:29:325-326

“Word of the king’s decision spread quickly throughout the entire nation, and all the people were awed as they realized the great wisdom God had given him”.

The central question is here: what does a “Solomon judgement” mean in real, modern life? This brings two primary questions to the fore: how did Solomon make his judgements of excellence and what were the tools used to reach findings which in the end assured him the characterisation of having great wisdom with his successful judgements? This leads to a further question: Are his “judgements and solutions” not also vested in a religious and/or a juridical foundation? The truth is the opposite when studying Solomon’s so-called “wise” judgements.29

The most prominent example of his many “wise” judgements is how he brought a lasting solution in the re-awarding of a baby to a woman whose motherhood was disputed by a false mother. As prominent tools stand out: his in-depth understanding of the suffering of humanity (in this case motherhood), his good moral compass, his logical thinking and action (who is the true and rightful mother) and his exclusive focus on the present and the future (ignoring the past and its rights).29

The under-mentioned biblical text on how Solomon had, from a pure cognitive viewpoint, addressed the conflict and determined the true parenthood of the boy, offers a good guideline on how South Africans may today, outside the contaminated and corrupted religious, juridical and political ”judgements and solutions” so far used, deal with the intended land expropriation by applying pure cognitive reasoning and wisdom. There is no doubt that a satisfactory, appropriate conclusion and finding may be reached through a cognitive approach on 1) who owns what land, 2) what are the immediate remedial actions needed, 3) what are the consequences if land reform is not introduced. In this context the outcome in 1 Kings 3:16-27 may serve as an excellent example of cognitive reasoning, totally free from the compulsion of religious and judicial contamination when it comes to decision-making. As a guideline for the approach needed to address and to solve our land reform problem logically, freed from past-contaminated influences, it was thought appropriate to quote the text. It reads as follows29:515-516:

Soon afterwards two young prostitutes came to the king [Solomon] to have an argument settled.

“Sir,” one of them began, “we live in the same house, just the two of us, and recently I had a baby. When it was three days old, this woman’s baby was born too. But her baby died during the night when she rolled over on it in her sleep and smothered it. Then she got up in the night and took my son from beside me while I was asleep, and laid her dead child in my arms and took mine to sleep beside her. And in the morning when I tried to feed my baby it was dead! But when it became light outside, I saw that it wasn’t my son at all.”

Then the other woman interrupted, “It certainly was her son, and the living child is mine.”

“No,” the first woman said, “the dead one is yours and the living one is mine.” And so they argued back and forth before the king.

Then the king said, “Let’s get the facts straight: both of you claim the living child, and each says that the dead child belongs to the other. All right, bring me a sword.” So a sword was brought to the king. Then he said, “Divide the living child in two and give half to each of these women!”

Then the woman who really was the mother of the child, and who loved him very much, cried out, “Oh, no, sir! Give her the child—don’t kill him!”

But the other woman said, “All right, it will be neither yours nor mine; divide it between us!”

Then the king said, “Give the baby to the woman who wants him to live, for she is the mother!”

Critics of Harari’s so-called “agnostic” view can now argue that the above “Solomon approach” is a return to the outdated and failed religious approach (and a “Hand from Above” to help again!), as was used previously by the TRC’s Bishop Tutu and the reverend Dr. Borraine; or that it is a legally-coded and guided device in an effort to solve the land issue, but the truth is far from it.

When reading critically the biblical text showing Solomon’s approach to drawing his conclusions and offering a solution, it is at most only a biblical-historical story. Although the remark is there that God gave him great wisdom, the text lacks any reference to Solomon having prayed even a single time to his God and asked for “divine insight” or asked his God to “divinely guide” him in his conclusion and solution in determining who is the true mother. The determining of the true motherhood by Solomon was an exclusively personal, logical and human decision, free from partisanship, as well as blurring emotions and lies. His cognitive mindset leads Solomon to the reaching of a personal conclusion, totally in line with the philosophy of Harari: a decision lacking the dangerous and blind principles of “obeying God” and “just because God says so” in his judgement. In practice, as said, it was an action solely based on his cognitive and pure human abilities, steered by a good morality, a sound insight and observation of people in their strife. He also had the ability, after the applicable information was offered to him by the two fighting parties, to separate the single truth and fact from many lies and myths, which contaminate the whole picture and which mislead the average observer.8,9,29,30

Looking further back on his above “judgement and solution”, Solomon was free at that time (making his decision easier) from the complications brought by the progress of modern-day medical science where a child can legally and biologically have two mothers by way of a donor mother and a surrogate mother. But on the other hand, lacking modern-day medical science, which can easily and quickly determine, using very specific and precise blood and DNA testing, the legal maternity of a child,  and thus reach a legal conclusion on who the true biological mother was, it was undoubtedly far more difficult for Solomon in his decision-making. In the timeframe and case-setup in which Solomon found him self, he overcomes the use, or more precisely, ignores fully any legal guidelines or prescriptions by a Constitution and a religious mandate to reach or not to reach a conclusion. He handles the problem purely in terms of his common sense and empowerment as a tribal leader who must make decisions for his subjects. Indeed, looking again at the contents of the text 1 Kings 3:16-27, Salomon29 did not, as said, use any legal code to support his finding, but, as already indicated, relies on his cognitive and moral abilities (free from contaminated emotional, religious and statutory influences and partiality) to make an excellent division between truth and many lies. Central is his intention to reduce the present suffering of the innocent victim (the true mother who was in the process of losing her child to a crook).8,9,29

From the literature, the so-called divinely-ordained and god-supported approach, in an effort to find a solution to the present land expropriation matter is greatly side-stepped by the antagonists. It is clear that an outright legal approach, namely to challenge the ANC regime’s intended land redistribution through the law-makers of the Parliament, the Constitution and the South African courts, up to the Constitutional Court, has been followed by the antagonists. This “legal” approach, similarly to the failed “religious” approach, is also viewed with a high degree of skepticism by many South Africans as to its capacity to bring a lasting success. In Zimbabwe the land issue was extremely successfully fought initially in courts there by the antagonists (mostly White landowners), but proved to be a total failure in the end. The present so-called court-case orientation here in South Africa, as driven by the antagonists — although at the moment only in a start-up process — also seems destined for outright failure. The advice from the White farmers in present-day Zimbabwe to the South African antagonists is to ignore the court solution, and instead to look at their present condition in a cognitive, open-minded, friendly and unemotional manner. They should also look in the same way at the condition of the other people in South Africa, their needs and demands, evaluate our political history and find through such an approach find, informed by facts (free from the past’s rights, etc.), a constructive, practical working solution to the land-ownership matter.23-27

1.2. Aims of articles 7 and 8

In this research project on the matter of land expropriation, introduced to the reader by six previously-published articles, the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists against it, as well as those of the propagandists for it, were described in depth. It is clear, in comparing and analysing the information, that facts and truths versus lies and myths on the intended land expropriation by the ANC regime have led to positioning by all the role-players. Although the present land expropriation, specifically without compensation, is reflected as a complex problem, one which requires extreme wisdom, divine and legal intervention and interference to steer and to solve it, this conclusion is far from the truth. On the contrary, it is a simple process to close the dispute on landownership when guided primarily by facts and the truth, and if sound cognitions outside, personal, emotional, political, judicial and religious influenes, are in place. Balancing the facts against lies and myths (see article 3 to 6), show that the facts indeed form a very small, central nucleus. A prerequisite is the outright disregard and refutation of unfounded and foolish arguments, opinions and viewpoints of both the antagonists and propagandists, to project a profile on the facts that must only serve as an instrument to drive the process of land reform in all its facets, from land expropriation with compensation to expropriation without compensation.  Central should be the use of the King Solomon’s wisdom approach in the selection of the facts and the disregard for fallacies.

We do not need more Desmond Tutus, Alex Borraines, TRCs, Constitutional Courts and Constitutions, or the court interventions of AfriForum and Solidarity to put a well-founded land redistribution program and landownership in place. We have more than enough persons of sound cognitive and objective minds, political maturity, free from religious, emotional, political and legal contaminations, to solve the present land-ownership matter with great success, applying the King-Solomon’s-wisdom approach .

2. Method

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case with the ownership of South African soil for the period 1652 to 2018. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources have been consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us to steer successful land-reform from 2019 in South Africa.

The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

The current conflict and uncertainty on landownership has been seen by many political analysts as  a result of the so-called “racial curse of revenge and counter-revenge” of South Africa, which is stemming from the disturbing of the earlier political and socioeconomic positions of its various migrating peoples. The current hostility for instance of some Blacks towards Whites and their unfounded rejection of them as an indigenous tribe, is a predictable political, psychological and pathological responses within the framework of the Herodotus philosophy, how much inappropriate and unrelated this hostility is. This kind of wanton socio-political setup makes a dramatic land-redistribution policy and programme many times an inevitable outcome as the one in Zimbabwe under Mugabe.23-27,30,31

South Africa’s present-day land reform is therefore no longer an innocent national conversation to be naively solved by foolish public utterances and delinquent intentions from either the right or the left in our politics. South Africans, especially the government as executor of just landownership, must follow a different methodology to the blunder created by Zimbabwe’s nationalism in the dispute around the future ownership of land.

The big temptations are still there to solve the botched South African landownership by criminal prosecutions and civil action against the culprits of apartheid, or by reconciliation between Whites and Blacks with respect to Apartheid crimes. These are political approaches which have in practice nothing whatsoever to do with the present topic of landownership and the redistribution of land in terms of a historical and humanely just system. There is neither sense nor reason to address South Africa’s complex past politics, racism, discrimination, indigenousness, Black and White colonialism, or the many Black persons’ unsolved personal, emotional and psychological issues and their enormous financial difficulties which are rooted in the racial discrimination that began in 1652, to activate a just land redistribution. These issues need to be addressed apart and independent from the issue of land transfer and redistribution by initiatives such as an Individual Citizen’s Land Reconciliation Commission, a South Africans Poverty Obliteration Commission and a South African Court for Apartheid Crimes.

3.2. Myth and lies busting: a retrospective

In the previous four articles (Articles 3 to 6) show-cased the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists and propagandists for a change to or against a change to Section 25 of the Constitution to effect land expropriation with or without compensation. These opposing arguments, opinions and viewpoints presented by the antagonists as well as the propagandists represent many lies and myths, and reflect an approach to falsify the truth. The myths and lies will be revisited in this subdivision (see under 3.2.1 to 3.2.11) with a retrospective to bust this contamination in addressing the present-day land expropriation matter appropriately and correctly, as guided by the King-Solomon’s-wisdom approach.  In the under-mentioned subdivisions 3.2.1 to 3.2.11 the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists and propagandists were weighed to reveal many of their misleading arguments and opinions and manipulation of information in their effort to steer the matter of land expropriation opportunistically and often mischievously, exclusively in their own interest.

It is clear from studying the under-mentioned subdivisions 3.2.1 to 3.2.11 of the discussion 3.2. Myth and lies busting: a short retrospective, that only a limited number of the arguments, opinions and viewpoints, as reflected in the previous four articles (Articles 3 to 6) on the land matter, may be taken seriously.

It must be noted that the discussion on the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists and propagandists, as reflected in the previous four articles (Articles 3 to 6) on the land matter, will be continued in subdivisions 3.2.13 to 3.2.23 of the next article (Article 8, titled: “Land-ownership and -grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 2 (8).

3.2.1. The all-over presence of acquired indigenousness in South African landownership

Neither of the races nor groups living presently in South Africa are natural indigenous people to it. Landownership was in the past and is still today based on a vicious circle of land grabbing, coming over centuries and effected by various early migrating strangers from each other, making all South Africans from 1652 up to today a lot of land thieves. Landownership in South Africa is not an issue of indigenousness versus colonialism as many political radicals falsely claim today. The so-called African/South African indigenousness of Blacks, Coloureds, Asians, Indians, KhoiKhois, KhoiSans and Whites is acquired with time by their own and their ancestors’ stay in South Africa.25,32-39

Natural indigenousness to South Africa is absent from all present-day South Africans, including Julius Malema and cannot play a role in the exclusive allocation of land.65

3.2.2. Biological assimilation of Blacks and Whites in nation-building impossible

The postulation that biological assimilation of Black and White in South Africa is impossible is a myth. The Whites as the minority and as an increasingly weaker one, are culturally, racially, politically and biologically slowly being overpowered by the stronger Blacks. Although this process of integration has been taking place very slowly and insignificantly from the beginning of the 1830s, it is becoming comprehensive in our time. South Africa’s complex multiracial society reflects clearly the four intertwined steps: firstly cultural assimilation; secondly economic assimilation; thirdly social assimilation coupled with political assimilation; fourthly biological assimilation.25,32-39

At present the Afrikaners are inside biological assimilation with the Black population. This finalizing of a new South African Nation, wherein the Afrikaners are going to be dissolved by intermixing with the Blacks and by their natural extinction as a specific group, has now been activated.25

The belief that biological assimilation between Blacks and Whites is impossible is a myth.

3.2.3. There is not a demand and an urge for rural land by Blacks

The present domination by White farmers of the agricultural sector and opportunities, limited the opportunities for Blacks in this sector. Prominent is the low compensation of Blacks as labour-employees on farms and the poor treatment of them in the past by their White land-owners, a direct reason why the poor and landless Blacks moved to the cities, and not so much a real eagerness to become city-dwellers. The present so-called low interest of 8% Blacks to farm or to own land is an outcome the perilous setup into which poor Blacks in South Africa found themsleves within the post-1994 dispensation after the disastrous centuries of economic exploitation by Whites.  There is no doubt if the process of the 1994 land-redistribution should be rerun correctly today in terms of justice and the improved economic and political positions of Blacks, the repossession of Blacks of their so-called “stolen land” by Whites since 1652 may be 50% and higher.5,2141-43,45-47

The hard fact is that the cities cannot accommodate all the poor and jobless Blacks. The lack of employment in urban areas today is forcing many back to the countryside. Prominent is the immense contingent of the unemployed Black population. Immediate Black economic empowerment is a prerequisite to institute a mass of Black landownership as farmers and the creation of optimal working conditions for the Black labourers on Black or White farms.5,2141-43,45-47

The two postulations that 1) only 8% of Blacks want land or want to stay in the rural areas or 2) that Blacks are not interested in farming or land and that they want only urban jobs, are patently false. 5,2141-43,45-47

There is an urgent demand and an urge for rural land by Blacks to farm on.

3.2.4. There is not a place for a contingent mass of independent sufficient-producing farmers and farm labourers

The constant decline in South African commercial farmers from 116 000 in 1950 to more or less 35 000 in 2018, is incorrectly used to claim that more than the present ±35 000 commercial farmers in South Africa are not financially viable and sustainable.  There is no evidence that the bringing in of a contingent mass of different types of Black self-sufficient farmers will be a failure.10,13,25,48,50-57

Statistics on the so-called “commercial” 35 000 farmers in South Africa reflect that only ±3 600 of them contribute between 90% and 95% to the country’s food security. The other more or less 31 400 farmers are so-called sufficient-producing farmers. This means that these farmers produce enough food and other agricultural produce to make them and their immediate families financially independent from social grants, as well to steer themselves successfully albeit slowly into the status of financially independent landowners and active farmers. This is the intended path to follow with the contingent of incoming Black farmers. Data from present-day Zimbabwe, Botswana, Israel, Belgium and Britain reflect well on the successes of these sufficient-producing farmers and their financial independence and contributions, especially locally as to essential products.10,13,25,48,50-57

Evidence shows present-day sufficient-producing farming is working well for most of the 32 400 White farmers with a turnover of less than R5 million per annum, to stay viable and sustainable for years totally outside the small circle of ±3 600  so-called “food-security producing” farms.10,13,25,48,50-57

For the present unemployed mass of Blacks, living in shacks in cities under parlous conditions, the development at last of a contingent of land-owning Black petty bourgeoisie, may be launched. There is a place for them; no evidence exists to contradict it, except racial and political prejudice. In terms of the ratio of ±1:10 between White farmers and Black farmers, the Black farming sector has the potential to be extended to 350 000 farmers and the present Black labourers working on farms from ± 800 000 to 8 000 000.10,13,25,48,50-57

Within this Black farming sector the intention is also to create a better marketing system for the sufficient-producing Black farmers’ products through their own chain shops to bring their products directly at a good but affordable price to consumers. This will be away from the White business bullies’ present monopolistic chain shops and comprehensive local and international markets wherein all the farmers receive in general a low, limited price for their produce.10,13,25,48,50-57

There is a place for a contingent of mass, independent sufficient-producing Black farmers and farm labourers.

3.1.5. There is an absolute need for the future existence of an Afrikaner/White farming sector

The so-called importance and need of White landownership and farmers — especially the Afrikaner farmers — to maintain the present-day economics of the South African farming sector and to guarantee food security, is more and more being erased by their dwindling numbers as a so-called “tribe” within the total population. This places their future position as an absolute financial asset for the country in jeopardy.10,21,25,47,50,58-71

The ratio between the ±35 000 mostly Afrikaner commercial farmers to the rest of the Afrikaner population is 13:1000 or 1.3% of the group, while for the 35 000 farmers the ratio to the White population is 7:1 000 or 0.7%. This reflects an almost insignificant correlation between the broader Afrikaner/White population and the Afrikaner/White farming population in terms of financial interest, such as ownership of land or direct income from farming. This fact makes the direct impact of lost farmland through the planned land expropriation on most Afrikaners/Whites outside the farming sector minimal. Evidence also shows that many of the ordinary Afrikaners have started to cut their cultural cord with the so-called “Afrikanervolk” after 1994, indicating that most of the emotive rhetoric on so-called land grabbing come from a small band of Afrikaner/White individuals and groups with direct financial interests in agriculture. This exclusive farming sector represents at most 10% of Afrikaners/Whites, making the present so-called all-out “Afrikaner fight for their Afrikaner soil”, together with the exclusive need for them by the broad South African population, a myth.  Also, the ±90% Whites and neo-Afrikaners outside the farming sector accept that a new generation of South African farmers, not associated with Afrikaners/Whites, has to be born as quickly as possible to ensure food security.10,21,25,47,50,58-71

The postulation of the absolute need for an Afrikaner/White farming sector “because only they can ensure food security” is false.  It is an over-estimation of Afrikaner/White farmers as a special group in South Africa.10,21,25,47,50,58-71

On a group-count basis the White farmers are irrelevant and are part of the bigger White population’s natural dying-out.

3.2.6. The so-called 90% failure of the 1994-2019 farm-redistributions program is true

The determination that 90% of farms redistributed to Blacks in the 1994 – 2019 land-redistribution programme, were failures, is very controversial and one-sided. It must be noted that the criteria used to decide on the “success” of the so-called “functioning Black farms”, seem to be very vague and undefined. There is an indication that the whole argumentation is arbitrary.5,10,16,25,41-43,46,51,72-74

Hard evidence erases the postulate of a 90% failure-rate since 1994. The truth is that today’s farming as an enterprise and a career can be tough, ignoring the fact that it must be equally applied to the established White farmers or incoming Black farmers:.The large financial loans by the Land Bank and other commercial banks to finance the White farmers’ daily activities, is an excellent example of this struggle even by Whites.5,10,16,25,41-43,46,51,72-74

The recent request in January 2019 by the formal farmers’ sector, specifically the White ones, for R3-billion drought emergency from the government, confirms this overall struggle. The multi-year drought of 2018 left five of South Africa’s nine provinces critically parched and two others extremely vulnerable, writes Strydom.75 In this context, seven out of 10 farmers are struggling. This contradicts the antagonists’ and White politicians’ arguments that the so-called “Black 1994 to 2019 land-redistribution programme”, to establish exclusively Black farmers, was a failure. The definition of “farmers’ failure” is applicable fully to the formal (mostly) White farmers with a need of R3 billion to rescue them.75

In this ratio of 7:10 of mostly White farmers seeking rescue, it must further be noted that this represents ±24 000 (out of the total of 35 000 formal farmers) affected who are not truly part of the 3 600 farmers supplying 90% of the county’s food, but the so-called “sufficient-producing farmers” who only contribute between 5% and 10% of the food stock. The question is: if the so-called White sufficient-producing farmers are being kept alive in the farming community, notwithstanding their failure, why could this not also be done with the incoming Black farmers and their so-called failures since 1994?75

Further evidence from the country’s negative political history shows that the same kind of failures, as the alleged 1994-2019 farm-redistributions program, had happened, even on a more extreme level, under the White SAP regime and the White NP regime over many years under the government of the Union of South Africa as well as the “Verwoerdian republic”. In these White cases, long-term development corrections were allowed and constant financial governmental assistance offered. Hereto must it be noted that the NP-regime in 1994 overloaded the incoming ANC-regime with many serious political, economical and social problems, like poverty, inequality, unemployment and landless of the Blacks, which the ANC has to address with an effort of a fast driven farm-redistributions program and a Black population unknown with the formal agricultural culture.5,10,16,25,41-43,46,51,72-74

For the ANC regime to rectify in the short period of 25 years this immense South African socio-economic and political chaos, created by the various White regimes over hundreds of years, was totally impossible. To claim that the 1994–2019 farm-redistributions program was a failure, is inappropriate and reflects political opportunism.5,10,16,25,41-43,46,51,72-74

The so-called 90% failure of the 1994-2019 farm-redistributions program is false.

3.2.7. The political history of South Africa confirms that in most cases landowners were compensated for dispossessions of their land

The South African White regimes and its White inhabitants from 1652 to 1994 followed mostly a policy of land expropriation without compensation towards the Blacks. Included in this lack of compensation for occupying of Blacks’ land, are serious atrocities committed against Blacks in driving them off their land.10,16,25,51,55,76,78-88,91

The White South Africans’ own RET from 1652 to 1994, specifically that of the nationalist Afrikaners between 1948 and 1994, was so immense and of such broad spectrum that it can never be quantified in a monetary value. In this immense harvesting of wealth we find today 5 million privileged Whites against the devastating poverty of a mass of ±29-million Blacks.10,16,25,51,55,76,78-88,91

It is a myth and a total misconception that during the continued land dispossession in South Africa, starting in 1652, most of the owners had ever been compensated. Most of the cases of so-called “transferring of land” were outright land grabbing, often leaving the dispossessed owners landless and in poverty.

3.2.8. The need for land reform insignificant

The initial outcomes of the parliamentarians’ countrywide testing of the public’s opinion on the change to Section 25 of the Constitution shows that there is a strong public need by Blacks to own land. The emphasis is that land expropriation is an immediate requirement that has to be implemented.5,21,41-43,45-47

The  postulation that there is not a need for more landownership by Blacks was statistically erased on the 4th December 2018 when so much as 209 MPs voted in favour (with only 91 votes against and zero absentees) to amend the Constitution to effect land transfer (without compensation) from Whites to Blacks.5,21,41-43,45-47

The First State Land Audit of 2013 shows that the difference between the total land area and the sum of the state-owned and private land is as follows: 14% state-owned land, 7% unaccounted-owned land and 79% privately-owned land. This shows that the state does not own enough land to satisfy the total need for land by the landless and poor Blacks to farm. The Second State Land Audit of 2017 identified close to 94 million hectares as privately-owned, reports Africa Check. (A breakdown by race was only provided for privately-owned land by individuals and not for land owned by companies, trusts and community-based organisations). Agricultural land owned by individuals made up 30% of the total land area. Farms and agricultural holdings (in hectares) owned by individuals in terms of race, are the following: White: 26 663 144 (72%), Indian: 2 031 790 (5%), Coloured: 5 371 383 (15%), African 1 314 873 (4%), Co-owned 425 537 (1%), and Other: 1 271 562 (3%).89

From above is it clear that an absolute imbalance between White landownership and Black ownership exists: Whites: 72%: Blacks: 4%.89

The need for land reform is significant and is driven by a mass of Black citizens and Black politicians of status. This makes the notion that the need for land reform is insignificant by opportunistic politicians as well as the antagonists an untrue postulation.

Drastic land reform and an immense need for land by Blacks, is a burning issue.

3.2.9. The doubtful success of a new farming system within land-expropriation planning

The planned founding of a large sector of financially independent Black farmers, strongly based on inclusive capitalism and the introduction of a new sufficient-producing farming system, driven by specific farming models — varying from small-scale subsistence farmers to small-scale commercial farmers and commercial middle-level farmers — have the potential to erase the  vast debt of more than R160 billion of the majority of present-day farmers (possibly as much as 32 000 and mostly White). But at the same time it offers immense opportunities for millions of emerging farmers, specifically Blacks. It has the potential at the same time to assure food security for the country, as well as the improvement of its local food production at far more affordable costs. The incoming and the to-be-established Black farmers have the potential to be on the same level as the existing White farmers’ sector. They can dramatically improve the present 5% to 10 % contribution to the country’s food security by the present ±32 000 sufficient farmers’ sector, to 30% and more.41,42,49,92-95

This planned new farming system, based on new technology, agricultural science, fertilizers and irrigation systems, can rapidly turn much of the present-day barren rural land in South Africa into productive soil and farming areas. The turn-around characterising the modern-day East-Asian farm system (China, Japan and South Korea) is an excellent example. The East-Asian farming reform and progressive management of farming, which was very successful in the uplifting of millions of poor Asians, brought phenomenonal delivery of affordable agricultural products to their local as well as international markets, and has limited the importation of food and lowered food costs. Most of all, the system erased to a great extent the inequalities in wealth with the gradual enrichment of previously landless poor people, after placing them in financially-secure careers as new farmers and farm workers. This outcome is equal to what the ANC planned with their incoming land reform and the creation of a new generation of mass Black farmers, varying from small and commercial to mega farmers, within a comprehensively functioning Black farming community.9,95,96 In this context, is it important to note that the WIBC-organisation (Wouldn’t It be Cool) of Dr Michael Magondo already established — on unused rooftops of buildings in Johannesburg — 20 farms and six agro-processing sites. Each one of these farms represents three to four jobs, creating an income of between R15 000 and R25 000 a month. How small farming is successfully established already, is illustrated by the 35 farms in the Philippi Horticultural Area (PHA). A 2017 study by the department of agriculture found that the PHA farmland yielded a yearly turnover of between R440 million and R480 million, while creating 3 000 direct jobs and 30 000 indirect jobs. Produce is supplied to Woolworths, Shoprite, Nulaid and Checkers.9,95,96

The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries plans to create countrywide so-called Aquaculture Development Zones (ADZ) to enlarge at low cost the existing small-scale aquaculture sector. Prominent stands the incoming of new Black farmers. These areas are earmarked for aqua-culture value-chain activities with official support and the upgrading of the existing basic infrastructure, writes Khumalo.  Governmental authorisations for a start-up had been received for place as Saldanha Bay, Western Cape, Qolora, Eastern Cape and for the Coega (Eastern Cape) ADZs. The intention is also to develop infrastructures at the Amatikulu (KwaZulu -Natal) ADZ and the Algoa Bay ADZ. Further is the Department, in cooperation with the provincial departments, piloting aquaculture in the Van der Kloof Dam (Northern Cape) and in Richards Bay (Kwa-Zulu-Natal). The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries also plans to establish multi-species hatcheries in the Eastern and Northern Cape. In these cases the incoming Black farmers will be provided with stock and their skills development. The intention is also to establish communal aquaculture farms.98

It must also be noted that the amount of land needed by Blacks is not, as often stated by antagonists against the land redistribution program of the government, a masse of land or a whole farm to make a living on. A 2004/2005 Human Sciences Research Council study including Limpopo, Free State and Eastern Cape found that 75% of those Blacks who needed land, wanted five hectares or less.  Similarly, a 2006-2007 study in five rural Western-Cape towns showed that the majority of households said they wanted a hectare or less. This shows that comprehensive and concentrated farming units do not need to be rural-oriented and can be executed on smallholdings of one to five hectares near city markets.89

It is clear that post-2019 government policy will activate the immense development of small-scale farmers.  It is also clear that this development will be government-orientated, free from the so-called “generosity” of the large private businesses’ domination with their agricultural inputs. This development will also be free from the present monopoly dominance of the agricultural-processing industry and food retail of the big businesses. The intention is to radically reconfigure and to expand the agricultural supply chain to make Blacks beneficiaries of it via their farming sectors.99

The doubtful success of the new farming system for post-2019 South Africa with the advent of land-expropriation planning is without foundation. It can work efficiently.

3.2.10. A sound balance in house ownership in South Africa in terms of racial demographics is in existence

The present-day one-by-one-person racial comparison, which is based on the definition: who are the owners of what property in South Africa, as done by the opponents of land expropriation, ignores the true numbers of the various racial populations’ holding of ownership per person of land. This comparison and reflection of the total White population of ±5-million versus a sub-population of 5 million Blacks, as represented by the official holding of land and property ownership, is an outright manipulatory equalization of the various races, giving the ratio 1:1, which is an outright myth. In reality the comparison must be of the total White population of ±5-million versus the total Black population of ±45 million, being the only correct one, giving the ratio of ±1:10. This means, unmasking the manipulated equalization of the various races regarding, in reality, ±ten Whites owning a property against only one Black owner of a property. In theoretical-statistical terms it means that for the 5 million Whites who owned in some way houses, only 5 million Blacks also own houses, with in reality as much as ±40 million Blacks being homeless or lacking the ownership of houses.41,42,49,92-95

The above selective and manipulative definition of ownership also ignores the low quality of the so-called present-day “other houses” of most of the ±40 million Blacks living everywhere in South Africa. These “other houses” (excluding the low quality RDP houses) theoretically accommodate ±35 million Blacks. In this category we find the comprehensive negative “house environments” wherein millions of the other Blacks are living: the so-called shack-dwellers who lack facilities such as electricity, water, toilet facilities; living in unfavourable areas with poor or no roads and situated in isolated and underdeveloped areas, lacking public transport, shops, public schools and medical facilities. These areas are mostly ridden by crime and not integrated into rich, even middle-class White housing areas; and often located on river banks exposed to constant floods and other life threats.25,46,100

A trustworthy value guide on the present-day ownership of houses in South Africa, specifically in terms of race, is offered by the Second State Land Audit of 2017. [Note: This audit only provides a breakdown by race on privately-owned erven (houses) and sectional title units by individuals and not for land-owning companies, trusts and community-based organisations]. Africa Check reports in terms of the Second State Land Audit of 2017, focussing on the individual ownership of 1) erven (which includes houses), which make up 0.6% of the total land area, and 2) sectional title units, which make up 0.009% of the total land area, in terms of White, Indian, Coloured and Black, as follows:  A) Erven (hectare): White: 357 507 (49%), Indian: 55 909 (8%); Coloured : 54 522 (8%); African 219 033 (30%), Co-owned 14 322 (2%) and Other 21 365 (3%), and B) Sectional title units (hectare): White 5 118 (45%), Indian 5556 (5%), Coloured 2 375 (21%), African: 1 989 (17%), Co-owned: 655 (6%), Other: 703 (6%).This confirms an absolute disproportial ownership of erven and sectional tile units, favouring exclusively Whites.90,96,97

In terms of ownership based on race, Whites own 49% of the erven (houses) and 45% (sectional titles), while they represent only ±9% of the total population.

It is an outright lie to say home ownership in South Africa matches the racial demographics.

3.2.11. White socioeconomic and political cooperation with the ANC regime overshadowing White socioeconomic and political resistance against the ANC regime

There is critical thinking, planning and action in present-day South African politics and socioeconomic planning within the greater Afrikaner/White community, especially the White farming community, in relation to Black empowerment in general. The basis for Black empowerment — which often leads to conflict — is that the contingent of privileged South Africans, mostly Whites, can no longer remain comfortable while the majority of the country languishes in squalor and poverty. This inequality must be addressed and the best way is through an official empowerment of the poor, through landownership.101-107

Many of the constructive changes planned by the ANC regime to better South Africa’s financial, political and racial environment, are just outright unacceptable to and resisted by the White group’s leaders by all means. Especially the issue of land ownership, as part of the Whites’ exclusive financial interests, figure prominently in this resistance. This immense resistance fully overshadows the Whites’ commitment to freely and willingly participate in land reform.101-107

White socioeconomic and political resistance against the ANC regime’s politics overshadows White socioeconomic and political cooperation with the ANC regime to uplift the poor and landless Blacks.

4. Conclusions

In this article the antagonists’ and the propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against or for the changing of Section 25(2) of the South African Constitution to enable land expropriation without compensation or not, were brought directly into comparison through the use of King Solomon’s wisdom approach to logically differentiate between truths/facts and the mass of lies/myths.

It is clear from studying subdivisions 3.2.1 to 3.2.11 of the 3.2. Myth and lies busting: a short retrospective, that only a limited number of the arguments, opinions and viewpoints, as reflected in the previous four articles (Articles 3 to 6) on the land matter, can be taken seriously. Or, better, as Harari describes this mass of untrue information, hanging on in the mindsets of many South Africans: they are mindsets deluged by the positing of immensely irrelevant information by political opportunists, exlusively to gain political power and are in fact fallacies.

In the sequential Article 8 [titled: “Land-ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 2 (8)”], subdivisions 3.2.12 to 3.2.23 will further reflect on the truths/facts that are needed to lead the thinking, planning and action on land expropriation after May 2019.

As to the analysis and evaluation of this article, it is at this stage clear, from the studying of subdivision 3.2.1 to 3.2.11 that myths and lies played an enormous role in misleading and misinforming the general South African public on the good intentions of the intended land expropriation and the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution. It seems so far as if an untrue, distorted picture was created, obstructing the good intentions of land reform. Land reform seems to be an urgent matter which needs immediate implementation. This postulation will be further tested in the sequential article 8.

A full conclusion will be offered at the end of Article 8, titled “Land-ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 2 (8)”.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

Land ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 2 (8)

Land-ownership and -grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting: Part 2 (8)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Age-old custom, colonist, frontiersman, humanity, impoverishment, indigenous people, land grabbing, landless, land ownership, land redistribution, political history, radicalism, terrorism, unemployment

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 2

1. Background

1.1. Introduction

This study, a continuation of the previous article: Land-ownership and -grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting: Part 1 (7), analyses and discussses further the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists against, as well as those of the propagandists for, land expropriation. The focus is again, as in Article 7, on a comparison and an analysis of the information with the intention to separate facts and truths from lies and myths that have became intertwined into the fight around landownership. Prominent is once more the use of the King-Solomon’s-wisdom approach central to the selection of the facts and the disregard of fallacies. Sound cognition, outside, personal, emotional, political, judicial and religious contamination, is also the central the guide here, in order to bust unfounded and foolish arguments, opinions and viewpoints of both the antagonists and the propagandists, enabling us to project a profile on the facts that must drive the process of land reform in all its facets, from land expropriation with compensation, to expropriation without compensation.

1.2. Aims of articles 7 and 8 (continued)

The primary aim of this article (Part Two: Article 8) is thus to continue the reflection on these various elements and role players as already described in the previous article (Part One: Article 7). In this context of manipulation and misrepresentation around the South African land expropriation matter, it is important to note that Chomsky1 points out that modern politics often hampers rational thought: It allows the practice of freedom, but limits the pursuit of truth, thus creating ignorance among a large percentage of the population in many countries. This notion is very much applicable to the thinking of South Africans on the landownership matter and its concomitant drivers of indigenousness and poor political and personal integrity. This contaminated paradigm limited the pursuit of truth and blocked the development of a critical role for leaders of integrity and independent thinking in the country’s skewed political system. This vacuum caused a lack of responsibility to provide students, individuals, citizens, politicians, and the wider public, with the knowledge and skills they need to be able to learn how to think rigorously, to be self-reflective and to develop the capacity to govern rather than be governed.

For Chomsky1 it goes much further and deeper. He postulates that it is not enough for the voter to learn how to think critically, but that engaged intellectuals must also develop an ethnic imagination and sense of social responsibility necessary to overcoming the politicians’ blocking of the truth, as well as to make power accountable to the drivers of politics around demanding matters tending towards conflict. It is for Chomsky the intellectuals’ duty to deepen the possibilities for everyone to live dignified lives infused with freedom, liberty, decency, care and justice. It is in this emptiness that the antagonists and propagandists, together with opportunistic and delinquent politicians, exploited the South African fight around landownership. The lack of knowledge and understanding, absolutely needed for sound cognitive thinking, created the opportunity to propagate lies and myths around the country’s critical landownership issue. These widely propagated fallacies bring us nowhere besides the creation of racial and political unrest, with the potential for revolution.1

The aim in this context is to evaluate further the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of both the antagonists and propagandists and to bust their unfounded and foolish arguments, opinions and viewpoints where applicable, in order to project a profile on the facts that must drive the post-2019 process of land reform in all its facets, from land expropriation with compensation, to expropriation without compensation.

2. Method (continued)

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case with the ownership of South African soil for the period 1652 to 2018. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in steering successful land reform from in South Africa from 2019 onwards.

The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion (continued)

3.1. Overview

As illustrated in the previous article, Landownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 1 (7), there is again a determined and focussed intention to bring clarity to the current conflict and uncertainty around landownership. The various kinds of arbitrary sociopolitical ideologies and delinquent actions by role players to damage a future land-redistribution policy and programme must be noted and unmasked.

3.2. Myth and lies busting: a retrospective (continued from article 7)

In the previous seven articles there was an in-depth analysis that showed not only the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists and propagandists for a change to or against Section 25 of the Constitution to make land expropriation with or without compensation possible, but also that both the antagonists and the propagandists represent many lies and myths in their presentations, and an intention to falsify the truth. These myths and lies (as was previously done in Article 7: 3.2.1 to 3.2.11) will be revisited in this subdivision (see understanding 3.2.12 to 3.2.23) with a retrospective to bust this falsification, as guided by the King-Solomon’s-wisdom approach.

3.2.12. Various statements by the antagonistic White group against the ANC’s land reform are free from comprehensive misrepresentations and suspicion mongering

The present generalising writings in newspapers by various journalists, especially those coming from the antagonistic White group, constantly point out how ill-conceived the planned land expropriation of the ANC is, the wrong way the expropriation is going to be implemented and the evil outcomes to be expected from the land-redistribution program. These generalisations are mostly absolutely misleading and consist of unnecessary suspicion mongering. Specifically the allegation of the inflated political scores that the ANC as a party and its leaders such as Ramaphosa, had allegedly gained through the recruiting of so-called unruly and indecisive Black voters during the past 2019 election with the inclusion of comprehensive land expropriation without compensation as a vote magnet, is without foundation and ill-disposed. On the contrary, the ANC, notwithstanding its propagation of “land grabbing”, performed worse than in the 2014 National Election.

The plethora of ongoing orchestrated false allegations and propaganda regarding the total nationalision of the White farming sector and the redistribution of land away from Whites are plainly foolish and baseless. It lacks evidence. What the antagonistic White group successfully did with their false allegations was to create hostility within the White population against not only the ANC as a regime, but also against Black people in general. Specifically the mass of poor and landless Blacks were fingered. Many ordinary Afrikaners/Whites, even those outside the farming sector and the capitalistic business sector, became fearful of their future in the country. This placed Black and White on a collision course, with the Afrikaners/Whites mistakenly seeing the poor and landless Blacks as the “takers” of their property, forcing the country into a dangerous face-off between “haves” and” have-nots”.1-26

These misreprsentations and suspicion mongering seem to be anchored in the mindsets of some Afrikaners/Whites; essentially because they selfishly want more attention, privileges and benefits than the rest of the South African races and ethnic groups. It reflects a limited understanding and honesty on their part about the true and good intentions of land reform by the ANC regime. Such intentions are blindly and bluntly ignored, together with the exclusive and immense wrongdoing of the proto-Afrikaners and nationalist Afrikaners between 1652 and 1994, which is politically calculated to put the ANC regime under suspicion.1-26

There is conclusive evidence that it is not the post-1994 ANC which is responsible for today’s mass of poor and landless Blacks, but a failed racial-political setup, directly linked to the pre-1994 White rulers’ monopoly on political power, creating almost exclusively White wealth. In reality, it is the Afrikaners/Whites and their ancestors who had robbed millions of Blacks over centuries not only of their self-respect, but plunged them into poverty. This led to a social structure in which millions of Blacks are still today lacking self-respect and dignity, while inequality, poverty, unemployment and landlessness are dominant features of the present South African Black lifestyle.1-26

The present misrepresentations and suspicion mongering, specifically against the person and leadership of Ramaphosa, is cemented in the contaminated mindset of those Whites who wantonly create false allegations against Black rule and politics in post-1994 South Africa. This is a malicious attitude that is directed against any other Black in a leadership position, as Nelson Mandela also quickly came to experience in South Africa after 1994 at the hands of the so-called Afrikaner/White rescuers and saviours, just because he was a Black ruler of the country.1-26

Most of the various statements by the antagonistic White group against the ANC’s land reform is undoubtedly comprehensively misleading and based on suspicion mongering. In general they are false and cannot be taken seriously.

3.2.13. Alleged crookery, corruption and other crimes are uncommon to the South African Black and White executive political leaderships from 1652 up to 2019

The present-day ANC’s alleged corruption and immense political delinquency from 1994 to 2019, thought to be unique to South African political history, is a myth. The presence of crookery, corruption and state capture under the Zuma regime, which the Ramaphosa regime fully inherited in 2018, cannot be disputed. However, various pre-1994 White regimes also clearly stand out as immensely affected. This is a process that commenced in 1652.3,11,15,20,27-44

The early political history of the country’s corruption statistics and records reflect large-scale evidence of corruption and theft of state assets. Prominent are the delinquent actions by Simon and Willem van der Stel. There is further the evidence that the various White regimes under the NP between 1948 and 1994 were also saturated with serious political and socio-economic misdemeanours in which state money played a central role. It indeed cost John Vorster his prime-ministership.3,11,15,20,27-44

It is wrong to assume that South Africa since 1652 has not been betrayed by many of its executive political leaders through their crookery, corruption and other crimes.

3.2.14. The role of terrorism, autocracy, fascism and undemocratic actions in the obtaining of South African landownership is unique to the ANC

The accusation that the ANC is a terrorist organisation which, as a result, is alleged to lack the integrity and ability as a legal government to make constructive social, economic and political contributions to improve South Africa for every citizen but has failed since 1994 to uplift the mass of poor Blacks, may also be levelled at the various White regimes since 1652. The process of terrorism, specifically around land grabbing by the Whites had just played itself out more slowely and over a longer period, namely 1652 to 1910, 1910 to 1948 and 1948 to 1994. This stretched time-frame makes it less obvious than the alleged delinquent actions of the ANC between 1994 and 2019. The various White regimes were also unable to run passable governments or to improve the quality of life of all South African people, beyond their provision of handouts mainly to Whites. Especially prominent among such handouts were those received by the Afrikaners from 1948. The Blacks’ as well as the Whites’ historical and modern land grabbing, have thus been founded on liberation actions and the committing of terrorism alike.3,11,30,31,39,45-47

Evidence contradicts outright the allegations of the ANC as an autocratic, fascist and undemocratic regime in terms of the governmental rules agreed on by the 1994 Political Dispensation and embodied in the Constitution. The labels of racial discrimination, autocracy and fascism are more applicable to the Whites’ various regimes stretching from 1652 to 1994. Democracy as practised in the politics of South Africa under the various White regimes from 1652, especially those from 1913 to 1994, was an exclusive “Whites-only democracy”. This was one which was enjoyed solely by the Whites occupying and owning 93% of the country known as South Africa. It was executed with an exclusive policy of White one-man-one-vote, based on absolute autocracy and fascism predominating during this White era, subjecting the voiceless majority of the Black population to the status of second-class citizenship.3,11,30,31,39,45-47

Terrorism, autocracy, fascism and undemocratic behaviour in the obtention of landownership for Blacks exclusively are at this stage absent from the ANC. It is indeed characteristic of the various White regimes during the period from 1652 to 1994.

3.2.15. Political and racial radicalisms associated with the present-day ANC are early manifestations of land grabbing within Mao-Stalin-Mugabe-horrors

The prospect of the horrors of land grabbing as reflected by Mao’s Cultural Revolution, Stalin’s anti-landowners inclination or Robert Mugabe’s land-grabbing policy in Zimbabwe, to establish and uplift the poor via agriculture, features prominently in the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists against any form of land reform. The antagonists offer Mao’s, Stalin’s and Mugabe’s delinquency as examples of how bad the present-day South African land expropriation can or will turn out. Such representations represent planned malevolent distractions from South Africa’s present economic and political realities by the White antagonists for opportunistic reasons. The so-called sudden rise in and presence of farm-murders as indicators of a Mao-Stalin-Mugabe-scenario-in-waiting are part of a well-planned false-news media system, consisting of manipulated information which is sent out constantly and continuously to the world by the antagonists. It is the use of “stretched statistics” by a section of the Whites from within their constant supply of outright “false news” and their ongoing White supremacy. It is totally contradicted by true hard statistics.11,15,48-59

The racial factor is undoubtedly present in some of the post-1994 South African incidence of murder (primarily with Whites as the victims), but it is insignificant as a cause of murder in general in South Africa. The average Black’s inclination and attitude are very positive towards Whites and absolute lacking murderous intent based on the landownership of Whites or as a form of revenge because of Apartheid.11,15,48-59

Political and racial radicalism, associated with the present-day ANC, as early manifestations of land grabbing within Mao-Stalin-Mugabe-horrors, are falsities.

3.2.16. The probability of racial genocide, driven by revenge and counter-revenge in the future political history of South Africa, is absent or minimal

Racial and ethnic genocide had started in 1652 at the Cape Settlement. It was executed in time by Whites as well as Blacks all over South Africa. It was first practised by the Dutch and the British authorities at the Cape. This is evidenced by the Dutch and the British authorities’ extreme suppression and abuse of the indigenous inhabitants at the early Cape and of the proto-Boers, as well as the British genocide during the Second Anglo Boer War (1899–1902) against the Boers and their families (as well as a contingent of non-Whites). The proto-Afrikaners’ and later Afrikaners’ political delinquency against the non-Whites equals these earlier genocides. Also the political crimes of the Black tribes against each other during the first and second Black colonisations of South Africa between 1810 and 1840 (which represent South Africa’s first known full-scale genocides), had led to brutal ethnic wars and the murder of Blacks by Blacks for landownership. Many of these various genocides were anchored in revenge and counter-revenge.7,47,60-81

It is a myth to accept the statement that genocide in some form is not a general phenomenon in the South African political history. It was indeed practised by most of its people. Thus we have to reject the statement that some of the radical racial groups will not get involved again in revenge or counter-revenge in an effort to rectify what they see as the wrongs of the past. Prominent in this regard are the poverty and inequality of more than 60% of the Black population who can retaliate against the failure of the ANC regime to improve their situation dramatically now after it won a mandate to rule for the sixth time.7,47,60-81

The probability of racial genocide, driven by revenge and counter-revenge in the future political history of South Africa, is not absent or minimal.

3.2.17. Anarchy, revolution and political coups are not specific future outcomes of the Black masses’ poverty, landlessness and inequality

In many of the bloody civil wars, the availability and ownership of water, food, accommodation and land played central roles when these essential shortcomings occur for long periods in the greater community. In the pre-1994, as well as in the post-1994 periods, all-out revolutions and coups, prominently driven by the poor and landless Blacks, have been absent from South Africa.48,52-54,82-85

Chronic anarchy has shown up the last decade in some form or another. The landownership issue has played a prominent role here. This is an outcome which has been driven by the poverty, human indignity and inequality of the mass of neglected Blacks. This conflicting and unstable situation was created over many centuries by the delinquent actions of White regimes. This outcome is not because the mass of landless and poor people are Black (meaning any group can reacts with this kind of behaviour under circumstances of political, social and economic stress, as the Boers reacted at the early Cape against the British), or because Blacks have an inborn characteristic to commit anarchy and revolution (If it was an inborn characteristic, the Blacks would long ago have reacted against their wrongdoers).48,52-54,82-85

It must also be noted that there are no political intentions to derail by military or other physical means the present-day land reform by the ± 4-million modern thinking and politically-orientated Afrikaners/Whites. These ± 4-million Whites clearly dissociate themselves from the at most ± 300 000 so-called White antagonists who undoubtedly show serious hostility against Blacks.48,52-54,82-85

But, taking certain indicators into consideration, it must be acknowledged that revolution seems undoubtedly a strong possibility if the poverty and landlessness of the mass of Blacks are not sufficiently and immediately addressed, meaning that human deprivation and misery can be the primary drivers. The chances for a coup in terms of political ideologies and party-political interests are minimal at this stage in South Africa. Although there are clear links between the Zimbabwe’s politics, the Arab Spring and the collapse of the communist regimes in Europe in 1989 and present-day South Africa, the current South African situation differs far more from those examples, than it shows any similarities. Prominent here is the country’s sound democracy since 1994, which the present ANC regime underwrites and will respect if they lose any National Election. In addition, the South African Defence Force is not much connected to domestic policies, and will probably not participate in a coup favouring the ANC or an opposition group. Land expropriation as a primary driver of revolution because of the Whites’ enormous holdings of land and thus bringing death to White land owners, is out.48,52-54,82-85

Anarchy, revolution and political coups are not natural outcomes of the personal and political characters of South Africa’s poor and landless Blacks. But those could be specific future outcomes if the South African poor and landless Blacks’ immense poverty, landlessness and inequality, accumulated over many years, are not rapidly addressed.48,52-54,82-85

The postulation that anarchy, revolution and political coups will not and cannot be specific future outcomes of the Blacks’ poverty, landlessness and inequality, is a myth.

3.2.18. The absence of Black poverty within present-day South Africa’s  wealth

It is a myth to accept that the years of isolation of the mass of Blacks in Black territories (areas representing in practice only 15% of the total South Africa geography), did not contribute directly to the present-day immense Black poverty and the Blacks’ political and economical disempowerment. A long-term programme of comprehensive land redistribution is an absolute must to rectify the economic condition of the poor and landless Blacks.11,86-110

The negative impact of poverty and inequality on the Black population is well described by the fact that out of the total population of South Africa (±55-million) who need some basic income to be able to live, only 15 million are working in some form of established job. Of the± 55-million the Blacks form ± 45-million with 29 million living in poverty. This immense Black poverty and discrepancy with the Whites’ wealth in general, shows up when comparing Whites versus Blacks: the ratio for Whites is ten in work against 13 unemployed (10:13 or 71:100), while the ratio of Blacks employed versus unemployed is 10:28 (36:100). Technically it reflects, in terms of numbers, a White unemployment of ±1.5 million persons against a Black unemployment of ±29 million persons. The official unemployment number, putting the unemployment of Whites at 7% versus 30% for Blacks, is untrue. The 30% for Blacks is more likely to be ±60%.11,86-110

Compared to the various White regimes’ official socio-economic uplifting of the so-called Poor Afrikaners (1830 -1939), as well as the uplifting after 1938 to 1960 of Whites by nationalist Afrikaner politics — especially with its extreme racial favouring of the remnants of the still poor and unsuccessful Afrikaners in the economically progressive South Africa — there was an absolute absence of financial uplifting of Blacks in the political history of the country. The post-1994 BBBEE and land redistribution policies have been totally insignificant and incomplete. They also came also too late after a period of more than 300 years of immense deprivation.11,86-110

The awarding of land through land expropriation to the poor and landless Blacks, using Majority Procurement (MP), after their suffering for many years under the extreme practice of Minority Empowerment (ME) of the Whites’ discriminatory politics, is a prerequisite in a balanced democracy.11,86-110

To posit that there is an absence of Black poverty within present-day South Africa’s wealth, is a wanton lie.

3.2.19. The increase of inclusive (social) capitalism will endanger exclusive (classic) capitalism and the economy stability of South Africa

The present condition of mass poverty and inequality needs a form of capitalism that seeks to put society rather than profit at the heart of decision-making, away from the manipulating actions of business bullies and the rich (which includes mostly the Whites) whose exclusive contemporary capitalism places profit in a central position. The postulation that society always has in the past, and will again benefit from exclusively capitalist instruments, is opportunistic and false.11,21,22,31,51,112-116

The model of exclusive (classic) capitalism in South Africa’s economic and political thinking, planning and doing, has been going on for ages — a model which imitates the economics of the Western world with outcomes that are not always good — has only resulted in the growth of a small group of super-rich and the growth of a mass of super-poor, bringing immense poverty to as much as ± 29 millions of poor and marginalised Black people in South Africa.11,21,22,31,51,112-116

The introduction of inclusive capitalism is not intended to erase exclusive capitalism or to change South Africa’s economic system to an exclusively socialist or Marxist model. It is a separate economic-financial model that is needed, parallel to the exclusive capitalistic model, but intertwined to form a progressive socio-economic system to benefit every citizen as well as the country as a whole. This model reflects the justified redistribution of the financial assets, including the redistribution of land to the poor masses, which have been discriminated against outright since 1652.11,21,22,31,51,112-116

The proposed implementation of inclusive capitalism, to drive and to establish land expropriation, is just an extension of the old existing inclusive capitalistic model emanating from the pre-1994 use of the South African state-owned enterprises (like today’s Transnet, SABC, Eskom, SAA), as well as primary and secondary education, etc. It is a financial policy which was also extensively used by the early White regimes to uplift the poor and landless Whites. It indeed reflects, notwithstanding the outcry of the antagonists, the country’s own socialistic-capitalistic governmental system, dating back to 1910.11,21,22,31,51,112-116

Inclusive capital must be seen as intertwined with exclusive capital. It is a supportive system to improve the present-day disadvantaged people as was done many times during the uplifting of the Poor Whites in South Africa.11,21,22,31,51,112-116

It is a myth that increasing inclusive (social) capitalism will endanger exclusive (classic) capitalism and the economy stability of South Africa.

3.2.20. The functioning par excellence of the 1994 Dispensation within the mandate of South Africa’s Bill of Rights

The South African Bill of Rights is not an internationally-lauded constitution which is premised on freedom, dignity, and equality, as it is described by the antagonists. Its most prominent shortcoming is its lack of understanding for the country’s indigenous problems, realities and challenges to make South Africans true Africans. It is a piece of legislation which exclusively favours Whites and has so far stood in the path of a totally South African Rehabilitation. It did not clear the immense backlog created by the centuries-old comprehensive deprivation of non-Whites and led to further financial imbalance after 1994.1,3,7,31,125,130-132

The 1994 Dispensation and the Constitution represent (and safeguard) a still self-appointed European supremacy, as in pre-1994 South Africa. Its premise is “to plan and to may think” for Blacks on democracy, human rights and other demanding and society-shaping realities, as well as to assure post-1994 benefits to the White minority and to safeguard their exclusive and permanent interests. Its incompleteness is well reflected by its inability to institute a balanced and just landownership.1,3,7,31,125,130-132

To say the 1994 Dispensation within South Africa’s Bill of Rights is functioning par excellence in the service of all citizens, especially the poor Blacks, is a misrepresenation and a farce.

3.2.21. The altering of Section 25 will cause a negative effect for South Africa’s local and foreign economics

South Africa can still develop immensely without foreign investment. Even in its most extreme land reform mode, the country’s economy will not necessarily be devastated as predicted. In this context, it must be noted that the intended land expropriation is not going to be radical in line with nationalisation and there is no intention to block foreigners from the ownership of land either. These foreigners’ opportunities will be left untouched. The present decline of radical political parties propagating land grabbing and the nationalision of public and private assets during the May 2019 election, such as Black First Land First, confirms the excellent prospects for a continuing democracy and individuals rights in future south Africa.117-129,137-142

On the availability of capital for development, is it important to note that there is more than enough South African capital internally available to help a start-up of large-scale Black farming without the so-called saviour’s help from foreigners.117-129,137-142

The argument that Section 25’s alteration would block the country’s so-called “flourishing economy” and that foreign investors for instance will not risk to have their land confiscated when they can pick any number of other nations that will protect their investments, is fake news par excellence. It is just not true.

The changing of Section 25 will not bring a negative effect for South Africa’s local and foreign economics.

3.2.22. Unnecessary to restructure South Africa’s colonial financial-political-structure and landownership in 2019

The political, social and economic — basically bankrupt — setup that the ANC regime unwillingly inherited from the NP regime is unfortunately part of a colonial financial structure and landownership that dates back to the White colonial years. It reflects the same centuries-old colonial-political “White privilege”, including their domination of the Black population, White landlordships and the benefits of an exclusive White farming economy, as well as the in-depth practice of exclusive capitalism by a few White rich who manipulate the country’s economics and politics in the background. Any change to the colonial financial-political structure and landownership structure means the end of their White empowerment.4,6,22,23,93,143-145

This present-day one-sided colonial financial-political structure and landownership structure make it possible that the country can still be governed by a self-serving White minority, who is mostly well-established in the White business and financial sectors, and includes a strong foreign component. Notwithstanding their so-called “awarded” political liberty in 1994, the majority of Blacks are still disenfranchised economically, socially and to be honest, even politically. This is essentially because of the faulty 1994 colonial Constitution in which the land matter was never clearly spelled out and truly addressed. This situation makes the comprehensive decolonisation of South Africa an absolute necessity. Prominent in this respect is the much-needed modernisation of the agricultural economy, in which the implementation of a comprehensive program of land reform and landownership is central. Included in this modernisation of the agricultural economy is the need to establish a large community of Black farmers that may compete with the present-day monopolised White colonial farming system and its models. On the other hand, there is the absolute need that they must take over the functions of the diminishing White farmers and White population to assure that South Africa stays economically effective.4,6,22,23,93,143-145

The ANC is in the process of addressing the exploitation inherent to the present-day one-sided wantonly-colonial financial-political structure and landownership system, such as the imbalance and injustice of landownership which is today still mostly located in White hands. The only solution is through the direct restructuring of these structures. This process, as activated by the ANC, is democratic and free from colonial autocracy; it is characterised by a politics that eschews the pre-1994 as well as the present financial and political structures. Their intention is to intertwine exclusive and inclusive capitalism.4,6,22,23,93,143-145

It is an utmost necessity to restructure South Africa’s colonial financial-political structure and the form of landownership that goes with it.

3.2.23. Land reform’s short and long-term upheavals will bring serious consequences

The truth is that land reform always brings some upheavals in which there is bad for some inhabitants and good for others. The key to doing this division is primarily to consider the numbers of the people to suffer versus the numbers to benefit. Secondly, the way in which the victims of the proposed land reform had come into possession of their wealth needs to be considered during this reform.11,15,55,86,91,96,101,103,106,111,146-165

Derby’s150 guideline in this context is more than clear when he writes150:2:

But of course, as part of land reform, some farmers will find themselves having to carve up their lands; one can’t ignore our shared history. Land reform comes with great upheaval as it involves taking land from those who have it and giving it to those who don’t. To unleash it, title deeds are necessary. Landowners, white farmers, the government and our chiefs and kings need to buy in so South Africa can reap the economic rewards.

Whites are the minority of inhabitants, benefiting immensely from landownership and wealth accumulated over many centuries, clearly at the cost of the majority of Blacks. The Blacks’ immense suffering before 1994 was not much of a concern to most of the Whites. There is undoubtedly a price to pay by the Whites in the land-transformation process.

Land reform and expropriation, where applicable, are needed to uplift the poor and landless Blacks and to make South Africa an effective and happy country for the majority of its people.

The good of the proposed land expropriation absolutely overshadows the bad of it.

The intended land reform does not hold serious short and long-term consequences and upheavals in broad terms for the country.

4. Conclusions

It is clear from studying the above subdivision “3.1. Myth and lies busting: a short retrospective, in this article (Part 2: Article 8)” as well as the previous article (Part1: Article 7), that myths and lies have so far played an enormous role in misleading and misinforming South Africans on the intended land expropriation and the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution. It is clear that only a limited number of the arguments, opinions and viewpoints as reflected in the previous four published Articles (Articles 3 to 6) on the land matter, can be trusted as true.166,167 Or, better, as Harari166 describes this mass of untrue information, hanging on in the mindsets of many South Africans: they are mindsets deluged by the posting of grossly irrelevant information by political opportunists to get exclusive political and economical empowerment and are in fact falsities.

In this article the antagonists’ and the propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against or for the changing of Section 25(2) of the South African Constitution to enable land expropriation without compensation or not, were brought directly into comparison with the exclusively used King-Solomon’s-wisdom approach to differentiate between the few truths/facts and the mass of lies/myths. This brings us to the existing few facts and truths, guiding us clearly to the truism that land expropriation is unavoidable in post-2019 South Africa.

There is clearly large-scale resistance to land reform, specifically among the White farmers. This resistance, which is turning more and more into hostility, has over time spread extensively to the general White population. This issue was wantonly generalised and politicised in the past by the various so-called saviours and rescuers of the Whites. Most of these persons and groups are purely driven by their own selfish and opportunistic interests, while many of them reflect political remnants of the old Apartheid ideology of the NP and the Broederbond. The hard fact is here that the majority of people in the country cannot be held back by false sentiment and the exclusive interests of an increasingly diminutive group, who were in the past the unjustified beneficiaries of the discriminatory political system from 1652 onwards. The overwhelming interests of the mass of Black poor and landless people can no longer be ignored. The present status of landownership and economic empowerment is a recipe for revolution.11

Land expropriation with reasonable compensation is a must that needs immediate activation. But, where applicable, land expropriation without compensation should also be part of the tools to rearrange the South African scene as to land ownership. In this respect, state property stands out prominently as the first stage in activating land expropriation. The mass of poverty, landlessness, indignity and inequality, which had became a lifestyle for nearly 30 million Blacks — people isolated socially, economically and politically from their rights as South Africans and exposed to delinquencies equal to crimes against humanity — creates the potential for country-wide anarchy and revolution, to flame up from the end of 2019, if not fully addressed. This makes land expropriation an absolute priority.168

The prominent question at this stage is: are there South African political parties to rapidly steer the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future? This is a very complex question to answer, given that popularity at the ballot box does not guarantee that a government of quality and ability is put into power. The political analyst, Mamokgethi Molopyane169, writes that for all 48 of the parties that had taken part in the May 2019 election, there is the sign of a kind of “adapt or die” in the political outcomes of the past election. Indeed, seen from a critical focus, most of the 48 parties had already died silently on May 8, without pain or a being missed by the population. Even the three main contenders, the ANC, DA and EFF, are at a crossroads. There are immense weaknesses in their political bodies borne out by the election. Prominent among these is their disconnection from the people they assumed supported their ideologies and actions. Pertinent here, in their confusion, is to be found the issue of land expropriation without compensation and the negative racial context created by land grabbing and the nationalisation of Whites’ assets.169

Molopyane169 gives good insight into the three main political parties’ failure to live up to the standards required of a ruler of quality and their present political constitution. He writes as follows on them169:21:

“The coinciding decline of the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), contrasted with the below-expectations growth of the Economic Freedom Fighters EFF), are unsurprising developments with far-reaching, unique consequences for each.”

Undoubtedly this puts my question, “…are there South African political parties to rapidly steer the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future?” directly in the foreground. In the context of doubt on the future abilities of the ANC, DA and EFF Molopyane posits169:21:

“The ANC’s support is waning. It’s proving to be devoid of freshness, with leaders who have been in politics for so long they may be reluctant to envision change. The party must undergo a makeover of its leaders and change the perceptions they’ve created. If a credible, attractive opposition emerged, its hold on power would fail. Its biggest hurdle is itself.”

On the DA he writes169:21:

“These elections have shown that having a black man in charge doesn’t translate into resonance with black voters. The DA’s crisis may not be as apparent as that of the ANC, but it’s similarly struggling to contemplate change. Worse, it’s riddled with the fear that it might alienate its white supporters.”

With reference to the EFF, he postulates169:21:

“We tend to forget the enthusiasm and political cult of youth doesn’t offer value for voters. Populism in the age of social media doesn’t mean the same in real life. The election showed the red party will have to come up with a new approach. Its change in direction must reflect the challenges faced by a society in an ever-changing globalised economy. Although appearing to make the right noises, voters denied the EFF that 15%. Was it a case of dislike, distrust or low turnout?”

The land expropriation issue, together with the question of the trustworthiness and the integrity of the three parties, not only to govern the country but also to successfully execute a comprehensive and justly balanced land expropriation programme, is important here. Where the DA successfully resists radical politics, its ultra-conservative land-reform policy is a loser for the mass of poor and landless Blacks. In contradistinction, both the EFF and the ANC show revolutionary thinking on the assets of the White population, while the ANC in its 25 years of rule has displayed an absolute lack of integrity and trustworthiness.

The ANC won with a national majority of 57,7% for a sixth term the right to be the country’s ruling party until 2024, and thus seems as if it is going to be the sole executor in terms of its promises on land expropriation (which seemingly includes expropriation without compensation in certain appropriate cases) in its political manifesto (its so-called “political CV”) for the May 8, 2019 election. However, there is also an absolute prerequisite for it to reflect on the strongest opposition parties’ political manifestos for the May 8, 2019, election regarding their promises and abilities to execute land expropriation successfully. It is necessary to see how these opposition parties in theory could be evaluated as good versus bad regimes should they have win the ruler’s throne in May 2019. (This approach would give also a preview of their potential as good versus bad opposition parties on the land matter, specificallly for the period up to 2024).170,171

Closely linked to these political manifestos in the description of the three parties’ “characters”, are also the public viewpoints as a further descriptive guide on the three parties’ “characters” up to May 8, 2019. These public viewpoints are best reflected by the reporting on them by investigative journalists (their so-called “political letters of reference”). These mentioned letters of reference are seen by many political commentators, strategists and analysts as the most (and only) decisive guide for the true description of a political party and its leaders’ quality and integrity; far more trustworthy than the so-called “trust for the party” brought out by the voters at the ballot box.

Land grabbing is an age-old custom in South Africa. It was practised by Blacks on Blacks as well as Whites on Blacks for more than three hundred years. It is thus of utmost importance that this custom is not restarted again in 2019 and that a perfect solution to the present imbalance between White landownership and Black landownership is rapidly found, without falling back into the past’s vicious circle of revenge and counter-revenge to erase the manifold injustices done before 1994.

South Africa’s political history is far from completion. Also, there is an immense political history that needs to be retraced and to be rewritten, or at least to be corrected. It does not matter if we liked it or not: it is a must. Angelo Fick172, the director of research at the Auwal Socio-economic Research Institute, guides us here par excellence when he writes172:29:

We have unfinished business from the distant past — questions of land dispossession unaddressed, issues of colonial and apartheid spatial dynamics in our towns and cities that affect the life chances of the majority, the poor, in the most unequal society in the world.

We have urgent business from the more recent past, the fetid pollution of corruption, maladministration, theft of state resources and non-delivery of services.

At this stage the most demanding question, in terms of Kgosana’s168, Molopyane’s169 and Fick’s172 pinpointing of the wrongs of our politics and the immediate demand to fix our past and our future, is: can land expropriation (with compensation or without compensation) be executed after more than three hundreds of years of failure — correctly and with justice?

In the next three successive articles (Articles 9 to 11) the political manifestos of the DA, EFF and the ANC for the May 8, 2019 election, together with the reporting of investigative journalists on these three parties’ political thinking, planning and actions, will be put into perspective in an effort to reflect on how the expected land expropriation will or may turn out.

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PEER REVIEW
Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING
The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS
Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652 to 2018. Part 6: Performance profiles of executive political leaders and regimes for the period 1795 to 1872 (Cape Colony)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: appraisal, black, executive, history, leaders, performance, political, profile, regime, white.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 4: 1

1. Background

1.1 Introduction

At the end of 1794, France invaded Holland and in January 1795, they captured Amsterdam. As a result, the monarch, the Prince of Orange, fled to England. In Holland the Patriot Party came to an agreement with the French Republic in May 1795 and took over power to create the Batavian Republic, for all intents and purposes a vassal state of the French. The Prince of Orange, living in exile in England, requested the British government to protect the Cape Colony until he could recover the throne. He wanted to prevent the strategic halfway house falling into the hands of the French. For the British government, this was an excellent opportunity to safeguard their immediate interests in India and they decided to send a fleet of nine vessels. This fleet was under the command of Admiral Sir GK Elphinstone. He was accompanied by a military force sixteen hundred strong under the command of General Sir JH Craig. The fleet reached False Bay in June 1795, and after minimal resistance, the VOC’s force surrendered. Commissioner-General AJ Sluysken, the acting Governor of the Cape, signed the Treaty of Rustenburg on 6 September 1795, handing over the Cape Colony to the British to rule temporarily on behalf of the Prince of Orange. The VOC’s soldiers became prisoners of war, while Sluysken returned to the Netherlands. General Craig acted as governor until May 1797 when he was relieved by the Earl George Macartney.1,2

The total population within the borders of the Cape Colony was as follows at that stage1:37:

  •     White free burghers numbering 16 000, with more or less 11 000 living in the rural areas and 5 000 living in Cape Town.
  •     About 1 500 White officials and 1 200 troops.
  •     Non-White slaves numbering 17 000.
  •     A KhoiKhoi population of 4 000.

Regarding the European population at the Cape in 1797, the proportion was 50% Dutch, 27% German, 17% French, and other elements representing 6%, mostly Scandinavian.1

1.2 The presence of the civilized world in the form of the British Empire as temporary rulers of the Cape, 1795 to 1803

We already saw in Part 5 of the series that the Cape’s inhabitants were exposed to different commanders and governors of the VOC over the period 1652. In general they brought very little that was positive, but they all had one common feature: they were all Dutch and of the same culture and political orientation as most of the White inhabitants living at the Cape. The inhabitants could address their appeals about wrongdoings by the VOC government and the commander and governors, to organizations that were Dutch, although these appeals mostly went unanswered. As a direct result of the VOC’s mismanagement on many terrains, a culture of lawfulness had developed in the Cape Colony, and this had become entrenched among the White frontiersmen. This made them resistant to stricter governance and order and to the change to a more humane attitudes to the non-Whites. The arrival of the British as temporary rulers meant the end of the VOC. The British had often been at war with the Dutch before this and were directly responsible for the downfall of the VOC’s rule at the Cape with their shipping trade embargos.1-5

The free burghers certainly did not see the British as trustworthy comrades and true partners when they came to the Cape in 1795, especially not the unruly White frontiersmen. Most of all, they did not foresee the collapse of the VOC and its partnership with the Netherlands, opening the door for one of their greatest enemies to become their ruler without a shot being fired. The unpreparedness of the free burghers is reflected in the arrogance of the inhabitants of Graaff-Reinet and Swellendam when they declared themselves “independent” from the Cape, seemingly as part of the Batavian Republic.1-3

On the other hand, the British were interested in expanding their Empire and they had little respect and consideration for different from what they considered their “civilized” culture. Their domination of the globe was equally entrenched in their thinking, and they forced many groups around the world to march to a British tune. They came with an aggressive intent to shape and control the indigenous cultures and people under their control. Those who adopted the British culture were always ultimately still the underdogs. The Europeans of the 1800s, like the British at the Cape, were inclined to distinguish themselves from “other” human beings by taking and consuming a growing share of the world’s goods. They skillfully manipulated the environments in their territories. Roberts4 shows this very well in his research. Self-service, self-enrichment and self-empowerment formed the bases of their British thought and behaviour. They tapped other nations’ resources, potential and human energies by overpowering them. In this way, they created a self-perpetuating wealth, opening up and creating new resources and more wealth at the costs of the oppressed.4

Roberts writes4:761:

The profits of Congo rubber, Burmese teak or Persian oil would not for a long time be reinvested in those countries. The poor European and American benefited from the low prices of raw materials, and improving morality rates tell the story of an industrial civilization finding it possible to give its peoples a richer life. Even the European peasant could buy cheap manufactured clothes and tools while his contemporaries in Africa and India still lived in the Stone Age.

In the minds of the British, the inhabitants of the Cape Colony were uncivilized. A later reference after the British final occupation of the Cape Colony in the 1800s reveals that the felt obliged to make the people of the backwards Cape Colony acceptable and functional so that they could become part of the mighty British Empire.

Compared to what the British knew as civilized, the Cape Colony indeed did not hold to this standard Roberts writes4:761:

When they looked for it, they tended to see only heathen, backward, benighted people or a few striving to join the civilized. Such an attitude was an important part of the story of European success; what were taken to be demonstrations of the inherent superiority of European ideas and values nerved men to fresh assaults on the word and inspired fresh incomprehension of it. The progressive values of the eighteenth century provided new arguments for superiority to reinforce those originally stemming from religion. By 1800, Europeans had lost almost all of their former respect for other civilizations. Their own social practice seemed obviously superior to the unintelligible barbarities found elsewhere.

It was in this “uncivilized” Cape Colony that the British arrived in 1795. Up to 1872, they ruled the area without disturbance by means of a series of autocratic governors. The period 1795 to 1872 can be divided in four: the first British occupation as caretaker of the Cape Colony (1797–1803); the Cape as a colony of the Batavian Republic (1803–1806); the second British occupation of the Cape Colony by conquest (1806–1814); and the British occupation of the Cape Colony by treaty (1814–1872). A total of twenty-nine governors served between 1795 and 1872 (2 Dutch and 27 British).

1.3 Overview of this study

This article (Part 6) is part of the second project (Project 2) on the executive leadership and regimes of South Africa. The two projects cover the period 1652 to 2018. The first series (Project 1) of five articles (Part 1 to 5) have been published in Ensovoort. The first five articles evaluated and described the performance profiles of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa (previously the Cape Colony) for the period 1652 to 1795. These five articles, published under the main title: An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652 to 2018, are titled as follows:

  •     Part 1: Leadership characteristics in perspective;
  •     Part 2: The entities in government and society that executive political leaders use to aid     their political behaviour;
  •     Part 3: Factors that influence the development of executive political leaders;
  •     Part 4: A basic checklist for the appraisal of executive political leaders and regimes;
  •     Part 5: The performance profiles of executive political leaders and regimes for the period     1652 to 1795.

The reader is referred to this first project for the theoretical basis of this endeavour. The five articles that constitute Project 2 cover the remaining period of 1796 to 2018. In this project, the focus is on the performance profiles of executive political leaders and regimes in five timeframes: 1796 to 1872 (Part 6), 1873 to 1909 (Part 7), 1910 to 1948 (Part 8), 1949 to 1994 (Part 9) and 1995 to 2018 (Part 10).

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern historical research where there is not an established body of research, like with the functioning of executive political leaders and their regimes of governance for the period 1795 to 1909 in South Africa. The sources included articles for 2018, books for the period 1945 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2016. These sources were consulted to evaluate the functioning of executive political leaders and to put thoughts, views and opinions on the South African political leadership for the period 1795 to 1909 in perspective.6-8

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

2.1 Problem statement

The research question asks whether the executive political leaders of South Africa (Cape Colony) during the period 1795 to 1872 made any extraordinary contributions to the country and its people and whether their behaviour as leaders and individuals was above reproach.

  •     People refers to all the South African groups – the various races, cultural groups, tribes, etc. It includes the minorities and the majorities – it does not refer to any sole grouping in terms of dominant political party, etc. In the above reference would it be more correct to refer to     “peoples”.
  •     Country refers to today’s greater South Africa as represented by the Republic of South Africa. It also refers to the Cape Settlement and Cape Colony, etc.

2.2 Research aims

  •     The first aim of the research is to determine if the South African executive political leaders and regimes of the period 1795 to 1872 made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their time of rule.
  •     The second aim of the research is to determine if the behaviours of the South African     executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 were above reproach.

In light of above, two research questions must be asked and answered to discover the truth about the South African executive political leaders. This then leads to two objectives, as well as two hypotheses and two alternative hypotheses.

2.3 Research questions

The following two research questions focus the research intentions:

RQ1: Did the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 make any extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their times in office?

RQ2: Were the behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 as leaders and as individuals above reproach?

2.4 Objectives of the study

The following two objectives guide the study:

RO1: To determine if the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 made any extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their time in office;

RO2: To determine if the behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 as leaders and as persons were above reproach.

2.5 Hypotheses

The following two hypotheses and two alternative hypotheses are tested:

H1: The South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their time in office.

H1A: The South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 did not make extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their time in office.

H2: The behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 as leaders and as persons were above reproach.

H2A: The behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 as leaders and as persons were not above reproach.

3. Results

3.1 First British occupation as caretakers of the Cape Colony (1797–1803)

3.1.1 Autocratic governors

During the British government’s acting as care-taker of the Cape Colony on behalves of the Prince of Orange, the following four British governors’ served1,2,9:

1797–1798: George Macartney

1798–1799: Francis Dundas

1799–1801: Sir George Yonge

1801–1803: Francis Dundas

The British temporary military management under General Craig started well and he attracted positive input from many pro-colonists. The colonists were required to take an oath of allegiance to the British king for as long the Cape stays British property. The rights and property of the VOC were transferred to the new authority, but the laws, rights and customs of the colonists stayed the same. The Cape, Stellenbosch and Swellendam accepted the new regime, but Graaff-Reinet stayed aloof until November 1796 after the defeat of the Dutch fleet at Saldanha Bay. Many of the Cape inhabitants, even those took the oath of allegiance, remained hostile to the British.1-3,5

3.1.1.1 George Macartney (1797–1798)9        

On 5 May 1797 with the take-over by governor, Duke Macartney, political management suddenly changed to a strict form of Crown colony management. He introduced Imperial Authority immediately at the Cape and over the Colony, a system that remained valid until 1872. All civil and military powers were now vested in the hands of the Governor, he abolished the Political Council and soon after that the other bodies. He also created a strong official management, excluding the colonists. Any form of direct representation was absent and a further loss of political freedom followed. Strict action was taken against colonists who refused to take the oath of allegiance to the British king. A new High Court of Justice replaced the Council of Justice, while the Appeals Court consisted of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor (the commander of the military forces) with the right of higher appeal to the Privy Council in Britain. Most of the other administrative and judicial bodies of the VOC remained. The Roman-Dutch Law was retained.1-3,5

Improvements included the abolishment of corrupt monopolies, overdue land tax were written off, there was freedom of conscience and religious freedom, and torture and the barbaric execution of the death penalty on slaves were abolished. He also made the benefits of the two English Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 applicable on the Cape colonists.1,2,5

However, the British love for material gain emerged in the benefits and salaries paid to the British top executives and their officials, undoubtedly to detriment of the colonists. In this sense, the British were no improvement. British officials like Frans Bresler and John Barrow who were placed at Graaff-Reinet to oversee the eastern border of the colony were responsible for much of the hostility towards the British. Macartney favoured and promoted Anglo-orientated colonists, which damaged his relationship with the White inhabitants.1,2,5

The biggest challenge for Macartney was to solve of the conflict between the races, especially keeping the Xhosas within in the confines of their territories with promises and smart talk. More or less the same approach of “termination” was followed that the VOC took. The colonist-commandos received orders to keep them in their place and if needed, to drive them to the Kalahari. He tried to solve conflict by separating White and Black along the borders where the different groups started to come into contact more and more. The Macartney apartheid of 1798 failed in the end, as did the grand Apartheid of the NP a hundred and fifty years later.1,2,5

Although the temporary British government’s executive leader created a better administrative environment, Macartney failed to establish a balanced government to benefit all the inhabitants living in the Cape Colony. The British government, like the VOC government previously, was one of autocracy.

3.1.1.2 Francis Dundas (1799–1799, 1801–1803)9

The Lieutenant Governor of the Cape Colony’s forces, Francis Dundas, acted as the first governor (the office was run by Sir George Yonge’s from 1799 to 1801).

Craig’s arrest of the two Graaff-Reinet leaders, Adriaan van Jaarsveld and Marthinus Prinsloo, caused conflict between the early Afrikaners and the Britons that did not calm down before 1961. The result of these arrests was a group of colonists from Graaff-Reinet on the eastern border staged their first failed rebellion. At the same time the attitude of the KhoiKhoi, mostly those living along the Orange River on the undefined northern border, changed for worse and serious conflict broke out between the Whites and the KhoiKhoi. Some British officials sided with the KhoiKhoi, which caused a further deterioration of the relationship between the early Afrikaners and the British governor and the other officials appointed by the British government. Meanwhile, an alliance formed between the KhoiKhoi and the Xhosas. The situation became very dangerous for the colonist farmers on the Eastern Frontier. The Xhosas attacked the southern part of Graaff-Reinet, committing atrocities and creating enormous chaos during the Third Xhosa War. No real action against the Xhosas and KhoiKhoi followed. The only consequence was new regulations, and the early Afrikaners felt that these regulations favoured the KhoiKhoi and the Xhosas. The British authority compelled the colonists to behaviour well towards the KhoiKhoi and the Xhosas. The British also limited the punitive action farmers could take against the KhoiKhoi and the Xhosas after an attack or livestock theft. The eastern border districts were reduced to chaos, with homesteads and farms being burned down. Racial hatred against the KhoiKhoi, Xhosas and KhoiSan deepened, especially after the Xhosas occupied large colonial areas in the east of the colony.1,2,5

Although Dundas did improve the Cape Colony in some ways, he could not solve the increasing conflict on the eastern border. The political strife between Blacks and Whites was far worse by 1803 than in 1795.

3.2 Batavian Republic (Dutch Colony) (1803–1806)9

During the Council for Asian Possessions’ rule of the Cape Colony on behalf of the Batavian Republic, the following two governors served9:

1803–1804: Jacob Abraham Uitenhage de Mist

1804–1806: Jan Willem Janssens

The Peace of Amiens between Britain and France gave the colonies back to the Netherlands. The VOC was closed down in 1798 and replaced in May 1800 by the Council for Asian Possessions, a body subject to the Dutch government. They were responsible for the further administration and management of the Cape Colony. The Cape was handed back to the Batavian Republic in February 1803 to be governed by a commissioner general. De Mist was appointed in the position, assisted by General JW Janssens as the governor in charge.1,2,5

De Mist quickly established a functioning system. Many of the VOC bodies were reinstated, like the Political Council and the Council of Justice. The Cape Colony’s juridical status changed to that of a province of the Netherlands and was managed directly from there.1,2,5

The non-Whites who had no human rights up to 1803 were now burghers and formed the majority of the population. By 1803 there were 22 000 Whites versus 25 000 slaves and 10 000 KhoiKhoi (making the population ratio 4:6), while in 1805 there were 25 757 Whites versus 29 545 slaves and 20 006 KhoiKhoi (ratio 3:6). Both De Mist and Janssens, as liberal thinkers, were worried about the oppression of the Blacks by the government itself and by the colonists, especially in the areas along the inland borders. This concern was justified, seeing that the non-Whites were the majority, and growing, left without any civil or human rights from 1652. The Dutch leaders improved on many of the regulations designed to limit the lawless actions of the White frontiersmen. They for instance compelled White employer to sign service contracts with their KhoiKhoi employees. This was a positive step that better work- and race relations. De Mist also wanted to gradually emancipate the slaves by freeing slave children at birth. However, his short period at the Cape and the rigid attitudes of the White farmers thwarted his humanitarian efforts. The White farmers wanted cheap labour and they kept importing of more slaves.1,2,5

Another positive contribution was De Mist’s establishment of a Board of Education to manage education and to rectify the neglect of education by the British caretakers. His intent to get education of an equal standard to the frontiersmen is especially noteworthy. He also focused on maintaining of free trade and made efforts to improve the local wool and wine industries. With respect to religion, he introduced measures to reorganise and recognise various religious dominations. This included help with gatherings of congregations to the payment of their ministers. However, he made it clear that the church in all its forms is subject to the state. He addressed the colour issue directly, opening religious practice to all.1,2,5 Van der Merwe writes5:147:

…public religious gatherings on Sundays could only take place on Sundays with open doors, so that no-one, Christian or heathen, White or Black, slave or free man, could be refused entry (Own translation).

For the first time since 1652, there was the flickering of hope that there would be a form of executive and political leadership that would serve all the populations of the Cape, gaining the respect, support and approval of all races. The hope was that this leadership would guide the future politicians in their duties and behaviours as leaders at the Cape.1,2,5

De Mist’s Memorie expounded a new civil and juridical code of governance that was unknown to the Cape Colony until that time. It covered every facet of live from health, education, religion, economics, farming, civil and political rights, defence to taxation. Although the De Mist Code did not suggest one-man-one-vote, his various governmental and civil bodies granted more representation to inhabitants in every sphere of life and clearly intended to end civil unrest in daily life. His code also limited power abuse by the executive leaders of the Colony and its inhabitants with respect to economic, civil, political and juridical rights. De Mist did wonders in his short time (1803–1804) at the Cape. Although his progress with rights for non-Whites was limited, he significantly improved the situation of the Whites.1,2,5

Regarding the Black–White issue, especially in the Graaff-Reinet and areas along the eastern border, he addressed possible future mistreatment of the slaves, KhoiKhoi, Khoisan and the Blacks by the colonists by the placing of a subdivision of soldiers there to oversee justice. However, his liberal policy of befriending the Xhosas failed, as evident from continuing attacks. De Mist’s one-sided view of the non-Whites as the only victims at the hand of the colonists changed over time. The Whites often saw reprimands for illegal Black behaviours as support for the Whites. Later in history, Whites often cited these incidents as proof of the evil intentions of the KhoiKhoi, Khoisan and the Xhosas in the 1800s. They rarely mention the transgressions of the Whites, like land grabbing, stock theft and the murder of these non-Whites as punishment actions (like the “hunting” of the KhoiSan).1,2,5

Historical writings rarely reflect both sides of the story. The events occurred in a less civilized world than today. The Whites saw the KhoiKhoi, Khoisan and the Xhosas as African barbarians, and the non-Whites saw the White frontiersmen as White barbarians. The impact of these early conflicts on later hostility and counter-hostility is often underestimated. The problems that started in 1652 and that went on to affect South African politics until 1994 and beyond, did not resolve under De Mist.1,2,5

In 1803 De Mist entered a political system where racial differences (and discrimination and domination) affected religion, culture, cognition, emotion, education, lifestyle and standard developments and functioning and where these differences were already deeply entrenched. The situation could not have changed with a single code. Continuing the separation that Macartney started in 1798 seemed the best solution, but it ultimately spelled disaster.1,2,5 Van der Merwe describes the doom lurking in De Mist’s policy5:153:

…the intention of the Batavian authorities was to create a better grounding for the relationship between the colonists and the Bantus along the eastern border. According to Alberti [captain of the military forces based at Fort Frederick on the Eastern border and later military magistrate at Uitenhage in charge of overseeing peace in the area], the policy had to be founded on two principles, namely dispelling all Bantus from the Suurveld and driving them across the colonial border, and ending all contact between colonists and Bantus, and between Bantus and Hottentots. This principle was also included in the first message of De Mist to the settled populations along the border districts and to the Xhosa captains. The Bantu had no concept of ‘mine’ and ‘yours’, and this was at the core of all the problems. Nobody was allowed to move across the border and back. Alberti felt that sixty soldiers would be enough to patrol the border. The policy therefore came down to inexorable separation to maintain peace between the eastwards migrating Whites and the southwards moving Bantu stream (Own translation).

The above description reveals the complete lack of understanding of the problems along the border. The Blacks and Whites were seen as two groups, there was no understanding that neither these categories consisted of a natural unity. At this point in history, not a single executive political leader, Dutch or British, had shown insight or had made decisions beyond their own short-term interests. The leaders came from European tradition of the separation of nations where each nation is financially independent and large enough to form a nation. This was not the case here. What is more, the right to land and the ownership of land played a significant role in the relationships. The South Africa of the 1800s was basically an agricultural economy, making the sole ownership of land a point of conflict. It was naïve of Alberti to think that they could stop the migration of the different groups. It was a complicated process, and the politicians of the 1800s were used to settling these kinds of problems with brute military force.1,4

De Mist’s hopes that his governance would inspire good leadership that would serve all the populations of the Cape and that he would be remembered as a leader who was respected, supported and approved by all the different races, failed to become a reality. He started well in 1802, but he undid all of his own good work. This begs the question: Would any future South African judiciary or political regime or executive leader be able to do better than De Mist? Time will tell.

De Mist and his assistant Janssens inherited a dysfunctional system. They had the genuine intention to better it and made honest attempts in their short rule of two years (1802–1804). However, it was already an unhealthy situation where each race was trapped in their little corner with their own fears. Van der Merwe5 writes as follows about De Mist and Janssens5:155:

However, their work at the Cape was not without fruit, although their limited time did not allow for it to be thoroughly tested. Their labour was fraught with extraordinary difficulty. All their actions and decisions were aimed at promoting the good of South Africa. In cases where measures were not received well by the citizens, this should not be attributed to ill will or a lack of diligence, but rather to the fact that the authorities were not informed of the intricacies, morals and habits of the communities to which these measures were made applicable. They regarded the communities as people with the same prejudices as all colonists, which was not true. This became clear from the colonist’s views of all beings who are not White, and their religious views in this regard. In essence the leaders were confronted here with a people who were no longer Dutch, but who showed the traits of a new, separate nation with an own language and views regarding all terrains of life, and they differed significantly from those of their Dutch, German and French contemporaries (Own translation).

Van der Merwe5 poignantly captures the problems created by the fact that the White inhabitants were developing a unique political identity. They actually needed their own state by the 1800s, run independently without outsider interference or intervention. He highlights the beginnings of the early Afrikanerdom, a people prepared to challenge anyone who dares to limit their identity and human rights. However, this imminent Afrikaner historian does fail to describe, like many of his contemporaries, the many changes and transformations the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi and Xhosas also underwent, often by force, since the 1600. Nor does he acknowledge the role, good or bad, that the Whites (both inhabitants and authorities) at the Cape played in these many changes and transformations. This information sheds light on why the Cape Colony’s politicians and executive leaders failed to appoint good leaders and to establish a permanent regime up to the 1800s.1,2,5

Most historians and Afrikaner scholars fail to offer sound alternatives to the political debacle of the 1800s and to indicate how early Afrikaner nationalism and its hunger for territory and political power over the non-Whites could have been managed differently. It took an outsider, the historian JM Roberts4, to do this in the space of only a few pages in his History of the World. The De Mist Code was by far the best guideline for managing affairs at the Cape. It had the potential to change the attitudes of both non-White and White inhabitants and to unite them under a good leader. The potential of the code was immediately lost with the British imperial intervention of 1805. The British failed to understand the early Afrikaner, perhaps as result of their “civilized” British culture. De Mist and the Batavian rulers did have this understanding. Van der Merwe5 rightfully points out that there was too much of the Rousseau doctrine left in the British mindset and too little common sense.1,2,4,5

However, the British also failed as a result of how contaminated the system was by the political dogmas, doctrines and ideologies of the early Afrikaners and the non-Whites themselves. Neither the early Afrikaners nor the non-White tribes designed these dogmas, doctrines and ideologies. They were inherited from the various foreigner rulers of the Cape and exacerbated by poor leadership. The British were notorious for ruling with dogma.1,2,4,5

De Mist retired on 25 September 1804 and moved back to the Netherlands in February 1805, leaving the enormous task of being governor to Janssens. However, the plans for the new Cape Colony came to an absurd end with the military takeover on 18 January 1806. The Cape surrendered to the British forces under David Baird for a second and last time.1,2,5

3.3 Second British occupation of the Cape Colony (1806–1814)9

3.3.1 Autocratic governors

Up to 1814 the British held the Cape Colony by conquest and not by treaty rights. The legal position of the Cape Colony as a full British possession was only finalized with the Peace of Paris. The six governors for 1807 to 1814 were1,2,9:

1807–1808: David Baird

1808–1808: Henry George Grey

1808–1811: Du Pré Alexander, 2nd Earl of Caledon

1811–1811: Henry George Grey

1811–1814: John Francis Cradock

1813–1814: Robert Meade  (acting)

From day one it was clear that although the Cape Colony was held by conquest, which should technically have limited their rights to make large statutory and administrative changes, many changes and autocratic actions followed.1,2,5

The second British occupation resulted in comprehensive statutory changes and political conflict between the early Afrikaners and the British, as well as between the early Afrikaners and the various non-White ethnic groups. Although the British promised to maintain certain parts of the De Mist code, there was a dramatic change from a centralized governmental system to a autocratic one-man regime with the governor as head of the executive, legislative and juridical powers. There was no a consulting body to guard against the governor’s misuse of powers, he ruled by proclamation.10

The six governors were autocratic rulers who were only subject to the Secretary of State in London. Their submission was reflected in favouring the followers of the Prince of Orange in civil service appointments at the Cape. Although the Roman-Dutch Law was retained, the High Court was demoted to its lower level status of the pre-Batavian times, while the despised Office of the Fiscal with all its negative features was restored. The Burgher Senate was reinstated as a town council for Cape Town, while it also became an advisory body to the Cape government. Again, the Cape administration was overburdened by highly paid officials as during the first British occupation. The De Mist Code’s stipulations on churches and the improved Batavian administration of rural areas were retained, but the central governmental system was replaced by an autocratic one-man rule. At this time there was still no sign of democracy at the Cape.10

The White colonists were doing well financially as result of the growth in the shipping industry and better sales of produce to these visiting ships and a rise in exports. However, the Black–White conflict really reared its head. Racial conflict and governance problems were awaiting the colony.

3.3.1.1 The Earl of Caledon (1808–1811)9

Caledon’s reign was autocratic, with him being in charge of the executive, legislative and judicial powers. There was no advisory body to temper his behaviour. He legislated by proclamation and was only accountable to the Minister of Colonies in London. He could do as he pleased, and in the case of urgent decisions, he did not always act with wisdom. The lag-time involved in communication meant that London could often not intervene.1,2,10

Some of Caledon’s more positive policies include the division of the territory’s six districts, namely the Cape, Stellenbosch, Tulbagh, Swellendam, Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage, into smaller districts. This resulted in better administration and offered Caledon more control over the countryside and the unruly White frontiersmen. It enabled him to gradually expand the British system of centralizing political, judicial and legislative power. He attained this goal by establishing a circuit high court at Caledon to support the magistrate’s court, lower the cost of high court cases.10

Caledon regarded human rights as important, especially the position of the KhoiKhoi in the Colony. Up to this point the KhoiKhoi were treated as an independent group managed by own chiefs, although under the care of the Cape government. However, they disintegrated into small travelling groups without work or sometimes in the service of the White farmers. In November 1809, Caledon made the KhoiKhoi inside the country’s borders citizens to whom all laws were applicable. In an effort to manage their movement, all KhoiKhoi had to have a permanent place of residence and needed a pass from their employers to move around. Caledon tried to instil a work ethics in the KhoiKhoi and to make them a future substitute for the slaves, who became a problem for London from 1809. He also wanted to stop White farmers from abusing the KhoiKhoi and being cruel by enforcing work contracts between farmers and workers. This decision elicited a reaction from the London Mission’s managers in South Africa, Read and Van der Kemp, who lived in Bethelsdorp. Dissatisfaction with Caledon’s racial policy spread to London where the philanthropist William Wilberforce was already creating awareness of slavery and the mistreatment of the KhoiKhoi by the Whites at the Cape. This issue quickly escalated after 1814.1,2,10

The Xhosa problem needed swift action from Caledon. They were still living in the Zuurveld and frequently entered the districts of Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage, causing chaos. However, it was clear to Caledon that driving them back would create conflict with London. He ultimately left an already failed border policy untouched. Black and White were in direct conflict over land, with various governments failing to offer a sound future strategy and a plan for a permanent working relationship between the two groups.1,2,10

3.3.1.2 John Francis Cradock (1811–1814)

The new governor ignored London’s request not to address the “Black problem” with military action and in the fourth Xhosa war, he drove the Xhosas back across the Fish River. In an effort to limit the fast northwards migration of White frontiersmen into Black territory, he also introduced a new system of land ownership in Cradock in 1813 where the Black-White conflict was prominent. He replaced the loan farm system with a system of hereditary possession, hoping to bind the farmers to their farms to stop them from migrating.10

Cradock’s actions against the Xhosas and the KhoiKhoi quickly got a reaction from the White missionaries at Bethelsdorp and other role players concerned about human rights. This led to the so-called “Swarte Ommegang” (Black Circuit) where several White farmers and their families were accused of theft and murdering KhoiKhoi. Although these accusations were found untrue by judges Strubberg and Cloete of the Circuit High Court, the White farmers lost trust in London as a ruler and in the foreign missionaries. From then onwards the mission stations were side-lined. The Blacks and Whites were now positioned as enemies.1,2,10

Strubberg and Cloete of the Circuit High Court gave a description of how chaotic Black-White relations became in 1814. The groups were played off against each other by foreign powers like Wilberforce in London and Read and Van der Kemp in South Africa. The two judges described the KhoiKhoi at Bethelsdorp as people living in a situation where10:162:

…the natural state of barbarism has seemingly taken the place of civility and social order…where laziness and idleness and the subsequent dirtiness and taintedness have grown to perfection (Own translation)

The two judges also commented on the feebleness of people like Wilberforce in London and Read and Van der Kemp in South Africa as they played off Blacks and Whites in 1814. Grundlingh quotes them as follows10:161:

If the lords Van der Kemp and Read went to the trouble of succinctly and impartially investigating the different stories they were told, they would have viewed many of these complaints that caused a racket inside and outside of the colony as purely fictional, and as a result neither the court nor the government would have been pestered (Own translation).

The Black Circuit was the first sign for the Cape Colony’s inhabitants, especially for the White frontiersmen, that the Peace of Paris of 1814 would change their lives forever and that the British had different plans for them.

Roberts writes as follows about the dramatic impact of the British political system from 1814 onwards4:740:

No European nation has so successfully seeded the globe with its own stock as the United Kingdom. By the end of the nineteenth century, it had created an Anglo-Saxon world which was an identifiable sub-unit within the ambit of European civilization, with an historical destiny diverging from that of the European continent. Its components included growing British communities in Canada, Australia and South Africa (the first and the last containing other important national elements, too).

The Dutch descendants in the colony had settled into a quasi-Dutch lifestyle and governmental dispensation. The change to an autocratic British system was dramatic and they struggled to adjust. To some extent, they never accepted it and sought to escape, like with the Great Trek later. The indigenous people who mostly lived outside the Cape’s statutory and political management and control experienced this change from a Dutch to a British system as less dramatic. This was also true for the slaves who had become separated from the ruling processes as a result of their loss of human rights.1,2,5,10

Looking back at the British rule of 1806 to 1814 critically, it was an immensely autocratic regime, for Blacks and Whites alike. It left the Whites confused. The situation was equally devastating for non-Whites, especially the slaves, the KhoiKhoi and the KhoiSan. Notwithstanding their new status as citizens awarded by Caledon, they were exposed to abuses by the White frontiersmen of Swellendam, Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage more than ever. On the other hand, the slaves, the KhoiKhoi and the KhoiSan were also often cruel and barbaric towards the Whites. Livestock was frequently stolen and they were lazy and undisciplined. No one-sided description of either of the groups at the Cape could do justice to history. These renditions of history should be considered critically. For example, one Afrikaner historian wrote as follows during the heyday of Grand Apartheid10:161:

Some of the complaints pertained to events in the remote past and a great number sprung from the fruitful and stimulated imagination of the Hottentots with their unbridled tongues and the malicious of unbalanced negro-loving zealots. It is true that there were cases where workers and servants had been abused in the pioneer community along the Cape borders, just like in America and even in a factory country like England, but one can assume that the Cape colonists did not act more callous than their White peers elsewhere and that the non-Whites in the Cape colony in general were better off than people elsewhere (Own translation).

Grundlingh10 words here are not quite true and are to a certain extent in line with the thinking of DF Malan, HF Verwoerd and BJ Vorster, leaders of the racist NP. He contradicts himself no less than six times in the above passage. By referring to the “remote past”, he acknowledges that the early Afrikaners did indeed commit wrongs towards the KhoiKhoi. With the reference to “unbalanced negro-loving zealots” he not only uses inappropriate language to create a false history for his Afrikaans readers, but also shows his subjectivity. This was so characteristic of the Afrikaner nationalist historians who wrote during Grand Apartheid. When he speaks of the “pioneer community along the Cape border”, he gives away his naiveté about who the Swellendam, Uitenhage and Graaff-Reneit border farmers really were. They unlawfully invaded Black territory, what we would call terrorism today. The claim that “the non-Whites at the Cape colony in general were better off than elsewhere” is a blatant lie. White farmers from Swellendam and environs went on official “hunting expeditions” to “terminate” KhoiSan and to take the KhoiSan womenfolk and children as “apprentices”, meaning forced slaves. This makes his claim far-fetched. These farmers constantly rebelled against the government, one reason being that their actions were no longer condoned.1,2,10

I would like to refer back to Geen’s1 words quoted in Part 5 about the calibre of the farmers who lived in the region of Swellendam, Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage around 1814. They became the Voortrekkers, some rising as prominent Voortrekker leaders and politicians in the later republics of Transvaal and the Free State. Geen said1:29:

…but the isolation and difficulties of frontier life also made them limited in their outlook, impatient of all forms of control and so intensely individualistic that it became difficult to unite them in effective cooperation. They lost most of their civilization on the way to the Promised Land. Some could write, still more could sign their names, many read the Bible, especially the Old Testament, into which they read a justification of themselves, their beliefs and all their works, but for the rest learning and the affairs of the great world were closed books to them.

This lawlessness among the White frontiersmen resulted in the Slaughter’s Nek Rebellion in 1815 under Frederick Bezuidenhout, which ended with the hanging of five of the ringleaders by Lord Charles Somerset. Geen writes1:57:

In 1815, there occurred the Slaughter’s Nek Rebellion, a typical incident of lawlessness on a distant and disturbed frontier. It was really nothing more than the resistance of a truculent type of frontiersmen to the new conceptions of law, order and justice that were gradually being made effective in the remoter districts.

These farmers lost their civility on their way to the Promised Land. They were cut off from the rest of the world, the Bible serving as their only literature. They read especially the Old Testament and used it justify their actions. This isolation self-righteousness made for naïve decisions on governance later in the republics2:120-121:

The new British authorities had to deal with many of these culturally poor and isolated early Afrikaners on the one hand, and pre-modern Xhosas, KhoiSan and KhoiKhoi with little understanding of simple political and governance matters on the other. They had been schooled to deal with the enemy the African way for centuries, namely war. The political refined British found it difficult to manage the situation.

The second British Cape Colony (1806–1814) with the British holding the colony by conquest, undoubtedly improved the economy of the Cape. Also, from an objective political-historical view away from the contaminated writings of Afrikaner nationalist writers and historians, the governmental administration, law-enforcement and law-making as well as the execution of leadership, progressed. Although serious issues like border and racial conflicts remained largely unchanged, they did have plans to address it. The British governors were backed by a much stronger system than were the Batavian governors.

The South African race issue became more and more laden with aggression, hate and murderous intentions from 1814 onwards.

3.4 Third British occupation of the Cape Colony (1814–1872) by treaty1,2,9

3.4.1 Autocratic governors

The Cape Colony became a rightful British possession with the Peace of Paris. The Netherlands was forced to hand it over to the British Empire permanently in August 1814. The seventeen governors who served from 1814 to 1872 were as follows1,2,9:

1814–1826: Charles Somerset

1820–1821: Rufane Shaw Donkin

1826–1828: Richard Bourke

1828–1833: Galbraith Lowry Cole

1833–1834: Thomas Francis Wade

1834–1838: Benjamin d’Urban

1838–1844: George Thomas Napier

1844–1847: Peregrine Maitland

1847–1847: Henry Pottinger

1847–1852: Sir Harry Smith

1852–1854: George Cathcart

1854–1854: Charles Henry Darling

1854–1861: George Grey

1859–1862: Robert Henry Wynyard

1862–1870: Philip Edmond Wodehouse

1870–1870: Charles Craufurd Hay

1870–1877: Sir Henry Barkly

The British authority lacked democracy. On the other hand, the Boers wanted excessive freedom. This dissatisfaction with authority and the limitations of borders limited their vision. They were intolerant of all forms of control and so intensely individualistic that it became difficult to unite them for effective cooperation. This became characteristic of many of the Boers during the Great Trek and later on in their “Promised Land”, the Boer-republics.1,2,4,10

Between 1806 and 1814 there were not large numbers of British citizens in South Africa, so the British that were present were only there to rule. After 1814 this changed dramatically when thousand of British settlers arrived. Although they were outnumbered by the Boers, they had the backing of the British government and thus the Cape authority. The introduction of British assumptions and laws and the large new English population, created a world that the Boers were not ready for. This ultimately led to negative outcomes. Roberts reports4:777:

This opened a period of whittling away of the privileges of the Boers, as the Dutch farmers were called. In particular, they were excited and irked by any limitation of their freedom to deal with the native African as they wished. Their special indignation was aroused when, as a result of the general abolition of slavery in British territory, some 35,000 of their blacks were freed with, it was said, inadequate compensation.

The Boers became increasingly annoyed, especially with their lack of influence. The Boers found the British regime unacceptable and below standard with respect to full political rights. Roberts says the following about the relationship between the Boers and British4:778:

It was the beginning of a long period during which Anglo-Saxon and Boer struggled to live sometimes apart, sometimes together, but always uncomfortably, their decisions as they did so dragging in their train others about the fate of black African.

3.4.1.1 Charles Somerset (1814–1826)

Somerset arrived at a time when the relationship between non-White and White and between British and Boer had been damaged. The autocratic Charles Somerset damaged these already sensitive relationships further with his management of the unrest at Slaughter’s Neck, causing the dislike for the British occupiers to increase as a result of his over-reach with his political and juridical powers.1,2,10

Somerset inherited the eastern border problem. The policy of segregation failed and led to further Xhosa attacks on the White areas. In this instable situation, two Xhosa leaders entered into conflict themselves. This caused the one leader, Ndlambe, to move into White territory. He reached as far as Grahamstown for an unsuccessful attack on 22 April 1819. Somerset ignored London’s liberal policy and started a clean–up operation by removing the Xhosas from the area between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers, making the Keiskamma the new outer border. He created a neutral area between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers as a buffer to keep the factions away from each other and reinstated the segregation policy.1,2,10

Somerset addressed slavery by issuing a proclamation in 1816 making it compulsory to register all slaves. In 1823 he determined the workdays and hours of slaves and prescribed the minimum standard of their food and clothing rations. Married slaves could no longer be sold separately, and the Christian religion had to be made available to them. The number of strokes for physical punishment, and their testimonies were allowed in the court in cases against their owners. In 1826, a slave protector was appointed in Cape Town and various assistant protectors in the rural areas to attend to the complaints of slaves.1,2,10

In the meantime, the British government acted to minimize the Dutch influence in the Cape. They Anglicized the churches, schools and the legal system.1,2,4,10

Although the autocratic and despotic one-man regime at the Cape was replaced by a governor and a Council of Advice that could make laws by way of ordinances, the early Afrikaners could give little input. The problems between the British and the Boers were largely attributable to failure on the side of the British to appoint an effective leader at the Cape who considered the interest of the Afrikaners. Roberts4 points out how this became a situation ready for conflict4:780:

When people then spoke of a ‘racial problem’ in South Africa, they meant the problem of relations between the British and Boers whose conciliation seemed the most urgent need. The defects of the settlement would take some time to appear. When they did it would be not only because the historical sense of the Afrikaner proved to be tougher than people had hoped, but also because of the transformation of South African society which had begun by the industrialization of the Rand could not be halted and would give irresistible momentum to the issue of black Africans.

These racial defects never disappeared – the foundation had been laid for Afrikaner nationalism and its rejection of anything British. The cracks that would lead to a deep divide among Afrikaners, the subsequent founding of the Republic of South Africa 1961, and Apartheid with its racial discrimination, had started to appear.1,2,4,10

The British government was caught off-guard by the British Settlers of 1820. The process started while Somerset was on leave in Britain (1820–1821), leaving the Cape in the hands of an acting governor, Donkin. The settlers, who were used to democracy, immediately got into conflict with the government. This brought a second force to the foreground against the Cape Colony’s way of ruling and their human rights practices. Although most of these immigrants had no voting rights in the UK (this only changed in 1832), they knew what discrimination was why they had to fight it. The settlers’ agitation and resistance on various terrains started slow political reform at the Cape.1,2,4,10

The arrival of the British settlers also affected the Boer–British relations. The settlers were placed in or near Black territories and close to the Xhosa conflict. They became the Eastern Province. They were more well-intended towards the Crown and were therefore considered a better defence. The Western Province was inhabited by a more political independent-minded population.1,11

The Cape colonists did not get into direct conflict with Somerset, they left that to the British Settlers. The settlers had success in 1828 when Bourke came to power.1,2,10

Grundlingh10 writes as follows about Somerset10:174:

The autocratic Somerset in his self-righteousness did not realize that the influence and power of the ruling “High Tories”, his congenial spirits and protectors, were decreasing in his mother land. The rise of the progressive “Young Tories” under the leadership of Canning, and especially the increasing power of the liberal Whi-opposition, heralded the beginning of the end of Somerset’s glory. The increasingly passionate criticism of Dr. John Philip and Exeter Hall contributed greatly to undermining the governor’s authority.

There is no doubt that Somerset made more enemies than friends and that his rule, besides the exaggerations of his Exeter Hall and settler enemies, had serious flaws like tyranny and corruption. The Governor was sharply criticized in the British parliament, and his actions came under the scrutiny of the Colebrook-Bigg commission, who visited the Cape from 1823–1826 for a thorough investigation into a number of government matters (Own translation).

The autocratic behaviours of the various governors at the Cape were being questioned. Human rights also began to make some progress, although it was still limited. The introduction of the first rudimentary rights for the Cape’s Black population was a prominent step in the right direction.11

3.4.1.2 Richard Bourke (1826–1828)

During Somerset’s second leave (1626–1628), the acting governor, Richard Bourke, suddenly had to face a flood of pro-Black sentiment from for instance John Philip. Bourke himself was pro-Black, and started a process to undo the limitations Somerset and earlier governors had imposed on the Black population. The Black-White conflict was steered by a liberal policy that the early Afrikaners saw as discriminatory. They felt that it affected their property, economic, social and political rights. The British started using KhoiKhoi to police Whites, and with Ordinance 49, all legislation that had forbidden Blacks to cross the border into the Colony was recalled. The punishment expeditions of White farmers to retrieve stolen livestock from across the borders were forbidden. Ordinance 50 recalled all legislation pertaining to the KhoiKhoi and lifted discriminatory laws against the free inhabitants of the Colony with respect to property rights, movement, living place, lifestyle or work and choice of work. The KhoiKhoi, Khoisan and free Coloureds received the right to own property. Legislation to fight slavery was also put in place, with laws to abolish it following. The political and social position of non-Whites in the bigger British society improved dramatically from 1928.1,2,11

This progress with Black emancipation was followed up with the rule of Galbraith Lowry Cole (1828–1833). He shortened the working hours of slaves and stipulated better accommodation. In August 1833 legislation was passed that slavery would be forbidden after the 1st of December 1836 in any of the British colonies.1,2,10

The reformations still did not bring democracy to the Cape. It was a first wave of human rights and freedom for the Xhosas, KhoiKhoi, KhoiSan and slaves.11

3.4.1.3 Benjamin D’Urban (1834–1838)

D’Urban inherited the immense task of emancipating 39 021 slaves. He had to calculate the value of the slaves. Compensation for slaves became a disputed topic in South African history books as parting with “Black gold” meant tremendous losses.1,2,10

Grundlingh writes10:179:

All this led to utter bewilderment at the Cape. Mortgages were foreclosed on; foreign agents and speculators exploited the confusion of the colonists by buying up their claims for ridiculously low sums. Many slave owners received one fifth or less of the capital value of their slaves. Wealthy families, especially the large patriarchal households in the Western Province, became so impoverished that many were unable to overcome the significant economic crisis. Stock farmers in the outlying districts also suffered. Although they had fewer slaves than the Boland farmers, some of them were quite considerable slave owners (Own translation).

The above Afrikaner sentiment that was mostly put on paper during NP rule, is misleading. Firstly, as with any apparatus or instrument used to generate money, there is always the unavoidable annual depreciation of the apparatus or instrument as a direct result of use and damage (with a slave this would take the form of aging, poor health, being constantly over-worked, poor accommodation, live conditions, and money already generated for his owner, etc.). It seems that the values were calculated on the sales value of the slaves (in other words a depreciated price) in 1836 and not on the initial purchase price minus the depreciation. Secondly, the many children born to slave parents became the sole property of the farm owners. Geen reflects as follows on the economic impact of the developments in the slave trade1:55:

It is true that the abolition of the slave trade proved to be a source of gain for a time, for the value of the slaves increased and, as their owners obtained considerable profit from the hire of their labour, greater care was bestowed on them.

Geen’s1 description below shows the subjectivity and arrogance of many of the White South African writers before 1990. They adhered to an undisputed right of ownership, even as late as the beginning of the 19th century. One human being may own another human as long as the owned person was Black1:55:

However, the numerous regulations made slave-ownership a burden, as the slaves were gradually removed from the control of their owners, though they continued to be private property. In contrast to the West Indies slavery at the Cape was largely domestic and the slaves on the whole were well treated, so that Lord Charles Somerset could write to the Colonial Secretary, ‘No portion of the community is better off or happier, perhaps, than the domestic slave in South Africa.

If the slaves were such a burden, why did the British government struggle so much to grant them freedom from 1816 onwards and why did the White slave owners at the Cape try everything to prolong slavery? Geen1 neglects to mention that it was only in the time of De Mist that the use of the pain bench and the barbarous torture of slaves were forbidden. The 1823, 1826 and the 1830 Ordinances had to end everything that was still happening to slaves. If the Whites were so “fond of their slaves”, seemingly as intimate family members, why did they want to keep them in chains? Somerset is the last person to make remarks on slaves. He had a track record of cruelty to any opposition, even other Englishmen, at the Cape.1,2 Did Geen1 forget the Slaughter Nek’s executions of five White farmers by Somerset or Somerset’s punishment of the Xhosas?

It later became fashionable for South African history books written by Whites to attack individuals such as William Wilberforce, his wife Hannah Gurney, Elizabeth Frey and Dr Philip and other Whites for their roles in the emancipation of not only of Black slaves, but also “free” Blacks from political oppression in their own country by foreign settlers. They were called “Black boeties” or “negrophiles”. These personal attacks lack any sound arguments and insight. These derogatory names were also used by the Afrikaner nationalists of the Verwoerdian republic to refer to Jan Smuts. “Liberal” people like Wilberforce were ahead of their times and they laid the foundation of today’s Code for Humanity. These “Black Boeties” should get more respect in the modern South African political history. They shone the rare light in a dusky world of abuse and suppression of non-Whites, helping to bring humanity to all.1,2,7,10,11,14-17

The importance of these early abolitionists, not only in South Africa but worldwide, is well described by Martinez12:235:

The abolitionists raised the political and moral consciousness of enough people to change the rules of their society. By redefining what was acceptable, they built a movement powerful enough to make the unthinkable inevitable. A similar task faces all those who value freedom today. The moral and political consciousness of society once again needs to be raised; a unifying, compelling, inspiring vision again needs to be articulated – and the ideal of freedom needs to be at its core.

The argument on the “value” of Black slaves is a further indication of how morally sick the White community at the Cape had become over time. Their value was calculated equally to that of cattle in the 1830s. Geen states1:56:

Besides some very old slaves, there were at the Cape 35,800 slaves valued at ₤3,041,290:6:0 – an average of just over ₤85 each…

and

The colonists did not object to the emancipation itself, …but they did resent the financial loss it involved and, still more, the fact that no vagrancy laws were passed to control the movements of the liberated slaves, who became ‘free persons of colour’ in terms of Ordinance 30.

South Africa had become a White country for the benefit of Whites only. “Free” non-Whites were walking around without work, homes and internal security by the 1830s because of the abuse of non-White labour and the orchestrated disorganization of their societal life, their political suppression, their dehumanization and the illegal occupation of their land by Whites. This resulted in immense poverty and political disorientation. The many similarities between the situation in the 1830s and the situation in South Africa from 1910 to 1994, are obvious. It shows us where the dispensation of 1910 to 1994 came from.1,2,10,14

The fact that farm activities came to a virtual halt without the presence of slaves after emancipation shows how selfishly slave owners previously profited from cheap labour. Why could the members of the large patriarchal families not do the work themselves given their numbers? Was it White laziness? The Council of Policy in 1717 described the Whites as “lazy and incompetent and more expensive than slave labour”,1:22 or was it because the White farmers were13:7-8:

…drunken, lazy, boorish oafs who went to stay at the Fort despite all threats and coercive measures, and set up boarding houses, attempted to exploit sailors and visitors, and further wasted their porch-sitting lives with endless drink and idleness, which is the root of all evil (Own translation).

or was it because,

…every common or ordinary European becomes a gentleman and prefers to be served than to serve…We have in addition the fact that the majority of the farmers in this Colony are not farmers in the real sense of the world, but owners of plantations, and that many of them consider it a shame to work with their own hands.1:25

Although the emancipation was meant to teach Cape Whites to find dignity in manual work, it failed to do so. The early Afrikaners’ alleged loss of about three million rand from the emancipation of the slaves in 1836, is nonsense.10:179 Why could the British settlers make a living on their farms at the Cape without slave labour?10

The poor remuneration to White farmers for their freed slaves is often cited as the main reason for the Great Trek. The poor payment was undoubtedly a secondary reason for the Great Trek, but later Afrikaner writers exaggerated its importance. The primary reason for the Great Trek was racism and the early Afrikaners blindly refusing to be equal to slaves and Black citizens.1,2,10

In this regard Geen writes1:67:

Perhaps, Mrs. Anna Steenkamp, a niece of Piet Retief, writing in 1876 has expressed as truly as anyone the most important cause of the Great Trek: ‘The shameful and unjust proceedings with reference to the freedom of our slaves; and yet it is not so much their freedom which drove us to such lengths, as their being placed on an equal footing with Christians, contrary to the laws of God, and the natural distinction of race and colour, so that it was intolerable for any decent Christian to bow down beneath such a yoke; wherefore we rather withdrew in order thus to preserve our doctrines in purity.

Geen gives an apt summary of the benefits of the emancipation1:56:

…in the words of the great English historian, Lackey, ‘The unweary, unostentatious and inglorious crusade of England against slavery may probably be regarded as among the three or four perfectly virtuous pages comprised in the history of nations’.

In the South Africa of 1830s emancipation did not bring one-man-one-vote, but at least it gave some dignity to non-Whites. However, they were low on the socio-economic ladder. The improvement came solely by order from London, not due to the morality or efficiency of the governors at the Cape.

D’Urban did make changes to the executive management of the Cape Colony to make it more liberal so that it could serve the people. He did this by the replacing the Council of Advisory by a Legislative Council and adding five to seven members to the Cape government. Although the governor’s autocratic power was not greatly affected by this change, this new legislative body’s approval was needed in future for the proclamation of ordinances. However, much of the government was still run from London.1,2,10

The Xhosa conflict did not disappear after the 1830s, notwithstanding the various ordinances to improve the citizenship of non-Whites. This hostile aggression of this situation was far more complex and the various Xhosa wars did not cease. In 1834 the Sixth Xhosa War broke out when 15 000 Xhosa soldiers unexpectedly entered the Colony. The outcome was devastating for the Whites (and for future Black-White relations): 22 White farmers were murdered, 456 homesteads burned down, 5 700 horses, 115 000 heads of cattle and 161 000 sheep were stolen by the Xhosas. D’Urban’s reaction was fierce and swift. He drove the Xhosas from the White farming areas and established the Province of Queen Adelaide between the Kei and Keiskamma rivers. London overruled this in 1836 and the area was handed back to the Xhosas with the reinstatement of the 1819 borders.1,2,10,14

By the end of D’Urban’s reign there had been no improvement in Black-White relations and the direct conflict between the two races raged on, especially the aggression from the Xhosas. In 1846 the new governor, Pedegrine Maitland (1844–1847), fought the War of the Axe. Again the Xhosa warriors penetrated the Colony in a war that lasted the terms of governor Henry Pottinger (1847–1847) and governor Harry Smith (1847–1852).1,2,10,14

3.4.1.4 Harry Smith (1847–1852)

Smith, like his predecessors, inherited the Cape Colony’s chaotic Black-White relations, border conflicts, growing Xhosa unlawfulness and a London government that lacked an understanding of the political and racial energies of Southern Africa. Some of Smith’s efforts to manage the border did partly correct some of the political failures of the past. In an effort to contain the ongoing war-like behaviour of the Xhosas, Smith declared the area previously known as the Province of Queen Adelaide a formal British area. The name changes to British Kaffraria, but it was not part of the Cape Colony. It became a separate Black reserve, managed by a Chief Commissioner that resorted with the British High Commissioner. However, peace still eluded the border areas. In 1850 military villages in British Kaffraria were destroyed by the Xhosas. Some of the inhabitants were murdered and the Colony was again entered again, which led to another series of murders of White farmers and the destruction of farms.1,2,10,14

What made the situation in 1850 worse, was the entrance of a non-White allied force against the British rulers of the Cape Colony. It no longer consisted of the Black inhabitants of British Kaffraria only, but of groups from Transkei and the Kat river KhoiKhoi. Smith indecisiveness on finding a workable solution to the growing Xhosa problem, led to his replacement by George Cathcart (1852–1854) who successfully reinstalled the British management of British Kaffraria. However, he did not really establish permanent Xhosa rule. This finding of a solution became the task of George Grey (1854-1861).1,2,10,14

By the 1860s it was clear that the autocratic Cape governors, guided by their unable imperial government in London, had been failing to serve all the inhabitants of the Cape, Black and White. The Cape Colony remained autocratic, while the racial situation became increasingly explosive. A permanent hostility had developed between the Whites, mostly the early Afrikaners, and the Xhosas. It seemed that the only resolution would be one of the groups being wiped out completely.1,2,10,14

3.4.1.5 George Cathcart (1852–1854)

By the 1850s the autocratic style of governance became untenable. A unity started developing among the White Afrikaans-speaking inhabitants and the English-speaking settlers and they started viewing the government as oppressive. This newfound unity was illustrated by their joint obstruction of the boat Neptune, which was set to unload bandits from Britain at the Cape in 1849. Harry Smith, the then governor, wrote as follows about this unity1:80: “This is the first occasion on which Dutch and English inhabitants coalesced in opposition to Government”. Prominent leaders against the penal colony for convicts (similar to Australia) were Porter, Solomon, Fairbairn, Molteno and Stockenström. This unity between the White groups goes deeper: they had an overwhelming belief that London was incapable of understanding the Cape inhabitants’ interests. They strove for self-government based on liberal, inclusive multi-racial politics.15,16

This unity changed the views in London, making the government more inclined to eventually granting some form of self-government for the Cape. The Attorney-General at the Cape sent a draft constitution to London, which was returned after revision by the Privy Council in London.1,2,10,14 This set into motion a process in 1830 where two petitions to London from the Albany District and Cape Town asked for representative government. It was without success. In 1841, the two districts re-petitioned London, on which the Colonial Secretary replied1:79:

The Colony was not ripe for such a measure’ and enlarged upon some of the difficulties in the way of introducing an elective assembly – the choice of a capital, the possible separation of the Eastern Province, the coloured franchise and the danger of the townsmen gaining control of the parliament.

In 1848, Harry Smith renewed the request for self-government at the Cape. This led to the preparation of another draft constitution in February 1850, but infighting delayed the outcome (infighting had behaviour become typical in South Africa and in the later Boer republics).1,2,10,14,16,18

During the office of Cathcart, the first signs of democracy appeared in the Cape Colony with the establishment of a Parliament in 1853 by her Majesty, the Queen. The constitution was finally approved in December 1852 by the Duke of Newcastle, the then Colonial Secretary. It was promulgated as the Constitution Act of 1854. In 1853, the Cape Colony became a British Crown colony. The Cape’s “independence” came through a gradual evolution and not a sudden revolution.1,15,16,18

Geen comments as follows on the work and powers of the first parliament (1854–1858)1:81-82:

The Governor had to convene Parliament at least once a year; he could dissolve both houses of the legislature or the House of Assembly alone; he could approve or veto the bills passed by Parliament or submit them to the Crown, which retained the power to disallow them within two years of their reaching England. The Executive Council was still composed of senior officials appointed by the Colonial Secretary and was responsible to the Governor and not to the Parliament, but it could not follow a policy opposed to the wishes of Parliament, which consisted of two houses. The upper house, called the Legislative Council, consisted of fifteen members elected for ten years, seven by the Eastern Province and eight by the Western Province. On the first occasion, the four members for each Province with the least number of votes had to retire after five years. Members had to be at least thirty years of age and possess ₤4,000 worth of general property or land to the value of ₤2,000. The Chief Justice was the President of the Council, but he had not the right of voting. The lower house, the House of Assembly, had a membership of 46, elected for five years by 22 constituencies, Cape Town alone being represented by four members. The Speaker…was elected by the members and he had a casting vote. The franchise was a liberal one and remained unchanged for almost forty years. The vote was given to all adult male British subjects, who earned at least ₤50 a year or had occupied for at least a year property with a minimum rental value of ₤25 per annum. Thus was Ordinance 50 carried to its logical conclusions and not on colour introduced by the new constitution.

The Constitution Act of 1854 was a relatively liberal document that prohibited any racial or class discrimination. It instituted a non-racial qualified franchise. The same qualifications for suffrage were applied equally to all males, regardless of race. It changed the Legislative Council to the Upper House of the new parliament, of which members were elected according to the Western Province and the Eastern Province that formed the Colony. A New Lower House, the Assembly, was also constituted.16,18

However, the Constitution of 1854 was a troublesome one: it instated a parliament without a parliamentary government. The executive power remained as before firmly with the office of the appointed governor from London. The parliamentary body led to serious conflicts between the representative legislative power and the appointed executive power until 1872. This was especially true during the political abuse and power play of governor Philip Edmond Wodehouse (1862–1870). This unstable governmental system and its ineffective constitution created enormous conflict between the Cape inhabitants and the British in London.11,16,19 Wiid writes as follows about this early effort to bring some form of democracy to the Cape19:324:

The constitution of 1853 carried the seed of self-destruction and provided sufficient proof of its uselessness. Repeated disagreements and deadlocks between the resprentative legislative authority and the elected executive authority, especially during the rule of the autocratic sir Philip Wodehouse, demonstrated that a parliament without parliamentary government under the British system was a constitutional evil (Own translation)

For the poor non-Whites, who formed the majority of the non-Whites and the total South African population, this legislation did not bode well, notwithstanding its non-racial clause. It had the potential to become a White man’s and a rich-man’s constitution to maintain White rule. Both the Dutch and English wanted to ensure that they could dominate politically. This became clearer after 1874. The only power available was in the hands of the executive governor and London.1-3,10

It took eighteen years to move to a more democratic system. Since 1853, a more realistic idea started to develop about effective rule in the Cape. Prominent was the growing political and financial responsibility assigned to the management of the Cape Colony. Internal struggles also obstructed effective governance from London. It was clear that an improvement to the self-management of the 1853 constitution at the Cape was urgently needed.10

The initially introduction of the representative constitution was delayed by the Eight Xhosa War. The First Cape Parliament (1854-1858) was at last opened by Governor Charles Henry Darling (1854–1854) on the 30th of June 1854. The governor that really implemented the constitution and its parliament was Sir George Grey (1854–1861).1,2,10,16,17

This First Cape Parliament (1854-1858) was, in terms of office, followed by the following three parliaments15,16,18:

  • Second Cape Parliament (1859–1863)
  • Third Cape Parliament (1864–1869) [Office was ended by dissolution of British Governor]
  • Fourth Cape Parliament (1870–1873)
 3.4.1.6 Henry Barkly (1870–1877)

The deadlocks and conflicts between the representative legislative power and the appointed executive power of the First Cape Parliament continued, hampering political decision-making. In 1862, Wodehouse got into trouble with the Cape Parliament, which refused to take over British Kaffraria from the imperial government or to impose additional taxation. British Kaffraria was annexed in 1865 by a bill that also increased the membership of the Legislative Council to 21 and the House of Assembly to 666 to include the representatives of British Kaffraria. After another conflict and a deadlock in the Parliament in 1869, the governor dissolved parliament. This internal conflict between the executive and legislative powers continued, and in May 1870 the parliament was prorogued. Democracy, even in its primitive form, was not handled effectively by the Cape Colony’s inhabitants, however much they dreamed and fought for democracy and their political rights since 1652.1,2,19

Ultimately, the Colonial Secretary ordered Henry Barkly (1870–1877) to introduce responsible government at the Cape. The colony and its ineffective leaders were becoming more of a burden than an asset. The British government felt that drastic action was needed, as Wiid17 states19:325:

The British government argued that, if the Cape colonists would not be ruled from above, they should be allowed to assume the responsibilities of self-government (Own translation).

This noble belief (and hope) of the Empire was easier said than done. Notwithstanding their internal fights and obstructions, Barkly steered the colonists. A Responsible Government Bill was passed to instate responsible government in 1870. It passed successfully through the House of Assembly, but was rejected by the Legislative Council owing opposition from the Eastern Province. The bill was finally passed in April 1872 by both houses, but opposition was still prominent.1,15,16

After unsuccessful appeals to eminent Capetonians, like Southey, Porter and Solomon, Barkly asked JC (John) Molteno (who also became the first Prime Minister) to put a government together, which he did with success. The 1872 Constitution of the Cape Colony, also known as the Constitution Ordinance Amendment Act of 1872, had as its underlying principle full responsible government for the Cape Colony. It brought important changes to the political empowerment of the Colony’s inhabitants. This happened 220 years after the establishment of the Cape Refreshment Settlement. This development ended the autocratic reigns of governors, like Phillip Edmond Wodehouse (1862-1870), who became famous for their wrongdoings. Sir Henry Barkly’s efforts and initiative as well as that of the Colonial Secretary in London to bring full responsible government for the Cape Colony, are praiseworthy and shows that the British leadership in London was not always unsympathetic to the colonists’ interests. Also, the prominent role of Sir John Molteno, an English-speaking Capetonian, in getting Afrikaans- and English-speaking Whites into a political unity to embark on responsible government towards the Union’s foundation, needs special reference. Barkly and Molteno were the first good leaders at the Cape.1,2,15,16,18

The positive implications of the Constitution Ordinance Amendment Act of 1872 were numerous, as Geen1 spells out1:84-85:

Responsible Government means government by a ministry which is responsible to Parliament and which continues in office only as long as it receives the support of the lower house of Parliament. Thus civil servants appointed by the Colonial Secretary and responsible to him through the Governor ceased to form the Executive Council, which from 1872 consisted of a Prime Minister without any other portfolio and four other ministers, all of whom were members either of the House of Assembly or the Legislative Council and belonged to the party in power in the former body. The Cape Government could no longer be ordered by the Imperial Government to do what it did not want to do, though it could have foreign policy of its own and was bound by many British treaties that affected the whole Empire and also by various admiralty and merchant shipping laws. However, the Governor had to act on the advice of the Cabinet in regards to local matters, though as High Commissioner he still had considerable powers in territories beyond the borders of the Cape Colony.

The new constitution held non-racialism as a core value, while the universal qualification for suffrage of ₤25 was seen as sufficiently low to ensure that most owners of any form of property or land could vote. An effort to raise it was successfully stop although it was agreed that rising in levels of wealth would eventually render it obsolete. Many new voters registered, specific the rural Xhosas of the frontier areas who were mostly communal landowners and therefore eligible for suffrage. This caused racial conflict. An important outcome was that the operating language of the Parliament was English, creating to a limitation of (and discrimination against) Dutch-speaking members because of their inability to speak English.15,16,19

The Fifth Parliament (1874–1878) was finally put in place. However, in the eighteen years from the promulgation of the Constitution Act of 1854 to the Constitution Ordinance Amendment Act of 1872, little changed with regard to racial and cultural conflict, and it all transferred to the Union of South Africa.1,2,15,16

3. Discussion

The Third Marquess of Salisbury, Robert Arthur Gascoyne-Cecil, the British prime minister at the height of Britain’s imperial power, believed that to ensure the stability of the wonderful and joyous Empire of Queen Victoria, as little as possible must be done to maintain the utopia. Gascoyne-Cecil summarized this belief in a single sentence quoted by Barber20:1: “Whatever happens…will be for the worse, and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible”.

Barber20 does points out that Salisbury was by no means the only political leader who aspired to do very little. Barber writes20:1:

William Evarts, secretary of state in the administration of US President Rutherford B. Hayes (1877–81), admonished him once by saying, “You don’t sufficiently realise, Mr President, the great truth that almost any question will settle itself if you only let it alone long enough”.

Barber continues by describing the US president Calvin Coolidge (nick-named Silent Cal).20 His biographer, Amity Shlaes, wrote20:1: “Congress always says ‘Do’. Coolidge replied, ‘Do not do’, or at least, ‘Do less’”.

When looking to the political history at the Cape 1795 to 1872, the Salisbury, Evarts and Coolidge attitude became the curse of the inhabitants of the Cape Colony under British rule. As little as possible happened on the political field. The belief was human rights politics would cause chaos at the Cape. The belief was also that the race factor would settle itself.15,16,19

It seems that although the British governors were well-educated men and had talent in terms of thinking, planning and doing. However, they were driven by the imperial spirit to establish and to maintain their much loved Empire.

In the ‘civilized world’ of the British of 1872, it was clear that the Cape Colony’s inhabitants were lacking good British culture. The British, were obliged to make the people of the backwards Cape Colony acceptable and functional parts of their grand Mighty Empire. This “backwardness” is to a great extent the truth, as Wiid confirms19:324:

This colony was still conducting a politically restricted life and, as consequence, lost many of its strongest sons as emigrants. Before the seventies, Afrikaans speakers – who back then only comprised about three quarters of the white population in the Colony – only provided around one third of the members of parliament (Own translation).

But Wiid shows that this backwardness was also created and maintained by the British Empire with their suppression of human and political rights.

The non-Whites’ voting rights, based on the multi-racial Cape Qualified Franchise, using the universal qualification for suffrage of ₤25 as sufficiently low to ensure that most owners of any form of property or land could vote, was a mislead plan to keep them out of the Parliament. The majority of these non-Whites – from KhoiKhoi, KhoiSan, Coloureds to free slaves, as well as Blacks inside the borders of the Cape Colony – was absolutely poor. Most of them could not speak English, which disqualified them as voters. Even early Afrikaners – people who were better educated and economically more stable in the period 1795 to 1872 – could be excluded by the Constitution Act of 1854. Wiid writes19:331:

In these circumstances the Afrikaans-speaking, who at the time constituted about one third of the White population at the Cape, delivered about one third of the parliament before the seventies (Own translation).

There is an immense difference between professing multi-racial politics or race equality in theory, and practicing human tolerance. The White Cape inhabitants knew from early on that to rule the Colony and its people they must capture and hold on to two intertwined energies: money and politics: they who have the money rule the politics and they who have the politics rule the money. Chomsky21 explains this fact clearly21:55:

…concentration of wealth leads almost reflexively to concentration of political power, which in turn translates into legislation, naturally in the interests of those implementing it…

and21:82:

…concentrated wealth will, of course, try to use its wealth and power to take over the political system as much as possible, and to run it and do what it wants, etc.

The Whites did not want a non-White regime in power after their “own suffering” on the hands of the VOC and the British Empire. Engelbrecht22 remarks on politicians after he reviewed Ronnie Kasrils’s23 book on Jacob Zuma, when he says22:12-13:

Kasril’s book reveals a serpent’s nest that confirms one’s suspicions that most politicians – everywhere, not just in South Africa – are cunning and dangerous snakes. [Own translation].

As a regime the British Empire was cold-blooded towards non-British persons when its interests were endangered. It did not hesitate to use extreme force when needed, as later reflected in their war against the Boers and their families during the Second Anglo Boer War (1899–1902). The British autocratic management of the Cape Colony inspired hostility among Blacks and Whites.1,2,10,12,23

They laid the table for future hate and rebellion.1,2

These British Empire’s military actions towards and suppressions of indigenous Southern Africans from the early 1800s are, when comparing it with their own modern British guideline to describe a terrorist, precisely the same, namely24:9:

  • Violence against a person;
  • Serious damage to property;
  • Designed to influence a  government or an international organization or to intimidate the     public or a section of the public;
  • With the aim of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

This brings to the foreground Boon’s25:75 description of the characteristics of a political mobster:

Selfishness; delinquent inclinations all-over; strategies total stripped of all democratic principles, traditions, thinking, planning and doings; absolute intolerant; anti- order; minorities are quickly eradicated; coercion actions characterized by destruction, threat, killings and brutalities; aim the creation of a delinquent mob-reign; aim the exclusive of executive political mob-leaders to reign the country.

This contamination went much deeper: it also contaminated White inhabitants’ mindsets, as already reflected by the White frontiersmen along all the borders of the Colony.

The Cape’s inhabitants’ isolation from true democracy for over two hundred and twenty years made them political immature (and full of distrust for the Empire), as was reflected by their constant internal fighting and senseless tussling before the Constitution Ordinance Amendment Act of 1872 could finally be promulgated for self-management. This political immaturity was also internalized into the mindsets of the Voortrekkers as reflected by the problematic ruling of their Boer republics.

The period 1795 to 1872 was characterized by in-fighting between Afrikaans-speaking Whites and English-speaking Whites, the growth of the British Empire and British supremacy and the suppression of especially the non-Whites of Southern Africa. Murder was justified as a means to control Blacks. As much as the British showed justice to the slaves, they were cruel to those Blacks who were independent of their control and who resisted. The British leaders at the Cape, twenty-seven governors, failed. The “Spook of Godske” (Ghost of Godske), whose sole intention is to inspire racism and racial disharmony who started his night walks at the old Refreshment Station’s fort, it seems, had never come to rest, not even two hundred years later.1,12,19

The British Empire’s constant wavering and unpredictable policy on the personal and political rights of the Coloureds, KhoiKhoi, KhoiSan and Black tribes such as the Xhosas, a policy that ranged from a kind of “apartheid” to assimilation and to extreme suppression, undoubtedly laid the foundation of more than one political tragedy for South Africa waiting in the future.

The British Empire was a failed regime at the Cape Colony. The British never learned from the old Chinese proverb: Of all the stratagems, to know when to quit is best.

4. Conclusions

The two objectives of this study were to discover if the South African leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 made contributions to the country and its people during their time, and to determine if the behaviours of the South African leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 were impeccable.

The conclusions that are drawn from this study are presented in accordance with the aims and hypotheses as postulated in 2.2 to 2.5:

H1: The South African leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people.

The findings of this study show that the leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 failed to make extraordinary positive contributions to the country and its people. # Hypothesis H1 must be rejected.

H2: The behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 were impeccable.

The findings of this study show that the behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 as leaders and as persons failed to be extraordinary and impeccable. # Hypothesis H2 must be rejected.

Looking at the racial discrepancies, discriminations, injustices and conflicts present by 1872 in South Africa, especially between its individual inhabitants, the Italian proverb: After the game, the king and the pawn go into the same box, is misleading. After two centuries of gaming together, these groups could not fit into one box.

5. References

  1. Geen MS. The Making of the Union of South Africa. London: Longman and Green; 1945.
  2. Scholtz GD. Suid-Afrika en die Wéreldpolitiek: 1652-1952. Pretoria: Voortrekkerpers; 1964.
  3. Beyers C. Binnelandse Beroering en Ondergang van die Kompanjie, 1779-1795. In: AJH     Van Der Walt, JA Wiid, AL Geyer. Geskiedenis van Suid- Afrika. Cape Town: Nasou; Annon.).
  4. Roberts JM. The Penguin History of the World. London: Penguin; 1995.
  5. Van der Merwe JP. Die Kaap onder Britse en Betaafse Bestuur, 1795-1806. In: AJH Van Der Walt, JA Wiid, AL Geyer. Geskiedenis van Suid- Afrika. Cape Town: Nasou; Annon.).
  6. Bless C, Higson-Smith C. Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: An African Perspective. 2nd ed. Kenwyn: Juta; 1995.
  7. Louw GP. A guideline for the preparation, writing and assessment of article-format     dissertations and doctoral theses. 2nd ed. Mafikeng Campus: North-West University, South Africa; 2017.
  8. Maree K, Van der Westhuizen C. Head start in designing research proposals in social sciences. Cape Town: Juta; 2009.
  9. Governors of the Cape Colony. [Internet]. [Cited 2018 Apr.18]. Available from     https://www.geni.com/projects/Governors-of-the-Cape-Colony/12332
  10. Grundlingh MAS. Vyftig Jaar Britse Bestuur, 1806-1854. In: AJH Van Der Walt, JA Wiid, AL Geyer. Geskiedenis van Suid- Afrika. Cape Town: Nasou; Annon.).
  11. Cape Colony. [Internet]. [Cited 2018 Apr.18]. Available from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape_Colony
  12. Martinez R. Creating Freedom. Edinburgh: Canongate; 2016.
  13. Van den Heever CM. Generaal JBM Hertzog. Johannesburg: AP Boekhandel; 1944.
  14. Van Der Walt AJH, Wiid JA, Geyer AL. Geskiedenis van Suid- Afrika. Cape Town: NASOU; Annon.
  15. Immelman RFM. Men of Good Hope, 1804-1954. Cape Town: CTCC; 1955.
  16. Parliament of the Cape of Good Hope. [Internet]. [Cited 2018 Apr.18]. Available from     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_the_Cape_of_Good_Hope
  17. Morudu P. Wie dra die meeste skuld? Rapport (Weekliks). 2016 May 22; pp. 4-5.
  18. McCraken JL. The Cape Parliament.Oxford: Claredon; 1967.
  19. Wiid JA. Politieke Ontwikkeling in die Kaapkolonie, 1872-1896. In: AJH Van Der Walt, JA Wiid, AL Geyer. Geskiedenis van Suid- Afrika. Cape Town: Nasou; Annon.).
  20. Barber M. How to run a Government. London: Penguin; 2015.
  21. Chomsky N. Occupy. Parktown: Penguin; 2012.
  22. Engelbrecht T. ‘n Kroniek van ‘n kaalgatperske. Rapport (Weekliks). 2018 Jan. 21; pp. 12-13.
  23. Kasrils R. A simple Man. Kasrils and the Zuma Enigma. Pretoria: Jacana; 2018.
  24. Powell J. Talking to Terrorists. London: Penguin; 2014.
  25. Boon M. The African way: The power of interactive leadership. Sandton: ZebraPress; 1996.

PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

The propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution (6)

Full title: The propagandists arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible. Part 2: Age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system (6)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PUCHE), DPhil (PUCHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: age-old injustice, arguments, constitution, discrimination, injustice, land redistribution, opinions, political and socio-economic system, propagandists, viewpoints, without compensation

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 2: 4

1. Background

1.1. Introduction

In a world deluged by irrelevant information,” writes Yuval Noah Harari, “clarity is power.”1

When a writer accepts the responsibility to record the political histories of persons or groups, objectivity, honesty and dedication to these persons’ and groups’ interests and courses, are absolute pre-requirements. He/she must gather relevant information at all times to give clarity. Existential observing of their past and present behavior, planning, thinking and action are the only paths to get entrance into these persons’ and groups’ mindsets and to “reprint” in writing their “assumed” cognitions of their past, present and future. The study of the antagonists and propagandists arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the subject of land expropriation without compensation, and the politics surrounding it, are immense challenges. Prominent here are the need to align opposing thinking, planning and action on the land matter, bringing us to a kind of finality to reach conclusions and to be able to make a dictum. The presence of two kinds of evidence, completely opposing each other, is evident here: facts and truths versus lies and myths. If the researcher fails to make clear what is truly fact and truth and thus to erase from the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists or the propagandists lies and myths, a matter such as true land ownership becomes contaminated and ends in false claims.1,2

The intention with this research is to offer firstly the antagonists the opportunity to present their arguments, opinions and viewpoints (see Articles 3 and 4) as to why land expropriation is not acceptable, and thus that the land ownership at present with the Whites as the majority owners must continue. However, the propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints offered so far (see Article 5) demonstrate that the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints, as offered in Articles 3 and 4, are many times in terms of the historian and philosopher Yuval Noah Harari’s prescription of only true information and clarity to be able to gain empowerment, are in fact falsities.1,2

In this article (Number 6), the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints will further be tested in terms of the requirements prescribed to be fact and truth, and thus to be relevant information which is powerful or not, as measured in terms of the counter arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the propagandists.

How much a researcher/writer is trying to penetrate the mindsets of other persons, to be able to report on their internal, deeper thoughts, remains a personal “revelation”, and an escaping ideal forever for the researcher/writer. What energies motivate and drive the individual in his/her daily life, is mostly a black secret he/she frequently fails to understand and to describe. This and the previous Article 5 (as well as in articles 3 and 4 with the focus upon the antagonists), reflects pertinently upon the propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints on their reasons to activate so-called “land grabbing”. This forces the writer to note and to report primarily upon the negativities experienced during their political history by the propagandists, in order to have internalised and formed their mindsets, activating their hope for a better future which has developed with time. In the creation and internalisation of this mindset, religion has undoubtedly played a prominent part in South Africa from 1652 with the advent of Christianity. In reference to our political history, the all-encompassing dominant role which Christianity plays in the country needs to be highlighted – not only to drive specific behavior, but to provide certain hope and planning in times of suffering and crisis, notwithstanding the short or the long term.3-7

Since Christianity was accepted long ago by the Blacks to make them today the majority of Christians in South Africa, with strong religious empowerment as well as devotion, they started not only to believe that their Christian God (the same God as the Whites’ Christian God) would bring a long term salvation for a life in the Hereafter, but also to believe, right or wrong, in a short term earthly salvation through him and Christianity. The Blacks’ devoted worship of God and his assumed love for them, bound over many years into their earthly salvation through constructive politics, gave them hope for the eradication of their immense suppression and exploitation by Whites. However, there is little evidence that an anointed outcome reached them after “White” Christianity came into their lives: it became a White Christianity versus a Black Christianity, seemingly steering the Christian God’s love or hate in a certain direction. The Blacks sincere religious hope for an “earthly salvation” was crushed in 1910 with the founding of the Union. Hope and religion can become outright failures when the individual believer has no control or say over it. This makes the experience of a relationship between religion and politics, as well as a “God-intervention and interference” with politics (and thus an afterlife salvation versus an earthly salvation), very doubtfuly. For many Blacks this was and still is undoubtedly the experience.1-3,5,7-12

In the late 1970s there was renewed hope of a better political dispensation for Blacks, specifically with the NP regime’s revision of the Constitution, and thus the flickering of the beginning at last of an “earthly salvation” through a “God’s intervention and interference and thus for them to at last be unchained from “Black slavery” in South Africa.5,13 Boot-Siertsema and Boot13 write in 1982 with great enthusiasm about that late 1970s seemingly positive political non-racial development inside the NP regime with a kind of God’s “hand” present, as follows13:394:

Wij moeten aanvaarden dat de nieuwe grondwetsherziening definitief een eind zal maken aan het exclusieve concept van een Blank Zuid-Afrika. Inplaats van de traditionele stijl van politiek paternalisme, zal er een nieuwe stijl ontstaan van consultatie, onderhandelen en consensus tussen gelijkwaardige partijen. Het toepassen van deze nieuwe stijl zal een zware tol eisen van het geduld en de tact van de Afrikaner. Inplaats van zelfbescherming, die tot dusver door de wet en door het ingrijpen van de staat werd verleend, aanvaarden wij dat ons bestaan in de toekomst veel minder zeker zal zijn en zelfs risico’s met zich mee zal brengen. Er zal veel meer gaan afhangen van eigen inzet en bekwaamheid. Hieruit spreekt een bereidheid tot persoonlijke offers van de zijde van de regering, waarin idealisme en realisme hand in hand gaan, een bereidheid zich tot het uiterste in te spannen voor een nieuwe bedéling voor Blank en Zwart waarin beiden kunnen overleven, en een bereidheid om daarbij risico’s te nemen die ook zij in Gods hand geeft.

But South Africa’s politics failed the hopes of positivists like Boot-Siertsema and Boot, and of course many Christian Blacks in the presence of their Christian God. In the early1980s there was nothing positive in the post for the Blacks: their politics were still run extremely by the Whites without consultation, negotiation and consensus with them on their immediate or long term socio-economic and political interests. Also was there not a single drop of White offering to the impoverished Blacks to help and uplift them, like the transfer of White land and wealth to uplift their poverty, inequality, unemployment and landlessness. Most of all, Apartheid was further, after the 1980s, practiced in its extreme form. Hope and the Christian religion did not, it seems, work for the Blacks to better their socio-economics. All that seems to play out in the 1980s was that the Blacks were forced, as so many other times in the past in terms of their Christian sincerity, to desperately believe again solely in God for future help against Apartheid’s wrongdoings. In 1994, with the political dispensation, this failure of the good relationship between hope and religion replays and stays on with the Blacks (propagandists) up to 2019.5,7-9

Efforts by positivists like Boot-Siertsema and Boot13 to re-steer in the 1980s the Blacks with “good” Christian religion back into short term hope of an earthly escape from their immense suppression and exploitation by Whites, started to fail fast. Even the Apostle Jacob’s “heavenly help” seemed to be of no real “holy” value or impact to lessen the socio-economic and political suffering of Blacks after the 1980s. Boot-Siertsema and Boot posit13:395:

Wij mogen niets goed praten van wat verkeerd is. Maar ten aanzien van de Zuid-Afrikaanse situatie mogen we elkaar wel wijzen op het klemmende woord van de apostel Jacobus: “Gerechtigheid groeit waar vrede is, en wie vrede zaait, zal gerechtigheid oogsten”.

For the Blacks the difference between a “White Christianity” and a “Black Christianity” wherein their Christian God it seems was and is on the side of the Whites became obvious with time. This “god-choice” of Whites above Blacks in their early lot, is still echoed today by prominent Black leaders pointing out the seeming anointment of the “White god-sweetheart” Voortrekker Gen Piet Joubert (hero of the Boers’ First War of Liberation against the British and deputy to Paul Kruger of the ZAR), to allow him and his men to murder and cut off the head of the Black nationalist Kgoši Makgoba (the leader of the clan baTlou of Makgoba), to be able to grab the Makgoba’s land. Joubert, when he received the head of Magoba as evidence of his termination, after keenly attending Sunday church, filled with great “White god-love” and a seemingly “god-selectiveness”, said to his Christian God with joyousness14:21: “The Lord reigns, and I am his servant”.

But this “Christian capturing” did not stop in 1994 with exclusively White orientation. The post-1994 new age political empowerment – which was also many times driven through “sincere and pure Black religion”, aimed to free Blacks from the ongoing chains of Apartheid and to bring them at last an earthly salvation – changed to a Black orientation. It again held the same suppression and exploitation as the pre-1994 dispensation, although offered now in another potpourri. This time delinquent Black leaders and figures, most prominently Jacob Zuma, stand out in their wave of evangelical churches to steer South Africa to improvement.15 The emphasis, under the pre-1994 White suppression, is again “Christianity”: but this time openly “Black Christianity”, characterised by the same delinquency. Munusamy15:16 writes: “Zuma recognises the enormous influence of religious leaders…”, and “…knows the mainstream churches played a major role in swinging public sentiment…”.

The new Black churches associated with Zuma not only drew large congregations and influenced peoples’ political thinking and action, but were indeed active in big business enterprises funding political ideologies like that of Zuma. Politics became religion and religion politics in this Christian Black movement. In post-2016, political parties become churches, and churches become political parties without any hope of distinguishing between them. Munusamy15 guides15:16: “But the pull of these new political parties, rooted in evangelical and messianic churches with huge followings, should not be underestimated.” In this context it is important to note that Zuma shored up support from these Black churches, even continuously attending huge church gatherings. What they said and what Zuma said, were exactly the same15:16: “The messages from the church leaders was overtly political – whipping up the radical economic transformation rhetoric and fostering antagonism against “white monopoly capital” and its supposed defenders”. Furthermore, on religious parties cum political churches and the Zuma confusion and contamination connection as cum politician cum priest therein, Munusamy reports15:16: “The orbit of new political parties around former president Jacob Zuma is a noteworthy phenomenon …”, and15:16: “Zuma is the nexus of this phenomenon and very far from the pope’s definition of a ‘good politician’.”

In these religious gatherings around the present so-called “Christian” empowerment of Zuma for the coming election and his undermining of the ANC (and Ramaphosa) and South Africa as a whole, are undoubtedly his many religious manipulating “Christian” cronies, like the African Transformation of Mzwanele, the SA Council of Messianic Churches in Christ, made up by the Twelve Apostles Church in Christ, the Bantu Church of Christ, the Zion Christian Church and a faction of the Shembe Church, with another Zuma fervent supporter Bishop Timothy Ngcobo of the African Freedom Revolution and the seemingly self-immolate “Buddhist monk” Mzwanele Manyi and his African Transformation Movement, writes Rumasamy15. About these priest cum politicians, with Zuma standing central, Munusamy15 posits15:16: “We should not for a second believe that the religious leaders transfiguring into politicians here are doing so for virtuous purposes, or that having preacher men in parliament will elevate our politics.”

There is only one mass group that is going to lose again in a long awaited “god-intervention and interference” – and miss out also on a kind of “god’s anointment” — and this is the pre-1994 and the post-1994 mass of poor and landless Blacks.

For many Black propagandists there is undoubtedly today, after so many years of political suffering at the hands of Whites, and notwithstanding the Blacks’ sincerity as Christians, not much belief left of the existence of a biblical justice and peace for Blacks. It does not matter if this “Christian savior” is Black or White, and if Zuma is the big “Christian savior” and seems to be in contact with Jesus. Solutions to their problems need a non-religious approach, totally free from falsities, crookery, populism and emotion. This non-religious approach, according to the propagandists, is also applicable to the present land matter. There is only one solution to get the mass of poor and landless Blacks out of their chaos and to rectify the discrimination, and that is action and deed like legislation and the Constitution, as determined and driven by the majority. In this process, which can include various actions to uplift the poor, the expropriation of land without compensation when needed from Whites is central. The whole process needs to be free from the asking by the ANC regime and the poor Blacks, as in the past, for “Higher intervention and interference” to make it workable (besides of course Zuma’s religion politics to obtain votes for his selfish and opportunistic needs and intentions). The process has the intention of going against the religious concepts of goodness, honesty, sincerity, even so-called Christian salvation: pure political action, with all its risks, is the driver in the planning, thinking and action around land expropriation.15-18

Many propagandists are undoubtedly today with good reason skeptical as to whether the benefits of the intended land expropriation initiative will be fully delivered. For them there are too many antagonists of the kind of the religious Piet Joubert left in South African politics, and the crooks of the Christian Zuma, all still “schizophrenically anointed” by their “Christian god-empowerment”, to be able to sabotage the poor and landless Blacks’ ownership of land and their right to be farmers. The manipulated and fraudulent 1994 political dispensation, which left the mass of Blacks in the cold to date, and wherein Black and White religious leaders of the Christian faith played a prominent role in their efforts to coax the unsatisfied and socio-economically and emotionally hurt Blacks into a Christian political acceptance (within an Afterlife salvation with its later benefits and privileges to come), is still fresh in the mindsets of the propagandists.15-19

For the propagandists, there is a stern warning in the words of Motsoko Pheko when he says19:10: “’Western Christian civilisation’ was, in fact, colonial terrorism”. The correct credo would be: “African Christianity is many times in fact also Black suppression which is repeated over and over”.15,19

In addition of course are there also just too many so-called Christian inspired humanists active in present day politics, like Boot-Siertsema and Boot13, who still do not understand fully the cruel realities and dishonesty of South African politics, or what Yuval Noah Harari1,2 really means when he writes1:61: “[political] clarity is power.”

General Bantu Holomisa20, MP and the President of the United Democratic Movement, is possibly the nearest to reality and a solution to approach the current land expropriation matter, totally free from religion as well as political unattached when he says20:18:

We, the people, must take back the promise of 1994. We are not Zulu or Venda, men or women. We are not Catholic or Zionist, Indian or Coloured. We are not gay or straight, clever or stupid. For if we are, we are lost. We are South Africans. Period. Rise not to this reality and we are lost indeed.

For the ANC regime is it undoubtedly clear that the Blacks’ many, many calls over centuries to the higher power and their hope for some anointed Help from There to bring a justified South African society where poverty, inequality, unemployment and most of all landlessness are absent or limited, is wishful thinking: constructive political action, based upon own sound cognitive reasoning, thinking, planning and action, cutting out any assistance from “Up”, is the only way out. This approach is for the propagandists the only solution to the present land ownership matter. What is of further absolute importanceis: this action must now be activated. Cyril Ramaphosa is central to this issue.

The propagandists feel there is only one clear path left to them – as already done by them in Article 5 — and that is to show again with this article (Number 6) that the antagonists’ arrogant arguments, opinions and viewpoints offered in Articles 3 and 4 are all lies and myths. For the propagandists, the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints are irrelevant information, lacking any empowerment to obstruct land expropriation without compensation.

1.2. Short overview of White socio-economic and political empowerment, discrimination and domination

The propagandists’ counter arguments, opinions and viewpoints in the previous article (Number 5) against those of the antagonists (Articles 3 and 4) reflect a broad identification of the elements and role-players alleged by the propagandists to be active and/or established in the White injustice and discriminating political and socio-economic system of South Africa, coming from 1652, which led to the poverty, unemployment, inequality and landlessness of a mass of Blacks and which directly obstructed the 1994 political dispensation to better the lives of Blacks. These elements’ and role-players’ negativism, internalised into the mindsets of the broad public by the antagonists with their fake news and data, has so far blocked the change to Section 25 to expropriate land without compensation. The propagandists allege that much of the delinquent political thinking and action, characterising the antagonistic Whites mindsets are wanton cognitions created over decades through White socio-economic and political empowerment, discrimination and domination of Blacks. Examples of these wanton cognitions are for instance the antagonists’ rigid underwriting and preaching of the goodness of exclusive capitalism, their outright support for White corrupt business and financial capitalistic bullies, their exclusive underwriting of pro-Western political ideologies, their opposing of free political and economical world associations by the ANC regime, their obstruction of the introduction of inclusive/social capitalism, their anti-Black orientations in the country’s politics and their ongoing execution of White psychopathology politics. These elements and role-players as negative determinants, form part in this research of the propagandists’ presentation, to be understood and to be unmasked, to persuade the voters to give their permission for the change of Section 25 to expropriate land without compensation.5-12

The opinion of the researcher is that only through such a comprehensive presentation of primary as well as secondary negative determinants in the case of the propagandists, in their opposing and their taking of the antagonists’ case in the present “informal court”, can the case be evaluated with justice and with balance. Indeed, a comprehensive open-door presentation was already granted to the antagonists in the previous Articles 3 and 4.

1.3. Research intentions

The research aim of this article is to evaluate and to describe in-depth and comprehensively what the propagandists believe are the hostile elements and role-players obstructing change to Section 25 to expropriate land without compensation. The drivers and needs for an immediate change to Section 25 and the awarding of the legal right to the ANC regime to expropriate land without compensation to empower the poor and landless Blacks, are for the propagandists actions required to neutralise the age-old White injustice and discriminative political and socio-economic system of South Africa, which makes the post-1994 political dispensation dysfunctional. Racial discrimination, coming from so far back as 1652, forms the basis for this negative setup.5,7-12

The opposing by the propagandists of the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against their changing of Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution, as well as the antagonists’ opposition to the ANC regime being able to effect land redistribution without compensation, is central to this research.

This article (Number 6) forms the final part of the two part article, entitled: “The propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to be able to effect land redistribution without compensation”. The article will further describe and evaluate in-depth and comprehensively what the propagandists believe are the White injustices and discriminative elements and role-players making the post-1994 political dispensation’s political and socio-economic system of South Africa dysfunctional. It is only by such a comprehensive presentation that a reflection of the propagandists’ civil rights, to be able to change the Constitution in its present form and to effect land expropriation, can be made.

The presentation of the various elements and role-players in this article will be done in eleven subdivisions.

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern political historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research on the ownership of South African land for the period 1652 to 2019 in South Africa. The sources include books for the period 1945 to 2018, articles between 2018 and 2019 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the current arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the propagandists for the change of Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution to effect land expropriation without compensation.

The research findings are presented in narrative form.

3. Discussion

3.1. The pre-1994 White injustice and discriminating political and socio-economic system of South Africa (Continuation of Article Five)

The propagandists’ counter arguments, opinions and viewpoints against those of the antagonists (see previous Articles 3 and 4) reflect a broad identification of the elements and role-players alleged by the propagandists to be active and/or established in White injustice and the discriminating political and socio-economic system of South Africa, coming from 1652, which led to the poverty, unemployment, inequality and landlessness of masses of Blacks and which obstructed the 1994 political pispensation from bettering the lives of Blacks. These elements and role-players began to be identified and described in depth already in Article 5, entitled: “The propagandists arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to effect land-redistribution without compensation: Part One” and will be continued in this article.

The abovementioned as well as many other secondary determinants form part of the focus in this research of the propagandists’ presentation. The immediate intention is to unmask, to analyse and to describe all of these negative determinants, in order to make it better understood by the general public and to persuade the voters to give their permission for the changing of Section 25 to effect land expropriation without compensation. The opinion of the researcher is that only through such a comprehensive presentation of primary as well as secondary determinants, can the case of the propagandists, in their opposition of the antagonists’ case in the present “informal court”, be evaluated with justice and with balance.

3.2. Myths, lies and fables fabricated by the antagonists to obstruct the intended land expropriation (Continuation of Article Five)

The propagandists postulate that the antagonists have mastered the ability to turn myths, lies and fables into facts and truths in the mindsets of the general public, through their constant attacks upon the government’s genuine efforts to assure political stability in the country in terms of their planned land transformation. Prominent for the propagandists are the antagonists’ constant misuse of the public media to nationally and internationally falsely portray the ANC regime as radical and Marxist driven, and as a revolutionary party with the sole intention of nationalising all private property and assets. A further untruth for the propagandists is the publically false reflection by the antagonists of an overall hostility by the ANC and Blacks against the Whites and a rejection by the ANC and the Blacks of Whites as indigenous South Africans. Constructive and positive efforts by the ANC to better the relationship between Blacks and Whites are denounced by the antagonists and mostly cold shouldered. For the propagandists in this continuing creation of conflict, is the destructive behavior of the so-called rescuers and saviors of the Afrikaners/Whites with their organised wanton, fake and false news. Many of these so-called rescuers and saviors’ histories reflect an adverse political setup of racism and the focused obstruction of Black rule since 1994.5-7,21-27

3.2.1. Is Cyril Ramaphosa a White land grabber and an anti-White collaborator?

A point of strong criticism against the antagonists and their lack of understanding of the post-1994 South African politics is for the propagandists their accusing without proof of Cyril Ramaphosa to be a Zuma collaborator in state capture and in the country’s mismanagement during the Zuma regime.

In this context the antagonists portray him specifically as a politician who is going to bring further misery to South Africans in general and to Whites specifically with his so-called “all-out land grabbing approach”. The antagonists accuse him to be a passive ANC member and later as vice-president as a primary collaborator in Jacob Zuma’s many wrongdoings. Then there is also the criticism that Ramaphosa is allegedly influenced and steered by the politically uncontrolled Julius Malema in his decision making, especially on the land issue, making Ramaphosa a political risk par excellence.28-36

3.2.1.1. The political integrity of Cyril Ramaphosa in perspective

Looking comprehensively at the political literature, the critics of Ramaphosa are numerous. But, after scrutinising these criticisms, is it also clear that much of the literature is activated by antagonists, emotional and flooded with false allegations, as well as arguments, opinions and views which are lacking any evidence or fact. There are many superficial “statements” or vague “generalisations” compiled by the antagonists, questioning Ramaphosa’s so-called “political intentions and actions”, showing the antagonists’ lack of evidence. When these political (and sometimes personal) “statements” and “generalisations” are further analysed, they show malicious intent against him as a person, which would not be tolerated if he was just a ordinary citizen and could activate slander and libel actions against these false accusations. But the fact that he is in the middle of the ANC’s politics and is the President of South Africa – both positions which activate political controversy and the pouring down of crude and rugged political allegations and acts by his direct and indirect political opposition – leaves him in an invidious position where he cannot really can defend himself. In the present politics of the country, the antagonists get away with extreme false allegations and delinquent actions against him, making the lies and myths of the antagonists look like truths.28-36

Firstly, it is clear that the antagonists are misleading for politically opportunistic and malicious reasons the public upon the primary aims of Ramaphosa’s future for South Africa. Prominent in this malicious action is his and the ANC regime’s intended land expropriation without compensation. The propagandists maintain that there is a totally “stretche truth” around this matter, in order to activate fear with the individual White that his/her property and assets are going to be confiscated outright if Article 25 of the Constitution is amended and if the ANC wins the 2019 election with a mandate to effect expropriation. Many “political tails” are added to statements by him or his ministers and other officials on the land issue. The antagonists frequently misrepresent in this context for opportunistic and malicious politics, for instance, Julius Malema’s foolish rhetoric upon nationalisation, which is totally unrelated to the ANC’s policy of land- and assets-ownership, as part and parcel of Ramaphosa’s utterances. Prominent in this situation are the various antagonistic organisations and the Afrikaanse media reflecting Ramaphosa as a revolutionary and a political danger for the Whites regarding their land ownership and personal lives. Critical and in-depth evaluations of Ramaphosa’s speeches and writings show these kinds of political action in public by the antagonists as false, and as said, personal and political attacks upon him.3,28-36

But the attack on his integrity as President is not driven alone by the antagonists coming mostly from the White sector, but is also coming from two other intertwined forces: ethnicity differences and conflict inside the Black population, and internal conflicting ANC politics. With reference here to the “classification” of Black population, it is important that the well-coined term “Black/Blacks” has became associated with the existence of one “South African Black Nation”, which is assumed to represent one single cultural, economic, political orientation and unity. This is untrue: “South African Blacks” consist of at least eleven tribes, and although their communal fighting of Apartheid and White suppression united them, these tribes stay encircled by their own uniqueness and foundations. Separateness between the various tribes became gradually stronger after 1994, with the ousting of the overwhelming politics of the nationalist Afrikaners which previously had forced all Blacks into one laager. The main and strongest role-players in the so-called “Black Nation” were in the past and are still at present the Zulus and the Xhosas. Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki were Xhosas and Jacob Zuma a Zulu. Hereto are ex-president Mthlanthe associated with the Tswanas and Cyril Ramaphosa with the Vendas. Although Mthlanthe showed himself to be a president of excellence, his reign was cut short by the ANC due to his non-Xhosa and non-Zulu identity and the Zulu overtaking of the ANC party under Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa is now, as was Mothlanthe, in the same Zulu and Xhosa process of being politically gobbled up. Inside this “Black Nation”, disturbed by delinquent ethnicity and the ANC heartland overrun by the Zulus and Xhosas, Ramaphosa’s ousting and ongoing opposition by the crook Zuma and his cronies, is prominent. In the present unstable ANC politics, the nearly 50% Zuma-faction of the ANC-NEC, is the cause of vicious and malicious fighting, as bad as that by the antagonists. The continuation of Ramaphosa’s leadership of the ANC party and his Presidency is strongly contested.28-39

Given that the focus of this research is upon the intention to redistribute so-called White land to a mass of landless and poor Blacks, representing all eleven of the Black tribes, the political integrity of Cyril Ramaphosa as leader of the ANC, as well as the State of South Africa, must first be place in perspective, especially because he as a person who as a politician is constantly under attack by the antagonists. On the other side stands his duty to assure political and socio-economic stability for the country, within these unjust attacks.

It is important here to pinpoint how Ramaphosa’s speeches and writings upon the matter of land expropriation became “enlarged” upon and “coloured in” by the antagonists and other opponents, the precise moment that he moved away from the exclusive future upkeep and guarantee of the present White land ownership (and seeming White richness) and his intended limiting of the exclusive shielding of the White farmers in the future from the competition of Black farmers. It is also important to note how his vague intention of the introduction of inclusive capitalism, which has successfully supported and driven as many as 32 000 commercial White farmers now for nearly a century in South Africa, was suddenly called Communism, nationalisation and land grabbing by the antagonists!40-46

3.2.1.2. Cyril Ramaphosa’s speeches and remarks upon land reform in perspective

Firstly, land ownership and the forced need to relocate mass land to Blacks, is not a new concept in Ramaphosa’s mind (or that of the ANC elite). Indeed, the discontent around the insufficient addressing of the land issue already in 1994 has arisen many times since 1994 in the speech of ANC leaders. More recently, in 2016, it was prominently forced to the foreground by the rhetoric of the Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma gang, which aimed with utmost political opportunism to keep Jacob Zuma in the presidency, so as to force to the foreground the land transformation matter under the banner of land expropriation without compensation. Central to the issue of land transformation implementation stands the Constitution and its shortcomings to allow land transformation unhindered.28-36

The imbalanced possession of a mass of land by Whites in South Africa was indirectly referred to in 1994 by Ramaphosa in an interview with the journalist Kaizer Nyatsumba35 of The Star, when he clearly voiced his disagreement with certain outcomes of the 1994 dispensation which had negated the Blacks’ rights and privileges. Prominent in this was his reference to strategies to be developed and to be followed for corrections in this concern. But, according to the propagandists, this early so-called inclination of Ramaphosa to activate land reform so as to install balanced Black land ownership, was then (and is still today) free from extreme revolutionary intentions and changes, like the outright grabbing of every White farmer’s land as falsely alluded to by the antagonists to be Ramaphosa’s intentions.28-36

The antagonists maintain that there are radicals inside the ANC elite (alleged to function within Ramaphosa’s intimate party circle and thus actively seeming to have his knowledge and permission) who propagate that all White land should be or will be expropriated without compensation. Prominent here are the alleged remarks by some spokespersons of the ANC, like Lamola55, Kodwa47 and Mokono52. The antagonists focus here is that the ANC’s intended “weighted compensation” of redistributed farms must only be seen as the short-term start-up of the process of land expropriation, to reach at the end full-scale land expropriation without compensation as the ultimate goal. This allegation is for the propagandists wantonly used by the antagonists to illustrate the so-called coming of land nationalisation primarily to create fear within the general public and is indeed for the propagandists a clear example of the constant manipulation of the truth by the antagonists. The various remarks of the abovementioned three spokespersons of the ANC bear the propagandists out and are in line with the ANC Lekgotla in December 2017, which adopted only a basic decision to speed up land expropriation without compensation. The propagandists contend that Lamola55, Kodwa47 and Mokono52 never referred to “utmost expropriation” of all land/property inside a nationalising model, neither did the ANC Lekgotla in December 2017 do so. In addition, there was no comprehensive plan put on the table at the Lekgotla by the ANC of land expropriation. The focus was only that certain categories of land/property be ear-marked in the future for expropriation without compensation.47–57

In this context of a future land expropriation, Ramaphosa personally gives a further guideline when he says55:4: “…that the state’s immediate intention is to target land from state-owned enterprises and private sector businesses that have large tracts of unused land – such as forestry giants Sappi and Mondi, and where there are already at present a load of uncompleted land claims.”

In this context, the propagandists also make it clear that the December 2017 Lekgotla of the ANC regime has not set the sights on various other traditional financial, legal and statutory institutions as alleged many times by some antagonists.49,52,55,57,58

Taking into account what Ramaphosa really said and meant upon land expropriation, it is undoubtedly far from what is so far reflected by the antagonists. The true profile on Ramaphosa’s land expropriation is clearly and unchangeably formulated by Dr. Nick Koornhof59, an ANC MP and member of the Constitutional Revising Committee of the ANC, when he writes59:17:

Nêrens lui die ANC se besluit dat wit boere se grond gevat moet word nie! Nêrens word daar gesê produktiewe plase moet geteiken word nie! Die ANC het daarom die EFF se mosie in die parlement gewysig.

With regard to the ANC’s recently launched review of the Constitution which could allow for land expropriation without compensation, it must be pointed out that this review outcome is only one (possibly a last) option of many under consideration, writes Derby60:2.

For the ANC regime, their basic principle of land reform will be premised upon three elements, namely security of tenure, land restitution and land redistribution. Ramaphosa’s land redistribution plan (with or without compensation), according to the propagandists, fully guarantees that the outcome of expropriation without or with compensation will not hurt the economy in the short or long term and will also not hurt foreign investments.59-61

Bruce62 writes on the possible post outcomes of land expropriation as follows62:16:

Labour tenants who have been on farms for decades will get their land. Rural families living under traditional leadership in the former Transkei and rural KwaZulu-Natal could get title. The state has a lot of land to make available to new farmers. Near the cities, where pressure for land is huge, the answer is to turn dreadful living conditions into a giant economic opportunity.

People pressing for land near their work places in or nearby urban centres will be given serviced plots upon which to build their own homes.

The most extreme impact upon South Africa’s politics and economics that Ramaphosa’s expropriation can bring is well researched and described by Haffajee50. Three categories without real negative impact upon the economy or to influence negatively the international status of the country are identified, making the whole process clearly free from the dangerous “sting of the scorpion”. This final profile is well shielded by the antagonists from the ordinary citizens’ attention, so as to opportunistic not undermine their efforts to incite resistance to the planned democratic land reform approach of Ramaphosa.50

Haffajee50 writes50:8:

The compromise gaining ground is to enhance the national expropriation laws (which are before parliament) to allow for the expropriation of certain categories of land without having to engineer an amendment to the property clauses of the Constitution.

These categories are abandoned buildings, unutilised land, commercial property held unproductively and purely for speculative purposes, under-utilised property owned by the state, and land farmed by labour tenants with an absentee titleholder.

Firstly, the above identified properties are so-called “passive properties”, held in reserve by rich owners, undoubtedly mostly Whites, for speculation and profiteering in terms of exclusive capitalism wherefrom the majority (mostly the poor and landless Blacks) is discrimitively isolated. In this context, it must be acknowledged that most of these passive properties were obtained exclusively by the rich Whites due to their favoured financial position during the more than 300 years of racial discrimination and exploitation of the poor non-Whites who not only lacked the money to buy property for speculation and profiteering, but were strictly prohibited during Great Apartheid through the Group Areas legislation to buy into better White areas’ land and property. Furthermore, much of this “passive properties/ land” was confiscated from non-Whites through the Groups Area’s legislation at ridiculously low prices to benefit Whites. This is precisely the “stealing of Black land” by Whites to which imminent Black leaders such as Pheko, Makgoba and others refer. The propagandists also note that this massive stealing of land and property was executed over centuries, phasing out most of the wrongdoing in the present day mindsets of South African people. It was only after 1994 that the attention was focused upon this whole process of injustice, which the antagonists are now trying to cover up and down play with their 1994 dispensation and Constitution as just outcomes with a duration forever in South Africa19.

Secondly, according to the propagandists, the abovementioned specific classification of properties to be expropriated is already a good indication of Ramaphosa’s sincerity to Whites and other land owners as well as White capitalists. It certainly erases the uncertainty in the mining and agricultural sectors. There is also no intention that foreign or local investors’ factories, properties or capital will be expropriated. As the poor Blacks become rich and established farmers and owners of urban land, homes, the private buying out of the land of the shrinking White population will undoubtedly follows. This latter process will clearly also be without any land grabbing of every piece of land (either for farming or home development), based upon the honest buying out of the Whites’ property at market related prices.50

Thirdly, as stated by Haffajee50, the above land reform plan of Ramaphosa as clear and honest, making the allegation by the antagonists that the ANC regime lacks an informative and operational land expropriation plan, null and void. Hereto there is also a clear legal detailing that there can be expropriation without compensation in certain cases, but also that realistic and just compensation is incorporated into expropriation. The propagandists show that it is impossible for the ANC regime at this stage to pinpoint precisely the scope of expropriation and how long the process will need to be applied, so as to obtain balance in equality. The propagandists note that the process of redistribution of the so-called “stolen Black land”, which was intensely activated by the Native Land Act of 1913, could not even be completed in 1994 (81 years later) by the nationalist Afrikaners themselves. To undo the present unjustified land grabbing setup in a just and orderly way, wherein more than 60% of the total South African soil belongs to Whites, illegally obtained over hundreds of years, will take time but surely not the 81 years duration of the Whites’ “land-expropriation”! Of course there are timeframes to be followed for Ramaphosa in his land redistribution, depending upon various constant changing determinants and needs of the poor and landless Blacks, as well as the state of South African and world economics, etc. But what is clear for the propagandists, is that Ramaphosa’s land redistribution plan is not going to be land grabbing as the antagonists try to profess to the public and the world. This was a bad custom and a bad habit only exclusively practiced by the pre-1994 White regimes of South Africa and will not be repeated in any way by the ANC regime.42,50,62-64

The whole controversy around Ramaphosa’s land reform plan, which the antagonists masterly redirect with malice to be land grabbing, must be read in one of Ramaphosa’s65 announcements65:4: “Land expropriation without compensation is going to happen whether South Africans, US President Donald Trump and the UN General Assembly like it or not”, and: “I am going to explain it without any fear and I am going to say: ‘This is us. Take us or leave us’”.

His words to Mfeketo67 and Collins66 and a group of Black professionals at a September 2018 business breakfast in Pietermaritzburg were redirected by the antagonists to fits their malicious allegations of land grabbing, when he says67:4: “Happen it shall, whether people like it or not; it is going to happen”.65-67

The propagandists’ emphasise that he promotes land expropriation, but he never said in any way all expropriations will be outright from Whites and without compensation. His “mild” form of expropriation versus that of extremists such as Malema, and even Jacob Zuma, is excellently reflected by Hunter68 when he reports68:1-2: “Zuma recently released a video on Twitter in which he advocated the nationalisation of land – which is the policy of Julius Malema’s rival EFF. In contrast, Zuma’s own party stands for the expropriation of land, without compensation if necessary, so that it can be redistributed to those who were dispossessed”. The above clause “expropriation of land without compensation if necessary”, tells the story of Ramaphosa’s intention of a democratic, balanced land transformation, a process which the antagonists shield away from the public eye. This again confirms that there is not any process anticipated by Ramaphosa of nationalisation or a dramatic process focusing upon the individual White with expropriation without compensation.68

What the antagonists ignore is Ramaphosa’s clear inclination of anti-grabbing of land when he says that the ANC regime only want an equation balance in land ownership because an alleged 87% of South Africa’s land had been given before 1994 to a minority population (Whites). It is important to note that the real context of his speech was ignored by the antagonists and needs for the propagandists to be reflected properly to the public. It reads65:4: “We are saying that the equation has to be balanced, and because we are balanced people and we are not mad, we are going to do it in a responsible manner, but we are not going to turn away from making sure it does happen”.

It is clear that for Ramaphosa, it clearly turns around an equal and a responsible landtransfer, only applicable to “unproductive land, unused buildings”, etc. and not productive and functional White land and farming businesses. It was in this context that Donald Trump later on accepted the Ramaphosa land expropriation plan, but urged him to be more descriptive with what he intends to do. Cyril Ramaphosa is not a White land grabber as the antagonists wantonly try to portray him.65

3.2.1.3. South Africa’s orderly democracy justifies Ramaphosa’s land expropriation

Democracy allows orderly change to rectify injustice; justice is indeed the main principle of democracy. But, notwithstanding the fact that the primary intention of democracy is to be righteous always and every moment of the day the implementation of it can take time, especially when democracy is new born to a country which had suffered for centuries under autocracy and fascism. Political, social and economical transformations ask for time and patience. Two decades have passed since South Africa became a democracy, clear shortcomings in the Constitution are coming to the foreground, forcing daring challenges to be faced and solved, like the addressing of the imbalance between the races on land ownership. The 1994 settlement on land-redistribution is, in terms of the prescription of the country’s democracy, far from a fait accompli as the antagonists try to present. In the finalising of the outstanding account of the transferring back of White land “stolen” from the Blacks, Ramaphosa is, as the official executer of it upon behalf of the ANC regime and the Nation, now unfortunately singled out as the culprit of so-called full scale aggression against Whites, which even Donald Trump believed, according to AfriForum.65

The propagandists put it clearly that President Cyril Ramaphosa has no intention to grab functioning White private property without compensation and that his land transferring scheme is not going to target all the present land of Whites which was “stolen” from Blacks. That will be undemocratic, something he does not underwrite. Furthermore, the state’s own high potential land of millions of hectares of agricultural land, which has not been collateralised and is not productive, will become part of the intended land expropriation. There is also not any intention, like Stalin cruelly did with the privileged nobles and rich in Russia, to travel back in history to punish any White culprits for the stealing of land from Blacks: there will be no “White kulaks” to be the focus of Black or ANC revenge.65,67,69,70

Ramaphosa, a qualified attorney by profession, has a well established mindset based upon right and wrong and has always been steered by the principles of democracy in his so-called freedom fighting politics: the concept of one-man-one-vote stands central for him without negatively influencing the rights specific to Whites. He was one of the founders of the 1994 South African democracy and one of the compilers of the Constitution. What he underwrotes in 1994 to uphold democracy he underwrites still today. The only outcome is that he believes, as the majority of Blacks also believe, that the present day Constitution must be streamlined and legal obstructions to block progress and justice must be rectified.37,38,65-67,69,70

Evidence of how much Ramaphosa stresses democracy inside the ANC structures and the greater South African politics, especially regarding citizen’s rights, is his decision to make the ANC’s list of representatives for the 2019 election to Parliament far more racially representative (undoubtedly reflecting a party functioning betternow that Jacob Zuma is gone) and that the list must be consistent with each province’s demographics. Hunter68 reports68:1-2: “In the Western Cape there need to be more coloured people on the list because that is the constituency, and in KwaZulu-Natal because there are Indians…” Ramaphosa’s openness to democracy is also seen in his allowing of the previous presidents Thabo Mbeki, Kgalema Motlanthe and even Jacob Zuma into his advisory circle, because, as he says, they are fountains of wisdom and can make his decisions more constructive.68

3.2.1.4. Ramaphosa’s role in Black land ownership as a “volks”-movement

The antagonists’ further postulation that the intended land expropriation is exclusively driven by the chief leaders of the ANC with Ramaphosa as the key-culprit, enabled by their extreme political empowerment to cleverly mask the manipulation of the South African politics solely to benefit Blacks, lacks insight for the propagandists. Looking closely at the real facts, the activation of the process of land expropriation is the start-up of a normal “Black volks movement” away from specific political affiliations. This is an incoming movement which Ramaphosa knows very well might be devastating if he is not steering it inside orderly democratic principles. For the propagandists it is clear that every member of the Black “volks”-movement underwrites the single motto on land ownership66:4: “We are together”. It is not done on a populist ticket, driven by the ANC elite from their Tshwane or Cape Town headquarters. It is clear that the ANC regime’s notion of an immense incompleteness and dissatisfaction by “the people” with the 1994-2018 dispensation’s land redistribution decision and plan have a sound base. The 1994 to 2018 land reform programme cemented into the 1994 dispensation, failed to fulfill its requirements to serve the people well. Less than 15% of the poor and landless Blacks’ legitimate claims were served. This is why Ramaphosa is so well informed from as far back as 1994.28-36,61,66,71-75

The propagandists’ view that the parliamentary commission’s testing of the public’s opinion upon the matter of land reform shows firstly an in-depth need for the return of Black land to its disempowered owners, and secondly that the whole process is decentralised by the ANC regime, allowing the South African people themselves to work out solutions upon future ownerships of land. It is only at the end that the whole process will be backed up by laws and a clear policy provided by the government. The ANC regime’s land transformation plan is a true tool for real transformation, to address inequality of opportunity, poverty and unemployment and not a so-called Ramaphosa “brain child” of political wrongdoing, according to the propagandists.32,34,71,73 71:21

The propagandists maintain that Ramaphosa’s policy on land ownership and land expropriation and his steering of the Black “volks” movement inside this policy, adheres to the principles of the Freedom Charter, which reads specifically71:21: “SA belongs to all who live in it, black and white”, and: “All national groups are equal before the law”. Equality was absent until 1994 in South Africa. Without land ownership and financial empowerment it is still absent in 2019 for a mass of Blacks.71

3.2.1.5. Freedom Charter as an exclusive motivator for and driver of Ramaphosa’s land reform

The abovementioned Freedom Charter’s land clause, dated 1955, reflecting upon the justified comparability of land ownership in terms of the South African race numbers and land ownership, guided by a democracy for the rights of the individual, is not the sole guidance used by Ramaphosa assuring his democratic right to effect his intended land expropriation. A further supportive guideline of the rightfulness of his programme is the ANC document on future land ownership issued in 1969 after the historic ANC Conference in Tanzania, which confirmed that the ANC was cognisant that the redistribution of land would include all race groups equally, an outcome which is now seriously lacking. Tabane72 writes72:6: “It makes bold to say that the restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended and all lands shall be open to ownership and use by all people, irrespective of race’ ’’.72,74

It is clear from the Freedom Charter that all races can (more precisely: must) be land owners, but on the basis of equality in terms of the proportional numbers of the various racial groups. The present day South African 83% White owners versus 13% Black owners is an imbalance, representing inequality which needs rectification. It contradicts the ANC’s 1955 and 1969 decisions. For the propagandists, Thabo Mbeki’s interpretation in October 2018 that Ramaphosa is breaking the principles and guidelines of the Freedom Charter with his intended land expropriation plan is absolutely incorrect. The same can be said about the antagonists’ generalisation in this context of the Freedom Charter. As Mbeki and the antagonists see it, it is a plain reflection of the present unjust land ownership introduced in 1994.71,72

The Freedom Charter leaves Ramaphosa no other choice but to activate land expropriation with great urgency.71,72

3.2.1.6. Advent of a comprehensive Ramaphosa “grabbing”?

Closely related to the antagonists’ constant accusations of a comprehensive process of grabbing to come, in this context is Ngcukaitobi’s74 argument that land redistribution goes further than just the physical handing over of White land, but that there is an emotive component as well as a further physical compensation also included in the process (a comprehensive outcome to activate expropriation created earlier by the Whites in their land grabbing of Blacks’ land), to rectify their past wrongdoings. Ngcukaitobi’s74 postulation reads that74:23: “… [if] the legacy is to be undone, the return of the land should be restorative of African humanity. Transactions about the ‘return’ of the land are incomplete without restoring the dignity of those from whom the land was taken,” with specific reference to dignity74:23: “African identities, freedom, equality and political autonomy which were lost.” The antagonists maintain that an additional element of the total land grabbing and nationalising of White assets, is the further mention by Ngcukaitobi of 74:23: “Land is not the only asset that was lost through colonial occupation. Cattle, farming implements, labour and human potential were taken away. African societies were broken up, their cultures ravaged and their identities erased”.

Ngcukaitobi’s74 so-called “comprehensive” reparative land project goes deeper than merely the right of the so called “indigenous” Blacks to obtain ownership of their birth land and the right to stay on it and to live there. For the antagonists, this seems to be based upon masked, exclusive comprehensive Black empowerment, in order to make the South African soil and its culture exclusively Black owned and orientated, and land per se as a future point of departure, so as to steer Black politics, to the exclusion of Whites’ participation or consultation. This intention of Ngcukaitobi74 however indirect and theoretically argued and fronted by the antagonists as a truth to come, is not in any way part of the ANC’s land expropriation. Neither is Ngcukaitobi’s74 official part of the ANC’s elite or lawmakers, and his comments can thus not be taken seriously as the antagonists are doing. A kind of “Ngcukaitobi expropriation” is for the propagandists an outright revenge which the ANC regime is not in anyway going to allow. The ANC is viewing this as the thinking of a small radical element in its own heartland.74

In shooting down the academic and theoretical argument of Ngcukaitobi74 on the “total approach” of land expropriation, which is seen by the antagonists as revenge, the propagandists put it clearly that revenge or absolute reparation of the past wrongdoings by Whites is not a part of the ANC regime’s land expropriation (with or without compensation). It is important for the propagandists that the emotive can connect the past with the present, but that new and modern day lifestyles and cognitive realities already show their exclusion of their own past from their present day actions. This makes Ngcukaitobi’s74 postulation of the need for the restoration of age-old (and many times outdated) African identities, freedoms and equalities, together with Black ideologies, which are coming specifically from those early times to a great extent, null and void. The ANC, as a modern day political party, knows very well that this “new age development” which minimised the past, impacts upon their present and future political practices. To implement it means outright inappropriate revenge upon the Whites for the ANC. It means, if implemented by them, the repeat of wanton political wrongdoings of the White rulers which they totally detested. Furthermore, it is against the principles of the Freedom Chater.74

The comprehensive failing of revenge actions to punish all so-called culprits of Apartheid, to turn back the clock to relive the past in terms of revenge, as Ngcukaitobi74 theoretically alludes, will not be allowed by Ramaphosa. For the propagandists this is in practice impossible through land expropriation without compensation as a vehicle.74

Firstly, as the propagandists have already emphasised many times, is it not the intention of the ANC regime now or in the future. Secondly, our past is just too contaminated for the activation of such a process, as Makgoba14 clearly states14:23:

Although I don’t want to turn the current fight over land reform into a free-for-all, we can not afford to ignore the seisure of land before the current cut-off date of 1913. Expropriation going back to colonial times has sentenced many generations to utter poverty and shame. Laws and practice were maintained by force of arms, leading to a system of landownership and economic development disproportionately based upon race.

However, we must recognise that going back to the colonial era raises difficult questions. What happens to white families who have long since sold land originally seised by their forebears and invested the proceeds? And what about those who bought land for the first time more recently, using big loans from the banks? If the banks lose their money, what damage does that do to the economy?

What about the land given in the 18th Century to those of our ancestors who helped the colonisers defeat other groups of African people? Who adjudicates those disputes?

The abovementioned outcomes, according to the propagandists, clearly reflect the limitations inherent to the ANC regime’s intended expropriation. It is also within this guideline that Cyril Ramaphosa is driving his land expropriation intentions. It is in this context that the propagandists’ plea that ordinary South Africans must erase from their mindset a Mugabe-Zimbabwe land grab scenario reflected by the misleading of the antagonists as an outcome on the land issue. It will not happen. The consequences are just too overwhelming and destructive for South Africa, as Derby60, after analysis of the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe political history points out60:2:

Our closest example of what land reform means upon a massive scale was that undertaken by Zimbabwe’s very desperate ruling elite at the turn of the century. Faced with the possible ousting by what was then an emerging, urbanised and trade union-based opposition party in the Movement for Democratic Change, they unleashed an untidy and populist land reform programme that ruined the economy, setting it back decades. But that’s not to say the elite led by former president Robert Mugabe had been leading the country towards economic prosperity in the years before the land grabs were sanctioned.

Derby60 shows how the White elite as well the later Black elite of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe botched up Zimbabwe, plainly by their double-sided racism and foolish political thinking, planning and action. The ANC regime under Cyril Ramaphosa wants at all costs to avoid such outcomes here: the White rule from 1652 to 1994 was more than enough tragedy for him. The ANC’s land proposals and intentions are not pointing to a Zimbabwe experience in waiting for South Africa. There is another, better side to land redistribution and this is the way that the ANC regime (far from the false and outrageous allegations of the antagonists) wants to take South African farming inside the country’s total economics. In this context Derby60 again guides60:2:

Instead of being panicked as a nation, we should focus upon what a well implemented land reform process promises for the South African economy, which is trapped in low single digit growth territory when what is most needed is the type of growth rates experienced in East Asia over the past few decades. If reforms are done well (or nearly as well as the apartheid regime went about its reforms), it is thought that growth in Africa’s second biggest economy could move on to another plateau, one that would ensure that structural unemployment – which sits at over 26% – is finally and sustainably eroded.

The propagandists emphasise that the ANC land redistribution policy proposals of December 2017 in no way point to the Mugabe-Zimbabwe tragedy of landgrabbing, with good consensus. It is a good policy of future politics, specifically and in general, to bring about long term benefits for the individuals of South Africa.59,60

Looking at the abovementioned reports, is it also clear that a so-called “Malema-nationalisation” is absolutely absent from Ramaphosa’s land expropriation plan, contrary to what the antagonists try to reflect.59,60

With regard to the recent much debated 139 “White” farms which the antagonists allege are going to be “confiscated” or “nationalised” in the near future, the propagandists maintain that the present circumstances of these farms must be correctly understood and evaluated in terms of the prescribed legal process upon the transfer and pay-out of private land needed for redistribution. The reference to “confiscation” is untrue and is used by the antagonists to mislead the public. The facts are manipulated by the antagonists in order to negatively profile Ramaphosa’s presidency as well as his good intentions in the creation of a better South Africa. The truth is that the ANC regime’s land reform programme was and still is being obstructed by some White farmers who are blocking the transfer of their farms because they mostly disagree upon the final selling price. This focused “political as well as business sabotage” unnecessarily complicates the traditional “willing seller versus willing buyer” agreement for land redistribution coming from 1994. The dispute here, according to the propagandists, is purely about the constant “over-pricing” of farms. This unrealistic imbalance in value creation of their farms by the delinquent actions of some farmers has caused the government to find a justified and responsible solution. It is an unavoidable blockage which the government must overcome. For the propagandists, the constant “illegal obstruction” by White farmers in the selling of farms to the government by their misuse of the Constitution and the courts canno longer be allowed or tolerated. It is nothing less than sabotage with the prime intention to create anarchy. The propagandists note that the presence of the so-called Afrikaner/White saviours and rescuers is strongly observed in this obstruction of the government’s normal functioning to assure harmony between the races upon land ownership.47,52,55

There is not a single fact to support the allegation of “confiscation” or “nationalisation” of White land as the antagonists allude. By going to court with test cases upon land transfers (after staying away from the courts since 1994, so as to avoid the label of autocracy, Black racism or the suppression of Whites’ rights, etc.), the government only wants at last to overcome the White farmers’ delinquent obstruction of the land redistribution programme. All that the government wants to do with the 139 farms at present is to get a legal foot to stand upon in the future, even without changes to the Constitution, so as to normalise the process of land redistribution. The propagandists emphasise that in this case it must be clear that the intention of the ANC is to undertake in the near future land redistribution within a coded legal guideline, which prescribes justified and realistic compensation.49,52,55,57,58

3.2.1.7. Reviewing Ramaphosa’s new age farming system through justified land expropriation

The constant painting by the antagonists of an outright failiure in waiting for the planned new sufficient-producing Black farmers is an outright manipulation of fake facts, according to the propagandists. Rampahosa plans to introduce a totally new system of financially independent farming, based upon inclusive capitalism and the introduction of a new sufficient-producing farming system driven by specific models, varying from small scale subsistence farmers up to small scale commercial farmers and commercial middle level farmers. This farming system has the potential to also erase the present day vast debt of the majority of farmers (possible so many as 32 000 mostly White farmers) to the tune of more than R160bn to both private bankers (R129bn plus) and the Land Bank (R40bn).26,75-79

This new planned farming policy and style of Ramaphosa’s farming sector will also erase the antagonists’ groundless postulations that if the present more or less 35 000 commercial farmers active in 2018 are increased to 70 000 farmers in the system, or that the more or less 35 000 commercial farms are each turned over to ten Black families, totally failure will follow. The antagonists clearly hang onto outdated farming models and profiles, as the only means to activate good farming, high production and food security. Evidence gathered worldwide contradicts this outdated and rigid farming model of South Africa which allows only the existence of mostly White farmers and their exclusive holding of vast areas of land under the pretext of “food security” for South Africa. The ANC’s planned new age farming system for South Africa offers hereto immense opportunities for new in-coming farmers and hasthe potential at the same time to assure food security for the country as well as the improvement of its local food production and food exports at far more affordable costs. For the propagandists, the antagonists lack insight into the ANC regime’s planned Black farming sector (and possibly also an understanding of what the concept “normal farming sector” as a whole means), while their White cultural and political exclusiveness and supremacy, cemented into their farming culture over more than 100 years, make a change in 2019 seemingly very troublesome for them.26,77-79

The abovementioned good intentions, system and planning of the ANC regime to drive and to execute a just and balanced land redistribution are at present totally being missed by the antagonists. Their constant false allegations against the expropriation plan are being activated by their immense fear that the White farmers and business sector will lose their financial empowerment. The antagonists’ delinquent influences upon and actions within the White farming sector also create cognitive confusion in most South Africans’ mindsets about their assets and future in the country. This also throws a conflicting and misleading shadow over the intentions of the Ramaphosa regime upon economics as far it is bound to land ownership and the farming setup around so-called food security.60

The modern day East Asian farming environment provides an excellent example to enlighten the intentions of the ANC’s intended new age farming models wherein the mass of poor and landless Blacks are central as a blue print. The East Asian farming reform and progressive management in the upliftment of millions of poor Asians, as well as their phenomenonal delivery of agricultural products by these new incoming farmers to their countries’ local as well as international markets, are not only an example of what the ANC intents to do, but an aim which they can easily reach with their planned land reform and a new generation of Black farmers. These farmers vary from small and commercial up to mega farmers within a comprehensively functioning Black farming community. Prominent examples here are the rise of masses of farmers in the East Asian nations China, Japan and South Korea.60

In the Asian context the restructuring of agriculture, based upon land reform, erased inequalities in wealth with the enrichment of previously landless poor people after financially securing them as farmers and workers. At the same time, have these new agricultural enterprises made a turn-around with the limiting of importation of food and its costs by the constructive delivery of these new farmers to local produce. South Africa’s agricultural sector holds the potential to conservatively create a million more jobs (from farmers to labourers) in ten years time, if a good land reform scheme, supported by an increase in investments to start up production and Black farmers, is implemented.60 With regard to the positive impact of new technology and agricultural science to increase not only agricultural production but also the better use of small pieces of land, Derby60 writes60:2: “With new technology, fertilisers and irrigation systems, the land that we once thought barren in rural South Africa need not be, as long as there is government and private sector support and it is well organised”.

Land expropriation as done in East Asia, always has unavoidable short term negativities, but these are mostly fast overcome with a supportive and well organised government and private sector on the one side, and an eager sector of incoming farmers on the other side. The antagonists are correct in their argument that the new age farming system of the ANC is going to require, as it did initially in the East Asian countries, sacrifices from all the roleplayers, but if these sacrifices and positive contributions are not made, anarchy, revolution and starvation are on the cards for South Africa as a whole. For the propagandists it is clear that it is going to be the antagonists, now rigidly hanging on to their under-used land and unjust privileges, as the White farmers foolishly didin Zimbabwe, who will be the greatest losers if land expropriation is not activated in 2019.60 In this context Derby60 writes60:2: “But of course, as part of land reform, some farmers will find themselves having to carve up their lands; one can’t ignore our shared history. Land reform comes with great upheaval as it involves taking land from those who have it and giving it to those who don’t. To unleash it, title deeds are necessary. Landowners, white farmers, the government and our chiefs and kings need to buy in so South Africa can reap the economic rewards”.

To make an East Asian farming system sustainable and viable in South Africa, the South African State can at last, after hundreds of years of utmost suffering by millions of Blacks, of which the most are at the moment still caught in poverty, inequality and unemployment, bring about a positive change through land expropriation. For the propagandists, Ramaphosa is obliged by the country’s post-1994 democracy and the absolute need to erase the country’s tragic political past, to effect immediate and comprehensive land expropriation. Moreover, Ramaphosa has no other choice. The propagandists believe Ramaphosa’s and the ANC’s new age farming project is not only positively challenging, it is something great with which to get involved.

3.2.2. The ANC’s present day steering of the Poor Black Problem

The antagonists allege that there is presently a low success rate around the upliftment of the poor and landless Blacks through farming initiatives by the ANC regime. The antagonists allege this to be a direct failure which was activated by certain negative characteristics of the poor and landless Blacks, together with an incapable and failed ANC regime. The propagandists reject this view completely as devoid of truth. For the propagandists it is again a planned racist effort by the antagonists to obstruct the ANC’s land expropriation plan.

Regarding the specific allegations by the antagonists that the 1994 to 2018 land redistribution plan of the ANC regime failed because negative characteristics hamper the placed Black farmers, the propagandists note that the antagonists missed the fact that it takes far more than 24 years to acclimatise and to promote disadvantaged peoples, in this case specifically as farmers in a new socio-economic and political system. The fact is that the Black farmers of the 1994 to 2018 land redistribution programme all come from an extremely poor background, mostly uneducated and poorly trained in the agriculture profession and trade, which they had to overcome while at the same time having to adapt to new standards of functioning and living from which they were excluded most of their lives by the pre-1948 and later the Apartheid system. To understand the complexity of the ANC regime which their 1994 to 2018 land redistribution had to face, and the so-called low success rate of 10% to 20% accompanying it as alleged by the antagonists, it is firstly important to go back into the political history of the post-1948 successful nationalist Afrikaners, noting the problematic course of upliftment of the so-called poor Afrikaners (pre-1948) of the 1930s as farmers and their failure to obtain an immediate high success outcome.3,26,42,75,77-78

3.2.2.1. The 1994 to 2018 Black farmers’ upliftment a repeat of the poor Afrikaners’ farmer rehabilitation (1830-1939)

In the problematic upliftment of the so-called poor Afrikaners (pre-1948), it clearly stands out that the failure of some of the descendants of the poor and struggling Voortrekkers (proto-Afrikaners) who had left the Cape Colony in the 1830s and who were in 1939 (more than 100 years later), still under very supportive Afrikaner/White political regimes and their racial favouring, but were still poor and unsuccessful in the economically progressive South Africa of the 1939s. Geen3 illustrates this reality well3:74:

Looking back it may not be unduly optimistic to claim that the political division [Northern Afrikaners versus British and Cape Dutch] that began in 1836 were healed by the Union of 1910, but the decisive social consequences of the Trek – the Poor White and the Native Problems – still remain [in 1939] to be solved and affect the public weal in the Union of South Africa today.

This rigid, ongoing White poverty and its negative and obstructive role in the South African economy, especially in the farming communities in the 1930s, is also well illustrated by the Carnegie Commission’s comprehensive reporting of 1932 on the poor White. The Commission estimated that more than 300,000 South African Whites, as much as 17.5% of the total White population of South Africa, were very poor, living mostly in rural areas where 30% of them were landless squatters.3,5

To understand the problematic situation around the present day rural Black poverty and the dilemma of the ANC regime to make a mass of poor and landless Black people immediately successful farmers and financially independent, the propagandists show the importance of noting Geen’s3 excellent reflection upon the Afrikaners’ poverty dilemma. In this study the following is highlighted3:

a) The proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners’ similar pre- and post-1930 poverty as compared to that of the pre-and post-1994 poor Blacks, and

b) the Afrikaners’ failure to be made successful farmers immediately.

3.2.2.1.1. White settlement at Kakamas on the Orange River

With reference to the well established land settlement schemes of the Union Government and the Dutch Reformed Church to immediately provide the poor Whites with smallholdings, finance and the teaching of improved farming methods and skills, Geen3 offers the following disappointing outcome of the failure of these enterprises and farmers3:200:

The Church settlement at Kakamas on the Orange River in the north-western corner of the Cape Province has been one of the most successful rehabilitation settlements, but every such scheme is a palliative rather than a cure. Moreover, the families placed on the settlements have been carefully chosen and yet only about half of them seem to make good.

This meant that a success rate of not more than 50%, notwithstanding an immense direct and continuing programme of moral, psychological and financial support by well established Afrikaner institutes such as the DRC and the AB, as well as further immense financial support by the South African Government. This mere 50% success rate by the poor Whites, growing up in a White governmental setup which had brought immense benefit over many years to Whites only and had greatly supported the White farming establishment and enterprise, confirms that a fast implementation scheme of Black-ownership of farms as required and prescribed by the antagonists as a absolute outcome after 24 years of implementation (lacking further the immense support from a large rich Black community, which was and is totally absent in pre-and post-1994 as a result of the Blacks’ immense poverty in general), is completely impossible. This explains why the immense financial inputs by the post-1994 government, as with that of the Eastern Cape Province which the antagonists allege yielded only a success rate of an alleged 10%, cannot and must not be seen as failures inherent to the poor Blacks as persons and the ANC regime as a poor ruler.3,42

For the propagandists the Afrikaner dilemma of the 1930s must be further used as a blue print to understand the post-2018 plans of the ANC regime with their uplifting of the mass of poor and landless Blacks within their planned land expropriation programme. What must be noted is that the 2019 dilemma around Black poverty is enormous in comparison with the small White poverty dilemma of the post 1930s. The present day official poor Blacks count is more than 29 million, while the poor Afrikaners in the 1930s counted only 300 000 (reflecting 1% or the ratio 1:100 against the Blacks’ numbers). Furthermore, this present day Black poverty is undoubtedly not due to personal shortcomings or characteristics inherent to the Black population or by their own wrongdoings, as is frequently argued by the antagonists (whose mindsets are still seemingly caught up in racism and White supremacy), but mostly a direct negative outcome of the long term planned racial discrimination against and suppression of Blacks, coming from as far back as the days of the British Cape and pre-1910s South Africa, and ending only in 1994.3,5 Geen3 reports here, in line with the antagonists’ so-called “failed” Black farmers of post-1994. This mirrors some of the proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners own “personal shortcomings or characteristics inherent to them” (which the British authority at the Cape had described as the proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners “economical and personal backwardness”). About this unfortunate situation, which for years contaminated the Afrikaners socio-economically and personally to prolonge the poor Afrikaner problem (and which is also echoed by today’s poor Black problem), Geen3 writes3:197:

Many factors have played a part in the origin of the poor White section of the community. The hardships and isolated life in the frontier districts of the old Cape Colony were one of the earlier causes and it is likely that many poor Whites found land and some salvation by joining the Great Trek, for as long as there was empty land to which to trek, their numbers were kept down. But before long the conditions that prevailed in the outlying districts of the Cape Colony were repeated in the states founded by the Voortrekkers on the interior plateau of southern Africa, for they did not go forth to found a new world but to continue the old one that they knew. The isolation of life in the huge area between the Orange and the Limpopo was even more marked than in the Cape of pre-Trek days. Educational facilities were often almost non-existent and there was no inducement to enterprise. Their environment tended to make many of the pioneer Boers an ignorant and indolent people, though hardy and self-reliant withal. Moreover, the time came when land was again scarce and then it was revealed that, though many had obtained much land too easily, others were landless squatters on the farms of the more well-to-do. For many years both in the Cape Colony and in the two republics the deterioration of a large section of the European population was overlooked, as a result of the preoccupation with numerous wars against the Bantu and the political strife between Boer and Briton, but before the end of the century the problem was engaging the attention of the Cape Government as well as that of President Kruger in the Transvaal, where changing economic conditions consequent upon the discovery of gold to increase the number of the poor Whites, who as a group have proved very unadaptable to new ways of life.

3.2.2.1.2. White-poverty and Whites’ obstructive attitude to manual labour

To understand in further detail the present immense poor Black situation and the most challenging political, social and economical environment the ANC regime since 1994 faces and wherein it must trys to function and rule optimally to correct unjust land ownership and its roots of unemployment, inequality and poverty, is it also important to focus upon the roots of the poor White setup of the 1930s (which was overcome with time by the then White regime) and then to reflect from this how it is also rooted in today’s poor Black problem and can be solve by the ANC regime.3,5

Prominently intertwined with initial White poverty was the obstructive attitude of Whites against manual labor. This, on the one side, was work which most of the ordinary Blacks were forced to do, starting in the early Cape, so as to be able to make a living, and which had, willingly and unwillingly, became part of their financial and personal survival for centuries inside the White racially dominated economy. The primary intention of this economy was to create a contingent of plentiful cheap, untrained Black labor. This discrimination between types of work, so called “White work” and “Black work”, had made the Whites resistand refuse to do suitable unskilled and semi-skilled work provided by the Cape Government. In order to develop Whites and to give them insight into the need to do all types of work, so as to help them with time to overcome their joblessness and poverty. But the Whites’ negative and discriminative attitude to not do so-called “Black work”, continued for a long time and forced many Whites into the category of the 300 000 poor Whites of the 1939s. The fortunate position of Whites inside their discriminative political and economical system and the financial favouring of Whites in general through better work and business opportunities which included land ownership and farming, enriched most Whites and saved them from doing comprehensive cheap manual work. However, this had only emerged after 1948 with the DF Malan nationalist Afrikaners in government. This rich man, poor man setup, creating a master-servant relationship, was one of the prominent reasons for the maintenance of White racism and the keeping of masses of Blacks in immense poverty. This degrading situation and negative setup of landless and poor Blacks, which continues up until today, is highlighted by the propagandists as the contaminated situation which the ANC regime is now trying to rectify with their land reform to comprehensively uplift the poor and landless Blacks and which some White racists, who have been constantly obstructing Black rule since 1994, try to uphold.3-6,10,77

3.2.2.1.3. Roman-Dutch law of inheritance and the division of land

A further contaminative factor in the creation of ongoing White poverty was the early custom and tradition of the constant division of a father’s farm among his sons. In Transvaal this habit, based upon the Roman-Dutch law of inheritance, was abolished in 1902, but was still respected for years in the more backwards rural areas all over the Union. This constant sub-division of land blocked the creation of thrifty peasantry of small landholders as in Europe, basically due to South Africa’s harsh agricultural and climatic conditions and the failure to adopt new farming models to overcome these blocks. This aggravated poverty on the growing smaller and smaller “small” farms, lead thereto that the initially White owners became White “bywoners” on the lands of progressive White farmers, or were forced to look for work at diamond diggings and in towns where they, as result of a lack of training and skills, joined the ranks of the unemployed and unemployable, mostly Blacks. Many of these poverty stricken White “bywoners” were later on forced from the land of progressive landowners by improved farming methods and the development of pastoral farming, ending up in cities as poor and landless Whites.3

The abovementioned tragic outcomes, according to the propagandists, also occurred in the Black territories (besides the fact that they lost their land and farms to White land grabbers), forcing Blacks to seek work in the White farming community as poor paid labourers, as well as labourers in urban areas and at mines, due to the unprofitability of their constantly decreasing own tribal land. This outcome matches the Whites’ differentiation of “White work’ and “Black work”. Regarding the large contingent of poor Black and landless labourers, working and living from early times upon White farms, since 1994 an immense forcing out of these Black labourers from White farms where they and the ancestors had stayed for many years took place. They became, as did the poor Whites of the 1930s, a mass of poor, unemployed and unemployable persons in towns and cities with very little say in their destiny or a real human existence.3,5

3.2.2.1.4. White Helping Hand for only Whites

With regard to the then exclusive White Helping Hand for Whites only to uplift the poor and landless Whites in the post-1900s, Geen3 shows that the cure approach of the poor Whites by the White regimes from 1910s was the use of an exclusive focused discrimination (WEE) against non-Whites. This early outcome makes today’s AA, EE and BEE (and intended comprehensive forms of land redistribution) not only understandable but fully justified.5

Today’s AA, EE, BEE and intended comprehensive forms of land redistribution by the ANC regime also focus once again attention on the present day accusations by the antagonists that the ANC regime is solely a liberator with the modus operandi to destroy rather than build. They maintain that the ANC are unable to run a passable government and to greatly improve the quality of life of Black people beyond giving them handouts by the “redistribution” of the wealth of the rich Whites, like so-called “land grabbing.”

Upon examining the racially discriminative and exploitative political history of South Africa, the propagandists, quite rightly ask what were the actions of the White regimes from the 1800s up until 1994 other than to destroy rather than build, an inability to run a passable government to effectively serve the total population and an immense failure to greatly improve the quality of life of every citizen besides giving handouts only to Whites and the “redistribution” of the already limited wealth of the non-Whites to Whites?3,5 The White Helping Hand for Whites Only initiative demonstrates this extreme process and immensity of the handouts by the White governments of the assets of Blacks to Whites.

Geen3 illustrates this inclination of White liberation and the exclusive promotion through WEE to Whites at the costs of Blacks, over centuries, but especially from the 1910s, very well when he writes3:200:

Successive [White] governments have also adopted a white labour policy to provide the poor Whites with unskilled and semi-skilled work on the railways, roads and irrigation schemes. In 1921 there were 4,700 unskilled Europeans employed by the S.A. Railways. Seven years later the number was not far short of 16,000. They were given free housing and paid at the rate of from 3s. to 5s. a day. In this manner over a period of years, thousands have reached a higher level of subsistence. On the other hand, this policy of replacing Natives in unskilled occupations by Europeans added another disability to the Bantu. In the case of the railways it also meant that, contrary to the provisions of the South African Act, they were being used as a means of disguised poor relief. By means of such subsidised relief work and by charitable endeavour the rest of the community is helping to carry the poor Whites and to raise their status.

3.2.2.1.5. Black Helping Hand for Blacks Only

The propagandists emphasise that the Black and the non-White communities were so impoverished since 1652, especially after the founding of the Union in 1910, that “charitable endeavor by the rest of the Black and non-White communities” to uplift the poor Blacks – a much needed Black Helping Hand for Blacks Only – was never possible up to 1994, even until today. Positive opportunities regarding Black farming, similar to that of the upliftment of the poor White, never occurred for them before 1994. It is only in the last 24 years, that the ANC regime under very troubled circumstances could engage for the first time in an action of upliftment similar to that of the Whites’ with their Black Helping Hand for Blacks Only. The motto of Geen3:200: “To keep the poor Whites on the land the Union Government and the Dutch Reformed Church have established land settlement schemes to provide them with smallholdings and to teach them better farming methods”, is precisely what the ANC regime is going to do now with the poor and landless Blacks on the road to perdition. For a successful outcome, the ANC regime only needs to return the unused and unproductive land of White farmers that were grabbed by their ancestors over centuries to the Blacks.

3.2.2.2. Ongoing Black poverty within undisturbed present day White wealth

The propagandists believe that the years of isolation of the mass of Blacks in Black territories and the later so called Bantustans (areas representing in practice only 15% of the total South Africa geography) undoubtedly also contributed directly to the present day immense Black poverty and the Blacks’ ongoing political and economic disempowerment. To erase this negative setup will take much more time than the 25 years already spent, while an outright immediate success of 100% as the antagonists require and rigidly prescribe is just impossible. For the propagandists, a long term programme of comprehensive land redistribution is an absolute must for the ANC regime to be able to rectify the economics of the poor and landless Blacks and to correct the political wrongdoings around land ownership. In this setup the antagonists are clearly either uninformed of the South African political history and the immense efforts needed to uplift the poor, or they are deliberately sabotaging for their own opportunistic reasons, the ANC’s efforts to bring about a better South Africa for all its citizens.

The ongoing White political historical ignorance on the sound reasons of the ANC to activate land expropriation in order to rectify the immense injustice over a broad spectrum, are seen by the propagandists as blind and blunt opposition by the antagonists to a balanced and justified land ownership. The Blacks’ dire present day general financial position, when compared with the good general position of the Whites, nullifies the antagonists’ opposition that any form of compensation should be done for the poor and landless Blacks. For the propagandists, land expropriation a must, notwithstanding all its consequences. (For the propagandists, these consequences are minimal in comparison with the consequences if land expropriation is not effected in a fast and comprehensive manner).58,80-82

In this context it is important to compare the alleged 350 000 to 400 000 poor Whites in South Africa, and the alleged 150 000 financially struggling Afrikaners with the masses of non-Whites still living below the poverty line in South Africa in 2018 (reflected at an 8% poverty line). It is conservatively estimated (which seems to be an underestimation) that as many as 29 236 632 Blacks, or 73.0% of the total Black population [and 2 175 417 Coloureds (48.1% of the total Coloured population) and 150 409 Indians (11.8% of total Indian population)] are living in poverty. The dire situation of unemployment among Blacks is a further indicator of the poor Black Problem which the ANC regime must immediately address through action such as land reform. In this context statistics reflect that of South Africans (with ± 55 million of which the Blacks are by far the majority and ± 5 million Whites) older than 15 years, less than 40% are employed in some form, while of the 55 million of the total population (of which 35 million can accept employment), only 15 million are in stable employment. This means that 20 million persons (mostly Blacks) are unemployed and that for every ten persons who have work, 25 persons are unemployed (meaning 40% or the ratio 2:5 for employment).58,80-83

This negative impact upon the Black population is much higher when one remembers that the total population of ±55 million needs some basic income to be able to live, and that only 15 million are working in some form of established work. Comparing Whites to Blacks, these statistics indicate a ratio for Whites of ten in work against 13 unemployed (10:13), while the ratio for Blacks employed versus unemployed is 10:28. (In the rural areas in Kwazulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape the expanded Black unemployment rate is 41% and 50% respectively for 2017-2018). Hereto the official unemployment number for Whites is 7% versus 30% for Blacks.58,80-83

How extreme this unemployment and poverty are within the Black community, is further confirmed by the fact that there has been an insignificant increase of only 127 000 persons into employment from 2010 to 2015 in the age group 7 to 17 years, to bring to a total 11.2 million persons in work placement for this age group. In 2015 2.4 million children, mostly Black, not really qualified and mature enough to work, were being forced to work as a result of their family’s poverty.58,80-83

Looking more closely at the official statistics which reflect that only 26.6% of the population is unemployed, these statistics are misleading, seeing that only 42.8% of the total population is employed in some way and that the youth unemployment is 53.7%, most of whom are Blacks. This calculation means unofficially that 57.2% of the total South African population is not in employment, and as much as only 46.3% of the youths are employed. Again in terms of the number of Blacks against that of the total population, this reflects not only the presence of immense unemployment, but at the same time immense Black poverty.58,80-83

The abovementioned data is further strengthened by official household studies that reflect the average annual income of Whites as R444 446.00 versus that of Blacks as R92 983.00 (with the Indians at R271 621.00 and the Coloureds at R172 983.00). The ratio of this annual income for Whites versus all other South Africans is 2:6, while for Whites versus Blacks it is 2:9.5,58,80-83

These statistics, as with all the others quoted thus far in this subdivision, confirm the permanent cementing of a mass of Blacks in extreme poverty of which they, on their own, ever can escape (and for which they are mostly not responsible). Direct intervention and interferance by the ANC regime to start-up the rehabilitation of this mass of poor Blacks is the only way out. The fastest and most appropriate approach for the propagandists is the present intended land expropriation (based upon the just redistribution of stolen Black land).5,58,80-83

The propagandists contend that AA, EE and BEE did not solve 70% of the total Black population’s tragic poverty between 1994 and 2018. It was too minimal to focus upon the total poverty of the Black masses. Other, better focused and planned immediate solutions, even extraordinary undertakings, are needed to bring about a positive turn-around.5,58,80-83

The further reflection that the Blacks possess only 20% of the South African economy compared to 80% of Whites, notwithstanding that the Blacks having 100% of the political power is a demanding highlight of dissatisfaction by the general Black population that needs to be answered by concrete actions. These actions include land ownership and the right to make a living through farming on the one hand and on the other hand the right to be trained, to have housing and housing property and to be able to work for a decent income and live a good lifestyle. It must be noted that when the BEE-system started in 1994, it was not meant to be a permanent structure to forever empower Blacks: it was aimed at economic upliftment on the one side, and on the other side to make up for the comprehensive derailment brought to Blacks by White political rule over centuries.5,58,80-84

The fact is that BEE did not work properly due to the immense gap between the White haves and the Black have-nots, the mass of unemployment of Blacks, as well as the ongoing comprehensive White empowerment. The maintenance of this gap today is due to ongoing White supremacy and the Whites monopoly of every part of the South African economics and financial world since 1994, with their exclusive White capital, making the dismantling of BEE today impossible. Other measures to rectify the discrepancy between the rich (mostly Whites) and the poor (mostly Blacks) are needed urgently. As already demonstrated many times by the propagandists, land redistribution and the creation of self-sufficient Black farmers, is the best solution. However, the duration of the land expropriation is also unclear: the process and progress of the completion of it will be determined by the start-up level (low or high) of expropriation when it is activated and how intensively it is driven in the future.5,58,80-84

3.2.2.3. Upkeep-mechanism of Black poverty, inequality, civilisation, dignity and inferiority

Looking at the literature, the references to a discrepancy in terms of wealth and poverty between South Africans, and of a discrepancy in terms of Black and White between South Africans, are prominent. It is further necessary for the propagandists to be enlightened at this stage to support why they think that land expropriation is an immediate must.

Two issues in this regard are intertwined: poverty and inequality (and in the background: landlessness, uncivilisation, indignity and inferiority). The propagandists argue that the White economists and politicians frequently underwrite outdated theoretical views (which some propagandists believe can be an internalised colonial cognition) to see poverty and inequality as separate troubles which also need separate treatments. Bruce85 hereunder tries to prescribe to the ANC regime how to mend not only the country’s racial problems, but also Black poverty as well as inequality85:16:

Why, for instance, are poverty and inequality almost always mentioned in the same sentence as if they were the same thing? A real leader would have sorted that out long ago. If you had the choice, now, to fix either poverty or inequality in South Africa, which would you choose? You can’t do both. They have different causes and, therefore, must have different solutions.

Inequality is caused by the presence of wealth. Poverty is caused by its complete absence. And you surely, surely, fix poverty first.

Bruce’s85 opinion and understanding are totally inappropriate in modern day humanities, economics and politics and reflect a strong antagonists’ standpoint. It is clearly vested in a racially discriminative colonial cognition, which also characterides the thinking in general by the antagonists on the so-called “inability” of the Black race to address today’s political problems effectively with good planning and action, and to bring from the background Black uncivilisation, indignity and inferiority immediately to the foreground. In the present setup of White politics and economics aiming to squash the ANC regime’s intended land expropriation plan, it seems for the propagandists as though the racial and belittling White talks of 1908 to 1909 of Blacks as a specific race during the Convention to found the Union of South Africa, are replayed again and again, to reflect again to-day’s so-called “inferior or uncivilisation” identity of Blacks to again carry out contaminated political planning and action.4 Jan Smuts’s4 Memorandum of Proposals for the formation of the Union reflects the “liberal” Cape politician Merriman’s extreme racial writing to him, echoing this White South African age-old view of Black inferiority. Merriman4 reflects4:18: “…I do not like Natives at all and I wish we had no Black man in South Africa. But there they are, our lot is cast with them by an overruling Providence and the only question is how to shape our course so as to maintain the supremacy of our race and at the same time do our duty.” On this Smuts4 answered in a very similar negative racial tone4:19: “…I sympathise profoundly with the Native races of South Africa whose land it was long before we came here to force a policy of dispossession on them… But I don’t believe in politics for them. Perhaps at the bottom I do not believe in politics at all as a means for the attainment of the highest ends, but certainly so far as the Natives are concerned politics will to my mind only have an unsettling influence.”

Smut’s4 final conclusion upon the role of Blacks in future South Africa describes the fates in 1908 of Blacks and other non-White races and the age-old negative racial indoctrination and contamination of the Whites’ mindsets, which it seems is still today present, when he says4:19: “When I consider the political future of the Natives in South Africa I must say that I look into shadows and darkness; and then I feel inclined to shift the intolerable burden of solving the sphinx problem to the ampler shoulders and stronger brains of the future.” It is this early “darkness”, an economic and political mess created exclusively by Whites – which over many years locked the Blacks into immense poverty and inequality in their daily existence and psyche – that the ANC regime (since 1994) must try to solve in only twenty-five years, after more than three hundreds years of White failure and supremacy. This absolutely needed rectification was in 1994 and is now in 2019 for the propagandists an unattainable outcome to expect from the ANC regime, notwithstanding their best efforts. This is an immensely problematic setup which is “comfortably missed out” today by the antagonists and which they opportunistically describe as the so-called “shortcomings of the Black farmers and the ANC regime” to fulfill their racially driven unrealistic and unreachable aims and masked intentions.4-7

The political naivety of the antagonists upon the comprehensive abilities of today’s Black (which includes their view of the ANC’s abilities) is not only shocking, but also lacks the understanding of the intertwining of poverty and inequality in the complex South African racial society. For the propagandists, the two issues can and must be addressed simultaneously, as the ANC has correctly been doing since 1994. Just because the White politicians and journalists seemingly lack the ability themselves to think analytically and comprehensively, it does not mean that the present day Blacks also lack this ability. Many of the antagonistic White journalists and opinion-makers’ understanding of modern day governance and political transformation is seemingly still caught and steered in the thinking-pattern and political knowledge of Grand Apartheid, which still emphasises utmost White superiority in thinking, planning and action upon behalf of the “inferior” and “uncivilised” Blacks. It is in this racially contaminated cognitive context that the ANC regime’s uplifting of the poor and landless Blacks through the receiving back of White land is attacked.86 For the propagandists, the antagonists today still miss out a century later on JBM Hertzog’s viewpoint of the 1920s when he warns some of the arrogant racial Whites86:195: “… that the time would come when a black skin was no longer a test for uncivilisation and that the Blacks of South Africa would one day politically and physically swamp the white civilisation”. This political rectification is now well-reflected by the “civilised” Ramaphosa’s effort through land expropriation to constructively mend the country’s economic and political mess left by the NP-AB-alliance when they fled the political scene in 1994.

By firstly only addressing so-called Black poverty, as propagated by Bruce85, the propagandists show that the White rich and the White business sectors will economically and politically profit more. This handling will successfully keep Black inequality strongly in place, while at the same time assuring the continuation of Black-poverty (and undoubtedly in the antagonists’ mindsets their contamination of a so-called “Black inferiority and uncivilasation”). The abovementioned naïve political view, specifically his lack of insight into the violating nature of Black-White inequality which is fully intertwined into poverty, is reflected further by Bruce’s85 postulation85:16: “You end poverty in South Africa and you fix everything. It doesn’t mean the end of inequality. But it means the end of our greatest curse – indignity”. For the propagandists this is a laughable and superficial political view. To think that indignity is only locked into poverty is a myth. Inequality holds the same indignity in the activation of hatred in Blacks, as that of poverty: the proto-Afrikaners’ delinquent retro-behaviour up to 1948 and the Afrikaners’ delinquent retro-behaviour up to 1994, as a direct result of their own inequality, coming from the pre-1900s, still brings out today in them today the emotions of indignity and inferiority, long after their poverty and indignity was erased.85

For the propagandists, Ramaphosa’s present approach, specifically his land redistribution to the poor and landless Blacks, is correct: if you change poverty you change inequality, and if you change inequality you change poverty. Cyril Ramaphosa as a Black, living under Apartheid, knows well the intertwining of poverty and inequality as well as the indignity internalised in each. It is only after the poverty, indignity and inequality are fully erased from the mindsets of today’s poor Blacks (and, as already said, this is a process that lives long in the mindset), that the process of economic upliftment of the poor Blacks in Ramaphosa’s land expropriation plan will have a positive impact.85

There is no doubt in the mindsets of the propagandists that the ANC regime knows well the risk of future revolt and anarchy, and that land grabbing instead of land distribution is a reality, if justice is not done.

What the poor and landless Blacks under the guardianship of the ANC now require is the rectification of the immense injustices done to them through Apartheid. Prominent actions, according to some propagandists, required from the ANC, are extreme RET and RST, which include direct and fast land grabbing (which the ANC is not going to do). On the other hand, RET and RST are for some propagandists simply the breaking down of superficial political, economical and human borders (and contaminated political, racial and economicbeliefs) created by Whites over more than three centuries to safeguard their privileges in the country.5,58,80-83,87 This is captured in an extraordinary discriminative phenomenon and experience, overwhelming in its human and psychological destructiveness, which the late Professor Richard van der Ross87 already highlighted in 1979 when he wrote87:92: “To be told by law where to live, whom to marry, with whom to dance, against whom not to play cricket, where to go to school, which university to attend…”.

Enough is enough for most Blacks: the 1994 dispensation and the South African Constitution failed the mass of South Africans. It is clear for the propagandists that through well manipulated emotions around land ownership, and the various hijackings of the economics and the judicial thinking by the so called “good” Constitution since 1994 by White racists and exclusive capitalists, the Whites are still fully governing South Africa at the cost of the non-Whites. This imbalanced and unjustsetup must be rectified with immediate effect, of which the introduction and activation of land-expropriation is the least disruptive and the most just choice. For the propagandists, as shown over and over by them in this article, many antagonists are still caught up in a nationalist Afrikaner racial mindset, beset by false supremacy and empowerment, believing that they can block any form of reform.5 Louw5 describes this mindset of abasement as a5:44: “…doctrine that taught that they are a superior race that does only the ethically correct and good, versus the inferior Black subordinates whose actions were infected with unethical and bad behaviour and an inferior disposition”.

Furthermore, many of the Whites are fighting off the incoming land expropriation not only to keep their enrichments coming from Apartheid and other racial discrimination over 300 years, but also the seeking of a better and more secure position to enlarge these enrichments through more masked political (juridical) empowerment assured to them by the present day unjust Constitution. The antagonists sudden pleading of Minority Procurement (MP), after their many years of the extreme practice of Minority Empowerment (ME), is laughable as well as a surprise. For the Whites, selfishly fighting for MP to further uphold their racial ME there is in a balanced democracy no justified grounds to listen to or to consider this. The antagonists know it well.5

It is clear that the antagonists various “savior and rescuer” organisations, fighting so-called upon behalf of the White farmers and their White land (but in reality for upholding the “old” White racial South Africa and its White exclusive capitalistic models and systems, are losing their battles one by one. In this context it is for the propagandists clear that more than 90% of the White population are ignoring the various exclusive “Afrikaner bodies” like the Freedom Front Plus Party (approximately 166 000 supporters), Solidarity (approximately 350 000 members), and the organisations with minor support such as AfriForum, the Institute of Race Relations, the FW de Klerk Foundation’s Centre for Constitutional Rights, the National Dialogue Initiative (Nasionale Stigting-dialoog Inisiatief or NSDI), the Organisation for Unrepresented Nations and Groups (UNPO) and the Africa-European Indaba. The efforts of religious groups with minority status within the White community to mesmerise the mindsets of a small group of directionless Afrikaners with their false doctrines are in the process of being faded out. All these various antagonistic organisations’ lifespans are at most that of ten years, and are very superficial, directionless, nor viable or sustainable in the new South Africa.23,24,75,88-94

The Ramaphosa land expropriation with the main intention of erasing the poverty and landlessness of a mass of Blacks is also in the process of erasing the pre-1994 racial cognitions and mechanisms cemented into the political minds of some Whites, which are steering their wanton propaganda of Blacks as uncivilised and inferior.

3.2.3. Can the Afrikaners’ military derail South Africa in the future?

In 1994 the incoming ANC was well aware of the military, as well as the political empowerment of the Afrikaners to derail the new dispensation up to the 2000s. This empowerment slowly declined from the first five years after 1994, to end up in the present day in complete political and military disempowerment by the Afrikaners to be able to derail or stop any dramatic land reform. For the propagandists, the Afrikaners and the Whites as populations are in disempowered positions to endanger Ramaphosa’s land reform intentions. The previous mass of Afrikaners who so publically and eagerly underwrote anti-ANC rhetoric and who blocked the ANC physically at every turn in South Africa are today a small segment of minimum importance. The so-called military power of the “nation of the Afrikaners” is just a ghost of the past. Since 1994 the Afrikaner-volk started splitting up in into small, less rigid and less extreme Afrikaner cultural, political and financial bodies. It seems that only a small number, not more than ±300 000 of unhappy and rigid nationalist Afrikaners, mostly from the farming sector and a segment of the exclusive White capitalist sector, as well a small part of the old NP-AB-DRC-alliance, form part of the antagonists. This minority is prominent in their constant efforts to oppose the ANC regime in various ways, as well as to derail and to block Ramaphosa’s intended land expropriation. Since the beginning of 2016, this opposition has become louder and more organised, but seemingly with little success.3-5

The propagandists acknowledge that most individual nationalist Afrikaners have settled into a new South African lifestyle that is completely different from that of their fathers. They have clearly repositioned themselves as individuals, stripped from all the emotional and political rhetoric with which they are falsely bombarded daily by the extreme racial Afrikaner politicians and executive leaders, who are forming the so-called antagonists. The land reform issue is not really a worrying aspect today for most of the ordinary Afrikaners, as what the “saviours” and “rescuers” of the Afrikaners try to present. The 1994 dispensation was indeed a watershed for the Afrikaners of South Africa.5

For the propagandists it is clear that many of the ordinary Afrikaners had to learn to live as individuals inside a new South Africa after 1994. Their old ties with the Afrikaner Nationalist’s “volk” were suddenly cut, erasing blind group loyalty and dogma and the protection of the group’s interests. For the poor and peace-loving individual Afrikaner, it swiftly became clear after 1994 that he would not benefit in any way from the wealth of Afrikaner exclusive capitalist magnates such as the Ruperts, Wieses and Steyns, etc. For the ordinary Afrikaners these exclusive capitalist Afrikaner magnates must save themselves: they have the abilities to get rich on their own and surely also have the abilities to stay rich on their own. At the moment the ordinary Afrikaner is only misused by the exclusive White capitalists in their economic and political self-empowerment, leaving the poor individual Afrikaner in the cold. The same kind of opportunistic “self-centredness” can be said of the farming community who are crying “wolf” about a so-called impending “land grabbing”. Looking closely at the situation, the ordinary Afrikaner never benefited over the years from the farming community or the Afrikaner magnates who now run with the antagonists. He missed out on their many benefits and was nothing more than a springboard and a voter voice to be misused by the Afrikaner/White farmers, politicians and business magnates. With reference to the Afrikaner/White business magnates, the prominent question today for the ordinary Afrikaners and for the propagandists is: why can the ultra-rich White South Africans not be targeted for RET, and thus also especially landv expropriation? Financial data shows that 66 000 South Africans (mostly Whites) are part of the richest 1% in the world, with 40 400 of the world’s 13.6 million ultra-rich and between 38 500 and 45 000 billionaires (mostly White) living in South Africa. The three richest South Africans (Whites) possess more than 50% of the total South Africa riches.5,23,24,75,88-94

About 2.7 million other Afrikaners and more than 4 million Whites in total are completely ignoring the antagonists’ plea for an organised offensive against the current ANC regime. It seems as though most modern day Afrikaners, many of whom are already politically and culturally differently minded to their parents of 40–60 years ago, are driven in their daily lives and future planning by their own life needs, decisions and planning, clearly outside the antagonists’ dogmas and false intentions of so-called “Afrikaner/White rights”. The political intentions to derail or physically obstruct land reform are absent from them. In all honesty, these ± 4 million modern thinking and politically orientated Afrikaners/Whites know that the ± 300 00 antagonists (mostly passively as “co-riders” to the small group of opportunistic Afrikaner/White saviours and rescuers) do not have real political or military power, know-how and the finances “to restore” in any way the nationalist Afrikaners’ so-called “pre-1994 South Africa”. Most of these ±4 million Afrikaners clearly dissociate themselves publically from this racial “pre-1994 South Africa”. They also see the so-called loss of “dignity and rights” that the antagonists allege were taken away from the Afrikaners/Whites by the ANC regime, as false statements and well planned manipulations to mislead the general public upon the truth around the intended land expropriation of Ramaphosa and the ANC.5,23,24,88-95

Another prominent factor which is well known to the ANC regime – making the possibility of a “Boer-revolution” zero – is the hard fact that in 100 years time only between 10 000 to 30 000 Afrikaners/Whites will be left in South Africa. This makes the “pure” Afrikaners/Europeans as a dynamic entity insignificant in a future South Africa and the present-day rescue efforts of the “pure” Afrikaners/Europeans and their exclusive rights by the antagonists a failed effort. Statistics indicate that the Afrikaners may decrease to between 1% and 3% of the total population in 30 to 40 years from now, leaving a remnant of less than 1 million Afrikaners against an estimated 70 million Blacks in South Africa. In 40 years from now their diminishing from the scene as a “population” will be phenomenal.5

With regard to the diminishing numbers of the Afrikaners (and also the Whites) and their move into insignificance, the propagandists maintain that the Afrikaner/White population has already become a so-called “old population”, lacking young people to assure growth. In 2016 the ratio for Black persons under 16 years to persons over 60 years was 100:20, while this ratio for Whites was 100:130. This imbalance will increase over the next five years, as more young Whites are leaving South Africa permanently and the high concentration of the elderly is growing.5

In this context is it also very important for the propagandists to note that not all Afrikaners and Whites agreed with the NP-AB-DRC-Alliance’s racial policy or were ever members of these bodies. Many of these persons always supported a fair and justified South Africa. These so-called “liberal” Afrikaners/Whites do not support the antagonists’ obstructive thinking, planning and action around the intended land expropriation programme. They directly and openly support Ramaphosa’s land expropriation plan.5

From another perspective the propagandists note that the average Afrikaner has become poorer since 1994, making them less of a target through RET for the ANC- egime if they should decideon such a step. In this context the propagandists note that 22% of the total Afrikaner population are 60 years and older: to capture their already constantly diminishing capital through RET will only impoverish these older persons further and make them a direct financial burden for the state. It is thus more and more clear for most of the ordinary Afrikaners, outside the old nationalist Afrikaners’ sick political system and remnants of a corrupt elite, that RET and land grabbing will not be applied to them as the antagonists falsely predict.5,79,95-97

Regarding the antagonistic White farmers’ call to other Afrikaners and Whites for “help against the so-called land grabbing of Ramaphosa”, the propagandists mention in this context that the NP-AB-Alliance themselves long ago dropped the Afrikaner farmer community due to their self-centered intentions – a group who the propagandists see as mostly adhering to the extreme racist thinking of DF Malan, HF Verwoerd and JB Vorster. There has been an enormous decline over the years in the numbers of Afrikaner farmers — they declined from 116 000 in 1950 to more or less 65 000 in 1986, while in 2018 they number ±36,000. As the NP became “politically liberal”, most of the declining number of White farmers (basically due to their diminutive numbers and thus less political empowerment) became unsupportive of the NP and became thus less important as voters. By 1985-1986 the NP turned their attention away from the White farmers to urbanised industrial and business orientated Afrikaners for votes. It is an open question why the ordinary Afrikaners must be supportive to the White farmers in a setup wherein only the White farmers are opportunistically benefitting.5,98

It is clear that land redistribution is not a primary issue for the hard working individual Afrikaner outside the farming sector who had cut his umbilical cord with the “volk” in 1994. The antagonistic White farmers and rich Whites are on their own in fighting their battles with the ANC regime to keep their land and riches. There is no justice in benefitting and favouring more or less 36 000 persons who are not part of the country’s poverty group and who benefitted from racial discrimination, above 29 million landless people, who have livedforever in outmost poverty.5

The ANC regime is well-informed about the present day Afrikaners/Whites’ political empowerment and poor status in the greater Afrikaner/White community. The isolation of the antagonistic group as a very small minority group with limited influence and empowerment in the future South Africa on the one side, and on the other side the majority of Afrikaners/Whites who are not against land reform, make the Afrikaners/Whites as a future political pressure group null and void.

For the propagandists, the antagonistic Afrikaners/Whites as a possible racial, political, economic and military force to derail the ANC regime’s intended land reform, are not a force of which to take note. To allow them to keep and uphold their present exclusive rights at the cost of an immense and growing sector of poor and landless Blacks, is not only unwise and foolish, but a crime against mankind. Immediate land redistribution is thus a must for the propagandists.100-103

3.2.4. The postulations: Almost all victims of land dispossession are been compensated according to relevant circumstance, versus expropriation of land without compensation which has been tried in communist regimes where it has harvested riches for a few and devastation for everyone else

The remarks by Opperheimer42 that42:18:“…almost all victims of land dispossession have been compensated, which is worked out according to relevant circumstances…”, and that42:18: “…expropriation without compensation has been tried in communist regimes, where it has harvested riches for a few and devastation for everyone else…”, needs in the propagandists opinion, serious attention, basically for two main reasons. Firstly, the superficial and well-planned distraction by the antagonists of the attention from their upholding of White empowerment and their exclusive model of capitalism (the same approach the antagonists follow in all their presentations to create discontent around the intended land expropriation programme), and secondly, the total misleading of the public on the ANC regime’s good intention to soften the immense poverty among more than 29-million Blacks left by the racial pre-1994 regimes. Above all stands the Afrikaners’/Whites’ bloody, merciless and vicious political history of land grabbing inside their own RET since 1652, which has seemingly been completely erased from their mindset by political Alzheimers. The growing disregard for truth by the antagonists in their practice of politics in the present day South African setup is a point of concern for the propagandists, especially by the passivity of the media to the Black setup.5,29,31,42,103-105

Firstly, in presenting his argument, it is clear that Opperheimer’s42 mind became fixated upon extraordinary and singular political cases such as those of Stalin, Mao and Mugabe, totally unrelated to present day South African politics, and the intentions and the management of the ANC regime thereof. Looking at all three of these cases of land grabbing (and comparing them to the present land expropriation plan of the ANC), there is a prominent similarity: the fact that the elites (the rich, the massive land owners, the vicious political and economically empowered masters and exclusive capitalists) of the three countries’ populations, who later fell prey to outright land grabbing, were groups who over time through their political empowerment viciously suppressed the lower socio-economic groups and stole land over long periods. Most notabe in these empowerments are the Tsar and his nobles in Russia, the Emperor and his royals in China and Cecil John Rhodes and the British Empire’s men in Zimbabwe (the old Rhodesia). Initial requests and pacific efforts to reform Russia by the Bolsheviks, China by the Maoists and Zimbabwe by the Mugabits, were blindly ignored and suppressed by the elite in order to uphold their wealth, rights and privileges. In Zimbabwe, the requests of the Mugabe regime to the White land owners for the free transfer of their redundant land to the poor Blacks were fought with court cases. In addition, there were no efforts by the Smith regime to compensate the Black victims for their land which was stolen by the White British colonialists, or to uplift the poor and landless Blacks. In all three cases most notable is the fact that the land was stolen. Indeed, in all three cases, land grabbing was further accompanied by the murder of the elite landowners.5,29,31,42,103-105

The abovementioned situation’s comprehensive tragic setup and the contaminated elements of human disrespect by the elite landowners, as well as the vicious behaviour of the elite landowners is totally ignored by Opperheimer in his contention regarding the rightness of the constitutional dispensation of 1994 and its guarantee of ongoing exclusive capitalism and land ownership in South Africa by the post-1994 democracy. Furthermore, human rights and justice became only institutional values after 1994 in South Africa for Opperheimer42, with the contaminated pre-1994 political history absent from his mindset. Land grabbing, as a selective form of revenge, was for the propagandists in all three of the cases a normal predicted outcome, after the failiure to activate through the elite themselves correction of their wrongdoings, so as to cleanse the past’s immense injustice and most of all, the breaking down of resistance by the elite to activate reform in order to benefit the mass of the poor. If this had not occurred, namely the cruel phasing out of the elites in the three countries, theywould undoubtedly still be ruled today by small groups of exclusive capitalists with a political leadership of empowerment, based exclusively upon dictators, autocrats and fascists. For the propagandists, the extreme political outcomes in Russia, China and Zimbabwe are exactly what the ANC regime is trying to avoid here with a peaceful and orderly land transfer before the mass of poor and landless overtake the present government with radicalism.5,29,31,42,103-105

The propagandists maintain that the South African White regimes and their inhabitants from 1652 to 1994 never compensated their ancestors’ Black victims for the masses of land stolen or the atrocities committed (very much in line with the behaviour of the unrepentant elites of Russia, China and Zimbabwe). During the pre-1994 period, the antagonists labelled anyone who dared to oppose the White capitalists and Afrikaner political system and thinking, as “communists”, “terrorists” and “traitors”, mostly accompanied by the incarceration (and often murder) of these dissidents. The post-1994 antagonists still today use the old trick of the NP-AB-alliance by classing anyone opposing their policy communists or so-called “Chinese and Russian parrots and followers” who intend to transfer South Africa in line with Russia and China into a totalitarian, communist state.5,29,31,42,103-105

Opperheimer’s42 postulation that42:18: “…almost all victims of land dispossession have been compensated”, which is worked out according to relevant circumstances…,” is false. In South Africa, the Whites’ land grabbing began the moment Jan van Riebeeck put his feet on South African soil, without until today any compensation to “all the initial victims and their descendants”. It seems as though Opperheimer’s42 above postulation of “relevant circumstances” means that when the land was stolen by the Whites from non-Whites, the “clause of compensation” was not applicable.42

Above reference by Opperheimer42 that private owners must be compensated, reflects arrogance and ignorance. A simple and strait answer to nullify today’s Whites’ call for compensation of their so-called land under the intended land expropriation without compensation, is the balancing of costs to their Black victims by the Whites’ early land grabbing without compensation. For the propagandists the present day White land owners do not deserve any compensation, firstly seeing that most of them and their forefathers stole their present land mostly by land- terrorism and bloodshed since 1652; and secondly because the intended land expropriation will be done in an orderly manner, with justice and moderation, and not based upon the pre-1994 land grabbing under Whites.3,5-7

How much Opperheimer42 missed the good intentions of the ANC regime (and of course the true political history, particularly the Whites’ land grabbing) to bring about with its intended land reform plan inclusive capital, is well illustrated for the propagandists by his confused postulation42:18: “…expropriation without compensation has been tried in communist regimes, where it has harvested riches for a few and devastation for everyone else…”. Firstly, if the ANC regime wanted to change South Africa into a communist regime, it could have done so shortly after 1994. Secondly, South Africa will never change to a communist state, and its intended land redistribution is not based upon communism, but upon balanced and justified democracy wherein the voice of the majority is paramount. Thirdly, the immense land grabbing characterising the South Africa political history of 1652 to 1994 was not executed by so-called “communists” to “enrich a few communist leaders”, but by so-called Christian and democratically orientated Afrikaners/Whites to42:18: “…harvest riches for a few and devastation for everyone else…”. In this context of harvesting riches for a few, 5 million Whites stand against the devastating poverty of a mass of ±45 million Blacks!

The present day amnesia of Whites of their own and their ancestors’ delinquent actions and roles in the tragic political history of South Africa, wherein land grabbing and murderare central – delinquent actions well-planned, activated and steered by the Netherlanders, the British, the proto-Afrikaners and the later Afrikaners – is surprising. The many lies and myths offered today by the antagonists to cover up the immense political delinquencies of Whites are thus not surprising for the propagandists. Mthombothi31 diagnoses this “memory malfunction” of South African Whites well when he writes31:17:

It is understandable at times, especially in the heat of political battle, that there would be different interpretations of what happened or what was said, but nobody is entitled to their own facts. There’s been a lot of rewriting of history lately by people who seem incapable of either reading or writing, especially those who never witnessed such events first-hand, and

Lies and falsehoods often have dire political consequences. Those who know the truth should have the courage to speak up.

For the propagandists, White South Africans’ own RET (specific that of the Afrikaners) from 1652 to 1994 was so immense and of such a spectrum that it can never be but into monetary value, a psychological perspective or the counting of lives. It can only be described as a tragedy, far worse than the modern day Rwanda genocide and chaos.

Opperheimer’s42 postulations that almost all victims of land dispossession have been compensated, according to relevant circumstance, and that expropriation of land without compensation has been tried in communist regimes where it has harvested riches for a few and devastation for everyone else, are inappropriate to apply to the post-1994 ANC regime. When looking at the pre-1994 White regimes’ action, then the postulations are fully applicable.

3.2.5. Is the ANC’s need for land reform insignificant and driven by few opportunistic politicians?

The postulation by the antagonists, reading42:18: “…barring a few opportunistic politicians, almost no-one views land reform as a burning issue…”, reflects for the propagandists the intense confusion and the distancing of the antagonists of themselves from the broad South African news, especially the reporting upon the immense dissatisfaction of Blacks about their landlessness and poverty. Mthombothi’s31 reference to these “fact-blind” antagonists as31:17:“…people who seem incapable of either reading or writing”, is very meaningful. For the propagandists this is very descriptive and declares to a certain extent the antagonists’ constant illogical and unintelligible attacks on the ANC’s good intentions to bring about a bettered life for all South Africans by land redistribution. It seems as though the antagonists are totally mesmerised and struck blind and cognitively frozen by their own untrue White political propaganda upon the land issue, turning “White” myths and lies into “false” facts. Looking carefully at how the antagonists position their “facts” with the statement42:18: “land reform is not a burning issue”, to make their arguments, opinions and viewpoints “respectable” and “true” (but totally based upon untested research and evidence) and as if it is issued by “experts,” so as to influence the public’s mindset with the wanton cognition that the ANC regime’s land expropriation intention is evily disposed, it becomes clear that misleading statements have with time overcome the antagonists’ mindsets, limiting their ability to distinguish between right and wrong.31,42

Rapport106 reported on the 23rd September 2018 that land reform is seen by only 4% of Black voters, 11% of White voters and an average of 6% (White and Black) of the population as a top priority to be addressed. (The research statistic is seemingly obtained from a probe by the firm Victory Research of a said Ryan Coetzee).106

When looking to the initial outcomes of the parliamentary countrywide testing of the public’s opinion on the change to Section 25 of the Constitution, the results show that there is, contrary to the results of Victory Research106, a strong public support reflected by their testimonies showing an immense demand for land reform, even drastic land grabbing. There is an emphasis in these testimonies that the land belonging presently to Whites was stolen since 1652 to 1994 from Blacks, and indeed that land expropriation must immediately be activated. As much as 40% and higher of the presentations support some form of land reform and land grabbing as a form of compensation (against the average of the Victory Research of only 6%). This nullifies the Victory Research finding. In addition, an analysis of the reports of independent journalists upon opinions of Black sack-dwellers countrywide on the need for immediate land expropriation, show an immense need for drastic land reform and the execution of a policy of land grabbing from Whites. These outcomes oppose the Victory Research’s findings that the present ownership of land and the transfer of White land in terms of the intended expropriation plan is a matter of insignificance. Secondly, the question for the propagandists here is about the reliability and objectivity of the Victory Research to be able to evaluate scientifically in terms of trustworthiness. The propagandists ask whether there is any direct association between Coetzee106, Victory Research and the antagonists. Pelser106, editor of Rapport, writes pertinently that the study was specifically done by Victory Research for the South African Institute of Racial Relations (IRR), bringing thus the position and role of the IRR106 in the present antagonists’ attacks on the land reforms of the ANC prominently to the foreground.

Literature upon the present fight against land expropriation shows that the IRR stands central as one of the so-called Afrikaner/Whites rescuer and saviour organisations and a body which stands directly and hostilely to the ANC’s land reform. Musyoka106, specific to this context, classes these organisations, in terms of the two opposing role-players representing various subgroups each on the land matter, as the conservative nationalists (right-wingers), ranging from the centre-right DA, agriculture-based associations – most of which represent the interests of white commercial farmers – to far-right groups such as the Freedom Front Plus and solidarity groups such as AfriForum. This clear association of political or personal and group interests contaminates the IRR’s impartiality. The IRR’s commissioning of Victory Research and the prominence of the Afrikaans media’s reference to the so-called “shockingly low number” of only 4% of Blacks’ concern on the land matter makes the findings of Victory Research for the propagandists null and void. Reading with this the fact that only an insignificant number of 978 respondents (voters) out of a potential 35 million voters were consulted, the whole IRR exercise is for the propagandists a well planned manipulation.7,106

The strength of the antagonists’ first postulation, namely that “there is not a need to effect land expropriation”, was finally totally erased on the 4th December 2018 when 209 MPs voted in favour (with only 91 votes against and zero abstentions) to amend the Constitution to effect land expropriation without compensation.107-109

This outcome also nullifies further the antagonists’ other arrogant postulation, namely that42:18: “… barring a few opportunistic politicians, almost noone views land reform as a burning issue…”. The fact that as many as 209 MPs, the so-called “few opportunistic politicians” in terms of Oppenheimer’s42 factless argument – counting 118 more than the 91 MPs supporting the antagonists’ viewpoint of no land expropriation without compensation – have voted for land expropriation without compensation, confirm the immense impact that the land issue has upon the ordinary people as well as the political leaders of the country. For the propagandists, land expropriation without compensation (limited in certain cases) is a reality and is irreversible. Although the antagonists seemingly intend to obstruct through court action the ANC regime’s intended amendment of the Constitution, the propagandists believe that they face failure. In Zimbabwe the White farmers followed the same path of legal obstruction of land expropriation, only to be demolished in the end.107-109

▲The present voting in the National Assembly where the 209 MPs voted in favour and 91 MPs against the amendment, reflecting a 69.6% in favour (which is 3% above the two-thirds majority), is reflected hereunder22,47,110-113:

For a change to the Constitution, a two-thirds majority is needed in parliament and an approval from six of the nine provinces, while the ordinary Bill on Expropriation that is serving before parliament at the moment only needs an approval vote of 50% by the parliament. Two sections of the Constitution will have to be amended – 25 and 31. Section 25 is applicable to the property clause that allows for expropriation, and 31 is the limitations clause that outlines when rights, to, for example, property, can be limited. Although a two-thirds parliamentarian majority is needed to Section 25 (Article 25) of the Constitution, it ultimately depends upon a 75% parliamentarian majority vote as guided by Article 74(1) of the Constitution. To change the Constitution the amendment must be approved and accepted by the National Assembly, after which the concept amendment must also be considered and accepted by the National Council for Provinces. Laws aimed at streamlining the expropriation process without constitutional changes are the Employment Equity Act, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act and Codes, the Skills Development Act, the Levies Act and the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act. These legislations are supported by for instance the National Development Plan and the Black Industrialist Programme. Land expropriation in terms of democratic principles and African empowerment, is clearly described by Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, while the redistribution of agricultural land is further partially covered in the Agri BEE codes.

From a critical evaluation point, the propagandists’ sense worrying characteristics in the present day actions of many of the antagonistic organisations. For the propagandists, AfriForum’s mediaconference in April 2018 in Centurion about their looking for international support against the changes to the Constitution and the planned land-redistribution shows AfriForum’s total lack of understanding of the working of democracy and international opinion and empowerment to bring changes in countries. This also reflect their foolishness in determining who were the prominent role-players who changed South Africa in the 1980s from a White autocracy for Whites only to a Black democracy for all South Africans: the international community! (This is demonstrated by Donald Trump’s fast turnaround after his initial criticism of Ramaphosa’s land reform, to support it in the end).114

The propagandists agree that political criticism is good, but not one-sided, manipulated White-criticism thoughtout steered by the antagonists to incite political delinquency. For the propagandists, AfriForum and many of its White associates lack patriotism and a love for their South African bastard fatherland. Most of the White antagonists, as are mostly everyone in South Africa, are from long ago not White or Non-White, Black or non-Black, Colored or non-Colored: they are the Bastards of South Africa. Land redistribution must be seen in this reality: every bastard of South Africa must be in some way the owner of land. That is a bastard’s legal right, at least from 2019.114

In light of the above ongoing foolish arguments, assumptions and manipulations by the antagonists as a group, it is the view of the propagandists that the political empowerment of groups like AfriForum, Solidarity and the IRR and many of their leaders’ unconscious and conscious rigid racial bias must be wrenched away from them. They endanger South Africa more than any land redistribution can do. It seems for the propagandists that without the activation of affirmative laws, bringing about BEE and land redistribution, the White privileged classes will never that Blacks have competence and skills and can be responsible land owners. Bias, conscious and unconscious, is alive and well in South Africa.115 Haffajee115 sumsit up well115:2: “Apartheid injured them [Afrikaners] too, by making them blind to anything except that which looked like them. Apartheid, designed to promote Afrikaner interests and to maintain Anglo-Saxon corporate interests, required not only oppression but active bias, and it lingers because it is intergenerational, since sons learn from their fathers”.

Looking to the easy influencing of some Afrikaners/Whites at present by the antagonists, planting suspicion of the ANC’s planned land redistribution, it seems as though many of these antagonistic Afrikaners have never outgrown their political and socio-economic immaturity, which the leaders of the NP-AB-DRC-alliance so effectively used to cloud the nationalist Afrikaners’ mindsets with racism and to steer the practice of Apartheid.116-118

For the propagandists, there are still too many persons in AfriForum, Solidarity, the DA and IRR, with their roots in the late AWB, who are mimicking the nationalist Afrikaners “tough” but failed actions of the “Stormjaers of the Ossewa-Brandwag” of a century ago in their present foolish driving of so-called Afrikaner interests and the maintainanceof Anglo-Saxon corporate interests. They are as blind as their fathers when it comes to the immediate demanding realities and interests of land redistribution by their fatherland, bastard South Africa.5

The propagandists wonder if it is not time that the South African Government starts to take a more critical look on the ideologies of the many false prophets of doom on land redistribution and RET, and whether their actions are not equal to sabotage.

Land redistribution is a burning issue which needs to be addressed immediately, to prevent anarchy, mass unrest and revolution before or just after the 2019 General Election. How lucky South Africa has been in the last five years to escape revolution, when 29 million of its people, out of a total of 55 million, live in utmost poverty. Ramaphosa sees that revolution is here and tries to erase it by his constructive land reform policy.116-118

The ANC shows that the need for land reform is significant and is driven by a mass of Black citizens and Black politicians of status.

3.2.6. Unsupportive and wavering DA in land reform

With regard to the two prominent political parties’ active in South African politics, namely the ANC and the DA, is it clear for the propagandists that it is only the ANC which plays a prominent role in the promotion of land expropriation, specifically without compensation in certain cases. With regard to this promotion of the population’s welfare and interests, the DA is for most propagandists very passive and unattached. The propagandists see the DA today as the 1999 Tony-Leon-party, which openly called upon Whites and supporters of the apartheid era’s National Party to vote with one single aim against Nelson Mandela’s ANC: to secure absolutely the interests of Whites. For the propagandists, the DA has still today an absolutely obstructive approach to anything that looks anti-capitalist (specifically exclusive capitalism) and anti-White.117,119

The DA’s inconsistent policy initially publically opposing BEE, other forms of affirmative action and land redistribution, versus their later masked ongoing adoption of the ANC policies on issues such as broad based BEE and affirmative action, has been a catastrophe, alludes Grindrod119. He writes119:14: “What is the point of voting for an opposition that largely replicates government policy? It takes a lot more than vague policy statements and sound bites to attract voters.”

The DA, as a so-called “Black obstructive party”, is captured by its rich and influencial Whites leaders, members and supporters. For the propagandists, it is the DA’s segment of Whites who are the creators of most of the anti-Black politics and actions today. Excellent examples here are the unrelenting yapping in parliament by the DA’s leaders such as John Steenhuisen against every action of the ANC regime, Helen Zille’s inappropriate comments about colonialism and Mmusi Maimane’s recent remarks about White privileges in South Africa.116,117,120-126

To further illustrate the DA’s constant unfocussed and superficial attacks on the ANC and Ramaphosa, Grindrod119 writes119:14: “Very little of its outputs articulate solutions or alternatives, for the larger part it simply exists to criticise. A year after Zuma’s resignation, it is still on its Stop Zuma campaign. If Zuma does not exist, the DA would have to invent him.”

Enlightening specifically the DA’s ongoing inconsistance on BEE, affirmative action and land redistribution, etc., since 1994, blocking the direct bettering of the mass of poor and landless Blacks, Grindrod119 writes119:14:

SA, however, has been very poorly served by the official opposition. The DA over the past two years has floundered in terms of both style and substance. We have witnessed a lot of rhetoric, media stunts and theatrics, but little to inspire us to elect Mmusi Maimane as president of the republic this year. This has largely allowed the ANC a free pass to perpetuate the mediocrity, corruption and mismanagement we have suffered.

In its frantic efforts to be all things to all people, the DA is pleasing very few. Its much-vaunted takeover of metros such as Joburg and Tshwane in 2016 came only as a result of an unholy alliance with the EFF,.a wholly unprincipled move that illustrated hunger for power at any cost to its claimed values.

The self-inflicted misfortunes of the DA can be directly attributed to three factors: weak leadership, abandonment of its founding principles, and a failure to understand that South Africans are looking for a change in direction, not just PR branding. As a result, its right flank is bleeding off to AfriForum (via COPE) and the FF Plus, its left flank is marching back to Ramaphosa’s revitalised ANC, and its centre is a shrinking mass of grudge voters with nowhere else to go.

They have become a motley group of naysayers and Afro-pessimists. I sometimes think they relish it when our country falls short. In some perverse way it may affirm their smug “told you so” attitude. The party should oppose the government by any means, but that does not mean it should talk down our country in the process.

The abovementioned obstructive thinking and action by the official opposition not to constructively support good projects with merit, or at least oppose the government on matters and give clear facts for their objection, give a good understanding for the propagandists as to why some of meritorious projects of the ANC regime failed since 1994 to get through parliament. The failure to write a mandate on just and balanced land ownership within a focused and sincere political setup with the DA, as the ANC tried to do over a long time, was just such an unfortunate outcome. This has lead to today’s negative build-up countrywide around the land matter. Drastic land redistribution, outside the passive and disconnected DA policy, is now forced on Cyril Ramaphosa as an unavoidable must. For the propagandists, it is the DA, with its exclusive whitish interests, which is going to be the loser at the 2019 election box, and not the ANC regime which the DA is putting constant under attack.62,117,119120,126-129

The propagandists see the DA as totally unsupportive and wavering in the establishment of just land reform. They believe that the present interests of the poor and landless Blacks are secondary for the DA, and that the party with its well planned delaying, wavering and obstructive actions, is a role-player in the maintenance since 1994 of the mass of poor and landless Blacks.

3.2.7. Is South Africa’s Bill of Rights much lauded nationally and internationally?

To plead innocent about the devastating faults of the South African Bill of Rights with rhetoric by the antagonists such as42:18: “We have an internationally lauded constitution premised upon freedom, dignity, and equality. We have never altered our Bill of Rights and the evidence shows that there is no reason to do so now”, is for the propagandists a further admission of guilt by them that they do not understand the indigenous realities of South Africa and are indeed unprepared to become true Africans.

For the propagandists, the antagonists’ underwriting and promoting of the 1994 Constitution as statutorily excellent, is evidence of a self-appointed European supremacy, as in pre-1994 South Africa, to be able to ignore democracy, human rights and other demanding realities within South Africa. They see the basis of this thinking, planning and action as to assure further benefits and to safeguard the interests of the small White minority. These interests of the pre-1994 suppressors’ interests and their future are still paramount, while leaving the interests of masses of deprived Blacks in the cold.5,26,74,130

The Bill of Rights is incomplete for the propagandists. They have no doubt that the Constitution’s primary aim was to exclusively serve the White politics and economics for a long time after 1994.

Evidence shows that there is a good reason now to change Section 25 of the Constitution, allowing various forms of land expropriation, so as to address the pressing demands of poverty and unemployment of the mass of Blacks. In this statutory planning to change Section 25, the propagandists maintain that there is undoubtedly no intention by the ANC regime to alter the South African citizens’ freedom, dignity and equality. The only aim is to improve the Bill of Rights to serve the South African citizens appropriately. To offer praise by the antagonists for the so-called42:18: “… international lauding of the Constitution”, is to infer that its contents are accepted worldwide as absolutely “good” and as such cannot or may not be changed, is out of context and lacks reality. . The fact that the ANC regime, with their voting to activatea change to the Constitution, obtained a 69.6% favourable vote, confirms the antagonists’ lack of reality and their outdated thinking “on behalf” of the Blacks in the New South Africa. For the propagandists, the antagonists seem to be increasingly “blind and deaf strangers”, lost in their own darkness in South Africa.7,42,107-109

Firstly, the question for the propagandists is who are these international persons lauding the 1994 Constitution? Praise here, is for the propagandists undoubtedly from the White international capitalists who shamelessly exploit/ed pre- and post-1994 the South African economics through shares and foreign owning of land. In this context, their masterly political manipulation through the antagonists as activists’ groups to safeguard their interests is clear. The truth for the propagandists is that these persons prefer an exclusive foreigner-right in South Africa, through an even exclusive foreign-orientated Constitution, allowing with them into the country’s land ownership and capital.130

Secondly, for the propagandists, the question is cleverly watered down by the antagonists in terms of who must really be favoured by the Constitution: is it not the South African inhabitants, especially the poor Blacks, who form the mass majority?

Thirdly, upon evaluation of the phrase: “international lauding”, meaning undoubtedly excellence and integrity, the propagandists contend that Israel’sconstitution is also a so-called “international laudatory” one, as evident from the USA, the UK and France’s acknowledgement of it, while it is arguably one of the most suppressive ones in the world. It’s is an “Israel Apartheid”, allowed by the Western world to continueundisturbed, to commit war crimes, genocide and land grabbing from the Arabs since 1948 (Al Nakba). The classification or status of “international lauding” of the South African Constitution by the antagonists is hereto for the propagandists undoubtedly applicable only when a Constitution exclusively suites Western countries’ corrupt interests, while it devastates at the same time the interests and rights of the poor, indigenous people. Although most of this type of “Israeliconstitutional contamination” was expelled in 1994 from South Africa, are there still elements of contamination in the country’s Bill of Rights which must be rectified. The beginning of its “healing”, according to the propagandists, can be seen in the recent overwhelming Parliament vote in the National Assembly to begin with the process to “repair” the 1994 Constitution, to bring back land ownership to the lawful people and to erase the immense poverty, inequality and unemployment of Blacks.5,7,131,132

In perspective, South Africa’s Bill of Rights is not really lauded nationally and internationally. This is simply “fake news”.

3.2.8. Altering of Section 25 will block and damage South Africa’s local and foreign economics?

To argue, as many antagonistic White-capitalists do that42:18: “The alteration of Section 25’s would block the country’s flourishing economy and that foreign investors won’t risk having their land confiscated when they can pick any number of other nations that will protect their investments”, is a foolish argument. The propagandists note that indigenous land is in the first place not meant for foreigners to possess and to make money from. In South Africa’s troubled poverty, profits must be transferred back to the inhabitants. If foreigners can make a good living on South African land and be successful as entrepreneurs and farmers, so can South African Blacks make agood living on the land and be successful as entrepreneurs and farmers. There is more than enough South African capital internally available to aactivate a start-up of large scale Black-farming.133

The false concept of the introduction of so-called “good” by foreigners to the country through their ownership of South African soil, is in the mindset of the propagandists created solely by the White minority who own masses of land and their association with the outside White communities, who are really not worried about the short and long term interests of the Black community. The ownership by foreign elements, such as the Jews, of land from the 1900s in Germany and Russia, was one of the direct reasons for the Holocaust, which led to the murder of approximately 10 million Jews. To allow further unlimited foreigners into South Africa as land owners, will only aggravate the present day conflict around land ownership and can easily lead to a “South African Holocaust of foreigners and Whites” in the near future. How the antagonists’ oppose some form of curbing future foreign investments and land ownership, even citizenship, is not new in South Africa: South African White political leaders such as DF Malan, HF Verwoerd, JBM Hertzog and JC Smuts, put such a block into practice in the 1930s on the Jews fleeing the Nazis to South Africa, without any negative international impact on the economics or activating a political backlash. (Smuts to the contrary, after the 1930s became an imminent world leader, respected worldwide). The Malan-clan did the same on a full scale locally with Apartheid to the Blacks from 1948, again without any internationally financial backlash. It must also be noted that South Africa’s political and economic associations are today far less intertwined with the “extreme Western democracies” such as the USA and the UK, but are directed and steered by the political thinking and action of their BRICS partners, which are less of hypocritical “ultra-democracies”.5

On the so-called immense negative impact that the ANC’s land reform can activate, the economic adviser of the Optimum Group, Dr. Roelof Botha133 (a son of the late ex-minister Pik Botha of the NP), states that foreign investments are not playing nearly such an important role as our local investments: in the last three years, foreign investments only amounted to an average of 0.7% of South Africa’s annual gross inland produce (GIP). The unimportance of a contingent of foreign investors is also well reflected by the decline of direct foreign investments of R76 billion in 2008 to only R17.6 billion in 2017. Inland investments (local capital-forming) are thus far more important than foreign investments which the White politicians within the antagonists try to reflect as an absolute pre-requisite not to become another Venezuela or Zimbabwe. It confirms that South Africa can develop immensely without foreign investments. It also means that land redistribution, even in its most ugly form, will not necessarily devastate the country’s economy, as many of the financial prophets of doom, especially from the White side, predict. Furthermore, it is kept silent by the antagonists that the intended land expropriation is not going to be radical, in line with nationalising the Whites’ assets. In this context it is important to reflect back to Haffejee’s50;8 description of the land expropriation plan: only certain categories of land like abandoned buildings, unutilised land, commercial property held unproductively and purely for speculative purposes, under-utilised property owned by the state, and land farmed by labour tenants with an absentee titleholder will be expropriated. There is also no intention by Ramaphosa to block foreigners from the ownership of land. This was a Zuma theoretical “delinquency”.50,133,135

For Opperheimer42 to also speak of a flourishing economy to exist in South Africa today is a little bit overdone. (See again the above reference: the direct foreign investments were in 2017 only R17.6 billion against the R76 billion in 2008). Regarding the effort of Ramaphosa to attract new foreign investments per se of R1 200 billion is praiseworthy, but not the end of the road if it is not reached. If this foreign investment is to be based upon an exclusive land ownership wherein rich foreigners or White South Africans are the main role-players and policy makers, then South Africa’s masses of landless poor Blacks are doomed. It will be a replay for the propagandists ten-fold of Apartheid’s wrongdoings of 1948 to 1994. Such an outcome is unacceptable for the propagandists and will not be agreed upon or allowed by the ANC regime before or after the 2019 Election. It must be noted that the securing of abnormal foreign investment in the unstable political setup which the ANC regime inherited from the NP regime, and which needs at least another 25 to 50 years to rectify, is risky for the State, given the danger of financial overpowering by foreign powers, as the Russians tried to do to South Africa with their nuclear deal. South Africa does have the internal riches in the form of minerals, human capacity and money, to make a positive growth if the country’s human potential can develop through political and economic actions, like land redistribution to uplift the poor and the landless. The propagandists believe for this correction, the country urgently needs Ramaphosa and his land reform.42,135

That the South African so-called “flourishing economy of 2018” will be devastated by land reform as Opperheimer42 tries to reflect, is wishful thinking, which again characterises the antagonists’ many wanton actions to damage the ANC regime’s and Ramaphosa’s improvement of the dire poverty of the Blacks. The impact of land expropriation will not devastate the economy in the long term, because the implementation thereof will be kept inside the initial December 2017 Nasrec-resolutions of the ANC, which exclude extreme land expropriation like land grabbing. For the propagandists it is the intention of the ANC regime to channel national capital into the country’s development through land expropriation (and vice versa), not only to fast erase the poverty associated with the poor and landless Blacks, but to turn these poor Blacks also into independent financial generators as effective Black farmers to be able to contribute to the inland investments. With this new political and economical stability in the poor Black sector, a rise in the economy, more jobs, as well as a rise in foreign investments, can follow five years from now.42,135

3.2.9. Restructuring of South Africa’s colonial financial structure and land ownership

Taking into account the present day South African economy in general (local and foreign) which the ANC regime inherited from the basically bankrupt NP -regime in 1994 and still has to struggle with, the propagandists show that this political, social and economical setup is unfortunately part of a colonial financial structure and land ownership which dates back to long before Apartheid. The ANC is indeed in the process of addressing the exploitations that are inherent to this system, like the imbalanced and unjustice land ownership which is located in White hands.50,59135-138

For the propagandists, notwithstanding how the antagonists try to denying it at all costs, South Africa is today, as in 1795 with the first kind of proto-Afrikaner self-rule, still being governed by a self-serving White minority who is mostly seated in the White business and financial sector, including a strong foreign component. The antagonists, especially those coming from the White business and agricultural sectors, are seen by the propagandists to be an inclusive part of thss self-serving White minority, still awarded with colonial empowerment to be able to think, plan and do for the mass of poor and landless Black South Africans. The importance of foreign capital, as reflected by the antagonists, and their allegation that the impact of the land expropriation is going to destroy it, is untrue. So far the antagonists have failed to offer a trustworthy report to confirm the negative impact of the intended land expropriation on foreign investments or on the age-old colonial farming setup.50,59,135-138

It must be remembered that 2015 was a milestone for post-Apartheid South Africa, writes Tsotetsi.138 As a water-shed it brought to the foreground not only lingering governmental and nation questions and incompleteness coming from pre-1994, but also demands for the equaling of citizen rights after 24 years of democracy. It was the start-up of the total “decolonisation” of the New South Africa, wherein the Blacks’ land ownership was central and that of foreigners secondary. Tsotetsi138 writes138:21: “That word – “decolonisation” – is one that’s been uttered, shouted and written about many times. It’s the spirit of the Fallism, which I understand as a movement that, at its core, is about taking charge of our present so that we can be more in control of our future”; and: “It was about reclaiming a country that hasn’t felt like ours in our lifetimes or in those of our parents, or of their parents, and maybe even of their parents’ parents”. Tsotetsi138 can, in this context, with right postulate that the Freedom Charter fails the landless poor Blacks because it states that South Africa belongs to all who live in it (Blacks as well as White foreigners). It was never fully positioned with the majority of Blacks at the centre. Notwithstanding their political liberty awarded in 1994, the majority of Blacks are disenfranchised economically, socially and even politically due to their faulty 1994 Constitution wherein the land matter was never clearly spelled out and which the antagonists now are misusing around the so-called blocking of foreign investments. This, state the propagandists, is precisely the correction which the ANC regime wants to effect with land expropriation and why decolonialisation of South Africa is an absolute neccessity.138

For the propagandists many of the Whites of 2018 in South Africa are undoubtedly missing their centuries old colonial political “White privileges”, like their domination of the Black population, White land lordships and the benefits of an exclusive White farming economy. In the upholding of these privileges (or at least a last effort to uphold it) the South African Whites need the direct backing of White and Western foreigners (and their governments) through their investments here, forcing these foreigners, through fear created by the antagonists of land grabbing and nationalisationg, to get active with the antagonists in fighting the ANC’s so-called land reform. In this context of ongoing White economic empowerment, the propagandists show that notwithstanding there are only 2.8 million Afrikaners left in South Africa (representing just 8% of the total population), they, although White-rule ended 25 years ago, are still beingappointed in 72% of the country’s top executive managerial posts in the private sector, in spite of the fact that they only take up 5.6% of the workforce. [Joblessness for Whites is at 7%, while the country’s national statistics reflect 26.7% (which can be 55% and higher for Blacks)].59,135

Further contradicting the antagonists’ profile of a so-called failed ANC regime and that its land reforming is going to be a further mass failure to endanger the investments of foreigners and to close the door for them, the chair of Naspers, Koos Bekker, is of the opinion that there was more prosperity created from 1994 to 2018 (25 years) by the ANC-regime, as in the 300 years up to 1994 by the various White regimes (This financial improvement is also reflected for the post-1994 Whites’ prosperity and demonstrates why foreigners are so eager to invest here, notwithstanding the antagonists’ many false doom stories). Outstanding here is the evidence that for the period before 1994, the Whites were the greatest beneficiaries (although a minority), while post-1994 , for the first time the advent of riches to Blacks, began to slowly cut down on the Whites’ sole right to riches. These benefits were also extened to foreigners (mostly White Westerners) for pre- as well as post-1994 South Africa. What land expropriation will bring for foreigners after 2019 is the same cutting down of their riches as for local Whites, simply because the sole right to the enormous pool of riches of all Whites was erased with the normal advent of a relocation of riches to Blacks.59,135

The focus above is again upon the immediate constructive land redistribution by Ramaphosa to restart the aims of the Freedom Charter after 25 years of failure to the majority of Blacks as equal citizens. It is this calling that many Whites (locals and foreigners), clinging to their unjust and doubtful land ownership, are missing out on and are trying with groundless arguments and foolish resistance to uphold, in terms of their dying colonial political establishment versus the poor Blacks’ fast growing demands. The explosiveness of the demands of the poor and landless is read well by Tsotetsi138 when she writes138:21: “The voices of decolonisation grew louder because the philosophy spread to those who had previously ignored it. Fallism and the conversations it has sparked isn’t just about taking on white privilege, racism and the pervasiveness of whiteness – it’s also about challenging the present government”.

It is this choir of demanding voices which Ramaphosa hears loud and clear, and tries to steer constitutionally constructively. The incitement role played by the antagonists, using every page from the crook’s book to stay in power, is clear. The interests of foreigners are also clearly misused here by the antagonists.

For the propagandists, the ANC regime with its intended programme of land redistribution is in a specific process to replace South Africa’s outdated colonial state and its accompanying aged economic principles and visions with a solid bond between exclusive and inclusive capitalists, landowners and the masses of poverty stricken people who indeed possess immense political power through their mass votes to be able to activate any political and socio-economil changes if needed and wanted. The South African State is becoming a modernised democratic institution under Ramaphosa and his regime.

3.2.10. White participation versus White resistance

Looking at the reactions by the antagonists since 1994, especially from 2016 by the so-called rescuers and saviours of the Afrikaners/Whites, it is clear that any constructive change planned by the ANC regi