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An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652 to 2018. Part 6: Performance profiles of executive political leaders and regimes for the period 1795 to 1872 (Cape Colony)

Gabriel P Louw


Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)


Keywords: appraisal, black, executive, history, leaders, performance, political, profile, regime, white.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 4: 1

1. Background

1.1 Introduction

At the end of 1794, France invaded Holland and in January 1795, they captured Amsterdam. As a result, the monarch, the Prince of Orange, fled to England. In Holland the Patriot Party came to an agreement with the French Republic in May 1795 and took over power to create the Batavian Republic, for all intents and purposes a vassal state of the French. The Prince of Orange, living in exile in England, requested the British government to protect the Cape Colony until he could recover the throne. He wanted to prevent the strategic halfway house falling into the hands of the French. For the British government, this was an excellent opportunity to safeguard their immediate interests in India and they decided to send a fleet of nine vessels. This fleet was under the command of Admiral Sir GK Elphinstone. He was accompanied by a military force sixteen hundred strong under the command of General Sir JH Craig. The fleet reached False Bay in June 1795, and after minimal resistance, the VOC’s force surrendered. Commissioner-General AJ Sluysken, the acting Governor of the Cape, signed the Treaty of Rustenburg on 6 September 1795, handing over the Cape Colony to the British to rule temporarily on behalf of the Prince of Orange. The VOC’s soldiers became prisoners of war, while Sluysken returned to the Netherlands. General Craig acted as governor until May 1797 when he was relieved by the Earl George Macartney.1,2

The total population within the borders of the Cape Colony was as follows at that stage1:37:

  •     White free burghers numbering 16 000, with more or less 11 000 living in the rural areas and 5 000 living in Cape Town.
  •     About 1 500 White officials and 1 200 troops.
  •     Non-White slaves numbering 17 000.
  •     A KhoiKhoi population of 4 000.

Regarding the European population at the Cape in 1797, the proportion was 50% Dutch, 27% German, 17% French, and other elements representing 6%, mostly Scandinavian.1

1.2 The presence of the civilized world in the form of the British Empire as temporary rulers of the Cape, 1795 to 1803

We already saw in Part 5 of the series that the Cape’s inhabitants were exposed to different commanders and governors of the VOC over the period 1652. In general they brought very little that was positive, but they all had one common feature: they were all Dutch and of the same culture and political orientation as most of the White inhabitants living at the Cape. The inhabitants could address their appeals about wrongdoings by the VOC government and the commander and governors, to organizations that were Dutch, although these appeals mostly went unanswered. As a direct result of the VOC’s mismanagement on many terrains, a culture of lawfulness had developed in the Cape Colony, and this had become entrenched among the White frontiersmen. This made them resistant to stricter governance and order and to the change to a more humane attitudes to the non-Whites. The arrival of the British as temporary rulers meant the end of the VOC. The British had often been at war with the Dutch before this and were directly responsible for the downfall of the VOC’s rule at the Cape with their shipping trade embargos.1-5

The free burghers certainly did not see the British as trustworthy comrades and true partners when they came to the Cape in 1795, especially not the unruly White frontiersmen. Most of all, they did not foresee the collapse of the VOC and its partnership with the Netherlands, opening the door for one of their greatest enemies to become their ruler without a shot being fired. The unpreparedness of the free burghers is reflected in the arrogance of the inhabitants of Graaff-Reinet and Swellendam when they declared themselves “independent” from the Cape, seemingly as part of the Batavian Republic.1-3

On the other hand, the British were interested in expanding their Empire and they had little respect and consideration for different from what they considered their “civilized” culture. Their domination of the globe was equally entrenched in their thinking, and they forced many groups around the world to march to a British tune. They came with an aggressive intent to shape and control the indigenous cultures and people under their control. Those who adopted the British culture were always ultimately still the underdogs. The Europeans of the 1800s, like the British at the Cape, were inclined to distinguish themselves from “other” human beings by taking and consuming a growing share of the world’s goods. They skillfully manipulated the environments in their territories. Roberts4 shows this very well in his research. Self-service, self-enrichment and self-empowerment formed the bases of their British thought and behaviour. They tapped other nations’ resources, potential and human energies by overpowering them. In this way, they created a self-perpetuating wealth, opening up and creating new resources and more wealth at the costs of the oppressed.4

Roberts writes4:761:

The profits of Congo rubber, Burmese teak or Persian oil would not for a long time be reinvested in those countries. The poor European and American benefited from the low prices of raw materials, and improving morality rates tell the story of an industrial civilization finding it possible to give its peoples a richer life. Even the European peasant could buy cheap manufactured clothes and tools while his contemporaries in Africa and India still lived in the Stone Age.

In the minds of the British, the inhabitants of the Cape Colony were uncivilized. A later reference after the British final occupation of the Cape Colony in the 1800s reveals that the felt obliged to make the people of the backwards Cape Colony acceptable and functional so that they could become part of the mighty British Empire.

Compared to what the British knew as civilized, the Cape Colony indeed did not hold to this standard Roberts writes4:761:

When they looked for it, they tended to see only heathen, backward, benighted people or a few striving to join the civilized. Such an attitude was an important part of the story of European success; what were taken to be demonstrations of the inherent superiority of European ideas and values nerved men to fresh assaults on the word and inspired fresh incomprehension of it. The progressive values of the eighteenth century provided new arguments for superiority to reinforce those originally stemming from religion. By 1800, Europeans had lost almost all of their former respect for other civilizations. Their own social practice seemed obviously superior to the unintelligible barbarities found elsewhere.

It was in this “uncivilized” Cape Colony that the British arrived in 1795. Up to 1872, they ruled the area without disturbance by means of a series of autocratic governors. The period 1795 to 1872 can be divided in four: the first British occupation as caretaker of the Cape Colony (1797–1803); the Cape as a colony of the Batavian Republic (1803–1806); the second British occupation of the Cape Colony by conquest (1806–1814); and the British occupation of the Cape Colony by treaty (1814–1872). A total of twenty-nine governors served between 1795 and 1872 (2 Dutch and 27 British).

1.3 Overview of this study

This article (Part 6) is part of the second project (Project 2) on the executive leadership and regimes of South Africa. The two projects cover the period 1652 to 2018. The first series (Project 1) of five articles (Part 1 to 5) have been published in Ensovoort. The first five articles evaluated and described the performance profiles of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa (previously the Cape Colony) for the period 1652 to 1795. These five articles, published under the main title: An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652 to 2018, are titled as follows:

  •     Part 1: Leadership characteristics in perspective;
  •     Part 2: The entities in government and society that executive political leaders use to aid     their political behaviour;
  •     Part 3: Factors that influence the development of executive political leaders;
  •     Part 4: A basic checklist for the appraisal of executive political leaders and regimes;
  •     Part 5: The performance profiles of executive political leaders and regimes for the period     1652 to 1795.

The reader is referred to this first project for the theoretical basis of this endeavour. The five articles that constitute Project 2 cover the remaining period of 1796 to 2018. In this project, the focus is on the performance profiles of executive political leaders and regimes in five timeframes: 1796 to 1872 (Part 6), 1873 to 1909 (Part 7), 1910 to 1948 (Part 8), 1949 to 1994 (Part 9) and 1995 to 2018 (Part 10).

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern historical research where there is not an established body of research, like with the functioning of executive political leaders and their regimes of governance for the period 1795 to 1909 in South Africa. The sources included articles for 2018, books for the period 1945 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2016. These sources were consulted to evaluate the functioning of executive political leaders and to put thoughts, views and opinions on the South African political leadership for the period 1795 to 1909 in perspective.6-8

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

2.1 Problem statement

The research question asks whether the executive political leaders of South Africa (Cape Colony) during the period 1795 to 1872 made any extraordinary contributions to the country and its people and whether their behaviour as leaders and individuals was above reproach.

  •     People refers to all the South African groups – the various races, cultural groups, tribes, etc. It includes the minorities and the majorities – it does not refer to any sole grouping in terms of dominant political party, etc. In the above reference would it be more correct to refer to     “peoples”.
  •     Country refers to today’s greater South Africa as represented by the Republic of South Africa. It also refers to the Cape Settlement and Cape Colony, etc.

2.2 Research aims

  •     The first aim of the research is to determine if the South African executive political leaders and regimes of the period 1795 to 1872 made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their time of rule.
  •     The second aim of the research is to determine if the behaviours of the South African     executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 were above reproach.

In light of above, two research questions must be asked and answered to discover the truth about the South African executive political leaders. This then leads to two objectives, as well as two hypotheses and two alternative hypotheses.

2.3 Research questions

The following two research questions focus the research intentions:

RQ1: Did the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 make any extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their times in office?

RQ2: Were the behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 as leaders and as individuals above reproach?

2.4 Objectives of the study

The following two objectives guide the study:

RO1: To determine if the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 made any extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their time in office;

RO2: To determine if the behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 as leaders and as persons were above reproach.

2.5 Hypotheses

The following two hypotheses and two alternative hypotheses are tested:

H1: The South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their time in office.

H1A: The South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 did not make extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their time in office.

H2: The behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 as leaders and as persons were above reproach.

H2A: The behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 as leaders and as persons were not above reproach.

3. Results

3.1 First British occupation as caretakers of the Cape Colony (1797–1803)

3.1.1 Autocratic governors

During the British government’s acting as care-taker of the Cape Colony on behalves of the Prince of Orange, the following four British governors’ served1,2,9:

1797–1798: George Macartney

1798–1799: Francis Dundas

1799–1801: Sir George Yonge

1801–1803: Francis Dundas

The British temporary military management under General Craig started well and he attracted positive input from many pro-colonists. The colonists were required to take an oath of allegiance to the British king for as long the Cape stays British property. The rights and property of the VOC were transferred to the new authority, but the laws, rights and customs of the colonists stayed the same. The Cape, Stellenbosch and Swellendam accepted the new regime, but Graaff-Reinet stayed aloof until November 1796 after the defeat of the Dutch fleet at Saldanha Bay. Many of the Cape inhabitants, even those took the oath of allegiance, remained hostile to the British.1-3,5 George Macartney (1797–1798)9        

On 5 May 1797 with the take-over by governor, Duke Macartney, political management suddenly changed to a strict form of Crown colony management. He introduced Imperial Authority immediately at the Cape and over the Colony, a system that remained valid until 1872. All civil and military powers were now vested in the hands of the Governor, he abolished the Political Council and soon after that the other bodies. He also created a strong official management, excluding the colonists. Any form of direct representation was absent and a further loss of political freedom followed. Strict action was taken against colonists who refused to take the oath of allegiance to the British king. A new High Court of Justice replaced the Council of Justice, while the Appeals Court consisted of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor (the commander of the military forces) with the right of higher appeal to the Privy Council in Britain. Most of the other administrative and judicial bodies of the VOC remained. The Roman-Dutch Law was retained.1-3,5

Improvements included the abolishment of corrupt monopolies, overdue land tax were written off, there was freedom of conscience and religious freedom, and torture and the barbaric execution of the death penalty on slaves were abolished. He also made the benefits of the two English Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 applicable on the Cape colonists.1,2,5

However, the British love for material gain emerged in the benefits and salaries paid to the British top executives and their officials, undoubtedly to detriment of the colonists. In this sense, the British were no improvement. British officials like Frans Bresler and John Barrow who were placed at Graaff-Reinet to oversee the eastern border of the colony were responsible for much of the hostility towards the British. Macartney favoured and promoted Anglo-orientated colonists, which damaged his relationship with the White inhabitants.1,2,5

The biggest challenge for Macartney was to solve of the conflict between the races, especially keeping the Xhosas within in the confines of their territories with promises and smart talk. More or less the same approach of “termination” was followed that the VOC took. The colonist-commandos received orders to keep them in their place and if needed, to drive them to the Kalahari. He tried to solve conflict by separating White and Black along the borders where the different groups started to come into contact more and more. The Macartney apartheid of 1798 failed in the end, as did the grand Apartheid of the NP a hundred and fifty years later.1,2,5

Although the temporary British government’s executive leader created a better administrative environment, Macartney failed to establish a balanced government to benefit all the inhabitants living in the Cape Colony. The British government, like the VOC government previously, was one of autocracy. Francis Dundas (1799–1799, 1801–1803)9

The Lieutenant Governor of the Cape Colony’s forces, Francis Dundas, acted as the first governor (the office was run by Sir George Yonge’s from 1799 to 1801).

Craig’s arrest of the two Graaff-Reinet leaders, Adriaan van Jaarsveld and Marthinus Prinsloo, caused conflict between the early Afrikaners and the Britons that did not calm down before 1961. The result of these arrests was a group of colonists from Graaff-Reinet on the eastern border staged their first failed rebellion. At the same time the attitude of the KhoiKhoi, mostly those living along the Orange River on the undefined northern border, changed for worse and serious conflict broke out between the Whites and the KhoiKhoi. Some British officials sided with the KhoiKhoi, which caused a further deterioration of the relationship between the early Afrikaners and the British governor and the other officials appointed by the British government. Meanwhile, an alliance formed between the KhoiKhoi and the Xhosas. The situation became very dangerous for the colonist farmers on the Eastern Frontier. The Xhosas attacked the southern part of Graaff-Reinet, committing atrocities and creating enormous chaos during the Third Xhosa War. No real action against the Xhosas and KhoiKhoi followed. The only consequence was new regulations, and the early Afrikaners felt that these regulations favoured the KhoiKhoi and the Xhosas. The British authority compelled the colonists to behaviour well towards the KhoiKhoi and the Xhosas. The British also limited the punitive action farmers could take against the KhoiKhoi and the Xhosas after an attack or livestock theft. The eastern border districts were reduced to chaos, with homesteads and farms being burned down. Racial hatred against the KhoiKhoi, Xhosas and KhoiSan deepened, especially after the Xhosas occupied large colonial areas in the east of the colony.1,2,5

Although Dundas did improve the Cape Colony in some ways, he could not solve the increasing conflict on the eastern border. The political strife between Blacks and Whites was far worse by 1803 than in 1795.

3.2 Batavian Republic (Dutch Colony) (1803–1806)9

During the Council for Asian Possessions’ rule of the Cape Colony on behalf of the Batavian Republic, the following two governors served9:

1803–1804: Jacob Abraham Uitenhage de Mist

1804–1806: Jan Willem Janssens

The Peace of Amiens between Britain and France gave the colonies back to the Netherlands. The VOC was closed down in 1798 and replaced in May 1800 by the Council for Asian Possessions, a body subject to the Dutch government. They were responsible for the further administration and management of the Cape Colony. The Cape was handed back to the Batavian Republic in February 1803 to be governed by a commissioner general. De Mist was appointed in the position, assisted by General JW Janssens as the governor in charge.1,2,5

De Mist quickly established a functioning system. Many of the VOC bodies were reinstated, like the Political Council and the Council of Justice. The Cape Colony’s juridical status changed to that of a province of the Netherlands and was managed directly from there.1,2,5

The non-Whites who had no human rights up to 1803 were now burghers and formed the majority of the population. By 1803 there were 22 000 Whites versus 25 000 slaves and 10 000 KhoiKhoi (making the population ratio 4:6), while in 1805 there were 25 757 Whites versus 29 545 slaves and 20 006 KhoiKhoi (ratio 3:6). Both De Mist and Janssens, as liberal thinkers, were worried about the oppression of the Blacks by the government itself and by the colonists, especially in the areas along the inland borders. This concern was justified, seeing that the non-Whites were the majority, and growing, left without any civil or human rights from 1652. The Dutch leaders improved on many of the regulations designed to limit the lawless actions of the White frontiersmen. They for instance compelled White employer to sign service contracts with their KhoiKhoi employees. This was a positive step that better work- and race relations. De Mist also wanted to gradually emancipate the slaves by freeing slave children at birth. However, his short period at the Cape and the rigid attitudes of the White farmers thwarted his humanitarian efforts. The White farmers wanted cheap labour and they kept importing of more slaves.1,2,5

Another positive contribution was De Mist’s establishment of a Board of Education to manage education and to rectify the neglect of education by the British caretakers. His intent to get education of an equal standard to the frontiersmen is especially noteworthy. He also focused on maintaining of free trade and made efforts to improve the local wool and wine industries. With respect to religion, he introduced measures to reorganise and recognise various religious dominations. This included help with gatherings of congregations to the payment of their ministers. However, he made it clear that the church in all its forms is subject to the state. He addressed the colour issue directly, opening religious practice to all.1,2,5 Van der Merwe writes5:147:

…public religious gatherings on Sundays could only take place on Sundays with open doors, so that no-one, Christian or heathen, White or Black, slave or free man, could be refused entry (Own translation).

For the first time since 1652, there was the flickering of hope that there would be a form of executive and political leadership that would serve all the populations of the Cape, gaining the respect, support and approval of all races. The hope was that this leadership would guide the future politicians in their duties and behaviours as leaders at the Cape.1,2,5

De Mist’s Memorie expounded a new civil and juridical code of governance that was unknown to the Cape Colony until that time. It covered every facet of live from health, education, religion, economics, farming, civil and political rights, defence to taxation. Although the De Mist Code did not suggest one-man-one-vote, his various governmental and civil bodies granted more representation to inhabitants in every sphere of life and clearly intended to end civil unrest in daily life. His code also limited power abuse by the executive leaders of the Colony and its inhabitants with respect to economic, civil, political and juridical rights. De Mist did wonders in his short time (1803–1804) at the Cape. Although his progress with rights for non-Whites was limited, he significantly improved the situation of the Whites.1,2,5

Regarding the Black–White issue, especially in the Graaff-Reinet and areas along the eastern border, he addressed possible future mistreatment of the slaves, KhoiKhoi, Khoisan and the Blacks by the colonists by the placing of a subdivision of soldiers there to oversee justice. However, his liberal policy of befriending the Xhosas failed, as evident from continuing attacks. De Mist’s one-sided view of the non-Whites as the only victims at the hand of the colonists changed over time. The Whites often saw reprimands for illegal Black behaviours as support for the Whites. Later in history, Whites often cited these incidents as proof of the evil intentions of the KhoiKhoi, Khoisan and the Xhosas in the 1800s. They rarely mention the transgressions of the Whites, like land grabbing, stock theft and the murder of these non-Whites as punishment actions (like the “hunting” of the KhoiSan).1,2,5

Historical writings rarely reflect both sides of the story. The events occurred in a less civilized world than today. The Whites saw the KhoiKhoi, Khoisan and the Xhosas as African barbarians, and the non-Whites saw the White frontiersmen as White barbarians. The impact of these early conflicts on later hostility and counter-hostility is often underestimated. The problems that started in 1652 and that went on to affect South African politics until 1994 and beyond, did not resolve under De Mist.1,2,5

In 1803 De Mist entered a political system where racial differences (and discrimination and domination) affected religion, culture, cognition, emotion, education, lifestyle and standard developments and functioning and where these differences were already deeply entrenched. The situation could not have changed with a single code. Continuing the separation that Macartney started in 1798 seemed the best solution, but it ultimately spelled disaster.1,2,5 Van der Merwe describes the doom lurking in De Mist’s policy5:153:

…the intention of the Batavian authorities was to create a better grounding for the relationship between the colonists and the Bantus along the eastern border. According to Alberti [captain of the military forces based at Fort Frederick on the Eastern border and later military magistrate at Uitenhage in charge of overseeing peace in the area], the policy had to be founded on two principles, namely dispelling all Bantus from the Suurveld and driving them across the colonial border, and ending all contact between colonists and Bantus, and between Bantus and Hottentots. This principle was also included in the first message of De Mist to the settled populations along the border districts and to the Xhosa captains. The Bantu had no concept of ‘mine’ and ‘yours’, and this was at the core of all the problems. Nobody was allowed to move across the border and back. Alberti felt that sixty soldiers would be enough to patrol the border. The policy therefore came down to inexorable separation to maintain peace between the eastwards migrating Whites and the southwards moving Bantu stream (Own translation).

The above description reveals the complete lack of understanding of the problems along the border. The Blacks and Whites were seen as two groups, there was no understanding that neither these categories consisted of a natural unity. At this point in history, not a single executive political leader, Dutch or British, had shown insight or had made decisions beyond their own short-term interests. The leaders came from European tradition of the separation of nations where each nation is financially independent and large enough to form a nation. This was not the case here. What is more, the right to land and the ownership of land played a significant role in the relationships. The South Africa of the 1800s was basically an agricultural economy, making the sole ownership of land a point of conflict. It was naïve of Alberti to think that they could stop the migration of the different groups. It was a complicated process, and the politicians of the 1800s were used to settling these kinds of problems with brute military force.1,4

De Mist’s hopes that his governance would inspire good leadership that would serve all the populations of the Cape and that he would be remembered as a leader who was respected, supported and approved by all the different races, failed to become a reality. He started well in 1802, but he undid all of his own good work. This begs the question: Would any future South African judiciary or political regime or executive leader be able to do better than De Mist? Time will tell.

De Mist and his assistant Janssens inherited a dysfunctional system. They had the genuine intention to better it and made honest attempts in their short rule of two years (1802–1804). However, it was already an unhealthy situation where each race was trapped in their little corner with their own fears. Van der Merwe5 writes as follows about De Mist and Janssens5:155:

However, their work at the Cape was not without fruit, although their limited time did not allow for it to be thoroughly tested. Their labour was fraught with extraordinary difficulty. All their actions and decisions were aimed at promoting the good of South Africa. In cases where measures were not received well by the citizens, this should not be attributed to ill will or a lack of diligence, but rather to the fact that the authorities were not informed of the intricacies, morals and habits of the communities to which these measures were made applicable. They regarded the communities as people with the same prejudices as all colonists, which was not true. This became clear from the colonist’s views of all beings who are not White, and their religious views in this regard. In essence the leaders were confronted here with a people who were no longer Dutch, but who showed the traits of a new, separate nation with an own language and views regarding all terrains of life, and they differed significantly from those of their Dutch, German and French contemporaries (Own translation).

Van der Merwe5 poignantly captures the problems created by the fact that the White inhabitants were developing a unique political identity. They actually needed their own state by the 1800s, run independently without outsider interference or intervention. He highlights the beginnings of the early Afrikanerdom, a people prepared to challenge anyone who dares to limit their identity and human rights. However, this imminent Afrikaner historian does fail to describe, like many of his contemporaries, the many changes and transformations the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi and Xhosas also underwent, often by force, since the 1600. Nor does he acknowledge the role, good or bad, that the Whites (both inhabitants and authorities) at the Cape played in these many changes and transformations. This information sheds light on why the Cape Colony’s politicians and executive leaders failed to appoint good leaders and to establish a permanent regime up to the 1800s.1,2,5

Most historians and Afrikaner scholars fail to offer sound alternatives to the political debacle of the 1800s and to indicate how early Afrikaner nationalism and its hunger for territory and political power over the non-Whites could have been managed differently. It took an outsider, the historian JM Roberts4, to do this in the space of only a few pages in his History of the World. The De Mist Code was by far the best guideline for managing affairs at the Cape. It had the potential to change the attitudes of both non-White and White inhabitants and to unite them under a good leader. The potential of the code was immediately lost with the British imperial intervention of 1805. The British failed to understand the early Afrikaner, perhaps as result of their “civilized” British culture. De Mist and the Batavian rulers did have this understanding. Van der Merwe5 rightfully points out that there was too much of the Rousseau doctrine left in the British mindset and too little common sense.1,2,4,5

However, the British also failed as a result of how contaminated the system was by the political dogmas, doctrines and ideologies of the early Afrikaners and the non-Whites themselves. Neither the early Afrikaners nor the non-White tribes designed these dogmas, doctrines and ideologies. They were inherited from the various foreigner rulers of the Cape and exacerbated by poor leadership. The British were notorious for ruling with dogma.1,2,4,5

De Mist retired on 25 September 1804 and moved back to the Netherlands in February 1805, leaving the enormous task of being governor to Janssens. However, the plans for the new Cape Colony came to an absurd end with the military takeover on 18 January 1806. The Cape surrendered to the British forces under David Baird for a second and last time.1,2,5

3.3 Second British occupation of the Cape Colony (1806–1814)9

3.3.1 Autocratic governors

Up to 1814 the British held the Cape Colony by conquest and not by treaty rights. The legal position of the Cape Colony as a full British possession was only finalized with the Peace of Paris. The six governors for 1807 to 1814 were1,2,9:

1807–1808: David Baird

1808–1808: Henry George Grey

1808–1811: Du Pré Alexander, 2nd Earl of Caledon

1811–1811: Henry George Grey

1811–1814: John Francis Cradock

1813–1814: Robert Meade  (acting)

From day one it was clear that although the Cape Colony was held by conquest, which should technically have limited their rights to make large statutory and administrative changes, many changes and autocratic actions followed.1,2,5

The second British occupation resulted in comprehensive statutory changes and political conflict between the early Afrikaners and the British, as well as between the early Afrikaners and the various non-White ethnic groups. Although the British promised to maintain certain parts of the De Mist code, there was a dramatic change from a centralized governmental system to a autocratic one-man regime with the governor as head of the executive, legislative and juridical powers. There was no a consulting body to guard against the governor’s misuse of powers, he ruled by proclamation.10

The six governors were autocratic rulers who were only subject to the Secretary of State in London. Their submission was reflected in favouring the followers of the Prince of Orange in civil service appointments at the Cape. Although the Roman-Dutch Law was retained, the High Court was demoted to its lower level status of the pre-Batavian times, while the despised Office of the Fiscal with all its negative features was restored. The Burgher Senate was reinstated as a town council for Cape Town, while it also became an advisory body to the Cape government. Again, the Cape administration was overburdened by highly paid officials as during the first British occupation. The De Mist Code’s stipulations on churches and the improved Batavian administration of rural areas were retained, but the central governmental system was replaced by an autocratic one-man rule. At this time there was still no sign of democracy at the Cape.10

The White colonists were doing well financially as result of the growth in the shipping industry and better sales of produce to these visiting ships and a rise in exports. However, the Black–White conflict really reared its head. Racial conflict and governance problems were awaiting the colony. The Earl of Caledon (1808–1811)9

Caledon’s reign was autocratic, with him being in charge of the executive, legislative and judicial powers. There was no advisory body to temper his behaviour. He legislated by proclamation and was only accountable to the Minister of Colonies in London. He could do as he pleased, and in the case of urgent decisions, he did not always act with wisdom. The lag-time involved in communication meant that London could often not intervene.1,2,10

Some of Caledon’s more positive policies include the division of the territory’s six districts, namely the Cape, Stellenbosch, Tulbagh, Swellendam, Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage, into smaller districts. This resulted in better administration and offered Caledon more control over the countryside and the unruly White frontiersmen. It enabled him to gradually expand the British system of centralizing political, judicial and legislative power. He attained this goal by establishing a circuit high court at Caledon to support the magistrate’s court, lower the cost of high court cases.10

Caledon regarded human rights as important, especially the position of the KhoiKhoi in the Colony. Up to this point the KhoiKhoi were treated as an independent group managed by own chiefs, although under the care of the Cape government. However, they disintegrated into small travelling groups without work or sometimes in the service of the White farmers. In November 1809, Caledon made the KhoiKhoi inside the country’s borders citizens to whom all laws were applicable. In an effort to manage their movement, all KhoiKhoi had to have a permanent place of residence and needed a pass from their employers to move around. Caledon tried to instil a work ethics in the KhoiKhoi and to make them a future substitute for the slaves, who became a problem for London from 1809. He also wanted to stop White farmers from abusing the KhoiKhoi and being cruel by enforcing work contracts between farmers and workers. This decision elicited a reaction from the London Mission’s managers in South Africa, Read and Van der Kemp, who lived in Bethelsdorp. Dissatisfaction with Caledon’s racial policy spread to London where the philanthropist William Wilberforce was already creating awareness of slavery and the mistreatment of the KhoiKhoi by the Whites at the Cape. This issue quickly escalated after 1814.1,2,10

The Xhosa problem needed swift action from Caledon. They were still living in the Zuurveld and frequently entered the districts of Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage, causing chaos. However, it was clear to Caledon that driving them back would create conflict with London. He ultimately left an already failed border policy untouched. Black and White were in direct conflict over land, with various governments failing to offer a sound future strategy and a plan for a permanent working relationship between the two groups.1,2,10 John Francis Cradock (1811–1814)

The new governor ignored London’s request not to address the “Black problem” with military action and in the fourth Xhosa war, he drove the Xhosas back across the Fish River. In an effort to limit the fast northwards migration of White frontiersmen into Black territory, he also introduced a new system of land ownership in Cradock in 1813 where the Black-White conflict was prominent. He replaced the loan farm system with a system of hereditary possession, hoping to bind the farmers to their farms to stop them from migrating.10

Cradock’s actions against the Xhosas and the KhoiKhoi quickly got a reaction from the White missionaries at Bethelsdorp and other role players concerned about human rights. This led to the so-called “Swarte Ommegang” (Black Circuit) where several White farmers and their families were accused of theft and murdering KhoiKhoi. Although these accusations were found untrue by judges Strubberg and Cloete of the Circuit High Court, the White farmers lost trust in London as a ruler and in the foreign missionaries. From then onwards the mission stations were side-lined. The Blacks and Whites were now positioned as enemies.1,2,10

Strubberg and Cloete of the Circuit High Court gave a description of how chaotic Black-White relations became in 1814. The groups were played off against each other by foreign powers like Wilberforce in London and Read and Van der Kemp in South Africa. The two judges described the KhoiKhoi at Bethelsdorp as people living in a situation where10:162:

…the natural state of barbarism has seemingly taken the place of civility and social order…where laziness and idleness and the subsequent dirtiness and taintedness have grown to perfection (Own translation)

The two judges also commented on the feebleness of people like Wilberforce in London and Read and Van der Kemp in South Africa as they played off Blacks and Whites in 1814. Grundlingh quotes them as follows10:161:

If the lords Van der Kemp and Read went to the trouble of succinctly and impartially investigating the different stories they were told, they would have viewed many of these complaints that caused a racket inside and outside of the colony as purely fictional, and as a result neither the court nor the government would have been pestered (Own translation).

The Black Circuit was the first sign for the Cape Colony’s inhabitants, especially for the White frontiersmen, that the Peace of Paris of 1814 would change their lives forever and that the British had different plans for them.

Roberts writes as follows about the dramatic impact of the British political system from 1814 onwards4:740:

No European nation has so successfully seeded the globe with its own stock as the United Kingdom. By the end of the nineteenth century, it had created an Anglo-Saxon world which was an identifiable sub-unit within the ambit of European civilization, with an historical destiny diverging from that of the European continent. Its components included growing British communities in Canada, Australia and South Africa (the first and the last containing other important national elements, too).

The Dutch descendants in the colony had settled into a quasi-Dutch lifestyle and governmental dispensation. The change to an autocratic British system was dramatic and they struggled to adjust. To some extent, they never accepted it and sought to escape, like with the Great Trek later. The indigenous people who mostly lived outside the Cape’s statutory and political management and control experienced this change from a Dutch to a British system as less dramatic. This was also true for the slaves who had become separated from the ruling processes as a result of their loss of human rights.1,2,5,10

Looking back at the British rule of 1806 to 1814 critically, it was an immensely autocratic regime, for Blacks and Whites alike. It left the Whites confused. The situation was equally devastating for non-Whites, especially the slaves, the KhoiKhoi and the KhoiSan. Notwithstanding their new status as citizens awarded by Caledon, they were exposed to abuses by the White frontiersmen of Swellendam, Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage more than ever. On the other hand, the slaves, the KhoiKhoi and the KhoiSan were also often cruel and barbaric towards the Whites. Livestock was frequently stolen and they were lazy and undisciplined. No one-sided description of either of the groups at the Cape could do justice to history. These renditions of history should be considered critically. For example, one Afrikaner historian wrote as follows during the heyday of Grand Apartheid10:161:

Some of the complaints pertained to events in the remote past and a great number sprung from the fruitful and stimulated imagination of the Hottentots with their unbridled tongues and the malicious of unbalanced negro-loving zealots. It is true that there were cases where workers and servants had been abused in the pioneer community along the Cape borders, just like in America and even in a factory country like England, but one can assume that the Cape colonists did not act more callous than their White peers elsewhere and that the non-Whites in the Cape colony in general were better off than people elsewhere (Own translation).

Grundlingh10 words here are not quite true and are to a certain extent in line with the thinking of DF Malan, HF Verwoerd and BJ Vorster, leaders of the racist NP. He contradicts himself no less than six times in the above passage. By referring to the “remote past”, he acknowledges that the early Afrikaners did indeed commit wrongs towards the KhoiKhoi. With the reference to “unbalanced negro-loving zealots” he not only uses inappropriate language to create a false history for his Afrikaans readers, but also shows his subjectivity. This was so characteristic of the Afrikaner nationalist historians who wrote during Grand Apartheid. When he speaks of the “pioneer community along the Cape border”, he gives away his naiveté about who the Swellendam, Uitenhage and Graaff-Reneit border farmers really were. They unlawfully invaded Black territory, what we would call terrorism today. The claim that “the non-Whites at the Cape colony in general were better off than elsewhere” is a blatant lie. White farmers from Swellendam and environs went on official “hunting expeditions” to “terminate” KhoiSan and to take the KhoiSan womenfolk and children as “apprentices”, meaning forced slaves. This makes his claim far-fetched. These farmers constantly rebelled against the government, one reason being that their actions were no longer condoned.1,2,10

I would like to refer back to Geen’s1 words quoted in Part 5 about the calibre of the farmers who lived in the region of Swellendam, Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage around 1814. They became the Voortrekkers, some rising as prominent Voortrekker leaders and politicians in the later republics of Transvaal and the Free State. Geen said1:29:

…but the isolation and difficulties of frontier life also made them limited in their outlook, impatient of all forms of control and so intensely individualistic that it became difficult to unite them in effective cooperation. They lost most of their civilization on the way to the Promised Land. Some could write, still more could sign their names, many read the Bible, especially the Old Testament, into which they read a justification of themselves, their beliefs and all their works, but for the rest learning and the affairs of the great world were closed books to them.

This lawlessness among the White frontiersmen resulted in the Slaughter’s Nek Rebellion in 1815 under Frederick Bezuidenhout, which ended with the hanging of five of the ringleaders by Lord Charles Somerset. Geen writes1:57:

In 1815, there occurred the Slaughter’s Nek Rebellion, a typical incident of lawlessness on a distant and disturbed frontier. It was really nothing more than the resistance of a truculent type of frontiersmen to the new conceptions of law, order and justice that were gradually being made effective in the remoter districts.

These farmers lost their civility on their way to the Promised Land. They were cut off from the rest of the world, the Bible serving as their only literature. They read especially the Old Testament and used it justify their actions. This isolation self-righteousness made for naïve decisions on governance later in the republics2:120-121:

The new British authorities had to deal with many of these culturally poor and isolated early Afrikaners on the one hand, and pre-modern Xhosas, KhoiSan and KhoiKhoi with little understanding of simple political and governance matters on the other. They had been schooled to deal with the enemy the African way for centuries, namely war. The political refined British found it difficult to manage the situation.

The second British Cape Colony (1806–1814) with the British holding the colony by conquest, undoubtedly improved the economy of the Cape. Also, from an objective political-historical view away from the contaminated writings of Afrikaner nationalist writers and historians, the governmental administration, law-enforcement and law-making as well as the execution of leadership, progressed. Although serious issues like border and racial conflicts remained largely unchanged, they did have plans to address it. The British governors were backed by a much stronger system than were the Batavian governors.

The South African race issue became more and more laden with aggression, hate and murderous intentions from 1814 onwards.

3.4 Third British occupation of the Cape Colony (1814–1872) by treaty1,2,9

3.4.1 Autocratic governors

The Cape Colony became a rightful British possession with the Peace of Paris. The Netherlands was forced to hand it over to the British Empire permanently in August 1814. The seventeen governors who served from 1814 to 1872 were as follows1,2,9:

1814–1826: Charles Somerset

1820–1821: Rufane Shaw Donkin

1826–1828: Richard Bourke

1828–1833: Galbraith Lowry Cole

1833–1834: Thomas Francis Wade

1834–1838: Benjamin d’Urban

1838–1844: George Thomas Napier

1844–1847: Peregrine Maitland

1847–1847: Henry Pottinger

1847–1852: Sir Harry Smith

1852–1854: George Cathcart

1854–1854: Charles Henry Darling

1854–1861: George Grey

1859–1862: Robert Henry Wynyard

1862–1870: Philip Edmond Wodehouse

1870–1870: Charles Craufurd Hay

1870–1877: Sir Henry Barkly

The British authority lacked democracy. On the other hand, the Boers wanted excessive freedom. This dissatisfaction with authority and the limitations of borders limited their vision. They were intolerant of all forms of control and so intensely individualistic that it became difficult to unite them for effective cooperation. This became characteristic of many of the Boers during the Great Trek and later on in their “Promised Land”, the Boer-republics.1,2,4,10

Between 1806 and 1814 there were not large numbers of British citizens in South Africa, so the British that were present were only there to rule. After 1814 this changed dramatically when thousand of British settlers arrived. Although they were outnumbered by the Boers, they had the backing of the British government and thus the Cape authority. The introduction of British assumptions and laws and the large new English population, created a world that the Boers were not ready for. This ultimately led to negative outcomes. Roberts reports4:777:

This opened a period of whittling away of the privileges of the Boers, as the Dutch farmers were called. In particular, they were excited and irked by any limitation of their freedom to deal with the native African as they wished. Their special indignation was aroused when, as a result of the general abolition of slavery in British territory, some 35,000 of their blacks were freed with, it was said, inadequate compensation.

The Boers became increasingly annoyed, especially with their lack of influence. The Boers found the British regime unacceptable and below standard with respect to full political rights. Roberts says the following about the relationship between the Boers and British4:778:

It was the beginning of a long period during which Anglo-Saxon and Boer struggled to live sometimes apart, sometimes together, but always uncomfortably, their decisions as they did so dragging in their train others about the fate of black African. Charles Somerset (1814–1826)

Somerset arrived at a time when the relationship between non-White and White and between British and Boer had been damaged. The autocratic Charles Somerset damaged these already sensitive relationships further with his management of the unrest at Slaughter’s Neck, causing the dislike for the British occupiers to increase as a result of his over-reach with his political and juridical powers.1,2,10

Somerset inherited the eastern border problem. The policy of segregation failed and led to further Xhosa attacks on the White areas. In this instable situation, two Xhosa leaders entered into conflict themselves. This caused the one leader, Ndlambe, to move into White territory. He reached as far as Grahamstown for an unsuccessful attack on 22 April 1819. Somerset ignored London’s liberal policy and started a clean–up operation by removing the Xhosas from the area between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers, making the Keiskamma the new outer border. He created a neutral area between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers as a buffer to keep the factions away from each other and reinstated the segregation policy.1,2,10

Somerset addressed slavery by issuing a proclamation in 1816 making it compulsory to register all slaves. In 1823 he determined the workdays and hours of slaves and prescribed the minimum standard of their food and clothing rations. Married slaves could no longer be sold separately, and the Christian religion had to be made available to them. The number of strokes for physical punishment, and their testimonies were allowed in the court in cases against their owners. In 1826, a slave protector was appointed in Cape Town and various assistant protectors in the rural areas to attend to the complaints of slaves.1,2,10

In the meantime, the British government acted to minimize the Dutch influence in the Cape. They Anglicized the churches, schools and the legal system.1,2,4,10

Although the autocratic and despotic one-man regime at the Cape was replaced by a governor and a Council of Advice that could make laws by way of ordinances, the early Afrikaners could give little input. The problems between the British and the Boers were largely attributable to failure on the side of the British to appoint an effective leader at the Cape who considered the interest of the Afrikaners. Roberts4 points out how this became a situation ready for conflict4:780:

When people then spoke of a ‘racial problem’ in South Africa, they meant the problem of relations between the British and Boers whose conciliation seemed the most urgent need. The defects of the settlement would take some time to appear. When they did it would be not only because the historical sense of the Afrikaner proved to be tougher than people had hoped, but also because of the transformation of South African society which had begun by the industrialization of the Rand could not be halted and would give irresistible momentum to the issue of black Africans.

These racial defects never disappeared – the foundation had been laid for Afrikaner nationalism and its rejection of anything British. The cracks that would lead to a deep divide among Afrikaners, the subsequent founding of the Republic of South Africa 1961, and Apartheid with its racial discrimination, had started to appear.1,2,4,10

The British government was caught off-guard by the British Settlers of 1820. The process started while Somerset was on leave in Britain (1820–1821), leaving the Cape in the hands of an acting governor, Donkin. The settlers, who were used to democracy, immediately got into conflict with the government. This brought a second force to the foreground against the Cape Colony’s way of ruling and their human rights practices. Although most of these immigrants had no voting rights in the UK (this only changed in 1832), they knew what discrimination was why they had to fight it. The settlers’ agitation and resistance on various terrains started slow political reform at the Cape.1,2,4,10

The arrival of the British settlers also affected the Boer–British relations. The settlers were placed in or near Black territories and close to the Xhosa conflict. They became the Eastern Province. They were more well-intended towards the Crown and were therefore considered a better defence. The Western Province was inhabited by a more political independent-minded population.1,11

The Cape colonists did not get into direct conflict with Somerset, they left that to the British Settlers. The settlers had success in 1828 when Bourke came to power.1,2,10

Grundlingh10 writes as follows about Somerset10:174:

The autocratic Somerset in his self-righteousness did not realize that the influence and power of the ruling “High Tories”, his congenial spirits and protectors, were decreasing in his mother land. The rise of the progressive “Young Tories” under the leadership of Canning, and especially the increasing power of the liberal Whi-opposition, heralded the beginning of the end of Somerset’s glory. The increasingly passionate criticism of Dr. John Philip and Exeter Hall contributed greatly to undermining the governor’s authority.

There is no doubt that Somerset made more enemies than friends and that his rule, besides the exaggerations of his Exeter Hall and settler enemies, had serious flaws like tyranny and corruption. The Governor was sharply criticized in the British parliament, and his actions came under the scrutiny of the Colebrook-Bigg commission, who visited the Cape from 1823–1826 for a thorough investigation into a number of government matters (Own translation).

The autocratic behaviours of the various governors at the Cape were being questioned. Human rights also began to make some progress, although it was still limited. The introduction of the first rudimentary rights for the Cape’s Black population was a prominent step in the right direction.11 Richard Bourke (1826–1828)

During Somerset’s second leave (1626–1628), the acting governor, Richard Bourke, suddenly had to face a flood of pro-Black sentiment from for instance John Philip. Bourke himself was pro-Black, and started a process to undo the limitations Somerset and earlier governors had imposed on the Black population. The Black-White conflict was steered by a liberal policy that the early Afrikaners saw as discriminatory. They felt that it affected their property, economic, social and political rights. The British started using KhoiKhoi to police Whites, and with Ordinance 49, all legislation that had forbidden Blacks to cross the border into the Colony was recalled. The punishment expeditions of White farmers to retrieve stolen livestock from across the borders were forbidden. Ordinance 50 recalled all legislation pertaining to the KhoiKhoi and lifted discriminatory laws against the free inhabitants of the Colony with respect to property rights, movement, living place, lifestyle or work and choice of work. The KhoiKhoi, Khoisan and free Coloureds received the right to own property. Legislation to fight slavery was also put in place, with laws to abolish it following. The political and social position of non-Whites in the bigger British society improved dramatically from 1928.1,2,11

This progress with Black emancipation was followed up with the rule of Galbraith Lowry Cole (1828–1833). He shortened the working hours of slaves and stipulated better accommodation. In August 1833 legislation was passed that slavery would be forbidden after the 1st of December 1836 in any of the British colonies.1,2,10

The reformations still did not bring democracy to the Cape. It was a first wave of human rights and freedom for the Xhosas, KhoiKhoi, KhoiSan and slaves.11 Benjamin D’Urban (1834–1838)

D’Urban inherited the immense task of emancipating 39 021 slaves. He had to calculate the value of the slaves. Compensation for slaves became a disputed topic in South African history books as parting with “Black gold” meant tremendous losses.1,2,10

Grundlingh writes10:179:

All this led to utter bewilderment at the Cape. Mortgages were foreclosed on; foreign agents and speculators exploited the confusion of the colonists by buying up their claims for ridiculously low sums. Many slave owners received one fifth or less of the capital value of their slaves. Wealthy families, especially the large patriarchal households in the Western Province, became so impoverished that many were unable to overcome the significant economic crisis. Stock farmers in the outlying districts also suffered. Although they had fewer slaves than the Boland farmers, some of them were quite considerable slave owners (Own translation).

The above Afrikaner sentiment that was mostly put on paper during NP rule, is misleading. Firstly, as with any apparatus or instrument used to generate money, there is always the unavoidable annual depreciation of the apparatus or instrument as a direct result of use and damage (with a slave this would take the form of aging, poor health, being constantly over-worked, poor accommodation, live conditions, and money already generated for his owner, etc.). It seems that the values were calculated on the sales value of the slaves (in other words a depreciated price) in 1836 and not on the initial purchase price minus the depreciation. Secondly, the many children born to slave parents became the sole property of the farm owners. Geen reflects as follows on the economic impact of the developments in the slave trade1:55:

It is true that the abolition of the slave trade proved to be a source of gain for a time, for the value of the slaves increased and, as their owners obtained considerable profit from the hire of their labour, greater care was bestowed on them.

Geen’s1 description below shows the subjectivity and arrogance of many of the White South African writers before 1990. They adhered to an undisputed right of ownership, even as late as the beginning of the 19th century. One human being may own another human as long as the owned person was Black1:55:

However, the numerous regulations made slave-ownership a burden, as the slaves were gradually removed from the control of their owners, though they continued to be private property. In contrast to the West Indies slavery at the Cape was largely domestic and the slaves on the whole were well treated, so that Lord Charles Somerset could write to the Colonial Secretary, ‘No portion of the community is better off or happier, perhaps, than the domestic slave in South Africa.

If the slaves were such a burden, why did the British government struggle so much to grant them freedom from 1816 onwards and why did the White slave owners at the Cape try everything to prolong slavery? Geen1 neglects to mention that it was only in the time of De Mist that the use of the pain bench and the barbarous torture of slaves were forbidden. The 1823, 1826 and the 1830 Ordinances had to end everything that was still happening to slaves. If the Whites were so “fond of their slaves”, seemingly as intimate family members, why did they want to keep them in chains? Somerset is the last person to make remarks on slaves. He had a track record of cruelty to any opposition, even other Englishmen, at the Cape.1,2 Did Geen1 forget the Slaughter Nek’s executions of five White farmers by Somerset or Somerset’s punishment of the Xhosas?

It later became fashionable for South African history books written by Whites to attack individuals such as William Wilberforce, his wife Hannah Gurney, Elizabeth Frey and Dr Philip and other Whites for their roles in the emancipation of not only of Black slaves, but also “free” Blacks from political oppression in their own country by foreign settlers. They were called “Black boeties” or “negrophiles”. These personal attacks lack any sound arguments and insight. These derogatory names were also used by the Afrikaner nationalists of the Verwoerdian republic to refer to Jan Smuts. “Liberal” people like Wilberforce were ahead of their times and they laid the foundation of today’s Code for Humanity. These “Black Boeties” should get more respect in the modern South African political history. They shone the rare light in a dusky world of abuse and suppression of non-Whites, helping to bring humanity to all.1,2,7,10,11,14-17

The importance of these early abolitionists, not only in South Africa but worldwide, is well described by Martinez12:235:

The abolitionists raised the political and moral consciousness of enough people to change the rules of their society. By redefining what was acceptable, they built a movement powerful enough to make the unthinkable inevitable. A similar task faces all those who value freedom today. The moral and political consciousness of society once again needs to be raised; a unifying, compelling, inspiring vision again needs to be articulated – and the ideal of freedom needs to be at its core.

The argument on the “value” of Black slaves is a further indication of how morally sick the White community at the Cape had become over time. Their value was calculated equally to that of cattle in the 1830s. Geen states1:56:

Besides some very old slaves, there were at the Cape 35,800 slaves valued at ₤3,041,290:6:0 – an average of just over ₤85 each…


The colonists did not object to the emancipation itself, …but they did resent the financial loss it involved and, still more, the fact that no vagrancy laws were passed to control the movements of the liberated slaves, who became ‘free persons of colour’ in terms of Ordinance 30.

South Africa had become a White country for the benefit of Whites only. “Free” non-Whites were walking around without work, homes and internal security by the 1830s because of the abuse of non-White labour and the orchestrated disorganization of their societal life, their political suppression, their dehumanization and the illegal occupation of their land by Whites. This resulted in immense poverty and political disorientation. The many similarities between the situation in the 1830s and the situation in South Africa from 1910 to 1994, are obvious. It shows us where the dispensation of 1910 to 1994 came from.1,2,10,14

The fact that farm activities came to a virtual halt without the presence of slaves after emancipation shows how selfishly slave owners previously profited from cheap labour. Why could the members of the large patriarchal families not do the work themselves given their numbers? Was it White laziness? The Council of Policy in 1717 described the Whites as “lazy and incompetent and more expensive than slave labour”,1:22 or was it because the White farmers were13:7-8:

…drunken, lazy, boorish oafs who went to stay at the Fort despite all threats and coercive measures, and set up boarding houses, attempted to exploit sailors and visitors, and further wasted their porch-sitting lives with endless drink and idleness, which is the root of all evil (Own translation).

or was it because,

…every common or ordinary European becomes a gentleman and prefers to be served than to serve…We have in addition the fact that the majority of the farmers in this Colony are not farmers in the real sense of the world, but owners of plantations, and that many of them consider it a shame to work with their own hands.1:25

Although the emancipation was meant to teach Cape Whites to find dignity in manual work, it failed to do so. The early Afrikaners’ alleged loss of about three million rand from the emancipation of the slaves in 1836, is nonsense.10:179 Why could the British settlers make a living on their farms at the Cape without slave labour?10

The poor remuneration to White farmers for their freed slaves is often cited as the main reason for the Great Trek. The poor payment was undoubtedly a secondary reason for the Great Trek, but later Afrikaner writers exaggerated its importance. The primary reason for the Great Trek was racism and the early Afrikaners blindly refusing to be equal to slaves and Black citizens.1,2,10

In this regard Geen writes1:67:

Perhaps, Mrs. Anna Steenkamp, a niece of Piet Retief, writing in 1876 has expressed as truly as anyone the most important cause of the Great Trek: ‘The shameful and unjust proceedings with reference to the freedom of our slaves; and yet it is not so much their freedom which drove us to such lengths, as their being placed on an equal footing with Christians, contrary to the laws of God, and the natural distinction of race and colour, so that it was intolerable for any decent Christian to bow down beneath such a yoke; wherefore we rather withdrew in order thus to preserve our doctrines in purity.

Geen gives an apt summary of the benefits of the emancipation1:56:

…in the words of the great English historian, Lackey, ‘The unweary, unostentatious and inglorious crusade of England against slavery may probably be regarded as among the three or four perfectly virtuous pages comprised in the history of nations’.

In the South Africa of 1830s emancipation did not bring one-man-one-vote, but at least it gave some dignity to non-Whites. However, they were low on the socio-economic ladder. The improvement came solely by order from London, not due to the morality or efficiency of the governors at the Cape.

D’Urban did make changes to the executive management of the Cape Colony to make it more liberal so that it could serve the people. He did this by the replacing the Council of Advisory by a Legislative Council and adding five to seven members to the Cape government. Although the governor’s autocratic power was not greatly affected by this change, this new legislative body’s approval was needed in future for the proclamation of ordinances. However, much of the government was still run from London.1,2,10

The Xhosa conflict did not disappear after the 1830s, notwithstanding the various ordinances to improve the citizenship of non-Whites. This hostile aggression of this situation was far more complex and the various Xhosa wars did not cease. In 1834 the Sixth Xhosa War broke out when 15 000 Xhosa soldiers unexpectedly entered the Colony. The outcome was devastating for the Whites (and for future Black-White relations): 22 White farmers were murdered, 456 homesteads burned down, 5 700 horses, 115 000 heads of cattle and 161 000 sheep were stolen by the Xhosas. D’Urban’s reaction was fierce and swift. He drove the Xhosas from the White farming areas and established the Province of Queen Adelaide between the Kei and Keiskamma rivers. London overruled this in 1836 and the area was handed back to the Xhosas with the reinstatement of the 1819 borders.1,2,10,14

By the end of D’Urban’s reign there had been no improvement in Black-White relations and the direct conflict between the two races raged on, especially the aggression from the Xhosas. In 1846 the new governor, Pedegrine Maitland (1844–1847), fought the War of the Axe. Again the Xhosa warriors penetrated the Colony in a war that lasted the terms of governor Henry Pottinger (1847–1847) and governor Harry Smith (1847–1852).1,2,10,14 Harry Smith (1847–1852)

Smith, like his predecessors, inherited the Cape Colony’s chaotic Black-White relations, border conflicts, growing Xhosa unlawfulness and a London government that lacked an understanding of the political and racial energies of Southern Africa. Some of Smith’s efforts to manage the border did partly correct some of the political failures of the past. In an effort to contain the ongoing war-like behaviour of the Xhosas, Smith declared the area previously known as the Province of Queen Adelaide a formal British area. The name changes to British Kaffraria, but it was not part of the Cape Colony. It became a separate Black reserve, managed by a Chief Commissioner that resorted with the British High Commissioner. However, peace still eluded the border areas. In 1850 military villages in British Kaffraria were destroyed by the Xhosas. Some of the inhabitants were murdered and the Colony was again entered again, which led to another series of murders of White farmers and the destruction of farms.1,2,10,14

What made the situation in 1850 worse, was the entrance of a non-White allied force against the British rulers of the Cape Colony. It no longer consisted of the Black inhabitants of British Kaffraria only, but of groups from Transkei and the Kat river KhoiKhoi. Smith indecisiveness on finding a workable solution to the growing Xhosa problem, led to his replacement by George Cathcart (1852–1854) who successfully reinstalled the British management of British Kaffraria. However, he did not really establish permanent Xhosa rule. This finding of a solution became the task of George Grey (1854-1861).1,2,10,14

By the 1860s it was clear that the autocratic Cape governors, guided by their unable imperial government in London, had been failing to serve all the inhabitants of the Cape, Black and White. The Cape Colony remained autocratic, while the racial situation became increasingly explosive. A permanent hostility had developed between the Whites, mostly the early Afrikaners, and the Xhosas. It seemed that the only resolution would be one of the groups being wiped out completely.1,2,10,14 George Cathcart (1852–1854)

By the 1850s the autocratic style of governance became untenable. A unity started developing among the White Afrikaans-speaking inhabitants and the English-speaking settlers and they started viewing the government as oppressive. This newfound unity was illustrated by their joint obstruction of the boat Neptune, which was set to unload bandits from Britain at the Cape in 1849. Harry Smith, the then governor, wrote as follows about this unity1:80: “This is the first occasion on which Dutch and English inhabitants coalesced in opposition to Government”. Prominent leaders against the penal colony for convicts (similar to Australia) were Porter, Solomon, Fairbairn, Molteno and Stockenström. This unity between the White groups goes deeper: they had an overwhelming belief that London was incapable of understanding the Cape inhabitants’ interests. They strove for self-government based on liberal, inclusive multi-racial politics.15,16

This unity changed the views in London, making the government more inclined to eventually granting some form of self-government for the Cape. The Attorney-General at the Cape sent a draft constitution to London, which was returned after revision by the Privy Council in London.1,2,10,14 This set into motion a process in 1830 where two petitions to London from the Albany District and Cape Town asked for representative government. It was without success. In 1841, the two districts re-petitioned London, on which the Colonial Secretary replied1:79:

The Colony was not ripe for such a measure’ and enlarged upon some of the difficulties in the way of introducing an elective assembly – the choice of a capital, the possible separation of the Eastern Province, the coloured franchise and the danger of the townsmen gaining control of the parliament.

In 1848, Harry Smith renewed the request for self-government at the Cape. This led to the preparation of another draft constitution in February 1850, but infighting delayed the outcome (infighting had behaviour become typical in South Africa and in the later Boer republics).1,2,10,14,16,18

During the office of Cathcart, the first signs of democracy appeared in the Cape Colony with the establishment of a Parliament in 1853 by her Majesty, the Queen. The constitution was finally approved in December 1852 by the Duke of Newcastle, the then Colonial Secretary. It was promulgated as the Constitution Act of 1854. In 1853, the Cape Colony became a British Crown colony. The Cape’s “independence” came through a gradual evolution and not a sudden revolution.1,15,16,18

Geen comments as follows on the work and powers of the first parliament (1854–1858)1:81-82:

The Governor had to convene Parliament at least once a year; he could dissolve both houses of the legislature or the House of Assembly alone; he could approve or veto the bills passed by Parliament or submit them to the Crown, which retained the power to disallow them within two years of their reaching England. The Executive Council was still composed of senior officials appointed by the Colonial Secretary and was responsible to the Governor and not to the Parliament, but it could not follow a policy opposed to the wishes of Parliament, which consisted of two houses. The upper house, called the Legislative Council, consisted of fifteen members elected for ten years, seven by the Eastern Province and eight by the Western Province. On the first occasion, the four members for each Province with the least number of votes had to retire after five years. Members had to be at least thirty years of age and possess ₤4,000 worth of general property or land to the value of ₤2,000. The Chief Justice was the President of the Council, but he had not the right of voting. The lower house, the House of Assembly, had a membership of 46, elected for five years by 22 constituencies, Cape Town alone being represented by four members. The Speaker…was elected by the members and he had a casting vote. The franchise was a liberal one and remained unchanged for almost forty years. The vote was given to all adult male British subjects, who earned at least ₤50 a year or had occupied for at least a year property with a minimum rental value of ₤25 per annum. Thus was Ordinance 50 carried to its logical conclusions and not on colour introduced by the new constitution.

The Constitution Act of 1854 was a relatively liberal document that prohibited any racial or class discrimination. It instituted a non-racial qualified franchise. The same qualifications for suffrage were applied equally to all males, regardless of race. It changed the Legislative Council to the Upper House of the new parliament, of which members were elected according to the Western Province and the Eastern Province that formed the Colony. A New Lower House, the Assembly, was also constituted.16,18

However, the Constitution of 1854 was a troublesome one: it instated a parliament without a parliamentary government. The executive power remained as before firmly with the office of the appointed governor from London. The parliamentary body led to serious conflicts between the representative legislative power and the appointed executive power until 1872. This was especially true during the political abuse and power play of governor Philip Edmond Wodehouse (1862–1870). This unstable governmental system and its ineffective constitution created enormous conflict between the Cape inhabitants and the British in London.11,16,19 Wiid writes as follows about this early effort to bring some form of democracy to the Cape19:324:

The constitution of 1853 carried the seed of self-destruction and provided sufficient proof of its uselessness. Repeated disagreements and deadlocks between the resprentative legislative authority and the elected executive authority, especially during the rule of the autocratic sir Philip Wodehouse, demonstrated that a parliament without parliamentary government under the British system was a constitutional evil (Own translation)

For the poor non-Whites, who formed the majority of the non-Whites and the total South African population, this legislation did not bode well, notwithstanding its non-racial clause. It had the potential to become a White man’s and a rich-man’s constitution to maintain White rule. Both the Dutch and English wanted to ensure that they could dominate politically. This became clearer after 1874. The only power available was in the hands of the executive governor and London.1-3,10

It took eighteen years to move to a more democratic system. Since 1853, a more realistic idea started to develop about effective rule in the Cape. Prominent was the growing political and financial responsibility assigned to the management of the Cape Colony. Internal struggles also obstructed effective governance from London. It was clear that an improvement to the self-management of the 1853 constitution at the Cape was urgently needed.10

The initially introduction of the representative constitution was delayed by the Eight Xhosa War. The First Cape Parliament (1854-1858) was at last opened by Governor Charles Henry Darling (1854–1854) on the 30th of June 1854. The governor that really implemented the constitution and its parliament was Sir George Grey (1854–1861).1,2,10,16,17

This First Cape Parliament (1854-1858) was, in terms of office, followed by the following three parliaments15,16,18:

  • Second Cape Parliament (1859–1863)
  • Third Cape Parliament (1864–1869) [Office was ended by dissolution of British Governor]
  • Fourth Cape Parliament (1870–1873) Henry Barkly (1870–1877)

The deadlocks and conflicts between the representative legislative power and the appointed executive power of the First Cape Parliament continued, hampering political decision-making. In 1862, Wodehouse got into trouble with the Cape Parliament, which refused to take over British Kaffraria from the imperial government or to impose additional taxation. British Kaffraria was annexed in 1865 by a bill that also increased the membership of the Legislative Council to 21 and the House of Assembly to 666 to include the representatives of British Kaffraria. After another conflict and a deadlock in the Parliament in 1869, the governor dissolved parliament. This internal conflict between the executive and legislative powers continued, and in May 1870 the parliament was prorogued. Democracy, even in its primitive form, was not handled effectively by the Cape Colony’s inhabitants, however much they dreamed and fought for democracy and their political rights since 1652.1,2,19

Ultimately, the Colonial Secretary ordered Henry Barkly (1870–1877) to introduce responsible government at the Cape. The colony and its ineffective leaders were becoming more of a burden than an asset. The British government felt that drastic action was needed, as Wiid17 states19:325:

The British government argued that, if the Cape colonists would not be ruled from above, they should be allowed to assume the responsibilities of self-government (Own translation).

This noble belief (and hope) of the Empire was easier said than done. Notwithstanding their internal fights and obstructions, Barkly steered the colonists. A Responsible Government Bill was passed to instate responsible government in 1870. It passed successfully through the House of Assembly, but was rejected by the Legislative Council owing opposition from the Eastern Province. The bill was finally passed in April 1872 by both houses, but opposition was still prominent.1,15,16

After unsuccessful appeals to eminent Capetonians, like Southey, Porter and Solomon, Barkly asked JC (John) Molteno (who also became the first Prime Minister) to put a government together, which he did with success. The 1872 Constitution of the Cape Colony, also known as the Constitution Ordinance Amendment Act of 1872, had as its underlying principle full responsible government for the Cape Colony. It brought important changes to the political empowerment of the Colony’s inhabitants. This happened 220 years after the establishment of the Cape Refreshment Settlement. This development ended the autocratic reigns of governors, like Phillip Edmond Wodehouse (1862-1870), who became famous for their wrongdoings. Sir Henry Barkly’s efforts and initiative as well as that of the Colonial Secretary in London to bring full responsible government for the Cape Colony, are praiseworthy and shows that the British leadership in London was not always unsympathetic to the colonists’ interests. Also, the prominent role of Sir John Molteno, an English-speaking Capetonian, in getting Afrikaans- and English-speaking Whites into a political unity to embark on responsible government towards the Union’s foundation, needs special reference. Barkly and Molteno were the first good leaders at the Cape.1,2,15,16,18

The positive implications of the Constitution Ordinance Amendment Act of 1872 were numerous, as Geen1 spells out1:84-85:

Responsible Government means government by a ministry which is responsible to Parliament and which continues in office only as long as it receives the support of the lower house of Parliament. Thus civil servants appointed by the Colonial Secretary and responsible to him through the Governor ceased to form the Executive Council, which from 1872 consisted of a Prime Minister without any other portfolio and four other ministers, all of whom were members either of the House of Assembly or the Legislative Council and belonged to the party in power in the former body. The Cape Government could no longer be ordered by the Imperial Government to do what it did not want to do, though it could have foreign policy of its own and was bound by many British treaties that affected the whole Empire and also by various admiralty and merchant shipping laws. However, the Governor had to act on the advice of the Cabinet in regards to local matters, though as High Commissioner he still had considerable powers in territories beyond the borders of the Cape Colony.

The new constitution held non-racialism as a core value, while the universal qualification for suffrage of ₤25 was seen as sufficiently low to ensure that most owners of any form of property or land could vote. An effort to raise it was successfully stop although it was agreed that rising in levels of wealth would eventually render it obsolete. Many new voters registered, specific the rural Xhosas of the frontier areas who were mostly communal landowners and therefore eligible for suffrage. This caused racial conflict. An important outcome was that the operating language of the Parliament was English, creating to a limitation of (and discrimination against) Dutch-speaking members because of their inability to speak English.15,16,19

The Fifth Parliament (1874–1878) was finally put in place. However, in the eighteen years from the promulgation of the Constitution Act of 1854 to the Constitution Ordinance Amendment Act of 1872, little changed with regard to racial and cultural conflict, and it all transferred to the Union of South Africa.1,2,15,16

3. Discussion

The Third Marquess of Salisbury, Robert Arthur Gascoyne-Cecil, the British prime minister at the height of Britain’s imperial power, believed that to ensure the stability of the wonderful and joyous Empire of Queen Victoria, as little as possible must be done to maintain the utopia. Gascoyne-Cecil summarized this belief in a single sentence quoted by Barber20:1: “Whatever happens…will be for the worse, and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible”.

Barber20 does points out that Salisbury was by no means the only political leader who aspired to do very little. Barber writes20:1:

William Evarts, secretary of state in the administration of US President Rutherford B. Hayes (1877–81), admonished him once by saying, “You don’t sufficiently realise, Mr President, the great truth that almost any question will settle itself if you only let it alone long enough”.

Barber continues by describing the US president Calvin Coolidge (nick-named Silent Cal).20 His biographer, Amity Shlaes, wrote20:1: “Congress always says ‘Do’. Coolidge replied, ‘Do not do’, or at least, ‘Do less’”.

When looking to the political history at the Cape 1795 to 1872, the Salisbury, Evarts and Coolidge attitude became the curse of the inhabitants of the Cape Colony under British rule. As little as possible happened on the political field. The belief was human rights politics would cause chaos at the Cape. The belief was also that the race factor would settle itself.15,16,19

It seems that although the British governors were well-educated men and had talent in terms of thinking, planning and doing. However, they were driven by the imperial spirit to establish and to maintain their much loved Empire.

In the ‘civilized world’ of the British of 1872, it was clear that the Cape Colony’s inhabitants were lacking good British culture. The British, were obliged to make the people of the backwards Cape Colony acceptable and functional parts of their grand Mighty Empire. This “backwardness” is to a great extent the truth, as Wiid confirms19:324:

This colony was still conducting a politically restricted life and, as consequence, lost many of its strongest sons as emigrants. Before the seventies, Afrikaans speakers – who back then only comprised about three quarters of the white population in the Colony – only provided around one third of the members of parliament (Own translation).

But Wiid shows that this backwardness was also created and maintained by the British Empire with their suppression of human and political rights.

The non-Whites’ voting rights, based on the multi-racial Cape Qualified Franchise, using the universal qualification for suffrage of ₤25 as sufficiently low to ensure that most owners of any form of property or land could vote, was a mislead plan to keep them out of the Parliament. The majority of these non-Whites – from KhoiKhoi, KhoiSan, Coloureds to free slaves, as well as Blacks inside the borders of the Cape Colony – was absolutely poor. Most of them could not speak English, which disqualified them as voters. Even early Afrikaners – people who were better educated and economically more stable in the period 1795 to 1872 – could be excluded by the Constitution Act of 1854. Wiid writes19:331:

In these circumstances the Afrikaans-speaking, who at the time constituted about one third of the White population at the Cape, delivered about one third of the parliament before the seventies (Own translation).

There is an immense difference between professing multi-racial politics or race equality in theory, and practicing human tolerance. The White Cape inhabitants knew from early on that to rule the Colony and its people they must capture and hold on to two intertwined energies: money and politics: they who have the money rule the politics and they who have the politics rule the money. Chomsky21 explains this fact clearly21:55:

…concentration of wealth leads almost reflexively to concentration of political power, which in turn translates into legislation, naturally in the interests of those implementing it…


…concentrated wealth will, of course, try to use its wealth and power to take over the political system as much as possible, and to run it and do what it wants, etc.

The Whites did not want a non-White regime in power after their “own suffering” on the hands of the VOC and the British Empire. Engelbrecht22 remarks on politicians after he reviewed Ronnie Kasrils’s23 book on Jacob Zuma, when he says22:12-13:

Kasril’s book reveals a serpent’s nest that confirms one’s suspicions that most politicians – everywhere, not just in South Africa – are cunning and dangerous snakes. [Own translation].

As a regime the British Empire was cold-blooded towards non-British persons when its interests were endangered. It did not hesitate to use extreme force when needed, as later reflected in their war against the Boers and their families during the Second Anglo Boer War (1899–1902). The British autocratic management of the Cape Colony inspired hostility among Blacks and Whites.1,2,10,12,23

They laid the table for future hate and rebellion.1,2

These British Empire’s military actions towards and suppressions of indigenous Southern Africans from the early 1800s are, when comparing it with their own modern British guideline to describe a terrorist, precisely the same, namely24:9:

  • Violence against a person;
  • Serious damage to property;
  • Designed to influence a  government or an international organization or to intimidate the     public or a section of the public;
  • With the aim of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

This brings to the foreground Boon’s25:75 description of the characteristics of a political mobster:

Selfishness; delinquent inclinations all-over; strategies total stripped of all democratic principles, traditions, thinking, planning and doings; absolute intolerant; anti- order; minorities are quickly eradicated; coercion actions characterized by destruction, threat, killings and brutalities; aim the creation of a delinquent mob-reign; aim the exclusive of executive political mob-leaders to reign the country.

This contamination went much deeper: it also contaminated White inhabitants’ mindsets, as already reflected by the White frontiersmen along all the borders of the Colony.

The Cape’s inhabitants’ isolation from true democracy for over two hundred and twenty years made them political immature (and full of distrust for the Empire), as was reflected by their constant internal fighting and senseless tussling before the Constitution Ordinance Amendment Act of 1872 could finally be promulgated for self-management. This political immaturity was also internalized into the mindsets of the Voortrekkers as reflected by the problematic ruling of their Boer republics.

The period 1795 to 1872 was characterized by in-fighting between Afrikaans-speaking Whites and English-speaking Whites, the growth of the British Empire and British supremacy and the suppression of especially the non-Whites of Southern Africa. Murder was justified as a means to control Blacks. As much as the British showed justice to the slaves, they were cruel to those Blacks who were independent of their control and who resisted. The British leaders at the Cape, twenty-seven governors, failed. The “Spook of Godske” (Ghost of Godske), whose sole intention is to inspire racism and racial disharmony who started his night walks at the old Refreshment Station’s fort, it seems, had never come to rest, not even two hundred years later.1,12,19

The British Empire’s constant wavering and unpredictable policy on the personal and political rights of the Coloureds, KhoiKhoi, KhoiSan and Black tribes such as the Xhosas, a policy that ranged from a kind of “apartheid” to assimilation and to extreme suppression, undoubtedly laid the foundation of more than one political tragedy for South Africa waiting in the future.

The British Empire was a failed regime at the Cape Colony. The British never learned from the old Chinese proverb: Of all the stratagems, to know when to quit is best.

4. Conclusions

The two objectives of this study were to discover if the South African leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 made contributions to the country and its people during their time, and to determine if the behaviours of the South African leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 were impeccable.

The conclusions that are drawn from this study are presented in accordance with the aims and hypotheses as postulated in 2.2 to 2.5:

H1: The South African leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people.

The findings of this study show that the leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 failed to make extraordinary positive contributions to the country and its people. # Hypothesis H1 must be rejected.

H2: The behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 were impeccable.

The findings of this study show that the behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1795 to 1872 as leaders and as persons failed to be extraordinary and impeccable. # Hypothesis H2 must be rejected.

Looking at the racial discrepancies, discriminations, injustices and conflicts present by 1872 in South Africa, especially between its individual inhabitants, the Italian proverb: After the game, the king and the pawn go into the same box, is misleading. After two centuries of gaming together, these groups could not fit into one box.

5. References

  1. Geen MS. The Making of the Union of South Africa. London: Longman and Green; 1945.
  2. Scholtz GD. Suid-Afrika en die Wéreldpolitiek: 1652-1952. Pretoria: Voortrekkerpers; 1964.
  3. Beyers C. Binnelandse Beroering en Ondergang van die Kompanjie, 1779-1795. In: AJH     Van Der Walt, JA Wiid, AL Geyer. Geskiedenis van Suid- Afrika. Cape Town: Nasou; Annon.).
  4. Roberts JM. The Penguin History of the World. London: Penguin; 1995.
  5. Van der Merwe JP. Die Kaap onder Britse en Betaafse Bestuur, 1795-1806. In: AJH Van Der Walt, JA Wiid, AL Geyer. Geskiedenis van Suid- Afrika. Cape Town: Nasou; Annon.).
  6. Bless C, Higson-Smith C. Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: An African Perspective. 2nd ed. Kenwyn: Juta; 1995.
  7. Louw GP. A guideline for the preparation, writing and assessment of article-format     dissertations and doctoral theses. 2nd ed. Mafikeng Campus: North-West University, South Africa; 2017.
  8. Maree K, Van der Westhuizen C. Head start in designing research proposals in social sciences. Cape Town: Juta; 2009.
  9. Governors of the Cape Colony. [Internet]. [Cited 2018 Apr.18]. Available from
  10. Grundlingh MAS. Vyftig Jaar Britse Bestuur, 1806-1854. In: AJH Van Der Walt, JA Wiid, AL Geyer. Geskiedenis van Suid- Afrika. Cape Town: Nasou; Annon.).
  11. Cape Colony. [Internet]. [Cited 2018 Apr.18]. Available from
  12. Martinez R. Creating Freedom. Edinburgh: Canongate; 2016.
  13. Van den Heever CM. Generaal JBM Hertzog. Johannesburg: AP Boekhandel; 1944.
  14. Van Der Walt AJH, Wiid JA, Geyer AL. Geskiedenis van Suid- Afrika. Cape Town: NASOU; Annon.
  15. Immelman RFM. Men of Good Hope, 1804-1954. Cape Town: CTCC; 1955.
  16. Parliament of the Cape of Good Hope. [Internet]. [Cited 2018 Apr.18]. Available from
  17. Morudu P. Wie dra die meeste skuld? Rapport (Weekliks). 2016 May 22; pp. 4-5.
  18. McCraken JL. The Cape Parliament.Oxford: Claredon; 1967.
  19. Wiid JA. Politieke Ontwikkeling in die Kaapkolonie, 1872-1896. In: AJH Van Der Walt, JA Wiid, AL Geyer. Geskiedenis van Suid- Afrika. Cape Town: Nasou; Annon.).
  20. Barber M. How to run a Government. London: Penguin; 2015.
  21. Chomsky N. Occupy. Parktown: Penguin; 2012.
  22. Engelbrecht T. ‘n Kroniek van ‘n kaalgatperske. Rapport (Weekliks). 2018 Jan. 21; pp. 12-13.
  23. Kasrils R. A simple Man. Kasrils and the Zuma Enigma. Pretoria: Jacana; 2018.
  24. Powell J. Talking to Terrorists. London: Penguin; 2014.
  25. Boon M. The African way: The power of interactive leadership. Sandton: ZebraPress; 1996.


Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.


The author declares that he has no competing interest.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.


Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

The propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution (6)

Full title: The propagandists arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible. Part 2: Age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system (6)

Gabriel P Louw


Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PUCHE), DPhil (PUCHE), PhD (NWU)


Keywords: age-old injustice, arguments, constitution, discrimination, injustice, land redistribution, opinions, political and socio-economic system, propagandists, viewpoints, without compensation

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 2: 4

1. Background

1.1. Introduction

In a world deluged by irrelevant information,” writes Yuval Noah Harari, “clarity is power.”1

When a writer accepts the responsibility to record the political histories of persons or groups, objectivity, honesty and dedication to these persons’ and groups’ interests and courses, are absolute pre-requirements. He/she must gather relevant information at all times to give clarity. Existential observing of their past and present behavior, planning, thinking and action are the only paths to get entrance into these persons’ and groups’ mindsets and to “reprint” in writing their “assumed” cognitions of their past, present and future. The study of the antagonists and propagandists arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the subject of land expropriation without compensation, and the politics surrounding it, are immense challenges. Prominent here are the need to align opposing thinking, planning and action on the land matter, bringing us to a kind of finality to reach conclusions and to be able to make a dictum. The presence of two kinds of evidence, completely opposing each other, is evident here: facts and truths versus lies and myths. If the researcher fails to make clear what is truly fact and truth and thus to erase from the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists or the propagandists lies and myths, a matter such as true land ownership becomes contaminated and ends in false claims.1,2

The intention with this research is to offer firstly the antagonists the opportunity to present their arguments, opinions and viewpoints (see Articles 3 and 4) as to why land expropriation is not acceptable, and thus that the land ownership at present with the Whites as the majority owners must continue. However, the propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints offered so far (see Article 5) demonstrate that the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints, as offered in Articles 3 and 4, are many times in terms of the historian and philosopher Yuval Noah Harari’s prescription of only true information and clarity to be able to gain empowerment, are in fact falsities.1,2

In this article (Number 6), the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints will further be tested in terms of the requirements prescribed to be fact and truth, and thus to be relevant information which is powerful or not, as measured in terms of the counter arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the propagandists.

How much a researcher/writer is trying to penetrate the mindsets of other persons, to be able to report on their internal, deeper thoughts, remains a personal “revelation”, and an escaping ideal forever for the researcher/writer. What energies motivate and drive the individual in his/her daily life, is mostly a black secret he/she frequently fails to understand and to describe. This and the previous Article 5 (as well as in articles 3 and 4 with the focus upon the antagonists), reflects pertinently upon the propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints on their reasons to activate so-called “land grabbing”. This forces the writer to note and to report primarily upon the negativities experienced during their political history by the propagandists, in order to have internalised and formed their mindsets, activating their hope for a better future which has developed with time. In the creation and internalisation of this mindset, religion has undoubtedly played a prominent part in South Africa from 1652 with the advent of Christianity. In reference to our political history, the all-encompassing dominant role which Christianity plays in the country needs to be highlighted – not only to drive specific behavior, but to provide certain hope and planning in times of suffering and crisis, notwithstanding the short or the long term.3-7

Since Christianity was accepted long ago by the Blacks to make them today the majority of Christians in South Africa, with strong religious empowerment as well as devotion, they started not only to believe that their Christian God (the same God as the Whites’ Christian God) would bring a long term salvation for a life in the Hereafter, but also to believe, right or wrong, in a short term earthly salvation through him and Christianity. The Blacks’ devoted worship of God and his assumed love for them, bound over many years into their earthly salvation through constructive politics, gave them hope for the eradication of their immense suppression and exploitation by Whites. However, there is little evidence that an anointed outcome reached them after “White” Christianity came into their lives: it became a White Christianity versus a Black Christianity, seemingly steering the Christian God’s love or hate in a certain direction. The Blacks sincere religious hope for an “earthly salvation” was crushed in 1910 with the founding of the Union. Hope and religion can become outright failures when the individual believer has no control or say over it. This makes the experience of a relationship between religion and politics, as well as a “God-intervention and interference” with politics (and thus an afterlife salvation versus an earthly salvation), very doubtfuly. For many Blacks this was and still is undoubtedly the experience.1-3,5,7-12

In the late 1970s there was renewed hope of a better political dispensation for Blacks, specifically with the NP regime’s revision of the Constitution, and thus the flickering of the beginning at last of an “earthly salvation” through a “God’s intervention and interference and thus for them to at last be unchained from “Black slavery” in South Africa.5,13 Boot-Siertsema and Boot13 write in 1982 with great enthusiasm about that late 1970s seemingly positive political non-racial development inside the NP regime with a kind of God’s “hand” present, as follows13:394:

Wij moeten aanvaarden dat de nieuwe grondwetsherziening definitief een eind zal maken aan het exclusieve concept van een Blank Zuid-Afrika. Inplaats van de traditionele stijl van politiek paternalisme, zal er een nieuwe stijl ontstaan van consultatie, onderhandelen en consensus tussen gelijkwaardige partijen. Het toepassen van deze nieuwe stijl zal een zware tol eisen van het geduld en de tact van de Afrikaner. Inplaats van zelfbescherming, die tot dusver door de wet en door het ingrijpen van de staat werd verleend, aanvaarden wij dat ons bestaan in de toekomst veel minder zeker zal zijn en zelfs risico’s met zich mee zal brengen. Er zal veel meer gaan afhangen van eigen inzet en bekwaamheid. Hieruit spreekt een bereidheid tot persoonlijke offers van de zijde van de regering, waarin idealisme en realisme hand in hand gaan, een bereidheid zich tot het uiterste in te spannen voor een nieuwe bedéling voor Blank en Zwart waarin beiden kunnen overleven, en een bereidheid om daarbij risico’s te nemen die ook zij in Gods hand geeft.

But South Africa’s politics failed the hopes of positivists like Boot-Siertsema and Boot, and of course many Christian Blacks in the presence of their Christian God. In the early1980s there was nothing positive in the post for the Blacks: their politics were still run extremely by the Whites without consultation, negotiation and consensus with them on their immediate or long term socio-economic and political interests. Also was there not a single drop of White offering to the impoverished Blacks to help and uplift them, like the transfer of White land and wealth to uplift their poverty, inequality, unemployment and landlessness. Most of all, Apartheid was further, after the 1980s, practiced in its extreme form. Hope and the Christian religion did not, it seems, work for the Blacks to better their socio-economics. All that seems to play out in the 1980s was that the Blacks were forced, as so many other times in the past in terms of their Christian sincerity, to desperately believe again solely in God for future help against Apartheid’s wrongdoings. In 1994, with the political dispensation, this failure of the good relationship between hope and religion replays and stays on with the Blacks (propagandists) up to 2019.5,7-9

Efforts by positivists like Boot-Siertsema and Boot13 to re-steer in the 1980s the Blacks with “good” Christian religion back into short term hope of an earthly escape from their immense suppression and exploitation by Whites, started to fail fast. Even the Apostle Jacob’s “heavenly help” seemed to be of no real “holy” value or impact to lessen the socio-economic and political suffering of Blacks after the 1980s. Boot-Siertsema and Boot posit13:395:

Wij mogen niets goed praten van wat verkeerd is. Maar ten aanzien van de Zuid-Afrikaanse situatie mogen we elkaar wel wijzen op het klemmende woord van de apostel Jacobus: “Gerechtigheid groeit waar vrede is, en wie vrede zaait, zal gerechtigheid oogsten”.

For the Blacks the difference between a “White Christianity” and a “Black Christianity” wherein their Christian God it seems was and is on the side of the Whites became obvious with time. This “god-choice” of Whites above Blacks in their early lot, is still echoed today by prominent Black leaders pointing out the seeming anointment of the “White god-sweetheart” Voortrekker Gen Piet Joubert (hero of the Boers’ First War of Liberation against the British and deputy to Paul Kruger of the ZAR), to allow him and his men to murder and cut off the head of the Black nationalist Kgoši Makgoba (the leader of the clan baTlou of Makgoba), to be able to grab the Makgoba’s land. Joubert, when he received the head of Magoba as evidence of his termination, after keenly attending Sunday church, filled with great “White god-love” and a seemingly “god-selectiveness”, said to his Christian God with joyousness14:21: “The Lord reigns, and I am his servant”.

But this “Christian capturing” did not stop in 1994 with exclusively White orientation. The post-1994 new age political empowerment – which was also many times driven through “sincere and pure Black religion”, aimed to free Blacks from the ongoing chains of Apartheid and to bring them at last an earthly salvation – changed to a Black orientation. It again held the same suppression and exploitation as the pre-1994 dispensation, although offered now in another potpourri. This time delinquent Black leaders and figures, most prominently Jacob Zuma, stand out in their wave of evangelical churches to steer South Africa to improvement.15 The emphasis, under the pre-1994 White suppression, is again “Christianity”: but this time openly “Black Christianity”, characterised by the same delinquency. Munusamy15:16 writes: “Zuma recognises the enormous influence of religious leaders…”, and “…knows the mainstream churches played a major role in swinging public sentiment…”.

The new Black churches associated with Zuma not only drew large congregations and influenced peoples’ political thinking and action, but were indeed active in big business enterprises funding political ideologies like that of Zuma. Politics became religion and religion politics in this Christian Black movement. In post-2016, political parties become churches, and churches become political parties without any hope of distinguishing between them. Munusamy15 guides15:16: “But the pull of these new political parties, rooted in evangelical and messianic churches with huge followings, should not be underestimated.” In this context it is important to note that Zuma shored up support from these Black churches, even continuously attending huge church gatherings. What they said and what Zuma said, were exactly the same15:16: “The messages from the church leaders was overtly political – whipping up the radical economic transformation rhetoric and fostering antagonism against “white monopoly capital” and its supposed defenders”. Furthermore, on religious parties cum political churches and the Zuma confusion and contamination connection as cum politician cum priest therein, Munusamy reports15:16: “The orbit of new political parties around former president Jacob Zuma is a noteworthy phenomenon …”, and15:16: “Zuma is the nexus of this phenomenon and very far from the pope’s definition of a ‘good politician’.”

In these religious gatherings around the present so-called “Christian” empowerment of Zuma for the coming election and his undermining of the ANC (and Ramaphosa) and South Africa as a whole, are undoubtedly his many religious manipulating “Christian” cronies, like the African Transformation of Mzwanele, the SA Council of Messianic Churches in Christ, made up by the Twelve Apostles Church in Christ, the Bantu Church of Christ, the Zion Christian Church and a faction of the Shembe Church, with another Zuma fervent supporter Bishop Timothy Ngcobo of the African Freedom Revolution and the seemingly self-immolate “Buddhist monk” Mzwanele Manyi and his African Transformation Movement, writes Rumasamy15. About these priest cum politicians, with Zuma standing central, Munusamy15 posits15:16: “We should not for a second believe that the religious leaders transfiguring into politicians here are doing so for virtuous purposes, or that having preacher men in parliament will elevate our politics.”

There is only one mass group that is going to lose again in a long awaited “god-intervention and interference” – and miss out also on a kind of “god’s anointment” — and this is the pre-1994 and the post-1994 mass of poor and landless Blacks.

For many Black propagandists there is undoubtedly today, after so many years of political suffering at the hands of Whites, and notwithstanding the Blacks’ sincerity as Christians, not much belief left of the existence of a biblical justice and peace for Blacks. It does not matter if this “Christian savior” is Black or White, and if Zuma is the big “Christian savior” and seems to be in contact with Jesus. Solutions to their problems need a non-religious approach, totally free from falsities, crookery, populism and emotion. This non-religious approach, according to the propagandists, is also applicable to the present land matter. There is only one solution to get the mass of poor and landless Blacks out of their chaos and to rectify the discrimination, and that is action and deed like legislation and the Constitution, as determined and driven by the majority. In this process, which can include various actions to uplift the poor, the expropriation of land without compensation when needed from Whites is central. The whole process needs to be free from the asking by the ANC regime and the poor Blacks, as in the past, for “Higher intervention and interference” to make it workable (besides of course Zuma’s religion politics to obtain votes for his selfish and opportunistic needs and intentions). The process has the intention of going against the religious concepts of goodness, honesty, sincerity, even so-called Christian salvation: pure political action, with all its risks, is the driver in the planning, thinking and action around land expropriation.15-18

Many propagandists are undoubtedly today with good reason skeptical as to whether the benefits of the intended land expropriation initiative will be fully delivered. For them there are too many antagonists of the kind of the religious Piet Joubert left in South African politics, and the crooks of the Christian Zuma, all still “schizophrenically anointed” by their “Christian god-empowerment”, to be able to sabotage the poor and landless Blacks’ ownership of land and their right to be farmers. The manipulated and fraudulent 1994 political dispensation, which left the mass of Blacks in the cold to date, and wherein Black and White religious leaders of the Christian faith played a prominent role in their efforts to coax the unsatisfied and socio-economically and emotionally hurt Blacks into a Christian political acceptance (within an Afterlife salvation with its later benefits and privileges to come), is still fresh in the mindsets of the propagandists.15-19

For the propagandists, there is a stern warning in the words of Motsoko Pheko when he says19:10: “’Western Christian civilisation’ was, in fact, colonial terrorism”. The correct credo would be: “African Christianity is many times in fact also Black suppression which is repeated over and over”.15,19

In addition of course are there also just too many so-called Christian inspired humanists active in present day politics, like Boot-Siertsema and Boot13, who still do not understand fully the cruel realities and dishonesty of South African politics, or what Yuval Noah Harari1,2 really means when he writes1:61: “[political] clarity is power.”

General Bantu Holomisa20, MP and the President of the United Democratic Movement, is possibly the nearest to reality and a solution to approach the current land expropriation matter, totally free from religion as well as political unattached when he says20:18:

We, the people, must take back the promise of 1994. We are not Zulu or Venda, men or women. We are not Catholic or Zionist, Indian or Coloured. We are not gay or straight, clever or stupid. For if we are, we are lost. We are South Africans. Period. Rise not to this reality and we are lost indeed.

For the ANC regime is it undoubtedly clear that the Blacks’ many, many calls over centuries to the higher power and their hope for some anointed Help from There to bring a justified South African society where poverty, inequality, unemployment and most of all landlessness are absent or limited, is wishful thinking: constructive political action, based upon own sound cognitive reasoning, thinking, planning and action, cutting out any assistance from “Up”, is the only way out. This approach is for the propagandists the only solution to the present land ownership matter. What is of further absolute importanceis: this action must now be activated. Cyril Ramaphosa is central to this issue.

The propagandists feel there is only one clear path left to them – as already done by them in Article 5 — and that is to show again with this article (Number 6) that the antagonists’ arrogant arguments, opinions and viewpoints offered in Articles 3 and 4 are all lies and myths. For the propagandists, the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints are irrelevant information, lacking any empowerment to obstruct land expropriation without compensation.

1.2. Short overview of White socio-economic and political empowerment, discrimination and domination

The propagandists’ counter arguments, opinions and viewpoints in the previous article (Number 5) against those of the antagonists (Articles 3 and 4) reflect a broad identification of the elements and role-players alleged by the propagandists to be active and/or established in the White injustice and discriminating political and socio-economic system of South Africa, coming from 1652, which led to the poverty, unemployment, inequality and landlessness of a mass of Blacks and which directly obstructed the 1994 political dispensation to better the lives of Blacks. These elements’ and role-players’ negativism, internalised into the mindsets of the broad public by the antagonists with their fake news and data, has so far blocked the change to Section 25 to expropriate land without compensation. The propagandists allege that much of the delinquent political thinking and action, characterising the antagonistic Whites mindsets are wanton cognitions created over decades through White socio-economic and political empowerment, discrimination and domination of Blacks. Examples of these wanton cognitions are for instance the antagonists’ rigid underwriting and preaching of the goodness of exclusive capitalism, their outright support for White corrupt business and financial capitalistic bullies, their exclusive underwriting of pro-Western political ideologies, their opposing of free political and economical world associations by the ANC regime, their obstruction of the introduction of inclusive/social capitalism, their anti-Black orientations in the country’s politics and their ongoing execution of White psychopathology politics. These elements and role-players as negative determinants, form part in this research of the propagandists’ presentation, to be understood and to be unmasked, to persuade the voters to give their permission for the change of Section 25 to expropriate land without compensation.5-12

The opinion of the researcher is that only through such a comprehensive presentation of primary as well as secondary negative determinants in the case of the propagandists, in their opposing and their taking of the antagonists’ case in the present “informal court”, can the case be evaluated with justice and with balance. Indeed, a comprehensive open-door presentation was already granted to the antagonists in the previous Articles 3 and 4.

1.3. Research intentions

The research aim of this article is to evaluate and to describe in-depth and comprehensively what the propagandists believe are the hostile elements and role-players obstructing change to Section 25 to expropriate land without compensation. The drivers and needs for an immediate change to Section 25 and the awarding of the legal right to the ANC regime to expropriate land without compensation to empower the poor and landless Blacks, are for the propagandists actions required to neutralise the age-old White injustice and discriminative political and socio-economic system of South Africa, which makes the post-1994 political dispensation dysfunctional. Racial discrimination, coming from so far back as 1652, forms the basis for this negative setup.5,7-12

The opposing by the propagandists of the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against their changing of Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution, as well as the antagonists’ opposition to the ANC regime being able to effect land redistribution without compensation, is central to this research.

This article (Number 6) forms the final part of the two part article, entitled: “The propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to be able to effect land redistribution without compensation”. The article will further describe and evaluate in-depth and comprehensively what the propagandists believe are the White injustices and discriminative elements and role-players making the post-1994 political dispensation’s political and socio-economic system of South Africa dysfunctional. It is only by such a comprehensive presentation that a reflection of the propagandists’ civil rights, to be able to change the Constitution in its present form and to effect land expropriation, can be made.

The presentation of the various elements and role-players in this article will be done in eleven subdivisions.

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern political historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research on the ownership of South African land for the period 1652 to 2019 in South Africa. The sources include books for the period 1945 to 2018, articles between 2018 and 2019 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the current arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the propagandists for the change of Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution to effect land expropriation without compensation.

The research findings are presented in narrative form.

3. Discussion

3.1. The pre-1994 White injustice and discriminating political and socio-economic system of South Africa (Continuation of Article Five)

The propagandists’ counter arguments, opinions and viewpoints against those of the antagonists (see previous Articles 3 and 4) reflect a broad identification of the elements and role-players alleged by the propagandists to be active and/or established in White injustice and the discriminating political and socio-economic system of South Africa, coming from 1652, which led to the poverty, unemployment, inequality and landlessness of masses of Blacks and which obstructed the 1994 political pispensation from bettering the lives of Blacks. These elements and role-players began to be identified and described in depth already in Article 5, entitled: “The propagandists arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to effect land-redistribution without compensation: Part One” and will be continued in this article.

The abovementioned as well as many other secondary determinants form part of the focus in this research of the propagandists’ presentation. The immediate intention is to unmask, to analyse and to describe all of these negative determinants, in order to make it better understood by the general public and to persuade the voters to give their permission for the changing of Section 25 to effect land expropriation without compensation. The opinion of the researcher is that only through such a comprehensive presentation of primary as well as secondary determinants, can the case of the propagandists, in their opposition of the antagonists’ case in the present “informal court”, be evaluated with justice and with balance.

3.2. Myths, lies and fables fabricated by the antagonists to obstruct the intended land expropriation (Continuation of Article Five)

The propagandists postulate that the antagonists have mastered the ability to turn myths, lies and fables into facts and truths in the mindsets of the general public, through their constant attacks upon the government’s genuine efforts to assure political stability in the country in terms of their planned land transformation. Prominent for the propagandists are the antagonists’ constant misuse of the public media to nationally and internationally falsely portray the ANC regime as radical and Marxist driven, and as a revolutionary party with the sole intention of nationalising all private property and assets. A further untruth for the propagandists is the publically false reflection by the antagonists of an overall hostility by the ANC and Blacks against the Whites and a rejection by the ANC and the Blacks of Whites as indigenous South Africans. Constructive and positive efforts by the ANC to better the relationship between Blacks and Whites are denounced by the antagonists and mostly cold shouldered. For the propagandists in this continuing creation of conflict, is the destructive behavior of the so-called rescuers and saviors of the Afrikaners/Whites with their organised wanton, fake and false news. Many of these so-called rescuers and saviors’ histories reflect an adverse political setup of racism and the focused obstruction of Black rule since 1994.5-7,21-27

3.2.1. Is Cyril Ramaphosa a White land grabber and an anti-White collaborator?

A point of strong criticism against the antagonists and their lack of understanding of the post-1994 South African politics is for the propagandists their accusing without proof of Cyril Ramaphosa to be a Zuma collaborator in state capture and in the country’s mismanagement during the Zuma regime.

In this context the antagonists portray him specifically as a politician who is going to bring further misery to South Africans in general and to Whites specifically with his so-called “all-out land grabbing approach”. The antagonists accuse him to be a passive ANC member and later as vice-president as a primary collaborator in Jacob Zuma’s many wrongdoings. Then there is also the criticism that Ramaphosa is allegedly influenced and steered by the politically uncontrolled Julius Malema in his decision making, especially on the land issue, making Ramaphosa a political risk par excellence.28-36 The political integrity of Cyril Ramaphosa in perspective

Looking comprehensively at the political literature, the critics of Ramaphosa are numerous. But, after scrutinising these criticisms, is it also clear that much of the literature is activated by antagonists, emotional and flooded with false allegations, as well as arguments, opinions and views which are lacking any evidence or fact. There are many superficial “statements” or vague “generalisations” compiled by the antagonists, questioning Ramaphosa’s so-called “political intentions and actions”, showing the antagonists’ lack of evidence. When these political (and sometimes personal) “statements” and “generalisations” are further analysed, they show malicious intent against him as a person, which would not be tolerated if he was just a ordinary citizen and could activate slander and libel actions against these false accusations. But the fact that he is in the middle of the ANC’s politics and is the President of South Africa – both positions which activate political controversy and the pouring down of crude and rugged political allegations and acts by his direct and indirect political opposition – leaves him in an invidious position where he cannot really can defend himself. In the present politics of the country, the antagonists get away with extreme false allegations and delinquent actions against him, making the lies and myths of the antagonists look like truths.28-36

Firstly, it is clear that the antagonists are misleading for politically opportunistic and malicious reasons the public upon the primary aims of Ramaphosa’s future for South Africa. Prominent in this malicious action is his and the ANC regime’s intended land expropriation without compensation. The propagandists maintain that there is a totally “stretche truth” around this matter, in order to activate fear with the individual White that his/her property and assets are going to be confiscated outright if Article 25 of the Constitution is amended and if the ANC wins the 2019 election with a mandate to effect expropriation. Many “political tails” are added to statements by him or his ministers and other officials on the land issue. The antagonists frequently misrepresent in this context for opportunistic and malicious politics, for instance, Julius Malema’s foolish rhetoric upon nationalisation, which is totally unrelated to the ANC’s policy of land- and assets-ownership, as part and parcel of Ramaphosa’s utterances. Prominent in this situation are the various antagonistic organisations and the Afrikaanse media reflecting Ramaphosa as a revolutionary and a political danger for the Whites regarding their land ownership and personal lives. Critical and in-depth evaluations of Ramaphosa’s speeches and writings show these kinds of political action in public by the antagonists as false, and as said, personal and political attacks upon him.3,28-36

But the attack on his integrity as President is not driven alone by the antagonists coming mostly from the White sector, but is also coming from two other intertwined forces: ethnicity differences and conflict inside the Black population, and internal conflicting ANC politics. With reference here to the “classification” of Black population, it is important that the well-coined term “Black/Blacks” has became associated with the existence of one “South African Black Nation”, which is assumed to represent one single cultural, economic, political orientation and unity. This is untrue: “South African Blacks” consist of at least eleven tribes, and although their communal fighting of Apartheid and White suppression united them, these tribes stay encircled by their own uniqueness and foundations. Separateness between the various tribes became gradually stronger after 1994, with the ousting of the overwhelming politics of the nationalist Afrikaners which previously had forced all Blacks into one laager. The main and strongest role-players in the so-called “Black Nation” were in the past and are still at present the Zulus and the Xhosas. Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki were Xhosas and Jacob Zuma a Zulu. Hereto are ex-president Mthlanthe associated with the Tswanas and Cyril Ramaphosa with the Vendas. Although Mthlanthe showed himself to be a president of excellence, his reign was cut short by the ANC due to his non-Xhosa and non-Zulu identity and the Zulu overtaking of the ANC party under Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa is now, as was Mothlanthe, in the same Zulu and Xhosa process of being politically gobbled up. Inside this “Black Nation”, disturbed by delinquent ethnicity and the ANC heartland overrun by the Zulus and Xhosas, Ramaphosa’s ousting and ongoing opposition by the crook Zuma and his cronies, is prominent. In the present unstable ANC politics, the nearly 50% Zuma-faction of the ANC-NEC, is the cause of vicious and malicious fighting, as bad as that by the antagonists. The continuation of Ramaphosa’s leadership of the ANC party and his Presidency is strongly contested.28-39

Given that the focus of this research is upon the intention to redistribute so-called White land to a mass of landless and poor Blacks, representing all eleven of the Black tribes, the political integrity of Cyril Ramaphosa as leader of the ANC, as well as the State of South Africa, must first be place in perspective, especially because he as a person who as a politician is constantly under attack by the antagonists. On the other side stands his duty to assure political and socio-economic stability for the country, within these unjust attacks.

It is important here to pinpoint how Ramaphosa’s speeches and writings upon the matter of land expropriation became “enlarged” upon and “coloured in” by the antagonists and other opponents, the precise moment that he moved away from the exclusive future upkeep and guarantee of the present White land ownership (and seeming White richness) and his intended limiting of the exclusive shielding of the White farmers in the future from the competition of Black farmers. It is also important to note how his vague intention of the introduction of inclusive capitalism, which has successfully supported and driven as many as 32 000 commercial White farmers now for nearly a century in South Africa, was suddenly called Communism, nationalisation and land grabbing by the antagonists!40-46 Cyril Ramaphosa’s speeches and remarks upon land reform in perspective

Firstly, land ownership and the forced need to relocate mass land to Blacks, is not a new concept in Ramaphosa’s mind (or that of the ANC elite). Indeed, the discontent around the insufficient addressing of the land issue already in 1994 has arisen many times since 1994 in the speech of ANC leaders. More recently, in 2016, it was prominently forced to the foreground by the rhetoric of the Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma gang, which aimed with utmost political opportunism to keep Jacob Zuma in the presidency, so as to force to the foreground the land transformation matter under the banner of land expropriation without compensation. Central to the issue of land transformation implementation stands the Constitution and its shortcomings to allow land transformation unhindered.28-36

The imbalanced possession of a mass of land by Whites in South Africa was indirectly referred to in 1994 by Ramaphosa in an interview with the journalist Kaizer Nyatsumba35 of The Star, when he clearly voiced his disagreement with certain outcomes of the 1994 dispensation which had negated the Blacks’ rights and privileges. Prominent in this was his reference to strategies to be developed and to be followed for corrections in this concern. But, according to the propagandists, this early so-called inclination of Ramaphosa to activate land reform so as to install balanced Black land ownership, was then (and is still today) free from extreme revolutionary intentions and changes, like the outright grabbing of every White farmer’s land as falsely alluded to by the antagonists to be Ramaphosa’s intentions.28-36

The antagonists maintain that there are radicals inside the ANC elite (alleged to function within Ramaphosa’s intimate party circle and thus actively seeming to have his knowledge and permission) who propagate that all White land should be or will be expropriated without compensation. Prominent here are the alleged remarks by some spokespersons of the ANC, like Lamola55, Kodwa47 and Mokono52. The antagonists focus here is that the ANC’s intended “weighted compensation” of redistributed farms must only be seen as the short-term start-up of the process of land expropriation, to reach at the end full-scale land expropriation without compensation as the ultimate goal. This allegation is for the propagandists wantonly used by the antagonists to illustrate the so-called coming of land nationalisation primarily to create fear within the general public and is indeed for the propagandists a clear example of the constant manipulation of the truth by the antagonists. The various remarks of the abovementioned three spokespersons of the ANC bear the propagandists out and are in line with the ANC Lekgotla in December 2017, which adopted only a basic decision to speed up land expropriation without compensation. The propagandists contend that Lamola55, Kodwa47 and Mokono52 never referred to “utmost expropriation” of all land/property inside a nationalising model, neither did the ANC Lekgotla in December 2017 do so. In addition, there was no comprehensive plan put on the table at the Lekgotla by the ANC of land expropriation. The focus was only that certain categories of land/property be ear-marked in the future for expropriation without compensation.47–57

In this context of a future land expropriation, Ramaphosa personally gives a further guideline when he says55:4: “…that the state’s immediate intention is to target land from state-owned enterprises and private sector businesses that have large tracts of unused land – such as forestry giants Sappi and Mondi, and where there are already at present a load of uncompleted land claims.”

In this context, the propagandists also make it clear that the December 2017 Lekgotla of the ANC regime has not set the sights on various other traditional financial, legal and statutory institutions as alleged many times by some antagonists.49,52,55,57,58

Taking into account what Ramaphosa really said and meant upon land expropriation, it is undoubtedly far from what is so far reflected by the antagonists. The true profile on Ramaphosa’s land expropriation is clearly and unchangeably formulated by Dr. Nick Koornhof59, an ANC MP and member of the Constitutional Revising Committee of the ANC, when he writes59:17:

Nêrens lui die ANC se besluit dat wit boere se grond gevat moet word nie! Nêrens word daar gesê produktiewe plase moet geteiken word nie! Die ANC het daarom die EFF se mosie in die parlement gewysig.

With regard to the ANC’s recently launched review of the Constitution which could allow for land expropriation without compensation, it must be pointed out that this review outcome is only one (possibly a last) option of many under consideration, writes Derby60:2.

For the ANC regime, their basic principle of land reform will be premised upon three elements, namely security of tenure, land restitution and land redistribution. Ramaphosa’s land redistribution plan (with or without compensation), according to the propagandists, fully guarantees that the outcome of expropriation without or with compensation will not hurt the economy in the short or long term and will also not hurt foreign investments.59-61

Bruce62 writes on the possible post outcomes of land expropriation as follows62:16:

Labour tenants who have been on farms for decades will get their land. Rural families living under traditional leadership in the former Transkei and rural KwaZulu-Natal could get title. The state has a lot of land to make available to new farmers. Near the cities, where pressure for land is huge, the answer is to turn dreadful living conditions into a giant economic opportunity.

People pressing for land near their work places in or nearby urban centres will be given serviced plots upon which to build their own homes.

The most extreme impact upon South Africa’s politics and economics that Ramaphosa’s expropriation can bring is well researched and described by Haffajee50. Three categories without real negative impact upon the economy or to influence negatively the international status of the country are identified, making the whole process clearly free from the dangerous “sting of the scorpion”. This final profile is well shielded by the antagonists from the ordinary citizens’ attention, so as to opportunistic not undermine their efforts to incite resistance to the planned democratic land reform approach of Ramaphosa.50

Haffajee50 writes50:8:

The compromise gaining ground is to enhance the national expropriation laws (which are before parliament) to allow for the expropriation of certain categories of land without having to engineer an amendment to the property clauses of the Constitution.

These categories are abandoned buildings, unutilised land, commercial property held unproductively and purely for speculative purposes, under-utilised property owned by the state, and land farmed by labour tenants with an absentee titleholder.

Firstly, the above identified properties are so-called “passive properties”, held in reserve by rich owners, undoubtedly mostly Whites, for speculation and profiteering in terms of exclusive capitalism wherefrom the majority (mostly the poor and landless Blacks) is discrimitively isolated. In this context, it must be acknowledged that most of these passive properties were obtained exclusively by the rich Whites due to their favoured financial position during the more than 300 years of racial discrimination and exploitation of the poor non-Whites who not only lacked the money to buy property for speculation and profiteering, but were strictly prohibited during Great Apartheid through the Group Areas legislation to buy into better White areas’ land and property. Furthermore, much of this “passive properties/ land” was confiscated from non-Whites through the Groups Area’s legislation at ridiculously low prices to benefit Whites. This is precisely the “stealing of Black land” by Whites to which imminent Black leaders such as Pheko, Makgoba and others refer. The propagandists also note that this massive stealing of land and property was executed over centuries, phasing out most of the wrongdoing in the present day mindsets of South African people. It was only after 1994 that the attention was focused upon this whole process of injustice, which the antagonists are now trying to cover up and down play with their 1994 dispensation and Constitution as just outcomes with a duration forever in South Africa19.

Secondly, according to the propagandists, the abovementioned specific classification of properties to be expropriated is already a good indication of Ramaphosa’s sincerity to Whites and other land owners as well as White capitalists. It certainly erases the uncertainty in the mining and agricultural sectors. There is also no intention that foreign or local investors’ factories, properties or capital will be expropriated. As the poor Blacks become rich and established farmers and owners of urban land, homes, the private buying out of the land of the shrinking White population will undoubtedly follows. This latter process will clearly also be without any land grabbing of every piece of land (either for farming or home development), based upon the honest buying out of the Whites’ property at market related prices.50

Thirdly, as stated by Haffajee50, the above land reform plan of Ramaphosa as clear and honest, making the allegation by the antagonists that the ANC regime lacks an informative and operational land expropriation plan, null and void. Hereto there is also a clear legal detailing that there can be expropriation without compensation in certain cases, but also that realistic and just compensation is incorporated into expropriation. The propagandists show that it is impossible for the ANC regime at this stage to pinpoint precisely the scope of expropriation and how long the process will need to be applied, so as to obtain balance in equality. The propagandists note that the process of redistribution of the so-called “stolen Black land”, which was intensely activated by the Native Land Act of 1913, could not even be completed in 1994 (81 years later) by the nationalist Afrikaners themselves. To undo the present unjustified land grabbing setup in a just and orderly way, wherein more than 60% of the total South African soil belongs to Whites, illegally obtained over hundreds of years, will take time but surely not the 81 years duration of the Whites’ “land-expropriation”! Of course there are timeframes to be followed for Ramaphosa in his land redistribution, depending upon various constant changing determinants and needs of the poor and landless Blacks, as well as the state of South African and world economics, etc. But what is clear for the propagandists, is that Ramaphosa’s land redistribution plan is not going to be land grabbing as the antagonists try to profess to the public and the world. This was a bad custom and a bad habit only exclusively practiced by the pre-1994 White regimes of South Africa and will not be repeated in any way by the ANC regime.42,50,62-64

The whole controversy around Ramaphosa’s land reform plan, which the antagonists masterly redirect with malice to be land grabbing, must be read in one of Ramaphosa’s65 announcements65:4: “Land expropriation without compensation is going to happen whether South Africans, US President Donald Trump and the UN General Assembly like it or not”, and: “I am going to explain it without any fear and I am going to say: ‘This is us. Take us or leave us’”.

His words to Mfeketo67 and Collins66 and a group of Black professionals at a September 2018 business breakfast in Pietermaritzburg were redirected by the antagonists to fits their malicious allegations of land grabbing, when he says67:4: “Happen it shall, whether people like it or not; it is going to happen”.65-67

The propagandists’ emphasise that he promotes land expropriation, but he never said in any way all expropriations will be outright from Whites and without compensation. His “mild” form of expropriation versus that of extremists such as Malema, and even Jacob Zuma, is excellently reflected by Hunter68 when he reports68:1-2: “Zuma recently released a video on Twitter in which he advocated the nationalisation of land – which is the policy of Julius Malema’s rival EFF. In contrast, Zuma’s own party stands for the expropriation of land, without compensation if necessary, so that it can be redistributed to those who were dispossessed”. The above clause “expropriation of land without compensation if necessary”, tells the story of Ramaphosa’s intention of a democratic, balanced land transformation, a process which the antagonists shield away from the public eye. This again confirms that there is not any process anticipated by Ramaphosa of nationalisation or a dramatic process focusing upon the individual White with expropriation without compensation.68

What the antagonists ignore is Ramaphosa’s clear inclination of anti-grabbing of land when he says that the ANC regime only want an equation balance in land ownership because an alleged 87% of South Africa’s land had been given before 1994 to a minority population (Whites). It is important to note that the real context of his speech was ignored by the antagonists and needs for the propagandists to be reflected properly to the public. It reads65:4: “We are saying that the equation has to be balanced, and because we are balanced people and we are not mad, we are going to do it in a responsible manner, but we are not going to turn away from making sure it does happen”.

It is clear that for Ramaphosa, it clearly turns around an equal and a responsible landtransfer, only applicable to “unproductive land, unused buildings”, etc. and not productive and functional White land and farming businesses. It was in this context that Donald Trump later on accepted the Ramaphosa land expropriation plan, but urged him to be more descriptive with what he intends to do. Cyril Ramaphosa is not a White land grabber as the antagonists wantonly try to portray him.65 South Africa’s orderly democracy justifies Ramaphosa’s land expropriation

Democracy allows orderly change to rectify injustice; justice is indeed the main principle of democracy. But, notwithstanding the fact that the primary intention of democracy is to be righteous always and every moment of the day the implementation of it can take time, especially when democracy is new born to a country which had suffered for centuries under autocracy and fascism. Political, social and economical transformations ask for time and patience. Two decades have passed since South Africa became a democracy, clear shortcomings in the Constitution are coming to the foreground, forcing daring challenges to be faced and solved, like the addressing of the imbalance between the races on land ownership. The 1994 settlement on land-redistribution is, in terms of the prescription of the country’s democracy, far from a fait accompli as the antagonists try to present. In the finalising of the outstanding account of the transferring back of White land “stolen” from the Blacks, Ramaphosa is, as the official executer of it upon behalf of the ANC regime and the Nation, now unfortunately singled out as the culprit of so-called full scale aggression against Whites, which even Donald Trump believed, according to AfriForum.65

The propagandists put it clearly that President Cyril Ramaphosa has no intention to grab functioning White private property without compensation and that his land transferring scheme is not going to target all the present land of Whites which was “stolen” from Blacks. That will be undemocratic, something he does not underwrite. Furthermore, the state’s own high potential land of millions of hectares of agricultural land, which has not been collateralised and is not productive, will become part of the intended land expropriation. There is also not any intention, like Stalin cruelly did with the privileged nobles and rich in Russia, to travel back in history to punish any White culprits for the stealing of land from Blacks: there will be no “White kulaks” to be the focus of Black or ANC revenge.65,67,69,70

Ramaphosa, a qualified attorney by profession, has a well established mindset based upon right and wrong and has always been steered by the principles of democracy in his so-called freedom fighting politics: the concept of one-man-one-vote stands central for him without negatively influencing the rights specific to Whites. He was one of the founders of the 1994 South African democracy and one of the compilers of the Constitution. What he underwrotes in 1994 to uphold democracy he underwrites still today. The only outcome is that he believes, as the majority of Blacks also believe, that the present day Constitution must be streamlined and legal obstructions to block progress and justice must be rectified.37,38,65-67,69,70

Evidence of how much Ramaphosa stresses democracy inside the ANC structures and the greater South African politics, especially regarding citizen’s rights, is his decision to make the ANC’s list of representatives for the 2019 election to Parliament far more racially representative (undoubtedly reflecting a party functioning betternow that Jacob Zuma is gone) and that the list must be consistent with each province’s demographics. Hunter68 reports68:1-2: “In the Western Cape there need to be more coloured people on the list because that is the constituency, and in KwaZulu-Natal because there are Indians…” Ramaphosa’s openness to democracy is also seen in his allowing of the previous presidents Thabo Mbeki, Kgalema Motlanthe and even Jacob Zuma into his advisory circle, because, as he says, they are fountains of wisdom and can make his decisions more constructive.68 Ramaphosa’s role in Black land ownership as a “volks”-movement

The antagonists’ further postulation that the intended land expropriation is exclusively driven by the chief leaders of the ANC with Ramaphosa as the key-culprit, enabled by their extreme political empowerment to cleverly mask the manipulation of the South African politics solely to benefit Blacks, lacks insight for the propagandists. Looking closely at the real facts, the activation of the process of land expropriation is the start-up of a normal “Black volks movement” away from specific political affiliations. This is an incoming movement which Ramaphosa knows very well might be devastating if he is not steering it inside orderly democratic principles. For the propagandists it is clear that every member of the Black “volks”-movement underwrites the single motto on land ownership66:4: “We are together”. It is not done on a populist ticket, driven by the ANC elite from their Tshwane or Cape Town headquarters. It is clear that the ANC regime’s notion of an immense incompleteness and dissatisfaction by “the people” with the 1994-2018 dispensation’s land redistribution decision and plan have a sound base. The 1994 to 2018 land reform programme cemented into the 1994 dispensation, failed to fulfill its requirements to serve the people well. Less than 15% of the poor and landless Blacks’ legitimate claims were served. This is why Ramaphosa is so well informed from as far back as 1994.28-36,61,66,71-75

The propagandists’ view that the parliamentary commission’s testing of the public’s opinion upon the matter of land reform shows firstly an in-depth need for the return of Black land to its disempowered owners, and secondly that the whole process is decentralised by the ANC regime, allowing the South African people themselves to work out solutions upon future ownerships of land. It is only at the end that the whole process will be backed up by laws and a clear policy provided by the government. The ANC regime’s land transformation plan is a true tool for real transformation, to address inequality of opportunity, poverty and unemployment and not a so-called Ramaphosa “brain child” of political wrongdoing, according to the propagandists.32,34,71,73 71:21

The propagandists maintain that Ramaphosa’s policy on land ownership and land expropriation and his steering of the Black “volks” movement inside this policy, adheres to the principles of the Freedom Charter, which reads specifically71:21: “SA belongs to all who live in it, black and white”, and: “All national groups are equal before the law”. Equality was absent until 1994 in South Africa. Without land ownership and financial empowerment it is still absent in 2019 for a mass of Blacks.71 Freedom Charter as an exclusive motivator for and driver of Ramaphosa’s land reform

The abovementioned Freedom Charter’s land clause, dated 1955, reflecting upon the justified comparability of land ownership in terms of the South African race numbers and land ownership, guided by a democracy for the rights of the individual, is not the sole guidance used by Ramaphosa assuring his democratic right to effect his intended land expropriation. A further supportive guideline of the rightfulness of his programme is the ANC document on future land ownership issued in 1969 after the historic ANC Conference in Tanzania, which confirmed that the ANC was cognisant that the redistribution of land would include all race groups equally, an outcome which is now seriously lacking. Tabane72 writes72:6: “It makes bold to say that the restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended and all lands shall be open to ownership and use by all people, irrespective of race’ ’’.72,74

It is clear from the Freedom Charter that all races can (more precisely: must) be land owners, but on the basis of equality in terms of the proportional numbers of the various racial groups. The present day South African 83% White owners versus 13% Black owners is an imbalance, representing inequality which needs rectification. It contradicts the ANC’s 1955 and 1969 decisions. For the propagandists, Thabo Mbeki’s interpretation in October 2018 that Ramaphosa is breaking the principles and guidelines of the Freedom Charter with his intended land expropriation plan is absolutely incorrect. The same can be said about the antagonists’ generalisation in this context of the Freedom Charter. As Mbeki and the antagonists see it, it is a plain reflection of the present unjust land ownership introduced in 1994.71,72

The Freedom Charter leaves Ramaphosa no other choice but to activate land expropriation with great urgency.71,72 Advent of a comprehensive Ramaphosa “grabbing”?

Closely related to the antagonists’ constant accusations of a comprehensive process of grabbing to come, in this context is Ngcukaitobi’s74 argument that land redistribution goes further than just the physical handing over of White land, but that there is an emotive component as well as a further physical compensation also included in the process (a comprehensive outcome to activate expropriation created earlier by the Whites in their land grabbing of Blacks’ land), to rectify their past wrongdoings. Ngcukaitobi’s74 postulation reads that74:23: “… [if] the legacy is to be undone, the return of the land should be restorative of African humanity. Transactions about the ‘return’ of the land are incomplete without restoring the dignity of those from whom the land was taken,” with specific reference to dignity74:23: “African identities, freedom, equality and political autonomy which were lost.” The antagonists maintain that an additional element of the total land grabbing and nationalising of White assets, is the further mention by Ngcukaitobi of 74:23: “Land is not the only asset that was lost through colonial occupation. Cattle, farming implements, labour and human potential were taken away. African societies were broken up, their cultures ravaged and their identities erased”.

Ngcukaitobi’s74 so-called “comprehensive” reparative land project goes deeper than merely the right of the so called “indigenous” Blacks to obtain ownership of their birth land and the right to stay on it and to live there. For the antagonists, this seems to be based upon masked, exclusive comprehensive Black empowerment, in order to make the South African soil and its culture exclusively Black owned and orientated, and land per se as a future point of departure, so as to steer Black politics, to the exclusion of Whites’ participation or consultation. This intention of Ngcukaitobi74 however indirect and theoretically argued and fronted by the antagonists as a truth to come, is not in any way part of the ANC’s land expropriation. Neither is Ngcukaitobi’s74 official part of the ANC’s elite or lawmakers, and his comments can thus not be taken seriously as the antagonists are doing. A kind of “Ngcukaitobi expropriation” is for the propagandists an outright revenge which the ANC regime is not in anyway going to allow. The ANC is viewing this as the thinking of a small radical element in its own heartland.74

In shooting down the academic and theoretical argument of Ngcukaitobi74 on the “total approach” of land expropriation, which is seen by the antagonists as revenge, the propagandists put it clearly that revenge or absolute reparation of the past wrongdoings by Whites is not a part of the ANC regime’s land expropriation (with or without compensation). It is important for the propagandists that the emotive can connect the past with the present, but that new and modern day lifestyles and cognitive realities already show their exclusion of their own past from their present day actions. This makes Ngcukaitobi’s74 postulation of the need for the restoration of age-old (and many times outdated) African identities, freedoms and equalities, together with Black ideologies, which are coming specifically from those early times to a great extent, null and void. The ANC, as a modern day political party, knows very well that this “new age development” which minimised the past, impacts upon their present and future political practices. To implement it means outright inappropriate revenge upon the Whites for the ANC. It means, if implemented by them, the repeat of wanton political wrongdoings of the White rulers which they totally detested. Furthermore, it is against the principles of the Freedom Chater.74

The comprehensive failing of revenge actions to punish all so-called culprits of Apartheid, to turn back the clock to relive the past in terms of revenge, as Ngcukaitobi74 theoretically alludes, will not be allowed by Ramaphosa. For the propagandists this is in practice impossible through land expropriation without compensation as a vehicle.74

Firstly, as the propagandists have already emphasised many times, is it not the intention of the ANC regime now or in the future. Secondly, our past is just too contaminated for the activation of such a process, as Makgoba14 clearly states14:23:

Although I don’t want to turn the current fight over land reform into a free-for-all, we can not afford to ignore the seisure of land before the current cut-off date of 1913. Expropriation going back to colonial times has sentenced many generations to utter poverty and shame. Laws and practice were maintained by force of arms, leading to a system of landownership and economic development disproportionately based upon race.

However, we must recognise that going back to the colonial era raises difficult questions. What happens to white families who have long since sold land originally seised by their forebears and invested the proceeds? And what about those who bought land for the first time more recently, using big loans from the banks? If the banks lose their money, what damage does that do to the economy?

What about the land given in the 18th Century to those of our ancestors who helped the colonisers defeat other groups of African people? Who adjudicates those disputes?

The abovementioned outcomes, according to the propagandists, clearly reflect the limitations inherent to the ANC regime’s intended expropriation. It is also within this guideline that Cyril Ramaphosa is driving his land expropriation intentions. It is in this context that the propagandists’ plea that ordinary South Africans must erase from their mindset a Mugabe-Zimbabwe land grab scenario reflected by the misleading of the antagonists as an outcome on the land issue. It will not happen. The consequences are just too overwhelming and destructive for South Africa, as Derby60, after analysis of the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe political history points out60:2:

Our closest example of what land reform means upon a massive scale was that undertaken by Zimbabwe’s very desperate ruling elite at the turn of the century. Faced with the possible ousting by what was then an emerging, urbanised and trade union-based opposition party in the Movement for Democratic Change, they unleashed an untidy and populist land reform programme that ruined the economy, setting it back decades. But that’s not to say the elite led by former president Robert Mugabe had been leading the country towards economic prosperity in the years before the land grabs were sanctioned.

Derby60 shows how the White elite as well the later Black elite of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe botched up Zimbabwe, plainly by their double-sided racism and foolish political thinking, planning and action. The ANC regime under Cyril Ramaphosa wants at all costs to avoid such outcomes here: the White rule from 1652 to 1994 was more than enough tragedy for him. The ANC’s land proposals and intentions are not pointing to a Zimbabwe experience in waiting for South Africa. There is another, better side to land redistribution and this is the way that the ANC regime (far from the false and outrageous allegations of the antagonists) wants to take South African farming inside the country’s total economics. In this context Derby60 again guides60:2:

Instead of being panicked as a nation, we should focus upon what a well implemented land reform process promises for the South African economy, which is trapped in low single digit growth territory when what is most needed is the type of growth rates experienced in East Asia over the past few decades. If reforms are done well (or nearly as well as the apartheid regime went about its reforms), it is thought that growth in Africa’s second biggest economy could move on to another plateau, one that would ensure that structural unemployment – which sits at over 26% – is finally and sustainably eroded.

The propagandists emphasise that the ANC land redistribution policy proposals of December 2017 in no way point to the Mugabe-Zimbabwe tragedy of landgrabbing, with good consensus. It is a good policy of future politics, specifically and in general, to bring about long term benefits for the individuals of South Africa.59,60

Looking at the abovementioned reports, is it also clear that a so-called “Malema-nationalisation” is absolutely absent from Ramaphosa’s land expropriation plan, contrary to what the antagonists try to reflect.59,60

With regard to the recent much debated 139 “White” farms which the antagonists allege are going to be “confiscated” or “nationalised” in the near future, the propagandists maintain that the present circumstances of these farms must be correctly understood and evaluated in terms of the prescribed legal process upon the transfer and pay-out of private land needed for redistribution. The reference to “confiscation” is untrue and is used by the antagonists to mislead the public. The facts are manipulated by the antagonists in order to negatively profile Ramaphosa’s presidency as well as his good intentions in the creation of a better South Africa. The truth is that the ANC regime’s land reform programme was and still is being obstructed by some White farmers who are blocking the transfer of their farms because they mostly disagree upon the final selling price. This focused “political as well as business sabotage” unnecessarily complicates the traditional “willing seller versus willing buyer” agreement for land redistribution coming from 1994. The dispute here, according to the propagandists, is purely about the constant “over-pricing” of farms. This unrealistic imbalance in value creation of their farms by the delinquent actions of some farmers has caused the government to find a justified and responsible solution. It is an unavoidable blockage which the government must overcome. For the propagandists, the constant “illegal obstruction” by White farmers in the selling of farms to the government by their misuse of the Constitution and the courts canno longer be allowed or tolerated. It is nothing less than sabotage with the prime intention to create anarchy. The propagandists note that the presence of the so-called Afrikaner/White saviours and rescuers is strongly observed in this obstruction of the government’s normal functioning to assure harmony between the races upon land ownership.47,52,55

There is not a single fact to support the allegation of “confiscation” or “nationalisation” of White land as the antagonists allude. By going to court with test cases upon land transfers (after staying away from the courts since 1994, so as to avoid the label of autocracy, Black racism or the suppression of Whites’ rights, etc.), the government only wants at last to overcome the White farmers’ delinquent obstruction of the land redistribution programme. All that the government wants to do with the 139 farms at present is to get a legal foot to stand upon in the future, even without changes to the Constitution, so as to normalise the process of land redistribution. The propagandists emphasise that in this case it must be clear that the intention of the ANC is to undertake in the near future land redistribution within a coded legal guideline, which prescribes justified and realistic compensation.49,52,55,57,58 Reviewing Ramaphosa’s new age farming system through justified land expropriation

The constant painting by the antagonists of an outright failiure in waiting for the planned new sufficient-producing Black farmers is an outright manipulation of fake facts, according to the propagandists. Rampahosa plans to introduce a totally new system of financially independent farming, based upon inclusive capitalism and the introduction of a new sufficient-producing farming system driven by specific models, varying from small scale subsistence farmers up to small scale commercial farmers and commercial middle level farmers. This farming system has the potential to also erase the present day vast debt of the majority of farmers (possible so many as 32 000 mostly White farmers) to the tune of more than R160bn to both private bankers (R129bn plus) and the Land Bank (R40bn).26,75-79

This new planned farming policy and style of Ramaphosa’s farming sector will also erase the antagonists’ groundless postulations that if the present more or less 35 000 commercial farmers active in 2018 are increased to 70 000 farmers in the system, or that the more or less 35 000 commercial farms are each turned over to ten Black families, totally failure will follow. The antagonists clearly hang onto outdated farming models and profiles, as the only means to activate good farming, high production and food security. Evidence gathered worldwide contradicts this outdated and rigid farming model of South Africa which allows only the existence of mostly White farmers and their exclusive holding of vast areas of land under the pretext of “food security” for South Africa. The ANC’s planned new age farming system for South Africa offers hereto immense opportunities for new in-coming farmers and hasthe potential at the same time to assure food security for the country as well as the improvement of its local food production and food exports at far more affordable costs. For the propagandists, the antagonists lack insight into the ANC regime’s planned Black farming sector (and possibly also an understanding of what the concept “normal farming sector” as a whole means), while their White cultural and political exclusiveness and supremacy, cemented into their farming culture over more than 100 years, make a change in 2019 seemingly very troublesome for them.26,77-79

The abovementioned good intentions, system and planning of the ANC regime to drive and to execute a just and balanced land redistribution are at present totally being missed by the antagonists. Their constant false allegations against the expropriation plan are being activated by their immense fear that the White farmers and business sector will lose their financial empowerment. The antagonists’ delinquent influences upon and actions within the White farming sector also create cognitive confusion in most South Africans’ mindsets about their assets and future in the country. This also throws a conflicting and misleading shadow over the intentions of the Ramaphosa regime upon economics as far it is bound to land ownership and the farming setup around so-called food security.60

The modern day East Asian farming environment provides an excellent example to enlighten the intentions of the ANC’s intended new age farming models wherein the mass of poor and landless Blacks are central as a blue print. The East Asian farming reform and progressive management in the upliftment of millions of poor Asians, as well as their phenomenonal delivery of agricultural products by these new incoming farmers to their countries’ local as well as international markets, are not only an example of what the ANC intents to do, but an aim which they can easily reach with their planned land reform and a new generation of Black farmers. These farmers vary from small and commercial up to mega farmers within a comprehensively functioning Black farming community. Prominent examples here are the rise of masses of farmers in the East Asian nations China, Japan and South Korea.60

In the Asian context the restructuring of agriculture, based upon land reform, erased inequalities in wealth with the enrichment of previously landless poor people after financially securing them as farmers and workers. At the same time, have these new agricultural enterprises made a turn-around with the limiting of importation of food and its costs by the constructive delivery of these new farmers to local produce. South Africa’s agricultural sector holds the potential to conservatively create a million more jobs (from farmers to labourers) in ten years time, if a good land reform scheme, supported by an increase in investments to start up production and Black farmers, is implemented.60 With regard to the positive impact of new technology and agricultural science to increase not only agricultural production but also the better use of small pieces of land, Derby60 writes60:2: “With new technology, fertilisers and irrigation systems, the land that we once thought barren in rural South Africa need not be, as long as there is government and private sector support and it is well organised”.

Land expropriation as done in East Asia, always has unavoidable short term negativities, but these are mostly fast overcome with a supportive and well organised government and private sector on the one side, and an eager sector of incoming farmers on the other side. The antagonists are correct in their argument that the new age farming system of the ANC is going to require, as it did initially in the East Asian countries, sacrifices from all the roleplayers, but if these sacrifices and positive contributions are not made, anarchy, revolution and starvation are on the cards for South Africa as a whole. For the propagandists it is clear that it is going to be the antagonists, now rigidly hanging on to their under-used land and unjust privileges, as the White farmers foolishly didin Zimbabwe, who will be the greatest losers if land expropriation is not activated in 2019.60 In this context Derby60 writes60:2: “But of course, as part of land reform, some farmers will find themselves having to carve up their lands; one can’t ignore our shared history. Land reform comes with great upheaval as it involves taking land from those who have it and giving it to those who don’t. To unleash it, title deeds are necessary. Landowners, white farmers, the government and our chiefs and kings need to buy in so South Africa can reap the economic rewards”.

To make an East Asian farming system sustainable and viable in South Africa, the South African State can at last, after hundreds of years of utmost suffering by millions of Blacks, of which the most are at the moment still caught in poverty, inequality and unemployment, bring about a positive change through land expropriation. For the propagandists, Ramaphosa is obliged by the country’s post-1994 democracy and the absolute need to erase the country’s tragic political past, to effect immediate and comprehensive land expropriation. Moreover, Ramaphosa has no other choice. The propagandists believe Ramaphosa’s and the ANC’s new age farming project is not only positively challenging, it is something great with which to get involved.

3.2.2. The ANC’s present day steering of the Poor Black Problem

The antagonists allege that there is presently a low success rate around the upliftment of the poor and landless Blacks through farming initiatives by the ANC regime. The antagonists allege this to be a direct failure which was activated by certain negative characteristics of the poor and landless Blacks, together with an incapable and failed ANC regime. The propagandists reject this view completely as devoid of truth. For the propagandists it is again a planned racist effort by the antagonists to obstruct the ANC’s land expropriation plan.

Regarding the specific allegations by the antagonists that the 1994 to 2018 land redistribution plan of the ANC regime failed because negative characteristics hamper the placed Black farmers, the propagandists note that the antagonists missed the fact that it takes far more than 24 years to acclimatise and to promote disadvantaged peoples, in this case specifically as farmers in a new socio-economic and political system. The fact is that the Black farmers of the 1994 to 2018 land redistribution programme all come from an extremely poor background, mostly uneducated and poorly trained in the agriculture profession and trade, which they had to overcome while at the same time having to adapt to new standards of functioning and living from which they were excluded most of their lives by the pre-1948 and later the Apartheid system. To understand the complexity of the ANC regime which their 1994 to 2018 land redistribution had to face, and the so-called low success rate of 10% to 20% accompanying it as alleged by the antagonists, it is firstly important to go back into the political history of the post-1948 successful nationalist Afrikaners, noting the problematic course of upliftment of the so-called poor Afrikaners (pre-1948) of the 1930s as farmers and their failure to obtain an immediate high success outcome.3,26,42,75,77-78 The 1994 to 2018 Black farmers’ upliftment a repeat of the poor Afrikaners’ farmer rehabilitation (1830-1939)

In the problematic upliftment of the so-called poor Afrikaners (pre-1948), it clearly stands out that the failure of some of the descendants of the poor and struggling Voortrekkers (proto-Afrikaners) who had left the Cape Colony in the 1830s and who were in 1939 (more than 100 years later), still under very supportive Afrikaner/White political regimes and their racial favouring, but were still poor and unsuccessful in the economically progressive South Africa of the 1939s. Geen3 illustrates this reality well3:74:

Looking back it may not be unduly optimistic to claim that the political division [Northern Afrikaners versus British and Cape Dutch] that began in 1836 were healed by the Union of 1910, but the decisive social consequences of the Trek – the Poor White and the Native Problems – still remain [in 1939] to be solved and affect the public weal in the Union of South Africa today.

This rigid, ongoing White poverty and its negative and obstructive role in the South African economy, especially in the farming communities in the 1930s, is also well illustrated by the Carnegie Commission’s comprehensive reporting of 1932 on the poor White. The Commission estimated that more than 300,000 South African Whites, as much as 17.5% of the total White population of South Africa, were very poor, living mostly in rural areas where 30% of them were landless squatters.3,5

To understand the problematic situation around the present day rural Black poverty and the dilemma of the ANC regime to make a mass of poor and landless Black people immediately successful farmers and financially independent, the propagandists show the importance of noting Geen’s3 excellent reflection upon the Afrikaners’ poverty dilemma. In this study the following is highlighted3:

a) The proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners’ similar pre- and post-1930 poverty as compared to that of the pre-and post-1994 poor Blacks, and

b) the Afrikaners’ failure to be made successful farmers immediately. White settlement at Kakamas on the Orange River

With reference to the well established land settlement schemes of the Union Government and the Dutch Reformed Church to immediately provide the poor Whites with smallholdings, finance and the teaching of improved farming methods and skills, Geen3 offers the following disappointing outcome of the failure of these enterprises and farmers3:200:

The Church settlement at Kakamas on the Orange River in the north-western corner of the Cape Province has been one of the most successful rehabilitation settlements, but every such scheme is a palliative rather than a cure. Moreover, the families placed on the settlements have been carefully chosen and yet only about half of them seem to make good.

This meant that a success rate of not more than 50%, notwithstanding an immense direct and continuing programme of moral, psychological and financial support by well established Afrikaner institutes such as the DRC and the AB, as well as further immense financial support by the South African Government. This mere 50% success rate by the poor Whites, growing up in a White governmental setup which had brought immense benefit over many years to Whites only and had greatly supported the White farming establishment and enterprise, confirms that a fast implementation scheme of Black-ownership of farms as required and prescribed by the antagonists as a absolute outcome after 24 years of implementation (lacking further the immense support from a large rich Black community, which was and is totally absent in pre-and post-1994 as a result of the Blacks’ immense poverty in general), is completely impossible. This explains why the immense financial inputs by the post-1994 government, as with that of the Eastern Cape Province which the antagonists allege yielded only a success rate of an alleged 10%, cannot and must not be seen as failures inherent to the poor Blacks as persons and the ANC regime as a poor ruler.3,42

For the propagandists the Afrikaner dilemma of the 1930s must be further used as a blue print to understand the post-2018 plans of the ANC regime with their uplifting of the mass of poor and landless Blacks within their planned land expropriation programme. What must be noted is that the 2019 dilemma around Black poverty is enormous in comparison with the small White poverty dilemma of the post 1930s. The present day official poor Blacks count is more than 29 million, while the poor Afrikaners in the 1930s counted only 300 000 (reflecting 1% or the ratio 1:100 against the Blacks’ numbers). Furthermore, this present day Black poverty is undoubtedly not due to personal shortcomings or characteristics inherent to the Black population or by their own wrongdoings, as is frequently argued by the antagonists (whose mindsets are still seemingly caught up in racism and White supremacy), but mostly a direct negative outcome of the long term planned racial discrimination against and suppression of Blacks, coming from as far back as the days of the British Cape and pre-1910s South Africa, and ending only in 1994.3,5 Geen3 reports here, in line with the antagonists’ so-called “failed” Black farmers of post-1994. This mirrors some of the proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners own “personal shortcomings or characteristics inherent to them” (which the British authority at the Cape had described as the proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners “economical and personal backwardness”). About this unfortunate situation, which for years contaminated the Afrikaners socio-economically and personally to prolonge the poor Afrikaner problem (and which is also echoed by today’s poor Black problem), Geen3 writes3:197:

Many factors have played a part in the origin of the poor White section of the community. The hardships and isolated life in the frontier districts of the old Cape Colony were one of the earlier causes and it is likely that many poor Whites found land and some salvation by joining the Great Trek, for as long as there was empty land to which to trek, their numbers were kept down. But before long the conditions that prevailed in the outlying districts of the Cape Colony were repeated in the states founded by the Voortrekkers on the interior plateau of southern Africa, for they did not go forth to found a new world but to continue the old one that they knew. The isolation of life in the huge area between the Orange and the Limpopo was even more marked than in the Cape of pre-Trek days. Educational facilities were often almost non-existent and there was no inducement to enterprise. Their environment tended to make many of the pioneer Boers an ignorant and indolent people, though hardy and self-reliant withal. Moreover, the time came when land was again scarce and then it was revealed that, though many had obtained much land too easily, others were landless squatters on the farms of the more well-to-do. For many years both in the Cape Colony and in the two republics the deterioration of a large section of the European population was overlooked, as a result of the preoccupation with numerous wars against the Bantu and the political strife between Boer and Briton, but before the end of the century the problem was engaging the attention of the Cape Government as well as that of President Kruger in the Transvaal, where changing economic conditions consequent upon the discovery of gold to increase the number of the poor Whites, who as a group have proved very unadaptable to new ways of life. White-poverty and Whites’ obstructive attitude to manual labour

To understand in further detail the present immense poor Black situation and the most challenging political, social and economical environment the ANC regime since 1994 faces and wherein it must trys to function and rule optimally to correct unjust land ownership and its roots of unemployment, inequality and poverty, is it also important to focus upon the roots of the poor White setup of the 1930s (which was overcome with time by the then White regime) and then to reflect from this how it is also rooted in today’s poor Black problem and can be solve by the ANC regime.3,5

Prominently intertwined with initial White poverty was the obstructive attitude of Whites against manual labor. This, on the one side, was work which most of the ordinary Blacks were forced to do, starting in the early Cape, so as to be able to make a living, and which had, willingly and unwillingly, became part of their financial and personal survival for centuries inside the White racially dominated economy. The primary intention of this economy was to create a contingent of plentiful cheap, untrained Black labor. This discrimination between types of work, so called “White work” and “Black work”, had made the Whites resistand refuse to do suitable unskilled and semi-skilled work provided by the Cape Government. In order to develop Whites and to give them insight into the need to do all types of work, so as to help them with time to overcome their joblessness and poverty. But the Whites’ negative and discriminative attitude to not do so-called “Black work”, continued for a long time and forced many Whites into the category of the 300 000 poor Whites of the 1939s. The fortunate position of Whites inside their discriminative political and economical system and the financial favouring of Whites in general through better work and business opportunities which included land ownership and farming, enriched most Whites and saved them from doing comprehensive cheap manual work. However, this had only emerged after 1948 with the DF Malan nationalist Afrikaners in government. This rich man, poor man setup, creating a master-servant relationship, was one of the prominent reasons for the maintenance of White racism and the keeping of masses of Blacks in immense poverty. This degrading situation and negative setup of landless and poor Blacks, which continues up until today, is highlighted by the propagandists as the contaminated situation which the ANC regime is now trying to rectify with their land reform to comprehensively uplift the poor and landless Blacks and which some White racists, who have been constantly obstructing Black rule since 1994, try to uphold.3-6,10,77 Roman-Dutch law of inheritance and the division of land

A further contaminative factor in the creation of ongoing White poverty was the early custom and tradition of the constant division of a father’s farm among his sons. In Transvaal this habit, based upon the Roman-Dutch law of inheritance, was abolished in 1902, but was still respected for years in the more backwards rural areas all over the Union. This constant sub-division of land blocked the creation of thrifty peasantry of small landholders as in Europe, basically due to South Africa’s harsh agricultural and climatic conditions and the failure to adopt new farming models to overcome these blocks. This aggravated poverty on the growing smaller and smaller “small” farms, lead thereto that the initially White owners became White “bywoners” on the lands of progressive White farmers, or were forced to look for work at diamond diggings and in towns where they, as result of a lack of training and skills, joined the ranks of the unemployed and unemployable, mostly Blacks. Many of these poverty stricken White “bywoners” were later on forced from the land of progressive landowners by improved farming methods and the development of pastoral farming, ending up in cities as poor and landless Whites.3

The abovementioned tragic outcomes, according to the propagandists, also occurred in the Black territories (besides the fact that they lost their land and farms to White land grabbers), forcing Blacks to seek work in the White farming community as poor paid labourers, as well as labourers in urban areas and at mines, due to the unprofitability of their constantly decreasing own tribal land. This outcome matches the Whites’ differentiation of “White work’ and “Black work”. Regarding the large contingent of poor Black and landless labourers, working and living from early times upon White farms, since 1994 an immense forcing out of these Black labourers from White farms where they and the ancestors had stayed for many years took place. They became, as did the poor Whites of the 1930s, a mass of poor, unemployed and unemployable persons in towns and cities with very little say in their destiny or a real human existence.3,5 White Helping Hand for only Whites

With regard to the then exclusive White Helping Hand for Whites only to uplift the poor and landless Whites in the post-1900s, Geen3 shows that the cure approach of the poor Whites by the White regimes from 1910s was the use of an exclusive focused discrimination (WEE) against non-Whites. This early outcome makes today’s AA, EE and BEE (and intended comprehensive forms of land redistribution) not only understandable but fully justified.5

Today’s AA, EE, BEE and intended comprehensive forms of land redistribution by the ANC regime also focus once again attention on the present day accusations by the antagonists that the ANC regime is solely a liberator with the modus operandi to destroy rather than build. They maintain that the ANC are unable to run a passable government and to greatly improve the quality of life of Black people beyond giving them handouts by the “redistribution” of the wealth of the rich Whites, like so-called “land grabbing.”

Upon examining the racially discriminative and exploitative political history of South Africa, the propagandists, quite rightly ask what were the actions of the White regimes from the 1800s up until 1994 other than to destroy rather than build, an inability to run a passable government to effectively serve the total population and an immense failure to greatly improve the quality of life of every citizen besides giving handouts only to Whites and the “redistribution” of the already limited wealth of the non-Whites to Whites?3,5 The White Helping Hand for Whites Only initiative demonstrates this extreme process and immensity of the handouts by the White governments of the assets of Blacks to Whites.

Geen3 illustrates this inclination of White liberation and the exclusive promotion through WEE to Whites at the costs of Blacks, over centuries, but especially from the 1910s, very well when he writes3:200:

Successive [White] governments have also adopted a white labour policy to provide the poor Whites with unskilled and semi-skilled work on the railways, roads and irrigation schemes. In 1921 there were 4,700 unskilled Europeans employed by the S.A. Railways. Seven years later the number was not far short of 16,000. They were given free housing and paid at the rate of from 3s. to 5s. a day. In this manner over a period of years, thousands have reached a higher level of subsistence. On the other hand, this policy of replacing Natives in unskilled occupations by Europeans added another disability to the Bantu. In the case of the railways it also meant that, contrary to the provisions of the South African Act, they were being used as a means of disguised poor relief. By means of such subsidised relief work and by charitable endeavour the rest of the community is helping to carry the poor Whites and to raise their status. Black Helping Hand for Blacks Only

The propagandists emphasise that the Black and the non-White communities were so impoverished since 1652, especially after the founding of the Union in 1910, that “charitable endeavor by the rest of the Black and non-White communities” to uplift the poor Blacks – a much needed Black Helping Hand for Blacks Only – was never possible up to 1994, even until today. Positive opportunities regarding Black farming, similar to that of the upliftment of the poor White, never occurred for them before 1994. It is only in the last 24 years, that the ANC regime under very troubled circumstances could engage for the first time in an action of upliftment similar to that of the Whites’ with their Black Helping Hand for Blacks Only. The motto of Geen3:200: “To keep the poor Whites on the land the Union Government and the Dutch Reformed Church have established land settlement schemes to provide them with smallholdings and to teach them better farming methods”, is precisely what the ANC regime is going to do now with the poor and landless Blacks on the road to perdition. For a successful outcome, the ANC regime only needs to return the unused and unproductive land of White farmers that were grabbed by their ancestors over centuries to the Blacks. Ongoing Black poverty within undisturbed present day White wealth

The propagandists believe that the years of isolation of the mass of Blacks in Black territories and the later so called Bantustans (areas representing in practice only 15% of the total South Africa geography) undoubtedly also contributed directly to the present day immense Black poverty and the Blacks’ ongoing political and economic disempowerment. To erase this negative setup will take much more time than the 25 years already spent, while an outright immediate success of 100% as the antagonists require and rigidly prescribe is just impossible. For the propagandists, a long term programme of comprehensive land redistribution is an absolute must for the ANC regime to be able to rectify the economics of the poor and landless Blacks and to correct the political wrongdoings around land ownership. In this setup the antagonists are clearly either uninformed of the South African political history and the immense efforts needed to uplift the poor, or they are deliberately sabotaging for their own opportunistic reasons, the ANC’s efforts to bring about a better South Africa for all its citizens.

The ongoing White political historical ignorance on the sound reasons of the ANC to activate land expropriation in order to rectify the immense injustice over a broad spectrum, are seen by the propagandists as blind and blunt opposition by the antagonists to a balanced and justified land ownership. The Blacks’ dire present day general financial position, when compared with the good general position of the Whites, nullifies the antagonists’ opposition that any form of compensation should be done for the poor and landless Blacks. For the propagandists, land expropriation a must, notwithstanding all its consequences. (For the propagandists, these consequences are minimal in comparison with the consequences if land expropriation is not effected in a fast and comprehensive manner).58,80-82

In this context it is important to compare the alleged 350 000 to 400 000 poor Whites in South Africa, and the alleged 150 000 financially struggling Afrikaners with the masses of non-Whites still living below the poverty line in South Africa in 2018 (reflected at an 8% poverty line). It is conservatively estimated (which seems to be an underestimation) that as many as 29 236 632 Blacks, or 73.0% of the total Black population [and 2 175 417 Coloureds (48.1% of the total Coloured population) and 150 409 Indians (11.8% of total Indian population)] are living in poverty. The dire situation of unemployment among Blacks is a further indicator of the poor Black Problem which the ANC regime must immediately address through action such as land reform. In this context statistics reflect that of South Africans (with ± 55 million of which the Blacks are by far the majority and ± 5 million Whites) older than 15 years, less than 40% are employed in some form, while of the 55 million of the total population (of which 35 million can accept employment), only 15 million are in stable employment. This means that 20 million persons (mostly Blacks) are unemployed and that for every ten persons who have work, 25 persons are unemployed (meaning 40% or the ratio 2:5 for employment).58,80-83

This negative impact upon the Black population is much higher when one remembers that the total population of ±55 million needs some basic income to be able to live, and that only 15 million are working in some form of established work. Comparing Whites to Blacks, these statistics indicate a ratio for Whites of ten in work against 13 unemployed (10:13), while the ratio for Blacks employed versus unemployed is 10:28. (In the rural areas in Kwazulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape the expanded Black unemployment rate is 41% and 50% respectively for 2017-2018). Hereto the official unemployment number for Whites is 7% versus 30% for Blacks.58,80-83

How extreme this unemployment and poverty are within the Black community, is further confirmed by the fact that there has been an insignificant increase of only 127 000 persons into employment from 2010 to 2015 in the age group 7 to 17 years, to bring to a total 11.2 million persons in work placement for this age group. In 2015 2.4 million children, mostly Black, not really qualified and mature enough to work, were being forced to work as a result of their family’s poverty.58,80-83

Looking more closely at the official statistics which reflect that only 26.6% of the population is unemployed, these statistics are misleading, seeing that only 42.8% of the total population is employed in some way and that the youth unemployment is 53.7%, most of whom are Blacks. This calculation means unofficially that 57.2% of the total South African population is not in employment, and as much as only 46.3% of the youths are employed. Again in terms of the number of Blacks against that of the total population, this reflects not only the presence of immense unemployment, but at the same time immense Black poverty.58,80-83

The abovementioned data is further strengthened by official household studies that reflect the average annual income of Whites as R444 446.00 versus that of Blacks as R92 983.00 (with the Indians at R271 621.00 and the Coloureds at R172 983.00). The ratio of this annual income for Whites versus all other South Africans is 2:6, while for Whites versus Blacks it is 2:9.5,58,80-83

These statistics, as with all the others quoted thus far in this subdivision, confirm the permanent cementing of a mass of Blacks in extreme poverty of which they, on their own, ever can escape (and for which they are mostly not responsible). Direct intervention and interferance by the ANC regime to start-up the rehabilitation of this mass of poor Blacks is the only way out. The fastest and most appropriate approach for the propagandists is the present intended land expropriation (based upon the just redistribution of stolen Black land).5,58,80-83

The propagandists contend that AA, EE and BEE did not solve 70% of the total Black population’s tragic poverty between 1994 and 2018. It was too minimal to focus upon the total poverty of the Black masses. Other, better focused and planned immediate solutions, even extraordinary undertakings, are needed to bring about a positive turn-around.5,58,80-83

The further reflection that the Blacks possess only 20% of the South African economy compared to 80% of Whites, notwithstanding that the Blacks having 100% of the political power is a demanding highlight of dissatisfaction by the general Black population that needs to be answered by concrete actions. These actions include land ownership and the right to make a living through farming on the one hand and on the other hand the right to be trained, to have housing and housing property and to be able to work for a decent income and live a good lifestyle. It must be noted that when the BEE-system started in 1994, it was not meant to be a permanent structure to forever empower Blacks: it was aimed at economic upliftment on the one side, and on the other side to make up for the comprehensive derailment brought to Blacks by White political rule over centuries.5,58,80-84

The fact is that BEE did not work properly due to the immense gap between the White haves and the Black have-nots, the mass of unemployment of Blacks, as well as the ongoing comprehensive White empowerment. The maintenance of this gap today is due to ongoing White supremacy and the Whites monopoly of every part of the South African economics and financial world since 1994, with their exclusive White capital, making the dismantling of BEE today impossible. Other measures to rectify the discrepancy between the rich (mostly Whites) and the poor (mostly Blacks) are needed urgently. As already demonstrated many times by the propagandists, land redistribution and the creation of self-sufficient Black farmers, is the best solution. However, the duration of the land expropriation is also unclear: the process and progress of the completion of it will be determined by the start-up level (low or high) of expropriation when it is activated and how intensively it is driven in the future.5,58,80-84 Upkeep-mechanism of Black poverty, inequality, civilisation, dignity and inferiority

Looking at the literature, the references to a discrepancy in terms of wealth and poverty between South Africans, and of a discrepancy in terms of Black and White between South Africans, are prominent. It is further necessary for the propagandists to be enlightened at this stage to support why they think that land expropriation is an immediate must.

Two issues in this regard are intertwined: poverty and inequality (and in the background: landlessness, uncivilisation, indignity and inferiority). The propagandists argue that the White economists and politicians frequently underwrite outdated theoretical views (which some propagandists believe can be an internalised colonial cognition) to see poverty and inequality as separate troubles which also need separate treatments. Bruce85 hereunder tries to prescribe to the ANC regime how to mend not only the country’s racial problems, but also Black poverty as well as inequality85:16:

Why, for instance, are poverty and inequality almost always mentioned in the same sentence as if they were the same thing? A real leader would have sorted that out long ago. If you had the choice, now, to fix either poverty or inequality in South Africa, which would you choose? You can’t do both. They have different causes and, therefore, must have different solutions.

Inequality is caused by the presence of wealth. Poverty is caused by its complete absence. And you surely, surely, fix poverty first.

Bruce’s85 opinion and understanding are totally inappropriate in modern day humanities, economics and politics and reflect a strong antagonists’ standpoint. It is clearly vested in a racially discriminative colonial cognition, which also characterides the thinking in general by the antagonists on the so-called “inability” of the Black race to address today’s political problems effectively with good planning and action, and to bring from the background Black uncivilisation, indignity and inferiority immediately to the foreground. In the present setup of White politics and economics aiming to squash the ANC regime’s intended land expropriation plan, it seems for the propagandists as though the racial and belittling White talks of 1908 to 1909 of Blacks as a specific race during the Convention to found the Union of South Africa, are replayed again and again, to reflect again to-day’s so-called “inferior or uncivilisation” identity of Blacks to again carry out contaminated political planning and action.4 Jan Smuts’s4 Memorandum of Proposals for the formation of the Union reflects the “liberal” Cape politician Merriman’s extreme racial writing to him, echoing this White South African age-old view of Black inferiority. Merriman4 reflects4:18: “…I do not like Natives at all and I wish we had no Black man in South Africa. But there they are, our lot is cast with them by an overruling Providence and the only question is how to shape our course so as to maintain the supremacy of our race and at the same time do our duty.” On this Smuts4 answered in a very similar negative racial tone4:19: “…I sympathise profoundly with the Native races of South Africa whose land it was long before we came here to force a policy of dispossession on them… But I don’t believe in politics for them. Perhaps at the bottom I do not believe in politics at all as a means for the attainment of the highest ends, but certainly so far as the Natives are concerned politics will to my mind only have an unsettling influence.”

Smut’s4 final conclusion upon the role of Blacks in future South Africa describes the fates in 1908 of Blacks and other non-White races and the age-old negative racial indoctrination and contamination of the Whites’ mindsets, which it seems is still today present, when he says4:19: “When I consider the political future of the Natives in South Africa I must say that I look into shadows and darkness; and then I feel inclined to shift the intolerable burden of solving the sphinx problem to the ampler shoulders and stronger brains of the future.” It is this early “darkness”, an economic and political mess created exclusively by Whites – which over many years locked the Blacks into immense poverty and inequality in their daily existence and psyche – that the ANC regime (since 1994) must try to solve in only twenty-five years, after more than three hundreds years of White failure and supremacy. This absolutely needed rectification was in 1994 and is now in 2019 for the propagandists an unattainable outcome to expect from the ANC regime, notwithstanding their best efforts. This is an immensely problematic setup which is “comfortably missed out” today by the antagonists and which they opportunistically describe as the so-called “shortcomings of the Black farmers and the ANC regime” to fulfill their racially driven unrealistic and unreachable aims and masked intentions.4-7

The political naivety of the antagonists upon the comprehensive abilities of today’s Black (which includes their view of the ANC’s abilities) is not only shocking, but also lacks the understanding of the intertwining of poverty and inequality in the complex South African racial society. For the propagandists, the two issues can and must be addressed simultaneously, as the ANC has correctly been doing since 1994. Just because the White politicians and journalists seemingly lack the ability themselves to think analytically and comprehensively, it does not mean that the present day Blacks also lack this ability. Many of the antagonistic White journalists and opinion-makers’ understanding of modern day governance and political transformation is seemingly still caught and steered in the thinking-pattern and political knowledge of Grand Apartheid, which still emphasises utmost White superiority in thinking, planning and action upon behalf of the “inferior” and “uncivilised” Blacks. It is in this racially contaminated cognitive context that the ANC regime’s uplifting of the poor and landless Blacks through the receiving back of White land is attacked.86 For the propagandists, the antagonists today still miss out a century later on JBM Hertzog’s viewpoint of the 1920s when he warns some of the arrogant racial Whites86:195: “… that the time would come when a black skin was no longer a test for uncivilisation and that the Blacks of South Africa would one day politically and physically swamp the white civilisation”. This political rectification is now well-reflected by the “civilised” Ramaphosa’s effort through land expropriation to constructively mend the country’s economic and political mess left by the NP-AB-alliance when they fled the political scene in 1994.

By firstly only addressing so-called Black poverty, as propagated by Bruce85, the propagandists show that the White rich and the White business sectors will economically and politically profit more. This handling will successfully keep Black inequality strongly in place, while at the same time assuring the continuation of Black-poverty (and undoubtedly in the antagonists’ mindsets their contamination of a so-called “Black inferiority and uncivilasation”). The abovementioned naïve political view, specifically his lack of insight into the violating nature of Black-White inequality which is fully intertwined into poverty, is reflected further by Bruce’s85 postulation85:16: “You end poverty in South Africa and you fix everything. It doesn’t mean the end of inequality. But it means the end of our greatest curse – indignity”. For the propagandists this is a laughable and superficial political view. To think that indignity is only locked into poverty is a myth. Inequality holds the same indignity in the activation of hatred in Blacks, as that of poverty: the proto-Afrikaners’ delinquent retro-behaviour up to 1948 and the Afrikaners’ delinquent retro-behaviour up to 1994, as a direct result of their own inequality, coming from the pre-1900s, still brings out today in them today the emotions of indignity and inferiority, long after their poverty and indignity was erased.85

For the propagandists, Ramaphosa’s present approach, specifically his land redistribution to the poor and landless Blacks, is correct: if you change poverty you change inequality, and if you change inequality you change poverty. Cyril Ramaphosa as a Black, living under Apartheid, knows well the intertwining of poverty and inequality as well as the indignity internalised in each. It is only after the poverty, indignity and inequality are fully erased from the mindsets of today’s poor Blacks (and, as already said, this is a process that lives long in the mindset), that the process of economic upliftment of the poor Blacks in Ramaphosa’s land expropriation plan will have a positive impact.85

There is no doubt in the mindsets of the propagandists that the ANC regime knows well the risk of future revolt and anarchy, and that land grabbing instead of land distribution is a reality, if justice is not done.

What the poor and landless Blacks under the guardianship of the ANC now require is the rectification of the immense injustices done to them through Apartheid. Prominent actions, according to some propagandists, required from the ANC, are extreme RET and RST, which include direct and fast land grabbing (which the ANC is not going to do). On the other hand, RET and RST are for some propagandists simply the breaking down of superficial political, economical and human borders (and contaminated political, racial and economicbeliefs) created by Whites over more than three centuries to safeguard their privileges in the country.5,58,80-83,87 This is captured in an extraordinary discriminative phenomenon and experience, overwhelming in its human and psychological destructiveness, which the late Professor Richard van der Ross87 already highlighted in 1979 when he wrote87:92: “To be told by law where to live, whom to marry, with whom to dance, against whom not to play cricket, where to go to school, which university to attend…”.

Enough is enough for most Blacks: the 1994 dispensation and the South African Constitution failed the mass of South Africans. It is clear for the propagandists that through well manipulated emotions around land ownership, and the various hijackings of the economics and the judicial thinking by the so called “good” Constitution since 1994 by White racists and exclusive capitalists, the Whites are still fully governing South Africa at the cost of the non-Whites. This imbalanced and unjustsetup must be rectified with immediate effect, of which the introduction and activation of land-expropriation is the least disruptive and the most just choice. For the propagandists, as shown over and over by them in this article, many antagonists are still caught up in a nationalist Afrikaner racial mindset, beset by false supremacy and empowerment, believing that they can block any form of reform.5 Louw5 describes this mindset of abasement as a5:44: “…doctrine that taught that they are a superior race that does only the ethically correct and good, versus the inferior Black subordinates whose actions were infected with unethical and bad behaviour and an inferior disposition”.

Furthermore, many of the Whites are fighting off the incoming land expropriation not only to keep their enrichments coming from Apartheid and other racial discrimination over 300 years, but also the seeking of a better and more secure position to enlarge these enrichments through more masked political (juridical) empowerment assured to them by the present day unjust Constitution. The antagonists sudden pleading of Minority Procurement (MP), after their many years of the extreme practice of Minority Empowerment (ME), is laughable as well as a surprise. For the Whites, selfishly fighting for MP to further uphold their racial ME there is in a balanced democracy no justified grounds to listen to or to consider this. The antagonists know it well.5

It is clear that the antagonists various “savior and rescuer” organisations, fighting so-called upon behalf of the White farmers and their White land (but in reality for upholding the “old” White racial South Africa and its White exclusive capitalistic models and systems, are losing their battles one by one. In this context it is for the propagandists clear that more than 90% of the White population are ignoring the various exclusive “Afrikaner bodies” like the Freedom Front Plus Party (approximately 166 000 supporters), Solidarity (approximately 350 000 members), and the organisations with minor support such as AfriForum, the Institute of Race Relations, the FW de Klerk Foundation’s Centre for Constitutional Rights, the National Dialogue Initiative (Nasionale Stigting-dialoog Inisiatief or NSDI), the Organisation for Unrepresented Nations and Groups (UNPO) and the Africa-European Indaba. The efforts of religious groups with minority status within the White community to mesmerise the mindsets of a small group of directionless Afrikaners with their false doctrines are in the process of being faded out. All these various antagonistic organisations’ lifespans are at most that of ten years, and are very superficial, directionless, nor viable or sustainable in the new South Africa.23,24,75,88-94

The Ramaphosa land expropriation with the main intention of erasing the poverty and landlessness of a mass of Blacks is also in the process of erasing the pre-1994 racial cognitions and mechanisms cemented into the political minds of some Whites, which are steering their wanton propaganda of Blacks as uncivilised and inferior.

3.2.3. Can the Afrikaners’ military derail South Africa in the future?

In 1994 the incoming ANC was well aware of the military, as well as the political empowerment of the Afrikaners to derail the new dispensation up to the 2000s. This empowerment slowly declined from the first five years after 1994, to end up in the present day in complete political and military disempowerment by the Afrikaners to be able to derail or stop any dramatic land reform. For the propagandists, the Afrikaners and the Whites as populations are in disempowered positions to endanger Ramaphosa’s land reform intentions. The previous mass of Afrikaners who so publically and eagerly underwrote anti-ANC rhetoric and who blocked the ANC physically at every turn in South Africa are today a small segment of minimum importance. The so-called military power of the “nation of the Afrikaners” is just a ghost of the past. Since 1994 the Afrikaner-volk started splitting up in into small, less rigid and less extreme Afrikaner cultural, political and financial bodies. It seems that only a small number, not more than ±300 000 of unhappy and rigid nationalist Afrikaners, mostly from the farming sector and a segment of the exclusive White capitalist sector, as well a small part of the old NP-AB-DRC-alliance, form part of the antagonists. This minority is prominent in their constant efforts to oppose the ANC regime in various ways, as well as to derail and to block Ramaphosa’s intended land expropriation. Since the beginning of 2016, this opposition has become louder and more organised, but seemingly with little success.3-5

The propagandists acknowledge that most individual nationalist Afrikaners have settled into a new South African lifestyle that is completely different from that of their fathers. They have clearly repositioned themselves as individuals, stripped from all the emotional and political rhetoric with which they are falsely bombarded daily by the extreme racial Afrikaner politicians and executive leaders, who are forming the so-called antagonists. The land reform issue is not really a worrying aspect today for most of the ordinary Afrikaners, as what the “saviours” and “rescuers” of the Afrikaners try to present. The 1994 dispensation was indeed a watershed for the Afrikaners of South Africa.5

For the propagandists it is clear that many of the ordinary Afrikaners had to learn to live as individuals inside a new South Africa after 1994. Their old ties with the Afrikaner Nationalist’s “volk” were suddenly cut, erasing blind group loyalty and dogma and the protection of the group’s interests. For the poor and peace-loving individual Afrikaner, it swiftly became clear after 1994 that he would not benefit in any way from the wealth of Afrikaner exclusive capitalist magnates such as the Ruperts, Wieses and Steyns, etc. For the ordinary Afrikaners these exclusive capitalist Afrikaner magnates must save themselves: they have the abilities to get rich on their own and surely also have the abilities to stay rich on their own. At the moment the ordinary Afrikaner is only misused by the exclusive White capitalists in their economic and political self-empowerment, leaving the poor individual Afrikaner in the cold. The same kind of opportunistic “self-centredness” can be said of the farming community who are crying “wolf” about a so-called impending “land grabbing”. Looking closely at the situation, the ordinary Afrikaner never benefited over the years from the farming community or the Afrikaner magnates who now run with the antagonists. He missed out on their many benefits and was nothing more than a springboard and a voter voice to be misused by the Afrikaner/White farmers, politicians and business magnates. With reference to the Afrikaner/White business magnates, the prominent question today for the ordinary Afrikaners and for the propagandists is: why can the ultra-rich White South Africans not be targeted for RET, and thus also especially landv expropriation? Financial data shows that 66 000 South Africans (mostly Whites) are part of the richest 1% in the world, with 40 400 of the world’s 13.6 million ultra-rich and between 38 500 and 45 000 billionaires (mostly White) living in South Africa. The three richest South Africans (Whites) possess more than 50% of the total South Africa riches.5,23,24,75,88-94

About 2.7 million other Afrikaners and more than 4 million Whites in total are completely ignoring the antagonists’ plea for an organised offensive against the current ANC regime. It seems as though most modern day Afrikaners, many of whom are already politically and culturally differently minded to their parents of 40–60 years ago, are driven in their daily lives and future planning by their own life needs, decisions and planning, clearly outside the antagonists’ dogmas and false intentions of so-called “Afrikaner/White rights”. The political intentions to derail or physically obstruct land reform are absent from them. In all honesty, these ± 4 million modern thinking and politically orientated Afrikaners/Whites know that the ± 300 00 antagonists (mostly passively as “co-riders” to the small group of opportunistic Afrikaner/White saviours and rescuers) do not have real political or military power, know-how and the finances “to restore” in any way the nationalist Afrikaners’ so-called “pre-1994 South Africa”. Most of these ±4 million Afrikaners clearly dissociate themselves publically from this racial “pre-1994 South Africa”. They also see the so-called loss of “dignity and rights” that the antagonists allege were taken away from the Afrikaners/Whites by the ANC regime, as false statements and well planned manipulations to mislead the general public upon the truth around the intended land expropriation of Ramaphosa and the ANC.5,23,24,88-95

Another prominent factor which is well known to the ANC regime – making the possibility of a “Boer-revolution” zero – is the hard fact that in 100 years time only between 10 000 to 30 000 Afrikaners/Whites will be left in South Africa. This makes the “pure” Afrikaners/Europeans as a dynamic entity insignificant in a future South Africa and the present-day rescue efforts of the “pure” Afrikaners/Europeans and their exclusive rights by the antagonists a failed effort. Statistics indicate that the Afrikaners may decrease to between 1% and 3% of the total population in 30 to 40 years from now, leaving a remnant of less than 1 million Afrikaners against an estimated 70 million Blacks in South Africa. In 40 years from now their diminishing from the scene as a “population” will be phenomenal.5

With regard to the diminishing numbers of the Afrikaners (and also the Whites) and their move into insignificance, the propagandists maintain that the Afrikaner/White population has already become a so-called “old population”, lacking young people to assure growth. In 2016 the ratio for Black persons under 16 years to persons over 60 years was 100:20, while this ratio for Whites was 100:130. This imbalance will increase over the next five years, as more young Whites are leaving South Africa permanently and the high concentration of the elderly is growing.5

In this context is it also very important for the propagandists to note that not all Afrikaners and Whites agreed with the NP-AB-DRC-Alliance’s racial policy or were ever members of these bodies. Many of these persons always supported a fair and justified South Africa. These so-called “liberal” Afrikaners/Whites do not support the antagonists’ obstructive thinking, planning and action around the intended land expropriation programme. They directly and openly support Ramaphosa’s land expropriation plan.5

From another perspective the propagandists note that the average Afrikaner has become poorer since 1994, making them less of a target through RET for the ANC- egime if they should decideon such a step. In this context the propagandists note that 22% of the total Afrikaner population are 60 years and older: to capture their already constantly diminishing capital through RET will only impoverish these older persons further and make them a direct financial burden for the state. It is thus more and more clear for most of the ordinary Afrikaners, outside the old nationalist Afrikaners’ sick political system and remnants of a corrupt elite, that RET and land grabbing will not be applied to them as the antagonists falsely predict.5,79,95-97

Regarding the antagonistic White farmers’ call to other Afrikaners and Whites for “help against the so-called land grabbing of Ramaphosa”, the propagandists mention in this context that the NP-AB-Alliance themselves long ago dropped the Afrikaner farmer community due to their self-centered intentions – a group who the propagandists see as mostly adhering to the extreme racist thinking of DF Malan, HF Verwoerd and JB Vorster. There has been an enormous decline over the years in the numbers of Afrikaner farmers — they declined from 116 000 in 1950 to more or less 65 000 in 1986, while in 2018 they number ±36,000. As the NP became “politically liberal”, most of the declining number of White farmers (basically due to their diminutive numbers and thus less political empowerment) became unsupportive of the NP and became thus less important as voters. By 1985-1986 the NP turned their attention away from the White farmers to urbanised industrial and business orientated Afrikaners for votes. It is an open question why the ordinary Afrikaners must be supportive to the White farmers in a setup wherein only the White farmers are opportunistically benefitting.5,98

It is clear that land redistribution is not a primary issue for the hard working individual Afrikaner outside the farming sector who had cut his umbilical cord with the “volk” in 1994. The antagonistic White farmers and rich Whites are on their own in fighting their battles with the ANC regime to keep their land and riches. There is no justice in benefitting and favouring more or less 36 000 persons who are not part of the country’s poverty group and who benefitted from racial discrimination, above 29 million landless people, who have livedforever in outmost poverty.5

The ANC regime is well-informed about the present day Afrikaners/Whites’ political empowerment and poor status in the greater Afrikaner/White community. The isolation of the antagonistic group as a very small minority group with limited influence and empowerment in the future South Africa on the one side, and on the other side the majority of Afrikaners/Whites who are not against land reform, make the Afrikaners/Whites as a future political pressure group null and void.

For the propagandists, the antagonistic Afrikaners/Whites as a possible racial, political, economic and military force to derail the ANC regime’s intended land reform, are not a force of which to take note. To allow them to keep and uphold their present exclusive rights at the cost of an immense and growing sector of poor and landless Blacks, is not only unwise and foolish, but a crime against mankind. Immediate land redistribution is thus a must for the propagandists.100-103

3.2.4. The postulations: Almost all victims of land dispossession are been compensated according to relevant circumstance, versus expropriation of land without compensation which has been tried in communist regimes where it has harvested riches for a few and devastation for everyone else

The remarks by Opperheimer42 that42:18:“…almost all victims of land dispossession have been compensated, which is worked out according to relevant circumstances…”, and that42:18: “…expropriation without compensation has been tried in communist regimes, where it has harvested riches for a few and devastation for everyone else…”, needs in the propagandists opinion, serious attention, basically for two main reasons. Firstly, the superficial and well-planned distraction by the antagonists of the attention from their upholding of White empowerment and their exclusive model of capitalism (the same approach the antagonists follow in all their presentations to create discontent around the intended land expropriation programme), and secondly, the total misleading of the public on the ANC regime’s good intention to soften the immense poverty among more than 29-million Blacks left by the racial pre-1994 regimes. Above all stands the Afrikaners’/Whites’ bloody, merciless and vicious political history of land grabbing inside their own RET since 1652, which has seemingly been completely erased from their mindset by political Alzheimers. The growing disregard for truth by the antagonists in their practice of politics in the present day South African setup is a point of concern for the propagandists, especially by the passivity of the media to the Black setup.5,29,31,42,103-105

Firstly, in presenting his argument, it is clear that Opperheimer’s42 mind became fixated upon extraordinary and singular political cases such as those of Stalin, Mao and Mugabe, totally unrelated to present day South African politics, and the intentions and the management of the ANC regime thereof. Looking at all three of these cases of land grabbing (and comparing them to the present land expropriation plan of the ANC), there is a prominent similarity: the fact that the elites (the rich, the massive land owners, the vicious political and economically empowered masters and exclusive capitalists) of the three countries’ populations, who later fell prey to outright land grabbing, were groups who over time through their political empowerment viciously suppressed the lower socio-economic groups and stole land over long periods. Most notabe in these empowerments are the Tsar and his nobles in Russia, the Emperor and his royals in China and Cecil John Rhodes and the British Empire’s men in Zimbabwe (the old Rhodesia). Initial requests and pacific efforts to reform Russia by the Bolsheviks, China by the Maoists and Zimbabwe by the Mugabits, were blindly ignored and suppressed by the elite in order to uphold their wealth, rights and privileges. In Zimbabwe, the requests of the Mugabe regime to the White land owners for the free transfer of their redundant land to the poor Blacks were fought with court cases. In addition, there were no efforts by the Smith regime to compensate the Black victims for their land which was stolen by the White British colonialists, or to uplift the poor and landless Blacks. In all three cases most notable is the fact that the land was stolen. Indeed, in all three cases, land grabbing was further accompanied by the murder of the elite landowners.5,29,31,42,103-105

The abovementioned situation’s comprehensive tragic setup and the contaminated elements of human disrespect by the elite landowners, as well as the vicious behaviour of the elite landowners is totally ignored by Opperheimer in his contention regarding the rightness of the constitutional dispensation of 1994 and its guarantee of ongoing exclusive capitalism and land ownership in South Africa by the post-1994 democracy. Furthermore, human rights and justice became only institutional values after 1994 in South Africa for Opperheimer42, with the contaminated pre-1994 political history absent from his mindset. Land grabbing, as a selective form of revenge, was for the propagandists in all three of the cases a normal predicted outcome, after the failiure to activate through the elite themselves correction of their wrongdoings, so as to cleanse the past’s immense injustice and most of all, the breaking down of resistance by the elite to activate reform in order to benefit the mass of the poor. If this had not occurred, namely the cruel phasing out of the elites in the three countries, theywould undoubtedly still be ruled today by small groups of exclusive capitalists with a political leadership of empowerment, based exclusively upon dictators, autocrats and fascists. For the propagandists, the extreme political outcomes in Russia, China and Zimbabwe are exactly what the ANC regime is trying to avoid here with a peaceful and orderly land transfer before the mass of poor and landless overtake the present government with radicalism.5,29,31,42,103-105

The propagandists maintain that the South African White regimes and their inhabitants from 1652 to 1994 never compensated their ancestors’ Black victims for the masses of land stolen or the atrocities committed (very much in line with the behaviour of the unrepentant elites of Russia, China and Zimbabwe). During the pre-1994 period, the antagonists labelled anyone who dared to oppose the White capitalists and Afrikaner political system and thinking, as “communists”, “terrorists” and “traitors”, mostly accompanied by the incarceration (and often murder) of these dissidents. The post-1994 antagonists still today use the old trick of the NP-AB-alliance by classing anyone opposing their policy communists or so-called “Chinese and Russian parrots and followers” who intend to transfer South Africa in line with Russia and China into a totalitarian, communist state.5,29,31,42,103-105

Opperheimer’s42 postulation that42:18: “…almost all victims of land dispossession have been compensated”, which is worked out according to relevant circumstances…,” is false. In South Africa, the Whites’ land grabbing began the moment Jan van Riebeeck put his feet on South African soil, without until today any compensation to “all the initial victims and their descendants”. It seems as though Opperheimer’s42 above postulation of “relevant circumstances” means that when the land was stolen by the Whites from non-Whites, the “clause of compensation” was not applicable.42

Above reference by Opperheimer42 that private owners must be compensated, reflects arrogance and ignorance. A simple and strait answer to nullify today’s Whites’ call for compensation of their so-called land under the intended land expropriation without compensation, is the balancing of costs to their Black victims by the Whites’ early land grabbing without compensation. For the propagandists the present day White land owners do not deserve any compensation, firstly seeing that most of them and their forefathers stole their present land mostly by land- terrorism and bloodshed since 1652; and secondly because the intended land expropriation will be done in an orderly manner, with justice and moderation, and not based upon the pre-1994 land grabbing under Whites.3,5-7

How much Opperheimer42 missed the good intentions of the ANC regime (and of course the true political history, particularly the Whites’ land grabbing) to bring about with its intended land reform plan inclusive capital, is well illustrated for the propagandists by his confused postulation42:18: “…expropriation without compensation has been tried in communist regimes, where it has harvested riches for a few and devastation for everyone else…”. Firstly, if the ANC regime wanted to change South Africa into a communist regime, it could have done so shortly after 1994. Secondly, South Africa will never change to a communist state, and its intended land redistribution is not based upon communism, but upon balanced and justified democracy wherein the voice of the majority is paramount. Thirdly, the immense land grabbing characterising the South Africa political history of 1652 to 1994 was not executed by so-called “communists” to “enrich a few communist leaders”, but by so-called Christian and democratically orientated Afrikaners/Whites to42:18: “…harvest riches for a few and devastation for everyone else…”. In this context of harvesting riches for a few, 5 million Whites stand against the devastating poverty of a mass of ±45 million Blacks!

The present day amnesia of Whites of their own and their ancestors’ delinquent actions and roles in the tragic political history of South Africa, wherein land grabbing and murderare central – delinquent actions well-planned, activated and steered by the Netherlanders, the British, the proto-Afrikaners and the later Afrikaners – is surprising. The many lies and myths offered today by the antagonists to cover up the immense political delinquencies of Whites are thus not surprising for the propagandists. Mthombothi31 diagnoses this “memory malfunction” of South African Whites well when he writes31:17:

It is understandable at times, especially in the heat of political battle, that there would be different interpretations of what happened or what was said, but nobody is entitled to their own facts. There’s been a lot of rewriting of history lately by people who seem incapable of either reading or writing, especially those who never witnessed such events first-hand, and

Lies and falsehoods often have dire political consequences. Those who know the truth should have the courage to speak up.

For the propagandists, White South Africans’ own RET (specific that of the Afrikaners) from 1652 to 1994 was so immense and of such a spectrum that it can never be but into monetary value, a psychological perspective or the counting of lives. It can only be described as a tragedy, far worse than the modern day Rwanda genocide and chaos.

Opperheimer’s42 postulations that almost all victims of land dispossession have been compensated, according to relevant circumstance, and that expropriation of land without compensation has been tried in communist regimes where it has harvested riches for a few and devastation for everyone else, are inappropriate to apply to the post-1994 ANC regime. When looking at the pre-1994 White regimes’ action, then the postulations are fully applicable.

3.2.5. Is the ANC’s need for land reform insignificant and driven by few opportunistic politicians?

The postulation by the antagonists, reading42:18: “…barring a few opportunistic politicians, almost no-one views land reform as a burning issue…”, reflects for the propagandists the intense confusion and the distancing of the antagonists of themselves from the broad South African news, especially the reporting upon the immense dissatisfaction of Blacks about their landlessness and poverty. Mthombothi’s31 reference to these “fact-blind” antagonists as31:17:“…people who seem incapable of either reading or writing”, is very meaningful. For the propagandists this is very descriptive and declares to a certain extent the antagonists’ constant illogical and unintelligible attacks on the ANC’s good intentions to bring about a bettered life for all South Africans by land redistribution. It seems as though the antagonists are totally mesmerised and struck blind and cognitively frozen by their own untrue White political propaganda upon the land issue, turning “White” myths and lies into “false” facts. Looking carefully at how the antagonists position their “facts” with the statement42:18: “land reform is not a burning issue”, to make their arguments, opinions and viewpoints “respectable” and “true” (but totally based upon untested research and evidence) and as if it is issued by “experts,” so as to influence the public’s mindset with the wanton cognition that the ANC regime’s land expropriation intention is evily disposed, it becomes clear that misleading statements have with time overcome the antagonists’ mindsets, limiting their ability to distinguish between right and wrong.31,42

Rapport106 reported on the 23rd September 2018 that land reform is seen by only 4% of Black voters, 11% of White voters and an average of 6% (White and Black) of the population as a top priority to be addressed. (The research statistic is seemingly obtained from a probe by the firm Victory Research of a said Ryan Coetzee).106

When looking to the initial outcomes of the parliamentary countrywide testing of the public’s opinion on the change to Section 25 of the Constitution, the results show that there is, contrary to the results of Victory Research106, a strong public support reflected by their testimonies showing an immense demand for land reform, even drastic land grabbing. There is an emphasis in these testimonies that the land belonging presently to Whites was stolen since 1652 to 1994 from Blacks, and indeed that land expropriation must immediately be activated. As much as 40% and higher of the presentations support some form of land reform and land grabbing as a form of compensation (against the average of the Victory Research of only 6%). This nullifies the Victory Research finding. In addition, an analysis of the reports of independent journalists upon opinions of Black sack-dwellers countrywide on the need for immediate land expropriation, show an immense need for drastic land reform and the execution of a policy of land grabbing from Whites. These outcomes oppose the Victory Research’s findings that the present ownership of land and the transfer of White land in terms of the intended expropriation plan is a matter of insignificance. Secondly, the question for the propagandists here is about the reliability and objectivity of the Victory Research to be able to evaluate scientifically in terms of trustworthiness. The propagandists ask whether there is any direct association between Coetzee106, Victory Research and the antagonists. Pelser106, editor of Rapport, writes pertinently that the study was specifically done by Victory Research for the South African Institute of Racial Relations (IRR), bringing thus the position and role of the IRR106 in the present antagonists’ attacks on the land reforms of the ANC prominently to the foreground.

Literature upon the present fight against land expropriation shows that the IRR stands central as one of the so-called Afrikaner/Whites rescuer and saviour organisations and a body which stands directly and hostilely to the ANC’s land reform. Musyoka106, specific to this context, classes these organisations, in terms of the two opposing role-players representing various subgroups each on the land matter, as the conservative nationalists (right-wingers), ranging from the centre-right DA, agriculture-based associations – most of which represent the interests of white commercial farmers – to far-right groups such as the Freedom Front Plus and solidarity groups such as AfriForum. This clear association of political or personal and group interests contaminates the IRR’s impartiality. The IRR’s commissioning of Victory Research and the prominence of the Afrikaans media’s reference to the so-called “shockingly low number” of only 4% of Blacks’ concern on the land matter makes the findings of Victory Research for the propagandists null and void. Reading with this the fact that only an insignificant number of 978 respondents (voters) out of a potential 35 million voters were consulted, the whole IRR exercise is for the propagandists a well planned manipulation.7,106

The strength of the antagonists’ first postulation, namely that “there is not a need to effect land expropriation”, was finally totally erased on the 4th December 2018 when 209 MPs voted in favour (with only 91 votes against and zero abstentions) to amend the Constitution to effect land expropriation without compensation.107-109

This outcome also nullifies further the antagonists’ other arrogant postulation, namely that42:18: “… barring a few opportunistic politicians, almost noone views land reform as a burning issue…”. The fact that as many as 209 MPs, the so-called “few opportunistic politicians” in terms of Oppenheimer’s42 factless argument – counting 118 more than the 91 MPs supporting the antagonists’ viewpoint of no land expropriation without compensation – have voted for land expropriation without compensation, confirm the immense impact that the land issue has upon the ordinary people as well as the political leaders of the country. For the propagandists, land expropriation without compensation (limited in certain cases) is a reality and is irreversible. Although the antagonists seemingly intend to obstruct through court action the ANC regime’s intended amendment of the Constitution, the propagandists believe that they face failure. In Zimbabwe the White farmers followed the same path of legal obstruction of land expropriation, only to be demolished in the end.107-109

▲The present voting in the National Assembly where the 209 MPs voted in favour and 91 MPs against the amendment, reflecting a 69.6% in favour (which is 3% above the two-thirds majority), is reflected hereunder22,47,110-113:

For a change to the Constitution, a two-thirds majority is needed in parliament and an approval from six of the nine provinces, while the ordinary Bill on Expropriation that is serving before parliament at the moment only needs an approval vote of 50% by the parliament. Two sections of the Constitution will have to be amended – 25 and 31. Section 25 is applicable to the property clause that allows for expropriation, and 31 is the limitations clause that outlines when rights, to, for example, property, can be limited. Although a two-thirds parliamentarian majority is needed to Section 25 (Article 25) of the Constitution, it ultimately depends upon a 75% parliamentarian majority vote as guided by Article 74(1) of the Constitution. To change the Constitution the amendment must be approved and accepted by the National Assembly, after which the concept amendment must also be considered and accepted by the National Council for Provinces. Laws aimed at streamlining the expropriation process without constitutional changes are the Employment Equity Act, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act and Codes, the Skills Development Act, the Levies Act and the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act. These legislations are supported by for instance the National Development Plan and the Black Industrialist Programme. Land expropriation in terms of democratic principles and African empowerment, is clearly described by Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, while the redistribution of agricultural land is further partially covered in the Agri BEE codes.

From a critical evaluation point, the propagandists’ sense worrying characteristics in the present day actions of many of the antagonistic organisations. For the propagandists, AfriForum’s mediaconference in April 2018 in Centurion about their looking for international support against the changes to the Constitution and the planned land-redistribution shows AfriForum’s total lack of understanding of the working of democracy and international opinion and empowerment to bring changes in countries. This also reflect their foolishness in determining who were the prominent role-players who changed South Africa in the 1980s from a White autocracy for Whites only to a Black democracy for all South Africans: the international community! (This is demonstrated by Donald Trump’s fast turnaround after his initial criticism of Ramaphosa’s land reform, to support it in the end).114

The propagandists agree that political criticism is good, but not one-sided, manipulated White-criticism thoughtout steered by the antagonists to incite political delinquency. For the propagandists, AfriForum and many of its White associates lack patriotism and a love for their South African bastard fatherland. Most of the White antagonists, as are mostly everyone in South Africa, are from long ago not White or Non-White, Black or non-Black, Colored or non-Colored: they are the Bastards of South Africa. Land redistribution must be seen in this reality: every bastard of South Africa must be in some way the owner of land. That is a bastard’s legal right, at least from 2019.114

In light of the above ongoing foolish arguments, assumptions and manipulations by the antagonists as a group, it is the view of the propagandists that the political empowerment of groups like AfriForum, Solidarity and the IRR and many of their leaders’ unconscious and conscious rigid racial bias must be wrenched away from them. They endanger South Africa more than any land redistribution can do. It seems for the propagandists that without the activation of affirmative laws, bringing about BEE and land redistribution, the White privileged classes will never that Blacks have competence and skills and can be responsible land owners. Bias, conscious and unconscious, is alive and well in South Africa.115 Haffajee115 sumsit up well115:2: “Apartheid injured them [Afrikaners] too, by making them blind to anything except that which looked like them. Apartheid, designed to promote Afrikaner interests and to maintain Anglo-Saxon corporate interests, required not only oppression but active bias, and it lingers because it is intergenerational, since sons learn from their fathers”.

Looking to the easy influencing of some Afrikaners/Whites at present by the antagonists, planting suspicion of the ANC’s planned land redistribution, it seems as though many of these antagonistic Afrikaners have never outgrown their political and socio-economic immaturity, which the leaders of the NP-AB-DRC-alliance so effectively used to cloud the nationalist Afrikaners’ mindsets with racism and to steer the practice of Apartheid.116-118

For the propagandists, there are still too many persons in AfriForum, Solidarity, the DA and IRR, with their roots in the late AWB, who are mimicking the nationalist Afrikaners “tough” but failed actions of the “Stormjaers of the Ossewa-Brandwag” of a century ago in their present foolish driving of so-called Afrikaner interests and the maintainanceof Anglo-Saxon corporate interests. They are as blind as their fathers when it comes to the immediate demanding realities and interests of land redistribution by their fatherland, bastard South Africa.5

The propagandists wonder if it is not time that the South African Government starts to take a more critical look on the ideologies of the many false prophets of doom on land redistribution and RET, and whether their actions are not equal to sabotage.

Land redistribution is a burning issue which needs to be addressed immediately, to prevent anarchy, mass unrest and revolution before or just after the 2019 General Election. How lucky South Africa has been in the last five years to escape revolution, when 29 million of its people, out of a total of 55 million, live in utmost poverty. Ramaphosa sees that revolution is here and tries to erase it by his constructive land reform policy.116-118

The ANC shows that the need for land reform is significant and is driven by a mass of Black citizens and Black politicians of status.

3.2.6. Unsupportive and wavering DA in land reform

With regard to the two prominent political parties’ active in South African politics, namely the ANC and the DA, is it clear for the propagandists that it is only the ANC which plays a prominent role in the promotion of land expropriation, specifically without compensation in certain cases. With regard to this promotion of the population’s welfare and interests, the DA is for most propagandists very passive and unattached. The propagandists see the DA today as the 1999 Tony-Leon-party, which openly called upon Whites and supporters of the apartheid era’s National Party to vote with one single aim against Nelson Mandela’s ANC: to secure absolutely the interests of Whites. For the propagandists, the DA has still today an absolutely obstructive approach to anything that looks anti-capitalist (specifically exclusive capitalism) and anti-White.117,119

The DA’s inconsistent policy initially publically opposing BEE, other forms of affirmative action and land redistribution, versus their later masked ongoing adoption of the ANC policies on issues such as broad based BEE and affirmative action, has been a catastrophe, alludes Grindrod119. He writes119:14: “What is the point of voting for an opposition that largely replicates government policy? It takes a lot more than vague policy statements and sound bites to attract voters.”

The DA, as a so-called “Black obstructive party”, is captured by its rich and influencial Whites leaders, members and supporters. For the propagandists, it is the DA’s segment of Whites who are the creators of most of the anti-Black politics and actions today. Excellent examples here are the unrelenting yapping in parliament by the DA’s leaders such as John Steenhuisen against every action of the ANC regime, Helen Zille’s inappropriate comments about colonialism and Mmusi Maimane’s recent remarks about White privileges in South Africa.116,117,120-126

To further illustrate the DA’s constant unfocussed and superficial attacks on the ANC and Ramaphosa, Grindrod119 writes119:14: “Very little of its outputs articulate solutions or alternatives, for the larger part it simply exists to criticise. A year after Zuma’s resignation, it is still on its Stop Zuma campaign. If Zuma does not exist, the DA would have to invent him.”

Enlightening specifically the DA’s ongoing inconsistance on BEE, affirmative action and land redistribution, etc., since 1994, blocking the direct bettering of the mass of poor and landless Blacks, Grindrod119 writes119:14:

SA, however, has been very poorly served by the official opposition. The DA over the past two years has floundered in terms of both style and substance. We have witnessed a lot of rhetoric, media stunts and theatrics, but little to inspire us to elect Mmusi Maimane as president of the republic this year. This has largely allowed the ANC a free pass to perpetuate the mediocrity, corruption and mismanagement we have suffered.

In its frantic efforts to be all things to all people, the DA is pleasing very few. Its much-vaunted takeover of metros such as Joburg and Tshwane in 2016 came only as a result of an unholy alliance with the EFF,.a wholly unprincipled move that illustrated hunger for power at any cost to its claimed values.

The self-inflicted misfortunes of the DA can be directly attributed to three factors: weak leadership, abandonment of its founding principles, and a failure to understand that South Africans are looking for a change in direction, not just PR branding. As a result, its right flank is bleeding off to AfriForum (via COPE) and the FF Plus, its left flank is marching back to Ramaphosa’s revitalised ANC, and its centre is a shrinking mass of grudge voters with nowhere else to go.

They have become a motley group of naysayers and Afro-pessimists. I sometimes think they relish it when our country falls short. In some perverse way it may affirm their smug “told you so” attitude. The party should oppose the government by any means, but that does not mean it should talk down our country in the process.

The abovementioned obstructive thinking and action by the official opposition not to constructively support good projects with merit, or at least oppose the government on matters and give clear facts for their objection, give a good understanding for the propagandists as to why some of meritorious projects of the ANC regime failed since 1994 to get through parliament. The failure to write a mandate on just and balanced land ownership within a focused and sincere political setup with the DA, as the ANC tried to do over a long time, was just such an unfortunate outcome. This has lead to today’s negative build-up countrywide around the land matter. Drastic land redistribution, outside the passive and disconnected DA policy, is now forced on Cyril Ramaphosa as an unavoidable must. For the propagandists, it is the DA, with its exclusive whitish interests, which is going to be the loser at the 2019 election box, and not the ANC regime which the DA is putting constant under attack.62,117,119120,126-129

The propagandists see the DA as totally unsupportive and wavering in the establishment of just land reform. They believe that the present interests of the poor and landless Blacks are secondary for the DA, and that the party with its well planned delaying, wavering and obstructive actions, is a role-player in the maintenance since 1994 of the mass of poor and landless Blacks.

3.2.7. Is South Africa’s Bill of Rights much lauded nationally and internationally?

To plead innocent about the devastating faults of the South African Bill of Rights with rhetoric by the antagonists such as42:18: “We have an internationally lauded constitution premised upon freedom, dignity, and equality. We have never altered our Bill of Rights and the evidence shows that there is no reason to do so now”, is for the propagandists a further admission of guilt by them that they do not understand the indigenous realities of South Africa and are indeed unprepared to become true Africans.

For the propagandists, the antagonists’ underwriting and promoting of the 1994 Constitution as statutorily excellent, is evidence of a self-appointed European supremacy, as in pre-1994 South Africa, to be able to ignore democracy, human rights and other demanding realities within South Africa. They see the basis of this thinking, planning and action as to assure further benefits and to safeguard the interests of the small White minority. These interests of the pre-1994 suppressors’ interests and their future are still paramount, while leaving the interests of masses of deprived Blacks in the cold.5,26,74,130

The Bill of Rights is incomplete for the propagandists. They have no doubt that the Constitution’s primary aim was to exclusively serve the White politics and economics for a long time after 1994.

Evidence shows that there is a good reason now to change Section 25 of the Constitution, allowing various forms of land expropriation, so as to address the pressing demands of poverty and unemployment of the mass of Blacks. In this statutory planning to change Section 25, the propagandists maintain that there is undoubtedly no intention by the ANC regime to alter the South African citizens’ freedom, dignity and equality. The only aim is to improve the Bill of Rights to serve the South African citizens appropriately. To offer praise by the antagonists for the so-called42:18: “… international lauding of the Constitution”, is to infer that its contents are accepted worldwide as absolutely “good” and as such cannot or may not be changed, is out of context and lacks reality. . The fact that the ANC regime, with their voting to activatea change to the Constitution, obtained a 69.6% favourable vote, confirms the antagonists’ lack of reality and their outdated thinking “on behalf” of the Blacks in the New South Africa. For the propagandists, the antagonists seem to be increasingly “blind and deaf strangers”, lost in their own darkness in South Africa.7,42,107-109

Firstly, the question for the propagandists is who are these international persons lauding the 1994 Constitution? Praise here, is for the propagandists undoubtedly from the White international capitalists who shamelessly exploit/ed pre- and post-1994 the South African economics through shares and foreign owning of land. In this context, their masterly political manipulation through the antagonists as activists’ groups to safeguard their interests is clear. The truth for the propagandists is that these persons prefer an exclusive foreigner-right in South Africa, through an even exclusive foreign-orientated Constitution, allowing with them into the country’s land ownership and capital.130

Secondly, for the propagandists, the question is cleverly watered down by the antagonists in terms of who must really be favoured by the Constitution: is it not the South African inhabitants, especially the poor Blacks, who form the mass majority?

Thirdly, upon evaluation of the phrase: “international lauding”, meaning undoubtedly excellence and integrity, the propagandists contend that Israel’sconstitution is also a so-called “international laudatory” one, as evident from the USA, the UK and France’s acknowledgement of it, while it is arguably one of the most suppressive ones in the world. It’s is an “Israel Apartheid”, allowed by the Western world to continueundisturbed, to commit war crimes, genocide and land grabbing from the Arabs since 1948 (Al Nakba). The classification or status of “international lauding” of the South African Constitution by the antagonists is hereto for the propagandists undoubtedly applicable only when a Constitution exclusively suites Western countries’ corrupt interests, while it devastates at the same time the interests and rights of the poor, indigenous people. Although most of this type of “Israeliconstitutional contamination” was expelled in 1994 from South Africa, are there still elements of contamination in the country’s Bill of Rights which must be rectified. The beginning of its “healing”, according to the propagandists, can be seen in the recent overwhelming Parliament vote in the National Assembly to begin with the process to “repair” the 1994 Constitution, to bring back land ownership to the lawful people and to erase the immense poverty, inequality and unemployment of Blacks.5,7,131,132

In perspective, South Africa’s Bill of Rights is not really lauded nationally and internationally. This is simply “fake news”.

3.2.8. Altering of Section 25 will block and damage South Africa’s local and foreign economics?

To argue, as many antagonistic White-capitalists do that42:18: “The alteration of Section 25’s would block the country’s flourishing economy and that foreign investors won’t risk having their land confiscated when they can pick any number of other nations that will protect their investments”, is a foolish argument. The propagandists note that indigenous land is in the first place not meant for foreigners to possess and to make money from. In South Africa’s troubled poverty, profits must be transferred back to the inhabitants. If foreigners can make a good living on South African land and be successful as entrepreneurs and farmers, so can South African Blacks make agood living on the land and be successful as entrepreneurs and farmers. There is more than enough South African capital internally available to aactivate a start-up of large scale Black-farming.133

The false concept of the introduction of so-called “good” by foreigners to the country through their ownership of South African soil, is in the mindset of the propagandists created solely by the White minority who own masses of land and their association with the outside White communities, who are really not worried about the short and long term interests of the Black community. The ownership by foreign elements, such as the Jews, of land from the 1900s in Germany and Russia, was one of the direct reasons for the Holocaust, which led to the murder of approximately 10 million Jews. To allow further unlimited foreigners into South Africa as land owners, will only aggravate the present day conflict around land ownership and can easily lead to a “South African Holocaust of foreigners and Whites” in the near future. How the antagonists’ oppose some form of curbing future foreign investments and land ownership, even citizenship, is not new in South Africa: South African White political leaders such as DF Malan, HF Verwoerd, JBM Hertzog and JC Smuts, put such a block into practice in the 1930s on the Jews fleeing the Nazis to South Africa, without any negative international impact on the economics or activating a political backlash. (Smuts to the contrary, after the 1930s became an imminent world leader, respected worldwide). The Malan-clan did the same on a full scale locally with Apartheid to the Blacks from 1948, again without any internationally financial backlash. It must also be noted that South Africa’s political and economic associations are today far less intertwined with the “extreme Western democracies” such as the USA and the UK, but are directed and steered by the political thinking and action of their BRICS partners, which are less of hypocritical “ultra-democracies”.5

On the so-called immense negative impact that the ANC’s land reform can activate, the economic adviser of the Optimum Group, Dr. Roelof Botha133 (a son of the late ex-minister Pik Botha of the NP), states that foreign investments are not playing nearly such an important role as our local investments: in the last three years, foreign investments only amounted to an average of 0.7% of South Africa’s annual gross inland produce (GIP). The unimportance of a contingent of foreign investors is also well reflected by the decline of direct foreign investments of R76 billion in 2008 to only R17.6 billion in 2017. Inland investments (local capital-forming) are thus far more important than foreign investments which the White politicians within the antagonists try to reflect as an absolute pre-requisite not to become another Venezuela or Zimbabwe. It confirms that South Africa can develop immensely without foreign investments. It also means that land redistribution, even in its most ugly form, will not necessarily devastate the country’s economy, as many of the financial prophets of doom, especially from the White side, predict. Furthermore, it is kept silent by the antagonists that the intended land expropriation is not going to be radical, in line with nationalising the Whites’ assets. In this context it is important to reflect back to Haffejee’s50;8 description of the land expropriation plan: only certain categories of land like abandoned buildings, unutilised land, commercial property held unproductively and purely for speculative purposes, under-utilised property owned by the state, and land farmed by labour tenants with an absentee titleholder will be expropriated. There is also no intention by Ramaphosa to block foreigners from the ownership of land. This was a Zuma theoretical “delinquency”.50,133,135

For Opperheimer42 to also speak of a flourishing economy to exist in South Africa today is a little bit overdone. (See again the above reference: the direct foreign investments were in 2017 only R17.6 billion against the R76 billion in 2008). Regarding the effort of Ramaphosa to attract new foreign investments per se of R1 200 billion is praiseworthy, but not the end of the road if it is not reached. If this foreign investment is to be based upon an exclusive land ownership wherein rich foreigners or White South Africans are the main role-players and policy makers, then South Africa’s masses of landless poor Blacks are doomed. It will be a replay for the propagandists ten-fold of Apartheid’s wrongdoings of 1948 to 1994. Such an outcome is unacceptable for the propagandists and will not be agreed upon or allowed by the ANC regime before or after the 2019 Election. It must be noted that the securing of abnormal foreign investment in the unstable political setup which the ANC regime inherited from the NP regime, and which needs at least another 25 to 50 years to rectify, is risky for the State, given the danger of financial overpowering by foreign powers, as the Russians tried to do to South Africa with their nuclear deal. South Africa does have the internal riches in the form of minerals, human capacity and money, to make a positive growth if the country’s human potential can develop through political and economic actions, like land redistribution to uplift the poor and the landless. The propagandists believe for this correction, the country urgently needs Ramaphosa and his land reform.42,135

That the South African so-called “flourishing economy of 2018” will be devastated by land reform as Opperheimer42 tries to reflect, is wishful thinking, which again characterises the antagonists’ many wanton actions to damage the ANC regime’s and Ramaphosa’s improvement of the dire poverty of the Blacks. The impact of land expropriation will not devastate the economy in the long term, because the implementation thereof will be kept inside the initial December 2017 Nasrec-resolutions of the ANC, which exclude extreme land expropriation like land grabbing. For the propagandists it is the intention of the ANC regime to channel national capital into the country’s development through land expropriation (and vice versa), not only to fast erase the poverty associated with the poor and landless Blacks, but to turn these poor Blacks also into independent financial generators as effective Black farmers to be able to contribute to the inland investments. With this new political and economical stability in the poor Black sector, a rise in the economy, more jobs, as well as a rise in foreign investments, can follow five years from now.42,135

3.2.9. Restructuring of South Africa’s colonial financial structure and land ownership

Taking into account the present day South African economy in general (local and foreign) which the ANC regime inherited from the basically bankrupt NP -regime in 1994 and still has to struggle with, the propagandists show that this political, social and economical setup is unfortunately part of a colonial financial structure and land ownership which dates back to long before Apartheid. The ANC is indeed in the process of addressing the exploitations that are inherent to this system, like the imbalanced and unjustice land ownership which is located in White hands.50,59135-138

For the propagandists, notwithstanding how the antagonists try to denying it at all costs, South Africa is today, as in 1795 with the first kind of proto-Afrikaner self-rule, still being governed by a self-serving White minority who is mostly seated in the White business and financial sector, including a strong foreign component. The antagonists, especially those coming from the White business and agricultural sectors, are seen by the propagandists to be an inclusive part of thss self-serving White minority, still awarded with colonial empowerment to be able to think, plan and do for the mass of poor and landless Black South Africans. The importance of foreign capital, as reflected by the antagonists, and their allegation that the impact of the land expropriation is going to destroy it, is untrue. So far the antagonists have failed to offer a trustworthy report to confirm the negative impact of the intended land expropriation on foreign investments or on the age-old colonial farming setup.50,59,135-138

It must be remembered that 2015 was a milestone for post-Apartheid South Africa, writes Tsotetsi.138 As a water-shed it brought to the foreground not only lingering governmental and nation questions and incompleteness coming from pre-1994, but also demands for the equaling of citizen rights after 24 years of democracy. It was the start-up of the total “decolonisation” of the New South Africa, wherein the Blacks’ land ownership was central and that of foreigners secondary. Tsotetsi138 writes138:21: “That word – “decolonisation” – is one that’s been uttered, shouted and written about many times. It’s the spirit of the Fallism, which I understand as a movement that, at its core, is about taking charge of our present so that we can be more in control of our future”; and: “It was about reclaiming a country that hasn’t felt like ours in our lifetimes or in those of our parents, or of their parents, and maybe even of their parents’ parents”. Tsotetsi138 can, in this context, with right postulate that the Freedom Charter fails the landless poor Blacks because it states that South Africa belongs to all who live in it (Blacks as well as White foreigners). It was never fully positioned with the majority of Blacks at the centre. Notwithstanding their political liberty awarded in 1994, the majority of Blacks are disenfranchised economically, socially and even politically due to their faulty 1994 Constitution wherein the land matter was never clearly spelled out and which the antagonists now are misusing around the so-called blocking of foreign investments. This, state the propagandists, is precisely the correction which the ANC regime wants to effect with land expropriation and why decolonialisation of South Africa is an absolute neccessity.138

For the propagandists many of the Whites of 2018 in South Africa are undoubtedly missing their centuries old colonial political “White privileges”, like their domination of the Black population, White land lordships and the benefits of an exclusive White farming economy. In the upholding of these privileges (or at least a last effort to uphold it) the South African Whites need the direct backing of White and Western foreigners (and their governments) through their investments here, forcing these foreigners, through fear created by the antagonists of land grabbing and nationalisationg, to get active with the antagonists in fighting the ANC’s so-called land reform. In this context of ongoing White economic empowerment, the propagandists show that notwithstanding there are only 2.8 million Afrikaners left in South Africa (representing just 8% of the total population), they, although White-rule ended 25 years ago, are still beingappointed in 72% of the country’s top executive managerial posts in the private sector, in spite of the fact that they only take up 5.6% of the workforce. [Joblessness for Whites is at 7%, while the country’s national statistics reflect 26.7% (which can be 55% and higher for Blacks)].59,135

Further contradicting the antagonists’ profile of a so-called failed ANC regime and that its land reforming is going to be a further mass failure to endanger the investments of foreigners and to close the door for them, the chair of Naspers, Koos Bekker, is of the opinion that there was more prosperity created from 1994 to 2018 (25 years) by the ANC-regime, as in the 300 years up to 1994 by the various White regimes (This financial improvement is also reflected for the post-1994 Whites’ prosperity and demonstrates why foreigners are so eager to invest here, notwithstanding the antagonists’ many false doom stories). Outstanding here is the evidence that for the period before 1994, the Whites were the greatest beneficiaries (although a minority), while post-1994 , for the first time the advent of riches to Blacks, began to slowly cut down on the Whites’ sole right to riches. These benefits were also extened to foreigners (mostly White Westerners) for pre- as well as post-1994 South Africa. What land expropriation will bring for foreigners after 2019 is the same cutting down of their riches as for local Whites, simply because the sole right to the enormous pool of riches of all Whites was erased with the normal advent of a relocation of riches to Blacks.59,135

The focus above is again upon the immediate constructive land redistribution by Ramaphosa to restart the aims of the Freedom Charter after 25 years of failure to the majority of Blacks as equal citizens. It is this calling that many Whites (locals and foreigners), clinging to their unjust and doubtful land ownership, are missing out on and are trying with groundless arguments and foolish resistance to uphold, in terms of their dying colonial political establishment versus the poor Blacks’ fast growing demands. The explosiveness of the demands of the poor and landless is read well by Tsotetsi138 when she writes138:21: “The voices of decolonisation grew louder because the philosophy spread to those who had previously ignored it. Fallism and the conversations it has sparked isn’t just about taking on white privilege, racism and the pervasiveness of whiteness – it’s also about challenging the present government”.

It is this choir of demanding voices which Ramaphosa hears loud and clear, and tries to steer constitutionally constructively. The incitement role played by the antagonists, using every page from the crook’s book to stay in power, is clear. The interests of foreigners are also clearly misused here by the antagonists.

For the propagandists, the ANC regime with its intended programme of land redistribution is in a specific process to replace South Africa’s outdated colonial state and its accompanying aged economic principles and visions with a solid bond between exclusive and inclusive capitalists, landowners and the masses of poverty stricken people who indeed possess immense political power through their mass votes to be able to activate any political and socio-economil changes if needed and wanted. The South African State is becoming a modernised democratic institution under Ramaphosa and his regime.

3.2.10. White participation versus White resistance

Looking at the reactions by the antagonists since 1994, especially from 2016 by the so-called rescuers and saviours of the Afrikaners/Whites, it is clear that any constructive change planned by the ANC regime to better South Africa financially, politically and in terms of the racial environment, is just unacceptable for this White group’s leadership. The ownership of land since 2016 is particularly forefronted, although the financial interests in general of Whites are also prominently well positioned in this “White resistance”. Seen in terms of the context of a political diagnosis, it is prominent for the propagandists that the antagonists are in a White existence crisis wherein their fear of losing what they see as the “last part” of their White political and financial power, left to them in post-1994 South Africa, stands central and on trial. This outcome of a striving for an outdated “empowerment”, is a small remnant left of their diminished Afrikaner nationalism, which is still nurtured in the mindset of a small faction of Afrikaners through the contaminated influences of the opportunistic and delinquent antagonists as so-called “needed behaviour” to uphold Afrikanerism. Schoeman139 brings this political mess together well when he says139:4: “Die hele kwessie van die herverdeling van grond, ook die konseponteieningswet, word misbruik vir politieke doeleindes en word gegrond op ‘n skeefgetrekte en eensydige geskiedenis.” This description summarises precisely the extreme wanton and misleading actions of the broad public by the antagonists and their collaborators in the present day politics.139

Looking objectively at the antagonists’ inciting and driving of “White resistance” against the ANC regime and the leadership of Ramaphosa, is it clear that it is wanton behaviour: there is no evidence of any action by the ANC regime to block Afrikanerism or to harm the interests of the Afrikaners/Whites (and this includes harming their land ownership and lifestyles around it). What is important here is the offering of a good quality of life to all South Africans and not exclusively to Whites (and rich Blacks). There is undoubtedly an element in this setup which can financially stress Whites (and rich Blacks), but is not unbalanced or exploitive, as Dr Peter Matseke140, the CEO of Clinix Health Group, puts it140:11: “The privileged, both black and white, can no longer remain comfortable while the majority of the country languishes in squalor and poverty. Some 24 years into democracy, they [heroes of the Struggle] would be expecting us to accelerate our efforts towards a just, non-racial, united, democratic society”.

What is urgent needed is that the wanton actions of the antagonists inside the greater Afrikaner/White community are erased as fast and comprehensively as possible. The advent of constructive mindsets with Afrikaners/Whites, especially the White farming community, on the present day South African politics and socio-economic setup, is an absolute imperative. Such positivity will help all the races to let Apartheid’s wrongs go, to interrelate, while it will reflect to all South Africans the importance of sound and balanced thinking for co-existence between exclusive and inclusive capitalists, Whites with know-how and the majority of Blacks now ruling to make the country work. Such a change will eliminate the degrading influences of substandard politicians and short-sighted activists, who are currently very active within the circle of antagonists.138

The propagandists highlight that arguing by the antagonists of an ANC land expropriation in terms of the EFF’s fanatic policy, which prescribes wholesale property and bankconfiscations as fact, is misleading and indeed “fake news” of the ANC’s true and sincere intentions of redistribution. This falsity is the same as that by the antagonists in their talk of the horrors of Mao’s, Stalin’s and Mugabe’s regimes. To “jump” by the antagonists from the ANC regime – as the ex-politician Tony Leon116 did in his warning to the South African public of the ANC’s intended land redistribution – to Julius Malema and his EFF, as a diminutive and insignificant group to be the possible “true, unstoppable possible future ruler of South Africa”, and then to draw lines in terms of this theoretical governmental setup with the chaos of the Venezuela executive political leaders Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro and their failed revolutionary parties, is plain cheap journalism. The comments by Leon116, reflecting on this Malema- Chávez- Maduro-brotherhood as seemingly “on way to South Africa” through the ANC’s plan of land reform, is for the propagandists laughable. Leon116 writes116:18:

He [Nicolás Maduro] and his late predecessor [Hugo Chávez] implemented an EFF-style programme of uncosted giveaways, at war with private production or even basic economics, reducing what was once the richest country in the hemisphere to beggary.

Inflation is recorded at 13 000%, the world’s highest, and prices of basic foods, mostly now imported, double every month. But eventually fact-free economics wearies the truest of believers, and very few bothered even to vote last weekend.

One fed-up Chavista, Carlos Gonzales, 64, who abstained, put a price on his disillusion. “My monthly pension is only enough to buy one frozen chicken…”

The question by the propagandists is: was Tony Leon, as a member of parliament and leader of the opposition ever badly paid by the ANC regime, or is his pension as a parliamentarian and an ambassador, presently again paid by the ANC regime, just enough to buy him one frozen chicken? The answer of the propagandists is a decisive No: so why this distrust of a parliament and a country he himself decided to serve as a parliamentarian, even as ambassador? As a White he was and is today surely not financially or personally discriminated against in terms of his parliamentarian pension and other payments, ownership of property or other assets. Can he reflect that he is in danger of losing his parliament benefits from 1994 to 2018? For the propagandists it is an open question as to why this fantastic political double-talk arises now from Leon116, on his accusations of so-called land grabbing by the ANC? Is this opposition of the ANC, which is reflected by the antagonists’ actions, nothing else than rigorous opposing of Black rule, even after 25 years of Black political empowerment?116

It is for the propagandists time that the many suspicion mongers inside the antagonists, together with political and so-called cultural leaders like Tony Leon, Flip Buys of Solidarity SA, AfriForum, AgricSA, Oppenheimer, the IRR and the anti-ANC Afrikaner social media, attacking constantly without motivation and clear evidence the ANC’s planned land redistribution, apply a much needed self-introspection about their political and business intentions and interests and how these are aligned with the ANC’s politics versus exclusive White capital. Only after such self-introspection, will it be clear for them if they really are making a constructive contribution to the future of South Africa and if there is really sense in their political rhetoric and actions. To act politically deconstructively landed many people in the time of the NP regime behind bars.32,59,138

With regard to Leon’s116 association of Julius Malema and his EFF with the ANC, it is important to note that it was not the ANC which was lured by the EFF’s political songs to be taken as a partner, but the DA which was foolishly (or was it opportunistically) lured to fall into a working relationship with the EFF, and which has allowed Malema to sing in the choir with Maimane. For the propagandists, is it clear that the EFF will never become part of the ANC regime under Ramaphosa. The propagandists maintain that Malema himself as a person and as a “politician”, is unacceptable to the established ANC elite and emphasise that Malema’s behaviour inside formal politics has shown him to be uncontrollable and bewitched by his own “untrammeled power”. The propagandists believe that it is also politically foolish to think that a reckless EFF with only 6% of the votes can ever be allowed entrance into the ANC, making “warnings” by the antagonists of an “evil collaboration” between the ANC and the EFF wanton actions, spread by the antagonists purely for their own selfish political gains.32,59,119

For the propagandists, looking at the easy influencing of many of the ordinary Afrikaners/Whites at present by the antagonists in their creation of suspicion of the ANC’s planned land redistribution and about Black rule, it seems as though many the Afrikaners never outgrew their political and socio-economic immaturity which the leaders of the NP-AB-DRC-alliance so effectively used in the old days to cloud the nationalist Afrikaners’ mindsets with racism and political wrongdoing.

Yes, allude the antagonists, for the unprepared Whites, still cast in their European dressings and unwilling to understand and adapt to South Africa’s indigenous realities, the present day South Africa is undoubtedly a critical and frightening time: there is a lot of uncertainty, a lot of tension and a lot of anger, but the signs are good for at last a better South Africa in the making, or as Tsotetsi says138:21: “[It is an] inspiring time to live in South Africa”. There is no doubt for the propagandists that even Tony Leon and many of the antagonists are going to stay on to live comfortably and safe forever in South Africa: the country is at least still safer than Israel and free from their immense politics of suppression and delinquence! For the propagandists all that Leon and the contingent of antagonists must do to be able to also be happy in their hearts here, is to free themselves from White imperialistic thoughts and symbols, colonised curriculums, as well as the chains of patriarchy and misogyny and the hierarchies of White privilege. The ANC regime is by far better than the NP regime in which most of the antagonists have lived “so very happily for many years” while the Blacks were completely unhappy. The question for the propagandists is: if South Africa under the ANC regime (together with Black rule) is so “bad”, as the antagonists preach daily, why are they staying on here? It seems just too nice to leave!138

White participation is far nicer than White resistance. More than 90% of the Afrikaner/White population have learned this fact fast since 1994 and are living happily here. But to obtain this happiness they freed themselves from the contamination of the antagonists.

3.2.11. President Cyril Matamel Ramaphosa: The last bright candle light in South Africa’s darkest night?

There has been a lot written about Cyril Matamel Ramaphosa, the person and the leader, since the 1990s. This writing has picked up speed since his appointment as President of the country. As Jacob Zuma was initially a blue-eyed politician, but fell with time into unpopularity with the antagonists, it seems also to be the path to come for Ramaphosa. The specific reason for his sudden unpopularity, preached daily in the media, is his so-called “political turn on Whites” with his intended land expropriation without compensation. Enclosed therein stands some ongoing but justified rhetoric by him which the Whites see as hostile against them, just because he does not favour them more than the Blacks in the past.50,142-145 Antagonistic White sector’s misleading and suspicion-mongering

We need to teach our children that in life, some things are not going to be fair. That there are going to be some white people who will not like you simply because you are black, but at the same time, there are good white people and bad white people, and that tolerating and celebrating diversity should be our life-long journey.145:25

The above postulation, maintain the propagandists, holds certain truths, ignoring Mkhondo’s145 own racism and racial subjectivity. Indeed, admit the propagandists, he failed to elaborate fully to reflect also in reverse upon the fact that there are good as well as bad Black people doing the same good or bad racial things as the Whites, and that both Black and White sometimes are doing delinquent things activating unacceptable racism. But, argue the propagandists, no-one can object to Mkhondo’s145 argument when it comes to the racism echoed by the behavior and rhetoric specific to Cyril Ramaphosa. For the propagandists, this racism is more than locked-in because Ramaphosa is the leader of the ANC party as well as the president of the ANC regime, but rooted in Mkhondo’s145 postulation: he is not like, simply because he is Black.

The present generalised writings in newspapers by various journalists on the person of Cyril Ramaphosa, especially those coming from the antagonistic White sector on what land redistribution is going to be under Ramaphosa, are mostly misleading and unnecessary suspicion-mongering about him. The intimation that Ramaphosa is going “to try a big score” through the unruly and indecisive Black voters in 2019 with his bringing in as a vote motivator comprehensive land expropriation without compensation, is for the propagandists anathema. Although this propaganda must be taken with a pinch of salt, many of the ordinary Afrikaners/Whites, even those outside the farming sector and capitalist business sector, have become filled with fear for their future by the antagonists’ ongoing orchestrated false allegations. This places Black and White on a collision course, with the Afrikaners/Whites seeing the poor and landless Blacks as the “takers” of their property, forcing the country into a dangerous face-off between “haves” and” have-nots”.42,64,117,134,136,142-144

Prominent in these unanchored criticisms – remarks undoubtedly, as mentioned, to be taken with “a pinch of salt” – are those where the Afrikaners/Whites want “more” attention, privileges and benefits than the rest of the other South African races. Pertinent to such an outcome is that the contention of the chair of the Afrikanerbond (AB), Dr Jaco Schoeman139, when he says139:4: “Een van pres. Cyril Ramaphosa se uitdagings met die 107de verjaardagviering [January 2019] in KwaZulu-Natal om te wys dat hy die leier van alle Suid-Afrikaners, ook wit landsburgers, kan wees, sê die Afrikanerbond (AB).” For the propagandists, this remark clearly confirms how the Afrikaners/Whites became used since 1652 to an exclusive preference of treatment, notwithstanding their socio-economic and political wrongdoings and continued privileges and benefits at the cost of the majority of non-Whites. The central issue here again for a certain segment of the Afrikaners/Whites (specifically the insignificant group known as the AB), is the possible loss of the land which Whites stole from Blacks and which the ABs from their limited framework of reasoning and honesty, now see as “discrimination” and “wrongdoing” against the Whites. Schoeman139 and his AB group ignore the hard fact that there are more than 50 million so-called non-Whites living in South Africa who were hard done by many of the ancestors of the present ABs and other Afrikaners/Whites. The question is clear: were DF Malan, JG Strydom, HF Verwoerd and BJ Vorster ever good and sincere leaders to all South Africans (most prominently Black South Africans)? The answer is a resounding: no; not a single one of them. Ramaphosa is forced to balance the interests of all citizens and to do justice to all the main tribes within the country, of which the Whites are only one. He shows daily that he is all the people of South Africa’s president. (The ABs will benefit from realising that Ramaphosa is not a psychologist/psychiatrist with the official order to treat South African citizens’ attention and rejection syndromes).

For the propagandists, the comparison by the antagonists of the qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa with those of Jacob Zuma as a president, as was indirectly done by Schoeman139, is inappropriate. The journalist Prince139 of Beeld reflects on Schoeman’s thinking139:4: “Schoeman sê oudpres. Jacob Zuma het dit in sy termyn baie duidelik gemaak dat die ANC belange bo die Grondwet was. ‘Daarmee het hy hom van ‘n groot deel van die bevolking vervreem’.” For the propagandists, this “redirected and indirect” kind of thinking and rhetoric on Ramaphosa by the antagonists is far from the truth. Secondly, this shows the disconnection that exists in the mindsets of the antagonists to be able to observe and to read political facts and realities correctly (especially when they are Black facts and realities).139

Louw5 comments on the contaminating potential of executive political leaders when he describes how Afrikaners surrender their “independent thought” to their leaders5:218-219:

Afrikaner status, Afrikaans as an exclusive Afrikaner language, Afrikaner radical economic transformation, Afrikaner state capture, the racial purity of the Afrikaner, race separation, the limitation of Black politics, Afrikaner social and economical empowerment, Afrikaner nation identification, Afrikaner group identity above individuality, etc., became the dominant propaganda of the Malan era.

Thirdly, reflects Schoeman139 there is a seemingly “absolute innocence” on the exclusive and immense wrongdoings of the proto-Afrikaners and nationalist Afrikaners between 1652 and 1994 by his allegation of the so-called “suppression and autocratic behaviour” of the ANC regime between 1994 and 2018. Schoeman139 postulates in this context139:4: “…die [ANC] party wat self rassisme en diskriminasie op allerlei maniere toepas en in die proses vele Suid-Afrikaners van hul vryheid en self-respek ontneem het.” The question is prominent for the propagandists: who were these South Africans who lost their so-called beloved “freedom and self-respect”? If it is supposed to be the Afrikaners/Whites (on whose behaf Schoeman with his ±20 000 ABs is not authorized to speak and as a small selfish group are ignored by the majority of Afrikaners/Whites), then his139 remark is politically wanton for the propagandists, just to put Ramaphosa and the ANC regime under suspicion.139

Self-enrichment and self-empowerment were undoubtedly the main motives in the Whites political policies over the centuries. On the contaminated intertwining of these two powers, fully applicable to the White South Africans lifestyles, Chomsky132 says it well132:28:

Concentration of wealth yields concentration of political power. And concentration of political power gives rise to legislation that increases and accelerates the cycle.

The above clearly reflects that it is not the post-1994 ANC which is responsible for today’s mass poor and landless Blacks: it comes directly from the pre-1994 White rulers’ pairing oftheir concentration of White wealth with their concentration of White political power. In this context upon the remnants of the pre-1994 Black poverty rooted in today’s Black poverty, Mmusi Maimane writes146: 22: “Our country still has deep divisions of colour, of gender and religion. But the biggest division in our society is between those on the inside – people with jobs, good education and access to opportunity – and the millions still locked out of our economy.”

Specific to Maimane’s146 reference to the immense ongoing Black poverty since 1994 which needs Ramaphosa’s attention through land reform, Mcebisi Jonas147 writes that the past 25 years brought significant improvement to the Blacks’ earnings but less improvement to the provision of wealth. He writes147:15-16: “The inequalities in wealth and opportunity present a threat both to the dignity of our citizens and to the strength and security of our society. Inter-racial inequality provides fertile ground for divisive populism.”

The question is clear for the propagandists: do Schoeman and his ABs understand what Maimane146 and Jonas147 are basically saying, especially about: “the millions still locked out of our economy” and the: “inequalities in wealth and opportunity present a threat both to the dignity of our citizens and to the strength and security of our society”? Looking critically at their constant and rigid defense of their favoured position as: “people with jobs, good education and access to opportunity”, they are, it seems, lost politicians from Mars!!

With regard to Schoeman’s remark on the actions of the ANC regime who people’s “selfrespek ontneem” (it can only be assumed to be Afrikaners/Whites), he failed, to offer trustworthy research to back up his postulation, but most of all he stays silent on his Afrikaners/Whites’ pre-1994 extremely delinquent actions to Blacks. In this context the answer to Schoeman139 by the propagandists is clear: it was exclusively the Afrikaners/Whites and their ancestors who robbed millions of Blacks over centuries of their self-respect, causing a setup where millions of Blacks are still lacking self-respect and dignity, and not the ANC who had “robbed the Afrikaners/Whites of self-respect”. The postulation by Schoeman139 is again an antagonistc farce.

A fifth clear example of the antagonistic White-sector’s misleading and suspicion-mongering against Ramaphosa and the ANC, is the narrative by Schoeman139 on the political history of South Africa when he reflects subjectively139:4: “Die hele kwessie van die herverdeling van grond, ook die konseponteieningswet, word misbruik vir politieke doeleindes en word gegrond op ‘n skeefgetrekte en eensydige geskiedenis. Ongelukkig maak die president hom ook skuldig aan die narratief wat net een geskiedenis voorhou.” The only narrative in the reference of Schoeman is seemingly that the “history” he refers to, is the post-1994 one wherein the 25 year regime (1994-2019) of the ANC is central, ignoring the “pre-1994 history” wherein from 1652 to 1994 (342 years) the history was exclusively and totally one-sided, driven and written by the autocratic White/Afrikaner rulers (and a delinquent history wherein the AB played a prominent role). The most contaminated part of this pre-1994 history occurred from 1948 to 1994 by the NP-AB-DRC-alliance under their politically corrupt and autocratic Grand Apartheid. Hereto has the ANC regime since 1994 tried in all seriousness to put a balanced political history upon the table, covering the period from 1652 until today. So far is it solely the antagonists who are completely ignoring the badness of the Afrikaners/Whites’ role in the 1652 to 2019 history. Secondly, they are deaf and blind, as Schoeman’s doings reflect, to the balanced historic facts offered by the ANC regime. To accuse Ramaphosa (or the ANC regime) of presenting a one-sided or false history around the land expropriation matter, is for the propagandists again an example of the antagonistic White-sector’s well-planned misleading and suspicion-mongering against the person and leadership of Ramaphosa.4-7,139

It becomes clear for the propagandists that the so-called Afrikaner/White rescuers and saviours, like the AB, AfriForum, Solidarity, AgriSA, FF Plus, etc., still, after 25 years of Black rule and empowerment (and a Christianity coming from 1652), have not developed insight that their internalised cognition of White supremacy is a “bad” characteristic, based upon a clear cut between Black and White. Central to this naïve thinking, planning and action, driving seemingly the majority of Afrikaners/Whites mostly unconsciously since 1652 by their belief system of an association of good with White and bad with Black, stands racism. From a psychoanalysis view it seems as though they never learned what racism really is and the many manifestations thereof as reflected in human behaviour including their own. Much of the present misleading and suspicion-mongering against the person and leadership of Ramaphosa is cemented in this contaminated mindset. But this misleading and suspicion-mongering would be reflected against any other Black in a leadership position (as Nelson Mandela also experienced) in South Africa by the so-called Afrikaner/White rescuers and saviors. It did not matter whether these Blacks were the ruler or the opposition. This character defect, reflected thankfully for the propagandists’ since 1994 by only a minority of Afrikaners/Whites, will only be healed by their comprehension of what racism is. Constructive education, it seems for the propagandists, has become an absolute. The solution to the problem – which will bring an end to the misleading and suspicion-mongering against the person and leadership of Ramaphosa – lies in Mkhondo’s145 simple guideline when he posits145:25:

As parents, we must teach our children the different definitions of racism as contained in many dictionaries: the negative benefits, attitudes, actions, or behaviours that are based upon phenotypic characteristics or ethnic affiliations; the beliefs in inherent superiority or inferiority upon the basis of perceived group attributes, often conceptualised as including beliefs and attitudes (racial prejudice) and actions and practices (racial discrimination), and that it can occur on individual, internal, or structural (institutional) levels, and be either subtle or obvious.

The Afrikaners/Whites as individuals, but especially the hostile leadership of the so-called Afrikaner/White rescuers and saviours, will all benefit to note Mkhondo’s simple guideline: they are not too old or too rigid to change positively.145

The good advice of an outsider to politics, Roy T. Bennett, can also guide the hostile Afrikaners/Whites as individuals and leaders, together with their Afrikaner/White rescuers and saviors, when he says: “It’s only after you’ve stepped outside your comfort zone that you begin to change, grow, and transform.”

The many false outcomes for Ramaphosa — started up deliberately with bad intentions by the antagonists, bringing nightmares to the mindsets of the ordinary Afrikaners/Whites — are not part at all of the intended land expropriation of which so many Whites are deeply afraid. The end result is going to look totally different in a very good way, as emphasized by the propagandists. They maintain that it is not Ramaphosa’s intention to move from an existing exclusive capitalism to a solely inclusive or social capitalism, while Communism is and was never on the cards for South Africa under the ANC. The economy will be for him a parallel economy between exclusive capitalism and inclusive capitalism, so as to steer land redistribution. This immediately made the antagonists’ allegation of a Chinese economic and political “occupation” null and void (Ramaphosa already showed the Russians the door under the Putin-Zuma-nuclear deal).

Ramaphosa’s present good standing on the issue of land is totally masked by the antagonists for the general public. The antagonists have so far wantonly frequently and successfully created negative impressions of him and his regime. Examples are the potential full-scale land grabbing, the irresponsible allocation of immediate full title-deeds to the new Black land owners without precise pre-limitations on the reselling of the given land or other limitations on the future trading of the so-called “free land” received by the poor and landless Blacks, and the alleged irresponsible handing over of other assets and expropriation of riches from Whites (which is of course not part of Ramaphosa’s land expropriation plan!). The financial journalist Chris Barron148 warns the uninformed ordinary public about the false belief of the worst to come created by the antagonists. It is far-fetched mind capture, and mostly action impossible to introduce by any regime in present-day South Africa (This outcome was indeed created and fully obtained by the Afrikaner/White regimes, but only after more than 300 years of their political domination of the Black South Africans). Barron148 reflects a mild change coming around the intended land reform of Ramaphosa: an action spread out over a long time, to be executed inside an orderly process, and free from political radicalism. It is for the propagandists clear that Ramaphosa has, after his assumption of the presidency, successfully counteracted the delinquent intentions and planning of land grabbing by certain radicals’ inside the ANC who were still associated with Jacob Zuma.59,148,149

Ramaphosa knows very well that the short and long term processes around land redistribution are complicated and sensitive and he is steering it very responsibly.

Ramaphosa’s legal foundation and approach to obtain an orderly and just land reform, taking the interests of White land owners into consideration, can be read in Barack Obama’s150 speech at the Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture in Johannesburg on the 17th July 2018 when he said150:11: “Mandela taught us the power of action, but he also taught us the power of ideas; the importance of reason and arguments; the need to study not only those who you agree with, but also those you don’t agree with…Mandela [also] demonstrated that action and ideas are not enough. No matter how right, they must be chiseled into law and institutions.” For the propagandists it is time that the antagonists study without subjectivity the reasons and arguments of Ramaphosa on land reform, and how it is going to be executed: only then will they start to understand the meaning of Obama’s remark150:11: chiseled into law and institutions. Ramaphosa’s whole exercise on land expropriation will be driven within the Constitution: it will be executed in terms of democratic principles and overseen by law respected institutions such as the country’s courts and various parliamentary bodies.150

This balanced intention on future human rights and economics for South Africans by Ramaphosa, erasing the antagonists’ misleading of his intention to impoverish Whites and to strip them of their civil rights, is also echoed by Jonas147 when he posits147:15-15:

Building a more inclusive economy must be at the centre of our national development agenda. But transformation is not simply about replacing the white elite with a new black elite. A fundamental restructuring of the economy is instead required in which rent-seeking is incrementally replaced with the development of new productive capabilities in which black South Africans have an increasing share. The current dichotomy between growth and transformation is false. We need to transform to grow, and we need to grow to transform. Ramaphosa’s economic goodwill to every South African and his sincere underwriting of a capitalist democracy

With regard to the constant criticisms by the antagonists of Ramaphosa and his regime as failures, is it important to take a perspective on Ramaphosa’s outputs. Ramaphosa, in contrast to Jacob Zuma, after his selection as president, immediately launched various initiatives to improve the ANC regime’s relationship with the private business and financial sectors. These initiatives include industrial development, training and the shoring up of public enterprise. Substantial changes were made in the top tiers of the government, SOEs and other vital institutions, according toUmraw.50,136,137

In this context, most prominent is his focus upon two areas: activation of the economy and the fighting of corruption. Regarding the economy he identified five key pillars which he activated and is steering to a high level: an investment drive; youth employment; state-owned enterprises as economy vehicles for growth creation, improvement of competition and land redistribution. Eight direct interventions have already taken place on certain state owned enterprises which were previously exposed to state capture. There enterprises changed their boards. Furthermore, Ramaphosa tasked Gwede Mantashe, Jeremy Cronin and Ronald Lamola to find solutions for the prominent problems around the areas of mineral resources and public works, and he also put the issue of land redistribution and inequality between the races under direct investigation. Ramaphosa’s restructuring and re-steering of the country’s various public enterprises assures that these bodies will remain economic drivers to bring about growth, skills development and business competition. These interventions avoid a forced selling off or an untimely privatisation of these public bodies.50,136,137

Ramaphosa fully recognises that the corruption and capture issue during the Zuma regime must not recur and is geared not only to prevent this happening in his regime, but acknowledges that the crooks must be erased from the regime if he wants to steer the country onto a winning path. Fikile Mbalula152 describes this crooked and deep rooted setup under Zuma as an in-depth cancerous infection which needs an in-depth treatment152:4: “… you can’t clean a sore without going deep into it – just dressing the wound won’t help”. The intention of Ramphosa is to go deep into the state capture under Jacob Zuma and his cronies.152

Ramaphosa knows that in his addressing of the disabled South Africa left behind by Jacob Zuma and his cronies, the immediate requirement is to form a post-2018 South African identity solidly based upon the cooperation of the public and private enterprises and the individual citizens. Integrity and ethics are imperative here. With such a strong consensus and mandate to back his reformation of the ownership of land, it will be a great success. Ramaphosa knows that without an absolute unitary consensus and mandate, his best intentions and actions for a better South Africa will be fruitless.153

Thombothi154 is not wrong when he, in reflecting upon Ramphosa’s intentions, postulates154:17: “One cannot, for instance, launch into battle with a disjointed army or without the support of the entire populace. The coherence or the agreement needs to first come from inside.”

In this context the propagandists show Ramaphosa’s economic goodwill to every South African and his underwriting of a broad-spectrum of a capitalistic democracy with his appointments of prominent capitalist economic leaders. Prominent here is the appointment of the economist Trudi Makhaya, a Rhodes scholar, and an alumnus of Wits and Oxford universities, as his special economic adviser. Included in his supportive circle are four special envoys and eminent South Africans under Trudi Makhaya’s oversight. These are the ex-Minister, Trevor Manuel, the ex-Deputy-Minister of Finance, Mcebisi Jonas, the Liberty Holding Chairman, Jacko Maree and the Executive Chair of Afropulse, Phumzile Langeni. The main aim of this team is to uplift the South African economy and to obtain $100 billion (R1.2 trillion) plus in foreign investments (an aim which they have already fulfilled to a great extent). These appointments and intentions by Ramaphosa are seen by the propagandists as a sign that extreme RET and the leftish Zuma politics, which include the promotion of extreme political actions like land grabbing, the nationalising of the assets of Whites, and the kicking out of foreigners as land, property and other asset owners, are erased from the ANC’s future politics.60,144,145

In this new business initiative is it clear that Ramaphosa has, with sound business leadership, steered the ANC elite’s mindset away from a Mugabe-Zimbabwe land grab as a solution to our land issue, showing to them that the consequences are just too overwhelming and too destructive for South Africa. Herewith were the doctrines of ex-Minister of Finance, Malusi Gigaba and his economic adviser, a said Professor Chris Malikane, which called from inside the ANC, with Jacob Zuma’s permission, for radical RET like the nationalisation of mines and banks to cure the country’s economic ills, also killed for ever by Ramaphosa.60,144,145

To challenge the many obstructions, especially to get the private sector engaged, Professor Mills Soko75 sees Ramaphosa as the ideal leader to pull it off. He writes75:9: “He’s been a union leader, a business leader, he knows what’s happening in the economy. He must start these uncomfortable conversations. He has the tactical language to speak to business”.

This, as mentioned byProfessor Soko, is according to the propogandists exactly what Ramaphosa has doing from day one in the presidency!

Ramaphosa’s economical goodwill to every South African and his sincere support of a capitalistic democracy are unchallengeable realities, and the world must know it.

Ramaphosa is not an Nkandla Crooner (a Jacob Zuma looting the public monies of South Africa). He was primarily involved in the birth of the New South Africa and is today still part of that elite leadership who assured our peaceful transition. The transition was not a miracle155:9: “It’s a choice made by [good] leaders and the [good] people they lead. Countries that succeed make tough choices”, posits Malala155. Ramaphosa is leading wisely by making tough choices to let South Africa succeed; choices that do not fit into the selfish and opportunistic plans of the antagonists. The disfunction in certain segments of the present South Africa have nothing to do with Ramaphosa leadership, as the antagonists try to reflect, but it has a centuries old history. His present role is to again bring about a peaceful land transformation, as the dispensation of 25 years ago did.

The advent of Ramaphosa and the rebirth of South Africa, states Malala155 can be equated to the enormous reform that was activated from April 2018 in problematic Ethiopia which was also drowing in a sea of mediocrity, until its salvation by a leader in the class of Ramaphosa. Malala155 writes155:9:

It can be done, though. In Ethiopia in April 2018 we saw the arrival of a young new leader, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and the swift and resolute implementation of a wide range of confidence-boosting measures. Opposition parties have been unbanned and invited to participate in ensuring a free and fair election next year [2020]; exiles have been welcomed back without fear of reprisals; borders are opening; women are taking up leadership positions. Journalists have been freed from jails.

The ANC regime since 1994 has mercifully been free from the incarceration of the opposition, persons banned, borders closed or the jailing of journalists and discrimination against women. Neither were the antagonists even banned or prosecuted,due to their racial incitement and false rumours on Ramaphosa and the ANC. But the rehabilitation and rebuilding of a country and its people subjected to hundreds of years of suppression and exploitation, asks the same input from President Ramaphosa as Ethiopia asks from its Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Political and personal hostilities focused upon Ramaphosa

The propagandists’ emphasise that South Africans must not ignore the hostility and manipulation of the political environment which Ramaphosa has to face in his presidency – from inside and outside the ANC regime. This brings him constant unusual stress and places him under attack. The political analyst and journalist Peter Bruce62 warns in this context that “it is easy in light of our present politics to become dismayed by the complexity of almost every single issue and the reality that Cyril Ramaphosa is sincerely trying to rehabilitate and to reform the ANC as a regime and political party after the corruption of Jacob Zuma. This rehabilitation is an enormous process”. Ramaphosa is simultaneously in a battle to resist and to eliminate the strong Zuma-ANC-NEC-powerbase, which is trying to derail his leadership and to put the country again directly into a Zuma project of stealing. On this immense constructive action and rehabilitation by Ramaphosa (mostly unseen and observed by the ordinary South African), not only of the ANC but also of the total administration of the country, Bruce62 writes62:16: “But simply because we cannot foresee the outcomes of events already in motion does not mean Ramaphosa is failing. Look, he may well be failing, but the evidence isn’t there. What is there is evidence of a painstaking setting to rights of issues as they come up”.

Ramaphosa’s political clean-up of the present day South African politics is also confirmed by the writing of the editor of the Sunday Times117 when he highlights the positive outcome of the Ramaphosa regime117:16: “But the tide has turned. Ramaphosa, in the understated yet quietly determined way that has become his hallmark, is picking off bad apples one by one. Slowly but surely, Ramaphosa’s “New Dawn” is shining a light into the darkest recesses of the Zuma era.” 117

Ramaphosa himself is under no illusions about the immense mess which South Africa is in and that it will take some time to recalibrate and realign every part before good governance is being reached. The May Report (2016-2017) of the Office of the Auditor-General is sobering and depressing reading, making the immense task of Ramaphosa ahead understandable, and fillingthe reader with great sympathy. The report shows that only 33 out 257 municipalities received clean audits, while irregular expenditure at local government level amounts to R28.37 billion. It must also be acknowledged That South Africa has a weak growth rate from as far back as before 1994, far behind that which characterised the global world’s recovery (and which was one of the reasons to force the NP to hand over the politics to the ANC). Attached to this stands the significant gap between the country’s needs versus its aspirations and capacity, making it, notwithstanding it being the best developed economy in Africa, a slow growing country. South Africa’s remote location, in combination with its history of economic isolation, makes it an all-over outsider in the global economy. Furthermore, the mass unemployment of the youth and poor basic and tertiary education, are direct results of the spatial pattern of Apartheid’s economic inequality. The propagandists note, specific to the criticism by the antagonists of the so-called poor general performance by the Ramaphosa regime so far, that notwithstanding the epic swindles and under-performance at various state institutions which are immensely comprehensive and deep seated, Ramaphosa’s men already demonstrate excellent improvement in their functioning, and are progressing well in their clean up.50,117,136,156

The cry for the immediate correction of the South Africa official political system, for instance by action such as the firing and taking to court of political and government officials previously active inside the Zupta-setup, has been heard from especially the antagonists in their senseless labelling of Ramaphosa as a failure as President. What the antagonists, mostly inexperienced themselves in serious and advanced politics, missed out in their arrogante criticism, is that Zuma’s empowerment inside the ANC elite (prominently the ANC NEC) is still there. Ramaphosa is not a “blind, impulsive politician”. He knows the odds and is aware of Zuma’s corrupt political mindset.Ramaphosa is forced to follow prescribed legal (and sound political) ways to bring the many culprits to book. This process takes time and is to a certain extent outside Ramaphosa’s control: he cannot takes premature action and have it later questioned, criticised or recalled by the judiciary.35,68

The comprehensiveness of the above infighting and extreme undermining of President Ramaphosa’s leadership and good regime is well illustrated by Munusamy34 when she warned already in April 2018 about the underminers in the ANC as follows34:22:

Ramaphosa might have great plans for South Africa’s recovery, but it would appear that his own organisation is weighting him down. Instead of focusing on stabilising the state and creating an optimum climate for the investment and economic growth that would hopefully result in job creation, he must fight the ANC’s internal problems.

Meanwhile, other ANC leaders are ineffective, dogged by scandal or engaged in sideshows.

While Ramaphosa is able to send his lions on the hunt for investment, it is a pity he does not have beasts at his disposal to deal with the nuisances in the ANC.

Nyatsumba35 politically educates the naïve antagonists of a direct and immediate “revenge-taking” by Ramaphosa on the criminals associated with Zuma still in the ANC regime when he writes35:18: “Only a president with a political death wish would succumb to the deafening public calls to dispense with due process and take immediate and precipitous action against individuals who face allegations”. Patience is the key, as Ramaphosa plays by the rules before he can oust the delinquent Zuma-faction from the ANC NER. About this temporary, but immense hold-up of Ramaphosa’s political reforms by the delinquents in the ANC party and ANC elite, Munusamy33 states33:18: “…South Africa can only leave the Zuma era behind when the corruption networks are completely broken, the criminals are brought to book and there is a re-orientation of the state.”

This immense challenge for Ramaphosa cleanse, is also well demonstrated by Barron151 when he writes151:10: “The claws have gone very deep into these institutions, corruption has become pervasive. So it is not going to be smooth sailing”.

There is no doubt for the propagandists that Ramaphosa will act fast and comprehensively when his mechanism of ruling is in place. But, as the propagandists’ emphasise, South Africans will have to learn to be patient and realistic with the present style of Ramaphosa-reign and rid from their mindsets the antagonists’ implants of a Ramaphoria or Ramaphosa-mania. This criticism is also a finger-pointing to the antagonists’ unjustified profiling of Ramaphosa as a person of doubtful character and an sub- standard executive political leader: many of the antagonists’ objections, moans and accusations on Ramaphosa’s so-called failures to rectify so far all the wrongs of the Zuma-era, have a purely racial foundation and originate from the pre-1994 racial politics practiced by the nationalist Afrikaners. For the propagandists is it now the time for the antagonists to do self-introspection, to rectify their delinquent politics to the poor and landless Blacks Their scapegoating of Ramaphosa as a so-called “Black racist”, is the utmost mischief-making and will cost them dearly in the end.35

The balancing act at present by Ramaphosa to get the populace on his side, in avery limited time, and to at the same time effect land redistribution while keeping the country unified, is a challenge that has never before, since 1652, been undertaken by an executive political leader in South Africa. What Ramaphosa now needs is immense moral and political support from the populace, not the aimless and noisy warbling of the many antagonistic political songbirds who are missing out on today’s forced realities such as the immediate need for land redistribution.157

It is important to reflect again upon the immense conspiracies activated by the Zupta-cronies to unseat him. Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma are the prominent leaders here, referred to as the “Brutus’ in waiting”. Such an ousting will undoubtedly activate a full blooded land grabbing and extreme RET wherein every member of the White tribe will figure prominently as the victims.34,103,105,106,158,159

This political complexity and “blood-battling”, with the possibility of focused murder inside the present day ANC, clarifies for the propagandists why Ramaphosa has so far been unable to make dramatic changes to the still “Zuma-ridden” South African political setup, and thus to challenge directly the Zuma part in the ANC. Other than during the Zuptiod-reigning up to 2018 of South Africa, which had lacked responsibility, insight and integrity, Ramaphosa acknowledges publically that there is an enormous balancing task awaiting him as president, namely145:4: “…to balance business friendly policies with pent-up demand for social and economic justice”, and that his present timely response is145:4: “… people’s ‘yearning for land’ would insure against ‘policy mishaps’ in future”.. These are tasks he does not fear to take on and he knows he can solve the issues with full justice inside the democracy, as he stateswith confidence154:4: “Addressing the “gaping and bleeding” wound caused by land hunger need not threaten either business or white minority”.

Although there is a belief that the struggle for the soul of the ANC to be a regime is far from over, it must be emphasised that a possible Zupta-derailing of the Ramaphosa presidency in the near future seems to be limited. Although the KwaZulu-Natal Youth League Chair Mshengu still refers to the pro-Zuma formations like the Mazibuye African Congress and the African Transformation Movement in KwaZulu-Natal as “enemies” of Ramaphosa, and Jacob Zuma through his Zulu-ticket stays the most popular figure in KwaZulu-Natal, the anti-Ramaphosia is busy passing away. The ending of Zuma’ populistic and unrealistic hand-outs to the Zulus, as shown by Jonas, is now already one of Ramaphosa’s intentions to limit the unrealistic expectations that a fiscally constrained and hollowed out the state presents. Ramaphosa knows that financially the country can simply not further meet the years’ of populist handouts as occured under Jacob Zuma. This, of course, is going to put strain (and masked, well-planned attacks) on his regime, especially from the Zuma-gang not as yet in retirement.34,37,38,147,158-162

Mcebisi Jonas147, a former Deputy Minister of Finance, and now an investment envoy to Ramaphosa, writes that there is in every government a fighting back by crooks when a political delinquent such as Zuma and his men are ousted with force147:15-16: “… future assaults on the constitution and on the rule of law as obstacles to so-called transformation are to be expected”, but the evidence is there that Cyril Ramaphosa has slowly overcome the Zuma orientated resistance and hostility against him as a person and leader inside the ANC, especially the hostility of the ethnicity of the Zulu tribe and their doctrine by Jacob Zuma’s Zulu ethnic-nationalism against his ethnic Venda-Tshivenda connection.34,37,147,153,158-162

The internal hostility in the ANC, as shown by Hunter160, especially in KwaZulu-Natal, was fired up by the undermentioned threatening war songs by Zuma supporters against Ramaphosa, when he visited KwaZulu-Natal in April 2018. However, this is mostly a thing of the past160:17:

Phansi ngoCyril Ramaphosa phansi! [Down with Cyril Ramaphosa, down!],

That NEC of the ANC is rotten. Those are not ANC leaders. They are the agents of [Johann Rupert] and Opperheimer…Thuma mina Cyril Ramaphosa”.

Where Jacob Zuma deserves to be blacklisted as a political scoundrel, Ramaphosa innocently attracts negative news, unfortunately for the wrong reasons. The present political and personal hostility focused upon Ramaphosa, is mostly driven by the antagonists in their foolish “smash-and-grab” politics in their hope to make some gains. The antagonists failed over many years to bring solutions to conflicts and problems which they, by their rule had created, making it now for the ANC to address this through their. The facts are there, not only to contradict the false allegations of the antagonists against Ramaphosa, but also that they are going to be the losers in their fight with Ramaphosa.144,145,152,163 The Zuma reference within the Ramaphosa CV

Prominent in the criticism against Ramaphosa by the antagonists is their calling him a “Zuma-collaborator” in state capture and the country’s mismanagement. In this accusationthey constantly refer to his so-called “passivity” as an ANC member and later Vice-President in the Zuma regime upon Zuma’s wrongdoings. They attempt to portray him to bring only further misery to South Africans in general and to Whites specifically, with what the antagonists like to call “all out land-grabbing”. In response the propagandists, after comprehensive research and evaluation of the matter, show that there is no evidence offered by the antagonists to assure their allegations. The propagandists’ opinion is that these allegations are unjustified and clearly delusional thinking by the antagonists.28,29,31-36,42,64,75,117,134,136,141-144

In specific defense of the above allegations on the person and the leader Cyril Ramaphosa, the propagandists note that although he was part of the Zuma setup, it was an executive position forced upon him officially by his membership of the ANC party, the ANC elite and the ANC NEC. The propagandists offer clear evidence showing that he publically objected to Zuma’s delinquent actions. Furthermore, it is well known that in private he fought Zuma and the Guptas. Limiting Ramaphosa’s hostile actions against him, evidence is there that it was undoubtedly Zuma’s intention to silence him if he continued to block Zuma’s plans: there were plans by Zuma to axe him as Deputy-President and even to arrest him, in order to silence and to totally erase his influence as a party and executive member of the ANC if he resisted with continued fighting with Zuma. There was in the darkness behind curtains the fear of an assassination. Any direct or indirect ousting of Ramaphosa would give the majority Zuma ANC NEC at Luthuli House the ideal opportunity to “blacken” his career for ever, as Zuma did with others like Thabo Mbeki, in his capture of the presidency from him. For Ramaphosa, there were thus two choices: to be erased summarily as a politician from the active South African politics, or to stay on as Vice-President and with some form of constructive criticism to wrentch away at a later time Zuma’s empowerment. The propagandists contend that there was very little else for Ramaphosa to do, besides to resign, which, as said, would have given Zuma, without Ramaphosa’s direct blocking, far stronger leverage to activate more state capture with the Guptas and the Zuma cronies. For Ramaphosa there was only one way to go: stay on, stand up against Zuma in a less aggressive way, activate support against Zuma and wait for the right moment to get him out of his power base. There is no doubt for the propagandists that if Ramaphosa exited a decade ago from the ANC elite and the ANC regime, Jacob Zuma would most possibly still in power, with a much larger state-capturing and a Gupta-Zuma-family-circle to support him in wrongdoing.28,29,31-36,42,64,75,117,134,136,141-144

Ramaphosa is indeed willing to appear before the Zondo Commission (and even to apologise as ANC leader and State-President for Zuma and his cronies’ immense wrongdoings to South Africans), confirming again his innocence of a direct or an indirect collaboration with state capture. Fikile Mbalula, a senior ANC executive at Luthuli House, has never denied the committing of state capture under Jacob Zuma, but insists that Ramaphosa was innocent as Vice-President. On a possible presentation by Ramaphosa at the Zondo Commission on his previous position as Vice-President, an ANC spokesperson reflects152:4: “… the president does not want to present mere hearsay to the commission. ‘We will have to find a way to use cabinet minutes to show that just because he was Deputy-President he was not complicit in these things’.”

Ramaphosa’s honest answer to his critics for staying on in the Zuma setup must be more than an assurance to South Africans that he is not another Jacob Zuma crook. Munusamy33 reflects upon Ramaphosa’s words, in answering his critics33:18: “Could I have done anything differently? Possibly, but we are where we are now, where we are all able to take action”.

The Zuma reference within the Ramaphosa CV is an unfortunate inscription, which however much he wants to erase it, was unavoidable in his capacity as an executive member of the ANC. In the end it serves as a positive reference to the world to understand the person and the leader Cyril Ramaphosa. Leadership characteristics

With regard to the outstanding characteristics of Ramaphosa, when specifically reflecting upon his integrity as an executive political leader, is that Ramaphosa does not run away from responsibility. Noteworthy here is the fact that he takes the blame for the police wrongdoing in the Marikana massacre, notwithstanding the he was in no way directly involved as a mine boss in the whole situation. This “not to blame other persons when things go wrong”, but to take the full blow alone, is the characteristic of a great executive leader, a so-called Level-5-Leader (ultra-exceptional great leader), who the Collins study164 identified to only be reflected by eleven leaders (0.7%) out of a total of 1 435 identified good leaders within American business society.164

Some of the other extraordinary characteristics of excellence unique to these Level-5-leaders, which are all associated with Cyril Ramaphosa, are the following164: they build enduring greatness through a paradoxical blend of personal humility and professional will; they are fanatically driven, infected with an incurable need to produce results; they make productive contributions through talent, knowledge, skills, and good work habits; they contribute individual capabilities to the achievement of the group’s objectives and work effectively with others in a group setting; they organise people and resources towards the effective and efficient pursuit of pre-determined objectives; they catalyse commitment to and vigorous pursuit of a clear and compelling vision; and they stimulate higher performance standards. These manifold examples of “goodness”, are all characteristics which Ramaphosa has shown from his beginning as an ANC member until today as President of South Africa. Very few executive political leaders in the political history of South Africa, from 1652 until the present, reflect this characteristics.164

There is undoubtedly a new enthusiasm in the Ramaphosa regime on all political, social and economic levels of society.28-36,42,64,75,117,136,141-144,165,166

In the emotional overwhelming hostility for Ramaphosa, the antagonists, in their ongoing daily criticism of him, are also completely missing out on Ramaphosa’s enormously successful business career after he left politics for a while in the 1990s. In this business setup he showed outstanding personal and business wisdom, again said to be exclusive characteristics of a Collins Leader-5 or a great leader.164 His undermentioned business “wise man” guideline to ordinary citizens, as well as seasoned politicians, spells an orderly land transfer and the allocation of land to the poor and landless Blacks without hurting the country’s internal and external economics, when he says145:4:

When I was in the private sector, you built a book and that’s how I’m approaching it.

I want to build a book of investment. We are not going to go for a smash-grab-grab. We are seeking to create a very good, solid and durable environment for investment.

For the propagandists, there is no other leader inside or outside the ANC like Ramaphosa at the moment, who can be trusted to activate land redistribution in an orderly manner, and who can guarantee a high success rate in the placement of new sufficient-producing Black farmers in the next two decades to come. The editor117 of the Sunday Times reflects upon the positive characteristics of Ramaphosa as an executive political leader to get South Africa out of its mess when he says117:16:

The new South Africa, now a month into its 25th year, needs a “new dawn” only because the lights have been off – metaphorically and sometimes literally – for so long. Ramaphosa has always played the long game, so he will not be fazed either by the magnitude of the task or the sniping of critics within the ANC and on opposition benches.

His achievements in 100 days have already begun to overwrite memories of his predecessor’s calamitous 3 145-day administration.

In the context of the mischief-making of Ramaphosa as a person and a leader by the antagonists, still catching up in their short term selfish and exclusive benefits of White land holding instead of supporting the long term benefits of balanced land redistribution wherein the poor and landless can after 25 years of democracy become economically, socially and politically empowered, Kariuki167 gives the antagonists a simple, but effective cognitive guide when he writes167:18:

Nation building in the context of South Africa cannot be a perpetuation of hierarchies of the past based upon imposed divisions and rooted in prejudice, discrimination and exclusion.

It calls for a rethinking, in South African terms [an inclination so far, even after 25 years of Black rule, is missing many Whites, especially their politicians], of what democracy and tolerance mean in terms of lived experiences, where every citizen promotes peaceful co-existence in the spaces they inhabit and the communities they live in.

Ramaphosa has done enough to give a beleaguered, cynical and jaded electorate a glimpse of light at the end of a horribly long tunnel.117

The propagandists posit Ramaphosa is at the moment the only bright candle light in South Africa’s darkest night. If an organised land transformation programme is not activated in 2019 and steered in an orderly manner, to erase South Africa’s all-encompassing poverty, unemployment and inequality, the mass of poor and landless Blacks are going to do it themselfves, outside any political association, bringing to South Africa an accompanying racial and ethnic bloodshed and a long term socio-economic and political disorder under the leadership of extreme radicals. Ramaphosa’s expropriation without compensation, as shown in this research by the propagandists, means in most cases limited but balanced compensation, instead of without compensation: it will not hurt the economy and the panacea unlocking the country’s potential to create wealth to every citizen. Ramaphosa does have the backbone to do this.14,64,168-170

4. Conclusions

The many arguments, opinions and viewpoints as positioned by the antagonists against any change to Section 25 be able to completely reject the expropriation of land without any compensation or market related prices, are for the propagandists complete falsehoods and myths. The propagandists have shown in detail the dysfunctioning of the corrupt age-old White political and socio-economic system of South Africa and how the antagonists are misusing remnants thereof effectively, to be able to uphold exclusively White interests, such as immense White land ownership and a closed, exclusive White farming community. Prominently imbedded in the antagonists’ fighting and obstruction of a change to Section 25 to effect much needed land expropriation without compensation, is for the propagandists the presence of well planned delinquency by the antagonists to make the ANC’s new political and socio-economic system of South Africa dysfunctional.

Studies of the pre- and post-1994 political history of South Africa show that the many arguments, opinions and viewpoints positioned by the antagonists, besides it being fake news and reporting, are also very emotion laden and mostly lack depth. Furthermore, a critical evaluation in general shows that the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists are lacking the support of the total White or Afrikaner population. The antagonists mostly come from the contingent of White farm- and land owners, White capitalist business groups with immense direct and indirect interests in land economics, as well the so-called “saviours and rescuers” of Afrikaners/ Whites, reflecting themselves as “unselfish fighters” for the interests of the White farming community and for the upholding of the Constitution and dispensation of 1994. This group’s opportunistic and delinquent aims and intentions seem not always to be sincere to benefit especially the White farmers’ community.

The antagonists as a specific minority group are undoubtedly extremely motivated by and fearful of any socio-economic and political changes, away from exclusive White democratic capitalism. Their resistance to the full handover of the country’s economics and politics to the constantly growing Black majority is reflected in their wanton thinking, planning and action to prevent it. The antagonists are a shrinking minority group inside another shrinking minority group, estimated to represent less than 10% of the White population and ± 0.5% of the total South African population. For the propagandists, the antagonists are nothing less than a political resistance group, a remnant from the proto-Afrikaners’ terroristand racial past, which refuses blindly any constructive participation in the ANC regime. In perspective, the antagonists are insignificant in South African politics and s it is clear that their political and economic delinquent opportunism is being unmasked. The propagandists have no doubt that the antagonists’ present obstruction of the land expropriation initiative is temporary, unfounded and doomed to failure. Profiling them in the future politics and economics of the country, their survival duration is at most ten years. As fast as the land expropriation plan is implemented next year, as fast will the antagonists disappear from the public stage. For the propagandists this will mercifully finally end the antagonists’ destructive impact upon the non-racial nation building initiative of the ANC regime and the repositioning of the socio-economics and politics. The propagandists believe that this will lay the land expropriation conflict to rest.

The antagonists are aware that they are reaching a watershed in the South African political history and that their racism and exploitation of the Blacks have come to an end. Exclusively unjustified White rights and privileges are in the process of being erased. Land expropriation is going to at last bring some compensation to the victims of Apartheid’s land grabbing, although only a fraction of their total claim. Louw5 comprehensively contends5:175-176:

However, as said, criminal proceedings are not enough for many of the apartheid victims. Many of these victims want financial compensation from those who were directly involved in criminal actions, while others wish for compensation from the Afrikaner community and business sector as a whole, as they have benefitted from favoured business deals, the many other interests and the jobs etc. that apartheid offered them. Prominent are certain Afrikaner and nationalist Afrikaner business leaders and magnates who benefitted greatly from the apartheid system. They were favoured for business deals, contracts and other benefits. The current battle regarding Radical Economical Transformation (RET), seen by many Blacks as the second leg (economical revolution) in continuation of the first leg of the 1994 dispensation (political revolution), are excellent indicators of the Black call for “pay-back” of White capital obtained from apartheid incongruities.

The change to Section 25 to effect land expropriation without compensation is for the propagandists an unchangeable fact. For the propagandists, the intended land expropriation without compensation is going to at last bring about the “pay-back” of White land and other capital obtained through Apartheid incongruities. The land expropriation initiative is going to with time bring an end to the poverty, inequality, unemployment and landlessness of the mass of Blacks; all negative outcomes of centuries of Apartheid and its’ exploitation of Black the population.

For the propagandists, it is undoubtedly clear that for most poor and landless Blacks an anointed solution to bring justified landownership to them is wishful thinking: constructive political action, based upon sound cognitive reasoning, thinking, planning and action is the only way to proceed; no further unanchored prayers, promises and hopes. This course of action must now be activated by Cyril Ramaphosa.

Post-1994 South Africa brought democracy to every South African and immense changes to improve the country. But democracy can never be complete and neither can the Constitution which is driving and overseeing this democracy be complete and comprehensive enough. The year 2019 brings a fresh input to democracy with orderly and justified land expropriation through the improved Constitution. For Ramaphosa and his regime, the land expropriation matter is a command to do what is right, not what is easy nor what is popular (RT Bennett Proverb).

In closing down the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists (Articles 3 and 4) and the counter arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the propagandists (Articles 5 and 6) as offered in this research project, the stage is at last set for an objective and seasoned judgment to be able to draw conclusions and to offer a dictum as to whether the planned land expropriation of the ANC regime is correct or incorrect, and thus can be implemented with great speed. These conclusions and dictum will be delivered in the next and final article (Number 7) of the project.

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Not commissioned; externally peer-reviewed.


The author has no competing interests to declare.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.


Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa. (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). These terms do appear in dated documents. These terms or translations are used for the sake of historical accuracy in this article. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting upon the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanisation and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

The propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution (5)

Full title: The propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible. Part 1: Age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system (5)

Gabriel P Louw


Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PUCHE), DPhil (PUCHE), PhD (NWU)


Keywords: age-old, arguments, compensation, constitution, custom, frontiersman, injustice, opinion, propagandists, landownership, land-redistribution, radicalism, socioeconomic, terrorism, viewpoint.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 2: 3

1. Background

1.1 Introduction

The history of colonialism and imperialism poses challenges to the legitimacy of property rights today. From the Fifteenth Century onwards, European nations took control of much of North, Central and South America, large swathes of Asia and, by the Twentieth Century, most of Africa. Indigenous populations were wiped out or pushed off their land, communities were devastated and resources were appropriated for Western profit; and

There is nothing voluntary about this process. Indeed, it is hard to see the original appropriation and privatisation of commonly owned resources as anything but theft.1:153

The propagandists, in line with Martinez1, pinpoint the occupation and possession-taking of the land and commonly owned resources of indigenous non-Whites by White settlers as outright theft. They maintain that similar behaviour has occurred in South Africa since 1652 and that the evil of land grabbing had an affect from 1652 to 1994 upon all the peoples of South Africa. Boot-Siertsema and Boot2, as well as Geen3, describe in depth the tragic chain reaction of early land grabbing by the White frontiersmen of the Cape Colony in the 1830s. This spread to the northern parts of South Africa, established itself in an extreme manner in the Transvaal Republic from the 1850s onward. The research of Geen3 and Boot-Siertsema and Boot2 shows that the Great Trek activated various negative socio-economical and political outcomes, such as the subsequent poor White problem and wrong-headed Black-White-relations, to make true segregation between the Black tribes and White settlers, as he puts it, “forever impossible”. Boot-Siertsema and Boot2 refer to the initial start-up of White discrimination, coming from 1652, as Kleine Apartheid, before it beasted aggressively transformed in the 1900s into DE Grote Apartheid. One of the most prominent negative impacts for the propagandists, in line with Martinez1 arising out of the outcomes of White colonialism, was the theft by the proto-Afrikaners of the traditional land of the Blacks and their disrespect for Black human- and civil-rights in the northern parts of South Africa. (This devastating outcome also followed as the White Trekboere moved westwards and northwestwards into the various areas like the Groot Karroo etc., of the Northern Cape (traditionally the living area of the KhoiSan and KhoiKhoi). This land theft from Blacks in the Transvaal and Free State Boer-republics resulted in the creation of landless and poor Blacks there, which is still present today all over the country and which the propagandists posit is a primary driver for the ANC regime’s intended land expropriation.2-4

With regard to the theft by the proto-Afrikaners of the traditional land of the Blacks of the northern parts of South Africa, Geen3 writes3:73:

Despite the wars of Chaka and Msilikazi in the land into which the trekkers moved, it was by no means empty of population for Native [Black] wars were not unduly destructive of life. Having subdued the Native tribes, the trekkers soon disposed them of their lands and thus helped to create a landless class of Natives, which is the source of many of the Union’s economic troubles at the present time [1946].The trekkers hardly exemplify a judicious Native policy, for their haphazard apportionment of land often without survey at all means that the Natives became mere squatters on their own tribal land; and in looking at the things exclusively from the point of view of European interests, the trekkers set the disastrous precendent of ignoring the very existence of the Native population. Sir T. Shepstone was near the truth when he wrote to the Colonial Office in January 1880 that “the government of the (Transvaal) Republic never thought it necessary, even as a matter of mere prudence, to set apart land for the occupation of the natives. The Native Problem that exercises the attention of South African statesmen today [1946] is largely the creation of the trekkers, who in the interior provinces of the Union laid the foundation of a civilization based upon a landless Bantu proletariat and a rigid maintenance of the Colour Bar in State and Church.

This creation of a lawless setup by the proto-Afrikaners and their ongoing actions as land thieves of the Black inhabitants’ land, especially in the northern parts of South Africa in the middle 1800s, is, according to the propagandists, also highlighted by Louw5. Louw5 describes in depth the early transfer and internalision of contaminated and delinquent political thinking, planning and actions of the White frontiersmen at the Cape into their own mindset, as well as into the mindsets of their descendants (the later Trekboers and Voortrekkers, and the later burghers of the Northern Cape Province and the two Boer republics). For the propagandists, Louw5 reflects that these proto-Afrikaners’ comprehensive socio-economic and politic delinquent behaviour against non-Whites, their disrespect and trampling upon the non-Whites legal rights, land ownerships and citizenships inside the greater South Africa, were as follows5:18:

The fact that the Boers constantly moved northwards confirms that: “…they wanted to do things their way”. Their way was not always within the limits of the law (like land grabbing and the planned termination of non-Whites like the KhoiSan). It resembled terrorism as described by Powell6 and Boon7. Their terrorist behaviour, as already indicated, reappeared during the Great Trek when the Voortrekkers started to occupy land that they argued and rationalised as “uninhabited and ownerless,” while in reality it was the property of Black tribes who used it as hunting grounds and pasture for their cattle and as a defence zone between hostile tribes. Despite this reality, the Boers occupied the land, often by brute force and the loss of Black lives. This first forceful occupation of Black land north of the Cape Colony’s border took the same form as the killing and atrocities during the migration of Black tribes southwards with the first and second colonisation of South Africa.The aggression of the Boers escalated with the large scale occupation of Black territory to form the Boer republics. They drove away or killed the Black owners. They used the same tactics that Shaka used in order to take over the land of other tribes. This early occupation facilitated the founding of the two Boer republics, both of which supported racial discrimination. This shows how much terrorism and Boer liberation are internalised in the minds of the Afrikaners.

The direct outcome of the above stealing of land and the focussed termination of Black resistance by the White burghers of specifically the Transvaal Boer-republic, is also evidenced for the propagandists in the writing of Thabo Makgoba8, Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, on the tragic lot of his great-great grandfather and the loss of his family’s land at the hand of Paul Kruger and his delinquent cronies.

Makgoba writes8:21:

The Makgobas and our clan, baTlou of Makgoba’s Kloof, Limpopo, know all about the pain of having land expropriated without compensation.

When our great-great grandfather, Kgoši Mamphoku Makgoba, resisted the decision of Paul Kruger’s government to parcel out our land to White settlers in the 1890s, they sent a force of at least 4,000 to crush our army of 250. They finally caught up with Kgoši Makgoba in the kloof on a Sunday. Because Gen Piet Joubert, hero of the Boers’ First War of Liberation against the British, and his men were at church, the Swazi auxiliaries who found Makgoba cut off his head and sent it to Joubert to prove they had killed him. Announcing the news to Kruger, Joubert ended his telegram: “The Lord reigns, and I am his servant”.

We are still searching for our ancestor’s skull.

Makgoba8 writes further about this unfortunate lot of his ancestors in the Transvaal8:21:

More than 120 years later, when I drive through white owned land down the beautiful Makgoba’s Kloof Pass, I pass citrus farms, avocado pear trees and commercial pine plantations. It smells of wealth and privilege. Arriving to visit relatives at Tlhabine in the lowveld – the descendants of those driven from the kloof – it is barren by comparison. The stench is of deprivation and dispossession. The suffering and the hurt live on into the current generation.

Motsoko Pheko9, the former leader of the PAC, reflects that after 1910 the stealing of land from Blacks by Whites intensified and spread to every corner of South Africa. Pheko posits that the land stealing — which began with stealing of the land of the KhoiSan in the Cape Colony and spread to the Boer-republics to reach a climax in Apartheid – was initially positioned by the promulgation of the Berlin Act of the 26th February 1885 through which the Cape Colony became a British colony. A British colonial law, the Union of South Africa Act 1909, unites the four British colonies of the Cape, Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State under exclusive White rule to what Pheko9 calls9:10: “…to fight the ‘native danger’ of African resistance against European colonialism, and which legalised racial discrimination against Africans…” .

About the deeper delinquent intention of the above European colonialism of South Africa, as far back as the 1885s, Pheko reflects further that9:10: “…even though colonialists called it the spreading of ‘Western Christian civilisation’ it was, in fact colonial terrorism.”

Pheko9 describes the immediate devastating impact of the Union Act (1910) on the nullification of Blacks’ land ownership (a land ownership situation which is still for the propagandists basically the same in 2018) and the process of stealing Black land, as follows9:10:

Within four years of the Union of South Africa Act, the colonial parliament, with the approval of the British Government, passed the racist and genocide colonial law allocating a paltry 7% of their own country to over five million Africans and giving the remaining 93% of the African land to 349 837 European settlers. This was done through the Native Land Act of 1913.

This was a crime against humanity. It was theft.

Relaying the past to the present in a critical retro-perspective upon legal land ownership, Mthombothi10 makes prominent the existence of an Africa milieu versus a European milieu, seemingly each with its own culture upon what is right or wrong, and time frames and time limits wherein these unique culture presentations were allowed as acceptable. It seems for the propagandists as though the concept of the arrival of a total, specific African political milieu, which includes the demand to the Whites to hand over in 2019 their economic empowerment obtained through centuries of colonialism and White dominance – twenty-five years after they handed over their political empowerment – has escaped the antagonists’ mindsets (mostly White) in their present rigid upholding of the not–so-friendly 1994 Constitution to secure and to assure further exclusive White land ownership. What most Whites and their many so-called rescuers and saviours (Afrikaners/Whites for the propagandists) do not understand today is that the world constantly changes and sometimes extensively and extremely. South Africa is not an example of Black extremity, but of the late arrival of African Uhuru with its own culture on what is right or wrong, together with its time frames and time limits to be able to execute this unique Uhuru.The propagandists show that the balancing of racism, economics and security empowerment are prominent and overwhelming elements here. These elements can – and it seems are going to – bring a phenomenal change to the socio-economic and political setup of the country. In this setup the Whites’ so-called richness, land ownership and privileges are fully under stress and focus. This focus and the questioning thereof are fully sanctioned by the ANC regime. For instance an element such as the intended land expropriation without compensation confirms this. One of the outcomes of political history is to remember the past in the present. Present day political alignment suddenly disrupts the badness from even the far past, as South Africa is currently experiencing, asking for a reversed replay of the past, undoing the White supremacy and their exploitation of Blacks for centuries.10

For the propagandists, it is in this context prominent that the pre-1994 exclusive White South Africa, which is still functioning, albeit extremely well-masked today, is at last being dismantled, although it has taken the ANC twenty-five years to activate the process. The propagandists allude that the message by Black South Africa is of a total socio-economic and politic change to come (not only for Whites but also Blacks): a new setup at last exclusively to be based upon true democracy, one-man-one-vote with real empowerment, exclusive majority rule in the obtaining and guarantee of the individual’s right, equality, inclusive capital to every citizen, the availability and providing of decent work and living conditions. This was a message clearly sent to the antagonists in 1960 by Nelson Mandela. This was precisely what he wanted then and what he aimed to obtain, but was foolishly ignored by the Whites under the corrupt and selfish NP-AB-DRC-alliance. It was to be believed then as a truth and a reality in coming.10

The remark of Denis Goldberg11 (as quoted by the journalist Jonathan Ancer11) when he reflects upon Nelson Mandela’s warning words during the start-up of the Rivonia Trail in 1960 and his intention to already to break down White dominance then with time (something his party is now doing very well upon his behalf), resonates in 201811:12:

Mandela, who was in prison when the Rivonia raid took place, was brought to the Palace of Justice in Pretoria to stand trial with the others. “Mandela was in short pants and sandals – they tried to humiliate him, but he was absolutely in control,” recalls Goldberg. “He told us: ‘We are not going to apologise. We are going to put apartheid on trial’”.

It seems as though the ANC regime, elite and party are now in the process of at last starting up Mandela’s long cherished dream of expropriation of land without compensation but also without any apology. But, note the propagandists, the ANC is doing more than at last putting Apartheid on trial: they are finishing it off. True rewards take time to realise and there is mostly one winner in a political war. The propagandists believe that for the ANC elite and regime their victory is in sight through the guidance of Cyril Ramaphosa with his clear planned land expropriation without compensation.3,4,9-11

However, the propagandists further emphasise that Mandela’s “Apartheid trail” also tells of an earlier Apartheid’s trail of Blacks and their struggle since then against the inhumanity and injustice brought about by the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910. This struggle indeed comes from far back in the past: the degrading categorisation of Blacks as incompetent and uncivilized by Whites, the propagandists believe, must now with good reason be erased. This rectification includes the erasing of present day poverty, unemployment, inequality and landlessness of Blacks. For the propagandists it does not matter how doubtful and controversial the doings of the ANC regime are at present with what the antagonists propagate as so-called delinquent behaviour: such as land grabbing, it is absolutely necessary and unavoidable.3

For the propagandists it is above all the reality of today’s statutory land ownership wherein the Whites illegally hold the majority of the land. When the propagandists listen to and read of the comprehensive number of arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists (as presented by them in Articles Three and Four) objecting to a change to Section 25 by the ANC regime to expropriate land without compensation, is it clear for the propagandists that the present day political and socio-economic reality is blindly ignored and refused by the antagonists as an urgency. Political historical and legitimate reasons are why the present government must immediately activate land expropriation with or without compensation. The fact that the nationalist Afrikaners are not politically and militarily (to some extent also economically) empowered (as they were in 1994) to obstruct comprehensive land redistribution, make the circumstances optimal to now erase the injustices of the past. To wait longer will spell disaster for the economy as well as the start-up of an uncontrollable revolution. For the propagandists, Motsoko Pheko is correct to say: “we need to save South Africa”, through sound thinking and action on future land ownership, based upon an urgent legitimate, comprehensive and balanced process of land expropriation. If this process fails, South Africa can soon expect a “Bolshevik land revolution” by the masses of poor and landless Blacks. This can bring tragic consequences for all South Africans, but most of all for the antagonists who have rigidly refused since 1994 to get involved in true, constructive land reform.4,9

2. Research intentions

The research aim of this article is to evaluate and to describe in-depth and comprehensively what the propagandists believe are the hostile elements and the role-players obstructing change to Section 25 to facilitate land expropriation without compensation. The drivers and needs for an immediate change to Section 25 and the awarding of the legal right to the ANC regime to effect land expropriation without compensation, to empower the poor and landless Blacks, are for the propagandists’ outcomes from the White injustice and discriminative political and socio-economic system of South Africa, which makes the post-1994 political dispensation dysfunctional. Racial discrimination, coming from as far back as 1652, forms the basis for this negative setup.

The opposition by the propagandists of the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against their changing of Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution, as well as the antagonists’ opposition to the ANC regime to effect land redistribution without compensation, are central to this research.

This article (Number 5) forms the first part of the article entitled: “The propagandists arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible: Part 1”.

The next article (Number 6), entitled: “The propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible: Part Two”, will further describe and evaluate in depth and comprehensively, what the propagandists believe are the White injustice and discriminative elements and role-players, which are making the post-1994 political dispensation’s political and socio-economic system of South Africa dysfuntional.

2.1. Method

The research was carried out by means of a literature review. This method had the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research developed. This approach is used in modern day political-historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research upon the ownership of South African soil for the period 1652 to 2018 in South Africa. The sources included articles for 2018, books for the period 1945 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the present day arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the propagandists to change Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible.

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

3. Discussion

3.1. The pre-1994 White injustice and discrimitive political and socio-economic system of South Africa

The propagandists’ counter arguments, opinions and viewpoints against those of the antagonists (see the two previous articles, numbers Three and Four) reflect a broad identification and pinpointing of the elements and role-players alleged by the propagandists to be active and/or established in the White injustice and discrimitive political and socio-economic system of South Africa. This comes from as far back as 1652, and led to the poverty, unemployment, inequality and landlessness of masses of Blacks, which obstructed the 1994 political dispensation to better the lives of Blacks. These elements and role-players’ negativisms, internalised in the mindsets of the broad public by the antagonists with their fake news and data, have so far blocked the change to Section 25 to effect land expropriation without compensation. The propagandists allege that much of the delinquent political thinking and action, frequently characterise the antagonistic Whites’ mindsets. Examples thereof are the antagonists’ rigid underwriting and preaching of exclusive capitalism, their outright support for White corrupt business and financial capitalist bullies, their exclusive underwriting of Western political ideologies alone, their opposition of free political and economic world associations, their obstruction of inclusive/social capitalism, their anti-Black orientations, and the execution of White psychopathological politics. These are cognitions created over decades through White socio-economic and political empowerment, discrimination and domination of Blacks. These elements and role-players as negative determinants, form part in this research of the propagandists’ presentation to be understood and to be unmasked in order to persuade the voters to give their permission for the change of Section 25 to effect the land expropriation without compensation. The opinion of the researcher is that only through such a comprehensive presentation of primary as well as secondary negative determinants in the case of the propagandists, in their opposition of the antagonists’ case in the present “informal court”, can the situation be evaluated with justice and with balance. Indeed, such a comprehensive presentation was already allowed for the antagonists in the previous two articles (See Articles Three and Four of the series).

The primary aims with this article (Part One) as well as the next one (Part Two) are thus to reflect in depth and as broadly as possible upon the various elements and role-players obstructing change to Section 25 of the Constitution. It is only by such a comprehensive presentation that a picture of the propagandists’ civil rights, to be able to change the Constitution in its present form to effect land expropriation, can be made. The presentation, evaluation and description of the various elements and role-players of this article will devolve further and broadly into Article Six (Part: Two).

The presentation of the various elements and role-players in this article will be done in sixteen subdivisions. In the next article (Part Two) this presentation of the various elements and role-players will continue with another six subdivisions.

3.2. Myths, lies and fables fabricated by the antagonists in order to obstruct the intended land expropriation

The propagandists postulate that the antagonists have mastered the ability to turn myths, lies and fables into truths in their attacks on the government’s genuine effort to assure political stability in the country through their planned land transformation. Prominent for the propagandists is the antagonists’ misuse of the public media in order to depict the ANC regime both nationally and internationally as radical and Marxist driven, with the sole intention to nationalise all private property and assets. Futher untruths for the propagandists are the public reflection of an overall hostility by the ANC and Blacks against the Whites and the rejection of Whites as indigenous South Africans. Constructive and positive efforts by the ANC to better the relationship between Blacks and Whites are denounced and mostly cold shouldered by the antagonists. Prominent for the propagandists in this continuing creation of conflict is the destructive behaviour of the so-called rescuers and saviours of the Afrikaners/Whites – coming from Apartheid South Africa and its White privileges and rights, still rigidly captured in the upkeep of it and lacking the understanding of the future – with their organised fake and false news. It seems as though these irresponsible so-called rescuers and saviours of the Afrikaners/Whites are totally missing out on a modern day African perspective on the anger which is characterised by the landlessness in South Africa. Incorporated herein stand the immense risks they are taking in their political blindness by ignoring the realities which put land expropriation as a first priority.4,12-18

These so-called rescuers’ and saviours’ histories reflect an adverse political setup of racism and the focused obstruction of Black rule, spelling future doom if Whites’ political blindness on land ownership is not erased. It it is essential that they shed and part from their favoured past. The investigative journalist Jonny Steinberg,15 author of the book “Midlands” on the conflict and tragedies in the Ixopo area of Natal-KwaZulu in post-1994 South Africa, referred later in 2013 in the literary magazine Granta to the fate of a White farmer family. The Mitchells find themselves in the middle of this Black-White conflict and violence. They lost their son in this violence in Ixopo, and had ignored realities and a request for adaptation, as follows15:17: “Peter Mitchell died on a frontier, not so much between black and white, or between the landed and the landless, as between the past and the future.”

The journalist Fred Khumalo15 contends that when Apartheid ended in 1994, as many as 2 million Black South African labour tenants were living under the proprietorship of only 50 000 or so White farmers, reflecting a ratio of 40 Blacks tenants without their own land for every one White farmer with land. (Today these labour tenants number more or less 860 000, while the White farmers number approximately 35 000, to still give a high ratio of 1:25). For the propagandists, this shows that the so-called “baas-kneg-setup” is more or less the same as 25 years ago. In this present day context of an ongoing imbalance of “Black-tenantship” versus “White proprietorship” regarding land, politics and economics, there have indeed been positive developments and outcomes outside the so-called rescuers’ and saviours’ political contamination, although Black poverty still reigns, as today’s setup in Ixopo reflects15:17:

Meanwhile, back in Ixopo, many white farmers have regained their equanimity. The Mitchells and other from the “old era” have left. The Mitchel farm has been taken over by labour tenants, some of whom have lived there for five generations. They live on it but are too poor to farm it.

Neighbouring white farmers who stayed behind have moved quikly to build bridges between white and black, landed and landless. But the fear [of whites] is far from over.

Allan Paton’s15 call in 1948 (the same year that the racist NP came to power) upon the theft of Black peoples’ land by their White conquerers since the 1600s in his book: “Cry, the Beloved Country”, has not receded15:17: “Cry, the beloved country, these things are not yet at an end. The sun pours down on the earth, on the lovely land that man cannot enjoy. He knows only the fear of his heart.” South Africa is now 70 year older than when the sentence was uttered, but the potential of the unleashing of a bloodbath is still there in 2019 by the actions of the antagonists in their retention of Blacks’ stolen land and their blindly ignoring racial politics.

On today’s emergence of the land expropriation without compensation issue, Khumalo refers back to the incomplete 1994 political dispensation of which the so-called rescuers and saviours are deliberately ignoring and which needs to be rectified. Khumalo15 writes15:17:

The apartheid regime collapsed and was replaced by the ANC of Mandela in 1994.

But the new party couldn’t readily reverse the horror of land dispossession without falling foul of the carefully crafted Constitution of 1996, the result of the give-and-take negotiated settlement between the old regime and the Black liberation movement. The Constitution put great emphasis upon the protection of (White) private property.

What is called the “land question” in SA has become topical once again, after the government proclaimed its expropriation-without-conpensation intentions.

Indeed, the focus is back upon the past wrongdoings to Blacks on their land grabbing by Whites, pinpointing at the least to 1913 and the proclamation of the Native Land Act.9

It is also important, in the continuing of the so-called rescuers’ and saviours’ adverse political setup of racism and the focused obstruction of Blacks’ justified land- and citizens-rights in 2019, to note the words of the Reverend Msimangu in the late 1940s. Khumalo reflects15:17:

“I have one great fear in my heart, that one day when they are turned to loving, they will find we are turned to hating.”

The breathless intensity of these words can never be overemphasised. When they were written, in 1946, the Black masses were on their knees, begging their White, supposed fellow countrymen to allow them a place in the sun.

The advent of democracy after 1994 has emboldened Black people to be able to stop some of the suffering of Apartheid and its White officialdom. But there are many outstanding issues which must be addressed. But for the propagandists the Black population is thankfully today empowered enough to be able to question things withour fear, as can prominently be seen in the redistribution of land ownership to Blacks. After 1994, spilling over to 2019, South Africa will never be the same again.4,12-18

For the propagandists it is important that the many myths and lies, circulated at present by the antagonists on the land ownership matter, are unmasked and erased from the mindsets of ordinary people.

3.2.1. The antagonists’ organised sabotage of the 1994 dispensation programme

The propagandists’ postulate that the antagonists already started in 1994 to intensively agitate against even the initial intended land redistributions prescribed by the 1994 dispensation programme. Prominent were organised efforts of the antagonists to obstruct the government’s buy-outs of White land by inflating the prices of farms and constantly going to court if the government’s offerings were “beyond the market value” of the farms. Accompaning this was the antagonists’ agitation against any further land redistributions as those initially intended by the 1994 dispensation programme. This organised obstruction of the goodwill of the ANC regime by the antagonists, spearheaded mostly by the irresponsible so-called rescuers and saviours of the Afrikaners/Whites, was directly responsible for more or less 5% of the land transfers of the 1994 dispensation programme still being outstanding at present. Furthermore, the inflated prices paid for White land led thereto that the funding of the buy out of farms for Black farmers was seriously hampered, while the funding needed to develop and run the newly activated Black farms, was lacking. It is clear that the intention of the present obstruction of the post-2019 land expropriation programme by the antagonists is the maintenance of the pre-1994 White economics, rights and privileges.4,12-18

The impact of the many myths and lies upon the country’s immediate political and socio-economic security, deliberately circulated at present by the antagonists with planned mischief, is noted by the editor of the Sunday Times – a journalist of status, who, so far in the fighting around land expropriation and the converse allegation of Black racism and revolutionism unique to the ANC regime, as well as the alleged Whites’ political opportunism and crooking, stays impartial at a distance with only wisdom and good advice to all the parties involved. He recently issued a clear borderline to the so-called rescuers and saviours of the Afrikaners/Whites which they in the future with their fake news, myths and lies dare not cross. For the propagandists this is an impartial guideline (and a possible warning of a dragon waiting to be awakened). It is much needed to steer the antagonists to political and personal sanity, honesty, integrity and truth. The propagandists feel that the importance of the editorial report requires that the full text be reflected as an introduction. On the 16th December 2018 the editor19 wrote in his editorial under the title: “A day for reconciliation and reflection”, as follows19:18:

The fact that there is a need to correct the wrongs of the past is not in dispute.The inequalities that exist in SA are a direct result of laws that not only discriminated against people based on skin colour, but also dispossessed them of their properties, rendering them paupers in thei own country.

President Cyril Ramaphosa has repeatedly assured us that the process to correct the wrongs will be done within the laws and the Constitution. This is a move that should be supported by all South Africans, because, when done correctly, it could resolve a century-old land dispute – and promote stability.

But there are forces that have hijacked this noble process to serve their selfish political interests. On one side are the EFF, Black Land First and the so-called “radical economic transformation” champions in the ANC. While it is unavoidable to talk about race when talking about redress, the racial slurs that are being thrown around with such recklessness can only take the reconciliation project 20 years backwards. One does not have to advocate hate for a particular race to make one’s argument.

On the other side of the spectrum are AfriForum and other rightwingers who propagate the lie that correcting the legacy of apartheid and colonialism amounts to reverse racism. Their spreading of propaganda that there is a genocide against whites serves only to create unnecessary tension.

The South African Human Rights Commission says the number of complaints related to racial slurs is at a record high. “Most of these cases involve the use of the ‘k-word’ and other derogatory comments with the racial undertones, such as use of the terms ‘baboon’ or ‘monkey’,” the commission said early this year.

In addition to the huge task of cleaning up the government and the state institutions, Ramaphosa has another responsibility: that of putting the reconciliation project envisaged by our founders back on track as we celebrate the Day of Reconciliation today. Irresponsible leaders who thrive on inciting hatred and violence must be condemned as we move towards the nonracial, nonsexist and equal society that many fought and died to achieve. Today is an opportunity for all of us to reflect.

3.2.2 ANC an autocratic and fascist regime, untolerant to its opposition?

One of the most outstanding myths and lies offered by the antagonists is their successful labeling of the ANC regime as racist, autocratic and fascist; a regime which suppresses the opposition’s political rights. In this propaganda the Whites are alleged to be victims since 1994. Prominently specific is the false reflection of the ANC regime as a revolutionary and Marxist organisation with an anti-Western and anti-capitalist inclination. Especially since 2016, the antagonists have hijacked the media with their immense hostility against the ANC regime. Central thereto stands the profiling by the antagonists of the Afrikaners/Whites as innocent people in the South African political history who have only done good since 1652 to non-Whites, specifically the Blacks. Donald Trump was even seated in this circle of allegations and falsities by the antagonists. How the Afrikaners/Whites obtained ownership of land and other assets, seemed not to be a point of importance known by the broad public. Prominent myths and lies became truths in the mindsets of the antagonists and are manifested as true cognitions in the mindset of the ordinary White.4,12-18

Looking to the immense false information offered since 1994 by the antagonists about the ANC’s alleged racial intentions and suppression of Whites, is it clearly malevolent politics. The facts are there that the ANC regime never in any way followed the suppression of their opponents (mostly Blacks) as the NP regime did between 1948 and 1994, or the pre-1948 White regimes. Facts contradict the falsity reflecting the ANC regime as anti-democratic or as suppressing the rights of any citizen.The absolute permitting of free speech by the ANC regime, as this research reflects (see the manifold direct and indirect allegations, remarks and opinions of journalists, etc., as reflected in Articles 3 and 4). This is a clear confirmation of the democratic inclination of the ANC regime by allowing all these allegations, etc. by the antagonists against them without the banning of organisations such as the EFF, Black Land First, the RET radicals in the ANC, AfriForum and other White rightwing bodies and the incarceration of these organisations’ leaders, as would undoubtedly have happened if the NP-AB-DRC-Alliance was still the government of the day. Neither is there the presence of assassinations of opponents, as also occurred under the NP regime. 4,12-18

The propagandists show that the use by the antagonists of the writings of persons who are not part of the leadership or advisory bodies of the ANC, as coming officially from the ANC regime, to reflect the ANC regime as suppressors of their opponents, are malevolent politics practiced by the antagonists. Prominent here is the manipulation of opinions to be that of the ANC, such as the refence to the so-called new African empowerment movement and the intent to focus the term and its benefits exclusively upon “African Blacks” only. Here radicalism is prominent, but, the propagandists emphasise this is from outside the ANC. The suggestion that the definition in the draft amendment to the regulations of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act must be changed, not to define the identity Black further in terms of three classes as being African, Indian and Coloured, but should only be applicable to African Blacks, is clearly a remark misused by the antagonists for opportunistic reasons. Brun17 on this “Blackish“ issue writes17:22: “This is a hugely politicised area that needs to be dealt with boldly by the lawmakers if radical economic transformation is to be a reality in South Africa.There has to be an acknowledgement that during apartheid Black South Africans were treated unfairly at different levels, with Africans being discriminated against the most.” RET was an issue, with the focus upon an exclusiveness of a Black identity, promoted by Jacob Zuma. It is a discriminative political outcome which does not form part, in contrast to Brun’s17 propagation, of the ANC’s principles vested in the Freedom Charter of 1955.17,20,21

Reflecting specifically upon the nationalist Afrikaners’ general discriminative behaviour in terms of their autocratic and fascist regime, intolerant of their opposition, when comparing the ANC with the NP on the underwriting of democracy, are their extreme hostile actions against the Jews as another White race, during World War Two under DF Malan and HF Verwoerd. Malan, beset by purified nationalism under the Nazi doctrine of anti-Semitism, denounced the Jews as an unassimilable group. Louw4 writes4:141: “Even the belief that the Jews are the Chosen People of the Bible was skilfully extinguised in the mindsets of the Boers under the influence of the purified Afrikaners. The Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church annulled the Divine decree that the Jews were God’s Chosen People after a study on the historic credentials of the Jews”. In this regard it must be noted that South Africa was at that time a safe place to settle for German Jews fleeing Nazi persecution and genocide. Under Malan and his collaborators, the Jews became a target, leading to the prohibiting of further Jewish immigration. This anti-Jewish hostility of the “purified” nationalist Afrikaners reached a climax when a German chartered ship, the Stuttgart, arrived in Cape Town filled with German Jews and urgently looking for asylum. An agitation by Malan’s “purified” nationalist Afrikaners forced Hertzog’s government to act and the Aliens Bill ended the entrance of Jewish refugees (even the liberal JC Smuts did not block this draconian act). By his blocking of German Jewish refugees into South Africa, Malan and his collaborators made themself directly part of the killing and genocide of German and other European Jews by making it impossible for them to flee the Nazis.4

The extreme political racial mindset of the nationalist Afrikaners is further reflected by Malan’s successor, HF Verwoerd. Verwoerd started to ruthlessly conduct his policy of Grand Apartheid from 1948 onwards. Today his unjustified expropriation of South African non-Whites property and the illegal sending of a mass of South African Blacks to so-called unprofitable “Bantustans” is old, but is still not forgotten and is embittered news. His expropriation of South African Coloureds’ and Indians’ property at cheap prices, located in so-called White group areas and their relocation to so-called exclusively “Coloured” and “Indian” living zones, became the rule of the day. The same discrimitive policy for the non-Whites work-, living- and citizens’-rights followed.The psychological and physical estrangements which Malan and Verwoerd brought between Black and White seems to have become permanent, making the Afrikaners still outcasts today, with a limited knowledge of South Africa’s indigenous realities.4

Never in any of the post-1994 stand offs between Blacks and Whites did the ANC unleash violence such as that perpetuated by the White NP regime on Blacks, especially between 1960 and 1976. The undermentioned serve as excellent examples.15:17

On the 21st March 1960 in the small township of Sharpeville south of Johannesburg, in a conflict between Black marchers and the police, 60 Black people were killed in cold blood – as highlighted by Khumalo15 as White aggression against Blacks15:17: “…shot in the back as they were running away from the scene when it became clear that the police were intent on unleashing violence.”

In the 1976 student uprising as many as 500 kids were killed by the police in the first week of protests.15

On the 12th September 1977, in line with the many other murders of Black resistance leaders, the father of Black Consciousness, Steve Biko, was murdered by the police in his cell in Pretoria.15

The above ethnic and racial cleansing by the NP regime of Whites or Blacks never reflects under the so-called Black ANC, according to the propagandists.

Secondly, the propagandists see radical minority groups such as the EFF, Black Land First and the RET- champions in the ANC as very contaminated and dangerous role-players and not as political partners to the ANC, as the antagonists allege. In perspective, Ramaphosa’s regime sees these Black “radicals” as part of the greater Black community and the practice of democratic politics that must be allowed at all times as opponents of the ANC. For the propagandists, these radicals are a temporary nuisance and is it clear that they will naturally be phased out totally from politics by the public self after next year’s election. The so-called saviours and rescuers of the Afrikaners/Whites stand independent from Ramaphosa’s inner circle of his democratic regime. They are role-players in the wider South African society, who he, as a democratic leader, cannot and dare not try to reign in from future politics, notwithstanding their official sabotage of the government’s good actions. Any actions, legally prescribed by the Constitution to counter their dangerous falsities, would immediately be seen as suppression of the minorities, specifically the Whites, as was already reflected by the false information on so-called “White farmer murders” sent by the antagonists to Donald Trump to turn him on the ANC regime. 4,12-18

In the ANC’s post-1994 democratically orientated and driven government, is it exclusively up to the greater group of Afrikaners/Whites as responsible citizens to totally get rid of their so-called “self-appointed” saviours and rescuers such as AfriForum, Solidarity, Agri SA and other Afrikaner/White rightwingers before their behaviour becomes out of hand and endangers the greater White group, which they undoubtedly do not represent. The facts are there that these antagonists already count less than 10% of the White population, but became overrated by their propaganda via the Afrikaner media. If these radical rightwingers continue with their many conflicting and false propagandas, especially their ongoing obstruction of the correction of the legacy of apartheid and colonialism, the only option left for Ramaphosa and his ANC regime is to constructively stop the antagonists’ sabotage by muzzling them within the rules that the Constitution allows a democratic government in order to assure its people’s safety. According to the propagandists, the so-called saviours and rescuers of the Afrikaners/Whites are at the moment far more radical and a danger to the country’s safety than the EFF’s rowdy group or the few RET radicals of the ANC. Irresponsible behaviour by the antagonists, using well planned falsities to incite hatred and violence between the races, must for the propagandists not only be condemned, but removed from society if South Africa hopes to ever reach a non-racial, non-sexist and equal society. Irresponsible leaders who thrive on inciting hatred and violence must be condemned and isolated. Today is an opportunity for the Whites to also reflect reconciliation instead of inciting violence.4,12-18

Thirdly, the antagonists not only masterfully cover up the NP’s autocratic and extreme suppression of Blacks between 1948 and 1994, but also the political history of White autocratic suppression of Blacks from 1652 onward, as well as the Whites’ extreme grabbing of Blacks’ land. This land grabbing by Whites, accompanied by murder and even genocide of the Blacks, forms the basis for the propagandists’ reasoning as to why land transfer from Whites to Blacks is an immediate must in order to erase poverty created by landlessness. This process on White land grabbing (including genocide), since 1652, is comprehensive and of immediate importance. It unmasks the antagonists’ falsities on how today’s Whites “honestly” obtained their land and riches.Thus the earlier political history of the Whites, indeed of South Africa, must be reflected upon in depth. This political historical evidence totally refutes the Whites’ present day legal ownership of land and indeed makes the antagonists’ objection to change Section 25 by the ANC regime at this stage without base.4,15

Looking at the concept “democracy” practised in the politics of 1913 to 1994 under the White regimes, it was only “White democracy” enjoyed exclusively by the Whites in 93% of South Africa with one-man-vote against the subjecting of the majority Black population in this area to absolute autocracy and fascist rule of second class citizenship.3,4,8 Trustworthy evidence rejects the ANC as an autocratic and facist regime, intolerant of its opposition.

3.2.3. Political-historical background to White land grabbing

Central here for the propagandists is the Whites’ extreme land grabbing from Blacks and other non-Whites, over the period 1652 up to 1994. For the propagandists this mass of White wrongdoings went unnoticed due to the manipulation of the truth and the offering of misleading information by the various White rulers from 1652 to 1994 to the public, based upon an exclusive false White political history of South Africa. The propagandists furthermore see the faulty and manipulated 1994 political dispensation of the NP as an upholder of the pre-1994 White supremacy and its politics, limiting the outcome and exposure of the true political history of the South African Blacks which originated in the 1600s.22-27

To better reflect the false arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists, the propagandists find it of critical importance to show that the radical racial land grabbing behaviour by South African Whites has an established aetiology which dates specifically from the 1700s politics of the early White Boers on the borders.3,4,23,28 [Geen3 categorises and describes these early Boers as the White frontiersmen (Grensboere) and the migratory Boers (Trekboere) and Voortekkers].

In reaction to the antagonists’ constant and prominent mention of Shaka’s earlier murdering of other Blacks in his land grabbing as a similar phenomenon to the intended land expropriation without compensation from Whites under Cyril Ramaphosa, the propagandists feel it is important to also bring the same kind of alleged murdering and land grabbing intentions, inclinations and wrongdoings of the earlier Whites/Afrikaners to the foreground. Many descriptions and overviews are indeed available on the character profile and delinquent political and racial doings of the proto-Afrikaners (frontiersmen) and the post-1910 nationalist Afrikaners.3,4,28-31

In this established aetiology, which dates from the 1700s political history of the early Boers on the borders, the role models of the autocratic Netherlanders and British authories at the Cape is central. It is specifically the British authorities who were responsible for the introduction of immense negative racial and political cognitions into the mindsets of the proto-Afrikaners. The British Empire was cold blooded towards any non-British persons when its immediate interests, such as land, assets, income and empowerment, were endangered. [It did not hesitate to use extreme force when needed, as reflected in its genocidial war against the Boers and their families during the Second Anglo Boer War (1899–1902), in order to take ownership of the land and assets of the Boer-republics]. The British autocratic management and politics at the Cape Colony inspired further hostility among Black and White inhabitants (based upon the imperial principle of divide the inhabitants of their colonies to be able to rule). This was activated by the Netherlanders and laid the table for future ethnic and racial hatred. In this negative socio-economic and political setup, the proto-Afrikaners’ mindsets became contaminated with racism and violence against non-Whites. The already impoverished and vulnerable non-Whites, who stood directly in political, social and economic competition with the White inhabitants, became for the White inhabitants, as their political empowerment and interests grew, an immediate target to isolate and to discriminate against so as to survive financially and politically. This negative racial besetting of the early White inhabitants’ mindsets was transferred to the burghers of the Boer-republics, the Union of South Africa, to reach a climax with Apartheid in the later nationalist Afrikaner Republic.3,4,29,32

The propagandists postulate that the years 1652 to 1910 internalised cognitions of prominent radical White racism, fascist and right-wing thought patterns into the mindsets of the proto-Afrikaners about Blacks in general. Central to this political and socio-economic setup stands the Blacks’ status as inferior humans. This extreme Afrikaner radicalism (which was well masked untill today behind so-called good Afrikaner nationalism) is evidenced for the propagandists by the extreme suppression and the dehumanising of Blacks – which became entrenched as acceptable, correct and good behaviour in the mindsets of the early as well as the latter day Afrikaners, equating their delinquent behaviour to political terrorism and extreme political radicalism in South African politics. The Malan Manifesto of 1948 which introduced Grand Apartheid, confirms this political terrorism and extreme political radicalism par excellence for the propagandists.3.4.23,28

Notwithstanding that statehood apparently reached the nationalist Afrikaners at the end of 1948, their isolation from true democracy for over two hundred and twenty years at the Cape, argue the propagandists, left them permanently politically disabled and immature, and full of distrust for their fellow non-White South Africans, equal to their hatred and distrust for the Britons. Although the Afrikaners after 1910 with their gradual receiving of a kind of political independence from the British, started to preach fellowship and justice between the races inside South Africa, it is important to note that there is an immense difference between the professing of multi-racial politics and race equality in theory, and the practice of true human tolerance. For the nationalist Afrikaners, exclusively captured into the dogma of the NP-AB-DRC-alliance, community fellowship was in real life mostly limited to other White persons, and mostly other Afrikaners. The political realities and outcomes of South Africa up to 1994 reflect evidence for the propagandists of a barbarous story of political and criminal delinquent thinking, planning and action of the Whites’ in their ruling, fellowship and justice against non-Whites.3,4 Land grabbing through White mob reign and mob behavior

White South Africans, especially the majority group, the Afrikaners, knew from their early days at the Cape that to rule the country and its people, they must, as a prerequisite, capture and hold on to two intertwined energies: money and politics.This proverb stands out prominently for them: they who have the money rule the politics and they who have the politics rule the money.3,4,33

To be able to obtain such a political White utopia, they implemented and made intensive use from 1910 of Apartheid’s political model of terrorism, dehumanising and land grabbing to create a political-economic system which would be exclusively theirs untill 1994. This basic mandate of dominantly reigning Chomsky33 explains as follows33:55: “…concentration of wealth leads almost reflexively to concentration of political power, which in turn translates into legislation, naturally in the interests of those implementing it…”; and21:82: “…concentrated wealth will, of course, try to use its wealth and power to take over the political system as much as possible, and to run it and do what it wants, etc”.

This White obsession: to have the money and to rule the politics simultaneously, is for the propagandists excellently reflected by the South African political history of the 1910s which shows that within four years after the Union of South Africa Act, the Union’s White colonial parliament allocated 93% of the Africans’ land to 349 837 European settlers, leaving over five million Blacks in possession of only 7% of their own country.9

For the propagandists it is a fact that White South Africans did not want after 1910 (and indeed not from 1652) a non-White regime in power after their “own suffering” on the hands of the VOC and the British Empire. To intertwine the concentration of political power and the concentration of wealth exclusively, and to keep up this immense empowerment, the Whites resorted fast to political mobbing of the country’s political system, started up earlier at the Cape border districts, followed by the Boer-republics of the Transvaal and the Free State, and moving into the Union of South Africa. The White founders of the Union and the earlier and later nationalist Afrikaner leaders such as Paul Kruger, DF Malan, HF Verwoerd and BJ Vorster, clearly reflect for the propagandists the characteristics of political mobsters. Exclusive White land ownership stands central within political mobbing.4,7,22-27,34,35

In this context is it important to note Boon’s7:75 description of the characteristics of a political mobster: “Selfishness; delinquent inclinations all-over; strategies totally stripped of all democratic principles, traditions, thinking, planning and doings; absolutely intolerant; anti-order; minorities are quickly eradicated; coercion actions characterised by destruction, threats, killings and brutalities; aim the creation of a delinquent mob-reign; aim the exclusive of executive political mob-leaders to reign the country”. Looking critically at the 1960s political history of South Africa, the nationalist Afrikaners did not even try to shield this political mobbery practised by them from the public’s eyes. This delinquency was justified under their fight against the so-called “Communism Danger.”

To completely understand the immense negative internalised racial political and socio-economical cognitions in the mindsets of the White frontiersmen, proto-Afrikaners and nationalist Afrikaners, coming from 1652, and to be able to evaluate it in terms of Boon’s7 definition of a political mobster, the propagandists refer to the description of Louw36 on the proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners racial discrimination which reads36:21:

The racial discrimination … exclusively based upon skin colour and officially recorded in 1671 with the Godske instruction, can be regarded as the first apartheid law of South Africa. Godske was the first White proponent of organised racial discrimination, eventually against all people of colour. However, this discrimination seemed to adhere to a view where ethnicity is seen in terms of class, meaning that the poor, and therefore to a certain extent the underdeveloped non-Whites at the Cape, were regarded as having lower socio-economical standing and as “untouchables.” The slaves especially were stripped of their human rights and dignity and their financial and personal independence. They were impoverished. Also, the initial problems with the behaviour of the first slaves in 1658 and the Hottentots in terms of work and social habits and aggressiveness already manifested from 1652. This contributed further to levels of social differentiation and discrimination between certain sectors of the White community and other racial groups in general (specifically guided and practiced officially by the Cape authority). It is in this context that the VOC implemented a strict policy of separation between Whites and the other races such as the slaves, Hottentots and Blacks from 1671. Later the Xhosas, with whom the Whites started to make contact in 1730, were included. This was extended to all Blacks and to all other races in South Africa from the 1850s onwards, especially in the republics of the Transvaal and the Free State. The year 1671 can therefore be considered the beginning of socio-controlled racial manipulation and engineering in South Africa, specifically with the aim of Whites limiting and managing the personal and group rights of all other racial groups in some way.

3.2.4. Cape’s White frontiersmen’s unwelcome presence in land of the KhoiSan

To obtain insight into the Whites’ political, social and economic manipulations and of the wanton actions accompanying their comprehensive grabbing of land from Blacks, the propagandists’ emphasise that it is important to revisit the political history of the country and to refresh the mindsets of the antagonists as to what their real political identity is. It gives insight into how mob leaderships and mob politics became part of the Afrikaners’ psyche and drove their land grabbing, contradicting the antagonists’ reflecting of the Afrikaners/Whites as land owners by justice and “political angels”, while the ANC regime is now falsely labeled as “land grabbers”. The antagonists are for the propagandists far from innocent citizens, wrongfully made political and racial black sheep by the ANC regime, as they try hard to reflect.

The illegal land occupations from the early- to late 1700s by Whites brought them and the non-Whites into face-to-face conflict. The abundance of soil and good conditions of the interior for stock farming, as well as the little initial physical resistance from the KhoiKhoi and KhoiSan, fast activated a self-sufficient lifestyle of the so-called White frontiersmen with a pastoral and nomadic existence: cattle bartering with the KhoiKhoi, hunting of an overabundance of game and the daily overseeing of their stock. There was no effective border policy and strict ruling by the VOC of their White subjects whose ancestors came initially to South Africa to farm only around Cape Town.3,4,28-31 White frontiersmen’s disorderly lifestyle

The VOC tacitly allowed the White frontiersmen to enlarge the colony’s area constantly by their shifting of the one official border to the following border; deeper and deeper inland, and by the taking over of non-Whites’ traditional land. This created a more and more disorderly form of government and lifestyle. Two prominent negative outcomes follow this White expansion: a moral decay and racial inclinations against Blacks.3,4,28-31 Moral decay as a result of cultural isolation and deprivation

The White frontiersmen’s cultural and governmental isolation claimed a price. Within two generations, negative outcomes followed due to their isolation from the traditional Cape European culture, together with the absence of good law and order overseen by the VOC. Their geographical isolation not only resulted in a lack of educational facilities and cultural and life-enriching influences, but fast installed a down-scaling in their European standards of living and disrespect for law and order, basically as a result of the absence of good and constant policing of their behaviour from outside.3

About their prominent cultural impoverishment, Geen3 writes3:29:

…but the isolation and difficulties of frontier life also made them limited in their outlook, impatient with all forms of control and so intensely individualistic that it became difficult to unite them in effective co-operation. They lost most of their civilisation on the way to the Promised Land. Some could write, still more could sign their names, many read the Bible, especially the Old Testament, into which they read a justification of themselves, their beliefs and all their works, but for the rest, learning and the affairs of the great world were closed books to them.

The impact of this cultural and personal decay was immense and infiltrated their whole lifestyle, as well as their previously internalised values, customs and traditions of good standards, based upon European culture. It is also evidenced in its negative streaming into the life-styles and characters of their descendants: the Trekboere and Voortrekkers and these groups’ descendants. This ongoing “European deculturing” and barbarism of the Whites, spreading overall to every level of their lives, is well illustrated later by the view of the post-1836 British Government at the Cape, after the annexation of the Transvaal and Free State Republics, to label their burghers as backwards people who the British were forced to make “acceptable and fitting” into the British Empire.3,4,31,37 Whites’ development and practice of immense racial and criminal delinquent behaviors

The geographical isolation at the Cape frontier, where there was mostly a shortage of direct governmental oversight and the accompanying prosecution of criminal delinquency, led thereto that many of these frontier Boers and their children lacked an immense sense of law abiding and fear. The delinquent behaviour of the White frontiersmen, mostly ignored by the Cape Authority, internalised and strengthened the cognition with them that their behaviour was entirely correct and appropriate. This “correct and appropriate” delinquent behaviour includes a great variety of wrongdoings, such as the illegal grabbing of land and livestock of the indigenous people, up to their assault and murder. The failure of the VOC Government at the Cape to handle the White frontiersmen’s increasingly delinquent actions towards indigenous South Africans and their unrelenting illegal grabbing of the KhoiSan’s land set the stage to come for immense conflict, bloodshed and the creation of permanent hatred between Whites and non-Whites. Prominently outstanding here is the White frontiersmens’ development of strong negative views upon race differentiation, the belief of the baas-kneg-system and Christian-versus-heathen. This process undoubtedly incorporated a combination of negative racial cognitions, customs, traditions, opinion, beliefs and views, which they carried with them as the so-called Voortrekkers later moved further north into the two Boer-republics as well as the so-called Trekboere when they moved west and east into the rest of the country. This combination of negative racial cognitions, customs, traditions, beliefs and views also streamed into the Union in 1910 and later into the nationalist Afrikaners’ short lived Verwoerdian republic. It laid the foundation of racism and racial disharmony, with a pivot around land owneship, which has been the country’s main problem until today.3,4,28-31

Referring to the criminal actions of the White frontiersmen/proto-Afrikaners at the Cape, Louw36 describes them as36:32: “…White men who became in their own right sheriffs, cowboys, outlaws and crooks in a completely unorganised border area”.

Geen3 refers to the disorderly and law evasive actions of the White frontiersmen and proto-Afrikaners as follows3:23-24: “In fact, since that it had appeared as though the central government was leaving the defense of the borders to the frontiersmen, so that in time they came to look upon themselves not only as their own defense but as a law unto themselves”, and3:68-69: “They had become a race of extreme individualists with an inherited suspicion of any authority and discipline, so that they viewed with dismay the steady extension of magisterial districts, which in their eyes meant stricter government control…”

Deneys Reitz3 reflects on these early Afrikaners as follows3:69: “Knowing my countrymen as I do, I think the cause of their leaving [Great Trek] was not so much hatred of British rule as a dislike of any rule”. Presence of terrorism coming from the proto-Afrikanerism

Looking critically at the foundation of the racist and defiant thinking of the early Afrikaners, is it clear that they expressed their Afrikanerism without inhibition, and among their uninhibited wrongdoings are terrorist attacks upon non-Whites, especially when land grabbing was present. Louw5 contends5:18:

“It is very important to pause for a moment to consider this early Boer mentality and their views of what is civilised and uncivilised behaviour, of what is right and wrong. Land grabbing and suppression of other groups were part of their way of doing things”.

In this context of anarchy, according to Louw5 , is it important to look again at Powell’s6 description of terrorism, which reads6:9: “Violence against a person and/or serious damage to property designed to influence a government or an international organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public with the aim of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause”.

Louw5 further posits5:18:“When considering the actions of the Boers, it resembles Saddam Hussein’s unlawful occupation of Kuwait that caused the world to react with full military force. In modern times, the behaviour of the early Boers would bring them before the International Criminal Court for terrorism, the unlawful occupation of foreign land and murder”.

In perspective, the early land grabbing and the murder of indigenous people going with this process, was not a “bad” characteristic of the White colonists (proto-Afrikaners/White frontiersmen) alone, but also of the early Cape authorities. This inclination to criminal delinquency and terrorism, together with a socio-economic and political functioning seated in anarchy to disturb the indigenous peoples’ harmonious living (and the internalising of it as “correct and justified” cognitions in the mindsets of the settlers), are often reflected in the Cape’s political history by the actions of specific government commanders and governors. Jan van Riebeeck, the first commander at the Cape Settlement, began this process. Besides his public racism of a policy that non-Whites could be owned as slaves by the VOC and by the free burghers, and thus the right of Whites to buy and sell these slaves as “human livestock”, stands prominent in his punitive actions against the indigenous KhoiKhoi groups who took up arms against the settlers who occupied the KhoiKhoi’s traditional land.5,6 In this context of terrorism and steered anarchy, Louw36 posits36:15: “The KhoiKhoi War (1658-1660) spells the first driving out of the non-White KhoiKhoi from their traditional lands in the Liesbeeck Valley. This was undoubtedly the first commission of White terrorism to non-Whites in South Africa and land grabbing by Whites, as guided by the British definition on modern day terrorism”.

These terrorism acts against the indigenous Khoi-Khoi and the KhoiSan (and later also the Xhosas) take a much more serious stance under governors Hendrik Swellengrebel (1739-1750), Ryk Tulbagh (1751-1771) and Joachim van Plettenberg (1773-1785) and continued until the end of VOC rule at the Cape. From a White political perspective the KhoiSan (and less often the KhoiKhoi) were a prominent “non-White problem” due to the non-Whites’ resistance to the grabbing of their land by the incoming Whites. This early grabbing of land ensured serious racial disharmony and bloodshed.3,7,29-31

The propagandists maintain that although the KhoiSan were hunters and not farmers permanently established upon specific land to do their farming, their traditional land and territory were very important to them. Certain areas of South Africa, notwithstanding a lack of inhabitants or a population, were claimed over many years by the KhoiSan as their exclusive hunting grounds and property; areas from which they had even driven out the in-coming Blacks. These traditions and customs of the KhoiSan were principles that were not well respected by many of the unruly White frontiersmen and the White authorities who started to occupy the best grazing land of the KhoiSan. (Indeed, this illegal land grabbing became a habit and later a custom which characterised the Afrikaners/Whites actions up to 1994 and remains central in the ANC’s present land corrections politics).3-5

The KhoiSan resisted the plan of the VOC Government to subordinate them and to organise their land ownership in terms of White colonialism. They started an organised resistance in the form of guerilla attacks in order to drive out the White frontiersmen who they saw as illegally occupying their traditional hunting areas. Louw36 reflects36:33: “For the KhoiSan this ‘White barbarism’ of continuous land-grabbing was a serious threat to their future existence and a reason for justified war. They organised four ‘wars’, more like guerilla onslaughts, in 1715, 1731, 1738 and 1754 against the White frontiersmen…”

In their reprisal attacks the KhoiSan resorted to great cruelty against the White frontiersmen – methods similar to those which are seen today in much terrorist fighting. Geen3, Louw4 and Van der Walt31 confirm these cruelties committed by the KhoiSan, meted out with as much possible pain and damage upon their White enemy.3,4,7,29-31 Between 1 July 1786 and 31 December 1788, 107 cattle watchmen were murdered, and 99 horses, 6,299 cattle and 17970 sheep were stolen or killed. On this immense force of arms Van der Walt,31 writes31:102:

During the last thirty years of the century, a bloody guerilla war full of hatred and bitterness developed. The Bushmen did not lose any chance to steal or destroy, to burn down farm houses and to murder farmers or cattle watchmen. The farmers shot all the Bushmen that they could get in their sights, and commandos were destroyed as often as possible [Bushmen]. In 1777 the government approved a war of extermination (Own translation).

Although the KhoiSan’s guerilla warfare spreading out over the vast borderline of the Cape Colony was initially successful, their primitive weaponry and moving by foot made them easy targets for the White frontiersmen, who moved fast on horses in large groups with guns. The Boer frontiersmen’s counter attacks (the so-called KhoiSan hunting parties, and what Van der Walt describes as governmental approved wars of extermination), were executed in the form of organised commandos. Mostly these commandos’ actions were uncontrolled and unauthorised, but in some of these counter actions the VOC Government, as said, gave formal permission, which sometimes lead to extreme cruelty against the KhoiSan. These punitive expeditions ended in the killing of hundreds of KhoiSan, basically for one thing: their traditional land.3,7,29-31

With regard to the tragic outcomes perpetuated on the KhoiSan by one of these official so-called wars of extermination of the KhoiSan by the Cape Whites (in which, as mentioned, land-ownership was central), Geen3 reports3:28 that in 1774 the Council of Policy of the Cape organised a large commando under Godlieb Opperman. The attack on the KhoiSan stretched over three hundred miles of the borderland and for the loss of one burgher, the commando captured over two hundred KhoiSan women and children of whom most were apprenticed (meaning enslaved) to members of the commando, while over five hundred male Bushmen were killed.

The question is asked by the propagandists how the constant and senseless killing of the KhoiSan, driven illegally from their original living space by the White frontiersmen since 1652, differs from crimes against humanity and whether it was not genocide? For the propagandists this represents it as a well planned scheme by the White occupiers to wipe the KhoiSan out. (Today the KhoiSan remain only in very small numbers in the Kalahari Desert and South-West Africa). The treatment of the KhoiSan in the 1600s to 1700s for the propagandists is an excellent example of the dehumanising and distancing as human beings the KhoiSan underwent at the hand of White individuals, as well as an official policy of dehumanising and distancing of non-Whites allowed and activated by the White authorities themselves since the Cape Settlement started up in 1652. For the propagandists it confirms that the respect of White South Africans, specifically White landowners, for the lives, land rights and the happiness of non-White people’s lives and use of their traditional land, already went wrong in the 1700s. Most of all, it gives the propagandists an in-depth insight into how and why most of the White executive political leaders failed all South Africans on justified land ownership from as far back as 1652, and how and why Apartheid was born to safeguard and to exclusively guarantee Whites’ land ownership. Indeed, for the propagandists, this White supremacy on land ownership is still present in the country with the same intensity and arrogance as in the 1700s. Just read the comprehensive fake arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists to uphold the present land ownership dispensation of 1994 in articles Three and Four.3,36

The propagandists contend that the Old Israel’s political and biblical history is strikingly similar to the political history of South African under its White rulers: both boast the same radical ideologies and doctrine upon racism, cultural dogmas, race-blood purity, religious blindness, politically murderous intentions and extreme land grabbing. (In the present day the same ideologies and doctrine politics are followed by New Israel against the Arabs and are accepted unquestioned as correct by the western Christian world).5 On this intertwining of an Afrikaner/Jewish contaminated foundation in the exclusive use of racial violence to effect land grabbing, Louw5 postulates5:2:

The Jews of the Old Testament perpetrated violence tantamount to a rape of humanity, shedding the blood of the innocent. It did not matter if the victims were men, women or children in their own homeland. Their actions were justified as a divine command. Today these murderous biblical acts of ethnic and racial cleansing and land grabbing would be classified as psychopathic and mentally disturbed behaviour upon the part of political and religious leaders.

In addition the two Dutch researchers, Boot-Siertsema and Boot2, highlight this doctrine of an intertwined Jewish godlike biblical right in the mindsets of South African Afrikaners/Whites, contaminating their political thinking, planning and action from the 1600s until today, when they write2:38:

Naast de tot nu toe besproken vormen van racism, vindt men, met name in Zuid-Afrika, nog een derde factor die leidt tot het striven de verschillende rassen apart te houden. Die factor zou men “rasgeloof” kunnen noemen: het geloof dat God de Heer de verschillende rassen geschapen heeft, dat Hij ze zó gewild heeft, en dat de aldus “door God gestelde grenzen” tussen hen niet door rassen-menging mogen worden uitgewist. Bij dit geloof komt nog het gevoel van overeenkomst van het Afrikanerdom met het volk van Israël, dat immers ook huis en have verliet om in een nieuw land, na veel strijd en ontbering, met Gods hulp een eigen leven op te bouwen, waarbij het uitdrukkelijk de opdracht kreeg zich niet met de omringende heidense volken te vermengen. Dat deze opdracht inherent was aan de unieke positie van het volk Israël als theocratie, is een verschil waaraan men voorbijgaat; men concentreert zich op de punten van ooreenkomst.

Over time, the abovementioned God-permitted and God-driven cognition to devastate the non-Whites in their White-supremacy became internalised in the mindsets of the Afrikaner-volk with time, according to the propogandists. The cleansing of their political, economical and human memory by the Afrikaners/Whites of their White frontiersmens’ and their White rulers’ grabbing of the non-Whites’ land (and their killing of non-Whites to succeed in this intention) are undoubtedly bordering on psychopathic and mentally disturbed behaviour.4,38

To understand the contaminated White supremacy thinking of the Afrikaners/Whites embedded in their God-permitted and -driven cognition in their right to practice politics up to 1994, the propagandists focus specifically upon HF Verwoerd’s unique godsend thinking and action.39-41 In describing the background to the day when Dimitri Tsafendas murdered Verwoerd in the Cape Parliament on the 6th September 1966, Dousemetzis40 reflects in this context of divine selection and driving of especially the nationalist Afrikaners, as follows upon the person Verwoerd40:15-16:

As he reached his seat, Verwoerd looked towards the spectators’ gallery for his wife, but she was not in her usual place, delayed by a crowded elevator.

He turned to acknowledge greetings from the National Party MPs around him.

The prime minister was in high spirits, even jaunty, and with reason: the national economy was booming, thanks to cheap black labour, with the highest growth rate in the world after Japan. A few months earlier, his party had comfortably won a new term in office. Commanding the space around him, smiling, nodding, confident, he looked unassailable, a picture of total power.

Indeed, he thoughy God was on his side. Six years earlier he had survived the bullets of David Pratt, a sure sign, Dr Verwoerd said, that God approved of his race policies and had spared him to ensure their implementation. Was it this miraculous survival that made him unafraid of assassins? Was it faith in divine protection that emboldened him to remark in 1962, “If someone really wants to kill you, it’s not a very hard job. One thing is certain, there’s no point going around worrying about it.”

He was about to discover that when it came to his race policies and implementing apartheid, his God had changed his mind.

Louw36, with regard to the internalising of deviating and wrongdoing inclination of the proto-Afrikaners (which the propagandists see still to be present in today’s Afrikaners), concludes36:34: “To issue the approval for the cold-blooded mass termination of other humans – people [KhoiSan] who were here in South Africa long before the Europeans, and basically to steal their land for self-enrichment – is unforgiveable. Any person or group wiping out a tribe, not only by their direct killing, but also by robbing them of their economics and livelihood and erasing them from society, is/are real Frankenstein monsters”.

Bruce42 also posits about this early White immense wrongdoing42:20: “Face it, though, Europeans didn’t arrive here with the noblest of intentions. Centuries later, white people in South Africa still don’t sleep easy. With the land question now palpably spreading fear, South Africa is once again approaching a watershed.”

With reference to the so-called terrorist inclinations and actions of the ANC against the NP regime from the 1950s to 1994, as demonstrated many times by the antagonists in Articles Three and Four, the propagandists emphasise, in light of above evidence, 1) that the antagonists could not identify and enumerate the so-called mass of Whites killed pre-1994 by the ANC’s freedom fighters; 2) the number of Whites killed pre-1994 never came close to the more than 500 KhoiSan killed in one attack alone by Whites; 3) since 1994 there was not a single incident of land grabbing or murder of Whites to take their land by the ANC regime.

Although it still took another 25 years for the ANC to break the NP regime’s racism and their godsent political journey after the murder of Verwoerd, it seems for the propagandists that God changed his mind fully at last in 1994, finally stopping the terrorism of the Whites which originated in 1652. For the propagandists the presence of terrorism in the pre- and post-1948 Afrikaners/White regime was by far more comprehensive than that of the pre-1994 ANC.39-41

3.2.5. Ongoing political and social delinquency of the White burghers of Transvaal, Free State, Union and Republic of South Africa

The suppression and terrorising of other groups, specifically the non-Whites, to execute land grabbing, became a permanent characteristic of the proto-Afrikaners, according to the propagandists. As the White frontiersmen on the Cape borders, many of the Trekboers and Voortekkers, as well as their offspring moved northwards, they were also beset with the same negative internalised cognitions on race, land ownership and a watered-down concept of justice and the practice of law and order, as part of their lifestyle. This delinquent deviation also later filtered into the mindsets of the burghers of the Union and the Republic, leading to Grand Apartheid and the immense suppression of non-Whites and land grabbing.3,5

Political histories show that negative patterns of thought and behaviour – such as self-enrichment and self-empowerment, racial aggression and racial discrimination, which includes the abuse and exploitation of people of other races – forged by years of bad exposure, examples and compensation in the mindset of persons, makes them extreme socio-economic and political transgressors, and are not easily erased from their thinking, planning and action. The Afrikaners/Whites are for the propagandists not exemptions in this setup of delinquent transgression. This is supremely reflected by the antagonists’ present day belief about their legitimate rights of land ownership and extraordinary White rights, notwithstanding the facts that show it to be myths and fables. The fact that the antagonists will not easily reclaim their lost privileges, rights, benefits and empowerments in post-1994 South Africa, make their daily actions more rigid, unchangeable and even dangerous in their efforts to uphold their fake status quo on political and economic empowerment and rights. Their troubled holding onto land that is mostly not theirs, is suddenly a shocking reality for the antagonists and a must to address, which of course they don’t want to do, according to the propagandists.4

The propagandists feel that the Afrikaners as individuals and as a tribe are over-estimating their current importance, role and empowerment in South Africa, to steer away the intended land expropriation initiative. The negative impact of inciting resistance to any political change by the so-called Afrikaner/White rescuers and saviours is immense and continues mostly unnoticed. For the propagandists, the Afrikaners/Whites refuse to accept the political reality and fact that they are probably moving towards dissolution in a century’s time, with, in the mean time, the mass of Blacks waiting impatiently for the correction of the age old injustice on land ownership. The propagandists believe that many Afrikaners are also missing out absolutely on the deep rooted land issue, which goes further than only land grabbing, into the Black tribes’ collective memory and the bitterness which is still with many Blacks. This Black collective memory and bitterness is well reflected by the Makgoba-clan of Makgoba’s Kloof, Limpopo, for their loss of land and the clan baTlou of Makgoba’s Kloof who want back the skull of their murdered great-great grandfather for a decent burial.8 There are undoubtedly manifold cries for revenge for the injustices surrounding Apartheid among some Blacks. Louw4 writes4:173: “Many Blacks still mourn loved ones who were mistreated or killed by the apartheid managers and their accomplices. Many struggle to escape the impoverishment they suffered at the hand of White regimes, especially by the nationalist Afrikaners after 1948”. The political history referred to by Pheko9, of the grabbing of Blacks’ land by Whites as a crime against humanity, makes immediate and comprehensive land expropriation a matter for the propagandists which needs to be urgently addressed and corrected by the present day governmental authority.8,9

In light of the above realities is Ramaphosa’s43 declaration that43:4: “…we are going to take land and when we take land we are going to take it without compensation”, in some way an unavoidable and sane governmental decision for the propagandists to rectify the unjust political history of South Africa.

For the propagandists, justified land redistribution to the poor and landless Blacks is indeed now an absolute. It is a hard fact, a final outcome and a guideline to understand Ramaphosa’s honest political intentions. It represents not Ramafear or Ramaflipflop, as the antagonists in their political confusion and hostility against Ramaphosa and the ANC elite reflect, as they try to obstruct land expropriation, but Ramaforia and Ramajustice for the masses. It is indeed for the propagandists Ramareality to bring not only prosperity to the mass of poor and landless Blacks, but also to bring South Africans in general peace and harmony at last.44

If a comprehensive land redistribution initiative, acceptable for the poor and landless Blacks, is not activated in 2019 – it does not matter who is the government of the day — the propagandists believe that the 1980s drive by Blacks to take over the regime violently, is again at hand. This time the “liberation” movement will be far more radical: the pre-1980s agitation’s empowerment and radical role players, of which Boot-Siertsema and Boot2 wrote in 1982 and feared then as an outcome, are still waiting and need very little incentive to be activated in the extreme2:394:

Daarom is elke aanmoediging tot revolutie, elke steun aan guerrilla’s en terreur in de huidige situatie onverantwoord en buiten elke competentie van religieuze autoriteiten. Want het betekent de vernietging van elke mogelijkheid tot same-leven van Blank en Niet-Blank, die onomstotelijk in dit land toch samen verder zullen moeten.

3.2.6. Coming horrors of the regimes of Mao, Stalin and Mugabe

To offer the horrors of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, Stalin’s regime or Robert Mugabe’s land grabbing policy in Zimbabwe as examples of how badly the present day South African land expropriation can or will turn out, are seen as planned malevolent distractions from South Africa’s political realities by the antagonists. These actions by the antagonists are also seen by the propagandists as outright planned distractions of the local and international public of the Whites’ vicious behaviour for centuries to non-Whites in their stealing of land. South Africa’s political history from 1652 to 1994 under White rule is for the propagandists saturated with long term land grabbing and its horrors, equal to that of Mao, Stalin and Mugabe. Looking critically at the history of these land thefts and accompanying horrors carried out by Whites (mostly proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners) to Blacks, stretching over more than three centuries, very little reference to it is made by Afrikaner historians and politicians.45-49

Evaluating the books of the so-called imminent nationalist Afrikaner historians and politicians on the “goodness of the opening of the South African hinterland for civilisation by the White frontiersmen, Trekboere, Voortrekkers and the later proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners from 1652 to 1994” and their heroic deeds, minimum reference is presented of the Whites’ horrors and delinquency to Blacks. The only negative outcomes ever described as devastating and horrifying, or as extreme land grabbing, which frequently go with genocide and crimes against humanity, are mostly reflected by dissident English speaking historians and some Black historians whose opinions and facts were mostly suppressed by the White regimes. If the horrors of the various South African White regimes, spreading out over more than three centuries, are condensed into a time frame of two to three decades, the propagandists doubt that the horrors of Mao, Stalin and Mugabe could be worse.45-49

With regard to the European or Western world, the South African Whites’ fellowship until today there was or is in terms of the Whites wrongdoings to non-Whites no reference or comparison of a “Rwanda kind of South African genocide”, which the propagandists feel is truely present in the country’s 1652 to 1994 history. Indeed, the propagandists mention the high “integrity standing” of the White governments internationally, and that during the heydays of Grand Apartheid and the comprehensive, extreme wrongdoings by the NP regime to Blacks, foreign White capital flowed into South Africa and the South African rand was on its highest levels ever against the dollar and the pound. The White business bullies’ interests, locally and internationally, came first, as it does today, before Black suffering. This extreme White hypocrisy is for the propagandists again reflected today, as mentioned, by some White business and political groups, driven by their so-called Afrikaners/Whites saviours and rescuers, in their actions to activate false fears in the White community about a so-called genocide awaiting them under a future ANC regime, basically to assure the ongoing exclusive White empowerment and capital.45-49

With specific reference to the negative “Zimbabwe factor” of the Mugabe regime, excessively alleged by the antagonists to be present in South Africa’s land reform, the differences are immense, making it basically incomparable. In Zimbabwe land reform led to horrors against the Whites under Mugabe, while in South Africa it has remained so far only a heated discussion between Whites and Blacks. The only clear similarity is the obstinacy of Zimbabwean Whites, who hung on to excessive land obtained through exclusive stealing of land, begun by Cecil John Rhodes, and that of South African Whites who are at present rigidly also hanging on to their excessive stolen land, refusing some realistic compromises. For the propagandists the tragic outcome of Mugabe’s revenge on the early land grabbing by Whites in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) is due to their rigid and foolish refusal to make a justified re-allocation of land to Blacks. This is the primary reason why the ANC regime intends to now activate, in time, orderly land reform in order to avoid bloodshed.45-49

The propagandists posit that the enclosing of the references to Mao’s Cultural Revolution or the horrors of Stalin’s regime or any other kind of murderous intentions are decisive outcomes in South Africa’s planned land reform by the ANC regime. It is applicable to future actions and behaviour to be expected from the ANC regime or poor and landless Blacks in the intended land reform. It is not only inappropriate, but an enormous insult to the ANC regime and to the South African Blacks per se, as failures can lead to mismanagent of the country effectively and wisely. For the propagandists, this confirms again the immense arrogance and race supremacy of some exclusively White capitalists and politicians, coming from the pre-1994 days, showing again unpunished “colonial” Black bias by Whites with their categorisation of Blacks one hundred and eighteen years ago with the forming of the Union as incompetent and uncivilised to run South Africa as a country. This false, negative racial categorisation of Blacks as people and as leaders, as done by well-known White politicians and leaders of that time who attended the Cape Convention in 1908 to design and to establish the Union Act in founding the Union of South Africa in 1910, is fully highlighted by the historian MS Geen3 in his book: “The Making of the Union of South Africa. A brief history: 1487-1939”.

The propagandists emphasise that since 1994, there has not been any physical, political, emotional or economic revenge-taking in any way by either the ANC regime or the Black population on the Whites in South Africa for their uncountable wrongdoings of Apadrheid, or specifically the Whites’ centuries of land grabbing and the killing of the indigenous people, i.e the termination of the KhoiSan, Zulus or Xhosas by the proto-Afrikaners.4

3.2.7. ANC regime’s alleged corruption and crimes unique in the South African political history

The constant references by the antagonists to the present day ANC’s alleged corruption as being unique to South African political history, is also a farce. The propagandists do not dispute the presence of corruption and state capture which reached a climax under the reign of Jacob Zuma and which the Ramaphosa regime is now busy trying to erase, but the pre-1994 White regimes are polluted as well, if not more than the present day ANC regime. Many of the corruption crimes of the late NP and its leaders passed comfortably into the forgotten as its leaders had started to die since 1994.

Looking to the early political history of the country’s corruption statistics and records, coming from Jan van Riebeeck, up to the immense evidence of corruption and theft of state assets personally by Simon van der Stel and Willem van der Stel, these wrongdoings by far overshadow the alleged wrongdoings of Jacob Zuma. The discussion by the antagonists of the ANC regime as a so-called suppressive regime with the focus upon Whites, not only politically but also economically since 1994, is pie in the sky for the propagandists: the NP regime was an utmost autocratic/fascistic regime with no mercy for Black Nationalism and its political, social, personal and economical rights. Evidence is there that these various White regimes, especially under the NP between 1948 and 1994, were saturated with serious political and socio-economical wrongdoings. Their daily doings were saturated with the murder of the NP’s opponents by their assassins such as Eugene De Kock and the NP’s security forces. These included “justified” cross-border murdering raids into Zambia, Botswana, Angola and Zimbabwe, even Europe of political opponents. There is evidence of manifold other murdering sprees of the NP regime. These actions are indeed, as illustrated already, equal to the horrors committed by Mao, Stalin and Mugabe. If there can be spoken of a specific “regime of horrors”, which characterised South Africa’s history, is it for the propagandists the NP regime from 1948 to 1994, par excellence.45-49

For the antagonists to accuse the ANC regime of being ridden by financial or political scandals alone is hypocrisy. The NP’s leaders BJ Vorster and PW Botha were basically fired as executive leaders due to their extreme political wrongdoings, wherein state money was paramount. With the references by the antagonists to the present day political murders of members of the ANC regime, as manifested in Natal-KwaZulu, is it important to note the murder of Dr Robert Smit of the inner circle of the NP just before the Information Scandal came to light and the alleged illegal transfer of state money overseas. Indeed there are still today allegations hanging in the air of the direct involvement of the inner circle of the NP regime in the murders of the Swedish anti-Apartheid prime minister Olof Palme, as well as that of their own prime minister, HF Verwoerd, because he allegedly decide to dump Apartheid and to follow the assimilation plan of the Tomlinson Commission. There are still unanswered allegations of the buying and the ownership of property in the state of Andorra and in various South American states with alleged stolen state money by some of the previous leaders of the NP-AB-alliance, to serve as safe havens if the NP fell flat and the NP leaders were to be prosecuted. Looking further at the allegations by the antagonists of the present day so-called actions of horror by the ANC regime to supress the political freedom of the individual, the prominent question by the propagandists around the practise of outright democracy, is “is there any evidence that the ANC regime locked up political dissidents, like journalists, Whites, public critics, or murdered them as the NP’s security forces did at the John Vorster Building”? The answer for the propagandists is over and over: No.3-5, 7, 36,39-41,45-49-51,53-55,57,58

On the book account of criminal wrongdoings, the question for the propagandists is: can the ANC-regime ever be more “evil” than the NP? Can Cyril Ramaphosa, who is now the focus of the antagonists’ anger, because he dares to try to obtain racial, economical and political stability and citizen’s peace, ever be as bad as DF Malan, JG Strydom, HF Verwoerd or PW Botha? For the propagandists, their answer of no is justified and undoubtedly the truth. The evidence is overwhelming to condemn the pre-1994 political White rulers’ corruption and crimes against humanity, by far worse than the ANC regime coming into power in 1994.3-5,7,36,39-41,45-49-51,53-55,57,58

When Mthombothi10 speaks about Africa being betrayed by its leaders and says it’s now time to call them to book, the propagandists point fingers at the antagonists’ NP leaders, saying that they must be first in line to do punishment and not the ANC leaders. For the propagandists the corrupt NP leaders and politicians were (and are still, with their indirect economic and exclusive capitalism, immensely empowered today) an obstacle to the country’s and its people’s progress. When Mthombothi says10:17: “They are the authors of our misfortune”, he is fully correct. When pinpointing: “A pig with lipstick is still a pig”, those “political pigs” were undoubtedly very plentiful in the NP regime up to 1994. Many of these NP politicians did not pass away and are still active behind the scenes to profile the ANC’s elite regime with fake data in order to portray them as “untrustworthy and corrupt”.10

Looking critically at the antagonists’ comprehensive attack on the ANC regime in an effort to shamelessly and corruptly keep the Whites’ land and economic empowerment in place at all costs by their portrayal of the ANC regime as a political horror and a Dracula to rise after the 2019 Election, De Groot59 gives insight in the antagonists present day delinquent thinking and political wrongdoings, when he writes59:16: “South Africans are never short of things to argue about, but the level of debate (for want of a better word) at the moment is staggering”. The NP’s leaders were and are still masters in cementing false and distracting arguments in their political debates.

According to the propagandists, the antagonists’ aimless and unfounded fighting off of the intended expropriation of White land, together with their constant opposition of the good politics and the good actions of the ANC regime, are undoubtedly founded in criminal mindsets. The propagandists declare that these fixed behaviour inclinations and motivations of the antagonists are delinquent in terms of the philosophy of the school of scientific thought which posits that human beings develop illogical and foolish thinking, not in order to think more rationally, or to grow in the understanding of reality, or to act correctly and with integrity, but purely to be able to manipulate and to persuade others that they (antagonists) are absolutely correct (although in reality totally incorrect). As such, they must get what they want and must be followed outright and unquestioned. This base of thinking harks very much to the etiology of psychopathology and thus abnormal behaviour and personal deviance. The propagandists associate this with the White frontiersmen, proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners’ psychopathological behaviour of land grabbing and “termination” of non-Whites in their years of politics.3,4,59

On the much so-called “overwhelming evidence” offered by the antagonists of the immensely bad and delinquent behavior inherent to the ANC regime since 1994 (and before as a so-called “terrorist organisation), specifically their intended land redistribution, it must be noted that it is a tall story. This created blindness by the antagonists to the good actions and strong position of the ANC in South Africa (since 1994 the ANC won every election at the ballot box, while the antagonistic groups lost constant support). The prominent self-created blindness on the good actions and strong position of ANC, is reflected by the IRR. An example is their foolish unrealistic favoring of the creation of an Afrikaner homeland wherein the Afrikaners’ so-called rights, needs and wishes can be obtained and be maintained, notwithstanding that the facts nullify their fantasies of such a need by the majority of Afrikaners (remember: less than 10% of the Afrikaners/Whites support the antagonists and IRR’s foolishness).60,61

Central for the propagandists is the antagonists’ rigid and one-sided political lifestyle and their faulty overall evaluation of the ANC regime as only bad in terms of the antagonists self-compiled but corrupt good-bad-classification. This is an outcome well confirmed by the antagonists’ reflection of only criticism at all times against the ANC regime, lacking any evidence to support this criticism. This history of a one-sided classification by the antagonists of an “all wrong with Black South Africans”, in comparison with their “always good White South Africans”, relays the propagandists again to the presence of psychopathology which is disabling and clouding the antagonists’ logical reasoning and actions in the end.60, 61

3.2.8. Biological assimilation with Blacks as a final outcome for Whites

There was a strong introspective belief with the proto-Afrikaners, as well as the later Afrikaners, that the non-Whites and later Blacks, as a mass population, were waiting in silence since 1652 to gobble them up somewhere in the future. This foolish belief, as borne out by the propagandists, did not happen in 1994 and will not happen ever in the future. What is logical, based upon the political histories of many nations and minority groups coming over thousand of years, is that when two opposite peoples meet in the same living area, the weaker one is in the long term mostly culturally, socie-conomically and biologically overpowered by the stronger one. In most cases, the weaker group is gradually absorbed, many times after decades and centuries, leaving it without influence or presence in the new society. In many cases a new society develops after a process of adaptation and intermingling between the various elements of the initial groups. The process of integration takes place mostly very slowly and insignificantly in the beginning, but forms a comprehensive integration in the end. With South Africa’s complex multiracial society, wherein the Blacks are immensely large in numbers and strong in culture, the long-term intent and reality of this process began with the first contact in the 1830s. This already reflected then most of the four intertwined steps: firstly cultural assimilation; secondly economic assimilation; thirdly social assimilation coupled to political assimilation and fourthly biological assimilation.4

Normal biological assimilation, it seems for the propagandists, is the antagonists’ biggest unspoken fear and is forcing the Afrikaners/Whites to desperate actions, such as the vast amount of false accusations and allegations sent out by the antagonists about the ANC regime’s integrity and the ANC’s so-called intention to terminate the Whites presence in the country. Prominent is the process of land expropriation fingered by the antagonists as the first step in this intended termination.4,12,56,61,62

Undoubtedly, the fear of a final biological assimilation is at present driving the antagonists to desperate and senseless actions. Louw’s4 research emphasises that research such as that of the Tomlinson Commission56 already indicated in 1955 only one of two choices for the Afrikaner: integration or segregation, with integration already then evident as the best option for the country’s people in the long term, and already activated in the 1950s. In this context Louw writes that in 1955, the Afrikaners were already in the stage of social assimilation in the South African greater society. In the 1980s they moved into political assimilation and the equalisation of the Black and White civilisations.4,62-64

Hereto the1994 dispensation fully activated social assimilation. The antagonists, still captured in their mindset of destructive White supremacy and their upkeep of the so-called pure White bloodline, tried to fight off the ANC regime’s positive and creative actions to stabilise the country socio-economically and politically, but biological assimilation was then activated. In this setup the advent of Blackness and Black political dominance and rule, are a reality. But, prominent for the propagandists, were all the assimilation steps, with the Blacks in charge since 1994, free from revenge on or genocide of the previously White suppressors. Clearly evident is the Blacks’ positive behaviour, opposite to the extremely delinquent behaviour which characterised the White rule from 1652 to 1994. At present the Afrikaners are within biological assimilation with the Black population. This finalising of a new South African nation, wherein the Afrikaners are going to be dissolved by intermixing with the Blacks and by their natural dying out as a specific group, is now being activated. Louw indicates that the process will be fully complete in a century’s time. Indeed, the process is busy erasing, besides the obstructive and foolish fighting of reality by the constant diminishing number of antagonists, the impact of the Afrikaners as role-players in the obstruction of land reform. For many realistic and future-thinking Afrikaners, immediate land redistribution is a must. This comprehensive, but orderly, land expropriation initiative, can amount in support to so much as 90% of the Afrikaner/White population. For the propagandists, the current efforts by a small group of antagonists (although strongly empowered by their power it seems over the total media of South Africa, in order to propagate their doctrine) to derail land expropriation with false accusations of the horrors of Mao, Stalin or Mugabe awaiting Whites in post-2019 South Africa, is only a temporary nuisance and will also, as the antagonists and the so-called saviours and rescuers of the Afrikaners/Whites, are departing fast from the scene.4,45-49,58

For the propagandists, it is thus now the correct time to take on the antagonists’ false “truths” on the intended ANC regime’s land expropriation. Guiding the propagandists in this alignment of the renewal of facts and the phasing out of many lies is the writing of John Berger59:16:

History is rewritten because new information emerges all the time. Fresh accounts of experiences, sometimes from unexpected sources, can alter the way we look at the past and change our minds about what we thought we knew”, while “the relation between what we see and what we know is never settled”.

New, true facts emerge upon the Afrikaners/Whites bad past, supplied many times by the majority of Afrikaners/Whites themselves, which are altering and positively changing the mindsets of the majority of Afrikaners/Whites on the integrity of the ANC and the Black population, to make South Africa a better place for all. This improvement for all its inhabitantswas obtained by the ANC in the short period of 25 years of reign, while the White regimes could not show any equal success in their more than three centuries of reign. The NP specifically, in its 46 years of government and racial Grand Apartheid, failed outright to do any good to ordinary individual South Africans.4

The facts are there for the propagandists that the ANC regime’s intentions and aims with land reform are noble and focused upon a better South Africa for all, something the antagonists know very well that they failed to do from 1652. Central to this process of future harmony in Black-White-thinking on the land issue, is for the propagandists, the process of the intermixing of Whites with Blacks.

What the so-called rescuers of the Afrikaners/Whites anticipate on the “upkeep forever” of an exclusive socio-economic and political empowered of the lily White Afrikaner-race in South Africa, is still vested in the way (Lady) Ruth Khama’s (born Williams) British father reacted when she told him in September 1948 she was going to marry (Sir) Seretse Khama.65,66 Sue Grant-Marshall65 in her book; “Your People Will Be My People”, reflects65:19:

Ruth told her parents about it. Her father’s reaction was worse than anticipated.

Mr. Williams, who was absolutely shattered by the news of which he did not have the faintest inkling, responded with a cold, icy anger.

His deeply ingrained prejudice, so well hidden over the years, was spelt out painfully clearly for Ruth. He was so opposed to mixed marriages, he said, that he would not talk to her again until she changed her mind.

“You can stay at home until you get married. After that you may not enter this home again as long as you are married to that man,” he ordered.

Ruth, whose face was as white as her father’s, realised that the painful encounter was over. She tried to persuade her father once more to meet Seretse, but he sat, face in hand, staring blankly down at the carpet, and shook his head.

How much so the anger, the staring blankly down at the carpet and how white the faces of the so-called rescuers and savers of the Afrikaners/Whites are today – the same reaction of White racism, supremacy and blood-purity reflected by Mr. Williams’. This phenomenon belongs seventy years back in the past. Today, the immense biological intermixing of Blacks and Whites in South Africa is a hard fact and a process already running at a fast pace to make future quarrels on land in terms of interfamily relations, null and void.3,4,22,65,66

3.2.9. White farmer murders

The so-called rise in farm murders is precisely the so-called “facts contradiction” as shown by the definition of John Berger, namely false “facts” which we hear in certain media sources versus “facts” about what is really happening as reflected by hard statistics. The use of “stretched statistics” by the antagonists, in their obstruction of the incoming of Black land ownership and transformation, have become a very handy information vehicle to attract the unjustified attention of the outside world and to manipulate the truths, such as the fixing in Donald Trump’s mindset of a so-called organised killing and driving of White farmers from their farms. Trump’s rhetoric is for the propagandists furthermore an excellent example of foreign White hypocrisy, mostly created by the false propaganda of the antagonists, where foreigners are ignoring and denying the bad and delinquent actions of South African Whites in the past to Blacks, together with the foreigners’ failure to recognise the antagonists’ well planned malevolent obstructions and undermining to bring about a justified new land ownership in the country.4,42,67-73

Farm murders, indeed any murder, are a concern for the propagandists, but, seen in terms of a total rise in the murder numbers of all South Africans (also in SOWETO), it is undoubtedly not a statistic only applicable to Whites, as many of the anti-Black and anti-ANC-orientated “White/Afrikaner rescuers and saviours” for obvious opportunistic reasons try to project. The so-called extraordinary number of White farmer murders is nothing but false news, solely to manipulate statistics to offer some trustworthiness to the antagonists’ growing unconvincing statements on the Whites’ unlimited rights to land ownership and their right to maintain an exclusive White farmers’ community. How masterfully this fake news is misused is evidenced by how easily sucked into the fabrication the Australian, British and American governments are.4,42,67-73

Various primary and secondary factors are equal role players in the murders of Whites as well as Blacks, like poor policing, general lack of law enforcement, immense poverty, joblessness, the social and personal isolation of races, uncontrolled gang activities, etc. No-one can dismiss the racial factor in some of the South African murder reflections, but it is insignificant in terms of the total reasons driving the commission of murders. It is important to mention that negative race opinions and views, seen from a Black inclination towards Whites, notwithstanding Apartheid’s many wrongdoings to them, are totally lacking. The average Black’s inclination and attitude is very positive to Whites. The so-called “Black danger stories”, coming from the days of Apartheid and which are still offered by the various so called Afrikaner saviours and rescuers as part of their present false and fake reflections and warnings of the “coming of the horrors of Mao, Stalin and Mugabe to Whites in South Africa”, together with the antagonists’ ongoing but unfounded claims of absolute White land-rights, are the main culprits to drive a wedge in between Blacks and Whites in order to create a false profile of so-called “Black hate for Whites”, specific by the ANC regime or the ordinary Black.4,42,67-73

Bruce42 gives insight into the selective use of data on so-called “White farmers” murders when he cautions the public on understanding the whole picture and not only that of the antagonists pinpointing wrongdoing to White farmers42:20:

“I have a deep sympathy for people who are attacked. The violence in the farm assaults is appalling and there is no justifying it. But so is it appalling on the Cape Flats. It’s appalling in rural Transkei and in downtown Johannesburg.”

Yes, the propagandists agree that Black-on-White violence can follow in the future, but then only under absolutely extreme circumstances, for instance if immediate land redistribution is deliberately and systematically blocked by the Whites, while the mass of poor Blacks go down in perilous poverty. In this case the Whites themselves are going to be the direct creators of the horrors of Mao, Stalin and Mugabe and not the ANC regime, according to the propagandists. But, be assured, this will only happen when all hope and patience have diminished from the Black mindsets, and this threshold will not easily be reached, as shown by the Blacks’ immense hope and patience to outlive Apartheid and its horrors. The fact that the mass of poor and landless Blacks respected the discriminative 1994 dispensation without revolution, or without harming in anyway the benefitting and favoured Whites, especially the White land owners, is evidence of the Blacks’ political and personal integrity and goodwill (which can surely not be said of the White occupiers of South Africa from 1652).68,74-76

Regarding the changes for a coup in South Africa, there are certain guidelines, writes Shain77. He shows that often present events, framed in terms of past occurrences, are used by political commentators as guidelines77:22: “Taking their cues from earlier trends, they identify patterns and reflect on mutations.” Although there are links between the Zimbabwe politics, the Arab Spring and the collapse of the communist regimes in Europe in 1989 and present day South Africa, the propagandists believe that the South African setup differs more from these setups than it reflects similarities. Prominent here is a sound democracy which the present ANC regime underwrites and will respect if they lose the 2019 Election, while the South African Defense Force is not connected to domestic policies, etc., in order to get involved in a coup. Land expropriation, bringing death to White land owners, is out. If the mass of the poor and the landless resorts to violence directly upon the Whites, the action of security would be in favour of the Whites in the upholding of law and order, according to the opinion of the propagandists.

Remember: In the most of bloody civil wars the availability and ownership of water, food and accommodation played a central part when these essential shortcomings occurred for long periods in the greater community. This tragic outcome only follows when there is not free land to build a house on and free land to make a living from. These were the primary reasons for delinquent land grabbing and many times genocide perpetuated by the White frontiersmen on the eastern and north-western borders of the Cape Colony, as well as the Voortrekkers in northern South Africa. Grouping together persons because of the same needs, thinking and anger, etc. by the various culprits are far greater drivers than pure racially orientated drivers. It is due to this concern that the ANC regime tries to steer constructive land redistribution so as to economically empower the mass of landless and poor Blacks. The dangerous driver here is poverty (created by White Apartheid) and not because the mass of the landless and the poor is Black: the phenomenon of the presence of Blacks is accidental.3,4,75,76

The propagandists’ emphasise that the sometimes public White-bashing by prominent Black politicians’ with remarks such as: “We will not now kill the Whites”, are misused and blown up by cunning antagonists to reflect a false hatred and aggression of Blacks for Whites. These kinds of political credos and rhetoric must not be taken seriously, warn the propagandists to the general public. It is limited to a small group of political trouble-makers and opportunists – better known as populists, autocrats, thieves and manipulators in present day South African politics – who are not only focusing their infantile aggression on the Whites, but are also intensely focusing it on the ANC elite and many other Blacks who oppose these radicals’ actions. The propagandists want to make it clear that the EFF and its radicals are not part of the ANC: not now and not in the future. This present “association” is a false one, created exclusively by the antagonists: indeed the DA is much nearer to the EFF than the ANC – it is the DA’s political partner in municipality management!68,74-76

It is of great importance to note than when the antagonists are forced to give more clarity on their statements and postulations on statics relating to “White farm murders”, they fail to react. Firstly, there is no clear definition of what a farm murder is. Secondly, there is also not a clear definition on what a farm is as an entity. African Check’s research could not find a constructive foundation in the data of the Freedom Front Plus (FFP), the national data or other research, making the conclusion of the finding of the FFP’s 133 per 100 000 people of so-called farm murders versus the 33 per 100 000 people as the average murder ratio per annum convincing. Thirdly, according to Bruce42, there is evidence that the present system offers many opportunities to manipulate data and to “stretch” it to fit the antagonists’ aims to mislead the public. The opportunity is present to raise the ratio unhindered (from 33:100 000 to 133:100 000, meaning a difference of 100:100 000!). For instance the misleading counting of one farmer per farm is used, rather than all the family members and labourers living on the farm. Fourthly, there is a clear lack of location of the murders and the kind of farming setup present. Bruce42 spells out this specific manipulation clearly, when he writes42:20: “There’s a big difference between a 5 000ha cabbage farm in Limpopo and a smallholding in Muldersdrift. Murders on either would be termed “farm murders” by people campaigning for recognition of farm attacks as a special category of crime.” That these “farms” are more precisely only basically erven with homes, without real farming interests confirms that many of the “farmer” victims are older, retired people who are really outside the farming community and are in reality persons who are not farmers anyway.42

It is also an open question as to whether the active White farming community is so intensively murdered as organisations such as AfriForum try to project and to emphasise that farming has became a dangerous and unattractive career. So why has the agricultural production and income of the farming sector exploded since the advent of democracy? Bruce writes42:20:

The gross value of farm production, according to agricultural economist Wandile Sihlobo, has grown from R28 billion in 1994 to R246 billion now in nominal terms. Adjusted for inflation, output had more than doubled, to R263 billion, by 2016.

You can’t achieve numbers like that in the middle of a farmer genocide.

The propagandists find it of absolute importance to state that the alleged presence of the negative Black-versus-White factor, as formulated by the antagonists in their warning of a so-called dooms day for Whites in future South Africa, is further contradicted by various recent research. The propagandists show that many of the points of conflict that some of the antagonistic politicians and activists pinpoint as reasons for the so-called urgent and immediate intention for land reparation by so called radical Blacks from Whites, are not true and thus not of importance. The taking of revenge through land redistribution about Apartheid’s wrongdoings, reflected by the antagonists as a primary motivator for Ramaphosa’s land expropriation initiative, is false and also outside sound cognitive thinking. The antagonists’ allegation that the intended land expropriation of Ramaphosa will go hand in hand with, or will activate, the horrors of the Mao, Stalin and Mugabe regimes, is a pathological cognition internalised in the mindsets of the antagonists alone.75,78-80

3.2.10. There is a not a demand for rural land by Blacks or an urge by them to farm

The postulations by the antagonists that the Black youths “are not interested in farming or land, they want jobs in cities”, are outright generalisations, lacking supportive facts. The IRR’s famous cliché, used over and over by the antagonists, that61:18: “…only 8% of land compensation awarded (1994 to 2018) to claimants were in the form of land as a compensation”, is a myth that became a truth in the pro-antagonists’ media.

Firstly, herewith the cold fact that in the present overwhelming setup of exclusively White farmers who own masses of land and dominate most of the farming activities and businesses as owners, the upliftment opportunities of Blacks as employees to the White farmers are very limited. This exclusively White setup of dominance and White enrichment is the primary reason why these rural Black labourers are already poor and landless people. Hereto must also be added the immense difference in the income of the White land owners and the farm labourers. Unil the coming into power of the ANC regime, the Black laborers were exposed to unfair pay and working conditions, and although the so-called “minimum wage legislation” by the ANC regime brought about some improvement, the rural Black farm labourers’ financial circumstances in general are still on the level of a hunger pittance. Basically this is the “baas-kneg-relation”, coming from 1652 and still functioning today, guiding mainly but not only the social, personal and political functioning between the White farmer and the Black labourer, but also the financial setup. In this present racial and discriminative situation, echoing in some way the days of the White frontiersmens’ dominance of the KhoiSan, land as a source of income per individual for the rural farm labourers is not attractive. This forces them to more and more unwillingly move to live and to work in towns and cities for a livelihood. Besides the immense poverty as labourers, is the poor treatment of the labourers by their White landowners. This is frequently a direct reason why the poor and landless Blacks move to the cities, and not so much a real eagerness to become a city dweller.61,81

Furthermore, it is a hard fact that the cities cannot accommodate all the poor and jobless Blacks, as is so often argued by the antagonists without any facts to confirm it. The fact is that a lack of employment is forcing the poor and jobless Blacks back to the countryside. The fact that nearly 30% of the South African population is officially unemployed (with an unofficial estimation of up to 60%), is a clear indication that it is imperative that an immense portion of the poor and landless Blacks need to be placed in the countryside. But this future rural setup must be positive for poor and landless Blacks as labourers, curtailing the White farmers’ mass land ownership and their political, social and economical manipulation of the Black labourers’ working and living setup. This can only be achieved by the creation of a mass of Black land ownerships as farmers and the creation of optimal work conditions for the Black labourers on farms, either Black or White farms.61,81

The antagonists’ statement that only 8% of Blacks want land or want to stay in the rural areas is a farce. This, according to the propagandists, is a manipulated distraction, superficially made from the 1994 dispensations pay outs by the antagonists (and in line with the 1994 failed political dispensation which is still discriminating against Blacks). Reflecting on this 8%, one must consider firstly the perilous setup into which Blacks in South Africa found themselves in 1994 after the disastrous centuries of economic exploitation by Whites. This chaotic 1994 setup has nothing to do with the ANC regime, besides the fact that they, as the new ruler of a chaotic state, had to find and try out every possible solution with limited funding to rectify the Whites’ and the NP regime’s economical exploitation and misuse of Blacks. At that stage in 1994 – and up to as recently as 2018 — the Blacks’ immense poverty which was directly created by the Whites and later the NP regime since 1913, was so comprehensive that it only grew as an “after-shock” in the political and socio-economical chaos surrounding the Black population which the failed NP regime left behind. There is no doubt for the propagandists that if the process of the 1994 land redistribution should be rerun correctly today in terms of justice, the repossession of Blacks of their land stolen by Whites since 1652 could be 50% and higher. The immense positivity inside the Black population showed in the recent parliamentarian public opinion testing on the change to Section 25 of the Constitution and Ramaphosa’s comprehensive land expropriation to bring a mass of farm land to the rural and urban poor Blacks, also contradicts the antagonists claiming that only 8% of Blacks want land or want to farm. They speak plain nonsense.66,81

Furthermore it must be noted that in 1994 and the decade thereafter, the poor Blacks first made contact with democracy and the concept of own money in an open racial and democratic society. Their poverty was so intense in 1994 for them, that, to be able to move into this new setup and its economical demands to be able to survive daily, their obtaining of immediate money became a first priority and requirement, putting money before land. With the political stability brought by the ANC regime and the experiencing of equal civil rights by the mass of poor Blacks and a direct say in land matters such as land ownership and farming (and of course “the right to live and walk where you want”), it is clear that the whole concept of the reclaiming of their ancestral land by the poor and landless Blacks changed dramatically and positively, undoubtedly nullifying the fake 8% mentioned by the antagonists.61,81

Regarding the ongoing poverty of the landless Blacks within the 1994 land redistribution plan, it is important to note that the official back payment to Blacks who lost their land to Whites, confirms that only a fraction of the at least 50% (25 million persons plus) of the population (total 55 million plus) who lost land, were truly compensated. Evidence by Opperheimer61 shows that according to the Institute of Race Relations (IRR), 1.8 million individuals have received compensation, and that in these cases, the pay out of money or relocation of land were respectively at the value of R45 billion for redistribution and R43 billion for land reform. This reflects an under payout. In real numbers and money this means that only between 8% and 10% of the rightful Black landowners were really compensated and that their rightful compensation, if it was paid out to the rest of between 90% and 92% left uncompensated, could be so much as R500 million and more.61,81

It is an outright deception presented by the antagonists that only 8% of the Black population want their land back or want to farm. These incorrect statistics show clearly for the propagandists how the antagonists constantly play the joker card in their contaminated politics, in an effort to safeguard in future the White farmers’ mass ownerships of land and the exclusive favours, rights and privileges of the White farmers. With Ramaphosa’s land expropriation plan, between 30% and 50% of the total Black population can successfully be re-established in the countryside in various farming capacities. There is no evidence to contradict this fact.

3.2.11. There is not a place for a contingent of mass independent sufficient producing farmers

The constant decline in South African commercial farmers from 116 000 in 1950 to more or less 35,000 in 2018, is used by the antagonists to argue rigidly and incorrectly that more than 35 000 commercial farmers in South Africa is not financially viable and sustainable. Indeed, they argue, the number will come down dramatically as future production costs activate mechanising and the conjugating of smaller units into large mega farms. The antagonists even try to put the final number in a decade at 10 000 commercial farmers. The antagonists argue that the bringing in of a contingent of masses of types of commercial farmers – in this case specifically Black self-sufficient farmers – will be a failure. But in the same breath opposing the introduction of Black farmers, the antagonists, as in most of their attacks on the ANC’s land expropriation initiative, fail to offer any hard facts or evidence to support their arguments, opinions and viewpoints, besides far fetched speculations based upon assumed national and international profiles of the past.82-100

Looking critically at the commercial and financial output of the present hotchpotch of the 35 000 so-called “commercial” farmers – mostly White farmers — the facts reflect that only ±3 600 of them contribute between 90% and 95% to the country’s food security. The more or less other 31 400 farmers are indeed only so-called sufficientproducing farmers, meaning that they produce enough food and other agricultural produce to make them and their immediate families financially independent from social grants, as well as steering themselves successfully into the status of financially independent land owners and active farmers. Basically these sufficient-producing farmers represent two farmer classes: commercial farmers and subsistence farmers. These sufficient farmers include small scale farmers up to middle level farmers. The present day Zimbabwe, Botswana, Israel, Belgium and Britain reflect well upon the successes of these sufficient-producing farmers and their financial independence and contributions to essential products, and to a certain extent, also to their various countries’ food security and food exports. Their produce surpluses are sold mostly locally into a limited market to generate cash and to form to a certain extent part of the local food and economic security chain, outside the country’s higher level of food in the security chain. This local cash creation makes it possible for them to buy other needed produce and essentials, locally or nationally. Prominent here is the new concept of intensive small scale farming, together with the new concept to activate inclusive or social capitalism where optimal economics and finance are brought to every ordinary citizen, away from South Africa’s present smothering exclusive capitals, where richness is located and limited to a few big businesses and financial bullies as well as exclusive, favoured governmental and political beneficiaries like South Africa’s White farmers. The Ramaphosa redistribution plan is specifically focused upon the creation and establishment of sufficient-producing farmers, functioning successfully inside inclusive capitalism.12-14,17,18,61,101

These sufficient farmers are equal in income status and independence to the city dwellers working for a good salary as employees. Indeed, these farmers’ incomes and financial setups can frequently be more stable and higher than that of many of the employees working in the city. This outcome of sufficient-producing farmers, varying from small scale to middle level farming, and driven by inclusive capitalism and financial independence, is exactly what Ramaphosa intends with his land expropriation and what the present day White farmers experience as endangering their exclusive richness.

For the propagandists, it is very interesting to see how the antagonists avoid the fact that as many as 32 400 farmers are sufficient-producing farmers and are not fully part of the nucleus of farmers contributing to more than 90% of the country’s food security. The antagonists never have objections to these mostly “only” sufficient-producing 32 400 mostly White farmers, within the present day farmers’ community, wherein the respect for and underwriting of exclusive capitalism is an absolute prerequisite to be a farming member. This extreme pre-selectiveness and the building into it of discrimination of the ownership of exclusive money, are excellent examples for the propagandists of the outright racial intention by the Whites of South Africa to all costs keep the future ownership of land and the farming sector exclusively in White hands. Derby102 demonstrates how the present day sufficient-producing White farmers, varying from small scale to middle level farming, and driven by inclusive capitalism and financial independence, (exactly what Ramaphosa intends with his land expropriation), are working for 32 400 White farmers outside the small circle of the so-called food security producing farms. Prominent in this context is the fact that as much as 96% of the 36 000 farms (mostly in White hands) generate a turnover of less than R5 million per annum and have remained viable and sustainable now for years. (How viable and sustainable these 32 000 farms are, is clearly reflected in their fight to keep their farms from land expropriation).98,103-112

Looking at the present unemployed mass of Blacks living in shacks in cities under parlous conditions, the development at last of a contingent of a land owned Black proletariat, which was blocked by the Whites of the Boer republics, the Union of South Africa and the Verwoerd republic as well as the 1994 political dispensation, can at last be started up.There is no reason why these new sufficient-producing Black farmers cannot contribute in some way to the country’s local and national food security chain with time. The intention of the ANC regime is also the creation of a better marketing system for sufficient-producing farmers’ products through their own chain shops to bring their products directly at a good but affordable price to consumers, away from the White business bullies’ present monopolistic chain shops and comprehensive local and international markets wherein all the farmers receive in general a low, limited price for their produce. The promoting role of inclusive capitalism in driving and upkeep of these new sufficient-producing farmers inside a parallel system with existing capitalistic farming and produce marketing systems, will be prominent here.3,4

The postulation by the antagonists that there is not a place for a contingent of mass independent sufficient-producing farmers, whose farming is based upon and driven by inclusive capital – as many of the other postulations of the antagonists in their fighting off the intended land expropriation by the ANC regime is – is for the propagandists a myth. The use of manipulated data by the antagonists, like the so-called 90% failure of the so-called new Black farmers in the ANC regime’s 1994 to 2018 land redistribution programe, is for the propagandists to obstruct Ramaphosa’s intended expropriation of land from Whites and his intention to establish a mass of Black farmers in the South African farming sector. There is not a single trustworthy statistic to support the antagonists’ political crooking. The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints failed the test of reliability for the propagandists.61,98,103-107,109-111,113,114

3.2.12. There is a need of an exclusive Afrikaner/White farming sector

For the propagandists, is it important to examine the antagonists’ emphasis on the importance of White land ownership and their so-called absolute need of White farmers to maintain South Africa’s present day economics of the farming sector and to guarantee food security.61

Central in this setup of so-called only viability and sustainability of the South African farming sector by the intimate role of the Whites (mainly Afrikaners) as absolutely needed as farmers, the element of immediate importance is the present day numbers of Afrikaners inside the total population and their future position in the country.

The total Afrikaner population stands at about ± 2.7 million (total White population: ± 5 million). The ratio between the ±35 000 commercial farmers (assumed to all be White for calculation purposes of this research) to the rest of the Afrikaner population is 13:1000 or 1.3%. If all 35 000 farmers are Whites (which they are not), the ratio would be 7:1 000 or 0.7%. There is an almost insignificant correlation between the broader Afrikaner/White population and the Afrikaner/White farming population in terms of financial interest, such as ownership of land or direct income from farming. The direct impact of lost farmland through the planned land expropriation upon most Afrikaners/Whites outside the farming sector would be minimal.4

About the so-called hugger-mugger of the Afrikaner farmers with the total Afrikaner community and the closed unity of Afrikaners, coming especially from DF Malan’s 1948 Afrikaner-volk, Louw4 shows that many Afrikaners have started to cut their cultural cord with the “Afrikaner-volk”, especially the younger generations after 1994. What these neo-Afrikaners want in a post-1994 South Africa is political stability, good work and a good living with affordable food on the table – it does not matter if the food is from Zambia, Argentina, produced by a White or Creole or Black Brazilian or a Black, Brown or White South African. These neo-Afrikaners do not really mind who rules the country, as long as it is a stable and responsible regime. The propagandists already noted that most of the emotive rhetoric on land grabbing does not come from the broad Afrikaner/White population, but from a small band of Afrikaner/White individuals and groups with direct financial interests in agriculture, like Agri SA, AfriForum, Solidarity, some Afrikaner media-groups and the FFP – groups who Louw4 calls the Afrikaner/White’s self-appointed rescuers and saviours. These groups represent at most 10% of Afrikaners/Whites, based upon their membership. It is clear for the propagandists that the present so-called “Afrikaner fight for the Afrikaner soil”, is a farce: it is nothing more than a myth upheld and preached by a small group of opportunistic antagonists, whose politics are still seated in the racism and Afrikaners’ self-enrichment and political empowerment stemming from the deceased Verwoerdian-republic. This dwarf group of antagonists’ political impact in future politics is insignificant.56,61,115,116

One can safely say that the Whites and neo-Afrikaners outside the farming sector have accepted that a new generation of South African farmers has to be born as quickly as possible, in order to ensure food security. This new generation of farmers can be, and must be, Blacks for most of the Whites and neo-Afrikaners outside the farming sector. The prominent outcome here is that the credo of Afrikaner farmers as absolutely needed in the farm sector is a deception. Moreover, it is a delusion in the mindsets of the antagonists. Any racial group can for the broader Afrikaner group drive and practice farming.56,61,115,116

The present rhetoric of the antagonists on land ownership, the right to farm and the exclusive entrance to farm economics is frequently dangerous, inapplicable and inappropriate to the stability of the country’s politics and race harmony. Much of this rhetoric reflects the old ideology of hard core Apartheid and is strongly carried by the Afrikaner media to the public. Thankfully there is a difference in the rhetoric between the English and Afrikaner media. Rhetoric from the English media (which includes Black and White journalistic voices) is mostly focused upon the urgent Black need for housing land in cities and the possible financial loss that expropriation without compensation can bring for present landowners and the financial institutions. The English media is also more focused upon the effect that land grabbing can have on future local and foreign investments if it is not done in an orderly fashion. For the propagandist, this English rhetoric is much more based upon constructive politics and is to a great extent free from the antagonists’ false and baseless attacks on the ANC regime’s land reform plan. Reality is not the basis of thinking and arguing here of the antagonists.3,4,13,16,18,62,117-121

For the propagandists, a large part of the Afrikaner media is motivated and driven daily by the antagonists’ political poison, a most derailing element to better South Africa politically and socio-economically. Part of the irrational thinking and often false presentation of land expropriation by the antagonists, which is as a matter of great concern to all members of the “Afrikaner volk” and White society, is the antagonists’ false argument on the absolute need for an Afrikaner/White farming sector because only they can ensure food security. It is plain nonsense: even the responses of the lay economist and politician confirm it. Any race can contribute constructively as farmers, if their circumstances are optimal. This is actually how the Afrikaners/Whites established themselves. There are American, Asian, British, Nigerian, Palestinian, Jewish, Algerian and many other farmers, who are not only successful commercial farmers in their own countries, but also contribute to global markets. In South Africa there are established commercial Black farmers already contributing in an indirect way to food security. Propagandists emphasise that evidence shows that when Black farmers receive the necessary financial and technical assistance, they become excellent farmers. The antagonists constantly preach that there is an absolute need for an Afrikaner/White farming sector because only they can ensure food security. This is a well-baked lie. It seems as though the antagonists lack the cognitive insight to ask themselves, in their constant fight to obstruct the introduction of a Black farmer community, why would Blacks not be able to become successful farmers in South Africa?56,61,115,116

A prominent factor, completely nullifying the antagonists’ foolish fight for the safeguarding of a sole contingent of White farmers (and which also is seemingly not part of the antagonists cognitive reasoning), is the fact that Afrikaners’ numbers have constantly declined since 1994, while the Black population shows a constant growth. Cognitive reasoning shows that a new generation of farmers would have to replace the current generation of Afrikaner/White farmers fast. The question of the propagandists, in line with Ramaphosa’s intention to establish a mass of Black farmers, is why must these replacements only be Afrikaners/Whites? Why must an exclusive small group of Afrikaner/White farmers be further protected at the costs of Black farmers and the interests of the majority of the Black population? In this regard Mthombothi122 posits a very critical and meaningful question122:25: “There is also the question of whether white farmers are a special breed who require special protection”.

The propagandists show that the over-estimation of Afrikaner/White farmers as a special, untouchable group in South Africa, is also contradicted by Dr Theo de Jager13, the president of the World Agricultural Union and of Galileo Capital. Reflecting upon the White farmers’ present day insignificance, he mentions that even if all White farmers voted for one political party, these votes would not be enough to assure one parliamentary seat. His following remark tells the whole story of the Afrikaner/White farmers decline and of insignificance in the present day political empowerment of South Africa13:3: “On a count-group basis the white farmers are irrelevant. The ANC does not need to take notice of farmers” [Own translation].

In systems where the majority gains control of the politics and the economy, the best balance between the interests of the majority and the minority (and for the country in general) is attained by way of a natural process and sometimes by statutory prescription. Land ownership and farming are prominent issues which the antagonists missed out as a result of their racial political stupefaction, reflect the propagandists. Sometimes land transformation happens in a very orderly fashion and sometimes these happenings are chaotic. The propagandists’ emphasise that South Africa is now in the middle of this normal process of economic, political and statutory balancing, moving the farming sector away from the minority Whites to the majority Blacks. Land reform should not be an emotional issue, but a rational issue, and always free from racism, something the antagonists fail to execute in their daily thinking, planning and action.4

South Africa currently has about 5 million Whites versus ± 55 million Blacks, or a statistical ratio of less than 1:11 or 9%:91% Whites versus Blacks. The present ratio of White farmers to Black farmers looks significantly different and represents an imbalance. Three outcomes are clear for the propagandists.4

Firstly, the racial dominance and abuse of Blacks from 1652 by Whites and the ousting of Blacks from their traditional land created an imbalance in terms of the number of White farmers versus the number of Black farmers. Indeed, if South Africa developed normally regarding racial and political rights and thus the correct racial balance in land ownership, the present day total Black farmers (calculated in terms of the ±35 000 commercial farmers and a Black population of 55-million), should be 32 000 Black farmers against more or less only 3 000 White farmers. Secondly, there is definitely in terms of the racial ratios of the country, an immediate need for a mass of able Black farmers. Thirdly, the perspectives of Mhtombothi122 and de Jager13 are correct: White farmers are not a special breed and do not require special protection to ensure food security, and White farmers are irrelevant in the future agricultural sector.13,122

The antagonists currentemphasis on the with importance of White land ownership and the absolute need of White farmers to keep up South Africa’s present day economics of the farming sector and the guarantee of food security, is an antagonist’s myth which nearly became a truth over more than three centuries.

3.2.13. The 90% failure of the 1994-2018 farm redistributions programme of the ANC regime is a truth

With regard to the constant carping by the antagonists that 90% of farms redistributed to Blacks in the 1994 land redistribution programme were failures, the propagandists note that the criteria used by the antagonists to decided on the “success” of the so-called “functioning Black farms” in the 1994 land redistribution programme are very arbitrary and in perspective nullify their so-called 90% failure rate. Firstly, the propagandists posit that criteria selected by the antagonists are vague and undefined. Secondly, the propagandists show that the estimations of the successfully functioning Black redistributed farms are 20% and more.61

Evidence, focusing upon the so-called high failure rate since 1994 to establish Black farmers, makes it clear that today’s farming as an enterprise and a career can be tough. It does not matter if it is applied to the established White farmers or incoming Black farmers. Many of the established White farmers are currently experiencing the same struggle to survive as the Black farmers who failed between 1994 and 2018 in the ANC regime’s redistribution model and programme. The large financial loans by the Land Bank and other commercial banks to finance the White farmers’ daily activities, is an excellent example of this struggle, even by Whites. What makes most of these White farming enterprises a success is the fact that they hold title deeds to loan on, while this kind of owner setup is frequently lacking with the Black farmers, especially those farming on state land under rent. The 1994 to 2018 official land redistribution plan was especially curbed by this problem, making not only the development of the Black farms null and void, but even the obtaining of basic funds by the new Black farmers to be able to run the daily functioning of their farms.61

Various other realities played a devastating role in the so-called failure of the ANC regime’s project of 1994 to 2018 in implementing land reform and the upliftment of Black farmers per se, which the antagonists keep back from the public in their attacks on the ANC regime’s farming projects, especially to block the intended land expropriation plan of Ramaphosa. For the propagandists these negative realities are opportunistically ignored by the antagonists in their criticism. In addition, modern day farming is a changeling undertaking in terms of high costs, immense time input, special training and experience, and uncontrollable natural phenomena such as droughts and the development of negative other climate blocks, putting produce successes under strain. Also the start up of a comprehensive project of various farming schemes countrywide has simultaneously put enormous strain in the form of an sudden abnormal need of professional labour, overseeing, administration, financing, advising, etc., on the ANC regime between 1994 and 2018. This negatively affected the full activation of the project. Farming needs enormous back-up funding before it becomes productive. Governmental support and finance is not enough. The start-up and running of such a comprehensive new project, especially wherein the poor and landless stand central, also needs immense public financial supportive input (many times on a gratis basis) via the private sector and the community, which was mostly lacking in the 1994 and 2018 governmental project. Prominent, as already indicated, is the fact that any new project needs to be allowed to development gradually, which on its own needs a slowed down time frame. The evaluation of the 1994 and 2018 land redistribution programme was forced by the antagonists into the immediate completion of the project with 100% successfully functioning Black farmers: required by the antagonists in only 24 years, as said, a 100% success rate in production and profits by these Black farms. Two clear blockages were ignored comfortably by the antagonists: 1) that the incoming Black farmers were novices who first needed time to acclimatise and to grow into independent farming; and 2) that such a new project needs a transition period of at least 20 years and more to stabilise and a further 20 years to grow. The success rate of more or less 20% (even the alleged 10% success rate of the antagonists) of the ANC regime’s 1994 to 2018 land redistribution project in the end, according to the propagandists, must be seen and respected as a phenomenal success.61

The propagandists believe that the already successful establishment of 26 Black farmers in the Eastern Cape at the costs of R1.4-billion is a worthwhile enterprise. To argue further by the antagonists that the incoming Black farmers in the ANC regime’s planned land redistribution will not contribute to the economy or will disturb the country’s economic system, is without any proven fact. The propagandists believe that it is plain thumb-sucking by the antagonists for their own opportunistic political reasons.61,123

For the propagandists it is clear that the antagonists are very fast to criticize the ANC regime’s so called failed land and farming redistribution efforts (1994-2018), but in this process ignore many external and uncontrollable factors contaminating the ANC’s sincere effort. Looking back to the country’s negative political history, evidence is there that the same kind of failures occurred, often in a more extreme context, under the White SAP regime and the NP regime over many years in the governing of the Union of South Africa and the Verwoerdian-republic. Indeed, precisely the same kind of contaminating factors were present for the Afrikaners from 1908 up to 1994, as well as with the rehabilitation of the poor proto-Afrikaners and the empowerment of the Afrikaners (but in these many cases long term development corrections were allowed and constant financial governmental assistance offered). It is specifically the nationalist Afrikaners with their NP regime, according to the propagandists, who socio-economically and politically botched up South Africa in many ways and cost the fortunes and lives of many Blacks, which had in 1994 overloaded the incoming ANC regime with many seriously problems which the NP regime could never solve themselves. The issues of poverty, inequality, unemployment and landlessness of the Blacks were pertinent unsolved problems of the NP regime (which they as a regime with their racial discrimination and exploitation of Blacks over many years indeed created themselves).3,4,22

The abovementioned early negative outcomes around the Afrikaners’ actions, coupled also to immense Afrikaner/White failures, are today erased from the mindsets of many hostile antagonists who are now fighting Black rule and any form of land redistribution which can negatively impact upon the Whites.

The present efforts of the antagonists to constantly focus the public’s attention on the so-called “failure of the 1994 to 2018 land redistribution programme”, are according to the propagandists to obstruct Ramaphosa’s plan of land distribution and prevent the introductiong of mass Black farming. For the propagandists this obstruction is more than that: it is the intentional steering of White political opportunism and the creation of falsities against the ANC as a political party with the main, but masked intention, of the fighting of the continued Black political rule of South Africa after 2018.123,125

Regarding the limitation of enough time for the ANC regime to introduce and establish its 1994 dispensation land reform, the propagandists note that the nationalist Afrikaner had in their immense rehabilitation plan of the poor Afrikaners far more than a half century’s time available to activate their various comprehensive upliftment schemes exclusively for Whites. In addition, the proto-Afrikaners, as opposed to the politically suppressed and abused Blacks, had already been exposed to independent government from 1853 at the Cape Colony and were far more financially independent than were the Blacks in 1994. This early Afrikaner process of White political development and emancipation, which was also streamed into the Boer republics, was further improved all over South Africa after 1910, especially after 1948 when the NP grabbed political power. As the Whites benefitted from the political setup, the Afrikaners were offered the opportunity to experience the long term (over far more than 100 years of exclusive White upliftment) the test-retest of good politics versus bad politics, and the gaining of valuable experience on governing. Hereto the ANC regime only had 24 years to test-retest the failed racial political setup which they unwillingly inherited from the nationalist Afrikaners under the NP and which they were forced to improve as fast as possible. The ANC, until 1994 a suppressed Black liberation movement, was totally cut out and cut off from any role-playing in the direct experiencing of the pre-1994 South African politics. Basically, the ANC was totally inexperienced and under skilled in 1994 to govern the then most troubled South Africa effectively. For the propagandists, this unhealthy political setup of 1994 limited the ANC regime to fast initiate the execution of their official land redistribution programme, making them a false culprit.3,4,22

For the propagandists, the 1994 dispensation steering the post-1994 governing period up to 2018, was a statutory ruling to fit par excellence the outgoing NP-AB-DRC-Alliance’s politics and economics. Although political rights were transferred to the ANC regime in 1994, the economical rights were kept until today by the old White establishment (who are also the majority land owners). This limited the ANC, through the 1994 Constitution, to be able to take extraordinary steps to rectify the unbalanced and corrupt land ownership coming over centuries from 1652. It is only from 2016 that the political and economic situation started to turn favourable for the ANC regime to break out from its White capturing and to address land reform on a limited scale.3,4

Furthermore, the Constitution, which the antagonists describe as excellent and untouchable, is for the propagandists a piece of legislation which exclusively favours Whites. The propagandists see the Constitution right in the path so far of a total South African Rehabilitation. Today, as a result of the immense backlog created by the centuries old complete deprivation of non-Whites, aggravated by the further financial imbalance after 1994, the propagandists believe land reform requires a dramatic approach: even where and when needed, the application of land grabbing in order to obtain balance and to prevent serious civil unrest.4

It must further be noted that the White Union regimes from 1910 to 1948, and the NP regime from 1948 to 1994, were rich and were for a long time in power to build up exclusive strong financial empowerment and governmental foundation for Whites, especially the Afrikaners. Thus the majority of non-Whites of South Africa are impoverished. Built into this exclusively White Helping Hand Only for Whites was the practice of economical discrimination of the already poor Blacks and non-Whites, forcing them further down the ladder of poverty, inequality and joblessness. This masse of poor Blacks has totally lacked from 1652 the sympathy support of rich private non-White institutions and non-White persons up to 1994, to aid the ANC regime immediately in and after 1994 (as was the case of comprehensive, ongoing support for the poor Whites in the 1930s, besides the White government’s support, by wel established and financially strong Afrikaner organisations (such as the Dutch Reformed Church and the AB), to activate an effective and well steered government plan of successful land redistribution. As indicated, this immense lack of official and unofficial financial support and guidance (as well as training, moral, social, and psychological support) to aid non-Whites to better themselves in general, were absent from 1910 when the Whites began to be uplifted. For the propagandists this was an outright failure and a well planned ongoing discrimination to non-Whites by the various White regimes. Even the Theron Commission’s urgent recommendations in 1979 to better the mass of non-Whites were wantonly ignored by the White NP regime, as postulated by the propagandists.4

The propagandists challenge the hypotheses of Opperheimer61 and the IRR that in terms of the 1994 to 2018 land redistribution programme “nearly 95% the land in dispute was successfully solved and that the process around land redistribution is nearly fully complete”. Evidence contradicts this final outcome and the closing down of the South African land ownership issue as based on the 1994 dispensation. For the propagandists, this 1994 to 2018 official programme by far does not include all the land legally qualifying for redistribution. Motsoko Pheko9, in his explication of the official stealing of Black land by Whites, shows that the Native Land Act 1913 illegally allocated 93% of the Africans’ land to 349 837 European settlers, leaving only 7% of their own country to over five million Africans. This illegal transfer of Black land to Whites is also confirmed by the 1955 Thomson Commission56 which posits that the Blacks were in 1955 more or less in possession of only 15% of their original land. Ramaphosa makes reference of 13% of land today owned by Blacks in the new South Africa. Opperheimer’s61 and the IRR’s 15% ownership of land by Blacks, leaving 85% of the country’s total soil in the possession of Whites, is again a excellent example of the frame of mind of the antagonists. At least as much as 70% plus of the Blacks’ land was excluded from the 1994 dispensation and thus needs to still be addressed. This unjust outcome is why it is so important for the propagandists that Ramaphosa’s land reform plan must be activated with great speed.4,9,61

The arguments of antagonists such as Opperheimer61 and the IRR that the Blacks were nearly fully compensated in 2018 for all the land they had lost before 1994, is false and misleading. At least 70% and more of the land of Blacks lost before 1994 must still be transferred back to them.9,61

3.2.14. Home ownership in South Africa matches the racial demographics

The reference of Opperheimer61, based upon the statistics of the IRR, which reads61:18: “…home ownership [in South Africa] matches racial demographics”, is shown by the propagandists to be a falsity, or better, as Mthombothi puts it126:25: “… the use of own facts to make myths truths!” The same can be said about the misuse by the antagonists of the recent government’s own land audit which shows ownership of property (not farm land) a racial parity with 49% of properties owned by Whites and 46% owned by Blacks. The audit reflects more or less the same ratio for sectional title ownership of Whites versus Blacks.4,61,128

However, the antagonists argue that it must be noted that the definition upon which the IRR based its conclusion to state that home ownership matches racial demographics, is highly debatable. Indeed, it is a superficial and a misleading conclusion.4,61,126-129

Firstly, this is a one-by-one racial comparison, simply based upon the definition: who are the owners of what property in South Africa, absolutely ignoring the true numbers of the various racial populations in the total ownership of land. The comparison here by the antagonists is faulty in that the total White population of 5 million versus a sub-population of 5 million Blacks is used, in a manipulating equalisation of the various races, to give the ratio 1:1, which is a myth. In reality the comparison should be the total White population of 5 million versus the total Black population of 55 million, to give the ratio 1:11, which is the truth. This means that in real life for every eleven Whites owning a property only one Black person owns a property! More precisely, in theoretical statistical terms, it means that: if 5 million Whites own houses, only 5 million Blacks also own houses, with 50 million Blacks homeless or lacking the ownerships of houses. This immense joyless situation gives insight into why the ANC regime can refer with honesty to the present day definition of mass of poor and landless Blacks who urgently need land and their own accommodation, and why the activating of land expropriation is urgently needed.

Furthermore is it clear that the selective and manipulative definition of ownership, wherein the theoretical good quality existence of 5 million Whites’ houses and the 5 million Blacks’ houses is fronted to the public – which is used so promptly by Opperheimer61 and the IRR to illustrate the antagonists’ evidence of the “justice” around Black housing, is in an effort to obstruct and nullify the intended land expropriation. It ignores the low quality of the so-called present day “other houses” of most of the Blacks all over South Africa. These “other houses” (excluding the low quality HOP houses) theoretically accommodate 50 million Blacks. Looking critically at these so-called “other houses”, the best and only definition in describing them are “shacks”. These shacks are mostly of sink and/or cardboard which fail to withstand the harsh element (extreme sun, cold, rain) and are of short term duration. Again note: These shacks represent more or less eleven Blacks’ accommodation against every single White’s accommodation (White accommodation: a standard house fulfilling the building prerequisites of municipalities and building societies). Moreover, these shacks are mostly illegally erected on the land of White land owners or municipalities, permanently under threat to be demolished by the ‘Red Ants” and the shack dwellers to be arrested by the SAPD. The propagandists note that this illegal land occupation with the erection of shacks is not a willing action by the Blacks, but a delinquent action, forced on the poor Blacks, due to their immense poverty, joblessness and landlessness. This negative setup, as already shown many times in this research, is a direct result of the practice of the Whites’ racial discrimination, land theft and the utmost deprivation of Blacks, coming from 1652 under White rule. For the ANC regime to rectify this immense South African socio-economical and political chaos in the short period of 24 years, created by the various White regimes over hundreds of years, especially the NP-regime after 1948, is totally impossible. [In 1948, as much as 35 years after the start-up of the Afrikaners’ rehabilitation in 1913, all efforts to better the Afrikaners’ economical and social position were still fruitless. It took the nationalist Afrikaners more or less 47 years, from 1913 to 1960, to stabilise the Afrikaners poverty with their first stage of the Afrikaners’ rehabilitation. It was only in the 1980s onwards (nearly 70 years after 1913) that the second phase of Afrikaner rehabilitation worked positively for them and economical growth and political maturity started to really appear].4,61,126-138

The thousands of RDP/HOP houses erected by the ANC regime since 1994 as an emergency measure (just as a temporary measure to accommodate and to steer the immediate 1994 Black housing problem in a limited positive way, away from the mass political troubles the country under the ANC regime inherited from the previous Whites) – were immensely welcomed by the Blacks without a roof over their heads. RDP/HOP houses were a temporary solution to the chaotic Black housing situation of 1994, but they do not solve the greater problem around Black house ownership. This introduction brought much improvement for the living conditions of the poor and landless Blacks. But looking critically at it, is it clear that the RDP/HOP houses’ basic standards and facilities fail the average test as houses and are, when compared with the average houses of Whites, absolutely on the zero standard level.4,61,126-138

What Opperheimer61 and the IRR cleverly side-stepped and are deathly silent on – as are most of the antagonists in their justification of the present day imbalanced housing setup between Blacks and Whites in post-1994 South Africa – are the comprehensive negative “housing environments” wherein millions of Black shack dwellers are living: a lack of their own electricity, water, toilet facilities; unfavourable living areas without good roads; situated in isolated and underdeveloped areas, located far from public transport, shops, public schools and medical facilities; areas mostly ridden by crime and not integrated into rich, even middle class White housing areas; and many times located on river banks exposed to constant fluids and other life threats.61,132,139

What many of the rich White land and home owners, and also the antagonists missed out on, those who selfishly only think and act in the interests of Whites’ land ownership and richness, is that every poor and landless Black shack dweller belongs to the greater South African society: a society where the poorest of the poor Blacks deserve to be treated with respect and dignity. Democracy never really arrived in 1994 in South Africa. The inclusive capitalistic propagandists, other than the cold-blooded exclusive capitalistic antagonists, believe that nobody must be without a house or at least land to build a house and must enjoy basic services such as water, electricity and sanitation. It is in this context of inclusive capitalistic upliftment that the ANC regime is planning and steering its land expropriation intentions, trying to bring land and house ownership to the poor Blacks.132,139

The arguments by the antagonists that land redistribution is a well planned and masked social engineering initiative by the ANC leadership to activate RET and RST as fast as possible, is unsubstantiated and malign. The present day wealth and privilege captured by most Whites are so immense that any organised RST would fail from day one to disturb it, forget to remodel it. The opportunity for the masses of poor Blacks to ever be able to move into the expensive traditional living areas of Whites is zero. Their poverty is of such an extent that it would take them at least two decades of financial upliftment even to be able to move into the lower and middle level living areas of Whites. It seems to be the antagonists’ deep-seated fear that the bringing about of economic upliftment to the masse of poor Blacks would undermine their traditional socio-economic and political privileges, rights and positions in greater South Africa. The antagonists again demonstrate for the propagandists their intense racism by their selection of an unsubstantiated subject such as racial demographics to make a kind of statement to block the land expropriation initiative. Also it is the antagonists’ postulation that land expropriation is a selective effort by the ANC regime to force the integration of White into the greater Black community. It is extremely arrogant, racistic and malign. For the propagandists is it an open question whether Blacks want to integrate with Whites and whether they really want them as dwellers in the greater Black community. It is clear for the propagandists that the antagonists’ political confusion is so immense that they miss out on the reason for the government to bring the poor Blacks to better living areas: to uplift them out of their immense poverty and emotional deprivation, which are ongoing consequences of Apartheid and which the antagonists are blind to.4

The IRR’s and Opperheimer’s61 postulations that present day home ownerships match racial demographics must be rejected outright with the contempt they deserve. Central for the propagandists’ is one single concept: Black discrimination. For the propagandists, the antagonists’ outright blindness to indigenous South African realities and their urgent needs, is a cognitive disfunction. The antagonists’ obstruction of the rightful claims on land by the poor Blacks will one day cost them their heads, as it did the politically rigid and selfish Tsar and his rich nobles.

3.2.15. Strength of political contamination and obstruction of the antagonistic rescuers and saviours

Prominent in the present fight against land expropriation and the unchangeableness of the Constitution, according to the propagandists, are the so-called Afrikaner/White rescuers and saviours, or better: the White Knights, who seemingly believe rigidly that they are going to maintain Afrikanerism and White richness and land ownership at all costs for ever. The propagandists show that the numbers of these so-called rescuers and saviours of the Afrikaner/White group, do not amount to more than 350 000 in number or 7% of the total White population. From a political empowerment point of view they are thus insignificant as policy makers or changers. At the moment they figure prominently in public speeches, court cases, political and public petitions and do not hesitate to attack groundlessly every action that can “endanger” White land ownership, White richness and exclusive White political rights, favours and privileges. Looking critically at their functioning and the pre-requisite for “White Knight membership”, the propagandists see them as clear remnants of the late NP-AB-DRC-alliance which sent South Africa into doom. Critically, in perspective, the contributions of the Afrikaner/White rescuers and saviours to positive modern day South African politics are null and void.4

The Afrikaner/White rescuers’ and saviours’ constant foolish civil and sometimes even criminal actions against their main political enemies, the ANC regime and the various political independent Black political thinkers, politicians and leaders, are for the propagandists nothing less then wanton window dressing to recruit new members for their various White rightwing organiations, which are mostly masked White labour unions in private ownership. The sole aim of the recruiting of membership of antagonistic organisations (together many times with outright begging of money under the cover of donations for the so-called Afrikaner/White case) is to generate income for these organisations’ own workers, directors and leaders, and undoubtedly not the noble aim to safeguard the Whites’ interests, which they try so hard to reflect to the public. Of course there are also the foolish “know-all sympathisers” and other hangers-on to this small band of White Knights, also coming from the “good old days” of the NP-AB-DRC-alliance, with only one mission: fighting at all costs and at all times the ANC regime and Black Nationalism. For the propagandists the antagonists are besotted by the belief that they are going to be successful in the instituting of a Siener van Rensburg White South Africa in the near future.4,140

What is abundantly clear for the propagandists in this context of ongoing White supremacy, is that the antagonists do not hesitate to divide South Africans into different race groups simply to uphold their White rights and privileges. At the moment the antagonists’ sole intention is the reflecting of “White discrimination” by the “Black” ANC regime, without any clarification as to what precisely these “discriminations” are. Looking at the antagonists’ presentations on the South African “racial” discrimination to the international world, they are totally silent on admitting to the immense existing present day injustice and unfairness, together with the huge economic separation between the haves (Whites) and have-nots (Blacks) which were created solely by the antagonists through their Apartheid. In this context the country has a rich, largely White group, forming a strong branch of the antagonists (fighting at present not only for the upkeep of stolen riches like land through Apartheid, but further enlarging it with exclusive capitalism’s exploitation of the masses of poor Blacks) versus a mass of poor Blacks for whom it is impossible to ever escape from their dire circumstances without extraordinary help over an extremely long period of rehabilitation.140,141

Gandhi140 brings this planned delinquent “memory loss” of the antagonists of their contaminated past prominently into focus as follows140:21:

A result of no acknowledgement and no sharing is that we have a very large majority of people living in poverty with no facilities, while others have excessive wealth and privileged access to resources. Racism is linked to this privilege.

There is a reluctance to rectify the injustices of the past through constructive programmes and voluntary sharing of wealth gained through apartheid privilege. Instead, there is agitation for the protection of individual rights and privileges at the expense of the common.

For the propagandists, Gandhi describes precisely the modus operandi of the antagonists, to uphold stolen land through their various agitations to protect the Whites’ individual rights and privileges, notwithstanding the coming of the 1994 democracy and Black rule.140

For the propagandists, two prominent outcomes are more and more reflected in the antagonists’ present agitation for the protection of individual rights and privileges of Whites at the expense of the common poor Blacks: an insecurity as a group, knowing precisely that their crooked intentions with their so-called “saving” of the Afrikaner-volk, are detected by their own people and that they are going to be ousted in future from the Afrikaner/White inner-circle as well as the South African politics, wherein Black politics is going to steer the country constructively outside the White Knights’ contaminated racial and self-enriching politics of White supremacy. Secondly, a direct outcome of the White Knights’ insecurity, is that they, in an effort to still be accepted and to still be seated inside the greater Afrikaner/White circle, start to act extremely in attacking everyone politically and personally, from the ANC regime to other Afrikaners/Whites, who dare to criticise or oppose any of the delinquent thinking, planning and action of the antagonists.4

For the propagandists, this is degenerate of the antagonists’ political integrity and is a dangerous sign, reflecting back to the politically extreme actions of the NP regime against its opponents, which included murder. It echos again the foolish thinking and action of the rightwing Janusz Walusth, who believed that by murdering Chris Hani, the leader of the South African Communist Party and Umkhonto we Sizwe, he could incite a civil war to end post-Apartheid reconciliation and the incoming ANC as the new regime.142

Important for the propagandists is the antagonists’ negative labeling in public of any person, even persons from their own clan, who dare criticise or expose the falsehood of their antagonistic politics. This labeling is apparent many times in the Afrikaans media with the classification of their political opponents as “anti-Afrikaners” and “anti-Whites”, even sometimes as blockheads. Many of their political writings and speeches are nothing more than fake news, which, it seems, need the ANC regime’s attention and reaction.4,143

Prominent in the subjective attacks on critics of the antagonists’ foolish politics, is the abusive and confused writing of a said Du Plessis, in his reaction to the sound arguing and criticism of seasoned political and academic Afrikaners, because they dare to take on his so-called elite Solidarity, AfriForum and the Freedom Front Plus. Although his response is pie in the sky and does not have any impact in terms of opinion-making on the ANC regime’s well argued and planned politics around land expropriation, the propagandists believe that it must be reflected to demonstrate the antagonists’ poor present day perception of political reality and their foolishly aimless fighting of Black rule since 1994 (and the inherent dangers to the antagonists’ politics which many times go undetected). This present political confusion by many antagonistic journalists and writers is a surprise, seeing that some of them have spent years in political journalism. It seems as though their life long sojourn inside the politically corrupt NP-AB-DRC-alliance tragically contaminated their thinking of political and indigenous realities.143

Du Plessis143, in his focus upon so-called White antiAfrikaners who dare to fight the so-called mighty elite Solidarity and AfriForum, as well as Donald Trump, write as follows143:6:

Nes in die VSA, is dit hoofsaaklik dial-a-quote-professore en lessenaar-ontleders wat lostrek. In dieselfde mislik neerbuigende trant as hul geesgenote in die VSA. Met nóg minder resultate hier as daar.

Want Solidariteit/AfriForum het, nes die ANC van weleer, die EFF vandag en die Trumpiste in die VSA, die kragtige persepsie aan hul kant dat hulle “basies aan die kant van die mense is”, in hul geval meerendeels Afrikaanses.

Du Plessis’s143 reference – or more his self-appointment to be able to speak on behalf of the so-called Afrikaanses – reflects two outcomes: political confusion of who the Afrikaanses were in the time of the racist NP-AB-DRC-alliance government; and political arrogance, reflecting again the despair of the antagonists in their phasing out of present day politics and their last minute attempts to make a kind of come back in the already starving White politics. Firstly, the propagandists see Du Plessis143 speaking on behalf of the so-called Afrikaners, is already inapplicable and political stupidity, because he in no way represents them in present day politics. It reflects his present political confusion par excellence. Secondly, for him to speak on behalf of the Afrikaanses (all Afrikaans-speaking people including Coloureds, Blacks), is blatant arrogance and even totally outside Du Plessis’s143 self-mandate as a 2018 political prophet. Political confusion is again prominent here for the propagandists. For them all the evidence is there that the political ideologies of Du Plessis’s143 elite Solidarity, AfriForum, IRR and the Freedom Front Plus hold doom for the Afrikaners as well as the Afrikaanses. His actions and writings are making the adaptation of the Afrikaners and the Afrikaanses to the realities of the new South Africa extremely difficult. They may be doomed in the end.4,143

The propagandists view these antagonistic organisations as blind and blunt opposition to any form of land expropriation or better: “any so-called endangering of White interests and richness”. Thankfully, the propagandists believe that these obstructive White saviour and rescuer organisations, which are trying every day to derail the ANC regime’s positive undertakings and guarantees, together with the many arrogant and dial-a-quotes of Du Plessis and of the antagonists who are “guiding” confused Afrikaners on South Africa post-1994 politics, will disappear summarily from public life in less than a decade. Looking very carefully at the contents of these Afrikaner rescuers’ and saviours’ political rhetoric, the propagandists feel that much of the content is “false and fake news”, which can activate racial conflict and citizen disobedience, and as such, needs to be curbed by legislation in the near future.4,143

3.2.16. Exclusive capitalism and inclusive (social) capitalism in the South African economy

It has been referred various times in this article as well as in the other articles of the project to the concepts exclusive capitalism and inclusive (social) capitalism in the South African economy. It is important, in evaluating the land expropriation initiative of Ramaphosa, to bring the two concepts, exclusive capitalism and inclusive (social) capitalism, into perspective.

On the definition of inclusive capitalism Khumalo writes144:10:

Whilst the definition of inclusive capitalism remains largely fluid, the general consensus seems to be a form of capitalism which seeks to put society rather than profit at the heart of decision-making and action by business. This has to be contrasted with contemporary capitalism which places profit at the centre and argues that somehow society will benefit.

Despite its universal appeal, classic [exclusive] capitalism has resulted in the super-rich and the super-poor, and a widening inequality gap across the world. It has led to an economic universe where the benefits of capitalism are amplified for the minority and its shortfalls felt by millions of poor and marginalised people.

It is important to note that exclusive (classic) capitalism is a foundation in the drive of the antagonists to upkeep the exclusive ownership of the White farmers’ land and riches; and to keep out the mass of poor and landless Blacks, driven by inclusive capitalism, from the dominant White South African farming sector. Looking closely at the actions of many of the antagonists’ self-appointed spokesmen, such as Du Plessis143, it is clear that besides their besottment with White supremacy and the upholding thereof in future South Africa, their upholding of exclusive capitalism (unknown to most of these antagonists as a masked vehicle used by the exclusive capitalists for the further enrichment of a few of the rich in charge of the country’s purse), has became intertwined in their mindset with the practice of so-called Western democracy. The central (but wrong) belief is that only through the so-called Western exclusive capitalism and Western exclusive democracy can every South African‘s interest be promoted and upheld. The antagonists believe, without real arguments to confirm it, that international or global inclusive capitalism (which the propagandists promote together with exclusive capitalism in South Africa) to uplift the mass of poor and landless Blacks, is Marxist, revolutionary and anti-Western. Looking critically at the official practice of exclusive capitalism in South Africa, it becomes clear that the antagonists’ view thereof is a farce. South Africa’s political and economic system has for years, specifically under the nationalist Afrikaners, been inclusively capitalistically driven. The nationalising from day one of most of the South African service-delivery old enterprises (such as today’s Transnet, SABC, Eskom and SAA), primary and secondary education, the so-called Bantustans of the NP, etc., are examples par excellence of inclusive capital models. Hereto is exclusive capital always vested in South Africa in the hands of a few capitalistic bullies (mostly White till 1994), who are manipulating every financial interest and step of the individual (even that of persons like the self-appointed spokespersons of the antagonists, although this reality is totally lacking in their mindset) to enrich themselves selfishly through the exclusive capitalist model.4,98,143

This exclusive capitalist manipulation and management, especially since 1910, is well planned and executed by the exclusive capitalistic bullies, contaminating the ordinary Whites’ mindset through the fear and danger of the horrors of communism, nationalisation of the private capital and assets, and the rise of suppression of Whites politically, socially and personally (the so-called horrors of Mao, Stalin and Mugabe!). This doctrine by the nationalist Afrikaner capitalists intensified from 1948 with the arrival of DF Malan and has not abated until today. Looking at the so-called upliftment of the post-1910 Afrikaners, it becomes clear that certain Afrikaner leaders and their families (who with time, became the guardians of the NP-AB-DRC-alliance through their newly allocated richness) solely benefitted inside exclusive capitalism. Although the nationalist Afrikaners, forming most of the present antagonists, pride themselves today on their good pensions and ownership of houses etc., brought to them through Afrikanerism, the value of these monies paid out to them, is peanuts in terms of the direct financial benefits and richness their membership payments to pension and medical funds, etc. These monies have been brought to the White exclusive capitalists who own, run and manage these various funds and financial institutes. Most of the antagonists’ mindsets became so doctrine mesmerised and filled with fear over the years by these few White exclusive capitalists’ ideology on the dangers awaiting them if the communists and the practitioners of so-called inclusive capitalism take over, that they lost their cognitive insight of what is politically and economically a myth versus what is politically correct, while the few exclusive White capitalists were laughing all the way to bank their billions at the cost of the individual poor South African.3,4,16,144-146

Firstly, with the suppression and dangers alluded to by the exclusive capitalists awaiting South Africans if the so-called “communists” take over, the facts show that South Africa was a country characterised by suppression and genocide of its people during 1948 to 1994 (the NP-regime of the nationalist Afrikaners). This extreme suppression never happened before 1948 and never after 1994. Secondly, in 1994 a strong element of communists became part of the ANC regime, but never activated suppression or genocide of South Africa’s people, specifically not of the Whites. Neither was nationalisation introduced by them. Thirdly, it must also be clear in the mindsets of the antagonists that socialism was always strongly anchored within exclusive capitalism in the 1948 to 1994 regime of the NP; prominently here again reflected by the business principles of the old public services like the South African railways, primary, secondary and tertiary education and health services, etc. It was only from the 1970s that so-called privatisation of public enterprises began to develop, bringing a parallel system of socialism and private exclusive capitalism to run hand in hand. Fourthly, the propagandists emphasise that there is no intention to change the South African economic system to the PAC’s exclusive socialism model, and thus to replace altogether the present economic system of exclusive capitalism. For the propagandists this is nothing else than the” Malema-nationalising” model which the ANC sees as undemocratic and an outright business failure.3,4,16,144-146

Looking further critically, specifically at the presence of White exclusive capital versus White inclusive capital, is it clear that the ±32 000 commercial White farmers – farming outside the exclusive circle of 3 200 White mega-farmers producing 90% and more of country’s food security – were in the past and are still today, themselves underwriters and practitioners of inclusive capital (although the reality of it is suppressed in their mindsets by the doctrine of Afrikanerism on communism and Black empowerment). Journalists such as Du Plessis are in the same boat of financial functioning (Du Plessis as a pensioner) inside inclusive capitalism, without cognitively recognising it! He and most of the 32 000 commercial White farmers and other salaried and self-employed Whites became since 1948 just too spell-bound by the nationalist Afrikaners crooked politics to comprehend their true situation. If Du Plessis doubts the truth of this posit he can just ask his previous boss and mentor, Koos Bekker, to confirm it and to teach him more about the goodness of inclusive capitalism. For the propagandists the ANC regime’s land redistribution with or without compensation, and the foundation thereof on inclusive capitalism, are not new in the South African financial and economical setup. This was always there and will always be there in the future. In the past inclusive capitalism did immense good to White farmers and it is going to do good to them again in the future.4,143

What is important at this stage for the propagandists is that most of the antagonists, who are still themselves today excluded from exclusive capitalism and its immense benefits, start to observe their position inside the well established and functioning inclusive capitalistic system and make a change to the side of the propagandists. Cyril Ramaphosa’s uplifting of the poor and landless Blacks is just an extension of the old inclusive capitalism, coming from the 1913 and which was also extensively used by the early White regimes to uplift the poor and landless Whites. It worked then: why will it not work now again with the poor and landless Blacks and the South African Nation as a unity?9,98

It is astonishing for the propagandists that so many of the antagonists, well educated and intelligent people, are still opposing the ANC regime, notwithstanding knowing that there are very few differences between their own political and economic ideologies, aims and intentions and those of the ANC elite. For the propagandists, one negative driver in the antagonists’ fight against the ANC regime since 1994 stands out: the antagonists’ foolish and stupid racism which was internalised into their mindsets by the opportunistic Afrikaners’ exclusive capitalists.145 ***

The propagandists believe it is time for the antagonists to look critically to present day South African politics: only then they will be surprised by the false Western democracy and Western exclusive capitalism which they have lived in since 1910. It will give them insight into their personal, political and economic abuse by the exclusive capitalists. It is time for most of the ±350 000 antagonists to make a wise political turn around: most Afrikaners/Whites (more than 4.6 million already did this and are happy). These turned around antagonists can not only help to solve the poor and landless Black Problem, but can at the same time assure themselves and their ancestors a personal, political and economic haven in future South Africa.4 For the propagandists, all people are born into certain societies and, as Martinez1 shows, are introduced to and formed in these setups by certain cultures and beliefs for the good or bad. The White Afrikaners did not have a choice who were going to be their parents and what effect Apartheid would have on their characters, and thus how they were going to approach the South Africa of 2018. But, as Martinez1 also shows, no-one needs to be a victim of his/her circumstances: all persons can change. It is time for the antagonists to follow Lailah Gifty Akita’s proverbial advice: “Don’t be a victim of circumstances. Choose victory by gracious endurance”.

For the propagandists it is time for the antagonists to whole-heartedly join Ramaphosa’s land reform initiative!

4. Conclusions

Looking in perspective at the intended land redistribution of the ANC under the leadership of President Cyril Ramaphosa, the editor147 of the Sunday Times can rightfully say that there are more snakes than ladders in our silver anniversary year of democracy: there are indeed manifold problems and obstructions to overcome; the question is if it can be overcome. He writes147:8:

When Nelson Mandela delivered his inspiring inauguration speech on May 10 1994, he imagined a different SA than the one we live in today. Paying tribute to the heroes of the struggle and the sacrifices they made, he said: “Their dreams have become reality. Freedom is their reward”. Sadly, Mandela’s rhetoric soared far higher than the reality that has unfolded since then. His dream of a non-racial, non-sexist, equal society remains just that, a dream. Under apartheid, he said, SA was “the skunk of the world”. Now it is the country with the greatest levels of inequality, one burdened by a schooling system memorably described this week by the man who runs it as “not the worst in the world”.

As we prepare to celebrate a quarter of a century of democracy, South Africans have little to show for the vision held out by Mandela. The non-racial project has all but collapsed. Legitimate calls for redistribution have been hijacked by opportunists hellbent on sowing racial tension. Lingering racial discrimination refuses to let the wounds inflicted by apartheid heal.

It is so far clear for the propagandists that a mass of contaminating elements and role-players, integrated and established in the age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system of South Africa, are obstructing the change to Section 25 to be able to effect land expropriation without compensation. The presence of myths and lies, used masterfully by the antagonists to assure the continuation of exclusive White land ownership, are prominent in the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints.

The propagandists have no other choice in their fight for a just South Africa, free from White supremacy and enrichment, but to take on the change to Section 25 to effect land expropriation without compensation. It is the only path to uplift the mass of Blacks out of their inequality, landlessness, poverty and unemployment, which stem from Apartheid’s exploitation and suppression of Blacks for centuries. The immense land grabbing by Whites of non-Whites’ land, coming from 1652, can at last effectively be reversed.

For the propagandists, the antagonists’ hostility and manipulation, to hold on to their multiple privileges coming from pre-1994 South Africa, are prominent. Central is their rejection of Black empowerment, making their responsibility and contribution to society, especially the poor, in the end null and void. The antagonists’ intentions are all to activate self-profit. For the propagandists, the country is still today financially run by a small class of a White elite under guardianship of White males versus a mass of Blacks who posses little in social, cultural, racial and financial rights and privileges. The undoing of the historical trajectory of the age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system of South African society is one of the biggest challenges for the government. There is still the belittling of and the ignoring of Blacks as incompetent, which took root from the founding of the Union of South Africa. This setup is forcing the ANC government to activate and to bring democracy to every citizen, with no other alternative to comprehensive land redistribution to relocate exclusive capital to inclusive capital, so as to erase inequality, unemployment, poverty and landlessness.

The reference by Khumalo146 of the hanging of an economic-political revolution over South Africa’s head is clear when he says that146:10: “South Africans at large would do well to remember the words of the late English historian, EP Thompson, who spoke of the need to understand the moral economy and avoid becoming a world in which economic and moral concerns are gradually drifting apart”.

South Africa has failed totally since 1652 to understand the concept of moral economy; let alone to implement it in any form at any time outside a racial division with the Whites as the privileged and the Blacks as the victims. The presence of a mass of poor and landless Blacks is the clear result of this failed moral economy. This is evidenced by the hard fact that so much as 29 million Blacks are poor (more than 50% of the total population) and that the democracy of 1994 could not overcome the Blacks’ immense poverty, inequality and unemployment created by racial discrimination of centuries. The propagandists show that in this morally sick setup, the privileged Whites so far have blocked a free civilian transfer of some of their wealth to the Blacks, forcing a compulsory civilian transfer of land expropriation into practice.

Khumalo144 contends that the legitimacy of exclusive capitalism is at a crisis point in South Africa. Here its pitfalls are exhibited with the dubious distinction of the world’s greatest inequality quotient, a crisis of youth unemployment and a lack of upward mobility for millions of South Africans. Khumalo writes144:10:

The captains of [exclusive] capitalism – big corporate and wealthy individuals – are being found engaging in corruption and dubious business practices that seek to prioritise profit at the expense of society. In a society so polarised by the ongoing consequences of its history, this only feeds into the growing sense of resentment that the general public has against those seen to have economic power.

In this form of capitalism, business has the imperative of maximising internal wealth and doing little to advance society. Inevitably, it falls upon government and regulators to put in place guidelines to keep capitalism in check. Such guidelines range from compulsory regulations – workplace safety standards for example – to optional ones such as corporate social responsibility [and undoubtedly land expropriation legislation]. And yet even such interventions have failed to bend the arc of capitalism towards something more equitable and reflective of a shared prosperity. Partly because even when complying with guidelines, the primary focus of business remains profit.

Central to the overcoming of this Black immense poverty, inequality and unemployment versus the extreme wealth of a selective minority inside South Africa’s failed moral economy, stands the message of Barack Obama which he presented on the 17thJuly 2018 at the Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture during the centenary celebrations in Johannesburg: A message for the propagandists fully in line with that of Cyril Ramaphosa’s reflecting as inclusive capital, his intended land expropriation as the best way for the rich to help to create a more equal society here.98,147148 Joffe148, in perspective on this message of Obama (and indirectly also thus that of Ramaphosa), writes148:10:

His call was for an inclusive, market based economy and, essentially, for an ethical [moral] capitalism. In South Africa the debate is, understandably, often about transformation in the racial sense, but Obama’s comments should prompt us to think more globally and innovatively about the kind of inclusive, ethical capital he urged. Crucially, first, he didn’t suggest the rich shouldn’t be rich – but rather questioned, in a gentle sort of way, how much money they really needed, and urged them to give some of it away.

In the sequential Article Six (entitled: “The propagandists arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible: Part 2”), the various other contaminated elements and role-players (as already described in this Part 1), which form, support and drive the age old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system, will be described further in-depth and comprehensively evaluated.

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Not commissioned; externally peer-reviewed.


The author has no competing interests to declare.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.


Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa. (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). These terms do appear in dated documents. These terms or translations are used for the sake of historical accuracy in this article. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article in order to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting upon the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanisation and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution (4)

Full title: The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible. Part 2: The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime (4)

Gabriel P Louw
Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:
Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PUCHE), DPhil (PUCHE), PhD (NWU)

Keywords: antagonists, opponents, compensation, contamination, crookery, custom, expropriation, land grabbing, land ownership, opposition, poverty, radicalism, redistribution, wealth.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 2: 2

1. Background

1.1. Introduction

The study of the previous article (Part One) on the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints offer a broad identification of elements and role players present in the political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime. They each oppose the intended land grabbing of White land by the ANC regime to transfer it free to poor and landless Blacks. The antagonists see land grabbing as part of a greater international political and socioeconomic process through which the ANC regime is promoting its revolutionary and Marxist-socialist policy.

The primary aim of this article (Part Two) is to continue the reflection on these various elements and role players as already described in the previous article (Part One). It is only with such a comprehensive presentation that a picture can emerge of the antagonists’ civil right to uphold the Constitution in its present form. The presentation of the various elements and role players are divided into six subdivisions.

It is important to note how Chomsky’s1 points out that modern politics often hampers rational thought, allowing the practice of freedom, but limiting the pursuit of truth (creating ignorance among a large portion of South Africans on land ownership, indigenousness and what political and personal integrity means). This limited pursuit of truth limits the development of the critical role of leaders of integrity and independent thinking in skewed political systems. This vacuum causes a lack of responsibility to provide students, individuals, citizens, politicians, and the1:10 :“…wider public, the knowledge and skills they need to be able to learn how to think rigorously, to be self-reflective and to develop the capacity to govern rather than be governed”.

For Chomsky1 it goes much further1:10:

“… it is not enough to learn how to think critically. Engaged intellectuals must also develop an ethnical imagination and sense of social responsibility necessary to make power accountable and to deepen the possibilities for everyone to live dignified lives infused with freedom, liberty, decency, care and justice.”

In the view of the antagonists, Chomsky’s1 view is a reflection of how the ANC over time kept the South African public away from understanding the meaning of true justice, democracy and civil rights by limiting a non-racial intellectual leadership in the country’s politics. This is also how they successfully deprive Whites of dignified lives infused with freedom, liberty, decency, care and justice. The antagonists view the land process as something that is symptomatic of the ANC’s decay and as something that precludes Whites from a life of freedom. In this context of racism and isolation of groups, as experienced at presence by the South African Whites, Henry Giroux, professor at the McMaster University and distinguished visiting professor at Ryerson University, points to the correctness of Chomsky1 conclusion, namely that politics can only become emancipatory for a given group of people when these people speak out fearlessly and publically about their experience, like the antagonists are now doing in relation to land. Without such a political catharsis and public resistance against the government of the day by the suppressed antagonists, the criminal politicians of the ANC and their crooked politics will continue. The antagonists are deliberately being obstructed from the participation in politics by the ANC, and if they fail to force their identity into the total political setup, the can recede into obscurity. Challenging the ANC regime on the land issue is of absolute importance.1 Giroux writes in this regard1:11:

“Chomsky clearly connects with a need among the public for those intellectuals willing to make power visible, to offer an alternative understanding of the world, and to point to the hopes of a future that does not imitate the scurrilous present.”

Giroux further highlights1:11:

“Chomsky publicly argues against regimes of domination organized for the production of violence, and social and civil death. The force of his presence…offers up the possibility of dangerous memories, alternative ways of imagining society and the future, and the necessity of public criticism as one important element of individual and collective resistance”.

Chomsky’s1 advice on rectifying discrimination, exploitation and abuse of suppressed groups echoes the ideas of the antagonists in their present fight against the ANC’s planned amendment to Section 25 to make land grabbing possible.

Chomksky’s1 description of leaders with “poor political intelligence” fits the leadership crises of the ANC since 1994, from Nelson Mandela up to Cyril Ramaphosa, characterised by state capture, fraud and corruption. These leaders have failed to assure that everyone can live dignified lives infused with freedom, liberty, decency, care and justice in their countries. The antagonists as a group, opposing the ANC, know that the Whites are on their own in the ANC’s racist political reign and that they are an easy target for things like land grabbing.2

The antagonists see the ANC regime as one that lacks the political intelligence to be ethical and socially responsible and to be accountable so that everyone in South Africa could have dignified lives infused with freedom, liberty, decency, care and justice. They became a crooked autocracy, greatly biased against minorities like the Whites. As Mthombothi says2:3: “The ANC is drunk from the alcohol of corruption.” They have lost contact with political, social and personal decency and justice. The ANC’s deviant behaviour since 1994 is spilling over to the land issue, forcing the antagonists to take them on with some sound arguments. It is in this context that Articles 3 and 4 offer some insights.2

1.2. Research intentions

The research aim of this article is to evaluate and to describe what the antagonists believe about the dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of South Africa that supports and promotes land grabbing. Opposition to this dysfunctional system stands central in the antagonists’ perspective on changing of Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible.

This article forms the second and last part of the article titled: “The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints on changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible: Part 1”. This article, Part Two, reflects further on what the antagonists believe about dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime that supports and promotes land grabbing.

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern political-historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research on the ownership of South African land for the period 1652 to 2018 in South Africa. The sources include books for the period 1947 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2018. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the current perspective of the antagonists for the unchanged keeping of Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution and thus the continuation of the present land redistribution policy with compensation in place since 1994.

The research findings are presented in narrative form.

3. Discussion

As already indicated, the antagonists’ perspective reflects a broad array of elements and role players active in the political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime that they associate with the intended expropriation of White land without compensation by the ANC.

The presentation of the various elements and role players in this article is done in six subdivisions.

3.1. Political horrors, anarchy and revolution

3.1.1. Imitating the horrors of the Mao, Stalin and Mugabe regimes

The antagonists fear that the murderous events of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, the horrors of Stalin’s regime and, closer to home, Robert Mugabe’s implementation of the land grabbing in Zimbabwe, can be repeated in South Africa. In fact, they see the farm murders as proof that it is already starting. Opperheimer’s3 writing on the land issue is one of the few instances where antagonists tell the world of their deep-seated fears of a “post-2018 South African Uhuru”. However, the writing is symptomatic of a deeply entrenched idea of victimhood cemented into many White mindsets from 1652. Opperheimer3 almost writes as a lonesome White telling the world why he thinks the present political setup where land must be left untouched, must be upheld to assure Whites of a future economic and personal safe-heaven and as much power as the Blacks in South Africa. But it is also an outcry to the outside world to offer help to maintain the present political and economic model of South Africa if they want to not only to assure the stable and safe lives of Whites after 2018, but also the safeguarding of foreign economic and political interests here. There is undoubtedly a belief hidden under layers of arguments on the land-reform issue that if the present political and economic status quo can be upheld successfully, the present land ownership of White rights will be left unchanged. The flip side of that view is that land expropriation without compensation, with its many other conflicting disturbing rooting will open the floodgates for political instability and marginalisation of Whites.4-6

3.1.2. The Zimbabwe-South African environment of anarchy

When analysing the Zimbabwe-South African environment of anarchy, is it important to note that in Zimbabwe no horrors were initially committed against the Whites. Robert Mugabe suddenly steered land grabbing into action with his political radicalism and racism. This is very similar to the political radicalism and racism now awaking in South Africa. However, in reality there have not been any atrocities aimed at Whites at the hand of the ANC. The conflict situation has been limited to heated political debate (if one regards the farm murders as a matter of crime that is not linked to formal politics).3,5

The antagonists are quick to point out that in example cases, like Zimbabwe, violence emerged when the targeted group lost its military power. This could be why land expropriation was not an avenue in 1994: the White minority was still politically organised with a significant hold on the military. However, the numbers of the White South African have declined from 1994 (there are 2.7 million Afrikaners left, and the numbers are in constant decline). They have also become politically disorganised and disoriented. The antagonists believe that the radicals in the ANC, EFF and PAC think that the time is ripe to address the matters left untouched in 1994.6-8

The lack of Black land ownership is often blamed for the entire context of inequality, unemployment and poverty. Taking from Whites and the re-dividing it among the poor and landless have become an obvious rectifying step. The ANC regime sells the immediate implementation of land expropriation, even without compensation to owners, as a priority to avoid the tragic outcome of land grabbing in the form that it took in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. The antagonists see this reasoning as a dishonest attempt to hide the ANC’s true motives. They feel that the current Black poverty and inequality primarily have their roots in the ANC regime’s substandard governance. Taking land from Whites cannot dramatically improve the country’s failing economy. Black poverty, unemployment and inequality will just continue.6-8

3.1.3. South African farm murders

The antagonists see the constant rise in farm murders where Whites are the prominent prey as an indication that Mugabe-like chaos is looming. This is a murder spree, they argue, that can also spread to urban areas and cities. The antagonists allege that the killing of Whites, especially Afrikaner farmers, have become a common phenomenon in South Africa since 1994 in an effort to drive Whites from their land.9,10

The antagonists also see poor governance as one of the main causes of the murders on White farmers as it has led to poor policing, a general lack of law enforcement, immense poverty and unemployment, social and personal isolation of races, uncontrolled gang activities, and the ANC regime openly denying farm murders as a problematic phenomenon. The ANC dismissing of farm murders as “Black danger” propaganda vestigial of the previous regime and false reporting by the antagonists, is seen by the antagonists as planned lies. The antagonists accuse the ANC government of very little effort to prevent it or to offer compensation, even to discuss the matter publically.9-11

The antagonists have two prominent concerns, namely 1) that Blacks are taking revenge on White-farmers for Apartheid; and 2) that there is a direct effort to drive Afrikaner farmers from their farms as was done by the Mai-Mai in Kenya, by Swapo in Namibia and by Mugabe’s supporters in Zimbabwe. They try to prove this with official data. They report that in 2016 70 White farmers were murdered in 345 farm attacks, meaning one farm murder every four days and one farm attack every day. They support their argument on the danger that farming holds for Whites in post-1994 South Africa, the antagonists further compared the murder averages of 2016 for South Africa with the 2016 data on global averages. In this comparison the world average is 7:100 000 versus South Africa’s average of 33:100 000 (the crime statistics for the financial year 2017 to 2018 reflects a rise to 36:100 000). South Africa’s problems with violent crime are also confirmed by the murder of members of the South African Police Service in 2017, namely 54:100 000. The antagonists claim that the murders of South African farmers came to a shocking 133:100 000 in 2016. In this context it is also reported that the SAPS data for the period 1991 to 2016 reflect the death of 14 589 farm dwellers with a ratio 60% Whites versus 40% Blacks.9,10

It is clear to the antagonists that White farmers are slowly, as in Zimbabwe, being driven from farms. They see the farm murders as focussed systematic ethnic cleansing, and the decline in commercial farmers from 65 000 to only 35 000 in 2017 serves as further evidence of a murder spree aimed at White farmers.9,10

Ian Cameron12, head of community safety for AfriForum, recently reported that there have been 300 farm attacks and 41 farm murders since the 1 January 2018 to March 2018. For the financial year 2017–2018 (1 March 2017 to 28 February 2018), AfriForum reports 70 farm murders. The official crime statistics released by parliament on 11 September 2018 for the same financial year reflects only 62 farm murders with six attempted murders, 33 farmhouse robberies and two rapes; an outcome that AfriForum dismisses as a gross misrepresentation, with good reason.10,13-15 Cameron12 claims that his organisation shares their statistics with the police on a regular basis and that the data should therefore correlate. The antagonists see the eight less farm murders reported by the SAPS as manipulation, as reflected by Cameron’s response12:12:

“I am scared to say it is deliberate, especially now with all this attention from the international community”.

3.1.4 South Africa’s general murder statistics

The antagonists point out that however much the SAPS and the ANC regime would like to dismiss Trump’s description of South Africa as the murder hotspot for White farmers, the country’s overall murder statistics are more than enough to confirm Trump’s worries. They feel that these numbers are indicative that the events brought on by Mao, Stalin and Mugabe is already part of the ANC’s efforts. This reflection also includes the presence of low-level anarchy in the country. For the financial year 1 March 2017 to 28 February 2018, parliament’s general crime statistics14, published on 12 September 2018, are terrifying. It greatly overshadows farm murders. It reflects that 20 336 people were killed, of whom 6 555 were shot and killed. Of the rest 4 866 were killed in knife attacks, 445 by the use of hands, 76 in axe attacks and 72 were beaten to death with a sjambok. The Minister of Police, Bheki Cele14 (National Police Commissioner from 2009 to 2012) said in reaction14: 1-2:

“It doesn’t matter what figures you put, but if you can’t deal and control the murder cases, you are not bringing any joy to the South African people. It doesn’t matter what else you reduce; if people die and when you look at the figures, there are 57 dying a day. It borders close to a war zone while there is peace; there is no war in South Africa.”

The DA spokesperson on police matters, Zakhele Mbhele14, pinpointed the root of these evils when he responsed14: 1-2:

“…the ANC had failed to keep ordinary citizens safe. The fact that the ANC spends an average of R9.1 million to protect one VIP but only R1 500 per South African resident reveals that their skewed priorities are crippling the fight against the unacceptably high levels of crime in the country.”

Japhet Ncube16, the editor of the Star, drove it home when he wrote16:2:

If you feel unsafe in your home and on the streets, you haven’t been imagining things. South Africa is one of the most unsafe places on Earth. More people are dying here than in many war zones across the world.

We are all just statistics waiting to happen. The criminals rule South Africa.

And if we bank on politicians to stop the killings, the criminals, who sometimes work with police officers, will be knocking on your door soon.

And you can’t do anything about it. The police are unable to do anything about it. The government is unable to do anything about it. The battle has been lost.

The police is currently short of 62 000 officers due to a lack of funding and mismanagement. In the same period billions of Rands went down the drain as a result of state capture. The size of the police force has decreased from 200 000 in 2010 to 191 000 in 2018, meaning a decline of 9 000 in eight years while the population is growing.17

The antagonists see many other indicators that point to the horrors of the regimes of Mao, Stalin and Mugabe. The annual GLOBAL Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace gives us insight into the most dangerous countries in the world, ranking 163 independent countries on how peaceful they are (or, in contradiction: how dangerous they are), with the lowers scoring countries being those technically at war (like Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Iraq, Somalia). These 163 countries were assessed using 23 indicators that were each scored on a scale of 1 to 5. The 163 countries cover more than 99.7% of the world’s population. South Africa came in at 39th, but this changed negatively after the September 2018 parliamentary report on crime compiled by the SAPS.9 The editor9 of The Star writes9:12:

“The stats paint a grim picture. They show why South Africa is in the league of countries as Belize, Honduras and Venezuela in the murder stakes.”

The antagonists therefore view inciting public remarks such as “We will not kill the Whites now” as gravely serious.9,15,18-20

3.1.5. Increasing anarchy and destruction What is anarchy?

The antagonists’ belief that the horrors of the regimes of Mao, Stalin and Mugabe can also happen in South Africa, is based on the realities of upheavals in the country. There are many examples. There has been a wave of civil disobedience over the last ten years. Poor service delivery has resulted in protests and unrest. The shortage of jobs, accessible education and training, housing and medical care is resulting in full-scale anarchy, leaving the possibility of civil war and revolution before the end of 2019. The antagonists are not alone in this thinking. The South African veteran political analyst and journalist, Barney Mthombothi21, confirms this fear when he tries to convey what anarchy is and what it means to the ordinary citizens of South Africa21: 17:

Anarchy is defined in the Collins English Dictionary as: “General lawlessness and disorder, especially when thought to result from an absence or failure of government…the absence of any guiding or uniting principle; disorder; chaos”.

That could be our destination if we’re not careful.

Mthombothi21, a wise man, fine diplomat, true patriot and excellent journalist, avoids creating panic by saying that the country is already in anarchy. The political truth is that the country is in a constant low- to mid-level stage of anarchy; it is just waiting for the interference of the politically corrupt and opportunistic Zuptiods’ and intervention by the present South African government to explode into full-scale anarchy and its accompanying revolution and civil war. This may happen as soon as the 2019 election. All South Africans have been affected by injustice and have been dreaming of a broad socio-economic correction. Inequality, poverty, unemployment and landlessness are central. It is mostly the majority of poor and landless Blacks who had hoped that the election of 27 April 1994 would bring a new, improved life and who had placed the ANC into government to do exactly that, who are really suffering. They are now starting to make the country ungovernable with unrest and violence. The antagonists see an escalation in the scope, frequency and the severity of unrest and violence.21,22

Although Whites and land owners have thus far been largely unaffected, they are aware of this growing danger, not only in terms of their future right to own land, but also their personal safety. The tragedies of Belgian Congo, Rwanda, Somali, Sudan and Zimbabwe are burned into their minds, consciously and unconsciously. As much the Whites are confused about the most likely outcome, they are also confused about addressing the matter. Their public participation has mainly centred on 1) the legality of the 1994 regime change and upholding the Constitution, and 2) the use of the court of law to force order. They see land expropriation without compensation as a social injustice and a form of civil disorder. In their view it is a stop en route to anarchy and revolution to overthrow the present democracy of South Africa.21,22 The antagonists’ undeclared fears

The antagonists have thus far failed to address their own deep-seated fears constructively in public. Their public communication lack openness surrounding their fears about anarchy, both anarchy that could result from the populace’s growing frustration with the ANC government and the anarchy that could stem from the hostility against Whites that is built into the ANC’s radical statements on land expropriation and remarks such as “kill the Boers”, “the colonist Boers stole our land”, and “land possession by Whites is a sin”. This silence of some White South Africans is the result of a fear of reprisals from the poor and landless, of being labelled as non-Africans, colonists, or being associated with radical groups such as the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). The antagonists feel that a dislike of any objection to Black wrongdoing has been cemented into the mindsets of the radicals in the ANC, EFF and PAC. This entrenched dislike of justified criticism is illustrated by the reactions to Donald Trump, who dared to publically acknowledge the problems South Africa has with land expropriation and the murders on White farmers (Can Trump be wrong to ask for an inquiry when facts show that in 2018 the average for murders per day was 57 persons in South Africa, which is six times more than the average number for the USA? The question posed to the ANC regime is: Who are these 57 murder victims and why and where did these murders happen?).14,15,21,22

The ANC regime’s growing loyalty to and association with anarchist elements are also forcing most Whites into passivity and silence, although they speak freely in private. They have to voice their concerns about a failed ANC regime, their view that expropriation without compensation amounts to theft and their doubt about Ramaphosa’s ability to serve their interests. Such a “confession” would open a conversation on land reform. It could put Donald Trump’s remark on South African land grabbing and the threat to White lives into perspective, away from the propaganda and cover-ups.12,14,15,21,22 Attitudes of apathy about criminal wrongdoing in society

Antagonists point out that the recent and current unrest and violence involve a mixed crowd of mostly Black youngsters and adults with a focus looting of shops and properties, torching vehicles and public and private buildings and occupying private or public land. In Cape Town, losses due to arson directed at the Metrorail train fleet, has topped R300 million since 2015. Just fighting off the arson and protecting passengers by means of a security team have cost Cape Town’s city council, the Cape provincial government and Prasa R48 million per annum. The police mostly stand by passively, leading to a culture of no prosecution as if they fear angering a powerful political group who may be their bosses in the near future (or as if these hooligans are already their political partners). This apathy towards criminal wrongdoing is a global phenomenon where anarchist forces are gaining control.21,23 The base of the wanton destruction is a direct outcome of the masses’ disillusionment with the ANC’s politics, elite and regime and their failed democracy.21,23

The direct outcome of the masses’ disillusionment is already clear, as Mthombothi21 writes21:17:

“We’re witnessing a level of destruction probably not seen in the country’s history, save in war”.

Indeed, in well-ordered countries with well-ordered regimes in place, this would not happen as here in South Africa where the criminals run the show and the people are left unprotected, as Mthombothi24 reflects24: 25:

“South Africa have become blasé about crime, especially the ANC’s mindset on the matter and the thousands of people’s murdering, rape and robbing every day went unnoticed, even became internalised as the normal.”

Above is an important remark by Mthombothi24, seeing that the ANC-IFP anarchy in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1990s was described as brutal and cold-blooded, at the time the most severe within the borders of post-1910 South Africa. In this context is it important for the antagonists to note that the present anarchy may have a strong racial and ethnic under build, namely Black-on White and, as in KwaZulu-Natal, Black-on-Black violence.25-27 Munusamy25 writes as follows about this forgotten history and the possible implications of a revolution for the country’s stability25:18:

“The history books reduce the violence to a bland narrative of events and statistics about the number of people killed. Articles you find online fail to adequately convey the horror of the time and the depth of human suffering in violence-ravaged parts of the province.”

Sibongakonke Shoba27, a political editor of the Sunday Times, brings us back to the murder scene in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1990s. Shoba’s warning is clear27:21:

It was not the first or last time that IFP impis raided the area. Due to KwaMashu’s proximity to Richmond Farm and Lindelani, IFP strongholds, the bloodthirsty warmongers often acted on their temptation to show off their shooting skills whenever they marched past the township.

But that Sunday they were craving more action.

We later learnt that our attackers had been bristling for action after being addressed by IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi at a rally in Durban. They were still dressed in IFP regalia, mainly T-shirts emblazoned with Buthelezi’s beaming face.

3.2. Exclusion of the poor from the ANC

The political, social and economic disillusionment of the poor and landless Blacks has become deep-seated. It is no longer simply dissatisfaction with poor service delivery, corruption, political incompetence, poverty, landlessness and homelessness. It has become an “…immense feeling of exclusion from the ANC regime, party and elite”, writes Mthombothi.21:17 He continues by commenting on the ANC elite’s failure as responsible political leaders21:17:

While apartheid excluded people by virtue of colour, the new dispensation unfortunately has its own haves and have-nots. ANC members and those close to them are “deployed” to cushy jobs in the government, get handed state contracts, live in plush suburbs and drive fancy cars.

The poor, meanwhile, can only gawk in awe and amazement at the opulence that is at last so close and so visible, but that they can neither experience nor enjoy. While the government has failed to provide basic services to the poor, it has at the same time become a generous cash cow for the rich, the powerful and the connected. The contradiction is both stunning and maddening. It’s Animal Farm all over again. The pigs are having a great time.

But, the antagonists point out, during anarchy the “prosperous pigs on the animal farm are gobbled up by a beast with the head, mouth and teeth of a dragon”: total anarchy and full revolution. The description of illegal occupations below shows how far this process had progressed.

The final words of Fikile Mbhele28, who obstinately refused with 28 other families to vacate low cost houses that they occupied illegally of the eThekwini municipality since January 2018, became a common refrain among occupiers, reflecting a total disregard for law and order28:10: “We decided we had to come here and take these houses, and secure the houses from outsiders.” Occupiers argue that as individuals with constitutional rights, they are constantly being overlooked by the ANC municipalities. Instead unrelated people from outside their traditional areas were offered houses and even councillors have become involved in illegally selling houses. The legal steps taken by the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) against the eThekwini municipality to defend the occupiers’ right to occupy in view of the failure of the ANC’s local systems to serve the individual citizen’s rights are enlightening. There is no municipal housing beneficiary list, the housing administration is substandard, residents of the area are not consulted about placements, the municipality breached the Constitution and other pieces of legislation in the handling of this housing project, while other housing projects in the city in general also lack a housing allocation policy in line with current legislation.28

This not only provides insight into the human rights violations of the ANC regime since 1994, but confirms the correctness of Mthombothi’s21 postulation, namely21:17: “…that the ANC regime has failed to provide basic services to the poor and that the political system, from the top to the lower levels, has become a generous cash cow for the ANC’s rich, powerful and connected.”

Mthombothi’s21 direct reference of the ANC’s model as21:17: “… an animal farm wherein the pigs are having a great time”, is quite applicable and descriptive, but at the same time a serious point of concern for the future of South Africa.

Ramaphosa has thus far failed to act decisively by using the security forces to end anarchy in any form or even to condemn it. This reality is reflected by his skirting the issue of violence. Does he fear “…the hubris of Zuma’s 2014 prediction that the ANC will ‘run this government forever and ever…until Jesus come back’”? A racial and ethnic bloodbath can result from Ramaphosa’s land expropriation without compensation and labelling of Whites as colonial land thieves, argues the antagonists.29

The antagonists wonder if Ramaphosa is treading carefully around Black unrest and anarchy because of his poor positioning in the NEC of the ANC. His position means that he has to refrain from angering Jacob Zuma and his strong faction. Ramaphosa is insecure about his position in the unstable ANC at this stage of his presidency in 2019. Some political analysts and other hopefuls only see a future stable country in the distance with Ramaphosa in a doubtful future role, as Bruce30 reflects30:16:

“We ordinary folk are just going to have to get used to a little uncertainty. For my part I think the Zuma crowd will gradually fade away. Whether that means Ramaphosa succeeds is another question.”

Predicting the presence of leaders like Ramaphosa and Zuma in our future political history is foolishness, the future is just too unpredictable, but seasoned politicians, historians and futurists can offer the voters various considerations. At this stage of our history, the antagonists view both Ramaphosa and Zuma as risks and persons who do not belong in respected democratic governmental regimes. Chronic anarchy has sadly become part of their rule.21,29-31

Viewed from another perspective, the antagonists’ note, the people’s despair with the ANC regime’s failure to protect them has led to behaviour recent years that could be seen as chronic anarchy, but which is in reality pure self-defence and an expression of “normal” civilian rights to address their immediate danger. Mothombothi24 focused on these “legal” self-defence behaviours as follows24:25:

Society has lost faith in the government’s ability to protect its citizens, and as a result vigilantism is on the rise. People are taking the law into their own hands.

Police Minister Fikile Mbalula seemed to lay the blame for rampart crime at the door of the police. The police should obviously take the rap; but so should the minister. The buck stops with him. The police, for instance, had been without stable leadership since the departure of the hapless Riah Phiyega as national commissioner two years ago.

And of course the crime stats have a lot in common with the horrendous economic number laid bare in parliament a day later: two sides of the same coin. A thriving economy would create jobs and take people out of crime.

3.3. The impact of contaminated international alliances on South African land grabbing

Political commentators view land expropriation fashioned after the EFF’s fantasy of wholesale confiscation of private property and banks as misleading “fake news”. However, it is not so far-fetched when considering the rhetoric of the ANC elite, many other radicals, and Ramaphosa himself on the absolute need for immediate expropriation without compensation. The view of the retire politician, Tony Leon, touches on a nerve. He reflects on the ANC’s radical new land redistribution and the inclusion of Julius Malema and the EFF as part of the unstoppable future radical rulers of South Africa. He compares the resulting future of South Africa to that created by political leaders Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. Leon’s32 comments read as follows32:18:

He [Nicolás Maduro] and his late predecessor [Hugo Chávez] implemented an EFF-style programme of uncosted giveaways, at war with private production or even basic economics, reducing what was once the richest country in the hemisphere to beggary.

Inflation is recorded at 13 000%, the world’s highest, and prices of basic foods, mostly now imported, double every month. But eventually fact-free economics wearies the truest of believers, and very few bothered even to vote last weekend.

One fed-up Chavista, Carlos Gonzales, 64, who abstained, put a price on his disillusion. “My monthly pension is only enough to buy one frozen chicken…”

The radical propagandists have already decided on the outcome of the parliamentary hearings on possible land reform. There is only one outcome they find acceptable: extreme land reform. The antagonists feel that it clear that the radicals will force down radical land reform, whether or not it could end in revolution, rebellion, war or a second Rwanda.33 Malema33 himself stated publically on 22 July 2018 that if revolution breaks out33:3: “…the EFF will join in to empowers the previously oppressed to have access to the land”.

In the view of the antagonists, chronic anarchy is evident from the illegal land occupations all over South Africa. These occur outside the boundaries set by Section 25(2)(b) or any other legal interpretation of the Constitution. Examples include occupations in Alexandra, Klipfontein, Waterfall, Johannesburg, and Hermanus in the Western Cape. Ramaphosa spoke out against unlawful land occupation in March 2018 and called on the police to clamp down on it (like taking down 100 illegal structures at the end of March 2018 in Alexandra and arresting five persons). He also told MPs the adopted parliamentary resolution on expropriation without compensation is not a call for “a smash-and-grab-guideline”. However, the land grabbing is gaining momentum and Ramaphosa has become very quiet on the matter. Land-related incidents – resistance against evictions, land invasions and land protests – numbered 70 between 2013 and 2017. Of these 84% occurred in metros, with only 16% occurring in rural areas. However, a finding of the Institute for Security Studies that there has recently been a flare-up with 41 of these conflicts taking place in 2017. Of the 70 incidents, as many as 71% turned violent, with again the most in 2017. In KwaZulu-Natal, housing offices in Zwelihle, a library and a satellite police station were set on fire recently. Even farms in the historic Tea Estate area in Inanda, owned by Black small-scale farmers who farm on the land and hold deeds to it, have been targeted by Black occupiers. It is reported that in April 2018 some of the Black land invaders and grabbers near Durban flattened a sugar-cane crop to make way for their illegal houses.34-37

In his overview of the looming anarchy, Umraw38 reflects that the City of Cape Town reported a 74% increase in land invasions year on year; that in Gauteng one man was killed and four people injured in protests over land, while various property developments in KwaZulu-Natal were stopped due to illegal occupation of land by squatters.38

In the Free State about 100 inhabitants of the Monyakeng Township at Wesselsbron, started in August 2018 to erect plots on a farm, while the same happened in August on a Stellenbosch wine farm. In both cases the farmers alleged the efforts were well-organised and started after Ramaphosa’s announcement on expropriation. Jansen39 reports as follows on the Stellenbosch’s farmer’s reaction39:4:

“Things just happened to smooth and the structures are erected on an organised way. Here stands sometimes gleaming cars around. I understand the structures are being given at R350 each to the people and that prominent ANC-men are involved. He said that the police ignore the complaints or arrived hours later.” [Own translation].

Also, the Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) veterans joined the fight from in KwaZulu-Natal in April 2018 by illegally occupying units in the Masinge housing project in Margate, flats in Cornubia, Durban and the Aloe Ridge social housing complex in Pietermaritzburg, ignoring court orders. Nair reports that there are hundreds of members of the MK Military Veterans Association who have been illegally occupying housing developments across KwaZulu-Natal.34-37

Themba Mavundla37 shows how serious this has become when he, as the provincial chairman of the MK Military Veterans Association, reveals their aggressive and hostile intentions by saying37:4:

“They need the houses. This has been going on for years and nothing to do with land expropriation. We won’t back down.”

The initial fight for rural land has spilled over into urban areas between 2017 and 2018. Gift Maboke35, a community leader from Alexandra, paints a picture of this future of conflict outside the legal system35:4:

…none of the city’s vacant land [urban] was safe from occupation. ‘Any [vacant] land we see we are going to attack [regardless] if it is owned privately or by the city’; and

…the fight for land was shared by all poor and disenfranchised people across South Africa. ‘We are not talking about Alexandra [Johannesburg] only. It’s not us alone. We are talking about all townships and people who do not have land or accommodation. We are together’

In reaction to these illegal actions even Nomaindia Mfeketo, the Minister of Human Settlements, could not rule out more recently the possibility that the President’s (and the parliamentarians’) announcement about the land expropriation without compensation has been “misconstrued” by poor Black communities and sent an “incorrect message” to the poor. However much the ANC regime would like to argue, the antagonists point out that illegal land occupation has become an unstoppable movement.36,37 It is with good reason that Collins40 writes40:4:

“No vacant land in the city is safe from occupation”.

In the context of Ramaphosa’s possible indirect instigation of land grabbing,35,36 Mfeketo36 replies36:4:

“Well, that might be. Not only in Cape Town, Gugulethu, Khayelitsha and Waterfall – you’ve seen people who think they have arrived. ‘This is our opportunity to land-grab’.”

Mfeketo36 and Collins’s35 concerns about a troubled future South Africa relates to Ramaphosa’s public announcement on the night of 31 July 2018 at 22:00 on land grabbing. He claimed that Whites hold 87% of the land. He has promised to take it away without compensation, and there is no turn-around for him now without evoking revolution, as Julius Malema warned him.40 Consider Ramaphosa’s main argument of land expropriation in his speech to Black professionals at a September 2018 business breakfast in Pietermaritzburg41:4:

“Happen it shall, whether people like it or not; it is going to happen”.

He promised that the ANC regime only wanted41:4: “…an equal balance in land ownership because an alleged 87% of South Africa’s land had been given before 1994 to a minority population (Whites).”

However, the rest of the speech reveals confusion about what balance would entail41:4: “We are saying that the equation has to be balanced, and because we are balanced people and we are not mad, we are going to do it in a responsible manner, but we are not going to turn away from making sure it does happen.”

The antagonists read much (and not always positive) into Ramaphosa’s remark that: “…we are balanced people, we are not mad, we are going to do it in a responsible way”.41

The prominent question for the antagonists is: If Ramaphosa and his inner group are so balanced, why do they need an urgent change to Section 25 and why did Ramaphosa ignore the outcome of the parliamentary commission’s testing of the public’s opinion on the matter? The antagonists interpret this kind of autocratic behaviour by Ramaphosa as intentional invitation of revolutionary thinking and behaviour. His political revolutionary arrogance is visible when he says41:4:

Land expropriation without compensation is going to happen whether South Africans, US President Donald Trump and the UN General Assembly like it or not,


I am going to explain it without any fear and I am going to say: ‘This is us. Take us or leave us’.

Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi42, the leader of the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP), referred to the above remarks as an act of blunt disrespect for parliament, while the FW de Klerk foundation42 highlighted Ramaphosa’s abuse of the national broadcaster. He made the announcement as the leader of a political party (president of the ANC) but made it seem as if he was doing it as President of South Africa via the parliament. This reflects the different governmental setups of South Africa since 1994: 1) up to the end of Zuma’s reign there was a tripartite setup with a Zupta grouping under Zuma (highest), followed by Luthuli House (middle) and parliament (lowest), while now 2) the Ramaphosa government has a bipartite setup, driven at the highest level by Luthuli House’s ANC NEC, with the parliament powerless on the lowest level. This spells the presence of chronic anarchy, not only reflected by the delinquent behaviour of the poor and landless Blacks, but also the behaviour rooted in the power of the ANC elite.42

The antagonists point out that they have heard this kind of rhetoric of saying one thing and doing the opposite, from autocrats like Robert Mugabe, Idi Amin, Nicolás Maduro. Ramaphosa and his elite speak on behalf of the people, but they echo the autocratic and revolutionary speak of the pre-1994 ANC.27,42

The above, in the view of the antagonists, signals the arrival of the final, official stage of land grabbing. It reverts to the unruliness that characterised the ANC as a revolutionary organisation. Returning to symbolically speaking of the injustice of land ownership is impossible in 2018. ANC radicals like the MK veterans now want action. Ramaphosa’s36 early warning36:4: “We are not going to accept land grabs”, had become empty words as protesters (who belong to his group) not only said they are going to practice land grabbing, but did it36:4:

“We have taken our land. Don’t worry about building us houses, we will build our own. Just give as water”.

Most of all, Ramaphosa now promotes this behaviour with his latest public remarks on land grabbing. Any future efforts to stop the radical ideology of dramatic land reform have become impossible: he himself preaches it. The antagonists indicate that there are various other radical actions of the ANC regime that promote illegal land grabbing and that disempower White farmers on their own land. The Extension of Security of Tenure Act for instance works against White farmers. This Act specifically provides for security of tenure by regulating farm occupation. It describes the rights of farm dwellers when facing eviction and provides recourse when they are evicted by White farmers. The antagonists see this piece of legislation as another step towards forcing land redistribution by reducing the rights of the legal owner and making eviction costly. In many cases this poses a risk to the property and the life of the legal owner.43

The Ramaphosa regime finds itself, as the Chávez-Maduro brotherhood in Venezuela did, within a context of empowered autocrats, opportunists, psychopaths and crooks, as a journalist reports44:16:

“It was only a matter of time before the total disregard for the law and the constitution that was shown by our leaders in recent years trickled down to the masses. The media exposed countless allegations of wrongdoing – including the blatant looting by the Gupta family and their associates. But no one has been sent to prison.”

The antagonists feel that the foundations have been laid for anarchy and the destruction of the socio-economic and political order. Ramaphosa’s land expropriation only adds to the chaos.44

The current total disregard for the law and the Constitution has its origins in Zuma’s compromise of credible institutions of law enforcement. The editor45 of the Sunday Times wrote on 26 August 201845:20:

“The hawks were heavily compromised during the looting period, and led by buffoon. The same with the National Prosecuting Authority, led by a lame sheep who had no clue what it meant to use prosecutorial powers.”

The Zondo Commission of Inquiry has shown that there is more than enough to prosecute several looters of the state coffers, but the new Ramaphosa regime has taken no action.45

The uncontrollability of the masses is also reflected in the sudden resurgence (August 2018) of xenophobia (a reminiscent of the explosion of xenophobic violence in May 2008) in the trade sectors in Soweto and other Gauteng townships. It has led to at least four deaths and the looting of the shops of many foreign shopkeepers, forcing them to flee. What is worrying in this specific context is the murderous aggression directed at Black non-South Africans (an identity class that includes the Whites as so-called colonists) and the ANC regime’s failure to do something about these behaviours. The editorial46 of the Sunday Times reflects as follows46:24:

“Successfully prosecutions are few, as police stand idly by, often doing little more than helping shop owners escape the wrath of the mob. It is a blight on a democratic SA.”

The researcher Jean Pierre Misago47 of the African Centre for Migration and Society at Wits University’s conclusion on the base of these Soweto attacks is hair-raising47:12:

Communities find different reasons for attacks. They mobilise people by feeding them stories that are not necessarily correct.

This is a clear case of xenophobia violence. In previous instances WhatsApp messages calling for violence have originated from local business associations, whose members want to get rid of foreign competition.

For the antagonists Misago47 hits the spot with his identification of ethnic crimes and the bad intentions of people who have failed to compete and then fell back on anarchic behaviour, like land and asset grabbing. Consider the xenophobic remark directed at foreign Black shop owners by Rose Nkosi, the president of the South African Spaza and Tuckshop Association (SASTA), accusing them of “creaming our people”. Members of SASTA even marched to the office of Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba, demanding that he stop foreigners running spaza shops.47

A Somali, Abdi Sala48, whose shop was plundered for the fourth time in seven years in Soweto, cut the xenophobia of South Africa to the bone48:12:

“[Black] South Africans are spoilt. When the electricity goes off they loot, if they don’t have water they loot, [if they are unhappy about] no jobs then they rob the shops.”

The antagonists see the intended grabbing of White land by the ANC elite is just looting, equally to that of foreigners’ spaza shops. The ANC regime has become spoilt by the ease of their political self-enrichment since 1994.

The antagonists do not doubt that the same xenophobia awaits them if land grabbing under the guardianship of Ramaphosa is allowed to continue without direct and fierce resistance from the government.9,47 The editorial46 of the Sunday Times of 2 September is further very informative46:24:

“Looting is usually a sign of a society in an advanced state of social decay, suggesting rising public desperation and a breakdown in law and order.”

In this context the question of the antagonists is relevant: What are land grabbing other than looting and the destruction of law and order in South Africa? And what else is looting and the breakdown of law and order than anarchy?46

3.4. Mbeki’s ANC of 1994 versus Ramaphosa’s ANC of 2018

The arrival of Jacob Zuma and thereafter Cyril Ramaphosa as presidents of the ANC, making them at the same time also the presidents of the Republic of South Africa, introduced a new climate of political and judicial estrangement from the “old” ANC with leaders such as Thabo Mbeki. The radicalism that arrived after the ousting of the corrupted Jacob Zuma seems to be radiated by Luthuli House, which has almost become the only and highest policy- and decision-making body in the country. Former Jacob Zuma and his post-2018 ANC NEC are still quite central to this radicalism. The public often think of this radicalism as coming from the younger generation (with a root like Julius Malema), but this is not true. It is instigated and fuelled by the older, rigid ANC leadership who grew up in the old but now mostly outdated Russian political mentality of extreme Marxism (although it is now becoming more reminiscent of fascism). The present issue around land ownership reflects this radicalism. There is suddenly extreme discrimination against the Whites as a minority racial group, together with prominent fascistic behaviour reflected specifically by some of the ANC’s top leaders in the selective execution of this racism and discrimination. (This political ideology stands parallel to China’s extreme discriminative behaviours and manhandling of its various minority groups that the world comfortably ignores. Note here the intimate relationship between the ANC elite and the Chinese regime).46

Revolution and liberation, used to obtain political power and self-enrichment, are still central to the thinking of the likes of Jacob Zuma, as it was in the 1960s. The schizophrenic ANC cabinet of 2019 Ramaphosa’s constant efforts to please the older revolutionary ANC leaders in his NEC, makes the ANC of 2019 a totally different entity than the 1994 party that introduced democracy to all South Africans for the first time. Munusamy49 presents the antagonists with a good guideline in this context when she says49:22:

“We are stuck with the same old problems because we are stuck with the same old leaders in the same old electoral system”.

Land grabbing in this context is thus not a surprise, but the normal way of governing. Indeed, the antagonists postulate, it would have been the way some of the ANC leaders of 1994 went about if they had a free hand at the time.49

The following three subdivisions compare the ANC of 1994 with the ANC of 2019. The sections examine: 1) the schizophrenic ANC cabinet of 2019; 2) a farewell to the Freedom Charter of 1955; and 3) a new Ramaphosa and his new ANC.

3.4.1. The schizophrenic ANC cabinet of 2018-2019

Reflecting on Ramaphosa’s present aggressive and conflicting behaviour, specifically with reference to Whites and land expropriation, Munusamy49 takes the antagonists back into the past by reflecting the prominent role players who created a schism between the ANC’s present and past49:22:

“When Ramaphosa made changes to former president Jacob Zuma’s cabinet at the end of February [2018] he retained the configuration of portfolios and fired 10 ministers. He kept some of the worst-performing members, ostensibly to avoid causing too much turmoil within the ANC by purging the Zuma faction.”

But, in 2018 things became worse for the antagonists as the Zuma faction successfully reassembled with the controversial and politically stained Ace Magashule as ANC secretary-general. He quickly repositioned himself as a replacement for Ramaphosa, should the Zuma faction succeed with a campaign to re-establish Zuma and his cronies in the ANC. This is where good politics and sound economics stumble: the Zuma faction is still revolutionary and they target the masses with misleading and hostile political scripts. The Zuma faction at Luthuli House and in the Ramaphosa cabinet is using the country’s old electoral system to strengthen and to spread their outdated Marxist radical ideology and to re-profile the ANC as a liberation organisation for poor Blacks (while opportunistic enrich them selves at the coats of these poor) . Absolute loyalty to the ANC with the interest of the country in second place is a big part of this ideology.49 It makes the entry of honourable and patriotic leaders with progressive political and economic ideas very difficult, as Munusamy49 reflects49:22:

“There is little prospect of fresh, talented and upstanding leaders who are making strides in other sectors of society entering public office because the political space is so toxic and dominated by the same old faces.”

The end result, posit the antagonists, is that South African politics has become “hollow and acrimonious”, returning the same (many times corrupted and radical) people to parliament, over and over, to take the party on wrong political paths to fulfil these politicians’ opportunistic and delinquent aims and needs.49

The South African electoral system offers the ANC as a party and individual politicians the opportunity to stay on in leadership positions for any length of time. At the same time it offers them the opportunity to promote conflict and revolutionary ideas via an untouchable circle of deviant MPs and MPLs, as reflected by the untouchability of Jacob Zuma. The antagonists believe that if this system had been improved, the changes of the ANC to be in power in 2019 would have been zero. Leaders like Zuma, Ramaphosa or Magashule would never have been appointed in executive political positions. It is only the South African courts and judicial commissions that could break up many of these political evils resulting from the failed electoral system. However, the faulty electoral system is still with us, serving the Zuma faction (and the Ramaphosa faction) and their radicalism (and this will happen during and after the 2019 election), favouring a specific leader with specific cronies. This dilemma of political power within the ANC since 1994 is well illustrated for the antagonists by the intended land grabbing plan of the ANC elite. The radicals in favour of land grabbing are uncontrollable by the electorate from the outside. They can ignore their voters’ wishes and demands in terms of the present false democratic method of voting in parliament, seen as representatives of the people.49

Munusamy49 very precisely describes this failed system that led to the autocratic rule of South Africa since 1994 by a fascist ANC government49:22:

The country has not grappled with the prospect of electoral reform, even though the current system has proved inadequate in terms of public accountability. The proportional representation system means that MPs and MPLs are accountable to party bosses rather than to the electorate. The Zuma years showed how difficult it is to hold presidents accountable when they are protected by their party.

Mcebisi Jonas50, a former deputy finance minister, ANC member and a presidential investment envoy openly challenged the political ills of the ANC. “To save the South African democracy requires focus on its people and their interests and not the political party”, writes Jonas50:22. The presence of populism and revolutionism, as reflected by the Ramaphosa regime with its uncontrolled land grabbing policy, has the tendency to amplify a vicious cycle of declining legitimacy in governance, reduced investment, rising unemployment and increased social tension, says Jonas50. For him the present societal crisis in South Africa under the reign of the present ANC came about because the ANC lost its moral, ethical and political integrity. As an entity they need a positive turn-about, they should even be forced to such a turning by the public50:22:

“Civil society mass action and activism against corruption tended to be about fixing the ANC”.

Jonas50 posits further50:22:

“But we must also acknowledge that our nation has lost its way. SA is at a crossroads. One path follows current trends – rent-seeking, corruption, declining state legitimacy, reduced investment, economic stagnation, inequality band social tensions”.

Jonas50 says that when it comes to standing for the interests of citizens, democracy and the country against the interests of the party (which in many cases represents the masked agendas of corrupted leaders), the interests of the people should come first. The antagonists fully agree. Jonas’s guidelines for political correctness and warning of a growing decay of law and order, is clear50:22:

“We all have a responsibility to stabilize our democracy and chart a new economic path. This needs a new agenda and orientation in civil society, premised on the fact that in every revolution, the people are primary – everything else is secondary.”

This includes the false patriotism and false love for the people while the integrity of the leader in question is already compromised by a personal and political pathology of sole self-enrichment and -empowerment. The masked agendas behind the intended land expropriation without compensation are undoubtedly often anchored in personal and political pathology, making it unstoppable as the delinquent leader gains more power. The antagonists fear that it is no longer possible to save the democracy, especially given the ANC’s courting of China and Russia.50

Thabo Mbeki51 comments on the above dynamic in a 30-page covenant, denunciating land expropriation without compensation. The document is not only immensely informative about the present identity of the ANC, but is also shocking as it shows how the ANC as an initially progressive party for all South Africans has deteriorated in only a decade. It has become a racist party; corrupt to its core and focused on the progress a small group of Blacks (This political manoeuvre stripped the ANC of its hard-fought political integrity, putting it fully into the league of the despotic and racial National Party of pre-1994 South Africa). Mthombothi51 refers to these 30 pages offered by Mbeki as the Mbeki intervention on land grabbing.51 He writes as follows in this regard51:21:

“It’s almost as if he’s saying those in charge of the organization [ANC] neither know what they’re doing nor understand the implication of their actions”.

The antagonists are well aware of the possible impact of the plans of the schizophrenic ANC cabinet of 2019 on the future rights of Whites as land owners. The antagonists feel that they have much to fear.

3.4.2. A farewell to the Freedom Charter of 1955

Putting his arguments, opinions and viewpoint on the ANC’s current political delinquency in perspective, Thabo Mbeki51 charts the evolution of the ANC as an organisation from its founding in 1912 and reflects prominent events in its history. The drafting of the Freedom Charter in Kliptown in 1955 stands out, as do the breakaway of the Africanists in 1958 and the expulsion of the Gang of Eight in 1969, events that have shaped the ANC to unite all South Africans specific under a non-racial and non-discriminative policy as guided by the Freedom Charter. Mthombothi51 points out that Mbeki bases his view of the wrongness of the expropriation of land without compensation from Whites on two fundamental prescriptions in the Freedom Charter, namely 1) South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White; and 2) that the land shall be shared among those who work it. With land grabbing, both these prescriptions will be violated. Mbeki responds51:21:

“If the ANC abandons these two principles and strategic positions”, he says: “…it must accept that it is turning its back on its historical position as ‘the parliament of the people’”.

In this context the expropriation of land from one national group without compensating them to redistribute it to another national group is a radical departure from the traditional ANC and its prescription to trustworthy policies, cemented into its culture over 105 years. Mthombothi51 reflects as follows on Ramaphosa’s policy on land ownership (in conflict with the Charter)51:21:

“SA belongs to all who live in it, black and white, except as this relates to land”, and “All national groups are equal before the law, except as this concerns land”.

The Freedom Charter’s land clause, dated 1955, is not the only guidance Mbeki had for his political arguments on racial freedom and race-free property ownership. The clear declaration of 1955 is also reaffirmed by an ANC document issued after the historic conference in Tanzania in 1969, making it clear that the ANC was cognisant that the redistribution of land would include all race groups, writes Tabane52:6:

“It makes bold to say that the restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended and all lands shall be open to ownership and use by all people irrespective of race.”

Mbeki’s recent pamphlet is clear of the “second phase of transition” ideology that is driving the present Ramaphosa land grabbing initiative. The insecurity of the Ramaphosa faction is evident from the personal attack on Mbeki because he dared to doubt their lack of knowledge about the ANC’s history and principles and their lack of integrity. The infective language of the secretary-general of the ANC when he called on Mbeki “to shut up” shows where the ANC leadership is in 2019. Tabane brings us back to reality when he posits52:6:

“The current position is at best misguided and at worst a demonstration of the loss of its moral compass by the ANC – and the fact that it is purely fictional to consider the ANC a leader of society anymore.”

Looking closely at Mbeki’s pamphlet, it is clear for the antagonists that the current ANC’s character has changed, as did its mission at the recent 54th national conference. As a party it has transformed to where Jacob Zuma has long wanted it, namely an exclusively Black party, recognising it self that it does not represent all the people of South Africa anymore. Where the “old” ANC always regarded itself as the absolute opposite of the Apartheid NP that divided people along racial lines, there is now a “new” ANC that is dividing people along racial lines. There is no hope that the current ANC would change back to 1994, recalling its new 2018 policy on land grabbing. The ANC has changed permanently because the country’s political terrain has changed drastically. It has become radical, making it the home of selfish, opportunistic and political radicals who lack the conscience of the cadres of the “old” ANC. After testing the politics for 24 years, the ANC has become a Black NP that cannot recognise its own 1955 roots. It’s a new political party with a new vision and mission, the old name just remained. This outcome spells doom for Whites in general, and White land owners specifically, according to the antagonists.51,52

Mthomboth51 puts words to this state of affairs with his decisive conclusion on the “new” ANC51:21:

It’s now operating in a different setting. It is no longer waging a thankless liberation war away in the deserts of exile, but it’s now back home in the lap of luxury and in charge of the most sophisticated economy on the continent. It’s no longer led by the selfless, wise old men and women who sacrificed everything for the good of all, but it’s now controlled by BEE types, shysters, a thug or two and the odd murderer, all in it for a slice of the action. Greed now trumps selflessness.

Whites, the antagonists say, must note Mthombothi’s51 unwritten conclusion: they can expect much more political delinquency from Ramaphosa (or from Ace Magashule, if he and the Zuma faction successfully oust Ramaphosa in 2019 and redeploy Ramaphosa in a subordinate role to Luthuli House). Ramaphosa’s actions, especially with regard to land grabbing, can ultimately be much worse than Zuma’s endeavours.50-53

3.4.3. The new Ramaphosa and his new ANC

Munusamy’s51 description of what is wrong with the “new” ANC offers two warnings. Firstly, the expectations of the poor and landless Blacks will never be met. The leaders of the new ANC have other intentions with the land they want to confiscate. Secondly, it does not matter how failed and corrupted the whole exercise of land grabbing turns out, the antagonists should accept that land expropriation without compensation is here to stay as long as the “new” ANC rules. This can only change if the ANC loses at the ballot box. Munusamy49 is clear49:22:

How do we find the path to basic human decency and morality when we surrender our country to an endless cycle of power-drunk, greedy people who exploit our vulnerabilities and have no desire to help the people they serve?

In the cabinet, in parliament, in provincial government and in municipalities, there are too many people who see their positions as entitlement to wealth and perks.

Unless there is a complete overhaul of society and the political system, there is little chance of the deadwood being cast out and inspirational, resourceful and courageous leaders rising.

When the ANC radicalism is examined more closely, it is clear that their growing political relationship with autocratic Russia and China is a crucial element. These countries were the ANC’s best companions during Apartheid. Although the ANC leaders see South Africa as the opposite of China when it comes to human rights and the suppression of individual freedom and human engineering to suit communism, the ANC’s outdated version of communism and their autocratic behaviour, including land grabbing, make the two twins. The ANC masks this with false friendly and opportunistic contact with democracies like the US, Japan, Europe, in an effort to profile “democracy”. When Ramaphosa announced his land grabbing intention he first visited China to obtain “approval”, which he of course “received” indeed, while at the same time he dared South African Whites, the UN and Trump to test his right to make a radical decision on the matter. Since 1994 the ANC has slowly decreased contact with democracies like Europe, the US and Japan while they made friends with political radicals, not only China and Russia, but Zimbabwe, Venezuela and Brazil (and even Libya under the late Kaddafi).49-56

Under Ramaphosa China is, as under the Zuma regime, selectively respecting South Africa’s sovereignty in economic relations and interests. Munusamy and Mbeki are wrong to expect a positive overhaul of Ramaphosa politics. These politics were already “overhauled” by China and Russia into political, social and economic radicalism where the racial factor of the White man is central. Ramaphosa and his cronies indeed see a “White problem” that must be addressed. Julius Malema has found a comrade at last.49-56

The current South Africa of Cyril Ramaphosa and his cronies are not at ease with White rights, privileges, benefits and riches. Land expropriation without compensation ignores the ANC’s founding manifesto. The ANC has lost its golden past. This makes the ANC elders like Thabo Mbeki and most of the Whites strangers in South Africa.

The antagonists believe, as Mbeki illustrates, that the radical ANC under Ramaphosa and his followers will take the last pieces of land from the back pockets of Whites in the near future.

3.5. Lies and myths versus facts and truths

The antagonists see multiple facts, lies, myths and truths that surround the ANC elite’s rejection of the 1994 dispensation’s land redistribution programme. So far most of these lies and myths remain unchallenged. The ANC regime’s perspective and untested allegations to justify their right to take land should be addressed, evaluated and be put into perspective. This is done in the following eight subdivisions, namely: 1) the people’s dissatisfaction with the 1994–2018 dispensation’s land redistribution; 2) Blacks prefer land occupations above the option of financial compensation for land lost between 1913 and 1994; 3) a large group of aspiring Black farmers is waiting for rural land; 4) the ANC has a clear expropriation and redistribution plan for the greater Black South African community; 5) there is an urgent need to balance the racial demographics of the country’s land and home ownership by placing Blacks in traditionally White areas; 6) the ANC has since 1994 successfully guided poor Blacks to financial independence; 7) Blacks are indigenous South Africans and Whites are European settlers; and 8) the Tsar and Stalin’s collective farm projects in rural Russia were great successes.

3.5.1. The people’s dissatisfaction with the 1994–2019 dispensation’s land redistribution

The ANC has publically claimed that the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution programme was characterised by incompleteness and dissatisfaction and that the programme did not deliver on the promise of transferring the prescribed land to Blacks as agreed by the 1994 dispensation and the Constitution. In their view, this makes land grabbing an absolute need. However, Opperheimer3 offers evidence to the contrary. Opperheimer3 posits that according to the Institute of Race Relations (IRR), the Land Claims Court has resolved more than 95% of the claims that have arisen in the past 23 years in terms of the 1994 dispensation’s prescriptions. More than 1.8 million individuals have received compensation in the form of pay-outs or land.3,58 Omri van Zyl58, the executive director of Agri SA, puts the amount paid towards redistribution at R45 billion and the amount paid towards land reform at R43 billion.

According to Opperheimer3 fewer than 3 500 (out of 76 000) or 5% of the claims remain unresolved. This gives an average of 3 152 claims resolved per annum of the total 73 500 claims successfully addressed since 1994. The still 3 500 outstanding claims will take at most one or two more years to complete (more or less to be completed in 2020) if the present debacle around land expropriation without compensation doesn’t hinder the process. There is no evidence of any incompleteness or dissatisfaction around land transformation as run by the 1994–2019 governments. There is no urgent need or reason to address the remaining 5% of claims with such an “attack” on White land ownership without compensation. The land transformation agreed upon in 1994 has, in the view of the antagonists, basically been completed.3

What is most worrying for the antagonists, given the near completion of the process, is that the ANC suddenly wants to “enlarge the pie” of land ownership at cost of their initial partner, the Whites. This breach of contract by the ANC regime under Ramaphosa needs the attention of the Constitutional Court.3 It is clear for the antagonists that the ANC regime’s claim of dissatisfaction among “the people” in relation to the 1994–2019 dispensation’s land redistribution is without any base. The 1994 to 2019 land reform programme served the people well.

For the antagonists is it clear that the new ANC and its merry men will not be pacified easily. They are into stealing and doing harm to the White farmers. For the opponents the ANC elite’s present intention of land grabbing is only a smokescreen for other future trespasses against Whites.

3.5.2. Land occupation versus financial compensation

With reference to the ANC’s argument that the majority of Blacks prefer land to cash pay-outs, reports showed as early as 2013 that of the roughly 76 000 rural land restitution claims disposed in terms of the described programme as decided by the 1994 agreement, more than 70 000 (91.5%) of the claimants had chosen to take compensation in cash rather than reoccupy the land they had lost. This means that of the 95% cases resolved, the choice of compensation in the form of receiving land per se as a vehicle for compensation, only 8% of the beneficiaries chose to receive land.3

The antagonists’ counter-argument is that the ANC’s recent claim of an absolute need for land for the poor and landless Blacks and for farming per se, is false. This finding means that the 1994 agreement worked well. The antagonists suspect that the land issue is being put forward by the ANC to mask the motives of some Black political leaders and radicals in the ANC. Political delinquency seems central to the whole land expropriation issue. The fact that 92% of Black land claimants did not wish to take back their ancestral land serves as proof for the antagonists that there is no drive for land on the side of the masses.3

For the antagonists there is enough evidence that a transfer of White land to Blacks is not the dramatic political issue of the moment; nor is there evidence of great numbers of Black farmers in rural areas. The resolution of the remaining 5% of cases is almost insignificant and cannot be the reason for the supposed great disappointment with the 1994 to 2018 redistribution programme. The statement of the propagandists that claimants prefer land occupation over and above financial compensation for land lost between 1913 and 1994 can therefore be rejected.3

3.5.3. Aspiring Black farmers waiting for rural land

There is a specific argument that there is an immense need and opportunity for more commercial Black farmers in South Africa’s rural areas. This contradicts the experience of the White farming community and the organised and formal business sector. Their data on land redistribution is often more scientific and analytical, free of emotional rhetoric. The organised farming and formal business sectors fully support land redistribution and underwrite its urgency, but in an orderly manner.3,59,60

The antagonists also point to the fact that replacing White farmers with Black ones will only accommodate a fraction of the poor and landless Blacks, making the whole exercise a failure from day one. A disaster is looming if there is no large-scale job creation outside the agricultural sector for the rest of the 90% of poor and jobless Blacks, whether or not land redistribution comes into effect. The large contingent of unemployed and untrained Blacks is becoming a national disaster that could easily result in anarchy.3,59-61

Exacerbating the problem of the contingent of poor and landless Blacks is the hard fact of a negative growth in the agriculture sector as reflected in September 2018 (-24%). [In this context of negativity, the estimated growth for South Africa for 2018 is between 1.2% and 1.8%, meaning the ANC regime’s economy has stagnated and technically fallen into recession].3,59,60

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has reported in 2018 that Africa’s urban population will double within a generation, contradicting the point of masses of people wanting to occupy rural land. The fact is that Africa’s peasantry is dying off. This phenomenon, as already cited in this subdivision with tested facts, is also present in South Africa. Farming has become one of the less lucrative South Africa careers, and farming has become very expensive and time-consuming. The number of commercial farmers is already on the decrease due to problems such as the cash flow needed for mechanisation and the risks involved in farming.4,51,59,61

The ANC should in fact focus on more urban land for housing for Black working citizens. Ramphele4 points out this reality when she writes4:21:

“The fourth myth is that land restitution is mainly a rural and farming matter. Cape Town, the seat of parliament, exemplifies the cruelty of the failure to redress the spatial geography of apartheid cities.”

It is clear from the above evidence that there is not an immense group of aspiring Black farmers waiting for rural land. It is a false postulation and a myth. The evidence also reflects that even if there was truly a large group awaiting farmland, the farming environment lacks the potential to accommodate them.

3.5.4. The ANC’s plan

The antagonists point out that the ANC regime has failed to offer the public full legal and descriptive details on the land expropriation matter. The whole initiative is driven by and based on Malema and Ramaphosa’s rhetoric, while a simple basic plan on paper remains absent. If expropriation without compensation is really on the cards, how long will the process be? Who will hold the title deeds? How will Black beneficiaries be selected? Will new Black farmers receive funding or mentoring? How will viable and sustainable markets be created? How will the correct produce be selected? How will this affect the short- and long-term food security of the country and what would be the specific role of Black farmers in this regard?3,59-61

This vagueness is worrying, seeing that the ANC’s similar processes of BEE and AAA to uplift the “poor non-Whites” since 1994 could not attain true success and are still in running, seemingly indefinitely. The vagueness of the 1994 programme mostly favoured the ANC elite. The antagonists stress that Ramaphosa has thus far offered only empty emotional and political rhetoric, filled with aggression against Whites. The ANC regime’s knowledge on implementing such a system stops with its various spokespersons’ rhetoric, basically because they are “uneducated, untrained and inexperienced on the complicated processes around land expropriation”.3,59-61

The formal business sector has also requested a guideline and constructive plan from the ANC. Barron63 makes it clear that the political intention of expropriation is one thing, but successful implementation based on sound ethic, business, economic, judicial and cognitive principles, is something total different. Besides that, it can be very complicated and time-consuming, and can be devastating to economic and political stability if it goes awry. Just defining a theoretical framework (hopefully by outside experts) can take up to three years. Implement such a “sound” theoretical plan in practice can takes a further five to ten years. The programme implemented in 1994 has not been concluded after 24 years. This estimate does not even include rejection by the formal business sector or experts if the framework is developed by opportunistic, foolish and short-sighted law-makers and political radicals in the contaminated ANC, EFF and PAC. Verwoerd and his followers attempted similar folly in 1955 with the Tomlinson Commission, which recommended that the best political, social and economic solution for South Africa would be to dismantle Apartheid. The Tomlinson Commission predicted the current dilemma.3,59-61

Barron63 quotes the insights of Professor Mills63, head of the University of Cape Town Graduate School of Business on land redistribution63:9:

The government needs to spell out how expropriation without compensation will feed into the National Development Plan and contribute to the overall national development objectives of the country.

What is their priority? Is it land expropriation or creating jobs? Young people living in rural areas want to live in urban areas. They are not interested in farming or land, they want jobs. So what is expropriation without compensation going to do for them? How is it going to bring them jobs?

Hereto Makgoba64 also writes64:21:

“I have not heard anyone [ANC] spell out an overarching vision which takes all the complex practical and emotional factors into account. Nor have I heard a satisfactory answer to the fundamental question: expropriation to do what?”

Ramphele4 refers to the ANC regime failure to offer an appropriate plan of land redistribution as4:21: “…the lack of a national spatial plan due to the lack of political will at all levels of government to tackle land reform”.

The formal farming and business sectors view Ramaphosa’s62 talk of land redistribution (with or without compensation) as unclearly formulated. His guarantees that the outcome will not hurt the economy or foreign investment in the short or long term are unspecific and undoubtedly open to various political and judicial interpretations. The antagonists see either a lack of a sound understanding of basic economics, or the deliberate masking of radicalism. Indeed, Ramaphosa’s hesitation when it comes to making clear decisions and his growing vague rhetoric, signals possible ulterior motives in the view of the antagonists.65

The antagonists and formal business sector fear that land redistribution will hurt the economy, and the ANC’s nonchalance about this worries them. They also feel that it would destabilise racial relations in South Africa to the same extent that Apartheid did.65

3.5.5. Balancing the demography with land ownership

The ANC regime argues that the racial demography of South Africa’s land- and home-ownerships is imbalanced as result of the socioeconomic and political inequality between Whites and Blacks, which the ANC radicals allege is due to the richness and racial privilege of Whites. This wealth inequality is alleged by the ANC regime and propagandists to be responsible for the development of exclusive high-quality White areas and White farmers with better living standards and conditions than that of the Blacks working and living on the farms. The demographics of the country thus reflect a clear division between Blacks and Whites in terms of race and socio-economic classing. For the average Black it is just impossible, because of his/her immense poverty, to break out on his or her own from the impoverished living areas and circumstances and to penetrate the exclusive White areas. In this rich man–poor man model the issue of farmland became mixed up with urban land, making it one issue that could be solved by land expropriation.

In an effort overcome above imbalance of the racial demographics the ANC regime argues that land redistribution without compensation is essential. Free land is the ANC regime’s key to unlock this “White exclusiveness”.

In terms of the imbalanced racial demographics, Opperheimer3 offers counter-evidence. He states, based on research by the IRR, that in 2015 the various racial groups’ ownership of homes was almost perfectly proportional. This postulation by Opperheimer3 is supported by the government’s own recent land audit. Regarding the ownership of property (not farm land), this audit shows racial parity with 49% erven owned by Whites and 46% owned by Blacks. The audit reflects more or less the same ratio for sectional title ownership. This data, argues Opperheimer3, indicate that redistribution, when it includes home ownership per se as a focus point, is unsubstantiated. Opperheimer3 does not feel that the racial demographics of the country need immediate correction through land expropriation. The antagonists see the negative ANC propaganda on racial demographics as a well-planned social engineering initiative by the ANC leadership to support RET and RST, to limit the socioeconomic and political privileges, rights and positions of Whites in greater South Africa and to force the integration of Whites into the greater Black community.3,6

In this context, with the focus on the ANCs discrepancy between Black and White when it comes to ownership, the antagonists point out that although there is unhappiness and discontent with the new South Africa, only 18% of the population’s discontent is about poor accommodation. Opperheimer3 points out that research shows that less than 1% of South Africans were concerned with owing land. For South Africans of all the races there are much more worrying issues. There are indeed three serious matters worrying the public, namely unemployment (40%), lack of and poor service delivery (34%) and poor education (15%). These are all results of the failed ANC regime. For the antagonists it is clear that the ANC regime’s present attack on White “rich” lifestyles as reflected by White living standards, etc. and the ANC’s hostile plans to equalise the “imbalanced demographics between Blacks and Whites”, is nothing else than an effort to cover up their failure as a regime since 1994 to erase unemployment, poor service delivery in Black areas and to improve Black education. The present poverty, unemployment and inequality stem from the ANC regime’s failures and not from imbalanced racial demographics.3,6

In response to the so-called disturbed racial demographics of the country as alleged by the ANC regime and its radicals, the antagonists argue that such disturbed racial demographics is a misrepresentation of the truth for political gain. Opperheimer3 states that only 3% of South Africans are worried about the race factor. Race in relation to the present ownership of land and Black discontent with the general South African political, social and economic situation is insignificant and the ANC gives a false reflection.3

The IRR found that 71% of Blacks (and 74% of Whites) have no concerns about race per se in their daily life. This absence of a desire for land grabbing among ordinary Blacks is further supported by the findings of the Caro Institute in the USA. The main reasons why South Africans are the 5th most depressed and unhappiest people in the world are not racial conflict or racial hate, but unemployment, inflation and high interest rates. For the antagonists this reflect badly on the ANC regime and its elite.3

3.5.6. The ANC has since 1994 successfully guided poor Blacks to financial independence

The ANC has bragged that they have guided poor Blacks to independence, implying that the ANC regime has changed the lives of the poor and landless Blacks for the better since 1994 in terms of basic living standards.

The basic question for the antagonists is: does the ANC truly develop the poor so that become self-sufficient enough to buy daily food and to afford basic accommodation, schooling and medicine?

Victory Research’s recent report is very significant here. It reflects that a great number of South Africans (Black and White) feel that their basic needs are not fulfilled in any way by the ANC regime. They not only feel that certain basic services are lacking, but that it has become unaffordable for them to afford these services. Unemployment is prominent. This has led many poor Blacks (an estimate 29-million) not having food on the table or basic accommodation on most days.67

The respondents (seemingly from the middle class and thus less exposed to the extreme poverty and living conditions of poor and landless Blacks) who took part in Victory Research show that their top concerns and dissatisfaction (measured by percentage with satisfaction 0% and dissatisfaction 100%) with the ANC regime centres on unemployment (47%), crime and security (20%), corruption (18%), poor education (18%), accommodation (14%), basic service delivery (12%), poor healthcare (8%) and high living costs (7%).67 It is clear that there is not a White-Black issue here. If the middle class feels this negative about the ANC, how must the poorest feel?

When looking to research reflecting on the living conditions and “satisfaction” of the poor and landless Blacks, it contradicts the ANC regime’s view that they have empowered the Black community. This data make the ANC’s claim of “doing good” to the poor and landless Blacks seems absurd.68,69

Derby68 reflects that in 2018 the financial circumstances of most South African households, not only the poor, were worrying. Prominent is the fact that the percentage of households in South Africa that is receiving at least one form of a social grant, is in the high 40% region, or 17 million persons (with 55% South Africans living in abject poverty). This is a direct outcome of down-sizing mines and other industries, causing unemployment, as well as the overall unemployment culture of the country (officially nearly 30%, unofficially 50%–60%). The unemployment is so severe that many people with good training are left jobless. The ANC regime’s failure to develop entrepreneurship and SMEs to create new jobs, especially for the lower socioeconomic and less trained classes is a major cause. The fact is that the contingent of jobless (and thus mostly foodless) people is growing daily, forcing at least 40% of the total population into financial dependence, poverty and indirect begging from the state (who in reality should generate work opportunities and income to make these people independent citizens).68,69

The extent to which the absolute poverty is starting to overwhelm even the South African middle class is evident from the need for the National Credit Amendment Bill in terms of which consumers earning less than R7 000 a month and with unsecured debt up to R50 000 will be absolved of their debt if they are deemed highly indebted by the National Credit Regulator.68,69

The spreading lawlessness and disorder is proof that unemployment is pushing people to the edge. Theft of food and money to buy food has increased. Central to these many asocial and anti-social behaviours stands what perpetrators see as the ANC regime’s betrayal of their rightful (and which the ANC promised them at every election) claim to basic services such as clean water, medical services, work, basic housing, etc. Dissatisfaction is becoming evident from unrest around the country. The growth and intensity of the masse dissatisfaction with the ANC regime are observable in how the initial unrests changed from a clear focus on only poor service delivery, to serious unrest and protests with a focus also on a lack of education, crime and a lack of personal safety, healthcare, transport, the unavailability of plots/land to erect houses and other forms of accommodation. The protests are also increasing in violence.70

The evidence shows that the main focus of these angers is the failure of the ANC regime to deliver on its post-1994 promises and the ANC’s failure to use budgets to aid the landless poor. Angry protesters point who are been caught up in corruption, state capture and the self-enrichment to the ANC regime and its elite at the cost of the poor. Their view is that the ANC regime not only failed as a regime to offer accommodation and land within the boundaries of the 1994 land reform programme, but often just ignored the urgent needs of the poor and landless Blacks. It is important to look at some examples of the behaviour and reactions of people from the Black community on the ANC regime’s failure to take care of their interests. It indeed reflects an outright dislike for the ANC regime and its elite.68-70

The testimony of a tin shack dweller living in a sprawling Durban shantytown, a said Mrs Lindiswa Mhlanga70, about her fantasies “to live in a brick house with windows, walls, bedrooms and perhaps a garden for her children to play” like the ANC elite, is heart-breaking, not only because of the tragedy around it, but also because it most probably going to remain a fantasy. A despairing neighbour of hers, a said Mrs. Tembu Xulu70, gives a poignant description of her utmost despair about her living conditions since the new 1994 democracy when she said in 201870:14:

“I can’t live like this anymore. It’s been 11 years I’m here. We have one room and one bed that eight of us share. What life is this? We have snakes under the shack. I want a life of dignity.”

Blacks are responding on these failures of the ANC with a clear warning to the Ramaphosa regime. S’bu Zikode70, the founding president of the national organisation Abahlali (of which 16 leaders have been killed since 2009 under very suspicious circumstances) which has approximately 50 000 members who are fighting for the rights of the poor and landless in informal settlements, says70:14:

“Many of us have given up hope that there will ever be any change or delivery to our people. What makes us hopeless is that every year the government has a budget announcement and out of those billions, very few communities are benefiting. We know that as long as the ANC is in power, shack dwellers and black people are not going to benefit anything from the government.”

This despair goes deeper than the experience of hopelessness, bringing the unavoidable result of political self-empowerment and lawlessness to the foreground. It is possible that extreme violence directed at the ANC regime is in the making. The antagonists not only consider the failure of the ANC as a party to serve the interests of the poor and landless Blacks, but also the presence of criminal role players inside the ANC regime who trample on the dignity of their poor Black brothers. The poor and landless Black activists highlight the open misuse of the benefits meant for the Black poor by some ANC councillors, instead of helping the homeless Blacks to make them independent citizens who can live a normal life as a worker with an income and a house. Zikode70 is especially succinct in when he reports70:14:

“We believe that many of them eat the money meant for the people. Some of the councillors have told me straight to my face that I am disturbing them from eating. It is their turn to eat. They are there to enrich themselves and it’s obvious. We are reaching a stage where we are saying: ‘Could we accept that we don’t have a government?’”

It would be a mistake to think the hostility of the Black poor and homelessness is limited to speaking out on the matter: their discontent has already moved to militant thinking. We are in a stage of aggressiveness, bordering on militant actions. Zikode’s70 words are prominent as he puts the immediate political decision and destiny of the poor and homeless Blacks on the table against the ANC regime70:14:

If you listen to us carefully, we are no longer talking about homelessness, we are talking about landlessness, the reason being we have accepted that there is no money for housing.

That is why our focus is now on the land question. Can you rather release land for us to see what we can do?

From the onset promises were made and broken, lies were put before truth and money and business were put before human needs. We have been calling for land in our cities for a long time.

Of course we support the call for the expropriation of land without compensation, but it is what we have already doing – it’s what we call land occupation.

It’s really about the redistribution of land from below. People are taking back the land.

Most of the settlements that we have occupied have not been given on a silver plate. People have had to occupy vacant land, because nobody will ever give you land.

Which is why today there are hundreds of casualties.

If you were to ask where all these assassinations and death threats come from: two sources – the police and politicians.

But despite the death threats we are receiving, we will not be silenced.

For Zikode70 there is undoubtedly one immediate dangerous enemy of the poor Blacks in their struggle to survive as humans: the ANC and its favoured elite. This outcome is more than enough evidence that the notion that the ANC has developed the poor and landless Blacks into financially independent and functioning citizens is a lie and a myth.

3.5.7. Blacks are indigenous South Africans and Whites are European settlers

Who are the rightful franchisees of South African land? Which of the Black and White tribes deserve South African land ownership? The current argument of the ANC and EFF is that it is only the Blacks. Most of these statements are purely meant for political opportunism and emotional rhetoric. It also reveals political leaders’ lack of an understanding of the political history of South Africa.

It is thus of great importance to separate myths and lies from the truth to determine who counts as non-indigenous colonists (so called land predators), who counts as true indigenous people (natives) and who are indigenous colonists (foreigners who over time indigenised) to South Africa, writes Louw6. The claim of Blacks as indigenous South Africans and Whites as European settlers, making Blacks the rightful sole owners of the country’s land and the intended land redistribution without compensation by the Blacks justified, should be evaluated.

The pre-1900 South Africans can be divided into six broad racial and ethnic groups, namely the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, the Black tribes, the White tribes, the Coloureds and the Asians/Indians/Malays. Louw6 shows that earlier inhabitants (settlers) of South Africa, before the Europeans and Blacks arrived, were undoubtedly the KhoiSan and the KhoiKhoi. The Cape Settlement was infused an Asian/Indian/Malay bloodline and this resulted in a new race in South Africa. It meant that two more peoples over time became indigenous to South Africa, namely the Coloureds and the Asian/Indians/Malay. This unique constellation of South Africa brings into focus the many political clichés of who are the rightfully franchisees of South African soil and who should have South African land ownership.6,71 KhoiSan

The KhoiSan were probably the first inhabitants of South Africa. It seems they migrated from central Southern Asia. It is theorised that their migrating resulted from a scarcity of food or as if they were driven out by other stronger races from Asia. The initial tribe split up in three sub-tribes: one group moving south-east to the Malaysian Peninsula, the Philippines and as far as Australia; the second group moving west as far as Spain and the third group moving into North Africa and from there constantly Southwards as result of attacks by the Hamites who were living around the Nile region. Other parts of this third group of KhoiSan moved downwards from the eastern part of Africa, to gather south of the Zambezi after the 1600s, ending up in the Southern African region as far South as the Cape. The KhoiSan are now only present in diminutive numbers, and they are politically and economically disempowerment. They have not made any direct claims to land ownership, although through inbreeding with the Blacks, Coloureds and KhoiKhoi, they can also lay claim to land ownership to a certain extent.6,71 KhoiKhoi

The KhoiKhoi probably have their origin as result of a mixture in Somaliland between KhoiSan and Hamites. It seems that they migrated Southwest down into Africa to the region of the Great Lakes, and, after staying several centuries, they moved further Southwards more or less around 600AC, to reach the Orange River where they initially established on the banks of the river and along the West Coast, from Walvis Bay to the Umtamvuna River. Later on they started to split up into smaller tribes, with each an individual name and customs, moving again further Southwards.6,71

Notwithstanding the fact that they were one of the first migrants to establish themselves in South Africa as an ethnic group, the KhoiKhoi have very little impact because of their small numbers and early political marginalisation. In terms of equality and justified human rights of the South African Constitution, they must, as the KhoiSan, be given the right to claim rightful ownership of the South African soil.6,71 Indians/Asians/Malays

Indians/Asians/Malays, although late-comers to South Africa as labour to Natal in 1860, have, like all the other races in South Africa, became indigenous to the country. Many of their forefathers or tribal associates were Asian/Indian/Malay female slaves who came to the Cape Refreshment Settlement between 1650 and 1670. Many of these women had children with Whites at the Cape, making the Indians/Asians/Malays rightful claimants together with the Whites to future land ownership. (The direct, first infusion of “non-White blood” into the White parent stock of today’s Afrikaners can be as high as 75%).6,71

It is clear that the Asians/Indians/Malays’ claim to South African land ownership as indigenous people is not limited to their South African identity, but also through their early inbreeding with the Whites and the Coloureds.6,71 Coloureds

The vertical biological development of a closed and outcast group of mixed people, mostly excluded from the White nucleus that formed the modern Afrikaners, is surely true as evidenced by the South African Coloureds and other mixed people of today. However, the superficial split between Coloureds and Whites is confirmed by historical evidence of an immense horizontal biological impact of “Coloured blood” on Afrikaners’ genes, contradicting earlier numbers of only 6% to 10.7% of mixed Afrikaner descendants and the separate vertical development of the Coloureds as a separate ethnic group. This brotherhood between White Afrikaners and Brown Afrikaners makes the claims of White Afrikaners on land ownership fully applicable to the Coloureds and vice versa. The further mixing of the Coloureds with KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi and Blacks makes these three groups’ claims on land ownership also fully applicable on the Coloureds and vice versa.6,71

Notwithstanding this birth right and the fact that the Coloureds are the second largest tribe in the country, they are still politically, economically and socially as deprived as in the pre-1994 dispensation.6,71 Blacks

The South African Blacks, like the South African Whites, are both comparative newcomers to Southern Africa. The South African Blacks’ probable initial home was Central Asia, from where the moved into Africa en masse, splitting in two: one group moving down to the middle of Africa and the second group moving along the East Coast to reach Sofala in the 10th century. When the Portuguese established themselves on the East Coast, these various East-bound Black groups reached Natal and in the 1650s the area around the Kei River. The middle group of Blacks also moved Southwards to establish themselves in the vicinity of the Vet and Caledon Rivers the 1750s.6,71

After the early First and Second Black Colonisation of South Africa between 1810 and 1840, Blacks become permanent settlers with time and obtained indigenous status (especially through land grabbing, war and the complete termination of their opponents).6,71

The constant reference of Black politicians to the Afrikaner as an “alien, murderous colonist” in South Africa, or to the Whites as the only colonist in South Africa, is false. Louw’s6 study shows that it is an undeniable fact that the current Black population are also foreign to South Africa and indeed in the same boat as the Afrikaners.

The South African Blacks have no more right to land ownership than the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds, Asian/Indians/Malays, Whites and Afrikaners. Land redistribution can only be executed in their favour in terms of their shared indigenousness with the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds, Asian/Indians/Malays, Whites and Afrikaners due to a time factor of living in South Africa. Their portion of land to be received in terms of the intended land expropriation project can only be calculated and determined based on the total South African population versus the ratio of the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds, Asian/Indians/Malays, Whites and Afrikaners. Their present claims to land and the intention of land redistribution without compensation, is land grabbing and terrorism, similar to what their forefathers did when they settled here as foreigners.6,71 Whites and the Afrikaner tribe

The popular view that the “Afrikaner” is a unique and “pure” White race that had its origins at the Cape Settlement in 1652 is wrong. Miscegenation and a multiracial component involving the South African Indians/Asians, Coloureds, KhoiKhoi and Blacks is a fact.6,71

The multiracialism of today’s Afrikaners makes their legal claims to land ownership of the South African soil equal to that of South Africa’s Asian/Indians, KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds and Blacks. The Afrikaners have become indigenous, as did the Asian/Indians, KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds and Blacks, to South Africa.6,71

The radical Black politicians’ claim that Blacks are indigenous South Africans and that Whites are settlers, is false and misleading. Indians/Asians, Coloureds, KhoiKhoi, Blacks and Whites are all foreigners (migrants) to South Africa who became indigenous over time.

3.5.8. The claim that the Tsar and Stalin’s collectivist farming projects in rural Russia were great successes

The radicals in the ANC often argue that the communist countries’ form of land ownership could work here. This is especially true for Julius Malema of the EFF who believes in the full nationalisation of all South Africans assets. When one looks critically at the similarities between the present-day political intentions of the ANC elite of South Africa and that of the Russian regimes as reflected by the Russian political history between the 1860s and 1950s, the similarities are startling: the same political radicalism, masked agendas, misuse of the problem of poverty and landlessness for own political and personal enrichment by the elites, the intentional lack of a clear land reform plan, political revenge on the previous beneficiaries of the old regimes, disrespect for the civil rights of individuals and for humanity, and the outcome of an even worse political end results. In both cases the end result of the land ownership issue was either revolution(s) or the possibility of revolution.4,6

It is therefore important to the antagonists to test the notion that the Tsar and Stalin’s collectivist farming projects in rural Russia were great successes and interventions that could be applied to the land expropriation model of the ANC regime. The historian Professor Niall Ferguson73 gives us great insight into this matter with his comprehensive book on the world’s political history titled: The War of the World. Ferguson73 writes73:198:

In the summer of 1931, in his seventy-fifth year, the playwright George Bernard Shaw paid a nine-day visit to the Soviet Union. What he saw — or thought he saw — was a workers’ paradise under construction.

Here was a symbol of the apparently realizable dream of state socialism, and Western visitors like Shaw reacted ecstatically. They had seen the future, and — compared with the apparently defunct capitalist system — it seemed to work.

Granted an audience with Stalin himself, Shaw was ‘disarm[ed]… by a smile in which there is no malice but also no credulity… [He] would pass…for a romantically dark Georgian chieftain’. In an impromptu speech in Leningrad, Shaw declared enthusiastically: ‘If this great communistic experiment spreads over the whole world, we shall have a new era in history…If the future is the future as Lenin foresaw it, then we may all smile and look forward to the future without fear’. ‘Were I only 18 years of age,’ he told journalists on his way back to England, ‘I would settle in Moscow tomorrow.’

Shaw73 elaborated further in 1931, writes Ferguson73:198-199:

“Stalin has delivered the goods to an extent that seemed impossible ten years ago, he rhapsodized. ‘Jesus Christ has come down to earth. He is no longer an idol. People are gaining some sort of idea of what would happen if He lived now.”

But Shaw was not the only famous and important Brit who was mesmerised by the communists’ benevolence to the poor in the 1930s: with him on his “tour of believing” were also Nancy and Waldorf Astor, and the Marquis of Lothian, Philip Kerr.73

Shaw’s73 “goodness” that came to the peasants (the poor and landless Russians) in the countryside under Stalin is now also seemingly on the way for poor and landless Blacks in South Africa. However, it is important to note that a limited form of land redistribution already took place in Russia under the Tsar with his abolition of serfdom in the 1860s and the transfer of land by a form of land ownership to them.73

The bid by the Tsar to build a new class of “thrifty peasant proprietors” by means of a form of land redistribution, had limited success for various reasons. The specific belief that their “independence” from the rich and the mega-landowners and their own say in agriculture would transform the poor and landless Russians into successful commercial farmers overnight, failed. Although the peasants’ input with agricultural produce boosted the Russian economy, it just introduced another form of inequality. More or less 80% of ordinary Russians living in the countryside remained poor and deprived of benefits and dependent on the Tsar’s whims. Although the living standards of the peasants improved, they were still far from those living in towns and cities. The backlash of the Tsar’s abuse of the poor and landless under the mantle of their economic and political empowerment, upliftment and independence only to enrich his elite circle, doomed the project to a failure right from the start. In real life the masses of poor and landless Russians gained nothing.73 Ferguson writes73:14:

“The hope that they [80% of the population] would gain land as well as freedom among the peasants by the abolition of serfdom had been disappointed.”

What becomes clear is the absence of a definitive plan and the focused intention to uplift the poor and landless Russians to empower them and not only the doings of the corrupted Tsar-elite.73

The vagueness of Ramaphosa’s plan of who would receive land, the allocation of deeds and what would be expected from these individuals, seems to be conflict in the making. In the Russia of the 1860s there were also different (often opposing and discriminative) socio-economic groups (as in the present-day South Africa), aggravating the battle for land ownership. This not only laid the foundation for immediate political conflict in Russia, but also a revolution. Ferguson73 reflects on this infighting73:14-15:

“A disgruntled peasantry, a sclerotic aristocracy, a radicalized but impotent intelligentsia and a capital city with a large and volatile populace: these were precisely the combustible ingredients the historian Alexis de Tocqueville had identified in 1780 France [and its revolution]. A Russian revolution of rising expectations was in making…”

It is more than clear from the Russian tsar’s failed experiment that neither extreme land grabbing nor orderly land redistribution bring immediate socio-economic and financial solutions and satisfaction for the poor and landless, especially when their numbers are large and the liberation regime’s intentions with land expropriation is based on political delinquency.

The above Russian experiment on land expropriation did not stop with the later doomed Tsar regime. It was later continued by the dictator and political delinquent Josef Stalin as president of Russia.

Stalin73 lends another dimension to the presence of the peasantry and its grievances inside the greater Russian community in the 1930s. Described in a differences: the misuse of the peasants through their “grievances” (here in South Africa the antagonists refer to this Stalin opportunism in terms of Ramaphosa’s politicking as the “people wants, needs and demands”), to promote and to benefit exclusively Stalin’s elite’s interests and sick political visions.

As in South Africa at present, the politics of socialism all over Russia was Stalin’s solution to address the peasant problem and their upliftment via “land ownership and wealth”. But, “What Stalin meant by ‘socialism in one country’ was a new revolution – an economic revolution that he, the self-styled ‘man of steel’ would lead”, writes Ferguson73:199. The “public” outcome of Stalin was one of “promoting” the interests of the poor and landless peasants living in the countryside (filled with grievances about their living conditions from the time of the Tsar), while in reality he killed them off to promote solely his own self-interests through military force and the greater Russian economy needed for military power via the agricultural economics. His economic revolution of masse industrialisation, secondary to social transformation, offered Stalin the opportunity of misusing the peasantry as the new proletariat (especially in the urban areas) to keep him and his elite in power without really awarding them significant political and economic power. It also limited the political and economic empowerment and aspirations of the peasantry still living in the countryside, tilling the soil for the Stalin elite’s benefitting. Ferguson posits73:199:

“By forcing a huge transfer of manpower and the resources from the countryside into the cities, he aimed to enlarge at a stroke the Soviet proletariat on which the Revolution was supposedly based.”

At the same time Stalin attacked the surviving elements of the pre-revolutionary society – “…former capitalists, nobles, merchants, officials, priests and kulaks with all their class sympathies, anti-pathies, traditions, habits, opinions, world views and so on…”, who he saw as remaining threats to his regime, writes Ferguson.73:199 Stalin’s policy of collectivisation of the Russian agricultural sector and its people was only superficially an attempt to improve Soviet agrigulture73:199:

“Its true goal was the destruction of the class enemy – to be precise, ‘the liquidation of the kulaks as a class’”.

Ferguson73 brings us nearer to the above events when he points out73:200:

“Predictably, the consequence of the systematic annihilation of any farmer suspected of being a kulak was not economic growth but one of the greatest man-made famines in history. As Party functionaries descended on the countryside with orders to abolish private property and ‘liquidate’ anyone who had accumulated more than the average amount of capital, there was chaos”.

In reflecting here on the destiny of the private land owners and the rich of the countryside (equal to the White farmers of South Africa), Ferguson stipulates the following six criteria set out in 1927 (revised in 1929) by the Soviet Ministry of Finance in their doomed evaluation of wrongdoings of the rich Russians (as Apartheid’s wrongdoings also reflects)73:200:

  1. The hiring of two or more labourers;
  2. Ownership of three or more draught animals;
  3. Sown area of more than 10–16 desyatims (the threshold varied by region);
  4. Ownership of any kind of processing enterprise;
  5. Ownership of a trading establishment; or
  6. Ownership of one or more agricultural machines or of a considerable quantity of good-quality implements

Looking at the above extreme criteria makes it clear that the more or less 35 000 commercial farmers in South Africa would have qualified in 1927 to be liquidated, making their fear for the radicals inside the ANC elite with their extreme land transformation (and sometimes open hostility against Whites, especially the Afrikaners) understandable.3

To understand better the liquidation of anti-Stalin and anti-Soviet farmers (and seemingly rich farmers) by communistic Russia through their good land expropriation policy in the 1920s, Ferguson takes us on an in-depth journey with a clear warning about the political, social and personal madness of Stalin and his cronies [a similar warning the antagonists have tried to send out to the world (like the note to Donald Trump) of what can comes in South Africa if the ANC regime, besotted by its political madness, stays on after 2019, noting the ANC’s revolutionary foundation and Stalinist orientation]. Ferguson73 text is of such importance that it is fully mentioned here. Ferguson73 writes73:200-202:

Who exactly was a kulak? Those who had been better-off before the Revolution or those who had done well since? What exactly did it mean to ‘exploit’ other peasants? Lending them money when they were short of cash? Rather than see their cattle and pigs confiscated, many peasants preferred to slaughter and eat them, so that by 1935 total Soviet livestock was reduced to half of its 1929 level. But the brief orgy of eating was followed by a protracted, agonizing starvation. Without animals fertilizers, crop yields plummeted – grain output in 1932 was down by a fifth compared with 1930. Grain seizures to feed Russia’s cities left entire villages with literally nothing to eat. Starving people ate cats, dogs, field mice, birds, tree bark and even horse manure. Some went into the fields and ate half-ripe ears of corn. There were even cases of cannibalism. As in the 1920-21, typhus followed hard on the heels of dearth. Perhaps as many as eleven million people died in what was a wholly unnatural and unnecessary disaster. In addition, almost 400 00 households, or close to two million people, were deported as ‘special exiles’ to Siberia and Central Asia. Many of those who resisted collectivization were shot on the spot; perhaps as many as 3.5 million victims of ‘dekulakization’ subsequently died in labour camps. It was a crime the regime did its utmost to conceal from the world, confining foreign journalists to Moscow and restoring the Tsarist passport system to prevent famine victims fleeing to the cities for relief. Even the 1937 census was suppressed because it revealed a total population of just 156 million, when natural increase would have increased it to 186 million. Only a handful of Western reporters – notably Gareth Jones of the Daily Express, Malcolm Muggeridge of the Manchester Guardian, Pierre Berland of Le Tempe and William Chamberlin of the Christian Science Monitor – had the guts to publish accurate reports about the famine. The bulk of the press corps in Moscow, notably Walter Durancy of the New York Times, knowingly connived at the cover-up for fear of jeopardizing their access to the nomenklatura.

The notion of the propagandists that the Tsar and Stalin’s collectivist farming projects in rural Russia to uplift and empower the poor and landless Russians were great successes is false. Indeed, for antagonists the tragic political history of Russian land reform spells disaster for South Africa. The Mothlante Report points out that the 1994 to 2018 land redistribution under the auspices of the ANC regime failed, not so much because of poorly qualified farmers, but because of the stealing of politicians and officials of the money allocated to farmers. The question for the antagonists is why would this setup not replay itself now?73

3.6. The presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa in perspective

3.6.1. The impact of Ramaphosa’s political baggage

One of the strong critics against Ramaphosa is the conclusion of the antagonists that he is only going to bring further misery to South Africans in general and to Whites specifically, making him just another “political monster” and a leader unable to handle the land expropriation with true justice and political balance inside the ANC elite. This conclusion is based on the view of the antagonists that Ramaphosa is a Zuma collaborator per excellence. The antagonists are constantly pointing out his long “passive” presence as an ANC member and later as vice-president during the Zuma’s time of transgression. It is justified for the antagonists to bring this matter to the table in the now stormy hurricane which is called land expropriation and in which Ramaphosa stands central with the radicals of the ANC. Munusamy74,75 and Mthombothi76,77 put this “involvement reality” on paper when they point out that he was the deputy-president and has sat through cabinet meetings where Zuma and several of his crooked ministers tried to take action on instruction from the Guptas. Munusamy75,78 and Mthombothi76,77 emphasise that he, as the deputy-president, attended numerous of the ANC’s top-six and national executive committee meetings where state capture was contested. He was also a direct figure in cases where state capture was at least clear to the eye, like the attempted heist of the National Treasury by firing three anti-corruption ANC politicians, namely Nhlanhla Nene, Pravin Gordhan and Mcebisi Jonas by Jacob Zuma in March 2017. The critics also say that Ramaphosa has been influenced and steered by the politically uncontrolled Julius Malema, especially on the land issue.74-77,80,81

Some political analysts look critically at Ramaphosa’s rhetoric on land redistribution (which they see as similar to EFF politics) from another angle. Firstly, his immediate radical enthusiasm about a fast and decisive land expropriation programme is seen by the antagonists as simple opportunism to win power inside the ANC for support against the pro-Zuma and Zupta-derailing movements to oust him before or during the 2019 election. Secondly, to stay on as supreme leader of ANC, his primary priority at this stage is to save the ANC regime from defeat in 2019 by hook or by crook. Failure will mean his automatic defeat as a figure in the future politics of the country. It is speculated that he is trying to play the long game and that he will wait until after the elections to consolidate his power base to fit exclusively his opportunistic needs.74-77.80,81 Barron63 writes63:9:

“Right now it’s about self-preservation, it’s about winning the 2019 election, feeling threatened by the EFF, feeling vulnerable…”

The whole issue around White land has become an irritating affair for Ramaphosa that is unnecessarily being stalled by Whites. It is now limiting his strength as president and ambitions. The Whites’ enthusiasm about Ramaphosa as their saviour as he replaced Jacob Zuma’s hostility, seems misplaced: Ramaphosa’s political baggage is just too much for him to accommodate the Whites as a group with all their needs and demands: things can get worse for the Whites under Ramaphosa, antagonists feel.82,83

At present Ramaphosa’s impatience about a lack of progress on land redistribution and White resistance since 1994 is growing. President Donald Trump’s questions about the ANC’s land expropriation has aggravated him.63 In his political arena the Whites’ future interests are not important. This mindset makes him a very dangerous to the White community and their future, argue the antagonists. For the antagonists Ramaphosa shows signs of having lost contact with the bigger political picture of long-term economics and nation-building. Indeed, it seems as if the Zuma-scenario of hostility against Whites have not disappeared.84,85

The matter of land expropriation without compensation can become Ramaphosa’s Achilles heel as a president. The months up to the possible May-2019 election can be a bruising battle for the Ramaphosa camp. They can get any side of the coin, which can both have devastating outcomes in the end. Ramaphosa is accused by the antagonists of constant double-talk and of creating many unrealistic expectations among poor Blacks.48 Some antagonists see the present identification of Whites as exclusive land owners as nothing else than the misuse of an “itching political-racial matter” to draw away attention from the ANC regime as a party in crisis to get votes in the next election. It is reminiscent to the White regime’s misuse of an itching political-racial matter in the 1930s when they played of the “poor Afrikaner problem” against the “Black and English dangers” of that time to get Afrikaner votes in exchange for financial benefits to secure their reign of South Africa. The Carnegie Commission then not only revealed this misuse of insecure voters by the nationalist Afrikaner leaders to obtain Afrikaner votes, but also warned against it as a crooked way getting votes. Geen71 reported well in 1939 on this matter71: 201:

The Commission also drew attention to the danger of allowing people to retain the vote if they were in receipt of government aid, over and above the privileges that fall to all citizens. “There are signs that voting power and political influence are being abused to an increasing degree in order to obtain State assistance” was the unanimous view of the commissioners. The opinion has been expressed that those who accept government assistance should forfeit the valued right to vote.

This unethical and crooked way of getting votes is applicable to the 2019 land intentions of the ANC regime and party.71

Ramaphosa’s integrity as politician and as previous vice-president of the ANC regime is doubted by the antagonists and thus the White community. Mthombothi76 refuses to deviate from his initial question in this regard and puts it clearly that Ramaphosa should react to these concerns before he could be cleared as a clean outsider, truly unconnected to the Zuma and Gupta cronies. The antagonists argue that Ramaphosa’s anti-White behaviours since July 2018 further complicated his trustworthiness as president of South Africa. Mthombothi’s76 writing echoes the questions of many antagonists about Ramaphosa into the presidency through the front door. Mthombothi posits76:17:

And because Zuma, the villain of the piece, is gone, we’re now encouraged to wake up to a new dawn. It’s a confession of sorts. Dawn is preceded by darkness. The suggestion is that we’re emerging from a nightmarish, dark place into a glorious sunshine and that we should be grateful to our saviour.

But hang on a minute. Not so fast. To suggest that state capture is all Zuma’s doing is not only a lie but a complete cop-out. It’s akin to arguing that Hendrik Verwoerd alone was responsible for apartheid. That’s pulling the wool over our eyes. The entire party, especially the top leadership, is complicit.

What is missing – and what those who smugly sat in the inner sanctums of power with Zuma want to avoid — is full and honest disclosure. During the Watergate scandal in the US, a high-ranking Republican senator put this seminal question to Richard Nixon: what did the president know, and when did he know it? President Cyril Ramaphosa and his cohorts need to respond to such a question. What was their role in the state capture debacle and why did they choose to stay silent, which was itself a criminal dereliction of duty?

Ramaphosa needs to level with the public. He should take it into his confidence. Be honest with us. Opening up is not a sign of weakness. To the contrary, it may strengthen his position. Trust is an important component in leadership.

The ANC spurned numerous opportunities to remove Zuma. It stood by him. Those who called for his scalp were mocked and disparaged. Now they’ve made a U-turn and are urging everybody to join in their thuma Mina kumbaya.

A pig with lipstick is still a pig.

The antagonists need not look further than Cyril Ramaphosa’s83,86 inaugural speech as the ANC’s leader at the party’s 54th National Leaders Conference in December 2017 to see Ramaphosa’s blindness to Zuma’s “bad” lipstick while he was vice-president83:6:

Finally, I would like, on your behalf, to thank President Jacob Zuma for the 10 years he has spent as the president of our movement and for a lifetime of service to the people; or

We cannot close down the 54th national conference of the ANC without to bring tribute to your [Zuma] contributions over decades in the struggle for Freedom, democracy and development [Own translation].

Mthombothi’s76 diagnosis of a pig with lipstick is still a pig seems to fit Ramaphosa’s political actions after June 2018. For the antagonists there is only one of two solutions for the land expropriation matter: get rid of the pig or clean its lips of lipsticks! But this seems easier said than done in the ANC regime’s corrupted setup where there seems just too many “holy pigs” to handle.76

Gary Eisenberg79 and John Steenhuisen87 put into perspective the cloudy, one-sided and privileged politics of the pre-2019 top circle of the ANC. The ordinary people were held to a different (higher) standard of administrative justice than the ANC’s top leadership (a system in which Ramaphosa was a prominent member together with his boss Zuma and of which he must now be answerable to all South Africans).87,76 Like Mthombothi76, Eisenberg79 is also questioning this ANC integrity79:17:

How can a regime of law exist with integrity when access to administrative justice is only possible through a shadow decision-making authority outside of the rule of law?

This principle cannot be more poignantly articulated than in the celebrated words of US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis: “If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy”.

Zuma and his regime became law-breakers and laws unto themselves, leading to immense anarchic outcomes. The question at this stage is where Ramaphosa stands in relation to personal and political honesty versus crooking. Any future perception of him as a puppet serving the ANC NEC under the Zuma-faction can be fatal to his credibility as leader Number One.79,87,88

The fact is, as indicated already, that the Guptas and top ANC leaders would not been in position to allow such constant state capture without the help and approval of other ANC-leaders in the top structure of the party and in the Zuma cabinet. Does a parallel Zuma regime still exist in the Ramaphosa regime? And, most of all, the honest question: Who are all the pigs with lipstick in the Ramaphosa cabinet and in his inner circle?76,79,84

The above questions of Mthombothi76, Steenhuisen87 and Eisenberg79 about Ramaphosa’s possible double role in the present South African politics are growing, also in the minds of the antagonists. It may be their single greatest worry.

Ramaphosa’s possible double role may be a factor in other events. Prominent here is the allegation of ongoing political terrorising and extortion of the Ramaphosa camp by Zuma and the Guptas. Is it a possibility that these alleged powers are making the Ramaphosa regime toothless to fire ministers and state officials from the Zuma regime and to kick out Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma from his inner circle? Is extortion making it impossible for Ramaphosa to depart fully from the established Zuma leftist and corrupted system, leading to his ongoing open support for crooked cadres? There is a die-hard suspicious rumour of a secret list (seemingly only known to Jacob Zuma, Oliver Tambo, Joe Nhlanhla and Nelson Mandela) of current prominent ANC members who are alleged to have been Apartheid spies and collaborators. It is now the time for Ramaphosa to address this matter with urgency. As with an open answer on his possible involvement or not in the Zuma regime’s wrongdoings, President Cyril Ramaphosa and his cohorts need also to respond with a clear answer about extortion by the Zupoids regarding their political and personal past. Ramaphosa has to level any possible dark past to the public. For the antagonists to trust Ramaphosa the question is prominent: Can Ramaphosa afford to respond publicly?82

The seasoned political and investigated journalist Barney Thombothi89 refuses to allow Ramaphosa to escape the present political reality in which he prominently positioned himself, seemingly washing his hands in innocence. Mthombothi89 takes justice further by postulating that accusing “uBaba” Jacob Zuma alone as the evil in state capture, fraud and stealing, is wrong and false. The truth, he writes, is89:21: “…uBaba’s ANC-party as a whole went along with him on his looting journey, making every step with well-planning with him”. This includes Ramaphosa as MP, member of the ANC NEC and vice-president. Ramaphosa’s present brain-washing of the ordinary man on the street with the appointment of various commission, investigations, inquiries, summits and conferences to investigate Zuma should not succeed. Ramaphosa is trying to steer the mess away from him self. It is only the inquiries of Raymond Zondo and Robert Nugent that seem to be of value thus far (but they did not lead to comprehensive criminal prosecutions by the NPA).19,89

The problem with the Zondo inquiry, as opposed to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of the 1990s, writes Mthombothi89:21, is that the perpetrators being investigated by the Zondo inquiry are still in power. Mthombothi89 points out this ANC contamination well89:21:

“They decided on its mandate, and it will be up to them to act on its recommendations, almost akin to an accused who has a remit to decide whether to abide by his sentence.”

The ANC elite’s effort to attribute all wrongdoing to Zuma is a failed strategy to escape responsibility: the fact is Zuma was appointed by the ANC out of their own free will and offered a free hand. He was no autocrat who grabbed the power directly. Indeed, he could have been stopped at any time by the ANC NEC. Mthombothi89 writes89:21:

“They were inside the tent with him cheering him as he plundered and looted with gay abandon. So they’re not simply complicit; they’re responsible for the awful mess the country’s in.”

The prominent question is why did Ramaphosa not testify so far to the Zondo inquiry: If he is not guilty of wrongdoing, why the avoidance? His contribution can be valuable and can open a door on the doings of the inner circle of the ANC from 1994 to 2018. Mthombothi89 is on the spot when he says89:21:

The Zondo commission gives Ramaphosa an opportunity to level with the public. As Zuma’s deputy, there is very little that could have escaped his attention. What did he know, and why didn’t he do anything about it? He should therefore be leading all ministers who served under Zuma to give evidence, mea culpas included, to the commission. These things took place under their noses. They must tell us what happened. We will be all ears.

With the above heavy baggage Ramaphosa is carrying, very few antagonists see Ramaphosa as an independent executive leader or futurist who is serving every citizen and community. Many see him as a person politically contaminated by his pre-1994 exposure to revolutionary “radiation”, still driven rigidly by this contaminated past.89 The inclination to misuse power and radical autocratic behaviour and disrespect for rules and traditions is well-illustrated by the fact that Ramaphosa openly ignored the parliament’s decision first to test the public’s sentiment on land expropriation without compensation. He started-up the process of land expropriation without official permission of the Parliament. Mthombothi89 reports on this as follows89:21:

It reduced the entire process to a sham: the currency was knocked off its stride and it’s continued its inexorable slide since.

Ramaphosa seems to be too contaminated to appear before the Zondo commission.

The request of the antagonists to the Ramaphosa regime is: Be honest with South Africans before the Zuptoids tell “their secrets” first to the outside-world.90,91,92 Look what happened with Nene after the Guptas “started to walk” again in daylight! Bruce90, like Mtombothi89, says90:12:

“Do it now, before the 2019 election. Opening up is not a sign of weakness. To the contrary, it may strengthen Ramaphosa’s and his intimate men’s positions. Trust is an important component in leadership. It can bring only confidence to the Ramaphosa regime, and most of all: to himself.”

Coming back to the failed and corrupted ANC period of reign between 1994 and 2019 and any constructive change possible to its reign in the near future, many political analysts rightly see very little change in the post-Zuma hundred days and more of Cyril Ramaphosa and that of Jacob Zuma. The antagonists describe it as an ongoing Zupta-ANC-NEC regime, which is still run direct and indirect by many controversial figures, the likes of Anoj Singh, Bruce Koloane, Mark Pamensky, Rajesh Naithani, Faith Muthambi, Fikile Mbalula, Lynne Brown, Daniel Mantsha, Des van Rooyen, Mosebenzi Zwane, Tom Moyane, Jonas Makwakwa, Supra Mahumapelo, Arthur Fraser, Shaun Abrahams, Brian (not Popo) Molefe, Matshela Koko, Malusi Gigaba, ACE Magashule, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and others. Anti-Zuma and non-corrupt persons in the ANC of the calibre of Vusi Pikoli, Senzo Mchunu and Pravin Gordhan are just too few in number to assure a positive governmental overhaul and the taming or cleansing of the corrupted Zuma-ANC-NEC. The spooky networks of dirty tricks (Bell Pottinger), rogue spying (governmental) and propaganda (Infinity Media, The New Age, ANN7) are still too involved in the Ramaphosa reign.53,76,79,84,93-105

The antagonists see a shadow hanging over the heads of some of Ramaphosa’s intimate political cronies. In this regard Mthombothi2 writes2:3:

Let’s look at Ramaphosa’s own record. In David Mabuza, he has a deputy who, as premier of Mpumalanga, turned that province into a den of thieves, where whistle-blowers are killed with impunity. The ANC head office is headed by Ace Magashule, who’s left the Free State in a shambles and who’s personality involved in enabling the Guptas to benefit in the Estina scandal.

This week it emerged that an ABC employee at Luthuli House has been arrested for involvement in cash-in-transit heists. One ANC apparatchik was heard to express shock at this, but such delinquent behaviour is par for the course. There are many upstanding people in the ANC, but sometimes it’s hard to escape the conclusion that the party has become a criminal syndicate.

There was a devastating exposé in August 2018 in The New York Times (arguably the world’s most respected English newspaper) with specific reference to Ramaphosa’s deputy president David Mabuza’s alleged corrupt activities and mismanagement while he was Mpumalanga premier, write Imraan Buccus106 and Asha Speckman107. Buccus106 reflects on these controversies in the intimate Ramaphosa inner circle as follows106:17:

From this point on he will, at best, be seen as the head of a divided party and of a government that includes the worst dregs of the Jacob Zuma era.

On the international circuit any talk of a “New Dawn” or a “crackdown on corruption” will now be immediately followed by the question: “Yes, but what about Mabuza, and his ilk?

If Ramaphosa cannot remove Mabuza and others like him from the party and the government, his presidency will be paralysed.

The New York Times (NYT) foregrounds the incompetence and lack of insight on Ramaphosa side to involve persons with clean hands into his cabinet and into the ANC NEC, together with his lack of political insight to understand the consequences of land grabbing on the human and economic components of the country107:10: “…saying South Africa needed [looking seemingly to Ramaphosa, the failed statesman] another ‘enlightened leader like Nelson Mandela but keeps electing imitations of Robert Mugabe’.”

In this context the NYT clearly pinpoints Ramaphosa’s failure as an executive leader and tears his foolish argument that land restitution without compensation would unlock economic growth, into pieces. The fact is, as the antagonists also see it: the emperor is naked and sadly he does not know it.107

For the antagonists poor quality of political decisions, supported by other condemning evidence, seems to be cemented into the Ramaphosa regime from day one.2,53,57,76,79,84,93-100,102-105

The antagonists are more than justified to say that it seems more and more as if the ANC (and South Africa) and Ramaphosa are all still stuck in the Zuma syndrome of delinquency and that South Africa will be stuck with this negativity as long as the ANC forms the regime of the day.2,53,57,76,79,84,93-100,102-105

The propagandists’ argument that Ramaphosa’s way of governing by consensus and the use of tactics in negotiation the ANC internal politics, has required him to put some of his key opponents into powerful ANC positions, like the national spokesman Pule Mabe and secretary-general Ace Magashule, is laughable. These decisions are part of Ramaphosa’s radical political ideology. Even if the strategy approach to Ramaphosa was true, it is just a repeat of the earlier failed version in 1994 by Mandela with Ramaphosa as his adviser when they placed political opponents in the cabinet. As Ferial Haffajee108 puts it108:2: “It didn’t work then, and it’s not working now”. It just points to a lack of political insight.2,53,57,76,79,84,93-100,102-105

Ramaphosa’s political baggage is just too heavy, packed with old, stinky and infectious clothes and inadmissible goods. The antagonists are looking forward to what will happen in 2019 when he tries to make a border crossing.

3.6.2. A Ramaphosa utopia versus a Ramaphosa dystopia

Cyril Ramaphosa chooses his words carefully — very carefully. Certainly, he is genial and relaxed, but he is too good a politician to allow himself to get carried away in his pronouncements.

And so, like a skilled artist trying hard not to give away too much, he culls his words most adroitly while also managing to remain warm and engaging.109:15

Is the above a description of an interview with Cyril Ramaphosa after his election as the president at the 54th National Conference of the ANC in December 2017? No, the words were uttered by Ramaphosa 25 years earlier in 1994 in an interview with the former political editor of The Star, Kaizer Nyatsumba.109 In 2019 he is the same seasoned and unchanged politician with the same political enigma: encircled by unpredictable thinking and behaviour and mysterious agendas.

One thing is clear: Ramaphosa did not change his political disposition; it is still embedded in radical African liberation and ANC revolutionism, and still not political finessed. The only obvious change between 1994 and 2019 is that he was 43 years old in 1994 and is now 69 years in 2019!109

Cyril Ramaphosa, like FW de Klerk, entered as Number One as the man of the moment, but like De Klerk’s auk! (greatness), Ramaphosa’s aura also has started to wash out: just much faster. In Ramaphosa’s case it started after only 100 days. The antagonists point out that Ramaphosa made initially a dramatic impact on the ANC and the country’s politics. In retrospect, his actions are bathed in controversy, basically aimed at overcoming and outliving his insecurity and endangering as leader of the disorganised and disunited ANC. This negativity is spilling to his presidency. Two dramatic, suddenly outcomes (totally unexpected for Whites) are prominent: 1) his intention to change Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution to implement land expropriation without compensation, and 2) his intention to estrange the White part of the population from the Black community and the greater African community.110

Critics of the intended land reform initiative of Ramaphosa and all that surrounds it lay the problems at the door of the person and politician Cyril Ramaphosa himself. Analysts see the sudden political radicalism of Ramaphosa as a direct outcome of a politically impoverished president of the ANC party as well as the state South Africa. Ramaphosa may have won the ANC’s leadership battle in 2018, writes Mthombothi111, but he’s lost the ideological one. He came out of the Nasrec conference wearing the mantle of leadership, but burdened by the opinions of a divided top six and a national executive committee of 80 members, bodies crawling with his political enemies.111

Mthombothi111 enlightens us111:21:

Ramaphosa leads a party that’s pulling in different direction from where he wants to go. As one activist puts it, the head is cut off from the body. A bit extreme perhaps, but it will be interesting to see how Ramaphosa goes about stitching the two together”. To stitch the ANC-party together seem more and more impossible for the antagonists: the head is under witch-doctor’s care at Nklanda and the perfumed half-decayed body stored at Luthuli-house.

Firstly, as Mthombothi111 says, it is becoming a question in which direction Ramaphosa and the ANC elite want to go: A Western type of capitalist democracy or a combined African-styled Chinese-Venezuelan autocratic socialism. His land expropriation intentions reflect a combined African-styled Chinese-Venezuelan autocratic socialism.

Secondly, Ramaphosa as a president is hamstringed by the leftish Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and her radical cronies (as well as the spooky Jacob Zuma who is still looking at every decision of the ANC elite, regime and party), who is still well-established in the background. The intention to oust Ramaphosa before 2019 or after the election is seemingly part of the Zuma-faction’s plan. This insecurity makes Ramaphosa the powerless head of a divided and corrupted ANC. It has gotten so out of hand that Ramaphosa, as last resort, had to appeal (not demand!) at the end of September 2018 for unity in the ANC as a prerequisite to winning the coming election. His rebuke of party bosses regarding their independent conflicting messages was clearly not successful. The fact further that Ramaphosa’s seemingly intimate friend Gwede Mantashe is also arm-in-arm with Ace Magashule (who is undoubtedly not an intimate friend of Ramaphosa), makes his present position extremely difficult. This conflict and disempowerment of Ramaphosa refer back to Ramaphosa’s possible involvement in the Zuma wrongs, or his direct knowledge of it as vice-president.112 As Mthomboth112 puts it precise112:4:

“Mantashe‘s entanglement presents Ramaphosa with a challenge. It constrains his scope to act or confront allegations of corruption by the likes of Magashule and others. His chair and trusted ally is knee-deep in it. The plot thickens.”

The antagonists feel that the radical economic transformation (RET) narrative has won at Nasrec and that the Zuma group of the NEC is arm-in-arm with the EFF ideology (Economic Freedom Fighters). The ANC’s unexpected radical metamorphosis (undoubtedly a driver of Ramamania specifically) was described well by Mthombothi111 in March 2018111:21:

“Early last year the ANC in Parliament voted against an EFF motion to expropriate without compensation, but almost days later Zuma started campaigning for exactly the same thing. The call was taken up by many branches of the ruling party, especially those supporting Dlamini-Zuma.”

On Ramaphosa’s sudden pliancy to the Zuma and Dlamini-Zuma inclinations of land expropriation without compensation, Tabane113 writes113:6:

“It is fascinating that President Cyril Ramaphosa seems to be very much alive to the possible chasm that may be an unintended consequence of the wild and generalized approach to the issue. Earlier this year he even sought to assure the Afrikaner community that the constitution will not be amended.”

The belief of the antagonists is that the Zuma group of the ANC NEC’s radical classic Marxist view is becoming cemented into the ANC base. It is echoed more and more by Ramaphosa himself since July 2018 with his public declaration that “we” (ANC) are going to take land without compensation. This was followed by his very provocative challenge, although indirectly, to three specific role players, namely the South African Whites, Donald Trump and the UN to do something about his (Ramaphosa) intended land expropriation. For a leader like Ramaphosa, with a built-in segment of radical liberation coming from the old ANC, these kinds of announcements and decisions are not recallable outcomes. It’s a final decision by Ramaphosa, without deviating one inch from his old radical political ideology. This Black radicalism, antagonists argue, includes the belief that White monopoly capital captured the entire South African economy and that the only panacea for this is radical economic transformation (RET), which includes dramatic and radical land reform to cleanse the country of socio-economic apartheid and the presence of the inequality and poverty of Blacks solely at the costs of the Whites (who Ramaphosa identified as the sinners). The status of the Whites seems more and more to be second-class citizenship, stripped from its traditional common law rights.111

The opponents of land expropriation are of the opinion that although it initially seemed as if Ramaphosa does not subscribe to land grabbing from the Whites in his heart, he, in line with his liberator’s instinct, has become part and parcel of the “new” ANC’s radical view on the “colonists Whites” and their “stolen land”. This is a direct outcome of the Ramamania and Ramaforia that forced Ramaphosa to stay empowered inside the current ANC NEC and ANC regime.111

What makes Ramaphosa so dangerous in the minds of the antagonists is that it is seemingly important to Ramaphosa to hold the office of president by underwriting the mantra of the Zuma group in the NEC (and indirectly the Malema faction) at all cost, ignoring sound political justice and nationhood. Many of the antagonists doubted his half-hearted assurances that the ANC’s planned land seizure will happen in such a way that it does not jeopardise economic growth or food production from the start. The meaning and possibilities of this rhetoric is so wide that an ox wagon can turn in it! The antagonists see this kind of “presidential testimony” as just safeguarding the ANC regime’s “good” image. The same goes for Ramaphosa’s vague assurances that land reform does not mean full capture. For the antagonists the potential for extreme land grabbing is great. Ramaphosa is clearly not satisfied with the present land ownership and the favoured position of Whites.111

Ramaphosa showed his radicalism on White land in an interview with the journalist Kaizer Nyatsumba of The Star as far back as 1994 when he voiced his disagreement with the 1994 dispensation by pointing out that the major two challenges facing the ANC then were: 1) a clear future political strategy; and 2) the setting of tactics to prosecute the next phase of the struggle, like countering the favouring of White business communities at the expense of Blacks.86,109,111 Revolutionism has not diminished in his mindset, as his 2017 inaugural speech at Nasrec clearly confirms, where Ramaphosa86 said86:15:

“We serve them [principles of the ANC] because we [revolutionary democrats] have chosen, each one of us, to become selfless agents of revolutionary change.”

Antagonists view the present hamstringing of Ramaphosa as a president by the Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma gang as a failure to get rid of the corrupted and crooked ministers and high-level officials of the Zuma government. Political analysts refer to this mustering of renewed power by Jacob Zuma against Ramaphosa as a very dangerous political rebirth, coming from KwaZulu-Natal, one which can intensify in 2019 just before the election. The journalist Ranjeni Munusamy114 describes it as114:22:

“War drums in the political battlefields of KwaZulu-Natal will echo throughout the ANC and the country”.

The “angst” that Ramaphosa showed after King Goodwill Zwelithini’s threat to take up arms if his trust land becomes part of land reform, is good evidence in this context. Is he in fear of his life, seeing that political murders are already a permanent fixture in KwaZulu-Natal? Are the various Zuma reappointments by Ramaphosa in other ministerial or governmental positions or in the ANC executive leadership part of this fear of Ramaphosa? His willingness to pay Zuma’s immense court costs from the state’s fund is not only absurd, it reveals his fear. (Note: Zuma’s estimated legal bill per day is R290 000; the number of fraud, corruption and racketeering charges against Zuma is 16; while the number of payments alleged to have been paid as bribes to Zuma is 783).115-118 Mthombothi referred to this financial support as82:21: “…dishonesty doing by Ramaphosa, written all over, if not being patently fraudulent”.

Mthombothi82 posits82:21:

“Ramaphosa’s explanation in parliament last week was evasive, and not at all in keeping with the spirit of Thuma Mina. It reeks of the very odour he claims to want to eradicate.”

The political misbehaviour of Ramaphosa as reflected by the Zwelithini land case and Ramaphosa’s blind disregard for the sound recommendations of the parliamentary High-level Panel Report of Motlanthe for a strict but justified land redistribution programme, spells doom, making Ramaphosa a political factor to be feared in the future.3,82,111,119-122

Munusamy75 warned in April 2018 as follows on Ramaphosa, the leader and his limitations and shortcomings75:22:

Ramaphosa might have great plans for South Africa’s recovery, but it would appear that his own organization is weighting him down.

Instead of focusing on stabilising the state and creating an optimum climate for the investment and economic growth that would hopefully result in job creation, he must fight the ANC’s internal problems
Meanwhile, other ANC leaders are ineffective, dogged by scandal or engaged in sideshows.

While Ramaphosa is able to send his lions on the hunt for investment, it is a pity he does not have beasts at his disposal to deal with the nuisances in the ANC.

Ramaphosa’s ongoing failures, specifically earlier in his capacity as vice-president for many years when he had to oversee the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act to do justice to the poor, landless Blacks living on Black trust land are also prominent in the antagonists arguing. For the antagonists the question is that if he failed the Blacks, how can he been trusted to do good to Whites? The antagonists see him as a leader who underwrites a total pro-Black (radical) sentiment on land redistribution and rights.109,111,112

The negativity of critics about the planned land reform under the presidency of Ramaphosa is aggravated further by Ramaphosa’s contradicting and vague remarks on the land issue, which is seen more and more as an escape route he uses out of a situation he does not understand, nor knows to handle. 3,82,111,119-122

The ANC regime went down the drain from 1994 to 2019. Prominent is the rising national debt. Ramaphosa as vice-president was associated with the Zuma regime’s fraud, theft and corruption.3,82,111,119-122 Bruce73 indicates that the country’s debt rose from $20-billion with the start-up of the Zuma regime to more than $80-billion at the closing of the Zuma regime, with Ramaphosa as the vice-president. Bruce73:22 posits that by 2021 the interest to be paid by South Africans on the country’s debt will average more than R850 million per working day. This reflects not only failure by the ANC regime in general up to 2018 but also failure by Ramaphosa as vice-president and second-in-command of the South African state. The state capture during the Zuma regime and the failure of Black farming projects and other government enterprises were often the direct result of corruption, fraud and theft from inside the ANC elite and not so much always the inabilities or irresponsibility of Black farmers. The question for the antagonists is how Ramaphosa can improve the crooked and failed political system? Their answer is that he can’t, he is a crippled political leader. Under Ramaphosa South Africa has gone into a technical recession and so far, besides his political and emotional rhetoric, nothing constructive has happened.3,82,111,119-122

Ramaphosa’s41 naivety on the present recession is further reflected by his own emotional, foolish denial of its existence and seriousness when he said41:4: “We should not be fearful and think we are in a recession. We are not.” The ANC has failed to create income for many years, and the government simply does not have the funds for land redistribution. This dire financial situation means that the ANC has to trade confiscated White land in exchange for votes to stay in power.3,82,109,111,119-122

The political week of 11 to 18 November 2018, in the view of the antagonists, reflects the truth about the ongoing Zuma corruption inside the unpredictable Ramaphosa regime after Cyril Ramaphosa’s shocking admission that an amount of R500 000 was disclosed in parliament by DA leader Mmusi Maimane was in fact to help fund his campaign. It was not for work that his son Andile had done for the Bosasa logistics group (presently known as African Global Operations), which has been named as benefactor of several other high-profile ANC figures.123 Qaanitah Hunter writes123:1:

“President Cyril Ramaphosa’s ambitious drive to rescue the ANC and the country from the state-capture debacle is facing its sternest test yet. Today, the president has been forced onto the back foot after he admitted this week a R500,000 donations from the politically Watson family.”

This condemning situation must be read together with the under-mentioned series of condemning setbacks for his presidency, writes Hunter.123:1-2

In this context Hunter123 points out the shock resignation of finance minister Nhlanhla Nene after he was exposed as having lied about his visits to the Gupta compound, the resignation of Malusi Gigaba after the public protector found that he lied in court under oath, and the admission by public enterprises minister Pravin Gordhan that he met the Gupta family. There was also a slew of bad economic markers indicating that Ramaphosa’s economic remedy to fix South Africa in any way is a failure.123 Critics believe Ramaphosa knows about the donation and is not forthright when he responded by saying that he “just learn now of it”. DA leader Mmusi Maimane said123:2 “…this was no different to how the Guptas captured individuals in the government,” while the leader of the EFF Julius Malema said123:2: “Ramaphosa ‘must take full responsibility and admit that he lied to parliament, and he knows what happens to people who lie to parliament’”. The possibility that his presidency seems to be a short-lived one, is forcing him into irrational politics in an effort to outlive his enemies inside the ANC elite. This situation can make his future actions devastating, unpredictable and untrustworthy.3,82,111.119-123

Ramaphosa’s41declaration41:4: “…we are going to take land and when we take land we are going to take it without compensation’”, is not for the antagonists a myth or a lie, nor is it meaningless and aimless rhetoric. It is a hard fact, a final outcome and a guideline to understand Ramaphosa’s future extreme political intentions with Whites. His extreme decision has a momentum of its own, writes Corrigan110:22: “…it is not going to stop and anyone believing that Ramaphosa is going to back off from his land grabbing intentions of White-land is in for a surprise”. The antagonists now have Ramafear, a fear to go on, even after the Ramaflop at the end.110,124

The CEO of the Altron Group and a Yale World Fellow, Mteto Nyati125, puts the confusion in which the current ANC finds itself under Cyril Ramaphosa into words when he reflects on the abilities of the leader Ramaphosa125:9: “Everything but vision from Cyril”. Nyati125 points out the role of land expropriation from Whites in this political and moral besetting of Ramaphosa and his arrogance and ignorance to publicly rebuke the US President Donald Trump for his comments on the land issue, when he writes125:9: “…it was a strategy mistake on the president’s [Ramaphosa] part. We cannot talk about growth and ignore the US. Our national interests have to inform our choice of partners”, and: “The big threat to Ramaphosa’s turnaround strategy is the lack of a unifying and compelling vision. The vision that the president had was derailed by the land issue.”

For the antagonists the reality, which Nyati does not say, is that the ANC and Ramaphosa have a compelling vision: a vision that is based on live-long national Black radical liberation, one that cannot even be derailed by delinquency such as land grabbing and that makes it clear that South Africa does not belong to all who live in it.125

The antagonists find closure in the words of Mthombothi126 on Ramaphosa and his intimate ANC elites, when he concludes126:14:

“When he speaks, the words often sound as though they come from an empty space, devoid of emotions. He drones”,


“Ramaphosa does not have it in his locker. His words have to be respected simply because they carry the stamp of his office.”

The antagonists’ respect for him and his elite as good leaders is long gone.

Munusamy127 helps to assure the antagonists that their disrespect (and fear) of the leadership of Ramaphosa and his cronies is correct when she posits127:16:

SA’s sixth democratic poll is just six months away yet there is no coherent discourse about leadership and major national issues. Anti-corruption should have been Ramaphosa’s flagship campaign issue but there are concentrated efforts to discredit the clean-up of the state and undermine investigation into corruption. Journalists are branded enemies. There are hidden forces, including criminal syndicates, impacting on our politics. A surprise outcome in the elections is not far-fetched as we might think.

Cyril Ramaphosa is a willing but an inapt president. As PW Botha was unfit to be the king of the modern Zulus due to his White supremacist views, so Ramaphosa with his Black supremacist views is unfit to be president of modern South Africans. For the antagonists South Africa is caught in Ramaphosa dystopia.

4. Conclusions

The many perspectives of the antagonists on any change to Section 25 and their rejection of expropriation of land without market-related prices as described in articles 3 and 4 provide an overview of the political scenario of South Africa, especially for the period 1994 to 2019. The antagonists show how land expropriation is symptomatic of a gradual change in the ANC. It therefore forms, with the manifold other elements, a political unity, linking the land issue with the ANC’s political and economic management as it is primarily guided and steered by the aims of Black liberation and revolutionary politics. The antagonists see delinquent elements and role players that aim to make the political and socioeconomic system of South Africa dysfunctional.

When aiming to understand the aim and intentions of the ANC elite with their land expropriation without compensation, it is crucial to describe and to understand the post-1994 politics of South Africa. This approach was followed in putting forward the many perspectives of the antagonists. Some of their arguments are based on sound foundations while others are emotionally laden and lack depth. In the end, the antagonists want to make their case against land expropriation without compensation as strongly as possible in an effort to secure a win. From a critical vantage point it must be noted that in general the perspective of the antagonists is not representative of the total White or Afrikaner population, but mostly of the contingent of White farm- and land owners, White capitalist business groups with direct and indirect interests in agricultural economics, as well as self-appoints White “saviours and rescuers” that claim to fight unselfishly for the interests of the White farming community and for the Constitution and dispensation of 1994. The antagonists are a minority group, estimated to represent less than 10% of the White population which in reality is another minority group, more or less 8% of the total South African population. They do have immense financial influence and interest in the country’s present economics and politics and its private land ownership model. They feel threatened by and fearful of any socioeconomic and political change away from exclusive democratic-capitalism.

The antagonists know very well that they have reached a watershed in the South Africa political history. They have become easy prey for the radicals inside the ANC, not only for political disempowerment, but also to be robbed of all their assets. Louw gives guidance in this regard6:175-176:

However, as said, criminal proceedings are not enough for many of the apartheid victims. Many of these victims want financial compensation from those who were directly involved in criminal actions, while others wish for compensation from the Afrikaner community and business sector as a whole as they have benefitted from favoured business deals, the many other interests and the jobs etc. that apartheid offered them. Prominent are certain Afrikaner and nationalist Afrikaner business leaders and magnates who benefitted greatly from the apartheid system. They were favoured for business deals, contracts and other benefits. The current battle regarding Radical Economic Transformation (RET), seen by many Blacks as the second leg (economic revolution) in continuation of the first leg of the 1994 dispensation (political revolution), are excellent indicators of the Black call for “pay-back” of White capital obtained from apartheid-incongruities.

For the antagonists the ANC is a politically bankrupt and dangerous political organisation. To say now, as some ANC elites do, like Vusi Mavimbela128 [who worked previously as adviser to Thabo Mbeki, as director of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and as director-general in the first presidency of Jacob Zuma]128:10: “The ANC delivered liberation. What happened subsequently is not what we wanted to see happening”, is a self-acquittal that can only be accepted from a derailed politician who lost his/her memory of the delinquent liberation and revolutionary energy unique to the ANC.128 It was on this liberation ticket that the ANC came to power in 1994 and continuously committed corruption, theft and mismanagement. Mavimbela128 himself admits the negative turn of the ANC in the Zuma days128:10: “Corruption was institutionalized, state institutions were decimated and the ruling alliance brought to the brink”.

The antagonists’ objections against a change to Section 25 hold merit, making their case a strong and well-reasoned one. They believe that a total land grab is outside the reach of the ANC. The party lacks the judicial power, but their unpredictable governing since 1994 is a threat.18,72,129-137

For the antagonists, the period 1994 to 2019 under the ANC regime has been a dark period of criminality, state capture, confused violence, thuggery and race-baiting. It is reminiscent of Apartheid, and it has a momentum that will not slow as long as the ANC is in power.126,127,138-149

The antagonists have an unshakable belief that the general public and the parliament itself will reject any change to the Constitution or would not allow land grabbing from Whites. They also believe that the South African courts, including the Constitutional Court, will denounce any illegal and unconstitutional actions by the ANC that could lead a one-sided policy of land expropriation without full compensation. They base this on the recent failures of the ANC and their failure to do anything about the salvation of the poor. Both Julius Malema and Cyril Ramaphosa are political bluffs that will disappear from the country’s politics.138, 127,139-150

The antagonists agree fully with Bruce151 when he describes this coming cleansing of the ANC from the South African politics, obliterating any remaining fears of land grabbing. He wrote on 16 December 2018151:18:

But wait until Moyane gets arrested and tried, until Julius Malema, Floyd Shivambu and the ANC’s Danny Msiza and a host of others implicated in the looting of VBS Mutual Bank are arrested and tried. Wait until Ace Magashule, Supra Mahumapelo and perhaps even DD Mabuza and Malusi Gigaba and, yes, Bathabile [Dlamini], are arrested and tried for corruption. Wait until the Gupta brothers are extradited and tried. Wait until the whole slimy dough of corruption is unearthed and put on display before disappearing into jail cells around the country. Add Markus Jooste, Brian Molefe and Ben Ngubane to this list.

The antagonists see South Africa as just another failed “liberated” African country, experimenting time after time with failed “visions” and driven by failed leaders.150

Mthombothi150 describes the failed ANC leaders well and calls them to book for their political and criminal delinquency150:17:

Africa is let down by its [Black] politicians. They’ve been an obstacle to its people’s progress. Whichever way one looks, whichever problem one may think of, whichever boulder or ditch that’s ever been a bar to its advancement, the politicians have in the main been responsible for it. They are the authors of our misfortune.

While Mandela sought a better and humane way for Africa, Thabo Mbeki, his successor, in his desire to be the spokesman for the continent and its diaspora, decided not to rock the boat. He turned a blind eye to its misconduct. And he would brook no criticism of its wrongdoings. One, however, suspects that he knew better.

Jacob Zuma had no time to either think or defend anybody else. He descended into some of worst corrupt practices of his fellow African leaders. And he dragged the country [South Africa] from the young and promising democracy that it was to one of probably the most corrupt countries on Earth. Quite an Achievement.

But it should begin with us: we should be brutally frank and intolerant of the misdeeds of our leaders.

The antagonists take this failed leadership of the present-day ANC, as identified by Mthombothi150, back to the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and the White rulers categorising Blacks one-hundred and eighteen years ago as too incompetent and uncivilised to run the country South Africa. Prominent is the dooming testimonies of two well-known White politicians and leaders of that time who attended the Cape Convention in 1908 to design and to establish the Union Act.71 The historian MS Geen, in his book, The Making of the Union of South Africa. A brief history: 1487–1939, reflects71: 54,60:

1) General Christiaan de Wet of the Free State Colony71: 60:

Providence has drawn the line between Black and White and we must make that clear to the Natives and not instil into their minds false ideas of equality. To his mind, the greatest kindness and the greatest justice the Convention could do to the Blacks were to inform them that they are unequal to Whites.

2) Sir Frederick Moor of the Natal Colony71:54:

… White and Black races in South Africa could never be amalgamated. The history of the world proved that the Black man was incapable of civilization and the evidences were to be found throughout South Africa today. Almost every race in the world could point to its stages of civilization but what traces of Black civilization could South Africa produce though the Native people had been brought into contact with civilization for ages?…Sir Percy Fitz-Patrick has spoken of a test of civilization. What was a civilized man? Was it not a man who proved himself adaptable to a civilized community? The Native were incapable of civilization because they were incapable of sustained effort.

However inhumane these comments may seem within the modern context of human rights and political correctness, the events of the past year cause the antagonists to consider for a minute whether these persons were correct.71

The antagonists have two prominent questions at this stage:

  1. Can the ANC regime really erase the remnants of the Black-White struggle by taking revenge by means of land grabbing from Whites, in the process perpetrating the same crimes as their own oppressors?
  2. Can the ANC regime really better South Africa for all its people with land grabbing after they have mostly failed in every category of political, social and economic sphere from 1994 to 2018?

The pertinent question for an objective and seasoned judge will be if the arguments of the antagonists are well founded enough to be heard and to be considered. In considering this question, the counter arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the propagandists should first be considered.

The next two articles (5 and 6), titled: “The propagandists arguments, opinions and viewpoints on changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible: Parts 1 and 2”, examines the perspectives of the propagandists and their efforts to turn the public’s sympathy to win the case for the ANC regime to change Section 25(2)(b) to implement a policy of land grabbing without compensation.

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85. Mokone T, Makinana A & Deklerk A. Cyril takes over North West. Sunday Times (News). 2018 May 13; p. 2.
86. Ramaphosa C. ANC will serve the people. The Star (Inside). 2017 Dec. 22; p. 15.
87. Steenhuisen J. The ANC certainly has a case to answer on state capture. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Sept. 2; p. 24.
88. Maimane reasserting his leadership to steer his party on a new course. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 June 3; p. 16.
89. Mthombothi B. Jacob Zuma was no autocrat – the party went along with him on his looting spree. Sunday Times. 2018 Sept. 9; p. 21.
90. Bruce P. Careful moves as the endgame begins. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2017 Dec. 31; p. 12.
91. De Groot S. The politics of perspective and the power of dissent. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Apr. 15; p. 16.
92. Tshabalala M. Beware, the snake myth be dead but these who share its secrets can still bite. Sunday Times. 2018 Jan. 7; p. 13.
93. Haffajee F. Gordhan’s Gornado shakes up public enterprises. Sunday Times. 2018 May 27; p. 2.
94. How leaks foiled the king’s gambit. Sunday Times (News). 2017 Dec. 31; p. 4.
95. Deklerk A, Hunter Q. ANC moves to keep Supra in post. Sunday Time. (News). 2018 Apr. 15; p. 4.
96. De Lange R. Nog taks wink vir SA se rykstes. Rapport (Sake). 2018 Apr. 15; p. 1.
97. Henderson R, Anetos P. Moyane to answer for SARS decay. Sunday Times (Business). 2018 May 6; p. 1.
98. Hunter Q. Youth brass rap Maine for Gupta ‘confession’. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Apr. 15; p. 4.
99. Modak AR. ANC stuck in Zuma syndrome. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 May 13; p. 16.
100. Munusamy R. The Guptas may be heading for the dock, but there is other like them lying in wait. Sunday Times (Opinion).2018 Jan. 21; p.18.
101. Pauw J. Now is the time to clean the spy agency rot. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Apr. 22; p. 22.
102. Roodt D. Wat gedoen kan word aan ongelykheid in SA. Rapport. 2018 Apr. 29; p. 4.
103. Light is being shone in dark, festering places all over the country. Sunday Times. 2018 May 27; p. 16.
104. Chambers D, Jika T. SA set to put the moves on the Guptas. Sunday Times (News). 2017 Dec 31; p. 4.
105. Mthethwa B. State goes easy on Nklanda scapegoats. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Apr. 29; p. 2.
106. Buccus I. Only the Left can save us from crisis of EFF and Zuma populism. Sunday Times. 2018 Aug. 12; p. 17.
107. Speckman A. Business needs to wake up – and speak up. Sunday Times (Business) .2018 Aug. 12; p. 10.
108. Haffajee F. No more Mr Nice Guy, Cyril. Sunday Times (Business). 2018 July 15; p. 2.
109. Nyatsumba K. Ramaphosa reveals his thoughts in 1994. The Star (Inside). 2017 Dec. 22; p. 15.
110. Corrigan T. There’s madness in the land debate, but not in pointing out the risks. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Aug. 26; p. 22.
111. Mthombothi B. Ramaphosa may have won the leadership battle but he’s lost the ideological one. Sunday Times. 2018 Mar. 11; p. 21.
112. Mthombothi B. Plot thickens as Mantashe’s involvement presents Ramaphosa with a challenge. Sunday Times. 2018 Sept. 23; p. 21.
113. 113.Tabane OJJ. Mbeki’s take on land is a necessary provocation. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Oct. 7; p. 6.
114. Munusamy R. War drums in the political battlefields of Kwazulu-Natal will echo throughout the ANC and the country. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2017 Sept. 17; p. 22.
115. Matiwane Z. ANC’s predicament is to keep Zuma at arm’s length while embracing his supporters. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 July 29; p. 20.
116. Maughan K. Zuma hires top silks in spite of Cyril’s squeeze. Sunday Times (News). 2018 July 22; p. 4.
117. Mnguni L. ANC needs a political solution in KZN rather than a legal one. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2017 Sept. 17; p. 22.
118. Shoba S. Zuma’s hidden hand in ANC’s KwaZulu-Natal crisis. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2017 Sept. 17; p. 20.
119. Shoba S, Mthetwa B. Ramaphosa bends the knee to Zulu king on tense land issue. Sunday Times (News). 2018 July 2018; p. 4.
120. Cousins B. Your land rights may be trampled every day if you’re an ordinary black South African. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Mar. 11; p. 22.
121. Is Ramaphosa willing to sacrifice our rights to the Zulu king’s blackmail? Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 July 8; p. 22.
122. Munusamy R. Amid high theatre and spectacular blunders, it’s up to the Zondo inquiry to gauge the full extent of the rot. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Mar. 11; p. 22.
123. Hunter Q. Dodgy cash turns up heat on Cyril. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 18; pp. 1-2.
124. Kgosana C. ANC seeks China’s help to win votes. Sunday Times (News). 2018 July 29; p. 4.
125. Nyati M. Everything but vision from Cyril. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 11; p. 9.
126. Mthombothi B. When MPs treat parliament as a shebeen, Cyril must remind them where they are – and lead. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 11; p. 14.
127. Munusamy R. The misreading of Trump led to his reactionary regime…might the same happen in SA, where dark forces hover over politics? Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Nov. 11; p. 16.
128. Kgosana C. The struggle and all that jazz. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 11; p. 10.
129. Tabane OJJ. Calling the ANC’s dangerous bluff on land reform. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 June 3; p. 18.
130. Deep in unbanked country, a sophisticated heist relies on political cover. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Oct. 14; p. 20.
131. Munusamy R. Despite VBS scandal, Malema will continue to fill the leadership vacuum and concoct bogeymen. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Oct. 14; p. 22.
132. Munusamy R, Kgosana C. NO, NO NENE! Sunday Times. 2018 Oct. 7; pp. 1-2.
133. Stadler H, Malherbe P, Essop P, Selebano B. EFF rooi in die gesig. Beeld. 2018 Oct. 12; p. 1.
134. Leon T. TV expropriation debate enters realm of Neverland. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 July 29; p. 20.
135. Joshua 11:14, 11:16 and 11. 23; pp. 325-326. In: Life Application Bible. The living Bible. Illinois: Tyndale House Publishers; 1988.
136. Bruce P. A better way to reach for the promised land. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Mar. 4; p. 14.
137. Munusamy R. Cyril plays nice while Julius seizes moment to change game. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Mar. 4; p. 16.
138. Derby R. ‘Sober’ ANC must step up if Cyril is to salvage SA’s fortunes. Sunday Times (Business). 2018 Nov. 4; p. 2.
139. Don’t confuse violent thuggery and race-baiting with vibrant politics. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Nov. 11; p. 10.
140. Extreme measures for desperate times. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Nov. 11; p. 14.
141. Gordhan P. How to rescue a state that been pillaged by the corrupt and greedy. Sunday Times. 2018 Oct. 28; p. 5.
142. Hunter Q. ‘Not ill’ but Mabuza in Russia on sick leave. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 11; p. 1.
143. Kgosana C. Big firearms to protect VBS looting kingpins. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Nov. 4; p. 6.
144. Kgosana C. Minister purges ‘slush fund’ spies. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 11; pp. 1, 4.
145. Kgosana C, Hunter Q. VBS looting: ANC got R2m. Sunday Times. 2018 Oct. 28; pp. 1-2.
146. Matiwane Z. Zuma cronies lobby against KZN chair. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Nov. 4; p. 4.
147. Mokone T. Maimane to move on Andile deal. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 11; p. 4.
148. Munusamy R. Bank honcho gloated over Treasury visit. Sunday Times. 2018 Oct. 28; pp. 1-2.
149. Naidoo L. Time for bold leadership to rid SA of the scourge of corruption. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 4; p. 21.
150. Mthombothi B. Africa is being betrayed by its leaders – now it’s up to us to hold them to account. Sunday Times. 2018 June 3; p. 17.
151. Bruce P. Due process, grinding slowly, will be exceedingly fine. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Dec. 16; p. 18.


Not commissioned; Externally peer-reviewed.


The author declares that he has no competing interest.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa.


Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution (3)

Full title: The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible. Part 1: The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime (3)

Gabriel P Louw


Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PUCHE), DPhil (PUCHE), PhD (NWU)


Keywords: antagonists, opponents, compensation, contamination, crookery, custom, expropriation, land grabbing, land ownership, opposition, poverty, radicalism, redistribution, wealth.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 2: 1


1. Background

1.1 Introduction

The EFF can’t tell you with a straight face how exactly the expropriation of land without compensation would work. It is time someone pointed out to it that, with 8% of the vote, it will not be able to implement it without the ANC’s say-so.

Everyone is in such euphoria over the long overdue airing of the land question that we have suspended our reasoning about how disastrous this policy could be.

Let’s be frank: the ANC is stringing along the EFF and those who believe it on the land question, lulling them into thinking that it is on the same page. The ANC cannot afford to hand over the land question on a platter to the EFF as an election tool. It has to take some credit for an impending land revolution – except that such a revolution is not near!

The ANC is bluffing.1:18

February2 agrees that Julius Malema, as a master manipulator of the media, is, like all populists, well-schooled in offering very simple solutions for very complex challenges and problems, ultimately leaving a bomb that can explode at any moment. Add to this the senseless utterances of Malema’s sidekick Floyd Shivambu, and land ownership is turning into a time bomb.2-7

February2 describes Malema as a dangerous rabble-rouser with his radical opinions of land ownership and reform. His reference to Malema’s naïve remark on farming, finance, citizenship and land ownership reveals Malema’s political foolishness and short-sightedness. February says that Malema’s message to his followers is in essence2:16: “You are here in large numbers because you are jobless. But if you had land you would be at home tilling your land” [Own translation].

The EFF’s Gauteng chairwoman, Mandisa Mashego8, has shown where she learned her flawed understanding of the economics and politics applicable to land management and ownership when she said on the eNCA TV show Let’s Have it Out, that the EFF–style expropriation without compensation is equal to that of the so-called Singaporean model of expropriation without compensation (which is actually done only in terms of market prices).8 The English proverb: A little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing, seems quite applicable to many of the EFF leaders when it comes to serious politics.2-8

1.2 The land narrative in South Africa    

When Joshua conquered the entire Levant as Israeli territory, they “loot[ed] all the cattle, ravaging all the cities and killing all the inhabitants in the area”.9 A repeat in South Africa is unlikely, as indicated by the political journalist and commentator Onkgopotse Tabane1. He also does not see the “godly higher hand” and “a loud voice coming from heaven” that guided Moses and Joshua in their tremendous religiously, politically, economically, ethically and socially deviant land grabbing. Indeed, Tabane1 posits that the final outcome in South Africa after the 2019 election will be the opposite. Tabane1 believes that the whole Ramaphosa exercise of land expropriation will ultimately be toothless. He feels that the ANC elite is been playing a well-planned mind-game with the poor and landless Blacks. For Tabane1 the ANC regime is just continuing on the path of failing to empower the poor Black masses, as has been the case since 1994 with its ineffective implementation of Section 25 (2)(b) of the Constitution. The opinion is that the ANC party and its regime’s actions, like the testing of the public opinions with the submissions on the land issue, is only part of a manipulated and planned process of political window-dressing. It is seen as nothing else than a 2019 election trick to counter the EFF’s craziness and to optimize the DA’s passivity on the land issue, which the ANC themselves know they are also unable to solve, even if they remain in power for the next 24 years.1,9-11

In short: the argument of a strong faction of political analysts, which includes many prominent Black political thinkers, politicians, journalists and commentators, is that many of the smooth talkers in parliament will not make any change to Section 25(2)(b) or any other part of the Constitution. Tabane writes1:18: “The parliamentary process will not result in a constitutional change that will give the state any more power to expropriate land than was agreed to by Ramaphosa’s ANC at Codesa.” Section 25 as it stands at present is more than enough to bring effective land redistribution and, as said, the ANC’s process of land redistribution has failed to bring real change under its land reform minister Gugile Nkwinti over the last nine years.1,12

The simple questions in the minds of critics are therefore: What will more political and judicial power bring the ANC? Is it just more planned corruption and political delinquency, state capture and self-enrichment by the ANC elite? Is a masked corrupt Chinese deal with farmland in the making, like the doomed Zuma-Putin-Mahlobo nuclear deal that nearly wrecked South African security? Will South Africa become a subordinate Chinese province in extreme poverty with the Marxist suppression of the masses? What is really behind the ANC’s planned land expropriation without compensation?

The antagonists feel that South Africa has been knocking at the door of the Chinese state since 1994 under the corrupted ANC regime and its elite who is more than willing and ready to put its sovereignty on a silver platter for the taking. Land expropriation without compensation is only a small part of the ANC’s deception. Is this a far-fetched thought? No. Three Indians showed this with their crooked enslavement of some of the ANC elite.13-15 Mthombothi focuses partly on above questions when he says12:15:

The amendment wants to go further than current laws allow. If we are to right what President Cyril Ramaphosa calls an original sin, where do we start? Do we have full knowledge or understanding of the original lie of the land, as it were? And at the end of the process, will every black person be entitled to a piece of land or plot gratis? The Khoisan people will vehemently dispute the prevailing idea that Black people are the original owners of the land.

There are just too many imponderables.

Also, Archbishop Thabo Makgoba16 points out the bewilderment in the minds of many of the ANC elites on the land expropriation matter when he writes16:21: “I have not heard anyone spell out an overarching vision which takes all the complex practical and emotional factors into account. Nor have I heard a satisfactory answer to the fundamental question: expropriation to do what?”

Mthombothi is very specific when he writes about Ramaphosa17:19:

President Cyril Ramaphosa, having been blindsided by the ANC, have thought he could muddle through it. He’s now a convert who thinks he, like a magician, can grab private property without compensation and grow the economy at the same time.

He’ll squeeze water from a stone. It also remains to be seen how a scheme that targets taking land from one race group while leaving others untouched can pass constitutional muster.

Thabo Mbeki is also clear on this anomaly in the current ANC’s politics on land ownership with their prominent targeting of Whites and its immense long-term impact on the race relations of the country. Tabane writes18:6:

Amid the insults now emanating from the ANC [because Mbeki has blown the lid of the disorganized and unprincipled approach of the ANC on the land question], Mbeki underlines that it is sad that in the name of populism the ANC is willing to depart from its century-long commitment to non-racialism.

Makgoba16 elaborates further, putting into perspective another side of the lack of insight chief leaders of political parties, like Ramaphosa and Malema, have on the complexity of land expropriation16:21:

I do not think land reform will work if it is driven only from Tshwane or Cape Town, or only by business. We should decentralise the process by allowing people to work out local solutions backed by laws and policy provided by the government.

A fully developed policy of redistribution needs both to take into account that there is more demand for urban land than for rural land, including clear proposals for education and practical help for those who want to work the land. It should not be a political tool but a tool for real transformation, to address inequality of opportunity and unemployment.

1.3 Research intentions

The research aim of this article is to evaluate and describe how the antagonists see the dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of ANC regime that supports and promotes land grabbing. Opposing this dysfunctional system is central to the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the amendment of Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution make land redistribution without compensation legal.

This article forms the first part of an article in two parts titled: The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible: Part One. The next article, titled: The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible: Part Two, reflects further on how the antagonists see the dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime that supports and promotes land grabbing.

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern political-historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research on the topic, in this case ownership of South African land for the period 1652 to 2018 in South Africa. The sources include articles from 2017 to 2018, books for the period 2000 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2018. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the current arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists in favour of keeping Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution as is and therefore the continuation of the present land redistribution policy with compensation in place since 1994.

The research findings are presented in narrative form.

3. Discussion

A study of the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints reveals a broad range of elements and role players that affect the political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime. All these elements and role players either support and promote the intended land grabbing of White land by the ANC regime for transfer to poor and landless Blacks, or see land grabbing as an important part of a greater international political and socioeconomic process of the ANC regime as it benefits the party’s revolutionary and Marxist-socialist policy. Literature on the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints on land expropriation reflect a variety of determinants that they believe directly and indirectly promote and steer the matter. They point out actions, politics and mindsets that they feel characterize the ANC regime and its elite. Examples include their so-called support for the corrupt business and political ideologies of BRICS and the Russian and Chinese Marxist imperialism; their tendency to be anti-West; anti-capitalist and anti-White; the presence of psychopathological politics; the tendency towards anarchy in their political practices; and revenge for Apartheid. These determinants and many others form part of the antagonists’ objections to the amendment of Section 25 and the land expropriation without compensation that accompanies it. Only a comprehensive study of the primary and secondary determinants can present the case of the antagonists so that it can be evaluated justly.

The primary aim of this article (Part One) and the next one (Part Two) is therefore to reflect in detail on the various elements and role players the antagonists perceive. It is only with such a comprehensive presentation that we can conjure a picture of the antagonists’ civil right to uphold the Constitution in its present form and of their legitimate efforts to oppose land grabbing.

The various elements and role players that enter the argument of the antagonists are presented below in six subdivisions. In the next article (Part Two) this presentation of the various elements and role players continue with another six subdivisions.

3.1. The Malema-Ramaphosa element

This section reflects on the role of the empowerment of the radicals in the ANC and the EFF with land grabbing as a central matter. The section divides into the following subsections: 1) The danger of Malemania and Ramamania, 2) The foolishness and similarity of Malemania and Ramamania and 3) The rise of a new ANC.

3.1.1. The danger of Malemania and Ramamania

It is a mistake to argue that the views of Malema and Ramaphosa (described in the media as Malemania and Ramamania) on land expropriation without compensation is mere propaganda. Notwithstanding the sound arguments of various seasoned political analysists1,10,12,17 that the present talk of land grabbing will ultimately be toothless, there is evidence to the contrary that the demands from Blacks for more legal ownership of South African land will increase after 2019. It won’t matter if Malema or Ramaphosa are still active in politics. The demand for land can become a driverless vehicle, speeding uncontrolled on a busy highway, taking out other cars and many lives, creating massive damage. Prominent in this whole argument is firstly a mass of poor and landless Blacks, hanging on to any kind of promise or solution for their poverty. These are often people who lack a basic understanding of politics, economics and risk-taking.12,17,19-29

The EFF’s ideology (now seemingly also part of the post-2019 ANC’s political ideology) includes a push for classical Marxist land ownership for South Africa, with the state as the sole owner of land, property and financial institutes. This radical inclination stands in total opposition to the intentions of some of the antagonists and propagandists who support a just land redistribution outcome, leaving all the players (Whites and Black) with sufficient land and an economy still reasonably stable.12,17,19-29

The EFF has a very small number of parliamentary seats, but they are exceptionally vocal. The reality is that Malema’s message of land grabbing is influencing the minds of many of the landless and poor Blacks. Malema’s openly hostile rhetoric on Whites as “illegal” citizen of South Africa and his support for radical land grabbing are red lights. The impact of the radicals, who are sometimes criminals or rogues in the EFF, ANC and PAC, must be seen as dangerous political markers with the potential to radically change the South African political, economic, social and judicial models. The political system seems to be restructuring very fast. The Whites, be they land owners or not, seem to be the target as “culprits”.12,17,19-29

Regarding the growing radicalism on land expropriation without compensation and the political delinquency reflected by some of its prominent role players, Bruce10 reflects as follows10: 14: “Over at the EFF, its leader, Julius Malema, insists that not only will White people lose their land, but all Black people too. He wants to nationalize all the land…”

3.1.2. The foolishness and similarity of Malemania and Ramamania

The former leader of the DA, Tony Leon8, writes that the EFF’s Mandisa Mashego equates the EFF’s land expropriation with the well-established Singaporean expropriation of land. However, Mashego deliberately refuses to acknowledge that the Singapore Academy of Law Journal already stated clearly in 2010 (eight years before the Ramaphosa-land grabbing initiative) that in the event of a forced Singapore expropriation, there would be compensation and that the compensation for land will be based on open market value. In practice, the Singaporean regulations are far clearer and it has more specific safeguards for land ownership than the current system in South Africa, even with the unchanged Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. The lack of insight on the side of the EFF, ANC and PAC quickly emerges when they start arguing with seasoned opponents. Leon8 describes this kind of primitive reasoning of those in favour of radical land reform excellently8: 20: “If you ask what is 2+2 and your opponent says 5, you can still have a discussion: but if he answers 87 [the alleged percentage of White land ownership], you are on different planets. So this proved in our debate about land in South Africa. We were Venus and Mars”.

The EFF and the ANC’s increasingly racist rhetoric on the land matter is a serious point of concern.17 Mthombothi emphasizes17: 19: “It’s the sort of bigotry that comes straight out of Hendrik Verwoerd’s playbook, and to which, we had hoped, the new dispensation had dealt a fatal blow”. It seems as if the opposite happened with the EFF, and it is now also prominent in the ANC’s political psyche: the ANC is just preaching racism.

Bruce30 tries to give us some positive reassurance of the average individual and political goodwill of South Africans outside the extreme racial context of the ANC and the EFF.30 He writes30: 2: “I suspect very few people know how much trouble [financially and debt-ridden] South Africa is in. It’s not that we’re approaching a racial civil war. I think South Africans are far too sensible for that. They don’t want their country destroyed. They want a [justified, not stolen] stake in something with a future.”

But, objectively seen, Bruce’s guideline, although undoubtedly coming from a very wise man, is truly at this stage that of a very “lone voice in our political desert and wilderness”.30

The most important question still remains for the antagonists: who will curb the ongoing irresponsible war-mongering and the destructive and dangerous incitement of politicians like Julius Malema and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (and now also Cyril Ramaphosa) after the 2019 election, even if land grabbing from Whites is successfully implemented? It is common cause that the EFF thugs (and ANC radicals) are seeking new targets for their ongoing aggression against Whites. The only positive assurance in the face of “anti-Whites” like Malema and Dlamini-Zuma, is that the EFF seems unlikely to obtain more than 6% of the votes, leaving them politically castrated. It also seems as if Dlamini-Zuma is falling into disrepute among the broader base of ANC voters. They make false claims about the extent of their support.17,28,31

3.1.3. The rise of a new ANC

One of the most prominent current dangers for the antagonists is that the ANC has failed to discipline its radicals. The ANC itself remains a dangerous component in politics: the fact that predictions indicate that the ANC can obtain 60% or more of the votes in the 2019 election, which would give them a free hand, could make the practice of law and order more and more difficult. Thabo Mbeki18 recently voiced public concern on the bad racial intentions of the ANC in 2018, even suggesting that the current ANC has become a failed political entity.18

Mthombothi31 emphasizes that the ANC has become drunk from the “alcohol of corruption”. Indeed, corruption is the ANC’s lifeline and further power for them after the 2019 election spells doom for the country in the same way as the EFF’s intentions on land and citizens’ rights, argue also the antagonists. Mothombothi writes31: 3:

Having jettisoned non-racialism and with the paucity of its performance in power, what exactly does the ANC stand for now? What is its culture? By culture I mean its guiding principles, customs and social behaviours. Corruption seems to tower above all else. I’d therefore argue that corruption has become its abiding culture. It’s endemic, it’s systemic, it’s ingrained. In fact, corruption is the glue that holds the ANC together. To the ANC, corruption is like a drink to a drunkard who’s at an advanced stage of alcoholism. He has to keep drinking, or he dies.

Mthombothi12 shows how the current ideas on land redistribution has resulted in resistance from White land owners (as individuals and as farmers’ associations) to the contravention of their land rights.12

Current media debates reveal that there is a possibility that dramatic outcomes, different from those postulated by Tabane1, February2, Mthombothi17 and Bruce10, can follow with the ANC’s revisiting of Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. It is argued that if these radical factions win, the outcome can and will change the South African political, racial and socioeconomic scene adversely forever.4,10,12.19-24,26,28-35

3.2. Political scenarios after 2019

Two clearly opposing possible outcomes await us after the 2019 election. Number one: A possibly moderate profile varying from a social-capitalist, but democratic state in which everyone will benefit financially, with an inflow of foreign capital and an improved governing style, leading to development and improvement of the country’s infrastructure, curbing of joblessness and poverty. This setup will to a great extent be an undisturbed continuation of the present status of a free market of land ownership as vested in hands of Whites or other persons (Blacks/Whites) who want to and/or have agreed to buy land at market-related prices. Number two: it reflects a hard-core communist state under autocratic/fascist rule, saturated with corruption, theft and political murders; a country ravaged by total poverty and lawlessness, leaving not only the present White land owners and White rich landless and penniless, but also the masses of other South Africans in the same devastating boat of poverty and distress. 4,10,12.19-24,26,28-35

When considering this, it is important to take into account the present pressure for a better land ownership model, which includes creating a comprehensive Black land ownership and a farming community. One should consider the legal claims by the majority of Blacks on land and the injustice locked into the South African political-historical setup, mostly responsible for the Blacks’ dire personal and group circumstances. But, most of all: it must be addressed in an orderly, accepted and representative way, outside our overwhelming contaminated politics. At the moment the arguments from the different sides are so emotional that it makes a reasonable and rational solution impossible.4,10,12.19-24,26,28-35

3.3. White initiatives to uplift the poor and landless Blacks

The various White initiatives to uplift poor Blacks are described in the following two sub-divisions, namely 1) the White farming sector’s initiatives and 2) White financial and business sector’s initiatives.

3.3.1. The White farming sector’s initiatives

The negative picture painted of the White farming sector as land-grabbing and racist colonists is not entirely accurate.36-38 Many individual farmers and farmers’ organizations have been involved in uplifting farm workers and rural communities since 1994. A good example (although extraordinary) is that of farmers David and Elaine Potter of the Nieuwe Sion Farm between Paarl and Franschoek, who built a R30 million village of 4ha named Lumière, consisting of 22 houses and a crèche, aftercare and entertainment centre for their staff. The cottages and the village became the property of the workers with the title deeds of the 22 cottages being transferred to them.36

There are various other good examples of upliftment by individual farmers and the organized White farming sector to establish commercial Black famers and to help poor Black farmers. One White farmers’ entity, the SA Varkvleis Produsent–organisasie (Savpo) had much success with training support and a financial development contribution of R5.8 million to incoming Black producing farmers in 2016 and 2017 in the North West province, KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Western and Eastern Cape provinces.37,38

Katoen SA supplied financial and other support in the period 2016 to 2017, including training through mentorship to 700 cotton farmers in Nkomazi, Mpumalanga, while they also organized financial support for 718 Black farmers to the value of R19.7 million by means of 18 cooperation projects.37

The SA Suikervereniging has helped 6 523 Black farmers in 2016 to 2017 with R124.8 million.37

From the wine industry’s side, Vinpro made a contribution of R2 million to 232 projects by 2017, including 9 588 Black farmers.37

Grain SA, the country’s biggest organization for grain producers, contributed R19.7 million to 718 Black farmers for 2016–2017. It is further involved with 3 800 small grain farmers countrywide in an assistance programme with the government.36, 37

Other White farming entities involved in training and giving financial support to Black farmers is the Wolkwekersvereniging with a contribution of R19.6 million to 330 Black communities and more than 10 000 Black farmers for the period 2016–2017. There was also a support programme for another 108 307 Black beneficiaries in 2016–2017, which includes 55 000 new Black farmers. 36, 37

Agri SA, for instance, is already engaged in upliftment projects with various Black farmers. In 2017 the body paid the guardianship of 22 Black farmers and the veterinary costs of these farmers. The body is also directly responsible for financing the four development farms for Blacks.36,37 Agri SA’s initiative

Agri SA under its president, Dan Kriek, has shown a willingness to work with the government to develop a collaborative approach to land restitution and reform right from the start. Agri SA and its affiliates are already very active with constructive contact with the ANC, for instance with their acceptance of the Expropriation Bill (which was unsuccessful before parliament in 2016) and a comprehensive plan that focused on agriculture, land reform and the rural development for Black farmers.39,40

Agri SA feels that the populist and emotional concepts tied to land ownership by the ANC will only endanger the country’s food security. They make it clear that the present demand for more land ownership by “African Blacks” and the annexation of the farming sector by the Ramaphosa regime is a direct result of how the ANC bungled the approved land reform scheme since 1994. Agri SA feels that the intended land grabbing will not solve the matter of enlarging the contingent of commercial Black farmers without a proper development plan: one with a focus on financing and training. The government’s present hostile and aggressive approach will only create more problems around land ownership and endanger the immediate food security of South Africa.39,40 Omri van Zyl, the CEO of Agri SA, puts it as follows39: 9:

The government can expropriate land without paying for it, but what then?

There’s no follow-on financial solution, or sustainable agric financing for the farmers they put on this land, as we have seen with the land reform projects which have failed.

A recent Agri SA land audit shows much of South Africa high-potential land is in government hands.

Government is sitting on multiple millions of hectares of agricultural land which has not been collateralized and is not productive.

If the aim is to chase after the goals of the National Development Plan and Operation Phakisa, then the lowest hanging fruit is obviously to look at government land and give title to farmers on that land.

The moment you do that, those farmers can go to the bank and collateralize it so they can borrow money to develop their farms.

There’s a massive amount of capital that can flow into that land.

On their part Agri SA believes that some kind of agricultural development agency based on a public-private partnership to provide capital for developing farmers must first be established. Their aim is to create a vehicle that offers a form of subsidized capital to circumvent the security of tenure issue. In light of the ANC’s constant failure to implement proper land reform since 1994, Agri SA is of the opinion that properly incentivized private sector involvement will speed up transformation very quickly and with great success without endangering the country’s food security.39

Van Zyl41 believes that there is very little difference between the government’s empowerment plan for Black farmers and that of Agri SA. He writes41: 4-5:

The White farmer community agrees that South Africa must have a much greater contingent of Black commercial farmers and not subsistence farming which is sentimental only and laden with aggressive and hostile politics. At the end these peasants will have to be feed from the country’s national account which is in reality tax-payers’ money. They feel their advice, inputs and various other contributions were so far totally ignored by the government on the creating of a community of Black commercial farmers. Much more they cannot do. Not even the fact that Pieter Mulder served as an adjunct-minister of agriculture under Zuma brings any bettering.

The efforts of White farmers are sincere and comprehensive. The government’s efforts to side-line them seem to be based on pure racism and Marxism.41,42

3.3.2. The initiatives of the White financial and business sectors

As with the White farming community, the ANC often also criticizes the South African financial and business sector for apathy towards the problems of the poor and landless Blacks. Prominent is the ANC’s criticism on the financial and business sector’s public stance on its intended land reform policy. These negativities of the ANC are contradicted by the evidence offered by their opponents. The willingness of the business and financial sectors

The public declaration of the South African Top 100 Companies on 8 April 2018 shows the business sector’s willingness to get involved in a constructive way in erasing Black poverty, unemployment and inequality, as well as to initiate and finance various kinds of training and job appointments to get Blacks active in the labour market. What these companies clearly oppose is any government policy and initiative of land grabbing where the market-related compensation for land is absent. They are not in any way against the justified transference of land to the poor and landless Blacks and the promotion of commercial or small-scale Black farmers. Indeed, as in all well-planned and functioning business communities, they welcome a strong component of commercial Black farmers, especially in light of the decrease in the numbers of the Afrikaner and White populations, which could affect the country’s food security. They also underwrite sound and healthy business principles, which indicates that dramatic land reform means the impoverishment of the existing land owners, the damaging of the food chain and affordable food delivery to the masses, of which most are poor, as well as the creation of political, social and economic disorder, which would not only flatten the whole governmental setup of the country, but also the government’s international standing and trustworthiness. The business sector does not view land reform as money well spent.37, 39-42

The opponents of the ANC emphasize that the business sector seems to doubt if the ANC elite and its current leadership have a basic understanding to run a country by creating well-planned new enterprises, jobs, income and taxes by means of the constructive support of the private sector instead of the liberation thinking of taking from the rich to keep the poor alive. The calls of radicals in the ANC and EFF to nationalize the banking and other financial and business institutions, the mining industry, even the houses and assets of individual citizens and the assets of foreigners in South Africa, is a dangerous political inclination that will cause anarchy.37,39-42

The South African business sector has always been willing and able to bring financial improvement to the poor and landless Blacks without the ANC’s misplaced policy of land redistribution without compensation. The first constructive effort needed before the ANC can hope to better their business and financial record, is that they fix their relationship with the business sector and assure the business sector of their sincerity as a partner of integrity.39, 43-45

Barron39 quotes Soko in this regard39:9: “There need to be ‘honest, courageous, uncomfortable conversations’ between the government and business about what is causing the trust deficit and how it should be addressed”.

The constant failure of the ANC regime to deliver on promises and contracts after honest, courageous, uncomfortable conversationswith the business sector is evident from for instance the ANC’s New Growth Path, which articulates the Green Economy Accord that was signed by the government with great fanfare in 2011 with the organized labour and business sectors. The government has failed to make an inch of progress to advance a green economy.39,43-45

South Africa’s so-called 14-Point Plan and List of Structural Reforms, which Ramaphosa promised will increase the economic growth rate and bring more jobs, failed from day one in terms of the principles formulated by the business sector because these plans and lists lack action plans that detail targets or timeliness. Even the Treasury’s list of five reforms, estimated to raise the country’s potential growth rate from 1.5% to 4%, provides, as the 14-point list, little detail on what exactly these measures entail or when they will be implemented, making it a risky undertaking for the private sector to put private money into the endeavour. Moreover, for the opponents all these governmental “wonderful” lists and their promises still failed to stop South Africa from falling down the cliff into recession in September 2018.46

For the business and financial sector, political and business integrity must be a central principle in the ANC’s intended theoretical frameworks for land redistribution or poverty alleviation. The business sector finds Ramaphosa’s recent bragging that “if a referendum was held in 1994 on land redistribution the outcome would be a massive vote collection for land grabbing”, to be lacking evidence. The political views on capital ownership lack the business and political sense associated with democracy and capitalism. It spells doom for the private sector’s assets in which private citizens’ money is prominent.42,45

Soko’s39 view is that it is39:9: “…time for the South African business sector to open its wallet to support the ANC regime if last mentioned mends its delinquent ways”. Private initiatives have far more success and profitable outcomes than the intended job creation through land reform of the ANC can ever bring. In March 2018, Ramaphosa gained the support of the business section by launching the Youth Employment Service (YES). YES intends to link Black empowerment points to corporations that take young interns into one-year work opportunities with a salary. This has already brought into placement 40 000 interns (the intention is a placement of one million). The intent is to later expand the goodwill of the business sector to higher education entities.47,48

The formal business sector, as a primary generator of capital, economy and jobs, stands central: it is indeed the only sector that can steer the South African economy to functionality again.49,50 The increase in distrust

As with most antagonists (opponents) of drastic land expropriation, the South African private domestic business community’s distrust is caused by the ANC regime’s doubtful intentions and actions and the ANC’s intention to start RET (Radical Economic Transformation) and RST (Radical Social Transformation). This justified distrust is the primary reason why the formal business side does not promote domestic investments. This is clearly not an anti-ANC lobby per se, but plain a safeguard against losses of public moneys through the ANC’s irresponsible political, social and economic adventures.47, 48

The business sector’s level of distrust is quite clear from the R71 billion that is being invested elsewhere, such as in Ghana. This kind of money that is flowing around in the private sector is why Malema so badly wants to nationalize private banks and the other financial institutions. The recent massive looting of the VBS Mutual Bank and the earlier capturing at Transnet under its former CEO Siyabonga Gama are excellent examples of the many losses citizens have suffered to ANC “infrastructure development” and “upliftment”.46-48, 51-53

The business sector is concerned about the lack of understanding and insight in the ANC after 24 years of rule. They have done little that has been constructive and they still adhere to the belief that taking White capital will free the country from poverty. They have not helped Black citizens like the Afrikaners helped themselves on their own in the 1930s. The little penetration of Black business people into mining, for instance, occurred with the help of White-led companies and the BBBEE model. There are Black mines and other enterprises that have been and are successful, among others those of Cyril Ramaphosa and Tokyo Sexwale. There have also been Black enterprises that have failed, and in those cases it had nothing to do with a lack of support from the White business sector.54-57 Opponents of the ANC rightfully point out that the ANC has had enough power in the last 24 years to change the situation. Corruption is killing the positivity the business sector had about South Africa’s future. The antagonists eagerly want to support a future South African regime free from political evils and they want to lift the country’s economy out of the international rating agencies’ red listings.58

The former AngloGold CEO, Srinivasan Venkatakrishnan58, a prominent business leader who was involved in the Minerals Council SA and who was also a director of Business Leadership SA (BLSA)—a person well-known for his hard work behind the scenes to raise business voices against corruption in the post-1994 government—assures South Africa of a certain future if business speaks up when he says58: 2:

Corruption is like cancer. If you don’t catch it early on it spreads very, very quickly. You need to nip it in the bud. That corruption was happening here and was endemic across certain parts [is true].

Business is an important voice and it was lost in the wilderness before, and historically it sat on the side-lines, worrying about how speaking up would impact its business. We had to do introspection and see where we were at fault, make corrections and then move forward. This was all important for us. It was an absolutely critical moment where potentially SA was about to jump over a cliff and it had to be pulled back.58

On the question of whether Zuma’s corruption had been caught early enough and if the country’s economy and integrity can be mended, Venkatakrishnan says58:2: “Honestly, no, but better late than never. It should never happen in the first place. Here, it was probably caught a bit later but before it was too late. It can be reversed. It won’t be a walk in the park, but if there’s a will and co-operation of people saying, ‘not another time. We’ve nearly lost the country once and we won’t make that mistake again.” The prominence of the banking sector

The banking sector seems to be regarded as an easy cow to milk by the likes of Black First Land First, SACP, Cosatu, EFF and the ANCYL. Jacob Zuma accused the banking sector in public of “thwarting the growth of Black business and as contributors to inequality.” The ANC regime’s radical liberation politics and ideology of taking from the one to give to others without generating anything constructive for the state’s coffer led to early resistance and counter-actions from the private financial and business sector. The sector put limitations on possible abuses of banks and other financial institutes, which created fertile grounds for ANC radicals to attack them.59

The CEO of First Rand Group, Johan Burger59, tried hard to teach ANC radicals about the realities of economics and finance and the basic principles of responsible financial management of other people’s assets.59,60 Burger posits59:10:

To the extent that the economy grows, to the extent that there’s capacity for people to take on debt, we will extend credit. It’s our business to extend credit.

To the extent that the economy struggles we will find it difficult to extend credit.

It’s not about whom we extend credit to. If there is no demand and no affordability, we cannot extend credit. This is not about small business or large business or about black entrepreneurs or white entrepreneurs. It’s just a fact of economic life.

At the end of the day, it’s about affordability. If the affordability is not there you can’t expect us to extend credit into that environment.

It needs to be understood that we’re dealing with other people’s money. We’re dealing with savers’ money. We have an enormous fiduciary duty to make sure that we extend credit in a responsible manner.

Banks rightfully oppose land grabbing in any form because they deal with other people’s money, as the CEO of First Rand Group61 clearly states. Expropriation without compensation can bring not only bankruptcy to banks, but also to their investing individuals. The direct impact of the intended land grabbing by the Ramaphosa regime is already affecting the banking system. Professor André Louw61, an agricultural economist of the University of Pretoria, reports that farmers are already experiencing the sudden cancellation of purchase contracts because of the intensifying uncertainty around land ownership. According to the statistics of the Bank Association of South Africa (BASA), banks’ exposure to bonds amount to more than R1 600 billion: Of this amount more or less R133 billion is for agricultural land and R1 068 billion for residential property only. [Their exposure to agricultural debts is around R80 billion, the cooperative banks carrying R9.3 billion and the Agricultural Bank R38 billion (of which 90% is to White farmers whose land is now under possible ANC and state capture)]. Land expropriation without compensation or semi-compensation will endanger the whole South African banking system.60,61

Pierre Venter,61 the manager for human settlements at BASA, gives us insight into the chaos that land grabbing has meant for bank systems when he writes61: 1: “Many banking crises worldwide started when property prices dropped and this negatively impacted on the trust of markets” [Own translation]. In South Africa this devastating phenomenon is beginning to manifest as markets are exasperated by for example the rhetoric of Olly Mlamleli, the ANC mayor of Mangaung, when he said that60: 4: “…the ANC is looking forward to redistribute grabbed farms and plots around Bloemfontein”. ANC’s democratic and capitalist economics

It is an open question for the antagonists whether the ANC really understands the model of democratic and capitalist economics as compared to so-called “liberation” economics. In the view of the ANC’s opponents this “grabbing instinct” is the main reason why the ANC has failed as a responsible and creative regime since 1994 and why the formal business sector is shying away from them. It is far less risky to invest in Kenya, Nigeria and other African countries. The South African scene is dominated by a racial rhetoric that seeks retribution for past injustices.59,62,63

Bruce64 confirms64: 16:

The lesson in all of this for President Cyril Ramaphosa to learn and hold on to – is that the private sector can help (indeed it wants, still, to help) but the state has to be cautious with its money. Assuming Ramaphosa makes no (more) unnecessary gaffes on land expropriation without compensation, ensures that land invasions are resisted and begins to spell out and sell his vision of how an orderly process of expropriation might trigger an economic recovery, the private sector will probably stick to him.

However, if the Wall Street Journal publishes an editorial comparing Ramaphosa to Robert Mugabe and South Africa to Venezuela, Ramaphosa and the ANC must be in trouble. Impressions are sticky and hard to shift once they take hold, writes Bruce64: 16: “If Ramaphosa and the ANC could negotiate the death of Apartheid, why are they so foolishly besotted with poor economic thinking and doing like extreme land-reform, asks the business-sector.”

The question is whether the private business sector would still want to help Ramaphosa and his government in the future.

3.4. Basic questions of immediate interest around land ownership

When reading and listening to the rhetoric on land expropriation, certain questions arise. In some ways these questions have become forces that have to be addressed.4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65,66

In short these questions on rightful land ownerships in South Africa and the legal integrity of land grabbing are the following:

  1.     Which of the many arguments, opinions and viewpoints are truly grounded in reality and facts? Which are emotional, naïve and even bizarre or outright political falsities and myths?
  2.     Who are the people with all these many contrary views, opinions and arguments and what are their agendas?
  3.     What are the direct and indirect interests of the many parties to land reform?
  4.     What does lawful land ownership really when referring to the claim of the individual     citizen?
  5.     Why this serious infighting between South Africans about a changed Constitution based on a single Section?
  6.     What is really meant with the concept “land hunger by the masse” and “poor and land     landless Blacks”:
    1. Is it rural land for farming that Tabane and others are referring to, or is it urban land for housing settlements, situated near industrial and business hubs?
    2. Is the issue of urban land for housing not really the main issue?
  7. In general, are persons like Tabane, Mothombothi and Bruce false prophets with their     promises of a prosperous and basically unchanged South Africa in the waiting?:
    1. Are these political writers and commentators visionaries who can really and truly read the South African future?
    2. Are they correct to think that the Ramaphosa regime will be successful in steering the landless and poor Blacks and the many extreme political militant propagandists in their demands for land in a constructive, non-violent direction?

The evidence for both sides in answer to the above questions is overwheliming.4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65,66

3.5. The harsh reality of land reform in 2019

The current push in parliament to change the South African Constitution’s property clause [Section 25(2)(b)] to give the state the right to expropriate land without compensation is eliciting strong opposing arguments. Some of the crucial questions include:

  •     Is the view that Ramaphosa’s focus on land expropriation is purely political     accurate?
  •     Is it true that the desire for land is purely based on retribution and hate for Whites?
  •     Is it true that the ANC wants White land because those farms are successful?
  •     Is land expropriation up front because the ANC is still at heart a terrorist organization?
  •     Are the calls for land expropriation all unfounded?

The following sub-division presents the arguments of those who oppose land expropriation.

3.6. The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime

For the antagonists opposing land expropriation without compensation, the current debate is intertwined with the dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of South Africa in which the ANC stands central. It is crucial to take a look at the causes of the current state of affairs and the aims of the ANC if one wants to consider what went wrong since 1994 in the South African political setup.

The sections below provide a comprehensive overview of the direct and indirect elements, determinants and role players that brought us here, including political histories, economics, politics, the judiciary, etc.

3.6.1. The ANC’s drowning of the 1994 democracy

According to those who oppose land reform, the undermining of the South African democracy started in 1994 with the ANC taking power. Fascist thinking quickly formed a foundation for ANC action. It is illustrated by their present direct attack on the Constitution and their intended land expropriation without compensation. This makes the ANC a troubled regime and a direct danger to the civil and democratic rights of South Africans in the eyes of the antagonists. Their disregard for White rights to land ownership and their plans to specifically harm Whites financially, show how they are drowning democracy. The antagonists refer to five clear political outcomes when they make this argument: 1) the decline of the democracy, 2) the use of populism, 3) the still fragile South African democracy, 4) the uncertain economy in a fragile democracy, and 5) land grabbing as a fascist act.4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65,66 The ongoing decline of the democracy

The antagonists see the land grabbing from Whites by the ANC regime as part of a dangerous democratic decline in South Africa. In the book State Capture in Africa by Melanie Meirotti and Grant Masterson, published by the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa is identified with various other African countries to be under attack for state capture in various forms by private groups and individuals (as happened with the “Zupta” state capture). In this context the agendas and strategies of the political leaders are often masked and their personal needs are sold as that of the population (land expropriation without compensation is also being sold as something on behalf of the population who wants it urgently).4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65-67

John L Stremlau67, a visiting professor of international relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, describes the modus operandi of state capture when he writes67:11: “Dictators can do this at will. Those who are elected democratically face obstacles. They must subvert democratic norms and hollow out state institutions, all the while obscuring their real purposes, often exploiting populist fears and resentments.”

For the antagonists, land grabbing is one of the outcomes of how South African state institutions have been hollowed out from 1994, implying the subversion of democracy. Evidence is plentiful that many remnants of this delinquent model are still functioning inside the Ramaphosa regime. The Zuma-orientated ANC NEC still strongly reflects in the ANC government of 2019. 4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65-67

To stay in power, the ANC is gathering as many as possible votes from the masses, primarily by the exploiting populist fears and resentments.67 Land grabbing has also become a vehicle for secondary wrongdoings, like channelling riches to the ANC elite. They offer reasons such as Black empowerment, but in truth Luthuli house is steering the process as state capture has become entrenched in the post-Zuma regime. The way in which Ramaphosa addressed the nation “officially” only as president of the ANC with respect to the ANC’s decision on land expropriation and his disregard for parliament’s authority with his announcement of a policy on land expropriation decided on and approved by Luthuli house, reminded of an authoritarian regime and a fascist leadership.4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65-67 The antagonists no longer feel as if they have any say in the matter. The use of populism

Derby68 shows that populism is still a tantalising and easy option to use to mesmerize certain segments of society. As result of the failure of the ANC regime over two decades, its leadership is jumping on the revolutionary bandwagon of land to win votes.68

Derby warns68: 2: “Never believe a politician whose mission is draining the swamp”. This echoed for the antagonists’ one of the many reasons why the ANC, driven by their opportunistic and corrupted ANC leaders, has failed the country and why our democracy is in a process of drowning.

The former KwaZulu-Natal premier and a member of the ANC’s National Working Committee, Senzo Mchunu, clearly indicates the power Luthuli house has to override parliament in official decision-making and the execution of decrees regarding the land reform issue.69 Prominent is the public downplaying of the parliamentary Motlanthe Report by Ramaphosa himself as well as by the ANC NEC. Mchunu69 declared69: 4: “Comrade Kgalema has expressed a view, it shouldn’t be confused as the ANC having come to a conclusion”.

The un-parliamentarian and authoritarian ANC conclusion that led to the “official” implementation of land expropriation by the 80 members of the ANC NEC is seen by the antagonists as the final decision on land expropriation. But for the antagonists this is also a warning of how undemocratically the ANC will be ruling in future.69

The opponents note, with good reason, that the ANC, as the present ruling party that is losing its majority, can stay in power unconstitutionally by means of traditional dictatorial or authoritarian rule (well-known in post-colonial Africa). The present forcing of land grabbing reminds of these practices.67, 70-72 The still fragile South African democracy

Land expropriation could be the tip of the iceberg of retribution and revenge. Those who oppose it are all too aware that democracy is not a given, it is sustainable only in certain conditions.67 Stremlau67: 11 writes: “But no democracy is ever secure, even the US. That case study points to historic and current examples of how oligarchs masked as patriots and democrats, can exploit the fears and resentments of key constituencies to win elections, disarm democratic protections, and diver public resources to the privileged few.”

There are just too many old comrades in the “renewed” ANC. They parade as the saviours and rescuers of the poorest Blacks, fronting the White problem as reason for all ills. Mchunu’s69 following naïve remark reveals a lot about the word manipulation of the ANC leadership as they cover up their real intentions69: 4: “We are cautioning against unnecessary and inflammatory statements that are not conductive to peace. The land debate must move without any political populism of any kind.”

The good intentions of the ANC leaders are contradicted daily by their actions. The ANC elite reflects a lack of understanding of the concept of keeping peace and the enormous difference between expropriation with compensation and without compensation, as well as the difference between justice and injustice, reconciliation and revenge.69

The ANC may win the 2019 election (the sixth post-1994 general election) by jeopardising the country, but chances are good that they may lose soon after 2019 because of the bankruptcy of the country. This is basically because they lack sensible domestic policies, besides radicalism, to generate work opportunities and to create money to erase poverty and inequality: something that land grabbing cannot bring to the table. It only can aggravate the already chaotic situation.73,74 Uncertain economy of a fragile democracy

The antagonists believe that other constructive approaches and solutions are needed for South Africa’s many ills and crises. Bruce says73:22: “That leaves only one other route – sensible domestic policies that, even in the face of external events, can serve as a floor from which to build viable defences of our own.”

Prominent here is cutting government debt (it quadrupled in Zuma’s time to $80 billion) by cutting public sector jobs, selling off the SAA, SABC, Transnet and Eskom and training the masses. There is a clear choice and message for the ANC regime73:22: “…cut government’s debt and make money and stop exploiting through land grabbing and over-taxing the hard-working citizens of South Africa to make-up for your governmental impotence.”

If the ANC wants to persuade people to invest in their government and the country, they must first have the necessary potential and integrity to convince investors that they will make profits without risks73:22: “To prove it to them you put every piece of legislation you pass through just one stress test – will it attract or repel investors?”

The legislation on land expropriation will not pass this test. It not only repels investors, it is driving local and international investors’ away.73 ANC’s intent to grab land

Those who oppose land expropriation feel that the policy stems from a fascist seed.75, 76 The question is what is fascism? The former US politician, Madeleine Albright75, points out that it is in the first place difficult to define fascism75:11: “First of all, I don’t think fascism is an ideology. I think it is a method, it’s a system…a means of seizing and holding power.”

Albright75,76 brings us into the ANC elite’s state of mind: fascism and not so much communism is what drives the ANC elite. It tells us for the first time the reason why the ANC elite wants to seize power and how they hold power.75,76

One should understand fascism to understand the possible course of politics in South Africa after 2018. Land expropriation without compensation is only the tip a massive iceberg. It is useful to reflect Albright’s description of fascist leaders and their fascist systems. Albright 75:11 posits:

Fascism’s leaders have an “aptitude for spectacle”, a cult-like ability to establish emotional links to the mob and bring to the surface “deep and often ugly” feelings. Theirs is an intolerant, antidemocratic “doctrine of anger and fear”, marked by strong ethnic identification, as well as vilification and discrimination against non-members.

It often draws its energy from “a memory of humiliation” that percolates upwards from the general populace. The more painful the grounds for resentment, the easier it is for the fascist leader to build his following by “dangling prospects of renewal or vowing to take back what’s been stolen”.

It relies on intimidation and, often, violence. For it to succeed, the traditionally independent institutions of democracy, such as the police, the prosecutorial services, the judiciary, and civil service, all have to be brought under partisan control.

After reading the above, can anyone doubt who the ANC elite or what the ANC regime represents? Their opponents know very well that rooting out fascism is not easy: it is like cancer. Land grabbing is one of its most serious manifestations, the first of many other manifestations to come as the cancer penetrates the system. As long as the ANC is the ruler, land grabbing will thrive.

3.6.2. Land expropriation’s effects on the economy

Land grabbing is fully intertwined as a financial and economic generator within the South African economy. It does not matter to whom land belongs or who is producing what on it, it has intrinsic value. The income and the value of land of course depend on the sound political, socioeconomic and financial system of the country in which it functions. If it is functioning in an unstable political environment the income from and the value of land is mostly poor, leading to poverty, unemployment and inequality between urban and rural inhabitants. Land grabbing itself mostly generates distrust of the government, leading to a low foreign investment culture, seldom improving the situation of the poor and landless. If land grabbing is engineered in an already down-spiralling economy characterized by political instability, it can only spell economic and political disaster. It is in such an unfavourable socioeconomic and political environment that extreme land reform is planned in South Africa. Besides land grabbing as part of the ANC’s plan to improve the South African economy, they are planning various other schemes with which land expropriation is intertwined.4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65-67

In this division the attention is on the following three subdivisions: 1) Ramaphosa’s Stimulus Package, 2) the devastating unemployment in South Africa, and 3) the constant decline politics and economics. Ramaphosa’s “Stimulus package”

Antagonists see land grabbing as signs of a failed economy in which all kinds of escape routes from reality are being tried out by a government stripped of the ability make an economic turn-around. It is often started by regimes simultaneously with attempts at economic development and other so-called “bettering” of fiscal plans to distract negative attention from the grabbing process where mostly a certain prosperous group is harmed to benefit another less meritorious group. Other times it is used in an effort to offer some credibility to the particular regime’s continuously failing economic reforms and upliftment schemes to serve as a guarantee for the poor people and voters of a regime that has somewhere in the future a free assistance plan in place to help them.

At the moment is it old news that the Ramaphosa regime is in deep financial trouble, making drastic actions such as land grabbing, either as an attention distracter or, as Ramaphosa seemingly believes, a money generator, an unavoidable part of his many promises of dramatically reforming the South African economy. The present plans around land grabbing by Ramaphosa must be read together with his bigger stimulus plans as a supporting source of income or finance and voter recruiting. Ultimately this will do little good.4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65-67

Firstly, it is important to look to Ramaphosa’s various economic plans together with land grabbing, like his Stimulus Package with which he promises to invigorate the economy. In the context of the current economic stagnation of South Africa, Derby74 paints a very distressing picture, mentioning an economy bereft of any substantive investment over the past decade and a national psyche drenched in tales of corruption centred on the ruling party and the role of its former president. This failed governance of the ANC regime dented the confidence of consumer and business to levels last seen more than 30 years ago [during Apartheid]. Notwithstanding Ramaphosa’s various promises to the nation, especially to his electorate, there are negative realities that are overwhelming. In this failed economic state, land grabbing is undoubtedly becoming tempting, an excellent way to put some of the political and economic demands at rest, at least for the short term.74

Derby77 discusses the country’s present economic fiasco by looking at Ramaphosa’s much talked about Stimulus Package as presented during his economic address on Friday 21 September. He writes77: 2:

Finally, some sobriety. That is my take from this Friday’s economic address by President Cyril Ramaphosa and his team. There were no grand announcements of billions flooding into the economy from friends in Asia, no promises of the creation of millions of jobs in whatever catalogue of time frames politicians dust off the shelf. And importantly, it also wasn’t the matter-of-fact economy diagnosis that former finance minister Malusi Gigaba once delivered that sent everyone into a mad panic

What emerged most for me from the Ramaphosa “stimulus” announcement was this cabinet, or at least those members of it that are in his corner, have a grip on the reality of the situation.

Lumkile Mondi78, a senior lecturer in economics at Wits University, says that the Ramaphosa plan is simply a recovery package rather than a stimulus one. He concludes that South Africa has energy, water, transport healthcare and educational problems that need comprehensive fixing78: 8: “We have a huge infrastructure deficit that requires trillions of Rands to get it going for a modern economy. We don’t have capital at all. The money the IDC and others have is not enough for us to address the infrastructure deficit in our country.”

The above reflection is in line with the view of Joffe79, who also writes that Ramaphosa’s economic stimulus package is not a stimulus package at all, but the plain replay of a budget previously done79:2:

There is no new public money going into the economy, and that’s no bad thing given that the government doesn’t have the money to spend. The R400bn of public money that will go into the new SA Infrastructure Fund is simply the infrastructure spending – minus that of the state-owned companies – that government already had on the budget for the next three years. And the R50bn that’s going into new priorities such as black commercial farmers, township and rural economies and bedding for public hospital patients is being shifted somehow from other budgets.

Bruce80 describes it as a neither a negative nor a positive plan, but a fiscally neutral one, lacking any improvements to the chaotic economy of the country, while Khumalo81 says81: 10: “…that to everyone he spoke see it as negative” and that it was merely a reprioritization of money already in the coffer, and indeed no more than a reversal of bad policy decisions and fixing some obvious missteps by Jacob Zuma”.

For Khumalo81 the best description of the different analyses by commentators is 81:10: “…was once again the prophesying of an imminent Armageddon for the South African and its economy”. Khumalo81 him self, tactfully as a professional, describes it the best as follows81:10: “In layman’s terms, the president, in his capacity as the head of the home, told his family: “Hello guys. We are broke. There is no more money coming. I am not getting a raise. I am not getting a bonus. And I cannot borrow any more money from the bank”.”

The SA Infrastructure Fund is already a mess, writes Joffe79:2. It is unclear how the new fund will work and how it will be governed, but it seems to be intent only on re-collecting the billions rands already allocated to the government’s fragmented and ineffective infrastructure spending programme. It seems indeed a desperate last effort to steer the money budgeted more effectively and creatively, as well as a hopeful last effort to incorporate outside the fiscal other funds and skills to rehabilitate the economy. The private sector is interested in the recruitment of local private sector funding outside the fiscal, like the private sector’s pension funds and various other sources of private sector funding to improve the economy, but again, when considering the poor financial CV of the ANC regime and their poor relations with the South African private sector, the private sector will be hesitant in the coming three to five years if the ANC wins the 2019 election. The fact that national debt is nearing 60% of revenue (with the potential of growing) and the fiscal is also burdened with the immense liabilities of the SOES and financial collapse of more and more municipalities, makes Ramaphosa’s mission to turn around South Africa’s economy almost impossible. Recovery for South Africa, even under a new responsible and respected political party and government, is a long way off.74,77-79,82,84,85

In the economic and financial chaos it is understandable why it is tempting for Ramaphosa and his men – in an effort to lessen the people’s political and growing economic pressure on him to erase in some way their immense poverty – to execute an extreme land grabbing programme as fast as possible.74,77-79,82-85

Ramaphosa himself describes the outcome of the ANC’s political and economic actions as follows78: 8: “The state is unable to raise borrowing. SA has a debt-to-GDP ratio of about 53%”.

South Africa’s debt-to-GDP leven is 53%, and the general view is that for emerging market nations, the healthy debt-to-GDP level is about 40%. It is not advisable to go beyond this as South Africa has done. Ramaphosa’s planned Stimulus Package seems to be a long term dream and an ideal that can only be reached under an able and competent regime, requirements that the ANC does not meet in the eyes of the antagonists.74,77-79,82,84,85

Land expropriation with full compensation is totally outside the financial ability and reach of the ANC regime. However much the regime would have liked to do it (if it was politically correct), it lacks the capital to do so. In the current unstable South African economy, radical land expropriation is the only option.74 Unemployment in South Africa

Ramaphosa’s further admission that the country’s growing devastating unemployment is an immense problem is another condemning failure of the ANC. The ANC regime promised and undertook constantly from 1994, before every election, to rectify the unemployment. This constant promise of the ANC regime to rectify unemployment was again manifested in the Ramaphosa Stimulus Package. This promise of Ramaphosa failed dolefully before it started.74,77-7982,84,85 When presenting his Stimulus Package, reflecting wistfully on “bettering” the record of the present high unemployment that sits above 27%, Ramaphosa says74: 1: “Governments [as the ANC] are “… usually not very good at creating jobs…We do our little part’. Overall, we are not good at creating jobs. We should be at the top of our game when it comes to being an enabler and being a catalyst.”

With his admission of the ANC’s failure as a government with a specific mandate from its voters to offer them sufficient work opportunities and of their long term failure to run successful job creation programmes in over 24 years of rule, Ramaphosa offers insight into why land expropriation without compensation could be used as a vehicle to solve unemployment.

In this context of the present unemployment of the masses, it is important to mention that when Jacob Zuma came into office (with the support of Ramaphosa as vice-president), he promised to create 5 million jobs in 10 years (2 million per year). Of course, as with the most other ANC promises, this was not met, leading to a situation where the state ended up with a bloated and rather expensive public service instead (by offering jobs in state services to unemployed Blacks and in this way buying votes for the ANC through loyalists). Again, notwithstanding the failed unemployment record of the ANC (and the manifold empty promises), Ramaphosa is trying again to pull a rabbit out of his hat, knowing very well there is not a rabbit to grill for the poor and jobless Blacks. Another way must be found to offer the masses of poor and unemployed Blacks many fat rabbits to grill: land grabbing.74 For the antagonists there is clearly one specific outcome at their costs: more land grabbing to solve the hunger of Ramaphosa’s millions of unemployed persons.

For the antagonists South Africa has basically been bankrupted by the ANC and there is no other way for Ramaphosa and his cronies to find the immense capital needed to erase unemployment in their own funding model other than a free hand with land grabbing in the hope to keep in short term the unemployed and landless poor Blacks silent.

The unemployment crisis is central to the ANC’s constant failure with serious political matters and their failure to make a constructive correction away from the foolish and useless so-called 2018 Stimulus Package Plan. They are masking a far more disastrous future situation of an unofficial unemployment percentage of far higher that the reflected official 27%. It has the potential, in combination the other negative political and economic determinants, to derail the political state with anarchy and revolution in the near future. This negative set-up needs further reference. Firstly, to think that the recent control taking of economic structures by the presidency will be a cure to the country’s ineffective economy is wishful thinking. Secondly, the Ramaphosa regime’s belief that they will bring unemployment to zero (0%) in 2030 is laughable. Even lowering the percentage will be to 14% in a decade or two is just not possible in an ANC regime.74,77,78,81,86

These “fantasies” are part of the ANC’s political history, coming from 1994 with their: “we have a good story to tell”. The ANC’s political stories, like their political doings, lack trustworthiness for the antagonists. The ANC regime and its elite are in a mess.74,77,78,81,86

Bruce80 consolidates this present mess under the ANC regime well, especially the ANC elite’s constant excuses and proclaimed innocence of involvement in this mess that came with the 24 years of their reign80: 20: “On a more mundane level, we all make choices all the time. Most of us. One creature that never has to make choices is the ANC. It always manages to combine everything it wants into one choice. Come the next election, I guarantee you it will dream up a new list of Five Priorities, whatever they are”.

The next election is in 2019, meaning more new fantasies and promises come from the ANC! Ramaphosa himself is doing exactly what Bruce80 identifies as a failing politician80: 20: “…to put a list on top of his priorities instead of putting a priority on top of his list”. The ANC has become well-known for propagating falsities before elections and what has happened in reality is that unemployment (as well as crime, murder, state capture) has gotten out of control in ten years.74,77,78,81,86

Ann Bernstein87, the executive director of the Centre for Development and Enterprise, reports that the country’s unemployment crisis is the worst in the world. She reports there are 37.8 million work-age adults, of whom 11.9 million are not economically active (mostly students and school learners), reflecting an unemployment of more than 32%. Of the remaining 25.9 million people, as many as 9.6 million cannot find any work, making it almost two out of every five adults (40%). In terms of the 37.8 million work-age adults, these so-called “not economically active adults” of 11.9 million and the 9.6 million failing to find work, represents nearly 52% of unemployed adults. Seen from another angle, Bernstein87 shows that only 43% of adults work (while globally this number is 60%), meaning that 57% are out of work. The growing chaos into which the ANC regime has forced its people, is confirmed by the fact that between 2008 and 2018, the number of work-age adults has grown by 6.3 million, while only 1.9 million (30%) had been employed and 3.2 million stayed unemployed (thus more than 50%). The hard truth is that there is a daily increase of 900 unemployed people in the population. This has been the case for ten years, but Ramaphosa and his ANC elites are very quiet about this as they sit in their highly paid jobs.87

Bernstein87 delves deeper into the tragic realities created by the ANC since 1994 by reflecting that the position of young people is even worse. They have an unemployment rate of 50% and 400 000 fewer people were employed in 2018 than in 2008 (ten years earlier) despite that he number of young people increasing by 2 million between 2008 and 2018. She writes87: 21: “The 9.6-million unemployed mean that there are more people looking for work in SA than there are people living in seven out of nine provinces, and, if you wanted to reduce the unemployment by half, you would need to create industries that employ 11 times more people than are currently working in the entire mining sector.”

The reasons she offers for unemployment is comprehensive, like the prescription of relatively high minimum wages by the government, the considerable legal protection from dismissal, the failure of job creation projects, most only benefitting a small group of jobseekers, constraints on private firms when employing people, a lack of SMEs and a lack of constructive governmental support to generate such entities, etc.87

The writing of Sifiso Skenjana88, an investment and economic research specialist, describes Bernstein’s87 epitaph on South Africa further in an effort to give Ramaphosa a free diagnosis of the economic reasons for the looming death of the country. He writes that South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies globally in terms of income and wealth distribution. The bottom half of the local workforce receives a meagre 12% of all wages. In this context, he pinpoints that the Oxfam report88:9, “Reward Work, Not Wealth” reflects that the cost of supporting the needs of one person monthly in South Africa is about R6 460-00, while the minimum wage from the 1st May 2018 is R3 500-00 (reflecting a shortage of R3 000). Using the World Bank’s measure of SA’s Gini-coefficient, it is the highest in the world at 0.63. [Income inequality on the Gini ranges from 0 (excellent) to 1 (worst)]. Skenjana88 also shows that poverty levels are rising, quoting Stats SA’s recent report “Poverty Trends in South Africa”, which says that the poverty head count increased from 53.2% in 2011 to 55.5% in 2015. Taking into account that the down-spiral of the country is a constant feature (like the debt-to-GDP ratio accelerating from 32% in 1990/91 to 53% in 2017/18), there is no hope of a turn-around on any of these statistics, only a desperate hope to decrease some of this negative numbers.88

The above comprehensive profile on South Africa’s economic chaos brings us back to the “Ramaphosa solution” in which poverty, inequality and unemployment are seen as the same things that can and must be tackled simultaneously to be nullified. In his solution land grabbing is one of the main means and the easiest solution to better the ANC’s poor financial profile. White land grabbing offers an open door to get entrance to exclusive capital, to not only generate free capital without cost to the state so that they can satisfy the poor and landless’ growing needs and demands, but also to assure cohesion inside the ANC’s voter contingent. But, as with most of the ANC’s solutions for politics and economics, these radical ANC politicians lack the ability to reason and tell how they are going to do the land grabbing, writes Bruce80: 20. What these ANC politicians miss as a result of their lack of expertise, is that the causes of and the solution to unemployment, poverty and inequality differ immensely, making land grabbing as a solution to any one of these three problems, null and void. As a guideline for the Ramaphosa regime Bruce profers80: 20: “Poverty is caused by the absence of money or assets. Inequality results from the presence of money. Poverty is the first priority to fix [and must thus be on top of the list as a priority]. Unemployment is often caused by employers being deterred from hiring people”. This means to bring down unemployment there must be less rigid and senseless official employment rules inside the country’s unstable politics. Bruce80 writes further80: 20: “…but then politics makes an appearance, because to lighten the load on employees, or to make it worthwhile to be an employer, requires, to an extent, disempowering the trade unions and we can’t have that [because Cosatu and its affiliates are alliances of the ANC]. At the end the ANC has become his own prison warden”.

This emphasis on the mismanagement of the current South Africa points to Albright’s identification of the presence of fascism in the ANC’s government system so that the partisans’ (like the trade unions) obtain part or full control of the traditionally independent institutions of democracy, making the economics and democracy of the country a failure on the one hand, while on the other hand the capital and assets of the moderate to rich persons look attractive for grabbing. When the unions and the partisans come from the majority of the population and they also formed the radical government of the day, outcomes such as the ANC elite’s decision to do land grabbing become an obvious and a natural reaction in an uncontrolled and disorderly society under an uncontrolled and disorderly regime.75,76,80

The alliance with the workers and their primary (individual, citizen, worker and so-called false democratic) rights at the cost of the functional private business sector and individuals is closely linked to its economic failure. These distinctions are taking on a racist tone, with the minority group of Whites as the losers). In this context the ANC’s basic political and economic policies, thinking, planning and doing has become cemented in revolution and fascism via the unions. This explains the shying away of the private business sector and their fight to keep sustainable democracy and private capital out of reach of the ANC’s tentacles in South Africa. Prominent in this grabbing of Whites assets is Cosatu and its affiliates’ contaminated political roles and influences in the past inside the ANC alliance, together with their current continuation of foolish and outdated revolutionary political thinking and doing. It is many times more radical politically than the already politically and socioeconomically radical ANC. It is impossible for the ANC to end its relationship with the trade unions: they are instead forced to pamper their sacred partners because of the basic empowerment by the partisans of the ANC to stay in power after 2019.85,89

Khumalo’s89 question on the future of the labour unions is significant89:13: “…one couldn’t help but wonder whether Cosatu, and the trade unions in general, still have relevance to the workers of SA”. This irrelevance was erased by the indestructibility of the ANC’s dependence on the unions’ ongoing massive power at the voting boxes. The arrogant ideas and demands of the secretary-general of Nafcor, Monga Phaladi85, that billions in cash in the private sector must be made available to the public sector by means of a “social compact” is a good example of how the unions abuse their power.85,89

Phaladi85 seems to overlook the risk that private money would go down the drain, as happened with the state’s money when it was captured by the Zuptoids with this obligation he puts on the private business sector to service the needs of the unions by whatever means they think well. His suggestion85:13: “From corporations’ side, it would be an extremely good gesture if the CEOs of the top 40 on the JSE donated their 2019 increases to a fund run by a council of eminent South Africans to support good causes that have an economic impact”, shows a lack of understanding of sound business principles. Phaladi85 makes no reference to the ANC MPs and ANC ministers or of himself making the same kinds of contributions to his 2019-helpline. Or is this expected donation by the top 40 on the JSE in line with the ANC’s grab-and-run policy from its early revolutionary days that is echoed by their intended land expropriation?85

The closed-door politics of the private business sector and their immense fighting by all means behind the curtains of the political hooligans in the ANC and EFF on the nationalization of private assets and capital has made it impossible since 1994 for the radicals in the ANC to put their hands on the private funds in the private business sector. The White farming sector has less of a defence against the land expropriation attack of the radicals in the ANC because of the open door that the Apartheid history created. This situation makes land ownership ideal as a first step towards their greater project of nationalization of White assets. At the same time land expropriation as a mean of nationalization offers direct free capital/assets with which the ANC regime can solve the Black unemployment, Black poverty and inequality. Thirdly, land expropriation can become a political powerbase for the ANC regime to obtain voters’ support from the poor and landless Blacks in the 2019 election. Constant decline of politics and economics

On inspection is it clear that the dire economic situation of South Africa will only continue to worsen, unless the ANC regime of 2019 can reform itself and stabilise its governing system, policies, vision, mission and short- and long-term aims to assure greater confidence so that they can get private support and capital by creating and promoting of a healthier environment for the business sector. The Ramaphosa regime has thus far failed on all the business and political markers to do a positive turn-around. It is significant that the Zuma regime’s crooks have not yet been purged from the system. In one of South Africa’s partners in BRICS there has been a cleansing of corrupted state servants. Until June 2018, 144 executives, bureaucrats and political actors had been sentenced to more than 1 464 years in jail, while the Gupta’s and Zuma specific are still all free and respected burghers.90

The antagonists believe that South Africa’s crisis of governance that started in 1994 has led to an economic crisis with time, bringing down democracy and its good rules. It is now at the point where it is making criminal behaviour in government possible. The ANC is turning to land-grabbing to distract the attention from the ANC regime’s manifold failures and unsolvable crises. They also offer the poor and landless false hope and financial solutions for the poverty, unemployment and inequality. Land expropriation without compensation from Whites is central to this false solutions.90 Davies pinpoints the only solution to these manifold crises very well with his short remark90: 3: “Until the politics are fixed, there is little vision for the economy”.

For the antagonist, the above proves that Ramaphosa and the ANC do not have the political ability and trustworthiness to be mandated rulers of South Africa. Nelson Mandela failed to turn Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa into good political heirs. The antagonists have started to publically questioning the continuation of the present Ramaphosa-ANC regime after analysing the recent insignificant Ramaphosa economic Stimulus Package and Ramaphosa’s many ongoing commissions of inquiry through which it seems he is walking a political path without a destination.74,77,78,91,92

Mthombothi91 rightfully describes the worrying aetiology of the many useless Ramaphosa commissions without a clear destinantion91:17: “We now have these commissions coming out of our ears. It seems our president can’t help himself”. Mthombothi91elaborates further91:17:

The commissions could end up tripping over each other though. We have the all-compassing state capture commission under Raymond Zondo and the Nugent inquiry into the devastation at Sars. This week Ramaphosa obliged with another, one that will investigate poor decisions and possible corruption at the PIC that could cost the country billions.”

Bruce92 elaborates on Ramaphosa’s use of commissions to indicate how it relates to his failing leadership92:16: “Now he is thinking about a parallel inquiry into the so-called “rogue unit” story at Sars, which led to the forced departures of some of its best managers”. (Note: these good managers departed not only under Zuma as president, but also under Ramaphosa as vice-president). Bruce92 pinpointed this leadership failure of Ramaphosa further with the reference92:16: “Ramaphosa has an inspired way of “not doing anything”. For the antagonists the question is essential: if there is not quality and sound leadership in the ANC at present, how can there be quality and sound economics? In this context the antagonists feel that the hard facts already show that there is no quality and sound economics at the moment in South Africa under the ANC and that the country is in a constant down spiral of politics and economics. The question is pertinent for the antagonists: What are awaiting South Africans in general and the Whites under attack specific because of their land ownership?

Mthombothi91 further reveals the current comprehensive political instability of the Ramaphosa-ANC regime. In addition, the ANC regime under the stumbling leadership of Ramaphosa has to cope also with a low-level civil war in parts of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), specifically among the ANC members. Mthombothi91, in reference to the status of the ANC leadership of Ramaphosa in KZN, reflects91:17: “[the] region where he is least popular is almost an understatement. He is reviled by some in his own party”. Mthombothi91 elaborates further91:17:

People are being butchered almost daily in townships and even small rural villages up and down the province. The country averts its eyes. It doesn’t want to know. AS KwaZulu-Natal premier Willies Mchunu noted when tabling the report [the Moerane commission of Inquiry into political killings in KwaZulu-Natal] before the legislature last month, these killings are taking place at local government level. And they continue unabated. Another councillor was gunned down in Umlazi, outside Durban, on Thursday night. No big deal. It’s when high-profile politicians, such as Sindiso Magaqa, the former secretary-general of the ANC Youth League, are killed that the country takes note. Violence has almost become our way of life.

The problem for KZN is that the police and its intelligence services have been compromised. They have found to be complicit in most of the murders, killing for one faction or the other, or simply turning a blind eye.

Bruce92 also reflects on the growing insufficient governing of the total South Africa by the Ramaphosa-ANC regime.

For the antagonists, two questions become pertinent when they look at the way the ANC regime has cranked the South African economy lifeless; their current senseless actions like land-grabbing to solve unsolvable economic problems; and their focussed attack on the racial unity created by Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. Firstly, are these fatalistic actions of Ramaphosa and the ANC elite culminating of their political obituaries written in anticipation?74,77,78 Secondly, as it becomes more and more clear for the antagonists that the country is moving towards a total collapse fast due to the failure of the ANC as a democratic and effective regime, is there any sense to hang on to land ownership while their lives can be the first to be lost? The anarchy in the Black areas of KZN and the failure of the police and the intelligence services to safeguard even other Black lives in KZN is becoming a wake-up call for antagonists all over South Africa to think very, very deeply about their future in South Africa after 2019. Prominent, as said, is land ownership.91

What is prominent for the antagonists at this stage is that as the country’s economy becomes more lifeless, the more extreme land expropriation without compensation will be forced down on the Whites to draw every sent of their assets and to distract attention from messes of the politically ill ANC. Only a new political party can make a turn-around and even then it will take the new regime years to re-establish some form of stability and self-respect in the country’s psyche.

3.6.3. The ANC’s political and business models

The antagonists argue that the ANC regime’s business and political model with which to plan and to run large state enterprises with success from 1994 to 2019 is one enormous failure. This stems basically from the ANC party’s inability as a liberation organization to create and to add to the value of any existing enterprise under its jurisdiction (This inclination to fail is a world-wide phenomenon of most of liberation movements that came to power as governments). The ANC’s financial and managerial failures are aggravated by the corruption inherent to the system, which is reflected by the state capture on all the financial and political levels during its governance of South Africa.93-97 State enterprises

Steenhuisen98 points out when reflecting on the ANC’s various forms of financial delinquency, that in state-owned entities alone it has resulted in R161 -billion being wasted on bailouts, subsidies and capital injections since 2008, while at the South African Revenue Service, state-capture and mismanagement has gobbled up R140 billion in lost revenues. The known losses suffered are be more than R300 billion (22% of the national revenue budget for the period 2017/2018).98

What is of further concern for the antagonists is the financial mismanagement inside the civil service. The total turn-over of the state enterprises under the supervision of the Department of Public Enterprises for 2017 to 2018 was R284 billion, but in total they incurred a loss of R1.6 billion. (The total assets of these state enterprises are more than R1100 billion, with 124 616 employees). Some of these enterprises current financial functioning is so poor and substandard that many experience difficulty to pay their employees’ monthly salaries, while creditors are often not paid. Many of these enterprises are under strain just to stay viable in the short term, while long-term sustainability is a question. What makes it very problematic to obtain a full profile of the financial status of civil enterprises in the past regarding their loss and corruption/fraud count is the absence of legal leverage to force them to indicate illegal spending. Corruption also goes unpunished.99

Constant failures include the SABC, SAA, Denel, Transnet, Telkom, public education and healthcare, public universities, municipalities. Added to this there is the ANC regime’s inability to oversee and control private enterprises to safeguard the state and the public’s money as reflected by the fraud that characterized over a long period the VBS Mutual Bank, the African Bank and Steinhoff.100,101

The mismanagement of the municipalities where the ANC is mostly in charge shows a chaotic history of stealing, corruption, poor service delivery, etc. Prominent is the lack of water delivery to residents or the unlawful actions and lack of respect for democracy. Regarding the delinquent behaviour and actions of many ANC-run municipalities that cut off water to living areas, Phephelaphi Dube100, the director at the Centre for Constitutional Rights, said municipalities must in such a case provide alternative ways to provide residents with access to water. These kinds of delinquent behaviours are indeed juridical misdemeanours and should result in criminal prosecution, but there are never court cases.100 A said Kagiso Mere100 reports that the lack of water at his area forces him to take three hours off work every day to collect water for household use. The total chaos in which he must try to live every day, he describes in short but comprehensive100: 6: “My boss understands, because he’s also affected. The municipality has endangered our lives. There is s**t everywhere. They were meant to provide us with services, but instead they build themselves nice homes with tar roads to the mayor’s guesthouse”.

At Koster in the North West province, the mismanagement of the ANC mayor and her cronies lead to a situation where she and ten of her councillors had to flee for their lives and hide in “a safe place” in Rustenburg in June 2018, reports Hosken100: 6.

Municipal IQ economist Karen Heese101 reports that the situation for municipalities is very negative, specifically those situated in Limpopo, the Northern Cape and North West where the ANC is mostly in charge. It is mostly due to poor managerial capacity and substandard performances of officials and councillors representing the ANC. It started with a lack of provincial oversight of financial planning by the ANC regime. Only 40% of the municipalities have enough cash or cash equivalents to pay their creditors. It reflects the failure of the ANC regime’s local government business model. A critical analysis shows that only 7% of the country’s municipalities are classified as well functioning, 31% as reasonably functional, 31% as almost dysfunctional and 31% as dysfunctional or distressed.100,101

In most of these clear failures it seems that the ANC elite are often the prominent culprits who engage in money capture and fraud or through associated crooked enterprises. These excellent examples of the ANC elite’s inabilities and lack of skills to manage the country on middle level, further aggravated by their practice of corruption as a daily custom in their work capacities and responsibilities, are in the view of the antagonists also now present in their land reform initiative to create a so-called immense contingent of Black farmers in the future and to erase Black poverty and landlessness. The lack of integrity and honesty with regard to financial and political matters in the government, together with widespread corruption, nepotism and fraud, as well as the well-planned execution of state capture by the top brass of the ANC regime between 1994 and 2019, and their attitude of “don’t care” for the poor and landless Blacks, is seen as ominous for any form of land redistribution from 2019 and onwards. There is no safety net for corruption and misuse. This emphasizes failure of the ANC due to its liberator’s heritage.43,44,93-97,102 The Reserve and Land Banks under attack

With regard to business entities like the Reserve Bank and the Land Bank, these entities do their best to steer clear of direct conflicts with the ANC regime on the matter of land grabbing. The fact is that the Reserve Bank can with little effort be nationalized, seeing that only the Act on the Reserve Bank must be changed, which in practice can be done with a general majority decision in parliament. It will be more difficult for the ANC to attack the Reserve Bank’s mandate, seeing that is written into the Constitution and needs a 67% majority to activate change. Given how tempting this is for the ANC and EFF radicals, the Reserve Bank has warned the ANC regime that nationalization is an exercise of which the long-term consequences can be very expensive for the government.103,104

The Land Bank survived years of corruption, looting and maladministration to make a wonderful comeback to become South Africa’s only professional and profit-making state-owned running institution. The irresponsible land grabbing hunger and talks of persons like Ramaphosa and Malema forced its CEO, Tshokolo Nchocho103, to take a tactful stand by warning of the collapse of the Bank if the ANC fails to adhere to some economic sanity. The CEO pointed out the present ANC leadership’s failure to respect the constitution and their interest in using the Land Bank as another vehicle to promote land grabbing as well as state capture103: 9: “…the noise and the uncertainty make our work difficult as development bankers using commercial solutions and commercial resources to address social needs such as employment and enterprise creation”; and: “It is deeply regrettable that this kind of work gets contaminated in the dust of political rhetoric”.

It is clear for Nchocho103, as it is for the antagonists that in this dust of political rhetoric the ANC elite, including Ramaphosa, fails to sort out for themselves what they mean with an “explicit” policy on land expropriation. Even the previous finance minister, Nhlanhla Nene, who must know the results of land grabbing and nationalization well and must surely be well-informed on the matter after his intimate experience with the Guptas, seems to have, as the rest of the ANC’s radicals, limited insight on the matter if the following remark of Nchocho103 is true103:9: “Finance minister Nhlanhla Nene has now instructed the Land Bank to provide him with a risk assessment on what expropriation without compensation could mean for the bank”. For a seasoned senior minister, trusted with the keys of the money coffer of the country, to ask such a basic question, is seen by the antagonists as an indication that the nationalization of the Land Bank in the near future has become a reality (again, notes the Guptas in Nune’s earlier past). It emphasizes for the antagonists the blurred and troubled mindset into which the ANC leadership has drifted on human rights, racial doctrine and business ethics.103

To highlight why the Land Bank is a tempting vehicle to promote land grabbing, the following can be mentioned. Firstly, farmers owe the bank R49 billion while the bank itself has liabilities to the tune of R41 billion, meaning every sent will be at risk if farms are confiscated. The bank is completely dependent on outside funders like the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the local fund management industry, the European Investment Bank and the World Bank. These are strong role players in advocating for a good government and who can, if they pull the plug, or just partly back out for fear of land expropriation without compensation, erase the bank’s credit status, bringing fast bankruptcy. It is clear that any action that affects the credit quality of loans and endangering loan repayments will cause its funders to step back. What is the ANC radicals don’t see is the fact that the bank is already a crucial funder of commercial as well as emerging Black farmers. A substantial portion of its loans are production loans, meaning that a pullback by funders will affect agricultural productivity and food security, jobs and transformation of ownership to Black farmers.103,105 Nchocho pointed out the following103:9: “If expropriation without compensation is not handled carefully, the likely consequences don’t bear thinking about”; and: “…the worst-case scenario in the event of widespread expropriation and the removal of property rights is ‘the real destruction of the economic base of agriculture, as well as the economy of the entire country’”.

The plain fact is that bank loans are guaranteed by the National Treasury, and if it must make good on banks that default, it would cause a financial burden on the Treasury, which is already under strong financial pressure. Economic and financial chaos can follow fast.103 The risk for commercial banks in a mad exercise of land expropriation without compensation, whether or not it secures credit for farmers or not, can descend into a chaos in the country’s banking sector and specifically for the Reserve Bank as a pivot.103,105 Our weak economy means that the Reserve Bank cannot take a negative financial experience of this kind alone as Nortjè points out105:9: “There isn’t enough fat in the system for the Reserve Bank to bail out another bank [like African Bank]. Impact of the current rule

The chaotic outcome described above103,106,107, activated by the autocratic and blind man style of political thinking and rule of the ANC since 1994, is also well-illustrated by Kuseni Dlamini106, the chair of Aspen Pharmacare and Massmart Holdings, in his perspective on the 10th BRICS Summit of July 2018, by identifying three crucial shortcomings in the ANC regime’s (and now also Ramaphosa’s) reign since 1994106:9:

1) A lack of investors’ confidence and growth-enhancing structural reforms under the ANC. Prominent in this total context are the absence of fit-for-purpose state-owned enterprises as result of the ANC’s style of tolerance of mediocrity and corruption, lack of a culture of high performance, lack of accountability, and a lack of consequence management and leadership of integrity and quality. The question is: how can the country attract foreign investors as its local investors lack trust in the government;

2) The ANC’s aimless and confusing intention of land expropriation without compensation is a driver away of investors: they want to know precise the imbalance in land ownership is going to be executed. So far the ANC only reflects their outdated liberation instinct;

3) The ANC’s failed policy on the mining economy and its future ownership as result of the ongoing policy of uncertainty and unpredictability of the ANC regime on a clear and sound Mining Charter. The hard fact is that the South African mining-sector is a thin shadow of its past as a contributor to the country’s coffer or to employment. Where in the 1970s to 1980s every R100 made in the economy so much as R21 came from the mining, is it contributed now only R7 to the economy.

The ANC’s radicals who promote RST and RET, which includes land- and mine expropriation, don’t see the devastating effect on the upkeep of current employment when dead and dying gold- and other kinds of mining towns emerge and the sources of salaries, which assure the functioning of poor towns in Eastern Cape, stop. Add to this the food shortages that can follow after the land grabbing of White farms and the collapse of food production, as happened in Zimbabwe. This makes the antagonists fear a fourth industrial revolution. Again, in this present chaos of the country’s economics, Black poverty and joblessness, promising already only better lifestyles for a few fortunate ones, while unemployment among the untrained in the diminishing labour market will gear-up at high speed. It seems as if the radicals lack some constructive and responsible future and strategy on what economics, work availability (forget growth), society- and family stability are.103,106,108

The basic outcomes of above aimless political thinking, planning and actions by the ANC elite have led to a lack of trust and cooperation for the local business sector. This is a situation which is further aggravated by the government’s ignoring of the talents of the local business sector to bring know-how and solutions to the government’s (mostly self-created) problems. The local business sector should take a prominent position in policy-making to advance the greater society’s interests directly in government. It’s a setup which will mean balanced control of state affairs and the end of the ANC’s way of ruling. Instead the local business sector is made a permanent and sometimes a very hostile opposition.106

Indeed, distrust of the ANC regime as a governmental safe-keep of taxpayer money is very high amongst many South Africans, not only for the antagonists. An international 2016 study that tested the opinions of the citizens of various African countries as percentages indicates respectively the following trust counts: 73% for Namibia, 71% for Tanzania and 50% for Mozambique, while the count was only 40% for South Africa. This outcome offers strong support for the anti-land-transformers’ objections to any form of future land redistribution; basically because it is seen as another public enterprise failure: not only because the ANC regime lacks managerial ability and skills, but because it lacks most of all honesty on money-matters. The ANC regime is soaked in corruption and theft of state assets. These, again, are all actions, as already indicated, which seem to be driven by ANC’s liberator’s selfishness and opportunism and its aim to the exclusive enrichment of a few ANC elites.93-97

The antagonists associate what they think is a certain devastating “Zuma corruption outcome” of the ANC’s pending land redistribution as something that is cemented in most liberation organizations when they come to rule. Such organizations, notwithstanding many political face-lifts, never change their corrupted mindsets. Radical political thinking, planning and doing stay the centre of al liberation movements and it becomes clear when the regime starts to fail the country and its people’s interests. Extreme actions (like we are seeing in Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Sudan), ignoring the short- or long-term consequences to assure political and racial harmony and economic stabilities, follows and it takes years to repair. The way Angola went down-hill during the reign of José Eduardo dos Santos and the crooked Dos Santos family’s endemic corruption for the duration of his 38-year reign (only 14 years more than the ANC’s reign where a Jacob Zuma and his son Duduzane and daughter Duduzile were allegedly also busy with delinquent actions), could not be turned around by Joäo Lourenço since 2014. This is basically because, although the new president tried in public his best to remove members of the Dos Santos family from top government posts and charges were laid against crooked officials, the country leadership fails again because the new leader, Lourenço, was a contaminated member of the Dos Santos regime that he now tries to fight. As the leaders in current Zimbabwe after Mugabe, he is just continuing on another path of political sickness in a corrupted African liberation movement and it is devastating Angola’s economics and international integrity (although less openly as under José Eduardo dos Santosa.38,43,44,69,73,102,109–117

The above Angolan political delinquent path, the antagonists reflect, is fully in line with the ANC’s political delinquency since 1994 and a regime in which Ramaphosa as the new president was also a prominent role-player as parliamentarian and vice-president from day one. Political chaos and economic chaos go hand-in-hand in the future ANC regime. For the antagonists the IMF’s structural adjustment programme that Angola is now facing is not far away for the incurable South African political sickness. Note and remember the reality: The ANC is a prominent liberation-movement-cum-government: indeed, the oldest in Africa.38,43,44,69,73,102,109,111-117

Venezuela is very similar to the ANC’s foolish political reign since 1994. The antagonists point out that in Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro at present reigns, the currency Bolivar was previously nearly a dozen times devalued by his predecessor Hogo Chávez (1999–2013); a process started for the first time by his predecessor president Luis Herrera Campins in 1983. Chávez himself chopped three zeroes off the currency a decade ago. In August 2018, Venezuela started with a currency devaluation of 95% under Maduro, taking the country further into hunger and hyperinflation. At present the country’s inflation is running over 100 000%. Food and medicine are scarce, while more than 3 million citizens have fled to neighbouring countries. Maduro’s economic plan, as Zuma’s and now it seems Ramaphosa’s, was marked by inconsistencies, lacking clear specifications on aims, developments and plans, and of course saturated by corruption and disrespect for the Venezuelans. Maduro is turning Venezuela into a basket case, far removed from its previous status as one of Latin America’s wealthiest countries. South Africa is moving in the same direction in the view of the antagonists.118

For the antagonists South Africa’s similar failure loomed with the technical recession in August 2018. Ramaphosa’s search for $100 billion in foreign investments will become a hollow call if his expropriation without compensation starts to run. Money can leave the country faster than it comes in. His attraction of foreign capital since he took the leadership based on “secured commitments of R464 billion worth of investment from China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the UK”, is prominent in his political rhetoric. These “letters of intent” are something else than true investments: last is determined by political stability, not the instability in the class of Angola, Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Sudan.43,44,119

The resistance by critics, especially the White land owners and capital holders, to the ANC’s intended land redistribution, is more than justified and understandable in the context of the ANC’s liberation and crooked inclinations and doings in this context since 1994. For the antagonists the present conflict around land ownership has one tragic outcome: There is going to be one winner: the ANC, and one loser: the White land owners.

3.6.4. The ANC’s economics viewed critically The failure of the ANC’s economic plans since 1994

Current South African political and economic researchers are in agreement with Geen’s opinion of more than 80 years ago that a an improved economy and social functioning for South Africa can only be delivered by the job market of urban areas, and not an economy bound to the rural farming setup. The antagonists believe that this must be also the main aim and focus of the ANC regime. The current opportunistic and radical socioeconomic reform by the ANC regime, with their emphasis on a “back to the country” redeployment of masses of poor and landless Blacks on farmland to be expropriated exclusively from White farmers, needs evaluation and description. This planned socioeconomic engineering is reminiscent of the communist regimes in Russia under Stalin and China under Mao. As in the failed Russian-Chinese-experiment on land-reform and their redeployment of people to the countryside, “masses” of people are central in the planned Ramaphosa-ANC-back-to-the-country-scheme. In terms of South Africa’s population of between 50 and 55 million, “masses” means nothing less than the majority of people, which can be between 25 and 30 million persons. The rural placement of even 10% of the South African population (meaning 5 to 6 million of the population out of 50 to 55 million) for a successful living on the “to be expropriated” White farmland, is not in any way economically viable or sustainable. It is a doomed scheme. This dooming last resort by the ANC regime to address the country’s many seemingly unbridgeable economic ills and crises with radical actions like land grabbing, makes it prominent to ask the question what the ANC regime did so far in terms of other economic plans and initiatives since 1994 to better South Africa before they fell into despair.120-122

In light of above economic and financial negativity, is it important to reflect on the business plans and initiatives based on an urban-rural-orientation of the ANC regime since 1994. Firstly, the ANC’s must promote the National Development Plan (NDP) of job creation via small and medium enterprises (SME) as a successful policy intervention for upliftment the poor Blacks. A research project by the SBI (the old Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut) shows that the ANC misuses estimates that lack hard evidence in the reflection of their so-called SME-successes, writes Joffe.121The ANC regime has failed to create small enterprises, notwithstanding it’s NDP “caring policy”. This outcome of failure was reflected by the Indaba on small businesses held in July 2018, which pointed out the ANC’s failed economic policy to nurture small and medium enterprises. Indeed, the notion of the National Development Plan that SMEs will create most of South Africa’s growth and jobs (the vision of the sector is to create 90% of 11 million new jobs by 2030 and contribute 60% to 80% of the GDP growth), is “little more than a pipe dream”.120-122

Joffe121 shows, using the findings of the SBI, that the formal SME-sector (defined as firms registered for tax purposes and which employ fewer than 200 people) is much les than as the ANC’s rhetoric reflects (disarming their claims of a strong SME-sector). This group (classed as small- medium and micro-enterprises) represents only about a quarter of a million (250 000) enterprises with a contribution to employment to South Africa of only 28% job absorption (against a global of 60% to 70%), notwithstanding the fact that it forms 98.5% of all the registered firms in 2016. This finding is drastically lower than the estimated 1.2 million between 6 million postulates by the ANC regime in reflecting on their initiative to better the South African economy. Fifty-six per cent of jobs are provided by 1 000 larger enterprises, which includes the government as an employer (which is show to over-employs wherein political loyalty at the voting-box plays a strong role). A study by RED13X3 of the University of Cape Town reveals that the informal business sector, consisting of 1.4 million enterprises which are functioning outside the tax-net, provides only more or less 17% employment, mostly at a very low level of payment. Most formal SMEs are struggling in a very hostile business environment, varying from regulatory hurdles, red tape, as well as a lack of access to capital and skills development. Their contribution to the cross inland GDP is also relatively lower than previously reflected by the ANC regime in praising their false economic initiatives. Joffe121 also reports that more than 60% of them employ fewer than 10 people and that about 70% of them fail within the first two years of start-up.120-124

Research by the Small-business Institute, supported by data of South African Income Services(SAID), shows in short the following South African setup in 2016: 176 333 micro-enterprises (fewer than 10 workers, accommodating 5.1% workers), 68 494 SMEs (11 to 50 workers, accommodating 11% workers), and 17 397 middle-level enterprises (51 to 200 workers, accommodating 12% workers). In total SMEs accommodated 3 863 104 persons, or 29% of working South Africans.121,124

For the antagonists this failure by the ANC regime is a clear warning of an economy in decline, reflecting growing poverty and a failed ANC regime coming from 1994.121 In this regard is it important to note that in 2011 the South African economy was R5.7 trillion, while it retracted to R4.8 trillion in 2018.121,125

Exclusive land redistribution without compensation as a successful way to reform South Africa’s collapsing economy, racial inequality and Black poverty, is a failed option as Stalin’s Russia and Mao’s China already confirm and which the present radical land reform in Venezuela is in the process of confirming. Land redistribution without compensation will only contribute further to decrease and to degrade the South African economy. If the ANC’s economic plans and initiatives since 1994 could not move the country positively, how can land stealing do better?121-123,126

Speckman123 warning is pertinent when writes123: 5: “South Africa is on the brink of a fiscal cliff and unless the economy improves significantly the government could find itself in Washington, cap in the hand, begging a rescue package from the IMF.”

The technical recession that kicked in September 2018 can be the final straw breaking the ANC regime’s back. They have already started begging as its BRICS-partner, Brazil, is already doing.123

Derby125, with his eye on a seemingly unavoidable future IMF intervention in South Africa as a result of the ANC regime’s ongoing economic failures, notwithstanding their attempts, points out the origin of it in its revolutionary and radical economics foundation, spelling only doomed economic and political outcomes. This focuses the attention on the immense lack of economic and political talent of Ramaphosa and his men to bring a New Dawn to current South Africa, to be the result of “birds of the same feathers coming from the failed Zuma regime”; in the present political context only the “sound bites have changed”, like the absence of the term “radical”, when government officials and ANC politicians speak of economic transformation. Does this absence of political and economic radicalism now mean that the nationalization of banks and mines are dead? Derby’s125 answer in this context is sharp125:2: “The answer is quite simply no. It’s an argument that will live again, but, with the country closing in on possible IMF assistance (should the economy not move into high gear, and soon), it’s one that lies dormant. However, as an idea, it lives on and will be recycled some time in the future, when the state of plays allows.”

The ANC elite’s radicalism on land grabbing may also become dormant in 2019 in the ANC regime’s search for IMF assistance. It will become more aggressive in practice when the circumstances for ANC radicalism arise again. The safe-net of the Western economy, notwithstanding the “re-colonization” of South Africa after 1994 by the Chinese and Russians and the ANC’s hostile rhetoric against the West, especially the USA, can be the only rescuer of South Africa after 2019.125

For the antagonists the fact is there that the country is in a far worse position at present than when the ANC regime implemented their other economic plan, namely the five-year Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Strategy (Gear) in 1996. It was supposedly focused on privatization and the removal of exchange control, but it failed because of the revolutionary/liberation ideology that incorporated the radicalism of the trade unions and the communists on the ownership of land. Notwithstanding a short-term improvement in the economy with raw-material exports to China after 1994, this economic positivity was erased inside the ANC’s failed economic-political system, while the ANC’s failed policy brought constant economic uncertainty. This poor economic situation was further aggravated by the failure of the state-owned institutions to be free from corruption, mismanagement and state capture (while last-mentioned came down directly because of the ANC regime’s revolutionary/liberations ideology that had effected its integrity, political standards and ethics).123,127,128

South Africa’s debt-to-GDP, as well as the growing annual shortfall versus income, is another good example of the constant failure of the economic plans and initiatives of the ANC regime, which is bringing the country in economic disarray. From a 27.8% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2008 it has risen to record high of over 53% in 2017, moving upwards to the 60% notch now. The debt-to-GDP ratio forecast by the Treasury for the 2020–2023 financial year, is 56% (from the previous 60%). Although this number is far from the 180% of Greece, George Glynos warns, the MD of ETM Analytics, the movement to the 60% mark spells danger. It is important to note that the GDP has risen from 25% at the end of Trevor Manuel’s tenure as finance minister with a pick-up on the start-up of the Zuma presidency and the followed-up ministers to rise to 50%, before moving to 53%.123,127-129

With regard to the country’s income it is important to reflect that the National Treasury collected R71.34 billion for the 2017–2018 financial year and is predicting an additional R1.22 billion for 2018–2019, leaving shortfall of nearly R48 to R50 billion. This shortfall is pushed-up by Zuma’s feeble fee-free higher education and training scheme (accepted without obstruction by the ANC regime and its leaders like Ramaphosa), accepted in December 2017 and requiring a further R57 billion in new allocation over the next three years. This means a deficit of R28 billion and R57 billion (R85-billion) respectively for 2018–2019, funding that is only solvable by borrowing or by the rising tax, which has a domino effect on investment, consumption, standard of living, job creation and inequality. The severity of this domino effect of constant and growing shortfalls is confirmed by the paying of R180 billion this year alone in interest charges. For Khumalo the present failed ANC regime’s economics only spells chaos when he looks at the allocation of R85-billion against a mere R36-billion from tax increases in this year’s budget.123,127,128

It must also be noted, writes Speckman,129:4 that, notwithstanding a spending cut of R85 billion for 2018–2019 and the revising of the budget deficit over the next two years down to 3.6% from 4.3%, the total expenditure in reality for the coming year is R1.67 trillion, which negatively represents a 2% real growth in expenditure. David French, tax consulting director of Mazars, points out that South Africa has been steadily increasing its official spending levels for a number of years now, with negative consequences for the economics, as the technically recession starting in September 2018 confirms. This failed economic setup of the ANC regime makes the constant worry over the growing debt-to-GDP understandable. Inside this failed economic network it is also clear why the value of land deprecated with nearly 30% this year, even before land grabbing became a prominent and controversial issue.123,127-129

As were with Stalin and Mao in their ongoing failed political regimes (driven by a political system of Communism characterized by corruption, suppression, state-capture under autocracy), the present ANC regime and Ramaphosa need a drastic attention distraction from their ongoing failed economic policy to stay in power after 2019. Inside the context of distraction and political manipulation, the internalized characteristics of the ANC as a revolutionary movement, offers land expropriation without compensation, an excellent opportunity for the ANC regime to do the so-called “donkey’s carrot” kind of economic upliftment of its poor and landless Black supporters while costing the ANC regime basically nothing.123,127-129

For the antagonists the ANC regime with its total failure to create wealth through SME and to erase the debt-to-GDP, together with their intended land expropriation without compensation, is as a wantonly agent, not only to impoverish the land’s White agriculture sector, but to keep in place the syndrome of a masses of “poor and landless Blacks” as a “partisan powerbase” to overrule and limit the democratic statutory institutes and the Constitution. This crooked political setup that had kept the ANC in power since 1994 with its executive top-leader, was the basis of Jacob Zuma’s reign and is now spilling over to the Ramaphosa-reign. The main aim of this ANC political delinquency is to diminish and limited the development and presence of a strong Black middle class [leaving a small group of favoured and empowered crooked ANC elites at the top and a massive class of extremely poor people on the lower socioeconomically level; a group who mostly sees and accepts the ANC regime and its elite as their unquestionable saviours (many of this group have become financial and emotional dependence in their daily living of the ANC regime, as reflected that so much as 40% of them receives in one form at least a social grant)]. The Black middle class, who mostly oppose the autocratic and crooked politics of the ANC regime, underwrites democratic capitalism and are thus mostly anti-ANC. This group is essential to economic growth and to addressing inequality because they create jobs and stimulate a large economic umbrella to uplift the poor and landless Blacks, especially outside the agricultural sector.130,131

This ANC’s economic and governmental failings and their political short-sightedness and delinquency, not only drives away the Black middle class, but has also forced them into poverty. This outcome has a serious negative impact on the upholding of the economic initiative in the country.130,131

The loss of the Black middle class, together with the capitalist business sector and the labour sector, which has become anti-ANC due to the ANC’s corruption, is a prominent determinant in cutting the political size of the ANC, making it a dwarf of its past.132,133 Musyoka132 describes this diminishing of the ANC precisely132:18: “The emperor was left with no clothes, having lost support from three influential constituencies – capital, labour and the black middle class”

Regarding the Black middle class’ present economic empowerment and status, Musyoka132 shows that they as a group (forming 20% of the total population) contributes more than any other group to tax revenue, forming 40% of the labour force (although they tend to be a stagnant group of around eight to nine million), receives between 30% to 35% of the employment income, owns just under 10% of the country’s wealth and represent 85% of all that is spent in the country notwithstanding their 20% part of the population. They are being side-lined by the ANC regime and left under-developed to generate wealth for the country and to contribute to tax revenue.132,133

The current income of the middle class is shown by research of National Income Dynamics Study and Southern Africa Labour and Development Unit (SALDU) of the University of Cape Town at this stage to be much lower than the previous official estimates. From this data only one in five (20%) South Africans have a disposable income of at least R2 900 per month (earning gross around R 7000 per month) and are at all times open to falling into poverty. This 20% group is faced with financial obligations to jobless and poor family members, making them very sensitive to poverty status.133The presence of a burgeoning Black middle class is “a figment of the national imagination”, posits Professor Murray Leibbrand133:5, the director of SALDU.

The underdevelopment of the Black middle class are especially driven by the lack of an established SME sector, a lack of training and education, and the injustices done by BBBEE to enrich only a selective small group of Black elites. The ANC regime’s allegation that the lack of farmland and farming opportunities is a role player underdevelopment of Blacks are factors is false. This outcome confirms again the ANC’s failure to execute its’ promised economic plans and initiatives.132,133

The antagonists argue, as Geen134 did 80 years ago, that the cornerstone to erase Black poverty and landlessness is education to equip poor Blacks to fulfil to the demands and functions of highly paid jobs. This makes urbanization crucial. Land expropriation without compensation lacks the ability and pittance for the masses of poor Blacks to make a financial turn-around. The land matter serves only as a front to cover up the ANC’s manifold political failures, as reflected above by their inability to develop a successful SME sector and a flourishing Black middle class.132-134

The sudden A-h-a-experience of the ANC regime that the farming sector is one of the least transformed sectors and that through land expropriation without compensation the situation can and will be corrected is an untruth that shows the failure of ANC regime to understand the economy and where in the economic and business sectors the solutions lie. Tshandu108 points out that the retail sector of South Africa is the least transformed sector in terms of ownership, despite its 59.97% contribution to GDP through consumer spending. The Department of Trade and Industry’s rhetoric that White domination of the retail sector is not acceptable and that “new players should emerge, especially those owned by Black people”, is an empty promise to address the racial inclusivity of the retail sector, notwithstanding a strong Black labour union present in the sector to force change. Tshandu108 reports that according to Empowerdex’s 2017 Most Empowered Companies List, the grocery chain Spar Group has only Black ownership of 6.35%, while its female Black ownership stands on 2.35%. Africa’s largest retailer, Shoprite, has a Black ownership of 8.65% and a female Black ownership of 4.29%. The Black ownership of Clicks is 18.5% with a female Black ownership standing on 8.75%. The exception possibly Woolworths with a Black ownership of 37.2% and a female Black ownership standing on 16.02%.108,135,136 The answer to this failed transformation of the retail sector is described by Nomozamo Xaba108, an executive of Empowerdex, as follows108:10: “Customers such as you and me are unlikely to inquire about our supplier’s contribution to BBBEE before we buy bread and milk…and so there is little pressure for this sector to transform”.

In the above context the question is why the White farmers sector is the focus while less than 3 500 (10%) of farmers provide more than 90% of the country’s food? Why the pressure on the agricultural sector to transfer? As often reflected in this research, the antagonists believe there are more sinister reasons behind the land grabbing of the ANC regime that have nothing to do with sound economic plans and initiatives.108,135,136

This “passivity of customers in the retail trade” bring the antagonists back to the sudden positioning of the agriculture industry and land ownership in the mindsets of the post-Zuma leadership: Are White land ownership and the White-farmers’ contribution to BBBEE, besides their successful constant delivery of affordable food produce to customers, really a concern of the masses of Blacks of whom so much as 90% do not want to farm or to live on rural farmland as they have adopted a Western culture? For the antagonists a much more masked political agenda, driven fiercely by a segment of political radicals, is present: the presence of Whites in general. The White farmers are a first target, basically because of their political isolation and their vulnerability on isolated farms. In this context the opinion of some antagonists is that land redistribution without compensation is plain a lingering hate of some radical Blacks and their revenge on earlier White supremacy and wrongdoings. This is also an exercise driven by the ANC’s internalized culture of terrorism, which includes land terrorism and –grabbing to take the best (the good and developed farmland of Whites in 2018) for themselves without paying for it. This reminds one of the “Zupta” state capture.41,108,135,136 The ANC’s ongoing economic battles

As history always confirms when it comes to politicians and their antics: politicians never learn – they get into the same wars for the same reasons as hundreds before them, only to suffer the same endings. Sometimes they lose the battles but win the war; sometimes they win the battles but lose the war; and then sometimes they lose the battles and the war, leaving them with no hope or opportunity to return to their previous glory. It happened with the KhoiKhoi and KhoiSan who took on the migrating Blacks and Whites. They were wiped out of the South African politics.137,138

Now in 2019 we see it again with the foolishness of the ANC regime, supported by a segment of the landless and poor Blacks in exchange for their votes in the 2019 election. The antagonists view Ramaphosa’s view on land redistribution as a power game with the masses. 138,139

Viewing land redistribution as a financial comes at a heavy cost in the end. 26, 50-76 Land expropriation is political “adventure” that the ANC government cannot pay from the state’s coffer and normal taxes or from national/international loans because of their dubitable intentions.140 One easy and tempting way out of it, in terms of its political drive as a terroristic-cum-liberation-cum-democratic political party, is for the ANC to fall back on their basic political philosophy of grabbing and destroying, as Mthombothi140 reports140:17: “…to destroy stable economic systems because they were unable to run from 1994 a passable governments and must now fall back by the “redistribution” of the wealth of their “conquered” rich Whites through land grabbing and stealing from the minority and non-defendable individuals and groups.”

Khumalo141 roots the behaviour of the ANC well141:10: “At some point, especially with limited resources, we need to prioritise, or as young people say, ‘we need to pick a struggle’ ”.

This ANC’s “struggle-picking” is a long-standing culture, cemented into it a terrorist and liberation instinct to obtain without input, like their practices of RET and RST, where land-grabbing is now a primary element. The antagonists’ comments on the economic and judicial wrongdoings of the ANC are confirmed by the scepticism of the formal business sector that the ANC can create wealth in a honest way because of their lack of political integrity, business inability and bad political intentions. 26, 50-76

There are many negative realities related to land redistribution that must be spelled out all involved, from existing land owners to new land owners and banks, to prepare everyone involved and to handle it as applicably and practically as possible. One must remember that although the ANC’s ongoing losing economic battles will cost the country and the good South Africans enormously in personal and economic integrity and values. The ANC elite will be left untouched (as Jacob Zuma) for their manifold wrongdoings coming from 1994. The good South African must prepare him/her for this one-sided suffering. Derby142 brings these negative (and conflicting) realities well to the foreground and openness when he writes142:2:

But of course, as part of land reform, some farmers will find themselves having to carve up their lands; one can’t ignore our shared history.

Land reform comes with great upheaval as it involves taking land from those who have it and giving it to those who don’t. To unleash it, title deeds are necessary. Landowners, white farmers, the government and our chiefs and kings need to buy in so South Africa can reap the economic rewards.

The issue of land reform should not be left to political parties to use as a populist ticket either for or against. It’s necessary to fix the structural fault lines in the South African economy. Killing the goose that lays the golden egg

The arguments, opinions and viewpoints offered by the ANC regime that drastic land reform is unavoidable to uplift the poor and landless Blacks financially to give them entrance to farming and the economy, together with their idea that the whole process of land expropriation will in no way affect South Africa’s economic status in general, is seen by antagonists as either a total ANC myth dissociated from any reality, or a well-masked plan of evil-doing to Whites. In this context, the criticism is specific that the ANC regime (and many of Black politicians, activists and radicals promoting land exportation) plainly lacks a sound understanding of the negative principles of economics: the comprehensive negative impact of nationalization of any private asset(s) is prominent. In the Ramamania it seems to be specific White assets. In terms of the antagonists’ argumentation it is propagated that forcible redistribution without compensation will have disastrous effects (not only for the rich Whites), but all over for the South African economy to include the masse of poor Blacks with time. It is argued that the ANC regime land expropriation scheme, even before it is in practice, will kill the goose that lays the golden egg. The outrage of big private enterprises is already significant and it foresees the coming loss in foreign investments that will make South Africa more and more a risk for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to rescue.143

The term golden egg refers to the broader South African economics in which the land expropriation issue can be seen as one link among many that form the chain of the current South African troubled economy and its many ills. To understand in the first place the three elements poverty, unemployment, inequality in relation to poor economic planning and policy, homelessness, economic aggression and conflict, racism etc., which all stand central to land expropriation, some economic role players, determinants and drivers are evaluated and described in this sub-division. Poverty can devour all riches

If the ANC regime is hoping that the effects of land grabbing on the economics would be minimal when they do it as a once-off quick and hard cleansing by implementing land grabbing with absolute no changes thereafter, they are in for a surprise argue the antagonists. Also, to argue that such a fast, hard solution by the ANC regime of land grabbing will work because investors and individuals can accept and deal with losses fast and that they only dislike short-term uncertainties reflects a lack of understanding of the basic principles of economics. The loss of land ownership is a loss that is different from the individual shareholders of a company that went bankrupt (or is even nationalized). Farmers lose their much loved land, their source of income and their basic assets for their old age. Then there is the clear racism factor of political, social and economic discrimination because the losers are in the ANC’s case only Whites. They don’t even offer them sound evidence as to why they are losing their land versus the outcome as winners only Blacks without any reasons to show why they have to benefit.144

An all-out RET, of which land grabbing is a primary component, will still leave poor South Africans poverty-stricken. Fourie143 shows that if the total wealth of the approximately 38 500 millionaires of South Africa (which includes a significant number of Blacks) is paid out in cash to each South African citizen, the amount received by each citizen will be a single payment of R38 282.00. If this amount is wisely invested for 10% interest (tax-free), the monthly income would only be R319.00 per month, which is not much of an income if the current average monthly income of R7 750.00 for Black households is insufficient to take them out of poverty. For the antagonists it is clear that persons like Ramaphosa, Malema and their intimate cronies, besotted with land grabbing from Whites, do not really understand the basics of economy.143

Research shows that if the more or less 35 000 commercial farmers active in 2018 is halved, there will be only 17 500 farmers in the system. For these 17 500 farmers to be successful in terms of Western/White or even modern African lifestyles and standards and to be sufficient in own financial needs (which the 35 000 existing farmers are already struggling to do) without raping the present economic and farming system or directly or indirectly harming the livelihoods of others involved in the farming sector, is just not possible. The fact that farm labourers are some the lowest paid workers and some the poorest people in our country, have not changed when they moved from commercial White farms or subsistence Black farms. It is simply impossible to create new opportunities for more farmers and labourers in the agricultural sector in a decent compensation/payment-system when the whole setup goes broke.135,143

When the more or less 35 000 commercial farms today active in South Africa (and which as a total group currently contribute 95% of South Africa’s food output,) are each turned over to ten Black families, it will only create work for 6% of the South African jobless. In this kind of “informal” farming there will be an immense cost to produce, while the individual structures to upkeep farming will not be affordable given the income generated. It is postulated that this kind of subsistence farming model will not generate enough for a single family to live on, not even speaking of producing food for the country.143 The Ramaphosa myth of successful land expropriation and the establishment of a mass of successful Black farmers, is interpreted by the antagonists as just another failed African economic dream and a failed ANC experiment. It is wishful thinking, nothing more.135,136,143

The antagonists, look at the above facts, find it difficult to listen to the claim of Mamphele Ramphele38 of ReimagineSA during her promotion of land expropriation as a governmental instrument to return land to Blacks as a source of pride, wellbeing and for sustainable social stability to Blacks, as well as job-creation in the farming sector, null and void when she postulates38:21: “Why can’t the promotion of jobs and better education be part of more land restitution within a well-planned development process?”. Her much argued other postulations, offered with enthusiasm about the relevance of blind land expropriation as an absolute need for survival of the individual, turned out to be myths lacking economic intelligence. It is echoed by the failure of the experiment of socialism/Marxism in Venezuela by Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro.38,103,136,143

The potential and ability of Ramaphosa and his cronies to bring economic success to poor and landless Blacks and the country as a whole with land expropriation without compensation of White land, the anti-reformers reflect again on the ANC’s well-known continuing farming failures (The postulation here is that the ANC regime only obtained a 10% success in the placing new farmers from 1994 to 2018). Soko103 pinpointed these constant failures of the ANC, especially on farming103: 9: “That’s because it’s one thing to give land to people, but if you don’t give them adequate support and advice and so on, it’s not going to work”.

Glorifying the exclusive farming enterprises to absorb more Black workers and farm owners, like with the lone-standing macadamia-nut farming where the produce of just over 700 South African farmers gives the country a 34.4% of the world market in 2017 (against Australia’s 37%), is a false bravado to support land expropriation. Firstly, this kind of structured specialist farming is an expensive and long-term investment, but it does not need many workers. Secondly, this sector forms part of a very competitive world market. There is a lack of understanding (besides the presence of loads of aimless emotions in their propagation of the creation of a large contingent of farmers) by propagandists of land expropriation of the limitations South Africa’s geography puts on farming. The downsizing of expensive farming is well-illustrated by the effect of mechanising to side-line the high costs created for farming by regulation agricultural labour. To reinvigorate agriculture via land expropriation to offer the poor and landless Blacks richness, or even an affordable life-style, is only a fantasy of the ANC. Statistics confirms this over and over. In 2017, agriculture, together with forestry and fishing, contributed a meagre 2.6% to the country’s GDP and could only accommodate 5.3% employees of the total labour market. (At the moment agriculture is growing at a negative of less than -20%). If the numbers double positively through land reform, the contribution to the GDP and employment will only be 5.2% and 10.3% respectively.38,44,103,127,136,143

Derby145 takes this issue further by pointing out the chaos in waiting with land grabbing (even with compensation) to cut poverty and unemployment and to phase out inequality between Black and White. The established farming sector is already financially unstable and risky. He writes145: 2:

I’m certain that in the farming sector today, you’d find quite a few farmers more than willing to offload their assets to the state. With only 4% of farms in the country generating a turnover of more than R5m, and the vast majority indebted to the tune of more than R160bn to both private bankers (R129bn-plus) and the Land Bank (R40bn), there’ll be many willing to sign off all their liabilities.

These are just some of the financial realities of farming, which are best captured by the struggles of milk farmers in the Free State, the North West and Mpumalanga – realities that we need to consider rather carefully as we seek to speed up what has been a land reform process that has been blighted by bureaucratic failure of the state.

The ANC’s intentions can destabilize the presently stable farming sector and rob it of its richness and devastate its successful farmers, leaving the country food insecure overnight. Rural poverty as a public killer

Robust growth of the South African economy in terms of training, the availability of work, and industrial development is needed to solve the socioeconomic problems now prevalent, not land-grabbing. The country’s political setup and integrity must be able to generate inland capital and growth on its own. The way to move towards this is immediate bettering of the regime’s relationship with the country’s business sector for direct all-over investments and developments, and not increasing dependence on unstable foreign capital flows.146

The IMF’s “Article lV” of August 2018 reports that the South African state under the ANC has become caught up in irresponsible debt-making. The report reflects on why our public debt doubled in the past decade. At the core stands mismanagement of state funding, theft and corruption and inappropriate development of useless projects. It shows that the ANC regime’s debt has doubled since the 2008/2009 global crisis to reach now 53% of the GDP. The IMF147 reflects that this was entirely driven by the government’s irresponsible constant increased spending on the public sector wage bill as number one, followed by interests on debts and social grants. The wage bill and social grants expenditures are mostly for political opportunism at the voter box. They do nothing to boost growth, but indeed boost growing debt, making the IMF very doubtful of the country’s financial future.147

This IMF147 outcome is in line with Soko’s103: 9 view that the Black youths “are not interested in farming or land, they want jobs”, basically because of the poverty catch in agriculture. This postulation is also confirmed by the IRR-finding and the government themselves in that only 8% of land compensations that were awarded between 1994 and 2018 to Black claimants were in the form of land as compensation. The story of Ramaphosa and his cronies that farming by Blacks can bring work and sound economics – for which they need much land, making land grabbing the most logical (but undoubtedly the cheapest) way to provide land, is nothing but an economic farce. The base of truth is that land as a source of income per individual cannot deliver the same income as a job. The constant decline in the number of South African farmers from 116 000 in 1950 to more or less 36 000 in 2018 (± 1 000 per annum) confirms this reality about the viability and sustainability of a career in farming. The failure (50%) of the placement of seemingly well-qualified and selected Whites (mostly Afrikaners) in the 1930s in a land redistribution scheme by the White regime and the Dutch Reform Church (DRC) to solve the Poor Whites Problem, confirms that the placement of masses of poor people on land mostly does not work. The solution to the present poverty and inequality is to promote urbanization with the development of cities with modern facilities and infrastructure, the development of industries to create jobs, better education and training, etc.38,103,136,143

Africa has become the world’s most rapidly urbanizing continent, reports Pilling148. A study of the World Bank indicates that 472 million people in sub-Sahara are already living in cities. High birth rates and migration from the countryside has caused the African urban population to double to 1 billion people by 2014. From 2015 to 2045 the Mckinsey Consultancy148 estimates that 24 million more Africans will be living in cities each year, basically as a result of the rate of real GDP-growth due to the productivity in cities. South Africa is part of this immense urbanization trend: neither the ANC regime, nor Ramaphosa will be able to stop it.148

Farming careers in the present South African farming situation is risky. Aggravating this by adding masses of poverty stricken Blacks spells only disaster. There are better solutions to improve the situation of poor and landless Blacks. This is a situation in which the formal business sector as a primary activator and generator of capital, economy and jobs, stands central. Indeed, it is the only entity with the power to steer the economy of the country to functionality. However, the ANC has failed to enter into a partnership with the business sector.50

Ruralisation and its farming setup as a primary artery for the country’s economics was dropped nearly 80 years ago in South Africa after an earlier similar effort to address inequality and poverty, specific among the Whites. It was clear for the then White regime of South Africa that exclusive land ownership and –work in the rural area as an instrument for the upliftment of the Poor Afrikaner, were not favourable. Interestingly, this early report also referred to the poor and landless Blacks in the country-side. It also mentioned that exclusive land ownership and –work in the rural area as an instrument for the upliftment of the Poor Blacks were less favourable. As for the Whites, it was also believed that working and living in towns would bring financial and economic rehabilitation. Geen134 writes in 1939s, nearly 80 years ago, as follows on this troubling matter (which antagonists say is now re-emerging by the ANC’s foolishness in South Africa)134:20:

… the development of South African industries will provide more work for all classes of the community, including the Poor Whites, many of better sort of whom have found employment in the towns, for example in the mining industry or in the police force. The Carnegie Commission did not consider that the best place for the Poor Whites was necessarily on the land. In fact, in their Report the commissioners stated that industrial work in the towns was “one of the most potent means of bringing about their economic rehabilitation”.

The ANC regime’s present economic plan and initiative of land expropriation to redeploy masses of poor and landless Blacks to the country-side as farmers and labourers is nothing else than the planned killing of these people through extreme poverty and famine.

3.6.5. The ANC’s politics viewed critically The ANC’s capitalist-democratic failure

The myth of the ANC as the sincere care-taker of all South Africans, guaranteeing rights like land ownership, even respecting the simple citizen’s rights of Blacks, is a farce in the view of the antagonists. South Africa under the ANC is at the edge of an abyss, shackled into captivity by masses of parasites, acting even against the poor Blacks masses with contempt. The broadcast journalist and author, Redi Tlhabi,149 touches on the truth when she remarks149: 18: “Sometimes it feels like this government [ANC] hates Black people, like its predecessor [NP]”.

If some of the sincerest members of the ANC start to distrust the Party, how can they expect the opposition or those against the ANC’s land-reform inclinations, to trust them? Read the reaction that Mongane Wally Serote150, a South African award-winning poet and novelist, a long-standing member of the ANC and chairman of the ANC Stalwarts and Veterans, wrote on the 12th November 2017 in a well-known local newspaper on the failing and corrupted ANC150: 18: “The crisis resides in the hijacking of the ANC by corrupt elements who, despite their rhetoric, are completely bereft of the basic civic consciousness that had been the hallmark of ANC genealogy for many decades”.

But is Serote150 a late-comer to the choir bemoaning the current ANC’s corruption? Not at all: The ANC icon, the most honourable president Nelson Mandela151, pointed out in a public speech in 1999 (20 years before Serote’s remarks and only five years after the “1994-independence”) the immense corruption in the ANC when he said151:571:

Among the new cadres in various levels of governance you find individuals who are corrupt – if not more – those they found in government. When a leader in a provincially legislature siphons off resources meant to fund service by legislators to the people: when employees of a government institution, set up to help empower those who were excluded by apartheid, defraud it for own enrichment, then we must admit that we are a sick society.

Even the South African Communist Party (SACP), well-known for its radical Marxist ideology, has reflected on the present integrity of the ANC regime, which went down the drain the day of Jacob Zuma’s reappointment as president in 2007. The SACP states that although the ANC’s bad improved for a while after 2007, the integrity crisis restarted soon thereafter, not only with greater magnitude, but with the worst of corruption cemented into its foundation. In short, even for the SACP, also a liberation movement by excellence, it has become clear in 2018 that state power and a Constitution shaped for presidential autocracy is too important to be left in the hands of the corrupted ANC as a regime. This “formal letter of disapproval” by the SACP is also applicable to president Ramaphosa and his regime, reflecting back on his intended drastic land reform with its disastrous outcome for White land owners, poor Blacks and the country’s economics.152

The Zondo Commission of Inquiry is an excellent example for the antagonists of the political (if not also mental) madness of the ANC as a regime and as a party (and the danger for South Africa if they stay on as the regime after 2019). Zizi Kodwa54, the ANC’s head of the presidency at Luthuli House, made an arrogant declaration in the Sunday Times of 26 August 2018, reading54: 22: “The ANC is not on trial at the commission of inquiry into state capture”. It reflects not only a lack of consciousness what is right or wrong in the ANC elite, but also the lack of ability and integrity to take responsibility for their involvement in corruption as a regime and party from 1994 up to today.54

Mr Kodwa and his co-leaders in the ANC elite are seemingly newcomers from Mars. The ANC and all its tentacles lack shame.98,153,154

Steenhuisen98, DA MP, the chief whip of the opposition in the parliament, hits it right on the spot when he nullifies Kodwa’s and the other ANC’s like Ramaphosa’s plea of innocence when it comes to state capture and crookery, which flourished over the last eight years, when he says98: 24: “Those in the ANC who latterly claim they were not aware of what was happening, including President Cyril Ramaphosa, are frankly insulting the intelligent South Africa public. It is simply inconceivable that the capture of the state and associated shenanigans were unknown to a large segment of the ANC top leadership”.

For the opponents it is of interests that Kodwa54 and the remaining Zuma cronies in the ANC and the present leaders have to appear before the Zondo Commission to explain how the South African state was stolen under their watch. Such cleansing can give some insight into the role land expropriation without compensation played in present and past state capture. Land expropriation without compensation seems to have its roots into the Zuma-Gupta-ANC elite, reflecting again another well-planned outcome to bring riches for the ANC’s elite, instead of helping the poor and landless Blacks. On Kodwa’s “innocent plea” of not guilty on behalf of himself and the ANC in total, Munusamy153 gives him sound and wise advice153:26: “It is not acceptable for the ANC to wash its hands of accountability for state capture simply because it removed the chief enabler from power”. What she should have added is that the “other enablers” are still inside the ANC elite and regime, and that their hands are very, very dirty.153,154

The antagonists do not have to gather their own evidence of contamination of the country’s politics: numerous political overseers have done it well for them.155-158

The seasoned political journalist, Ranjeni Munusamy153,159, did it when she reflected on how the ANC’s 54th national conference at Nasrec in December 2017 just rubber-stamped the Zuma regime’s crookery: not only ignoring Zuma’s ousting of persons of integrity in the ANC elite and senior posts, but approving it. The Guptas’ state capture and the undermining of state security were by the ANC leaders denied, even contradicted as false. It is totally contradicted by the dangerous extent of Zuma’s criminality: his crooking with the Guptas went as far by them trying to clinch a deal on the five stored South African nuclear warheads, forcing the CIA in 2009 officially to warn the South African authorities to prevent this.153,159

The denial of wrongdoings by Zuma’s and some of the leaders of ANC at the Nasrec-conference are contradicted by hard facts. Munusamy153 refers as follows153:22:

  •     The ANC national     executive committee (NEC) had been told that the Guptas had prior knowledge of Zuma’s 2010 and 2011 cabinet reshuffles. In fact, the Gupta-owned newspaper The New Age in 2011 published an accurate prediction of Zuma’s cabinet changes before he announced them.
  •     These were just some of the signals that the Guptas had commandeered control of the state and the capture of the ANC’s highest elite [to make South Africa a tripartite governmental state: on lowest level the Parliament; on middle-level Luthuli-house and its ANC NEC; and on top-level the Gupta-clan].
  •     Yet the ANC did not question the usurping of its political power, did not come out in     support of Nene when he was fired, and allowed Jonas to dangle in the wind when he exposed the Guptas.
  •     The ANC NEC shut down an internal investigation into state capture and buried its     head in the sand.
  •     Not even the great Zuma vanquisher, President Cyril Ramaphosa, had anything to say     about the Gupta infestation in the state until he was ready to make a bid for the ANC leadership.

The crookedness of some of the ANC’s elite with the Guptas is even more evident from the testimony of Mcebisi Jonas153 before the Zondo Commission when he said that after his refusal to take a bribe of R600 million of the Guptas, they threatened to kill him if he disclosed what had transpired. There was another threat to Jonas by Ajay Gupta who said the Gupta family has the ability to destroy his political career.153

On the corrupted Gupta management of Jacob Zuma, Munusamy153 reports as follows on Jonas’s testimony153: 22:

The whole state was in favour of state capture”, Jonas said. He said the Treasury was utterly dependent on political support, particularly from the president, but it did not have it.

He testified about how Gupta bragged that he and his brothers were the de facto rulers of SA. “You must understand, we are in control of everything”, Jonas alleged Gupta told him, citing the NPA, the Hawks and the intelligence services. “The old man [Zuma] will do anything we want him to do”.

There is no indication that this was not true. Zuma made no attempt to distance himself from the [Gupta] family or to act to protect the state from their looting spree.

All the evidence shows that the ANC is not able to steer a land redistribution programme. This means that their potential to make the comprehensive land expropriation programme a success is doubtful. Tony Leon160, a former leader of the opposition in the South African parliament and a former ambassador to Argentina, writes that the ANC regime cannot even ensure regular electricity or even basic sanitation at primary schools, or safely care for psychiatric patients, but, notwithstanding these failures, they in their foolishness want to govern every facet of life, economics, and politics in South Africa. This failure includes for the opponents also their lives and belongings.160

Leon160 is correct with his postulation that South Africa is already in chaos. Claims that civil society is currently doing the best ever and that the credit agency Moody’s decision not to down-scale South Africa can be taken as evidence of a healthy economy are false. These postulations are based on short-term manifestations that mask the reality of a greater collapse in waiting (It was expected that a further degrading of the country for instance by Moody in March 2018 to lower than Baa3 and an outlook of stable, could have immediately trigger the exit of about R100 billion). South Africa’s reprieve with Moody is only a short-term improvement of the economy before end of 2018/early 2019 and it was done to give the country under Ramaphosa a chance “to sort out South Africa’s problems”. Moody is clearly not going to take off pressure off the country. Remember: Moody’s is the only one of the three largest international rating agencies still to have the government’s foreign- and rand-denominated debt on investment grade.119,160-164

Looking to the various rating agencies’ probations of the financial behaviour of South Africa, Joffe165 reflects165:9: “Chances are that the rating agencies will wait to see what happens at election time [2019]. But SA’s fiscal and growth risks could well see them put us back on watch for a downgrade before the end of this year [2018]”. With the revenue shortfall estimated by PwC at R6 billion (It could be so much as R10-billion), the chance of the worst is high.165

A degrading factor for the rating agencies that can evoke a fast the exit of R100 billion and more is the formal constitutional implementation of land grabbing and the loss of investor trust in the ANC regime. It be noted that Africa as a whole is facing a new wave of debt distress as the US hikes signal the end of cheap money, which can bring a funding crisis. Confidence is one of the key drivers to get South Africa into the international economy: The South African economy has been lacking international and national trust for a long time and will lack it for a long time in the future. The sweet-talk of pro-ANC economists and senior appointments in South African institutions are not going to help much.119,161-164

Leon160 points out that the ANC still has an appetite to encroach ever further into the sections of the country’s economy and that this actually appears to bring more chaos160: 22: “All these our political masters want to control. Or anaesthetize. Or close down”.

The failure of the ANC as a trustworthy regime and as a party, reflecting again on their unpredictable and inappropriate behaviour on the land expropriation issue, lies in their lack of a culture of integrity. It doesn’t matter for the ANC if its leaders committed murder or other wrongdoings, as long it is for the “party’s benefit” and inside its “ideology of liberation”. The party remains loyal to the accused and their doings, even after they have been found guilty. On the 29th of July 2018 no less than 26 tainted individuals held positions in the national (NEC) and provincial (PEC) executive committees, varying from 12 in NEC positions to 14 in PEC positions. These culprits form such a contingent in the power-base of the ANC that they are referred to as “The Rogues Gallery”. Despite being convicted of fraud, Tony Yengeni, Ruth Bhengu and Bathabile Dlamini sit on the NEC, while the ANC whip Jackson Mthembu was convicted of drunk driving. The present minister of policing, Bheki Cele, was fired as the National Police Commissioner in 2011 after being found guilty of improper conduct and maladministration and a finding of being unfit to hold office. The immediate question for the antagonists is how a serious matter like land expropriation can be entrusted to these people if they cannot even can handle their own affairs with honesty and dignity.27

The antagonists’ most poignant question is why these ANC rogues are being allowed into important political positions by the ANC-party and regime. The ANC’s spokesman, Pule Mabe27 (himself sanctioned by parliament for failing to declare his interest in a company doing business with the rail agency Prasa), gives the answer27: 4: “…there was nothing wrong with convicted people occupying influential positions, as the ANC believes in rehabilitation. ‘When individuals rise out of their own shortcomings, regardless of what those could be, they must be given an opportunity to come back and be part of a fully-fledged society’.”

This “humanistic-criminal rule” can be acceptable in some cases for the non-dangerous person who derailed, but it becomes a problem to maintain an honest government if a significant part of its leaders are “rehabilitated criminals” and psychopathic individuals. The questions for the antagonists are: 1) Why are the ANC attracting the interest and membership to its leadership of such a high percentage of delinquents and criminals?; and: 2) Why in the first place did these leaders “fall” into delinquency and crime?; 3) Seen from a psychological point of view, what are their so called “shortcomings” (is it psychopathic or what else?)? The ANC’s answer on the presence of rogues in its top structure is very simple, namely that it believes that members who have been charged in court can remain in good standing because they have not yet been convicted. ANC’s leaders, like Mike Mabuyakhulu who is out on R50 000 bail after being arrested for alleged corruption, Mathabo Leeto who stands accused of awarding a R15 million contract without due process, Nozillo Mashiya who stands accused of using a council credit card to buy R10 000 of liquor, Zukiswa Ncitha and Sindiswa Gomba who are facing charges related to the Nelson Mandela funeral scandal, are prominent ANC’s deemed “innocent until proven otherwise” in terms of Mabe’s explanation. The antagonists’ gut feeling is that the expropriation of land without compensation is going to be a great temptation for many of the seasoned criminals in senior ANC positions. The antagonists’ view that state capture via land grabbing will continue, seems more and more to be correct.27

Leon160 feels that the current South Africa, captured by the ANC, resembles Otto Bismarck’s view of the ambitious but short-sighted 19th-century Italy160: 22: “It has a large appetite but poor teeth”. A new kind of state capture

The myth presented by the ANC regime and its leaders is that the intended land expropriation of Whites is solely aimed at rectifying so-called White injustices committed against Blacks during Apartheid and colonialism, which, as they argue, created the current immense problems of poor and landless Blacks. Antagonists see this point of view as false. These kinds of utterances and rhetoric are seen by the antagonists as habits and customs of the ANC to distract the attention away from their own past and present wrongdoings and their current delinquent intentions. The antagonists read other more serious intentions into the whole process. What underlies the land grabbing is state capture. The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints are not unfounded in this regard: all the signs of capturing are present. The vagueness about what the process will entail and how it would increase landownership for the poor holds potential for state capturing, either through bribes, fraud or the theft of these “new government properties” freshly taken from the White farmers. Zuma’s corrupt cronies are still present in the system, some in very senior positions. Many of these persons are undoubtedly directly involved in driving the expropriation scheme.111,166-179

At the recent parliamentary hearing at Rustenburg, North West in 2018 on the suggested change to Section 25, the Black community gave voice to their immense distrust in the ANC regime to handle the process honestly. For them the ANC regime’s land expropriation is just a possible ongoing state capture, as illustrated when a said Rubosweni Mmelene35 says that he wants to support the change but feared the effects of rampant corruption in the North West province, which is run by the ANC, and which in the end can result in an outcome that can leave the poor and landless Blacks untouched by any improvement. Mmelene states35: 22: “I understand 87% of land belongs to whites. I want to agree with the amendment but because of the corruption in this province, it is difficult”.

The above confirms the fears of the antagonists. The antagonists especially point to the radicals in the ANC elite’s refusal to state how the expropriation is going to happen, specifically who will hold the titles deeds, who the recipients of the land would be, how people will qualify for land, for what the land will be used, etc. The other concern is the numerous corrupt ANC members in office. The question is what and who is going to stop them in the future: Did Ramaphosa or the ANC regime reappointed them for a specific purpose?111

This existence of delinquency and crooked officials in the current Ramaphosa regime is well-illustrated in an editorial of the Star111, dated 2018 July 16. The editor writes111: 10: “The dismal side is that so many on the public payroll continue to palm millions surreptitiously while supposedly serving South Africans, in spite of repeated and widely publicized instructions against this”.

In this regard the editorial states that 721 of the country’s most senior public servants are moonlighting without disclosure, forming part of a total of 1 943 public service managers who are directors of private and public companies, while there are hundreds of senior officials doing remunerative work outside the public service. KwaZulu-Natal (also the base of Jacob Zuma and his faction in the ANC NEC) seems to be the provinces the most guilty of misconduct by officials: 30 top officials, including two director-generals, two deputy DGs, five chief directors and 21 directors, received alone gifts worth close to R900 000.111,166-179

The level of corruption is illustrated by the high-level official with the rank of director-general in the provincial Eastern Cape government in the looting of the state funds in relation to the memorial and funeral services for Nelson Mandela, as well as her further involvement in a tender scandal of R171 million and a misdirection of the provincial government in 2013 into channelling about R300 million of taxpayers’ money into the Eastern Cape Development Corporation. This entrenchment of corruption means that the financial outcome of land distribution can leave both Black and Whites poor and landless.111,166-179

There has also been a loss of officials with integrity as the Zuma and his cronies systematically attacked these individuals from 2009 and ousted them. Some of the Zuma cronies are still there. The editor179 of the Sunday Times wrote with great concern on the 3rd December 2017 on this matter of crooks who have now captured even Luthuli House, as well as resurfacing of these bad guys soaked in Zuma-kinds of manipulating and crookery, to clear out the last portions of integrity left of the country’s official system (Prominent are theses crooks steering further the country of the various state-agencies, even the security agency).179 The editor writes179: 20:

What makes this problematic is that his [Zuma] only interest with such agencies is that they protect him and his associates from any harm, and not necessarily the country.

His appointments to the top jobs in the intelligence ministry as well the state security agencies have always been of his close comrades, who he believes would secure his interests. Any sign that a minister, a director-general or any other senior official was putting the interests of the country ahead of those of the president and his associates has often led to the immediate dismissal. Just ask Moe Shaik, Gibson Njenje, Sonto Kudjoe, Simon Ntombela and other securocrats who have found they rubbing the president and his associates up the wrong way.

A further indicator of the ANC regime’s administrative collapse, starting immediately in 1994, is reported by the May report (2016–2017) of the Office of the Auditor-General180. It is sobering and depressing reading. The report shows that only 33 out 257 municipalities received clean audits, while irregular expenditure at local government level amounted R28.37 billion.180-182 (If the wasted money was managed correctly, 1.3 million of South Africans could be accommodated in public work job programmes for a full year, 3 500 pit latrines at schools could be replaced, 14% of shack-dwellers could be accommodated in properly built homes and VAT reduced instead of increased.)180-182 The lack of proper financial management (mostly due to corruption, theft and fraud) by the ANC regime is further evident from the way municipalities failed to collect money for services rendered to inhabitants, the private sector and governmental departments inside municipalities. In total municipalities are owed R139 billion by service users, meaning they don’t have the funds to pay Eskom for electricity used. In total, municipalities, as a result of service users not paying, owe Eskom as much as R27.8 billion. The total debt of the ten municipalities with the most debt amounts to R11.8-billion. 180-183

These failed municipalities are well described by Dan Sebabi182, a senior member of the South African provincial legislature’s cooperative governance and traditional affairs committee. He points out specifically the role of crooked politicians and corrupt municipal officials in theft from the deposits transferred of municipalities’ union funds to the now VBS Mutual Bank under curatorship (more than R1,5 billion is involved).181,182

It goes deeper as many political and financial analysts already have indicated. The ANC regime is largely ignoring all these warning signs of the presence of corruption because its intimate members are directly and indirectly involved. When the ANC elite is faced with a problem (which they can either not solve or do not want to stop because of their criminal benefitting from it) they simply try to lay it to rest with extreme, unworkable political promises that generate more conflict (and more opportunity for theft), like offering free land to the landless and poor Blacks via land expropriation without compensation from Whites. Sebabi182 reacts to these failures, thefts and corruption by ANC-cadres as follows182: 2: “You are plunging Limpopo into a ball of fire. You tell our people you invest money when they don’t have water, when they don’t have roads. What do you expect our people to say? How do you expect them to respond?”

This corrupted setup around many of the ANC regimes’ governing bodies and leaders did not, as illustrated by the antagonists, change in culture or after staff replacements following the departure of Zuma. The ANC’s “new era” under Ramaphosa looks for the antagonists much like the ANC’s “old one” under Zuma. There are just not any constructive signs of true political renewal and integrity under the leadership of Ramaphosa to steer land reform honestly to benefit the poor and to isolate the opportunity for land capturing.111,181,182,184

The following editorial writing confirms the immense culture of corruption inside the ANC regime and the state well111:10: “The extent of the undesirable practices it [Public Service Commission – PCS] found points to the monumental task facing Ramaphosa in cleaning up the government. It will take years, great stamina and the will to be ruthless wherever the rot is found”.

The telling stories of Sidimba and Sifile185 on the above kind of dodgy and highly irregular transactions all over South African under the ANC – something that can quickly spills over to land redistribution – reaffirm the current corrupted culture still in the post-Zuma period in the South African government, when they write185: 1: “Shocking widespread corruption, fraud, theft and mismanagement of hundreds of millions of rand at the Municipal Councillors’ Pension Fund (MCPF) has been referred to the Hawks by its curators”. How serious these dodgy deals are, is the fact that its referral to the Hawks was in terms of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act.

3.6.6. ANC regime inside the BRICS-kabaya

South Africa’s position in BRICS was supposed to bring massive growth. However, the fact is that not even a quarter of what the ANC promised became a reality. What is clear is that South Africa already started to barter away its political and economic independence. An editorial186 in the Sunday Times praises the importance of South Africa being a BRICS-partner as follows186:18: “For South Africa, it is important that we remain in this powerful group, even though it may seem as if we don’t belong”. His comment is foolish: it indeed seems as if South Africa does not belong in this partnership. The cruel facts are there. It is clear that the ANC elite want to belong to BRICS for other questionable reasons and intentions. These delinquent intentions are also applicable to Russia and China, eyeing South Africa for more than noble reasons.186-188

The claim that the five BRICS countries comprise 40% of the world’s population (3 billion persons) with a growing portion of the world trade – producing more than 30% of manufacturing goods and 50% of agricultural products, that it is responsible for 22% of world’s GDP and that the inter-BRICS transactions form 17% of world trade and investments and has growth in 2017–2018 with 10%, and that the inter-trade between BRICS countries has risen from R203 billion in 2010 to R460-billion in 2017 – is misleading. It is precisely this over-populations (the populations of China and India make up 87% or 2.7 billion of the total BRICS’s population of 3 billion) and poverties associated with it, which is keeping true development away. At the end of 2017 the collective size of BRICS (four initial BRIC members without South Africa) was valued at $19 trillion (R256 trillion) and it is alleged that the Block will overtake the Group Seven (G7) by size of economy in 2035. In truth, is it only China and India that are growing, with South Africa, Brazil and Russia sitting in the low level of growth (with South Africa the clear odd one). South Africa’s contribution to the total BRICS GDP of $16 000 billion in 2016 was only 2%, placing it far below Russia’s 7%, Brazil’s 11%, India’s 13% and China’s 67%. Our GDP is only $300 billion compared to China’s $11 trillion, while Brazil, India and Russia have all passed the trillion dollar GDP mark. Furthermore, our unemployment situation is chaotic in comparison with the four other BRICS countries: for South Africa is it officially a staggering 26% (unofficially it can be between 55% and 60%), while for China it is 2.2% and the other three partners beneath 10%. Our investment imbalance with BRICS results in outflows of $60 billion in cash to purchase goods and services from our BRICS partners while the inflow of cash from them into South Africa is only $18 billion. Looking at it critically, South Africa under Ramaphosa could be vulnerable to the same kind of opportunistic Zuma abuse by its BRICS partners.186-188

This reality makes the remark we have much to gain from the block by the editor186 of the Sunday Times laughable. The fact that South Africa is small fry alongside the BRICS giants makes the whole BRICS set-up controversial and a dangerous political and economic play by the ANC regime.186

The South African minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Lindiwe Sisulu’s view that South Africa is a star in BRICS, is also laughed off by the antagonists. Very little of the foreign investment of $750 billion that China is planning will be allocated to South Africa. Although the two-way China-South African trade reached $39.17 billion, it is an imbalanced one with China in the exporter position, with South Africa as the loser. There are more dangerous determinants for South Africa in BRICS, something the ANC regime knows well, but it does not like to reveal this to the public and their voters. The danger of a repeat of the corrupt Mahlobo-nuclear-Zuma-Putin deal is prominent.187-188

Jim O’Neill188, the former Goldman Sachs executive and an expert on BRICS, put ideas of an advanced and rich South Africa in making in BRICS to sleep when he said in May 2018188: 22:

…almost since the day the political leaders agreed to invite South Africa to join the club Brics, South Africa has been disappointing. Frankly, I wouldn’t have made that decision because even if South Africa had enjoyed strong GDP growth, it is never going to be an especially large economy as it doesn’t have a lot of people. Even if it enjoyed enormous productivity growth it would never get to the size of the top 20 economies of the world.

The ANC elite became confused by their own false doctrine of South Africa’s importance in the international trade and politics, a manifestation O’Neill188 already points out. To say South Africa played and is playing an active role in the creation of the G20 and that the country under the ANC has established itself in many international forums as a strong voice, is a farce. What is prominent is that it aligned itself with the radical elements running many of the failed autocratic and Marxist impoverished world states that had become more and more isolated from respected stable democracies. At most one can say that at the time of its inclusion into the G20 South Africa was the largest economy on the African continent, characterized by established capital markets, relatively modern infrastructure, a robust regulatory environment and strong institutions, but since the entrance of the Zuma regime these many good descriptions became sorely ghosts from the past. Even its partnership with BRICS’s New Development Bank can not make much good to South Africa’s constant down-spiral and political chaos.189

The BRICS New Development Bank’s vice-president and CFO, Leslie Maasdorp189, makes the following very poignant remark189: 7:

Commentators interpret this R1-trillion target as foreign direct investment, but in most instances, including China, only a small percentage of gross investment comes from outside its borders.

The bulk of the investments in infrastructure and new equipment typically come from domestic savings. Stimulating domestic investment in South Africa is the most critical task.

In the same breath Maasdorp189 tries to relate domestic investments in South Africa to the China, Singapore and Korea economical solution. It is far-fetched. Maasdorp relates189: 7: “Some of the most successful investment destinations, such as China, Korea, Singapore and others, have built up their investments rates at between 30% and 45% of GDP. What this means is that out of R100 of income, on average R30 to R45 is re-invested in the form of new factories, new infrastructure and equipment.”

What Maasdorp189 and many other propagandists miss, is the simple fact that the ordinary South Africans are poor, domestic savings are minimal because there is no money left to save. There is immense distrust between the ANC regime and private investors. South Africa’s economic development is delayed by the demands of the labour unions, which are essentially part of the ANC regime. The country’s institutions are saturated by state capture and corruption, while Marxist extremism has been the basis of government since 2009. These outcomes nullify the entry of new factories, new infrastructure and equipment, even the good aim of the BRICS Bank to uplift South Africa.

Looking critically at the BRICS constellation, O’Neill188 shows that BRICS’s success stands solely on China’s relevance and dominance188:1: “Who would care about BRI, or BRIS, without China”, asks O’Neil188. Notwithstanding the low level position of South Africa in BRICS and its poor chances to really ever benefit immensely from the BRICS-kabaya, South Africa has value for China’s “imperial dreams”: it is primarily a bridgehead into Africa for China to steer its political (and growing military) influence and trade of essential products. These aims, visions and doings of Communist China are seemingly in line with that of some of the radicals in the “new” revolutionary ANC-party who put the country’s interests in second place to their self-enrichment and empowerment via China.188

South Africa’s membership of BRICS reflects a clear picture of a failed state coming from 1994 that is hanging onto the other radical states in an effort to survive the present. For the antagonists South Africa has since 1994 become a politically failed state under the ANC regime and its political radicals. Its failed economics is a direct result of this. André Perfeito90, the chief economist at Gradual CCTVM, describes the twining of Brazil and South Africa’s failed situations when he says90: 3: “Brazil’s problem is not economic, it’s political, so is South Africa’s problem”.

Martyn Davies90, the MD of Emerging Markets and Africa at Deloitte, also emphasises that there are other stark similarities, varying from economic to politics, between the two countries that do not bode well for South Africa. Prominent is corruption scandals involving state-capture. Most of the politicians of both states are contaminated with crookery: in July 2017 the Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison for accepting bribes (Zuma has thus far missed this fate and it seems more and more that he is not on his way to be a prisoner like Lula da Silva), while Lula da Silva’s successor, Dilma Rouseff, was impeached in August 2016 for creating an artificial budget surplus by unlawfully allowing loans from state-owned banks to the treasury. Around the corruption monster is it likely that the present Brazil president, Michel Temer, is going to suffer the same kind of fate in the near future. Notwithstanding corruption as a prominent similarity between South Africa and Brazil, Brazil shows still some kind of other goodness that is lacking already South Africa. One is, as said, the failure by the ANC regime to prosecute Zuma and his cronies (of whom many are part of the present ANC elite).90

Davies90 reports between South Africa and Brazil on the prominence and difference on genuine efforts to prosecute political crooks as follows90:3: “According to Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption Perception Index, South Africa and Brazil are in 64th and 77th position respectively. But despite Brazil’s dismal ranking, its judicial system at least continues to function”.

Davies90 writes further on the other many bad similarities between the two countries90:3: “Given the worrying similarities between the leadership of both countries, South Africa could follow in Brazil’s economic footsteps, with a two-year lag”.

At this stage for the antagonists it does not matter if Zuma or if Ramaphosa is the president of the Republic of South Africa, an outright failure and misuse of the whole intended land redistribution is a reality. This is a conclusion that seems difficult to contradict and much of this chaos to execute actions with success is vested in the ANC’s liberation contamination. Ramaphosa, as Zuma, became also fast and easily steered into the political mindsets of the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and China.

With South Africa’s partnership in BRICS, both the two South African leaders’ feet are helped to be cemented in the liberation and revolutionary thinking, planning and doing of their patrons, Brazil, India, China and Russia on the practice of corruption, disrespect for human rights and political manipulation to benefit the regime’s elite. For South Africa it is more and more a case of “re-colonialisation” by its two BRICS partners, namely Russia and China.

Basically, in the South Africa’s re-colonialisation only the country’s