Category Archives: Political Science

South Africa’s Troubled Landownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)

Title: South Africa’s Troubled Landownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Good, great, high-level, leadership, outdated, pretender, troubled, taker.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 12: 2

1. Background

Jonathan Tepperman1 writes1:29,220,221:

In real life, even more than in fiction, stories generally follow predictable paths. The good-looking woman gets the guy. The better-funded politician with the thicker head of hair wins the race. The rich get richer, and everyone else gets screwed. Improbable and unexpected victories are exceedingly rare. Yet every once in a while, they do occur… it’s worth considering just what made the happy ending so implausible and, as a consequence, so inspiring.1:29

By emphasizing circumstances, I don’t mean to suggest that fate, not free will and shrewd leadership, proved decisive in any of these episodes. Circumstances played an important role: the extreme conditions cleared away the institutional and political barriers that ordinarily make radical solutions impossible to effect. But governments face serious crises all the time. What separates the best from the rest is how they deal with them.1:221

The details of the crises varied from place to place, of course. While the specifics  varied, however, in all these episodes the extremity of the moment played a similar role, pushing those in charge to set aside ordinary politics and conventional policymaking and to think big — very big.1:220

Tepperman concludes1:25:

Abandoning hope certainly is tempting – especially at a moment when so many things seem to be going wrong with the world.

The problem with despair, however, is that it’s unproductive. And that makes it a dangerous indulgence at times like these.

Fortunately for us. It’s unnecessary. The solution gridlock – is already out there. You just have to know where to look for the answers.

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 18)

Central to the South African landownership matter is a political history in which discrimination against Blacks by various White regimes since 1652 played a dominant role. The post-1994 Political Dispensation in which justice, humanity, equality should play a primary role, failed to bring land and better economics to the mass of poor Blacks. Instead of bettering the country’s economics and Apartheid’s mismanagement, discrimination and corruption, the post-1994 ANC-regime went down the same path in committing corruption, mismanagement, turning White-on-Black discrimination into Black-on-Black discrimination. In particular, its elite creates state capture to favour their intimate cronies. BBEEE and cadre deployment brought wealthto the Blacks, but only to a small group of ANCs, mostly corrupt politicians and those in their intimate circles. The intended redistribution of land to the mass of poor and landless Blacks failed to realise. Inside the present collapse of the economy and the ANC elite’s lack of constructive thinking, planning and doing to bring prosperity to the mass of poor Blacks, there is a retreat into blaming such failure on the past wrongdoing by Whites: The main issue is the the Whites’ land, obtained over centuries, which the radical Black politicians now want. What is lacking in this land redistribution, is a qualified ruler able to manage it, something that the ANC regime is lacking. This unfortunate setup makes land redistribution a second priority, and the appointment of an able, trustworthy and skilled ruler to oversee the process, the first priority. Without such a regime with capability, skills and integrity there will never be successful land redistribution and a second state capture will become unavoidable.

Land grabbing is an age-old custom practised by Blacks on Blacks as well as Whites on Blacks for more than three hundred years in South Africa. It is  a custom that should not be restarted again in 2020. A perfect solution to the present imbalance between White and Black landownership must be found fast, without falling back onto the past’s vicious circle of revenge and counter-revenge to erase the manifold injustices done before 1994.

Our country’s political history is far from completion. We must complete it. The implementation of land redistribution will play a key role in the new part of our political history.

1.2. Aims of article 19 (Continue from Article 18)

The primary aim of this study (Article 19: Part 2) is to continue the analysis and discussion on the matter of land redistribution which is facing South Africans, post-2019.  (See the previous article, titled: South Africa’s Troubled Landownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 1 (18).  The intention  is to bring final conclusions  on how the process can be addressed and to offer a dictum if land redistribution can successfully be executed by the ANC regime as the present ruler or by another ruler post-2019. 

This is the final article in the series of nineteen articles on the matter of South African landownership. The previous eighteen articles in the series were published in the South African accredited journal Ensovoort [Volume 38 (2018), Number 12:1 to Volume 40 (2019), Number 12:10].

2. Method (Continued from Article 18)

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to successfully implement land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa in effecting successful land reform from 2019.

The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion (Continued from Article 18)

3.1. South Africa’s troubled landownership (1652 – 2019)

3.1.1. Introduction

It is true that the 1913 Land Act and the Group Areas Act had dispossessed many black people of their land and livelihood. These injustices and unfairness of Apartheid must be addressed in 2020 to minimise the inequality between White and  Black South Africans. Landownership occupies a central position as a source of serious conflict that is growing. So far there has been immense reluctance from the Whites to address the redistribution of land to the poor and landless Blacks. To effect South Africa’s intended land expropriation (with or without compensation) is not going to be easy. It cannot and must not be a popular political solution. It must bring a righteous and a justified outcome to all South Africans.2

3.1.2. Short  overview of the analysis and discussion of Article 18 (See 3.1.1. to 3.1.2.)

The failed Marxist-Leninist politics of the ANC-regime brought South Africa to the brink of economic and political disaster. Land grabbing is one of the most attractive solutions for the Ramaphosa regime to bring some form of capital and money to the mass of poor people and to restore the ANC regime’s credibility as a revolutionary organisation.

Not one of the political parties in present-day South Africa is capable of effectively running the country, which would include the mandated task of effecting a just and balanced land redistribution.

The troubled landownership is misused by radicals to steer the many dissatisfactions of the mass of poor and landless people into immense unrest and anarchy, even revolution. The unbalanced landownership issue in the country is the single most important reason available to the radicals in the ANC and other political parties to launch a Marxist-Leninist coup. Especially the fact that the ANC can be ousted in the 2024 elections, makes the implementation of a coup a strong possibility in 2020 already. It is thus clear that an acceptable solution to the landownership matter must be found not later than 2020.

3.1.3. Advice and suggestions for a post-2019 effective government

3.1.3.1. ANC-DA intertwining

Political analysts have tried since May 2019 to project what South Africans can be expected in our broader politics from the end of 2019. Suggestions of alliances between parties in an effort to solve the country’s immense problems have been prominent, while the spreading of internal conflicts, to undermine the integrity of political parties even further, have been widely publicised. Regarding alliances, it is argued by some analysts that the ANC’s decisive national majority makes the need for any alliance involving them zero. Other analysts point out the possibility of forming a government of national unity, just like after 1994. They believe such a “coalition” will bring the dissidents in South African politics into the inner circle of the ANC’s politics and promote “nationql unity and consensus” on controversial and conflicting issues such as land expropriation. Political commentators believe that such an outcome will be unacceptable to the hawks in the DA: Although it can be expected that the DA may receive some ministers in the overwhelming ANC cabinet, it will only serve to boost some DA members’  egos and to legitimise the ANC’ s ongoing delinquency (as happened with the FF Plus and Pieter Mulder in the Zuma cabinet). With a partner such as the EFF in a coalition, the ANC’s chaotic pre-1994 politics will prevail.3-6

For the DA elite to be able to cooperate with the ANC elite, they would want to see dramatic changes in the ANC’s politics, which would include abandoning its Marxist rigidity and ceding some of its extreme power. Bruce7 speculates on possible DA prerequisites as follows7:18: “…insisting it would not be the junior partner in any coalition and that it would not, under any circumstances, form coalitions or make ‘arrangements’ with the hated ANC unless the ANC splits and its ‘reformists’ (dove) wing becomes available as a partner”. But such a possible splitting of the ANC is disregarded by Bruce7 as a possibility in the near future when he posits7:18: “That’s (splitting) not going to happen any time soon.”

Other political analysts8 agree with Bruce7 and believe that the present-day ANC, notwithstanding its internal conflicts, will not cede power easily. For these analysts the failure of the ANC after May 2019 to make an alliance with the DA spells the same fate as the NP before its fall into obscurity after splitting up.8

Other analysts predict the formation of a new political party in which an ANC faction would assume a prominent position, but without dominance. The DA is seemingly prepared for any unexpected political happening. All the parties, such as the EFF, DA and ANC, are undoubtedly in some form of consultation as to their long-term politics. Especially for Ramaphosa, such consultation before the ANC’s 2020 mid-year conference, which can determine whether he remains leader, is very important.9

Since 1994 the functioning and structuring of South Africa’s political system in terms of a rigid Black-versus-White division was and is still being questioned by some political analysts. Today this 1994 habit is still seen as being responsible for the compartimentalisation of the two main groups (although the many smaller diverse groups, emanating from pre-1994, are still there): the conservatives and the radicals: the doves and the hawks. Indeed, some analysts foresee a kind of a present as well as a future ANC-DA intertwining. Labuschagne10 posits as follows10:6: “Op nasionale vlak verskil die DA en die ANC se beleid op sommige gebiede net in graad, byvoorbeeld oor grondhervorming. Dié verskille kan deur onderhandelinge en kompromie baie na aan mekaar gebring word.” Labuschagne10 elaborates further when he writes10:6:

Die aksentuering van waardes in die gematigde middelgrond van die politieke spektrum is die enigste werkbare oplossing vir die toekoms. Indien die gematigde partye in Suid-Afrika en die duiwe in die ANC bymekaar kan kom, kan so ‘n gematigde magsblok ontstaan.

In die ideologiese en politieke spektrum is die gematigde groep (duiwe) in die ANC baie nader aan die DA-beleid as die radikale EFF se beleid.

Die ANC-valke is ideologies nader aan die EFF en die groep kan ná ’n skeuring naas dié party links op die politieke spektrum sy plek inneem.

Die ANC-duiwe sal dan na die sentrum van die politieke spectrum kan beweeg om saam met die DA en ander gematigdes ’n sterk gematigde party te kan vorm wat sterk op maatskaplike demokrasie gegrond is.

Die antwoord en hoop vir Suid-Afrika is die hersamestelling van die politieke spektrum en die vorming van ‘n sterk gematide sentrumparty wat die magsbalans in die land beheer.

In Suid-Afrika is die onlogiese preapartheidskonfigurasie van politieke partye [en rasse] nie volhoiubaar nie. Die ANC se verskillende opponerende groepe, saamgebing deur belange en nie waardes nie, is onrealisties en nie in belang van demokrasie en die land nie.

The above so-called “similarity” between the Cyril Ramaphosa clan  and the DA has enjoyed much emphasis since the middle of 2019 in the so-called “battle” between Cyril Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule. But, as pointed out in the previous Article 17, there is a lot of misunderstanding by political analysts on the so-called “Ramaphosa-Magashule battle” and the so-called “fight” for the soul of the Marxist-Leninist ANC: it is a soul which both Ramaphosa and Magashule respect and propagate and do not want to hurt. The same holds for the “killing” of the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist ideology. Neither Ramaphosa nor Magashule disagrees with it: without a Marxist-Leninist ANC is there no place for Ramaphosa in present South African politics. The Ramaphosa-Magashule battle is  purely a short-term leadership battle in which the ambitions, blown-up egos and revenge of the two leaders occupy centre stage. Munusamy11 states appositely11:20: “It is well known that the resistance is not even driven by ideology or principle, but rather by vested interests.” The infighting is not influencing the ANC’s corrupt and radical politics in any way to “better” the ANC and thus to make the ANC acceptable for the DA as an alliance partner.11

Herman Mashaba12, the previous mayor of Johannesburg  writes in the Sunday Times of the 27th Oct. 2019 that he believes that after 25 years South Africans are faced with great inequality, more crime and an education system that has failed the country’s young people, which is a direct result of the monopoly on power enjoyed by the ANC. To combat these negative outcomes, together with the ANC’s state capture, corruption and the plundering of state resources,  Mashaba12 believes there is only one solution, namely that a coalition government is the best way forward for South Africa. For him is It simply  a case of overseeing by the so-called “regime parties ”of the actions of the other “regime parties” in the governance process. He writes12:23: “It is through this lens that the members of the multiparty government evaluated proposals, and ultimately built consensus. I view this to be one of the greatest advantages of coalition government. When no single party has a monopoly on ideas, proposals can be evaluated on their merits and their impact on residents.”

For Mashaba12 there is no deviation by parties in terms of their ideologies and politics. Critically evaluated, the contaminated, crooked values and behaviour of parties left unaddressed and the parties’ identity untouched in a coalition will essentially ripen further, leading to more wrongdoing. In reality it is only a planned and calculated effort by the elite of each party to obtain still a bigger part of the pie (as evidenced by the ANC elite’s immense corruption still continuing today). Mashaba’s12 misunderstanding and misrepresentation of such coalitions is well confirmed by the perverse outcomes of the ANC-SACP-Cosatu Alliance and the various failures of the DA-ANC-EFF Alliance. The exclusive party-only coalitions have not worked since 1994 and they opportunistically serve only the various coalition parties’ and their cronies’ own interests, while the residents’ and citizens’ interests are left out in the cold because they lack their own direct representative (non-political) bodies in the government.12

What Mashaba12 propagates is just a repeat of the wrong politics chosen in 1994 by the citizens of South Africa. It will just be the support again of the wrong party and most of all the wrong leaders, all saturated in opportunism and self-enrichment and -empowerment. Politicians such as Mashaba’s foolish statements and opinions must be read in terms of Gumede’s13 analysis13:20: “Some ANC and government leaders appear to think that just issuing a public statement will miraculously translate into the successful implementation of it. Policies are often based on aspirations, wishful thinking and ideology rather than on grinding reality, evidence and reason.

De Groot14 reflects on these kinds of malcognitive outcomes by quoting the philosopher Daniel Denett14:20: “Those who fear the facts will forever try to discredit the fact-finder.”  

The tragic outcome of these kinds of politics in South Africa under the ANC elite is well described (and at the same time warned against) by Gumede15 when he states15:18:

Many poor, marginalised and desperate black South Africans regularly support leaders and parties  whose policies and behaviour on the face of it run counter to their own interests, only worsening their poverty and marginalisation.

Sadly, the pattern is repeated across post-colonial Africa. This is one of the reasons Africa  has remained overwhelming poor. Nothing will change unless ordinary citizens stop supporting leaders and parties that undermine their own interests.

A dramatic new approach to ruling themselves via self-empowerment is needed not only by the mass of poor Blacks, but by every South African not able to identify with the corrupt political parties.  In addition, it is needed to abandon the positioning of Black versus White and vice versa in the choosing of good leaders, in an improved political system eschewing exclusively Black and White political parties.

To team up the ANC and DA either in an alliance or to form a new party composed of DA and ANC dissendents, is an outright impossibility when taking into account their dissimilar political ideologies, aims, kinds of membership and political histories. In this context of an absolute impossibility to amalgamate in future again only existing political entities in a form of governance in South Africa, we need to shortly reflect on the political entities, the ANC and the DA, in terms of their origins, functioning and aims.

 3.1.3.1.1. The ANC

What firstly stands out, is the founding model of the ANC and its anti-Apartheid ideology, being an inclusive “catch-all” party for all those pre-1994 persons and groups suppressed by the NP (and the Afrikaners/Whites). All types gathered in it:  from hard-core communists, socialists, anti-capitalists, anti-White and anti-Afrikaner, pro-Black, pro-African, democrats and anti-democrats, etc. It was a true hodge-podge of political “bastards” who had seen the ANC as an entrance ticket for their personal gain and to satisfy their ambitions. Its Marxist-Leninist ideology has been part of its foundation and is central to the practice of ANC politics and a presrequisite to become a member.  The absolute rule of the party by its politburo, which is guided by the resolutions of its national conferences and which is implemented via the ANC’s president into policy, forms the core of its politics.3-6,16,17 

Secondly, another prominent feature of the ANC’s revolutionary mindset, as evidenced by its state capture and the mismanagement of country’s finances and the botched 1994 land-redistribution programme, is the obtention of “compensations, gratifications and bait” through the misuse of BEE and other instruments like cadre deployment, thereby exclusively enriching the ANC’s top brass and their cronies. Such policies and attitudes have led to the constant and illegal “compensation” from the state coffers — master-minded by corruption, theft and bribery — justified as normal actions to benefit the so-called “freedom fighters” and those who had “suffered under Apartheid”. State capture and the exclusive chanelling of funds to the ANC elite has become a handle to keep a certain kind of voter on the ANC’s supporters list by maintaining them in poverty and unemployment on the one hand and to distribute free allowances and rewards to them, making these voters work-shy and absolutely dependent on the ANC’s so-called largesse on the other hand. The ANC was born from a revolutionary mother and revolutionary father who both never accepted democracy, political stability, parental responsibility and the development of their children. These negative internalised values are still being maintained by the Ramaphosa regime today.3-6,16,17

This ANC mafia has created an in-depth integration of the economics and politics of the party at the local, provincial and national levels of government, the state system as well as the public system. To break this power structure will not be easy.18,19

Thabo Mokone20, on the above growing gangsterism in the official bodies of the country in which the ANC wields power, writes on 8 December 2019 in the Sunday Times as follows20:20:

Auditor-general Kimi Makwetu this week presented a frightening report, confirming that our downward spiral is gaining momentum and that the public auditing profession has become a danger zone.

Makwetu detailed how high-ranking and highly paid government officials, among them CFOs and municipal managers, brazenly offered bribes or threatened to hijack and kidnap his auditors. Those officials don’t want committed and ethnical auditors to expose the theft and misuse of public money.

In November, a newspaper cutting of a report on a councillor’s murder was left in th offices that the auditors were using. The auditors were looking into a R21m Nelson Mandela Bay municipal drain-cleaning tender with which the dead councillor just happened to have been involved.

It was clearly a threat: the auditors needed to watch their backs. Since that tender was awarded in 2018, reports indicated that 18 people, including politicians and officials, had been murdered in the municipality as a result of squabbles over proceeds from such manipulated tenders.

If you still refuse to believe that SA has officially become a gangster state, Makwetu provided proof of it this week [December 2019].

Mthombothi16, in this context of crooked municipalities under the rule of the ANC elite, also enlightens us on the present return of the looters under Ramaphosa when he writes16:19:

We were convinced that a decade of carefree plunder and looting was behind us and the way was now clear to rediscover our route to the promised land. But a rip-roaring love affair that takes off like a rocket often ends in a crash.

Things have now come to a sticky pass. The national mood has plummeted. This week especially has been brutal [December 2019].

But it is the utter chaos in the big metros that has left people incandescent. Council chambers have been turned into circus. We are the laughing stock of the world. Our politics has long descended into a farce, but we seem to take it in our stride

The ANC’s return to power in Johannesburg this week has filled its residents with distress and trepidation. Their previous stint was marked by eye-popping corruption and incompetence. One has to confess there was nothing to choose between the parties. They’re all part of a bad bunch. But on would have expected the ANC to at least have put forward the least corrupt of its members as candidate for mayor.

Instead, the ANC put forward Geoff Makhubo, a man who apparently comes to the job dragging a caravan of scandals.

Such an appointment is a betrayal of everything that Ramaphosa has been telling us of his administration, and indeed the ANC under his leadership, would be about. Makhubo’s election is confirmation, if any was still required, that talk of a reborn ANC under Ramaphosa is hot air, is that the new dawn is a slogan dreamt up to impress a public hungry for a clean government.

The dancing on the ANC benches must have felt like a stake in the heart to all who want to see a society free of corruption. The looters are back and they won’t let you forget that.

Gumede21 writes that the ANC regime has since 1994 squandered almost the equivalent of the post-war financial aid that the US, in the form of the Marshall Plan and other programmes, gave countries in Europe and Asia to rebuild their economies. In value this misuse represents a staggering R2 trillion that went into outright public corruption. Emphasising the ANC elite’s essential financial fraud in dealing with the public’s money, he states21:22:

Since 1994, close to R1-trillion has been transferred in BEE deals that went to a handful of politically connected politicians, trade unionists and public servants. First, very few of the recipients are entrepreneurs – they were political capitalists.

Not surprisingly very few have added value by creating new industries, opening new economic sectors or developing new technologies. Instead, they have crowded out genuine black entrepreneurs and killed the development of a mass entrepreneurial spirit in black society, because all you need to secure a BEE deal or tender is the right political connections.

On the ANC leadership who have masterminded the defrauding of the state, Gumede21 writes21:22: “We have to honestly face the fact that a predominantly black post-apartheid government has done this. Coming to grips with this painful reality will mean a change in mindset about economic development”; and21:22:

Currently, the top ranks of the party appear to be bereft of leadership quality, ideas and imagination. The ANC seems to have deliberately elected or appointed the least capable members it can find to senior positions. The small dominant group that controls the ANC and government is just too insular, out of ideas and lacking in imagination to get us out of this crisis.

Mthombothi21 continues21:22:

We need to accept that the ANC will never get us out of this mess. It is the author of our predicament, not its solution. Corruption has become part of its makeup. It courses through its veins. To expect the party to fight corruption is akin to demanding that an incorrigible alcoholic give up booze.

Financially, South Africa has gone down the drain under the ANC’s 25 years of rule. The country’s existing debt of 50.6% of GDP in 2017 has worsened to 61% in 2019, with another increase in debt to 71% of the GDP in 2022, which makes it easily understandable why all the rating agencies, besides Moody’s, have long ago relegated our ability to repay our debt to the “junk” level.22,23  Bernstein24 reports that the Treasury recently estimated that the country’s debt will rise to 74% of GDP in 2023 and will keep rising thereafter to hit 80% by 2027.

Bruce22 elaborates further on this state debt, quoting Tito Mboweni, writing22:18: “This year, the national debt exceeded R3-trillion. It is expected to rise to R4.5-trillion in the next three years. To stabilise debt, government will target a primary balance by 2022/23 …we will need to find additional measures in excess of R150bn over the next three years, or about R50bn a year. How will we do this?”

 Bruce22 adds a further comment regarding our mounting debt, as follows22:18:

A senior Investec economist, Nazmeera Moola, has brilliantly grasped what the government cannot – that our finances are literally out of control, and putting off difficult decisions until “the outer years” is Treasury talk for a three-year policy holiday not going to happen.

Moola tracks how our 10-year sovereign bond yields (the margin required to attract buyers) have grown against emerging market peers. Pre-2015 we were paying about 1.5% more than, say, Mexico or Vietnam, to raise money on the markets. Today we’re paying 3.25%. More than double. It means that since December 2015 the extra interests on our debt has risen by R26.6bn. Over the whole life of the debt it will cost an extra R228bn.

In the context of governance, the ANC is a failed political party and has lacked sound leadership since its founding. Under Cyril Ramaphosa, it has become a confused and terminally ill party, lacking the ability to govern South Africa even on a daily basis. On the present immense chaos and pathology in the greater ANC, Crouse25 writes25:20: “Instead, by its unquestioned, corrupt primary system and the national party system, the ANC’s base has been skewered. We childhood lovers of the ANC are nailed like a million worms to a party plank that is at once reformist and recidivist, realistic and revanchist, promising and nihilism incarnate. It is maddening.”

Mkokeli26 writes with honesty that Ramaphosa does not have the ability, power and circumstances — as the one-man-band Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India is successfully doing — to hold things together in South Africa, amid growing chaos.

The successful re-election of the ANC in 2019 essentially means maintaining the corrupt networks created by some members of the ANC elite and their cronies under Zuma, which represent a future lifeline and financial empire for those corrupt members of the ANC elite. Kotze18 posits18:4:

Die tweede rede is dat die netwerke wat in die Zuma-era gevestig is, sover moontlik beskerm moet word. Dit sluit ook privaat sakebelange in. Met Zuma uit die Uniegebou is dt moeilik om nuwe netweke te vestig, maar dit  is steeds moontlik om bestaande s te prober beskerm.

Die toekoms van baie ondernemings en die lewenstyl van baie mense is hiervan afhanklik.

The failure of the ANC regime is well summed up by the editor27 of the Mail & Guardian when he states27:32:

While the ANC operated on the moral high ground during the anti-apartheid struggle, since 1994 they have slipped into a sleazy underworld where corruption, nepotism and money squandering are the order of the day, so that South Africa could become a neo-colonial satellite of the American-led neoliberal empire. Although the ANC has been the government of South Africa since 1994, we could allege that it is still not ‘ready to govern’.

Mthombothi28 concurs when he characterises the present-day ANC as follows28:21:

The fact is the ANC remains the criminal syndicate that found succour and prospered under Jacob Zuma. It is the party of the likes of Magashule, Bongani Bongo and so on, and Ramaphosa doesn’t seem to have even disturbed the furniture. Anybody getting into bed with the cabal cannot escape the stench.

It is to be doubted if the ANC and Ramaphosa would stay in power longer than May/June 2020. The ANC regime’s only hope to survive till 2024 as ruling party, is how successfully the ANC elite can “borrow” from the PIC to provide short-term finance for the country’s collapsing economy. Of course, as a regime it can undertake land redistribution in 2020 but, notwithstanding what the ANC elite do or the outside help they receive, the process is doomed to be a failure if the ANC stays in power until 2024. It will turn into a second round of so-called “state capture”. Poverty and inequality will rise sky-high and the end result spells the rise of revolution.

3.1.3.1.2. The DA

The DA was initially formed as an exclusively White political party, with a political ideology based on a narrow liberalism and exclusive capitalism. Today, it appears to be still hanging on to White supremacy and White interests, as the recent revamping of its leadership confirms. It seems to be at present an inbred verson of the old NP and the Freedom Front, making it a kind of a neo-AWB. It totally failed to handle land redistribution. More than that: it does not seem to have any intention to address the matter in the near future. It cannot be incorporated in any way in a government of unity to solve the land issue.3-6

Some of the DA’s liberal traditions are just too confrontational for the ANC and together with its racism exclude it from being invited as a partner in ruling South Africa. Lloyd4 in this context writes4:35: “It is not surprising because liberalism has become problematic in South African history, because it is based on colour-blindness, which is not in line with our colonial and apartheid realities.” 

It will be foolish to try to reconcile the so-called ANC doves with the DA liberals, as Labuschagne10 postulates10:6 “…wandelgang-diplomasie en ‘n gematigde middelpuntsoekende strategie sou die ANC-duiwe nader aan die DA kon posioneer en sodoende geleidelike middelgrond tussen die partye kon bou” .

Neither would any courting by the DA leadership of Ramaphosa and his clan bring virtue to the country on the land matter. The DA’s testing of the political waters before the May election was foolish when it said5:4:

Ours is not to fight Cyril, ours is to fight for South Africans. Cyril must do what he needs to do, we must do what we have to do to save SA. We are prioritising the voters we are not prioritising fighting Cyril …We are more concerned about South Africans. Ours is not to fight Cyril Ramaphosa or to sound better than him.

Maimane’s good intention of “blackening” the DA failed. When he said in October 2016 that the DA would diversify its leadership4:35: “… so that all party structures from branch to national level should set targets for the recruitment and development of exceptional black candidates for public office…”; and4:35: “If you don’t see that I am black, you are not seeing me”, became empty words for the present-day White DA elite. On the outcome Lloyd4 writes4:35: “This has split the DA into two groups — the one black (social democrats) and the other white (liberals/”liberal core”) — who are engaged in a fierce battle for the soul of the party.” This splitting, whereby the racial Whites remain in charge of the DA, is now in December 2019 greater than ever in the DA. This Whiteness makes any alliance with the ANC impossible. Indeed, the rise of the so-called “Zillenators” spells the end of the DA as a significant political party in post-2020 South Africa.4,29-33

Indeed, the rise of the “Zillenators” and an exnclusive, racially reversed DA under its old guard, confirms the DA’s dream of White supremacy and “to think for the Blacks”.34-37

Putting the DA chaos in perspective, Buccuss38 on the 3rd November 2019 In the Sunday Times writes38:22:

In the recent weeks, large volumes of ink have been split on analysis of the collapse of the DA into a minor ethnic party. In the wake of the party’s capture by the zealots at the Institute of Race Relations, and the return of Helen Zille, very few commentators have sympathy for the party, though some have argued that its collapse is bad for democracy.

But the collapse of the DA’s credibility means that the party is unlikely to be able to play a positive role again.

For years the DA sat on a racial powder keg without an explosion but, sure enough, the explosion eventually came.

Mthombothi39 offers some analysis39:21:

Ultimately, Maimane was the author of his own downfall. He was meticulous in choosing his assassins. Tony Leon and Ryan Coetzee are not disinterested or impartial observers on matters to do with the DA. The party as it stands is their handiwork., their baby.

The DA under Helen Zille, John Steenhuisen, Tony Leon and Ryan Coetzee is at the end of its political life. Indeed, the party was already dying under Maimane, notwithstanding his immense input to grow it and his efforts to keep it standing.28,35,37-47

3.1.3.1.3. Perspective on a failed ANC and DA

The basis of the failures of the ANC and the DA lies in their pre-1994 histories. Johann Rossouw48 writes48:7: “Die rede hiervoor is dat die meeste politieke partye nog ontstaan het in die stryd teen die Britse kolonialisme en apartheid. Dink mooi daaroor: Nie een nuwe politieke party wat werklik ‘n nuwe toekomsvisie vir alle Suid-Afrikaners verteenwoordig, is al ná 1994 suksesvol gestig en bedryf nie.” 

This characterisation is not only applicable to the “late” NP and the present-day ANC, but also to the DA which is rooted in the old South African Party of Jan Smuts. All these initial aims and intentions of our dominant political parties, which also include their pathology, have never been discarded and new visions adopted, but been maintained in modern South Africa to bring only evil.49

Mthombothi28 has not only summarised well the present-day pathology of the ANC but also the failed integrity of the DA (and the EFF) when he posits28:21:

But none of the other parties seems capable of coming to our rescue. The DA’s inability to attract black voters  will remain its Achilles heel, making its attainment of power almost a bridge too far. The EFF’s stock-in-trade is sowing racial hatred, and its leaders would be wearing overalls of a different colour had the criminal justice system been half-awake.  The other parties are nothing more than spaza shops serving no purpose except as sources of regular income for their leaders and their cronies.

Buccus50 gives his perspective on the ANC, DA and EFF and also draws a very negative conclusion as follows50:22:

But here in SA we have no political party in parliament that stands for a viable, progressive alternative.  The kleptocrats in the EFF and the ANC offer nothing but a vision of horror. The neoliberals in the ANC and the DA offer their own version of a vision of horror, in the form of an economy that condemns millions to poverty.

Buccus’s38 conclusion is final and is stated with integrity38:22: “It is plain that there is no party in our parliament that has a credible vision for SA.”

On splitting the ANC and DA to bring forward a successful viable and sustainable new party (or parties), the doubt is great. For Mthombothi28 to say to Maimane to ignore the doomsayers and to launch a new party, is irresponsible. The South African political parties’ histories show that the splitting of established parties — notwithstanding that so-called “saviour-leaders” lead them — has seldom been done with success. Mthomboth28, on the possible intention of Maimane to found a new party or to form an alliance with the ANC, writes28:21:

There are already voices warning against this idea. Look at what happened to COPE, Agang, the UDM and so on, they say. I guess the death or stillbirth of infants should be deployed as an argument against procreation. The better option apparently is for the likes of Maimane to join forces with President Cyril Ramaphosa in the noble struggle to avert national disaster.

People who think this are whistling in the wind. Ramaphosa has been a great disappointment, no two ways about it. In fact, this argument echoes the appeals we heard before the elections for people to hold their noses and vote for the ANC to strengthen Ramaphosa’s hand. The ANC was duly returned to power with the usual thumping majority, and the hyenas are laughing at our naiveté. Mosebenzi Zwane, Faith Muthambi, Bathabile Dlamini, the entire rotten gang, are back in harness under the tutelage of the venal Ace Magashule. It is business as usual. And Ramaphosa remains his wimpish self.

Any alliance between a Maimane faction of old DAs and a Ramaphosa faction of old ANCs will be born in outright political sin — it represents opportunism par excellence; an inclination that will gobble up each faction fast.51-53

Essentially, both of the main parties are in the process of dying — they cannot bring any success to a post-2019 South Africa: especially not around the land matter.3-6,54

3.1.3.2. Disregarding the ANC and DA out as future rulers
3.1.3.2.1. The end of political innocence

Firstly, it must be recognised, as the editor55 of the Sunday Times emphasises, that the glue which held this country and its people together in the immediate years after 1994, is gone. Secondly, the dream of building a non-racist, non-sexist and prosperous South Africa is also something of the past. The editor55 of the Sunday Times on the 28th April 2019 writes55:18:

The unity we showed the world during that brief post-1994 honeymoon is now fracturing. We are slowly being divided along racial lines. Today, as we reflect on these first 25 years of freedom, we need to find a new common goal that all South Africans can rally around.

Looking critically at the political mess of 2019 in South Africa (emphasised by the fact that 19-million or 51% of the eligible voters cold-shouldered politics by not participating in the May 2019 elections)  and its failed political parties saturated by their masked agendas and their contaminated mindsets, Mthombothi28 rightfully writes28:21:

So, despite the plethora of parties, many people are still without a political home. Ideology doesn’t seem to be an issue either. The country is simply crying out for decisive leadership, to get things done. There’s therefore space for either another political party or for some political realignment. The more the merrier.

The above words of the editor55 of the Sunday Times are visionary. He is formulating a totally new vision and guideline on governing South Africa from 2019: a clear, precise racial and ethnic model, inside a kind of a short-term form of democratic but inclusive government, to serve at last effectively the interests of all South Africans. The false and misleading nature of so-called non-racial and non-ethnic politics of the racial Marxist-Leninist ANC is something of the past: it did not work pre- or post-1994 and will not work in the near future.55

Indeed, a totally new political venture is required, entirely excluding the ANC and the DA as the exclusive ruler or rulers of the day. They are fallen angels.7,17,25,26,56

The 1994 Dispensation failed for many obvious reasons, in which the enormous corruption, fraud and theft by the ANC elite, together with the immense rape of the Constitution, stand out, making justified land redistribution a total failure too. Basically, in this confusion there are only three conclusions to be drawen: 1) the faulty belief that democracy is the only good and correct form of government;  2) the ignoring of South Africa’s racial and ethnic diversity as a pre-requisite for effective and justified government; and 3) the reality that the post-1994 BBEEE-policy and cadre deployment, to serve the pre-1994 discriminated-against Blacks, failed because the ANC elite delinquently captured and mismanaged it for their self-enrichment and –empowerment (and because of the outright practice of autocracy masked as democracy).

To expect that the Ramaphosa regime is going to do good in the future is lunacy. Ramaphosa and his regime are the same Marxist-Leninist group formed a century ago to disorganise the greater South African society to exclusively benefit its politburo. The same Cyril Ramaphosa was vice-president to Jacob Zuma during the post-1994 ANC regime’s ongoing state capture, while he was also  the driver behind cadre deployment which is state capture in its purest form. It is correct to describe the present ANC Lite as a crypto-party dictatorship which is intentionally enforcing a false and failed Western democracy and economy (the so-called “dirty” democracy), while a favoured political-economic system for the Marxist-Leninist ANC leaders and its politburo is kept in place.  The ANC’s intention in the past was and is still today to destroy political stability, as well as the rights and assets of the individual. They are more than a wolf in sheep’s clothing. In contemporary South Africa we are saddled with a corrupt ANC regime that can never be rehabilitated and a racial DA, extremely mismanaged by exclusively White capitalists, that are impossible to heal.

3.1.3.2.2. Time for political renewal

A clear, new broad political impact is needed for the positive renewing of our politics to successfully enact land redistribution. The direct intervention and interference through the use of a policy of comprehensive government directed by the nation, must be the priority. This broad national intervention must be of a duration of between five and ten years. Such a way of government in which the traditionally dominant role of political parties is minimalised, will undoubtedly be labelled by the main parties such as the ANC, DA and the EFF as autocracy because it will tend to phase them out of politics and expose their present politically delinquent activities.This political renewal will bring: 1) a totally new political style of government which is statutorily free from the contaminations and ideologies of the present-day politically delinquent parties and their corrupt leaders, their members and cronies; and 2) a precise racial/ethnic statutory prescription defining proporsional representation of the national body, enabling unhindered effective government and the implementation of balanced and responsible land re-allocation.

Buccus57, in forcing this urge for political and government renewal to the foreground, as well as the institution of an applicable governance body (referring specifically to the old UDF) to do it,  writes on the 22nd  September 2019 in the Sunday Times57:25:

Today, SA is in another kind of crisis. There is mass unemployment, rapid economic decline, a systematic collapse into lawlessness, and anti-democraric forces that are actively working to undermine democratic norms. There is also a global crisis with right-wing authoritarianism flourishing and a profound and urgent climate crisis.

In this situation we require inspired, visionary and decisive leadership. However, our president is largely absent from thje national debate. When Cyril Ramaphosa does speak, he equivocates, gives us insane clichés or fudges the urgent issues. He seems to suffer from a more or less complete inability to deal with the urgent issues confronting us. He is not even willing to acknowledge the seriousness of the crisis that we face, let alone offer us a credible path out of the crisis.

But whatever the reason for Ramaphosa’s inability to lead, we are in the midst of an escalating social, economic and political crisis and he is not able to give leadership. Many of the forces competing to fill the gap are extremely dangerous. These range from the alliance between the pro-Zuma faction of the ANC and the EFF, to the smaller and at times openly violent formations organising attacks on truck drivers  and migrants, and shaking down construction projects.

Increasingly, many in the middle class are abandoning democratic values and demanding dangerously authoritarian responses to the crisis such as the declaration of a state of emergency or the return of the death penalty. This is a very worrying development. If a charismatic authoritarian figure emerged, promising a law and order crackdown and a clean up of corruption, many in the middle  class would, as has happened in India, Brazil and the US, succumb to the authoritarian temptation.

This means that we have to accept that we cannot rely on elected authority to lead us out of the crisis. This does not mean that all is lost. There is another alternative. That alternative is that leadership will have to come from within the society itself.

This is not an entirely new situation. In the 1980s black leadership was largely in exile, in prison, underground or living with extreme harassment. The formation of the United Democratic Front in 1983 enabled ordinary people to participate in leadership from below, and  the UDF was able to give very significant leadership to society.

The UDF was, broadly speaking, a democratic force that was anti-racist and pro-working class. It wasn’t perfect. Its willingness to dissolve itself after the unbanning of the ANC was a major strategic error. But as imperfect as the UDF was, it organised and mobilised millions of people behind a broadly democratic and progressive vision of society.

It is clear that a renewal of the South African model, replacing the corrupt political parties that beset the voters’ mindsets with ideologies of White or Black supremacy, exclusively White capitalism, Stalininist communism, etc., is immediately needed and indeed possible to activate.

3.1.3.2.2.1. Many similarities between the UDF and the Pact of Mexican political parties

The questions are: 1) can the UDF work again in the 2020 politics of South Africa? and; 2) have such a kind of broad community organisation, inclusive of various political parties and many other non-party associates, worked worldwide so far? Although such outcomes failed to realise in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan at this stage, the outcomes brought by the Pact governance in Rwanda and Mexico have been very positive. Mexico, where the country’s political, social and economic heartbeat was exactly in the same extremely “ill-health” condition as in present-day South Africa — slowed down by crime, corruption, mismanagement, incapable leaders, state capturers etc. — an enormous rehabilitation was launched by a kind of UDF to run the politics there for a while and to do a clean-up of at least the economy. Although Mexico is today still contaminated by the evils of the past, such as the presence of crime and cartels, a major improvement in many areas of governance has been noted. It may be important to refer shortly to the success of  Mexico’s “UDF” (or as they call it there: Pact) to bring governance directly to the citizens by limiting the wrongdoing of the corrupted political parties.1

The initial approach by the  Mexican leader Peńa Nieto was not to focus on law enforment or the ongoing security problems of Mexico (notwithstanding immense bloodshed by crime cartels in especially drug-dealing), but to go for uplifting the economy. The outright failure of the government in ignoring the action and practice of “open” crime by the criminal cartels — these crime cartels alone are estimated to have killed one hundred thousand people since 2007) — led to widespread protest from 2014 by the ordinary public. To this Nieto reacted constructively by bringing in some measures to fight crime and to take on the immense powerful cartels. Jonathan Tepperman1, the managing editor of Foreign Affairs, writes in his book: The Fix,  on Nieto’s various constructive interventions and interferences in Mexican politics, as follows1:195:

[Nieto] moved to reform the nation’s police by dissolving local forces and assimilating them into new, state wide agencies; created a nationwide emergency hotline; promised greater transparency in government contracting; and set up special economic zones in Guerrero and other impoverished states. He also introduced constitutional amendments to allow the federal government to take over municipalities infiltrated by organized crime. And in 2015 he oversaw the establishment of a new National Anticorruption System that, among other things, created an independent prosecutor dedicated to fighting corruption and that requires public officials to declare their assets and potential conflicts of interests.

Another very important further step by Nieto to drive and to oversee the above remedial actions, was to gather the various opposition parties into a movement of unity, called the Pact on the 2nd December 2012, to work together and to manage the country constructively. The Pact stayed active until the 20th August 2014. Today, as said, Mexico is still far from an example of good governance, honesty, or even crime-free. Indeed, there are critics that derided Nieto’s measures as too little and too late, while there is scepticism as to the Nieto family’s own integrity because of their alleged involvement in corruption and murder. But at least there there are strong signs of integrity coming from Mexico’s government. It cured in some way the country’s political paralysis and helped to get It to function properly. Furthermore, and though the Pact may be finished, the reforms it had activated as a specifically empowered group in which the parties’ influence was limited, are still making a profound impact on Mexico’s governance and civil life today.1

Tepperman1 continues1:196: “And so for the inevitable question: Can other countries really replicate Mexico’s cure for political paralysis?” 

It is prominent that certain conditions helped Nieto, for instance that all three parties recognised their part in the country’s political mess and thus that they needed to change. This setup indeed forced them in the first place to form the Pact. What made the Pact work was the fact that its leaders shared an unusual ability to recognise reality, face it directly and deal with it in the most responsible fashion, reports Tepperman.1:196

Mexico’s political system is not unique in most ways, writes Tepperman1:196-197: “All this suggests that a good many currently deadlocked nations could indeed follow Mexico’s model — one that involved quiet negotiation, painful compromise, political leaders willing to take risks and keep their word, and above all a recognition that zero-sum politics accomplishes nothing.” 

A South African Pact or a New UDF can be realised, but what is clear is that the ANC elite’s dominant and destabilising Marxist-Leninist ideology will never recognise and accept their part in the country’s political mess. They do not want to change because the chaos of present-day politics is planned and steered by the ANC elite. Any  Pact is out for them because it will mean the end of their power and rule.1

Thankfully the ANC’s political obstruction (together with the other political parties’ rigid ideologies such as the DA’s “White supremacy”)  rules them out from participating in the Pact and the New UDF. To make things work, the leadership of the New UDF must only select leaders who share the unusual ability to recognise reality, face it directly and deal with it in the most responsible fashion. Prominent priorities for the new UDF’s leaders should be to serve society and the interests of individuals.1

3.1.3.2.2.2. The simultaneous practice of autocracy and democracy inside the South African Constitution
3.1.3.2.2.2.1. Failed South African post-1994 democracy

It is clear that the principle of democracy, as embedded in the Constitution, has not worked post-1994 when a Marxist-Leninist party — the ANC took over control of the state. Indeed, all five of the ANC’s previous administrations were in essence a tidal wave of malfeasance, dishonesty and state capture. Notwithstanding these misdeeds, the ANC was re-elected in May 2019 as the ruler for the sixth administration. This confirms that democracy does not always work to the benefit the total population. This is also evidenced by Africa’s and the world’s many “takers” and failed regimes, as that of Zimbabwe. Although democracy worldwide is still the most sought-after system with 53% of the total number of countries currently qualifying as democracies globally, it has to be noted that since 1994 so much as 75 countries worldwide have moved in the direction of authoritarianism (undoubtedly sometimes for good reasons, at least in the short-term). In 2017 alone 24 countries became autocracies. Hereto are there were in 2019 only 24 countries showing positive aspects in terms of democratisation. Although despots and takers are often central in such autocracies, it also often seems as if the innocent aims and intentions of democracy are inapplicable in the upliftment of the poor or to develop a country in a proper way. South Africa, where the revolutionary ANC misused democracy to exploit the poor, is such an example. It seems as if South Africa would be far better-off if it was initially gradually steered through autocratic economics and politics into a democratic system.21,58

The question is what must be done to assure successful land redistribution in South Africa post-2019 without disregarding the principles of democracy?

Firstly, our election system must be democratised by radically changing the present Electoral Act, to make it possible for voters to vote directly on national, provincial and local levels for their favoured candidates (independent from their mostly contaminated party-affiliations) in each of the constituencies. Lifestyle audits as a pre-selection requirement should be the first hurdle to cross for those wishing to be elected to Parliament or appointment to the civil service.

Secondly, associated with the above, there must thus be done away with the exclusive party-orientated system through the statutory implementation of a broad national government representing all the individual voters, together with political and economic role-players as the unions, etc.

Thirdly, the creation of “clean” local, provincial and national governments in which not one single member serving at any specific time as a so-called “people-representative” in the present local, provincial and national administrations (or had served in the past) are allowed to do so again. This clean-up can be done by way of a mutual agreement by the role-players involved in the rehabilitation of the parliament and the various  state organs, but the best will be if it is done statutorily by an amendment to the Constitution. Although this démarche undoubtedly will not totally free the new government and its organs from existing corrupt state capture networks and crooks, but this necessary intervention will launch the process of rehabilitation of the South African political landscape and civil service to assure that at least a 70% contingent of clean, trustworthy politicians and civil servants are appointed in future.

The above changes are not part of an autocratic intrusion and is in line with the traditional retirement conditions of persons who for instance have reached the retirement age of 60 or 65 years, or the retrenchment of staff under the retirement age, as traditionally practiced by democratic governments to decrease their employees. Such an intervention will not endanger the Constitution or the rights of the ordinary, good citizen: it will in the long run assure the establishment of true democracy within five to ten years and the kick out the present-day corrupt politicians. The substantial presence of questionable individuals serving as politicians and civil servants was well-illustrated by the various judicial commissions such as the Zondo and Mpati. What is further clear, is that these corrupt politicians and officials identified by means of the investigations led by the commissions mentioned, have all already taken more than their legitimate share in compensation. Also most of them were appointed to highly paid positions for which they really did not qualify. This was made possible by the country’s undemocratic electoral system — others were appointed by the ANC elite’s cadre deployment and BEE model, thus making them unworthy of their positions.

If above short-term statutory rehabilitation of the Parliament is not followed, the ANC elite will introduce a Stalinist regime quite soon to rule outside the Constitution while lording over the country indefinitely, with land grabs without compensation, taking assets from white property owners, making the policy of nationalisation an absolute way of governance. And of course, land grabs will quickly move to a Second State capture.21,58

3.1.3.2.2.2.2. ANC elite’s fascist leadership

In this rehabilitation the incoming of the New UDF and its replacement of the exclusive political party system by a comprehensive national, provincial and municipal  representative governance model, will become a central development. This approach to stabilise and to repair our failed governance system will undoubtedly be labelled as autocracy and even as despotism and fascism by the so-called neo-liberals and neo-Stalinists (which includes the ANC, DA and EFF).  But is above rehabilitation really autocracy? Here the seasoned South African political philosopher, Professor Tristan Taylor59 of the University of Stellenbosch, warns and guides us here clearly into what it would really mean. He writes59:24: “Liberals and the left are making a terrible mistake when they use fascist as a political insult in this way [by for instance calling the democrat Donald Trump the new Benito Mussolini]. They are blinding themselves to the true nature of fascism, which is something far worse than authoritarianism and ethnic nationalism”; and59:24: “Along with a fair dose of irrationalism and mysticism, fascism revolves around two key concepts: the body national and the leadership principle.” 

Taylor continues59:24: “In other words, the fascist leader is the embodiment of the nation. The fascist leader’s will is be above written law, is always correct and demand obedience.”  

Looking critically at the above guideline issued by Taylor59, the ANC, in terms of the empowerment of its elite and leaders, represent precisely fascism: just revisit the blind empowerment of the ANC regime with Mandela at the helm, and which was eventually transferred to Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, to end with rule of the so-called ANC saviour, namely Cyril Ramaphosa. The UDF’s rise minimized the power grab of the ANC leadership while the individual citizen and voter’s interests and rights were the only focus. This represents democracy in the extreme. Indeed, the whole process proposed taking over control of Parliament, its MPs and MPLs and cleaning up the civil service, ridding it of crooks by the suggested new UDF and its governance plan, which is democracy par excellence.59

3.1.3.2.2.2.3. State president’s unqualified powers to misuse the Constitution

To what extent fascism became embedded in the ANC from 1994 onwards as well as in our democracy and openly degraded by it daily, was recently revealed by the previous head of Asset Forfeiture Unit, advocate Willie Hofmeyr60, when he said South Africa is at risk of state capture again unless the president’s sweeping powers are cut. Hunter60, in the Sunday Times of the 1st December reports that Hofmeyr60 sees this errant presidential rule as such a serious matter that he, in an affidavit to the Zondo-commission, recommended that the Constitution be changed. Hofmeyr60 states that at present  Ramaphosa (as with Mandela up to Zuma60:8: “…has unqualified powers to appoint anybody in all positions in the criminal justice system.”

Hofmeyr60 notes60:8: “These powers are what led to the capture of the criminal justice system, including the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA)…”  It means that at present the heads of the SAPS, the Hawks, the NPA and the four deputy directors of public prosecutions and provincial directors of public prosecutions, as well as judges are appointed by the president, serving as it were, at his pleasure.60

What is obvious, confirming the lack of any democratic rule followed by the ANC leadership from 1994 onwards and them rather veering off into fascism in the extreme as suggested by in Hofmeyr’s affidavit, is, that already under former president Thabo Mbeki the justice system was abused by the clique in the executive. This means that political skullduggery at the top, on the level of the ANC’s leadership, was not some exclusive process started up by Jacob Zuma, but much earlier in the ANC regime by its corrupt elite. Hofmeyr specifically reflects on this matter60:8: “I don’t think people must underestimate the damage Mbeki was doing to law enforcement at that time.”

Contradicting further any trace of the presence of a true democracy during the ANC regime’s 25 years of rule [a fact which was basically already erased as by the evidenced in Ramaphosa’s overseeing of cadre deployment (equalling state capture) as vice-president and his absolute passivity as vice-president not to intervene and interfere in Jacob Zuma’s state capture], Hofmeyr60 believes the Constitution in its present form ha been disarmed to block bad appointments (by the President) which had in the past, for example by Mbeki and Zuma, led to the decay of the criminal justice system. (The former deputy chief justice Dikgang Moseneke said also in 2014 that too much power rests with the  presidency).60

Hofmeyr60 further erases the notion of our Constitution as one which exclusively promotes democracy and upholds clean governance, when he posits60:8:

The thesis I put forward essentially is that individuals don’t capture states, political parties capture states.

To capture a state, you have to capture a political party first and this is what happened here.

…’[the] ANC and corruption go hand’ because of how big a part money plays in party politics.

It’s not right to blame Zuma for all of it. It wasn’t just his people who were stealing. Both sides of the divide were stealing.

I think democracies tend to be built on patronage. Politicians have to deliver something for their constituencies.

The above remarks reflect again not only the ANC’s constant and ongoing failure to respect democracy, the Constitution or the rights of the individual citizen, but also the contaminating role which the present Electoral Act plays in freeing the ANC from their responsibility to the voters as democracy requires and prescribes. It is clear that the South African Constitution has many loopholes, making the presence of an intertwining of autocracy and democracy possible. There is a lifestyle audit missing for each politician on national, provincial and municipal level. There is no place for “freewheeling” candidate election funding and the Ramaphosa debacle of interdicts to maintain the anonymity of his funders and the money his election as leader of the ANC and State President attracted in 2017. Again, our electoral system’s fault to allow the appointment of a State President because a person was elected by only 179 winning votes, brought out by more or less 4 000 ANC delegates at the ANC’s National Conference, is a case in point. Furthermore, our so-called “democracy” and our much-praised “good Constitution” is a mockery, since the fact is that only 28% of the 37 million eligible voters voted in the May 2019 elections for the ANC. The fact that 51% eligible voters stayed away from the voting booth, is undoubtedly not an example of democracy.60

The best guide as to why past and  present-day politicians must be banned from official politics in future, is, as already said, solely based on the immense political corruption in which many of them have been directly implicated. Many of these individuals cannot be rehabilitated, as most religious sinners’ failed rehabilitations confirm. To make a clear difference between the so-called “good politician” and the “so-called bad politician”, is impossible. Politicians in South Africa at least, are mostly all in Parliament for opportunistic reasons, even though they try to hide it.  Secondly, all the politicians, either as members of the ruling ANC or the opposition, had the opportunity to make South Africa a better place for the ordinary citizen during their well-paid terms in Parliament. But South Africa is in chaos after 25 years: each politician thus failed in his/her task and duty.

3.1.3.2.2.2.4. The Bible’s guideline applicable on political sinners

To guide us clearly on the right to expel past and present politicians from further engagement in official politics, the Bible’s description of the treatment of sinners is enlightening, including on their sins and the frequent inability of these sinners to reform themselves truly and permanently. Looking carefully at the concepts of “ religious sins” and “political sins”, there is no difference between the wrongdoing and the failure of the two kinds of sinners to follow the path of integrity, honesty and trustworthiness.

Dr RJK Law61, in his book: Apostasy from the Gospel, gives us a clear guideline how to separate the politician crooks – as  the early Christian leaders did with religious crooks – from the future South African good politics. The many tainted ANCs on their May 2019 election lists, who found at the end the road successfully back to Parliament after the May 2019 elections, are par excellent examples of the immense amount of the ANC’s political sinners safely “staying-on” in the ANC’s own created political heaven.

Law writes61:91:

The early church was careful whom they admitted into fellowship. Every Christian who sinned was only readmitted into fellowship by open repentance.

But where notorious and scandalous sins, such as murder, adultery or idolatry, were committed, no readmission into the fellowship of the church was allowed. This was especially so when a Christian committed idolatry through fear of being martyred for his faith.

The Church of Rome, however, was considered to be very remiss and lax in its discipline. Tertullian accuses Zephyrinus, Bishop of Rome, of admitting adulterers to repentance and readmission into the fellowship of the church.

Novatus and Novatianus opposed this laxity by going to the opposite extreme. They denied all hope of pardon and return to church membership to any person who sinned after baptism. But their followers, horrified at such extreme discipline, left all persons, upon their repentance, to God’s mercy, refusing to readmit only those who had committed notorious and scandalous.

As for Novatus, Novatianus and Tertullian, who were not allowed back into the Christian church as members or as fellow congregants because they had committed notorious and scandalous acts such as murder, adultery and idolatry, there should be no place either in Parliament for politicians who committed any “politically notorious and scandalous acts”, or the political equivalent of “murder, adultery and idolatry”. Many of the ANC’s politicians, notwithstanding their eagerness to repent for their political sins (and sometimes doing so unashamedly), reflect a pattern of their ongoing and constant nefarious activities as a firmly established behavioural patron. The ANC elite (especially their MPs, MPLs and senior  state officials) have been implicated in outright state-capture, BEE and cadre-deployment, and harming millions of people directly in doing so. These are but a few examples of their shocking “politically notorious and scandalous acts” and of “political murder, adultery and idolatry” they committed. As for the religious sinners, there should be for the past and present MP and MPL sinners no longer a comfortable seat in Parliament. If the Church had no mercy on religious deviants, why should Parliament have mercy on political crooks?

Any failure to replace the present-day corrupt, autocratic and despotic ANC governance and to stop its intended land grab by the above-suggested statutory intervention and interference, could activate the crash of the economy, famine and the awaiting deadly revolution, as Gumede58 warns58:18: “Unless land reform is done in ways that will leverage the potential of agriculture to lift growth, secure food security and boost development, it will crash the economy; and58:18: “Unless land reform is done honestly, transparently and accountably, it will be ensnared in the sort of corruption, rent-seeking and populism that have befallen BEE. 

3.1.3.3. The ANC-regime’s possible awaiting judiciary and constitutional crisis

When a person becomes bankrupt, insane or mentally disabled, they lose their ability to function as independent citizens, and can no longer make decisions on their own. The first step in this process is to bring the case of such an individual before a court in order to strip them of their privileges since they have become incapable of handling their own affairs. Sometimes this kind of process is done specifically to keep the person from himself of herself, but often also to safe-guard society against an unpredictable, exploitative of a dangerous individual.  A care-taker or curator is appointed specifically by the court, giving the appointee a mandate to act on behalf of the disabled person as long as the court finds it appropriate – especially in the case of persons regarded as non compos mentis or a doli in capax individual. When such an individual commits crime, he/she can be declared insane and not answerable for their deeds. These wrongdoings can vary from murder, theft, corruption, rape, state capture, organised crime, violence, gender-violence as well as xenophobia, etc.

On the other hand, if such a person doing crime, is found to be sane and capable by the court and held responsible and accountable, he/she can be prosecuted by a criminal court and sentenced to a certain punishment.

Although it can be argued that a regime is not a person, and as such cannot be held responsible for its deeds, it is misleading. A regime is run by a certain team, consisting of certain members, who are until they reach the of their lives, responsible for their own as well as the team’s wrongdoings. This fact is confirmed by the prosecution of various Nazi individuals for war-crimes after WW2, specifically for their actions on behalf of the Hitler regime. It is in this context that Mthombothi’s description of the ANC elite’s nefarious acts against all South Africans as well as the country – committed as an ANC’ executive team, as individual members and as part of the same unit from 1994, under Nelson Mandela — should be profiled and analysed – in terms of the concepts non compos mentis, doli incapax and the penalties which common criminals should face. Mthombothi62 describes the ANC elite’s bad regime outcomes in the Sunday Times of the 15th December 2019 as  follows62:21:

Rampant crime is a consequence of the incompetence of the state. The basic responsibility of the state, its raison d’être, is the security or protection of its citizens. The state has all the legal power, including instruments of violence, to carry out such a mandate. But the South African state has continuously failed its people.

One cannot remember a time in this country when crime was either at a manageable level or was not the biggest concern for its people. It is a more pressing issue than, say, unemployment, which is very high. Those leaving the country rarely cite the lack of jobs or greener pastures as reasons. Violent crime is by far the biggest reason for those emigrating.

It’s no exaggeration to say SA has become a major crime scene. The government is failing its people. But for some reason it doesn’t seem to get sufficiently blamed for its numerous failures, be it the faltering economy, lack of jobs or rampant crime rate. Like all governments, it laps up any semblance of success, but would run a mile from its disasters. And the public, whether it’s the result of years of living under an unaccountable  and oppressive government or just sheer ignorance, does not readily lay the blame at the door of the state. Instead, people are often too willing to acknowledge or be thankful for small gestures.

Mthombothi63 further reflects63:25:

The government’s fault is one of omission, not commission. It had no control over what’s happening in the country.

Ramaphosa’s government is in no position to give any undertaking to anybody, not even to its own citizens, that such maddening violence won’t happen again. It has become a mere spectator to the drama unfolding in the country. It has lost control of the country. The country is on autopilot. The government can’t even protect its own citizens, who are hunted like animals even in their own homes.

The country is literally burning while Cyril and his ANC comrades are busy gazing at their own navels.

It is clear from the above that some members of the ANC elite have become implicated in criminal behaviour and in this context they have often exhibited personal characteristics  similar to that of the common criminal. Furthermore, the ANC elite in their way of governing — specifically regarding their personal traits and certain acts — are mostly associated with the mindsets of people who are non compos mentis and doli incapax. It is clear that the ANC elite’s thinking, planning and activities have become confused and frequently seemingly influenced by hallucinations and illusions, and a glaring lack of awareness. The ANC elite seems indeed, in terms of the test of sanity, often not answerable for their behaviour to the public as required from them as the ruler of the day. Some of the ANC elite, after we analysed their lifestyle audits, seemingly should be already in jails or asylums. The ANC regime’s continuation as the post-2019 ruler needs the attention of the court in order to see if it compos mentis. It seems, looking at the weirdness of the ANC regime over 25 years, that such a request should be processed as soon as possible demanding that the courts be involved to appoint a care-taker to support an interim executive body to rule on behalve of the ANC. Another approach is that the court should be asked to remove the ANC regime and forced a new election.64

Above suggestion is not without good reason and the necessary supporting facts. Referring back to the recent court conclusion that the ANC regime failed to manage land redistribution properly as prescribed by the law and the Constitution, forcing the court to appoint a master (caretaker) to see to it that justice be done, the South African courts were thus directly placed to position to be able to decide if the ANC elite is in fact compos mentis to rule or whether it is indeed non compos mentis and doli incapax to properly think, plan and act on behalf of itself or the public and voters.64

The court’s intervention64 on the land matter shows firstly that the ANC regime could not be trusted in the past to manage land redistribution in a proper way and will never be capable of managing any form of balanced and justified land redistribution in the future. Secondly, the court findings64:30 reflected on the behaviour of who can be regarded as non compos mentis within the ANC elite64;30: a lack of accountability and responsibility, the clear, deliberately ignoring the constitutional rights of citizens and for the  empowerment of the judicial institutions, the displaying of an ‘obstinate misapprehension of its statutory duties’, ‘unresponsiveness’, ‘a refusal to account to those dependent on its co-operation’ and a ‘patent incapacity or inability to get the jobs done’ in terms of what the statute and the Constitution require.64 An individual, who is constantly transgressing and going beyond the boundaries of what is acceptable with these kinds of above delinquent and deviating characteristics and behaviours, should in his or her private life surely attract the attention of  law-enforcement authorities and the courts about a conclusion on his/her state of mind, but in South Africa such people are deemed fit to be rulers.

The court’s findings and conclusions, as reflected by Fish-Hodgson64 confirm the right of the court to monitor any regime’s activities when it deviates, either compos mentis or non compos mentis, from its mandate. It confirms the court’s right to intervene and to interfere when a regime has totally collapsed and failed. On the initial finding of the ANC regime’s failure to do its duty around land redistribution, as prescribed by the Constitution, the court’s finding on the land matter becomes a future legal directive that means intervention and interference in the governance of the ANC elite because their behaviour reflects signs of being non compos mentis or could in fact be classed as doli incapax. On the court’s ruling (and its future legal impact) Fish-Hodgson64 reflects that it64:30: “… leaves the Cabinet with nowhere to hide and no so-called “sell out” constitutional property clause to hide behind”; and18:30: “…the court warns that, despite its sensitivity towards the need for the department to have a free hand at performing its constitutional mandate without undue interference, systematic failure to perform may justify, and require, muscular intervention by a court. This is of relevance far beyond the facts of this case and the land issue more generally”. Fish-Hodgson64 writes further on the ruling set by the court in this context:64:30: “The court warned that, because the separation of powers does not ‘imply a rigid or static conception of strictly demarcated functional roles’ and ‘the mythical spell must be broken’ to ensure the protection of Mwelase and his co-applicants’ constitutional rights’, court control of the remedial process’ may be warranted”.

Regarding the argument of the state that reads64:30: “The department told the court that the appointment of a special master, under the auspices of the judiciary, would amount to a usurpation of the powers of the executive in violation of the separation of powers”, but the court nullified this argument of the department’s judicial independence and only being responsible to the ConCourt for its actions, quite quickly and precisely by narrowly following the legal issue by concluding64:30: “…the court noted that none of those cases it had decided ‘quite match the sustained, large-scale systematic dysfunctionality and obduracy that is evidenced here’.” Fish-Hodgson64 points out that the court64:30: “…describing the situation as a ‘colossal crisis’, the court is warning the government that it must endeavour to ensure that, as the Constitution requires, its obligations are performed diligently and without delay. Failing which, and irrespective of the success of the mooted constitutional amendments of the property clause, courts may begin to act to the embarrassment of a government whose legitimacy is questioned within and outside of its own political ranks”.

The fact that the court had inscribed in its findings and conclusion that the executive must perform its constitutional obligations and accept at all time accountability and responsibility, means that other litigants can64:30: “…ask for such supervisory remedial action in the face of [its] systematic failures” from the ANC-regime.

The misadventurous and incompetent ANC regime’s actions, and by times their behaviour of being non compos mentis, can be brought directly before a court because of its failure or refusal to be accountable to those dependent on its co-operation – in essence, the electorate that voted for it on national, provincial and local levels. The time is right to launch such an intervention. It seems that the only enterprise able to undertake such an enormous task on behalf of the voters and citizens of South Africa to bring down the ANC regime in 2020 is a New UDF.64-7

3.1.3.4. Time for a new UDF

The launch of a second UDF as a kind of political party is needed for such a process of political “cleansing”. The economy and governance be addressed with the help of the business sector and the public since the post-1994 rule by die ANC has been a disaster. Professor William Gumede21 at Wits guides us21:22: “There has to be co-governance between the state, business and civil society.” On the economic side (which means the same for the political) Gumede writes: “We will have to plan an evidence-based, realistic and pragmatic national economic turnaround plan”.

Gumede21, on the future of such a UDF-kind of governance, posits21:22:

Whatever development funds are mobilised, and whatever projects are initiated, should be run not by the government or party alone but in tandem with independent business, entrepreneurs and civil society.

Every skill, resource and talent available in the country must be marshalled in a national reconstruction effort. The country cannot afford to marginalise people based on skin colour, ethnicity or ANC affiliation.

Where possible, money lost through corruption should be seized from the guilty.

Corruption should be made a crime against the people. Many lives have been lost because a crooked tender means a hospital had no medicine. Millions continue to live in squalor because the national social housing programme has long ground to a halt.

BEE in its current form should be scrapped, and businesses should divert “BEE” money away from political capitalists and into infrastructure, housing and education.”

Imraan Buccus50, a senior associate-researcher at Asri and  research-fellow at UKZN, takes Gumede’s21 suggestion of a drastic, comprehensive turnaround plan for post-2019 South Africa further by pinpointing the lack of insight, understanding and willingness in general by political leaders in South Africa to think anew and thus to successfully address such socio-political matters. He writes50:22:

We do have some very smart people working on alternatives  to neoliberalism in NGOs and universities, but, unlike in the UK, the US and Brazil, there is no political instrument through which our progressive experts can contribute to real change.

Ideas, especially when they represent the interests of the majority against those of the elite, don’t change anything on their own. This is especially so when, as in  SA, there is an overwhelming commitment to now discredited neoliberal ideas among the commentators.

Ideas that have not been taken seriously in most of the world since the financial crisis of 2008 continue to flourish among elites in SA. Commentator after commentator tells us that to advance, we must break the unions, privatise, and commit to fiscal austerity.

These policies have failed everywhere they have been tried and, in a number of countries, led by voters to embrace dangerous forms of right-wing populism.

Public discussion in SA urgently needs to catch up with current developments and to stop pretending that the world has not changed since 2008. But the extraordinary backwardness of our national conversation isn’t just a matter of provincialism, although there is plenty of that. It is also a result of the fact that where we do have progressive intellectuals up to date with current evidence about economics and policy they are not connected to social movements, trade unions or a progressive political party.

Enlightening further Gumede’s21 vision of a UDF kind of governance for post-2019, Buccus50 clearly points out that the trade unions are in fact part of our present and future politics – and implicated in the direct decision-making thereof – present in broad society, steering the voters and the various political parties fighting for power. This present union power informed Gumede’s notions, that namely it is essential to rehabilitate the country by the involvement of the private sector with governance. It is not only needed in future South African politics, but specifically the urgency to cooperate with the unions as an essential partner, is obvious. Indeed, the immense power of Cosatu forced the ANC not only to cooperate as a partner, but also to toe the line in its behaviour, following Cosatu’s prescriptions. To remove the unions from the South African political scene is more difficult than to remove the ANC from it. On the history and dynamics of the unions in our politics, and their immense power today to be a prime role-player within a kind of UDF regime to rehabilitate the post-2019 economy and politics of the South African state, Buccus50 reflects as follows50:22:

In the 1980s SA was often seen as being at the cutting edge of progressive politics. The UDF and Cosatu worked closely together and drew in hundreds of progressive intellectuals. Of course, all that was lost when the ANC was unbanned, popular struggles demobilised and political debate crushed by the dead hand of the Stalinism of the SACP.

But we do have the largest urban social movement in the world, in the form of Abahlali base Mjondolo, large industrial trade unions like Numsa and other located in Safru that are now independent of the ruling party, and some very good intellectuals in NGOs and universities.

Building a progressive alternative to kleptocracy and neoliberalism requires these three forces – social movements, trade unions and intellectuals – to be united behind a democratic political instrument that can build grassroots support, effectively engage in the battle of ideas and, ultimately, contest for power.

Professor Johann Rossouw48, in line with Buccus’ and Mthombothi’s arguing, also takes up the absolute need for the launch of a new UDF to reform South Africa. He, on the chaos in present-day South Africa under the ANC elite and their regime, writes48:7: “Suid-Afrikaners was laas in die 1980’s so onseker soos nou. Ons redding was toe die burgerlike samelewing wat die politici gelei het om nuwe bondgenootskappe ter wille van die toekoms te smee. En dis presies wat nou moet gebeur.”

Rossouw48 identifies doing away with political parties as the drivers, doers and planners on behalf of the interests of South Africans. He is pertinently clear on the path that the post-2019  politics could play in rehabilitating South Africa. He writes48:775:

Die antwoord lê in die bou van ’n nuwe bondgenootskap buite die party politiek om. Dis ou nuus dat die werklike besluite in SA nie in die parlement geneem word nie. Voorts is die meeste opposiepartye in amper ‘n vrotter toestand as die ANC.

Ons fokus moet dus nie op politieke partye wees nie, maar op burgerlike vennote wat kan saamspan. Aan die hand van ‘n uitstekende ontleding wat Moeletsi Mbeki van die SA maatskaplike struktuur gedoen het, is die volgende groeperinge vandag uitgesluit uit die ANC-geleide bedeling: die sakesektor, die beroepslui, die intelligentsia en, les bes, die arm onderklas van nagenoeg 60% Suid-Afrikaners [a standpoint which is echoed fully by Buccus].

Rossouw48, on this civil government in waiting to rescue the country, writes further48:7: “Daarom, as ons werklik ‘n nuwe bondgenootskap en selfs ‘n nuwe party wil sien, behoort ons deur een enkele ideal gelei te word. Al wat skynbaar vandag in die pad van so ‘n nuwe bondgenootskap staan, is nie ‘n tekort aan bronne, planne of welwillendheid nie, maar eenvoudig die diet van wanhoop waarvan ons leef omdat ons aandag op die mislikte regering en die mislukkende opposisie gerig is.”

Looking critically at the Chief Justice Mogoeng’s under-mentioned utterances, it seems that he, although not saying it directly, also speaks of a kind of UDF approach to solve our present problems. Rooi,75 in this context, refers to his speech of 23 November 2019 as follows75:2:

Hy het bygevoeg ‘n doelbewuste program moet gevolg word om diens-billikheid te bereik, selfs tot op die hoogste vlakke van indiensneming.

Wat ook al die burgerlike samelewing, die arbeid -en private sektor en die regering doen, moet die befhoeftes van armes in ag neem, waaronder hongersnood, siektes en ongeletterdheid.

Mogoeng het gesê enigeen met ‘n funksionele gewete moet sy of haar verantwoordelikheid ontdek soos in die grondwet vervat.

“ As jy in ‘n posisie is wat goed betaal en jy leef gemaklik, en nie omgee vir mense in Diepsloot (‘n township in Johannesburg) nie, is jy ‘n verraaier.”

The implementation of a UDF kind of regime is not easy. Buccus57 in this context sets it out thus57:25:

Achieving organisation and mobilisation on this scale requires real commitment at the level of grassroots community politics. It requires endless meetings, endless discussions and endless work. It is a world apart from the narcissism of “online activism” in which self-promotion usually trumps any commitment to real grassroots work. It is also a world apart from most forms of NGO politics, which are often deeply elitist and generally carried out without any sort of popular mandate or constituency.

On the goodness and honest motivation of persons driving the UDF, Buccus57 posits57:25: “ Most activists don’t want to be activists. They would prefer to spend their time with their families, or developing themselves in interesting ways. There is drudgery in real activism. This is why the bulk of the generation that built the UDF retired from activism when the ANC came to power.”

Kaizer Nyatsumba76, the CEO of the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa warns that South Africa is dangerously on the brink of a precipice, but lacks leadership from the ANC elite, which he describes as either somnambulant or deeply in slumberland, besides being arrogant too. On this lack in leadership of the ANC regime and the need by non-politicians to take the task to reform the country, he, as the other propagandists of a new UDF, posits76:19:

That impose a huge obligation on all South Africans of goodwill, but especially those with any influence in whatever space they find themselves, to make their voices volubly heard. Now that we know the promised “new dawn” has so far proved to be a mirage, civil society and organised business in particular have an inordinate duty to hold this government as accountable between elections as they did the Jacob Zuma administration, and to remind our political mandarins that they are no more than mere servants of our people, who are the real bosses in elections.

To listen further to the rhetoric of  persons such as Mosepe Matlala77, the president of the National African Farmers Union of SA (Nafu SA) and the agricultural economist Mandivamba Rukuni77 of the University of Zimbabwe, namely that to seize white land will “revive the South African economy”, is to keep the company of fools.  Firstly, Rukuni’s77 use of Japan’s land grab from the Japanese landlords after WW2 and giving it to Japanese small farmers to increase production and introduce more players into the market, shows his lack of understanding of how the Japanese system operates and Japan’s good work ethics, integrity and honesty which are in general lacking in Africa.77,78

On Rukuni’s77 memory loss about the fact that Mugabe’s land grab led to today’s famine in Zimbabwe, Gumede58 guides us58:18: “The independence movement governments of Algeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe that pursued populist land reform without compensation plunged their countries into mass starvation, crashed their currencies and caused mass foreign and local investor, human  capital and policy flight, with consequences they have been unable to reverse for decades.”

Secondly, Rukuni’s77 shocking lack of insight and know-how regarding the aspects of strategy planning, project-management and business planning in the complex South African agricultural economy, together with the complexity of the South African landownership matter – echoes that of the dangerous radical thinking and planning of likes of the elites  of the ANC and the EFF. It is evident when he says77:8: “You redistribute land in order to create, by my estimation, 500 000 to 700 000 new farmers. These  people… create a new market. Then you will not have the 17 million people on social grants because the people will get land and become farmers, and gain access to markets through public procurement. You convert social grants to real economic participation.”

Thankfully, the peaceful stand on land redistribution by Chief Justice Mogoeng75 erases the one-dimensional views of Rukuni77, Matlala77 and other radicals when he on the 23rd November 2019, in his Nelson Mandela memorial lecture speech proposes a peaceful and satisfactory outcome of the South African land matter, away from land grabs or nationalising of the assets of whites75:2: “Almal moet saamwerk om te verseker dat die grondvraagstuk en alle ander uitstaande vraagstukke op ‘n manier opgelos word wat tot versoening bydra”.

Gumede58 writes that the Ramaphosa regime must make a mature and pragmatist public stance on land reform and differentiate itself from the opportunistic populists within and outside the ANC who call for land expropriation without compensation. What persons such as Rukuni77 and Matlala77 missed out in their limited knowledge of the South African land matter, is that it is an immensely complicated issue. It is not a one-day solution as some foolish revolutionaries believe without a proper grasp on the matter. On the immense input required to reform the South African agricultural setup before there can be thought of any land redistribution, Gumede58 guides us in-depth58:18:

SA will need to foster a manufacturing sector out of agriculture, focusing on new agricultural products, agricultural processing and beneficiation.

Land reform is a complicated co-ordination and management of market perceptions; it therefore needs a competent public sector to manage it.

The agricultural and rural development government institutions, SOEs and lending institutions must be cleaned up, made more efficient and less corrupt.

Educational, research and technology institutions in the agricultural value chain will also have to be cleaned up, better resourced  aligned to agriculture industrialisation. White individual farmers and agricultural companies will have to be more proactive. They can mentor, partner with and share markets with black farmers.

Private financial institutions should also give easier, cheaper financing and advice to black farmers — and of course to white farmers.

Land redistribution should be done by a sound-minded new UDF and not be done by the corrupted clique as in the ANC-EFF circus. A wise approach and plan is needed. On the absolute need to activate an UDF once again, to manage an orderly and peaceful land redistribution, Buccus57 writes57:25: “But now that we confront a new and severe national crisis, and the ANC is no longer able to give leadership to a progressive vision, there has to be a return to the activist trenches. There is no credible alternative.”

3.1.3.4.1. Role and position of Whites in a new UDF

Clouding the cooperation between black and white to form a comprehensive civil organisation, such as the old UDF, to rule South Africa constructively in the place of the corrupted ANC and its elite, a sector in the ANC and EFF are under the misapprehension that whites are not part of the future of South Africa and as such cannot form part of such a civil organisation. This delusion is totally nullified by Gumede79 when he writes79:20:

Increasingly — and alarmingly — many people have a very narrow perception of who or what is African in SA. They base this on one type of pigmentation, ethnicity of forebearers or level of suffering.

This leads to the misguided phenomenon that some people are perceived as not African or black enough. For many South Africans this leads to unnecessary trauma, with people questioning their sense of identity and belonging.

An African identity in South Africa context is therefore more diverse than in most other African countries – and that is the overwhelming character and strength of Africanness in the South African context. It is the basis of the country’s national identity, its mirror to itself and its face to the world.

However, South African identities are not “gated communities” with fixed borders; they overlap meaningfully, beyond the occasional shared word or value. Our modern South Africanness, therefore, cannot but be a layered, plural and inclusive one, based on acceptance of our interconnected differences.

Being born into a particular “community’ should be only one aspect of Africanness or South Africanness. An African and South African identity would be adding parts of all communities to those one was born into, discarding aspects that impinge on the human rights of others.

The whites — as the blacks, the various civil organisations, the unions and the intelligentsia —  are all rightfully members of a new UDF. Whites, as well as blacks, must start to think outside the box on how to construct a better South Africa and to manage an orderly land redistribution with compensation, instead of land grabs without compensation. This means that as much for whites, blacks should not be following their delinquent  leaders blindly and naïvely just because they are of the same race.58,80,81

Perhaps it is important to emphasise that, although South Africans are often partitioned on the basis of their skin colour while some are scapegoated on the landownership issue as culprits, their bloodlines are frequently less certain. Especially the so-called whites who are viewed as settlers, foreigners or colonists by the ANC and EFF’s radicals. One of the ground-breaking peacemakers (a so-called white) who spent decades mediating SA’s bloody conflicts and who pioneered the successful talks between the Nats and the ANC pre-1994, the late Professor Ampie Muller82, was such a mixed-race individual, both black and white. His obituary of the 29th September 2019 in the Sunday Times reads:82:17

Muller, whose uncle was former South African state president Nico Diederichs, was delighted to discover through DNA testing that he had 5% Nigerian ancestry and was descended in part from Cape slaves.

He said this confirmed his belief that Afrikaners were naturally and historically part of the country’s greater racial mix, and should embrace rather than reject that.

White South Africans have undoubtedly a precise and a legitimate place in the new UDF.

3.1.3.4.2. The steps, paths and process of sound future land redistribution

On the correct process of land redistribution Gumede58 states the steps and path to be followed clearly and precisely (which is fully underwritten and supported by the author in this series on land reform) as follows58:18:

Pragmatic land reform should have multiple strategic pillars. The ANC government must ring-fence commercial agriculture to keep the country food self-sufficient and retain current agriculture jobs, high-grade farming skills and export income.

Commercially viable farms in white hands should not be touched. Redistribution must be pragmatic. Legitimate  farm employees who are active in agriculture could be given shareholder options, profit-sharing and of course be treated with dignity.

Communal land must be immediately transferred to individual households. Communal land, vested under control of traditional leaders, chiefs and kings rather than individual owners, is one of the biggest obstacles to development, industrialisation and economic growth in SA.

In SA and in most African countries, traditional leaders run communal land as if they own it, using it for patronage purpses and to punish those critical of them by depriving them of communal land rights.

State land, whether under the control of SOEs, municipalities or provinces, should be made available to black farmers already active in farming – not given to political farmers.

Undoubtedly the present-day landownership issue is saturated with the wrongs of the past, but to manage land redistribution in terms of the populists’ and radicals’ revenge-seeking modus, will crash the economy. The first stage of land redistribution, without compensation, must be the transfer of communal and state land. The second stage, focussing on the land which belongs to the church, must be the transfer of land accompanied by reasonable compensation. The third stage, namely the transfer of the land of whites, must be activated only with reasonable compensation if there is still land needed after the full completion of stages one and two. The present policy of the ANC that the land redistribution process must be done outright in terms of a race-proportional approach, must be strictly adhered to. The following statistical ratios (calculated out of 100 persons) are applicable: Blacks: 80; Coloureds: 9; Whites: 8 and Indian/Asians/Other: 3. The primary intention must be maintained to bring the present more than 80% of the land in white hands (a group forming only 8% of the total population) gradually down in terms of above race-proportional guideline.83-88

It must be noted that the “blacks” are not one single group to be served by the intended land reform. This is a reality that the ANC elite has so far successfully kept out of sight and discussions.  The proportional rights on land by the individuals of the various African tribes and sub-tribes must be statutorily described and be recognised. It is unavoidable and an immediate must to address. These black tribal and sub-tribal people have for centuries mostly been living in certain parts of South Africa as majority groups in those areas. This means for instance, that in terms of land allocation through the program of expropriation, the placement of Zulus on traditional Venda land and vice versa could be catastrophic; as were the old “Bantustans” and Apartheid’s other foolishness on who owned which land.  The ratio of 80% of the land to be owned by blacks in general can for instance mean at the end that a ratio of only 8% land for the Zulus, 7% land for the Venda’s, etc. This can bring a totally new dimension to landownership, greed and power grabs, which on its own can lead to the upstart of black ethnic conflicts and struggles (which can usurp the frequently excessive racial attention on white landownership). The impact on the system of African traditional chiefs, leaders and tribal structures could become a hurdle in traditional tribal areas with great swathes of tribal communal land, but Gumede83 clearly defined the setup’s solution83:22: “The system of African traditional chiefs, leaders and structures should be abolished, or if retained, reformed to be in line with constitutional democracy. Harmful African traditions, cultures and customs must be scrapped. Control of communal land must be taken away from traditional leaders and given to individual households.”

Also, there must be taken note of the statutory claims of the so-called “indigenous brown people” (KhoiSan, Griqwa, Namakwa). The allocation of land, obtained through any form of land expropriation from whites, must also favour them proportionally to the fullest extent (See above: Indian/Asians/Other: 3).83-88

4. Conclusions and Dictum

Comprehensive land redistribution is an immediate must. But it needs vision, statesmanship, and a balanced and  responsible implementation.

South Africa’s main political parties fail the test to be legitimate rulers. Not one of the politicians tasked with it is capable to execute a balanced and justified land redistribution programme.

The ANC as the present-day ruler failed to execute one single project without involving corruption, as its elite’s state capture confirms. Its implemented land redistribution programme was not only saturated by nepotistic ANC elites through cadre deployment and BBEEE, but is par excellence an example of its inability to execute the simplest land redistribution project to uplift the poor and landless blacks. The ANC seems not to know or understand its own “law-bible” and the contents of an act it had itself promulgated in 1996 to effectively manage land redistribution without the need to change Section 25 of the Constitution. The intention to change Section 25 is nothing else than to restart state capture on a grand scale and the intention of the Marxist-Leninist ANC to over-regulate politics in order to stay in power and bring benefits to the exclusive ANC clique.69

The ANC-regime is seemingly hellbent on pushing through land redistribution without a structured plan and a much-needed infrastructure. Political opportunism by the dying, but extremist Marxist-Leninist orientated ANC elite to obtain votes from the masses of poor and landless blacks in order to stay in power after 2024, remains the central theme here. If the ANC regime is going to force through land redistribution, the outcome will be a colossal failure and chaos. The chance of igniting a revolution in the process is huge, wherein racial and ethnic conflicts stand central. Rwanda Two is not impossible. It seems that even the Chief Justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng75, has his doubts and is hesitatant when it comes the alleged, good outcome of the land matter, as Rooi75, on Mogoeng’s recent  speech at the Nelson Mandela memorial lecture, reflects75:2: “Hy het ook sy geloof uitgespreek dat die grondvraagstuk op ‘n vreedsame  wyse opgelos kan word en selfs tot versoening kan bydra.” There is only hope expressed by Mogoeng, and no decisive assurance that the process of a peaceful land redistribution process is a fact or is going to be a fact.

Also, the unfortunate quote by Mogoeng75 sadly revisiting much of Apartheid and its evils, such as the mass landownership to which whites were allegedly entitled, does not lend much support to the many struggling and South Africans of goodwill in their efforts to create a new South African Nation. His remarks, as quoted by Rooi75 — especially coming from the influencial Chief Justice – is saturated by political ill-will and an incitement to create trouble:2 “Hoewel die verlede nie vir alles wat fout is in Suid-Afrika geblameer kan word nie, is ‘die meeste van die probleme wat Suid-Afrika ervaar egter ‘n direkte gevolg van kolonialisme en apartheid’.”

South Africa is in immense trouble, not only its economy, but its racial and ethnic relations and brotherhood. As said previously, revolution and civil wars remain possibilities as long as the ANC elite and their regime are in power.

South Africa, as never before in its history coming from 1652, is in great trouble. We need the wisdom of King Solomon. Our salvation is the procedure of proving the doli incapax state of ANC regime in the political sphere: we need a New UDF as the ruler before the end of 2020.

Here the words of Tepperman1 are very supportive for us1:29: “Improbable and unexpected victories are exceedingly rare. Yet every once in a while, they do occur… it’s worth considering just what made the happy ending so implausible and, as a consequence, so inspiring.”

Tepperman1 reflects also that Mexico’s story of rehabilitation and improvement holds for us an immediate and important directive:97Hope”.  Quoting a Mexican leader, Pardinas, Tepperman1 writes1:197: “If you had asked ordinary Mexicans, or even the people who negotiated the Pact, whether, [a few] years ago, they would have thought something like this could happen here, they would have said no. We went through fifteen years of frustration. But our lesson is that the impossible can happen. It happened. Sometimes you really can find water in the middle of the desert.”

The New UDF is more than hope; it could become a reality. It could happen. It is a must to save South Africa from the brink of disaster and to eventually bring democracy and prosperity to the masses of poor and landless blacks. The New UDF is the only organisation that can successfully bring about a peaceful land redistribution process.

You reap what you sow.

Since 1652 South Africans have sowed distilled and reaped chaos. Since the 1994 democracy we have sowed, distilled and reaped chaos and despair. But there is hope: with the right person at the helm, sowing good corn, this confused and devastated country can be saved to live its golden days at last. The landownership matter is central to guarantee such golden days.  

It’s now the duty and obligation of the country’s 37-million eligible voters to appoint the right helmsman.

5.  References

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  38. Buccus I. A doubly discredited opposition and a paralysed ruling party leave SA vulnerable to a social explosion. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Nov. 3; p. 22.
  39. Mthombothi B. White and black parties facing off in parliament would be a sad sunset for Cyril’s new dawn. Sunday Times. 2019 Nov. 3; p.21.
  40. Boonzaaier D. Die gif in die DA. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 4.
  41. Bruce P. The writing is on the wall for the DA. Sunday Times. (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 24.
  42. Cachalia G. The DA has an opportunity to recalibrate and concentrate on policy. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Nov. 3; p. 22.
  43. De Groot S. Spare a thought for poor old ‘liberal’ caught up in the DA crisis. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Oct. 27; p. 24.
  44. Leon T. Veterans of long haul are not rattled by death notices. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Oct. 27; p. 24.
  45. Makinana A. ‘Not a classical liberal’. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Dec. 1; p. 14.
  46. Mokone T, Deklerk A. Leon’s secret Mmusi mission. Sunday Times. 2019 Oct. 6; pp.1,4.
  47. Steenhuisen J. ‘Dead’ DA not only alive and well, but ready to do some kicking. Sunday Times. 2019 Nov. 1; p. 5.
  48. Rossouw J. Hier’s die revolusie wat SA kort. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 7.
  49. Louw GP. The Crisis of the Afrikaners. Beau Bassin, Mauritius; Lap Lambert Academic Publishing; 2018.
  50. Buccus I. The left in SA is being left behind in the reinvigorated battle of ideas. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Dec. 1; p. 22.
  51. Boonzaaier D. Wit kiesers straf die DA nog ‘n keer. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 8
  52. Mokgobu A. Vote for party federal chair looms. The Citizen (News). 2019 Oct. 17; p.  6.
  53. Naki E. DA infighting is ‘not about race’. The Citizen (News). 2019 Oct. 17; p. 6.
  54. Pelser W. Stryd in DA is morsig – met lang messe uit. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 6.
  55. Celebrate freedom, yes, but more important, rediscover our lost unity. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 April 28; p. 18.
  56. Phakathi B. DA vows to challenge land reform. Business Day (National). 2019 Feb. 14; p. 3.
  57. Buccus I. Leadership vacuum calls for a return to UDF-style activist trenches. Sunday Times. 2019 Sept. 22; p. 25.
  58. Gumede W. Protect land reform from the problems that beset BEE. Sunday Times. 2019 June 12; p. 18.
  59. Taylor T. Fascism, the barbarous undercurrent of our time, finds the ground ripe for a re-emergence. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Oct. 27; p. 24.
  60. Hunter Q.  Hofmeyr warns of ‘state capture’ risk if powers are not curbed. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Dec. 1; p. 8.
  61. Law RJK. Apostasy from the Gospel. Edinburgh; RJK Law; 2003.
  62. Mthombothi B. Politicians should spare us the photo-op sympathy shows and admit guilt for rampant violent crime. Sunday Times. 2019. Dec. 15; p. 21
  63. Mthombothi B. Instead of grovelling to foreign heads of state our government should apologise to us. Sunday Times. 2019 Sept. 22; p. 25.
  64. Fish-Hodgson T. State’s failures to impede land reform. Mail & Guardian (Comment & Analysis). 2019 Aug.30 to Sept. 5; p. 30.
  65. Basson A, Du Toit P. Enemy of the People. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball; 2017.
  66. Mthombothi B. It’s hard to see the wisdom of the chief justice inserting himself so blatantly in the political terrain. Sunday Times. 2019 Oct. 6; p. 19.
  67. Myburgh P. Gangster State. Cape Town: Penguin; 2019.
  68. Pauw J. President’s Keepers. Cape Town: Tafelberg; 2017
  69. Villa-Vicencio C. The Church in South Africa. In: Fisher A, Albeldas M. A Question of Survival. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball; 1987.
  70. Nail the farm-flippers. Mail & Guardian. 2019 May 24 to 30
  71. Friedman H. Corruption plaques land reform. Mail & Guardian. (News). 2019 June 7 to 13; p. 9.
  72. Pithouse R. ANC factions rely on silence from the poor. Mail & Guardian, 2019 June 14 to 20; p. 27.
  73. Mthombothi B. Clean up all you like, Cyril, but without consequences the litter will be back. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March 10; p. 19.
  74. Tabane JJ. Crack down on the crooks in private and public sectors. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Feb. 3; p. 20.
  75. Rooi J. ‘Dis apartheid,’ sê Mogoeng. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Nov. 24; p. 2.
  76. Nyatsumba K. The arrogance and disdain of our leaders is our greatest challenge. Sunday Times. 2019 Sept. 15; p. 19.
  77. Dlamini P. Seizing land will “revive economy”. Sowetan (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 8.
  78. 78.Ndlovo R. Grim harvest for white farmers. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Dec. 2; p. 3.
  79. Gumede W. Our African identity is complex and unique. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Oct. 6; p. 20.
  80. Yako Y. Why people worship demigods who don’t serve them? Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 June 20; p. 13.
  81. Runji N. Cyril has to show nation what the legacy of his years in office will be. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 June 20; p. 13.
  82. Ampie Muller: Afrikaner academic who pioneered talks between Nats, ANC (1930-2019). Sunday Times (Obituaries). 2019 Sept. 29; p.17.
  83. Gumede W. Traditional chiefs an anachronism in democratic era. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Dec. 15; p. 22.
  84. Demographics of South Africa. [Cited 2019 Apr. 10]. Available from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_South_Africa/
  85. South Africa’s white population is still shrinking. [Cited 2019 Apr. 10]. Available from https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/206219/south-africas-white-population-is-still-shrinking/
  86. Africa’s white population shrinks even further in 2017. [Cited 2019 Apr. 10]. Available from https://https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/189135/south-africas-white-population-shrinks-even-further-in-2017/
  87. Boonzaaier D. Gee grond aan bruin mense – Peter Marais. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 6.
  88. Rooi J. Buthelezi kyk terug: ‘SA kon so anders wees’. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 12.

PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

 

South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 1 (18)

Title: South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 1 (18)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Background, discriminative, expropriation, injustice, myth, ownership, redistribution, revenge, troubled, unconstitutional.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 12: 1

1. Background

Do what is right, not what is easy nor what is popular.1

To implement South Africa’s proposed land expropriation (with or without compensation) is not going to be easy. It cannot and must not be a popular political solution. It should represent a righteous and a just outcome to all South Africans.

Is it possible for us to fulfil the above requirements? The prominent question is here, firstly: how did we arrive at this problematic situation, what story is there to tell regarding the present motivation to effect land expropriation in which the Whites and their current land holdings occupy a central position, and what is needed to launch the process of land expropriation?

Ela Gandhi2, a well-known South African activist and granddaughter of Mahatma Gandhi, provides to some extent an answer to these questions and what we need to do to rectify the mess, when she writes in the Sunday Times of the 18th March 20192:21:

I believe that we can only understand what is happening in South Africa if we acknowledge our racist history. Racist education and unbridled racial discrimination were entrenched in the various apartheid laws. Today, although most racist laws are rooted out, racist attitudes, prejudices, misconceptions and judgments remain with us.

We still use racial terms to describe South Africans. Almost all official documents require people to indicate their race. I understand the need for this – we still have a highly unequal society based on race, class and gender, and we need to know these demographics in order to bring about the needed changes. But hopefully there will be a day, sooner rather than later, when we can discard all these tags and be proudly South African.

We still have townships which are predominantly occupied by particular race groups, as was designated historically. Even though there is no law that entrenches these divisions, we are left with the separation legacies of apartheid days.

Schools have had to adjust to having children from different race groups, but racism is still encountered in schools, perhaps because not enough conscious effort has been made to train educators and the communities to think differently, to recognise and root out the racism within us.

Besides dividing South Africans into different race groups, apartheid discrimination impoverished black people by denying them occupational opportunities through job reservation policies and pass laws.

The 1913 Land Act and the Group Areas Act dispossessed many black people of their land and live hood.

We need to acknowledge the injustice and unfairness of apartheid, and we need to engage with the huge economic divide apartheid created between the rich, largely white, and the poor, largely black. A result of no acknowledgment and no sharing is that we have a large majority of people living in wealth and privileged access to resources. Racism is linked to this privilege.

There is a reluctance to rectify the injustices of the past through constructive programmes and voluntary sharing of wealth gained through apartheid privilege. Instead, there is agitation for the protection of individual rights and privileges at the expense of the common.

1.1. Introduction

The land redistribution matter — or land expropriation, as it has been many times announced to the public, in which the sensitive issue of compensation versus non-compensation features prominently — seems to have recently become a central way for the Ramaphosa regime of diverting attention away from its failure to deliver growth-boosting reforms, to curb its elite’s ongoing rent-seeking, their inability to clean up corruption and governance at state-owned enterprises and to do something to the dysfunctional state created by the ANC regime over 25 years. In this context of utter failure, Joffe3 writes3:2:

This was the year of the reality check. We began 2019 with forecasts that economic growth would lift to 1.7% and a state of the nation speech in which President Cyril  promised long-awited reforms to boost the economy and fix ailing state-owned enterprises, especially Eskom. We have ended the year flirting with recession and stage 6 load-shedding – to the “surprise and the shock” of Ramaphosa, whose economic reforms have been delivered excruciatingly slowly, if at all.

The latest GDP figures showed the economy turned negative in the third quarter; a week or more of load-shedding could see that repeated in the fourth quarter; and it’s now possible the full-year 2019 number will be negative — for the first time since 2009. SA had become a 1% economy over the past five years. Now it’s falling even below that; 2019 has driven home just how stuck we are in the low-growth trap and how hard it’s proving to get out of it, despite oft-repeated promises of reform.

The esteem and personal standing of the ANC, the Ramaphosa regime, Cyril Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule with the ordinary man on the street have never been as low as in December 2019. Ramaphosa and the ANC elite know well that they have not been ablot to generate wealth for the poor since 1994 and cannot do it post-2019. Their failed Marxist-Leninist model in economics does not allow for it. They are more and more forced to do something extraordinary to make themselves popular again. Secondly, they must find immediate wealth to get the economy going and to satisfy the poor people’s hunger and other needs to avoid unrest and revolution, and to receive support to be able to stay in power until 2024. Three clear outcomes are easily available for them to regain power and to get money on the table: land grabbing, the nationaliation of the Reserve Bank and looting the public and private pension funds. The easiest to launch and the most popular choice inside the ANC radicals’ RET (radical economic transformation) is land grabbing from Whites.3-9

The year 2020 seems to be the Year of Land Grabbing, especially because Ramaphosa must do something politically extraordinary to outlive the 2020 Mid-year Conference of the ANC. At this stage, inside South Africa’s troubled land ownership, some positive and constructive guidelines are needed to make the unavoidable, threatening land redistribution a reality and a success.

1.2. Aims of article 18

In this article (together with Article 19), the primary aim is to make conclusions, based on the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the matter of land expropriation and to offer a dictum on whether it may be successfully be executed by the ANC regime as the present ruler or by another ruler post-2019.

This is the semi-final article in the series of nineteen articles on the matter of South African landownership. The previous seventeen articles of the series were published in the South African accredited journal Ensovoort [Volume 38 (2018), Number 12:1 to Volume 40 (2019), Number 11:7]. The short-titles of these seventeen published articles (numbered one to 17 in the series) are as follows:

  1. Who are colonists and who are indigenous people? (1);
  2. Perspectives on the background to the land ownership dispute (2);
  3. The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime – Part 1 (3);
  4. The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime – Part 2 (4);
  5. Age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system – Part 1 (5);
  6. Age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system – Part 2 – (6);
  7. Land ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 1 (7);
  8. 8. Land ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 2 (8);
  9. The EFF in perspective (9);
  10. The DA in perspective (10);
  11. The ANC in perspective (11);
  12. The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity);
  13. The ANC in perspective (13: Violence and Crime);
  14. The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability);
  15. The ANC in perspective (15: Opportunism);
  16. The ANC in perspective (16: Outdated ANC);
  17. The ANC in perspective (17: ANC’s troubled leadership).

2. Method

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to successfully execute land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa in order to effect successful land reform from 2019 onwards.

The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. South Africa’s troubled land ownership (1652 – 2019)

3.1.1. Overview (Articles 1 to 17)

The political dispensations of the Cape Colony of 1853 and 1872 and the Union of 1910 offered excellent opportunities to redistribute land and hand a justified part back to Blacks to create an open, just South African society. But White supremacy and its land-grabbing politics made it impossible. The later 1994 dispensation under the ANC failed again. Land redistribution from 2019 onwards will become a natural and unavoidable interference and intervention.

Land grabbing is an age-old custom in South Africa. It was practised by Blacks on Blacks as well as Whites on Blacks for more than three hundred years. It is thus of the utmost importance that this custom is not restarted again in 2019 and that a perfect solution to the present imbalance between White land ownership and Black land ownership is rapidly found, without falling back onto the past’s vicious circle of revenge and counter-revenge to erase the manifold injustices committed before 1994.

South Africa’s political history is far from completion. Also, there is an immense political history what needs to be retraced and to be rewritten, or at least to be corrected. It does not matter if we like it or not: it is a sine qua non.

For the antagonists (anti-land redistributors and mostly Whites), the period 1994 to 2019 under the ANC regime has been a dark period of criminality, state capture, confused violence, thuggery and race-baiting. It has gained a momentum that will not slow as long as the ANC is in power. The antagonists have an unshakable belief that the general public and the parliament itself will reject any change to the Constitution or would not allow land grabbing from Whites. They also believe that the South African courts, including the Constitutional Court, will denounce any illegal and unconstitutional actions by the ANC that could lead to a one-sided policy of land expropriation without full compensation. For the antagonists both Julius Malema and Cyril Ramaphosa are, as land redistributors of White land to the poor and landless Blacks, political bluffs that will soon disappear from the country’s politics.7,10-24

When comparing the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists and the propagandists, some are based on sound foundations while others are emotionally laden and lacking in depth.7,10-24

Hereto is it clear for the propagandists (pro-land redistributors and mostly Blacks) that a mass of contaminating elements and role players, integrated and established during the age-old, unjust and discriminative White political and socio-economic system of South Africa, are obstructing any change to Section 25 of the Consitution that would enable land expropriation without compensation. The propagandists believe that myths and lies are prominent in the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints. They believe the antagonists’ present obstruction of the land expropriation initiative is temporary, unfounded and doomed to failure. The change to Section 25, to effect land expropriation without compensation, is for the propagandists the only path to uplift the mass of Blacks from their inequality, landlessness, poverty and unemployment, and to reverse the immense land grabbing by Whites of non-Whites’ land, starting in 1652. The undoing of the historical trajectory of the age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system of South African society is one of the biggest challenges for the present or any future government. The overwhelming interests of the mass of Black poor and landless people can no longer be ignored. The present exclusive structure of White land ownership and economic empowerment is a recipe for revolution.7,10-24

From a critical vantage point it must be noted that in general the perspective of the antagonists are not representative of the total White or Afrikaner population, but mostly of the contingent of White farm and land owners, White exclusive capitalist business groups with direct and indirect interests in agricultural economics, as well as self-appointed White “saviours and rescuers” that claim to fight unselfishly for the interests of the White farming community and for the Constitution and dispensation of 1994. (The total number of these self-appointed White “saviours and rescuers” is far lower than 300 000 of the White population of 5 milion, representing 6% of the White population).  For the propagandists it is time for the White population to purge itself of this group of 300 000 White individuals’ contamination with fallacies and racism. The other nearly 5 million Whites (outside the antagonists’ and the 35 000 White farmers’ self-interest), also have citizen interests but are side-lined and ignored by the antagonists. The antagonists are a minority group, estimated to represent less than 10% of the White population which, in reality, is another minority group, more or less 8% of the total South African population.7,10-24

For the propagandists the land-ownership matter has been well planned and blown up for a long time by ±35 000 White farmers (of which only between 5 000 and 7 000 farmers really contribute to the country’s essential daily food supply). The opportunistic group of the rest of the ±30 000 of White farmers represents less than 0.1% of the total South African population and less than 1% of the White population. This priority granted to 35 000 White farmers and their land has led to the interests of nearly 30 million poor and landless Blacks in the post-1994 Democracy being ignored. For the propagandists, it just cannot go on in this way.7,10-24

The imbalance in land ownership, together with the inequality in the country between White and Black (as well as between Black and Black) means that redistribution should occur, but it should not be offered as a panacea for poverty or be based on arguments about who is indigenous and who is not. Redistribution of land is a good symbolic act for emotional relief and political catharsis as to Apartheid’s transgressions, but the fact it that it is not going to change the lives of the poor immediately and drastically as falsely claimed by radical politicians. Land expropriation so far has been saturated with corruption and state capture in which the ANC elite has played a central role. It is only one aspect of the political and socioeconomic delinquency of the ANC. The comprehensive dysfunction of the political and socioeconomic system of South Africa since 1994, with its corrupted elements and role players, may activate a poisonous element with the ability to kill the innocent and to bring devastation to South Africa. It can only aggravate the matter further, given the ANC’s present-day politics of corruption, criminality and extreme racism, planned and executed by a strong sector within the ANC elite.7,10-24

The current problems around land redistribution are just too enormous for the current ANC political leadership to solve. When they do attend to the matter, they do it in an explosive and conflict-ridden way, creating more complex problems and crises. Indeed, the fact is that the radicals in the ANC and other political parties do not really know what they want to do with the expropriated land. They do not have a sound plan. There seems to be much revenge about the discriminative politics of the past and land grabbing, making Whites rightfully worried about their assets, as well as their personal future and safety in the country.

Land expropriation with reasonable compensation is a must that needs immediate implementation. But, where applicable, land expropriation without compensation should also be a tool to rearrange the South African scene regarding land ownership. In this the redistribution of state property should take a prominent position as the first stage of activating land expropriation. The mass of poverty, landlessness, indignity and inequality, which had become a lifestyle to nearly 30 million Blacks — people isolated from their social, economic and political rights as South Africans and exposed to immense delinquencies, that are equal to crimes against humanity — contains the potential for country-wide anarchy and revolution; which may ignite from 2020 if not fully addressed. This dangerous situation makes a just land expropriation an absolute priority.7,10-24

Land redistribution is unavoidable. It needs a solution. Whites, mostly the Afrikaners, own most of the land that the Blacks want. The prominent question is how the transfer will take place: Will it be another land grab; or will there be a reasoned, balanced and just land transfer and redistribution? The last option has been absent from all of South African political history, creating doubt if land redistribution by Whites will ever be freely and willingly allowed.

The counts awarded in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018 25, is for the EFF a mere 8 points (9%) out of a possible maximum of 82 points (100%). This means that the EFF is an outright failure as a political institution of stature. It cannot be trusted in any way to be in charge of land expropriation. Moreover, they totally lack the experience to handle such a project.25

The DA was awarded 59 points (72%) out of the maximum 82 points.The DA reflects immense shortcomings in their experience regarding land reform — specifically on land expropriation without compensation. Where the issue of the land matter emerges in the DA’s politics, it seems to be determined and driven by White interests rather than the interests of the poor and landless Blacks. The DA is clearly a slave of exclusive capitalism and its principle of a “stretched democracy”. Since the May 2019 election the DA has shown a movement towards White right-wing politics, making just land redistribution essentially impossible and the party an improper and inappropriate ruler to effect land redistribution.The DA does not show the ability to immediately handle successful land reform.25

The awarding of 23 points (out of 82 points) to the ANC as a regime reflects that it is lacking capabilities and the general integrity as a skilled ruler. Indeed, the ANC failed the basic test to be the ruler of South Africa. Its Marxist-Leninist political ideology as to the economy, landownership and racism is outdated. Evidence is there that the ANC as a regime is going to run into trouble fast to fulfil its May 2019 election promises and to execute its basic duties to the voters. Under the ANC’s 25 years of rule most South Africans lost out on prosperity, while the the living environment of its people has become saturated with violence and crime. Its political leaders’ lifestyles are characterised by a lack of accountability and beset by extreme opportunism. The ANC is incompetent to honestly effect well-planned and balanced land redistribution, with or without compensation. Their intended plan to bring landownership to the mass of poor and landless Blacks will only create further state capture, poverty and anarchy, while a full-scale revolution becomes more and more of a reality.25

Looking at the evaluation of the three main political parties of South Africa in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, all three are absolutely incapable of successfully implementing balanced and justified land redistribution in the next five to ten years. To put in in even stronger terms: none of the three will ever be successful to do land redistribution in any way. The evidence is there that all three will be part of the country’s political history for the next five years.25

This leaves us with the prominent question at this stage: are there South African political parties or a political party that may fast-track the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future? This is very complex question to answer, seeing that popularity at the ballot box does not guarantee that a government of quality and ability comes to power, as the ANC regime of 25 years confirms. Defining the wrongs of our past and present politics and the immediate demand to plan and to fix our future, is the question: can land expropriation (with compensation or without compensation) be executed correctly and with justice after more than three hundred of years of failure?

3.1.2. Immediate and future negative outcomes and dangers
3.1.2.1. Unrest, anarchy and revolution

We already see from Article 13 (Violence and Crime) the extent to which chronic unrest has been established in the country. Looking critically at the uncontrollable murders in the Cape Town Area that necessitated the intervention of the SADF to curb the reign of criminal gangs, together with the burning of trucks on highways and the murder of truck drivers, South Africa has long ago moved from simple riots to chronic anarchy, bringing the country to the threshold of revolution. What is striking, is the hostility and aggressive behaviour of the mass of poor living in the growing shanty towns, also known as “informal settlements”. It initially started due to the lack of service delivery in these settlements, such as the absence of basic health care, education facilities, transport and security infrastructure, and basic accommodation. These shortcomings have been addressed in the past nor are they being tackled at the moment in any way by the ANC regime. The dramatic collapse of the economy since 2016 has led to an immense growth in unemployment, the influx of the poor from the rural areas into the cities, and a resulting lack of basic accommodation. A direct outcome of this migration, absent from the ANC elite’s as well as the broad public’s consciousness, is the significant presence of poverty among half of the South African population and the phenomenon of constant hunger experienced by the mass of poor.  In the past and worldwide, poverty and hunger have caused two opposing outcomes: Firstly, the start of revolution which has brought down regimes, leading to the large-scale killing of certain sectors of the population and radical long-term political changes within countries. Secondly, poverty and hunger in certain countries have brought a total collapse in the poor people’s intention and will to revolt against their tragic circumstances, causing them to lapse even futher and deeper into poverty and enslavement to a ruler’s oppression. We saw this negative enslavement outcome of passivity among the Black population in South Africa since 1652 and especially after 1910 with Apartheid. At the moment we are seeing it again in South Africa under the Black ANC regime, where the enslavement and oppression of the mass of poor Blacks is undoubtedly the highest ever since 1652 and where the mass of Blacks seemingly accept their poverty as their destiny. But actions cause reaction and we should not consider the ongoing unrest and anarchy as a chronic, permanent situation without any further serious outcomes. The truth is far from this, as the chronic ongoing unrest and anarchy in Algeria, Tunisia, Iraqi and Syria, which suddenly changed to deadly revolution, confirms. South Africa’s unrest and anarchy are starting to show the typical characteristics of the forerunners of a comprehensive revolution waiting to be enacted. The land-redistribution matter, together with unemployment, poverty and hunger, may be the imminent stimulant to set off revolution overnight.3-30

The advent of revolution after 2020 is a high possibility that needs to be discussed. It will be dishonest not to warn the public on the negative impact of revolution on their lives. Prominently at risk are the minority of Whites and surely the Black BBEEE-empowered businessmen and politicians such as Ramaphosa and his cronies as possible victims.3-30

Besides the element of revenge in revolution, it must be emphasised that revolution can activate blocked-up development that could not be reached normally inside the traditional political setup. The mass of Blacks (more than 30 million) stand to benefit from any South African revolution. On the virtue of revolution under certain circumstances, Mark Malloch-Brown27, a former UN Deputy Secretary-General and a minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK, in his book The Unfinished Global Revolution27 gives us a guideline when he posits:

Since the book calls for a more comprehensive global democracy where we all have more say over our local, national, and our global affairs, the Arab Spring is evidently a step in the right direction. The Arab Human Development Reports, which I had sponsored at UNDP, pointed out that of the world’s seven regions, the Arab countries had the lowest freedom scores.

The question is: if the Arab Spring was an essential outcome, why can a post-2019 South African revolution not be an essential outcome and a “step in the right direction” either?

The 1994 political dispensation was undoubtedly a revolution, but a passive revolution; one which did not bring an extreme re-balancing of South Africa’s wealth and economics. It was only a false political democracy, meaning much on paper but nothing in practice. It was a continuation of Apartheid, with all its evil. It was a planned revolution by the ANC top brass and the NP-AB top brass to suite their own interests. Features that characterise most active revolutions — actions such as land grabbing without compensation, the prosecution of the Apartheid penetrators for human-rights violations, the activation of inclusive capitalism and job creation — were totally absent. The critical evaluation of the reports of the ANC’s referees (see Articles 12 to 17 of this series), shows that this passive revolution, launched in 1994, was essentially an outright failure. Firstly, it brought more poverty to the mass of Blacks, demolished certain established facilities such as healthcare and education while the landlessness of the poor Blacks stayed unchanged. The second outcome was that a repressive pre-1994 political-economic-social regime was merely replaced with a comprehensively economically repressive post-1994 regime.3-24

The question is: if a radical, active revolution had indeed been implemented in 1994, would it have solved masse Black poverty, joblessness and their lack of landownership as we are experiencing now? The answers are a Yes as well as a No. These opposing two answers must be read in the political histories reflecting revolutions that have played out worldwide over many years. It would be foolish to say that revolution does not work and is an evil. It is not true. The Liberation War of the North American Colonies from Great Britain brought them, besides statutory independence, political, economic and social empowerment that have made the USA the most powerful nation in the world today. The French revolution brought for the lower and middle class, as well as the poor, emancipation from the domination of the rich aristocracy, but on the other hand it has left them to this day with a kind of political immaturity as reflected in their constant unrest which borders on anarchy. The Russian revolution also brought freedom to the poor, the lower and middle class from the domination of the nobility but led directly to the institution of another repressice regime, the Communists, with role players like Stalin up to Putin today. In Africa there were  many active revolutions, with essentially not a single one bringing long-term positive outcomes. Prominent examples in this regard are the Egyptian, Zimbabwean, and Ugandan revolutions.27

Mark Malloch-Brown27, on the phenomenon of positive revolutionary outcomes at certain times and in certain situations, bringing at last human rights to suppressed and discriminated-against people after centuries of suffering, gives good insight when he  writes27:250: “First, that the power of the people, when right is on their side, is always unstoppable.” Prominent stands the fact that the potentials for revolutions are mostly observable, reflecting to the insiders and outsiders that anything in political setups is possible and must be accepted. Mostly is this “incoming revolution” not only ignored, but see as impossible to can and will spring-up. Malloch-Brown27 emphasis that the Arab Spring revolution (to spring up in 2010-2011 in Tunisia and Egypt) was already observable in 2002 (eight years earlier), but ignored and laughed down as the impossible and not to be a serious concern by the authorities and experts. The corrupted leaders go on for nearly a decade to reign in Tunisia and Egypt before the social time bomb, that had been set over many years, had gone off.   But when a certain crisis hits – sometimes a small energy-stimulant is needed to activate it, like the Arab Spring — the surprise is great.27 Malloch-Brown27 writes272:45-246:

The Arab spring began with an auspicious, if tragic, start: the self-immolation of a Tunisian street seller, Mohammed Bouazizi [who could be as well a said Andile Zuzile in South Africa]. On December 18, 2010, he set himself alight because he felt threatened and ignored by corrupt, bullying local police officers [who had, because of their corrupted empowerment coming over years under a corrupted regime, fall into a state of thinking to do what they want and to do this for ever unchallenged].The power of  his protest came from the fact that his desperate frustration was shared by so many others [same as the present-day 30-million ignored impoverished and landless Blacks of South Africa]. His act lit the dry timber of latent anger against a line of corruption and privilege that stretched from the local female police constable, who ignored his complains, to President Ben Ali, his wife and his family. By the time Bouazizi died from his burns on January 4, 2011, the region was catching fire.

The act was auspicious because such apparent futility and weakness brought down an apparently all powerfully political order. And, indeed this David and Goliath theme of weakness confronting strength and prevailing was a steady part of the early months of the Arab spring. Peaceful protestors, drawing courage from the links to each other and the outside world… saw off heavily armed government forces. Yet it took only from December 18, Bouazizi’s burning, to February 11, 2011 for… Ben Ali to be driven from office.

Does the above situation of Mohammed Bouazizi differ from that of the unknown South African Black Andile Zuzile? No, it does not differ an inch. Does the Tunisian political, social and economic disorder under the regime of Ben Ali differ from the disorder under the ANC regime between 1994 and 2019? Again, no, it does not differ an inch. Is the said Andile Zuzile (as was Mohammed Bouazizi seemingly seen at the beginning of his action) the only sufferer and victim of the corrupt 1994 to 2019 regime in South Africa? No, apart from him there are 29, 900, 999 other Black sufferers and victims in South Africa. Are the dissatisfactions and demands of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionaries different from the mass of South African Blacks’ dissatisfactions and demands? No: it was also primarily about the price of bread, demands for jobs, as well as affordable goods and services, etc. And, most of all, a say in politics regarding one’s own affairs. It was not so much about differences in social classes, religions or races. Is the mentioned Andile Zuzile at this stage insignificant for the ANC elite? Yes. It is true that the Marxist-Leninist ANC regime sees Andile Zuzile as an insignificant role player in their political thinking, revealing the ANC elite’s lack of in-depth contact with the masses. In this context Redi Tlhabi30 refers to the book A Tale of Two Cities by Charles Dickens in which he describes the circumstances of the poor and landless people which led to the French Revolution and the followeding reign of terror. She writes, comparing the two delinquent regimes and their leaderships30:20:

Die kloof tussen die wat dié wat lei en dié wat gelei word, word groter en groter.

Dit het in Suid-Afrika gebeur.

Ons kan dalk nie die presiese tydstip aandui toe die kloof gevorm is nie, maar daaglikse uitsprake, besluite en optredes laat ons met geen twyfel nie dat die ANC – die party wat gevorm is deur eerbiedige mans soos John Dube, Pixley ka Isaka Seme en Sol Plaatje – sy vinger van die pols van die nasie gehaal het nie.

Hulle [ANC-topleiers] is besig om mense te “ontdek” en te paradeer wat geraak is deur hul latenskap van onbekwaamheid, korrupsie, swak dienslewering en ja, onbetrokkenheid.

What A Tale of Two Cities30 also tells us is that when the fires of revolution start they are not easily stopped: in France it required a Napoleon Bonaparte, a blood-thirsty dictator, to remove the revolutionaries from politics and to clean up their mess. (This intervention must stand as a warning for revolutionaries such as Zuma, Magashule, Ramaphosa, Mabuza and Malema about a possible destiny awaiting them).

But, cautions Malloch-Brown27, revolution does not always immediately bring success. He writes27:244:

…the notion that the force of street protests that begins a revolution subsequently loses its way in the long, less glamorous, sequel of taking power will not be new. Indeed, in my experience, the completion of the shift from overthrow of the old to a more stable democratic order is on average a ten-year project. Much beyond the ballot box has to change. The old elite’s grip on absolute economic power has to be prized open, a culture of democratic openness and minority rights forged, a civil society given political oxygen to breathe and grow, a justice system people respect and trust established. Nearly always new governments struggle to make these changeas while also battling a legacy of economic failure and pent-up popular demands for job and basic services that they have inherited from their failed predecessors. In Egypt and Tunisia, all these conditions for a long, difficult journey to a “finished” revolution are present. Elsewhere the challenges are more difficult still.

It is significant that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, which started in 2010, are still in 2019  far from over. Moreover, true democratic stability has so far not been reached [in line with Malloch-Brown’s27 estimation that the growth from an old order to a more (hopeful)  stable democratic order is on average a ten-year project. Especially in Egypt, there has been little improvementin the country’s autocratic politics up to 2019. It is also a fact that South Africa’s passive revolution, with its duration stretching over 25 years, is also far from over.27

In South Africa the passive revolution, launched by the 1994 Political Dispensation, did not entail revenge on so-called Apartheid wrongdoers. There were some “emotional confessions” which were drowned in religious dogma offering the cleansing of the political sins of the culprits, mostly the Whites. Then there was the intended prosecution by the NPA of political wrongdoers, also mostly Whites. Again, a failure to fulfil the demands of revenge: jailing, confiscation of assets, the compensation of the Black sufferers under Apartheid. The “1994 revolution” was a soft revolution without real punishment of the obvious culprits: Whites. All that was realised was BBEEE as a punishment of Whites, and cadre deployment as a punishment of anti-ANC Blacks obstructing the ANC elite’s delinquencies.3-24

The most recent revolution in the world, where one autocratic regime was replaced by yet another (more extreme) autocracy, is Iran. Iran’s past political structure had the same kind of basis as that of South Africa and needs some elaboration. One of the prominent outcomes in Iran, as during the French revolution, was revenge on the previous ruling class: the nobles and elite. Not only were they eliminqted from regime structures and their ownership of assets dismantled, but they were also physically killed.

3.1.2.1.1. The 1978 Iranian revolution

To understand what a “real” revolution and a “real” revenge mean, it is needed to look at Iran’s revolution which started in 1978 and is still going on today in the guise of various forms of instability. At the same time it gives it us some criteria to compare post-1994 South Africa under the Marxist-Leninist ANC regime with some of the characteristics of the Iranian post-1978 religious-extremist regime. The post-1978 setup in the end did not bring improvements to the Iranians, not even for the first group of revolutionaries. The well-known international writer and world-traveller, the late Sir VS Naipaul31, gives us a good description of the post-1978 failed Iran in his book, entitled: Beyond Belief: Islamic excursions among the converted peoples.31

In Iran the regime was run from the 1930s by Reza Shah, who was succeeded by his son, the last Shah. Both of the two rulers’ regimes’ were autocratic, repressive and much hated. Especially the last Shah’s SAVAK (secret police) was cruel. The Iranian revolution of 1978 did not come as a surprise — all the characteristics needed for an uprising were there, such as repression, food scarcity, lack of freedom, etc. But the identity of the role players who took power in the end, ignoring the true revolutionaries’ dreams, was indeed a surprise. The main role player, the opportunist and madman Khomeini first arrived on the scene after the revolution’s beginning, heading from there into his precisely planned direction of evil and murder by hijacking the whole exercise with his exclusive religious group. He embarked on the next phase, a religious-cultural revolution, intertwined with a political revolution. This outcome elicited the following response from one of the initial revolutionaries31:183: “We may win the revolution, but culturally we will go back a thousand years”, and31:183: “You will never gain anything following theses religious people. We have known them. We have seen them. These are the people who didn’t let me [female] learn reading and writing.”  On the further outcomes of the revolution Naipaul31, quoting the experience of the mentioned Iranian Ali just after the start of the revolution, reports31:170:

Some people Ali knew, supporters of the revolution, turned against it after the first month. Ali thought he should give it a little more time. But then, about two months after the revolution, when the executions began, he had serious doubts. People who had done nothing were arrested and taken to jail. Many of them disappeared. Then they started charging into people’s houses, confiscating their properties. We had no security for our property our children or our wife.

Naipaul31 further recounts Ali’s experience31:201: “He had his doubts about the drift of the revolution, and soon things began to be bad. There were religious regulations. Women had to wear the chador and the full headdress; music and cultural events were banned. There were restrictions on the press. There was a “cultural revolution,” as it was called; all the universities were closed.” But this was only the beginning, as Ayatollah Khalkhalli in 1979 said31:201: “The mullahs are going to rule now [they still did in 2019]. We are going to have ten thousand years of the Islamic Republic. The Marxists [their initial partners in the revolution] are going to go on with their Lenin. We are going to go on in the way of Khomeini.” Inside Khalkhalli’s malcognition is to be found his own dream of blood, to equal what Stalin did in Russia. Naipaul31, quoting Khalkhalli, writes:31:201 “What he did in Russia we have to do in Iran. We too have to do a lot of killing. A lot.”

Ali’s31 testimony goes further31:173:

There was now, too, a constant harassment from the Revolutionary Guards [still fully governing Iran in 2019], jumping into the garden and looking through the windows to see whether anyone was looking at television or videos, or breaking into the house to search for alcohol or ham or women’s dresses or men’s neckties, all now forbidden things.

And if you were cleanly dressed, they didn’t like it. They would attack you. It was like Pol Pot, but not so extreme. Ten precent. It was a full revolution.

The reins of government went altogether out of the hands of government, out of control. It was anarchy and terror. The reason was Khomeini himself.

In this context Naipaul31 points out that, to make up for his lack of money to supply the mullahs’ immense needs, Khomeini31 said31:173: “Go to your own towns. Find the first man who is rich or the first man who has a factory or a huge farm. And force him to pay.”

On this order by Khomeini to the mullahs in which theft is presented as “honest” and “morally correct”, Ali31 reports31:175:

Khomeini has set a bad example. Every ayatollah now can claim necessity, as Khomeini often did, and break the law. And Iran was still living with his Islamic constitution, which gave him supreme power, and established the principle of leadership and obedience.

On the further consequences of Khomeini’s delinquency, Ali states31:174-175:

The majority [people] wanted to loot. So, he [Khomeini] made disorder in the country and let them loot. He did what they wanted.

When he [Khomeini] said “follow the law, it wasn’t the law of the country. It was his law, the law in his own mind. Before the revolution he said it was un-Islamic to pay taxes to the government. After, he said it was Islamic to pay taxes to the government. He wanted complete chaos. That day in his house I realized this man is not a man of government. He was still a revolutionary. He couldn’t control himself. Until the very last day he was making disorder.

He had an instinctive brain. He was instinctively intelligent, an instinctive, animal intelligence. Because of this he could command the people. He did not have an educational intelligence. He did’nt become emotional. He was very cool.

Looked at from the viewpoint of clinical psychology, it seems as if Khomeini’ s brain function was one of psychopathy. This is borne out by his and his cronies’ undermentioned killing spree.

On the killing spree between 1978 and 1979 (it went on for many years), Naipaul31 writes31:200:

When I went to Theran in August 1979, Ayatollah Khalkhalli, the hanging judge of the revolution, was a star. The Islamic Revolutionary Court [the shah’s old military court] in Shariati Street was sitting almost round the clock, as Ali had said. People were being killed all the time in Evin Prison and trucks were taking away the bodies through the blue gates at night.

There was nothing secretive or abashed about the killings. Some revolutionary official was keeping count, and regularly in the Theran Times there was an update. In the beginning the counting was to show how clement the revolution was; later, when the killing became too much, the counting stopped. In those early days official photographs were taken of people before they were killed and after they were killed — killed and, as it were, filed away, naked on the sliding mortuary slab, in the giant filing cabinet of the morgue. These pictures were on sale in the streets.

Ayatollah Khalkhalli, the ruler of the Islamic Revolutionary Court, was open to the press. He gave many boastful interviews.

Naipaul31 writes further31:188:

Khalkhalli, in an interview [August 1979]  with the Theran Times…said that he “probably” sentenced three to four hundred people to death [in less than one year]. On some nights, he said, the trucks had taken thirty or fourty bodies out of the prison.

Comparing the above description of the Khomeini regime and his cronies’ actions with the letters of the referees on the delinquent actions of the ANC top brass between 1994 and 2019 (see: Articles 11 to 17), and the ANC’s pre-1994 political history, there seem to be immense similarities. Remember: both regimes and their leaders were committed to the revolutionary ethos, of taking without creating, as well as extremism in politics. In both of the two organisations, some of the leaders had blood on their hands,  both constantly broke the law during their rule and engaged in state capture. It gives us a warning what could happen after 2019 if things went wrong for the ANC elite’s grip on power.

3.1.2.1.2. Death mostly for the initial revolutionist

Revolution mostly brings death to the initial revolutionist, however noble his intention was to better his country. The recalcitrant holding on to power and actions of the old class whose regimes are challenged, as well as their tendency to turn to extreme repression to staunch the revolutions and their revolutionaries, are reflected by the counter-actions of Bashar al-Assad in Syria over many years. Most revolutions have gone down fast, unknown many times to the outsider, because suppression of the masses has been efficiently kept out of the public eye. The murdering spree of Bashar Assad’s father in 1982 of up to 20 000 people in Syria on a single occasion, was kept out of the news for long.27

The question is here: was there a pre-1994 revolution by South African Blacks against their suffering? Yes, there was the 1960s Black Revolution which gradually, with the impact of other determinants, spelt the end of Apartheid and the elimination of the NP from political, emotional and cognitive mindsets (although only three decades later). In the 1960s South Africa’s Black Revolution (undoubtedly, in line with the same reasons why present-day unrest and anarchy are kept under wraps, but now possibly on a higher level of dissatisfaction and more broadly experienced), was kept away from the news, as well as the NP’s bloody actions to stamp out this revolution with its immense security force and the elimination of the Black revolutionaries.27,28 The rapid phasing out of the 1960s Black Revolution was directly attributable to the absolute suppression of the Blacks by the security forces of the NP. As Malloch-Brown27 writes27:243: “Yet revolution is not easily sparked in a world where rulers govern with an iron hand. The examples of successful revolution in the Arab world were few and far between.’

South Africa’s 1960s Black Revolution went the same way as that of the many failed revolutions at the time in extreme authoritarian states. But today the ANC is a Black government where a racial guideline for the murder of the Black masses (we hope) is less defined than during the period 1652 to 1994. In addition, the ANC regime is thankfully not armed and trained to the same high level as that of the NP military of the 1960s. For the current South African revolutionaries to be gobbled up by the ANC regime and its incapable securirity forces is impossible. Read herewith the unionisation of the security forces and the presence of Black tribalism in the security forces, any significant bloodletting of Blacks by Blacks in the ANC regime, to avoid a revolution, will not easily be put into action. Neither must it be expected that if a revolution started, it would be quickly and effectively curtailed.26

3.1.2.1.3. Extreme Islamic politics inside a South African revolution

But various African-Black revolutionary efforts since 1960s against the White NP regime and its forces were not the only attempted revolutions. The terrorist expert De Wet Potgieter29 points out that during Apartheid repression a small group of Islamic extremists exploited low-intensity urban warfare in South Africa, after which this Islamic extremism started to flourish with a growing intensity.There was in the Western Cape the Qibla Mass Movement (Qibla), based on Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini doctrine. This group emerged as a militant pro-Shiite one, modelled on the Iranian Revolution, with the objective of implementing and establishing strict Islamic principles in South Africa. [This organisation also went under the names Muslims-Against-Global-Oppression (MAGO) and Muslims-Against-Illegimate-Leaders (MAIL)]. It paved the way for a more violent organisation, writes Potgieter29, which came to the fore in 1996 as the violent organisation People against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad). Qibla was fast labelled as a terrorist organisation by the USA government. It had already started back then to send its members overseas for military training in Libya, later Pakistan, who were deployed in the 1990s to fight in South Libanon with Hezbollah. At the millennium more than 100 Qibla members were arrested for violence-related activities and murder in South Africa. Before that, in 1995, reports Potgieter, the Isamic Unity Convention emerged, representing more than 250 Muslim groups in South Africa. Qibla was the central body within the movement and before 9/11 Qibla had already crossed swords with the USA for its activities in that country.  After the 9/11 attack Qibla sent fighters to Afghanistan. Central to all of this, is a figure such as Achmad Cassiem, a radical Islamic cleric who joined the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) at the age of 15 years and was later sent to Robben Island after having been sentenced for terrorism, attempted murder and the possession of arms and ammunition.29

This build-up in the presence of Muslim revolutionists became clear in 1998 in South Africa with their attack on Planet Hollywood at the popular V&A Waterfront in Cape Town. This was after Pagad had started to target businesses in Cape Town, in response to the US retaliatory attacks in the Middle East after the 9/11 attack.29 Potgieter29 writes on this 1998 radical Muslim attack29:31:

South Africans would never in their wildest dreams have believed that terror would return to the country a mere four years after the newfound freedom of a democratic society under Mandela’s Rainbow Nation. Unfortunately, this false sense of a peaceful transition to a new life of freedom and peace was short-lived with the global terror reaching our shores at the southern tip of Africa.

The above sets out the basic presence of Islamic terrorists in South Africa. Included would be the presence of ISIS in the country, exposing South Africa today to the threat of international terrorism. The country’s liberal foreign policy towards the Middle East and the ANC regime’s anti-American position do not safeguard it from Islamic terrorism. So far, the ANC regime has openly tolerated the existence of Islamic terrorists in South Africa, even it seems blind to the presence of these groups training all over the country, as well as their movements up into Africa. This empathy and passivity of the ANC regime is to a great extent (besides its long-established brotherhood with terrorist regimes of countries in Africa and South America) due to a fear of Islamic counter-actions if they were arrested and prevented from pursuing their terrorism from here to the outside world.29 This fear and passivity of the ANC regime Potgieter29 describes as follows29:33:

The ‘war against terrorism’ is ultimately a chess game in which governments need to be aware that their actions will have consequences, and although counter-measures might be successful in the short term, that might not be the case in the medium to the long term. In other words: states, through their actions, might win a battle (the arrest or elimination of prominent suspects) but ultimately lose the war against terrorism — by driving individuals to extremism and terrorism.

This “unofficial peace agreement” of the ANC regime with the Islamic radicals does not assure a permanent outcome of brotherhood and peace, as well as the absence of attacks on the South Africa state and its system by the Islamic radicals. Especially not for the ultra-extremist Islamic terrorists who have since 1960s clearly wanted an Islamic state with all its principles established here, in contradistinction to the liberal Christian and exclusively capitalist setups that have been dominant since 1652. For the time being, the ANC regime’s sympathy and alliance with terrorism (extending to its pre-1994 years) fits the situation of the radical Islamics well here, while the present low profile and passivity of the radical Islamics within the ANC regime’s political, economic and cultural composition, is  also a temporary characteristic which can change overnight. In the aftermath of the Syrian and Iraq wars, their internal conflicts and political disfunction, the true role and planning of the radical Islamics for the first time emerged with a bloody capture of parts of the two countries. On the other hand, the so-called end of the ISIS caliphate does not spell the end of a theoretical ISIS Caliphate, the ideology of ISIS and the elimination of ISIS jihadists from geopolitics: they are permanent ‘war fixtures” in the world. The fact that many of these jihadists have returned to South Africa and to other Western countries, makes them nothing less as than “soldiers of fortune”. In this case there are many similarities with the “Christian Crusaders” who had fought under the banner of Christianity all over the Middle-East against Islam, and today’s Islamic jihadists. In both cases their self-enrichment and pursuit of power are prominent and their quest for new political, economic and cultural terrority, to which the politically unstable South Africa exposes itself for easy capturing.29

3.1.2.1.4. Political radicalism-in-waiting

It seems in 2019 that South Africans, in terms of the political instability and lawlessness created by the ANC regime and its leadership, are foolishly naive regarding political radicalism (which is often practised in the guise of radical religiousness). The radicalism in the ANC and the EFF is not so innocent as the political term “Black Nationalism” might suggest. Potgieter, in this context, postulates29:35: “Accepting that South African nationals might become involved in transnational terrorism is an unfortunate reality.” It is a fact that our borders have become lawless territories, ruled by marauding gangsters and human traffickers who allow the infiltration of well-trained and experienced jihadists. The issuing of South African identity and passport documents to international jihadists and allowing the stay of international jihadists, fleeing Western forces after the fall of their ISIS state, is an every-day fact. The use of South Africa as the springboard for Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists has become a prominent issue. The passivity of the ANC regime allowed that Al-Qaeda-linked small training camps had not only been established since 2010, but had started to spread all over the country, alleges Potgieter29. These small camps and their trained terrorists are waiting patiently to act when the time is right and the conditions in their favour.

The notion that the terrorists of Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda or Boko Haram will not attack the South African state and its vulnerable political system because the ANC is an ex-terrorist organisation and is sympathic to the terrorists’ ideology, is foolish.  Potgieter29 writes on the Kenyan Hotel attack29:35:

Many will say that such groups have no reason to attack us. They will say that Kenya was attacked because its troops are in Somalia, where Al Shabaab operates. They are wrong.

Terror does not work that way. We are currently cooperating with the Kenyan authorities and a link as tenuous as that is enough to set off an attack on us.

Further, reason and logic are alien to such groups. Their tactics are to scare communities into submission. It does not matter who they attack. They seek  chaos and attention. They want to make a spectacle.

The patient waiting game by djihadists described above, seems to be in line with the more recent insurgency in Southern Africa — which the journalist Simon Allison32 describes as a” faceless insurgency”— that has started in October 2017 against a police station in the town of Mocimboa da Praia, Mozambique, to be followed in June 2018 by an attack in the Cabo Delgado province of northern Mozambique. Such attacks constitute a string of aimless assaults on the security forces and civilians without anyone claiming responsibility for it. In the June attack, 40 people were killed, some with extreme cruelty and at least 400 houses were burnt down, displacing more than 1 000 people. For such a significant conflict, out of the blue, there has been surprisingly little reliable information available, reports Allison.32 Until now, the situation has not changed, leaving the void as to information and understanding intact while the violence intensified in Mozambique. Allison32 reports there are now an average of two to three attacks a week while at least 120 persons have died. On this confusion and lack of knowledge regarding the assailants, Allison32 writes32:20:

Even local journalists can’t talk about it because the culture of intimidation is there. Yeah, it’s confusing. It’s really confusing. Even the government is confused. How can you negotiate with people when you don’t know who they are?

This same initial confusion as to “what is going on” and “who is behind the unrest” had struck the governments of Syrya and Iraq at the start of their wars, before ISIS with its unique ideology, took off its mask. The editor32 of the idependent online newspaper @Verdade in Mozambique, Erik Charas32, said32:20: “I have never come across something like this before. Never, not [even] during the Renamo war. It doesn’t even resemble the other Islamic State movements. This is completely different.”

There is no doubt that the South African djihadists’ début in politics will also take place in a unique way and possibly be associated with radicals in the EFF and the ANC who have already declared, in their intention to effect land grabbing from Whites, their participation in a revolution to come.

3.1.2.1.5. Political dissatisfaction-scoring  

To indicate how the dissatisfaction (during the Black Revolution) of the 1960s of the black masses under the white NP-regime compares with the 2019 dissatisfaction of the black masses under the black-ruled ANC-regime, is not easy, seeing that a kind of Malloch-Brown Arab Human Development Report27 is absent here to reflect scores. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,25 can effectively be used in this instance to award, in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification, a single count of both South African regimes and executive political leadership between: a) 1652 and1994; and b) 1994 to 2019. The central hypothesis is that a low satisfaction rating (50% and lower) with their political rights for the periods: a) 1652 to 1994 and b) 1994 to 2019, respectively for all South African voters (as with the low Arab ratings on the existing freedoms reflect on their “readiness for revolution” by being regarded “as a step in the right direction”), will also reflect how ready South Africans are for “revolution as a step in the right direction.”25,33

For the period 1652 to 1994 on Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction, a score of 42 (51%) out of a possible 82 points, was awarded. This means there was an average dissatisfaction reflected by South Africans in pre-1994 South Africa. Revolutionary activities during that period contradict the opinion that pre-1994 South Africans had a strong tendency towards starting revolution. This low dissatisfaction score possibly also explains why the fomenting of a revolution in the 1960s was easily suppressed by the NP regime.25,33

The count awarded to the ANC and its leadership for the period 1994 to 2019 in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification of satisfaction on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,25 out of a possible maximum of 82, is 23 (26%). This means there is serious dissatisfaction reflected by South Africans in the post-1994 South Africa. The hypothesis is confirmed that the mass of South Africans can see (as did the Arabs low scores on freedom reflect that the “doing of revolution” by them “as a step in the right direction”), post-2019 as the correct time of “revolution as a step in the right direction”.25,33

It is also important to reflect on General Jan Smuts’ words, now a true cliché after more than a century’s use, when he said that South Africa will never give it best but also never give its worst. As with many politicians and their statements, Smuts failed to offer a precise scale to ascertain his notions of “best” and “worst”, and thus the extremes of bad and good can be expected.34 In terms of the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201825 the challenge is to rate what Smuts34 tried to say in 1910 and how in some way a measurement of the concepts of the “best” and “worst” for the period 1910 up to 2019 should be designed in a suitable way. The classification of the information was done in terms of a Black political history, meaning how blacks had experienced their situation historically speaking. Firstly, in terms of the worst versus the best, categorising was done in terms of: 1) political dissatisfaction versus political satisfaction; 2) keenness to start a revolution versus reluctance to start a revolution; and 3) ability to launch a revolution versus inability to start a revolution. Secondly, each of the above categories allocated ten points to quantifying values on the 1 on the scale as absolute low versus the 10 on the scale as absolute high. Thirdly, the period 1910 to 2019 was divided into four time frames: 1910; 1948, 1994 and 2019. All the calculations were done in terms of these particular time frames.25,33

The scores were as follows25,33:

Political dissatisfaction: 1910: 6; 1948: 7; 1994: 9; 2019: 9.
Political satisfaction: 1910: 4; 1948: 3; 1994: 1; 2019: 1.

Keenness to start a revolution: 1910: 5; 1948: 7; 1994: 9; 2019: 9.
Reluctance to start a revolution: 1910: 5; 1948: 3; 1994: 1; 2019: 1.

Ability to launch a revolution: 1910: 3; 1948: 3; 1994: 5; 2019: 9.
Inability to launch a revolution: 1910: 7; 1948: 7; 1994: 5; 2019: 1.

From the above results it is clear that the political dissatisfaction of 1994 and 2019 are similar and has attained the highest level with a score of 9 (In contrast, political satisfaction for 1994 and 2019 attained the lowest count with a score of 1). The rating for keenness to start a revolution for 1994 and 2019 are at the highest level with a score of 9 (In contrast, the reluctance to start a revolution for 1994 and 2019 obtained the lowest level with a score of 1). The ability to launch a revolution in 1994 (possibly as a result of the NP’s strong and able security forces) was only 5 while in 2019 it has obtained a score of 9 (in a context in which blacks have become politically empowered and are actually manning the security forces, free from white dominance). It is obvious from the above outcome that 1994 was the year in which the Apartheid setup was experienced the most negatively since 1910 by blacks ( with a political dissatisfaction count: 9). In 1994, black rule and democracy were still absent. This explosive situation was one of the reasons why the NP regime had faced a strong push to “abdicate” or face a full-scale revolution in 1994. But also, as reflected in 2019, in a general climate in which blacks are supposed to be “free”, a score of 9 regarding political dissatisfaction has been registered. This result highlights the fact that the negative political outlook of blacks in 1994 has not not changed in any way in 2019, except that in 2019 the political scene has become far more volatile and potentially explosive than in 1994. It is confirmed by the ability of the masses of poor and landless people to foment revolution: Here the score of 9, is already four figures higher than 1994’s rating of 5.25,33

3.1.2.1.6. Post-2019 revolution-in-waiting

On the issue of a possible post-2019 revolution heading for South Africa, it is important to emphasize that the political differences between the group of revolutionaries that is able to steer the revolution and unit of the ANC elite who is currently governing the country (coming from pre-1994 and continuing after post-1994), is zero. They are all revolutionaries, born from the same pre-1994 terrorist organisation, the Marxist-Leninist ANC. They are mostly individuals who underwrite the same political ideology, which has been varying from classic to neo-Marxism. So why will they revolt against their own organisation? The answer is found in the existing two ANC liberator identities today: the unscrupulous ANC-elite versus the impoverished masses of black people (30-million plus), which include the ANC-members (less than a million) and the ANC followers (less than 10 million).

The author and political analyst Redi Tlhabi30 referred to the fact that although it has not been possible to identify the date of the above split, when the ANC-elite moved away from the South African people, the gap is enormous and is growing constantly.30 The editor35 of the Mail & Guardian, in an editorial in February 2019 under the heading35:32: “The sad fact is the state is ripe for picking”, pinpointed the date of the divorce exactly however: 1994. He refers to the book of the late Sampie Terreblanche, tittled: Lost in Transformation: South Africa’s Search for a New Future since 1986. Terreblanche,35 argues the editor35, clearly pinpointed that the ANC’s leadership (from Nelson Mandela) bartered away its revolutionary ideals for the pragmatism and acceptance of big business. There was only one intention for this leadership: its own self-enrichment and personal financial empowerment. This was one side and a secret decision by the ANC elite (which includes Cyril Ramaphosa as a writer of the Constitution and supporter of the 1994 Dispensation) with their acceptance of the dishonest 1994 Political Dispensation. In the meantime this leadership, without batting an eyelid, went on to send out and to propagate the false ideology of the pre-1994 ANC, namely that its primary aim and intention is to enrich and uplift the masses of black people caught in the scourge of inequality, poverty and landlessness. This false ideology, which has been repeated for twenty-five years, was and still is signalled to every ordinary ANC supporter. It has now been unmasked, but it was not done by the Zuma-Magashule-Mabuza-Ramaphosa clan of racketeers who are marketing themselves as revolutionaries to save, as they allege, the post-2019 ANC and the country. These four marketeers’ intention is not to save and to restructure the present “sick” ANC, but to worsen the plight of the masses of blacks, their chaotic position in 2019 South Africa to assure a Marxist-Leninist government under a powerful politburo. It is the grassroots of the ANC, especially the dissatisfied black jobless and poor youth, who are now taking on the task of liberation and revolution to advance the masses of black people.35

Reflecting the split in 1994 – and the ANC’s failure already then to rule with honesty and integrity to improve the lives the black masses – between the rich and the poor, which is based on the division between the ANC elite and the ANC’s ordinary members and followers, the editor35 of the Mail & Guardian quotes Terreblanche’s35 words35:32“While the ANC operated on the moral high ground during the anti-apartheid struggle, since 1994 they have slipped into a sleazy underworld where corruption, nepotism and money squandering are the order of the day, so that South Africa could become a neo-colonial satellite of the American-led neoliberal empire. Although the ANC has been the government of South Africa since 1994, we could allege that it is still not ‘ready to govern’.” 

This sustained failure and inability evident within the small circle of the ANC regime, coming from 1994, goes even deeper: it is a function of the ANC’s elite seemingly extraordinary ability to mesmerise the ANC party and its millions of unsuspecting supporters till today with their ideology and promises of liberating the black masses.30,35

The editorial35 of the Mail & Guardian is correct when it postulates that the sad fact is that the South African state is ripe for picking: For many this picking – or more precisely: this revolution-in-waiting – is merely a reappropriation by the masses of poor and landless blacks of the ANC as a party, and possibly also the capturing of the state. Here the notion of being black is a central theme. Helen Zille36 puts it in perspective on the 21st  April 2019 when she says36:9: “We are seeing the resurrection of racial nationalism in our country. It is highly retrogressive and I think it will take South Africa down a cul-de-sac. We will eventually come to realise that but the cost will be high. And I am very sad we are going to have to go down that path, very sad, before we achieve the vision of our Constitution.”

Malloch-Brown’s27 prerequisite for the activating of a revolution — and that such a happening can sometimes be a good event to better people’s tragic setup — fits well into the 2019 dysfunctional South Africa, and the seeming intention by the masses of blacks (ANC-supporters and non-supporters) to take back their so-called country from the mischievous ANC elite.  Tabane37, quoting Azapo president StrikeThokoane’s view, reports on the 21st April 2019, on this disenchantment of supporters with the present-day ANC37:9:

Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) president Strike Thokoane has an interesting analogy for explaining why many black people who supported the ANC for a long time are now turning to other parties 25 years since the dawn of democracy.

“I always liken this to a priest who tries to preach on Christmas Day or New Year eve when people are enjoying themselves at a party. He tries to say, ‘Jesus Christ saves’ but the noise of the entertainment is drowning him out.

But when they get sober, they want to go to the same person and say, ‘By the way, what were you saying about Jesus?”

He [Thokoane] says that, for a long time after 1994, black people were very complacent about democracy, thinking they had “arrived”.

“Our people were told that they have arrived and have nothing to do anymore. Everybody believed what they were told and promised. As a result , they were not even listening to the voice of Azapo. Others listened, but they thought we were rather too extreme and radical.”

The above view and the pleading of Strike Thokoane36, reflect again on Zille’s warning of the resurrection of racial nationalism and the coming of the collapse of the South African state. It goes beyond these issues in 2019 when he says that Azapo stands for the reversing of the betrayal of promises to by the ANC to the people.36,37 Tabane37 writes37:9:

We tell them, “Azapo stands for dignity of black people. Hence it is black consciousness roots. It is not anti white, but it is pro black. We love black people more.

The struggle had been sold. Black people have been sold for money and profit. Land has become fashionable but we have died for land. Our heroes have died for it. Land must be reconquered. So, we must repossess it so that we can redistribute it.

Unlike those who want to expropriate without compensation, we believe that, when you expropriate, you suggest it belongs to someone else and you are taking it by force. Repossession, however, means this belongs to us and we are taking it back.

Land needs to be possessed by black people after it was unlawfully stolen. We must reconquer.”

It must also be noted that there is the extreme radical standpoint of the Black First Land First (BLF) on land by its leader Andile Mngxitama38:4:

“…the BLF, unlike the ANC and the EFF, is serious on its stance on the land issue. The FFPlus knows that if we get into Parliament, we will not drag our feet on the matter. The ANC and the EFF make up more than two thirds of parliament; why do you think they have not amended the Constitution by now? They are in the pockets of these landowners and are protecting their interests.

…should the party be removed from the ballot paper [May 8], “we will be left with no choice but to take up arms and fight for our freedom”.

It is not a surprise, in light of this “revolution” declaration by the BLF,  that Bell39 refers with great reservation to the BLF’s leadership, as follows39:2: “…the self-appointed collective imbongi of North Korea, Andile Mngxitama’s Black First Land (BLF)…”.

It must be highlighted that unrest and chronic anarchy are today inherent to the South African society: The Provinces of the North-West and KwaZulu-Natal reflect this state of affairs extremely well with so-called daily “service-delivery unhappiness” which is characterised by residents burning down state property to40:8: “…announce to government that there is a protest going on…”; that40:8: “…we are going to do worse things”; and40:8: “We’re not benefiting from the advent of democracy. It’s as if we… residents are not South Africans. We are prepared to die to ensure we get basic services”. On the strength of this unrest-cum-anarchy, Lali,40 on the recent extreme violent protest in Khayelitsha in Cape Town (which is only one of a growing mass of violent protests countrywide) and which shows all the signs of a failure by the SAPS to master crime there, writes40:8: “Throughout the morning, the protesters blocked Japhta Masemola Road with burning tyres, various objects and a shipping container. The police tried unsuccessfully to disperse them, but they regrouped and set up more burning barricades, preventing traffic from moving along the normally busy roads.” 

Also, the preparation for unrest countrywide during the past May 2019 election and the ANC government’s decision to place the police and defense forces on readiness, reflect further the chronic presence of unrest-cum-anarchy in South Africa.  Van der Walt,41 quoting the minister of Police, Bheki Cele41, commented on the seriousness of this issue in May 201941:2: “Cele sê hoewel geweld in al nege provinsies moontlik is, hou Noordwes en KwaZulu-Natal die grootste gevaar in. Geweldadige betogings kom al die afgelope jaar gereeld in Noordwes voor, terwyl politieke moorde in KwaZulu-Natal nie ’n vreemde verskynsel is nie.” This unrest-cum-anarchy – representing the growing and broadening collapse of law and order in South Africa – to which Cele36 refers, is also confirmed by the Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba,41 the minister of State security. Van der Walt,41 on the past May election, writes41:2: “…inligting wat deur haar department ingesamel is, dui daarop dat daar ‘bedrywighede’ is wat moontlik ten doel het om die verkiesing in Noordwes en KwaZulu-Natal omver te werp.”

3.1.2.1.7. Political racism’s role in revolution

It must be clear that these are also problems waiting to muddy black versus white race relations, which can be opportunistically be shifted onto a revolutionary project.  It must therefore be acknowledged that a part of the leadership of the ANC seems also to start to reflect racism on the same basis as reflected by the leaders of the EFF, Azania and the BLF. The ANC secretary-general Ace Magashule ponders this in April 2019 when in Philippi in the Western Cape he alleged42:3: “to incite ANC supporters to exercise their vote in a racist way.” Maxon42 reports42:3: “Magashule told residents in Philippi that they must not vote for an umlungu (a white person).” In addition it should be noted that the ANC veterans immediately condemned his racial utterance, seeing it as a sign of irresponsible leadership: a racial and political misstep which demanded the intervention of Ramaphosa to punish Magashule (which unsurprisingly has so far not happened). But this kind of racial outburst from the ANC’s top brass could eventually become more prominent in the wake May 2019, depending on how Ramaphosa squares off against Magashule in a leadership battle.39,42

Maxon42 points out that this “mischievous” political behaviour of Magashule must be read in terms of the outcome of the Nasrec 2017 conference and the power play which has been an outcome of it.  Here his focus is on a contingent of old conservative ANC veterans (respecting the Freedom Charter as a prerequisite for non-racism), still clinging to their traditional Marxist-Leninist politics versus a new brigade of radical cadres (which Bell39 has  described as the “self-appointed collective imbongis of North Korea” and which could become numerous in the ANC if Magashule gets a proper grasp on power). In practice it seems not to be a pure asymmetric leadership feature in the ANC, but more of an outcome of clear groupings around the two big men of the ANC: Ramaphosa versus Magashule. The issue is not so much a political or an ideology renewal or an age-factor, as it is around the grasp on political power in which the Magashule politics is far more radical than the politics prescribed to ANC cadres in terms of the Freedom Charter. Inherent to this is the presence of radicalism which could trigger racially-inspired aggressive behaviour against whites in the advent of of revolution. Maxon42 is correct when he says the ANC’s soul is in peril (which spells danger for the political stability of South Africa after 2019). Yonela Dipko43 notices Magashule’s unflattering description of an umlungu (a white person) as the right of ANC cadres to call out specific white people who are alleged to be against the rights and interests of black persons (which seems in reality to be “ANC blacks”, and not “DA blacks”!). He clearly does not see white-listing by a black Magashule as racism as long as the black Magashule is categorical about a umlungu (white) who is, in his terms, a so-called “racist” particularly as defined by the ANC’s Diko43 and Magashule. At the same time Diko43 fails to describe the “characteristics and activities of the so-called 2019 White Western Cape racist” and falls back onto dangerous political clichés, which suggests taking revenge on and cleansing the opposition, which happens to be white too.39,42,43

Dipko43 reflects firstly on “soft politics”, the so-called “pity plea” by radical and dangerous blacks who, by their own misadventures and shortcomings, do not form part of able and skilled competitors, when he reflects43:3:

Integration is still a one-way street, blacks assimilating to whites. After 400 years, white people can’t pronounce our names, can’t speak our languages, can’t identify with black people’s challenges, such as a lack of spaces. So, black people find themselves having to assimilate. If your name is Tinyiko you must let then call call you “tiny”; you find your black self assimilating to their language, tastes and culture because you are a minority of one, at every board meeting, every restaurant, every school play. It’s disheartening.”

The above plea is obviously one-sided, biased and without serious consideration, while Diko43 also conveniently forgets who has ruled over South Africa since 2019: precisely the old garde and veterans of the ANC which have failed to give persons as Diko4 the required “spaces” and which have introduced English as the only “official” language, making the use of indigenous languages irrelevant. Furthermore, there are of course those who use colonial English first names willingly par excellence, ignoring their ethnic “black names”: the ANC top cadres are littered with such individuals such as Ace Magashule, Nelson Mandela  and Cyril Ramaphosa! It seems so far, from Diko’s43 rhetoric, that the possible presence of a poor self-esteem harboured by some blacks in ANC politics has been ignored, contrary to the public boast and much-touted 2019 “sound black self-esteem”.

But, on the “victim-identity” Diko43 quickly reveals his true intention (and unashamed racism) when he reveals his mindset regarding “hard politics”, as he writes43:3:

The Western Cape is a fiefdom of the abelungu and to contend that, in the name of non-racialism, in fact of a racist government, they must continue to be given governing power is offensive in the extreme, particular to the black majority.

Success here has a white face and it starts in the corridors of the provincial government. While Cape Town is 80% black, the divisional directors of the provincial government alone are 70% white. That then informs everything else, from government policy to the conceptualisation of programmes.

Most experiences are anecdotal, which is why someone such as Premier Helen Zille can deny racism exists in Cape Town. She has no personal encounter with it. Until a black government takes over the Western Cape, sensitivity with racial victimisation will not exist.

Looking carefully at Diko’s43 rhetoric, it seems to be an ANC creed, an organisation posing as a wolf dressed in sheep’s clothing, especially as far as the last election is concerned. This is shown from the words used to describe the Western Cape and Cape Town (both basically the only governmental entities still functioning with qualified audits in the country) as a “racist government”, an “offensive governing power”, and “time that black government takes over Western Cape”, etc. Secondly, the fact that Diko43 is a spokesperson of the ANC in the Western Cape, quite evidently rhymes with Magashule’s anti-abelungu politics, bringing to the foreground the undercurrent of post-2019 racism (and more: racial and political extreminism) prevalent in the ANC: clearly discrimination against blacks, Coloureds and whites who dare to criticise the ANC for its misadvetures and who do not support the ANC’s nefarious politics. Diko’s43 opinions and thinking must be read as the same reflected in Sudan by the previous tyrant Omar al-Bashir specifically against women during his rule of 1998 to 2019.39,42,43

The Guardian44, as quoted by the Sunday Times, reflects44:15: “In the Bashir era, women faced being jailed and were even threatened with physical torture for a variety of offences, such as wearing trousers or behaving in a way that deemed inappropriate.” 

If, so far, no concerns were evident in the minds of many South Africans about their future, especially whites, Coloureds, Indians and non-black ANC cadres, it is now time to start worrying. Diko’s and Magashule’s rhetorics are in line with the racism of the radicals of the EFF, Azano and the PAC. It is political cliches that echo Hitler and the Nazis’ racial policies of highlighting the “differences and evil nature of Jews” in their scapegoating of them as racial, economic, social culprits and saboteurs, and created the foundation for the Nazis to allow the genocide of Jews. In 2019, the insight into the mindsets of the leadership of the ANC, help to differentiate what is really bad and what is really good. It spells danger for the lives of the 15 million voters (out of the 25 million total voting individuals) who did not vote for the ANC and thus for 37 million people (out of a total 57 million population) who do not necessarily support the ANC.39, 42,43

South Africans know well how a madman such as an Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir of Sudan came to power and could stay in power for 30 years with the aid of their brand of extremism, contributing to racial, ethnic and religious discrimination, and murderous rule. For South Africans this should be a timeous warning and an indication what they can expect if the post-2019 politics go wrong and political power falls into the hands of characters like Julius Malema, Ace Magashule, Jacob Zuma and David Mabuza. During Apartheid, where the blacks were the victims, but it is important to note that they were also the victims in Sudan. Things can turn nasty quickly, even for the ANC elite, such as Diko, Magashule, Mabuza and Ramaphosa if they as the top cadres lost their grip on South Africa. On the power grab of Bashir in 1989 by means of a military coup and his corrupt rule up to 2019, the Sunday Times45 of the 14th April 2019 notes as follows45:15:

Labour unions were liquidated and dissenters detained without trial and tortured.

Life got even worse after South Sudan, home to the majority of Christians, seceded in 2011. Churches were bulldozed and burnt. In 2012 Bashir warned non-Muslims: “Nothing will preserve your rights except for Islamic sharia”.

Sudan turned into a playground for Islamic terrorist groups. Its’ harboured Osama bin Laden in the early years of his jihad movement that led to the creation of al-Qaeda, landing Sudan a spot on the US list of countries backing terrorism.

Bashir exploited ethnic and tribal tensions to consolidate power, with bloody ethnically targeted wars in Darfur and other parts of the country earning him an ICC indictment for war crimes and genocide in 2009, and making Sudan’s name synonymous with ethnic cleansing.

Refugees described the horror of racially targeted atrocities. Attackers would shout “Kill the slaves, kill the slaves!” and “We have orders to kill the blacks”. One refugee reported a militia member boasting, “We kill all blacks and even kill cattle when they have black calves.

3.1.2.1.8. Role of the youth in revolution

An aspect missed by political analysts is the possible role that the South African youth can play in a forthcoming revolution. Firstly, it seems that the efforts by the government to register the young voters have failed. Statistics show that the 18 to 19 years olds on the voter lists for 2019 is 47% lower than in 2014, while for the age group 20 to 29 the number declined by 9%. This reflects that only 341 236 of South Africa’s present registered voters are younger than 20 years against 646 313 in 2014 (In 2009 the number was even higher on 669 241). In the age-group 20 to 29 there is at present 5 299 297 voters (against 5 759 297 in 2014). In practice means it that only 1.3% of the registered voters are 20 years and younger, while only 21.1% is 30 years and younger. For formal politics and thus the various political parties mean this a loss of voter support. Firstly, the fact that only 35% of eligible voters participated in the 2014 election shows that the youth’s present apathy not a new kind of phenomenon. What is telling is that as with the 1960s black “revolution” against the Apartheid regime, the growing involvement of the youth in unrests all over the country currently could equally have a huge impact on the status quo. Although the widespread lack of service delivery is often mentioned as the main source of the unrest, unemployment is fast developing into a stronger driver for the widespread riots. Increasingly, it seems to be political indifference that has been playing a role in fomenting the unrest, since many youths are politically well-informed and driven by a political interest with the focus on their personal interests and problems instead of on a political party and the elite’s interests. Many of these non-party youths associated with the “rebellion” politics of the EFF and BLF, take to the streets without necessarily joining these parties as members or as supporters. At most, they see party politics only as a vehicle for self-promotion.38, 46-49

The youth are no longer mesmerised by the ANC’s message of 47:36: “…you should remember what the ANC did for you.” For the present youth the ANC as a party and as a regime have done absolutely nothing and they know it very well. A vote for the ANC by a black youngster simply means47:36: “…to endorse the ANC’s position in power, while its members continue with corruption, the corporatisation of the state and unethical governance.”

They are willing to take on the ANC system, as #RhodesMustFall and the #FeesMustFall movements showed us. They are not shying away from the concept that democratic rule has mostly emerged through bloodshed, but are rather making it a second option.27,46,47

The youth could soon become the real power to drive a revolution, in fact, sooner than most political analysts understand. As in Tunisia and Egypt, their South African revolution could be ignited too, quite suddenly by a small flame. And the various small fires burning already are manifold among the youth: hunger, poverty, abuse, indignity, dominance, discrimination, exploitation, and more.  The advise of Bruce in April 2019 to Ramaphosa in which he repeated Winston Churchill’s famous “blood, toil, sweat and tears” speech in 1938 to the South African youth, is nothing else than a threat on the one side to the youth to toe the line or else, and on the other side a further exploitation of them. These kinds of admonishments by Ramaphosa directed at the youth in the future may just be the single fire to start the revolution. It does not matter if it turns out to be a South Africa Youth Spring, South Africa Youth Winter, South Africa Youth Summer or South Africa Youth Autumn, the revolution is waiting. Where the politicians, especially the black ones of the ANC, celebrate April 27 as their Freedom Day of a 25-year old so-called New South Africa, most of the black youths can’t celebrate along with them. There is good reason for it, and also why they not have registered to vote on May 8 2019 and why they are becoming primed for revolution. They have never tasted Nelson Mandela’s promises of democracy and freedom. Mandela has become a stranger to them, a blurred, bitter memory.27,47,50,51

A prominent example of the sudden explosion of violence by the youth, and that it is looming, ever-present in every-day life, was well-illustrated on the 8th April 2019 in Johannesburg. Here a peaceful march of hundreds of black pupils [all members of the ANC-aligned Congress of South African Students (Cosas) were so disillusioned by the failure of their political parent and mentor, the ANC, to stop violence at schools, that the whole march turned into violence and  looting. Their looting did not stop with the theft of only fruit, but included cellphones and alcohol. The young protesters left a trail of destruction and even injured a shopkeeper. It appears that the Number One of the ANC, Ace Magashule’s speech at Luthuli-house, failed to calm them down. This, it must be noted, can be the future awaiting South Africans exposed to an extreme and unpredictable violent uprising by these youths.52,53

The youth of Cosas’s behaviour must not only be read in the poor example set by their peers in the ANC, but in their powerless situation and deprivation as a result of ignoring their rights in terms of the Constitution, specifically by their own people and group, namely the ANC. It is not a surprise that the secretary of the Young Communist League, Kgabo Moriti54, viewed this with a critical eye, especially the turn of events in South African politics. He says54:12: “We must ask ourselves if we have begun our descent into chaos.”

The seriousness of the misdemeanor by present-day South Africa youths, also caught the attention of the editor53 of The Star forcing him to revisit the past of unrest, anarchy and violence, in order to make sense of our future. He posits53:12:

For a moment it felt like 2002, when Cosas, then led by Jilius Malema , unleashed chaos in the Joburg CBD, leading to loses by pedestrians, vendors and shopkeepers who were mugged and robbed during the rowdy illegal march.

It should not surprise us that high-school children use violence and looting as part of protest. South Africa has an endemic culture of violence and looting in protest. During the days of the Struggle against apartheid, some elements among the protesters used to trash shops and loot during marches.

An editorial50 of the Sunday Times (dated 21 April 2019) tells us the truth and more about the reality that awaits the country50:2:

However, people born in 1994 may not share our joy – mainly because many are unemployed. These 25-year-olds are at the centre of the single biggest challenge SA has faced since 1994: unemployment. According to StatsSA, the youth unemployment rate is higher than any other age group, irrespective of education levels: 52.2% of people aged 15-24, and 35.5%of those aged 25-34, are unemployed – and these figures exclude the young people who have given up looking for work and become a burden on their parents and siblings, or have simply turned to criminal activity.

This brings us back to the sudden start-up of revolutions, especially those of the youth and the single match that usually lights it. For the ANC government to keep up the comprehensive suppression of these outbursts of youth violence, the editor53 of The Star seemingly sees as a solution, the much-needed match to start up revolution, much more serious than the “Malema-2002-uprising” or the 1960s black revolt. He errs when he writes  10th April this year12: “Our government needs to seriously curb this culture, for many a time it undermines the rights to protest and deals a blow to issues that many concerned people protest over.”

He completely misses the point: since 1994, peaceful protests in the first place have brought only false promises given to the black youth from the ANC, as with Ace Magashule’s reassurance to them that55:15: “…their grievances are being given attention”. Secondly, as already indicated, their (and their parents who voted for the ANC) needs, demands and ultimatums are laughed at by the autocratic Marxist ANC-regime, as Magashule’s insincere reaction on the 8th April 2019 in Johannesburg confirms: ongoing empty promises to the youth.

The political analysts like Barney Mthombothi56 — although they despise unrest, riots and violence — understand and respect the drivers of unrest, riots and violence in terms of the mindset of the average South African. They contradict the false insight that South Africa’s psyche is stable after 25 years of “household abuse” by the ANC and that unrest, riots and violence, and thus revolution, is impossible. The “burning of things to show your anger as seemingly the last and only resort” for many are the staple of 2019 politics. The motto that there are no real winners in a strike, riot or revolution, don’t matter for the poor, deprived and rejected persons. Statistics that the South African growth for 2019 is expected only to be 1.3%, with a possible improvement in 2021 to 2%, are not part of their world, because when it was 6% plus, they didn’t benefit from economic growth either.26,50,52,53,56,57

It must be noted that there are other contaminating elements which could play a role in any youth revolution. Firstly, there are the radicals that instrumentalize the unhappiness of the black youths, as we see from the allegations that the ANC youth movement has been behind serious unrest since March-April 2019 in places as Alexandria, Hammanskraal, Orange Grove, Pretoria and Soshanguwe in Gauteng, Khayelitsha, Blackheath, Eersterivier and the Strand in the Western Cape. Here also it seems to be an influx of adult trouble-makers who steer and incite the uprising. This we see too at the April 2019 meeting of Ace Magashule in Parys where the ANC Youth League’s war drums were heard loudly and the ANC seniors sided with the youthful radicals. Julius Malema’s legal and constitutional privilege to declare: “…we will not kill the whites for now” is not so innocent when the planning of anarchy and revolution is the ultimate goal. It must be remembered that Malema publicly said he would take part in a revolution when the situation arises. In addition the war-talk of the BLF is another feature of the political landscape that stands out. Secondly, South Africa is not built on a singular black unity and a singular non-black unity: The black unity is compiled of a very unstable black tribal composition, created by Apartheid, wherein the Zulus and Xhosas are still today regarded as the “superior” tribes. Cyril Ramaphosa and Mtolanthe maybe “Soweto-born”, but they are not of the Zulu- or Xhosa-tribes:  they are from the so-called “Northern tribes”. This “classification” is also applicable to Julius Malema. (note: Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki are Xhosas and Jacob Zuma is a Zulu). Azapo’s creed: “we are pro-black”, is starting to become an insignificant slogan beyond the racial classification and discrimination of the old ethnic reality. Also, the ANC’s erasing of ethnicity and tribalism from its politics is something of the past. When revolution flares up, the tribal reality can steer it to regard the white “tribe” and other “non-black” tribes with equal animosity, but it could well change direction quite quickly to become an extreme black-on-black tribal-driven revolution, like in Rwanda or as during the “First and Second Black Colonisations” of South Africa reflect only too well. The instigators and propagators of revolution can, as during the French Revolution, also unexpectedly become the victims of their fervour.27,34,35,37,38,39,48,52,58-60

Malloch-Brown’s27 notions on the advantages and inevitability of revolution, makes sense. It also makes sense for present-day South Africa.  Most black youth know that under another ANC regime their situation will never improve: Post-2019 could for them become the opportunity to settle and rectify the matter.27

To think that a revolution can and will not ever happen in South Africa is wishful thinking. Above comprehensive and in-depth findings confirm that a post-2019 revolution is not far-fetched. Undoubtedly, the country stands on the brink of a revolution. It is ripe for picking, even overripe. It does not need not another Marikana to start up. And, as in Tunisia and Egypt, when it suddenly comes to an eruption,  will it not only cost the heads of the ANC top brass, but sadly thousands of other people, mostly innocent bystanders, who are unrelated to the 1994 to 2019 ANC’s and the 1948 to 1994 Apartheid regime. And such an outcome can be bloody and unstoppable as in Rwanda.27,35,36,37,39,42,43

3.1.2.1.9. Immense presence of crime, violence, gender-violence and xenophobia in today’s South Africa

When we speak of the presence of unrest and anarchy in the country, is it important to point out that the foundations of it happening have been laid already (See also Article 13). What is important to note in this setup is the absence of a consciousness which is able to differentiate the transgressions of the ordinary citizen (This absence of a consciousness within the ANC elite was already covered in an in-depth study in Articles 11 to 17).

The basically permanent slide of law and order being eroded all over the country — reflected by immense, uncontrollable crime and violence present on the Cape Flats, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and many other places, as well as the presence of extreme highway and railway crime, violence and theft, together with gender- and xenophobic crimes and violence – show how near South Africa is on the path to a collapse into revolution. The basis for doing untold wrongs, as revolution and its murderous deeds often call for, is thus already well-established as a modus operandi with a large contingent of the population.61-73

3.1.2.2. The joker-surprises of history

Louw34 writes that history often brings about unexpected, even strange outcomes. He writes34:239:

The fortunes and misfortunes of nations have in some instances changed even after they had fled or failed, totally contradicting the rules of trustworthy predictions (and even sound thinking!). The impact of extreme world disasters, like earthquakes, pests, new wars, immense famine, new mass migrations, just to mention a few, have in the past had quick and profound impacts on the power of mighty empires or have caused undervalued, small nations’ fate to take a turn for the better.

The possibility remains that the political history of South Africa after 2019 can be one that we never have expected or anticipated, making the issue of land ownership insignificant or at least one eventually resulting in a very successful outcome.  Some determinants which can be roleplayers acting as jokers, need to be enlightened.74-82

3.1.2.2.1. Aids, mass illnesses and pests

The Christian Bible is full of stories of the sudden appearance of known and unknown illnesses and pests that killed off populations in large numbers. The outcomes were often that dynasties, despots and regimes collapsed under the weight of such events. Currently in Africa, Ebola is such a “pest” that, notwithstanding well-organised governmental and healthcare efforts to erase it, seems to have become an unstoppable plague.74,75,80,82

Aids is an illness that has been causing ongoing havoc but it seems it can not be contained, let alone totally erased.  In some countries it has registered a constant increase, notwithstanding healthcare education and medicine to combat it. South Africa unfortunately is caught in a downward Aids spiral. Data shows that in 2002  so much as 4.6 million South Africans were Aids-sufferers. The number 7.97 million was cited in 2019. This represents an increase of 3.37 million in 17 years. The 2019 Aids sufferers form nearly 15% of the country’s total population of 57 million. What is evident is that it is the youth  – who should constitute the base of the future work force and should fuel the growth in GDP, and who must assure the continuation of the nation’s population – has been the most vulnerable in contract the deadly virus.83

Illnesses such as Aids and others can dramatically change – when they become epidemics – a country’s socio-political and economic setup overnight with regard to the numbers of races and the traditional power that these numbers hold in terms of a majority-minority composition assured in a regime.

3.1.2.2.2. Impact of extreme poverty, unemployment and overpopulation

Many economic and political analysts and strategists underscore that there are more or less 30 million poor South Africans (out of a population of 58 million), while more than 17.5 million people, because of their utmost poverty and unemployment, are forced to live as beggars on social grants. This unfortunate poor contingent of people in need of social grants is constantly growing as a result of the growth in unemployment, rising living costs and population growth. The statistics reflect that social grants have grown from 2017 to 2018 by 8%, while the growth in cross tax revenue for the period was only 6%. It can be read from this growing poverty that for 2017/ 2018 there were officially 890 523 job seekers registered, but only 21 076 (2.3%) were placed in jobs or internships. Beyond this registered official jobless rate of 869 447 in 2018, is the mass of jobless people who are not registered. This social-economic chaos has been the result of the country’s high population growth of 1,43 % in 2019, worsening the already high unemployment and poverty.83-88

Growth in official unemployment is confirmed by the data for the first quarter of 2019 at 29% (with some sources putting it near 30%), with the indication that it can further deteriorate. Between 2001 and 2018 the primary sector recorded 484,000 job losses.  The impact of growing poverty, which indicates the presence of hunger for even those with some permanent work too, is pinpointed by Speckman89 when she writes89:3: “…the Pietermaritzburg Economic Justice & Dignity Group’s Household Affordability Index for 2019 showed that a general worker earning the national minimum wage at the 10% exemption level and working full for a 23 days earned  R3,312 per month. Transport and electricity costs accounted for 57% of the wage, leaving R1,425.48 for all other expenses, including food.

The direct impact of poverty, unemployment and overpopulation can bring about a total collapse of the South Africa economy on the one hand, but on the other hand a crisis of starvation and famine. Such outcomes with dire conditions is because of the total degradation that the poor population have to endure for the luxurious lifestyles of the ruler of the day in an effort to survive. An issue as land-ownership quickly becomes a non-starter for these impoverished masses.

3.1.2.2.3. South African climate changes and drought on food production, lifestyle viability and sustainability

The immense impact of climate change, such as extreme temperature fluctuations and droughts can firstly force the issue of land to become a vehicle to create a means of income; and secondly ignite the debate on the use of land to produce food but also question the viability of sustainable lifestyles. Both these issues could eventually lead to famine. The losing battle against hunger can already be read in the negative effect of the countrywide drought. Thus the importance of farm land per se as a means to sustain a living could become obsolete. This could result in waves of people from the rural population taking flight to cities for a living, bringing the need for urban land for homes into the bigger picture.90-96

If recurring droughts are taken into account, especially as a seemingly permanent, natural  phenomenon in South Africa, the arrival of a water scarcity crisis as far as human consumption, agriculture and industrial use is concerned, becomes a given. This can bring about a dramatic change in geopolitics, accompanied by a devastating impact on the already existing mass poverty and unemployment. For an overpopulated country such as South Africa the consequences could be enormous, leaving in its wake an impoverished nation, in which most of the population will be enslaved to the ruler for survival. A water crisis will replace the present political and emotional land-ownership matter and become the population’s foremost concern.90-96

The incoming drought has been confirmed by the SA Weather Service which indicates that the country has experienced drought since 2013 with a continuous uncertainty about when rains will fall. Patrick and Hosken95 write95:11 “This had put the jobs of about a million farm workers at risk, and made the country vulnerable to food and water insecurity, according to agricultural economists and farming associations”; and95:11: “AgriSA said in its 2018/2019 drought report that 31, 000 farming jobs had been lost since January 2018 in the drought hotspots of KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Western Cape, North West, Limpopo and the Northern Cape.”

Patrick and Hosken95 report further95:11: “Water restrictions are in force in some provinces. In the Northern Cape,  water is shut off overnight in its main town, while Eastern Cape premier Oscar Mabuyane this week declared the province a disaster area. Water restrictions are in force in its two metros, Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City.”

The spokesperson of Water Affairs, Sputnik Ratau95, said95:11: “SA is water scarce, so the reality of less than world-average rainfall, rapid urbanisation, climate change, desertification — especially from the west — and rapid population growth cannot be ignored.”

Professor Johan Willemse95, on the effect of the 2019 drought in general on the country, especially on the cost of living which could worsen poverty and hunger, writes:95:11 “We could see a 50% increase in the importing costs of white maize, which will rise from R3,000 per ton to R4,500 per ton. This will cause major meat price increases”.

Also, Patrick and Hosken95, quoting Mervyn Abrahams95 of the Economic Justice and Dignity Group,  report on the rising cost of living as a result of the drought as follows95:11: “…drought was a factor in the cost of the household food basket. It increased by R146.14 (4.8%) from R3,038.50  in October 2018 to R3,184.63 this year.”

Makhosini Mgitywa97, the head of Communication at the Ministry of Human Settlements, Water & Sanitation, writes in the Sunday Times of the 22nd September 201997:26:

The situation is dire and unless we do not do something, as the government and citizens, we will be left with a water shortage situation that will affect  us all, and to an extent never seen before.

SA is among the driest countries in the world but we go on as if we are among the wettest. It’s estimated that in five years’ time we will experience physical water scarcity. Our own department’s projection is that at that time the demand for water will outstrip supply.

Satgar96 writes on the 15th December 2019 in the Sunday Times and Vavi and Lenferna write98 on the 15th September 2019 in the Sunday Times that the climate crisis is already established as fact in the country. It is reflected in the form of sudden flash floods: killing more than 70 people at once and displacing more than 1 500 people, bringing damage at the cost of R1-billion at a time; leaving communities without drinking water or water for agriculture and posing a widespread threat to food security.96,98

Vavi and Lenferna98 reflect98:20:

Studies show that as a result of human-case climate change, SA faces deepening inequality and is already 10%-20% poorer.

Climate change is worsening an already dire situation of deep inequality, poverty and unemployment. The outbreaks of xenophobia violence were the most recent expression of our multifaceted crisis.

The xenophobia attacks are also connected to the climate crisis, because increasing climate impacts are eroding traditional livelihoods and driving people from their homes and increasing migration.

Many wars and revolutions were started because of the need for the three basic resources: water, food and land. Also, on the other hand, it has collapsed wars and revolutions, together with empowering regimes. It has also erased nations from the international scene. Beyond that, the experience of hunger and shortages of water can dramatically change voters to blindly support their failed regime, while thirst and famine could directly lead to revolution.

3.1.2.2.4. Racial assimilation, miscegenation and dissolution

The assimilation and miscegenation of the various races, which started in the Cape in 1652 between whites, blacks, Malays, Indian and Khoi San people, are ongoing today. The 1994 dispensation and the freeing of blacks and Afrikaners from the Apartheid shackles, has  created the impetus for a much deeper assimilation between the South African races while miscegenation seems to be gaining ground. It is possible that full assimilation and miscegenation of races may occur in the next 10 to 20 years. The racial issue around the so-called colour of the land owner could become unimportant because of this miscegenation in which mixed families are created.34

The fact also that the present dominant land owners, namely the whites and specifically the Afrikaners, have been since 1989 in a process of dissolution, could result in them numbering at most 30 000 in a century, and make it unnecessary to pursue land expropriation in the long term, taking farms they own.34,76-78,83,85

3.1.2.2.5. The possible post-2020 democratising of the Electoral Act

For years the South African voters have been caught in an undemocratic voter system which gives the ANC’s party bosses and not the voters the right to select MPs and MPLs through an imbalanced proportional system. This resulted that at present the country is being governed by a very small minority, a powerful ANC clique.47, 99-103

Looting and the appointments of shady figures in municipalities have restarted and is a direct result of this flaw of political accountability demanded from councillors and officials by the electors. Mthombothi104 postulates104:19:

In fact, it’s not even correct to talk about elected officials in our system because we vote for the party, not the individual. This decides which of its members should be elevated to higher office.

The party is given a blank cheque that it uses as it sees fit. That needs to change. Anybody wielding power — from the lowest councillor, to the mayor, to president — should do so by virtue of direct election by the voters.

The private legal action which was started up in 2019 to reform the electoral system and to do away with the present favourable climate for the ANC elite through the election system by means of the court application brought by the New Nation Movement (NNM), a KhoiSan organisation, to change the Electoral Act (Act 73 of 1998) could make provision for the direct election of MPs and MPLs by voters, and if it is at the end successful, it could have a dramatic anti-ANC voter outcome in 2024. So far, the Ramapohosa regime has not shown much support for the change.47,99,101-108

3.1.2.2.6. Lingering impact of nineteen-million passive voters on the 2024-elections

The outcome of the past May 2019 elections highlighted only a participation on national level by 49% of the eligible voters in the elections, of which the ANC only received the votes of  28% of the eligible voters.47,102,109-111

The Institute of Security Studies shows further, comparing the outcomes of the 2014 elections with the 2019 elections, that the ANC is in a permanent downward spiral.  In this free fall must be noted that the ANC has less than a million inscribed members against a total of registered voter population of ±27-million and an eligible voters population of ±37-million.47,99,101-108,112-115

Further statistics show, that as a result of their passivity not to register as voters,  that the 18 to 19 years olds on the voter lists for 2019 is 47% lower than in 2014, while for the age group 20 to 29 the number declined with 9%. Clear dislike and aversion by the youth for the ANC have developed apace since 2014. The youth vote can be devastating for the ANC in 2024.47

The above shows that if a party or a group of integrity can mobilise the 51% of passive voters, the ANC, as well as the DA, can be totally erased in 2024 from the political scene. Mthombothi104, on this immensely positive outcome waiting to be implemented: That is to convince passive voters, writes104:19:

Throughout the turmoil there’s on crucial element that nobody seems even bothered about. The voter is the rock, the foundation on which democracy is built. Yet no-one is talking about him or her. It’s almost as though the voter doesn’t exist or is immaterial to the entire setup. This whole circus therefore brings to the fore the need for electoral reform.

3.1.3. South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)

The analysis and discussion of this article (see headings 3.1.1. to 3.1.2.) will continue in the final article (Article 19) of the series of 19 articles, titled: South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19). The analysis and discussions of Article 19 will be done under the following heading and subheadings:

3.1.3. Advice and suggestions for a post-2019 effective government

3.1.3.1. ANC-DA intertwining
3.1.3.1.1. ANC
3.1.3.1.2. DA
3.1.3.1.3. Perspective on a failed ANC and DA

3.1.3.2. Cutting out the ANC and DA out as future rulers
3.1.3.2.1. The end of political innocence
3.1.3.2.2. Time for political renewal 
3.1.3.2.2.1. The simultaneous practice of autocracy and democracy inside the Constitution
3.1.3.2.2.1.1. The ANC-regime, the judiciary and the possibility of a care-taker administrator
3.1.3.2.3. Time for a new UDF 
3.1.3.2.3.1. Role and position of Whites in a new UDF
3.1.3.2.4. The steps, paths and process of sound future land redistribution 

4. Conclusions

The failed Marxist-Leninist politics of the ANC regime, together with the incompetent leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, has brought South Africa to the brink of disaster. Its economy is in a shambles. A short-term escape route is needed by the Ramaphosa regime. Land grabs are currently the most attractive solution for this ANC regime to deliver some form of capital or money easily to the masses of poor people, as well to give the Ramaphosa elite some credibility again as revolutionaries who are still “freeing” the masses of poor blacks from the shackles of white dominance and from capitalists.

It is clear that not one of the political parties which are active in present-day South Africa, is capable and trustworthy enough to run the country effectively. It is basically impossible for any one of them to deliver on a just and balanced land-redistribution policy.

The troubled land-ownership matter fits well into the many dissatisfactions of the masses of poor and landless people. It holds the potential to motivate them to become involved in immense unrest and anarchy, even revolution, in the immediate future. Furthermore the unbalanced and unjust land-ownership matter in the country is the single best reason available to radicals in the ANC and other political parties, under the cover of revenge on white supremacy and capitalism, to activate a Marxist-Leninist coup. The fact that the ANC is losing its autocratic grip on the country fast and could be ousted in the 2024 elections, makes the probability of a coup a strong possibility in 2020 already.

It is clear that an acceptable solution to the land-ownership matter must be found not later than 2020.

In the final article (Article 19), titled: “South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)”, the land-ownership matter will further be analysed and discussed. An approach and guideline on how the land expropriation process can be activated and steered in an effort to solve the matter, will be offered.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

 

 

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (17: ANC’s troubled leadership)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (17: ANC’s troubled leadership)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Good, great, high-level, leadership, outdated, pretender, troubled, taker.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 7

1. Background

In 2001, Prof Jim Collins1 and a group of academics, known as the Good-To-Great Research Team, published their findings on the eleven companies that made the list of so-called great American companies, in terms of strict and rigid selection prescriptions. This outcome follows a study of the records of 1435 well established and successful so-called good American companies that all appeared on the Fortune 500 list for at least 15 years. These studies show that leadership was the critical feature that distinguished ‘great companies’ from ‘good companies’: The type of leadership associated with transforming a good company into a great one, was their Level 5 leadership, or the highest level leaders. Collins reports:1:20,21,30,35

Compared to high-level leaders with big personalities who made head-lines and become celebrities, the good-to-great leaders seem to have come from Mars. Self-effacing, quiet, reserved, even shy – these leaders are a paradoxical blend of personal humility and professional will. They are more like a Lincoln and than Patton and Caesar. We expected that good-to-great leaders would begin by setting a new vision and strategy. We found instead that they first got the right people on the bus, the wrong people off the bus, and the right people in the right seats – and then figured out where to drive the bus.

Level 5 leaders channel their ego needs away from themselves and into the larger goal of building a great company. It’s not that the Level 5 leaders have no ego or self-interest. Indeed, they are incredibly ambitious – but their ambition is first and foremost for the institution, not themselves.

It is very important to grasp that Level 5 leadership is not just about humility and modesty. It is equally about ferocious resolve, an almost stoic determination to do whatever needs to done to make the company great.

Level 5 leaders look out the window to apportion credit to factors outside themselves when things go well (and if they cannot find a specific person or event to give credit to, they credit good luck). At the same time, they look in the mirror to apportion responsibility, never blaming bad luck when things go poorly.

On the question if a lower level leader can develop to become Level 51, Collins’s answer is clear [which could also guide politicians in South Africa]1:36:

My hypothesis is that there are two categories of people: those who do not have the seed of Level 5 and those who do. The first category consists of people who could never in a million years bring themselves to subjugate their egoistic needs to the greater ambition of building something larger and more lasting than them selves. For these people, work will always be first and foremost about what they get – fame, fortune, adulation, power, whatever – not what they build, create, and contribute.

Considering the slow death of the ANC party, as argued by my previous Article 16 (Outdated ANC) in which I discuss the direct impact of devastating group factions and leader infighting inside the regime and the party, it is clear that the ANC has lacked Level 5 leaders since 1994. First and foremost, the ANC’s leaders are working exclusively towards what they can get – fame, fortune, adulation, power, assets, and not what they can build, create, and contribute to the greater ANC and the people of South Africa.1

The above description by Collins1 is consistent with Thabo Mbeki’s2 warning in October 2017, during his OR Tambo memorial speech. Already then, Mbeki said that the ANC, as a political entity, is coming to an end. Their end is ascribed to the capturing of its’ elite by criminal and political thugs. To better understand the malfunctioning of the present-day ANC under the leadership of criminals, it is important to reconsider Mbeki’s2 message of October 2017 when he said2:23:

In his 1941 presidential address to that year’s ANC national conference, Dr [Alfred Bitini] Xuma said: “To Congress we must be loyal and true. For Congress, we must forget any personal or sectional interests or gain. We must put the cause and the interests of the people begore any expediency…To be true leaders, we must put the interests and welfare of our people above our own”.

Much later, in a December 1955 letter to the ANC, published in January 1956, Dr Xuma said: “Leadership means service for and not domination over others. True and genuine leaders serve the cause of the people and do not expect the cause to serve them or become a source of profit and honour for them”.

Earlier, I said that the ANC now faces the third threat of destruction since its foundation almost 106 years ago. This time that threat emanates from acts of commission originating from within the ANC itself.

As we all know, the ANC gained access to state power from 1994 onwards. It was inevitable that this would happen because of the place which the ANC occupied in the hearts and minds of the majority of our people as their true representative.

However, the challenge which arose with this access to stage power was and is that it could be abused, was and is being abused for purposes of self-enrichment. This means that the ANC contains within its ranks people who are absolutely contemptuous of the most fundamental values of the ANC, at whose centre is a commitment selflessly to serve the people.

These are people who only see the ANC as a stepladder to enable them to access state power for the express purpose of using that access for self-enrichment.

By definition these are people who are card-carrying members of the ANC but who have completely repudiated the value system which inspired Oliver Tambo throughout his life.

Part of the national tragedy in this regard is that the ANC recognised the emergence of this immensely negative phenomenon quite early after 1994.

The fact of the matter is that during the last two decades the ANC has failed to do the two things which Nelson Mandela mentioned in 1997 – to purge itself of the mercenaries who had joined its ranks and to make it difficult for such elements to join the movement.

This means that the historic value system of the ANC has become so corrupted that its replacement, that is unprincipled access to political power and the related corrupt self-enrichment, has in fact become the norm within the organisation.

Necessarily and logically, the qualitative change I have mentioned — arising from the failure to defeat the process of the increase in the numbers of those remained in the ranks of the ANC for selfish and corrupt reasons as described by Nelson Mandela – would in the end also affect the composition and quality of the very leadership of the movement.

I have sought to suggest that the negative situation currently affecting and characterising the ANC will, unless it is addressed correctly and immediately, sooner rather than later result in the destruction of the ANC.

The presence of the so-called Takers inside the ANC and their immense empowerment are prominent in Mbeki’s2 speech, such as the Arms Deal and other instances of the excessive state capture that transferred R1-trillion to the pockets of prominent ANC elite and their intimate cronies (which echoes Collins’s1 description of the defected characters of some leaders). Mike Boon3, in his book “The African Way”, has been skeptical of the ANC as long ago as 1996; he shows the derailing of morality of the ANC’s leaders and their values, principles and intentions, as well as their cognitive tilt towards corruption and criminality. Boon3 writes3:104: “Mature leadership dictates that we routinely and constantly attempt to employ people who are more capable than us or who, at the very least, have the potential to be. If this does not happen, the organization will, over the years, gradually slip into mediocrity and disappear”. Evidence of this negative outcome is the ANC’s incapable and crooked opportunistic leaders that have, since 1994, destroyed the soul of the ANC to promote their own corrupt interest.

The persons that Boon3 identifies as the “Takers” are well-positioned today in the ANC elite. Boon3 reflects3:48,50,51:

But there is a dark and utterly destructive cloud to the Third [developing] World: a massive movement of individuals turning their backs on their traditions and discipline and, in so doing, the closeness of community and ubuntu. They replace it, not with the best of the First [developed] World, but often with the very worst. They are self-serving and care nothing for the community other than what it can deliver to them personally. They seek to take, not to give or share. Many of these people have managed to educate themselves very well. They know how to manipulate Westerners and how to use, to their own ends, their once-upon-a-time tribe. They are part of the Third World but they also exist in the First World. We shall call this group the “Takers”. Takers have neither integrity nor discipline. They serve the dollar-god of power and will do anything for it.

Why have there been so many one-party states and coup after coup? The reason is that, in the past, many African leaders been totally and unapologetically self-serving. Yet the First World does not view Africa as different from itself for fear of discrimination. It is fundamentally different  because Third World Africa, which is largely led by Takers, has no discipline. It is not governed according to the same ethics and values as either the First World or the tribal worlds, and therefor does not respond to them.

It is the blatant rape of these fragile societies by fellow Africans that makes the issue more repugnant. The Third World Takers are far more insidious and warped than the colonists ever were, yet this is exactly the behaviour and attitude for which colonial settlers were criticized and expelled. The Takers obviously learnt their appalling, self-serving lessons well!

The corruption of the politics of the ANC needs to be understood and reflected on. The activities and functioning of the four top leaders of the ANC will be reflected on in the next subdivision: 3.3.1: ANC’s troubled leadership.

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 16)

Article 17 is a continuation of the previous article 16, titled: “Critical in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (16: Outdated ANC)”. This article is in sequence with articles 11 to 16, which were already published on the ANC. The intention is also to analyse and discuss further the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity the ANC and its ability to execute land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.2. Aims of article 17 (Continued from Article 16)

The primary intention of this project on the ANC is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by specifically describing the profile of the ANC on the same basis as was done by Article 9 on the EFF and Article 10 on the DA.

In this article, the primary aim is to determine how the ANC leadership and organisation, as well as the ruling of the ANC regime as the mandated ruler of South Africa, has been affected by the corrupted ideas of some of the ANC elite.

2. Method (Continued from Article 16)

This research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence, as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often no established body of research, as is the case with a discussion on the abilities of political parties to successfully employ land reformation from 2019 onward. The sources include articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that may guide one in making an evaluation of the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to successfully employ land-reform from 2019.

The research findings have been presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

In this article, the public referees of the African National Congress will further be reflected, evaluated and described in the division that follows, 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019. The focus is to reflect on the leadership and organisation of the ANC. 

3.2. Louw Appraisal Checklist

The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,4 will be used once more, for the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC. The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s’ manifesto and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees it applicable.

3.3. The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 16)
3.3.1. ANC’s troubled leadership
3.3.1.1. Post-2017 ANC top leaders

To make a conclusive decision on the integrity and quality of the contemporary leadership of the ANC is very difficult, as extremes manifest; in terms of the media’s profiling of some leaders as anointed, whilst others are labelled as crooks without an objective division. The lack of prosecution of a large portion of the ANC elite who were implicated by the various judicial commissions tells a story of a culture of criminality. These alleged culprits’ aggressive denial of all these testimonies against them, with the sole intent to besmirch the ANC leadership, makes it very problematic to profile its top leaders in terms of morality and virtue, etc.7-16

Perhaps an appropriate anecdote is the well-known American mobster, Vincent Teresa10, and the ease with which he describes another mobster in terms of virtuous acts versus evil acts. He writes on mobster habits, dressing, opportunism, thinking10:292:

If you’re on a plane sitting next to a mob guy, you’ll probably never know. Nine times out of ten, when a mob guy is travelling alone, he’ll sleep or just lay there with eyes closed, because he don’t want to bother with anybody. If he should happen to talk with you, he’ll talk about everything but the mob. He’ll say he’s in the food produce business. Unless he’s a clown, he’ll dress very conservatively, dark clothes, white shirt, hair well trimmed, like a businessman out of Wall Street except maybe his features might be a little tougher looking. His nails will be nice and manicured and polished.

The one way you can tell a mob guy is that his clothes will always match. His shoes will always match his socks, and his socks will always match his suit, and his tie and hat will always match the outfit he’s got on. In fact, the overcoat will probably be made from the same material the suit is made of. They dress very, very well. It’s not that they’re flashy; it’s just that everything they’re wearing is money.

There are a couple of mob peculiarities I’ve still got myself. Number One is big tipping. And Number Two is that you always want the best of everything. Like I always wanted the best seats in the house…

The NPA’s treatment of former state security minister Bongani Bongo can possibly brings us closer to a general understanding of the ANC’s leadership’s quality and integrity. Began on the 21st November 2019, the information around Bongo’s criminal prosecution may allow a deeper look into the life of a corrupt politician, or a Teresa-esque profile of a criminal. Notwithstanding the NPA’s action to prosecute Bongo, it must be clear that many of the corrupt ANC leaders, coming from 1994 and still very active in the ANC elite, will never sit in a cell or will even be suspected by the Hawks and the NPA. In contrast, they may only climb into higher positions inside the ANC.

The alleged Bongo-leadership fiasco can aid us in profiling leaders of the ANC in the future. Admittedly, though, the insight into a reliable criminal profile of the corrupt ANC elite is minimal; insofar that is it only an accusation against Bongo and not a conviction. The writing of the editor12 of the Sunday Times on the 24th November gives us at least some hope of the possibility to profile bad ANC leaders versus good ANC leaders somewhere in the future. The following information on the Bongo case must be noted in the context of the current chaos around the ANC leadership12:20:

When former state security minister Bongani Bongo stood in the dock on Thursday morning, his worst nightmare had come true. Two years after advocate Ntuthuzelo Vanara laid a charge of attempted bribery against him, Bongo was finally brought before court to answer to the allegation as that he tried to influence the outcome of the parliamentary probe into alleged corruption at Eskom. He was in Cuba when police summoned him, apparently receiving treatment for suspected poisoning. He was made to sit in a cell like a criminal suspect that he is.

Bongo and the rest of the corrupt elements in the radical economic transformation faction of the ANC have gotten away with so much that they never imagined the long arm of the law will ever reach them. It’s been a long, frustrating wait for those who want to see the law takes it course. Individuals with dark clouds of corruption over their heads continue to occupy positions of influence in the ANC and the government.

The lack of a trustworthy profile of the quality and integrity of the overall ANC elite forces this article to limit the evaluation and description of its top four leaders. In the next subdivision, the leaderships of Ace Magashule, David Mabuza, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa discussed respectively.

3.3.1.1.1. Ace (ES) Magashule

Inside the current struggle for leadership in the ANC, it is important to note Ace Magashule’s unkind public comments on President Cyril Ramaphosa. These comments reflect a well-masked intention to erase Ramaphosa from the future of ANC politics, if the radical ANC members obtain the upper-hand in the greater ANC between 2019 and 2024 (in Article 16, under the subdivisions 3.3.1.3: Post-2019 ANC faction-infights and 3.3.1.4: ANC leadership-infights, the activities of Magashule in contemporary ANC politics are described and discussed in-depth, specifically those against Ramaphosa).5-11 This subdivision will therefore only shortly discuss Magashule as a top ANC leader.

Ideologically, it seems as if Magashule’s leadership is hindered by the unbroken principle within the ANC that the ANC is bigger than the country and certainly bigger than the individual. Cyril Ramaphosa, therefore, is less important to  Magashule than the ANC at large. Leon5 writes on an unexpected insight here5:18: “…the direct and dangerous consequence of the Soviet idea that the ruling party is the vanguard of the people and its direct acts are cleansed by its immutable understanding of the needs of the masses”, is and was always part of Magashule’s promotion of the ANC’s aims. This is confirmed by his emphasis that the 2017 resolutions by the ANC’s national conference on land redistribution without compensation, and the nationalising of the Reserve Bank, are priorities that must be executed in 2019/2020.

The true socioeconomic and political dogma that inform Ace Magashule and the ANC’s politburo beliefs, actions and practices, seems to have never entered the greater part of the public consciousness, nor the ideologies of many political analysts and commentators. The ANC’s politics were and have always been dangerous for exclusive capitalism and Western ideas of democracy. Discussing Magashule’s ideas also clearly invalidates the belief held by most of the South African democrats and the white exclusive capitalists; that the current ANC-regime is well-functioning and well-disposed towards them. Promoting the standing of white people was never Magashule’s intention and will not be his as long he is in the ANC. Magashule’s main intention is to unabashedly continue the radical Freedom Charter’s nationalisation of land, mines and banks (an intention which was temporarily curbed by Nelson Mandela in order to begin the 1994 dispensation but is now ripe for Magashule to restart).6-11

If the ANC is successful in renewing their political power under Ace Magashule after 2024, serious problems await the public and private sector, the economy and specifically white people. The editor9 of the Sunday Times writes a warning on the 28th of July 20199:18: “…one gets the impression that while Ramaphosa and his ministers clean up the state and do their best to deliver a better life for all who live in SA, others in the ANC will not have any of it”.

In this context, the editor9 of the Sunday Times called Magashule and his delinquent cronies at Luthuli-house (captured by outdated soviet-communism) an “unelected cabal”. He writes9:18:

And at Luthuli House, a swelling band of malcontents, led by ANC secretary-general Ace Magashule, with little better to do than place booby traps in Ramaphosa’s path, seems happy to lay the groundwork for a dramatic reversal of the clean-up gains by removing him at the party’s national general council meeting next year.

All of which one wondering why we bother with democracy, elections, and even a constitution, when you have quasi-comical figures like Carl Niehaus and cronies running the political show in the background.

Unelected and accountable to no-one they would name in public, this band of malcontents  erodes the small but steady gains that Ramaphosa may be making.

Magashule’s presence as a dominant leader in the ANC’s politburo after 2020 will potentially mean great problems for South African law and order.

3.3.1.1.2.  David (DD) Mabuza

There are many other general initiatives that aim to isolate the leadership of Ramaphosa from the main stream of the ANC’s voters and supporters.10-16 David Mabuza has become a prominent example of a member that has begun to gain power as a third force inside the ANC. In this context, Marrian17 writes17:3: “To further complicate matters, Mabuza and ANC treasurer Paul Mashatile are being whispered about as a ‘third’ faction’ in the ANC, but the pair have thus far been adept at keeping in line with Ramaphosa’s vision.”

Mkokeli18 points out Mabuza as the “cat” in contemporary ANC politics, and with good reason: Mabuza is a dangerous political figure with a track record alleged to rival even Jacob Zuma’s criminal history. To Mkokeli18, Mabuza is in the same league as Ace Magashule and Supra Mahumapelo, specifically as they share the same brutal style of leadership and politics that quashes dissidence and is feared by opponents in and outside of the ANC. These three figures were the foundation on which Jacob Zuma had first begun to build his empire. Zuma won their loyalty by aiding them in their days as premiers of various Provinces to create their own corrupted network of political power, the so-called Premier League.18

Mabuza is, after Ace Magashule and Cyril Ramaphosa, the most powerful politician in the country. In reality, he is symptomatic of the greater malaise afflicting our politics. More precisely, he is an antithesis of the “New Dawn” associated with Ramaphosa. Political analysts indicate that it is not only Ace Magashule who can become the ANC’s candidate, post May 8 2019. Mabuza must not be under-estimated in Ramaphosa’s future downfall or in the further breakdown of the ANC from 2020 on.7,18,19

Mabuza’s political power play is difficult to approach, well-planned and has the potential to be devastating to the future positions of Magashule and Zuma. Ntyintyane20 warned readers about the impact of Mabuza in the future. In May 2019, he writes20:6:

The Cat lives on. Once again David Mabuza is trying to dictate the terms of Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidency. He claims to have made him the president of the ANC.

It is not the first time The Cat has become the narrative. At the last ANC elective conference, Mabuza outwitted Sun Tzu himself – that is, former president Jacob Zuma’s camp. The same Zuma who toyed with Thabo Mbeki as if he was Lionel Messi.

You underestimate Mabuza at your peril. In Mpumalanga he made Mathews Phosa irrelevant and outdated.

Mabuza is undoubtedly waiting to take the presidency of South Africa. It must be noted that all the ANC state presidents were first deputy presidents of the ANC. This makes making Mabuza, as much as Magashule, the ANC crown-prince for the presidential inheritance in the post-May 2019 ANC regime.7,18

Although Mabuza denies any alliance with either the Ramaphosa or the Magashule factions, he is described as undoubtedly having ties to the Magashule faction for opportunistic reasons.7,18,19

Not only does Mabuza shows a kind of “Zupta-radicalism”, but his political preferences seems to be more or less the same as Magashule’s and Zuma’s: to disassociate from the rule of law and order, and to nullify the ANC’s top leaders’ criminality thus far in order to support the corrupt ANC’s unity and empowerment at the cost of the ordinary South African.7,18,19

On the 28th April 2019, the editor7 of Rapport reflects on Mabuza’s specific corrupt political affiliations with Zuma when it reports7:1: “Hy het te velde getrek teen die kommissie van ondersoek wat pres. Cyril Ramphosa aangewys het om ondersoek in te stel na staatskaping en die misbruik van staatsinstellings soos die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens en die nasionale vervolgingsgesag.”

Mabuza, other than Magashule and Zuma, does not openly attack Ramaphosa. Mabuza has been silent during the “Ramaphoria” of the last 19 months, or the public lauding of Ramaphosa. His silence has left him out of the immediate conflict inside the greater ANC and the country, with Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule being vocal in public. Mabuza, according to Mkokeli18, has only chosen the Ramaphosa-camp in order to avoid outright disorder in the ANC, leading up to 2024. This theory implies that his ties are temporary, before turning against Ramaphosa in time for the elections. In this estimation, Mabuza might see Ramaphosa as only a figurehead, running out of political power. Mkokeli, reflect on Mabuza’s temporary affiliation with Ramaphosa18:19“Mabuza wanted someone who could give the ANC a longer shelf life so that at the right time, he will be able to claim his inheritance.” 

At times, Mabuza openly differs from Ramaphosa, which seems to be a challenge and irreconcilable with his supposed loyalty. Mabuza’s public comments are often rife with disrespect, such as when replying to Finance Minister Tito Mboweni’s opinions on serious issues such as the privatisation of SOEs, when he says22:2: “I don’t really take the minister of finance seriously when he makes comments”. Comments such as these seem to be political attacks. Furthermore, that Mabuza was not reprimanded by Ramaphosa, is telling. Some political analysts speculate that Ramaphosa is totally “gridlocked” by his fear for the slow growth of Mabuza’s support and his faction.21,22

As the ANC’s political landscape develops in the year 2020, Mabuza’s true intention may become clear and bring about a political re-positioning of the Magashule-Zuma camp and the so-called “rogues” of the ANC’s top members.18

3.3.1.1.3. Jacob Zuma

Upon reading contemporary political opinions in the media, one clear message emerges; that Jacob Zuma must be erased from the political sphere of South Africa entirely. His actions are often described as amoral, even evil. Dreyer23 writes23:1: “Zuma operated in this twilight zone of lies, danger and double lives. Psychologists have observed that agents can become subtly detached or separated from other people, even when they resume normal lives. Zuma’s appearance at the Zondo commission this week revealed the degree to which the murky sphere of espionage and counter-espionage has engulfed his world.”

Munusamy24 emphasises this presence of serious psychopathology in Zuma’s court, when she writes24:20: “…lunatics will continue to dictate the discourse and sabotage our country”.

On the 21st July 2019, the editor25 of Beeld writes that Zuma25:2: “…is ‘n ANC-karikatuur want sy gedrag is ‘n karikatuuragtige oordrywing van gedrag wat ook elders in die party goed gevestig is”.

The words of the former secretary-general of the ANC, Cheryl Carolus26, can possibly become dangerous to her political standing and safety in the future, after she labelled Zuma as follows26:4: “Zuma will do or say anything to protect himself. The man is an immoral, amoral, spineless thug.”

Contrary to the public removal of Zuma from the formal ANC politics, some evidence indicates that Zuma aims to not only recover political power behind the screens, but he that he also aims to regain the party loyalty that he lost to Ramaphosa and his cronies. Zuma seems to remain a treat to the fragile power of the current leaders of the ANC.26

Many political commentators argue that Jacob Zuma’s ousting from the formal ANC politics, after December 2017, means that his power was lost and that he is a figure of the ANC’s past. Evidence show that Zuma’s popularity has remained and even seems to be growing.25-35

The mounting tensions between the so-called “factions” of Zuma and Ramaphosa seem to manifest more and more often. The aim, it seems, is for Jacob Zuma’s loyal followers and cronies to nullify all of Ramaphosa’s political power no later than the end of 2020. Zuma’s large group of intimate and trusted cronies are people with unusual skills that have been following Zuma since the pre-May 2017 period, and are also still active and supporting him discreetly.36

Munusamy36 reflects on the Zuma loyalists’ heavy, problematic impact on contemporary South African politics. Munusamy writes36:20:

Former president Jacob Zuma also needed unusual skills set around him. He required ministers, key officials in the state, political allies and body men who were blindly faithful, who would readily implement the instructions of the Guptas, and who would defend him to the hilt even when he violated the constitution.

Evidence being reeled out at the Zondo commission shows how the state was “repurposed” and institutions paralysed so that Zuma’s various benefactors could plunder at will.

There is no doubt that many ANC MPs and MPLs that are aligned to the Zuma, Magashule and Mabuza factions, who have become entangled in corruption allegations, are now back in the Parliament. These same members, whose conduct show a shocking lack of integrity are also contributing to provincial legislatures for the sixth administration, as well. These tainted law-makers are clearly not invested in Ramaphosa’s success or in good politics.37-41

Besides the fact that Zuma was the previous secretary-general of the ANC (as was Ramaphosa), he was also the chief of the ANC’s external and internal security and intelligence, and head of Mbokodo, the intelligence centre of the ANC. With these credentials, Zuma is well-known to be highly informed on some of the contemporary ANC political leaders. Especially the information on these ANC member’s corrupt political associations with the Apartheid regime is highly valuable, as these members could have been paid blood money in exchange for ANC secrets. Zuma has allegedly already used this information to create suspicions around his opponents in the ANC, like ANC stalwarts and former ministers Ngoako Raatlhodi, Siphiwe Nyanda and Derek Hanekom. Furthermore, Zuma allegedly has a list of spies that he is threatening to release at a strategic time. Ramaphosa may also be targeted, as Lekota was, in Parliament. Ramaphosites may face the choas of Zuma exposing more so-called “secrets” in the next five to six months, regarding the alleged traitors in the ANC. At this stage, Zuma can afford to wreak havoc in ANC with his information; it may gain him immense political power and give him a chance to, against all odds, reclaim his position as the ANC’s top leader.23,25,26,30,32,34,35,42-46

For many political analysts, the so-called “Zuma-cobra” has been hibernating since 2017 and is now beginning to lift its head to strike. It is public knowledge that Zuma intends to derail not only the Ramaphosa regime and Ramaphosa as a leader, but also the country as a whole, with the aim of committing another immense state capture.17,37-40 

Many political analysts underestimate Jacob Zuma’s current political power, and thereby the ability to pose a threat to President Cyril Ramaphosa and to radically reform the South African political landscape before 2024. Although Zuma has lost his political power to call official press conferences at this stage, this does not means he is isolated from his contingency of loyal followers. Even after being publicly rejected from politics for the last nineteen months, new forms of media allow for direct attacks of the “Ramphosa ANC”. His effective use of Twitter since November 2018 confirms this; his handle, @PresJGZuma, and his widely read tweets might seem unimportant to some, but not to his cronies and his seemingly growing “crowd” of followers. This heightens the contrast between Ramaphosa’s unstable position and the Zuma-Magashule camp, inside the 2019 to 2024 South African and the greater ANC politics.48

Firstly, employing Twitter as a communication method has helped Zuma to overcome his initial isolation by the Ramaphosa faction. Secondly, Twitter offers him the opportunity to test his shifting popularity with the “Nation”. His first tweet in January 2018 was shared 10 000 times and was favourited 29 000 times. His total tweets thus far have amassed more than 222 000 followers in 15 months. Of the 64 tweets Zuma posted, he has an average of 1 720 re-tweets and 6 567 favourites. If Twitter can be read as indicative of follow interest, Ramaphosa’s twitter activity does not compare well with Zuma’s. Ramaphosa, who joined Twitter in January 2015, has 450 000 followers over 38 months, until March 2019. These statistics reflect an average of only 11 841 followers per month for Ramaphosa against Zuma’s average of 14 800 followers per month. Taking into account Zuma’s immense political and social isolation, thoroughly implemented by the Ramaphosa clan, his twitter support seems to indicate that he is still a strong contender for the top leadership position of the greater ANC in post-2019 South Africa.40,48-52 

 

The fact that Zuma has 2 958 followers per month more than Ramaphosa, confirms that Zuma is still very popular with the ordinary public; if not more so than Ramaphosa. This “measure of popularity” was a very important indicator for Jacob Zuma and his cronies when they returned to politics after May 2019. Zuma is aware of his popularity and the accompanying Zuma populism, as he reflects in his first interview48:8: “Hello, everyone. I have decided to move the times – to join this important area of conversation. Because I hear that many people are talking about me and many other calling themselves Zuma in many ways.

A prominent example of Zuma’s clear tweets on important political issues, as opposed to Ramaphosa’s vague and indecisive political policy, was his clear political stand in January 2019. In a two-part video on land expropriation (a topic that he had rarely addressed in his nine years as president), Zuma lays out his ideas. The videos intended to influence the large group of poor and landless black people to develop the belief that Zuma is “their only saviour and a president of integrity”, and that he will follow through on the land that was promised, taken from white people after May 2019. Coetzee48, after analysing Zuma’s speech in the video, discusses the radical political intentions of Zuma and how different this approach is from Ramaphosa’s insecure politics. Coetzee48 writes48:8: “With a view seemingly more aligned to the nationalisation policies of the Economics Freedom Fighters, Zuma referred to ‘developed European countries’ where, he said, property is nationalised by the state and leased to the people.”

Zuma is still very active on Twitter. The recent attack on Zuma by Shoba130, where he writes on the phenomenon of Zuma’s presence in the media growing parallel to his ever-diminishing status in the ANC, seems to be incorrect. Zuma has not faced any consequences as serious as the alleged sacking of the eThekwini and Msunduzi mayors Zandile Gumede and Themba Njilo, or the difficulties of the Sihle Zikalala-led ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, for example. It is likely that Zuma will send out more cryptic Twitter posts and gain more attention around political developments that harm Ramaphosa’s reputation. In addition to Zuma overshadowing Ramaphosa on Twitter, Zuma’s following also seems to be very positive towards him. This may also indicate that Ramaphosa will be unprepared in 2020, during the ANC’s meeting that “looks back from 2019 to 2020”. Political commentators argue that it will likely be problematic for Ramaphosa if he is re-elected as the ANC’s president from 2022 to 2024, without taking note of Zuma’s influence. Some of the signs of this danger is the way in which the so-called combined Zuma-Magashule faction has easily neutralised the Ramaphosa faction in the Western Cape,  since August 2019. The Zuma-Magashule faction has also been standing strong since May 2019, in the general ANC structures. With Zuma’s appointment of pro-Zuma-Magashule favourites in the Parliament and various parliamentary and provincial committees, it would seem as if Ramaphosa has taken a back seat in politics, whilst Zuma is in control.53,54

South Africans must be mindful of the intentions (as well as immense political power) of Jacob Zuma and his cronies’ future plans. Their singular strategy is to demolish Ramaphosa. In this context, it must be remembered that Jacob Zuma never does anything without a careful plan, or free from corruption, making the unstable and failed politics of pre-2019 a blue-print for post-2019 South Africa, especially if the Magashule-Zuma clan take over the Ramaphosa-regime.48,55,56

It is utmost correct to say that the combined Zuma-Magashule faction is preparing to take on Ramaphosa and to scheme him out of the presidency. The use of the politburo is the most obvious choice. The editor45 of the Sunday Times may be right when he writes on Jacob Zuma’s approach for the post-2019 politics, on the 23rd July 201945:18:

While he leads the theatrics from the front, it is those working in the shadows, behind the scenes, who we should most be worried about. Zuma and his fan club in the ANC never accepted defeat. When their candidate, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma lost at Nasrec, they grudgingly conceded. But those in the know say instead of demobilising and rallying behind the newly elected leadership, they have regrouped in dark corners and are mapping a cunning way to recapture the ANC and, by extension, the state.

The political analyst Eric Naki’s57 detailed description of the “yet to be reborn” Jacob Zuma needs to be reflected on to understand his present day strength and seemingly “anointed” political “rebirth”, that has the potential to make Cyril Ramphosa’s presidency more and more unstable.  Naki57 quotes Xolani Dube57, on the seemingly anointed political survivor Jacob Zuma and his political plans for post-2019 South Africa57:6:

The man creates not only a crisis but a catastrophe for the ANC and the entire country. But he manages to swim out of the net because he is no fool.”

The man is a chess game player, he is able to fool everybody who believes he is a fool. He is not a fool but is very smart.

Even the bruising legal wrangles between Public Protector Busiswe Mkhwebane and President Cyril Ramaphosa and his Public Minister Pravin Gordhan is seen as an extension of the infighting.

“Ramaphosites” like ANC chairperson Gwede Mantashe and SA Communist Party (SACP) deputy general secretary Solly Mapaila accused Mkhwebane of involving herself in ANC matters.

The SACP and civil society groups like the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation see a political agenda in Mkhwebane’s actions and as part of the Zuma group fightback.

Zuma created a catastrophe not only for the ANC but for SA. He is a man of the stage and on every stage that he stood, he has new supporters, he is a man who can incarnate himself.

Jacob Zuma has never strayed from Marxist-Leninist socialism. He grew up and developed in it; it remains his sole motivator. Indeed, the editor52 of Beeld describes Zuma’s behaviour, the ANC and Ramaphosa, and unintentionally acknowledges the rigid existence of democratic centralism and Marxist-Leninist socialism in the radical politics of Zuma and the ANC (which Ramaphosa also follows), over the last decades. This is prominent when he writes52:2: “Zuma se verdediging van se kaderontplooïngskomitee voor Zondo…het gewys dat Zuma bloot ANC-dogma korrek verwoord. Want ook die sogenaamde hervormingsgesindes in die party – insluitende pres. Cyril Ramaphosa self – onderskryf steeds die ANC se beleid dat lojale kaders in sleutelposte ontplooi moet word.”

For Zuma, the ANC cannot change: its ideology of yesteryear informs it today. Without its Marxist-Leninist ideology, there is no ANC, no Jacob Zuma and, most of all, no Cyril Ramaphosa. More so, without its corrupted and autocratic politburo (and its corrupted cadre-deployment committee) alone in charge of the Marxist-Leninist ANC and the country, is there no place for Zuma (and Ramaphosa) in the contemporary politics of South Africa. It is in this context that Zuma’s may turn the ANC away from Ramaphosa by smearing him as anti-Marxist-leninist.33,44

Many ANC MPs and MPLs are still aligned to Jacob Zuma, making him a strong partner in the Magashule and Mabuza factions. Ramaphosa can expect vicious attacks on all levels in 2020.37-41

3.3.1.1.4. Cyril Ramaphosa

Cyril Ramaphosa stand central in the current political climate of South Africa, as the state president and “Number One” of the ANC. The question remains if these positions of Ramaphosa are stable.

More so than Magashule, Mabuza and Zuma, an in-depth evaluation and discussion on Cyril Ramaphosa as the president of the ANC and of the South African State will be undertaken.

3.3.1.1.4.1. Introduction

The biggest mistake Cyril Ramaphosa, as president of the ANC, has made after his election in December 2017 (and which is rooted in his installment as President of South Africa), was not to do a comprehensive analysis of the preceded process and outcomes of his election. Taking the obstructions and resistance that Ramaphosa currently experiences into account, Ramaphosa is hindered not only as president of the country, but also as the president (leader) of the ANC. Majoko58 writes on this error58:12:

The biggest mistake that President Cyril Ramaphosa’s faction made on winning the ANC’s presidential campaign in December 2017 was to underestimate the size and viciousness of an already evident fightback campaign from those who benefitted from state capture.

But being astute to win a party election is no guarantee for long-term survival. And that is what is coming back to bite Ramaphosa now, the temporary friends that assured his ascendency to the highest office are not there backing him right now against the current fightback

The five questions that Ramaphosa should have asked himself before his inauguration as state president in 2019 are59-64:

1) Would his winning as the president of the ANC and South Africa had realised if the alleged R500-millions of donations were absent in his campaign, seeing that he won with a small majority of votes (179) out of the total of ±4 000 votes of the ANC representatives at the 2017 Nasrec-Conference, which leaves him a very insignificant and disempowered leader-figure in the greater ANC;

2) Was it not voting-buying with the deliberate separation of his so-called “voter-supporters” on his costs at hotels as well as his paying of their other costs?;

3) Is the ANC’s autocratic and despotic way of selection not only the president of the ANC but also that of the State by only ±4 000 (±2%) representatives out of a more and less 1-million ANC-members and a total of ±37-million eligible voters, not the direct reason for the ongoing failure of the post-May 2019 South African state under the ANC as a regime and the sole reason of the present bitterly conflict in the ANC?;

4) Would the election of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as presidents of the ANC and the State in 2017 not resulted in a much-better post-May 2019 ANC and South Africa;

5) Were the intrigues and plotting behind the doors in the steering of the votes for Ramaphosa and the fine foot-work by Cat Mabuza via his cronies to support Ramaphosa at the end of the voting, not responsible that the wrong leader for the ANC emerged after the 18th December 2019?

There is strong doubt that Ramaphosa, as a Marxist-Leninist, will honestly answer to any of these questions; it would not be in line with his politburo policy wherein he and his comrades at the top of the ANC have the exclusive power on behalf of the entire population [which implies a departure from democracy]. Basically, five honest answers by Ramaphosa could mean his downfall.

In short: Ramaphosa‘s CR 17 election campaign and his election in December 2017 were both controversial, making his present leadership of the ANC, as well as his presidency of South Africa, also controversial. Indeed, it seems as if the present disapproval by many ANC members and black people can be seen as similar to the conflicting views around HF Verwoerd, John Vorster and PW Botha.

To be frank, Ramaphosa’s popularity with the white population is also declining considerably. This is because they first mistook his political ideology as being positive towards Western democracy and capitalism. Instead he, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma, are all experienced Marxist-Leninists. For many political analysts and commentators to “beg” Ramaphosa in public and ask him to “to rid the ANC of Magashule in order to establish Ramaphosa politics”, is misguided, therefore. He cannot do it; if he removes Magashule, he endangers his own role as the main player in contemporary politics. Importantly, there does not seem to be a will to reform the party. Ramaphosa is not invested in finding a new political or economic order to make the country democratic and exclusively capitalistic. Neither is it Ramaphosa’s intention to bring inclusive capitalism into the ordinary public sphere; instead he is pitted against the hidden intentions of the ANC’s politburo in their strive to obtain and to keep riches and power exclusively for themselves. The Ramaphosa versus Magashule conflict stems from the desire for leadership in the ANC, and not a Marxist-Leninist ideological conflict. The conflict is also a personal one; they both strive for self-empowerment and are extremely ambitious, and certainly motivated and driven by their excessive, inflated egos. What both missed, however, is that the ANC is a horse that does not like an inexperienced and overweight rider on its back: both Ramaphosa and Magashule are such “riders” and both can fall off in the near future.65

The personal conflict over Ramaphosa or Magashule leadership is supported by various groups, factions and clans. Their support stem mostly from opportunistic reasons, such as seeing which one of the two shall become chief (and therefore their “ally”) of the ANC. Inside the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the ANC, all kinds of foul play are present. The ever-present Marxist-Leninist idea remains: ANC principles are greater than Ramaphosa and Magashule, Zuma or Mabuza as personal figures. It seems that all of the individuals in the ANC, including the leaders, knows this well and respects it.

3.3.1.1.4.2. Anointed ANC and a messianic Ramaphosa as saviour of South Africa

The cliché in the media is that18:19 “Ramaphosa has a magic wand that will fix the moribund ANC and sort out all our problems, from economics to racial tension”, and has become central in the propaganda of the ANC’s populists when advocating for their so-called economic restructuring of post-2019 South Africa under Ramaphosa.18

Indeed, the persona of Cyril Ramaphosa is seen by many economic and political commentators, as well as a great part of the public, to be the saviour of the ANC that will drive the ANC into good governance. He is perceived as someone who is going to save South Africa, and sometimes discussed with strong religious undertones. This opinion is supported by many political analysts.13,18,59-64,66,67

Tabane68 refers to the so-called “Ramaphosa the saviour”, as follows68:1:

… the exceptional CR – the Ramaphosa that exists in the imagination of many. He’s the man who will clean up corruption, ensure that former president Jacob Zuma and his cronies are sent to jail, defeat secretary-general Ace Magashule, get Public Protector Busiswe Mkhwebane removed from office and yes, create millions of jobs for the millions of unemployed South Africans.

CR feels like someone who has just landed from Mars and is about to wave his magic wand and free us all from our collective misery, which includes the threefold challenge of poverty, unemployment and inequality.

The ANC’s corrupted elite has optimised the Ramaphosa leadership and regime to their benefit. For Mthombothi69, Ramaphosa became a handy tool for the contemporary greater ANC (and for Zuma’s future plans). In this context, Mthombothi reflects69:19: “The ANC had found its messiah in Ramaphosa, the magician who’nt play tricks with the electorate. He’d wave the magic wand. ‘I wanna lend a hand/send me,’ Ramaphosa crooned”.

The confusion and choas behind the scenes of government can be seen in the inner circle of the ANC’s decision-making. This is especially clear in the ANC’s “Roadmap” document which was deliberately  leak to the public. In their efforts to do some damage control and reinstitute some flattering beliefs in their traditional voters, the ANC is clearly desperate after the elections in May 2019. Jacob Zuma’s criminal acts are understood as a decisive part of the ANC’s bad past (meaning the period pre-January 2018), which was stopped by the 1st January 2018’s so-called “unstoppable messianic” return of Cyril Ramaphosa and an “anointed, ameliorated ANC”. Once again, the ANC elite and their propagandists offer a narrative of a dramatic victory to the public, intended to show that the South African voters are still pro-ANC, based on Ramaphosa’s so-called popularity (57% votes for the ANC in the May elections). Some political analysts associated his so-called popularity in the election with the popularity of Nelson Mandela (who could never exceed more than 63% of the votes for the ANC, at any time during the various elections). Fikile Mbalula of the ANC equates the idea that the “ANC is still a strong brand” to the idea that “Hitler’s Nazi-party today is still a strong brand”, in the face of the ANC’s ongoing decline in support at the ballot box (from 62%: 2014 to 57%: 2019). Regarding Ramaphosa’s so-called “immense popularity” that may rescue the ANC, it must be noted that this image is constructed by his publicly propagated performance, and supported by the CR17 campaign that has allegedly cost R500 million. Pushing this image of Ramaphosa as the “Nation’s darling” has started to fail, as his lack of organisational and governing abilities become clear, and he fails to make a success of the future of South Africa.21,44

Seepe and Heller56 bring Cyril Ramaphosa’s public persona, as the only saviour of a nation, into the context of a country that oscillates between hope and hopelessness. This paints a picture of a nation in psychosis, where there is a cognitive inability to differentiate between reality and fiction, evil and virtue, and dishonesty and honesty. They write56:5: “This national psychosis is at the heart of the propagandist portrait of President Cyril Ramaphosa as the salve and salvation of South Africa. For his part, Ramaphosa has enthusiastically embraced this world of make-believe. He is as much complicit as he is an inevitable victim of this malady. But like all myths, the messianic Ramaphosa portrait is beginning to melt”.

Seepe and Heller56 continue56:5: “For those invested in the Ramaphosa presidency, the truth may just be too ghastly to contemplate. Truth is the supreme disruptor of both faith and fallacy, and right now, the truth is blowing the whistle on the make-believe of The New Dawn”. It seems that the pro-Ramaphosites and white capitalists are not going to allow negative views of Ramaphosa to infect and thus to create cognitive dissonance around the “Ramaphosa the saviour” idea, despite his many failures. On the other side, however, there is a growing portion of the public imagination that is seeing “Ramaphosa the saviour” as a myth and realising that his departure from politics will not mean the collapse of the country. As Seepe and Heller write55:5 “The sun will rise tomorrow, as surely as it did today”.

Tabane68 writes that it somehow remains unclear how South Africans arrived at the idea of “Ramaphosa the saviour”. A possibility is that a false hope – the contamination of the public mind by false expectations – forces people into believing that Ramaphosa will improve their living standards and ordinary lives. Indeed, it can be argued that the public are negatively affected by the Zuma regime and where it left off. Another possible origin of the myth may be because many people were left uninspired and confused by the phantom leadership of Ramaphosa; especially the people inside the ANC leadership and around the president, from David Mabuza to the younger ANC MPs, including the leaders of the DA and EFF.18,68 Clearly, the Ramaphosa-mania is a myth which was propagated to build support for the ANC in the May elections.

These initial projections of the “extraordinary qualities” of “Ramaphosa the leader” have overreached and this means that there is no energy left at the end of the Ramaphosa-mania, with no strategy to win at the ballot box. Neither is Ramaphosa himself enough to energise voters for the post-2019 campaign of the ANC. Ramaphosa’s “extraordinary qualities” as a leader is artificial and insignificant on every level.21,50

The various cognitive states or emotional conditions that suddenly manifested in 2017, like Ramaphoria and Ramaphomania, and the identity of “Ramaphosa the anointed saviour”,  has lost its colloquial use and seems rather dated. Instead, Ramaphosa’s identity seems to be better described by “Ramaphosa the phantom”. It seems to indicate the possibility of Ramaphosa soon disappearing from the public imagination of many South Africans.59,60

Furthermore, the so-called 57% winning vote for the ANC in the May elections have been frowned upon by some financial institutions and many political commentators and analysts. For these skeptics, the spirit of triumph contradicts the hard fact that only 49% of the eligible voters voted in the May elections, and that the ANC only received a 28% vote selection by the total contingent of eligible voters. These numbers nullify the well-published glorification of Ramaphosa that assumes that the ANC’s 57% is because of his leadership.13,18,59-64,66,67

The political analyst Mcebisi Ndletyana agrees that Ramaphosa’s “popularity” and saviour-status, that was unduly awarded to him by the media and some political analysts, clearly did not function to win more votes for the ANC. The narrative inside the party, however, is that 57% of votes for the ANC in the May elections was predicted to be only 40% of votes if Ramaphosa was not the leader. This means that Ramaphosa’s faction and supporters claim an alleged 17% gain under Ramaphosa’s leadership. The research, however, does not substantiate their narrative.50,70

In this context of the supposed high levels of voter energy behind Ramaphosa and the presence of Ramaphosa’s so-called saviour-profile, one might overlook the fact that the traditional ANC members do not vote for the ANC’s top leader but instead they vote to maintain the ANC’s democratic centralism. Furthermore, the media and several political analysts have completely ignored the entry of the elderly and respected Thabo Mbeki into the election, as well as the numerous propaganda campaigns of Ace Magashule, David Mabuza and Mrs Dlamini-Zuma that claim their role in the election-manifesto of the ANC that brought the 57% voter win. When comparing the provincial votes with the national votes for the ANC, the national voters outcome (assumed and used by many political analysts to be reflective and representative of the leader’s personality and popularity in his party and the country) were 643 194 national votes more than the provincial votes for the ANC. Bringing this difference in calculation with the 10 026 475 votes the ANC received on national level, the so-called positive impact of leadership is ±7%. When divided through the six main propagandists/leaders’ contribution to ANC-manifesto (Ramaphosa, Magashule, Zuma, Mabusa, Mbeki, ANC), this 7% impact is an average of 1.1% per leader. These numbers makes the so-called Ramaphosa-saviour contribution to the 57% win of the ANC less than 2% and therefore insignificant. Ramaphosa’s minimal impact is further confirmed by Ramaphosa’s fluctuating performance leading up to November 2019. Whilst his image and persona sets high standards, no evidence suggest that Ramaphosa can live up to these expectations.13,18,40,49,50,67,71-76

3.3.1.1.4.3. Ramaphosa’s enslaving to Marxist-Leninist socialism

Ramaphosa is often portrayed as the virtuous ANC politician who fell victim to the dictators in the ANC. As part of this narrative, it is speculated that Ramaphosa was forced to address or partake in issues such as land grabbing, by the two “communist dictators”, Zuma and Magashule. In this view of the ANC’s schizophrenic politics, Ramaphosa’s leadership is affected and undone by radicals and revolutionaries in the ANC. Du Plessis77 agrees with this narrative when he writes77:6: “Bepaald moet hy [Ramaphosa] die twee gifbekers wat die Jacob Zuma-faksie hom in die doodsnikke van die Nasrec-konferensie in die hand gestop het [om grond te onteien met of sonder vergoeding], so drink dat hy nie daarvan sterf nie”. There is evidence to the contrary, however. Ramaphosa is an established ANC member, and has participated in the ANC since the days of the Freedom Charter. The Freedom Charter has always clearly indicated that land grabbing is a priority of the ANC. The reissuing of the resolution at Nasrec in 2017 was expected by the ANC at large, including Ramaphosa. If Ramaphosa was opposed to land grabbing, he had the option to withdraw from the race for leadership, instead of playing the victim.

To deny that Ramaphosa supports Marxist-Leninist socialism is dangerous and it is equally problematic to subjectively profile Ramaphosa as a Western caricature. FW de Klerk arguably made the same mistake in the 1990s as Du Plessis now77, when De Klerk, in his “political innocence” and impetuosity, understood the ANC and its corps of leaders without their DNA of true traditional democratic centralism and Marxist-Leninist socialism. Instead, he believed them to be exclusively “good” political partners. De Klerk (and his NP) were quickly faced with the reality of their decision.25,78,79

Ramaphosa’s politics are rooted in the greater ANC’s venerable foundation of Marxist-Leninist socialism. This is a phenomenon that Du Plessis80, other than many political commentators, successfully identifies when he writes80:6: “Ramaphosa se ANC het in 2019 nog nie sy sentrale ideologie – rassenasionalisme en verknogtheid aan ras – dieselfde doodsteek gegee as wat die NP in die 1980’s met die Verwoerdiaanse apartheid gedoen het nie”, and80:6: “Die ANC sal dit nie maklik doen nie. Want al wat dan oorbly, nes in die 80’s, is naakte vasklou aan mag. Die ANC weet  baie goed regimes wat inbeweeg in daardie dimensie – mag ter wille van mag alleen – val, vroeër eerder as later.”

This recognition that Ramaphosa and the ANC member’s concerns are saturated with selfishness, opportunism and the corrupt Marxist-Leninist ideology of self-enrichment, nullifies the misleading argument by the Ramaphosa propagandists that he is a democrat and “virtuous” politician (these same propagandists blindly argue for Ramaphosa’s “anointed” virtue and his successful politics). His current entanglement with the corrupted politics and actions of Zuma’s cronies and their so-called “rot” is clear by the fact Ramaphosa has allowed them into his cabinet and his inner-circle. Ramaphosa supporters argue that this is only because he has been forced accept criminals in his cabinet for the sake of keeping the ANC intact. This line of reasoning is dangerous, naive and misleading; it is politically illogical. Another argument by Ramaphosa’s supporters, in their ardent Ramaphoria, is that Ramaphosa could not speak out against state capture when he was Zuma’s deputy as Zuma would fire him. This argument is erased by the fact that Ramaphosa participates in Marxist-Leninist politics. Instead, he did not react against Zuma and his cronies, or speak out against state capture, because his Marxist-Leninist ideology prioritises the group above all. Secondly, if this argument of his compliance with state capture is true, it confirms that Ramaphosa was disrespectful to his oath as vice president to serve the people of South Africa fully at all times, with honestly and integrity, and to obey its Constitution. Furthermore, that he was unaware, as vice-president, of the Zuptas’ state capture, is unlikely. If he was truly unaware of the corrupt situation, he was a poor observer of politics and an ineffective player in the ANC’s inner-politics. His attention to these matters is required as an executive political leader. It is more likely that he is in compliance with Zuma’s state capture. This profile makes him incapable to be an effective president for South Africa. Moreover, if he was aware of the presence of state capture, but feared to act against Zuma, it indicates blatant self-interest above duty and a political fear that is highly inappropriate for a vice president. A role with responsibility to the people of South Africa should not be allowed to be dictated by fear, and this keeps Ramaphosa from making the right decisions, both officially and unofficially.69,81,82

To many critics, the failure of Ramaphosa to attack Zuma openly since the start of his campaign, and in his appointment as vice president, indicates a much deeper foundation of brotherhood of the ANC’s leadership. This brotherhood is prescribed and forced upon members by the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist politics. The argument made by the pro-Ramphosa supporters – that Ramaphosa will act decisively and dramatically and kill the Zuma rot from 2019 to 2024 – is highly unlikely. An executive political leader of integrity – someone who acts with honesty and is trustworthy – never sits idly whilst his organisation falls deeper into corruption, or allows himself to be extorted by the demands of criminals.81,82

Evidence that Ramaphosa is deeply influenced by Marxist-Leninism and RET, can be found in his active practice of cadre-deployment. Cadre-deployment can be argued to be the primary cause of state capture since 1994. Ramaphosa, when he was vice president to President Zuma, was also the chair of the ANC’s cadre-deployment committee. The primary role of Ramaphosa in the ANC’s cadre-deployment committee, seen in terms of political contamination the country’s stature, was so excessive that he was recently asked to explain the matter before the Zondo-commission.79

Cadre-deployment, as evidenced by the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist political thinking, plans and actions, makes Ramaphosa part of the “brotherhood of communists” with Magashule and Zuma. Rooi writes79:8:

Vier jaar lank, terwyl hy tussen Mei 2014 en Februarie 2018 adjunkpresident was van die land, was Ramaphosa die voorsitter van dié omstrede ontplooiingskomitee. In dié jare is talle bedendenklike figure met ANC-bande in sleutelposte in die staatsdiens en by geruïneerded staatsbeheerde ondernemings aangestel.

Die kaderontplooiingskomitee bestaan nog steeds – die huidige voorsitter is adj.pres. David Mabuza, Jessie Duarte, die ANC se adjunk-sekretaris-generaal, is die koördineerder.

Die rol van die ANC se kaderontplooiingskomitee in staatskaping het in November voor die Zondo-kommissie ter sprake gekom toe Barbara Hogan, voormalige minister van openbare ondernemings, gesê het dat ‘n “handvol mense aangewys deur die ANC se nasionale uitvoerende komitee (NUK) [geskool op ‘n Marxisties-Leninisties politburo] – eenvoudig besluit wie is die voorkeurkandidaat” vir ‘n pos.

Ramaphosa’s support of the ANC’s outdated, 107-year old, communist value system is well reflected by his tainted cabinet and even his tainted chairpersons of the parliamentary portfolio committees. He is only a temporary and powerless role player in the greater ANC and their political narrative, especially its politburo’s intentions and rigid guidelines, as prescribed by its democratic centralism and Marxist-Leninist ideology.68

Tabane writes on the implications of an ANC president68:1:

When we expect him to fire Magashule, we are taking the ANC for granted and substituting our wishes for Ramaphosa’s agenda. And when we overlook his mistakes because we want him to emerge and be strengthened, we are kicking the can further down the road, postponing the solving of problems that are already there.

My fear is that those who portray him as the answer to all of South Africa’s problems – and spend time attacking his perceived enemies – will soon suffer an about-turn and turn against CR because he would have failed to meet their (unrealistic) expectations.

While hope has to spring eternal, investing such high hopes in one individual is unrealistic. Now that he is president of the country, of course we should expect only the highest standards from him, but we voted for an ANC president. It is the choice the majority made.

Ramaphosa’s so-called “conflict with the Magashule-Zuma clan” – increasingly breaking down his “saviour role” as the President of the South African nation – is not because they differ on the ANC’s contemporary politics and ideologies, but because of Ramaphosa’s personal conflict with Magashule (and Zuma, as well as any other opposing leader in the ANC) to hold the political power in the greater ANC68:1: “It is a well-masked leadership and personal revenge-fight coming from 1996 when Ramaphosa was side-lined in the ANC’s greater politics.” Ramaphosa’s belief in and his support of Marxist-Leninist socialism remains undisturbed by this conflict.

Tabane68 pertinently guides his readers through the rationale behind this personal conflict between Ramaphosa and Magashule-Zuma, and argues that it is outside of the ANC’s organisation and its ideology. In this small conflict, Ramaphosa is only a temporary figure and insignificant in the greater ANC psyche. She writes68:1: “The cold, hard fact is: Ramaphosa is the president of the country because of the ANC. To try to define him outside of the party with our imposed values is a mistake. He will always act within the value system and milieu of this 107-year old organisation”.

It is important to note, however, that Ramaphosa’s contradictory reactions to remarks (made by people such as Ace Magashule) on the nationalising of the Reserve Bank, sit well inside the ANC’s history of gradually and secretly nationalising important entities and land grabbing. The ANC’s greater ideological detraction breaks down the idea of Ramaphosa as the saviour of white land ownership and exclusive capitalism, against the Magashule faction as the criminal Marxist-Leninist threat that engages in land grabbing. The pretense of the “Ramaphosa-Magashule conflict” gives Magashule the opportunity to successfully and carefully construct a well-masked plan to gain power. The slow implementation of land reform by the ANC, from 1994 to 2017 (23 years), was fundamentally caused by the political environment and circumstances that limited the implementation of radical ANC politics. Since 2017, however, the circumstances seems to have been stimulating the aggressive, radical politics of nationalising and land grabbing. Both Ramaphosa and Magashule stand as central figures and as active supporters, role-players and partners in this sudden, aggressive behaviour. Both are familiar with the brand of the ANC, and support the activation and implementation of the 107 year old radical and revoltionary politics of the ANC.68,83,84

Understanding the aforementioned political strategy of the ANC, the editor85 of the Sunday Times, writes on the 5th 2019 how the current ANC party under Ramaphosa is problematic. He points out the fake leadership conflict, wherein Ramaphosa is reflected as the “virtuous” (capitalist/democratic) leader that will reform the ANC’s criminal culture. South Africa at large may be grappling with Western politics and democracy, but not ANC’s politics; the ANC is finally busy establishing communism in South Africa. The editor85 of the Sunday Times writes85:18:

The party has a new leader, President Cyril Ramaphosa, who has presented himself as a new broom that will sweep clean all the rot. So far, he has said all the right things, for which he has been endorsed even by the global community.

But as former president Kgalema Motlanthe said, Ramaphosa is no messiah. The rot in his party is so entrenched that it will require a massive purge, which could lead to its total collapse.

Ramaphosa’s clean-up campaign is facing strong resistance from within, with those accused of corruption working hard to weaken him. Until he firms up his grip on the party, he remains handicapped.

Makhanya83 also writes on the brotherhood of Ramaphosa and Magashule, as well as their relationship to the radical and revolutionary ANC. Ramaphosa, therefore, has no intention to establish a post-2019 democracy and unlimited exclusive capitalism, as Makhanya83 argues83:2: “Ramaphosa tinkered here and there, and thought we would all be bamboozled into the believing he had made a radical reduction [of the bad]. What actually happened was that he lost the battle to reform the state and rid it of the excesses of the Zuma era. The employment agency ethos remained largely undisturbed and little will happen in the next five years to change that. It showed that the Zuma zombies are alive and still very much in charge, Renewal is a myth”.

The ANC’s final establishment of communism in South Africa is executed through its trusted model of economic chaos. For Makhanya83 to declare that democratic renewal is a myth, is correct. Moveover, Marxist-Leninist renewal is a fact. There will likely be a reform of the South African state, but instead of positive reform, the ANC will keep radicalising. This means the ANC may bring a Marxist-Leninist reform if it rules post 2019.83,84

It must be taken into account that, historically, communists thrived on chaos; if it is not already present in a state, they create and cultivate chaos. A few instances of this encouragement of chaos has manifested the South African state since the ANC took power in 1994. Chaos is the norm of governing for the communists and the ANC elite. The present South African economy, having collapsed, is just one stage in establishing a vicious cycle of communism. In this context of a communist state, with its chaotic economy and human rights abuses, Scott86 reflects on the ANC’s affect on South Africa86:13: “The more one looks at the ANC, the more one can come to no other conclusion than that the only purpose it has is to complete the destruction of the country it claims to love. Everything it touches is destroyed.”

The overall chaos, and especially its impact on the economy, is confirmed by the fact that more African countries became less democratic since the 1990s. These countries are characterised by more autocratic political systems, wherein the communist model often starts to develop. This problematic type of political governance, together with unlimited population growth, contributed to the rapid growth of poverty in Africa. These factors led to number of impoverished people in Africa rising from 278 million to 416 million from 1990 to 2015. The means that 55% of the world’s poor is currently living in Africa. The World Bank estimates that the percentage of impoverished people in Africa is going to grow exponentially, and that in 2030, as much as 90% of the world’s poor will live in Africa. Since 1994, as many as 75 countries worldwide have moved in the direction of autocracy, while in 2017, 24 countries became autocracies. In 2019, there were only 24 countries that showed positive consequences of democratisation, while only 53% out of all the countries in the world still qualify as democracies. Looking towards South Africa, 25 years under the chaotic reign of the Marxist-Leninist ANC has seen an immense growth in poverty; 60% of the population are impoverished, seemingly in line with the political chaos that characterise most African countries. If the ANC continues to hold power after 2024, the 30 million impoverished people in South Africa (out of a 57 million population) is estimated to grow to 52 million in 2030.86-88

3.3.1.1.4.4. Alleged intertwining of junior-Ramaphosa with senior-Zuma

Notwithstanding the reflection of two main opposing and hostile groups inside the greater ANC, namely the Ramaphosa clan versus the Zuma-Magashule clan, the main question is if there is really a difference in thinking and political ideology between senior Zuma and the junior Ramaphosa in terms of South African politics. The land reform issue has been a bonding factor for the comrades. Comparing the thinking and activities of some of the cadres represented in Ramaposa’s inner-circle with that of the cardres of the Zuma-Magashule faction, there are strong similarities signalling some form of connection. Munusamy89 reflects clearly on this anomaly in Ramaphosa’s apparent inertia since December 2017 in taking on the Zuma-Magashule cronies suspected of various transgressions. The lack of any action taken before the prosecution started against Zuma and his cronies, as well as the subsequent appointment of dubious Zuma cronies in high level positions in the Ramaphosa regime since May 2019, reflects some sort of bond between the two rather than two hostile, opposing factions. Munusamy89 reflects on this “political intransparency” evident in the actions and reactions of Cyril Ramaphosa, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma when she pertinently warns that the public has often overlooked the ANC’s “dark politics”. Shrouded in this darkness is often the strange and extreme relationship between Ramaphosa, Magashule and Zuma. She writes89:20:

Zondo should not be the only one concerned with safeguards to prevent the state from being captured by corrupt business interests again.

If President Cyril Ramaphosa is serious about building an efficient state that repels corruption, he needs to ensure that the people in his core team share his perspective and commitment.

The disgraced people and deadwood he retained in cabinet to keep the peace in the ANC need to be put out to pasture”.

Tabane90 also mentions this possible bond rather than a prevailing animosity between Ramaphosa and Zuma to the foreground with his reflection on the ease with which the Constitutional Assembly had fired McBride in March 2019 to prevent him to rattle further on the SAPS’s wrongdoings and his revelations about the greater ANC’s immense political transgressions inside the law-enforcement agencies. This was reflected for Tabane90 in how easily the Magashule-Zuma faction eventually got rid McBride, booting him out of the SAPS without Ramaphosa as much as lifting his presidential finger to stop this obvious political move by the greater ANC’s leadership. Tabane90, on this apparent tap-dancing routine of the junior Ramaphosa to the tune of his senior Zuma, posed exactly this question90:20: “Is Ramaphosa in on this…?”

More evidence of the alleged cosy actual relationship between Ramaphosa and Zuma is also the fact that Ramaphosa has so far not been able to or hesitant to step out of the leader’s grim shadow. Ramaphosa — or so the antagonists scrutinising the ANC’s politics and governance believe — has undoubtedly helped the ANC elite since his days as vice-president to dodge the bullet directed at their failed past and corrupt schemes. His political thrust was in the past and still is today to advance a doctrine in which black voters are repeatedly convinced of the “existence of white supremacy” while the whites must take the blame for being “the sole culprits of blacks poverty”. This puts Ramaphosa on par with the radical political outlook of Jacob Zuma as well as Julius Malema. Here, Ramaphosa’s willingness to allow of many of the ANC corrupt elite to continue, untouched in their old Zuma ways in post-May 2019 South Africa, is underscored. Mthombothi69 brings this reality in focus when he writes69”19: “All the looting, the corruption, the sheer greed and debauchery over which it had presided, the poverty it failed to address as its leaders feasted on the gravy train, the criminals who are running amok…”, is just continuing under Ramaphosa.

The present Ramaphosa regime has been characterised by the antagonists as similar to the past Zuma regime, namely a regime: “…that has done everything but govern”. The basis for this kind of remark is, as said, Ramaphosa’s subordinate position in relation to Zuma, which dates from before 1994 as being inextricably intertwined with the Zuma political culture and the Zuma guidelines on governance.69,81

In terms of the above reasoning, it is for certain political analysts not a case of President Cyril Ramaphosa who cannot step out of ex-President Zuma’s grim shadow: for them is it that Ramaphosa does not want to step out from there. Ramaphosa and Zuma have had too much of a cosy relationship regarding their revolutionary outlook to be able to break-up their close association. Zuma’s extraordinary reaction of denying the Zondo commission’s testimonies against him, is evidence of his political-cognitive incompetence and impaired response. But, for the political insider, knowing the ANC’s psyche, it seems to be part of an established ANC political pathological culture. Ramaphosa is seemingly also blinded by the same ANC political pathological culture with makes him beliefs he is not implicated in any political corruption and is purely cast by his enemies as a scapegoat. The constant allegations against him of having been an Apartheid spy, a Bosasa beneficiary, a Zuma mate, a BBBEE opportunist or part of a crime network while serving as vice-president in the nine years of Zuma regime’s misadventures, do not seem to concern him. The reference by Ramaphosa of Zuma’s reign as “nine wasted years” is seen by his critics as nothing more than opportunistic political window-dressing only for the sake of the greater ANC. In reality, it  it is nothing else but “nine wasted years under the Zuma-Ramaphosa-duumvirate”.69,81

This kind of duumvirate inside a party’s leadership, with its parasitic roots smothering the nation’s heart, will not be terminated that easily. The ANC and its various leaders, have fallen prey to it. The principle is that if the one leader falls, the other leader also falls. The one needs the other, even if their well-hidden intentions and their rhetoric may seem to contradict each other in terms of political viewpoints. Moreover, these leaders need the ANC and the ANC needs them.69.81

Ramaphosa is for most true democrats and capitalists a Zuma remint — a political leader as dangerous and unpredictable as his mentor, the senior ANC Jacob Zuma. Mthombothi91 tells us the story behind this political danger, present in the pursuits of both Ramaphosa and his predecessor Jacob Zuma, as well as his fellow comrades Ace Magashule and David Mabuza, when he writes91:21:

But we have a political leadership which, because of years spent in Eastern Bloc countries, has inculcated an outmoded Soviet-style undemocratic culture, if not hostility to every idea of an open society. They mouth catchphrases such as “national democratic revolution”, which ordinary people hardly understand or relate to. Out in the hustings, they refer to each other as comrade, but they are honourable members in parliament. There’s a tug of war between ideology and praxis.

Such people therefore cannot always be relied upon to protect the values enunciated in our constitution, especially when the chips are down.

The total encirclement of some of the ANC’s top leaders by political delinquency had shaped them into a lifelong political gang. It is not without a specific reason that Munusamy81 suggests the greater ANC leadership’s moral collapse and their failure to deal with reality. Their unity is upheld by the conspiratorial and nefarious behaviour of the leaders, in their like-minded planning and mal intended way of approaching issues. On the functioning of Zuma’s political mindset (an enquiry that can also be extended to many of the political mindsets present in the top structure of ANC) she posits81:20: “Or is Zuma so detached from his moral compass that he does not know that secretly receiving money from crooked business people while serving as the president of the republic amounts to crime and a breach of office?” In this context, in exposing Zuma’s seemingly mental and political confusion, it is reflected quite succinctly by his own admission when he says: “I do not fear exiting political office. However, I have only asked my party to articulate my transgressions and the reason for its immediate instruction that I vacate office.”

Both Ramaphosa and Zuma seem for some of their serious critics to be equally implicated in misguided moral and political endeavours; they need each other and they both need the corrupt ANC as a motherboard to continue to function.69,81,82 Bruce92 of all the political analysts, is possibly the closest in his apt description of how far the Ramaphosa-Zuma intertwinement has progressed already when he postulates92:16: “It is an apocalyptic scenario when taken to its logical extreme, but it’s also the double life Ramaphosa must lead. Only one of his shoes is his own. Ramaphosa will dance like this for as long as he leads the ANC. The only positive is that the longer he dances, the more discredit the old order becomes. That can’t all be bad.”

But there lurks a danger for Ramaphosa in his close embrace of certain comrades in the ANC to promote its interests. It could cost Ramaphosa his job as that of a subordinate pawn to the opportunistic and ambitious Jacob Zuma, Ace Magashule and David Mabuza. These three are unquestionably the ultimate representatives of the greater ANC: they are, as said, the soul of the ANC, with Ramaphosa the most willing enabler. A Zuma-Magashule-Ramaphosa embrace could render Ramaphosa politically impotent, lacking as Jacob Zuma does, political insight, good decision-making skills and sound principles. It could result in him being totally incapable of leading the country’s reform initiative. This intertwining can make result in a milder version of the programme of land expropriation falling apart. The land expropriation initiative does not augur well for another round of Zuma involved in capture of the first order.69,81,82,89

3.3.1.1.4.5. Ramaphosa the failed leader

The fact that Ramaphosa is a so-called classical communist (or, as Mthombothi describes his adherence to the ideology as being “comrades practising an outmoded Soviet-style undemocratic culture”) and is working with Magashule, Zuma and Mabuza in the realisation the ANC’s aims, does not safeguard him from opposition inside the ANC, leadership battles, serious criticism or eventually from being ousted from the party. His controversial victory of the ANC’s leadership contest in 2017 created many enemies, like Magashule and Zuma and their respective devoted groups. Furthermore, there are the ill-intended ambitions of Magashule, Mabuza and Zuma who all aspire to be the ANC’s leader. There are immense benefits and privileges that come with this position. It seems that especially Ramaphosa’s ongoing failure to activate the 2017 national conference resolutions has been is making him vulnerable to internal attacks in the greater ANC and could mean a possible ousting.91

3.3.1.1.4.5.1. Ramaphosa in the backseat and in reverse-gear

Ramaphosa, notwithstanding his so-called political importance and his lofty title as State President, has been running in reverse-gear from May 2019. His regime has so far totally failed to address the problems of South Africa. His failure has been to implement some of the main resolutions of the 2017 Nasrec conference, like the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank and land grab policies aimed only at white constituents. The ongoing stuggling economy on his watch could soon deliver the final prick to the inflated political balloon, triggering his sudden downfall and speedy exit from the South African political scene.17,21,50,93-98

Evidence of his devalued position as the leader of the ANC is Ramaphosa’s poor grasp on power at Luthuli-house. Magashule and his faction are already advancing their own political views freely inside the greater ANC from Luthuli-house, in order to make up for Ramaphosa’s under-performance and inefficiency. They have taken control of the long-term command of the ANC at the headquarters of the party by the awarding the ex-ministers Malusi Gigaba and Nomvula Mokonyane with high-profile jobs, respectively as part of the ANC’s policy-making team and as head of organisation. The same empowerment of the Magashule-Zuma faction leading the party from Luthuli-house, is observable in the Parliament where they successfully appointed so-called anti-Ramphosa figures as chairs of various committees (Parliament committee chairs wield enormous legislative and oversight powers, controlling how parliamentary committees conduct oversight over ministers and senior government officials).55,99-101

The strength of the Magashule-Zuma group in all the ANC’s structures, especially in Parliament, is well-illustrated by the editor102 of the Beeld when he writes on the 22nd June 2019102:16:

Lojale trawante van oud-pres. Jacob Zuma wat ook nou by beweerde staatskaping betrek word, sal vir die volgende vyf jaar hoofde van strategiese parlementêre portefeulje-komitees wees.

Ace Magashule, sekretaris-generaal van die ANC, het Woensdag aangekondig dat Supra Mahumapelo, Faith Muthambi, Tina Joemat-Petterson, Mosebenzi Zwane and adv. Bongani Bongo die hoofde van portefeulje-komitees soos toerisme, begrotingstoewysings en vervoer sal wees.

Magashule het die aanstellings geregverdig deur te sê dat nie een van hulle nog in ‘n hof skuldig bevind is nie.

It is also clear that Luthuli-house’s corrupt relations with the security services are a cause for concern since it is used to isolate Ramaphosa more and more from the ANC’s active politics. The state security minister, Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba55, acknowledged that because of Zuma’s association with SSA, it has not been friendly towards Ramaphosa. Letsatsi-Duba55 recently said55:1-2: “Right now some politicians are happy with the status quo. Those intelligence officials serve them. There is no way they are going to say ‘we are not going to allow them to interface with us or interact with us’ because it benefits them anyways. Some [ANC] politicians used intelligence officers ‘for political reasons’ and ignored the law because it served their interests”.

Also, Hunter100 confirms this isolation of Ramaphosa via Luthuli-house, when Hunter100 writes100:2:

President Cyril Ramaphosa is facing a rebellion by senior spooks in the State Security Agency who are threatening to topple him over his plans to restructure the intelligence services.

This was confirmed by state security minister Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba in an interview with the Sunday Times.

Letsatsi-Duba said she feared that high-ranking officials were rebelling at Ramaphosa’s proposed overhaul of the agency following years of ‘lawlessness’”.

‘This is not an ordinary resistance, it has a bigger agenda which is to make the status qui remain, so people can do as they wish”.

The Mufamadi-report55, published in March 2019, reports as follows further on Ramaphosa’s growing threatening position in the intimate ANC- politics by the security environment55:1-2:

Spies loyal to Jacob Zuma ran an illegal and co-ordinated intelligence campaign and spent millions on dirty tricks in a failed bid to stop Cyril Ramaposa becoming president of the ANC [and South Africa], a shock new report on the state Security Agency (SSA) has revealed. The report exposes illegal activities in the service of Zuma, including:

Physically stopping CR17 supporters from distributing regalia;

Spying on civil society organisations that were critical of Zuma; and

Fake news in the form of a media campaign for the 2016 local government polls.

The Mufamadi report points out that the threat that spooks could “hit Ramaphosa” because of his intention to cleanse the state security agency from crooks and criminals who are obstructing law and order, as well as delinquent agents who endanger the lives of the innocent citizens. Hunter100 paints a bleak picture when he reports100:2: “Top intelligence operatives, speaking on condition of anonymity, have threatened to hit back. If Ramaphosa continued ‘agitating’ them, some of our guys will get involved and he will see it at the NGC”.

Also, the editor103 of the Sunday Times commented on the focused intention to undermine Ramaphosa, and writes on the 9TH June 2019 as follows103:18: “The Mufamadi report into the State Security Agency came to the shocking, if obvious, conclusion that there had been ‘serious politicisation…of the intelligence community over the past decade or more, based on factions in the ruling party’. This, it said, had resulted in ‘an almost complete disregard for the constitution, policy, legislation and other prescripts’, and turned the intelligence community into ‘a private resource to serve the political and personal interests of particular individuals.”

Two other negative factors are furthermore facing Ramaphosa inside the inner-circle of the ANC operating from Luthuli-house. One is the hostile positioning of the ANC stalwart Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (including her cronies) against Ramaphosa.55,104

Secondly, there are the Public Protector’s constant actions against Ramaphosa; allegedly   continuing unabated because she is a kind of “agent” or “supporter” of Jacob Zuma. The allegation is moreover that she has been receiving illegal and co-ordinated information from so-called intelligence operatives, or Zuma spies, in her campaign against Ramaphosa and his cronies.103,105 Solly Mapaila105 of the SACP in this context warned her not to be105:6 “…pursuing comrades on the basis of information that she is allegedly been fed by rogue intelligence units.” On these pro-Zuma elements alleged influencing of the Public Protector’s office, Mapaila is quoted on the 27th June 2019 in the Sowetan as follows by Goba105:6: “They feed this office with rogue intelligence and information. If that information is not utilised, you see it coming through opposition parties…which are supplied information by these roué intelligence units.”

It is clear that Ramaphosa has been hampered in some of his decision-making tasks and executive actions by his opponents in the greater ANC, that he is not the assumed strongman who can turn around the ANC’s politics in 2019 and neither will he be able to deliver pots of gold to South Africans. He appears unable to cleanse the ANC from his opponents and its alleged crooks. Ramaphosa may perhaps and does sometimes speak up in public about his enemies in the greater ANC and his ability and intention ”to demolish” them.  The writing of the editor9 of the Sunday Times on the 28th July 2019 is a well-illustrated example: it as follows9:18 “President Cyril Ramaphosa’s dramatic challenge to fellow leaders who oppose him, to remove him if they dare…”. But it is false bravado, with very little assertiveness and action. It is a misunderstanding to see Ramaphosa as the untouchable, empowered Messiah who will save the ANC and South Africa from Magashule and his faction:  Emperor Ramaphosa is naked.9      

Ramaphosa has been moved to the backseat, while under the ANC’s politburo’s rules Magashule is now driving the ANC bus exclusively. It is thus with good reason that the media postulates that Ramaphosa is heading for a difficult time in office.106

The intention by Ramaphosa’s opponents in the ANC to oust him must not be seen as an immediate action of retaliation in 2019. His opponents lie low and will only strike when they discern that Ramaphosa is at his most vulnerable.25,26,32,35

Although the appointment of Ramaphosa as President of the ANC will continue up to the national conference in 2022, the rumour is that there will be an effort to oust him in 2020 at the ANC’s National General Council (NGC). Hunter writes100:2: “There are suspicions that some Zuma backers plan to table a motion of no confidence in Ramaphosa at the gathering. A source close to Ramaphosa said his allies had been warned that some intelligence officials were ready to help ‘make life difficult’ for him”.

Matiwane142 reports also that the KwaZulu-Natal chair of the ANC Sihle Zikalala and his provincial executive recently quelled a brewing revolt against President Ramaphosa with great effort. Matiwane142 writes142:4: “The attempt comes amid talk of a plan to call for the president’s removal at the ANC’s next national general council (NGC), scheduled for next year”. He further writes142:4: “Zikalal confirmed raising the matter [ousting of Ramaphosa] at the PEC meeting, saying it was public knowledge that there were people discussing Ramaphosa’s possible dismissal”. Although Zikala said that the directive of the NGC is solely a process whereby the ANC takes stock of what had emerged in terms of successful implementations of the resolutions of the 2017 conference at Nasrec, and not a specific process to select leaders, the NGC-empowerment indeed offers the opportunity to intervene where the leadership failed because of bad intentions or ignoring these resolutions, making the selection of new leaders an immediate urgency.13,19,94-96,107

It is believed that there is going to be a full attack on Ramaphosa at the national conference in 2022. It is emphasised by political analysts that if the present leadership in-fighting and faction conflict in the ANC is not soon forced to deliver a clear outcome and in which one of the role-players is all but erased from the ANC politics, the outcome can be a constant, and ongoing fight for survival between Ramaphosa and Magashule and their factions leading up to 2022 or even 2024. The absence of a clear unified support fo a leadership to steer the greater ANC’s interests constructively, can make the ANC’s policies very confusing and conflicting, and disarms the ANC as the effective ruler of the country.13,19,107

About the Zuma/Magashule clan’s unwavering patience to wait before launching a full-scale attack in order to lay claim to the post-2019 to 2024 ANC-regime, Harper39 writes with specific reference and clarity39:31: “And, warm curled up as a fat cat waiting for an opportunity to eat the small, bewildered mouse, is of course Jacob Zuma and his list of crooks to take over the post May 2019 ANC and South Africa.” It is thus with good reason, undoubtedly after some glimpse into the ANC’s political future and the functioning of its revolutionary leadership, that Harper39 postulated39:31: “…Ace’s smug look is understandable, if the theory that his [the Magashule/Zuma] faction in the ANC is planning to call a vote of no confidence against Ramaphosa within the party and Parliament to cut short his term – and the clean-up of the state – is true.”

For the editor108 of the Sunday Times Ramaphosa is challenged daily for his leadership position in the ANC and as state president.

Labuschagne also doubts Ramaphosa’s ability to assure good governance post-2019. Labuschagne states that the ANC’s political setup is chaotic and can mean that Ramaphosa’s so-called plans to save the country could be ship-wrecked. This can directly end any improvement in the ANC itself; and neither will it advance Ramaphosa’s already precarious position.13,18,66,67,109

Hugo Pienaar66 of the Bureau for Economic Research also posits that the victory of the ANC during the May 2019 elections does not necessarily mean a totally free hand for Ramaphosa to get the country’s engine working again and resolving its problems. There are just too many complicated elements inside the battered soul of the present-day ANC, which are misread by economists and the media, and have the potential to block any positive input.66

Criticism of Ramaphosa is his under-performance as vice-President before 2017, his present-day powerlessness as ANC-leader, being encircled by hostile cadres from the Magashule-Zuma faction and the growing chaotic state of the South African economy in which he played a prominent role for a long time as Number Two in the country. Pertinent also are his inabilities as a leader to launch dynamic actions to prosecute the Zupta-clan and to cleanse the ANC of crooks on all levels since December 2017. The so-called “Ramaphosa vote”  is seen as of little impact after the 8th May 2019 elections, and neither is it going to bring gains for the ANC in the future. He is short-circuited by the Magasgule-Zuma clan, making him, solely a figurehead in the ANC. A possible return to the Zuma era after 2019, is therefore quite feasilble.18,19,67,111

The above finding echoes Motlanthe’s and Mthombothi’s pre-May’s opinions that Ramaphosa is not the anointed messiah to save the post-May 2019 ANC, neither can he bring about any improvement to South Africa. It seems South Africa is far worse off in November 2019 than it had been in December 2017 with the departure of Jacob Zuma as president. This outcome alone, political analysts believe, tells a story of a new kind of political mishap that is about to unfold.59,60,67,76,108

Msimang112 writes that during Ramaphosa’s presidency are there few objective reasons to be optimistic or hopeful about South Africa’s future, although it does not mean at this stage that South Africa is a failed state or that our democracy has ended in tragedy. The fact that Ramaphosa’s failure so far has brought uncertainty as to whether he will be capable post-2019 of addressing corruption, poverty and inequality; outcomes which in turn have forced South Africans into a life of constant uncertainty. The intention of nation-building after 2000 is no longer a priority while the mechanisms that had been established during Apartheid to resolve social conflicts, were discarded or were hijacked by quasi-governmental associated bodies. This state of affairs resulted in the impunity of and abuse by the ANC and its leaders. Political analysts sense that it was in this ill-fated socio-economic and political setup that Ramaphosa had been able to cast himself as a new broom that arrived to sweep away the unwanted debris. His assumed position of “excellence, goodness and ability” was subjectively strengthened because he served as vice-president for the second half of Zuma’s term as president, painted by the media as the good leader versus Zuma the bad one.112

Ramaphosa’s silence on the chaos in the SOEs confirms his immense fear of antagonising the unions (especially his tripartite partners Cosatu and the SACP). If he dares to act against them, as is required by a true statesman, and launches the reform of Eskom, the SABB and SAA assuring their profitably by firing their masses of over-appointed and over-paid staff to lessen the taxpayer’s burden, he could revive the economy. In the meantime, however, he has been continuing his backroom dealings, and by doing so he has been putting the credit rating of the country at risk113-116.

The view of political analysts is that for the likes of Ace Magashule, David Mabuza and Jacob Zuma, Ramaphosa is nothing else but a round peg inside the ANC square hole, making him unfit to deliver constructive results in the doomed ANC, not to mention the wider South Africa. Msimang112 continues in this context on Ramaphosa112:1-2: “His history in the last two decades – alongside that of his comrades – indicates that, at best, he will be able to promote incremental improvements to the economy. But where it matters the most, he will lack the courage and authority to rein in the worst impulses of a party that rewards the arrogant, the cruel and the callous. Ramaphosa and those who have accompanied him to power lack moral authority.” 

Also, Mthombothi117 agrees with Msimang112 on the failure of Ramaphosa as the much lauded saviour, when he specifically reflects on Ramaphosa’s foolish Third Sona:117:21

Ramaphosa says he has heard the frustration of South Africans and his administration will focus on addressing these.

However, his speech showed there is still disconnect and failure to approve the level of restlessness in the country.

This was a political moment that required a defining address to the nation.

But our nation remains adrift, and clearly nobody, including our president, knows how to get us on course.

Notwithstanding the growing opposition against him, Ramaphosa, as a well-seasoned politician knows his present-day dilemma is demanding and dangerous, but he also knows how to profit from it. Contrary to the dying NP under FW de Klerk, which had little breath left in the 1990s, the ANC is still one phase away from terminal death, giving Ramaphosa enough time to establish his grasp on the greater ANC and enhance his standing in the presidency and South African politics. This short but safe time-frame also offers him the scope to plan his final revenge on the ANC’s leaders and the ANC as a party, similar to how De Klerk directed his revenge on the NP’s leaders and their party.59,80

The post-May 2019 ANC political landscape that Ramaphosa is facing require from him a dangerous journey, full of potholes, that can either make him the winner or the loser counting his final days in the presidency. Mirrian writes17:3:

It is going to be a long, hard slog. The key question he faces is how long will he continue to play the negotiator against his political opponents?

Eventually, doing so will culminate in paralysis – it is at this point that he will have to set his instincts for consensus and negotiation aside and make hard decisions, which could lead to the fraught political environment coming to a head.

Ramaphosa is a master at escaping political responsibilities and blame. His use of political dummies to do his dirty work and to hang the “culprit-identity” around their necks is obvious. He has been using for instance Minister Tito Mboweni to make fearless stands in public in order to do his dirty work, without allowing the Zuma-Magashule clan to get a grip on him, notably. Mthombothi21 writes21:21:

Instead of Ramaphosa dipping his own toe in the water, Mboweni can do so for him. A few months ago he wondered aloud why the government thought it wise to run an airline, the troublesome SAA, Ramaphosa didn’t make any attempt to correct him. Mboweni has used strong language against the ANC decision to nationalise the Reserve Bank. In his presentation this week, he took a swipe at the Road Accident Fund, and was forceful about the drastic measures that need to be taken at Eskom.

There are many other kinds of Mboweni-like saviours helping to bolster Ramaphosa’s image and grasp on the levers of power. Mboweni’s various controversial and fundamental public opinions, which are seen as outright unspeakable and untouchable issues for the ANC’s radicals (and for Ramaphosa if he wishes to stay on as leader). Examples are for instance the cutting back of the rising public sector payroll (saving R30 billion for instance by the shedding of 30 000 civil servants in the 55- to 59-year age group) and the stopping the bailing out of the many ineffective and ailing SOEs. Mboweni’s furthermore announced to the public that the ANC regime was borrowing R1.2 billion a day while it pays out R1 billion a day in interest on the country’s debts (leaving a surplus of only R0.2 billion for “grocery-spending”), was certainly not sweet music to the ears of some of the corrupt ANC top brass living off their state capture loot.21,118,119

Then is there Mboweni’s so-called insensitive intention to squeeze more tax money from the already over-taxed citizens, varying from “sin-taxes” to “emergency-taxes”, to the bailout of the “hungry dog” Eskom to the tune of yet another R59 billion. Mboweni’s Special Appropriation Bill to take more money from the unfortunate taxpayers for the ANC’s ongoing failures – while at the same time, the dear leader Ramaphosa silently hides in the background, so as not to appear as politically contaminated through the “tax-punishment” meted out to his voters.113-115

The writings of the editor113 of The Citizen on the 25th July 2019 reflects the political manoeuvring of Ramaphosa via Mboweni113:12:

It is clear that the ANC government, through Mboweni, is still unwilling to bite the bullet and privatise Eskom, which might – although there are no guarantees – help set it on its financial feet. And that is because, whoever takes over Eskom and tries to run it as a going concern business will have to retrench thousands of employees. And that does not sit well with the ANC’s union partners.

3.3.1.1.4.5.2. Ramaphosa and his third Sona’s wonderland-dreams

President Cyril Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address (Sona) on the 20th June 2019 reflects his complete lack of an in-depth understanding of the country’s present-day comprehensive social, financial, political and statutory problems. Firstly, the fact that these problems were mostly created by the ANC during their rule of 25 years is seemingly missed by Ramaphosa. Secondly, it reflects a glaring lack of insight by Ramaphosa on the know-how to address these problems constructively.120:21

Ramaphosa’s third Sona on the 20th June 2019 was a Walt Disneyland fantasy flight. More precisely: a collection of Alice in Wonderland’s daydreams. It was also just a continuation of the Wonderland dreams that were announced by Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma and offered to the masses of poverty-stricken blacks as another African Uhuru to come; denoting the coming of more chaos and hunger in post-1994 South.121,122

Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address or Sona (often mocked by opposition voters as Same old nothing address) illustrates this political confusion and naivety of Ramaphosa quite well. It gives us a clear view of the chaos of the post-2019 politics that is currently awaiting us under Ramaphosa. Saunderson-Meyer120 writes120:12:

Like psychological troubled patients decoding ambiguous inkblots, we earnest tried to discern in the president’s vaguely sketched air castles and careful non-specifics our national gestalt.

Unfortunately, CR’s dream skirts big, existential issues. Forget about addressing an increasingly divided nation tearing itself apart, what most fires the imagination of the president is a bullet train that will traverse the country. To be precise, from Musina to Cape Town, via Pretoria and Buffalo City.

Oh, and please Father Christmas, a new “smart city…founded on the technologies of the fourth industrial revolution.”

Crime will be halved within a decade. International tourism will be double by 2030. Eskom will be rescued. The Reserve Bank will remain independent. Very soon, every child “will be able to read for meaning”. Our economy will grow faster than our population.

Less ambitiously, the government will cut data costs and build digital hubs for innovating youngsters. It will also build fresh produces marketplaces for their old-fashioned parents.

On Ramaphosa’s foolish dream in his third Sona that 2 million jobs will be created before 2029, Julius Malema of the EFF offered a cold shower when he said123:2: “Daar is 9 miljoen werkloses. Dit beteken 7 miljoen mense gaan steeds werkloos wees.”

His Third Sona confirms that sound planning of short and long term economic policy are outside Ramaphosa’s political competence, his planning and activities. Myths, short-sightedness, ignorance and lack of political responsibility seem to be present in abundance in Ramaphosa’s political register.120-132

Much praise was showered on Ramaphosa for his so-called excellent Third Shona, while it clearly lacked real solutions. Ramaphosa stood central in the reigning the chaos.125,134-138

Ramaphosa’s precarious position highlights Calland’s cliché134:8:  “Ramaphosa’s in control”, as empty words. For some political analysts to react to Ramaphosa’s many and increasing rhetorical flourishes in public speeches, such as the Third Sona, by saying that: “Ramaphosa knows what must be done”, “Ramaphosa is [a] brilliant economist”, “On Thursday night, though, Ramaphosa re-exerted his leadership over both the party and state…”, or “Ramaphosa’s in control”, reflect the outright foolish thinking, misleading and false postulations.

His Third Sona revealed that Ramaphosa remains unconcerned and disconnected from the problems of the country as the editor139 of The Citizen on the 20th June 2019 reflects139:10: “He should be in crisis mode. The country is in crisis. Things are getting worse, fast. Our finances are getting worse, look at the tax receipts. The liabilities of Eskom are in the hundreds of billions of rand. We need a crisis response.”

The immense problem of black poverty is has been shoved to the backburner. Ramaphosa is instead wallowing in his extravagant wealth and revolutionary education as part of the exclusive ANC elite. This mindset is underscored in an excellent manner by Pelser121 when he describes Ramaphosa’s personal appearance in Parliament while he had presented his foolish future dreams of South Africa in his Third Sona, as follows121:6: “Ramaphosa, geklee in sy pragtige House of Monatic-pak, vra ons moet plaaslike produkte koop terwyl die nuwe minimum loon die koste van plaaslike vervaardigers opstoot en goedkoop tekstielinvoer uit Xi se China klerefabrieke van Soutrivier tot Newcastle laat sluit”.

Can anyone disagree with Pelser121 when he concludes on the foolish dreams of Ramaphosa’s Third Sona, noting121:6: “Oppossie-LP’s het hardop vir hom gelag. Dit was tragies om te aanskou”.

The hard and tragic fact is that Ramaphosa’s third Sona confirmed that he as the president is not in command of his presidency, nor of the greater ANC, the SACP, Cosatu or the Magashule-Zuma clan. He has not been in the past and will not be in the future the ANC’s Commander One. Overall, the greater ANC is a lost case as a regime. Indeed, visible in many of his speeches, are the hands of the Magashule puppetmaster, together with that of the greater ANC politburo, pulling the strings on what is going to be done and what is not going to be done between 2019 and 2024 by Ramaphosa (and how and when the Magashule clan and the politburo will be giving permission or not to him to do whatever they want to have done).134-140

The editor130 of City Press reflects very succinctly on the 23rd June 2019 on Ramaphosa’s Third Sona speech as follows130:2: “This Sona ended up being one of his poorest speeches since December 2017. It was the worst possible start to his formal term as elected president of the republic.”

Bauer137 describe the “best” outstanding and extraordinary talent exhibited by Ramaphosa as his ability to avoid complex political problems by his masterly, well-manipulating of facts and the use of myths. Bauer137 offers in this context a useful insight when he says137:5: “There was a hell of a lot of rhetoric in his speech and we’ve all heard the same words being said about employment rates and committing to growth.”

Also, the editor85 of the Saturday Citizen on the 22nd   of June 2019 elucidates Ramaphosa’s  third Sona and the instability of the post-2019 South African state awaiting us, when he said85:12: “It’s true his address left more questions than answers. Over the next few years, he will have nowhere to hide when trying to fulfil these lofty plans.”

Ramaphosa, as President, again as he did as vice-President, refuses to face political realities. The consequences are immense.85

3.3.1.1.4.5.3. Zindzi Mandela-Hlongwane’s doings: a small fry for Ramaphosa but a big racial issue

South Africa is heading for a cliff of unstoppable troubles, especially around the unaddressed remnants of Apartheid, the present and future position of whites in the South African state, the present-day uncritical adherence to the ANC’s revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology deeply rooted in the ANC governance, the ANC’s  failed economic policy of land grab, void of economic stimulii and the ANC elite’s inclination to exclusively enrich themselves. Central in such matters too are the intrinsic value that white landowners hold and their full-status as citizens.

The many conflicting outcomes since December 2017 as evidenced daily is that the ANC is moving into the category of a failed and political bankrupt regime, led by a paramount chief who does not know how to handle even the smallest incident of racial conflict without allowing it to take root out in court cases and the continuous detonation of devastating black-on-white and vice versa political bombs. We see this in the present-day intolerance as reflected by Tweeters on social media who have unnecessarily been inflaming racial tensions. The presence of certain senior radical elements in the ANC (while elected and public salaried executives should know better) who are directly responsible of starting trouble by race-baiting while at the same time these elements within the ANC top brass are sheltered behind the law with enough money to ponder the legal ramifications of crimen injuria, human rights violations,  etc., have charged the racial atmosphere. Some whites have begun to retaliate in tweets because they fear what they perceive as the intention to grab their assets or as direct threats to their persons. Of the wise King Solomon Ramaphosa, using well-reasoned cognitive solutions instead of the massively unrealistic dreams, speeches and judicial solutions he proposes to bring concrete and lasting racial harmony — there is sadly no sign on the horizon of any constructive trouble-shooting or simple damage-control. The absolute silence by Ramaphosa on these racial matters could in the near future be one of the reasons for him to wave the presidency farewell.141-144

Here the recent activities of the daughter of the late Nelson Mandela, Ambassador Zindzi Mandela’s (Mandela-Hlongwane) relating to her tweets on the issue of whites landownership and their future position in the country, are causes for concern. The deafening silence of her top boss, Cyril Ramaphosa, on her specifically delinquent political and racial behaviour, inappropriate for a high-level diplomat, rings out.  It is not a case of whether or not she is entitled to act controversially as if she is speaking her mind as an individual, but that she, as a functioning ambassador, is undoubtedly not entitled to this kind of undiplomatic behaviour in public. The fact is that there were no serious consequences for her. Indeed, she was allowed to stay on in her diplomatic appointment. This is an outcome that had reflected very negatively on Ramaphosa. His inaction in addressing the issue and directly and immediately responding with a public and formal acceptable solution, was significant. The seriousness around Ambassador Mandela’s undiplomatic behaviour was of such a consequential and racial importance that ex-President Thabo Mbeki, in the absence of Ramaphosa’s constructive intervention as Number One, felt obliged to advise the Ramaphosa government that Ms Mandela should be recalled. What is again remarkable here is that Ramaphosa side-stepped any projection of him being pro- or anti-Mandela-Hlongwane, forcing his minister Dr Pandor to take the public rap in reprimanding the culprit.143-146

Zindzi Mandela-Hlongwane’s remarks may be a small matter for Cyril Ramaphosa, but the worsening racial issue is certainly not insignificant in the greater South Africa outside of the ANC regime’s dubious politics and delinquent activities. Especially the fact that comprehensive and extreme land expropriation without compensation of white-owned property is now seemingly a strong policy direction to be activated in the near future. This negative advance of the Mandela-Ramaphosa setup needs to be fully examined as an excellent example of Ramaphosa’s failure as the President of South Africa.143-146

Mandela’s expressions of racism as an individual and a senior state official was left without punishment by Ramaphosa, but this is in conflict with the recent cases where the alleged racism of four whites had officially led to their prosecution and sentencing, forcing them to either pay hefty fines or go to prison. The Mandela tweets, seen by opposition black and white politicians as well as whites in civil society as highly inappropriate for a diplomat and as a public attack on all whites in general in South Africa, read as follows146:2: “Dear Apartheid Apologists, your time is over. You will not rule again. We do not fear you. Finally # The Land Is Ours.”

How serious the Mandela tweets are, underscored by Makhanya.146 He writes as follows146:2: “The thing about Mandela’s tweets is that they were raw in their racism. Racism, not radicalism”.

Mkhwanazi,142 on the first official reaction by the ANC regime to the public critics on the Mandela tweets, points out a clear ANC intention of a further fire-up of the already explosive racial situation. He writes as follows142:7: “The ANC spokesperson Pule Mabe entered the fray and said this week Mandela was entitled to express her views”.

The Beeld reports that she also said in another tweet that141:4: “…wit Suid-Afrikaners is gronddiewe en apartheidsapologete wat nes ongenooide gaste ‘weier om te loop’.”

Ritchie,147 on the series of Mandela’s various ongoing tweets, describes the contents as follows: “…calling white South Africans land thieves and cowards to c#nts and a#seholes in almost as many tweets.”

The above kind of writing only contributes to the broad anti-white mood already pervasive to which Mandela seemingly also contributed with the misuse of her ambassador’s position and tweets under the ANC’s political protection and parliamentary privilege and mandate. It creates nothing less than planned racial conflict in a political setup in which Cyril Ramaphosa’s intervention and guidance as the wise state man, is absent.141,142,147-151

Ramaphosa’s passivity and uninvolved behaviour (as reflected in his usual way of political interactions) in above racism, becomes understandable in terms of the ANC’s growing extreme racism152,153 Jessie Duarte,153 the adjunct-secretary of the ANC said on the 21st of November 2019 that the ANC is attached to tribal- and racial-orientated politics. Boonzaaier153 reports in the Rapport of the 24th November 2019153:6:

In haar toespraak vir die jaarlikse Albertina Sisulu-gedenklesing in Soweto het Duarte gesê die ANC marginaliseer lede wat nie swart afrikane is nie. “Ons het amper stamgebonde geword in die manier waarop ons onsself voorhou”.

Ons is rassisties in die ANC, want ons marginaliseer mense  nie swart Afrikane is nie; ons hou hulle ten alle koste uit die ANC. (En) sit een of twee kwotas daar om te kan sê Jessie verteenwoordig ons.

Ons kan nie aanvaar dat nierasssigheid een van die kernwaardes van die ANC is nie. Ons wild it nie aanvaar nie, selfs al hou ons aan om mites daaroor te skep.

How intense this racism of the ANC is, is confirmed when even people of colour are discriminated against because they are not perceived to be “black enough”. Boonzaaier153 describes Duarte’s153 response in this context as follows153:6:

Sy het bygevoeg dat party ANC-lede volhou met die retoriek dat bruin mense baat gevind het by apartheid.

Volgens Duarte vra ANC-lede gereeld wie bruin mense kwansuis gedurende apartheid gemaginaliseer het. Hulle sê dat bruin mense niks nodig het van die demokratiese staat nie.

Sy het ook verwys na ANC-WhatsApp-groepe waar daar rassistiese terme gebruik word as daar verwys word na bruin en Indiërmense.

***[Thankfully many South African studies show that the outright majority of blacks does not feel hatred towards whites over Apartheid and the harm doen to them, as well as that the May 2019 elections had showed that there is no place for future black racial-radicalism and the future incitement of racial animosity (a radicalism unfortunately still cemented in  a small part of the ANC, the PAC, the ATM, the EFF, etc.)]141,142,147-151

3.3.1.1.4.6. Ramaphosa’s need to come clean as State President

In viewing Ramaphosa’s career critically, as a so-called “freedom-fighter, revolutionary, businessman, politician and State President, there are just too many loose ends and secrecies around all his activities from his pre-1994 days up to his post-1994 days. Three prominent issues need to be addressed urgently by Ramaphosa if he wants to continue his political career:

  1. His CR17 campaign’s funding and his in-fighting with the Public Protector;
  2. How he obtained his fortune;
  3. Lekota’s allegation of him as an Apartheid’s spy.
3.3.1.1.4.6.1. The case Cyril Ramaphosa versus Busisiwe Mkhwebane in the CR17 funding campaign

The CR 17 funding campaign and the ongoing legal battle between President Cyril Ramaphosa and the Public Protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane, undoubtedly reflect some strange behavioural discrepancies by Ramaphosa. This behavioural manifestation is in conflict with the lifestyle of any politician, let alone that of a president of a country. The proceedings launched against Number One, with the Public Protector’s interest in the R500 000 which was donated by the firm Bosasa to Ramaphosa’s December 2017 CR17 campaign, is a central issue. The whole campaign ended up with alleged donations of between R300 million and R500 million, although it can be as much as R1 000-million.59,60,154-156

On the alleged wrongdoings of Ramaphosa that have been a concern to Mkhwebane, is firstly the alleged R500 000 Bosasa money for Ramaphosa’s campaign and the Public Protector’s opinion that Ramaphosa had violated the Constitution and the executive’s Code of Ethics. Wa Afrika and Rampedi write157:1-2:

Mkhwebane added that Ramaphosa may have been involved in money-laundering since Watson‘s donation had been made through several intermediaries.

The public protector’s findings indicate that the donation was transferred from Watson’s personal account into the account of Miotto Trading, a company owned by Margaret Longworth, a sister of Bosasa’s former auditor Peet Venter, and then into the CR17 Attorney Trust Account managed by Edelstein, Faber and Grobler (EFG) Attorneys.

Mkhawebane says Ramaphosa may have breached the executive code of ethics by exposing himself to any situation involving the risk of a conflict between his official responsibilities and private interests and he acted in a way inconsistent with his position.

It does not matter whether the donation to the CR 17 is R500 000 or R500 million, because in the end allegations around Ramaphosa’s campaign financing hold the same negative implications for him, which Wa Africa and Rampedi157 highlight as157:1-2: …“exposing himself to any situation involving the risk of a conflict between his official responsibilities and private interests and he acted in a way inconsistent with his position”. Ramaphosa and his spokesperson Khusela Diko have since constantly been trying to sidestep the thorny issue. His eventual appointment to a public position, namely that of President of South Africa is underlined by the fact that he is being paid by the state, meaning by the taxpayers. The argument by Ramahosa that the Bosasa money, the R500 000157:1-2: “…was not for any benefit received by myself in my official capacity, nor was it in order to influence me in my duties, but to support an internal party election”, missed the fact that this donation may have helped him to win the national December 2017 ANC election. On the opinion and possible misconception of Ramaphosa157:1-2: “…of no direct befitting him through the R500 000”, the Public Protector found on the contrary157:1-2: “…that the campaign pledges were some form of direct financial sponsorship and therefore has benefits of a material nature for Ramaphosa.”

The donations of hundreds of millions of rand allegedly handed to him by outsiders to the CR17 campaign are undoubtedly a setup which (must) concern the Public Protector for various reasons, varying from the possibility of undue political influence to issues that can endanger the state’s security. Naki154 writes154:4: “Mathekga highlighted that his [Ramaphosa] campaign was run by outsiders. But the fact that he received a R390-million donation was indicative of his influence outside the party,” and154:4: “To me it remains a mystery because we know so little about it.”

The justified questions asked by all citizens were: Who were these donors or where do the donors come from? What are or were the relations between these donors and Ramaphosa? Were taxes declared?

Cele, Masuabi and Rooi158 write in the Rapport of 21st July 2019 on the alleged R440 miilion for Ramaphosa’s controversial election campaign158:1-2:

Pres. Cyril Ramaphosa weier om te aanvaar dat daar iets onbehoorliks was aan die R440 miljoen wat weldoeners geskenk het aan sy veldtog om ANC-president te word.

Sy het bevind daar is “meriete” in bewerings dat Ramaphosa ‘n reeks trustrekeninge en komplekse finasiële transaksies gebruik het om die oorsprong van miljoene rande se skenkings aan sy veldtog weg te steek.

Baie van die skenkersgeld is in die trustrekening van die regsfirma Edelstein, Faber en Grobler (wat sy in die verslag as die “EFG2-rekening” identifiseer) betaal vanwaar dit blykbaar na verskeie ander entiteie, insluitende die Ria Tenda Trust, Linked Environmental Services en die Cyril Ramaphosa Stigting, gevloei het.

Luidens die verslag is R191.5 miljoen tussen 6 Desember 2017 en I Januarie 2018 in die EFG2-trustrekening betaal terwyl R190 miljoen uitbetaal is aan ander entiteite.

Ander entiteite waardeur CR17-geld gevloei het sluit in:

  • R388.5 miljoen wat tussen 1Januarie 2017 en 20 Februarie 2019 in die Ria Tenda-trustrekening inbetaal is. R388.5 miljoen is uitbetaal.

  • R441.2 miljoen wat tussen 15 Desmber 2016 en 13 Februarie 2019 gedeponeer is in die FNB-rekening  van Linked Environmental Services. R444.1 miljoen is uitbetaal.

  • R336 000 wat tussen 20 Julie 2017 en 26 Maart 2018 van Linked Environmental Services aan die Cyril Ramaphosa-stigting betaal is.

Cele, Masuabi and Rooi158 write further158:1-2:

Uit die verslag blyk dit dat een enkele skenker R121.1 miljoen aan Ramaphosa se vedtog geskenk het. Die skenker word nie geídentifiseer nie. Hierdie geld is blykbaar in drie paaiemente betaal: R30 miljoen  op 9 Maart 2017, nege maande voor die ANC se verkiesingskonferensie by Nasrec, en twee verdere bedrae van R39.6 miljoeon en R51.5 miljoen, albei op 29 September 2017.

Ramaphosa self het R37.2 miljoen van sy eie geld in sy veldtog gestoot. Hiervan was R31 miljoen as lening [wat terugbetaal aan hom moes word] en R6 miljoen is geskenk [wat dus die enigste koste inset aan sy kant was].

Cele, Masuabi and Rooi158 report on the view of Mkhwebane as follows158:1-2: “Mkhwebane skryf dat in die lig van die groot bedrae geld wat betrokke sy ‘voorlopig die siening toegedaan is dat so ‘n scenario, as mens versigtig daarna kyk…die risiko skep van ‘n tipiese staatskaping deur diegene wat die geld aan die veldtog geskenk het’”; en dat158:1-2: “…’n  skenking van R500 000 van Gavin Watson en die ander skenkings van R440 miljoen  aan die sogenaamde CR17 –veldtog om hom tot die ANC-president verkies te kry, op geldwassery kan neerkom.”

Hunter and Munusamy159 report that the investigations followed [after Mkhwebane issued a subpoena to gain access to three bank accounts (among them Standard Bank and Absa, reflecting as the Cyril Ramaphosa Foundation, a company linked to Ramaphosa and the CR17 and linked to Ramaphosa’s campaign) because some members of Ramaphosa’s team declined to give details of the donors], as Mkhwebane analysed the inter-account transfers between January 2017 and February 2019. This analysis, report Hunter and Munusamy159 on the 23rd June 2019, led to the Public Protector’s suspicions159:1-2: “… that the president had used the accounts to launder money. She wants him to respond to her suspicions”. 

Hunter and Munusamy159 report furthermore that Ramaphosa’s long-time friend, one James Motlatsi, alleged that it was he who had asked Gavin Watson [of Bosasa] for money (supposedly R500 000) and that Ramaphosa did not know about the donations. On the various other donations to which Mkhwebane made enquiries, Motlatsi said159:1-2: “… Mkhwebane asked him who the other donors were: ‘I said no, we have taken a decision that each and every donor will remain confidential’.” On the broad aim and final destination of the money raised for the Ramaphosa-campaign, a member of the Ramaphosa- team said159:1-2: “Not all this money was fundraised for the campaign. Some of it is money for the foundation”, while another team-member said about the transfer of the funds which were moved between accounts that159:1-2: “…movement of money was ‘purely for logistical purposes’.” 

Wyngaard156 reports on the alleged R300 million to R500 million (Molatsi said that the amount of R400 million is incorrect but failed to give the correct amount) in donations for the CR17,  that Molatsi and the CR17 managers said156:21: “…dat die geld’ wetlik’ aangewend is vir verblyf, toelaes (‘stipends’) en bemarkingsmateriaal.”

Wyngaard156 elaborates on a clear guideline on how the “correct”  spending of the alleged R300 million to R500 million should have been done when he writes156:21:

Bemarkingsmateriaal’ sou seker T-hempde kon insluit, altyd ‘n gewilde item, of spesiale plakkate ter ondersteun van die kandidaat. Maar waarom sou ‘n kandidaat verblyf aan afgevaardigdes moet verskaf wanneer dit deur die organisaie self gedek word?

Wel, die verblyf wat die ANC aanbied, is dalk nie van die beste nie, dus skuif jy jou ondersteuners na “beter” verblyf – sonder dat hulle die rekening hoef te betaal.

En waarvoor sou die kandidaat se veldtog “toelaes” aan afgevaardigdes moet betaal? Die ANC dek immers self vervoer, etes én akkommodasie.

Of is hierdie toelae in werklikheid maar die “vergoeding” vir afgevaardigdes se lojaliteit, wat oornag kan verander na gelang van wat die belonging is en ten spyte van die “kandidaatmandaat” wat ‘n tak aan die afgevaardigdes gegee het.

Die WhatsApp-boodskappe wat ek gedurende die Nasrec-konferensie van ingeligtes ontvang het, het in die dae en ure vóórdat vir ‘n nuwe leierskap gestem is, vertel van aanbiedinge om afgevaardigdes se skuld af te betaal of beloftes van duisende rande om die familie oor Kersgety te bederf.

De Lange60 writes, specifically on the use of the campaign money to influence delegates, as follows60:13: “Die geld is gebruik om [Ramaphosagesindes] afgevaardigdes na die konferensie te vervoer en hulle te huisves in hotels waar hulle nie deur die teenkanting [skynbaar die Nkosazana Dlamini- Zuma kamp] beïnvloed of geïntimideer kon word nie.”

***[It is mentioned by Butler59 and De Lange60 that the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma camp spent far more than R500 million in their fight for the presidency of the ANC: Butler59 places the total costs of the ANC’s National Conference of December 2017 on R2 billion, making the donations for the two camps more or less R1 000 million. The sum of this R2 billion and the more than R500 million spent by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma camp, seems so far not to have attracted the attention of the Public Protector for “possible money-laundering”. This leaves the impression that the Public Protector can be subjective in her focus on the CR17, making the allegation that she is seemingly a “Zuma-appointed, -orientated -and –driven” agent in her so-called “attacks” on Ramaphosa, very convincing].59,60,160-162

Wyngaard156 emphasises that the156:21: “…’koop’ van stemme op ANC-leierskapkonferensies lê aan die kern van pres. Cyril Ramaphosa se huidige probleme met die openbare beskermer”. Wyngaard156 states clearly that there is surely no evidence that the two candidates were aware of above kinds of “candidate-promotions”, but quoted the unpublished book of Dr Oscar van Heerden156 about the “problematic outcomes” of the Nasrec 2017 ANC election156:21: “Geen eerbaarheid meer onder ANC-leiers nie en enigiets is aanvaarbaar – solank as wat jy wen”.

The indication by Wyngaard156 that the Ramaphosa-team was far less organised and experienced in political manipulation than the one of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, made him a less probable winner, seems appropriate. On the end-result of the Nasrec-election, Wyngaard writes156:21: “Stemme op die ANC-konferensies kom immers teen ‘n prys. En dit was so hittette of Dlamini-Zuma het hom [Ramaphosa] by die stembus verslaan – ‘n skrale 179 afgevaardigdes het hom gehelp om die knoop deur te hak. Nou met die OB se ondersoek na hom kan met reg gevra word: Wat het dit hom gekos?

The editor163 of The Star, on the corrupt buying of votes by candidates at the Nasrec 2017, responds163:8: “The leaking on social media of bank statements, showing payments from an account linked to the CR17 campaign showed, in black and white, what many had for a long time suspected: those wishing to stand for the ANC’s top job need more than just slogans and songs – they need deep pockets”.

***[The imbalanced outcome of the Nasrec election reflects that Ramaphosa’s simultaneous occupying of the chairs of the president of the ANC and that of the President of South Africa which was the result of an insignificant voter mandate brought about by merely ±2 090 votes for Ramaphosa against ±1 910 votes for Dlamini-Zuma. (This majority of Ramaphosa represents only 4.5% of the 4 000 delegate-group, which in turn represent ±1-million ANC-members)]156,164.

The above alleged “buying of the leadership” in 2017 by Ramaphosa is openly condemned by Ace Magashule,164 when he posits164:12:

Every leader of the ANC has been very critical about us using money because leaders are identified. Leaders are elected. Leaders emerge out of struggle.

We have always condemned these foreign tendencies within the ANC. Those tendencies are foreign and we will condemn them forever because there are clear conference resolutions and decisions and we must all adhere to those resolutions.

Magashule164 continues164:12:

We have not changed our character. We won’t behave like a pure electoral party that goes to the electorate during elections – we have principles.

If you understand the ANC, you will never move away from ANC objectives and principles, culture and traditions.

If you want to move away from it you must go to conference and change. Persuade people to take certain resolutions. The highest decision-making body is the national conference, and the national conference has never changed the character of the ANC.

***[It seems that there is at the moment an effort to quash covert party funding after the controversial Ramaphosa CR17 campaign by a draft Bill, the Promotion of Access to Information Act, to include provisions to get information on the funding of political parties.  The Bill, if passed, will compel parties to keep detailed records of the identity of donors and the amounts paid by the donor if it is above R100 000.The Bill stipulates that records should be kept (for a minimum of five years and should be made public quarterly) of money lent to political parties, sponsorships, expenses and its assets. Regarding the R100 000 limit Cosatu already demanded that all donations be declared because this threshold again could be a loophole for unscrupulous politicians to continue to accept bribes as so-called gifts. The intention is to align the Act with the Political Party Funding Act (promulgated in January 2019, 14 months after the ANC’s Nasrec election of 2017). This Act compels parties to declare to the Electoral Commission of South Africa donors who give in excess of R100 000, while it states that parties may not accept donations that are suspected or known to be proceeds of crime].165,166

Many stories and allegations have emerged around the alleged R500 millions of donations to the CR17. One story is that not all this money was fundraised for the campaign. De Lange162 reports that the CR-17 fund was not emptied or closed down after the election, as the CR17 management alleged. So-called donors’ money was apparently being used still after the Nasrec 2017 election for other purposes, such as salaries unrelated to the 2017 Nasrec election and for the party’s affairs, as well as Ramaphosa’s own personal activities. It is alleged that the salaries of certain ANC cadres at Luthuli-house – persons out of ANC jobs and who had formed part of the nucleus of Ramaphosa’s present list of loyalists and supporters at the time – were seemingly paid. Specifically, alleged De Lange162, Zizi Kodwa is alleged to be such a person. De Lange162 reports that Kodwa stayed on at Luthuli-house after the election at the cost of Ramaphosa to exclusively promote Ramaphosa’s interests there and in the greater ANC. De Lange162 writes further162:2: “Sy salaris is uit die CR-17-bankrekening betaal. Die CR-17-geld is ook gebruik om Fikile Mbalula se salaris te betaal. Dit word egter nie regstreeks so weerspieël in die gelekte state nie omdat dit meesal ingesluit is in ander items.”

The CR17 seems to have snared more politicians than Fikile Mbalula (now paid by the taxpayers as Transport Minister) and Zizi Kodwa (also, now paid by the taxpayers as State Security Deputy Minister) in its payment network. It is alleged by Mavuso and Ndaba167 in The Star of 19th August 2019 that the EFF-MP Tebogo Mokwele’s family also benefited from a payment and that former EFF-MP Nkagisang Mokgosi equally received finance from the CR17 when she ran into difficulties.167 On the strange “donations” to the two EFFs, Mokgosi  and Mokwele, Mavuso,168 quoting the political analyst Thabani Khumalo, writes168:7: “…the relationship that led to the soft financial bailout was not holy. Where there is a donation, there are always conditions attached”.

The above allegations together with other damning information stand out in the #CR17leaks, #RamaphosaLeaks and the #CR17BankStatements. These leaks, related to the persons named to have received or contributed funds to the presidential campaign and linked to bank statements of the CR17 campaign, were sealed from public knowledge by the North Gauteng High Court deputy judge president, Aubrey Ledwaba, at the beginning of August 2019 on a specific request by Ramaphosa.162,168,169

Other payments alleged by Mavuso168 is that a prominent KwaZulu-Natal-based black-owned firm, the said Ngweya and Zwane Attorneys, had also received R1.5-million from the CR17 campaign168.

On the so-called “excessive” amount of money paid to the CR17 and the alleged “streaming out” of such money during and after the Nasrec 2017-election, Wa Africa, Rampedi and Ngoepe write170:1: “President Cyril Ramaphosa’s supporters have accused the CR17 campaign managers, especially Small Business Development Minister Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, of having used them to enrich themselves from the R1 billion raised for his ANC leadership campaign in 2017”. It is alleged170:1: “…that Ntshavheni, who was the campaign co-ordinator in Limpopo, gave local ANC leaders only R1 500 of the R6 000 allocated per branch to sway members in Ramaphosa’s favour during the branch general meeting held before the Nasrec conference”. It is also alleged by Wa Africa, Rampedi and Ngoepe that Ntshavheni170:1“…claimed CR17 had no funds because it was a ‘religious’ campaign aimed at stopping state capture”. In this context of alleged pay-outs from the CR17 Wa Africa, Rampedi and Ngoepe170 write170:1: “The Sunday Independent learnt this week that Ntshavheni allegedly used a portion of the more than R5 million she received from the CR17 campaign funds to buy a luxury vehicle and build a mansion in Thohoyando for her mother”. They also alleged that Ntshavheni built another mansion for her alleged lover, Risimati Hlongwane, a CR regional coordinator in Vhembe.170

Maughan,169 on the other alleged beneficiaries from the CR17, reports further169:5: “The Sunday Independent reported that the beneficiaries of the campaign funds included ANC leader Enoch Godongwana, Ramaphosa’s adviser Marion Sparg, small business development minister Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, deputy minister in the presidency Thembi Siweya, former Free State economic development MEC Mxolisi Dukwana, former DA politician Grant Pascoe, Cosatu and Western ANC, among others”. 

Also, various other reports deal with the alleged funders.169,171 Regarding these alleged funders and their payments, Maughan169 reports169:5: “The records named some of the funders as billionaire Nicky Opperheimer (R10m), former Absa CEO Maria Ramos (R1m), Pick and Pick owner Raymond Ackerman who also contributed R1m. It also mentioned Absa Nation Building as one of the donors that contributed R10.5m”.  Friedman171 reports the name of John Copelyn of Hosken Consolidated Investments with the amount of R2 million.

The presidential spokesperson Khusela Diko172 admits that there were more than 120 donors. She, in her and Ramaphosa’s fightback on the publishing of the names of the donors, states:172:4 “Part of the conditions of them donating to the campaign was that they should not expect any benefit to arise from their contribution. It was for that reason that the campaign, to the greatest extent, attempted to keep that information from the president”.

The above statements of Diko172 reflect many contradictions. Firstly, is it unclear why Ramaphosa would want to keep these donors unknown in the light of his “clean”-governance undertaking in his election promises. The fact that he was one of the most eager supporters of the Political Party Funding Act of 2019 (promulgated post-January 2019), is now completely contradicted by his acknowledgement of his own secret political life, pre-January 2019. Secondly, any undertaking by a donor “not to expect benefits in exchange for their money” is not worth the paper on which the undertaking was signed: it seems some of the more than 120 donors were seasoned businessmen who are very active in White capitalism, while some seem not to be new-comers to associations with the ANC and to have had some previous dealings with and alleged benefits from the ANC regime.172-174

Two further contradictions here are prominent. Firstly, Ramaphosa maintains he knew very little about the donations made to his CR17 campaign (a standpoint reaffirmed by his spokesperson Diko), but then a batch of leaked e-mails arrived via the Public Protector’s report on Ramaphosa’s response to Parliament about the R500 000 Bosasa donation which suggested that he could indeed have known who the donors of the CR17 campaign were. These e-mails he successfully stopped from being released to the public by a court interdict because it was alleged that they, together with the financial records of his campaign, had been illegally obtained. Ramaphosa’s argument was not so much that it was untrue or fake news, which would mean that there could be more than just smoke, and a case that needs to be investigated by the NPA. What is important is that financial records and e-mails were indeed leaked, creating the possibility that serious mischief could be masked by the interdict.172-174

The above outcomes leave us with the question why Ramaphosa had interdicted genuine e-mails regarding his funding if he underwrites clean governance and has nothing to hide and is willing to take responsibility if there had been wrongdoing. On the integrity of the e-mails Dlamini172 states172:4: “News24 reported that the emails were shared among Ramaphosa’s political rivals and on Twitter and were apparently verified and found to be accurate”, while Rooi175 too states that175:2: “News24 het die e-posse …geverifisieer en bevind dit is eg”.

Based on reports from New24’s website, Dlamini172 as well as Rooi175 further state that the Public Enterprises minister Pravin Gordhan allegedly was central in raising funds for Ramaphosa. Dlamini172 writes172;4: “It further said the president was consulted by the managers of the campaign about plans to approach several donors, including a Greek shipping tycoon with links to the arms deal”. Prominent stands out the question why this Greek tycoon (alleged to have a local political connection, linked to a well-known “Afrikaner political figure” outside the ANC), and a person who should thus be seen by the CR17 managers to be part of state capture under the ANC regime coming from 1994 (and to can continue after 2017), was considered as a qualified donor. The editor108 of the Sowetan,172,175 S’thembiso Msomi, states:

Considering that Ramaphosa came into power promising clean governance and a break with the capturing of the state by business interests that South Africa experienced under his predecessor Jacob Zuma, it was worrying to see him keeping quiet over the weekend.

In addition, Rooi175 draws attention to another contradiction with seems to nullify Ramaphosa’s plea of a lack of knowledge on the intrigues surrounding the activities of the CR17. He writes175:2: “Daar is ook ‘n e-pos waarin Ramaphosa self opdrag gee dat R20 miljoen van een rekening na ‘n ander oorgeplaas word.”

Secondly, there seem to be many other contradictions to read in the responses of Diko172 on behalf of Ramaphosa when she vaguely reacted to the leaked e-mails172:4: “…the President could not comment on the substance of the emails or their veracity”. But in the same breath she said that Ramaphosa was perturbed by the narrative being built around these e-mails, which could be seen as an acknowledgment that the e-mails are all true, when she states172:4:

South Africans perhaps have a legitimate right to want to know who funded the campaign. But there was no obligation on the part of the president or the campaign to release that particular information.

There is no regulation that requires that information to be made public and a lot of those donors would have donated because it was also going to be confidential”. 

Answering her statement that there is “no regulation forcing Ramaphosa to make the e-mails public”, is it important to state that there are now postJanuary 2019 regulations in terms of the Political Party Funding Act of 2019 in place which could have forced Ramaphosa to make public his donors who gave money above R100 000 should the donations have taken place post-January 2019.172 What is important in all of Ramaphosa’s acts, is his paying lip service to good governance. The promulgation of the Political Party Funding Act of 2019 was promoted and endorsed by Ramaphosa, making the question now prominent: Should it not be politically correct for Ramaphosa as the Number One — after the nine Zuma years of deception and crooking — to freely oblige to the guideline of publishing all the names of the beneficiaries from and donors to his CR17 campaign and possible other funding-sources?172

Msomi,174 reflecting back on the names of the many donors and the e-mails allegedly  “blackening” them enough to justify a court interdict for Ramaphosa, thrusting the president in the centre of the web of lies and myths versus facts and truths concerning his involvement in the CR17 when he174, in line with Dlamini’s172 conclusion, writes on the 6th August 2019174:1:

News24 at the weekend reported on a number of leaked e-mails, some between Ramaphosa and his CR17 campaign managers, showing that the then deputy president had more than just a cursory interest in the drive to attract donors for his bid to become ANC president, and therefore president of the country.

Previously he had claimed that the CR17 kept a deliberate wall between him and their fundraising efforts and he did not even know who the donors were.

But the e-mails, which appear to have been partly relied upon by Mkhwebane in her findings that Ramaphosa misled parliament about the donations, suggest otherwise.

Although it can be argued that the CR17 money was not state money and thus outside the  authority of the Public Protector, it must be noted that Ramaphosa was still Vice President of the country at the 2017 Nasrec election and stood under the rules of the Executive Code as a civil servant. Also, the fact that the Nasrec election made him the State President with state pay and benefits, changes the private setup around the CR17 to a public one.  The Public Protector is indeed obliged by this outcome to investigate it and to refer it to the Hawks156 if there is an indication of possible money laundering.

The argument that Cyril Ramaphosa did not benefit from the CR17 money and that he is under no obligation by Parliament to declare the money or the donors’ names, seems not to hold water at all times. Ramaphosa’s obtention of an interdict to seal off from the public eye the many names of the donors of the money and his actions, reactions and counter-actions against Mkhwebane on the CR17’s activities are starting to look very suspicious. The question is prominent and contstant in the minds of many political analysts: what does Ramaphosa try to hide with all his opposing actions against the Public Protector’s findings or her indications of possible problems to be address by her.158,161,176-182 

Even Ramaphosa’s own supporters in the ANC’s NEC doubt his intentions and said the alleged amounts of R300 million (which can in reality be between R500 million and R1 000 million) of donations were overkill by Ramaphosa. About the so-called “humble” need to keep the donors’ names secret by Ramaphosa through an interdict, Cele, Masuabi and Rooi158 write158:1-2: “Dit kan korporatiewe Suid-Afrika met rooi gesigte laat.” This position of secrecy invokes once more the question primary question: why did these “good” but wealthy donors (undoubtedly with business and others interests mostly within the White-capitalist circles)  joine the Ramaphosa group? Was it not again a planned state capture and why should the public stay uninformed about the private donors’ actions and motives, hiding possible long-term political and economic effects still awaiting us? Ramaphosa’s successful interdict against the Public Protector, forbidding the publishing of the names of the donors to the CR 17, is of great concern: it spells out already the possibility of future state capture, as well as the possibility for Ramaphosa’s donors – with his guarantee by the court of their anonymity – to hold the country to ransom. It is obvious that Ramaphosa’s “good position” as state president at the end of the South African rainbow was ensured for him by the secret donors through their private financial and political intentions and activities.158,161

The fact that Ramaphosa is involved in an increasingly hostile battle with the Public Protector, while the Ramaphosa faction undoubtedly successfully smeared her in the media as the sole troublemaker against the “good Ramaphosa” and his regime, is a worrying phenomenon. It seems there can be an organised effort to undermine law and order.183-190 How intense Ramaphosa is fighting back against the Public Protector on any “suspicious” activities against him or by her doubting of his politics, is confirmed by the fact of  that he has appointed two of the top South African lawyers to take her on.183,184 On the 11th August 2019184 in his analysis of the situation, Hunter writes184:4: “President Cyril Ramaphosa has enlisted two top legal minds in what is expected to be an explosive legal fight against public protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane this week”.

About Ramaphosa’s role-playing as a so-called victim of the Public Protector in her alleged constant investigations against him, it must be noted that until June 2019 there had been only one. That his case should have been investigated, given all the questions around the CR17 funding, was justified, at least on a prima facie level. On her output of cases investigated (and wherein Ramaphosa did not play a role), inmiddle-June 2019 Mkhwebane herself gave us some inside information of her 20 months in office and the massive amount of cases so far investigated by her. This output by her clearly contradicts the public media’s allegation that she is primarily focussed on Ramaphosa or Gordhan, when she states191:2: “In die 12 maande tot 31 Maart 2019 het ek 14 000 sake ondersoek. Slegs twee het verband gehou met min. Gordhan, terwyl een met die president verband gehou het.”

Support is little for her in the media and politics, as Sokutu reflects192:12: “The opposition, from the Democratic Alliance (DA) to the ruling ANC – except for the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – have intensified the campaign to push for her firing.”

A well-organised antiBusisiwe Mkhwebane movement has emerged, reflecting focussed efforts to remove the present Public Protector from her post. Ramaphosa, his clan and supporters, parliamentarians, as well as officially and pro-Black organisations such as the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation, Freedom Under Law, the Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse, Cosatu and the SACP, have all called for Mkhwebane’s resignation or firing.183-193

There is no doubt that a Public Protector’s task and person are always endangered when he/she dares to try to implicate powerful individuals in their various kinds of wrongdoing, hardly making the case of Busiswe Mkhwebane a unique one. There are well-orchestrated efforts to oust the present Public Protector as soon as possible and at all costs for spurious reasons, such as her alleged “enabling of state capture” and of being an “alleged failure”. There are even the outrageous allegations that she is apparently mentally ubalanced, suffering from “paranoia” which would explain why she is daring to take on high-status figures, such as the two media heroes and darlings, Gordhan and Ramaphosa. Some want to take her to court for alleged perjury, while other persons cry out to remove her as an advocate from the roll.183-193

The attacks on her seem at times to be well-planned and focussed, extremely rude and undoubtedly mostly without evidence. Many are calculated to cast suspicion where evidence is lacking.183-193 Calland194 writes194:23: 

She [Mkhwebane] is not in fact exercising her powers without fear or favour, but in service of certain factional and other vested interests;

and194:23:

In the corridors of power, the most often stated rumour is that Mkhwebane  is being ‘handled by The Farm’ – a faction in the base of the intelligence services. Mkhwebane once worked there, but that does not mean she is a spook. However, there has to be an explanation for her conduct.

She is subjectively described as a “one-woman show which has to go”; postulations that fail to reflect any evidence against her besides betraying subjective and unrelated arguments which fit well into the pro-Ramaphosa faction’s mindset. Much of the criticism is characterised by the same personal rejection of her as of Jacob Zuma.183-193

Calland’s194 tirade that Mkhwebane’s dismissal by a two-thirds majority will be blocked in Parliament, constructs a narrative of the alleged sheltering of the Public Protector by crooks in the Parliament when he writes194:23:

The scoundrels on the list [ANC election list] will fight hard to stop a move against Mkhwebane. They have common cause with her; there are common interests in halting the reforms that may lead to their own investigation, prosecution and imprisonment.

Micheal193 writes193:13:

This woman has been an abject failure from the day she took office and everything she has touched has turned into a disaster. The only thing she is concerned about is to be a bulwark and a safeguard for Zuma’s cronies and this is the reason she was put there in the first place. It is fairly obvious now that she is incapable and cannot do the job that she was appointed to do…She should be fired from her job…

Sokutu192 writes192:12:

Looking at the string of her bungles – the latest the disputed finding on the SA Reserve Bank and Absa [as well as the latest court findings on Gordhan and on the Gupta-linked Estina dairy farm project] for which she has been slapped by the Constitutional Court with a huge personal cost order for “being untruthful” – the embattled Mkhwebane finds herself besieged by sharks baying for her blood.

Essop191 reports her own experience of the attack on her191:2: “Sy het gesê sy is in die sowat 20 maande in die amp onder meer ‘n “spioen” en “Zuptoid” of “Zupta-beskermer” genoem, ‘n minister het haar “onbevoeg” genoem, ‘n direkteur-generaal het haar vir ‘n “idiot “uitgekryt en joernaliste het haar ‘n “moroon” genoem. Mkhwebane het ook ontken dat sy betrokke is by die ANC se faksiegevegte.”

There seems to be an outright attack on Mkhwebane’s abilities and integrity as reflected by Munusamy’s195 writing of the 4th August 2019 which reads195:13-14:

Busisiwe Mkhwebane has been savaged by the highest court in the land. She has been branded a liar who is also incompetent, devious irresponsible, sloppy and opaque.

Marrian196 warns on the 14th June 2019, on the alleged capturing by Jacob Zuma and his cronies of the present office of the public protector – specifically the person Busisiwe Mkhwebane, and that political honesty, wisdom and sense must prevail as to her actions and person – when she writes as follows196:2:

At the end of this battle, the office of the public protector has to remain intact and if removing Mkhwebane ensures that this is done, so be it. But it is critical that this is done fairly and within the ambit of the law.

That Ramaphosa is going to pay a price in the future inside the greater ANC but mostly with the voters for his Ledwaba interdict, no-one can doubt. Mavuso and Ndaba167 refer to the viewpoint of the Durban-based independent political analyst Thabani Khumalo who said that the CR17 funds revelations were deeply damaging to the reputation of Ramaphosa167:2: “…as a man who came to power to clean the image of the country after lurching from one scandal to another in the past nine years”.

Khumalo167 is very straight on Ramaphosa’s insecure position since June 2019, triggered by the CR17 controversy and his own political clowning around it from June,  when he says167:2: “…there was little that Ramaphosa could do to cleanse his image, saying people would now start recalling that he was part of the previous leadership [as vice-President and righthand and supporter of Jacob Zuma] that was being questioned.”

Msomi174 writes that notwithstanding some South Africans having been sceptical on Ramaphosa’s New Dawn to come, they believed that he at least would bring and run a clean administration174:13:

At the very least, we expected Ramaphosa would not be allergic to truth, no matter how uncomfortable or embarrassing it might be. He is certainly no Zuma, but his handling of the donations saga so far has left a bitter taste in the mouth.

The editor176 of the Citizen is quite lucid, reminding us of legal objectivity and reality. This also forms the basis of the Public Protector’s approach to Ramaphosa, even if it might sink him in the end. Regarding the present-day fight between Ramaphosa and the Public Protector, the editor176 of The Citizen guides us well on the 23rd July 2019 when he writes176:12:

However, the fact remains that, whatever the dust stirred up by this judgement and by Mkhwebane’s report on Ramaphosa the president has serious questions to answer.

And whether we like her or not, Mkhwebane was asking them.

The fact that many people believe Ramaphosa is some sort of political saviour should not blind them to the fact that he does not appear squeaky clean himself.

People must, at all costs, avoid believing that the end justifies the means.

The former public prosecutor, Lawrence Mushwana197, warns us of an internalised unreality which can sometimes relegate objectivity and honesty into second place in the minds of all the parties involved in the cases investigated by the public prosecutor’s office, saying in June 2019197:9: “…stakes are high in the office of the public prosecutor with all interested parties trying to stake a claim.” It is about the power to rule via the Public Protector’s office by delinquent politicians: Here the actions of the Ramaphosa clan to stay in power are very prominent.  This so-called “claim staking” can be for less noble reasons as Makhanya187,197 warns on the role-playing of the dangerous populists in ANC politics as well as those in the economic world which have since 1994 dominated politics.178,197

About the distracting and organised attack on the Public Protector, discerning at least some suggestions of impropriety in the “smoke” suggesting some fire in the activities of the pro-Ramaphosa faction, Wyngaard156, supported by many other journalists, states156:21: “Maar die koor van kritiek teen Mkhwebane en die gereelde luide bevraagtekening van haar kundigheid, kan maak dat ‘n mens nalaat om te vra: Het Ramaphosa dalk tog iets om weg te steek?

Brian Sokutu192 is very correct when he says192:12: “Cyril needs to come clean”: it does not mean a week by week cleansing through affidavits and court interdicts to silence critics, but a permanent cleansing by himself of his past if he dares to stay on in the presidency.

What is obvious in this context are the increasing signs of Ramaphosa’s duplicity and evasions as a president to save his skin. He started his down-fall by misleading the Parliament himself with his slipperiness and ambiguity around the R500 000 of Bosasa money for his CR17 as an alleged payment to his son Andile for “consultation work”.156

The country is now in what many say is a crisis. The constant fights and interdicts around the position of Ramaphosa’s presidency doesn’t smell good186:4: “…worse news follow bad news”. It is time that Ramaphosa’s acts are taken to the courts to see if he is capable and skilled enough for the presidency. It is the duty of the court to intervene and to interfere when it seems that political leaders, regimes and law-makers fail their mandates of integrity, honesty and good governance.

Mkhwebane’s alleged transgressions against Ramaphosa are even deemed to be driven by her jealousy, especially because it is alleged that she does not receive as much attention as the previous Public Protector had received. Such allegations seem to be based on her lack of also being seen as a “national hero” and “saviour of the nation” as Madonsela was eulogised because she “captured” the bad Zuma and his cronies! Munusamy195 reflects this cognitive disposition well when she postulates195:13-14:

Mkhwebane’s deep resentment of Madonsela would become obvious. It seemed to go beyond the fact that Madosela took the role of the ‘Makhadzi’ with her, robbing Mkhwebane of the public adoration she felt entitled to.

The previous position and role of Madonsela as an alleged hero in ANC politics needs to be analysed. It will be done in the section immediately following here.

3.3.1.1.4.6.1.1. The strange role of Thuli Madonsela in Jacob Zuma’s state-capture adventure

The deputy general secretary of the SACP, Solly Mapaila198, in his testimony before the Zondo-commission on state capture which lifted the lid on the process that set the stage for state capture, made the surprising allegation of the role of previous Public Protector Thuli Madonsela in this process. Madonsela became a kind of “national heroine” for her so-called “role of saviour of the nation” from Zuma and his cronies’ state capture. Copious was the praise for her alleged role in the “fall of Zuma” with her report on Nkandla and state capture. In the evidence before the Zondo Commission by Solly Mapaila and Robert McBride, Madonsela was suddenly and unexpectedly clothed in another role, that of a crony and understudy to Jacob Zuma, in helping to prepare him for the presidency. It is alleged that Zuma finally helped her to become the country’s all-powerful public protector.198

Their testimony suggests the alleged formation of an elite group, called the engine room, which was gathered and apparently led by Zuma himself to advise him on the running of his regime from 2009 onwards. This training and advisory activity took place quite apart from the tripartite-alliance’s team, which was, on the face of it, supposed to guide and prepare Zuma officially. Mapaila198 said that this engine room, later also described as the kitchen cabinet, gave extensive advice to Zuma about the structure and policy direction of his government ahead of the 2009 period, totally disregarding the official ANC alliance team’s advice and guidelines.198

Munusamy198 also states that in submissions to Zondo, as was argued by Mapaila and the former Ipid chief Robert McBride, the members of the engine room group were very close to Zuma’s planning and decision-making: far closer and with more power than the ANC’s alliance (transitional) team. The evidence held that many of these members of the kitchen cabinet were later appointed by Zuma to key positions within the state.  The engine room (kitchen cabinet) members had included persons such as the filmmaker Duma Ndlovu, Thuli Madonsela, Independent Electoral Commissioner chairperson Glen Mashinini, the former national police commissioner Riah Phiyega, the former minister Nkosinathi Nhleko, while the former Sars commissioner Tom Moyane also attended the meetings.198

On the other hand, members of the alliance or transitional (official) team, that was established by the ANC, SACP and Cosatu to do the restructuring of the government and to determine its programme based on the outcome of the ANC’s 2007 Polokwane national conference, were sidelined by Zuma and his “kitchen cabinet”, Munusamy claimed198.[The members of this team consisted of the top six members of the ANC, as well as the secretary general of the SACP Blade Nzimande and the secretary general of Cosatu, Zwelinzima Vavi. The secretariat of the alliance team was headed by Collins Chabane (who later joined Zuma’s cabinet), with members Mapaila, Ayanda Dlodlo, Neil Coleman and Clifford Motsepe]198.

Mapaila198 said that when the transitional team was established Zuma had already activated his kitchen cabinet in secret without informing the alliance leadership. What was shocking for the alliance team was that when Zuma announced his cabinet, some of the kitchen cabinet’s proposals were implemented in conflict with the advice of the alliance team. It was clear that the alliance team had been short-circuited by Zuma and that the kitchen cabinet determined the policy directions of the future Zuma presidency. Prominent conflicting decisions taken by Zuma, in line with the kitchen cabinet’s advice and against the advice of the alliance team, were that the National Planning Commission and the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation became two separate ministries.198

Munusamy198 reports that there is no suggestion that the kitchen cabinet has been linked to corrupt activities. But certain outcomes of the decision-making of the kitchen cabinet and its members’ later appointments around Zuma’s interests are very suspicious. Firstly, a prominent outcome of the direction taken by Zuma with the appointment of his “own”, unofficial advisory team was a first sign that he was quite prepared to outsource the ANC’s mandate on ruling the country and to ignore the resolutions of the national conference. This is also a significant characteristic of his later state-capture enterprise via his appointed cronies and the involvement of strangers, such as the Guptas, opening the state’s coffers to them. Secondly, it is both significant and very suspicious that most of the so-called “members of his kitchen cabinet” were appointed later by Jacob Zuma in high-ranking positions. The following appointments followed from the kitchen cabinet: Nhleko, a previous provincial-prisons boss, was appointed minister of police; Moyane became the Sars commissioner; Mashinini was first appointed as an adviser to Zuma and then chair of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); Phiyga was first appointed chair of the presidential state-owned enterprises review committee, before becoming police commissioner; Vincent Magwenya was appointed presidential spokesperson; Bonsile Makhene became legal adviser to Zuma; Yekani Monde Gadini (husband of Makhene) was a State Security Agency agent, redeployed to Sars; while Madonsela became the public protector.198

Thirdly, all these positions were politically very powerful. These posts provided for excellent opportunities for the abuse and manipulations of the political, economic and statutory system as part of steering state capture. (The appointees Moyane and Phiyga’s problematic behaviours are today well-known).198

In reaction to the above developments and outcomes, Mapaila198 said before his appearance before the Zondo Commission198:5: “When we go to the commission we will illustrate our point of view that this is how capture happened even before [Zuma] became president. Policymaking shifted from the ANC to an unknown secret system.” Here, in the launching of state capture from within an unknown secret system, seems to stand out in some way for Mapaila the corrupting role of Zuma’s kitchen cabinet.198

Madonsela’s alleged association with and appointment by Jacob Zuma in the 2009s versus her current elevated and prestigious figure, and a person known since 2017 as a so-called national saviour and somewhat of an idol, as well as a so-called “prominent” fighter against the “bad” Zuma and his “evil” state capture, is controversial. If these allegations are true, it spells trouble in some way. There are enough conspiracy bloodhounds to start sniffing her tracks in the life and politics of the ANC and that of Zuma, not only after 2009, but also before 2009. The question, somehow, is what went wrong between her and Uncle Jacob? What cooled down her initial loyalty to and friendship with Zuma? What awful interpersonal incident had caused her to nearly put him in jail as well as attempt to take away his much beloved Nklanda from him. There are also her strange acquaintances with Moyane and Phiyga in their days of the kitchen cabinet and after the appointments of the three to state positions. It requires some answers.198

Two questions will stay undoubtedly unanswered: did Zuma’s kitchen cabinet teach him his political delinquency or did some of these “cabinet members” learn crookedness from him? Or was the whole group, including Zuma, from day one a bunch of delinquents? It seems as if Mkhwebane’s biggest problem at the moment is that she was not appointed by Ramaphosa as a favoured follower and that she was not  part of Ramphosa’s own “kitchen cabinet”. But her biggest sin, it seems, is that she dared to take on the “good, anointed saviour of the Nation”, Cyril Ramaphosa, while Madonsela took on the public’s much-hated “prime evil”, Jaco Zuma! The line between wrong and right is thin in the cesspit of South African politics, following on from 1994.

3.3.1.1.4.6.2. Where does Ramaphosa’s wealth come from?

The standpoint of President Cyril Ramaphosa that he wants to cleanse South African politics from corruption obliges him also as a politician to undergo a lifestyle audit. This seems to be an idea he supported strongly in the past in Parliament.81,200,201

At the moment it appears that he has not so far undergone a lifestyle audit, making it very difficult to determine how he had obtained his assets for the two periods, pre-1994 and post-1994. From media reports Ramaphosa seems to be a very rich man.  For the mass of poor people his financial success, power and wealth are things to adore. It undoubtedly brings him hero status amid the Black population. But, without an official parliamentary lifestyle audit, we are left in the dark, without an idea of the size of his assets and how and when he established it: was it pre-1994 or post-1994, etc.? The research of Phapano Phasha202, published on the 8th January 2019, seems to give us some insight as to how Ramaphosa had obtained at least some of his wealth. To get a better insight into Ramaphosa the businessman and politician, his story is reflected below to provide the reader with an in-depth understanding of the so-called “unique Ramaphosa lifestyle”.202

The report of the political analyst, commentator and spokesperson for the Progressive Professionals Forum (PPF), Phapano Phasha202, is of the opinion that Ramaphosa’s wealth could possibly have originated from support he had received from the PIC (Public Investment Commissioner).89,202

Note: The PIC is at the moment under scrutiny by the Zondo and Mpati commissions for possible state capture and other corruption by certain members of the ANC elite and their cronies. The alleged corruption unmasked by the inquiry is now starting to probe deeper and deeper into the integrity of the ANC elite, or lack thereof, stretching as far back as 1996. Indeed, it is suggested by forensic experts that the terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry into the PIC must be extended to investigate some of the ANC-elite members in depth.202-207

Phapano Phasha202 did a thorough study of the historical, economic and political occurrences from 1996 to 2005 at the PIC and its beneficiaries. Her comprehensive analysis of the data is very significant and needs to be noted here.  In this research Phasha202 states having identified the presence of Cyril Ramaphosa as an alleged beneficiary.202

The use of Phapano Phasha’s202 article is to provide further insight into the present and future role of Cyril Ramaphosa in the politics of post-2019 South Africa. It also makes the remark of the columnist of the Tiso Blackstar Group’s, Tom Eaton208, more understandable when reflecting on the South African Political Theatre and his investigation of the ANC leaders under the title: A-Z of Droscars – from Agrizzi to Zondo, he writes207:8: “Few political actors have gone so far with so little…”

The seasoned political analyst and commentator Phapano Phasha’s202 article is of great importance, not only because it gives insight into the political heartbeat of the ANC, but especially because it can serve as a guideline how to do constructive thinking and planning in future regarding the land reform matter. In this context a full quotation is necessary. She writes202:

Between 1996 and 2005 Trevor Manual, in his capacity as Finance Minister, was the sole trustee and custodian of the Government Employee Pension Fund (GEPF) which at the time of inception had assets close to R200 billion. As a sole trustee of GEPF, Mr Trevor Manual did not report or account to anyone but himself. To this end there was no board or governance and therefore Mr Manual had the sole discretion of how employees’ pension funds would be invested.

However, in 2002 a tender for actuarial services was advertised and eventually awarded to Alexander Forbes by Trevor Manual in his capacity as the sole trustee of GEPF, which was now worth over R250 billion. Alexander Forbes then proceeded to sell 30% of its shares to an empowerment group that was called Millennium Consolidated Investments (MCI) which was incorporated in 2001, being a year before the invitation to tender came out. This company belonged to the current President of the African National Congress (ANC) and South Africa (SA), Cyril Ramaphosa.

Before ‘buying’ 30% of the Alexander Forbes shares and thus getting first-hand access to the funds of the GEPF, President Ramaphosa was just another Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) proxy from the governing party who subsequently managed to buy more than 27 companies post 2003 which turned him into an instant billionaire. To strengthen the argument, according to a 2006 article by the Mail & Guardian titled ‘Anatomy of Fast Money’, the sudden wealth which was concentrated amongst a few new colonial elites, like President Ramaphosa, was not due to hard work but to connections to the ANC, patronage and friends in government which in turn led to some of the following acquisitions by President Ramaphosa:

  • April 2003: 16% of Alexander Forbes, now worth R1,1-billion.

  • July 2003: 14,4% of Bidvest, worth R706-million.

  • July 2004: 1,2% of Standard Bank, worth R1,1-billion.

  • August 2004: 42% of Mondi Shanduka Newsprint and 40% of Mondi Packaging, worth about R980 million.

  • November 2005: 11,74% of Assore, worth R394-million

  • November 2005: 1,5% in Liberty Life, worth R299-million.

  • May 2006: 25% of Downing, Reynard and Associates (unlisted)

  • July 2006: 40% of Kangra Coal…Source (Mail & Guardian)

It is quite obvious to any student of geopolitics that the rise and rise of President Ramaphosa was sparked by his acquiring the shares at Alexander Forbes. This brings me to the rationale on why President Ramaphosa must extend the terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry into the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), which is the asset-management company that invests funds on behalf of the GEPF.

It will be an injustice if the current terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry into the PIC [Public Investment Corporation] are left as they are because for more than a decade Trevor Manual was God presiding over billions in hard-earned savings of government employees whilst President Ramaphosa became Deputy God. Hence to only focus on the investment decisions taken by the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the PIC, Dan Matjila, is quite frankly opportunistic and self-serving. South Africans have every right to know which companies and individuals benefitted during the tenures at the GEPF of Trevor Manual and President Ramaphosa, especially since there was no board or governance in place at that time.

Another factor is the conflict of interest regarding both President Ramaphosa and Mr Trevor Manual which necessitates an investigation to unpack if President Ramaphosa directly used his position as a shareholder at GEPF to get a capital injection into his own companies; the same applies to Trevor Manual, which also falls under the ambit of state capture. This, by the way, is no different to the conflict of interest associated with Nhlanhla Nene who opted to resign as the Minister of Finance.

The investment decisions by both Trevor Manual and President Ramaphosa, each in their capacity as custodian of the GEPF, must also extend to the likes of Zanele Mbeki, Tokyo Sexwale, Saki Macozoma, Frank Chikane, Jay Naidoo, Kelso Gordian, Cheryl Carolus et cetera. To this end the Commission of Inquiry must assess whether they received, or legitimately received, any capital injection through the GEPF. Moreover, the conduct of the likes of Johan Rupert, Christopher Wiese, Johannes Mouton, Stephen Koseff and Markus Jooste, who used the funds of the GEPF through their asset-management companies which sub-contract with the PIC, to inject capital into their own businesses, must be inquired into.

It is therefore not surprising that the post-1994 Afrikaners, especially the Stellenbosch and Paarl gang, have become richer than they were during apartheid. It is precisely because Trevor Manual and President Ramaphosa literally handed them the pension funds of black employees without any competition from black-owned asset management companies.

The PIC, which now controls trillions of pension-fund money, has literally become a piggy bank for the private sector and politically connected elite who don’t have to work hard to earn their wealth – but simply abuse and misuse money that belongs to workers, many of whom are living from hand to mouth. Unfortunately, unions like the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), including the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA), have never been vocal on this slave-trade transaction because they are part and parcel of the same private sector which has perfected monopolizing public funds to feed the private sector. This is what Dr Okechukwu C Iheduru defined as labour capitalism in a paper titled ‘Organised Labour, Globalisation and Economic Reform: union investment companies in South Africa’.

In essence, state capture and exchange of capital between the blue-eyed boys, the Broederbond and the new colonial elite, was very systematic and structural. What is quite obvious is that this gang has been very sophisticated whilst using all sorts of treacherous and deceitful means to gain proximity to government coffers in order to empower itself and its family whilst simultaneously taxing the working class and poor who literally sustain their wealth.

uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) prisoner Soko Ndukwana defined this grouping as “looters of the Nation and Gangster Capitalists” who today have become the paragon of truth and business experts in a country which is rated as the most unequal in the world. This is precisely because state resources have been misused and abused by those using their struggle credentials to benefit a few whilst the majority, who keep them in power and who are yet to see the rays of liberation, are burdened by squalor and degradation. This is sheer state capture which has taken centuries to perfect and in its collapse, we must never allow it to use Dan Matjila as collateral damage…

Conclusion: The above is not about dishonesty or fraud. Neither does it represent an allegation of that nature, but with commissions such as Zondo and Mpati running and Ramaphosa at a loss to explain his and his son’s involvement with Bosasa and the CR17, together with his plea of “complete innocence” as vice president of Jacob Zuma and his many intimate cronies’ wrongdoing, an in-depth investigation into his assets, as from pre-1994, is urgently needed. It is not a recommendation, but a must. Official lifestyle audits, going back to the 1990s, are needed on Ramaphosa and Manuel (but the chances are good that they, as Ramaphosa and Manuel did recently with their various interdicts when the air gets hot, will summarily stop any investigation against them).

If the above allegations of Phapano Phasha202 are true, the questions are: Firstly, who did Manual consult for a good and independent consideration in his awarding of the BBBEE deal to Ramaphosa? Secondly, on what merits and grounds did Ramaphosa obtained the deal(s)? Why did Ramaphosa, as a co-ANC cadre and friend of Manuel, obtain such a deal? Why did Ramaphosa not declare it when he accepted the presidency? In this context, there are clear ethical obligations for Ramaphosa as the present chief executive of the Republic of South Africa, other than just an ordinary businessman, that he should immediately fulfil. These ethics clearly prescribe why he could not take on the presidency of South Africa if the BBBEE deal enabling him to obtain his wealth via the PIC, as alleged by Phasha,202 is true. To disregard such ethics, would place him in the same camp as Jacob Zuma. He cannot stay on as president.

It is doubted if Phasha’s202 allegations will easily reach the ears of the Zondo or the Mapti commissions. There is just too much ANC obstruction. The impact of Phasha’s202 reporting in the social media was limited to her article on Google (through the social media the EFF reach 5.8 million people, the ANC 4.9 million people and the DA 4.6 million people). Phasha’s202 allegations seem to be serious, but it is doubted that in the event of a court case she will be in a favourable  position to tell Ramaphosa and Manuel (as Malema did with ease in reaction to Manuel’s threat of a court case against him) that they “can go to hell” and “I am not afraid of you.”202,209

Weighing alleged self-enrichment via BBBEE versus the immense poverty of the mass of Blacks outside BBBEE opportunities (it does not matter if the BBBEE deal had been done entire honestly through the PIC) casts a cloud over Ramaphosa’s head.

If Phapano Phasha’s202 article on Ramaphosa’s use of the PIC has some merit, he must come clean on the PIC allegations in the first place. Secondly, he should fully declare his financial setup: his assets, other belongings and trusts, etc., starting before 1994. The origins of Ramaphosa’s wealth must be fully revealed. As president of South Africa it is his responsibility and duty to do it. At this stage he is a witness, not a perpetrator.  He is surely not one of the many persons who avoided the various judicial commissions on state capture. Munusamy210 writes210:28: “When former finance minister Nhlanhla Nene returned to the witness stand this week, Zondo asked him why so few former and current cabinet members and senior officials were coming forward to testify, Nene responded that other people might not be dictated by their conscience and could also be worried about the ‘price to pay’.” Indeed, these culprits should be worried, reports Munusamy210:28: “In Nene’s case, the price to pay was very high.” Cyril Ramaphosa must know it beforehand. He avoids without clear reason the Zondo and Mpati Commissions, as well as the public at large.210, 211

3.3.1.1.4.6.3. Role of the Lekota-Zuma-Ramaphosa triumvirate in the Apartheid regime’s spies

Since the December 2017 election of Ramaphosa as the ANC’s leader, there have been rumours about the Ramaphosa group’s alleged spying association with the Apartheid regime. The leaking of information by previous intelligence agents of the NP that the lists of the names of ANC members that had worked under-cover for them were erased created suspicion. Prominent present-day members of the ANC elite could indeed be spies and therefore at risk.

That there were indeed many ANC traitors working with the NP regime as agents and who as ANC VIPs may now fear being unmasked, was confirmed by the bragging of John Vorster23:1-2: “…that the majority of ANC exiles were spies”.

Moalusi212 also refers in this context to the possibly of “plentiful” ANC top leaders that may have been “spies” and the ANC’s punitive actions in the past against some of them, by specifically citing Jacob Dlamini’s book Askari. On Nelson Mandela’s own view on the possibility of “plentiful” ANC top leaders that may have indeed been “spies”, Moalusi writes212:14: “Nelson Mandela did say if the issue of spies is to be an obsessive point of discussion, then almost everyone in the ANC will be called a spy. Something the apartheid regime wanted to achieve, ultimately.”

Prominent among these wanton rumours is Jacob Zuma’s list of “ANC-spies”. It is alleged  by Dr Nel Marais30, a risk analyst who had worked from 1980 to 2000 in the South African national Intelligence structures (National Intelligence, SA Secret Service, Military Information and the SAPS Security Police), that there does not exist a single list of the names of Apartheid agents anymore. The belief is that this makes Zuma’s task of identifying these culprits with concrete evidence, based on the real Apartheid records very difficult. Marais reports that although the National Intelligence destroyed all its records in 1990, the NP regime’s various secret services never worked together and that the records of agents were probably limited to access by certain personnel inside those governmental agencies only. There is thus no indication that all the governmental records were destroyed and thus no assurance for ANC-NP collaborators not to be exposed in the near future.23,30,43-45,213

The main question is why it was so important for the NP regime to erase these ANC culprits’ names from being identified later?23,30,43-45,213

Rumours of a so-called secret list of ANC-NP collaborators started to circulate before Ramaphosa’s appointment as executive political leader of South Africa. This list, alleged to be in the possession of Zuma alone, was referred to as a kind of extorting method by  Zuma’s cronies to get Ramaphosa’s people in the ANC NEC to tone down their their anti-Zuma behaviour and campaign. This initiative seems directed at isolating Ramaphosa from the mainstream of the ANC’s voters and supporters. Political analysts see this very wanton allegation as undoubtedly well-planned and inserted into the public mind to sow suspicion so that Ramaphosa may be taken down. Featuring prominently among these rumours is the resurfacing of allegations about Ramaphosa’s relationship and favoured position with the NP regime during Apartheid. This observation was tabled in Parliament by Mr Patrick Lekota recently.25,26,32,35,213

Zuma’s political company know all too well Ramaphosa’s weaknesses and mistakes, originating from pre-1994, and how these may be used to undermine him before the election of 2024. The spying allegations may be one focus.25,26,32,35,213

Although Ramaphosa rejected Lekota’s allegation in Parliament, his defence was not very strong and indeed vague; creating the impression that he tried to further defuse confrontation with Lekota and to get the issue out of the public eye. There has so far also not been any outright rejection by Ramaphosa of the so-called “Zuma list” which is alleged to reflect indirectly on him and his clan.213

There are allegations that the SSA is still delinquent with a footing in the Zuma clan. The Mufamadi report is counted as evidence. The Zuma clan’s political, social and economic power is underestimated: it is still strong enough to topple Ramaphosa even as early as 2020.55,104

There is a clear coordinated fight-back by the pro-Ramaphosa camp to divert the attention from identifying alleged spies in their ranks by propagating that Jacob Zuma was himself in the 1980s an alleged  NP spy, without offering the evidence to back it up. The fact that the ANC veterans strongly rally to Zuma’s side in the growing Ramaphosa-Zuma war for the soul of the ANC and are standing on the side of Zuma in his spying allegations against some prominent ANC members, spells the possibility of spies being unmasked in the near future.25,26,28,30,33,34

The MK veterans, as well as Zuma, have publicly fingered Nyanda and Ramatlhodi as alleged spies. Kgosana32 writes, on the response of the leader of Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans Association (MKMVA), Kebby Maphatsoe, as follows32:4:

Maphatsoe said the veterans are not surprised that former ministers Ngoako Raatlhodi and Siphiwe Nyanda have been outed by Zuma as alleged apartheid agents. It now makes sense why the integration of former MK combatants into the new South African National Defence Force, which Nyanda had overseen, disadvantaged many of those who had fought for liberation.

“We are beginning to connect the dots to say under his leadership of the army, during integration, that is why MK members even now are retiring poor.”

Ramatlhodi30 remarked on the allegations of Zuma against him and Nyanda when he said30:8: “Hy [Zuma] wil die grafte heropen en dis nie wat ek wil doen nie”, but this may hide more than the eye can see. For alleged ANC members to escape their past as so-called “reform revolutionaries” there is no place in Zuma’s politics. Indeed, Zuma’s future strategy on Apartheid agents may be life-threatening for some ANC VIPs. Zuma and Lekota’s positions as head of the ANC external and internal security and intelligence undoubtedly provide them with information about many present-day ANC political leaders’ past political activities and the persons who had paid them blood money in exchange for ANC secrets. To write off Zuma or Lekota in favour of Ramaphosa and his neo-ANCs can be a grave error.25,26,30,34,35,46

Many Ramaphosa supporters can be sure that in the next twelve months more so-called “secrets” will be exposed in some way on the alleged traitors in the ANC by Zuma and his group. At this stage Zuma can afford to lift the lid of the story of treason in the ANC: it can make him in the end the winner against all doubts. He can bounce back as the top leader, as Winston Churchill successfully did in WW2.25,26,30,34,35,42,46

It is of the utmost importance that Cyril Ramaphosa address the allegation of Patrick Lekota regarding him as an alleged spy constructively with facts, and not again with libel cases and interdicts to staunch doubts about him.

3.3.1.1.4.6.4. Cyril Ramaphosa in perspective

From the above controversies that reflect on Ramaphosa’s actions, it is clear that the public, even his intimate comrades, know very little about Ramaphosa the person. His plan, similarly to his behaviour, are unpredictable. This spells serious trouble if he stays on in the presidency. In the context of Ramaphosa, the vague political-leader, De Lange60 writes as follows60:13:

Sestien jaar lank – van 1996, toe hy klaar was met die skryf van die Grondwet, tot 2012, toe hy uit die bloute adjunkpresident van die ANC geword het – het Cyril Ramaphosa ‘n baie private loopbaan en lewe in die sakewêreld gelei. Selfs in die vier jaar wat hy adjunkpresident was, het hy ‘n masker gedra wat bra min oor hom verklap het” en: “Die president is byvoorbeeld nie goed met fyner detail nie – dit laat hy aan ander oor; dit vat ook lank voordat hy ‘n besluit neem; niemand weet wat hy dink nie…”

Msimang214 is of the opinion that the positioning, power- and image-building of Ramaphosa go deeper. It seems to be well-anchored in the dark politics of the ANC. Msimang posits214:1-2:

Before that, he was already the embodiment of the grotesque. The rapid and enormous rise in his wealth was largely a result of his position as a lead mediator for the ANC during the negotiations for democracy, where he won the trust of the white businesspeople who controlled the economy in 1994 and continue to do so today.

His role in the events that led to the 2012 Marikana mineworkers’ massacre showed him to be callously out of touch with the interests of workers, and predictable and cruelly supportive of the interests of the mining company on whose board he sat.

 

3.3.1.1.4.6.5.  Results of the Louw Appraisal Checklist on the ability of the ANC to be a government

The activities of the regime and leadership of the ANC have been spread over seven articles. The contents of the seven articles are as follows:

The mark awarded to the ANC and its leadership for the period 1994 to 2019 in terms of the bad-versus-good classification of satisfaction on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,4 was 23 (26%) out of a possible maximum of 82.

4. Conclusions

4.1. Specific conclusions: Article 17 (ANC’s troubled leadership)

Since 1994, the ANC as a regime and leadership has gradually decayed into looters, serving the dollar-god of power and will do anything for it. These looters are opportunists who only see the ANC and its power since 1994 as a stepladder to enable them to access state power for the express purpose of self-enrichment. They are crooked card-carrying members of the ANC; persons whose inclinations and activities in the ANC are always first and foremost about what they get – fame, fortune, adulation, power, whatever – not what they build, create, and contribute.  Their principles, integrity and discipline, together with their cognitions are dominated by utter corruption and criminality. They blatantly rape the fragile societies of their fellow Africans. Corruption has become the norm within the value system of the current ANC. This lack of ethical norms, together with its lack of good leadership, in which the employment of capable people is missing, has led thereto that the ANC as an organization over the years has gradually slipped into mediocrity and is now disappearing.1-3

It just does not seem possible for Ramaphosa to reform the ANC or to better South Africa.  He lacks the ability to control the ANC’s politburo. He has so far not a single time shown a strategy to heal the deep fractures in the ANC, to eliminate corruption, to better and to reform governance and to restart the economy. He is not an anointed leader, nor the saviour of South Africans. The ANC cannot be reformed or be revitalised; it is “beyond redemption”.215

Reflecting specifically on the present Number One of South Africa, President Cyril Matamel Ramaphosa, he is as he was in 1994, still wearing a mask and as unpredictable as David Mabuza, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma. To say that Ramaphosa is a democratic and non-racial politician or that his politics are outside the Marxist-Leninist ANC box, represents the height of deception. He is an enrolled and loyal member of Mother ANC, from day-one until today. His present and future position as an executive political leader is absolutely dependent on it. He rigidly supports the ANC’s Marxist socialism and his only aim is to promote the ANC.80

It is clear that Whites and many non-Black Africans can expect  extreme situations to develop in South Africa under an ANC regime run by Ramaphosa, especially around their capitalist, land-ownership and civil rights. The ANC’s outdated and failed Soviet-communist politics has started to occupy future South African politics in full. The phantom of Robert Magube seems to be moving southwards. It was with good reason that Ramaphosa recently praised him at his funeral: those politicians in the Presentlife must always keep good relations with those in the Afterlife.

The ANC’s troubled leadership cannot be healed72:3: “…it is drunk from the alcohol of corruption”.

4.2. General conclusions: Articles 11 to 17

The awarding of 23 points (out of 82 points) to the ANC as a regime reflects that it lacks the capabilities and integrity as a candidate to be considered a skilled ruler. Indeed, the ANC may be seen as a failed candidate. The pre-May 2019 decision to allow the application of the ANC onto the shortlist to be considered as a possible candidate that may rule South Africa after the 8th May 2019, was a blatant mistake, theoretically speaking. Moreover, it was incorrect and inappropriate to mandate the ANC as a regime for the period 2019, particularly on the strength of 28% votes of the total eligible voters. Secondly, its poor political history as a regime and its crooked leadership, as reflected over 25 years, disqualifies it from being shortlisted as a candidate. It failed the basic test to be ruler of South Africa.

The general evaluation of the ANC and its leaders’ abilities, skills, competence and integrity show that they are as many as 59 points or 74% short of being the ideal candidate to be considered for the appointment as the top candidate for the position of post-May 2019 ruler, able to execute land redistribution. The sub-standard count of 26% also reflects that the ANC over 25 years (five regimes) failed to better themselves. The ANC is a false pretender to the throne. Its political ideology on the economy, land ownership and racism is outdated. Evidence is there that the ANC as a regime is going to run into trouble fast if it wants to fulfil its May 2019 election promises and execute its basic duties to the voters. Under the ANC’s 25 years of rule most South Africans lost out on prosperity, while the lives of its people became saturated with violence and crime. Its political leaders’ lifestyles are characterised by a lack of accountability and extreme opportunism. The ANC is incompetent to do well-planned and balanced land redistribution, with or without compensation. Their intended plan to bring land ownership to the mass of poor and landless Blacks will only create further poverty and anarchy, while a full-scale revolution becomes more and more of a reality.4,72,216

In the next and final Article (18), entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (18: Conclusions and a Dictum)”, the process and the politics that may bring successful land redistribution will be further evaluated and discussed.

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  87. Armoede al hoe meer ‘n Afrika-verskynsel. Rapport (Sake). 2019 Nov. 24; p. 2.
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  91. Mthombothi B. As Trump drags the US down, he emboldens those in other countries who are hostile to an open society. Sunday Times. 2019 Nov. 24; p. 21.
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  93. Mthombothi B.  Ramaphosa is in a position of strength, but his failure to act emboldens Magashule’s malcontents. Sunday Times. 2019 April 19; p. 10.
  94. Matiwane Z. KZN faction plots to remove president. Sunday Times (News). 2019 June 16; p. 4.
  95. SA betaal prys vir eenheid in die ANC. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 June 9; p. 2.
  96. De Lange J. Bank: Geveg in ANC verskerp. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 June 9; p. 2.
  97. Khumalo K. Rand plunges on ANC’s SARB dual-speak. Business (Influence). 2019 June 9; p. 18.
  98. RET nothing more than a slogan. Politics (Influence). 2019June 9; p. 18
  99. Cele S, Stone S. ANC opens up new battlefront. Sunday Times. 2019 June 23; pp. 1-2.
  100. Hunter Q. ‘Lawless’ spies threaten Cyril’s state clean up. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March 10; p. 2.
  101. Hunter Q, Matiwane Z, Mvumvu Z. Ace in a hole. Sunday Times 2018 Sept. 18; pp. 1-2.
  102. Ou gesigte. Beeld. 2019 June 22; p.16.
  103. Big Brother’s sinister reach needs to be restricted. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 9; p. 18.
  104. Use Special Tribunal as a tool to disinfect SA. The Star (Opinion). 2019 Feb. 26; p. 8.
  105. Goba N. Mapaila blasts public protector. Sowetan (News). 2019 June 27; p. 6.
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  107. Stone S, Modjadji N. Cyril-vyande kap terug. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 April 14; p.1.
  108. Time to choose direction for a country that is undeniable at a crossroads. Sunday Times (Oinion). 2019 May 5; p. 18.
  109. Labuschagne P. Só kan ANC onttroon word. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 April 2; p. 6.
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  111. Munusamy R. How Ace got his way on nominations. Sunday Times (News). 2019 June 23; p. 4.
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  113. Tito shakes fist at SA taxpayers. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 25; p. 12.
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  115. Eskom bailout ups SA credit risk. Citizen (Business). 2019 July 25; p. 3.
  116. Speckman A. S&P ratings move ratchets up pressure on government. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Nov. 24; p. 10.
  117. Mthombothi B. ANC shows the middle finger in allowing Magashule room where he doesn’t belong. Sunday Times. 2019 June 23; p. 21.
  118. Joffe H. Mboweni’s joviality hides the grim truth. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Feb. 24; p. 2.
  119. De Lange J. Mboweni: ‘Besnoei salarisse, nie ander besteding’. Rapport (Sake). 2019 Aug. 25; p. 1.
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  121. Same Old Nothing Address. Saturday Citizen (Opinion). 2019 June 22; p.13.
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  127. Kgosana C. The manifest failures of the ANC’s manifesto are all around us. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Jan. 20; p. 17.
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  129. Makgetla N. Jobs malaise due much more than bad governance. Business Day (Opinion). 2019 May 28; p. 7.
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  131. Van der Walt S. Sien ‘superstad’ as ‘n simbool. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 June 22; p. 5.
  132. Willemse. R. Jeug moeg vir fiksie oor werkskepping. Beeld (By). 2019 June 22; p. 2.
  133. Mkhwanazi S. Who’s going to stop the gaps? Saturday Star. 2019 June 22; p 7.
  134. Calland R. Ramaphosa’s in control. Saturday Star (Opinion). 2019 June 22; p. 8.
  135. Mashele P. Ramaphosa is blocking progress through his dour appointments. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 July 29; p. 13.
  136. President who dared to dream. Saturday Star (Comments). 2019 June 22; p. 8.
  137. Hlatshaneni S. Cyril sees SA in Business terms. Saturday Citizen. 2019 June 22; p. 5.
  138. Hlatshaneni S. President knows what must be done. Saturday Citizen. 2019 June 22; p. 5.
  139. A nation in crisis needs a remedy. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 June 20; p. 10.
  140. Munusamy R. No leadership to undo damaging anti-SA sentiment. Sowetan (Analysis). 2019 Sept. 11; p. 11.
  141. Van der Walt S. ‘Tree op soos ‘n diplomat!” Beeld (Nuus). 2019 June 22; p. 4.
  142. Mkhwanazi S. Pandor reprimands Zindzi Mandela over tweets. Saturday Star. 2019 June 22; p. 7.
  143. The end of Zindzi’s term may have driven tirade. City Press (News). 2019 June 23; p. 2.
  144. De Lange J. Zindzi Mandela se termyn straks nie hernu. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 June 23; p. 2.
  145. De Lange J. Pandora aan Zindi: Jy het perk ever oorskry. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 June 23; p. 3.
  146. Halt descent to hateful society. City Press. 2019 June 30; p. 21.
  147. Ritchie K. Pandor has the onerous task of damage control. Saturday Star. 2019 June 22; p. 8.
  148. Madonsela T. Confronting the past City Press. 2019 June 30; p. 3.
  149. For whom the bell told in SA politics. Saturday Star (Opinion). 2019 July 13; p. 8.
  150. Naki E. Koloane on thin ice? Saturday Citizen. 2019 July 13; p. 5.
  151. Sodi T. Why we are angry. City Press. 2019 June 30; p. 3.
  152. Om vir almal se regte op te kom, śo bou ‘n mens. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Nov. 24; p. 2.
  153. Boonzaaier D. Duarte sê ANC is rassisties. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Nov. 24; p. 6.
  154. Naki E. Breakaway party on CR17 agenda? The Citizen (News). 2019 July 25; p. 4.
  155. Don’t believe end justifies the means. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 23; p.12.
  156. Wyngaard H. Om moeilikheid te koop.  Beeld (Middelblad). 2019 July 4; p. 21.
  157. Wa Afrika M, Rampedi P. Ramaphosa ‘misled’ Parliament. Sunday Independent. 2019 June 9; pp. 1-2.
  158. Cele S, Masuabi Q and Rooi J. ‘Niks fout’ met R440 m. Rapport. 2019 July 2019; pp.1-2.
  159. Hunter Q, Munusamy R. Cyril’s R400m time bomb. Sunday Times. 2019 June 23; p. 2.
  160. Saloojee F. Protector must probe all parties’ donations. The Citizen (Letters). 2019 Aug. 22; p. 13.
  161. Naki E. Ramaphosa in hot seat. The Citizen (News). 2019 Aug. 22; p. 7.
  162. De Lange J. CR17-geld vir salarisse gebruik. Rapport (News). 2019 Aug. 12; p. 2.
  163. Casualties of PP’s CR17 stray bullet. The Star (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 21; p. 8.
  164. Shoba S. Money a problem in the ANC – ACE. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 12.
  165. Marrian N. Bill aims to quash covert party funding. Mail & Guardian (News). 2019 Aug. 30 to Sept. 5; p. 6.
  166. Naki E. ‘Declare party funding’. The Citizen (News). 2019 Oct. 2; p. 5.
  167. Mavuso S, Ndaba B. CR17 snares more politicians. The Star (Metro). 2019 Aug. 19; p. 2.
  168. Mavuso S. Law firm denies it got CR17 R1.5m. The Star (Nation). 2019 Aug. 21; p. 7.
  169. Maughan K. Ledwaba seals Cyril’s bank records. Sowetan (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 5.
  170. Wa Africa M, Rampedi P, Ngoepe K. More CR17 campaign skeletons. The Star. 2019 Aug. 19; p. 1.
  171. Friedman D. Daily Maverick did not get paid to punt Ramaphosa – editor. The Citizen (News). 2019 Aug; p. 13.
  172. Dlamini P. Ramaphosa maintains he was in the dark until…Sowetan (News). 2019 Aug. 6; p. 4.
  173. Madisa K. Ramaphosa not ready to disclose his donors. Sowetan (News). 2019 Aug. 13; p. 4.
  174. Msomdi A. Ramaphosa must come clean if his New Dawn is to be a reality. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 6; p. 13.
  175. Rooi J. E-posse weerlê Cyril se Cr17-storie. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Aug. 4; p. 2.
  176. Rooi J. Die ANC sal nooit verander, beloof Ace in Parys. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 April 28; p. 2.
  177. Jika T. Mkhwebane has done it again. Mail & Guardian (News). 2019 June 14 to 20; p. 3.
  178. Makhanya M. Populists on your stoep. City Press (Voices). 2019 June 9; p. 2.
  179. Hlatshaneni S. ‘Cough up for the poor’. The Citizen (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 3.
  180. Friedman D. ‘Her head must roll’. The Citizen (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 3.
  181. Busi poster not us – ANC. The Citizen (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 3.
  182. Stone S, Cele S. Cyril gears up for war. City Press. 2019 June 30; pp. 1-2.
  183. Majoko S. Busi not in political office. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 13; p.12.
  184. Hunter Q. Top lawyers take on protector. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Aug. 11; p. 4.
  185. Kgosana C. ‘I shouldn’t have to pay’. Sunday Times. 2019 Aug. 4; pp. 1,4.
  186. Enslin-Payne S. Worse news follow bad, and don’t look to business or state. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Aug. 4; p. 2.
  187. 1Versluis JM. OB bedrywig op Twitter. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Aug. 4; 2.
  188. Ongeag wat, OB is op ’n kontrak. Rapport (Nuus) 2019 Aug. 4; p. 2.
  189. Kgosana C; Played with a straight bat. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March 24; p. 12
  190. Political leadership matters. City Press (Voices). 2019 June 30; p. 2..
  191. Essop P. OB swyg oor verslag. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 June 10; p. 2.
  192. Sokutu B. Cyril needs to come clean. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 25; p. 12.
  193. Micheal J. Protector a disaster from day one. The Citizen (Letters). 2019 July 25; p. 13.
  194. Calland R. Getting rid of Mkhwebane won’t be easy. Mail & Guardian. 2019 July 26 to August 1; p. 23.
  195. Munusamy R. The protection racket. Sunday Times (Insight). 2019 Aug. 4; pp. 13-14.
  196. Marrian N. Office of the public protector must not be captured. Mail & Guardian. 2019 June 14 to 20; p. 30.
  197. Mkhwanazi S. Former public protector calls for cool heads in the office. Sunday Independent (Nation). 2019 June 9; p. 9.
  198. Munusamy R. Madonsela ‘helped to prep Zuma for top job’. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March 24; p. 5.
  199. Nelana B. The white economic class undermines the Madiba legacy that protects it. Sunday Times (Opinion) 2019 Feb. 3; p. 20.
  200. Mthombothi B. One year on, it’s high time Ramaphosa stepped out of Zuma’s grim shadow. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Feb. 3; p. 19.
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  211. Qobo M. Does Ramaphosa have the gumption to bring the ANC out of its turpitude? Sunday Times. 2019 March 10; p. 19.
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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (16: Outdated ANC)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (16: Outdated ANC)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Deployment, lifestyle, outdated, reconstruction, setup, uplifting, ANC, Marxist-Leninism.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 6

1. Background

In 1998, more than two decades ago, the chartered accountant and writer, Anthony Ginsberg1, penned an excellent book, titled: South Africa’s Future: From crisis to prosperity, on the prospects of South Africa and how it would prosper in twenty years from that date on. He clearly identified the wrongs of Apartheid against most of the Blacks and how the system allegedly devastated their economic, social and political lives. He points out that in 1991 (three years before the New Dispensation) the poverty level had reached an immense 77% in the former homelands, namely the Transkei, Bophutswana, Venda and Ciskei, while so much as 49% of households throughout the country (including the homelands) were living in poverty. In this setup, the poverty level of the whites had decline, rising from 3% in 1975 to 9.5% in 1991, but it was insignificant in comparison to the poverty levels which black people were experiencing. At that time 70% (31 million) of the total population had been classified as poor, with 75% of the poor living in rural areas. Statistics of 1975 also show that 53% of the total population consumed less than 10% of South Africa’s total consumption against the rest of the population’s consumption of 40%. It was also noted that the country at that time experienced a bloated civil service; between 1937 and 1966 the white population increased by 70% and the total population by only 87%, while the civil service grew by 276% (mostly Whites).1

So, many of the ills of present-day South Africa are thus not new, including unemployment, a weak currency, crime, etc. But in 1998 it was expected by Ginsberg1 that most of the country’s ills would be successfully addressed in five to ten years of the ANC being at the helm in terms of their promises and boasts of good governance. It was assumed that all the then negative statistics would be halved in a decade of two and that our natural resources, human capital and established infrastructure would be used to its fullest extent to make the country one of the par with high-performing small countries in the world. The outcomes on all the terrains of the ANC rule were quite the opposite: in 2019 all the systems are in chaos, to such an extent that many political analysts describe the country as on the brink of collapse. Foreigners see South Africa over time becoming another ungovernable third world country.1

We see in the present day South Africa more inequality and poverty than 20 years ago, notwithstanding our new democratic dispensation. The chaos of 1994 was still prominent in the South Africa of 1998 when Ginsberg completed his research, notwithstanding the ANC regime’s alleged “golden” upliftment of the poor and landless blacks through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Gear, BBBEE and cadre-deployment. The tragic state of dire poverty is still widespread in 2019. Ginsberg’s1 portrayal of 21 years ago is particularly instructive on the state of the country when he writes1:29:

The disparity in the lifestyles of blacks and whites remains so stark that to this day one feels as if one is entering entirely different countries when passing from a black to a white neighbourhood. On the outskirts of my native city Cape Town, which lies on the south-westernmost tip of Africa and is surrounded by the most gorgeous beaches and mountains, the squatter camps of Crossroads and Khayelitsha have some of the worst third-world conditions imaginable. The white suburbs less than ten miles away exceed even the luxurious standards of many, first world countries’ wealthiest neighbourhoods.

He continues1:29: “Although under a new constitution, blacks now have the right to vote, this does not in any way ensure that they will begin to enjoy the fruit of prosperity in the near future”. It is clear that Ginsberg1 never meant this “near future” to be too far beyond 1989. But yet in 2019 (thirty years later) the ANC regime has failed to bring about a significant improvement to the poverty stricken masses and landless who had voted them into parliament. In fact, they have failed the masses spectacularly — those who voted and trusted them — as is prevalent in their many nefarious activities, witnessed in the state capture (costing the state more or less R1-trillion), as well in their failed and misguided land redistribution and upliftment programmes which was also overshadowed by capture. One of the most frequent excuses offered by the leadership of the ANC regime is that it is the negative impact of the ongoing phantoms of Apartheid and sabotage by white capitalists which have been nullifying all their good efforts and achievements to uplift the poor  masses and landless blacks.1

Makhanya2 also warns against these dangerous political phantoms (better known as the party’s political populists or opportunists which include many other ANC personalities and not only the accused Jacob Zuma and Ace Magashule). They are still prominent in the government of the day while their well-established networks in the greater ANC are still functioning. Makhanya2 writes2:2: “When Zuma was removed, he left behind an intact network that had developed a life of its own. He may still be spiritual godfather of this network, but it no longer needed him as its raison d’être”. Makhanya continues2:2: “Populism is well incubated in the country’s majority party. It is not just the rot Zuma left behind that needs to be rooted out if South Africa is to rise.”

The presence of these various tainted networks and some of their rabble-rousing leaders misusing court interventions and interferences for their own benefit, especially court interdicts, have seemingly since May 2019 become the latest tools to keep their past misdemeanours and their future dubious intentions out of the public eye and their critics in absolute silence. Makhanya’s2 stern warning must not be ignored when he writes2:2:

These populists despise the constraints on power that come with regular democracy. Institutions such as an independent judiciary, a free media and a vibrant civil society are anathema to them. They also like to have partners in their criminality as this “binds them [the partners] to the regime” and they reward supporters with patronage to “assure compelling loyalty and mass allegiance”. They also make out that those who don’t support them are threatened “by losing jobs or benefits”. This minimises the need to resort to direct repression.

Populists also love conspiracies – there’s always some other force to blame for society’s woes and your own failings. That manufactured ogre comes in the form of bullying foreign governments, rebellious civil society and “unpatriotic” opposition.

The truth of this failure is firstly because the ANC regime lacks the leadership and political expertise and know-how to implement a decent upliftment programme. Secondly, their ill-intended tendency to appropriate assets, fired-up by their opportunism as Marxist-Leninist-politicians, therefore make them focus not on the interests of the masses who need them urgently, but solely on the satisfaction of their own interests and that of their cadre favourites. Thirdly, is there blame-shifting by the ANC elite, making others responsible for their failures as politicians (as already reflected with Apartheid being cited as such a reason); very similar to what  Robert Mugabe always did to cover up his crimes (ranging from murder to theft) against his own people. Ginsberg1: reflects1:55:: “…he [Mugabe] has often put his own interests above those of his countrymen. One can only hope that South Africa’s political leaders do not fall into the same trap. As unemployment continues to rise in South Africa, let us hope that our government will be willing to admit to at least some of its failures and be prepared to re-examine its failed policies. A government in self-denial is dangerous”.

On the ANC elite’s constant escape from their accountability and responsibility towards South Africans specifically, together with the fact that their minds are apparently occupied by opportunism while ignoring the rights of others, Ginsberg writes1:54-55:

It is not good enough for our leaders to keep deflecting criticism on the management of our country away from themselves and to always be defensive about our problems. Shouting “Racism!” when international observers criticise the lack of job creation, slow economic growth and our crime wave does not help our course, but rather lose much credibility in their eyes. President Mandela caused jitters among international investors when he scapegoated almost every conceivable non-ANC entity, and whites in particular, at the 1997 ANC Mafikeng conference. It is time to grow up and take some responsibility.

Just as Robert Mugabe must find a scapegoat while the economy of Zimbabwe crumbles and food riots spread, sadly South Africa may be headed for a situation where government’s non-delivery will just be blamed on apartheid – not only in 1998 but even 20 years from African countries from now. Foreign observers wonder whether we Africans will ever take responsibility for our actions. Are out leaders just so arrogant that they believe they can do not wrong? Impartial observers often wonder in amazement whether it is always some secret conspiracy that prevents African countries from succeeding.

When an observer compares suffering of South African blacks from the scourge of poverty and disorder to that of the suffering of the citizens of Bosnia in the late-1980s, it seems that time has been running out to start the repair of the country. Ginsberg in 1998 reflects1:39: “During the past few years we have seen the Bosnia tragedy unfold before our eyes, and our hearts go out to the innocent victims. However, many of our very own neighbourhoods, townships and cities are mini-Sarajevos every night of the week”.

South Africa is experiencing a crisis. It was already clearly manifested in 1998 when Ginsberg warns1:56: “This is no time for complacency in South Africa — we are at a crossroads. Our country is in crisis, whether we like it or not” and1:36: “All South Africans should be aware of the stark reality facing the country. As true patriots the wealthy cannot afford to cocoon themselves from the ills that surrounded them – the poverty has spread throughout South Africa and will destroy our country if something is not done about it”. 

Today, 20 years after Ginsberg1 voiced serious concerns and questions about the ANC elite’s integrity and whether South Africa will be improved by the party, the answer is no: They are a failed government and failed leaders; a regime run by an indictable elite which has deliberately steered the country into far more chaos than any good citizen in 1998 could ever have anticipated. The ANC’s failure is highlighted by its obsoleteness.

Central in above comprehensive chaos are two prominent determinants which will be further investigated in this article: the ANC as a regime and the ANC leadership.

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 15)

Article 16 is a continuation of the previous article 15, titled: “Critical in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (15: Opportunism)”. This article forms part of a sequence together with articles 11 to 15 on the ANC which have already been published. The intention is also to offer an analysis and further discuss the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC to manage land expropriation successfully as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.2. Aims of article 16 (Continued from Article 15)

The primary intention of this project on the ANC is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties in particular, and to describe the profile of the ANC in the same way as was done in Article 9 on the EFF and Article 10 on the DA.

In this article, the primary aim is to determine how the ANC leadership role and its organisation have influenced the mindsets of some of the ANC elite as well how it affected the party as the mandated ruler of South Africa.

2. Method (Continued from Article 15)

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case about the abilities of political parties to successfully coordinate land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources include articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to gauge and to describe the facts that must guide us in eventually reaching an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa tasked to carry out  successful land-reform in 2019.

The research findings are presented in a narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

In this article the public referees of the African National Congress will further be reflected upon, evaluated and described in the under-mentioned division 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019. The focus is on assessing the leadership and organisation of the ANC. 

3.2. Louw Appraisal Checklist

The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,3 will again be used for the quantitative classification and measuring of available political records on the ANC. The 82 selected items on the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s manifesto and the reports by investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees it applicable.

3.3. The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 15)

3.3.1. Outdated ANC
3.3.1.1. ANC politburo bottle-in by Marxist-Leninist-socialism

To understand the logic of the ANC elite and the activities of the successive ANC regimes since 1994, is it important to understand the ideology informing their politics and how they manage their political aims and intentions. It is Marxism-Leninism, executed by a politburo consisting of the ANC Top Six and the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC), with an empowered secretary-general and the leader of the ANC as its president. (The president of the party is also appointed as the State-president if the ANC is mandated as the ruler). The ANC’s political plans and decisions, to be executed over five years, together with the elections of its president, secretary-general and other officials, are done by the ANC delegates (between 4 000 and 5 000 ANC members), representing all its branches countrywide, at the party’s national conferences. These decisions, known as resolutions, are compulsory for the president and his cabinet to execute over the five years of the ANC’s term in office and before the next national conference. The ANC’s political organisation and structure are equal to that of the outdated Stalinist model of dictatorship, even if it is at this stage less extreme.

It is clear from the mass of political comments, that not even seasoned political analysts always understand from which base the ANC elite has been operating. Kgosana4 bring these shrouded, dangerous policies and hidden ideologies of some of today’s ANC leaders to the foreground, quoting the economist Dawie Roodt4, when he writes4:2: “We don’t know the ANC’s real ideology. Whether it is a neo-liberal or a communist organisation”.

The fact is that there has been little understood of the deeply cemented, unchangeable ideology of the ANC: a Marxist-Leninist organisation, falsely parading since 1994 as a so-called democratic party inside South Africa’s peculiar electoral system. This is a political fallacy, cloaked by the ANC’s quasi-neoliberalism: opportunistic revolutionary leaders who are unable to create anything are instead driven by their skill in appropriating state assets as the Communists of the 1900s had done.

A central issue has been the constant demand that Cyril Ramaphosa must without hesitation get rid of Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma and cleanse them from the ANC politics or that Ramaphosa must reform the economy into a Western capitalist model to attract foreign investments without delay, in order to create work and to pull the country back from the brink of disaster. Tito Mboweni and Pravin Gordhan are seen as the “right” persons to privatise the failed SOEs as SABC, SAA, and Eskom (and it is even believed by many outsiders that the ANC indeed will be following this road to political redemption). Especially Mboweni has loudly been expressing his misgivings in public about the Ramaphosa regime’s intention to privatise the SOEs and to fire thousands of useless (assumed black) workers from these failed institutions in the near future. Also, the recent “Mboweni-Plan” is praised in the media and by some political analysts as the imminent arrival of an economic utopia which will change the country. The reality is that this is not true and his announcements are clever manipulations of public opinion par excellence.5-14

Firstly, all these promises are mostly hot air and empty – they will never become reality. The basis of this “good” story-telling is to calm the international and local financial markets by falsely presenting how the country is being steered on a fresh capitalist course in terms of ANC economic policy and at the same time an effort to uphold the already poor rating of South Africa; And of course, to keep South Africans happy and in the dark. What happens next year does not count at this stage – the ANC leadership sorely lacks the ability to plan for the  future and they will most probably address tomorrow’s problems with other set of empty rhetorical statements when they arrive. Secondly, the ANC’s communist economic and political policy never be changed to a capitalist one, and no workers will be fired in their thousands by the Ramaphosa regime. Such moves are against the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist socialism. And without Marxism-Leninism deeply imbedded in their psyche, there is no ANC. Indeed, at this stage the ANC thinking has been imprinted on the Constitution of the South African state, in terms of its communist intention, and is so far developed and established that in the near future a drift towards radical economic transformation is all but certain. And this will frankly not resemble a democratic, Western-orientated capitalist model as expected by most white South Africans and businessmen.5-14

It does not really concern the ANC elite that the country is hovering on the verge of bankruptcy. They want (and create) this chaos for opportunistic reasons inspired by their political ideology which strongly advances the notion of taking from others.  The ANC-elite is well aware — most of them have strong roots in various labour unions or the SACP — that any challenge of the unions on their member rights and the introduction of hard-core capitalism, will automatically mean the end of the ANC regime, and of course also of the over-ambitious ANC elite’s exclusive hold on positions in the country’s governance. Cosatu and the SACP will by no means allow any form of capitalism or an economy run by any of the successful white capitalists. Ramaphosa, Mboweni and Gordhan know it well: all three come from Marxist-Leninist backgrounds. Mboweni’s and Gordhan’s rhetoric on full-on privatisation is really just well-planned and misleading political statements.  The ANC regime’s so-called “couldn’t care less about the economy” is well reflected by their intention to expropriate land without compensation from mostly whites, notwithstanding the immense negative impact it is going to have on the economy. As noted before, there is a clear plan taking shape within the Ramaphosa regime to first create chaos and then to grab land.5-14

Although the present-day chaotic economic situation could force the ANC elite to look for outside financial support from the IMF or the World Bank (with their exclusive prescriptions to borrowers on how to govern their countries), such an option is not on the cards yet (and has up to now been deliberately avoided) – the Reserve Bank and the public and private pension-funds are already within reach of the ANC elite. They could be dipping into these monies with the same ease as they did in capturing the state. What many pundits and analysts of the Western, democratic political persuasion have missed, is that an economic chaos – which is being used as a tool to launch a revolution – would create the ideal conditions for the ANC elite to intervene and interfere without an election. This would enable them to finally claim the entire South African state as their Marxism-Leninism prize. Troubled by present-day problems and outcomes — including the unfinished land expropriation issue and erasing the last vestiges of white political and economic power and alleged supremacy — such an intervention could easily be assured.5-14

South Africans, as did the unlucky Venezuelans, will not escape Marxist-Leninist state capture and the enslavement of the masses if the ANC stays on as the ruler of the country after 2024. For the ANC elite this outcome is neither devastation nor madness, but a political utopia.15

The tragedy is that the poverty-stricken black masses, having been traumatised over many years by colonialism and apartheid, as well as cronic poverty and unemployment especially in the 25 years of ANC rule, has once again fallen prey to suppression and exploitation by a new political master. This time a black one – “supposedly one of us”, to quote Gumede16. Opportunistic black leaders and a new absolutist and oppressive government, entrenched by means of a racial vote, will rule them. So far, the ANC has been invited back to parliament at least six times by voters, but the last elections showed them to have only 28% support amongst the total population of voters. There will not be a chance for the ANC to return to parliament through the ballot box as easily again, and thus the danger of a coup can no longer be excluded.16

3.3.1.2. The ANC’s tripartite partners

The South African Communist Party (SACP) and Cosatu tripartite partnership with ANC and their present-day impact on the Ramaphosa regime, need to be studied in-depth.  These two partners of the ANC have the potential to render the ANC’s ability to plan the execution of an effective, balanced and successful strategy around the land reform issue from 2019 onwards, ineffective should the ANC try to deviate an inch from their policy. The pro-Ramaphosa political  commentators and media, including those capitalists supporting Cyril Ramaphosa as a modern day economic reformer, democrat and saviour of their assets, believe that these two partners as role-players only hold minimal political clout, lack real power to make a constructive contribution to the country’s executive or does not have enough influence to endanger the “new Ramaphosa ANC”. They are even described as political parasites. The two organisations are profiled by their opponents as being focused on promoting very negative racial and political thinking as well as advancing radicalism and autocracy. They are often pictured as the underwriters of destruction and anarchy, while private white landowners and their farms are the exclusive targets. Looking back to 1994, the political history of South Africa contradicts this so-called “insignificant” roles of the SACP and Cosatu inside the ANC, and neither are their political dogmas and intentions worse or necessarily more destructive than those of the ANC. They have, in various ways since 1994, influenced the ANC’s policies dramatically, mostly to force the ANC’s opportunistic politicians to tone down their rhetoric and to respect at least their own traditional communist principles.17-20

3.3.1.2.1. South African Communist Party (SACP)

It is very important to point out the media view of the SACP a so-called political “tarnished” organisation. Mthombothi writes in-depth on the so-called tarnishing and destructive activities of the SACP on the pre-2017 and post-2017 South African political scene of both the Zuma and Ramaphosa regimes. About the present empowerment of the SACP inside the greater ANC continuum to torpedo good political outcomes in the Ramaphosa administration’s term from 2019 to 2024 – he specifically noted the undermining of the balanced and justified allocation of the expropriated land to deserving poor black farmers. Thus Mthombothi19 critically postulates19:19:

The SACP is nothing but a lame appendage of the ANC. It’s doubtful whether it could exist without riding on the ANC’s coattails;

The SACP is nothing but a vehicle for Blade Nzimande and his cronies to access power and privileges that they otherwise could not…And yet he and a few select SACP apparatchiks sit on the national executive committee of the ANC and in Cyril Ramaphosa’s cabinet…;

It’s akin to a shareholder who has double voting rights in a company. The SACP has a disproportionate influence on government policy and yet has nothing to offer in return. It has no significant membership, no organisational power and no intellectual heft to speak of…;

It [the ANC] is governing for the benefit of not only its members but the entire population. It cannot be right, therefore, that it should be taking orders, suggestions or ideas from some external body [the SACP] with no public mandate of its own. That’s not democracy; it’s a new form of entryism.

It is a misconception that the SACP never has earned its place in the alliance. To say their stories of good politics are contradicted by their negative activities or that they are political parasites, may be true, but it is also fully applicable to the ANC as a Marxist-Leninist organisation which in its 25 years of reign has only grabbed assets belonging to others. The SAPC did not pollute the minds of Ramaphosa’s cadres with communism — sound democratic thinking, planning and effective measures were basically absent from the Ramaphosa group, making it impossible for the SACP to “contaminate” it further. Ramaphosa and his elite never intended to introduce or to adhere to democracy or a Western kind of economy: his admiration for classic Stalinist communism has been confirmed by his reliance, continuation and further strengthening of his brotherhood (coming from the Zuma regime’s days) recently with communist China. His statement on Chinese tech giant Huawei and his direct attacks on the USA’s policies serve as excellent examples of how much deeply in communism Ramaphosa’s political thinking is steeped, undoubtedly independent of the SACP’s communism.

The firm commitment to the communist cause by the ANC elite – starting from Nelson Mandela, and underwritten by Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and now seemingly also Cyril Ramaphosa — is the sole pillar of the ANC’s thrust in politics. Communism is also part of the ANC’s mindset just like it is in the SACP. What the alliance of the SACP and ANC for the ruling class indeed confirmed, was the unbreakable bond between them, founded on classic communist ideas found in abundance in both the ANC and the SACP.19-22

For Ramaphosa and his regime any ideological disputes and conflicts with the SACP could result in a situation in which both parties could suffer huge losses.  Any sound politician in the ANC would think twice about disassociating themselves from the SACP. The allegations that the SACP’s garners only minimal voter support, has a poor standing among the general public, and that the SACP has not yet mastered the basics when it comes to human rights and how private assets should be viewed (worse than that of the ANC), is not true. There is some truth that in the long term — as an outcome of the deep political ANC-SACP relationship wherein the two groups have many political interests which are similar – that the SACP could swallow the ANC because of the party’s political failures to uphold Marxist-Leninist socialism and the basic rights of the masses of poor and landless blacks. The arrogance of the present leadership’s will to continue their infighting in the ANC — where the egos of insecure and substandard leaders are more important than the party’s ideologies and thus the practice of communism — seem to create the possibility of such a thrust and intervention by the SACP. This does not necessarily imply a direct confrontation, but the SACP could well start to undermine certain ANC policy decisions and initiate strikes with the assistance of Cosatu. The failure of Ramaphosa’s presidency (a clique of seemingly “anointed” leaders of the so-called Ramaphosa-clan), in his fight with leaders of the so-called Magashule-Zuma clan, waiting in the aisles for an opportunity to present itself to take over the ANC regime, could eventually kick-start a full-blown campaign to bring the Ramaphosa-regime down. This outcome, of course, can be accelerated by the intention of the Ramaphosa-regime to privatise the various failed SOEs, suggesting that masses of workers of these SOEs could be fired in the event.

Notwithstanding that the SACP had declared dissatisfaction with the Jacob Zuma regime’s misadventures many times in the past (and has been voicing their concerns over the Ramaphosa regime’s activities in very strong terms once more), they did it not hesitate to profit from the large-scale corrupt activities of Zuma and his cronies. The SACP’s pre-1994 revolutionary base is still present in the organisation, which means that it blends well into the “radical and autocratic” activities of Jacob Zuma, as well as in the present so-called “democratic and capitalist” activities of Ramphosa. In present-day politics it also blends well into the EFF’s radicalism. With the present ANC politburo  (ANC Top Six and ANC’s NEC) which relies on more or less a 50:50 support respectively from Ramaphosa and Magashule-Zuma, the SACP is undoubtedly remaining tactful towards their alliance partner and has been avoiding an all-out conflict with the ANC regime under Ramaphosa. The SACP is waiting patiently to see which of the two so-called factions of the greater ANC will be taking over the reins to rule by the end of 2024. There is no doubt that SACP’s favourate future political partner is the so-called Zuma-faction, because of their openness to communism/radical economic transformation as the preferred economic policy. For Ramaphosa the SACP could spell disaster, either as an ally or an enemy, if he dares to clip their wings in any way. As with Ramaphosa’s forced cooperation with the Magashule-Zuma-leadership to remain in power in the unstable ANC to guarantee some sort of precarious unity, Ramaphosa is also dependent for his own survival on the support of the SACP.19-22

On the negative reception by the SACP regarding the recent so-called “Mboweni-plan” to restructure the economy in a so-called “capitalist” way, is it clear that the SACP has been entertaining quite the opposite ideas on the matter: namely to kill privatisation and at the same time to launch nationalisation schemes. Notable is the SACP’s intention to expand the mandate of the Reserve Bank, suggesting a move towards the whole-scale nationalisation of the institution. On paper, it is certainly in conflict with the spirit of the ANC’s Mboweni plan. Furthermore, the SACP has slammed the Mboweni plan because of the proposals contained in it on microeconomics while ignoring macroeconomics. Although this stance appears to point to a deep ideological rift between the SACP and the ANC, must it be read in the context of how both entities have been attached to their Marxist-Leninist roots: in fact, on that score, there is no difference between the two. The alleged “obstruction” caused by Mboweni must be seen foremost as a way to pretend that a difference between the two exists in order to show foreign investors that the ANC elite intends to rehabilitate the economy (and to keep the rating agency Moody’s satisfied). It is at best some “democratic” window-dressing by the ANC regime. This feigned and duplicitous attitude is shared by the ANC elite as well as the SACP elite: in the end very little of Mboweni’s plan will be realised after the SACP, together with Cosatu, announce their intention to strike. The old ANC policy steeped in Marxist-Leninist thought will continue as usual, if not more focused. The SACP will never be booted out of the tripartite alliance as long as the ANC stays true to their radical communism.23

If the Ramaphosa regime dares to deviate from its political path, and decides to abandon radical economic transformation as prescribed by the ANC’s Freedom Charter, it also turns its back on the interests of the workers and poor black masses. It would be seen as a failure to advance the aims and intentions of Marxism-Leninism to “better” the position of the black working community and the poor masses – as has been reflected in the ANC regime’s notions on the level of local governance for many years already – and Ramaphosa can expect a backlash from the SACP. In this context it is reported by Mvumvu24 that the SACP has been mulling with the idea to fly solo in the coming 2021 local government elections, particularly in those administrations that have collapsed under the control of the ANC. The immediate intention is to once again “make the SACP directly visible” to the greater community as an active and dynamic political entity operating on a higher level than its present status as so-called “non-political party” inside the tripartite alliance. A such, it could address the people’s concern on health care, education, crime, corruption, etc. This move also implies a more radical intervention in the community — not excluding actual physical intrusions on these matters.  Mvumvu writes that the SACP is keeping its options open also for the 2024 general elections in case the Ramaphosa regime fails to reform the ANC in terms of Marxist-Leninist socialism and thus to implement the long awaited radical economic, social and political transformation it had promised the poverty-stricken black masses and landless people pre-1994. Indeed, it seems as if the SACP — if the ANC as a regime collapses under its present elite — intends to eventually revert back to its identity as a classic communist organisation in the tripartite alliance. Ramaphosa knows the consequences that this move would hold for him and the ANC. Solly Mapaila24, the deputy general secretary of the SACP, gives the ANC a clear warning that it has been failing at upholding its own ideology of Marxism-Leninism, when he reflects24:4:

We are of the view that in order to hasten the pace of our revolution, we will require an alliance that functions effectively, but at the moment that alliance does not, for a variety of reasons.

We feel the national democratic revolution has stagnated and it needs some rejuvenation and maybe the SACP contesting elections will bring in that rejuvenation.

But the SACP will not allow itself to be undermined. We rejected that under former president Jacob Zuma and will reject it under any president.

3.3.1.2.2. Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu)

On the immense impact that the various trade unions have on the present-day ANC policies, especially the Cosatu-unions on Ramaphosa’s political thinking and doing, Mthombothi writes19:19:

One gets the distinct impression the government is afraid of the unions. It bends over backwards to appease them. Announcing the restructuring of Eskom in parliament, Ramaphosa went out of his way to assure all and sundry there won’t be any retrenchments. The consummate negotiator was tying his hands behind his back before the negotiations even started. Everyone knows Eskom is overstaffed and a great many workers will have to be let go if the turnaround is to succeed.

They’ve [Cosatu-unions] become more than just unions; they’re power brokers. They decide who runs the country. We rightly condemn the burnings and destruction at universities and in townships up and down the country, but such practices started with unions trashing towns and city centres. And the government did nothing. The police stood by and watched, because they too are union members. The damaging effects of South African Democratic Teacher’s Union activities on the education system are well known – teachers holding union meetings during school hours, teaching posts being sold, head teachers being killed for taking up posts earmarked for union members, all without any consequences.

The Cosatu-unions (as the many other non-alliance unions), notwithstanding their more and more diminishing membership numbers and their lack of a significant direct political impact as was shown by their poor direct participation in the May 2019 elections, could very well influence the political direction and destabilise the economy, create unrest, anarchy and even foment a revolution. Most of their demands, although they are often intended to improve the dire situation of the poor, are mostly unrealistic and based on populism and the dismantling of so-called white capital, since the whites are mainly seen as the “sole culprits” responsible for all the present wrongs of the country. In addition, in this Cosatu-ANC-alliance, the outright failure of the ANC as a black regime to uplift the poor black masses over the last 25 years, has for a long time been ignored by Cosatu because of its own opportunistic interests. But since Ramaphos came to power, his two political servants Tito Mboweni and Pravin Gordhan, have not hesitated to estrange and anger Cosatu on a daily basis. The response from Cosatu has since become direct and very aggressive towards the Ramaphosa regime. And while Ramaphosa’s fear of the so-called Magashule-Zuma clan and the SACP is growing, so is his fear for Cosatu’s immense disrupting power and impact on his regime. Ramaphosa as an old unionist himself, knows very well what the impact of the unions in the 1960s and 1970s had meant to destabilise the regime of the Apartheid’s National Party (NP).17-20

Cosatu as well as the SACP have already shown their disagreement with the Ramaphosa regime on Finance Minister Tito Mboweni’s recently proposed economic reform to deal with what the Treasury identifies as South Africa’s “unsustainable current trajectory”, writes Saunderson-Meyer25 on the 28th September 2019 in the Saturday Citizen. The hostile stance of Cosatu, together with the SACP, was clearly highlighted regarding the proposed economic reform by the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) of September 2019. Saunderson-Meyer writes25:12: “Cosatu wants the document withdrawn, since it makes government’ incoherent, confused and unreliable’. The SACP sees in it the sinister hand of neo-liberal elites like the OECD, seeking to undermine the ‘integrity of SA sovereignty’”.

It is reported in the media that Tito’s economic plan had been accepted and that he had obtained the support of the ANC-NEC to get rid of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are malfunctioning,  described in the media as such because26:3: “…it became clear from his smile and cracking of jokes with journalists at the media conference that Mboweni has had his way as the governing ANC top brass largely accepted his economic recovery plan…”. The reaction of Cosatu (as well as the SACP) indicates in this powerplay, both Tito Mboweni and Cyril Ramaphosa could be caught-up in wishful fantasies on how an economy actually functions under Marxist-Leninist socialism. Firstly, Cosatu noted after the meeting that it was their understanding that the ANC-NEC would not discuss Mboweni’s economic policy plan (which has failed as far as Cosatu is concerned because it does not include other departments in the economic cluster and Cosatu rejects it because of the privatisation and other fundamental changes to the SOEs contained in it). According to them it would only be a basic overview of the economy as based on the National Treasury’s proposals and the plans of relevant parties. It seems that the proposals accepted by the NEC (and with the famous smiling “nod” by Mboweni that his economic restructuring was in fact accepted) exclude serious labour issues and that this outstanding issues with Cosatu and the SACP were still to be finalised at the multi-stakeholder meeting, the Alliance Political Council (a forum of  the leaderships of ANC, SACP and Cosatu). In this context is it important to note the warning remark by the chair of the ANC’s economic transformation sub-committee, Enoch Godongwa, namely that the NEC’s acceptance of the Mboweni-plan does not mean that it was also accepted by the SACP and Cosatu. It still has to be finalised with the two alliance-partners, which shows that the ANC-regime’s intent to block any future economic manoeuvres successfully.26

The above remark of Godongwa reflects on the possible presence of serious conflicts inside the tripartite alliances. The editor of The Citizen of the 3rd Oct. 2019 may possibly be correct in surmising that it was not an exaggeration to say the current political and economic situation in South Africa has suddenly brought the ANC to one of the most critical cross-roads in its history.  The challenge for the Marxist-Leninist ANC, which is supposed to be focused largely on workers’ rights, is now, after 25 years of its’ failed rule, confronted by the reality that financially the country is in deep trouble. It may be quite correct to say that the country needs a large dose of “harsh fiscal medicine” from the capitalists to heal the matter, but such intervention is totally contrary to its Marxist-Leninist policies by virtue of being a traditional revolutionary organisation. A sudden, unpredictable and opportunist political move by the ANC in this regard, would signal a huge shift and would present too much of a challenge for the radical political mindsets present in the SACP and Cosatu, triggering efforts to obstruct Mboweni’s economic reforms and for the first time, a large-scale conundrum for the ANC as a political entity. A crossroad may have been reached for the ANC, as well as for its two tripartite partners.27 The editor27 of The Citizen writes in this context27:12:

His [Mboweni] views make him seem, to the ANC’s leftist allies in the tripartite alliance – the Congress of SA trade unions (Cosatu) and the SA Communist Party (SACP) – to be a latter-day black Margaret Thatcher. When British prime minister in the ‘80s, she applied similar bitter pills to a country ruled by the trade unions…and, many believe, put it back on the path to prosperity.

South Africa’s unions are, by comparison, more powerful than even their British counterparts were then and the ANC is still beholden to them for bringing in the workers’ vote.

So, expect a battle royal ahead: Cosatu and organised labour will not allow this capitalist cure to be shoved down their throats without an all-out fight.

Notable in the editorial warning was that at this stage, although the ANC-NEC’s meeting of September 2019 seems to still seem “favourable” to Ramaphosa and company due to a so-called “reconcilable vision” of the various factions in the ANC-tripartite alliance and Top Six at Luthuli-house, there are also hidden nefarious intentions and plans by Cosatu and the SACP which may undoubtedly come into play soon. Both can, within a short time, create a very unfavourable setup for Ramaphosa to rule effectively and bring an abrupt end to his long-suffering political paralysis.25-27

On the immediate intentions and quality of the Mboweni-plan, Joffe writes that the two-year-old, 77-page policy document is hardly a scintillating read. In real life it is a political move rather than an economic plan. It is unclear and unsure if it will actually encourage the Ramaphosa regime to improve. Put succinctly, the plan does not offer any solutions on any of the pressing economic matters, neither on the country’s financial credit ratings nor on its massive debts and the resolve to address it28 The Mboweni-plan does not underscore the failure of the ANC’s economic model nor does it highlight the many shortcomings in its reconstructing and rebuilding approach, especially in the state’s debt payments. Joffe writes29:2: “The government is already borrowing just to pay the interest on its debt, which is already more than R200b a year. It is paying in interest more than 15c of every rand it collects in tax”. 

It must further be noted that the so-called “Mboweni-plan” is a compilation of various previous so-called ANC development plans, hailing from the late-1990s, which resulted in the ANC’s 2011 National Development Plan and is now re-cycled to a great extent as the ANC’s 2019 Development Plan. For the SACP and Cosatu is its content thus not new, making it at the end just another case of letting out hot air by the ANC. Despite the noise made by the Ramaphosa regime about its Mboweni plan, it is clearly not meant to ever be implemented, but serves only to manipulate the broad public, the business sector and foreign investors. For this reason Cosatu and the SACP policies will be left unscathed. The ANC’s (and the SACP and Cosatu) radical Marxist-Leninist politics will be kept intact, notwithstanding the chaos it is going to bring. There is not such a thing as an “emergency plan” in the ANC’s bag of tricks to bring about an economic turn-around.25-28,30-32

The editor33 of the Sowetan noted on Ramaphosa’s aim to seemingly solve the present national emergency by means of the inputs of new panels of expert advisers as well as new commissions of investigation, shows that these measures will not address the issues the country is facing and will leave his regime’s problems unchanged. Ramaphosa is confused about how capitalist economies come into being and are run because he himself has been deeply involved for years now in the ANC’s politics of chaotic Marxist-Leninist economics.   Therefore, his current efforts to forcefully introduce change, are efforts that should have been done at the beginning of 2018. The editor writes33:12: “Time is not on Ramaphosa’s side and setting up new task teams and commissions to investigate this or that  economic become policy option is a luxury he can no longer afford. What is required now is a clear plan and decisive implementation”. Such an implementation can be the final straw for Cosatu.

Ramaphosa’s recent appointment of the new Presidential Economic Advisory Council, to ensure greater coherence and consistency in the implementation of economic policy and to see to it that the government and society are in general better equipped to respond to changing economic circumstances, already seems to be stalled by the  tripartite alliance’s disharmony on the Mboweni plan. It seems that Ramaphosa has forgotten that Marxist-Leninist ideology is part of the deep-seated beliefs of the ANC, Cosatu and the SACP in spite of continued challenges to the revolutionary ideology of the tripartite alliance. The recent September NEC meeting can indeed be his high noon, making the chances of triggering his recall in 2020 more and more of a reality.34

As mentioned earlier, the 2019 Mboweni plan (also known as the ANC’s 2019 Development Plan) is not a clear plan, neither does it offer implementations that are decisive to bring about a positive turn-around. Ramaphosa’s economic policy will therefore fail, as did those of all of his predecessors. There is no real intention to privatise Eskom or other SOEs. Neither is there the intention to cut down on the number of civil servants in the public service sector nor to lower the salaries of civil servants by 10%, notwithstanding the fact that the government has a shortfall of R120-billion, which includes the R59-billion to assist Eskom against an expected decline in income tax for the tax year ending 20 March 2020. The fact that the civil service’s salaries are 45% of the total income tax does not concern the ideologues of Marxist-Leninist socialism (especially not members of Cosatu). This chaos is therefore to be expected. The socialist-inspired worker politics of the ANC will not be changed as long as the ANC continues its partnership with Cosatu. And avoiding financial and economic chaos is not a priority for Cosatu.25-28,30-32,35,36

It was expected that his Finance Minister would be painting a bleak fiscal picture when he presented in late-October his medium-term budget, warned Joffe on 15th September 2019. Joffe36 postulates36:1: “… it is likely that rating agency Moody’s will put SA on alert for downgrade to junk status when it reviews the rating in November”, or that the: “…economy heads closer to final nail in junk status coffin”. In this mess-up stands the demand of Cosatu central.

It must be clear that the ANC is running out of realistic ideas and narratives in their efforts to solve the manifold South African problems which have been steadily growing. The unions and their workers are right when they demand that Ramaphosa at least get the basics right, like seeing to it that the training of teachers is improved, as well as healthcare services, municipal services, housing, work opportunities, etc.. This means abandoning the fantasies and grandeur present in their thinking and rhetoric — as with the implementation of 4IR, mega-cities, a mega export country, as well as to boost South Africa as a  major role-player in the world’s politics and economics. This pipe dream might be realised sometime in the future but will be brought about by an able regime. Gumede37 focused on the presence of misplaced ANC grandeur in their political programmes well when he postulates37:20: “A basic-led growth requires pragmatism, inclusion and humbleness – which so far, sadly, have been in short supply”.

The Unions are going to be a threat to any ANC-regime and its exclusive “ANC-state” as long as there is a tripartite alliance in which a more and more demanding and strengthened Cosatu  and the SACP eventually displace the increasingly disempowered ANC as the ruler. Transgressions by Cosatu’s members have been overlooked and this acceptance of corruption by the ANC regime without any reaction of disapproval or punishment, has become the order of the day – like municipal workers who threaten ordinary citizens with violence if they want to go to work, the blocking of major transport arteries to the CBDs of large cities, the trashing of city centres, while keeping judges and magistrates away from the courts, are but a few examples. Basically, not because the ANC and the unions have since teamed up as a Marxist-Leninist unit, but because the unions have overtaken the ANC as a political entity. On the growing, uncontrolled anarchy of union members, like those in August 2019 in Pretoria, Mthombothi38 writes that it seems not to attract the attention nor the dismay of the government in the nearby Union Buildings. For Mthombothi38 South Africa is in the grip of a “worker mentality” with an ANC-government in absent as rulers, and the situation became38:19: “…a case of hear no evil, see no evil. Who exactly runs this place? Is the government still in charge, or has it capitulated to anarchists? Lawlessness has been normalised. Demonstrations often turns violent, even in the presence of the police., who in some instances  seem scared to intervene. 

Mthombothi38 maintains that the unions should be seen as a specific part of the ANC regime because of their immense empowerment by means of the country’s extremely robust and union-friendly laws which have given workers access to an array of rights since 1994. It has empowered the workers to such an extent that when Thabo Mbeki tried to rein them in, they summarily ousted him from the political scene at the ANC’s national conference. On the possible presence of a similar disastrous fate hanging over the head of Ramaphosa, to be activated unexpectedly in the near future by Cosatu and the SACP, Saunderson-Meyer25 issues a warning to be understood together with the ANC leadership’s curse from 1994, when he posits25:12: “In 2008, former president Thabo Mbeki defied the unionists and the communists on the issue of SA’s economic direction. It earned him an early ‘recall’.

Ramaphosa depends on the approval of the labour unions as much as he is dependent on the ANC politburo for approval in order to stay on in the presidency. Any deviating from the unions’ basics rights and interests, also spells an ousting for Ramaphosa. Their possible future collaboration with the EFF and other anti-Ramaphosa factions to form a new power-block and the threat for instance posed by unions (as Nehawu, the biggest public workers’ union) to make the country ungovernable if their members are retrenched, have raised concern. Ramaphosa knows well that the unions brought him to power, but also that this relationship with them and his presidency is a temporary one, depending on whether he continues to promote instead of endangering of the unions’ interests. Mothibothi38 guides us about the empowerment of the unions and their secondary role in empowering Ramaphosa when he posits38:19: “…the unions are in bed with power – they are the king makers. Cyril Ramaphosa is president today thanks primarily to the unions, just  as they have been responsible for elevating his predecessors. Such proximity is probably inoffensive, and even benign in good times. But the country is staring at an abyss and painful sacrifices will have to be made all round”. 

In all his activities and rhetoric related to privatisation and capitalist-inspired reform of the economy, Ramaphosa has already bowed to the threats coming from the unions, as is well reflected  by his announcement on the 10th October 2019 when he spoke in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) in Cape Town by saying there is “no plan to  privatise Eskom”.39,40

The ANC, in supporting the SACP and Cosatu since 1994 as the ruling power, has slowly become isolated from its power base. It can no longer pride itself in being called the sole leader of South Africa. As a political party, the ANC is being cast in the shadow of the SACP and Cosatu. Taking into account its ability to only attract 28% of the total eligible voters (of which many votes were from the SACP and Cosatu, it is right to say the ANC is experiencing a crisis. Its shelf life is over. Any conflict with Cosatu and the SACP can bring about its collapse.

3.3.1.3. Post-2017 ANC faction-infights

One of the internal determinants leading to the failure of the ANC as the ruler in post-2019 South Africa is its present complete lack of unity as a party. In this context Stone and Modjadji43 pointed out that the ANC became an open battleground already in 2017 with the so-called warring factions that had gathered around certain leaders. The first faction of this kind that comes to mind is the anti-Zupta grouping versus the Zuma-supporters in 2017, with the organised effort to unseat Jacob Zuma as president of the ANC as well as State-president of South Africa. Noting the comments of political journalists and commentators, it seems that the initial internal battle or so-called internal strife has intensified since. What became clear is that these opponents within the party are fighting each other tooth and nail daily in order to cling to their positions, to grow their numbers and to strengthen their influence. The broad media coverage of the so-called “clans” inside the ANC reflects at times a well-focused effort to portray Cyril Ramaphosa as the one in the winner’s seat. But undoubtedly, outside of the ordinary public’s observations and the seemingly pro-Ramaphosa media, there is another side visible for the critical political observer: a group of well-rooted and politically empowered anti-Ramaphosa cadres. People such as Ace Magashule, Jacob Zuma, Supra Mahumaphelo and the dark horse “Cat” David Mabuza are alleged to be part of this grouping. These persons were not pushed out of the party’s elite corps after the December 2017 Nasrec conference and they are continuing to play a decisive role in the functioning of the organisation. Their growing influence was already seen in post-May 2019 with various senior appointments given to them by the Ramaphosa regime. The allegation is that the intentions of these so-called “opponents” of Ramaphosa are to make Ramaphosa a subordinate leader and lame-duck president by means of a slow, and well-planned scheme. In this alleged organised intention to undermine Ramaphosa’s stature as president, and push him into a diminishing role in the ANC elite, they have restarted the use of the ANC’s so-called principle of democratic-centralism, wherein every member is subordinated to the party’s national  conference resolutions.41-48

After the December 2017 Nasrec conference  two clear factions inside the greater ANC have stood out: the Ramaphosa-faction (the so-called ANC-doves) versus the Zuma-Magashule-faction (the so-called ANC-hawks). The term faction is sometimes replaced by clan to reflect the warlike intentions of these warring groups within the ANC. This division initially seems to reflect an ideological difference on policies of economics. It is further postulated that these factions have been seemingly split more or less 50:50 among the ANC law-makers, its Top-six and its’ NEC consisting of eight members. The division into two main groups have since become more rigid and extreme in the course of 2018. The split is no longer seen as a temporary one, but a permanent fixture within the ANC which is now composed of basically two main opposing groups, which have already formed a temporary alliance to maintain the greater ANC regime’s status and power.41-48

The media’s division of the ANC on the simple grounds that is presents a strict classification of good versus evil in their descriptions of two groups, is false. Can the Ramaphosa faction really be good only and the Magashule faction really be evil only? The division is much more complex. The presence of ideology, etc., plays a central and prominent role, including those specific elements that the different leaders are propagating, which again imply specific economic models, notions about the haves and have-nots and often also unashamed racism. This is well-reflected by Lagardien49 when he writes49:19: “Such a split would not be the much-speculated divide between the ANC and the SACP or Cosatu. On the surface, this split is between constitutionalists and loyal cadres. Rhetorically, the split is replicated as a pro-Zuma and a pro-Ramaphosa faction. In more radical populist discourse it is condemned as a clash between protectors of “white monopoly capital” and a “radical economic transformation” faction”.

The planned group-forming and vote-buying to support a certain leader and outright nefarious plotting during the election in December 2017 at Nasrec to oust a specific group’s leader, together with the exposure of the CR17 campaign’s millions to get Ramaphosa elected as president of the ANC, seem to have created much of the present bitterness between the Magashule-Zuma faction and Ramaphosa and had undoubtedly contributed to the extreme divisions in the greater ANC.47,50,51

Also, exposing an alleged R390-million donation from the CR17 (estimated by various political analysts to actually be closer to R500-million), specifically by so-called unknown capitalist outsiders towards his campaign, has for good reason made Ramaphosa an untrustworthy and unacceptable person to be the leader of the ANC for Magashule and his faction. It is clear that because Ramaphosa could count on the largesse of CR17, he has stolen the presidency from his opponents and enemies.47,50

On the two opposing ANC groups and their intentions to annihilate each other as quickly and as soon as possible, Labuschagne52 reflects52:6: “Die ANC se Achilleshiel is die duidelike verdelingslyn wat tussen die twee hoofgroepe bestaan.” About this Achillesheel of the ANC, Labuschagne writes52:6: “Die ANC bestaan in hoofsaak uit twee sterk magsentrums, met pres. Cyril Ramaphosa, wat die meer gematigde  en rasionele groep verteenwoordig, en Ace Magashule, sekretaris-generaal van die ANC wat die radikale groep verteenwoordig.”

Makhanya53, on this ongoing post-2019 political split in the greater ANC — and the apparent intention by some of the factions’ members to continue the established pre-2019 irresponsible culture in the ANC, reports53:2:

Some of these people who refuse to recognise the depth of the malaise are at the top echelons of the governing party’s structures. Many of them will be sitting in the parliamentary benches after May 8 and will be determining policy and governance, as well as doing oversight on how the nation’s resources are managed.

It will be very difficult for the post-May 8 government to make a concerted effort to rid the country of this disease while the top structures of the governing party are not singing from the same sheet in so far as this issue is concerned and while some of the hard line state capture denialists serve as public representatives.

Specifically on the present-day immense in-fighting and multitude of intrigues produced in the greater ANC, especially at Luthuli house and in the various provincial houses governed by the ANC, the editor54 of Business Time already in February 2019  elaborated in-depth on the matter. On the ANC’s internal conflicts, he writes54:8: “The party is talking with two different voices, which adds to policy uncertainty, negatively affecting investment in the country’s ailing economy and making it more likely that we will eventually lose our one remaining investment-grade rating.”

Cele and Stone55 refer in June 2019 to this uncertainty that has taken root inside the ANC as55:2: “The ANC speaks with a forked tongue” referring to the many times in which conflicting rhetoric from Ramaphosa and Magashule were noted.

The conflict between the two groups seems to be exclusively driven by two exclusive primary intentions, inherent in each faction: 1)  political power through obtaining the dominant leadership position; 2) to assure through this dominance the opportunity to score financial gain for their supporters and followers as they did in the past through the capture of the state and other semi-state enterprises. Land grabbing and other gains, as the pension funds and the Reserve Bank, have become new motivating factors in this struggle of leadership dominance.41-45,55

Eric Naki56 brought a new understanding to the internal conflict of the ANC, and the drive of the two opposing factions, when he writes that the South African courts and the seven commissions, of which the Zondo and Mpati are the most prominent, are the new battlefields between the ANC’s various opposing and hostile factions. The factions as well as their leaders are making use of all the means available to them to gain the upper hand. The political analyst Xolani Dube56 reflects that the ANC squabbles since 2019 are not new and have been an internal part of the ANC elite’s political opportunism to fight each other for the lucrative top leadership positions because it guarantees the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow nation. ANC squabbles had resulted in court battles as far back as 2005 when Jacob Zuma was accused of alleged criminal activities for financial gain (with his involvement in alleged bribes in the Arms Deal) and state capture was born of his favours to his intimate followers (or faction). What is obvious from Dube’s postulation, is that all the present commissions on state capture and corruption are exclusively about the many failures of the Zuma-regime to govern correctly due to the nepotist bent of a specific group in the Zuma sphere. (Dube notes pertinently that most of the major cases of alleged corruption at the moment under investigation directly involve Jacob Zuma as a major protagonist. It is the same Jacob Zuma who seems to be making a strong come back into the ANC’s politics via Ace Magashule and his cronies.56

Infighting in the ANC (which sometimes even includes traitorous plotting with the enemy) around the positioning of groups which associated them with so-called leadership personalities to steer their interests (a setup in which it is sometimes very difficult to determine if this group’s members  are mesmerised by the leader’s personality and/or if the members only hang on for selfish and opportunistic reasons because of the leader’s ability to assure their enrichment), are well established. It is evidenced by the confession in July 2019 by the ANC senior member and former MP, Derek Hanekom, that he had called a meeting in 2017 with the EFF to oust the then president Jacob Zuma. (Madisa reports that Zuma resigned a day before Parliament was scheduled to vote on a motion of no confidence against him). It has to be noted that a group of ANC MPs had a specific agenda: to safeguard solely their political and other interests in the ANC against an opposing group of ANC MPs with the same and possible other interests. The forming of opposition groups to fight its own leaders inside the greater ANC is also evidenced by allegations that already before the 54th national meeting in December 2017 the so-called vague and unidentified “Ramaphosa group” decided not to accept a loss by the Magashule faction (and thus had intended to reject the leaderships of Mrs Zuma or Magashule should they be elected) and were determined to break away from the greater ANC if such an outcome were to follow.50,51,57

Although Hanekom denied such an intention by him or others inside the greater ANC in December 2017, Julius Malema, reports Madisa51, had in a recent speech in this context alleged 51:4:“… that Hanekom, during his meeting with Gardee [EFF’s secretary-general], said that he was planning a breakaway party should Cyril Ramaphosa not emerge as president at the ANC’s 54th national conference in Nasrec [in December 2017].”

Since December 2017, the separation of the two groups in terms of good and evil has been one of the prominent features of their depiction in the media. It seems as if the so-called Ramaphosa faction’s political “empowerment” was being attributed to and associated with Ramaphosa’s “goodness”. The Ramaphosa group were portrayed to be those persons living an honest life, who were not corrupt, did not steal, did not misuse their positions, etc. In short, it was a very subjective classification. Sokutu’s58pat on the back for Cyril” back in May 2019, is an example of such a misconception where solely goodness, honesty, excellent leadership, vision and being the saviour (of the so-called Ramaphosa faction) were exclusively associated with a so-called “impeccable” Ramaphosa as an extraordinary individual. He was being painted as someone far removed from the many misadventurous realities of the ANC and the country’s politics. This exclusive classing ignored the many negative allegations against Ramaphosa and his inner-circle, like  the clouded CR17 election funding, his passive and not so innocent vice-presidency under the alleged corrupt President Jacob Zuma, as well as his active chairmanship of the ANC regime’s corrupt cadre-deployment scheme. Another fact which was not taken into account into this leadership appraisal by Sokutu58 was Ramaphosa’s alleged cooperation with the “evil” Jacob Zuma. Sokutu58 writes comprehensively in May on the future good intentions (and seemingly also only good qualities) of Ramaphosa as the good ANC leader (without reflecting on the presence of a Ramaphosa faction that is also good). This praise is  based mostly on Ramaphosa’s 2019 election promises (ignoring the hard realities waiting for Ramaphosa after May 2019). Quoting Ramaphosa, Sokuto58 reflects on his words as follows58:12: “In this phase we’re going to renew the ANC and cleanse it of all bad tendencies –making the organisation to be the leader of society. The ANC must be an organisation of disciplined comrades. Our leaders must always speak with one voice, show unity and not hang our dirty linen in public”.

3.3.1.4. Post-2017 ANC leadership-infights

Many of the above literature reflects on the other side an immense leadership struggle within the ANC, in which personal ambitions and interests of two specific leaders are the central theme. Extreme opportunism is present in both the thinking of the leaders, their planning and activities. The interests of the groups supporting the two leaders are of secondary importance for the two leaders. This does not conform to the traditional notion of large groups fighting each other to advance their particular political ideologies and the executing of certain policies. The focus on “clans” in the ANC have become more and more vague and confusing since August. The general postulation that the so-called factionalism inside the ANC is purely based only on differences around its traditional ideology, seem to be a contradiction. The leadership issue — in which the exaggerated status of a quasi-leader stands central — seems to be the evil of the present internal strife in the ANC where parasitic supporters have joined in. Such kind of conflicts emerge when a party starts on the slippery slope of decline and it lacks able leaders to participate in actual politics. It is mostly not an exclusive ideological issue. To be able to see the difference between the so-called post-Soviet world-views of Cyril Ramaphosa (including Tito  and Pravin) with the so-called pre-Soviet world-views of the Ace Magashule (including Jacob Zuma and David Mabuza), is a foolish endeavour and a misplaced conception. Their actions and their speeches as leaders differ, but their ideology belongs to a classic Marxist-Leninist view, saturated with mischief and state capture. Both are hard-core Marxist-Leninist socialists who have been abetting land grab without compensation, the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank and the seizure of public and private pension funds. Both Ramaphosa and Magashule are die-hard ANC revolutionaries who intend to promote RET.26,30,31,59-64 

Sokuto’s58 own praise of the “good” leader Cyril Ramaphosa as a “collector” of only good ANCs  in his particular faction, reveals how the emerging figure of an outstanding leader who draws followers around his character and abilities as follows58:12:

But, in a show of unity, Ramaphosa extended an olive branch to all. I can only think of Nelson Mandela who would do that.

Upon taking over the reins, Ramaphosa has shown true leadership in all respects.

He has embraced all, including those that wished he would not ascend to power within the ANC and the country.

Given Ramaphosa’s corrupt-free background, stature, values and vision – a stark contrast to Zuma – it came as no surprise that when he was voted party president, the country rallied behind him./ 58Sokutu B. Pat on the back for Cyril. The Citizen (opinion). 2019 May 16; p. 12/

On the role of the good, the bad and ugly in the ANC politics, Magashule stands out as the bad (and often also the ugly) guy in the ANC elite and in ANC politics who is seemingly focused on rounding up all the bad ANC cadres into his faction. Bad represents the continuation of the Zuma faction which is alleged to be adept only at corruption, theft, etc. In this classing of the bad ones, most of the media describe Ace Magashule in absolute antipathetic terms, his profile as a person, as an ANC member and as a leader. In this context, the editor65 of The Citizen, on the 22 August 2019, reports on the so-called latest South African Citizens Survey that Ace Magashule (the alleged leader of the Zuma-faction’s “fightback” against Ramaphosa) is disliked by nine out of ten South Africans (rating 11% in July against a 16% in June), while Ramaphosa is still flying high in the people’s eyes (62% in 2019 against 64% in 2018). The editor66 of the Sunday Times writes more or less in the same key66:18: “It’s not a cardinal secret that the man is despised by some within his own party and there are even rumours of a possible attempt to unseat him in the national general council next year (2020).”

Bulger67 in an article in the Sunday Times, dated 16 June 2019, writes67:19: “Is Ace the reincarnation of Dr No?” and then, in making his comparison, refers to Dr Andries Treurnicht in the following terms: “In or out of office, Treurnicht was a danger to society, a loose cannon and a liability.”

Mthombothi46, on the so-called flagitious activities of Magashule, wonders:10: “…has Magashule become the ANC’s Mr Untouchable? The Samson who, if tangled with, will bring the whole house down?”

Tony Leon68 also reflects mischievously on Magashule’s so-called poor leadership status in the ANC and South Africa. His postulation68:18: “Magashule was elected to his post by fever than 5,000 South Africans. Ramaphosa enjoys a mandate from 10-million citizens”, is extremely misleading and false.

The same falsity, boosting Ramaphosa and belittling Magashule, is reflected by the writing of the editor69 of the Sunday Times, stating that the country gave Ramaphosa a 57%-majority mandate.

[In short: both Ramaphosa and Magashule were both autocratically elected by fever than 4 000 ANC-delegates/representatives of the various ANC-branches at the 2017 Nasrec National Conference. Ramaphosa won with 179 votes (±2 900 votes for Ramaphosa and 1 910 votes for his opponent), reflecting only 5% support for Ramaphosa at Nasrec and indirectly by the greater ANC. When the votes of the ±1-million registered ANC-members’ who the 4 000 delegates had represented, are taken into consideration, his support inside the ANC as its leader/president was less than 0.02%. Inside and outside the ANC  he cannot be called a “strong “leader and especially not because he became so in an autocratic way, supported by our faulty electoral legislation, the presidents of the ANC and the South African State. Only ±10-million voters voted ANC from the ± 19-million participating voters (less than 50% of the voters who participated in the May 2019 elections). Noting also that ± 19-million eligible voters did not vote or did not register as voters, meaning that only 28% voted “by means of their ANC vote” indirectly for Ramaphosa and the ANC and not 57% as alleged. There exists no evidence that Magashule’s status is poorer than that of Ramaphosa or that Ramaphosa enjoys a stronger mandate as Magashule].70

In fact, in analysing this peculiarity, one reason for this “contaminated” profiling of Magashule seems to be because he is a stronger leader than Cyril Ramaphosa and because he “canned” Ramaphosa’s glorified empowerment and political arrogance, having pushed him into a subordinate position in the greater ANC elite since December 2017. Mthombothi’s48 reflection on this alleged power grab by Magashule of Ramaphosa’s presidency and the so-called “bad” leader Magashule, tells us an in-depth story of how much subjectivity is playing a role in the ANC’s two factions and the falsities around leaders as being either good or bad. Mthombothi writes48:19: “…the ANC…is led by a mafia-like character in Ace Magashule. Magashule is now in full command. Ramaphosa seems to have ceded even the ground he gained at Nasrec. Magashule’s choice on the [candidate] list his way of encircling the wagons. ANC doesn’t have a few rotten apples. It is rotten. The whole bag.”

Thankfully the editor65 of The Citizen warns us that the reports circulating on social media are more often than not a collection of toxic cesspit stories and that one should be reading too much into the attacks on political figures such as Magashule. It serves only the ulterior motives and subjectivity of certain persons.

But on the other hand Mthombothi71 is clear on Magashule’s strong power base in the greater ANC71:19: “He’s king of all the surveys. He’s moulding the party – which policies and cadences to emphases – in his own image. It is putty in his hands . Zuma may have handed the baton reluctantly to Ramaphosa, but the party of Zuma is not likely to be the party of Ramaphosa. It seems destinated to be the party of Magashule . He has all the time in the world to achieve that”.

If one ignores the subjectivity and the ever-present adherence to Marxist-Leninist socialism that Ace Magashule unashamedly underwrites, it is clear for many political analysts and commentators that Magashule is one of the best leaders in the ANC elite, if not on top. His strongly empowered role in present ANC politics was also well-illustrated by his recent briefing of journalists on the outcomes of the recent ANC-NEC meeting where the NEC gave Tito Mboweni  approval to reform the troubled SOEs: he spoke to the media together with Enoch Godongwana and Tito Mboweni, while Ramaphosa was absent. This absence clearly showed that Ramaphosa does not have him on a leash on the ANC’s strategy politics as is often falsely projected by the media26,30,31,63,64,72

About Sokuto’s58 base for his praise of the “goodness” of Ramaphosa, is it firstly important to note that  Ramaphosa in May misled the public about unity which is supposed to already exist or to come to the ANC soon. His requirement of ANC leaders to ”speak with one voice” is contradicted by his own constant double-speak on the ANC’s affairs. Secondly, Ramaphosa has failed in cleaning house as far as the ANC’s inner circle of tainted leaders are concerned by his seemingly “willing” appointment of “not-so-clean leaders of the Zuma-cabinets” into his own cabinet. (Sokutu,58 notwithstanding his immense praise for Ramaphosa, acknowledged this failure himself). Thirdly, both the post-May 2019 ANC party and the ANC regime were not cleansed of all their bad tendencies as publicly promised by Ramaphosa. This interlacing of the so-called good with the bad, and the so-called Magashule people with the so-called Ramaphosa people in the greater ANC’s Parliament, the Ramaphosa cabinet and other executive ANC positions, suddenly forces the question to the foreground: is there really something like a Ramaphosa faction and a Magashule faction in the greater ANC? Is the present division not possibly a temporary outcome because of the problematic presence of Ramaphosa and Magashule in the greater ANC. If both are ousted from the ANC as members with immediate effect, will the so-called “group-forming” as well as all the troubles and conflicts inside the greater ANC stop?58

The broad assumption by many political journalists, analysts and commentators of the real possibility of a particular Ramaphosa faction existing, Munusamy47 expresses her scepticism. She questions the public’s understanding of the reality of the “spook” of the Ramaphosa-faction in the present political sphere. Munusamy writes47:11 “Who or what is the ‘Cyril Ramaphosa faction? Many people refer colloquially to ‘Cyril’s faction’ without knowing who exactly they are talking about”.

About the who and what from this Ramaphosa faction how it should be viewed in the reality of South African politics, Munusamy47 clearly states as follows47:11:

  • With significant constituencies in the ANC-tripartite-alliance forming a circle of empowerment around Ramaphosa;
  • Part of a power bloc in the ANC-NEC who dominate discussions and have formidable influence in the various Provinces;
  • Who at all times should be Ramaphosa’ eyes and ears on the ground, together to be his wall of defence within and outside the ANC.

In this faction, writes Munusamy47, Ramaphosa himself should be the dominant force, with his supporters prevailing from branch to national level. But, on the contrary, for Ramaphosa, as far as a real Ramaphosa-faction is concerned, there is little proof of such a faction. This is an outcome that Munusamy confirms47:11: “The reality, however, is that no such power bloc exists. It is difficult to identify the president’s surrogates – other than those who backed his campaign for the presidency in 2017.”

Munusamy47 points out that even those supporting Ramaphosa for the 2017 election, cannot explain the present-day person and leader Ramaphosa, his political planning and vision or who are his planners, intimates and informers are. Secondly, is it further clear that in this lack of  identifying his faction or grouping, that Ramaphosa does not appear to have a solid base nor a certain circle of political heavy-weights and surrogates in the greater ANC who represent him in structures across the country. In many cases those prominent followers inside the ANC who cheer for Ramaphosa, seem to never get ahead of their naked opportunism to gain more from their association with him as from another group This has been the prime motivator for his so-called supporters and not so much his unique leadership qualities. Institutions such as Cosatu were previously a traditional constituency for Ramaphosa, but it seems not to stand fully behind him or to be shielding him from attacks today. Neither are his close ministers Tito Mboweni and Pravin Gordhan showing any tangible backing from the greater ANC to strengthen his leadership, as Munusamy47 rightly pinpointed47:11: “There is no visible support for Mboweni’s mission in stop wanton spending by government or Gordhan’s clean-up of state-owned enterprises”.  Also is he basically alone in his fight against the Public Protector. This, states Munusamy47, reflects the weaknesses of the so-called  Ramaphosa-faction and47:11: “… the failure to join the dots between the onslaught on his key ministers and the coming attack on him”.

The above outcome spells problems for Ramaphosa inside the greater ANC. Magashule plays his cards as a master would, without him being perceived as the aggressor, but instead to be the subordinate servant of the ANC and the people of South Africa. In promoting effective leadership, Magashule and his clan are far more adept at the ANC politics than Ramaphosa and his group. The Magashule faction knows well how to play its cards correctly and wisely inside the greater ANC’s structure. This is being done constantly by Magashule through his emphasis of the ANC’s unchangeable democratic centralist ideology and Marxist-Leninist socialism, while at the same time preaching about the existence of “good unity” inside the greater ANC as well as the existence of an intimate leadership relation between him and Ramaphosa. This masterly move in the present ANC’s political landscape on all levels by Magashule – from local to national levels, which include also the ANC cadres in Parliament (which the editor73 of The Citizen described as “Ace’s blazing guns”) – was well-reflected in June 2019 with Magashule’s presence in the Parliament and his clear grip on the ANC’s future politics.

Cele and Stone74 on the 23rd June 2019 report on Magashule’s emphasis on the “collectiveness” of the greater ANC (bringing into picture again the Marxist framework that is driving it and which describes and control the position of Ramaphosa by the ANC’s politburo) when Magashule said74:1-2: “As the officials, we are very happy that we have been working very consistently. We just read in the media that the [secretary-general] is going this way and the president is going that way. It is not true. I don’t know when are you going to accept it; even when you hear it from the horse’s mouth, you still believe there is something else happening. There is no way the officials of the ANC would ever not work as a collective because that is our understanding of how this liberation movement works. We operate as a collective.”

The crafty counter-answer of Magashule recently in public, when he was tackled on the so-called Magashule-Ramaphosa infighting, responding that that there is no fightback by him or his clan against the activities of Ramaphosa nor that he is specifically objecting because Ramaphosa is failing so far to implement the 2017 Nasrec resolutions. He side-stepped criticism of Ramaphosa’s politics tactfully (a serious issue that he surely is going to address at the 2020 NGC with a killer’s focus and instinct) by saying there must be patience because Ramaphosa is operating inside a timeframe (without, of course, giving Ramaphosa the right to deviate intentionally from the resolutions) to execute the 2017 Nasrec resolutions62:12: “You don’t implement resolutions of conference in a year and a half. Material conditions define implementation of some of these resolutions. You don’t just blindly go and [implement]”.

On the other hand, he is succinct in his counter-answer on the untouchable Marxist-Leninist ideology and democratic centralism of the ANC, as woven into the empowerment of the National Conference to issue resolutions as final and binding “politics orders. Included, too is his confirmation of the empowerment of the politburo of the ANC (NEC and Top Six), which is not only steered by him as secretary-general but also by Ramaphosa acting as president of the ANC as well as the state president. No one dares to deviate from the resolutions or change the resolutions, as Magashule62 clearly pinpointed62:12: “…this did not mean that Nasrec resolutions would not be implemented”, and62:12:  “…there was commitments from ANC leaders, including Ramaphosa , that all Nasrec decisions would become reality, including the nationalising of the [Reserve] Bank”.

In the above context that all the resolutions taken by the National Conferences must be fully underwritten and executed by its leaders (surely with the focus on Ramaphosa), Magashule62 guides his audience clearly62:12:

The president said that resolution is a resolution of conference. It must be implemented. But as students of Lenin  and Marx…that’s our orientation. Material conditions dictate the tempo and pace of our struggle moving forward.

It’s not only when it comes to the Reserve Bank, it’s all matters affecting issues of the economy, issues of balance of forces internationally and domestically. Once you understand all those things, you then have to know that you’re a real leader of the ANC.

The reality of the politics that Jacob Zuma as well as Cyril Ramaphosa have underwritten and practiced since 1994 and are still pursuing in 2019, are well described by Gumede75. He writes75:20: “The mindsets of many ANC leaders are stuck in the Cold War period when the world was divided into a Marxist-Leninist ideological camp led by the Soviet Union, and a Western liberal group led by the US”, and75:20: “Many ANC leaders behave like high school or student politicians, with no sense of accountability, rather than grown-up politicians whose decisions daily determine whether people live or die, whether people go to bed hungry or not, and whether people lose or secure a job”.

To cast revolutionary and traditional ANC-leaders such as Ace Magashule, David Mabuza or Jacob Zuma in a Western democratic-capitalist political framework, or to underscore that the ANC’s traditional leaders from 1994 could change to such a system in 2019, is foolish. Gumede75 shows this misapprehension well when he postulates the following ANC faults that need to be changed in 201975:20: “Many influential ANC party bosses have not acknowledged the party is losing its market, that it has the wrong leadership and that its organisational culture is deformed”, and75:20: “The ANC’s language, customs and behaviour must become more resonant with those of it “customers”, the people of SA. Empty slogans such as a “National Democratic Revolution” are yesteryear’s”.

Magashule is presently steering of the ANC directly into implementing RET; his constant cat-and-mouse game with the insecure Ramaphosa is a sign that the revolutionary ANC leader Magashule is busy preparing for a deadly attack on the leadership of Ramaphosa. [In this context the approaching 2020 midterm national general council meeting (NGC)  can be seen at best as a trying time for Ramaphosa. Magashule’s long awaited chance, which for the first time after Ramaphosa became the “double-president”, could finally materialise, can either become a reality because of his supporters or whether his “faction” (if there is such an contingent) can safe-guard him from an eventual ousting. The 2020 NGC is going to be the foremost test for his leadership of the greater ANC. The NGC is going to be the first “legitimate place and time for the dissatisfied ANC cadres to reverse the Nasrec 2017 election’s so-called “scewed” results, via the anti-Ramaphosa group’s right to evaluate how successful or not his performances were, and thus if he correctly and precisely implemented the 2017 Nasrec-resolutions. It is important to note that at the 2020 NGC, facing the so-called phantom faction supporting Ramaphosa, there will a very real Magashule-Zuma faction to take-on Ramaphosa.47

The present prodding by Magashule of Ramaphosa’s qualities and weaknesses as leader of the greater ANC in terms of the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist model and the ANC’s democratic-centralism is obvious. Failed outcomes of the 2017 resolutions so far by Ramaphosa, include his hesitation to implement a practicable land expropriation without compensation policy, the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank, and a willingness to divert the R6-trillion private and public pension assets to the state’s coffer to rescue the ANC regime from its failed economics. There are also many other activities in which by Ramaphosa as leader has been involved in which are seemingly in conflict with the ANC’s political character, like the funding of his 2017 election via his CR17 connections, where the names of various prominent exclusive white capitalists have sprung up, alleged to be persons such as Nicky Opperheimer and the likes. This cosy relationship with capitalists that Ramaphosa — as an assumed communist leader — have cultivated, are all grist to the mills of ANC radicals searching for a reason to support a vote of no confidence. The ANC’s  radicals allege that it is not the real intention of Ramaphosa as its leader to unite the ANC around the principles of its Freedom Charter, but an orchestrated “renewal” by him in which the ANC will erase its Marxist-Leninist underpinnings and advance post-1994, his own and other interests dear to capitalists. Ramaphosa is painted as an obstructive leader, with seemingly a small group of followers inside the greater ANC. Indeed, some analysts believe the ousting of Ramaphosa will not activate the fall of the ANC: on the contrary, it could bring about the rebirth of a cleansed, improved ANC.76,77

Any apparent failing — or unwillingness — by Ramaphosa to abide by the 2017 resolutions and instead turn to “capitalist-orientated” policies in his presidency, can expect a backlash in return. Political unrest, anarchy, but especially revolution in 2019 to 2020, can be seen as the ideal opportunity for the Magashule faction (together with the Mabuza and Zuma factions) to interfere and intervene and thus to take over the running daily administration under the pretext of restoring political order and the ANC’s policy of democratic consensus or  centralism.54,78-80

For Magashule is there only place in the ANC for radical, revolutionary politicians; not for smart capitalists dressed as communists. In this context Rooi76 writes76:2: “Magashule het gesê die ANC sal nooit verander nie. Diegene wat die party verlaat het, moet terugkeer. ‘Die heilige Gees moet hulle teruglei’.” On Julius Malema’s specific role in Magashule’s radical political lifestyle foreseen by him for the post-May 2019 ANC, Rooi76 reports76:2: “Julius Malema, EFF-leier, is bestempel as ‘ons jong man, ons eie produk’.” Also, the extent to which the political radicals are gathering around Magashule as his inveterate followers and supportive “soldiers” in his struggle to “own” the post-May 2019 greater ANC, is well reflected by the support and sanctioning in April 2019 of Makalo Mohale, chair of the ANC Youth League, to further Magashule’s radical political aims and economic policies.76

From a critical analysis of Ramaphosa’s performance as the present double-president, it is evident that he has clearly not been fulfilling the ANC’s politburo’s prescriptions. This can be read in the guidelines and in the hidden, but continuous warnings being issued by the secretary-general of the ANC. The present uncontrolled infighting around the ANC’s leadership’s positions, wherein the political ideology of the greater ANC also starts to play a prominent role, is focused more and more on disabling the activities of the Ramaphosa leadership in the greater ANC. It seems as if Cyril Ramaphosa has unofficially already been placed on probation by the ANC’s politburo, making his survival dependent on his fierce, ongoing counter-attack of Ace Magashule because if he fails to do so, it will be basically impossible not to be ousted in the near future.

Magashule’s aversion and dislike for Ramaphosa may be well masked, but it is there. Rooi76, brought some light for instance on Magashule’s manoeuvres in and around the present ANC leadership of Ramaphosa and the intention to scapegoat him as a failed ANC executive leader and setting him up for punitive actions in 2020. The focus of Magashule is here on the alleged involvement of certain ANC top brass in spying on him and indirectly pinpointing the culprits to be tried later. Rooi76 quoted Magashule as follows76:2: “Ek weet nie wie daaragter sit nie. Ek waarsku net mense om nie staatsorgane te gebruik vir hul politieke tweestryde nie.” 

For Magashule Ramaphosa is undoubtedly not part of the circle of “legitimate” leaders of the  ANC elite when he speaks to exuberant young comrades in Pretoria in the middle of October 2019. Mthombothi71 reflects his opinion71:19: “I’ve served former president Mandela’s administration, former president Thabo Mbeki’s administration, former president Jacob Zuma’s administration, and now under Ramaphosa”. Putting into perspective Magashule’s speech, Mthombothi71 furthermore posits71:19:

The thing that immediately jumped at me was the fact that he assigned proper honorifics to all the leaders except Ramaphosa. He was just Ramaphosa, not the president. It’s a little detail but its not the first time he’s done it.  He hasn’t come to terms with the fact that Ramaphosa is the president and he doesn’t make any bones about it, nor does he seem to care.

Some seem to interpret his comments to mean the penny has finally dropped. He [Ramaphosa] now has to toe the line.

Magashule42 reflects obviously does not only have the division between the greater ANC and the Ramaphosa in mind, but also Ramaphosa’s seemingly doubtful and unwelcome leadership position in the post-2019 ANC political camps and groupings when he surreptitiously notes42:1: “Leiers sal kom en gaan. Diegene wat baklei, sal in in een of ander stadium die organisasie moet verlaat as hul nie kan berus by die beginsels en die tradisies en kultuur van die ANC nie. Swak gedissiplineerde leiers moet liewer die ANC verlaat.”

For  Magashule is it Ramaphosa who has betrayed the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Freedom Charter and the individual who wants to make the ANC an exclusive capitalist party. Mtombothi71 reflects on this apparent conflict in a succinct way as71:19: “…a fierce contestation about the ideological direction of the party”.

For a weathered socialist communist Ramaphosa’s defects and his alleged anti-communism, constitute high treason par excellence. And there is a price to pay. What is clear at this stage is that the table has been set for serious conflict politics in 2020 inside the greater ANC: the first clear step was, as said, already taken in April 2019 to isolate Ramaphosa in order to scapegoat him as a renegade and unwelcome leader in the ANC.71,76

There is no doubt that the leadership of the ANC is slowly, but patiently, being taken over by Magashule. This is seen in the hidden, strong hand of Magashule in the statement in June 2019 on the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank as well as other conflicting statements via the ANC’s NEC, harassing and testing Ramaphosa intentionally. Moreover, there is the growing alliance between Magashule and the ANC’s two alliance partners, Cosatu and the SACP. Their significant shift to the left on economic policy, is well-aligned with the economic ideology of Magashule. For Cosatu and the SACP the Ramaphosa-regime lack the ability to fix the country as far as the interests and demands of the working class is concerned. Magashule’s empowerment  is growing every day, notwithstanding the Ramaphosa’s camp desperate “leaks” to the media of how he is “constantly reigning in and is reprimanding Ace Magashule”. There are also leaks to the anti-Magashule press, allegedly by the ANC’s integrity committee, that Ace Magashule’s office is going to be chided in the future. Other allegations are that Magashule was involved in the forming of Mzwanele Manyi’s African Transformation Movement (ATM). These allegations were however quickly revealed to be baseless.73,82-98

The depressing reality may be that not only is the so-called Ramaphosa faction an illusion, but that his exclusive and extraordinary power and status as the leader of the greater ANC, could equally be a wishful fantasy.

Formidable odds will be facing Ramaphosa in future in his precarious hold on the presidency.  The view of him is one of a renegade leader in the greater ANC without a support and back-up structure at the moment. Marrian87 reflects87:3:

The constant threat of his removal by the ANC’s national general council has been muttered since Ramaphosa’s election at Nasrec. This is the one body in the party that could feasibly remove him between elective conferences.

The general council threat coincides neatly with law enforcement agencies closing in on Zuma’s allies, and those implicated in state capture and corruption.

Then there is the constant push-back from the ANC secretary general Ace Magashule against Ramaphosa’s reform agenda.

The result of this tug-of-war has forced Ramaphosa to compromise at every turn.

Another frontier Ramaphosa is having to navigate is the onslaught by public protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane, as she pushes ahead with her investigation into claims by the democratic Alliance that he lied to Parliament about a donation from the disgraced services company Bosasa.

Ramaphosa as a leader is, contrary to what many political commentators believe, not talented and empowered enough to move, break-up or to change the ANC even an inch. For him it would be impossible to implode the ANC as FW de Klerk had managed with the National Party. Even if Ramaphosa had been empowered, it seems that no one in the ANC elite will jump freely over the cliff with him. Mthombothi88 over-estimates Ramaphosa’s role in the ANC’s and South Africa’s politics when he writes88:10: “De Klerk destroyed his party to save the country. It’s now Ramaphosa’s turn. Will he instead run the risk of destroying the country in a vain attempt to preserve a party that is only tenuously glued together by the perks of power?”

Undoubtedly, the future of Ramaphosa as state-president and as leader (president) of the ANC at present remain in the hands of the ANC’s politburo. He knows it very well, as was reflected by him allowing to be permanently pinned down by the ANC-politburo. He is being led by them to always act within the ANC’s constitution if he does not want to forfeit his presidency of South Africa. On the consequences awaiting him if he disobeys, Saunderson-Meyer89 warns89:12: “It takes a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly to remove a public protector. It takes a simple majority of an ANC congress to recall a president”. 

As in all leadership struggles, it is important to note that there are two sides involved in the fighting. It needs to be reflected upon in due course. Although in most fables there is the bad dragon to be killed and the good knight to do it for the community, the ANC fable on state capture and the present ANC infighting suggest that their fable might end differently. The ANC fable seemingly lacks a good knight, leaving two bad dragons to fight it out untill one dies and the other bad dragon reigns on in the already prevailing chaos. Notwithstanding the notion that Ramaphosa’s presidency is busy failing as a good knight, the Magashule faction will not step up as the good but rather the bad dragons, clothed however as good knights.83-109

Many political commentators allege that it has been the primary intention of Ace Magashule as leader of the Magashule-Zuma faction — to keep intact the Zuma network of state capture and mismanagement — in order to revive the full power of the greater Magashule-Zuma faction as soon as possible. The political views on the future of the ANC to function as a good agent and to be a party of integrity in terms of a “Westminster- style democracy,” are not up-beat. Magashule has no intention to delve too deeply into his own and the top brass of the ANC’s past political transgressions. The party’s present-day lack of good guiding principles, traditions and the culture associated with a party and regime of integrity in terms of what their post-1994 rule has brought forth – will simply be perpetuated going forward, many pundits believe. The already entrenched mindset in the ANC in pursuing corrupt practices, traditions and a culture of impunity visible also in the Magashule faction with their intention to continue in their flagitious ways, has been confirmed beyond all doubt by Magashule’s declaration in public in April 2019 at Parys, in the Free State, that the ANC will never change. With Magashule in power, it is alluded by political commentators, that the ANC will once again serve as an example of Marxist-Leninist governance, bringing about financial and social chaos in its wake. For the first time Stalin’s autocratic politics may be fully implemented in South Africa.42,54,68,76,78-80,87-95, 110-118

In conclusion: It does not matter which faction of the ANC rules the country, since the party’s dedicated political opportunists will stay on. The ANC’s opportunistic elite knows very well how  to use the dying ANC’s many fault-lines to their own ends in order to enrich and advance their own interests. From Ramaphosa, to Magashule, Mabuza and Zuma will be using the greater ANC for their own selfish interests, notwithstanding that they belong to different factions: they need to uphold a partitioned ANC to guarantee gains.17-20,90-99, 101-114, 118-126

The only solution is to immediately oust the ANC-regime and its elite from the political scene. There are still good people left in South Africa’s political sphere and greater society. On this Majoko93 notes93:12:

It’s always best to remember that however fluid and incomprehensible the situation looks, there is a side that seeks to do good for the country and one that has done bad for the country.

Political expediency is bad for the overall health of the republic. No matter how badly one wants to deal with a festering wound, amputation the whole appendage because it’s quicker only creates a bigger long-term problem.

It is not going to be easy to rid the country from the misadventurous politician clique and to attract good knights to rush onto the political stage in our politics as Munusamy94 postulates94:20:

Many people lined up by the main political parties to be our public representatives are an insult to our nation. They would not even be able to run a cake sale without eating the cake themselves- or peddling the backing process to their patronage networks.

The Zondo commission has made me realise how farcical the political system is when corrupt business people are able to control the state by simply buying off politicians and key officials.

The reason there are so many hopeless people vying to be our public representatives is because the political system is closed off to credible, capable leaders who have the potential to modernise and re-imagining our future.

We have to revert to the goals of the Freedom Charter, written in 1955, because nobody can think of fresh solutions to society’s current problems.

SA has many great minds who opt to remain on the sidelines or choose to look after their own financial wellbeing rather than the good of society. So it is difficult to invest in a system that is never going to attract or shape good leaders.

3.3.1.5. The dying ANC
3.3.1.5.1.  Twenty-thousand crooks in the ANC’s heart

The slow exit of the ANC from the future South African broad political scene was initiated by the misadventures, faulty planning and the inability of its top brass over 25 years to rule. These immense shortcomings must not and can not be seen as part of the traditional attitude of the majority, the vision of how the country should be run according to most South Africans. Not everyone in South Africa is a crook, or without vision and no sense of responsibility, lacks accountability and no moral conscience. Neither is the political aspirations of most South Africans cemented into the revolutionary politics of the ANC’s top brass.127-154

The small circle of corrupt individuals running the ANC, their elite and their cronies, has been estimated by Magda Wierzycka155 to be more or less as 20 000 persons. Out of the South African population of 57 million of mostly law-abiding citizens, they are a negligible few. But it must be noted that the innate behaviour of these 20 000 questionable individuals that have successfully infiltrated and occupied all the important centres of power in terms of the political, judicial and financial spheres of the country, have given them the means to operate as though they number far more than 20 million people. It is unbelievable that so few corrupt cadres in the ANC system have, through focused patronage, deeply contaminated the quality of life of the 57 million South Africans in just 25 years. This contamination was so thorough that the moral mindset of a significant part of the greater political society is seemingly at the moment beyond immediate repair. Even their basic notions seems to have been perverted by the political patronage of the ANC elite’s corruption, making it impossible for them to even operate outside the ANC milieu of nefarious politics.78,127- 155

This enslavement has turned voters into mere minions of the ANC at the ballot box, as witnessed in election after election. This mesmerising of the greatest part of the ANC voter body and their supporters, namely the masses of poor blacks (±30-million), was planned by the ANC elite after 1994 to keep this poor constituency in a dependent state by means of their poverty. At the same time the ANC regime keeps feeding them thanks to a precariously low level of state support (old age pensions, child allowances, free education on secondary and tertiary levels, school feeding schemes, appointments to the civil services, RDP-houses, etc.), just enough to keep them dependent of the ANC regime’s rule while at the same time ensuring that they undoubtedly keep living below the bread line.78,155,156

The ruling ANC is currently steering South Africa by means of the ANC’s politburo and their effective use of their Marxist-Leninist socialism to exploit the masses and they use their corrupt cadre deployment schemes (in which Cyril Ramaphosa played a prominent role until his election as President of the country in December 2017) to enrich the ANC elite’s cronies. The origin of the “curriculum” which made it possible for more or less 20 000 miscreants to capture the state after 1994 and still maintain their hold on it, becomes clear: their mentors in China, North-Korea, Russia and Cuba helped them to attain this.

3.3.1.5.2. Viability and sustainability of a political party

The instability present within the present-day ANC, together with its elite’s propensity for being involved all sorts of nefarious political activities after 1994 and  up to 2019 and their disrespect for the old ANC’s values and certain principles contained in the Freedom Charter, confirm that the ANC is incapable of running the post-2019 government and managing land expropriation without corruption. The ANC’s politics have been in a state of bankruptcy, the party’s poor leadership’s qualities, integrity and status, its lack of vision and awareness of its failings, are put in focus especially on the misuse of the land ownership issue by Tabane157 when he said157:18: “…what the ANC has done on the land question must rank as the most desperate move to cling to power – just change policy to sound like the opposition until you are faced with the challenge of implementing it”.

In addition to Tabane’s157 doubt over the viability and sustainability of the ANC as a party and reflecting on its many tricks to hang on to power, there is also the test in terms of the ability of a political party as a regime to deliver on the promises of its political manifesto after every election.  Did the ANC succeed in making good on its promises, turning them into concrete outcomes or not? Over 25 years the ANC’s kept promises were either mostly thin on substance and consistency or tenuous at best. Mostly, they were fanciful.157,158

In this context Kgosana158 underscored this salient fact when he says the manifest failures of the ANC’s programme, going as far back as 1994, are in evidence all around us158:17: “The same bright, shiny, shameless promises are repeated each election, never to be actually met.”

An editorial54 of the Business Day of 26 February 2019 with the title: Gloves off in ANC turmoil, reflects on the terminal illness of the ANC, resulting in it being incapable of ruling South Africa for another 25 years. It states its manifold failures to realise its election promises, making the need for immediate political euthanasia to spare it further pain and suffering in its present decaying state, even more urgent.  In this context the editor postulates54:8:

The biggest threat to the ANC in the run-up to the general election may well be itself. It has been more than a year since President Cyril Ramaphosa took over the reins of the party and the country. While the ANC continues to talk about renewal and unity, it seems that the opposite is true.

Now it is time for Ramaphosa, as head of the party, to be more decisive and let go on the illusion that the party has become more united since Nasrec. It is becoming clearer that Ramaphosa has to step up the clean-up project in the ANC and remove those who were part of the project to loot the country.

Perhaps the best thing for the ANC would be another split. That may see it shed those who are not interested in fixing the party and the country so that real renewal can start.

Regarding the above reference of a “renewal” the editor of the Business Day has a somewhat naive take on it: Firstly, the remnants in the SSA of spooks loyal to Jacob Zuma as well as in society will not allow any real renewal, one that does not allow for corruption in the ANC in post-2019 politics. An intensified effort to improve the ANC by Ramaphosa, if he really means it, would not only cost him his executive political leadership, the expropriation of his own land, assets and richness, but probably his life. Many of the spooks in KwaZulu-Natal have settled in the past their grudges by means of assassinations.

Secondly, the split of the ANC into two broad factions already is so comprehensive and developed that the Purified ANC (Zumas) and the Reformed ANC (Ramaphosas), which have emerged from the 8th May 2019 election, have crippled the greater ANC permanently. It leaves the ANC thus with two internal parties in conflict, garnering a parliamentary voter count of more or less 29% each. For future politics in the country it seems already at this stage that one of the two opposing parts or the greater ANC as a whole, will have to pair respectively with the EFF or the DA in the hope to be in power until 2024. This indicates the extent to which the ANC has lost most of its identity. The ANC is thus no longer viable or sustainable.54,156,159

The senior journalist and seasoned political analyst and commentator, Barney Mthombothi156, reminds us of the ANC members (thankfully they are less than 1-million out of a possible 37 million eligible voters and a population of 57 million) and the ANC top brass’ approacing political “death”, when he writes156:19:

Our leaders are in a bind. People don’t listen to them anymore, let alone respect the law.

Someone suggested some time ago – it may have been this column for all I know – that we’ve been through a hell of a lot; we are a damaged people and therefore need a shrink. Such an exercise is not only impossible, it’s a cop-out. Bad behaviour or a culture of impunity is changed or reversed by a strict application of consequences.

 3.3.1.5.3. The maximum duration of a political regime in South Africa

The reflections so far in these articles of the project pointed out the ANC is incapable of keeping Zuma or his cronies like Thulani Dhlomo, Ace Magashule, David Mabuza, David Mahlobo, Dudu Myeni and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma out of the post-2019 executive leadership positions of the country. But to finger these Zuma cronies alone would be wrong: the same can be said about Ramaphosa and his cronies being incapable rulers.126

South Africa’s internal politics from 1652 to 2019, in which conflict has played a central role, confirms how the maximum versus minimum duration of regimes are expected to play out. Evidence shows that in South Africa for the period from 1910 to 1994, political parties, specifically certain regimes, have had an average shelf-life of 24 years.  This indicates that, although the ANC presents itself at present as the eternal dynamic and empowered master of South Africa — as Jacob Zuma once said with confidence “till Jesus comes” and Ace Magashule spoke seemingly of an untouchable “anointed ANC” — there are signs there that it is in its last throes after 25 years before being closed down. The ANC top brass’ immense self-doubt about the ANC’s future successes, integrity, trustworthiness and honesty, has been well hidden behind a facade of arrogance and grandeur, shoddy planning and ill-conceived policies.126

The so-called ANC reform, New Dawn and Thuma Mina since the ousting of Zuma, is insignificant and spells out the arrival of more dangerous ANC misadventures to be committed in the sixth parliamentary administration of the period 2019 to 2024. Especially its poor voter mandate of 57% obtained in the 8th May 2019 election (which in practice means a voter support of only 28% of all the eligible voters) has made it politically insecure, agitated and unpredictable. This state of affairs is starting to stimulate dangerous revolutionary behaviour inside the ANC, harking back to its terrorist/freedom-fighter days.126

This kind of return and inclination to aspire to the worst (again) by a dying regime which has had outlived its shelf-life by years – solely by the suppression of its own people – we are seeing in Zimbabwe currently after the fall of the dictator Robert Mugabe and his replacement by Emmerson Mnangagwa. With the incoming Mnangagwa, the world and Zimbabweans became excited and only spoke of “a better life to come” – as voters did in South Africa believing that a new Dawn and Thuma Mina would be awaiting them. Emmerson Mnangagwa announced a similar pipe dream to that of Ramaphosa, a foolish project known as the Third Sona. The true outcome for post-Mugabe Zimbabwe has been quite the opposite.160 The Zimbabwean activist Kauzani’s reaction to and viewing of the new, so-called “rehabilitated” Zanu-P party and its regime, described the project as follows, as Pather and Allison noted160:22-23 “When the Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa rose to power, veteran political activist Ishmael Kauzani did not buy the “New Zimbabwe” narrative. He was suspicious of Mnangagwa’s long and brutal track record as one of Robert Mugabe’s top lieutenants. But he did not know that things would get so bad”.

The mention of a top lieutenant used by Kauzani is a reference to the Gukurahundi genocide in the 1980s in which Mnangagwa, together with Magube, has been implicated in the direct planning and execution of the massacre of ±20 000 black Zimbabweans. The present outcome of the “new good Mnangagwa-regime” is worse than in Mad Bob’s time: more people are fleeing Zimbabwe as exiles, more poverty has been registered, more flagrant violations of human rights, the further collapse of social, medical and educational services, and the increasing number of demonstrations, violent acts and general anarchy in Zimbabwe, on its deathbed under the Zanu-P party and regime. This situation is similar to the one in South Africa where political, social and economic deterioration since 1994 have occurred under the ANC, which is now also reaching a peak. South Africans, as did Kauzani in Zimbabwe, are not buying the “New ANC” narrative. The ANC’s track record and that of its top brass’ regarding corruption make them even more suspicious than before.160

The present infighting and back-stabbing inside the ANC and the rise of factions and of break-aways is “normal” in “aging” political parties and regimes. It is firstly the sign of the death knell of it as a regime, and secondly the end as a party of significance. [This clear “dying-off” was also reflected by the breakaway of the NP, splitting from the SAP, the Purified NP, breaking away from the NP before 1948 and the breakaway of the Reformed (Herstigte) NP from the Purified NP in the 1980s, to leave at the end only a rotting political carcass unable to deliver anything of value to their voters].161-163

3.3.1.5.4. Afterlife fear in the Present life pleasure

Death is a finality when the obituaries of the deceased are eventually published, in addition to knowing full well that the biblical rising up from the ashes by the unfortunate deceased in modern-day life is impossible. But the ANC has been dislodged this modern thinking in its effort to come back from the Afterlife after its death, ignoring its many obituaries in a last effort to escape from its grave. This wish to escape the Afterlife has been announced by the ANC’s leaders: from the Afterlife it has been begging ±57 million South Africans to forgive the ANC as an outright bad party and as an outright bad regime — and of course also the nefarious activities of its top brass and their cronies mired in immense corruption, theft, state and public capture and mismanagement perpetrated since 1994. On a New life for the ANC as a regime and for its dubious top brass after May 8, 2019, no form of punishment will escape the fires of hell, As such, Leon164 writes on this “last grasp” from the Afterlife on the Present life by the ANC164:20: “…the biggest laugh provided in the campaign to date arrived last weekend from our president, when Cyril Ramaphosa implored voters in Ladysmith not to ‘punish the ANC on 8 May’.”

Similar to the fear of Ramaphosa and many of the ANC’s cronies implicated in transgressions and relegated to the political Afterlife, was the “I beg you” of Thabo Meeko165, the ANC spokesperson for the Free State: before the May election, with his one foot already in the grave and clearly not very confident about his future in the Afterlife165:14: “Ons glo die mense sal ons vergewe.”

The terminal illness of the ANC in 2019, was illustrated by the listing of 22 alleged crooks as MPs and MPLs candidates happily participating in the May election and after the election the of many of them were reappointed in prominent positions in Parliament and in the ANC’s Luthuli house. The figures of David Mabuza, Gwen Mantashe, Bathabile Dlamani, Nomvula Mokonyane, Malusi Gigaba and Mosebenzi Zwane stand out as the main culprits. Even the ANC veterans and the ANC Veteran League (ANCVL) voiced their rejection of the ANC’s ill-advised appointments and its self-destructive intentions.166

3.3.1.5.5. Thabo Mbeki’s and Kgalema Motlanthe’s messages on the terminal illness of the ANC

On awaiting the passing away of the ANC, it is important to note ex-president Thabo Mbeki’s167 message (and his clear warning to the ANC that as a political entity it is coming to an end) in October 2017 when he delivered his OR Tambo-memorial-speech. Here are some extracts from Mbeki’s speech167:23:

In his 1941 presidential address to that year’s ANC national conference, Dr [Alfred Bitini] Xuma said: “To Congress we must be loyal and true. For Congress, we must forget any personal or sectional interests or gain. We must put the cause and the interests of the people before any expediency…To be true leaders, we must put the interests and welfare of our people above our own”.

Much later, in a December 1955 letter to the ANC, published in January 1956, Dr Xuma said: “Leadership means service and not domination over others. True and genuine leaders serve the cause of the people and do not expect the cause to serve them or become a source of profit and honour for them”.

Earlier, I said that the ANC now faces the third threat of destruction since its foundation almost 106 years ago. This time that threat emanates from acts of commission originating from within the ANC itself.

As we all know, the ANC gained access to state power from 1994 onwards. It was inevitable that this would happen because of the place which the ANC occupied in the hearts and minds of the majority of our people as their true representative.

However, the challenge which arose with this access to stage power was and is that it could be abused, was and is being abused for purposes of self-enrichment. This means that the ANC contains within its ranks people who are absolutely contemptuous of the most fundamental values of the ANC, at whose centre is a commitment selflessly to serve the people.

These are people who only see the ANC as a stepladder to enable them to access state power for the express purpose of using that access for self-enrichment.

By definition these are people who are card-carrying members of the ANC but who have completely repudiated the value system which inspired Oliver Tambo throughout his life.

Part of the national tragedy in this regard is that the ANC recognised the emergence of this immensely negative phenomenon quite early after 1994.

The fact of the matter is that during the last two decades, the ANC has failed to do the two things which Nelson Mandela mentioned in 1997 – to purge itself of the mercenaries who had joined its ranks and to make it difficult for such elements to join the movement.

This means that the historic value system of the ANC has become so corrupted that its replacement, that is unprincipled access to political power and the related corrupt self-enrichment, has in fact become the norm within the organisation.

Necessarily and logically, the qualitative change I have mentioned — arising from the failure to defeat the process of the increase in the numbers of those remained in the ranks of the ANC for selfish and corrupt reasons as described by Nelson Mandela – would in the end also affect the composition and quality of the very leadership of the movement.

I have sought to suggest that the negative situation currently affecting and characterising the ANC will, unless it is addressed correctly and immediately, sooner rather than later result in the destruction of the ANC.

Mbeki foresaw the coming demise of the ANC through self-destruction, and it would equally be a shame not to reflect on the opinion of ex-president Kgalema Motlanthe on the “deathbed-status” of the present-day ANC. Motlanthe168 – who had served as interim president from September 2008 to May 2009 (and was also secretary-general from 1997 to 2007 and the party’s deputy president from 2007 to 2012) – says the ANC is now in far worse shape than it was before the 2017 Nasrec-conference that had elected Cyril Ramaphosa. This opinion is echoed by many political analysts in two ways, namely that Ramaphosa, notwithstanding his so-called immense popularity with the voters, is indeed a failure. Motlanthe168 drops his harsh criticism strait on Ramaphosa’s regal head: he does not believe in messianic figures as leaders and neither does he believe that Ramaphosa is the messiah who will be able to save the ANC in the long term. Even more critical is his reference to the contaminated list of ANC candidates for the recent May 2019 elections, Motlanthe168 underscores that the ANC’s line-up is weak and lacks confidence. Echoing the doubt that many political analysts’ have expressed on the ANC as having a long future ahead as a viable and sustainable entity, he reacts168:4 “The ANC is not in great shape… I think to strengthen the ANC it needs a surgical overhaul from where it is now. It is worse than it was in 2017 [before the Nasrec-conference].” Before the Nasrec-conference in December 2017 Motlanthe168 had already said that168:4: “…he believed that ANC could only change if it died in its current form and was reborn as a grassroots movement”. 

3.3.1.5.6. Other premature obituaries

The opinion of the deputy-president, David Mabuza42 on the future of the ANC, is very negative. In an interview with the City Press on the 27th April 2019 Mabuza reflects on the terminal illness of the ANC, based on the present stage of division in the party (in which he himself is an activist par excellence). The Rapport’s political editorial team reports on his view as follows42:1“Adj.pres. David Mabuza het gister…gesê hy is baie bekommerd oor eenheid in die party. Hy meen die ANC staan op die punt om dood te gaan weens voortdurende interne struweling.” 

In another recent April 2019 interview in Bophelong on the dying of the ANC, David Mabuza42 said furthermore42:1:

Die interne gevegte in die bewering bedreig die ANC se lewe. Ons sal dit eenvoudig moet oplos en agter ons kry. Die bose geeste van verdeeldheid is terug. Jy hoor elke dag nuus oor ons. Ons baklei met mekaar en gaan howe toe. Dit maak die ANC seer – iemand in die ANC sê dinge oor iemand anders in die ANC. Hoe kan ons mense vra om vir ons te stem as ons binne die ANC nie bymekaar kan staan nie. My boodskap aan die regerende party is om sy huis in orde te kry. As ons dit nie doen nie, loop ons werklikwaar die gevaar om die ANC dood te maak.

The above chaos within the ANC and of its fast approaching death, especially due to the intervention of Jacob Zuma169 and its suffering now only prolonged for a while by Cyril Ramaphosa, is echoed by Zuma’s self-confession (as one of the “mercenaries” who had used the ANC as a step-ladder to enable him to access state power for the express purpose of using it for self-enrichment). In his tribute to the ANC-leader, the late OR Tambo, Jacob Zuma reflects clearly cognisant while morally confused on the ANC as a regime of all the people of South Africa and his own role as an ANC top leader. It indicates that Zuma was already in April 2017 totally estranged from the ANC’s true, traditional values after his almost nine years of plotting and scheming to climb the steep ladder to the presidency. His destruction of the ANC and his stumbling to the political abyss, has been well illustrated, especially when Zuma writes on the 29th October 2017 in the Sunday Times as follows169:23: “Values, understanding, everything, is in theory one thing – but putting them into practice another.  The issue for us is how to maintain the values we all believe in and implement them today. I would conclude…by saying that…running a country is more difficult than fighting for freedom.”

The above example of how it appears difficult to avoid chaos, disaster and self-destruction by the ANC, forced the editor170 of Beeld on the 2nd of April 2019 to wonder if the ANC is in anyway empowered to shed its criminality, corruption, autocracy and things such as money laundering and tender fraud that took possession of the mindsets of especially the top brass. The naming of “Ace Ten Persent” in the editorial, in a clear effort to identify Magashale’s political delinquencies in some way, tells  a story of a party that cannot be revamped. The same kind of negativism evident in the editorial can be extended to almost all of ANC’s leaders, members and supporters.170

In this context the editor110 of the Sunday Times already in October 2017 gives us a clue why it has been so difficult for some of the executive leaders of the post-1994 ANC — especially Jacob Zuma, and now seemingly also Ramaphosa — to run the country with integrity.110,167 The editor110 of the Sunday Times in a nonchalant postulation tells us the story of how it came to this chaos110:26: “By his friends – thugs, smugglers and scofflaws – shall you know him [the president].”

Again, the re-entering after April 2019 with much ease of the many tainted comrades into the greater ANC’s leadership, as well as into the leadership of the factions of Ramaphosa and Magashule – together with their openly stated intentions to destroy each other — are reflected by political analysts as just another step in the advanced process of a dying ANC.43

An editorial126 of Saturday Star of March 2019 on the all-over contamination of the ANC’s psyche, reflects in terms of the presence of a level of zero goodness, the ANC’s present lack of integrity and its political bankruptcy and approaching death. This immense political train wreck forced the editor to ask126:12:

What does one have to do to get expelled from the ANC? Clearly, allowing a state capture network to take root is not enough. Nor is being charged with corruption. Nor is flouting the constitution.

…not only are those issues not sufficient to get you kicked out of the ANC, you are actually called up to help your comrades fight the upcoming election.

To non-ANC supporters, that clearly shows that the party is continuing under Cyril Ramaphosa, where it left off under Zuma and that the “New Dawn” and Thuma Mina slogans are 154:1merely that…words.

Also, Tim du Plessis154 announces the approach of the collapse of the ANC and states that the reason for it is because of “dubious” candidates appointed as a last resort to assure a contaminated and unjustified victory at the ballot box.  The ANC top brass no longer have an ounce of intellectual prowess or integrity left, and are thus at a loss when it comes to political creativity. Political and personal integrity have become strangers to the ANC elite. For the ANC’s top brass it has become an obsession to hang on to the Present life and its enjoyments, notwithstanding the costs it has incurred for the masses of poor black people.126,154

Du Plessis154 continues his commentary when he writes on the 28th July 2019 in the Rapport that the ANC is the end-product of a revolutionary movement, which, after it came to power, only intended to drive out the “colonists” and then suddenly fell into a disorganised state. He writes154:6: “Sodra dié doel bereik is en die bevrydingsbeweging bekom beheer oor die staat, verbrokkel die beweging in faksies. Spoedig begin die faksies mekaar beveg om toegang tot die “buit” te kry en te behou. Die krygstuig in dié faksiegevegte is die staatsinstellings.”

Du Plessis154, in an in-depth analysis of the present-day dying-off of the ANC, writes further154:6:

‘n Lae donderwolk hang oor die land en al sy mense ná 25 jaar van ploeter-regering onder die ANC.

Een “troos” is dat dit slegter as ooit gaan in die ANC. In verlede week se Sunday Times [21st July 2019] skryf die akademikus en ontleder William Gumede: “Die ANC is in ‘n klassieke doodspiraal, in volgehoue agteruitgang waar hy aanhou om dieselfde mislukte redmiddels oor en oor toe te pas. Dit sal bloot sy ondergang verhaas, tot by die punt waar die party uiteindelik die mag verloor en vervang word deur nuwe spelers”.

Gumede sê die ANC glo hy kan sy eie ondergang keer met die aanhoudende “hersirkulering”  van uitgediende leiers, is behep daarmee om die Zuma-faksie in die party te hou ter wille van “eenheid” met ‘n “aanhoudende gehamer op die slagkrete van die Koue Oorlog”.

In dieselfde uitgawe skryf die joernalis Ranjeni Munisamy, eens ‘n troue volgeling van Jacob Zuma: “Ons samelewing is nader as ooit aan ineenstorting met skurke en skobbejakke wat die politieke toneel oorheers.

A prominent sign of dying of a party is the sudden rogue attacks on each other by previous comrades consisting of name calling and court actions involving libel and slander.  Jacob Zuma allegedly called Derek Hanekom “a person working with the enemy”, while Ace Magashule allegedly called Hanekom a “bedrieër”.57

Bruce171, although he seemingly believes he is able prop up Ramaphosa as the executive leader inside the ANC’s rotten carcass, in order to save South Africa temporarily, writes on the questionable vital power of the ANC, coming as far back as pre-1994, as follows171:16:

The ANC itself is beyond redemption. I knew it in exile in London. It was a wreck then and it’s a wreck now. In exile it was drunk, self-pitying and miserable. Its leaders railed against the West yet declined to live in the East, preferring England. I remember attending ANC public meetings where Oliver Tambo would due to speak. He never pitched. But the choir would sing, the poet would tell us how the blood of the martyrs was watering the tree of the revolution, and then the hat would be passed around. Worse, its ranks were riddled with the apartheid special branch. It made no preparation for ever forming a government. [Today the inner-ANC is riddled with SSA spooks and is the revolution of the masse of poor and landless Blacks at last coming after 2019 by their own initiative].

So how, for all of that, did the ANC develop a legitimacy in SA that, even after nearly 25 years of abject rule, no other group even remotely threatens. That is the damage apartheid inflicted on us all. The longer the Nats kept Nelson Mandela on Robben Island, the more powerful the ANC became. How dumb can you get?

When a political party efforts of rehabilitation is so desperate, forcing it to call-up “dead comrades” for their help in an election, begging wizards and oracles to save it from a fast-approaching demise, all hope is gone. This stage is the beginning of the countdown of the last days before the political Afterlife arrives. Moreover, the fact that many of the ANC’s faithful supporters are considering to abandon ship or have already decided to leave the party, means they have already picked-up the prevailing scent of death and decay.126

The overwhelming figure of Zuma present on the upper steps to the throne room of the ANC palace and his access to party structures, make it difficult for the few good people in the ANC to stem the inevitable rising tide of wretchedness. The present clash between the alleged good and bad elements inside the greater ANC, in an effort to bring Zuma and his cronies to book, spells disaster. It already signals the beginning of the end for the ANC which is already struggling to come to grips with its current circumstances. Zuma and his intimate cronies’ motto is: if Zuma must die, the ANC also must die. In the post-2019 ANC it means that if Jacob Zuma and his cronies manage to take down Cyril Ramaphosa, the party will implode, not only Ramaphosa’s faction. The bad element seems to have been encroaching fast on the assumed last vestiges of able power in the ANC.172  Munusamy172 clearly points to this outcome when she describes Zuma as she writes172:20: “Zuma will not hesitate to take everything and everyone down with him”.

The above well-planned devastating onslaught on the greater ANC in which Ramaphosa and his clan stand out as the main targets marked by Jacob Zuma and his clan to take over and rule in post-2019 South Africa, while introducing the country to an autocratic and revolutionary system, is well enlightened by Hlatshaneni when he reflects on the intensifying since July 2019 power-struggle inside the ANC in its “killing off” the last remaining signs of order. It is clearly a case to erase as much as possible of the present-day ANC’s integrity, character and heart-beat, to remould the impoverished ANC and State as soon as possible to the wishes of the Marxist Zuma and Magashule clans. Hlatshaneni173, in quoting Lord Peter Hain, a South African-British Labour Party politician, writes173:2:

The biggest threat to the ANC is the bad guys still trying to pull the President back and keep the fingers in the trough of looting.

What has happened in the Zuma era the economy has bombed, the international investor confidence has tanked, growth has dissipated, credit rating has fallen, and international business confidence is low – and they want more of the same.

 4. Conclusions

The ANC’s two main supporters, the SACP and Cosatu, which have both kept the party in power through its leverage at the vote-box since 1994, have been moving out of its vital sphere. The ANC itself is captured in a poisonous leadership struggle, driven by power-madness and self-promotion inside the ANC’s established political dogma of Marxist-Leninist socialism. The ANC as a party has become outdated, a political stranger amongst it own people. It is a confused and disorganised organisation, as it had been in its days of exile.

The ANC is a dying party – so much so that its own top leaders Mbeki, Motlanthe and Mabuza.  admit it. After 25 years of corrupt reign, it has suddenly become suicidal. It will not survive another five years as a regime to experience the 2024 elections. It has lost its political compass, its human values and moral consciousness. The many Piet Promises of the NP eventually became the many Piet Promises of the ANC. Promises are not food: promises are foolish dreams, lack trust and is essentially contempt for voters. It is the hallucinations of a dying party. The ANC’s leaders have became foolish dreamers and unrealistic politicians, bewitched by the evil psyche of the ANC. Moreover, they have become the Don Quixotes of the South African politics, sent by the ANC on an aimless journey of self-annulment. The ANC has lost its appeal with the masses of impoverished and landless black people.The failures of the ANC and its transgressions over 25 years, is just too much to be forgiven by the public. The ANC will never be trusted again.42,78,126,155,156,173

The present dismemberment of the ANC as a regime with a mandate of only 28% of the total eligible voters, is a party with both its feet in the grave and its political heart permanently split between two opposing corrupt groups. It makes the execution of any concrete and constructive form of land expropriation in the immediate future unfeasible. The land issue cannot be wished away. It’s a time bomb waiting to explode if it is not defused soon. A true South African and wise solution must be obtained quickly and comprehensively on the land-ownership matter. Some other political party or affiliation will have to accept the responsibility to complete in all haste the land expropriation problem mired in the current mess.136-139

The ANC is outdated. The word outdated has many meanings. It refers to descriptive words such as obsolete, outmoded, Stone Age, fossilised, kaput, and moribund, or has-been, out-of-date, useless, ineffective, moth-eaten, and many others. All these words are fully applicable to the ANC. The ANC worship of Marxist-Leninist socialism, a political ideology that failed nearly a century ago, tells us why the party and its political ideology was destined to fail in 1910 already. It also tells us why it is now dying.

In the next (Article 17), titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (17: Troubled ANC-leadership)”, the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of the power it holds as ruler besowed on it by the 8th May 8 2019 election, will further be evaluated.

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  57. Pollux se pruttelpraatjies. Arme kamraad Hanekom. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Julie 28; p. 3.
  58. Sokutu B. Pat on the back for Cyril. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 May 16; p. 12.
  59. Munusamy R. Mboweni and Gordhan buckles down for massive fight on politically explosive SOE restructuring. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Feb. 24; p. 22.
  60. Mthombothi B. A finance minister who can say the things the president cannot – and they need to be said. Sunday Times. 2019 Febr. 24; p. 21.
  61. Moalusi R. Don’t hold your breath for Zuma resumption. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 19; p. 14.
  62. Shoba S. Fightback? What fightback? Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 12.
  63. Mokone T. Ace’s group fails to capture partly. Sowetan (News). 2019 June 20; p. 4.
  64. Mabena S. Ace’s trump card of Zuma loyalists can stump Ramaphosa. The Citizen. 2019 June 20; p. 3.
  65. At least Cyril is still flying, Ace. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 22; p. 12.
  66. Nation will rejoice if Cyril acts against Ace’s unelected cabal. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 July 28; p. 18.
  67. Bulger P. Is Ace the reincarnation of DR No? Sunday Times. 2019 June 16; p.19.
  68. Leon T. Corrosive fallout from buying into ruling-party myth. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 30; p.18.
  69. Time for dreaming is over, Mr President. There’s work to be done. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 23; p. 20.
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75. Gumede W. A party in a death spiral, repeating the same tune. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 July 21; p. 20.
76. Rooi J. Die ANC sal nooit verander, beloof Ace in Parys. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 April 28; p. 2.
77. Sokuto B. Cyril’s double-edged sword. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 June 27; p. 12.
78. Mirriam N. List scandal will haunt Ramaphosa. Mail & Guardian. 2019 March 15 to 21; p .4.
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80. De Lange J. JZ-kamp kaap ANC se kieslys. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 7.
81. Mabuza disses Mboweni. Mail & Guardian. 2019 March 15-11; p. 2.
82. Mattiwane Z, Munusamy R. Ace’s hidden hand. Sunday Times. 2019 June 9; pp. 1-2.
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84. Hunter Q. ANC ethics body chides Ace’s office. Sunday Times (News/Politics). 2019 June 2019; p. 4/
85. Marrian N. Fight against Magashule builds steam. Mail & Guardian (News). 2019 June 14 to 28; p. 6.
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87. Marrian N. Ramaphosa faces formidable odds. Mail and Guardian. 2019 June 21 to 27; p. 3.
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89. Saunderson-Meyer W. ANC midgets strap Cyril down. Saturday Star (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 17; p. 12.
90. Battle for the Bank is a power play by the financially ignorant. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 9; p. 18.
91. Strydom TJ. Rand dives, recession looms. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 June 9; p. 1.
92. Khumalo A. Decisive moments at which Ramaphosa must not yield. Sunday Times (Business). Sunday Times (Business). 2019 June 9; p. 2.
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96. Ace het ‘n jop vir Malusi. Rapport (Nuus) 2019 Jne 23; p. 2.
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98. Cele S, Stone S. ANC speaks with forked tongue. City Press (News). 2019 June 9; p. 2.
99. Wyngaard H. Om moeilikheid te koop. Beeld (Middelblad). 2019 July 4; p. 21.
100. Mkoketi S. Fixation on one man risks a swift return to the Zuma years. Sunday Times. 2019 April 7; p. 19.
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102. Ntyintyane L. Beware the Cat’s claws. Business Day (Opinion). 2019 May 28; p. 6.
103. Mthombothi B. A finance minister who can say the things the president cannot – and they need to be said. Sunday Times. 2019 Feb. 24; p. 21.
104. Dreyer N. Ending with a whimper. Sunday Times (Insight). 2019 July 21; p. 1.
105. Munusay R. Talk to us Mr President or the lunatics will continue to dictate the discourse and sabotage our country. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 9; p. 20.
106. Zuma is segsman vir ANC se beleid. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 July 21; p. 2.
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108. Leon T. Creating a desert where excellence can’t bloom. Sunday Times. 2017 Oct. 19; p. 26.
109. Munusamy R. ‘Mr State Capture” Gigaba has only one way to save himself: come clean on Gupta looting. Sunday Times. 2017 Oct. 19; p. 26.
110. By his friends – thugs, smugglers and scofflaws – shall you know him. Sunday Times. 2017 Oct. 19; p. 26.
111. Bruce P. Into the Twilight Zone as the sun sets on Jacob Zuma. Sunday Times. 2017 Oct. 19; p. 26.
112. Kumalo J. Zuma laude by young ones. City Press (News). 2019 June 30; p. 4.
113. Munusamy R. A masterclass in the evasion of accountability sets a dangerous precedent to accelerate our unravelling. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 July 21; p. 2
114. Kgosana C. MK veterans rally to former president’s side in “war”. Sunday Times (News/Politics). 2019 July 21; p. 4.
115. Boonzaaier D. Ons tel sy woorde. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 July 21; p. 8.
116. Gibson E. Die Zuma-taktiek lewensgevaarlik Rapport (Nuus). 2019 July 21; p. 8.
117. Rooi J. Talle pogings om hom ‘te vermoor’ – selfs gif. Rapport (News). 2019 July 21; p. 8.
118. Munusamy R. Ramaphosa should beware SA’s Michael Cohens, toadies who put up a firewall betwee Zuma and accountability. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March 3; p. 20.
119. Mangu X. Zuma is trying ‘to deploy Africa’s old ‘liberation handcuffs’ defence. Sunday Times. 2019 July 21; p. 19.
120. Gibson E. Dis laster, sê 2. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 July 21; p. 8.
121. Mbwoneni K. Cyril must act now to clear his name. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 June 27; p. 12.
122. A former president’s theatrics mask a stealthy attempt to retake power. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 July 21; p. 18.
123. Shoba S. Maharaj trashes spy claims. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Aug. 11; p. 12.
124. Shoba S. Mac on Zuma, well, sort of. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Aug. 11; p. 12.
125. Coetzee J. Zuma’s first 100 days on twitter. Mail & Guardian (News). 2019 March 15-21; p. 8.
126. ANC’s tenure at top under threat. Saturday Citizen (Opinion). 2019 March 16; p. 12.
127. Mvumvu Z. Cyril more popular than ANC-poll. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Feb. 24; p. 4.
128. De Lange J. Gewilde Cyril het knou weg – peilings. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 April 14; p. 2.
129. Boonzaaier D. ANC verloor heelwat steun in stede, staan (nog) sterk elders. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 July 21; p. 4.
130. Shoba S. Cold reality bites as Zuma wages his pointless fightback on Twitter. Sunday Times. 2019 Aug. 18; p. 17.
131. Deurbraak vir Cyril, al speel hy met vuur. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Aug. 18; p. 2.
132. Hunter Q. Zuma ‘spooked’ Cyril’s campaign. Sunday Times. 2019 March 10; pp. 1-2.
133. Use Special Tribunal as a tool to disinfect SA. The Star (Opinion). 2019 Feb. 26; p. 8.
134. Butler A. Cyril Ramaphosa: The road to presidential power. Johannesburg: Jacana; 2019.
135. De Lange J. ‘n Kyk na die man agter die masker. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 July 14; p. 13. 136.
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140. Munusamy R. Ramaphosa needs to end the dithering, strengthen his team and attend to our house on fire. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 30; p 18.
141. Mthombothi B. Ramaphosa is in a position of strength, but his failure to act emboldens Magashule’s malcontents. Sunday Times. 2019 April 2019; p. 10.
142. Matiwane Z. KZN faction plots to remove president. Sunday Times (News). 2019 June 16; p. 4.
143. SA betaal prys vir eenheid in die ANC. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 June 9; p. 2.
144. De Lange J. Bank: Geveg in ANC verskerp. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 June 9; p. 2.
145. Khumalo K. Rand plunges on ANC’s SARB dual-speak. Business (Influence). 2019 June 9; p. 18.
146. Hans B. RET nothing more than a slogan. Politics (Influence). 2019 June 9; p. 18.
147. Makinana A, Hunter Q and Mokone T. Cyril foils Ace partly “coup”. Sunday Times. 2019 June 16; pp. 1-2.
148. Cele S, Stone S. ANC opens up new battlefront. Sunday Times. 2019 June 23; pp. 1-2.
149. Hunter Q. ‘Lawless’ spies threaten Cyril’s state clean up. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March 10; p. 2.
150. Hunter Q, Matiwane Z, Mvumvu Z. Ace in a hole. Sunday Times. 2018 Sept. 18; pp. 1-2.
151. Big Brother’s sinister reach needs to be restricted. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 9; p. 18.
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Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (15: Opportunism)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (15: Opportunism)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Confidence, desperate, elite, liberty, opportunist, perspective, power, recapitalisation, venture, revolutionary.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 6

1. Background

Various definitions are offered on the word opportunism. The word is repeatedly redefined by businessmen and doubtful politicians as the “theory of discovering and pursing opportunities”, mostly because of their dislike for the idea that there “could ever be anything wrong with their motivated and ongoing capitalising on the many opportunities that cross their ways”.1:2 From a moral perspective, this is seen as nothing else than self defense. As in politics, this makes it easy to commit enormous delinquencies because the law is not applied in the absence of an efficient police force or prosecuting authority. The failures of these institutions are mostly manipulated by a crooked regime to let them off the hook from prosecution, as reflected by the Zuma regime’s contamination of the political system with hooliganism. What these opportunists, especially the crooked politicians, are not saying is that the others involved in these “grand” schemes are mostly vulnerable people who are lacking resources and knowledge to develop their own opportunities.

The unfortunate players in the political system are governed by a group racially and culturally similar to them. These vulnerable people blindly trust their government, as they were the so-called liberators of their people from their suppressors. En masse, black people accepted the ANCelite as the extraordinary leaders who had freed them from Apartheid. The poor and disadvantaged black people, in their pre-1994 socio-economic and political confusion, were not aware of their liberators’ broader context. The ANC was a political orphan, born out of a Marxist-Leninist ideology, thereby becoming an harsh, self-serving and unscrupulousness machine in adulthood. It is a revolutionary organisation which lacks honesty and humanity, and the ability to create and to develop the country beyond nepotism for its elite and their comrades. These communist ideas remain deeply rooted in their approach, as they were (and are still) extreme opportunists, to the detriment of the state. The various judicial commissions of the ANC from 1994 to 2019 indicate their chaotic governance. The delinquent ANC party gaining power in the country in 1994 was partly accomplished through the systematic misconduct of the naive Apartheid’s regime.2-8

Thirty-two years ago, in 1987, Villa-Vicencio8 already warned the potential voters of the approaching 1994 elections that they need to know what Marxist-Leninist socialism means in politics, especially if a similarly orientated political party obtain power. He writes8:91:

Marxist-Leninist socialism (also known as communism) is committed to the abolition of the oppressive and exploitative concentration of power and wealth in the bourgeoisie and the creation of the equality of a ‘classless society’ brought about by the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ – in fact the dictatorship of the leadership elite of the communist party. Practice has shown that while a totalitarian state is capable of enforcing a more egalitarian distribution of income, this may occur at the expense of liberty and productivity. State planning seems to be less efficient than the results produced by the free play of the market mechanism. The prescriptions of an incompetent and clumsy bureaucracy stifle initiative and versatility and devour resources, while the concentration of power in the hands of a few is even more fearful than that in the free enterprise system.

Villa-Vicencio’s8:91 aforementioned problematic traits of a communist regime (like the presence of a dictatorship of the “leadership elite with the concentration of power in the hands of a few”, the losing of liberty and productivity”, the degrading of state planning and doing,the devour of resources”, the presence of an incompetent and clumsy bureaucracy”, etc.) mirror all of the regime-markers of the ANC-regime, over the course of twenty-five years. It illuminates why there was state capture, why there was cadre-deployment and why the ANC-elite, in their constant and ongoing embezzling of other’s assets, are extreme opportunists. The post-1994 ANC elite became a kind of systematic aristocracy; the new lords and ladies who, as the old colonists did, are taking from the poor, indigenous people in terms of their “theory of discovering and pursing opportunities”.8

Martinez5 also indirectly contributes to an understanding of this robbing of the poor by the ANC elite, driven by their excessive opportunism. He prominently identifies how people are driven from their land and traditional living areas because of poverty and other negative circumstances, resulting in the people and their lawfully-gained assets to become the victims of the “opportunists” or elite. He writes5:153: “There is nothing voluntary about this process. Indeed, it’s hard to see the original appropriation and privatisation of commonly owned resources as anything but theft”.

Martinez5 quotes a paragraph that reflects the resentment from that time, against the exploitation of the poor’s resources and assets by political opportunists. The paragraph reads5:153:

The law locks up the man or woman

Who steals the goose off the common

But leaves the greatest villain loo

Who steals the common from the goose.

 

The law demands that we atone

When we take things we do not own

But leaves the lords and ladies fine

Who take things that are yours and mine.

Since the new Dispensation in 1994, the ANC regime’s projects were saturated with corruption and theft. Especially land projects financed by the state, such as projects that transfer land back to the legal Black owners, have been especially corrupt. A handful of senior ANC elites especially stand out. In light of Martinetz’s5 and Villa-Vicencio’s8 aforementioned descriptions, it is important to begin identifying the many “looters” inside the ANC elite through a thorough understanding of opportunism and the characteristics thereof.

A broad definition of opportunism describes a situation where a person or a group capitalises on the missteps of others. This means that opportunists aim to exploit the opportunities created by the errors, weaknesses or distractions of their opponents to their own advantage. This can be understood as the conscious and self-serving practice of taking advantage of circumstances. Furthermore, human opportunism mostly occurs where people can gain the most for themselves at the least cost to themselves. Rooted in this definition of opportunism is the specific and identifiable response to opportunities: the response has elements of excessive self-interest in combination with the disregard of ethical principles, intended or agreed-upon goals, or the shared concerns of a group. When functioning like this (overriding ethics, goals and concerns), a group cannot be virtuous.1

More precise descriptions include ideas such as1:1:

“Opportunism is the practice of taking advantage of circumstances – with little regards for principles or with what the consequences are for others. Opportunist actions are expedient actions guided primarily by self-interested motives. The term can be applied to individual humans and living organisms, groups, organizations, styles, behaviours, and trends”.

The above definition of opportunism is made more comprehensive and applicable to actions taken by opportunists by the following1:2:

…the moral dilemma implied by opportunism concerns the conflict of self-interest with the interests of others, or with following a principle: either to do what one wants, or to do “what is the right thing to do”. Thus, substantively, opportunism refers to someone who acts on opportunities in a self-interested, biased or one-sided manner that conflicts or contrasts in some way with one or more general rule, law, norm, or principle.

The fact that self-interested action evokes this conflict often implies that the tendency to use opportunities to advantage is excessive or improper, the corollary being a deficiency of character or at least a lack of propriety. Hence the term opportunism often has the pejorative connotation of morally unsound behaviour, or behaviour that sacrifices a greater good for the sake of gaining an advantage foe oneself or one’s own group. Moralists may have distaste for opportunism, insofar as opportunism implies the violation of a moral principle.

It is often difficult for an outsider to understand why an action or an idea is (or is not) “opportunist”, because the outsider does not know the whole story, or the whole context, or the true intention behind it. The way things appear can give an impression which is quite different from the real motivation that is behind it.

A third definition reads1:2:

As a style of human behaviour, opportunism has the connotation of a lack of integrity, or doing something that is out of character (inconsistent). The underlying thought is that the price of the unrestrained pursuit of selfishness is behavioural inconsistency. Thus, opportunism involves compromising some or other principle normally upheld. However, the boundary between “legitimate self-interest” and “undesirable (or anti-social) selfishness” can be difficult to define; the definition may depend on one’s point of view, or position in life.

Some people regard an opportunist stance positively as a legitimate choice, which can be the lesser evil.

Looking to some of the ANC elite’s ongoing and constant delinquent behaviour since 1994 (or since they’ve held legitimate political power), the primary characteristic of opportunism is the lack of integrity and the failure to uphold moral principles. Excessive improper behaviour comprises the principles that are normally upheld, and the presence of anti-social selfishness and the intention to gain an advantage for the self and/or the group ignores the interests and rights of others outright. General rules, laws, norms or other established and accepted principles are violated. The deficiency of character, or at least a lack of propriety, is also applicable inside this definition on some of the ANC elite’s personal functioning.

This aforementioned description1 of the ANC elite’s opportunism, together with the Louw10 checklist markers, will be the criteria used in the evaluation and exploration of opportunism as reflected by members of the ANC’s elite.

Opportunism mostly takes place when internal and external boundaries of behaviour are absent in individuals or groups, and they are pressured to choose and act. In this context, it must be noted that the majority of ANC members and their the leaders were financially underprivileged upon returning to South Africa after 1994. Even their new salaries as MPs, MPLs, ministers and the relatively higher president’s salary did not negate the challenging years of fighting the Apartheid regime without an income. The opportunity to make fast, large sums of money for their own benefit through various forms of state capture (such as the arms deal, the stealing of land, etc.) became attractive to many of the ANC elite. These decisions were also made under pressure, as they took power in 1994. Furthermore, the looting through opportunism created a new habit, custom and tradition inside the ANC elite. This new tradition built on the aforementioned belief that the struggle against Apartheid and their subsequent financial suffering needed to be compensated for in some way. For many ANC members, the role of political opportunists became a choice to serve as a vehicle for self-enrichment on the same basis as many businessmen justifying their crooked roles as opportunists: practicing the theory of discovering and pursuing opportunities. By this token, the political opportunism in the ANC is redefining entrepreneurship as a euphemism for opportunism.

Regarding evidence of the immense (and successful) instances of political opportunism in the ANC’s make-up, the late Jackie Selebi serves as a prime example of looting and delinquency. Books by Myburgh5, Pauw7, and Basson and Du Toit2 are in-depth studies of the facts and details of the ANC’s lawless behaviour. It must also be noted that the ANC’s direct involvement in numerous acts of terrorism and murder before 1994 has an impact on their present day operations; their present moral framework possibly influenced be these extremes. Looking back to the mid-1990s, where the ANC elites were settling in to their new political and executive empowerment, many kinds of “opportunities” were suddenly at hand. Clearly, many members could not refuse the financial reward. Furthermore, the money to be gained often did not require a high level of education on the part of the opportunist. In these circumstances, and inside the inner circle of the ANC, the small group of ANC opportunists developed. From here, the opportunist members and their benefactors were strategically and systematically developed and deployed through cadre-, MK- and friends-and-family-appointments. This can be seen in the capture of ESKOM, SAA, SABC as well as in other state enterprises and the creation of external role players, such as the Guptas and Bosasa that manage and guide opportunistic corruption. [One must consider this unique and sometimes strange behaviour of the ANC’s inner circle within the definition of opportunism that claims it is often difficult for an outsider to understand why an action or an idea is (or is not) “opportunist”. The outsider does not know the full story, or the whole context and the true intentions].1,4-8

The presence of possible psychopathy or psychopathology in the behaviour of some of the ANC elite (either inherent or as a result of extreme situations such as terrorist activities) must also be considered. Gumede4 opens the discussion for possible effects of psychopathy, or at least some form of psychopathology, apparent in the ANC’s history over 25 years. This possible pathology reflects on the leadership as well as the followers of the ANC when Gumede argues why psychopathology in politics took seat in South Africa. He writes4:18:

Mass trauma such as colonialism and apartheid, combined with chronic poverty and unemployment distort the way people make decisions including about how they will vote. The trauma of colonialism and apartheid ends up delivering many maladjusted black leaders who mimic the behaviour of their former white oppressors – cynical exploitation, callousness and dishonesty. At the same time, many of the formerly oppressed tolerate exploitative and corrupt black leaders because although they may be useless, they are at least black – supposedly “one of us”.

Mass trauma has instilled in many black communities’ fear, anger and resentment towards the former colonial and apartheid elites. Not surprisingly, many formerly oppressed see the world as a continuing black/white division between former governing elites (the “insiders”) and the formerly disadvantaged (the “outsiders”).

Yet, as African leaders and governments become entrenched in power, they become the new insiders, the oppressors, only now they are black.

The poor black majority of course remain the outsiders, but because their corrupt, autocratic and incompetent leaders are black and espouse anti-colonial beliefs, black voters see them not as insiders but as part of the “oppressed” group.

Zuma became very wealthy. Many SACP, EFF and trade union leaders are nouveau riche. Yet, they are seen by many poor black supporters as being on their side against privileged white or foreign “interests”.

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 14)

Article 15 is a continuation of the previous article 14, titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability)”. This article is in sequence with articles 11 to 14, which were already published on the ANC. The intention is to analyse and discuss further arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC to carry out land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.2. Aims of article 15 (Continued from Article 14)

The primary intention of this project on the ANC is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by profiling the ANC on the same basis that was applied to the EFF (Article 9) and the DA (Article 10).

In this article, the primary aim is to determine how opportunism has impacted the viewpoints and behaviour of some of the ANC elite as well as the ruling of the ANC regime as the mandated ruler of South Africa.

2. Method (Continued from Article 14)

The research was conducted by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is often used in modern political-historical research where there is no established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to successfully apply land reformation from 2019 onward. The sources included articles from 2018, books from the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers from the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that will guide South Africans when evaluating the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to perform successful land reform from 2019.

The research findings have been presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

The presence of opportunism in the actions of some of the ANC elite became apparent during the various judicial commissions of inquiry on state capture. The Zondo commission’s testimonies show clear criminal behaviour that can be followed up by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the National Prosecution Authority (NPA). The media’s reports on the Zondo commission are substantial in both the quantity of articles and the amount of content. The full amount and detail of the judicial commissions that uncover the ANC elite’s opportunism from 1994 to 2019 is impossible to include in an article with a prescribed word limitation, such as this one. For the purposes of this article, it is more appropriate to concentrate on clear examples of the unprincipled exploitation and ill-planned misuse of the impoverished black communities and all members of the public, through such criminal activities such as land grabbing from other black people and other self-enrichment schemes, such as salaries and benefits.

In this article the public referees of the African National Congress will further be reflected upon, evaluated and described in division 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019. This division focuses on the acceptance and the practice of opportunism as a lifestyle by the ANC elite.

3.2. Louw Appraisal Checklist

The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,10 will be used for the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC. The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s’ manifesto and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts. Lastly, these findings are interpreted by the researcher.10

3.3. The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 14)

3.3.1. ANC’s opportunism
3.3.1.1. The post-1994 damned farming projects
3.3.1.1.1. Failed upliftment programme of young black people in the farming

Whilst articles 3 to 6 already discuss the farming issue and its relationship to land expropriation without compensation in detail, it is appropriate to contextualise this issue with the ANC and their history in mind. In short, the ANC’s 1994 to 2019 land redistribution plan failed not only because of the regime’s own corruption and a lack of insight, strategy, business and project planning and management, but mostly as result of the opportunism culture of the inner circle of the ANC’s state capture and corruption. This present day fraud and stealing of land and assets of the impoverished black communities, activated and driven by the extreme opportunism of some of the ANC elite, is strikingly similar to the white opportunist’s theft of the land of black people between 1652 and 1994. This was the beginning of, ostensibly, black-on-black Apartheid and the birth of the exclusive monopoly of the ANC elite as the new owners of land paid by the state and the impoverished black community. The opportunism of these ANC elite’s land grabbing scheme goes deeper still: the deliberate denial of the black youth to become farmers, thereby having first access to the land grabbed by the ANC elite.11

Recent data reflects that, in 2019, three million members of the black youth wanted to enter the farming sector, but that they did not want to be trapped in the menial, minimum wage agriculture jobs that the ANC elite is trying to force down on them. These millions also did not want to enter the agriculture sector since it is been smothered by the ANC’s overall lack of upliftment in poor black communities. The black youth desire working and workable land, together with farming support, in the same way the ANC elite and their cronies have been “uplifted” into farming since 1994. Prominent examples here are the ANC’s botched training and financing of black people who desire to to work in the agricultural sector. Metelerkamp12 writes that, although agriculture is not a big contributor to the gross domestic product (GDP), its primary future value is in the creation of many jobs in the framework of a greener economy. Indeed, the National Development Plan (NDP) suggests that, even within a conservative estimation, agriculture could be the source of an additional million jobs in 2030.12

The question remains; why did this placement of one million young black people not happen under the ANC, over the 25 years that they have been in power? Furthermore, why has this vision and mission been postponed to another 11 years in the future?

The answer lies in the ANC’s unwillingness to disembark from their opportunistic plans that only share their riches with a small sector of black society. They don’t want to lose some of their land to people outside of the ANC elite’s club of favourites. This problematic perspective led to, firstly, a culture in which they seldom engaged with new policies and strategies, in favour of looting. Secondly, their opportunism lead to a lack of responsibility and accountability to any other cultural or governmental groups.

One of the main arguments of the ANC regime is that the lack of land available in the past remains a substantial obstacle for black people wishing to enter into the agricultural sector. Along with this, the ANC maintains that systematic radical land expropriation without compensation is going to lead to a successful end solution, from 2019 onwards. There is little factual evidence to support these claims. Instead, the evidence leads one to the ANC’s failure to successfully administrate land policies, in an environment where corruption and theft of state funds meant for land redistribution is commonplace. Whilst the implementation of strategies such as BBBEE is intended to empower impoverished black people both economically and in regards to land, these issues remain unsolved. The 1994 to 2019 land redistribution plan was, on all accounts, a failure. This is partially as a result of a corrupt BBBEE system which served to support ANC nepotism. The deeply rooted opportunism of the ANC’s politburo-like politics negates opportunities like the oversupply of land and development funds to ordinary black people. Since 1994, the results of these policies have not uplifted black people working as labourers on other’s land (be they black or white). Indeed, the greater community of black people working (and often living) on other’s land has dramatically diminished between 1994 and 2019; as a result of the political and thereby economic climate rather than the working or rental conditions.

The ANC has attempted to link the diminishing of the rural black farm community as being the result of racial tensions between white farmers and black labourers. Instead, it seems as if the poor and substandard development of the black agricultural community, specifically within the paradigm of black farmers, has stimulated this mass exit by the black community from rural farms. Despite the ANC’s frequent instances of radical rhetoric on land ownership, there has been little concrete action to change the situation. That millions of rural black communities remain impoverished, unemployed and underdeveloped whilst there is an intention to rehabilitate these communities is a symptom om goals being overridden in favour of opportunism. Additionally, a Marxist-Leninist political ideology show a history of leaders who continue to benefit precisely in the chaos of governmental failure. It could be argued that the ANC elite’s characteristics of Marxist-Leninist socialism contributes to a shrugging of accountability and responsibility to the general public.11,12

From within these conditions of nonresponsibility and nonconcern, a milieu has developed that is marked by the lack of integrity, honesty and accountability to the people. This can be seen in the fact that an estimated 10 000 young men and women with tertiary qualifications in agriculture are presently unemployed. These people were trained at great expense to the state, and often at great expense and sacrifice to their economically distraught families. Issues such as these accumulate and grow exponentially in the face of corrupt ANC elites that undermine national agricultural projects with the swindling of state funds.11

Adding to the dilemma of aspiring young black people failing to create a black-owned farming sector is the failure of the State president and his ministers of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, and the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to take responsibility for the situation. The presence of state capture (equal to opportunism) is central to this issue, hindering upliftment at every level. The Festa Tlala programme, for example, was launched in 2014 amid great fanfare by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform together with the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. It was promised that one million hectares of vacant land would be cultivated under traditional authorities by 2019, but, like many other programmes, this was never realised. The ANC elite’s isolation from the concerns of the communities in question contribute to this failure, as they did not see the initiative through to its end.11

The ANC’s failure to utilise and maximise the potential of 10 000 unemployed black agricultural graduates manifest on the macro scale in their treatment of the thirty million impoverished and landless black people, clearly on the brink of dilapidation after 25 years of neglect. In response, the ANC spokespeople refer to statistics that show that less than 3% of South African matric graduates and only 3% to 5% of the black beneficiaries of land actually want to farm, as well as only 4% of subsistence farmers that are under the age of 30. This is to argue that agriculture as a career is not attractive to the youth, which can be misleading. This fails to understand the many reasons why agriculture in South Africa may seem unattractive, precisely because of the aforementioned failures of the ANC regime.

At least outwardly, the ANC has attended to the needs of the disadvantaged black youth in 2018 by the appointment of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture, as well as the formation of the South African Agricultural Development, in order to repair the ANC’s many past failures. Whilst concrete results have yet to surface, the creation of these boards do not negate the ANC elite’s opportunism and its detrimental affect on all of the projects that they undertake.11-13

3.3.1.1.2. ANC farm-flippers

The arguments up to this point reflects on the presence of opportunism in the agricultural sector, as affected by some of the ANC elite in the ANC regime. The presence of highly problematic opportunistic politicians inside the ANC inner circle is further illustrated by the presence of so-called “farm-flippers”. Farm-flippers steal land from the new, legal black owners with a well-planned “estrangement-scheme”, construed by some members of the ANC-elite. The state capture of land especially stands out here, as it carried out through the proactive-land-acquisition-strategy. Through this strategy, the ANC-regime aimed to, through its land redistribution scheme, purchase farms in distress and lease the land to emerging Black farmers, until the farms become self-sustainable enough to establish the tenants as the new owners. It was assumed that this strategy should go together with the recapitalisation and development programme, where a strategic partner was brought on board to mentor emerging farmers and to provide the support necessary to help ensure the success of the venture, writes the editor14 of the Mail & Guardian in May 2019. But in many cases, the outcomes indicated the contrary, alludes the editor14 of the Mail & Guardian. The strategy and detailed plan makes it possible for corruption to take root and for those involved to seek out opportunistic ventures of stealing land for themselves. Situations like these make a mockery of land redistribution. More so, it confirms that opportunistic politicians in the ANC and opportunistic ANC-officials (characterised by their morally unsound behaviour and a deficiency of character) will remain active in the future of the ANC-regime. As these articles prove, the issue of land grabbing without compensation is especially vulnerable to this trend in the ANC.14

In this context of the presence of ANC opportunism, the editor14  of the Mail & Guardian writes14:30:

The rot goes all the way to the top. The former minister of rural development and land reform, Gugile Nkwinti, and his former head of security, Dumisani Luphhungela, have been implicated, along with other politically connected individuals, disparagingly referred to as ‘comrades-in-farms’.

The people who lost their land and hopes in this single instance of corruption are mirrored across South Africa. Land reform is littered with the stories of so many disenfranchised black South Africans.

In May to June 2019, Hazel Friedman15 of the Mail and Guardian did a comprehensive research series on the presence of opportunism and opportunists in the capture of redistributed land by private companies and connected politicians. She refers to those involved as the so-called “Luthuli House comrades-in-farms”. Herein, Friedman15 uncovers the immense corruption via opportunism committed through criminal co-operations between some of the ANC top brass and crooked businessmen, continually stealing through organised land grabbing from the rightful new black owners. On the 7th of June 2019, Friedman15 further reflects on a probe by the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) into 148 land reform projects which found that as much as a quarter were corrupt and that millions of rands has disappeared from the state. The SIU has recommended that 42 people be charged under the Public Finance Management Act. Most of the opportunistic state capture cases serving before the “Ramaphosa commissions”, however, are still underway. This process is further hindered by the incoherent rhetoric of the NPA of criminal investigations and prosecution. Up to this point, not a single culprit has been prosecuted.15

President Cyril Ramaphosa has insisted that land was the core of the “formation of the ANC” in 1912 and that it was the 1913 white apartheid land grabbing that has brought about the contemporary land situation. A case can be made for the contrary: The ANC’s top brass and their cronies’ roles as opportunists in the post-1994 land grabbing – where the black elites blatantly grabbed selected pieces of land through well-conducted schemes from the impoverished black community – looks strikingly similar to the white land grabbing of 1910s. The same refusal of accountability and pre-meditated opportunism that was characteristic of the white mindset around 1913 had also affected the ANC elite’s perspective from 1994 onward. These crooked and opportunistic politicians of the ANC and their lack of accountability and responsibility led to fall of thousands of blacks people into dire poverty. It can also be argued that there is no reason that the opportunistic ANC elites, some of whom already were involved in state capture and land grabbing pre-2019, are going to change their behaviour after May 2019. President Ramaphosa’s role features prominently here; as chair-person, his promotion and sanctioning of the corrupt cadre-deployment scheme that led directly to the exclusive and selective enrichment of the ANC-club is documented by journalists. President Ramaphosa has allowed and supported the opportunism within the ANC-regime, specifically around land transformation, and he has, therefore, been involved in some prior instances of corruption. Ramaphosa and his ANC-cronies’ pre-May 2019 election promises to ‘rehabilitate’ the ANC and its elite from dishonesty, mismanagement and state capture has not been delivered on, indicating the problem reverberates through the entire ANC regime.14,15

There is no guarantee that Ramaphosa’s post-May 2019 Land expropriation Act will bring the “Promised Land” to those that are justified in receiving it; the impoverished and landless black community. The problem is far-reaching, and therefore one of numbers. There is an excessive amount of members of the elite in the Ramaphosa-regime that show signs of the moral corruption common in opportunists, and their actions seem to indicate a set of ulterior goals that are completely detached from the devastating impact that the dishonesty and the theft has on the poor’s meager possession. These corrupt politicians will, most likely, not change their behaviour, even if it is at the cost of their potential voters and those that they have a responsibility towards. The tainted post-May 2019 ANC politicians in the Parliament will thereby assure that the culture of criminal opportunism and its consequences will be remain the norm in the post-2019 ANC-regime.14

3.3.1.1.3. Overall failing of the ANC’s post-1994 Black-farming initiative

It is clear that the chaos in the post-1994 agricultural sector, very much in line with the problems in the other economic sectors, are the eventual result of projects related to the ANC elite’s direct interests, self-empowerment and self-enrichment. This opportunism led to a situation where agricultural projects are forced to be undertaken outside of the ANC elite’s jurisdiction and therefore its corrupting nature. This is not wholly a solution, however, as these independent projects often lack the necessary knowledge and insight, as well as fair political conditions, to bring real success about for the people involved.11

How the ANC’s normal, daily governance has sabotaged the adult black agriculture community throughout its years in power is discussed by Phipson’s11. Through the ANC’s passivity and its lack to initiate a responsible and working agricultural development plan, wherein the financial interests and personal welfare of the black farmers stand central to the strategy, a potential solution is completely thwarted. This agricultural development plan should have uplifted communities in need, as opposed to prioritising the ANC-club’s interests. The results of this failure is wholly clear in the estimation of loss of potential income for the black agricultural community as part of the failed Festa Tlala programme of 2014. Phipson writes11:28:

One million hectares of maize for the 2018 -2019 season conservatively equates to six million tons of maize at R2 500 a ton, giving a gross income of R2.5-billion. This also equates to 50% of the maize crop produced by white commercial farmers. Or to 1 000 new black commercial farmers each farming 1 000ha, or 2 000 new black commercial farmers each farming 500ha.

Added to this is more than 100 000ha of high-yield potential land ideal for fresh vegetable and fruit production, most of it irrigated, which is lying unused or underused. At a gross margin of R40 000 a hectare these moribund land parcels would yield a gross margin of R4-billion a year, every year, create thousands of new young black farmers and provide a work income for 200 000 families.

The inequitable and unethical service that most of the emerging black farmers outside of the inner-circle of the ANC have received from the ANC’s failed black agricultural empowerment between 1994 and 2019 indicates that there is a total lack of concern for them or interest showed in them. The difficulties of this is well-illustrated by the writings of the wife of one such an “emerging black farmer” when she writes16:3:

But this type of farmer is no longer emerging. This type of farmer is beset by First World problems of economics and plagued by the festering, openly weeping and rapidly expanding abscess of Third World rural poverty…

Socioeconomic ills, to touch it in sanitised capitalistic terms. But that terminology ignores the political and cultural aspects. Sociocultural and politico-economic don’t quite work, either – but now we’re just playing with semantics, right? So, who cares?

These aforementioned “socioeconomic, sociocultural and politico-economic ills” of emerging black-farmers are side-lined outside the favoured circle of the ANC-elite, who’s interests were (and are still) looked after by the appropriate ministers. This is also reflected in those cases where farm-claims were successfully determined by the law long ago, but the ANC-regime’s has outright failed to bring finality to the ownership of the land and to resettle the true owners on the land. This failure is in spite of the intention of the Land Claims Commission to settle these matters with clarity and speed.

A prominent example of the failure of the Land Claims Commission is a case of the land successfully claimed and awarded in 2012 in KwaZulu-Natal, in terms of the government’s land restitution programme. The 2 115 hectare Kenbali sugar-farm was valued at R80-million and produced 400 000 tons of sugar cane annually. The farm, that employed 1 200 people, was successfully claimed in 2012 by the Mathulini community, but the transfer to its legal owners was left unfinished by the government until today. This lethargy is a direct outcome of a lack of accountability and the presence of opportunism on the ministerial level, which reflects how unrelated outsiders are possibly reaping rewards in the process of land being reformed. It has now transformed into a dispute between a local chief (who may possibly be part of an opportunistic effort to disown the legal owners from the land), the successfully land claimants and the former owners. This incident has also become the scene of violent protests and attacks. The Kenbali farm confirms how the ANC-regime has failed in re-established legal black owners on their land, as declared in terms of the government’s land restitution programme. Furthermore, the Kenbali farm is only one part of a greater ongoing and unsolved 2012 land-claim which includes another 1 732 hectare sugar farm, a 57 hectare macadamia nut farm, an 8 hectare timber farm and 318 hectare scrub farm. These rich farms form a total of 7 141 hectare, valued at over R300-million.17

The recent Constitutional Court judgement against the ANC regime is another indicator of the full measure of failure of the legalised land-redistribution programme under the ANC. The court’s judgement is strongly rooted in the failing of some of the ANC senior management to remain incorruptible in the face of potential opportunistic ventures and to accept accountability and responsibility for successfully overseeing the project. This judgement is seen as a ground-breaking turn in the halting of the ANC’s misuse of the Parliament and the various vehicles of governing. The Constitutional Court forms the first mechanism that the public may utilise to defend themselves and their interests against acts of opportunism, theft, irresponsibility, unreliability of the state etc. This turn of events give some hope that the general public have gained some power, previously lost the ANC regime and the ANC elite.

The judgment clearly took on the ineptitude of the ANC’s land reform department, together with its lack of responsibility and accountability, to successfully execute land-reform in terms of the Land Reform Act which has already come into effect on the 22nd of March, 1996. This 1996-legislation was designed to contribute to the restitution of land to those deprived of land by racial subordination in the form of Apartheid and colonialism. Tim Fish-Hodgson18 from the Africa team of the International Commission of Jurists, writes that the 1996 Act gives important rights to any person who was a labour tenant on June 2 1995, including the right to work “with his or her family members, to occupy and use that part of the farm” 18:30. This applies to parts of the farm that the people in question had previously lived and worked on. The Act also provides for protection against unlawful eviction of labour tenants living on the farm by the owner(s) of these farms. From the judgement it is clear that the implementation of these rights was deliberately and outright neglected or ignored by the officials of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. The Constitutional Court judgement gives (and confirms) labour tenants the right to acquire ownership of such land through a detailed, complex process that needs to be spearheaded by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. This lack of accepting accountability and responsibility, together with the suspicions neglect of the legitimate rights and interests of other persons outside the ANC club’s interests by the ANC-regime since 1996, led to the department failing to address a total of 30 516 applications over two decades of claims made. This led to the Constitutional Court’s appointment of a special master to supervise oversight of the administration of the applications/claims. The full measure by which the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform suspiciously avoid its accountability (or where opportunism seems to be an element) to solve these land matters and thus outright fail to oversee the law as prescribed by the Parliament, is well-illustrated by the findings and references of the Constitutional Court. Fish-Hodgson reflects18:30:

  •     The court goes on to describe the department as a whole as displaying an ‘obstinate misapprehension of its statutory duties’, ‘unresponsiveness’ and ‘a refusal to account to those dependent on its co-operation’;
  •     The court accepts that the department has a ‘patent incapacity or inability to get the job done’;
  •     It is not the Constitution, nor the courts, nor the laws of the country that are at fault…It is the institutional incapacity of the department to do what the statute and the Constitution require of it that lies at the heart of this colossal crisis;
  •     The department’s glib response to the applicants’ claim was to admit that, because its records keeping was ‘non-existent’ and ‘shambolic’, it would take two years merely to capture the details of these…applications. The Constitutional Court noted that it could take the department between 24 to 40 years to settle the remaining claims given its own [department’s] descriptions of its processes.
3.3.1.1.3.1. “Colossal” constitutional crisis in post-1994 South Africa

It is important to elaborate on the court’s reference of “colossal crisis” created by the Department’s (and thus also the ANC-regime’s) lack of accountability and responsibility, and their clearly deliberate disregard of the constitutional rights of citizens for the judicial institutions, as well as the ANC regime’s general ruling of the country in years to come. It is important to note the court’s reference of the department’s (and thus also its overseer, the ANC regime’s) display of an ‘obstinate misapprehension of its statutory duties’, ‘unresponsiveness’, ‘a refusal to account to those dependent on its co-operation’ and a ‘patent incapacity or inability to get the job done’ in terms of what the statute and the Constitution require.

The highly problematic court-findings on the Department indirectly ask the question whether the ANC regime is able to successfully manage the general ruling of the country. Indeed, it inspires further questions around the ANC regime’s characteristics in relation to the ruling party prescribed by the Constitution; responsible, accountable and compassionate. As such, it poses the question if the ANC regime is honest in its daily execution of its mandate as ruling party. It is therefore crucial to study the Constitutional Court’s findings and guidelines intensively, in all of its judicial complexity, in order to see if the ANC applies its ruler’s mandate on land reform correctly. Not merely on land reform, the Constitutional Court’s structures are also able to provide a measurement of the ANC’s capacity in general matters of state and where it stands on accountability, responsibility and compassion for every citizen on every matter in dispute. The matter of state capture and, subsequently, opportunism is also matters that concern the general public. Indeed, this court’s findings became a very important judicial vehicle for the future of South Africa. The people require a method that is powerful enough to take on the ANC regime when it fails to fulfill its prescribed duties to everyone in the society. For the first time, it brings the prescribed duties of the Parliament clearly into focus, specifically to all members of South African society.  Moreover, any form of state capture and the opportunists behind it is now also a point of direct focus for the court; not only to address culprits and their sentences, but also to intervene and interfere when the process of opportunism takes root or is supported by the ANC regime. This means that the Constitutional Court aims to stop the process even before prosecuting and sentencing the culprits.

Fish-Hodgson18 wrote an article that works to emphasise the ANC regime’s clearly delineated failure on the land-issue, within the broader context of the ANC’s general opportunism and lack of accountability and responsibility when confronted with their other failures. Fish-Hodgson18 states that the Constitutional Court’s findings firstly18:30: “… leaves the Cabinet with nowhere to hide and no so-called “sell out” constitutional property clause to hide behind”. Secondly, the evidence reflects that18:30: “…the court warns that, despite its sensitivity towards the need for the department to have a free hand at performing its constitutional mandate without undue interference, systematic failure to perform may justify, and require, muscular intervention by a court. This is of relevance far beyond the facts of this case and the land issue more generally”. [This reference to “systematic failures” certainly activate the court’s constitutional right of interference in other key service delivery-orientated departments. Examples of service delivery-orientated departments are education, healthcare, housing and social security (such as the Department of Women, the SAPS and the NPA)].18

It remains important to reflect on the Constitutional Court’s treatment and prosecution of the ANC regime’s for its failure, or refusal, to account to those dependent on its co-operation. This is within the context of the electorate that voted on this issue on a national, provincial and local level. Fish-Hodgson18 writes on these sets of rulings set by the Constitutional Court, whilst bearing the electorate in mind. He writes18:30: “The court warned that, because the separation of powers does not ‘imply a rigid or static conception of strictly demarcated functional roles’ and ‘the mythical spell must be broken’ to ensure the protection of Mwelase and his co-applicants’ constitutional rights’, court control of the remedial process’ may be warranted.”

Fish-Hodgson18 further reflects on this legal incidence, with the clear guidance of the Constitutional Court and its reprimand of the ANC regime, when writing18:30: “The department told the court that the appointment of a special master, under the auspices of the judiciary, would amount to a usurpation of the powers of the executive in violation of the separation of powers”. This argument of the department’s judicial independence, as well as its sole, swift and precise responsibility to the Constitutional Court is completely nullified in the court’s response, as follows18:30: “…the court noted that none of those cases it had decided ‘quite match the sustained, large-scale systematic dysfunctionality and obduracy that is evidenced here’.”

The immense failure of the department to impede land reform strategies that are already present in the existing legislation clearly indicate that the current plans to bring changes to Regulation 25 of the Constitution, and its complex political climate, were and are unnecessary. This is because the execution of land redistribution, conducted systematically and structurally, already exists in the South African law. This existing legislation also attempts to establish accountability for a governing body’s unlawful behaviour, such as the well-discussed opportunism in land-grabbing by the group of ANC elites. The change in legislation, therefore, suggest an ulterior goal; to allow the opportunistic politicians of the ANC club and other political opportunists to engage in land grabbing on a larger scale. This pattern seems to repeat in the ANC’s actions around the “state capture enterprise”. Besides the intention of opportunism, as well as the questionable actions around the change of Regulation 25, South Africa’s ruling party and its figure heads and supporters seem to lack knowledge or understanding of its own “Law-bible” and the consequences of disregarding or slackening the law. This is also despite the consequences of this legal ineptitude around land reformation being widely promulgated in 1996. [This brings us back to Villa-Vicencio8 arguments that communist rulers always over-regulate to stay in power and to have the elites of the communists benefit from their system].8 As said, the Constitutional Court’s findings extends further than merely discussing land ownership, as Fish-Hodgson18 points out that18:30:

“…describing the situation as a ‘colossal crisis’, the court is warning the government that it must endeavour to ensure that, as the Constitution requires, its obligations are performed diligently and without delay. Failing which, and irrespective of the success of the mooted constitutional amendments of the property clause, courts may begin to act to the embarrassment of a government whose legitimacy is questioned within and outside of its own political ranks”.

Now that the court has inscribed that the executive must perform its constitutional obligations and accept accountability and responsibility at all times, the fact remains that more and more litigants are going to18:30: “…ask for such supervisory remedial action in the face of [its] systematic failures” from the ANC regime.”

Mthombothi19:19 argues for the absolute need of the court’s intervention to safe guard the interests of South Africans, the Constitution and the State in itself. By force, the intervention reclaimed the right of the court to put these ideals into practice. He states that:

Given the complete collapse of any ethical conduct on the part of our rulers and the damage they’ve done to the country, the courts have become our only saving grace, our last line of defence.

In cleaning up the mess created by politicians, our judges, more often than not, are called upon to make decisions that have huge political consequences, thus inviting the sort of criticism that comes from the likes of Malema [to rid the country of “biased” judges]. But that shouldn’t be their bother. The judiciary should be averted only to politicians’ embrace or praise, not their criticism. After all, their job is to keep the executive on the straight and narrow [without insert blankly in the political terrain]. When politicians exceed their power or when decisions they make inflict pain on the powerless, it is the responsibility to rein them in. To reinforce their independence, judges should therefore eschew any conduct or comment that could be viewed as political or biased. Anything with a whiff of politics should be avoided like the plague.

Mthombothi19 writes on the recent xenophobic violence, and subsequently justifies the right of the judiciary to interfere and to intervene in contemporary South African politics. He discusses this right within the context of the ANC regime’s failure to oversee the xenophobic wave, and investigates the reasons behind the failure. The primary reason for it, he argues, is a failed regime and the presence of political opportunism which manifest in the lack of accountability and responsibility. Mthombothi reflects20:25:

The government’s fault is one of omission, not commission. It had no control over what’s happening in the country.

Ramaphosa’s government is in no position to give any undertaking to anybody, not even to its own citizens, that such maddening violence won’t happen again. It has become a mere spectator to the drama unfolding in the country. It has lost control of the country. The country is on autopilot. The government can’t even protect its own citizens, who are hunted like animals even in their own homes.

The country is literally burning while Cyril and his ANC comrades are busy gazing at their own navels.

From articles such as these, it is clear that President Cyril Ramaphosa’s government seems to be unable to serve any other group, including its own citizens. In regards to the xenophobic attacks, it is currently unlikely that the ANC will be able to control and eliminate any xenophobic violence in the future. This loss of control implies that other powers in South Africa are affecting the country, such as the various criminal structures. This can be seen in the government’s failure to protect its citizens, often in their own homes, at the height of the xenophobic wave.

The court offers a clear and unbiased judicial vehicle that upstanding citizens may purposefully employ to obstruct opportunism in ANC politics and to neutralise the opportunism of the ANC elite. This court action is also the first time, since the ANC has taken power, that the regime is confronted with their own failings.

How much the ANC, now under President Cyril Ramaphosa, promises to finally commit to the people of South Africa, in terms of its accountability and the elimination of opportunism and opportunistic politicians, is indicated by President Ramaphosa’s rhetoric. Amongst other things, President Ramaphosa describes an environment of prosperity in post-May 2019 South Africa, especially for aspirant young black farmers and emerging black farmers through land expropriation with or without compensation from the notable white land owners. Notable figures in journalism, after closely considering President Ramaphosa’s public appearances and communication, predict no change in government that will protect the people against exploitation of their rights. Together with the ANC regime’s problematic history of illegality and corruption, many sources are highly skeptical of change.11,12,17,21

3.3.1.2. ANC opportunists’ abuse and exploitation of the nation
3.3.1.2.1. “Emancipation” of the poor through state capture

The ANC politicians on all levels, as well as its members and supporters, are still unaffected by the broad backlash that the ANC elite’s lack of empathy and accountability, opportunistic political schemes and corruption have created over time. These schemes to enrich themselves at the cost of the Nation is often accompanied by a comprehensive and well-planned goal to stay in power. Apartheid’s exclusiveness, at the hands of a small group of white opportunists who benefited at the cost of the large, growing group of impoverished and landless black people, has led to the racial hatred that is still present in the country. This opportunistic abuse and exploitation of others have, since 1994, been mirrored by the actions and strategies of the ANC’s top decision makers. Those who suffer and are victimised under these conditions are still the same group of underprivileged black people, notwithstanding the highly-commended and well-discussed democratic conditions that the ANC brought under Nelson Mandela.

Whilst often discussed in its ideological role, democracy has not been of practical concern to this group of impoverished black people. The implementation of BBBEE was only focused on the ANC’s inner circle. The false accusations and corrupt justifications of the black ANC elite stand as prominent examples of their exclusive and opportunistic corruption and lawlessness. The main argument used when confronted is that the the existence of “corrupted white-colonial wealth” must be destroyed, although it is the ANC elite themselves that have benefited the most in post-1994 South Africa. Contradictory, the ANC’s wealth are sometimes seen as a sign of “successful statehood by the ANC members” by the large group of underprivileged black people. The opportunists of the ANC club argue that it was an essential and initial step in the longer process of gradually distributing the wealth to every poor black person in the near future. An example of this reasoning, in the context of the land issue, means that there is an expectation that the ANC will provide free land for the impoverished by expropriating land from white people without compensation. In these arguments, there is also the belief that other assets of white people will be transferred to black owners, gratis. In this context, the corrupted ANC elite are able to infer that the ANC elite’s self-enrichment cannot be see as corruption and criminal activity, but a prerequisite to bring an end to white supremacy and white exclusive capitalism.22,23 Mthombothi22 describes the so-called anti-white capitalist motivations of these corrupted acts by the ANC-elite as22:19: “…emancipatory” inside the Black empowerment, opening opportunities to all Blacks and that the present corrupt forms of accumulation by the top brass is indeed advancing the exclude majority of the poor Black”.

The ANC elite’s promises to transfer numerous pieces of land to the underprivileged black communities in post-2019 are undoubtedly true, but their real intention with the new “abundance” of land is suspect. Instead of intending to canalise the wealth of the land to enrich the impoverished black communities, their actions seem to indicate an enrichment of their own, nepotistic interests. The availability of large pieces of valuable land, together with the overwhelming presence of state capture, leads one back to a phenomenon that this paper discussed ealier: the exclusively enriching of the Marxist-Leninist elite of the ANC.

On the corrupt and well-stated argument of the criminal ANC’s opportunistic politicians of their so-called “group emancipation of the poor through State capture”, Tabane writes23:20:

Once there are billions involved, like housing and construction projects, you know that politicians and businesspeople have conspired to steal millions, for themselves or their political parties.

Many parties are guilty of stealing from the public purse in this way through their deployees. Individuals in the process also steal big in the name of raising money ‘for the movement’.

What is sad is that some of the most competent ministers are pressured into theft. This is why I have great respect for someone like Naledi Pandor, who asked why some ministers owned so many assets that were out of proportion to their salaries.

There are some who are ready to excuse the likes of Gwede Mantashe and Nomvula Mokonyane. They are said to have ‘taken one for the movement’. We have yet to be told how installing hi tech security at a home and enjoying obscene amounts of booze and meat benefited the ANC.

It becomes clear from these numerous failings by the ANC’s top brass, as mentioned above, that there is a clear discrimination and a presence of division between the exclusive rich ANC members from the mass of poorer ANC members and supporters. The ANC elite’s motto and custom of “taking one for the movement to benefit solely the party or the ordinary poor people”, is discussed by Pithouse24-28 and others. What becomes prominent here – informed by the definitions on the meaning of opportunism and what the typical character of the opportunist looks like – is that some of the ANC’s elite and their cronies have clearly lost their cognitive ability to differentiate between lies and truth, or virtue and vice. Especially after many years of corrupted, opportunistic and uncontrolled reign, a norm has been established. Delusions are prominent in many of the ANC elite’s political thinking, planning and actions. This is evident in President Cyril Ramaphosa’s third state of the nation address. As is the case with many of the ANC elite’s, their thinking, planning and actions are indeed saturated by a variety of political pathology. Ex-president Jacob Zuma has recently spoke before the Zondo commission, wherein he distanced himself from the very concept of state capture. This was instead of arguing that he was the target of political targeting and that state capture never existed under his presidency. This serves as an example of the ANC’s elite having lost the ability to understand that many of the impoverished black people have begun to disapprove of and reject the ANC as a party. The ANC elite cannot further manipulate black non-member supporters of the ANC to vote for them, evident from the outcome of the recently concluded elections of May 2019. Support has declined overall, with only 49% of the eligible voters participating in the elections, and an ANC voting support count of only 28% of the total eligible voters. The black youth’s immense apathy is especially problematic for the ANC’s aims and future plans in 2019. Self-empowerment and self-enrichment take precedent over the nation.24-28

Solly Mapaila29 of the South African Communist Party (a tripartite partner in ANC regime) slammed specific BEE as so-called “narrow nationalism” that enables state capture. He postulates29:26: “This narrow nationalism delayed our capacity to build and transform the state, and we ended up creating what has now developed into a predatory state. We must go back to this painful journey so that we don’t repeat it, but this painful journey played in a very nice policy framework and was called black economic empowerment. We even legalised it.” In this context, Mapaila29 adds that most of the state institutions of South Africa were paralysed due to looting by those who employed the government’s BEE policy, including specific members from within the ANC led coalition. With specific reference to the contaminating effect of BEE, Mapaila29 clearly states that the ANC’s so-called “developmental state” has provided opportunities a select few ANC groups could exploit to become rich in the name of the nation. He writes29:26:

“The corruption and what we call state capture and the disempowerment of the majority was within the framework of the terrain of the developmental state that we were trying to construct. We took this painful journey to appease particularly the middle strata. Our president is a product of this as well. He is a rich man; there is no doubt about it.”

3.3.1.2.2. Municipalities as milking cows

The development of a culture of state capture, as guided and steered by opportunism and the ongoing misuse and illegal use of public money by many ANC opportunists, has been confirmed and reflected in the decline of the state’s financial situation. The tax-payer is especially aware of these deficiencies, over the past nine years. Although the no-payment culture plays a role in municipalities’ decline in income, this outcome is also the result of clumsy and non-existent administration in the collection of service fees. The financial situation can also be argued to be symptomatic of the ANC regime’s Marxist-Leninist socialism where, in exchange for the voter’s support, free services are provided. This system is unsustainable, of course, and may indicate a possible end to the ANC. Furthermore, the presidencies and their cabinets that were appointed to oversee the lack of accountability and responsibility to law-abiding voters in their governing of South Africa for the period 2008 to 2019, are overly concerned with remaining in power.30-41

Analyses show that the growing shortfalls in municipal budgets stem from the misuse of their funds for things such as high salaries, unsuccessful projects where tender-fraud and the enrichment of cadres outweigh other goals, friend and families appointed to the municipalities’ top management and the use of so-called consultants as a cover for corruption. What these specific problems have in common is the overall disregard that the national government has towards the financial and administrative tasks in the municipalities. No improvement is made in areas where remedial recommendations have been made by the appropriate overseeing bodies. The relative freedom that these members of government have is well reflected by the immense amounts of irregular and unauthorised expenditure by municipalities. The culture of organised corruption, that became established in the municipalities under the Zuma-regime, has continued to grow exponentially.30-41

President Cyril Ramaphosa has, thus far, failed to restructure the problems that faced the municipalities under President Jacob Zuma, since Desember 2017. It could be argued that this phase of government under President Ramaphosa and his regime is the eventual death of the ANC, wherein the motivation behind many of the clearly contaminated decisions of the ANC-opportunists are made in their last efforts to benefit themselves out of the party. These decisions are in addition to their previous large-scale land grabbing corruption. Prominent examples are the enormous abuse and exploitation of state funds by the elite of the ANC regime on local levels, with the main intention being to benefit them exclusively in salaries and benefits. Additionally, state funds are stolen by well-masked tender fraud and various other forms of ongoing state capture. Kgosana32, writing on the opportunistic spending on national, provincial and local levels by the ANC elite (sardonically referred to as “irregular expenditures”), reports as follows32:12:

  1. The amount of irregular expenditure incurred by the national and provincial departments in 2008/2009: R11-billion against 2017/2018: R50-billion;
  2. The combined irregular expenditure at local government level in 2008/2009: R3.2-billion against 2017/2018: R27.6-billion;
  3. Unqualified audits with no findings, recorded in all spheres of the government in 2008/2009: 10% against 2017/2018: 24%.

Immense corruption, political mismanagement and nepotistic cadre-employment on the local municipality level has forced the Parliament to publish a gazette through the National Treasury on the local government cost containment measures, on the 7th June 2019. The introduction of these regulations was seen by a sector in the ANC as “unasked, inappropriate and limiting the empowerment” of the local government, possibly because these regulations curb the ANC opportunists as they continue their state capture and opportunistic crimes. The decline of the integrity and honesty of well-functioning municipalities run parallel to those municipalities that were under ANC rule and has since become bankrupt. Inside this deliberate and well-planned scheme around the finances of the municipalities, a R2-billion loss in the VBS Mutual Bank stand out. This immense loss has resulted from investments by ANC opportunists in charge of the municipalities’ finance.30,34-36,38

On the “untainted” VBS Mutual Bank looting of R2-billion, Matlala indicates that the criminals who had planned and executed the immense fraud – municipal managers, chief finance officers and supply chain managers who all have numerous strong connections to the ANC elite – are left protected and are never prosecuted. Clearly, the ANC regime’s prosecuting authorities also form part of the corrupt system. The excessive influence of the opportunist politicians of the ANC regime is also evident in the fact that the criminals in the Limpopo municipalities continue to draw monthly salaries, whilst others make government deals worth millions [colloquially referred to as golden hand-shakes]. Although some of the managers are currently serving suspensions, there has not a single criminal charge laid against them thus far. The Portfolio Committee on Cooperative Governance, found in October 2019, found that some of these culprits, that are still unaffected and “walking free”, are currently engaging in irregular business practices with their own municipalities in Limpopo. Furthermore, the opportunistic approach of awarding tenders to friends and relatives, and the paying of service providers for work that has not been done, are still frequent procedures in many of the corrupt Limpopo municipalities.33

The condemning Auditor-General’s report37 for the financial year ended June 30 2018 confirms the lack of legal oversight and political leadership in the failed municipalities (and also reflects a failed ANC regime on a national level). The performance of the country, in the terms of this report, is described by the editor37 of the City Press on the 30th June 2019 as37:2: “…one that paints a bleak picture of deteriorating audit outcomes.”

The auditor-general Kimi Makwetu states that the 2017/18 Auditor-General’s report shows the highest level of noncompliance with key governance laws since the 2011/12 financial year report. The lack of accountability and responsibility stands central in these criminal acts inside the municipalities. As opposed to the 14% of municipalities that received clean audits in 2016/17, the 2017/18 report only reflects 8% compliance. This means for 2017/18, only 18 out of 257 municipalities received clean audits, further reflecting that 239 municipalities failed the test. The report indicates that the various local government role-players, such as mayors, councillors and municipal managers, have not taken any of the previous report’s recommendations by the auditor-general into account, and they have not corrected their corrupt and dishonest systems. This echoes the profile of extreme opportunism where the opportunists’ own interest is the primary aim.

This failure to improve is also confirmed by the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) findings. The FFC is a body of constitutionally mandated members that make recommendations to Parliament and the Provincial legislators about the financial and fiscal viability of municipalities. The basis of the municipalities’ failure is the lack of accountability by the political parties to appoint able and responsible councillors and mayors to oversee that able officials are running their councils. The FCC demonstrates the total irregularity of expenditure regarding the R25.2-billion in 2017-18. Eybers31 and Khumalo31 pinpoint the management of the numerous beleaguered state institutions and local municipalities that has reached its highest ever levels of crises, at the end of June 2019: 30 of the municipalities battle to pay salaries, the municipal debt had increased to R60-billion over the past five years, the outstanding debt increased from R105-billion in March 2015 to R163-billion in March 2019. Additionally, It seems that most of these municipalities in crisis have no recovery plans and hope to receive a bail-out by the central government. This failure of most of the country’s municipalities is rooted in the corruption and opportunistic misuse of the municipalities’ finances, together with the poor overall management of it by sub-standard leaders. This setup is a direct outcome of the municipalities’ appointment by a dysfunctional national and provincial leadership under the ruling the ANC regime.31,36,39-41

On the chaos of local governing (much in line with ANC’s chaotic governing on provincial and national level) as reflected by the Auditor-general’s findings, the spokesperson of Cosatu, Sizwe Pamla40, has said that the situation was40:3: “…appalling, frightening and deeply worrisome.” (Note: Cosatu is a partner to the tripartite ANC-regime). In line with other findings of the failure of the ANC regime to assure good local, provincial and national government, especially in the fight against corruption and financial capture by corrupted opportunists, Pamla writes40:3: “This confirms the fact that there is little control over the corrupt abuse and manipulation of tenders and procurement of goods and services. All this shows there is virtually no appetite to abide by the laws across the country. What is even more depressing is that there are virtually no consequences for those responsible.”

Within the context of the appointment of cadres will numerous allegations logged against them and similarly tainted ANC elite in the ANC regime’s failed overseeing of all three levels of government, the editor37 of City Press, when discussing the problem of corruption, incompetence and the culture of opportunism in the politics of municipalities, writes on the 30th June 201937:2:

They should be electing competent and duly qualified people to these positions. But the ANC and the other parties have tended to use these positions to reward friends and fellow party members who have no clue of what is expected of them once in office.

In the few instances where professionals are appointed, they often do not last due to the embedded culture of laziness, bending the rules and employees ingratiating themselves with the bosses. These rare competent officials are often ostracised and effectively worked out of the system.

But the worst phenomenon to emerge over the past few years is that corrupt officials being reshuffled. Instead of being fired, they are simply moved from one municipality to the next. This is born out of a political culture of “looking after our own…” […as the ANC’s list of 22 tainted MPs and MPLs for the May 2019 elections and most of these tainted person’s reappointment in senior ANC-regime positions after May confirm].

The editor37 of City Press emphasises the problematic situation of unethical leaders, persons with a disregard for good governance, compliance and control, and no self-discipline and impunity when it comes to monetary opportunism. A lack of commitment to transparency and accountability in the municipalities is also reflected at the level of state-owned enterprises, as confirmed by the large-scale state capture and bankruptcy there. From here, the contamination spreads to the lower levels of government, as well. He writes37:2: “When political leaders [with seemingly pinpointing the President of the ANC and his intimate cronies] deemed these a feeding trough and deployed enablers of the Gupta empire to run them, they created the rot that drove many of them, such as Denel and Eskom, to financial ruin.”

Plaatjies42, in focusing indirectly on the ANC’s criminal acts as a regime overall, brings the failure of the Public Service Commission (PSC) into account. The PSC has failed to deal with corrupt and unqualified politically-appointed mayors, councillors and municipal managers effectively. He also emphasises the failure of Parliament’s various oversight committees, who’s main function is to handle the 239 outright failed and politically contaminated municipalities. These 239 munipalities are overwhelmingly under ANC rule, and are those that have become plagued by the political games of the ANC’s mismanagement and corruption of the national government.36,42,43

Plaatjies30, on the “intervention and interference silence” of the various parliamentary oversight committees, posits that30:7: “Until now we have not seen the members of these committees taking their responsibilities seriously. It’s about politicking. They need to jack up their responsibilities. ‘I know they’re representing their parties. I know they need to score political points. But my god, start scoring points for the citizens and the country’.”

The failing of the recent 239 municipalities led to a specific set of 30 municipalities in Limpopo, the Eastern Cape, Free State, Kwa-Zulu Natal, Mpumalanga and Northern Cape did not pay their staff’s salaries. Furthermore, these 30 municipalities also failed to pay their staff’s pensions up to the amount of R70-million. Some of the municipalities have been blacklisted while others assets were frozen. It is alleged that the equipment belonging to one of these, the Maluti-A-Phofung municipality in the Free State, was seized by the sheriff of the court due to the failure to pay Eskom. What features prominently inside the financial chaos at municipalities, is that the opportunistic mayors and their senior cronies are still compensated monthly. These mayors and their employees are mostly appointed in terms of the ANC’s cadre-centered and democratic-centralists policies.36,40-48

Cilliers44, in the context of the aforementioned outright and excessive failure of many municipalities, writes44:17: “Werkers en raadslede van die Tswaing-munisipaliteit in Noordwes het nog nie hul Junie-salaris gekry omdat die munisipaliteit se bankrekening glo weens onbetaalde skuld gevries is”, and44:17: “Die provinsiale regering het die munisipaliteit, wat Sannieshof, Delareyville, Ottosdal en die omliggende gebiede bedien, in Mei onder administrasie geplaas weens swak bestuur, wat gelei het tot ‘n ineenstorting van dienslewering”.

This chaos that Cilliers describes – that employees are not being paid and that this lead to a collapse of all municipal services – has forced President Cyril Ramaphosa to acknowledge that the central ANC government assists 57 municipalities in distress. The state capture by corrupt elements of the leadership of many of the mismanaged municipalities is so extreme that it has forced the Auditor-general Kimi Makwetu to admit that his team of investigators has experienced serious threats and intimidation. This extremity is primarily because of the ANC regime’s lack to introduce integrity, honesty, accountability and legitimacy in all levels of governance.36,40,42,43,45-48

In this context of absolute failure and corrupted government (from municipalities up to the Parliament), the editor37 of the City Press clearly brings two suspicious ANC leaders into focus for their criminal acts and to be help responsible, at least in part, for the chaos. He writes37:2:

Two key examples of this are the Free State province and the eThekwini municipality. The Free State, where former premier Ace Magashule micromanaged local government for his own ends and made sure his cronies were installed, has the largest concentration of poorly performing municipalities in the country.

eThekwini, run by the warlord-like Zandile Gumede for the past three years, has gone from being a star performer to one of the country’s most poorly run metros.

Will49 reports that the ANC-managed Matjhabeng municipality (or the Free State Gold Fields) is one of the 10 worst performing municipalities in the country. It takes first place of the 257 municipalities labelled as the worst spenders of taxpayers’ money: it had misspent R169 million for 2017-2018, its outstanding debt for water is R2.3 billion, while its Eskom debt is R1.84 billion. The unauthorised spending of the Matjhabeng-municipality was R873-million for 2018.49

The immense opportunism locked into the ANC’s governing on national, provincial and local levels, and the presence of prominent ANC opportunist politicians that contaminate their environment, is confirmed by many trustworthy resources. Dr Daniel Plaatjies26, chair of the FFC, repeats other examples of opportunism, corruption and theft at most municipalities when he says26:10: “There’s an overwhelming level of fraud and corruption, and tackling that is priority. These issues are systematic and they’ve been flagged for years.” Elaborating further on the failed service to the people by the ANC regime at local governing level, over the last 25 years, the editor26 of The Citizen writes26:10: … it shows that government is failing South Africans daily”. The report, titled: Audit Performance and Service Delivery at Local government Level of June 2019 by the organisation Good Governance Africa. Good Governance Africa reports on clean audits of municipalities and reflects on such services as sanitation, refuse collection, reliability of electricity, education, water and medication availability. They have found that all of these aforementioned services are still seriously lacking. The report reflects, for instance, that inhabitants of only 42% of high-performing municipalities and 40% of low-performing municipalities have access to sanitation outside their homes26. Plaatjies30 describes this immense of chaos as30:7: “… horror scenarios of towns with no tap water, sewage running down streets and industry ‘running away.”

3.3.1.2.1. ANC fat cats

There are prominent examples of the immense abuse and exploitation of the tax-payers’ money by the elite of the ANC regime, especially on national level, with the main intention to benefit them exclusively in salaries and various other advantages.32

How well planned and established this greed and self-enrichment of the ANC’s so-called fat cats are, must be read in its entirety. This presence is confirmed by the misleading revised New Ministerial Handbook, which the Ramaphosa regime approved in June 2019. The handbook indicates that the perks for travel, cars and other luxuries that ministers used to enjoy were cut drastically to “decrease the gap” of inequality between the law-makers and the poor people (propagated by Tito Mboweni: to demonstrate some restraint ourselves). A comparative analysis of the handbook shows the outcome is again one of sole advantage of the “fat cats” of the present ANC elite in the Ramaphosa regime. There are no signs of shame or guilt about the large group of impoverished people who were created by the ANC since 1994. Once again, this is caused by the ongoing policy of gratuitous opportunism by the Zuma regime’s political opportunists (notwithstanding an effort to manipulate the public imagination by Mboweni in his November budget speech, wherein he delcared that the Ramaphosa administration is going to curb the perks of the leaders in the public sector).50,51

Hilary Joffe51 confirms how far the opportunistic culture of the ANC elite has spread and how fast this culture has established itself in the Ramaphosa regime. She writes on the November 2019 medium-term budget speech of Mboweni.51:2

When finance minister Tito Mboweni delivered his medium-term budget speech in parliament on Wednesday afternoon, some small but significant changes had been made to the draft which had been shared with journalists under embargo on Wednesday morning. Specifically, the curbs on ministers’ pay and perks which had been in the speech in the morning had been somewhat diluted by afternoon. The cap on the cost of official cars had been raised from R700,000 to R800,000; a phrase about “downward adjustments” to cabinet and provincial premiers’ salaries replaced with one about “further negotiations”; and a ban on subsistence and travel payments substituted with something fuzzier.

Were Mboweni’s cabinet colleagues more concern about their cars than about the country’s catastrophic public finances? It was hard not to ask, especially after he arrived almost an hour late to brief media after the cabinet discussed the budget in its Wednesday morning meeting.

The fact remains that Parliament is still affected, and often adversely continuing with, its old ways of corruption. Mokone52 writes that, for 2019/2010, the government set aside R750-million to primp the Union Buildings, houses of MPs in Cape Town, as well as ministers in Cape Town and Pretoria. This act of opportunism is addition to 84 free flights a year that each of the 400 serving MPs and ministers receive. Furthermore, they also enjoy heavily subsided three-course meals and liquor at Parliament, a car/travel allowance of R120 000 a year for MPs, whilst also receiving taxpayer-sponsored phones, tablets and laptops. MPs park for free at all the airports across the country and are shuttled by bus daily from their parliamentary villages to Parliament, free of charge. In 2019, a further payment of R111-million in ‘loss of office’ gratuities were made available as ‘golden handshakes’ to 159 MPs who failed to return to Parliament after the May 8 elections. The taxpayers’ money are used on airline tickets for approximately 2 000 current and former MPs, ministers and their dependants, including children and spouses a year, at the value of R120-million a year.52  Describing the MPs reaction on the 1st September 2019, when it was suggested that they cut some of their parliamentary benefits, Mokone52 reports52:1,4:

Pampered MPs, who enjoy taxpayers-sponsored freebies and perks that would make the average South African green with envy, warned this week that they will resist any attempt to trim their generous benefits. And some of them insist they deserve even more gravy – on top of their free flights, accommodation and meals, and alongside salaries that range from R1.2m to R2.4m, depending on the position they hold in parliament.

Pather53 discusses the reckless opportunistic politics of the ANC’s leaders since 1994, as characterised by their self-enrichment and -empowerment at the costs and suffering of more than 30-million impoverished black people. He points out one of the biggest factors still strengthening the presence of crime, disorder, lawlessness in the ANC. Pather writes53:14:

Despite all their big talk about liberating their people from poverty and economic inequality and creating an egalitarian society, most of our leaders are basically slaves to social status and wealth.

They strive each day to build obscenely oversized nest eggs in the limited time they enjoy in office.

While you and I bite our nails down to the elbow worrying about the escalating cost of living, let’s take a peak into the kind of lives our public representatives enjoy.

Cabinet ministers earn a salary of R2 401 633 a year while their deputies will take home R1 977 795.

And that’s not counting their perks of luxury vehicles, first-class travel internationally, business-class local flights, state-owned residences, renovations, cleaning services and other out-of-pocket expenses.

Members of Parliament, both national and provincial, obviously earn a little less than their executive colleagues, but fall into the category of “fat cats”.

Other forms of the ANC regime’s abuse and exploitation of the people’s empowerment and finance – which stems from this “circus of stealing and no accountability” – are fueled by the state’s financial support for former president Jacob Zuma in his appearances before courts of law, as well as before the Zondo commission because of his crimes against the state and the tax-payers) in the past. The legal costs that Zuma has built up via the state’s legal support for his cases stand as a prominent example here. These cases are described as having cost several million rands. Zuma initially got away with free legal support for his court cases, until the beginning of June 2019, through his misuse of the state’s cheque book to fight the various court cases against him. Zuma is described as having prolonged these cases with appeal-on-appeal, despite negative sentences against him. [Zuma managed to forgo all payments and deny his sentences because the state, when presided over by both Thabo Mbeki and Cyril Ramaphosa, illegally undertook to cover Zuma’s legal costs). Rooi54 writes54:8: “Dit volg nadat die hooggeregshof in Pretoria in Desember [2018] bevind het dit was onwettig van oudpres. Thabo Mbeki en pres. Cyril Ramaphosa om te onderneem om Zuma se regskoste te betaal”.

The legal and other costs accumulated by Zuma still need to be accounted for by the state when he appears before the Zondo commission. On Zuma’s defence offered before the Zondo commission – and the extreme costs already accumulated and in danger of growing through more of Zuma’s testimonies, Rooi writes54:8:

Die department van justisie het gister aangedui meer as R1 miljoen is in dié stadium reeds aan Zuma se regsverteenwoordigers by die kommissie betaal.

Voorlopige berekeninge deur regslui toon die koste van Zuma se regspan oor die lewensduur van dié kommissie kan ‘n astronomiese R24 miljoen tot R30 miljoen beloop.

Dit is benewens die koste van Zuma se verdediging in strafregtelike en ander sake wat volgens die DA reeds meer as R15 miljoen beloop. Die EFF raam dié bedrag op R32 miljoen.

Another substantial case of the ANC regime’s opportunistic spending, under the Ramaphosa regime, is the paying of the costs of politicians who testify before the various judicial commissions, including the Zondo commission. They are paid to testify despite the fact that many of them are guilty of state capture themselves and should be charged and not allowed to contribute to legal processes. Hunter55 reports that, when Jacob Zuma’s lawyers put up a fight at the Zondo commission, accusing the Commission of being biased and unfair, the taxpayers payed the bill, via the state’s Department of Justice. These payments are for their communication with the Zondo commission as well as appearing before it. Furthermore, these payments are separate from Zuma’s other costs of inquiry, which are also carried by the state. But Zuma is not benefiting alone: there are others from his regime that are implicated and are testifying before the Zondo commission. An amount of R6 968 000 was paid by the state to cover the legal costs of those appearing before the Zondo commission, like Lynne Brown, Nathi Nhleko, ex-police commissioner Kgomotso Phalan and the former head of the NPA Shaun Abrahams. The legal costs of the three police officers of North West, Lt Gen Baile Motswenyne, Maj Gen Ntebo “Jan” Mabula and Brig Pharasa Ncube, were all paid, while incumbent ministers Pravin Gordhan and Nathi Mthertwa also relied on the state to pay their legal fees. Although there was no comprehensive legal team appointed at the state’s cost to represent civil servants who appeared before the Zondo commission, there were two advocates appointed and paid R220 000 by the state. These two advocates specifically came in to represent the Department of Mineral Resources when its staff appeared before the Zondo commission.55

The full measure of the extremity of ideas held by so-called “fat cats” of the ANC elite is well reflected by their current moves to steal from the country’s prescribed assets, like the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) of R1.8-trillion, as well as private pension and assurance funds. This intention of the ANC opportunists is driven by the 1983 ANC radical economic transformation document – built on the basis of Marxist-Leninist socialist ideas – which instructs that the “billions” of the various pension funds and insurance companies of South Africa will be made available at the disposal of the ANC if it obtains government. Stemmet56, a spokesperson for the Association of Monitoring and Advocacy of Government Pensions (AmaGP) describes the looting of other’s money and belongings by the ANC elite regarding pensions56:7: “The ANC government is making the basic mistake of referring to this as public money. It is not public money; it belongs to the members of the pension fund, not to the government. In effect you’re forcing pension funds to lend money to bankrupt state entities. How can you invest in an absolutely bankrupt entity like Eskom?”

It is clear that the opportunists of ANC regime have already begun to loot from the public fixed assets by using the GEPF as a bank. Stemmet56 argues that the Mpati-Commission’s investigation into the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) already shows evidence of political contamination, for instance the R94.5-billion of GEPF money that has been invested into Eskom already. The same kind of so-called “risky investments” are well masked in Denel, SABC and many others state institutions where state capture is prominent. On this opportunistic steering and misused of other’s money by the ANC-elite, Stemmet warns56:7: “They‘ve done it already. And it’s illegal, of course”. His further warns against further state capture: “Would you accept a guarantee from a bankrupt guarantor? The government is bankrupt. That is why they want to use the GEPF to keep bankrupt SOEs going. If we could have trusted the government this might have been an option. But we cannot trust this government. Even if the government could make such an agreement, how can we believe they’d honour it?”

To argue that the Ramaphosa regime is not opportunistic like the Zuma regime, and that new state capture and self-enrichment will not happen again, is a fallacy. Cyril Ramaphosa was Jacob Zuma’s vice-president for years and he was the chair of the ANC’s corrupt programme of cadre-deployment, which is based on the exclusive self-enrichment and positioning of a selective group of ANC members. It is especially telling that many of the tainted pre-2019 ANC politicians, implicated in various forms of corruption, opportunism and dishonesty, are still in Ramaphosa’s regime as MPs, MPLs, mayors of municipalities, premiers, provincial ministers, cabinet-ministers and chairs of various parliamentary committees. These unpunished culprits are waiting for new “opportunities” post 2019.The ANC’s political opportunists of yesterday are those of tomorrow.

To understand the opportunism of Ramaphosa’s politics, just reads his misleading under-mentioned 2017 election-promises57:9, 58:2:

  • The party that has our nation’s future foremost in its heart.
  • A government that has put in place a specialised anti-corruption unit.
  • The party that insisted on setting up the Zondo Commission to expose and destroy state capture.
  • The party that has led the process of once again getting SARS working at its world class best,
  • The party under whose leadership, a new leadership of the National Prosecuting Authority has been put in place.
  • The party that is restoring the ability of government to provide services fairly to all.

[It is clear that the “saviour” Ramaphosa and his immediate ANC elite comrades may benefit from the learning from the example of Uruguay’s former president, José “Pepe” Mujica, who was previously in jail as a freedom fighter for 14 years. Mujica had donated 90% of his presidential salary to charity and drove around in an old Volkswagen Beetle during his presidency, writes Pather53. Or, as Pather53 further describes, present-day Swedish MPs who live in tiny flats, travel in crowded buses and trains, wash and iron their own clothes in communal laundries and live like the people who put them into office].53

3.3.1.4.3. ANC’s integrity committee

The failure of the SAPS and the NPA to bring any of the ANC elite to justice for state capture, led to a situation where any tainted ANC political opportunist can still participate in official politics. This legal vacuum of official certification regarding a candidate’s integrity to position him/herself as able, trustworthy, honest and free from political opportunism, was denied and avoided by the ANC politburo. They managed to side-step any repercussion by establishing their so-called Integrity Committee (Commission). This aimed to not only to give tainted ANC members entrance to the official politics of post-2019, through the committee’s “certification”, but also to “clear” the contaminated status of many members of the politburo.

To position the tainted ANC members as “virtuous” for the voters and their partners in Parliament, to ensure that they be be re-elected, the ANC’s Integrity Committee (Commission) was established. This committee is in line with most of the Marxist-Leninist regimes’ customs throughout the world, and it works to certify and redeem all of their members through an “official” party body. This led to most of the crooked ANC political opportunists of pre-2019 being elected without obstruction, especially those from the Parliament’s fifth administration. It assured the continuation of mainstay power of the politburo (more or less 90 members, as opposed to the greater ANC’s slightly less than a million members). The resolutions taken by the national conferences, in terms of Marxism-Leninism, has also become more popular after 2019. The overall contamination of the ANC politics of 2019 (and therefore 2019 onwards), forced the editor59 of the Saturday Star on the 16th March 2019 to ask the following59:12:

What does one have to do to get expelled from the ANC? Clearly, allowing a state capture network to take root is not enough. Nor is being charged with corruption. Nor is flouting the constitution.

…not only are those issues not sufficient to get you kicked out of the ANC, you are actually called up to help your comrades fight the upcoming election.

To non-ANC supporters, that clearly shows that the party is continuing under Cyril Ramaphosa, where it left off under Zuma and that the “New Dawn” and Thuma Mina slogans are merely that… words.

These aforementioned corrupt actions and decisions of the ANC’s Integrity Committee stand clearly in line with the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist ideology, which is constant and ongoing since the 1910s. This ideology has often turned extreme, arguably because of its democratic-centralism that underlies the empowerment-umbrella of its politburo: ANC members are only loyal to the ANC, its constitution and the resolutions taken by its national conferences (while the loyal ANC member, notwithstanding the form and comprehensiveness of his/her criminality, is never stripped from his/her public “integrity”). For the loyal ANC member, the party comes first, not South Africa. It would seem that, for the loyal ANC member, the ANC’s constitution is prioritised above the South African Constitution. This has neutralised the effectiveness of the South African Constitution, as its asks absolute loyalty and support of the party’s interests. The integrity, and thus the ability of members to serve on official bodies (Parliament) and official positions (MPs, MPLs, ministers, state-president, etc.) is determined by its Integrity Committee and nothing else.60-62

Despite statutory empowerment being absent from the Integrity Committee, the committee plays a very decisive role in the ANC’s member’s position and their future in the ANC and the country’s politics. Although it lacks the ability to verify the truth of allegations against ANC-members and can only direct the ANC-NEC with moral advice, its recommendations often leads to the false certification of tainted ANC members as “clean” and “able” members, eligible to be elected to Parliament. This contaminated outcome was reflected by the 22 tainted names on the ANC’s list for the May 2019 elections. Notwithstanding the criminal evidence on candidates who indeed went to Parliament after May, the committee is seen inside the ANC, as well by some of the media, as a trustworthy body. This makes the committee a  “certification-body” of the ANC instead, and therefore misleads voters about the integrity of some of the ANC members going to the Parliament.60-62

The functioning of the committee is so that ANC members are arrested for serious crimes but still awaiting trial, and are seen and treated as innocent until proven guilty and sentenced. Problematically, it also sees certain crimes as less serious than others, for instance that murder during acts of of terrorism by ANC members are of low status. The present ANC members that hold top positions in office must be read in the context in this functioning of the ANC; that all of its public representatives can and may continue to hold high offices, even when charged with serious crimes. Paton60, on the unlimited staying on of criminals in the ANC’s official politics through its broken disciplinary system, remarks60:7: “Even when accused of crimes and charged by a court, public representatives stuck to the mantra of “innocent until proven guilty. The result was that numerous ANC public representatives continued to hold high office even when charged with serious crimes.”

The aforementioned scenarios are from the South African democracy promised by the ANC wherein the judicial bodies (the various judicial commissions, the SAPS and NPA) should play a key-role to act against the main culprits of corruption and illegal management under the ANC ruling. Without accepting accountability, the ANC cannot differentiate between right or wrong. This is because most of the ANC elite function in a negative culture which also manifests in its Integrity Committee’s opinions and decisions. Munusamy61 postulates61:20: “The line between wrong and right is indistinct,” and: “…we might doubt what seemed to be irrefutable facts, as well as our sanity. Heroes and villains could swap places.”

Many of the ANC’s personal and party crimes are rationalised and projected as the unavoidable outcomes of Apartheid, or as necessary to fight apartheid. This implies that they either have no control over the outcome, or cannot be held responsible. This rationale masks the exclusive opportunism and the pre-meditated crimes of opportunists. The refusal of accountability for this situation (which seems to be the approach for the erasing of accountability from most ANC member’s mindsets) seems to have become the modus operandi of the ANC members in their avoidance of their political and socio-economic responsibility, as well as their political crimes, since 1994. The extreme opportunists follow their own goals and intentions under the guise of promoting the party’s interests. The failing of the ANC’s integrity committee to uphold strict legal rules and its members’ integrity, as well as regulate its own operations, reflect the same political contamination.59

Saunderson-Meyer62, writes on the failure of the ANC elite to accept accountability in the selection of senior members to its leadership positions, as well as the ANC’s refusal to address their current and historic corruption. On the 13th of July 2019, in the Saturday Citizen, he argues62:12:

William Gumede, associate professor of governance at Wits, writes in Business Live this week [July 2019] that “black victimhood” is used as an excuse to avoid accountability. Songezo Zibi, former editor of Business Day, writing this week on News24, offers nought for comfort. “Until there is a new political school of thought that seeks… to build social structures that deepen accountability, our situation will not approve. We shall continue to degenerate, risking violent social upheaval.”

The ANC’s basis of Marxist-Leninist socialism remains the key to understanding the seeming ignorance (and the cognitive inability) of some of the ANC’s elite to understand the difference between moral and amoral governing (as was recently evident in Jacob Zuma’s rhetoric when appearing before the Zondo commission). These decisions must be read in the context of the ANC’s underlying aim of sole political empowerment of an exclusive group of their elite. Paton60 writes on the irony of the situation60:7: “At the root of the problem is the ANC’s fundamental flaw; its reluctance to hold its leaders to account for even the most flagrant abuses. This process, which should seamlessly occur through the natural workings of the party’s disciplinary processes, is broken. Instead of fixing it, a new structure was created: the integrity commission.”

It could be argued that there is a serious danger that all statutory structures will be further undermined by the ANC opportunists to obtain unobstructed access to state funds and other illegal opportunities. The empowerment of the ANC Integrity Committee, versus the current disempowerment of the NPA, leaves the impression of a deliberate erasing of any official structures which can sabotage the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist elite’s opportunistic plans to obtain exclusive political power and riches. Bateman63 discusses the possible presence of suspicious motives by the ANC’s leader. It is in this setup, amid the unstable and faulty official vehicles of law enforcement, there seems to be an increasing possibility that President Cyril Ramaphosa will follow his predecessors and ensure that the group of corrupt ANC elite keep their positions. This is similar to ex-president Jacob Zuma, when he disbanded the Scorpions and subsequently fired the honest senior officials and senior politicians when they tried to interfere and intervene with his and the ANC elite’s corrupted deeds. President Ramaphosa’s many conflicts with court interdicts against the Public Protector, especially around his controversial CR17 campaign, is suspicious and worrying. In this context, Bateman63 reflects63:2: “…true independence in bodies that probe is the last thing the ANC wants – as evidenced by new outfit still having to report to the executive…” and63:2: “…there’s a comfort clause if the evidence gets too warm for the incumbents, no matter how clean they appear. President Ramaphosa can simply shut it down…”

3.3.1.4.3.1. ANC-elite’s 2019 opportunistic maneuvering

Following the lack of accountability and responsibility, 2019 has indicated that a new phase of opportunism by the ANC elite is in development, especially seen in the operations of the Integrity Committee. This manifestation is, from a political view, not always taken as seriously as it arguable should. The corruption of the committee may be an indication of the ANC’s post-2019 plans, or indicative of the consequences that awaits South Africa. Inside this context of opportunism in the ANC elite and the various conflicting actions of President Cyril Ramaphosa, the negative consequences may outweigh his improvement on Zuma, in the end. Firstly, another prominent example of Ramaphosa’s questionable decision-making is that he, in the ANC’s fifth administration, refused outright to fire the minister in charge of the ANC Women’s League, Bathabile Dlamini (seemingly favoured by Zuma), after she alleged lied under oath. Secondly, Ramaphose included an excessive amount of Zuma’s tainted cronies on the ANC list for the May election. Thirdly, Ramaphosa has appointed many of Zuma’s tainted cronies in the sixth ANC regime. Fourthly, the ongoing “passive and stretched prosecution” of Zuma, without any constructive outcome by the NPA, is a point of concern. Many of the high-level criminals from the Zuma-regime are walking free, whilst being identified by the Zondo and Mpati commissions as tainted by evidence that are grounds for their immediate prosecution by the NPA. Lastly, the powerlessness of a Special Tribunal (ST), established by Ramaphosa to help the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) to recover money lost by the state institutions through irregular and corrupt means during the Zuma-regime, has offered no significant results.63-67

Several political analysts argue that Ramaphosa lacks the will and intention to deeply reform the ANC, and put forward the idea that his disassociation with the Magashule-Zuma clan sabotages any reform. Evidence shows that these three figures are rather linked through ideology; Ramaphosa, Magashule and Zuma underwrite and respect Marxism-Leninism, which is against any stable system that can endanger the ANC’s politburo’s exclusive empowerment of politics and riches. Ramaphosa, as Jacob Zuma and Ace Magashule, can have many ambitions and can be read as individuals, but to be leaders in the ANC political system (and to stay on), all three must respect, underwrite and perform the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist ideology, not their own. The modus operandi of Ramaphosa’s contemporary political decisions are fully in line with those prescribed by the ANC ideology and policy: their power works through the creation of unstable official institutions and the upholding of the ANC elite’s empowerment on all terrains. In this context, Ramaphosa’s behaviour is equally opportunistic to that of Zuma and Magashule, and perhaps more concealed. Ramaphosa’s public facade does not make him less dangerous than his two comrades. The whole lack of progress on the execution of law and order, and thus the establishment of sound and working institutions such as the NPA and the SAPS, are viewed as suspicious by some political analysts and commentators. Opportunists and their opportunism cannot be rehabilitated; opportunists and their opportunistic groups only disappear when both die.63-67

In closing, the question remains: when is the opportunistic politician the most active and most dangerous for a country’s welfare and future? Various answers are offered: perhaps when a country’s people and systems make it vulnerable for attack and dominance, such as the situation in 1994 when a mass of impoverished black people were manipulated by other black people. Captured by Marxism-Leninism, the ANC spokespeople created the dream of a utopia of freedom, wealth, food, happiness, peace, etc. Instead, their voters are in socio-economic crisis and enslaved and subordinate to an opportunistic elite once more. The second answer may be when the opportunistic black elite are rejected as the regime of the day by other black people. The ANC elite find themselves in this position after the May 2019 elections, as the voting outcome at the ballot box in May show the first signs of rejection. The Institute of Security Studies shows, when comparing the outcomes of the 2014 elections versus the 2019 elections, that the ANC is in a permanent downward spiral. But the ballot box’s results only tell half of the story;  the ANC has less than a million inscribed members against a total registered voter population of ±27 million and an eligible voters population of ±37 million. In terms of votes in the May-elections, the ANC obtained an insignificant part of less than 28% of the official voters’ cake. It is clear that the ANC only obtained and held the government for over 25 years by the country’s undemocratic election legislation. Furthermore, Ramaphosa’s election as president of the ANC (and thus also state president) tells a story of insignificance: he was elected by slightly more than 2 000 out of 4 000 delegates (representing 1-million ANC-members) in 2017 at the Nasrec national conference of the ANC (his majority over the next candidate was less than 200 votes). His position of power in the ANC (statistically calculated in terms of 1 million ANC members) is 0.2%. When this meagre amount of 2 000 votes for Ramaphosa by the ANC delegates are calculated in terms of democratic election principles, he only received a 0.06% mandate from the eligible 37 million voters.24,25,59,69-75

Three outcomes become clear here. Firstly, the ANC elite’s Marxist-Leninist model is outdated. Its total failure over 25 years of reign confirms this point. Secondly, the ANC elite know that their 28% portion of the eligible 37 million population of voters means that they are going to lose the 2024 elections if the country’s election legislation is changed to make future elections democratic. Thirdly, Ramaphosa knows that, in a new election dispensation, he will lose power. Behind his arrogance and bravado as the so-called elected South African state president, he is aware that his presidency is a dictatorship forced upon South Africa by the ANC’s communist model. The current opportunists of the ANC elite, especially its “Top Six” leaders, will attempt to remain in power, at the cost of destabilising the country’s legal system. Indeed, in this situation the ANC elite may even attempt a coup before the 2024 elections.24,25,59,69-75

4. Conclusions

It is clear that the post 2017 ANC regime differs very little from the pre-2017 one. The same opportunist politicians remain key role-players and are driven by the same criminal opportunism of the old ANC elite. A definitive profile of a regime in trouble has emerged; a regime in which the elite is desperately trying to uphold its Marxism-Leninism politics. Working to this end, the ANC regime is becoming more and more dangerous.

Tristan Taylor76, a South African political philosopher, writes comprehensively on the post-1994 political situation and opportunistic politics of the country, when he posits76:6:

How did the ANC get to this stage? A combination of considered policy and effective implementation marked the early years of the ANC’s rule. The government electrified townships, built houses and clinics, started to create a black middle class, institutionalised a progressive constitution and attempted to persuade society to live together and not apart.

Then came Thabo Mbeki’s post-truth HIV policy. Denying the link between HIV and Aids and refusing to roll out antiretrovirals was, putting it mildly, contrary to science. But facts were ignored, party loyalty kicked it, delusion reigned and 300,000 people died.

Like the first hit of tik, the taboo against setting government policy opposed to truth was broken. Contemporary examples include the department of basic education lowering the pass rate to avoid addressing inadequate schooling, and the department of agriculture, land reform & rural development completely ignoring the horrendous drought that is wiping out commercial and emerging agriculture in the Cape provinces.

But the greatest current delusion belongs to President Cyril Ramaphosa. The reality is that large swatches of the ANC are corrupt. The rot stretches from high to low. It has become endemic. But he seems to believe that the unity of the ANC can be maintained while corruption is dealt with in a substantive manner.

That’s contrary to reality. A fantasy. Comrades need to be purged and jailed: blind loyalty to the party must go. President Ramaphosa has to break the ANC in order to save the country. But given the lack of arrest for corruption, this looks almost as likely as a President Zille.

Ramaphosa is not incompetent: he is a perfect Marxist-Leninist leader of the ANC. As an ANC opportunist, he knows what he and the ANC elite want from South Africa, as well as how they are going to obtain it. He will never try to break the corruption and opportunism of the ANC: if he breaks the ANC and its corruption, he loses his power and opportunities inside the ANC’s established circle of opportunism. Endemic corruption is ANC culture; corruption is the heartbeat of the ANC’s unity. Marxism-Leninism is the ANC; opportunism is Marxism-Leninism.

In the next (Article 16), titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (16: Outdate ANC)”, the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter, in terms of the political power it received after the elections of 8 May 2019, will further be evaluated.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

 

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (13: Violence and Crime)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (13: Violence and Crime)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Analyst, confidence, desperate, expropriation, journalist, perspective, political party, traumatised, violence.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 4

1. Background

In 1973 the American ex-Mafia boss Vincent Teresa1 revealed in his book: “My Life in the Mafia”, how the Mafia ruthlessly ‘whack out’ their enemies; how film stars and singers are snared by the mob; how the mob infiltrates big business; how the mob steals countless millions of dollars and makes millions of dollars through almost every conceivable crime; how to fix a horse race or corrupt a cop; how to be a top money-maker; how the mobsters live, and what their fatal weaknesses are; and how it is to live in hiding under constant armed guard with a half-million dollar price on your head from the mob for whistle-blowing by an ex-gangster. Citing the dangers and excesses of organised crime , from their numbers to their actions, etc., to serve as a warning that the same can happen anywhere else in the “good” outside world, is far too late for crime-stricken South Africa. Teresa states:1:295-296

Crime families can vary in size. In New York, Gambino had maybe a thousand made men; in our family in New England we had a hundred and fifty. Between New Jersey and New York you might have two thousand five hundred people. In the whole country [USA], there is probably six thousand five hundred. But these are just the made men, remember. There are another two hundred to three hundred thousand mob guys working for the made guys. Nothing gives the mob a bigger laugh than when some expert says the mob is nothing to worry about because there are only six thousand members. Hell, behind those six thousand you’ve got a whole army, not counting all the people who aren’t Italian but who work with the mob.

These Sicilian Mafiosi will run into a wall, put their head in a bucket of acid for you if they’re told to, not because they’re hungry but because they’re disciplined. They’ve been brought up from birth over there to show respect and honour, and that’s what these punks over here don’t have. Once they’re told to get someone, that person hasn’t a chance. They’ll get him if they have to bust into his house in the middle of the night, shoot him, bite him, eat him, suck the blood out of his throat. They’ll get him because they were told to do it.

The above scenario does not seem strange to South Africans living in informal settlements, neglected suburbs and other areas out of the ordinary public’s eyes, or those reading the daily newspapers or listening to the news on radio or following the many television broadcasts of the Zondo commission. Here, we have the same mafia behaviour and inclinations which have become ingrained in the actions of some of the ANC’s top leaders in committing serious crimes, varying from state capture, election manipulation, to murder. We see various kinds of uncontrolled crime, present all over the country, especially from 1994 with the advent of the so-called “first democracy” in South Africa. What differs between the USA and the SA crime scenes, making the situation here much worse than in the USA, is that the American prosecution authorities act constructively and are locking up crooks constantly. However, as the Zondo commission under the guidance of an excellent judge revealed, the many culprits that seem mostly to be part of the ANC’s inner circle are able to get away with their crimes and corruption as the prosecution authorities demonstrate an outright failure to bring these perpetrators to book.

The example of Teresa’s whistle-blowing in the USA presented us with an excellent outcome: 27 top-ranking Mafiosi were jailed in America, while many more had been indicted or charged. Teresa himself was jailed for twenty years for his criminal activities before being paroled. Here in South Africa whistle-blowers are harassed, taken to court for libel and slander by the crooks who committed crimes and who are still walking free under the ANC’s safety-net, while other whistle-blowers are being murdered. The ANC’s policy’s is that if you are not found guilty before a court and have not be sentenced for an alleged crime, you are free to serve in the ANC’s highest positions. That policy includes awaiting the outcome of an appeal so you are considered not guilty until the court comes to a final verdict and thus that you may stay on untouched and comfortable in your position as lawmaker. The ANC list of 22 tainted candidates for the May 2019 elections and the positioning of some of these tainted ANCs later to senior posts in Parliament, confirm this policy very well. Jacob Zuma has been staying out of jail now for years, based on appeal on appeal against his alleged crimes in the arms deal, while the ANC’s top structure was also let off and walking free by the now disgraced Sereti commission.2-5

In this article the presence of crime — especially violence, gangsterism and related phenomena — and how it has infiltrated society and even the statutory institutions under the mandate of the ANC, will be reflected, evaluated and described.

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 12)

Article 13 is a continuation of the previous article (Article 12, titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity)”. This article, with the focus on violence and crime, is in sequence with articles 11 (Introduction) and 12 (Prosperity) already published on the ANC. The intention is also to analyse and to discuss further the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC to effect land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.2. Aims of article 13 (Continued from Article 12)

The primary intention of this project on the ANC) is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by specifically describing the profile of the ANC on the same basis as was done with Article 9 on the EFF and Article 10 on the DA.

Once more, we aim to evaluate the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of the mandate as ruler it received during the election of 8 May 2019.

2. Method (Continued from Article 12)

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to engage in successful land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources have been consulted to assess and to describe the facts that must guide us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to effect successful land reform from 2019 onwards.

The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

The manifestos, self-descriptions and public referees of the ANC were already reflected, evaluated and described in Article 11 (Introduction). The public referees of the African National Congress will further be reflected, evaluated and described in the under-mentioned division 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019.

3.2. Louw Appraisal Checklist

The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,6 will again be used for the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC. The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good classification, were again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s’ manifesto and  the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts, and interpreted as the researcher sees fit.6

3.3 The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 12)

3.3.1. South African violence and related crimes

One of the criteria of a failed state is the inability of a regime to guarantee and assure prosperity. Another one of the criteria for a good regime is to guarantee the presence and maintenance of law and order for its people, and thus to assure a peaceful society free from any crime, especially violence.

Undoubtedly South Africa has become a crime-ridden country, especially over the last two decades. Crime, in its broadest form, is totally out of control. It is practised on the highest levels by some members of our so-called political elite. The various judicial commissions, prominently the Zondo commission, bring this reality under our attention daily where it is alleged that certain top ANCs and their cronies stole millions of rand from the state, where murder in the form of assassinations to silence whistle-blowers is a common phenomenon, and where there is an almost complete lack of an effective prosecution system to punish criminals and murders.

South Africa is today a country of crooks without a single cowboy and a sheriff. If there is any doubt about the present-day South Africa being a gangster state and thus a failed constitutional state, just read the books of Adriaan Basson2, Pieter du Toit2, Pieter Myburgh5 and Jacques Pauw7. Through the mass penetration of crime in their daily dealings some of the political elite have become the South African Mafiosi, counting today nearly as many as Teresa’s1 thousands of Mafiosi in America. Unlike in America, the Mafiosi here are only partly friends with the politicians: many a time they are the politicians themselves. With such an official example it must thus not be a surprise that the practise of crime by some factions of society has become a common lifestyle.1,2,5,7

Crime takes various forms, from common theft, stealing, embezzlement, up to the most extreme form that should be punishable by hanging: Violence. Violence is central today in South Africa as the creator of poverty, political instability, inequality, as well as social, emotional and psychological traumas and despondency. It also tells us why prosperity is absent here. It plays a signifcant role in our country’s service-delivery unrest and the unstoppable chronic anarchy. The immense presence of violence in South African is well indicated by Bawa8 when he writes8:17: “South Africa is one of the most violent countries in the world”. But this violence is not experienced or observed at the same level by all the citizens; meaning that the middle and higher socio-economic groups, living and working in the better-off areas with good security systems, are mostly spared the extreme experience of daily rape, murder, robbery, etc. Predominantly, most sufferers of violence are the poor Blacks living in temporary shelters in isolated areas and informal settlements engulfed by crime and violence, far away from the security of the SAPS safety-net. But today the intensity of crime is spreading also to more developed areas and the poorer suburbs.8-10

Furthermore, it is clear that the statistics on violence and crime are understated, making the violence experienced by the poor far more comprehensive and in-depth than the general public realises. Their living conditions reflect not prosperity but utter adversity and hardship. What makes this crime condition so devastating, as well as a political pressure cooker waiting to explode, is the hard fact that nearly 30 million South Africans are poor, lacking sufficient housing accommodation, healthcare, basic education, work, and most of all not knowing when they or their children are going to be robbed, assaulted or murdered. Visible policing is mostly absent in those poor areas that are sheltering people marred by devastating life conditions that they can neither control nor are responsible for. These unfortunate people have been the forgotten, faceless ones for many years. They are people who are sometimes not only the ones to be robbed, assaulted and murdered, but who have in time become themselves robbers, attackers and murderers to survive in their dark, criminalised world. Some have an uncle, a nephew or brother as a parliamentarian but these have unfortunately forgotten them and their own homeland-past long ago because most politicians become with time blind and deaf to the outside world:  they live their lives ensconced in luxury and abundance.8-10

South Africa’s crime and violence, also as a barometer of the ANC regime as a failed government, will in the various next subdivisions be comprehensively described and be evaluated.

3.3.1.1. Western Cape

Even a cursory glance at South African media, persuades one that gangsterism and other crime-related activities such as the drug trade, theft, unrest, serious violence like assault, rape and murder, have taken over the Cape Flats of the Western Cape. It is not a sudden phenomenon, but a gradual development that has been gaining momentum over the last decade or two. It clearly betrays the ANC national government’s failure to maintain primary governmental structures. Prominent among these failures, must be counted the progressive downward spiral as to the quality of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and its ability to ensure daily crime prevention. It portends a very negative future for especially the poor living in the informal settlements as well as the lower-level socio-economic suburbs. The main sufferers and victims are Blacks, including the Coloureds. The immense long-term criminality in the Cape Flats is well reflected by the entrenched establishment of well-armed gangs, such as the Destruction Boys, which have become “armies” in their their own right. Organised, as well as common crime, associated with a very high murder rate, forced the ANC-regime to order the return of the South African National Defence Force (SADF) to the Cape Flats in July 2019. During the so-called Operation Prosper, the SADF was supposed to render assistance to the failed SAPS in areas identified as crime-ridden hotspots on the Cape Flats. (The “Cape Flats” is the collective name for a poverty-stricken, gang-infested area of more or less 25km between east and west, stretching from Bellville in the north, Blue Downs in the east, Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain in the south to Gugulethu. It totals 11 townships, including the places Lavender Hill, Bishop Lavis, the Steenberg district, Manenberg, Delft, Marcus Garvey, Elsiesrevier, Nyanga, Khayelitsha, Mfuleni, Philippi and Kraaifontein.9,11-17

But what is often overlooked, is that crimes such as gansterism and violence are permanent features of a society in peril and caught in social and economic instability, which is a direct result of South Africa’s poor governance over many years. The almost pathological conditions in the West Cape has seemingly been unknown to the ANC leadership since 1994. It is a situation of which the roots have so far never been addressed by government besides treating the symptoms so as to get the “fever down without healing the illness”. Four years ago the same kind of experiment in intervention was execited when the SADF was used in Operation Fiela, in cooperation with the SAPS, the South African Revenue Service (SARS), Home Affairs and a plethora of other state departments to raid, search and arrest anyone who did not have a reasonable explanation for anything in his/her possession. The immense criminality already established, and basically left untreated from 2014 to 2015, apart from ordinary law enforcement in 3 205 operations, is reflected by the official data in December 2015 when Operation Fiela began to be wrapped up. The data reflect: 41 000 arrests, the recovery of 737 vehicles, confiscation of 375 firearms and 10 homemade firearms. In 2018 Fiela Two was launched again, but seemingly without success. The present hopeless failure by the ANC regime to combat the immense criminality in the Western Cape and the need to activate the emerging use of the SADF, has forced the Police minister Bheki Cele to describe it as a “national effort to combat gangsterism in South Africa”. (This description applies one hundred present to the country’s gangsterism in general, but also specifically to its Parliament, its SAPS and many state enterprises where corruption is seemingly well entrenched).9,11-13,15-18

It seems that the SADF interventions since 2014, as well as the SAPS’s constant presence in the problematic Cape Flats since 1994, have never brought successes; the present ongoing criminal situation in the Western Cape confirms it. Although Fiela One did not bring much bloodshed on the side of the criminals, experts warn that the “Cape Criminality” is a deep-seated phenomenon that has developed over many years. It must be seen in terms of the active unrest and anarchy which have spread all over the country since 1994.  From a security perspective, it seems already to have moved into chronic anarchy, a phenomenon which the ANC regime either does not understand or ignores outright because they do not have the skills and ability to address it. This opinion is strengthened by the ANC’s poor fighting of criminality since 1994 and encouragement to engage in serious crime that the greater society may draw, given the bad example set by the ANC’s own law-makers, some of whom some were jailed for serious offences. Many other ANC law-makers and politicians are serious offenders too, but find themselves still outside jail because they have so far not been prosecuted by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).17,19

The fact that the ANC never took the Cape Flats crime issue seriously, is becoming more and more evident because it is a regime that still lives inside its old culture of lawlessness and disorder, coming from its pre-1994 days as a terrorist-revolutionary organisation. Ritchie19 aptly named it “real-politik at play”. Ritchie19 and Fokazi29 mention that, in light of the ANC’s neglect of the Cape Flats crime issue and their failure to do an in-depth analysis of the causes and to implement prevention and healing, the warning signs are there that Cape Town risks becoming the world’s most dangerous city.19,20

Hyman21 postulates that in reality Cape Town is already the world’s most dangerous city when he aligned its statistics with the world’s — until recently — most dangerous city: Caracas in Venezuela. The same author21 mentions that according to the Cape’s Citizen Council for Public Safety and Criminal Justice, which compiled a listing from official global statistics, Caracas was in 2017 the world’s murder capital with 3 387 murders. Hereto Cape Town’s death-by-murder rate rose from the 15th place in 2017 to the 11th place (with a growth of 15%) in 2018. Now, in 2019, if the body count is maintained in Cape Town with 3 900, Caracas is left far behind. Looking at the analysis of murders per 100 000 people, the rate for Cape Town of approximately 97.3 per 100 000 so far for the first four months of 2019, would propel it into the fourth place for 2018 on the global list where all the top cities in the top 10 are situated in Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil which are all at the centre of the international drug trade, reports Hyman21. A short analysis for 2019 for Cape Town by Hyman21 shows that the murders in the first four months of 2019 were 10.66 per day, while the number of murders between the three days of June 1 and June 3 were 62. The percentage rise in admissions of murdered victims to the Salt River mortuary so far this year has been 46%, while the projected murders for 2019 is 3 893 if the rate of killings continues.21

Other statistics are there to confirm Hyman’s21 labelling of Cape Town as the “World’s most dangerous city”. In May 2019 there were 331 murders in the Western Cape; in the month of June 2019 there were 448 murders in Cape Town (against the 344 murders of June 2018); in the first week of June 2019, 14 people were shot dead within 24 hours in Delft; on 5 July 2019 six women were shot and killed in the Marcus Garvey areas of Philippi in Cape Town, while on 6 July 2019 five men were also killed in the same area. On the weekend of 5 to 7 July 2019, 55 people were murdered in the greater Cape Town area. This year (over the last six months), 2 000 people have been killed so far in gang-related incidents in the Cape. Between January and June 2019 (six months) more than 44 people were killed in Bonteheuwel. The 2018/2019 SAPS report shows that in Nyanga, 289 people were murdered, followed by Delft with 247 murders and Khayelitsha with 221 murders.14,18-24

What the Cape Flats saga further reflects is the killing of persons under 30 years of age mainly, prompting Pinnock15 to call it “a war against young people”. What has been overlooked by the ANC’s bigwigs since their taking political power in 1994, is that most of the youth in the Cape Flats (as in most of the other socio-economically disturbed South African areas) grew up without supportive families, with poor education and no formal employment prospects (there are more or less 350 000 young people under 25 years outside education in the Cape). Many are adolescents who are victims of complex historical conditions, not of their own making, which are mixed into an inflammatory setup wherein Apartheid’s relocations, present-day migration and high levels of alcohol and drug abuse, play a prominent role.15

Looking at the monthly crime statistics, one finds that almost 1 300 murder victims arrived at the Cape Town mortuaries between January and April 2019, while between 1 November 2018 and 30 April 2019 (six months) a total of 1 875 people were murdered in the greater Western Cape. According to figures from Professor Lorna Martin20, head of forensic pathology in the Western Cape, by the end of April 2019 the city’s mortuaries in Tygerberg and Salt River handled 1 280 murder victims, with more than 50% having been shot. Martin20 states to Fokazi20 of the Sowetan that the region’s mortuaries (which can already not cope with the inflow of bodies — in such a way that bodies have to be stored in refrigerator shipping containers) are further overstretched by the storage of more incoming murdered bodies.14,19,20

Martin20, on the undercapacity of the mortuaries, responds as follows20:6: “Even though this is new [the R281-million Observatory mortuary] and we are moving in, it’s already not big enough. With the increase [in the amount of murders] that we’ve had lately, I don’t think we will cope.”

The names of Delft’s so-called “townships” (consisting in total of 500 000 residents), varying from “Blikkiesdorp”, “Tin-Can Town”, the “Hague” (the so-called “Bishopscourt” of Delft) to “Symphony Way” (where most of the evicted people find a “home”), reflect well the criminal and social disorder there. When Hyman25 writes as follows of “Symphony Way”, his description is fully applicable to all of the many “camps” around Cape Town where the city’s outcasts are forced to live and hope not to get murdered25:6:

It’s a place of constant waiting. An internment camp that represents the worst of apartheid’s legacy and the failure of the new governments to deal with it.

Pastor Ray McCauley26, president of the Rhema Family Churches and co-chair of the National Religious Leaders Council, put the situation as follows26:6: “Residents say enough is enough”. He said that 308 people were killed in June 2019 at the Cape of which 139 were shot and 118 stabbed.

In this regard, the editor18 of the Sowetan writes on the nonchalant attitude and lack of concern of South Africans as to what has happened concerning the number of murders at the Cape Flats over the last six months (with 1 875 murders) and the presence of immense crime and violence all over South Africa18:12:

That is a huge number of deaths in just six months but there was no outrage in SA, we carried on with our lives as if nothing had happened. This is the kind of news that would have made headlines every day in other countries until police were seen to be doing something to ensure the safety of innocent citizens.

The essentially permanent breakdown of law and order in the so-called “Cape Flats”, which Ritchie19 describes appositely as “a war zone run by crooks and murderers”, is primarily because the ANC regime failed to bring prosperity to the inhabitants in the form of good training, work opportunities and a safe environment. Instead, they have left the area on its own to struggle on haphazardly. This is a situation which Ritchie19 summarises as follows19:8: “What is happening in Cape Town, what has been allowed to develop on the forgotten and dumped communities of the Cape Flats, has to be a crime against humanity.” How much the ANC failed in the Cape Flats to bring prosperity to the citizens and how the present setup was allowed to deteriorate as a result of the ANC’s poor policing and law-enforcement, as well as corruption in the SAPS, is described by Watson17 as follows17:4: “Gangsters there are unafraid of fighting back as evidenced by the shooting of six police anti-gang unit members in June [2019].”

3.2.1.2. Violence is countrywide

But we must not be fooled to think that the Cape Flats represents an extraordinary, singular “bad” situation and place. Countrywide, crime has been created and maintained by the ANC regime’s poor governance since 1994. Just listen to Cyril Ramaphosa’s own confession in his speech during the state of the nation debate in June 2019 when he mentioned that the anti-gang unit was transferred to national control by police minister Bheki Cele because “hooliganism (gangsterism) is spreading across the country”.

McCauley26 describes the chaos of the constant murder-spree in South Africa at present well when he writes26:6:

The Western Cape is not the only province suffering from the violence. Throughout the country we are hearing of horrific stories where people are hijacked or robbed at gunpoint and their possessions taken.

According to the SAPS, there were 20 336 murders in South Africa, between April 2017 and March 2018, showing a 7% increase from the previous year.

This puts the country’s murder rate at close 36 people murdered per 100 000 of the population – with Cele [Minister of Police Bheki Cele] noting that 57 people are being murdered each day.

Crime in all its forms are indeed present and very active in the country, reflecting a country spinning out of control under the ANC regime. During its reign it has failed to improve the country’s infrastructure, economy and law and order, besides responding time after time by only implementing short-term crime interventions. The overview of Makhetha23 and Marupeng23 of an overwhelmingly crime-beset South Africa, based on the SAPS report for 2018/2019, is very informative, but shocking. They pinpointed Gauteng as a specific point of concern and write that the area of Ivory Park outside Tembisa remains one of the most dangerous areas in South Africa to live in: it recorded the highest number of house robberies with 373 (an increase of 52). The second was the Honeydew area (consisting of Northriding, Strydom Park and Randpark Ridge) with 329 house robberies (a decrease of 31), while Orange Farm (south of Johannesburg) reflects the highest number of rapes, 226. This statistic makes it the most dangerous area for women in the country. Regarding the number of murders committed, Johannesburg Central and its immediate surroundings areas remained the top murdering spot: 123 murders for 2019 against the 93 of 2018 (an increase of 30). In the second spot for high-murder areas are respectively Hillbrow and Jeppe with 111 cases each.23,24

The violent-crime behaviour and other disorders in the northern areas of Port Elizabeth which include Bethelsdorp, have been many years in the making. It has been, like most other crime-infected areas in the country, left essentially unattended by the ANC regime since 1994. In 2018, there was an SAPS intervention, but it was withdrawn later. On the prevalence of the uncontrolled murdering and other serious violent crimes in this area, Sain27 reports that with the SAPS intervention some results were obtained for a short while. Since May 2019 it has started to escalate again, leaving so far this year already 117 people murdered.27 This chaos, or lack of law and order, is well described by Sain27 when he writes27:8: “Impeccable sources say that in the last five months the Gelvandale Mortuary has recorded more than 100 gunshot wound related deaths.” The situation is now so serious that the inhabitants of the northern areas of Port Elizabeth have also started to plead for SADF intervention to safeguard them in some way.27

The presence of serious violent crimes countrywide is also reflected by the murder statistics showing the highest number of murders recorded at the top-30 police stations: Western Cape occupied 10 spots, Gauteng had eight spots and KwaZulu-Natal six spots.24

The 2018/2019 SAPS data28 reveal the following crime statistics countrywide: 21 022 murders (686 more than 2018 or a 3.4% increase), sexual offences increased by 4.6% (2 312 cases, bringing them to a total of 52 420), attempted murder increased by 4.1% (747cases) with 18 980 cases for 2019, common robbery increased by 2% to 51 765 reported cases and farm murders declined from 62 in 2018 to 47 in 2019.28

The latest SAPS statistics (2018/2019) reflects a rise in the reporting of crimes against women from 172 961 to 177 620, with a decline of 5.4% in the murders of women: 2 930 to 2 771. Regarding the reporting of crimes against children, the crimes decline from 43 842 to 43 540.  In this regard, 1 014 children were murdered, reflecting an increase from 985. The rate of sexual offences against women decreased by 0.4% to 36 597. There was an increase in sexual offences against children: 3.8%, to reflect 24 387 children affected. In total, general sexual offences has increased by 4.6 % to reach 52 420 offences (2 312 more). Sexual offences have reduced by over 10 000 cases since the 2009/2010 reporting year. On official rape-reporting stats, Gareth Newham30, head of the Justice and Violence Prevention programme at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), said that on average only one out of nine rape cases is reported, while in some communities it can be as low as one out of 22. Only between 4% and 8% of all rape reporting leads to sentencing).29-31

These SAPS statistics reports that children, affected by their daily lived environment of crime,  themselves joined the stream of murderers: out of 21 022 murders as many as 736 people were killed by children (Eastern Cape : 231, Western Cape: 170), while many of the children killed were victims of other children. In the same way, 4 196 common assaults were committed by  children.24,30,32

The ubiquitous presence of uncontrolled violent crime, intertwined with the constant growth of broad criminality in South Africa, is also evidenced by the call on 19 July 2019 by the DA for more specialised anti-gang units in the Gauteng Province. the presence of uncontrolled gang violence in the province was revealed in the research report of GIATOC, namely Ending the Cycles of Violence, which was focussed on the two areas, Westbury and Eldorado Park. John Moodley33 of the DA emphasised that the ANC regime’s general failure to ensure good law and order via the SAPS in Gauteng, engendered the same kind of chaos through gang violence as in the Cape Flats and had led directly to the undermining of job creation, schooling, youth and community development, further exacerbating the incidence of violent crimes.33

Violent crimes and the breakdown of law and order countrywide, including property crime, are doing one main thing: limiting the growth of prosperity. Until now, it does not seem to be a negative phenomenon for the ANC regime.

A specific category of violent crime which is growing countrywide is kidnapping. The Gauteng annual provincial crime statistics revealed that 125 cases of kidnapping were reported in Kempton Park, reflecting a 14.7% increase (making it the kidnapping capital of South Africa) for the period 2018/2019. In total there were 530 cases of kidnapping in Gauteng, with Free State 511, Eastern Cape 468 and Western Cape 458. Statistics revealed that the predominant motives for kidnappings were for robbery, rape or sexual assault, hijacking, domestic violence and for ransom.30,34

The 2018/2019 statistics show that another category of violent crime that reflects an increase is robbery. Robbery with aggravating circumstances has increased by 1.2% to 140 032 cases (meaning 1 668 more) countrywide. (In this category is included hijackings, cash-in-transit robberies and robberies at commercial and residential properties). Common robbery increased by 2% to 51 765 cases and arson by 5.5% to 4 083 cases (with an increase of 214). There were 113 089 cases of malicious damage to property, reflecting an increase of 1.4% (1 597 cases). In total the contact crimes with a violent element, as listed above, increased by 2.6%.30,34

Gareth Newham30, who made the shocking revelation about the 2018/2019 SAPS report, said that these statistics were almost six months out of date (closing on March 31, 2019) and did not reflect the current spate of high-profile violent crimes reported since 1 April in the media. This means the picture on all kinds of crimes, included violence, can be much worse.30

3.3.1.2.1. Highway violence

Another confirmation that the ANC regime’s maintenance of law and order collapsed, is the overtaking of violent gangsterism of the country’s roads and highways.35,36 On 9 June 2019 Hosken and Singh35 wrote in the Sunday Times35:2: “Motorists have been warned to stay off the N3 between Johannesburg and Durban after dark”.

Why this warning? Because the deadly attacks on foreign truck drivers, which started more than a year ago, are surging.

Hosken and Singh35 report that according to the Police 74 trucks were burnt and damaged, with 50 vehicles torched on the highway since April 2018. In the past year 213 truck drivers were killed of whom 12 were foreigners. The financial loss of cargo and trucks amounts to R1.2-billion. Towhat extent the government failed to protect not only the life of citizens, but the economy, is well described by the CEO of the Road Freight Association (RFA), Gavin Kelly35, when he says35:2: “If the government doesn’t act swiftly against this anarchy, which has increased over the past seven months, with 40 trucks torched in three weeks, RFA will consider taking action, including stopping deliveries across the country.”

How extensive these N2, N3, N7 and other road anarchies have become (in some way equal in seriousness to the chronic anarchy and lawlessness on the Cape Flats), is the control by gangs of the roads by blocking them for up to a day without any intervention by the security services. The ANC regime is utterly silent on the matter.35,37 Hosken and Singh35 report on these various occasions when gangsters took over the roads, as follows35:2:

Between Sunday and Tuesday [beginning of June 2019], gangs searching for foreign truck drivers besieged towns across KwaZulu-Natal  and Mpumalanga , pulling vehicles off the roads in Ermelo, Piet Retief, Newcastle, Amsterdam and Bethal. Foreign drivers were forced to surrender their cargo and vehicles.

An Ermelo truck-stop owner, who asked not to be named as he feared further attacks, said 500 trucks had been ‘held hostage’ at the stopover by the All Truck Drivers Association (ATDA).

Slabbert36 and others37 listed the other roads under attack and described as dangerous, besides the N3, as the R59, R550, R101, N1, N2 and N7.36,37

The permitted anarchic blockade of trucks on the highways without formal police intervention and interference is reflected by the fact that one of the blockades at Van Reenen Pass lasted undisturbed for 24 hours. This result has led with good reason to speculation and allegations of a conspiracy between the truck-blockers and the ANC regime and its law-enforcement institutions. The spread of anarchy as alleged to be perpetrated by the ATDA and other so-called anti-foreign-truck-drivers groups, with very little response to these events by the ANC regime still propagating its illusory policy of South African Prosperity, is further confirmed by Hestony’s managing director, Etuan van der Westhuizen35, who reported six trucks burnt at the beginning of June 2019 in Johannesburg and Cato Manor. Trucking company owner Barend Groenewald was in ICU at the Worcester Mediclinic after his truck was set alight in Touws River in the Western Cape in May 2019. More informative on this road anarchy is the testimony of Claudia Carvalho35, the owner of Hawkeye Trucker Association (HTA) which safeguards trucks on roads with armed escorts. Carvalho35 called it the “Wild West” and said35:2: “…it was ‘complete madness’ on the N3. ‘The situation, which began to develop a year ago, was largely ignored and is now totally out of control’.

Advocate Pria Hassan38, spokesperson of the Positive Freight Solutions Forum, who took a strong stand against the ongoing truck violence, was forced to take safety measures to guard her and her family after serious threats. She reports38:1:

Ons lewe nou elke dag in vrees. Dit is ‘n nuwe soort wetteloosheid wat kan oorspoel na ander bedrywe as die regering nie dringend en daadwerklik ingryp om dit te voorkom nie.

But this truck anarchy is at present going on, intensified and is spreading out westwards from the Cape to attacks on the N7 near Piketberg, Moorreesburg and Piekenierskloofpas, while an attack was recently reported on the N2 near the Strand too. The Cape provincial spokesperson Kenny Africa37 said on the ongoing and intensified truck anarchy which the ANC regime clearly failed to curb37:9: “This can’t keep happening. It’s bad at the moment”. A response or statement of action by the ANC regime’s Transport minister Fikile Mbalula still outstanding.37

Looking at the passive reaction of the ANC-regime on the road anarchy so far, which puts union interests first above those of the country (as enforced by the unions’ seat in the tripartite government alliance), it seems that the ANC regime wants to solve the matter solely as a workplace issue (wherein the appointment of foreign drivers, amounting to only 15% of the total drivers occupies a central position), rather than taking criminal steps against the perpetrators for robbery and murder. The rule of law seems to be placed second to the importance of ongoing anarchy, racism and ethnicity, taking at face value the words of the Police-ministerial spokesperson, Reneliwe Sereo35, when he says35:2: “A workplace joint inspection task team, which is coordinated by the labour department and which consists of various government departments including the police, has been established.”

The extent of anarchy on the roads against specifically foreign truck drivers (motivated by xenophobia, but which the ANC regime sees as criminality, free from racism or ethnicity), and the SAPS’s passivity in intervening, is well illustrated by Du Plessis38 when he writes38:1: “Die polisie het in die verlede magteloos toegekyk terwyl vragmotors beskadig word.”

Again, featuring prominently, is the lack of any official announcement of danger to the general public and anarchy lurking, or the assurance that drastic law enforcement and pertinent policing will be introduced, or the offering of NPA results in the arrest and punishment of the culprits concerned. There is no sign of the constructive cleansing of the criminals from the country’s roads. What is clear, however, is a regime not in control of the country; a regime which is allowing the murderers of  213 truck drivers and the crooks who burnt 74 trucks and did damages to the amount to R1.2-billion, to get off the hook, in the same as the perpetrators of state captue did not get punished and got away with their stolen billions of rand. Further confirming this open tolerance of anarchy, racism, ethnicity, xenophobia and murder by the ANC regime without punishing the criminals, and thus a further reaffirmation that South Africa has an impotent regime in Parliament, unable to safeguard its citizens’ rights and safety, is the arrogant and challenging utterance by the head of ATDA, Sipho Zungu35, when he allegedly said to Hosken and Singh35:2:

We have no problem with foreign trucks coming to SA, rather with foreigners driving for South African companies. South African drivers and their families are starving. Children cannot be sent to school. South Africans are losing jobs to foreigners, who don’t only take our jobs but also our rights to protect jobs.

Slabbert36 points out the “political empowerment” and hostility of ATDA, as reflected by their demand that in future only ATDA members should be appointed as drivers and that foreigners should be fired and that truck owners must pay R350 per month to ATDA for each of its members employed. Slabbert36 writes on the masked threat to companies which dare to “disobey” the ATDA’s demands and extortion36:8: “Maatskappye wat nie hieraan voldoen nie, word gedreig met weerwraak en dat hul voertuie aan die brand gesteek sal word.”

The endangering of the drivers’ lives went so far that a truck company was forced to obtain a court order on 31 May 2019 in the High Court of KwaZulu-Natal which forbade the ATDA to attack or threaten its members. But as the recent attacks at the beginning of September 2019 confirm, the violence is continuing, more intense than ever and spreading all over the country.36,37

The above kind of remarks against the truck drivers and their employers by unions reflect racism, ethnicity, xenophobia and the sanctioning of the murder against foreigners, as well as wreaking massive damage on trucking firms. They are remarks which should be brought under the attention of the Council for Human Rights, as well as the SAPS and the NPA for drastic action.  The passivity of the ANC regime can rightfully be seen as in some way allowing or even supporting such crimes.39

Secondly, in addition, we find the remark of the secretary general of the National Truck Drivers Federation, Siphesihle Muthwa35, to Hosken and Singh35 when he said35:2: “…the issue would go away if ‘employers did the right thing’.” This is undoubtedly an open threat to the lives and property of truck owners which again needs the attention of the SAPS and the NPA to enforce the law.35

The anarchy in the long-distance trucking industry has another aspect, confirming again the lack of a stable government to ensure law and order. This entails robbing trucks of their valuable loads, as well as open theft from trucks on our roads. Slabbert36 reports36:8: “…op die N2-hoofweg tussen Oos-Londen en Kokstad waar vragmotors weens die kronkelende en heuwelagtige paaie so stadig as soos 30km/h ry, spring misdadigers op die vragmotors, sny die seile wat die vrag bedek oop en gooi die vrag af; 36:8: “… in Beaufort-Wes gebeur dit [stropery] sommer by die verkeersligte”; en36:8: “Belhamels gooi rotse van brûe op voertuie om hul tot stilstand te dwing sodat hulle die vrag kan steel”.

The utter failure of the ANC to instill law and order on the roads and the comprehensiveness and seriousness of the problem which is simply being ignored by the ANC leaders is described by Ehlers40 as follows40:10: “The shocking statistics regarding trucks and cargoes burnt within the past 12 months should long ago have been addressed as a national problem bordering on civil war.”

Looking at the chaos and anarchy in the trucking industry created by crooks and murderers, it must be clear for Ehlers40 that we do not have a national government to combat the country’s massive crime, especially violence. We have again been captured by a new kind of “Zuptas of the road”.

3.3.1.2.2. Railway anarchy and violence

The above road anarchy and violence are echoed by the similar railway anarchy and violence. South Africa has suffered many arson attacks on the rail system over many years. It specifically started in the Western Cape and has spread gradually to become a countrywide phenomenon. It  cost the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa) and Transnet  close to a billion rand, with 1 496 rail carriages destroyed. Virtually not a single arrest for the 2017/2018 financial year of the was made by the SAPS.41,42

Pijoos43 refers to the chaotic conditions pertaining to the country’s railway system, on which millions of the poor are dependent for their daily travel to work, schools, shops, hospitals, etc., as43:9: “Stranded commuters, lengthy delays, stolen railway tracks, deadly train crashes and burning coaches — this the state of the country’s railway system”.

Including in this failure is the railway infrastructure, which is itself broken. Besides arson, there is immense vandalism of railway property. A recent cellphone video showed the George Goch station in Johannesburg being stripped of copper cables, windows, doors and even the roof covering within two days during a strike of railway policement. It seems, as with all the other schemes of the ANC regime that have collapsed, that it does not have a long-term solution. On the whole, it does not seem as if the ANC regime cares about the deterioration of South Africa’s railway infrastructure. When it becomes a headache, the ANC-regime, through sporadic, insignificant efforts, addresses the chaos it created by means of a superficial short-term approach, treating the “symptoms without the underlying causes”. For instance, in an effort to “handle” the violence and arson on their trains, Prasa’s short-term solution was the launching of the so-called “railway enforcement unit” whereby about 100 officers were deployed to ensure the safety of trains in the Cape Town area. The input was insignificant and nothing else than political window-dressing: it was only a trickle to rescue the railways.43

How serious the situation is for Prasa (Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa), seen from an economic viewpoint, is reflected by its 2017-2018 annual report. Pijoos43, after studying the report, warns on 10 July 2019 that the long-distance passenger train service of Prasa was declining to lower than acceptable levels. Pijoos43 reflects on the Prasa-report as follows43:9:

Passengers have dropped from 2.8-million in 2009-2010 to 465,647 [19%] in 2017-2018, while trains run have dropped from 6,604 to 1,770 [30%]. Both trains run and passenger patronage have dropped drastically at a rate indicative of a service that has totally collapsed.

3.3.1.3. Extraordinary violent crimes

More recently two further forms of violent crime have broken out country-wide, namely 1) violence against women and children (gender violence); and 2) violent crime against foreigners (xenophobia). Because of the comprehensive attention offered by the media, the public and especially the Ramaphosa regime to it and the outright political opportunism around the two forms of violence, they need to be evaluated and discussed in depth. These two issues are indeed part of the greater crime culture, or better: the crime mentality of many South Africans. To understand it, will help us to understand better the already discussed violence in the Western Cape as well as the epidemic of violent crime in the whole country.

3.3.1.3.1. Gender violence

Regarding another recent tragic phenomenon connected to crime, is the alleged appalling and often brutal way men treat women and children in South Africa. This is being seen in some way as having triggered a nationwide uprising to combat the evil, and described by some in the media as one of the most tumultuous and emotional episodes in our country’s history, the editor44 of the Sunday Times wrote recently. Indeed, the seemingly sudden rise in gender-violent crimes invoked promises of punishment of the male culprits by the ANC’s top leadership, even a presidential promise which reads44:3:

I will propose to cabinet that all crimes against women and children should attract harsher minimum sentences. We agree with the women of the country that the state should oppose bail and parole for perpetrators of rape and murder against women and children.

The minister of justice, Ronald Lamola45, continued where Ramaphosa stopped by saying that the cabinet would consider requests for a referendum on the issue, while the president of the ANC Women’s League, Bathabile Dlamini45, asked for a law to forbid bail for persons accused of violence against women.45

Supporting these “ANC royals” in their “revenge seeking and taking” is the opinion and standpoint of the “Zulu royal”, King Goodwill Zwelithini46 whor recently during Umkhosi weLembe (Shaka Day), addressing hundreds of his subjects, said46:24:

…maybe it would be better if once a man was found to have rape, he should be handed to ‘men like us’ to cut off his manhood. This would end this thing(rape), this should be done in a way that would show the world that the Zulu nation does not tolerate this shame.

Palesa Lebitse47 also brings the present shocking state of rape and gender-based violence to our attention by pointing out that the chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng recently reflected on the complexity of  rape and gender-based violence by showing that we are not confronted here with a sudden pathological surge of evil-doing men, but a deep-rooted problem which has been a long time coming. For Lebitse47, the so-called “phenomenon” of gender-based violence in 2019 is due to the long-term neglect and the “untouchability” of the problem by the various authorities within the ANC government, specifically the Department of Women, the SAPS and the NPA.47,48

To argue, as do Ramaphosa44 and Lamola45 and others inside the ANC circle, that present legislation on gender violence is insufficient, reflect a lack of knowledge by them of the country’s battery of laws on this issue. Indeed, effective legislation exists to tackle and solve the problems.  What is missing is an effective government to govern and which is able to effectively use  the existing laws to address and solve the matters. We will hear for a long time in future horrifying stories of the maltreatment of women and children — as we are constantly hearing the ongoing shocking testimonies before the Zondo and other commissions on state corruption — but both approaches to the offering of “confessions” will bring nothing constructive in the end. Results such as prosecutions will stay absent. Regarding gender-based violence, short-term rhetoric by the ANC’s leaders are being heard daily, exclusively for the opportunistic gains of the ANC and support for the ANC’s calculated diverting of attention away from their regime’s corruption and dishonesty since 1994.31,49-51

The minister of Justice and Correctional Services, Ronald Lamola52, is treading water when he reflects on the recent prominence of gender violence by saying it52:2: “…remains a sore point and requires all of us to do our bit to curb this scourge”, and that52:2: “…establishing more sexual offences courts remained an important step in ‘their quest to eradicate gender-based violence and femicide’.” In this context he further states52:2: “…an additional 15 courts rooms were adapted in line with the sexual offences model and this brought the total number of courtrooms adapted to 90. We are planning a further 11 courtrooms in the current financial year”.

What Lamola52 did not say loudly was that these courts have gathered dust since there establishment, because they are under-used, primarily because the promulgated laws to curb these kinds of crimes are not effectively used and the NPA lacks capable staff while the SAPS fails the people in combatting crime. This makes all the loud talk of Lamola, together with that of Ramaphosa on their supposed fight against gender violence, just hot air, once more.39,53,54

How much Ramaphosa and his ministers are confused and uninformed about the established and appropriate legislation already in place to fight and punish all kinds of crimes against women and children — but also seemingly taken up emotionally by the present protests and apparently orientated to use the situation opportunistically — is evidenced by Versluis31. She writes31:6:

Die minimum vonnisse is reeds jare lank lewenslank vir moord met voorbedagte rade, verkragting wat met roof of aanranding gepaardgaan, ‘n verkragting van ‘n kind, groepverkragting of meer as een verkragting. Vir die meeste ander seksmisdade, roof met verswarende omstandighede, asook moord sonder voorbedagte rade is die minimum vonnis 15 jaar vir ‘n eerste oortreding.

A further contradiction in Ramaphosa and his ministers’ opportunistic power-play that the present crimes against women and children are abnormally high and increasing all over the country, is the evidence that although the total cases in 2019 stand at 52 420 sexual offences, the peak before 2019 was higher and the 2019 number represents a reduction of over 10 000 cases since 2010. The latest SAPS statistics (2018/2019) reflects a decline of 5.4% in the murders on women: 2 930 to 2 771, the crimes against children declined from 43 842 to 43 540 and sexual offences against women decreased by 0.4% to 36 597.29,31,55

In regard to Ramaphosa’s hypocrisy to “commit” the ANC regime to rectify the maltreatment of children that suddenly “emerged” in 2019, it is important to emphasise (on paper at least), that South African legislation already protects and cares for the country’s children through the Children Act which was promulgated by the ANC regime itself in 2005.56 Pearl Boshomane Tsotetsi56, a freelance writer, states that the Act demands that parents ensure their children are financially supported and taken care of, but it is clear for her that the socio-economics under the present regime nullifies the fulfilment of this parental duty, primarily because of the parents’ growing poverty, leaving them destitute and unable to afford the necessities of life for their children. She writes56:20:

…the problem is that ours isn’t a country that encourages poor parents to be self-sufficient, and in turn to effectively take care of their offspring. With such a high rate of unemployable people and the economy in the gutter, how are parents meant to financially support their children when they can’t even support themselves?

On the ANC regime’s failed economics, which are creating only poverty and unemployment for the country’s citizens, Tsotesti56 points out firstly that the R430-a-month social grant for a child is totally insufficient. Secondly, she shows the frightening numbers of the poor who are suffering of hunger, indicating that among pregnant woman aged 12 to 50 as much as 16.3% lived in households where children or adults suffered from hunger because there was not enough food, and that 35% were living in households that ran out of money to buy food for five or more days a month. In this context, there is the bleakness of poverty that makes it difficult for people to better themselves or to ever escape poverty. A permanent culture of poverty and despair plays a role in causing poor mental health and depression, which could have explained why a mother recently killed her four children with rat poison. It is clear that, notwithstanding how much the country, especially the leadership of the ANC-regime were “shocked” by the gender violence in 2019, there is a lack of focus by the media and the public on the specific role of the failed government in these kinds of tragedies around children, primarily because of its outright lack of financial support and provision of a mental help service for struggling mothers. At the moment, as with the “maltreatment of women issue”, the ANC regime of Ramaphosa is fleeing from its direct responsibility to children by their efforts to cast it as a non-political issue, while in reality they stand accused of the tragedies which their failed politics have caused in 2019.56 Tsotesti56 points to the ANC regime’s failure (and their present political opportunism)  when she writes56:20: “Lack of resources, lack of effective politicking and a lack of social workers (while thousands of social work graduates are unemployed) mean single mothers are left to fend for themselves in untenable situations that are not of their own making.

The poverty of women is strongly related to gender violence, especially those women who are single mothers and must care for children on their own. Busi Mavuso57, CEO of Business Leadership SA, points to the presence in the country of an all-over gender inequality which she believes contributes to engendering the suppression of the female and triggering gender violence. Mavuso said that there was a growing crisis in the social construction of the South African society: South African women who are permanently employed earn 22.7% less than men, and the country’s mothers, wives and daughters face a future where their work will be less remunerated than that of their male counterparts. There has been an entrenched lack of equality under the ANC regime since 1994 (for which they now cry foul as part of the mistreatment of women), placing the female in the traditional men’s world, together with female inequality inserted as part of a wider process whereby certain social and racial groups are neglected or discriminated against, the perpetuation of which the ANC regime makes itself guilty. Mavuso writes57:26:

The lack of equality in our own private rooms in a climate of low growth and confidence levels played itself out in a rising tide of femicide, which our country’s statistical agency calls the intentional killing of females because they are females.

The problems of patriarchy, some of whose norms and standards are inherited from our colonial past and some of which come from our different cultural influences, need to be addressed. All of us – the government, business and civil society – need to find common purpose on just how we start to deal with a system that goes against equality.

Professor William Gumede58 of the School of Governance, Wits University, offers Mavuso57 a clear picture of the many wrongs of cultural influences, inherent to the country’s patriarchy which is directly responsible for gender violence. For Gumede58 these aberrations must go first before the ANC regime may dare to speak further of a “sudden” rise in 2019 of gender violence and the “urgent need” for legislation to combat it. He writes58:26:

Patriarchy, which informs most South African cultural, social and religious traditions, is at the root of violence against women.  To end this scourge, any cultural belief, custom or practice that encourages inequality between men and women must be made illegal; all traditions and social practices must be democratised.

Gumede58 enumerates the following cultural beliefs, customs and practices, which have all been supported and maintained by the ANC regime since 1994, notwithstanding the party’s condemnation of gender violence, that should be abolished, erased and nullified58:26:

  • Customary law that made women defer to men and preclude them from inheriting property or becoming traditional leaders;
  • Initiation schools encourage patriarchy, aggressive masculinity and a violent response rejection;
  • Patriarchal traditions such as lobola;
  • The reed-dance ceremonies that objectivise women;
  • Religious practices which undermine the rights of women;
  • Improper school curriculum.

The editor59 of the Sunday Times also shoved the role of established cultural beliefs, customs and practices in triggering gender violence into the lime-light by pointing out our two-tier legal system which is forcing discrimination on the poor and rural Black women with little access to justice. Pertinent here is the ANC regime’s direct contribution to the abuse of the women in society over many years as “good”, which has now been re-established by the Traditional Courts Bill. This Bill was passed at the end of the fifth Parliament, supported by the majority of MPs during which the assenting votes by the ANC MPs including ANC women MPs, were prominent. These MPs also specifically voted to remove a crucial so-called “opt out” clause which would allow rural women to opt out of matters before the traditional courts in order to seek justice in statutory courts. There is further evidence that some women, appearing before traditional courts presided over by male traditional leaders, are sometimes not allowed to attend the proceedings simply because they are women. In other cases where they are allowed to attend, they are not allowed to speak, while the testimonies offered by women were belittled. The Bill, making Ramaphosa’s presidential promises that the ANC regime was going to fight the abuse of women simple hypocrisy, was passed despite a legal guideline that it was unconstitutional. It is now before the National Council of Provinces. [Note: Traditional courts are empowered to adjudicate matters including theft, malicious damage to property, burglary, crimen injuria and other matters in which women frequently experience forms of discrimination such as in a customary-law marriage, guardianship of children and inheritance matters].59

The criminologist, Professor Christian Bezuidenhout31 reflects on the chaos of the present social system in South Africa which the ANC now wants to solve bye means of a quick and easy solution in the form of new laws and new kinds of judicial punishments, notwithstanding the fact that the problem has been created and nurtured over 25 years of rule by the ANC itself.  He postulates31:6:

Dit spruit uit ’n komplekse wisselwerking tussen omgewingsfaktore en die genetiese material van die individu [geslagsgeweld is ‘n ekspressiewe misdaad met ‘n sterk emosionele motivering].

Die probleem in Suid-Afrika is dat kinders in ‘n groot deel van die samelewing konstant aan geweld blootgestel word.

In sommige gemeenskappe word geweld beskou as die medium tot sukses.

Dié tipe misdade is die moeilikste om af te skrik. Dit gebeur ook gewoonlik in die privaatheid van die huis.

Meer polisie of swaarder strawwe gaan nie help nie.

The opportunism of the Ramaphosa regime to misuse the issue of the current gender violence to score political points is proven over and over by supporting evidence. The extreme opportunism of the Department of Women — established as the sole, exclusive government vehicle to better and to safeguard the rights of women and children — is increasingly coming under the spotlight. The question strongly arises as to why the department has not executed on its mandate since its creation, already turning Ramaphosa’s recent presidential promise into reality? It can rightly be asked further which constructive legislation on the rights of women and children has it propagated and promulgated, and what evidence there is to reflect that it is engaged in a comprehensive team effort with the NPA and the SAPS to improve the life circumstances of women and children? Why has there been such a “sudden and immense” rise in crimes related to women and children over the last two years if the department had been doing its utmost to curtail such violence and violations of women’s and children’s rights?60,61

Most importantly, why has the Department of Women not taken the SAPS to the ConCourt on neglect of duty when women accused the SAPS that rape victims had to face uncaring cops who fobbed them off with callous remarks when the wanted to lay charges? Fokazi48 writes in a very focussed manner on these accusations against the SAPS, reflecting the description of the head of the Western Cape’s Thuthuzela Care Centre regarding some of the phrases women often hear when they try to report rape to police48:4:

  • Go home, don’t bathe or wash your underwear for the next few days, and come back on Monday.
  • He only used his finger to penetrate you, it’s no big deal.
  • This case is weak, do you really want to put yourself through this?

It is thus of great importance to consider the actions of the Department of Women to make an evaluation of the ANC regime’s intentions and actions since 1994 around women and child welfare and care. This can also give us an indication if Ramaphosa’s presidential promise on rectifying the affairs of women and children may be taken seriously, in the same vein as all of his political promises made in the May-2019 election and his many other post-May 2019 promises on job creation, an end to crime and invigorated economic growth. As a guideline for evaluating ANC policies on the importance of women and children, as represented by the Department of Women’s actions, one may consult Katharine Child’s61:4 recent article in the Sunday Times of the 8 September 2019, very descriptively entitles: “Plenty of pricey talk, no action”.

Child61 depicts a failed and incapable ANC Department of Women under the leadership of its ministers Bathabile Dlamini and Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, including many highly-paid officials, who were supposed to implement their official duty directive, which reads61:4: “…the custodian of the promotion and advancement of gender quality and the empowerment of women”. Child61 makes it very understandable why the publicly expressed outrage at the high rate of murder and rape of women takes place without the truth behind this chaos. Clichés by the department’s present minister, Mate Nkoana-Mashabane, have dealt with the “ideal man-woman relationship in South Africa”, and she has also said that61:4: “We [women] cannot continue to live lives that are constantly under siege and where we are not all enjoying the fruits of our constitutional democracy. Enough is enough, we need justice”. This is hypocrisy of the highest order. It is at the same time an excellent example of how the ANC’s leadership, specifically that of the Ramaphosa regime, directs the people’s attention away from the real culprits that have abandoned women and children since 1994 with their corrupt governance: the ANC leadership itself.61

It is by no means an exaggeration to say that the Department of Women has constantly failed to address gender-based violence. It has indeed itself acknowledged that it never meets its prescribed targets but “only held dialogues with women” with useless travelling around the country and the world to promote these so-called departmental dialogues to “better” the position of women and children. There were no constructive and concrete outcomes confirmed by the Department of Women in its annual performance indicator which requires true “interventions to enhance prevention and elimination of violence against women and children”. It is amid this chaos (mostly unknown to the public) that Ramaphosa is now shamelessly trying to capitalise on the gender-based violence issue with his sudden so-called “judicial intervention and interference in the acts of criminal men”, while he stays silent on his government’s failed Department of Women.60-62

Child61 gives an in-depth description of the Department of Women’s lack of fulfilling its annual performance indicator. She states that when the Parliamentary oversight committee listened to the Department of Women’s annual performance plan in July 2019, its members were unimpressed. Indeed, in a statement afterwards the committee said61:4: “…it could not understand the issues the department is working on as there is no visible community outreach and it did not see tangible achievements”, writes Child61. The parliamentary researcher Kashiefa Abrahams,61 after studying the most recent report of the Department of Women, describes the official explanations by the leadership of the Department about its “national dialogues” held, which allegedly were set up to discuss gender violence, as “incoherent”.61

To give insight into the failed performance of the Department of Women — confirming also the failed performance of the ANC-regime starting from 1994 and telling us in some way again of the immense state capture between 2008 and 2017 — it is of great value to read Child’s61 summary of the Department’s recent annual report.61 Child61:4 writes that of the department’s R244m budget in 2017/2018 about R80m was allocated to the Commission for Gender Equality, lacking a declaration for how and why the R80 million was used. Of the rest, the lion’s share — R72.4m — went to salaries for the 101 staff members. In addition to these salaries, R13m was spent on travel and subsistence, R11.5m on “property managers” and R6.3m on consultants [with R1.2m last year on consultants to investigate the distribution of free “sanitary dignity products”. This last-mentioned  project has after two years still not been finalised].61

Child61 also mentions that the report stated that staff members went on four official overseas trips (without reporting how many staff went on the trips) which the Department recorded as “achievement”! Of the R13m spent on travel, R4m was for overseas travel to destinations such as New York to attend the UN Commission on the Status of Women conference in 2017. Further there were a three-day meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Swaziland and a five-day AU meeting in Ethiopia. There was again a SADC meeting in Ethiopia to prepare for the next UN Commission on the Status of Women conference in New York in 2018. Moreover, under the category “achievements” listed in the report was attendance at a “moral regeneration movement” meeting in Kimberley in 2017, a Women’s Day celebration on 9 August last year in Kimberley, an interdenominational meeting on gender-based violence in Upington, a “cancer-awareness-raising imbizo”, the launch of the 16 days of activism campaign and a men’s meeting in Port Elizabeth. It also became clear that of the 101 staff 47 were in senior positions, with annual salaries averaging R1 million each. This “salary capture” prompted the IFP MP, Liezl van der Merwe61, to call the Department of Women in Parliament an “employment agency”, asking questions about the need for consultants [with a R6.3m budget] when most of its staff had seemingly high training as reflected by their high salaries.61

Another issue pointing to the failure of the Department of Women under Mate Nkoana-Mashabane to govern properly on behalf of the ANC cabinet the affairs of women and children, is the nonperformance by other ultra-motivated women’s rights fighters, such as  Dlamini, Goodwill Zwelithini, Cele, and other top executives of the ANC regime in addressing crimes against LGBTQ+ people. This passivity of specific politicians undoubtedly led thereto that in the first place there are blind spots in South African data on the crimes against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer community, wrote Hlatshaneni63 recently. This makes SAPS data unreliable and sub-standard while the pending legislation on hate crimes initiated by the ANC regime is blocking data collection on LGBTQ+ crimes. There is not any official effort to calculate the true presence of gender-based violence by trying to establish the incidence of unreported gender violence. Lisa Vetten63, a gender activist and researcher reports that the last official report on the rate of unreported cases of gender-based violence was released 22 years ago.  But from the statistics (starting in 2009), emanating from nongovernmental organisations and their investigations of LGBTQ+ crimes, the presence of these crimes is high (profiled as unreported or unrecorded cases). It has shown a strong upwards trajectory from 2011, writes Vetten63. For a person who has declared him on the side of the victims of gender violence, Ramaphosa has shown ignorance of these LGBTQ+ crimes which may be seen as a selective escape from a kind of gender-based crime which is politically, socially, culturally and religiously controversial, as well as pertaining to a specific lifestyle not accepted by the greater society of patriarchy.57,58,63

The LGBTQ+ crimes are, as a part of gender violence and thus of the same importance, by and large totally ignored by the ANC regime. Ramaphosa’s silence here seems significant. Letsike63, director of Access Chapter 22, writes that LGBTQ+ crimes have occurred in South Africa for decades, forming an important element of gender-based violence, but are completely ignored by the ANC as not having any importance.  There are some shocking cases of SAPS discrimination when it comes such gender cases shocking, especially because it has been tolerated by the ANC regime during its failed crime-prevention programme to eliminate xenophobia and gender violence since 1994. Letsike63 reflects on the discriminatory behaviour of the SAPS against the LGBTQ+ gender group as follows63:2:

We have actually seen research that showed that 88% of crimes against the LGBTQ+ community go unreported or unrecorded.

One of the reasons for this is when investigating officers do not look at hate or bias as possible motive if the person’s gender identity or sexual orientation is known.

Letsiko63 elaborates further63:2:

Another reason the stories of hate crimes against this community went untold was that the criminal justice system still harboured bias against complainants from the LGBTQ+ community.

We still have a very high level of secondary victimisation where police themselves will victim-blame or intimidate a person for instance, and ask “are you a boy or a girl?” These are the things that discourage victims from reporting these cases”.

Lebitsi47 places the ANC’s outright failure over years to safeguard persons through its judicial arms, the SAPS and the NPA, against gender violence, prominently in focus. His analysis again confirms Ramaphosa and his regime’s opportunism in their misuse of the so-called “2019 gender violence”. Lebitsi writes47:13:

And in interrogating issues around cases involving sexual abuse and gender-based violence, I pondered about the National Prosecuting Authority and its role in ensuring that it too interrogates these issues.

I ended up asking myself: where is the national director of public prosecutions, Shamila Batohi, given the gravity of sexual abuse? But I remembered that Batohi has not even uttered a single word about the calamity of sexual abuse.

I did however remember how a friend of mine once told me about a joke at the NPA about certain rape cases: “at the tavern, to the tavern, from the tavern – no prosecution”.

The bottom line is that the way the NPA treats cases may be a major contributor to this national crisis and may also perpetuating rape myths that plague our society.

Giving us another glimpse into previous official promises by the ANC regime which were made to women and children, similar to the one of Ramaphosa, to “wipe out gender violence by the law” which never went further than mere utterances, is that of the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa) a year ago. In June 2018 the newly appointed chairperson of Prasa, Khanyisile Kweyama64, promised to set aside women-and-children-only train carriages on Cape Town‘s Metrorail when she said64:7: “In Women’s month, we will assign terms of reference on how we are going to proceed to implement it”.

A month later in 2018 she apparently made the same commitment to the civil society group #UniteBehind, namely to personally oversee the implementation of the new carriages by August 2018. When #UniteBehind sent a letter with  updates to her in August, it received no response. Further enquiries at Prasa tell another story as to the initial promise of Kweyama: the excuse was that there were other more important issues than the women-and children-only train carriages. Prasa further states that there was a shortage of usable train carriages as well as a lack of security guards available to guard the women and children. So far, until September 2019, requests for updates from #UniteBehind were ignored by Prasa. The official Prasa promise stays just a promise, ignoring the safety of women and children on the Cape Town Metrorail, a negative situation which has now been continuing for years under the ANC regime.44,64

It seems as if the Department of Women is untouchable when it comes to being called to account inside the ANC regime which is characterised by ongoing poor performances and failure. This untouchability is well revealed by Child61,62 when she recounts that when she asked the Department to answer certain questions regarding its 2017/2018 annual report and actions, its spokesperson, Shalen Gajadhar’s only reaction was to send copies of seven speeches made by the Department’s staff! 61,62

It is important to consider, in terms of Ramaphosa’s promise to introduce “extreme laws” to punish men treating women “badly”, that he seemingly lacks an in-depth understanding that South Africa is not only a violent country for women, but also for men. Ramaphosa’s “women’s promise” fails as such to imply an improvement of our failed criminal justice system to serve both gender victims of violence, meaning also men. Moreover: Ramaphosa should have said that South Africa was a violent land for women and men, but he ignored the matter as his regime has been turning a blind eye since 1994 to the violent Western Cape. Lisa Vetten66 of Wits University states in this context that police murder statistics showed that a man was 5.6 times more likely to be murdered than a woman in South Africa. This avoidance in addressing violence against men again highlights the political opportunism of Ramaphosa with his “suddenly selecting and addressing” of the so-called “women’s issue”. He knows well that the chances at this moment of bringing lasting and comprehensive changes to the maltreatment of woman and children are zero. It is a tragic situation which has developed strongly after 1994 under the ANC regime. Evidence shows that the ANC regime can do nothing constructive to the matter. Promises like that of Ramaphosa are all that the ANC can offer South Africans.61,62,65,66 It is a standard part of the ANC’s well-known political practice, what Melody Emmett65;15 referred to as the phenomenon of “lies, lies and more lies” and Child describes as61:4: “Plenty of pricey talk, no action”.

Real evidence contradicts the apparent stereotyping by the ANC leadership of all men as beasts — the “exclusively male transgressors of gender violence” (excluding of course the ANC leadership!) who suddenly arrived in 2019 in South Africa. This profiling of all men as psychopathic characters reflects thankfully only one clear meaning after it was stripped of its emotional and political posturing: an utterly sick political opportunism in the mindset of the ANC.52,67 The author Azille Coetzee’s67 argues that all men are undoubtedly not bad and have not suddenly become perpetrators of gender violence. For her, there is a gender-violence problem, but it is a chronic problem, extending back in the post and in which the behaviour of the ANC and its members also stand accused.52,67

Finally, the question is why the so-called “appalling and often brutal way men treat women in South Africa” was only suddenly recognised in 2019, positioned, and undertaken to be addressed by the ANC regime’s leadership after 25 years of their failed governance. Never in the ANC’s previous elections promises was the matter brought up or recommendations made to rectify it. It is clear that the ANC’s 25 years of poor rule has discredited it on all the levels associated with good governance and excellent leadership. It is forcing Ramaphosa to misuse any emotional and political issue that distracts the attention from the ANC’s delinquent rule and which can easily be used to put him in the lime-light again as the so-called “good” leader after his presidency had started to falter from June 2019. Opportunism seems to be strongly present in the ANC regime nowadays60:4: “…sincerely striving to better the lives of women and children”.

The current one-sided, exclusive over-emphasis of the maltreating of women and children  by the pro-Ramaphosa media and the ANC itself, stands totally in contrast with their ignoring of gang and taxi violence where the gangsters and the taxi bosses and drivers are apparently above the law and the lot of the innocent, suffering people around them deemed insignificant. The ANC fails in this context to issue a similarly public “Ramaphosa empathy” at the individual level to citizens who have been flagrantly abused by public officials by successive ANC regimes. Gumede49 sees a syndrome of “little empathy of Ramaphosa for the mass of victims gripped and suffering in the observable political disorder of the country”. This obvious passivity, observable in the crisis on crimes committed against women, is similar to the passivity that the government shows on crime in general committed against the individual citizen, as well as the passivity recently showed during the crimes perpetrated against foreigners.68-71

The opportunistic effort by the ANC regime and Ramaphosa to reverse the ANC’s present political turmoil by misusing the maltreatment of women and children is wrong. Notwithstanding the tragedy around the abuse of women, children and foreigners, it is a secondary matter when viewed against the total criminal mess the country finds itself in. The main reason for these criminal outcomes is the crooked ANC which created and nurtured these crimes over the past 25 years. To eliminate these crimes, it is also needed to eliminate the ANC as a regime because it fails to practise law enforcement within the existing legal framework, besides their own political and legal transgressions, as well as their lack of taking responsibility for their extensive delinquencies. Pelser45 is very much here correct in emphasising the right of the innocent citizens (including the mass of innocent men) to defend their civil rights, when he writes45:6:

As ons gaan toelaat dat die demone van eiereg, wraaksug en growwe veralgemenings oor mans of buitelanders uit hul hokke kom, om van die soeke na nuwe sondebokke nie te praat nie, gaan ons problem as nasie vererger. Wetstoepassing is die sekerste manier vorentoe.

Hierdie regering gee die barbare in die samelewing al so lank vrypas om te steel en te verkrag en te moor, soms met opset en soms uit blote onbevoegdheid, dat niemand meer die staat se waarborge glo dat reg en orde weer afgedwing kan word nie.

Gumede72 brings a reality to the crimes against women, a matter which the ANC regime has carefully tried to sweep under the carpet for a long time in their frenzied political opportunism, when he writes72:22:

What appears to be a sudden alarming rise in violence against women is in fact the continuation of a rape culture that has been with us since the apartheid dispensation, but which has not been spoken about loudly before, the victims shamed or feared into silence or a stubborn denial of the enormity of the crisis.

What is new, though, is that the spells of silence about the extent of SA’s rape culture – rape, sexual harassment and violence – has finally been broken, and the scourge is now discussed in social, family and public spaces.

This culture has been normalised within social institutions, communities and families.

Even in the military camps of the ANC and PAC, rape culture was pervasive but cloaked in silence. And it also existed within the associated anti-apartheid civil society organisations, including the trade unions and student and youth movements.

It is important for the ANC leadership to own up to the sexual violence that happened within the liberation movement during the struggle against apartheid. Such a move would be an important act of acknowledgment to victims but may also help to bring about a culture change in our present time.

The tragedy was that, for the victims at that time, to accuse liberation leaders of sexual violence was seen as a “betrayal” of the liberation movement, undermining the cause of the struggle and strengthening the hand of the apartheid forces.

Because rape culture is so pervasive, an integrated strategy will be needed to tackle it, focusing on changing the cultural, social and political acceptance of what is “normal”.

3.3.1.3.2. Xenophobic violence

The outbreak of xenophobia is a matter that the ANC regime clearly tries hard to play down as general crime committed by some members of communities in their revenge taken on particular foreigners for their alleged criminal acts, either on their own or as part of local South African crime syndicates as well as foreigner syndicates against so-called “innocent” local South Africans. Another element is that those local South Africans, who are involved in vengeful attacks on foreigners, have been described by the ANC regime specifically as criminals who are attacking small groups of foreigners (on the same basis as if they were attacking  other South Africans) only for opportunistic and self-enriching reasons. The ANC regime does not discern any sign or intention of xenophobia in these attacks: as said, the same kind of attack by the local criminals is directed against other South Africans, as seemingly evidenced by the Western Cape violence. Ramaphosa too, has carefully avoided both the term and the subject of xenophobia in his responses to foreign governments. A case in point was his recent public statement to Nigeria’s envoy, Ahmed Rufal Abubakar, in an effort to calm down the recent conflict between Nigeria and South Africa around the attacks on the lives and property of Nigerians, that these attacks are not xenophobia, but solely the delinquent actions of local criminals against criminal Nigerians for their specific transgressions. Central to the South African-Nigerian conflict was the death of eight South Africans who had allegedly been killed by criminal Nigerians and thus sparked the reaction against  Nigerians which came to be known as xenophobia, worldwide . On the incidence of criminality as a characteristic of a certain group of Nigerians — isolating them as crooks but not as “foreigners”— it is reported that Ramaphosa, stating that South Africans were innocent of any discrimination against any Nigerians or harbouring any xenophobia against them, put forward “justified” actions by the locals to rid the country of crime and criminals (which seems in this case to be sometimes, accidentally, Nigerians!). On the existence of such foreign criminals in South Africa, igniting the recent violence, Ramaphosa even called on Nigeria to assist him with the deportation of some of its citizens who were committing crimes in South Africa and were in the country illegally.68-71

In response to Nigeria’s demand that South Africa compensates the losses of Nigerians here in the unrest (which the Nigerian government sees as xenophobia), South Africa took a hard line of not being guilty of any xenophobia or committing crime against any Nigerians and stated that it would only assist and compensate damaged Nigerian businesses here that where legitimately registered in the country and had their affairs in order with the South African Revenue Service, writes Hunter70. But Hunter70 reports that this “foreign-policy profile” projected on the ethnic unrest involving Nigerians in South Africa, differs from the ANC regime’s local “self-confession” on xenophobia. Hunter70, on the seeming arrogance and deception of Ramphosa in his double-talk with Abubakaro, writes70:1,7: “This was despite Ramaphosa’s acknowledgement of the existence of xenophobia in SA in his address to the nation on Tuesday evening [5th September] in which he condemned the violence and looting”.

That there is no doubt in most of the ANC’s leaders’ minds that xenophobia is real, is well confirmed by their orchestrated effort to lie about it to diplomats. Munusamy writes54:11:

The government has been flat-footed in countering the anti-SA sentiments. SA diplomats have been instructed to keep the line that the violence is as a result of criminality, not xenophobia.

Including in this denial of the presence of xenophobia was the violence against foreigners even relayed to so-called49:8: “conspiracy theories, claiming dark outside forces were ‘organising’ the xenophobic violence”, writes Gumede49. On the lack of an in-depth understanding of the true nature of xenophobia in the country by the ANC and thus to address it correctly, Gumede49 guides us well49:20: “Throughout all these crises, the ANC and government leadership appears to have been out of their depth, many not grasping the severity of the crisis the country is facing.4

It seems as if two ministers in the Ramaphosa regime accepted the reality of xenophobia, without saying it publicly or attributing it to the ANC’s failure to rule correctly and effectively. In avoiding the truth about the ANC’s direct role in the manifestation of xenophobia — as many members of the ANC’s elite mostly do when they are at the receiving end — they play the “blame game”. Other than Ramaphosa who confusingly blamed tribalism and nationalism as a possible reason, the Higher Education Minister Blade Nzimande blamed capitalism, while the International Relations Minister Naledi Pandor attributed it to Apartheid.71

An interesting contradiction arising from the alleged xenophobia phenomenon and Ramaphosa’s view that Nigerians were responsible for committing crime against locals, is that it militates against the ANC’s traditional denial of tribalism and ethnicity in favour of the class struggle and other Marxist concepts of sociology and history. In their statements on the attacks against Nigerians and other foreigners, both Ramaphosa and Magashule therefore acknowledged the existence of ethnicity, a phenomenon which is anathema to the ANC’s revolutionary ideology (besides racism against the Whites as European “colonists” and hence the ANC’s intention to grab their land without compensation).70,71

Saunderson-Meyer71 points out that not only does Ace Magashule reaffirm that xenophobia is based on ethnicity but that the presence of xenophobia is also based on racism (and in September 2019 puts on record the ANC’s most recent official standpoint on Whites). Saunderson-Meyer71 refers to Magashule’s racial and anti-White stand (which can be seen undoubtedly as the open instigation of racial violence), as follows71:12: “Last week Magashule had expressed regret that the violence was being directed at ‘people who have the same skin colour as us’, rather than those many others with a whitish colour’…[who] have never been attacked, because they are also so-called foreigners”. Pelser45 reports on this alleged White racism by Magashule as follows45:6: ““Ace Magashule, sekretaris-generaal  van die ANC, maan swart Suid-Afrikaners om hul woede nie uit te haal op swart mense nie — hulle moet liewer wit mense teiken”.

Also Munusamy50 shows that Julius Malema, the leader of the EFF, tried to refocus the violence against White people rather than foreign nationalists. Referring to this, Pelser45, quoting Malema, writes45:6: “‘Ons woede is op die verkeerde mense gerig. Soos ons almal, verkoop ons Afrika-broers en susters hul arbeid teen ‘n lae prys om te oorleef. Die eienaars van ons welvaart is witmonopoliekapitaal; hul weier om dit met ons te deel’.”

On Ramaphosa’s reaction on the involvement of Nigerians in the latest so-called “crimes” in South Africa and the specific background to it, Hunter45, aligning Ramaphosa’s acknowledgement of tribalism with that of crimes as xenophobia and thus indeed that xenophobia springs from tribalism.  Hunter reports as follows45:1,7: “The president reasserted his publicly held view that rising nationalism globally is affecting the rise of tribalism on the continent”.

In this context Saunderson-Meyer71, on the official standpoint of the ANC on tribalism and thus also indirectly xenophobia, states71:12: “…tribalism is not acknowledged to be the cause of anything, implying as it would, ethnic cleavages within the Black South African society” and71:12: “…xenophobia, the x-word, has joined the k-word as unutterable in SA”.

Magashule, in line with Ramaphosa’s confusion on seemingly what the violence, tribalism and the xenophobia definitions mean, also opened the can further when he referred to some of the violence in which foreigners were involved recently as “tribal battles,” which expressly means ethnicity and xenophobia. These ANC references to tribalism, positioned suddenly by Ramaphosa and Magashule, also brought to the foreground the extreme presence of South African violent crimes in certain communities, such as gangsterism in many so-called exclusively “Coloured” Western Cape areas in South Africa. (As already discussed, the SADF was forced to intervene on the Cape Flats in a crime-prevention role because the SAPS utterly failed to do their job.)  It seems then that some issues are indeed “tribal-orientated” for the ANC’s top managers and thus the reason why the ANC-regime since 1994 has taken such a passive stance on this “Coloured problem” and had left it in the cold.70

Saunderson-Meyer71, on the supposed ANC revolutionaries’ traditional blindness to xenophobia and tribalism, further writes71:12:

While Ace should expect a chiding from the ANC’s political commissars for the little slip, xenophobia and tribal denialism is prevalent among black nationalists. It is simply inconceivable to admit that there is, indeed, a deep-seated antipathy among many black South Africans to their black ‘brothers and sisters’, both here and abroad.

Saunderson-Meyer71 reports that Ace Magashule’s explanation of his rejection of xenophobia, goes this way71:12: “What I know …is that our presidents, the presidents of Africa [Nigeria, Zambia and Rwanda] are talking, and they have analysed this correctly. It is not acts of xenophobia, it’s acts of criminality”.

The editor73 of the Sowetan, in an article dated 13 September 2019, reflects on how the blackjacks in the 1960s, harassing Africans found in urban areas without so-called “dompasses” by going from door to door to pull-out those considered to be “too Black and too different to belong to the other Blacks”. He states that on Wednesday, September 11 2019, in the supposed free South Africa, Blacks again knocked on doors73:14: “Open the door, we want to see your ID. The k-word of the apartheid-era is replaced by an equally derogatory k-word that they reserve for foreigners. …the reality is that there are a significant number of our citizens who are — and are engaging in acts of violence against those they deem foreign”.

If the above editorial description, read together with the descriptions by various local Blacks on the reason why they are burning trucks and killing truck drivers, are not true examples of the presence of extreme xenophobia, what kind of example do we need to offer which would convince the ANC leaders of it?35,36,73

Secondly, contradicting Ramaphosa and his cronies’ standpoint in their overseas rhetoric that xenophobia is purely criminal violence, is the prominent presence of foreigners (legal and illegal) in South Africa as so-called “culprits” in the reasons for the deaths of 11 persons in Gauteng.74,75 Hosken74 refers in this context to the “culprit” foreigners as to be exclusively people who many Blacks classed as persons74:2: “…endangering Black South Africans’ work opportunities, and to be people peddling drugs and committing crimes”.

The reporting of Hosken and Germaner75 of the mobilising in August 2019 of Black communities by the Sisonke People’s Forum, which had spurred locals into action against so-called “delinquent foreigners”, is very informative. Hosken and Germaner75 quoted the Forum chairman Zwelie Ndabe who allegedly said75:2:

Since 2016 our pleas to government have been ignored. We are tired of our kids dying from drugs sold by foreigners, South African business employing foreigners, and of foreigners hijacking buildings for human trafficking and prostitution. That’s why we mobilised. We didn’t expect people to be this angry, and the violence disturbs us. But we won’t stop mobilising.

In 2008 the nationwide so-called xenophobic attacks had claimed the lives of 56, to be followed by regular flare-ups of similar incidents. The deaths of foreigners over the period, from 1994 up to 2019, withing the category of “xenophobia (which is disavowed by the ANC regime), reflect that the ANC regime has no strategy and possibly no intention to stop foreign ethnic hate. This apathy about others’ lives must be read together with the delinquent acst of the police force under the ANC regime in the 2012 Marikana massacre which led to the death of 34 Black miners — which lacks any response seven years later of  a single police officer having been prosecuted or that the recommendations of the Farlam commission have been implemented. The presence of hatred for foreigners, from speaking, intentions and actions, hold serious consequences for the more or less 4 million foreigners living in South African.44,75

But the growing anti-foreigner sentiment (seen by many White South Africans as a masked anti-foreign sentiment of them also as so-called “colonists”), is for political analysts a possible sign that the historical Black tribal infighting (and Black genocide) of the 1800s between the Xhosa, the Zulu, the Tswana, etc., might be restarted as the tribal right to land and resources in the increasingly collapsing economy, as well as the dissolution of the South African state (and nation), become a reality.75

On foreigners, specifically so-called “bad persons, thieves”, etc., it is important to reflect the official ANC and ANC associates’ negative characterisation of foreigners, to see how in-depth xenophobia has become rooted in the psyche of South Africans. Here the KwaZulu-Natal House of Traditional Leaders represents a worrying phenomenon regarding ethnicity and foreigners, much in line with Ndabe’s view above. The remarks of the House’s chairperson, Inkosi Phathisizwe Chiliza76, are a classic case of xenophobe when he responds76:5:

Many foreigners did not respect SA traditions. When you get to those levels, they will tell you they are taking our jobs, the problem is they are here in big numbers and they don’t respect our traditions, and that is what needs to be fixed.

Even ANC ministers of the Ramaphosa cabinet were fast to capitalise on the “not fitting” into South Africa of Black foreign nationals (while at the same time involuntarily revealing their own ethnic mindset and inclination to xenophobia). Pelser reports45:6: “Thulas Nxesi, minister van arbeid en werkskepping, sê xenofobiese geweld is als die ‘elitistiese vryemarkstelsel” se skuld, wat buitelanders toelaat om hul arbeid teen minder as die minimum loon te verkoop”,  en45:6: “Ook David Makhura , premier van Gauteng, reik na populisme toe hy sê buitelanders moet verbied word om ‘sekere tipe sakeondernemings’ in townships te bedryf”.

But this false and ethnic categorisation of foreigners as “crooks” did not stop with Nxesi and Makhura’s negativity. The Gauteng ANC’s community safety MEC, Faith Mazibuko77, ventured77:16: “…we can’t govern with criminals, especially foreign nationals who want to turn our country into a lawless banana republic”.

In this context of “separating” Black foreigners from the Black South African society because “they take our people’s jobs and opportunities” — and thus seemingly: “they were killed in the past, are killed at present and can be killed in future”  for “understandable” reasons — Tony Leon77 points out that the ANC regime’s present ministerial viewpoint and guidance may be of the same dangerous ethnic hostility as that of Zwelie Ndabe and Inkosi Phathisizwe77, when he writes77:16: “According to the minister of justice, Ronald Lamola, the government is ‘developing legislation that will bar foreign nationals from operating in certain sectors of the economy’.”

This view of Lamola makes Ramaphosa’s agreement with the Nigerian government of a guaranteed balanced and good treatment of foreigners (Nigerians) in the future null and void. At the same time it is an early warning of the possible advent of the extreme ethnic politics of Robert Mugabe that led to the death of more than 20 000 Black Zimbabweans because they did not fit into his exclusively “Black Zimbabwe”. More than this: it spells out an ethnocentric South African Black-BEE policy which excludes certain other Black persons.78,79,80-82

There seems to be an encircling as well as an intertwining of the definitions xenophobia, crime, violence, which describe in some way the recent so-called “spree” of xenophobia (remember: in terms of the ANC regime’s view there exists the alleged exploitation by Black foreigners of Black South Africans), Hosken83 gives an excellent overview of the whole process as general criminality, based on South Africans’ internalised, ongoing and actively delinquent acts. It is for him a process wherein the presence of foreigners is only used as an excuse or as a distraction from the real reasons: exclusively looting from the easiest and most defenceless group of people, namely foreigners by some South Africans whose own lives have been degraded in only 25 years into a general life of crime under an equally disorderly and crime-orientated regime. Hosken83 in this context sums up the situation well when he writes83:2:

Looters, armed with guns and self-made weapons, stormed through a 2km stretch of Jules Street burning cars, torching buildings, ransacking businesses and terrorising people on Sunday night and throughout the week. In Alexandra, Crosby, Slove Park, Coronationville, KwaThema and Katlehong, looters turned on foreign-owned shops.

For Henry Mathe, who lives in Crosby’s povertry-stricken Slovo Park informal settlement, the looting was justified. “They killed two of us. It was only right that we went to the Somali and Pakistan shops and took what was theirs.

We just wanted them out. We were not burning or stealing their stuff. They were just told to get out because Solve Park does not need foreigners here. We waited until the cops were gone. We took groceries, cold drinks and Red Bulls. We took revenge, not because we were hungry. They provoked us by killing our people”.

Mathe claims that Isaac Sebeka, a South African who was killed in Coronationville, was shot when he was caught looting.

Hosken83 also describes the reaction of the medical doctor Samir Saha83, a Bangladeshi national who has been living in South Africa for 24 years, of which the last 10 was in Johannesburg. He lost all his assets in the recent “foreigner bashing” and had to flee for his life. Saha’s story contradicts totally Ndabe’s perceptions of the delinquent acts of so-called foreigners as always being wrongdoers against local Blacks or to be job-stealers, when he says83:2:

I have never experienced anything like this before. I am a doctor. I don’t run a spaza or a barber shop and even if I did, how would me running such shops rob South Africans of jobs? Saying I steal South Africans’ jobs is madness. In fact it is the opposite. I employ two South Africans, one as a secretary and the other as my medical assistant.

The above various outcomes show that the execution of violence (undoubtedly driven by internalised aggression and hostility in their mindsets, as well as by the immense poverty of some Black South Africans), which had become focussed on foreigners, is now affecting not only the individual innocent foreigner, but also any innocent South African businessman who dares to employ a single foreigner. This tragic outcome is well confirmed by the already mentioned, recent attacks on South African companies’ transport trucks (which led directly to the murder of various foreign drivers) on our highways and other routes which employ foreigners.

Misago75, quoting the senior researcher Jean-Pierre of the Wits Centre for Migration, says South Africa is becoming a pariah state. Hosken and Germaner75 bring into focus the ANC’s failed crime-prevention capability as a regime and allowing uncontrolled crime to develop and to get internalised in a great part of the society’s mindset as a “normal” condition. Secondly, Hosken and Germaner75 show just how dysfunctional the ANC regime is, including the ANC’s ambivalent thinking on the foreigner issue and the regime’s failed intention and capacity to eliminate violence and crime or at least to handle it from day to day. Misago states75:2: “The situation is complicated by the lack of governance and the delayed reaction to violence. Despite repeated warnings of violence, police were seemingly slow to respond”.

In this context of failed police oversight and a descent by the ANC regime into disorder, crime and violence, the potential that the so-called xenophobia may be transformed into anarchy and even as part of the start of a people’s revolution, Misago75 reflects further75:2: “What happens when those attacks shift to universities, medical institutions and international agencies employing migrants? 

Dr Franz Fanon84, a psychiatrist, who also turned political analyst, confronted us for the first time with one of the main reasons for unrest, crime, violence and xenophobia captured in the mindsets and actions of the poor and side-lined people of the slums, the informal settlements and lower socio-economical townships and parts of towns and cities: the utterly cold-blooded abuse and extremely opportunistic exploitation of the poor, mostly by their own race’s leaders (elite). The end result is violent reactions to all of those that seem to be better off than they the poor or who are assumed to be the cause for their chaotic lives. Fanon84 based his experience on the liberation of Algeria from France, specifically on the immediate outer and inner circle around the origin of violence as xenophobia. He shows that it is an international phenomenon which reflects extreme nationalism, driven by political opportunists without caring for the poor or the minority — essentially for anyone besides themselves. Violence against the foreigner is tacitly encouraged by the elite of the ruling party whose only interest is self-enrichment and political power to keep up their human exploitation. He precisely brought for us the story of South Africa’s economic, political and social failure under the extreme, Marxist-Leninist ANC. Moreover, Fanon84 tells us that our country is on the brink of collapse and why: Because of the ANC elite’s exploitation of Black politics by an exclusive but useless Black African nationalism for 25 years.84

This preaching of nationalism by the ANC’s elite was heard clearly around the xenophobia matter wherein the poor Black people’s violent behaviour against the vulnerable foreigners was justified, albeit in a masked manner. The South African mass of poor, absolutely unhappy and dissatisfied with their chaotic lifestyle, cannot take on their oppressor: the ANC’s elite. Here, as happens worldwide where the masses are exploited by their own people, they turn almost immediately their dissent into direct revenge, focussed on the easiest and most available target without fear for mass counter-revenge. Foreigners, migrants and other poor people stand out as targets because they are extremely vulnerable as a result of their isolation from their fatherland, poor political empowerment and a lack of recognition as a local. Only after the process of the elimination of the migrants is completed, will the poor masses turn with much effort to their real exploiters and oppressors. However, it will mostly be too late because of the immense power build-up by the regime to squash any revolt besides allowing chronic unrest and violence by the poor on the poor, and xenophobia. Buccus84, quoting Fanon84, writes as follows84:19:

Xenophobic violence, often tacitly encouraged by elite figures, has become an omnipresent reality.

Because the national elite “is preoccupied with filling its pocket as rapidly as possible…the country sinks all the more deeply into stagnation”. But, as “the people stagnate deplorably in unbearable poverty, slowly they awaken to the unutterable treason of their leaders”.

Fanon’s84 enlightening view of xenophobia as primarily a people’s unrest against the regime and not really the foreigner (which firstly must be read also in the presence of the immense violent crime in the Western Cape and other parts of the country, and secondly as a sign of a revolution from within) is supported in some way by seasoned local political analysts.

Fred Khumalo85, a seasoned journalist and political analyst writes in this context that inside the so-called xenophobia-violence-crime crisis there is far more negative energy to be read: the simple fact is that the country is teetering on the brink of an abyss because of the wrongdoing and failure of the ANC regime as result of its elite’s self-orientation. Removing the so-called (Black) foreigners will not solve the violence. Buccus84 too, points out that the xenophobic violence is the primary reaction of the mass caught up in poverty, which was solely a process activated by the ANC elite’s capturing of the country, its resources and richness for their self-enrichment and -empowerment and upheld through various manipulations. These manipulations include unleashing a false Black-African nationalism and fictitious anti-colonialism, and then, as the government of the ANC elite started to lose their power over the masses, slowly moving into a process of anti-democracy and the capturing and management of the political, social and economic empowerment of the mass of poor. At the end of this process, the poor will become conscious of their betrayal by their opportunistic revolutionary leaders, commencing in 1994 as the “fathers” of the Black nation. Unrest, crime, violence and pertinent xenophobia are the middle-stage behaviour of the poor masses.84,85

3.3.1.4. ANC as a failed regime inside a constitutional state

Many writings75,83-85 are loud and clear that there is such a thing as xenophobia in South Africa and that it can be practised because of some Black South Africans’ hostility against and hatred of foreign nationals. They also tell us that there are crimes as the ubiquitous violence in the country is channelled into xenophobia because of the internalisation over years of criminality in the psyche of some South Africans. The foreigner falls prey because of he/she has poor defence and is thus vulnerable. These writings tell us also that crimes such as xenophobic violence and other violent behaviour are often committed out of jealousy, for self-enrichment and the inability of poor, undeveloped locals to compete with other people who are seemingly successful or are favoured in some way by the socio-economic and political system. Moreover: the writings tell us that most of these crimes are focussed on other citizens as a way of compensation in not being able to directly engage in crimes such as violence, theft, murder, etc., against the ruler of the country who is basically solely responsible for the poor people’s chaotic lives. The present mixing of xenophobia-crime-violence is very much similar to the crime and violence reflected by the Black masses who had risen against Apartheid and its unjust racial, economic, social and personal discrimination which had denied Blacks their citizenship in the country of their birth and which had reduced them to beggars.75,83-85 Today, postulates Khumalo85, the masses are rising again because our current crooked rulers — many of whom were inside the Struggle of the 1970s and 1980s with the now suppressed and poor Blacks — have lost contact with their own past as well as who the masses of poor and landless Blacks really are. These rulers have become drunk on corruption, insensitivity and self-enrichment.75,83-85

At the root of the current social chaos is a failed political system wherein most of the people are not developed, but are left to plan for their own for survival inside a collapsed socio-economic and political system where there is no law and order and where the criminal has become untouchable by the society and the prosecution institutions. We see it well in the Western Cape’s uncontrolled crimes like extreme violence and murder, and the ANC regime’s inability as well as unwillingness to address it since 1994.

The poor are today venting their anger on each other and those less fortunate than themselves, including the foreigners. Xenophobia, like all violence, exists but is mostly part of organised crime and power plays which the mass poor by times cannot control, nor understand. Their way and method of venting their anger were largely acquired and internalised in the 1970s as the only solution to get attention: the burning of buildings, homes and the destruction of essential structures. They mostly got attention and their way from the previously White rulers. These actions are repeated today, although sometimes in other manifestations.85

On the current social conditions, Khumalo85 comments on the unobserved, ignored and neglected grievances of the mass poor and their present hostile reactions to it, in the following way85:15:

People have come to realise that if you want to have a conversation with the authorities, you burn something down.

What has been happening in pockets here and there seems like a replay from the 1980s. Except that the rulers are no longer arrogant white Afrikaners. They are black like the masses who are rising. Which makes it even more palpable.

The masses can’t help but wonder: how can these people, our own people, act like the oppressors of yore, if not even worse?

The warnings in commentaries66,75 of more evil to can come through “national” violence with its origin in poverty and inequality — issues which the ANC have so far left unattended in their 25 years of rule, and which have in reality nothing to do with “genuine” xenophobia and ethnicity — is further brought into the lime-light by Runji66 in emphasising the immense presence of inequality and poverty. The primary reason for this negative outcome is the fight for primary resources such as water, food, accommodation (which has led over ages to many wars in the world). Firstly, there is the prominent fear by the present economic middle class who are living in areas bordering on poor townships and informal settlements (and who themselves have moved up over the past 25 years from the poor lower economic class), to be dragged down again by any socio-economic instability and new competitors. Competition may lead thereto that they lose their assets, privileges and benefits. In this setup, it is true that the competitors from the present lower economic classes are gunning especially for the middle class’s privileges and benefits, while the middle class is doing anything to stop movements endangering their benefits. The outcome is immense hostility and violence. On the other side one finds the ambitions and often successes by the poor lower economic class (people who are mostly unwillingly “locked up” by their unfortunate conditions in poor townships and informal settlements that are thoroughly affected by mostly established “national” violence), leading to a class restructuring inside the poor townships and informal settlements themselves, which in itself causes a constant strife and even fighting for resources, rights, privileges and benefits there. Instead of growth and improvement, because of the lack of government intervention, the direct outcome is mostly the creation of more inequality, greater competition and hostility between the competing groupings in the poor lower class, which turn into daily behaviour tending to do harm to anyone seen as a competitor, regardless of being a local or a foreigner.66,75

The conflict between local poor Blacks from the shanty towns and informal settlements with the better-off middle class of the suburbs, with inequality the pivot, is at present more than a looming phenomenon. Evidence confirms that this hostility has already transformed into open clashes, for instance the clashes in July 2019 between the better-off middle-class homeowners and the neighbouring lower-class shack dwellers in Ennersdale, Lawley and Lenasia, Gauteng, during which four persons were wounded86. Wicks86 described it as an “all-out war brewing”. It is clearly an issue triggered by the financial inequality of the mass of poor, lower-class Blacks making it impossible for them to own land, and this group objecting violently to the rights, privileges and wealth of the middle class.  This outcome is a clear result of the ANC regime’s empty promises to eliminate inequality since 1994 and to better every citizen’s lifestyle. Wicks writes86:5:

The clashes are the latest chapter in SA’s heated land problems. They come after Alexandra township was effectively shut down in June due to similar issues, with residents facing off against “invaders”. Unabated illegal building had seen structures erected on pavements and in people’s gardens.

An established home-owner of Ennersdale, guarding his property, describes the violent conditions (which have also nurtured the so-called xenophobia for some time) very appositely when he says86:5:

I carry this [knobkerrie] when I patrol. I have to because the fight is coming here. The way these people [illegal shack dwellers] are doing things is uncalled-for, but they are doing it because our government has failed.

In this context Gilad Isaacs86 of the National Minimum Wage Research Initiative at Wits University says the problem is the state’s housing policy86:5: “Forceful occupation is no-one’s first choice, and we have to ask why there is vacant land owned by the provincial government in the first place.”

Runji66 comments on the country’s immense social inequality and the enormous insecurity present in the middle class — “cancerous metastasis” — which have been left untreated for 25 years by the present-day government and is boiling and exploding in various crimes, as for instance violence, xenophobia, etc. She writes66:13:

SA is not a nation at peace with itself. And that peace has been difficult to forge because the rights to life, dignity and liberty that are enshrined in the constitution have failed to find practical expression in the daily experience of millions across the country.

The reality is that many of those who have benefited from the opportunities of social mobility in the last 25 years, who form part of the new middle class, are precarious.

Their economic position hinges on them retaining their employment. As such they are a few pay checks away from falling of that prized middle class rung of the ladder.

They don’t only carry themselves and their picture-perfect families but they provide the remittances which many other relatives rely on to survive — the so-called black tax.

Misago75 traces all these different forms of serious crimes such as violence and specifically the so-called xenophobic attacks, to three origins (which are fully in line with the origins of the deadly violence in the Western Cape). He writes75:2: “Government must act before it’s too late. Government must target the root causes, which are unemployment and poverty”.

Specifically on the  presence of unemployment and poverty, which often serve as primary stimulants in doing violence and attacking other people’s lifestyles and possessions, and which unfortunately also engulf foreigners living in these areas, making them falsely troubled xenophobic areas, Pheto87 gives us in-depth insight when she argues that the unrest-troubled Alexandra has among the highest unemployment rates in the Gauteng province with between 4 979 and 8 758 jobless people per square kilometre.

Misago’s75 view of the incompetent ANC regime’s failed role in putting an end to the violence is supported by Alan Mukoki88, the CEO of the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Sacci).  He prominently blames88:7: “…a lawless environment in which people feel they can do what they like with impunity. The government needs to show that it is serious about law and order”.

Barron88 conveys Mukoki’s88 counter-description of the so-called exclusively “South African xenophobia” when he writes that Mukoki88 is of the opinion that the vast majority of South Africans are not xenophobic and that a few hundred people, engaging in racial and ethnic delinquencies, undoubtedly do not represent 60 million good people. The opinion of Mukoki88 is clearly that it is misleading and dangerous to label the present-day violent outbreaks as xenophobia, but that it is rooted in the results of a failed ANC regime. Barron88 reflects Mukoki’s88 words as follows88:7:

We cannot afford to politicise crime, to say that when people are committing crime they’re xenophobic. Deal with it as crime. When people steal goods and burn property it is crime. Xenophobia is used as a cover to commit crime.

For trust and confidence in SA to be restored, the government needs to demonstrate that it has the capacity and the will to take decisive action to contain violent outbreaks “before they get completely out of control”.

To have any hope of restoring the trust that is vital to investment, business people need a very clear plan from government about what it intends to do to deal with this issue in a way that is decisive.

The best answer to so-called xenophobia…is the “enforcement of existing laws, proper policies, proper leadership, proper values, proper service delivery”.

Ron Derby89 is looking from another angle at the unwelcome current hostility and violence aimed at foreigners (as well as South Africans on South Africans which forms the overwhelming violence in the country) by also putting the ANC regime, together with the various pre-1994 White regimes, in the accused box regarding such violence. Most of the violence now associated with the bad behaviour of foreigners, represents for him the negative outcomes of poor Black townships, the joblessness and poverty there, as well as the isolation from the greater economy of these people, whereby poor, destitute foreigners (fleeing sometimes much more chaos at home) are also forced to survive in an unfavourable living environment. Notwithstanding that these foreigners are forced to survive under equally poor local conditions (sometimes worse) as the local poor Blacks in the making of a living, their adaptable, practical styles of surviving (like doing various forms of trade) are often seen as faults by the locals, even as exploitation of the locals. Many of the politicians and policy-makers inside present South African politics show ignorance of the deeper drivers of violence, crime and thus the so-called xenophobia to which they have personally contributed through their poor governance.89 Derby writes89:9:

We’ve been exposed to some terrible economic planning [which led surely to poor townships, contaminated by joblessness and poverty], and it goes back to land legislation passed more than a century ago and apartheid laws a few decades later, and through the unintended consequences of the many plans for SA post 1994.

Amid this, we have a flood of migrants trying to make a living without the support of our government or their own.

Those of them who are merchants have priced their goods at levels so low that the Shoprites won’t try to match them, operating on margins so narrow that few average South African families would try to survive on them.

In this frustrating low-growth economic environment, immigrants are the easiest targets to blame for everything, from taking jobs to violence and crime.

At the centre of the ongoing violent outburst, Dr Kenosi Mosalakae90 reminds us, is the ANC’s inbred culture of revolutionary politics, wherein the obstruction of order is central and wherein every one of the present-day ANC top leaders had participated en masse in making the pre-1994 functioning systems ungovernable. This has led to an immense outlet of delinquent energy which is still steering the ANC clan on a daily basis in most of their actions. Mosalakae states90:14: “We are where we are because we have never forgotten to ‘render the country ungovernable’, we continue to do so whenever we have a grievance”.

The above established revolutionary culture of the ANC, inbred in its post-1980s members and constantly internalised in its post-1994 generation’s mindsets, has led thereto that lawlessness has almost become the norm, writes Mthombothi91. According to him91:25:

No demonstration or protest seems complete without a spate of violence or looting. There’s a bonfire somewhere every day of the week with the people protesting about one thing or the other. It started with unions trashing towns and cities during labour strikes. The government looked the other way because they were its allies. The students burnt books and buildings, including libraries, and were hailed as latter-day revolutionaries.

Looking critically at the various ANC regimes’ unwillingness and inability to stop and to eliminate prominent mass murdering since 1994, for instance in the Western Cape, and their lack of concern for the murders there (with a massive upswing the last five years or so), it seems wishful thinking to believe that the present Ramaphosa regime is going to do anything constructive to the present crime spree of violence;  it does not matter if it is called xenophobia or plain criminality. The deaths of fewer than 20 people in the context of so-called xenophobia in Gauteng this year are just too insignificant for the ANC mindset: the thousands of deaths by murder on the Cape Flats were seemingly not a real issue, until three months ago, so why really about a few more, newer murders?66,88,89

The ANC since 1994 has been “flying blind” when it came to assuring good governance, basically because its leadership is contaminated with the crooked mentality of revolutionary politics. Ramaphosa’s present actions to “make up” for instance to Nigeria about its citizens’ poor treatment here, will again be limited to the doing of talking but lacking the walking as the surge of conflict between foreign nationals and the SAPS in Cape Town at the end of October 2019 confirms. Criminality has overwhelmed the ANC’s top leadership, as the state capture and their many tainted members in the Parliament reflect. As leaders they are unable to be rehabilitated: they are blind to social disorder, especially inequality in wealth, social and personal status, such as that of the poor caught in the chaos of informal settlements and townships. Here the immense chaos is not limited to one specific informal settlement and township, but extend to the many around the country. The question may be asked with good reason if the ANC regime understands what is really going on in the townships where the poor are mostly forcefully channelled into an unstable and conflicting society. Comparing these problematic informal settlements and townships’ residents’ behaviour with that of residents in middle-class residenatial areas who are mostly stable and happy, the inequalities in wealth and class status reveal a stark picture which is a recipe for violence.66,68,69

Runji66 gives us an insight into the indecisiveness of the Ramaphosa regime when it comes to doing something constructive to mitigate inequality and to defuse violence. Runji postulates66:13:

Research shows that unequal societies tend to be the most violent. Therefore, what will Ramaphosa do to get SA closer to be a nation at peace with itself. He should apply his mind and provide definitive responses to these questions.

The first 100 days of a leader in office is the sole guide to give an indication of what the legacy of his five years in office will be. Looking at the comprehensive criticism of what has gone wrong in these 100 days, the indicator classes Ramaphosa as a failed leader.66,88,89

An intimate view of the life of most of the many people in the informal settlements and neglected townships are given by three testimonies. In the first of the testimonies, under the title: “Top dogs need to feel pain of poor”, the author93 writes93:13:

Millions of my compatriots live in squalid and unsanitary conditions, without electricity, running water and toilets.

So the time has come for a united front made up of the President Cyril Ramaphosa, Mmusi Maimane …and Julius Malema to hold court with the poorest of the poor and feel the pain, the suffering, the hunger pangs, the joblessness.

But, most of all, to feel what it is like to rise from your slumber, and use a “long drop” for relief – 200m away from your shack.

It will be tough to leave their luxurious surroundings, but such a night will re-programme their moral compass.

The second author94 writes94:18:

In this morass, Ramaphsa and his mavens think it is possible for society to gravitate towards a social compact. When people are living with raw sewage flowing down their streets, digging in rubbish bins for food and getting arrested in a police dragnet because they ‘smell Ethiopian’, it is quite difficult to embrace fanciful ideas of nationhood.

The third author95, under the title: “President Ramaphosa is living in dream land”, concludes as follows95:13:

A new day and another addition from the wish list of Cyril Ramaphosa who made a request which turned out to be similar to his “I have a dream of future cities on the clouds and bullet trains”.

Now the president encourages the public “to use public transport to foster social cohesion”.

Has he ever tried to take a ride on public transport? Oh yes, he did once and a 20 minutes ride took him three hours as there was a breakdown and he was fuming.

Has he taken the Metrobus service that only operates between strikes or taken a ride on one of the overloaded killing machines called minibus taxis? Of course not.

It seems he still didn’t learn a lesson and so he dreams and pontificates.

Has he considered as well the crime and thieving and killings on some of the modes of our transport? Definitely not.

That’s why it’s a bit rich coming from him.

Which planet do he and the rest of the clowns in his government come from when they endanger everyone’s lives with their blue light convoys which are screaming through our roads, but encourage everyone else to take public transport?

The fact that the ANC regime over 25 years failed to understand, to respect and to rectify the poor people’s circumstances, is the basis of not only of gangsterism and murder, but also xenophobia. Inequality in its broadest context, notwithstanding the consequences, must first be addressed as it was required to be addressed correctly over the last 25 years. The EFF MP Yoliswa Yako96, reflecting her own negative experience — varying from hope and excitement in 1994 to disappointment and despair in 2019 on the failed 1994 democracy and the comprehensive negative outcomes — tells us of the ongoing, devastating inequality and its many injustices which are gobbling up the South African nation, when she writes96:13:

I was a jovial 11-year-old in 1994. I have fond memories of how my mother proudly spoke of new hope, that everyone would own decent houses and how their children would go to any school of their choice.

She said working conditions would be incredibly better and opportunities would be afforded to all, in particular the previously disadvantage, without racial prejudice.

But all this excitement quickly turned into disdain as I watched my mother continue to toil like before. She continued to work as hard while our lives remained the same. Not much chanced and I grew up and I realised that this new democracy did not deliver on all its promises.

The ANC top leaders in the persons of Cyril Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule are too engaged in their own fighting over power within the present South African regime, making them disconnected with reality and in constant flight from taking responsibility for the massive wrongdoing perpetrated by the ANC since 1994 in the country. Munusamy54 illustrated this well by pointing out the failure of the two to meet the press together in person at Luthuli House (the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg) on 10 September to brief them on the current state of affairs in the country regarding unrest, gangsterism and undoubtedly the economy. The fact is that the two would have had to face a barrage of deep-cutting questions from journalists that would probably not only have exposed their failed leadership, but their lack of response to the multiple crises on their watch. On the present so-called xenophobia, gender and other kinds of violence, Munusamy54 writes that Magashule timidly  took the lead above Ramaphosa alone at the meeting, but  side-stepped his responsibility to the nation (and that of Ramaphosa and the ANC) as the ANC’s secretary general, by simply issuing a statement calling on government’s justice, peace and security cluster54:11: “…to establish the immediate causes of the violence and to identify those involved in fuelling it”. This statement, as expected, was of course never respected.

Of the immense gangsters’ threat to South Africa’s political setup, together with other forms of organised crime, the Deputy State Security Minister, Zizi Kodwa97, said recently that it indeed poses a danger to the legitimacy and stability of the South African state, reported The Citizen97 on 19 July 2019. The acting director general of state security of the ANC regime, Loyiso Jafta97, concurred, saying that there were already signs of erosion of the state by entrenched gangsterism [referring to additional crime, outside the crimes of state capture]. The Citizen of 19 July 2019 reports that Jafta97 stated97:6:

The truth is, and we have already seen elements of this, it does displace the formal structures of the state and once it happens, those who are benefitting, like getting healthcare, education, etc, will have a diminished view of the state, but those who are standing outside of it will also see a very, very weak state and therefore the legitimacy and the integrity of the state will severely subtracted from.

But further to that, if you allow it to mature then it starts corrupting law enforcement authorities, it starts corrupting the judiciary, it start s corrupting the legislature and before you know it, you have a complete narcoleptic state and once that happens it is very, very difficult to reverse the effects of that.

The presence of gangsterism, corruption, theft, state capture, murder and immense wrongdoing inside the South African state go deeper than only the endangering of the legitimacy and the stability of the South African state: it represents a symbol of how the political leadership in the country is wholly ineffectual and disconnected from reality, writes Munusamy54.  This results in a bad economy and a totally insecure citizenship ready to riot, with serious consequences already on view. Munusamy posits54:11: “The state of the economy creates the sense that life in our country is a constant fight for survival and that we are at war with each other”. 

Supporting Munusamy’s54 postulation, Dr Saths Cooper54, president of the International Union for Psychological Science and previously a prominent Anti-Apartheid activist, states that the country’s people are54:11: …“living in a state of psychic emergency and the presence of a sense of ‘deep insecurity’ stemming from the demise of law and order”. Referring to the flaming-up of violence in the middle of July to 16 September period of 2019, especially gender and xenophobic violence, he states54:11:

I don’t think the leadership [ANC] fully appreciates where we are right now. The past two weeks have been the worst psychological moment the country has experienced post-democracy. It is really a new low.

People are living with conditions of imminent emergency, crisis and fear. It is an all-pervasive fear. People are afraid to go out and common spaces are deemed to be unsafe.

Munusamy54, quoting Cooper’s standpoint, writes that for Cooper54 the underlying problem is deep public distrust of officials, either elected or appointed. In this context, she writes54:11:

People have lost confidence in those in positions of authority and we do not have the calibre of leadership to rally the nation; and: : “It is unclear what it would take for government and the ANC to realise that SA is at war with itself and the rest of the continent. While the ANC is hoping that a government that is ‘in touch’ and ‘responsive’ conjures itself out of thin air, people continue to lose confidence and feel under siege.

The economist Thabi Leoka54 is of the opinion that the present chaos in the country, especially the devastating violence, can be laid before the door of the government’s inaction to govern appropriately and effectively. She writes54:11: “The violence is how the poor is responding to the failure of leadership. That is the essence of what is happening”. Leoka54 describes this failed ANC leadership as follows54:11: “The lack of leadership appears almost as if this [the xenophobic attacks] is encouraged by SA’s politicians”.

On the failed ANC regime and the empty utterances and promises of its leader Cyril Ramaphosa who has a bag full of goodies for every South African post-2019, Munusamy50 postulates50:20:

Still, his [Ramaphosa] words and those of other party leaders failed to provide solace and direction. We are beyond the point of promises to fix the bureaucracy.

In a week of turmoil and despair, it was apparent more than ever that our country is surely in need of leadership and change but that it could not come from the president.

Ramaphosa does not seem to have the mettle to lead the way in a time of deep crisis. He does not have a team around him that can read the room, and is therefore constantly on the back foot and fighting fires. The government has no money and does not implement the measures he announces.

On the high level of crime in present-day South Africa there is much warning in the words of Gareth Newham55 of ISS regarding the presence of an incurable crime culture when he writes55:3: “South Africa’s high level of violence is rooted in its violent past and continues across generations”.

Indeed, South Africa seems to be lawless, leaderless and spiralling into the Armageddon of a failed state, notwithstanding that Ramaphosa is president and the ANC in government. The hungers of violence and crime are insatiable; they are busy gobbling up South Africa.

4. Conclusions

There are no signs that the pre-May 2019 election promises of Cyril Ramaphosa and his ANC regime have so far in any way been realised. The many ills of South Africa have still not been healed and there are even more ills. The economy is still in a dire state, while the ANC’s politics is indecisive. The country can indeed be described as being in a state of disparity and despondency. The presence of the Chávez-Madura-elite is also palpable here and the feeling of another Venezuela in the making, may be true.

Our law-enforcement institutions are in disrepair; they just do not have the ability and keenness to combat violence and crime.

Crime, as well as prominent violence in various forms, is well anchored in the South African culture. It is not new, but a phenomenon traceable to pre-1994. The 1994 New Dispensation, with its assumed and preached democracy, peace and justice for everyone, was supposed to erase it, but the internalised revolutionary mentality to destroy within the ANC seems to have aggravated the situation, creating more violence and crime.

The present-day South Africa as a failed constitutional state, masterly captured inside a culture of extreme violence and crime by the Marxist-Leninist ANC, is well summed up by Saunderson-Meyer41 when he writes41:12:

There is virtually not an international comparator that SA has not sagged against. There is not a moral or ethical standard that we have not betrayed. The country is literally grinding to a halt.

In full support of Saunderson-Meyer’s41 opinion Scott98:13 states:

The more one looks at the ANC, the more one can come to no other conclusion than that the only purpose it has is to complete the destruction of the country it claims to love. Everything it touches is destroyed.

South Africa is, as Myburgh claims in his book, a gangster state.5

Within the ganster state, there flickers the vague red light of a planned political-military coup in the making. The fact that the ANC has been ruling undemocratically with only 28% of the eligible voters on its side, reflecting that it is losing power and may lose the next national election, makes its agenda very dangerous. Political unrest, anarchy, but especially revolution, may be seen as the ideal opportunity for the Magashule-Mabuza-Zuma clan to interfere and intervene, and thus to grab the daily government under the pretext of restoring political order and the ANC’s policy of Marxism-Leninism.99-102

To terminate violence and crime, more is asked than just the reform of the ANC as a regime. It would need a total obliteration of the ANC from the country’s politics. To hang on to the ANC as a regime and to try to reform the party will only aggravate further our already uncontrolled violence and crime: Its Marxist-Leninist intentions will put the country on fire. The warning of Majoko103 is clear and precise103:12:  

Political expediency is bad for the overall health of the republic. No matter how badly one wants to deal with a festering wound, amputation of the whole appendage because it’s quicker only creates a bigger long-term problem.

Post-2019 spells chaos for South Africans if the ANC stays in power. Justice Edwin Cameron104 gives the ordinary citizen a warning when he says104:12: “Tough times lie ahead for those who are committed to democracy, governance under law and to social justice for all people in our country — not the enrichment of the inside elite.”

In the next (Article 14), entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability)”, the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of its mandate as ruler it received from the 8 May 2019 election, will be further evaluated.

5. References

  1. Teresa V, Renner TC. My Life in the Mafia. Hart-Davis and MacGibbon, London. 1973.
  2. Basson A, Du Toit P. Enemy of the People. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball; 2017.
  3. Davis D, Mutemwa-Tumbo D. Guns, lies, politics: seeking a judicial inquiry into arms deal’s whitewash commission. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 16; p. 20.
  4. Gibson E. Wapens: ‘Ons kán geld terugkry’. Rapport (Nuus).  2019 Aug. 25; p. 8.
  5. Myburgh P. Gangster State. Cape Town: Penguin; 2019.
  6. Louw, GP. 2018. Ensovoort, 38 (2018): 7(2): 1-36:An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652 to 2018. Part 4: A basic checklist for the appraisal of executive political leaders and regimes.
  7. Pauw J. President’s Keepers. Cape Town: Tafelberg; 2017.
  8. Bawa K. The Star (Opinion). 2019 June 11; p. 8.
  9. Police is failing, but there is a way to destroy Cape Town’s gangs’ recourse. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 30; p. 16.
  10. Bruce D. Focus on violent crime welcome but likely to lead to fiddling of figures. Sunday Times. 2019 June 30; p. 17.
  11. Jansen J, Du Toit E. ‘Julle sal ons wel sien op Vlakte’. Rapport (Nuus), 2019 July 14; p. 4.
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  13. Nombembe P, Hyman A. The killing field. Sunday Times (News/Crime). 2019 July 14; p. 6.
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  15. Pinnock D. Young people in the crosshairs as army moves into Cape townships. Sunday Times. 2019 July 28; p. 19.
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  17. Watson A. SANDF is off to Cape Flats. Saturday Citizen (News). 2019July 13; p. 4.
  18. Lockdown a little too late for deceased. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 July 9; p. 12.
  19. Ritchie K. Bloodbath on Cape Flats should make us worried. Saturday Star (Opinion). 2019 July 13; p. 8.
  20. Fokazi S. Cape Town mortuaries not coping with intake. Sowetan (News). 2019 July 10; p. 6.
  21. Hyman A. “World’s most dangerous city’. Sunday Times. 2019 June 30; pp. 1, 4.
  22. Makora M. More cops to beef up safety. Daily Sun. 2019 September 12; p. 8.
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  24. Makhetha T. Hundreds of murders committed by kids. Sowetan (News). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 3.
  25. Hyman A. Like a prison camp for a city’s outcasts. Sunday Times (News). 2019 June 16; p. 6.
  26. McCauley R. Decisive action is essential. The Star. 2019 July 16; p. 6.
  27. Sain R. Body bags mount after Port Elizabeth’s fatal gunshot attacks. The Citizen (News). 2019 June 14; p. 8.
  28. Curb lawlessness or pay the price. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 12.
  29. Marupeng P. Femicide sentences not a deterrent. Sowetan (News). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 2.
  30. Okoye CJ. Crime focus must shift. The Citizen (Crime stats). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 3.
  31. Versluis JM. “Totale kopskuif’ moet kom. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 6.
  32. Two places where our police can start to improve right now. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 15; p. 18.
  33. Special anti-gang police units needed, says DA. The Citizen (News). 2019 July 29; p. 4.
  34. Makhetha T. Kempton Park kidnappings capital. Sowetan (News). 2019 Sept. 13; p.2.
  35. Hosken G, Singh O. Motorist warned of N3 terror zone. Sunday Times (News Arson). 2019 June 9; p. 2.
  36. Slabbert A. Aanvalle op lorries eis 200 lewens. R1,2 mjd in 1jaar. Rapport (Nuus), 2019 June 9; p.8.
  37. Trucks bombed, set alight. Sowetan (News). 2019 Sept. 11; p. 9.
  38. Du Plessis C. “Die geweld kan uitbrei, ander raak’. Beeld. 2019 June 10; p. 1.
  39. Marupeng P. Plans afoot to tackle violence in SA. Sowetan (News). 2019 Sept. 11; p. 7.
  40. Ehlers W. State apathy at truck violence inexcusable. Sunday Independent (Opinion). 2019 June 9; p. 10.
  41. 41. Saunderson-Meyer W. Optimism shrivels on vine. Saturday Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 13; p. 12.
  42. Smit S. Prasa leaves guards in the cold. Mail & Guardian (News). 2019 June 28 to July 4; p. 15.
  43. Pijoos I. Train services really off the rails. Sowetan (News). 2019 July 10; p. 9.
  44. Let’s not waste another chance to save SA. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 3.
  45. Pelser W. Ja, barbare is los, maar wraak sal ons nie red. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 6.
  46. Hans B. Castration would end the problem of rape, says King Zwelithini. The Star (Nation). 2019 Sept. 26; p. 24.
  47. Lebitse P. Mogoeng spot on about giving rape and gender-based violence special attention. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 13; p. 13.
  48. Fokazi S. After rape, victims still have to face uncaring cops. Sunday Times (News) 2019 Sept. 15; p. 4.
  49. Gumede W. Cyril must learn: a little empathy goes a long way. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 20.
  50. Munusamy R. Our abnormal society can change through rebellion or in a planned way, but no messiah can save us. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept 8; p. 20.
  51. Jansen J. Die gruwels teen vroue duur voort. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 6.
  52. Zulu M. Justice minister vows to go after transgressors. The Citizen (News). 2019 Oct. 17; p. 2.
  53. Nakedi Z. It’s time to take action against violence in SA. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 11; p. 12.
  54. Munusamy R. No leadership to undo damaging anti-SA sentiment. Sowetan (Analysis). 2019 Sept. 11; p. 11.
  55. Okoye CJ. Latest figures are based on pure speculation, says expert. The Citizen (Crime Stats). 2019 Sept.13; p. 3.
  56. Tsotesti PB. Tragedy amid neglect our mothers have to endure. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 29; p. 20.
  57. Mavuso B. Business cannot ignore the pleas of women who fears to walk down the street or in office corridors. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 26.
  58. Gumede W. Lobola, reed dance has to go as we root out patriarchy. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 26.
  59. Let us not forget the rights of poor and rural women with little access to justice. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 4; p. 18.
  60. Presidential promise. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 4.
  61. Child K. Plenty of pricey talk, no action. 2019 Sept. 8; p. 4.
  62. Child K. A violent land – for Women and men. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 4.
  63. Hlatshaneni S. Data collection ‘subpar’. The Citizen (Crime Stats). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 2.
  64. Wayland D, Gontsana MA. Women-only carriages derailed. Saturday Citizen (News). 2019 Sept. 21; p. 7.
  65. Emmett M. Lies, lies and more lies. Sunday Times (Lifestyle). 2019 Sept. 29; p. 15.
  66. Runji N. Cyril has to show nation what the legacy of his years in office will be. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 June 20; p. 13.
  67. Coetzee A. Waarom ek huiwer om alle mans ‘vuilgoed’ te noem. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Sept 22; pp. 4-5.
  68. Makhetha T. Police call for calm in Soweto after looting. Sowetan (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 2.
  69. Njilo N. Foreign nationalist close up shops and leave area. Sowetan (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 2.
  70. Hunter Q. SA pushes back against xenophobia fury. Sunday Times, 2019 Sept. 8; pp. 1,7.
  71. Saunderson-Meyer W. Don’t uses that dirty x-word. Saturday Citizen (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 14; p. 12.
  72. Gumede W. ANC leaders need to own up to past sexual violence. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Oct. 20; p. 22.
  73. Action now, not debate on attacks. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 12; p. 14.
  74. Hosken G. Gauteng’s death toll rises to 11. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 2.
  75. Hosken G, Germaner S. Warnings of xenophobic attacks ignored. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept 8; p. 2.
  76. SA’s apology ‘not a solution’. The Citizen (News). 2019 Oct. 3; p. 5.
  77. Raids and ugly rhetoric the wrong way to go. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 11; p. 16.
  78. Comrade Bob to some…how SA leaders saw Mugabe. Sunday Times (Insight). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 2.
  79. From democrat to despot. Sunday Times (Insight). 2019 Sept. 8; pp.1-2.
  80. Leon T. Rap on the knuckles for the new nationalists. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 29; p. 20.
  81. Rooi J. Afrika eer Mugabe as held. Rapport (Sport). 2019 Sept 8; p. 9.
  82. Rooi J “Mugabe se dood verander niks” – Zim-uitgewekenes. Rapport (Sport). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 9.
  83. Hosken G. Provocation or sheer madness? Two sides of the tragedy. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 2.
  84. Buccus I. Ace and the gang are precisely the people Fanon warned us about. Sunday Times. 2019 Aug.4; p. 19.
  85. Khumalo F. Foreigners not the real target of fires of fury. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 15.
  86. Wicks J. Suburbs on edge as shanty towns grow. Sunday Times (News). 2019 July 28; p. 5.
  87. Pheto B. Down jobless street. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Aug. 11; p. 6.
  88. Barron C. ‘Flying blind’ as lawlessness rules. Sunday Times (Business) 2019 Sept 8; p. 7.
  89. Derby R. Violence sprouts from broken plans. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 9.
  90. Mosalakae K. SA drifting from Biko, Sobukwe’s ideals. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 14.
  91. Mthomboti B. Instead of groveling to foreign heads of state our government should apologise to us. Sunday Times. 2019 Sept. 22; p. 25.
  92. Mokgobu A. Bread theft ‘sparks looting’. The Citizen (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 5.
  93. Bachtis P. Top dogs need to feel pain of poor. The Citizen (Letters). 2019 Aug. 16; p.13.
  94. Munusamy R. A bare-knuckle fight rather than fanciful philosophies is what we need now to secure the future of our country. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 18; p. 18.
  95. Michel J. President Ramaphosa is living in dream land. Saturday Citizen (Letters). 2019 Oct. 12; p. 13.
  96. Yako Y. Why people worship demigods who don’t serve them? Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 June 20; p. 13.
  97. Gangsters’ threat to state. The Citizen (News). 2019 July 19; p. 6.
  98. Scott C. ANC obviously out to destroy SA. The Citizen (Letters). 2019 Aug. 28; p. 13.
  99. Mirrian N. List scandal will haunt Ramaphosa. Mail & Guardian. 2019 March 15-21; p. 4.
  100. De Lange J. JZ-kamp kaap ANC se kieslys. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 7.
  101. Gloves off in ANC turmoil. Business Times (Opinion). 2019 February 26; p. 8.
  102. Harper P. ANC applies the Ronaldo principle Mail & Guardian. 2019 March 15 -21; p, 31.
  103. Majoko S. Time for some introspection. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 23; p. 12.
  104. Sokutu B. Cameron’s parting shot. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 22; p. 12.

 

PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names

 

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3—The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3—The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Accountability, capacity, effective, governance, inequality, reprimanded, tenancy.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 5

1. Background

Ginsberg1 reprimanded South Africans for their passivity over many years not to take on parliamentarians and ruling parties for their immense failures. He makes it clear that the electorate owns and controls the country, that they are the ones who hold the power in South Africa and are the final judges as to whether our leaders and politicians have succeeded in the tasks entrusted to them. At least, this may be the theory, but in the 25 years of the ANC’s well-planned Marxist-Leninist ideological policy rule, this unique political empowerment of voters appears to have faded into one where the voters’ empowerment has been impaired, where they lack the ability to make a direct contribution to change our doomed setup. Opposition to the ANC’s dereliction of duty is driven by a one voice, basically a puny, lone one, not audible to the deaf and blind ANC, a party sorely lacking a sense of righteousness, justice or accountability. To move away from this “voter capture” would require immense sacrifices from voters to erase such delinquencies. To hold a regime accountable and force them to always rule with integrity and honesty, is the primary prerequisite for assured prosperity, the way to assure a good socio-economic and political system, to erase violence, criminality, inequality and poverty and bring about harmony in the greater society.1

South Africa has been waiting for a spark somewhere in the country to ignite an explosion. South Africans, captured by mass poverty and unemployment, all sitting on a racial powder keg as well as a corruption powder keg, realise that such an explosion is imminent. The November 2019 medium-term budget showed how much our economy has suffered, basically because the ANC regime has never since 1994 been called to account on any of its wrongdoings.2 Kgosana2 highlighted this chaotic state of the country’s economy very well – revealing that ANC never tried to better it because accountability was not essential for the regime – when he writes2:22:

If SA were a person, its finances would be in dire shape. Credit cards, loans and overdraft facilities would be in the red, she would be borrowing more each month just to cover interest on loans.

Her debt is fast approaching 70% of her household’s entire assets. She is insolvent.

Left with no choice but drastic frugality, she would look hard at her finances and spending. It’s what happens when you spend more than you earn.

Looking back into South Africa’s chaotic politics, it seems as if accountability as a requirement for a decent government over the last 25 years, had been nullified. Indeed, South Africa has become vulnerable to all kinds of dangers such as state capture, poor statutory service providers, a self-centred political elite which is focussed on only self-enrichment and the gradual suppression of the poverty-stricken masses. South Africa may already be beyond repair because of the ANC’s lack of accountability, a fact which was clearly highlighted by the senior researcher of ASRI and fellow in the School of Social Sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Imraan Buccus3, when he reflected on the issue:3:22

As we all know, SA is one of the most unequal countries on the planet. Millions are without work, and unemployment is getting worse rather than better. The patience of the poor will not be infinite. We just have to look around the world to see this. Right now the poor are on the streets in Chile, Ecuador, Haiti and Lebanon, demanding more justice and democracy. We already have one of the highest rates of protest of any country. It is only a matter of time before the wave of protests, sometimes termed “the rebellion of the poor”, which stretch back to 2004, cohere into a national force. This seems inevitable. The urgent question that faces us all is what form this will take.

Ginsberg’s1 advice that the creation of good governance should the voter’s duty in holding the ANC regime accountable, seems to have been all but ignored in present-day politics. The ANC elite has remained out of reach to the ordinary, good voter to hold it accountable. Ever since 1994, when the ANC cadres entered Parliament, they have never shown any respect to voters, and neither have they seen them as significant role-players. In the ANC’s politburo’s mindset, planning and endeavours, the autocratic electoral regulations moreover have made it possible for the cadres to continue their power grab; emboldened to disrespect the Constitution and to shrug off their accountability.  At this stage, only two possibilities are left for the voter, either to oust the ANC at the ballot box, which seems to have been too daunting a task over the past 25 years, or to remove it with a revolution as Buccus3 reflects. To understand the capture of South Africa by the ANC inside the framework of its Marxist-Leninist disregard for other persons’ and groups freedoms and rights, together with its total lack of accountability, it may be timely to reflect on Ginsberg’s1 guidance on what South Africans should have expected from a new regime in terms of accountability. It will in some way also underscore this study’s intention to determine the measure of accountability in the ANC regime. Ginsberg posits1:20:

Members of our present and future governments should not be treated as untouchables, no matter how courageous their leaders may have been or how many years they may have struggled to achieve leadership positions. By voting them into power we have sufficiently rewarded them for their years of struggle and sacrifice. The longer we wait to demanded results and answers to the harsh realities our country faces, the deeper the hole will become which we have dug ourselves into.

It is our role as the electorate to ask tough questions and to demand answers of the people we put in power. They are our servants, not the other way around.

We are the shareholders of government – the current management team is only temporary, and can be replaced by a new team with new ideas every five years.

We the people must be respected by our tenants — they are our temporary tenants: we own the houses our ministers live in at Grootte Schuur and next to the Union Buildings in Pretoria. Until we confront our politicians with tough questions and demand specific answers, they will continue to ignore us, while hobnobbing with the same special interest groups at the various functions so many of our politicians seem to attend so regularly.

1.1. Accountability versus unaccountability

It appears that from 1994, with the start of the ANC’s first administration, that the concept of accountability and respect for the law have been treated as foreign notions by the ANC’s top brass. On the established delinquent character of the ANC and thus the possibility that the many misdemeanors will continue post-2019, Helen Zille4 sensibly reflects on the 5th May 20194:12:

You see the essence of a democracy is accountability. Now the reason corruption carries on unabated is because there is no accountability in the system.  Normally, when a government loots and steals people’s money on the scale we have seen, the voters vote it out. We heard Cyril said at the weekend, don’t punish the ANC at the polls. Polls are there to punish a corrupt government, so if people vote for the ANC again, and they get exactly the same people on that list [of who are 22 contaminated top brass members of the ANC] – to me if you vote for that list, you are an accomplice to corruption.

It seems that over 25 years of corrupt ANC reign, the rule of law that is embedded in the essence of accountability, was also gradually being erased from the expectations of many  South Africans. On the lack of accountability and the ease with which corruption has been allowed to expand unpunished as was pinpointed by Zille4, McKaiser5 writes on the absence of the principle of respect for the rule of law in the ANC’s psyche. For McKaiser5 following the rule of law should be done out of respect for doing what is right and not be a kind of good behaviour solely driven by the fear of prosecution for wrongdoings. In pre-2019 South Africa, it seems that the notion of respect has been absent from the mindsets of many politicians, especially in some of the ANC’s top brass and their provincial cronies as the massive testimonies before the Zondo and Mpati commissions confirmed all too well. These politicians have no qualms about their decrepitude either. Even the realistic perception that criminality will be reigned in as the result of the rule of law, by law-enforcement based on prescribed laws, seems to be absent in the mindsets of these culprits. This reflection brings us back to Zille’s4 prerequisite of good character, and McKaiser5 notion about the lack of good character prevalent among the ANC’s top brass and their cronies. Such is the quality of the people currently once again populating the executive of the post-2019 regime. The ANC’s law-makers, untouched and unconcerned by their bad and crooked pasts have been voted into positions where they can easily replicate their actions in future.4,5

This absence of guilt shown by some politicians and the unwillingness of the ANC regime to prosecute its top brass, forced McKaiser5 to ask5:27: “But how many corrupt South Africans, to now test these normative ideas, have been jailed? How many politicians and business people are struggling to sleep at night because they know that our specialist economic crime-busting agencies are close to arresting them? 

The answers to these questions above were: none in the pre-2019 ANC-regime period, and so far also none in the post-2019 South Africa under the new ANC regime. People like Ace Magashule, Jacob Zuma and Julius Malema and even Cyril Ramaphosa all seem to sleep well – and continue to show little remorse. 

1.2. Introduction (Continued from Article 13)

Article 14 is a continuation of the previous article 13, titled: “Critical in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (13: Violence and crime)”. This article is part of a sequence together with articles 11 to 13 which were already published on the ANC. The intention also is to analyse and discuss the arguments in further depth, and to offer various opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC to pursue land expropriation successfully as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.3. Aims of article 14 (Continued from Article 13)

The primary intention of this project on the ANC is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties specifically in order to describe the profile of the ANC in a similar way as was demonstrated in Article 9 on the EFF and Article 10 on the DA.

In this article, the primary aim is to determine how the ANC regime as the mandated ruler of South Africa accepts accountability for its socio-economic and political endeavours and thus if it is able to fulfill its promises regarding land expropriation. The focus will be on the party’s leadership, to detect dysfunction and to describe their personal and political integrity.

2. Method (Continued from Article 13)

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as it develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case with the abilities of political parties to eventually successfully navigate land reform in the future — from 2019 onwards. The sources include articles from 2018, books for the period between 1944 to 2018 and newspapers from the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must serve as guides in offering an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the sole ruler of South Africa to enable successful land reform from 2019.

The research findings have been presented in a narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

The manifestos, self-descriptions and some of the public referees of the ANC were already reflected, evaluated and described in the previous Article 13. In this article the public referees of the African National Congress will further be reflected upon, evaluated and described in the under-mentioned division 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019. The focus is on the acceptance and respect for accountability by the ANC. 

3.2. Louw Appraisal Checklist

The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,6 will again be used for the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC. The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, were again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party manifesto and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees it as applicable.6

3.3 The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 13)

3.3.1. ANC’s accountability

One of the criteria of a failed state is the inability of its ruling regime to take responsibility for its own performance. These doings can vary from the misuse of money, corruption, poor management, unresolved poverty or the upliftment of its people, self-enrichment, or autocratic and fascist behaviour. Of these various criteria to evaluate accountability, the effective functioning of state’s institutions are key, for instance the law-enforcement services that include the police, the courts, as well as the effective functioning of schools, the state administration, etc.

3.3.1.1. Law-enforcing institutions
3.3.1.1.1. South African Police Service (SAPS)

The apparent inability of the SAPS to comprehensively fulfil its prescribed duties such as the practice of effective law-enforcement, have undoubtedly contributed to crime becoming endemic in many of the poor parts of the country, as witnessed for instance in the Western Cape. This failing to enforce laws effectively as well as the growth of criminal enterprises, have massively contributed to the economy of these parts being entrapped in a death spiral. What has emerged in the first place, is the ANC regime’s failure to hold the police force accountable for this chaotic situation which blocks socio-economic development, prosperity and the creation of stable families. Not only the police are to blame, but also the ANC regime itself is guilty of failed accountability and is thus also a perpetrator together with the SAPS in the rise of violent crimes such as murder and manslaughter.  Basically because the ANC regime itself had long ago on national level bid farewell to its responsibility to combat crime and assure a peaceful society of law-abiding citizens, this dire situation exists. The ANC regime failed in its role of overseeing the SAPS, facilitating the fact that a large part of the SAPS is currently without answerability, and responsible to no-one.

Evidence reflects that inside this culture of unaccountability some of the police lost their ability to differentiate between good and bad, leading to crime and other delinquent behaviours besetting members of the SAPS and funding their often luxuriant lifestyles.  It seems as if the SAPS to a certain extent a body only responsible to its own criteria of accountability. This is confirmed by evidence that the SAPS is itself ridden with serious remissness, such as extortion and rape, which have percolated down not only to junior members, but is also evident in the SAPS’s higher ranks. This outcome is telling us more or less why the SAPS is seen by many as a toothless force, ineffective to effectuate law-enforcing; one seemingly stripped of responsibility and accountability. This statement is based on the findings of a research report of GIATOC: Ending the Cycles of Violence7, with its focus on the presence of crime and the presence of gang violence in the two areas Westbury and Eldorado Park, in Gauteng. This report reveals that corruption itself in the SAPS and its inefficient practice of policing in the area, are two significant problems. It not only has a negative impact on all the strategies to deal with gang violence or crime in these areas, but has furthermore negatively impacted on the existing crime-contaminated societies, unable to establish a minimum standard of prosperity. This delinquency of the SAPS comprehensively undermines development in poverty-stricken areas, blocking job creation, obstructing better schooling, youth and community development, making the poor areas totally unsafe places to live in and promoting the growth of crime.7 This tragic reality for the unfortunate and harassed citizens in Westbury and Eldorado, are compounded by the many allegations of police misdemeanors with accusations that officers have been acting in collusion with the hooligans, Moodley7 reports7:4: “Residents no longer feel safe in their homes and on the streets, and do not believe that the police are able to deal with the crime, especially in areas that are riddled by gang violence.”

The clear failing of the SAPS to fulfil with decency and integrity its task of keeping citizens safe, is specifically mentioned in the findings of the GIATOCI report7 on the presence of crime in the SAPS and its inefficiency to perform acceptable policing, Moodley7 reflects as follows7:4: “Furthermore, the report also found that it will not matter what strategy the South African Police Service [Saps] implements, as it will only be effective if the issue of corruption is addressed within the police service.”

The above quote is a harsh statement, and it begs the question of whether it could actually be true? But, as seen and heard from the Zondo commission, crime has infested the mindset of some of the ANC’s leadership as well as their intimate cronies, making the GIATOCI report7 not only credible in a small part of Gauteng, put applicable on the whole country. The accusations of corruption and ineffectiveness of the SAPS, and the extent of unaccountability which is being deleted from the police’s culture, will fully further be evaluated and discussed. What is important to underscore at this stage is that when a government fails at combatting crime – and thus becomes a failed regime – there is a direct link between the delinquent doings of law-enforcement and judicial institutions in effectuating this failure. What is obvious, is that if such institutions are ineffective, sub-standard, corrupt and infiltrated by the Mafiosi,8 the the spread of violence and its related crimes taking root in society is a “normal” phenomenon. As already stated, at the forefront are the actions and status of the SAPS in dealing with fighting crime as well as being actively involved in perpetrating crimes, together with the status and outcomes of the various judicial commissions such as the Zondo and the NPA, both specific entities functioning within the failed ANC regime.7,8

On the massive infiltration by the gangsters of the SAPS, Watson quotes Simone Hayson9, a senior analyst at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime (GIATC)9 based in Geneva. Watson writes on the contamination of some members of the SAPS by criminal actions4:

One of the fundamental drivers of why the gangs are so powerful in the Cape Flats is because there is a very big drug market.

Research on the corrupting effect of the drug economy on the police is obvious to see.

There was a high level of interaction between police officers on the streets and dealers, with the latter treated like ATMs by the police.

At a higher level, there’s a long history of senior police officials being implicated in corrupt relationships with the Cape gangs.

Remember (former Western Cape Provincial Police Commissioner) Arno Lamoer.

And while there was probably less chance the SANDF could be corrupted, given their lack of powers, it wouldn’t hurt to keep an eye out for potential problems.

Various other references are made of the SAPS officers allegedly involved in doing crime via crime syndicates. How deeply the ANC police service’s own staff’ is alleged to be engaged and involved in crime, is seen in the case of General Lemoer9 since his is not an unusual or deviating case. Evidence reflects a much broader network of senior police officers associated with the crime world. The finger is also being pointed at Maj. Gen. Andre Lincoln, the anti-gang unit boss, on whose behalf the Western Cape police recently decided to ask the Supreme Court of Appeal to overturn its exoneration for corruption in the Palazzolo case.10,11 Then is there the former Crime Intelligence boss Gen. Richard Mdluli who is waiting for sentencing on two counts of kidnapping, two counts of common assault, two counts of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and four counts of intimidation,  committed in 1999 against a said Oupa Ramogibe (who was shot dead in 1999 by an unknown killer)10,11. Mdluli has also been implicated before the Zondo  commission in the alleged looting of the State Security Agency (SSA)’s funds and of other alleged cases involving fraud and corruption.12,13

More recently there were allegations by the suspected underworld boss Nafiz Modack that Maj. Genl. Jeremy Vearey, the Cape head of detectives and alleged would-be police commissioner, has been soliciting bribes. In one of various affidavits signed on the 10th April Modack complained to the police at the Parow police station that he was being extorted by Veary and officers under his command for the amount of R10 000 in cash and firearms, writes Hyman14. (An allegation rejected by Vearey). Hyman’s14 writes further on the problematic Cape police top structure, alleged to be contaminated by political influences and ethnicity; influences which are alleged to contribute to the lack of the top structure’s accountability and trust and thus its ability to function effectively and bringing an end to crime in the Cape. He reports as follows14:8:

A Western Cape ANC insider said Vearey, a former uMkhonto weSizwe member, still had allies from the liberation struggle. These are relationships that were forged in the trenches. The one element of it is loyalty to one another, seeing one another deployed to different parts of government…These are old cliques. They are a clique of coloured stalwarts.

Vearey and his ANC comrades Peter Jacobs – now national head of crime intelligence – and Andre Lincoln, head of the anti-gang unit, have been controversial figures for several years.

Slabbert,15 using the guidelines set by Corruption Watch and the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) on the need and functioning of a trustworthy SAPS crime-intelligence unit to erase organised crime, reflects on unauthorised cadre appointments in the top ranks of the SAPS of incapable, tarnished and doubtful characters. Slabbert15 posits as follows15:8:

Die bekommernis is dat daar die afgelope paar jaar op groot skaal afgewyk is van geloofwaardige werwingspraktyke. Dit was moontlik omdat dele van van die polisie se indiensnemingsregulasies daarvoor voorsiening maak dat die aanstelling en bevordering van senior polisiebestuurdslede “in oorleg met die minister” gedoen word sonder om normale aanstellingsvereistes na te kom.

Dit het volgens die organisasies die ruimte gelaat vir politieke inmenging in aanstellings. Khomotso Phahlane, voormalige polisie-kommissaris, het byvoorbeeld 80 sulke aanstellings in een jaar gedoen en Berning Ntlemeza, voormalige Valkehoof, het agt van sy nege provinsiale hoofde vervang.

The delinquent actions and hooliganism of the disgraced ANC leader and cadre-appointed former commissioner of police, the late Jackie Selebi, ended in him branded as an ordinary jailbird.16 

In relation to the recent xenophobia cases in Johannesburg, and the various police raids on foreign traders in the beginning of August in Johannesburg before the xenophobia outcomes, Okoye17 reports that in the Johannesburg CBD ten cops were charged for allegedly attempting to sell counterfeit goods confiscated in the raids, as well as facing various charges of theft, extortion, defeating the ends of justice and corruption.17

About the alleged ineffective SAPS – an SAPS infected by the ills of a failing ANC regime, unable to root out crime despite its parliament mandate and other statutory institutes – the half-heartedness with which it has been combating crime committed on the inside of the SAPS itself has been striking, especially as evidenced by the failure of some of the SAPS staff to commit their time and energy in fighting crime as their work contracts have prescribed. Their passivity and even obstruction to effectively collaborate with law-enforcement officials outside of their union rules and guidelines have been patent. Tumelo Mogodiseng’s18 interview with the secretary general of the South African Police Union (Sapu), reflected in the Rapport of the 21st July 2019, tells us the real story of one of the role-players underpinning the Cape’s crime scourge in eviscerating the accountability of police officers. In this context, the Sapu making known its dislike for the SADF presence in the Cape without their “permission”, acknowledged that the issues of “over-time pay” and “free time” as applicable on SAPS members, help to weaken the manpower input and to keep officers from fulfilling their duties because “angered” officers cannot combat crime in the Cape areas. The SADF intervention in combatting crime without consulting first with the SAPS, seems to have been not an insignificant part of the problem, triggering passivity in the SAPS ranks and an unwillingness to fully participate in crime prevention efforts. The issue is clear: union rules comes before the duties of police officers and even though they are funded by taxpayers. Mogodiseng18 reflects the Sapu’s standpoint on this passivity, notwithstanding consequences passivity had wreaked on the country’s security as follows18:3:

Die problem is, ons lede gaan negatief wees omdat hulle nie ordentlik gekonsulteer is nie. Ons lede moet oortyd werk en ons is nooit ingelig oor ‘n oortydbegroting nie. Die ouens van die bende-eenheid kla juis nou oor hul nie genoeg rusdae het nie.

Furthermore, there seems to be a rich-man-poor-man approach prevalent in the ANC regime as well as in the Ministry of Police’s in their locating and placement of police officers to the different socio-economic areas around the country, ignoring a glaring lack of sufficient police officers in the poor, crime-ridden areas resulting in the unnecessarily high murder rates in such afflicted areas. This irresponsible attitude by the SAPS’s top structure, not held liable for their missteps by the ANC regime, has exacerbated the poor delivery of service in terms of policing to areas such as informal settlements and the struggling, lower socio-economic townships and suburbs while good policing is limited the well-off areas (mostly the financially secure class in affluent white areas).11 This so-called “discriminative” policing service was confirmed in the ruling by the Western Cape High Court in December 2018, namely that the allocation of police in the Western Cape was discriminatory, reports Hendricks11.

This imbalance in manpower at police stations have led to some police members becoming over-worked as well as burdening some officers in dangerous areas with enormous stress factors, making them less effective in serious crime fighting. On the other side, as already indicated, the lack of sufficient police officers in the crime-ridden areas undoubtedly contributed to the immensely high murder rates there. The discriminative distribution where fewer police officers are dispatched to poor areas against a higher number allocated to rich areas has specifically been reported by the editor19 of the Sunday Times and the journalists Hosken and Wicks20 on the 15th September 2019. Prominent is the the pertinent revelations on police data relating to the unequal distribution of police resources at stations across the country, confirming the significant discrimination against the poor, black communities. For example, in Diepkloof in Gauteng there is a ratio of 80 police officers for every 100,000 residents, whereas the ratio in affluent Rosebank, Johannesburg, is 987 for every 100 000. It is reported that eMondlo (near Vryheid, KwaZulu-Natal) faces the country’s second worst staff shortage with 70 officers for every 100,000 people, against the ratio of 1,844 officers per 100,000 people for Pietermaritzburg. At the Flagstaff police station (Eastern Cape) 56 police officers are allocated to 100,000 residents against Port Alfred’s 1,485 members per 100,000. The Sophiatown police station, which must handle Westbury, south of Johannesburg, an area which has been weathering a strong element of gangsterism, is alleged to have only 240 officers instead of 275 and only three vehicles to services the area.11,19-21

It seems that the legal battles by the Social Justice Coalition (SIC) and the Equal Education and Nyanga Community Policing Forum, squaring up over three years in the Equality Court with the SAPS, has indeed brought forth on paper some corrections on this discrimination in the allocation of the police manpower. Also, by strictly applying the court’s ruling on the liability of the behaviour in the SAPS which it so far dodged for a long time, some headway has been made, at least on paper. On December 14, 2018 judges Nolwazi Boqwana and Mokgoatji Dolamo ruled on the way police resources were being allocated is discriminating against poor black people.20 On August 6, 2019 the court ordered police management to provide a plan to remedy the situation by September 1, 2019, writes Hosken and Wicks20. Hosken and Wicks20, quoting Dali Weyers20, point out specifically how police-allocated resources discriminated against people clearly on the basis of race and income. Weyers20 posits further20:5:

There has been a cycle where specific communities have been underserved. At some stations the discrimination is dire. If you look at murder rates, which have increased and which are the highest at some of the country’s most under-resourced stations, one would have expected the police to put more resources into such stations. What this data shows [is that] this is not the case.

It is thus not a surprise that the residents of poor (and dangerous) areas, such as that of the eMondlo community, were forced to form a vigilante private “force” to deal with criminals to compensate for the lack of responsibility and accountability of the top structure of the SAPS and the ANC regime to safeguard them. As a result of this reigning chaos of poor and discriminative policing it thus came as no surprise that the Nigerian government wanted to send its own police to South Africa to safe-guard its citizens after the recent so alleged xenophobic attacks.20,22-25

Highlighting this South African political chaos, born out of the fact that crooks have been allowed to take hold of some of the institutions which are supposed to serve society — and Nigeria’s duty to its citizens to safe-guard them 24-hours a day — Tau25 writes on the 8th September 2019 in the Rapport as follows25:9:

Die Nigeriese regering wil graag hul eie polisie na Suid-Afrika stuur om hul burgers hier teen xenofobiese aanvalle te beskerm. Dis die boodskap wat die Nigeriese regering se spesiale gesant, Muhammadu Buhar, blykbaar die afgelope week in Pretoria kom lewer het.

The impropriety within the SAPS to initiate effective law-enforcement in the Western Cape, has been caused by the immense infighting inside the SAPS top ranks there about who gets to be in the pound seats of the organization. It has contributed further in making the policing service there almost ineffective, together with the deficient structuring and management of police units, such as the anti-gang unit itself in taking responsibility for the risk of police officers are involved in (in the application of anti-gang measures).10,19 Hyman10 writes in this context10:1,4:

While politicians’ bicker and police commanders wage their own civil war, hundreds of poorly trained officers have become sitting ducks for the gangs”. Six anti-gang unit officers were shot during an operation in Philippi on June 12. The attack followed a 54-hour period in which 62 murder victims arrived in Cape Town mortuaries.

On the current disorderly administration of the SAPS — which has mimicked the ANC regime’s own disorderly governmental administration of all its allotted tasks — Hyman10, quoting Johan Nortje10, the lawyer of Lincoln, on the anti-gang unit’s malfunctioning which in terms of the Police Ministry is supposed to “dislodge and terminally weaken the capacity of the Cape gangs, writes as follows10:1,4:

The people are seconded, they’re not appointed to official positions. There are no clear guidelines about who is being reported to. The guys in the stations don’t know if they should get involved in gang violence cases because there is now a unit for that. The unit doesn’t know exactly what its mandate is. The gangs can see what’s going on. They are laughing at the police because it looks like the police themselves don’t really know what they’re doing.

The ANC regime’s inadequate rule (in lacking responsibility and accountability) has meanwhile cemented the above-mentioned chaos in the SAPS, diminishing their ability to fight crime, especially the present murdering spree and gangsterism in the Cape, David Bruce10, an independent researcher who specialises in policing, guides us in some way when he said10:1,4: “…the government had ‘never responded in a coherent way to violent crime”.

It seems that the sudden statement about “rehabilitation” of the Cape Flats by the Western Cape community safety MEC Albert Fritz came in response to the stated concerns of mismanagment of resources, as9:4: “…his office would establish a parallel inter-ministerial collaboration to facilitate intelligence gathering and sharing, and the rollout of integrated social programmes to encourage job creation, increased school programmes, sport and culture programmes, youth development and community programmes”. It is a very  late acceptance by the authorities of some form of responsibility and accountability to oversee the safety of inhabitants after many years of deprivation of a small area of 25 km of the country. The question is why the ANC regime has been absent on national level as well as on provincial level since 1994 with constructive intervention, such as job creation, etc., in the Cape Flats, to better it permanently instead of their present opportunistic so-called “initiative to bring prosperity” there in July 2019. How can they hope to repair the integrity of the areas, creating stable communities, and acceptable living conditions in the future? The “reformers” and the “new Police” are the same people with little integrity who now want to fight the same criminals that they as a regime since 1994 gave a free hand to establish themselves and to prosper.9,26 Indeed, prosperity for ordinary citizens is in short supply and will be in the future for all of South Africa, and this is well reflected by the above example of the absolute chaos present in the small part of the country known as the Cape Flats when Fritz9 reacts in July 2019 as the SADF readies to be deployed to fight crime with the remark9:4: “…the SANDF deployment was a massive relief for the people of our province who can now look forward to be safe in their own communities and homes”. He not only confirms the lack of accountability by the SAPS, the ANC regime and the provincial authorities in the Cape Flats but also the impotence of the ANC as a regime afte