Category Archives: History

The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution (4)

Full title: The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible. Part 2: The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime (4)

Gabriel P Louw
Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:
Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PUCHE), DPhil (PUCHE), PhD (NWU)

Keywords: antagonists, opponents, compensation, contamination, crookery, custom, expropriation, land grabbing, land ownership, opposition, poverty, radicalism, redistribution, wealth.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 2: 2

1. Background

1.1. Introduction

The study of the previous article (Part One) on the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints offer a broad identification of elements and role players present in the political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime. They each oppose the intended land grabbing of White land by the ANC regime to transfer it free to poor and landless Blacks. The antagonists see land grabbing as part of a greater international political and socioeconomic process through which the ANC regime is promoting its revolutionary and Marxist-socialist policy.

The primary aim of this article (Part Two) is to continue the reflection on these various elements and role players as already described in the previous article (Part One). It is only with such a comprehensive presentation that a picture can emerge of the antagonists’ civil right to uphold the Constitution in its present form. The presentation of the various elements and role players are divided into six subdivisions.

It is important to note how Chomsky’s1 points out that modern politics often hampers rational thought, allowing the practice of freedom, but limiting the pursuit of truth (creating ignorance among a large portion of South Africans on land ownership, indigenousness and what political and personal integrity means). This limited pursuit of truth limits the development of the critical role of leaders of integrity and independent thinking in skewed political systems. This vacuum causes a lack of responsibility to provide students, individuals, citizens, politicians, and the1:10 :“…wider public, the knowledge and skills they need to be able to learn how to think rigorously, to be self-reflective and to develop the capacity to govern rather than be governed”.

For Chomsky1 it goes much further1:10:

“… it is not enough to learn how to think critically. Engaged intellectuals must also develop an ethnical imagination and sense of social responsibility necessary to make power accountable and to deepen the possibilities for everyone to live dignified lives infused with freedom, liberty, decency, care and justice.”

In the view of the antagonists, Chomsky’s1 view is a reflection of how the ANC over time kept the South African public away from understanding the meaning of true justice, democracy and civil rights by limiting a non-racial intellectual leadership in the country’s politics. This is also how they successfully deprive Whites of dignified lives infused with freedom, liberty, decency, care and justice. The antagonists view the land process as something that is symptomatic of the ANC’s decay and as something that precludes Whites from a life of freedom. In this context of racism and isolation of groups, as experienced at presence by the South African Whites, Henry Giroux, professor at the McMaster University and distinguished visiting professor at Ryerson University, points to the correctness of Chomsky1 conclusion, namely that politics can only become emancipatory for a given group of people when these people speak out fearlessly and publically about their experience, like the antagonists are now doing in relation to land. Without such a political catharsis and public resistance against the government of the day by the suppressed antagonists, the criminal politicians of the ANC and their crooked politics will continue. The antagonists are deliberately being obstructed from the participation in politics by the ANC, and if they fail to force their identity into the total political setup, the can recede into obscurity. Challenging the ANC regime on the land issue is of absolute importance.1 Giroux writes in this regard1:11:

“Chomsky clearly connects with a need among the public for those intellectuals willing to make power visible, to offer an alternative understanding of the world, and to point to the hopes of a future that does not imitate the scurrilous present.”

Giroux further highlights1:11:

“Chomsky publicly argues against regimes of domination organized for the production of violence, and social and civil death. The force of his presence…offers up the possibility of dangerous memories, alternative ways of imagining society and the future, and the necessity of public criticism as one important element of individual and collective resistance”.

Chomsky’s1 advice on rectifying discrimination, exploitation and abuse of suppressed groups echoes the ideas of the antagonists in their present fight against the ANC’s planned amendment to Section 25 to make land grabbing possible.

Chomksky’s1 description of leaders with “poor political intelligence” fits the leadership crises of the ANC since 1994, from Nelson Mandela up to Cyril Ramaphosa, characterised by state capture, fraud and corruption. These leaders have failed to assure that everyone can live dignified lives infused with freedom, liberty, decency, care and justice in their countries. The antagonists as a group, opposing the ANC, know that the Whites are on their own in the ANC’s racist political reign and that they are an easy target for things like land grabbing.2

The antagonists see the ANC regime as one that lacks the political intelligence to be ethical and socially responsible and to be accountable so that everyone in South Africa could have dignified lives infused with freedom, liberty, decency, care and justice. They became a crooked autocracy, greatly biased against minorities like the Whites. As Mthombothi says2:3: “The ANC is drunk from the alcohol of corruption.” They have lost contact with political, social and personal decency and justice. The ANC’s deviant behaviour since 1994 is spilling over to the land issue, forcing the antagonists to take them on with some sound arguments. It is in this context that Articles 3 and 4 offer some insights.2

1.2. Research intentions

The research aim of this article is to evaluate and to describe what the antagonists believe about the dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of South Africa that supports and promotes land grabbing. Opposition to this dysfunctional system stands central in the antagonists’ perspective on changing of Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible.

This article forms the second and last part of the article titled: “The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints on changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible: Part 1”. This article, Part Two, reflects further on what the antagonists believe about dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime that supports and promotes land grabbing.

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern political-historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research on the ownership of South African land for the period 1652 to 2018 in South Africa. The sources include books for the period 1947 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2018. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the current perspective of the antagonists for the unchanged keeping of Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution and thus the continuation of the present land redistribution policy with compensation in place since 1994.

The research findings are presented in narrative form.

3. Discussion

As already indicated, the antagonists’ perspective reflects a broad array of elements and role players active in the political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime that they associate with the intended expropriation of White land without compensation by the ANC.

The presentation of the various elements and role players in this article is done in six subdivisions.

3.1. Political horrors, anarchy and revolution

3.1.1. Imitating the horrors of the Mao, Stalin and Mugabe regimes

The antagonists fear that the murderous events of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, the horrors of Stalin’s regime and, closer to home, Robert Mugabe’s implementation of the land grabbing in Zimbabwe, can be repeated in South Africa. In fact, they see the farm murders as proof that it is already starting. Opperheimer’s3 writing on the land issue is one of the few instances where antagonists tell the world of their deep-seated fears of a “post-2018 South African Uhuru”. However, the writing is symptomatic of a deeply entrenched idea of victimhood cemented into many White mindsets from 1652. Opperheimer3 almost writes as a lonesome White telling the world why he thinks the present political setup where land must be left untouched, must be upheld to assure Whites of a future economic and personal safe-heaven and as much power as the Blacks in South Africa. But it is also an outcry to the outside world to offer help to maintain the present political and economic model of South Africa if they want to not only to assure the stable and safe lives of Whites after 2018, but also the safeguarding of foreign economic and political interests here. There is undoubtedly a belief hidden under layers of arguments on the land-reform issue that if the present political and economic status quo can be upheld successfully, the present land ownership of White rights will be left unchanged. The flip side of that view is that land expropriation without compensation, with its many other conflicting disturbing rooting will open the floodgates for political instability and marginalisation of Whites.4-6

3.1.2. The Zimbabwe-South African environment of anarchy

When analysing the Zimbabwe-South African environment of anarchy, is it important to note that in Zimbabwe no horrors were initially committed against the Whites. Robert Mugabe suddenly steered land grabbing into action with his political radicalism and racism. This is very similar to the political radicalism and racism now awaking in South Africa. However, in reality there have not been any atrocities aimed at Whites at the hand of the ANC. The conflict situation has been limited to heated political debate (if one regards the farm murders as a matter of crime that is not linked to formal politics).3,5

The antagonists are quick to point out that in example cases, like Zimbabwe, violence emerged when the targeted group lost its military power. This could be why land expropriation was not an avenue in 1994: the White minority was still politically organised with a significant hold on the military. However, the numbers of the White South African have declined from 1994 (there are 2.7 million Afrikaners left, and the numbers are in constant decline). They have also become politically disorganised and disoriented. The antagonists believe that the radicals in the ANC, EFF and PAC think that the time is ripe to address the matters left untouched in 1994.6-8

The lack of Black land ownership is often blamed for the entire context of inequality, unemployment and poverty. Taking from Whites and the re-dividing it among the poor and landless have become an obvious rectifying step. The ANC regime sells the immediate implementation of land expropriation, even without compensation to owners, as a priority to avoid the tragic outcome of land grabbing in the form that it took in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. The antagonists see this reasoning as a dishonest attempt to hide the ANC’s true motives. They feel that the current Black poverty and inequality primarily have their roots in the ANC regime’s substandard governance. Taking land from Whites cannot dramatically improve the country’s failing economy. Black poverty, unemployment and inequality will just continue.6-8

3.1.3. South African farm murders

The antagonists see the constant rise in farm murders where Whites are the prominent prey as an indication that Mugabe-like chaos is looming. This is a murder spree, they argue, that can also spread to urban areas and cities. The antagonists allege that the killing of Whites, especially Afrikaner farmers, have become a common phenomenon in South Africa since 1994 in an effort to drive Whites from their land.9,10

The antagonists also see poor governance as one of the main causes of the murders on White farmers as it has led to poor policing, a general lack of law enforcement, immense poverty and unemployment, social and personal isolation of races, uncontrolled gang activities, and the ANC regime openly denying farm murders as a problematic phenomenon. The ANC dismissing of farm murders as “Black danger” propaganda vestigial of the previous regime and false reporting by the antagonists, is seen by the antagonists as planned lies. The antagonists accuse the ANC government of very little effort to prevent it or to offer compensation, even to discuss the matter publically.9-11

The antagonists have two prominent concerns, namely 1) that Blacks are taking revenge on White-farmers for Apartheid; and 2) that there is a direct effort to drive Afrikaner farmers from their farms as was done by the Mai-Mai in Kenya, by Swapo in Namibia and by Mugabe’s supporters in Zimbabwe. They try to prove this with official data. They report that in 2016 70 White farmers were murdered in 345 farm attacks, meaning one farm murder every four days and one farm attack every day. They support their argument on the danger that farming holds for Whites in post-1994 South Africa, the antagonists further compared the murder averages of 2016 for South Africa with the 2016 data on global averages. In this comparison the world average is 7:100 000 versus South Africa’s average of 33:100 000 (the crime statistics for the financial year 2017 to 2018 reflects a rise to 36:100 000). South Africa’s problems with violent crime are also confirmed by the murder of members of the South African Police Service in 2017, namely 54:100 000. The antagonists claim that the murders of South African farmers came to a shocking 133:100 000 in 2016. In this context it is also reported that the SAPS data for the period 1991 to 2016 reflect the death of 14 589 farm dwellers with a ratio 60% Whites versus 40% Blacks.9,10

It is clear to the antagonists that White farmers are slowly, as in Zimbabwe, being driven from farms. They see the farm murders as focussed systematic ethnic cleansing, and the decline in commercial farmers from 65 000 to only 35 000 in 2017 serves as further evidence of a murder spree aimed at White farmers.9,10

Ian Cameron12, head of community safety for AfriForum, recently reported that there have been 300 farm attacks and 41 farm murders since the 1 January 2018 to March 2018. For the financial year 2017–2018 (1 March 2017 to 28 February 2018), AfriForum reports 70 farm murders. The official crime statistics released by parliament on 11 September 2018 for the same financial year reflects only 62 farm murders with six attempted murders, 33 farmhouse robberies and two rapes; an outcome that AfriForum dismisses as a gross misrepresentation, with good reason.10,13-15 Cameron12 claims that his organisation shares their statistics with the police on a regular basis and that the data should therefore correlate. The antagonists see the eight less farm murders reported by the SAPS as manipulation, as reflected by Cameron’s response12:12:

“I am scared to say it is deliberate, especially now with all this attention from the international community”.

3.1.4 South Africa’s general murder statistics

The antagonists point out that however much the SAPS and the ANC regime would like to dismiss Trump’s description of South Africa as the murder hotspot for White farmers, the country’s overall murder statistics are more than enough to confirm Trump’s worries. They feel that these numbers are indicative that the events brought on by Mao, Stalin and Mugabe is already part of the ANC’s efforts. This reflection also includes the presence of low-level anarchy in the country. For the financial year 1 March 2017 to 28 February 2018, parliament’s general crime statistics14, published on 12 September 2018, are terrifying. It greatly overshadows farm murders. It reflects that 20 336 people were killed, of whom 6 555 were shot and killed. Of the rest 4 866 were killed in knife attacks, 445 by the use of hands, 76 in axe attacks and 72 were beaten to death with a sjambok. The Minister of Police, Bheki Cele14 (National Police Commissioner from 2009 to 2012) said in reaction14: 1-2:

“It doesn’t matter what figures you put, but if you can’t deal and control the murder cases, you are not bringing any joy to the South African people. It doesn’t matter what else you reduce; if people die and when you look at the figures, there are 57 dying a day. It borders close to a war zone while there is peace; there is no war in South Africa.”

The DA spokesperson on police matters, Zakhele Mbhele14, pinpointed the root of these evils when he responsed14: 1-2:

“…the ANC had failed to keep ordinary citizens safe. The fact that the ANC spends an average of R9.1 million to protect one VIP but only R1 500 per South African resident reveals that their skewed priorities are crippling the fight against the unacceptably high levels of crime in the country.”

Japhet Ncube16, the editor of the Star, drove it home when he wrote16:2:

If you feel unsafe in your home and on the streets, you haven’t been imagining things. South Africa is one of the most unsafe places on Earth. More people are dying here than in many war zones across the world.

We are all just statistics waiting to happen. The criminals rule South Africa.

And if we bank on politicians to stop the killings, the criminals, who sometimes work with police officers, will be knocking on your door soon.

And you can’t do anything about it. The police are unable to do anything about it. The government is unable to do anything about it. The battle has been lost.

The police is currently short of 62 000 officers due to a lack of funding and mismanagement. In the same period billions of Rands went down the drain as a result of state capture. The size of the police force has decreased from 200 000 in 2010 to 191 000 in 2018, meaning a decline of 9 000 in eight years while the population is growing.17

The antagonists see many other indicators that point to the horrors of the regimes of Mao, Stalin and Mugabe. The annual GLOBAL Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace gives us insight into the most dangerous countries in the world, ranking 163 independent countries on how peaceful they are (or, in contradiction: how dangerous they are), with the lowers scoring countries being those technically at war (like Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Iraq, Somalia). These 163 countries were assessed using 23 indicators that were each scored on a scale of 1 to 5. The 163 countries cover more than 99.7% of the world’s population. South Africa came in at 39th, but this changed negatively after the September 2018 parliamentary report on crime compiled by the SAPS.9 The editor9 of The Star writes9:12:

“The stats paint a grim picture. They show why South Africa is in the league of countries as Belize, Honduras and Venezuela in the murder stakes.”

The antagonists therefore view inciting public remarks such as “We will not kill the Whites now” as gravely serious.9,15,18-20

3.1.5. Increasing anarchy and destruction What is anarchy?

The antagonists’ belief that the horrors of the regimes of Mao, Stalin and Mugabe can also happen in South Africa, is based on the realities of upheavals in the country. There are many examples. There has been a wave of civil disobedience over the last ten years. Poor service delivery has resulted in protests and unrest. The shortage of jobs, accessible education and training, housing and medical care is resulting in full-scale anarchy, leaving the possibility of civil war and revolution before the end of 2019. The antagonists are not alone in this thinking. The South African veteran political analyst and journalist, Barney Mthombothi21, confirms this fear when he tries to convey what anarchy is and what it means to the ordinary citizens of South Africa21: 17:

Anarchy is defined in the Collins English Dictionary as: “General lawlessness and disorder, especially when thought to result from an absence or failure of government…the absence of any guiding or uniting principle; disorder; chaos”.

That could be our destination if we’re not careful.

Mthombothi21, a wise man, fine diplomat, true patriot and excellent journalist, avoids creating panic by saying that the country is already in anarchy. The political truth is that the country is in a constant low- to mid-level stage of anarchy; it is just waiting for the interference of the politically corrupt and opportunistic Zuptiods’ and intervention by the present South African government to explode into full-scale anarchy and its accompanying revolution and civil war. This may happen as soon as the 2019 election. All South Africans have been affected by injustice and have been dreaming of a broad socio-economic correction. Inequality, poverty, unemployment and landlessness are central. It is mostly the majority of poor and landless Blacks who had hoped that the election of 27 April 1994 would bring a new, improved life and who had placed the ANC into government to do exactly that, who are really suffering. They are now starting to make the country ungovernable with unrest and violence. The antagonists see an escalation in the scope, frequency and the severity of unrest and violence.21,22

Although Whites and land owners have thus far been largely unaffected, they are aware of this growing danger, not only in terms of their future right to own land, but also their personal safety. The tragedies of Belgian Congo, Rwanda, Somali, Sudan and Zimbabwe are burned into their minds, consciously and unconsciously. As much the Whites are confused about the most likely outcome, they are also confused about addressing the matter. Their public participation has mainly centred on 1) the legality of the 1994 regime change and upholding the Constitution, and 2) the use of the court of law to force order. They see land expropriation without compensation as a social injustice and a form of civil disorder. In their view it is a stop en route to anarchy and revolution to overthrow the present democracy of South Africa.21,22 The antagonists’ undeclared fears

The antagonists have thus far failed to address their own deep-seated fears constructively in public. Their public communication lack openness surrounding their fears about anarchy, both anarchy that could result from the populace’s growing frustration with the ANC government and the anarchy that could stem from the hostility against Whites that is built into the ANC’s radical statements on land expropriation and remarks such as “kill the Boers”, “the colonist Boers stole our land”, and “land possession by Whites is a sin”. This silence of some White South Africans is the result of a fear of reprisals from the poor and landless, of being labelled as non-Africans, colonists, or being associated with radical groups such as the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). The antagonists feel that a dislike of any objection to Black wrongdoing has been cemented into the mindsets of the radicals in the ANC, EFF and PAC. This entrenched dislike of justified criticism is illustrated by the reactions to Donald Trump, who dared to publically acknowledge the problems South Africa has with land expropriation and the murders on White farmers (Can Trump be wrong to ask for an inquiry when facts show that in 2018 the average for murders per day was 57 persons in South Africa, which is six times more than the average number for the USA? The question posed to the ANC regime is: Who are these 57 murder victims and why and where did these murders happen?).14,15,21,22

The ANC regime’s growing loyalty to and association with anarchist elements are also forcing most Whites into passivity and silence, although they speak freely in private. They have to voice their concerns about a failed ANC regime, their view that expropriation without compensation amounts to theft and their doubt about Ramaphosa’s ability to serve their interests. Such a “confession” would open a conversation on land reform. It could put Donald Trump’s remark on South African land grabbing and the threat to White lives into perspective, away from the propaganda and cover-ups.12,14,15,21,22 Attitudes of apathy about criminal wrongdoing in society

Antagonists point out that the recent and current unrest and violence involve a mixed crowd of mostly Black youngsters and adults with a focus looting of shops and properties, torching vehicles and public and private buildings and occupying private or public land. In Cape Town, losses due to arson directed at the Metrorail train fleet, has topped R300 million since 2015. Just fighting off the arson and protecting passengers by means of a security team have cost Cape Town’s city council, the Cape provincial government and Prasa R48 million per annum. The police mostly stand by passively, leading to a culture of no prosecution as if they fear angering a powerful political group who may be their bosses in the near future (or as if these hooligans are already their political partners). This apathy towards criminal wrongdoing is a global phenomenon where anarchist forces are gaining control.21,23 The base of the wanton destruction is a direct outcome of the masses’ disillusionment with the ANC’s politics, elite and regime and their failed democracy.21,23

The direct outcome of the masses’ disillusionment is already clear, as Mthombothi21 writes21:17:

“We’re witnessing a level of destruction probably not seen in the country’s history, save in war”.

Indeed, in well-ordered countries with well-ordered regimes in place, this would not happen as here in South Africa where the criminals run the show and the people are left unprotected, as Mthombothi24 reflects24: 25:

“South Africa have become blasé about crime, especially the ANC’s mindset on the matter and the thousands of people’s murdering, rape and robbing every day went unnoticed, even became internalised as the normal.”

Above is an important remark by Mthombothi24, seeing that the ANC-IFP anarchy in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1990s was described as brutal and cold-blooded, at the time the most severe within the borders of post-1910 South Africa. In this context is it important for the antagonists to note that the present anarchy may have a strong racial and ethnic under build, namely Black-on White and, as in KwaZulu-Natal, Black-on-Black violence.25-27 Munusamy25 writes as follows about this forgotten history and the possible implications of a revolution for the country’s stability25:18:

“The history books reduce the violence to a bland narrative of events and statistics about the number of people killed. Articles you find online fail to adequately convey the horror of the time and the depth of human suffering in violence-ravaged parts of the province.”

Sibongakonke Shoba27, a political editor of the Sunday Times, brings us back to the murder scene in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1990s. Shoba’s warning is clear27:21:

It was not the first or last time that IFP impis raided the area. Due to KwaMashu’s proximity to Richmond Farm and Lindelani, IFP strongholds, the bloodthirsty warmongers often acted on their temptation to show off their shooting skills whenever they marched past the township.

But that Sunday they were craving more action.

We later learnt that our attackers had been bristling for action after being addressed by IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi at a rally in Durban. They were still dressed in IFP regalia, mainly T-shirts emblazoned with Buthelezi’s beaming face.

3.2. Exclusion of the poor from the ANC

The political, social and economic disillusionment of the poor and landless Blacks has become deep-seated. It is no longer simply dissatisfaction with poor service delivery, corruption, political incompetence, poverty, landlessness and homelessness. It has become an “…immense feeling of exclusion from the ANC regime, party and elite”, writes Mthombothi.21:17 He continues by commenting on the ANC elite’s failure as responsible political leaders21:17:

While apartheid excluded people by virtue of colour, the new dispensation unfortunately has its own haves and have-nots. ANC members and those close to them are “deployed” to cushy jobs in the government, get handed state contracts, live in plush suburbs and drive fancy cars.

The poor, meanwhile, can only gawk in awe and amazement at the opulence that is at last so close and so visible, but that they can neither experience nor enjoy. While the government has failed to provide basic services to the poor, it has at the same time become a generous cash cow for the rich, the powerful and the connected. The contradiction is both stunning and maddening. It’s Animal Farm all over again. The pigs are having a great time.

But, the antagonists point out, during anarchy the “prosperous pigs on the animal farm are gobbled up by a beast with the head, mouth and teeth of a dragon”: total anarchy and full revolution. The description of illegal occupations below shows how far this process had progressed.

The final words of Fikile Mbhele28, who obstinately refused with 28 other families to vacate low cost houses that they occupied illegally of the eThekwini municipality since January 2018, became a common refrain among occupiers, reflecting a total disregard for law and order28:10: “We decided we had to come here and take these houses, and secure the houses from outsiders.” Occupiers argue that as individuals with constitutional rights, they are constantly being overlooked by the ANC municipalities. Instead unrelated people from outside their traditional areas were offered houses and even councillors have become involved in illegally selling houses. The legal steps taken by the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) against the eThekwini municipality to defend the occupiers’ right to occupy in view of the failure of the ANC’s local systems to serve the individual citizen’s rights are enlightening. There is no municipal housing beneficiary list, the housing administration is substandard, residents of the area are not consulted about placements, the municipality breached the Constitution and other pieces of legislation in the handling of this housing project, while other housing projects in the city in general also lack a housing allocation policy in line with current legislation.28

This not only provides insight into the human rights violations of the ANC regime since 1994, but confirms the correctness of Mthombothi’s21 postulation, namely21:17: “…that the ANC regime has failed to provide basic services to the poor and that the political system, from the top to the lower levels, has become a generous cash cow for the ANC’s rich, powerful and connected.”

Mthombothi’s21 direct reference of the ANC’s model as21:17: “… an animal farm wherein the pigs are having a great time”, is quite applicable and descriptive, but at the same time a serious point of concern for the future of South Africa.

Ramaphosa has thus far failed to act decisively by using the security forces to end anarchy in any form or even to condemn it. This reality is reflected by his skirting the issue of violence. Does he fear “…the hubris of Zuma’s 2014 prediction that the ANC will ‘run this government forever and ever…until Jesus come back’”? A racial and ethnic bloodbath can result from Ramaphosa’s land expropriation without compensation and labelling of Whites as colonial land thieves, argues the antagonists.29

The antagonists wonder if Ramaphosa is treading carefully around Black unrest and anarchy because of his poor positioning in the NEC of the ANC. His position means that he has to refrain from angering Jacob Zuma and his strong faction. Ramaphosa is insecure about his position in the unstable ANC at this stage of his presidency in 2019. Some political analysts and other hopefuls only see a future stable country in the distance with Ramaphosa in a doubtful future role, as Bruce30 reflects30:16:

“We ordinary folk are just going to have to get used to a little uncertainty. For my part I think the Zuma crowd will gradually fade away. Whether that means Ramaphosa succeeds is another question.”

Predicting the presence of leaders like Ramaphosa and Zuma in our future political history is foolishness, the future is just too unpredictable, but seasoned politicians, historians and futurists can offer the voters various considerations. At this stage of our history, the antagonists view both Ramaphosa and Zuma as risks and persons who do not belong in respected democratic governmental regimes. Chronic anarchy has sadly become part of their rule.21,29-31

Viewed from another perspective, the antagonists’ note, the people’s despair with the ANC regime’s failure to protect them has led to behaviour recent years that could be seen as chronic anarchy, but which is in reality pure self-defence and an expression of “normal” civilian rights to address their immediate danger. Mothombothi24 focused on these “legal” self-defence behaviours as follows24:25:

Society has lost faith in the government’s ability to protect its citizens, and as a result vigilantism is on the rise. People are taking the law into their own hands.

Police Minister Fikile Mbalula seemed to lay the blame for rampart crime at the door of the police. The police should obviously take the rap; but so should the minister. The buck stops with him. The police, for instance, had been without stable leadership since the departure of the hapless Riah Phiyega as national commissioner two years ago.

And of course the crime stats have a lot in common with the horrendous economic number laid bare in parliament a day later: two sides of the same coin. A thriving economy would create jobs and take people out of crime.

3.3. The impact of contaminated international alliances on South African land grabbing

Political commentators view land expropriation fashioned after the EFF’s fantasy of wholesale confiscation of private property and banks as misleading “fake news”. However, it is not so far-fetched when considering the rhetoric of the ANC elite, many other radicals, and Ramaphosa himself on the absolute need for immediate expropriation without compensation. The view of the retire politician, Tony Leon, touches on a nerve. He reflects on the ANC’s radical new land redistribution and the inclusion of Julius Malema and the EFF as part of the unstoppable future radical rulers of South Africa. He compares the resulting future of South Africa to that created by political leaders Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. Leon’s32 comments read as follows32:18:

He [Nicolás Maduro] and his late predecessor [Hugo Chávez] implemented an EFF-style programme of uncosted giveaways, at war with private production or even basic economics, reducing what was once the richest country in the hemisphere to beggary.

Inflation is recorded at 13 000%, the world’s highest, and prices of basic foods, mostly now imported, double every month. But eventually fact-free economics wearies the truest of believers, and very few bothered even to vote last weekend.

One fed-up Chavista, Carlos Gonzales, 64, who abstained, put a price on his disillusion. “My monthly pension is only enough to buy one frozen chicken…”

The radical propagandists have already decided on the outcome of the parliamentary hearings on possible land reform. There is only one outcome they find acceptable: extreme land reform. The antagonists feel that it clear that the radicals will force down radical land reform, whether or not it could end in revolution, rebellion, war or a second Rwanda.33 Malema33 himself stated publically on 22 July 2018 that if revolution breaks out33:3: “…the EFF will join in to empowers the previously oppressed to have access to the land”.

In the view of the antagonists, chronic anarchy is evident from the illegal land occupations all over South Africa. These occur outside the boundaries set by Section 25(2)(b) or any other legal interpretation of the Constitution. Examples include occupations in Alexandra, Klipfontein, Waterfall, Johannesburg, and Hermanus in the Western Cape. Ramaphosa spoke out against unlawful land occupation in March 2018 and called on the police to clamp down on it (like taking down 100 illegal structures at the end of March 2018 in Alexandra and arresting five persons). He also told MPs the adopted parliamentary resolution on expropriation without compensation is not a call for “a smash-and-grab-guideline”. However, the land grabbing is gaining momentum and Ramaphosa has become very quiet on the matter. Land-related incidents – resistance against evictions, land invasions and land protests – numbered 70 between 2013 and 2017. Of these 84% occurred in metros, with only 16% occurring in rural areas. However, a finding of the Institute for Security Studies that there has recently been a flare-up with 41 of these conflicts taking place in 2017. Of the 70 incidents, as many as 71% turned violent, with again the most in 2017. In KwaZulu-Natal, housing offices in Zwelihle, a library and a satellite police station were set on fire recently. Even farms in the historic Tea Estate area in Inanda, owned by Black small-scale farmers who farm on the land and hold deeds to it, have been targeted by Black occupiers. It is reported that in April 2018 some of the Black land invaders and grabbers near Durban flattened a sugar-cane crop to make way for their illegal houses.34-37

In his overview of the looming anarchy, Umraw38 reflects that the City of Cape Town reported a 74% increase in land invasions year on year; that in Gauteng one man was killed and four people injured in protests over land, while various property developments in KwaZulu-Natal were stopped due to illegal occupation of land by squatters.38

In the Free State about 100 inhabitants of the Monyakeng Township at Wesselsbron, started in August 2018 to erect plots on a farm, while the same happened in August on a Stellenbosch wine farm. In both cases the farmers alleged the efforts were well-organised and started after Ramaphosa’s announcement on expropriation. Jansen39 reports as follows on the Stellenbosch’s farmer’s reaction39:4:

“Things just happened to smooth and the structures are erected on an organised way. Here stands sometimes gleaming cars around. I understand the structures are being given at R350 each to the people and that prominent ANC-men are involved. He said that the police ignore the complaints or arrived hours later.” [Own translation].

Also, the Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) veterans joined the fight from in KwaZulu-Natal in April 2018 by illegally occupying units in the Masinge housing project in Margate, flats in Cornubia, Durban and the Aloe Ridge social housing complex in Pietermaritzburg, ignoring court orders. Nair reports that there are hundreds of members of the MK Military Veterans Association who have been illegally occupying housing developments across KwaZulu-Natal.34-37

Themba Mavundla37 shows how serious this has become when he, as the provincial chairman of the MK Military Veterans Association, reveals their aggressive and hostile intentions by saying37:4:

“They need the houses. This has been going on for years and nothing to do with land expropriation. We won’t back down.”

The initial fight for rural land has spilled over into urban areas between 2017 and 2018. Gift Maboke35, a community leader from Alexandra, paints a picture of this future of conflict outside the legal system35:4:

…none of the city’s vacant land [urban] was safe from occupation. ‘Any [vacant] land we see we are going to attack [regardless] if it is owned privately or by the city’; and

…the fight for land was shared by all poor and disenfranchised people across South Africa. ‘We are not talking about Alexandra [Johannesburg] only. It’s not us alone. We are talking about all townships and people who do not have land or accommodation. We are together’

In reaction to these illegal actions even Nomaindia Mfeketo, the Minister of Human Settlements, could not rule out more recently the possibility that the President’s (and the parliamentarians’) announcement about the land expropriation without compensation has been “misconstrued” by poor Black communities and sent an “incorrect message” to the poor. However much the ANC regime would like to argue, the antagonists point out that illegal land occupation has become an unstoppable movement.36,37 It is with good reason that Collins40 writes40:4:

“No vacant land in the city is safe from occupation”.

In the context of Ramaphosa’s possible indirect instigation of land grabbing,35,36 Mfeketo36 replies36:4:

“Well, that might be. Not only in Cape Town, Gugulethu, Khayelitsha and Waterfall – you’ve seen people who think they have arrived. ‘This is our opportunity to land-grab’.”

Mfeketo36 and Collins’s35 concerns about a troubled future South Africa relates to Ramaphosa’s public announcement on the night of 31 July 2018 at 22:00 on land grabbing. He claimed that Whites hold 87% of the land. He has promised to take it away without compensation, and there is no turn-around for him now without evoking revolution, as Julius Malema warned him.40 Consider Ramaphosa’s main argument of land expropriation in his speech to Black professionals at a September 2018 business breakfast in Pietermaritzburg41:4:

“Happen it shall, whether people like it or not; it is going to happen”.

He promised that the ANC regime only wanted41:4: “…an equal balance in land ownership because an alleged 87% of South Africa’s land had been given before 1994 to a minority population (Whites).”

However, the rest of the speech reveals confusion about what balance would entail41:4: “We are saying that the equation has to be balanced, and because we are balanced people and we are not mad, we are going to do it in a responsible manner, but we are not going to turn away from making sure it does happen.”

The antagonists read much (and not always positive) into Ramaphosa’s remark that: “…we are balanced people, we are not mad, we are going to do it in a responsible way”.41

The prominent question for the antagonists is: If Ramaphosa and his inner group are so balanced, why do they need an urgent change to Section 25 and why did Ramaphosa ignore the outcome of the parliamentary commission’s testing of the public’s opinion on the matter? The antagonists interpret this kind of autocratic behaviour by Ramaphosa as intentional invitation of revolutionary thinking and behaviour. His political revolutionary arrogance is visible when he says41:4:

Land expropriation without compensation is going to happen whether South Africans, US President Donald Trump and the UN General Assembly like it or not,


I am going to explain it without any fear and I am going to say: ‘This is us. Take us or leave us’.

Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi42, the leader of the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP), referred to the above remarks as an act of blunt disrespect for parliament, while the FW de Klerk foundation42 highlighted Ramaphosa’s abuse of the national broadcaster. He made the announcement as the leader of a political party (president of the ANC) but made it seem as if he was doing it as President of South Africa via the parliament. This reflects the different governmental setups of South Africa since 1994: 1) up to the end of Zuma’s reign there was a tripartite setup with a Zupta grouping under Zuma (highest), followed by Luthuli House (middle) and parliament (lowest), while now 2) the Ramaphosa government has a bipartite setup, driven at the highest level by Luthuli House’s ANC NEC, with the parliament powerless on the lowest level. This spells the presence of chronic anarchy, not only reflected by the delinquent behaviour of the poor and landless Blacks, but also the behaviour rooted in the power of the ANC elite.42

The antagonists point out that they have heard this kind of rhetoric of saying one thing and doing the opposite, from autocrats like Robert Mugabe, Idi Amin, Nicolás Maduro. Ramaphosa and his elite speak on behalf of the people, but they echo the autocratic and revolutionary speak of the pre-1994 ANC.27,42

The above, in the view of the antagonists, signals the arrival of the final, official stage of land grabbing. It reverts to the unruliness that characterised the ANC as a revolutionary organisation. Returning to symbolically speaking of the injustice of land ownership is impossible in 2018. ANC radicals like the MK veterans now want action. Ramaphosa’s36 early warning36:4: “We are not going to accept land grabs”, had become empty words as protesters (who belong to his group) not only said they are going to practice land grabbing, but did it36:4:

“We have taken our land. Don’t worry about building us houses, we will build our own. Just give as water”.

Most of all, Ramaphosa now promotes this behaviour with his latest public remarks on land grabbing. Any future efforts to stop the radical ideology of dramatic land reform have become impossible: he himself preaches it. The antagonists indicate that there are various other radical actions of the ANC regime that promote illegal land grabbing and that disempower White farmers on their own land. The Extension of Security of Tenure Act for instance works against White farmers. This Act specifically provides for security of tenure by regulating farm occupation. It describes the rights of farm dwellers when facing eviction and provides recourse when they are evicted by White farmers. The antagonists see this piece of legislation as another step towards forcing land redistribution by reducing the rights of the legal owner and making eviction costly. In many cases this poses a risk to the property and the life of the legal owner.43

The Ramaphosa regime finds itself, as the Chávez-Maduro brotherhood in Venezuela did, within a context of empowered autocrats, opportunists, psychopaths and crooks, as a journalist reports44:16:

“It was only a matter of time before the total disregard for the law and the constitution that was shown by our leaders in recent years trickled down to the masses. The media exposed countless allegations of wrongdoing – including the blatant looting by the Gupta family and their associates. But no one has been sent to prison.”

The antagonists feel that the foundations have been laid for anarchy and the destruction of the socio-economic and political order. Ramaphosa’s land expropriation only adds to the chaos.44

The current total disregard for the law and the Constitution has its origins in Zuma’s compromise of credible institutions of law enforcement. The editor45 of the Sunday Times wrote on 26 August 201845:20:

“The hawks were heavily compromised during the looting period, and led by buffoon. The same with the National Prosecuting Authority, led by a lame sheep who had no clue what it meant to use prosecutorial powers.”

The Zondo Commission of Inquiry has shown that there is more than enough to prosecute several looters of the state coffers, but the new Ramaphosa regime has taken no action.45

The uncontrollability of the masses is also reflected in the sudden resurgence (August 2018) of xenophobia (a reminiscent of the explosion of xenophobic violence in May 2008) in the trade sectors in Soweto and other Gauteng townships. It has led to at least four deaths and the looting of the shops of many foreign shopkeepers, forcing them to flee. What is worrying in this specific context is the murderous aggression directed at Black non-South Africans (an identity class that includes the Whites as so-called colonists) and the ANC regime’s failure to do something about these behaviours. The editorial46 of the Sunday Times reflects as follows46:24:

“Successfully prosecutions are few, as police stand idly by, often doing little more than helping shop owners escape the wrath of the mob. It is a blight on a democratic SA.”

The researcher Jean Pierre Misago47 of the African Centre for Migration and Society at Wits University’s conclusion on the base of these Soweto attacks is hair-raising47:12:

Communities find different reasons for attacks. They mobilise people by feeding them stories that are not necessarily correct.

This is a clear case of xenophobia violence. In previous instances WhatsApp messages calling for violence have originated from local business associations, whose members want to get rid of foreign competition.

For the antagonists Misago47 hits the spot with his identification of ethnic crimes and the bad intentions of people who have failed to compete and then fell back on anarchic behaviour, like land and asset grabbing. Consider the xenophobic remark directed at foreign Black shop owners by Rose Nkosi, the president of the South African Spaza and Tuckshop Association (SASTA), accusing them of “creaming our people”. Members of SASTA even marched to the office of Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba, demanding that he stop foreigners running spaza shops.47

A Somali, Abdi Sala48, whose shop was plundered for the fourth time in seven years in Soweto, cut the xenophobia of South Africa to the bone48:12:

“[Black] South Africans are spoilt. When the electricity goes off they loot, if they don’t have water they loot, [if they are unhappy about] no jobs then they rob the shops.”

The antagonists see the intended grabbing of White land by the ANC elite is just looting, equally to that of foreigners’ spaza shops. The ANC regime has become spoilt by the ease of their political self-enrichment since 1994.

The antagonists do not doubt that the same xenophobia awaits them if land grabbing under the guardianship of Ramaphosa is allowed to continue without direct and fierce resistance from the government.9,47 The editorial46 of the Sunday Times of 2 September is further very informative46:24:

“Looting is usually a sign of a society in an advanced state of social decay, suggesting rising public desperation and a breakdown in law and order.”

In this context the question of the antagonists is relevant: What are land grabbing other than looting and the destruction of law and order in South Africa? And what else is looting and the breakdown of law and order than anarchy?46

3.4. Mbeki’s ANC of 1994 versus Ramaphosa’s ANC of 2018

The arrival of Jacob Zuma and thereafter Cyril Ramaphosa as presidents of the ANC, making them at the same time also the presidents of the Republic of South Africa, introduced a new climate of political and judicial estrangement from the “old” ANC with leaders such as Thabo Mbeki. The radicalism that arrived after the ousting of the corrupted Jacob Zuma seems to be radiated by Luthuli House, which has almost become the only and highest policy- and decision-making body in the country. Former Jacob Zuma and his post-2018 ANC NEC are still quite central to this radicalism. The public often think of this radicalism as coming from the younger generation (with a root like Julius Malema), but this is not true. It is instigated and fuelled by the older, rigid ANC leadership who grew up in the old but now mostly outdated Russian political mentality of extreme Marxism (although it is now becoming more reminiscent of fascism). The present issue around land ownership reflects this radicalism. There is suddenly extreme discrimination against the Whites as a minority racial group, together with prominent fascistic behaviour reflected specifically by some of the ANC’s top leaders in the selective execution of this racism and discrimination. (This political ideology stands parallel to China’s extreme discriminative behaviours and manhandling of its various minority groups that the world comfortably ignores. Note here the intimate relationship between the ANC elite and the Chinese regime).46

Revolution and liberation, used to obtain political power and self-enrichment, are still central to the thinking of the likes of Jacob Zuma, as it was in the 1960s. The schizophrenic ANC cabinet of 2019 Ramaphosa’s constant efforts to please the older revolutionary ANC leaders in his NEC, makes the ANC of 2019 a totally different entity than the 1994 party that introduced democracy to all South Africans for the first time. Munusamy49 presents the antagonists with a good guideline in this context when she says49:22:

“We are stuck with the same old problems because we are stuck with the same old leaders in the same old electoral system”.

Land grabbing in this context is thus not a surprise, but the normal way of governing. Indeed, the antagonists postulate, it would have been the way some of the ANC leaders of 1994 went about if they had a free hand at the time.49

The following three subdivisions compare the ANC of 1994 with the ANC of 2019. The sections examine: 1) the schizophrenic ANC cabinet of 2019; 2) a farewell to the Freedom Charter of 1955; and 3) a new Ramaphosa and his new ANC.

3.4.1. The schizophrenic ANC cabinet of 2018-2019

Reflecting on Ramaphosa’s present aggressive and conflicting behaviour, specifically with reference to Whites and land expropriation, Munusamy49 takes the antagonists back into the past by reflecting the prominent role players who created a schism between the ANC’s present and past49:22:

“When Ramaphosa made changes to former president Jacob Zuma’s cabinet at the end of February [2018] he retained the configuration of portfolios and fired 10 ministers. He kept some of the worst-performing members, ostensibly to avoid causing too much turmoil within the ANC by purging the Zuma faction.”

But, in 2018 things became worse for the antagonists as the Zuma faction successfully reassembled with the controversial and politically stained Ace Magashule as ANC secretary-general. He quickly repositioned himself as a replacement for Ramaphosa, should the Zuma faction succeed with a campaign to re-establish Zuma and his cronies in the ANC. This is where good politics and sound economics stumble: the Zuma faction is still revolutionary and they target the masses with misleading and hostile political scripts. The Zuma faction at Luthuli House and in the Ramaphosa cabinet is using the country’s old electoral system to strengthen and to spread their outdated Marxist radical ideology and to re-profile the ANC as a liberation organisation for poor Blacks (while opportunistic enrich them selves at the coats of these poor) . Absolute loyalty to the ANC with the interest of the country in second place is a big part of this ideology.49 It makes the entry of honourable and patriotic leaders with progressive political and economic ideas very difficult, as Munusamy49 reflects49:22:

“There is little prospect of fresh, talented and upstanding leaders who are making strides in other sectors of society entering public office because the political space is so toxic and dominated by the same old faces.”

The end result, posit the antagonists, is that South African politics has become “hollow and acrimonious”, returning the same (many times corrupted and radical) people to parliament, over and over, to take the party on wrong political paths to fulfil these politicians’ opportunistic and delinquent aims and needs.49

The South African electoral system offers the ANC as a party and individual politicians the opportunity to stay on in leadership positions for any length of time. At the same time it offers them the opportunity to promote conflict and revolutionary ideas via an untouchable circle of deviant MPs and MPLs, as reflected by the untouchability of Jacob Zuma. The antagonists believe that if this system had been improved, the changes of the ANC to be in power in 2019 would have been zero. Leaders like Zuma, Ramaphosa or Magashule would never have been appointed in executive political positions. It is only the South African courts and judicial commissions that could break up many of these political evils resulting from the failed electoral system. However, the faulty electoral system is still with us, serving the Zuma faction (and the Ramaphosa faction) and their radicalism (and this will happen during and after the 2019 election), favouring a specific leader with specific cronies. This dilemma of political power within the ANC since 1994 is well illustrated for the antagonists by the intended land grabbing plan of the ANC elite. The radicals in favour of land grabbing are uncontrollable by the electorate from the outside. They can ignore their voters’ wishes and demands in terms of the present false democratic method of voting in parliament, seen as representatives of the people.49

Munusamy49 very precisely describes this failed system that led to the autocratic rule of South Africa since 1994 by a fascist ANC government49:22:

The country has not grappled with the prospect of electoral reform, even though the current system has proved inadequate in terms of public accountability. The proportional representation system means that MPs and MPLs are accountable to party bosses rather than to the electorate. The Zuma years showed how difficult it is to hold presidents accountable when they are protected by their party.

Mcebisi Jonas50, a former deputy finance minister, ANC member and a presidential investment envoy openly challenged the political ills of the ANC. “To save the South African democracy requires focus on its people and their interests and not the political party”, writes Jonas50:22. The presence of populism and revolutionism, as reflected by the Ramaphosa regime with its uncontrolled land grabbing policy, has the tendency to amplify a vicious cycle of declining legitimacy in governance, reduced investment, rising unemployment and increased social tension, says Jonas50. For him the present societal crisis in South Africa under the reign of the present ANC came about because the ANC lost its moral, ethical and political integrity. As an entity they need a positive turn-about, they should even be forced to such a turning by the public50:22:

“Civil society mass action and activism against corruption tended to be about fixing the ANC”.

Jonas50 posits further50:22:

“But we must also acknowledge that our nation has lost its way. SA is at a crossroads. One path follows current trends – rent-seeking, corruption, declining state legitimacy, reduced investment, economic stagnation, inequality band social tensions”.

Jonas50 says that when it comes to standing for the interests of citizens, democracy and the country against the interests of the party (which in many cases represents the masked agendas of corrupted leaders), the interests of the people should come first. The antagonists fully agree. Jonas’s guidelines for political correctness and warning of a growing decay of law and order, is clear50:22:

“We all have a responsibility to stabilize our democracy and chart a new economic path. This needs a new agenda and orientation in civil society, premised on the fact that in every revolution, the people are primary – everything else is secondary.”

This includes the false patriotism and false love for the people while the integrity of the leader in question is already compromised by a personal and political pathology of sole self-enrichment and -empowerment. The masked agendas behind the intended land expropriation without compensation are undoubtedly often anchored in personal and political pathology, making it unstoppable as the delinquent leader gains more power. The antagonists fear that it is no longer possible to save the democracy, especially given the ANC’s courting of China and Russia.50

Thabo Mbeki51 comments on the above dynamic in a 30-page covenant, denunciating land expropriation without compensation. The document is not only immensely informative about the present identity of the ANC, but is also shocking as it shows how the ANC as an initially progressive party for all South Africans has deteriorated in only a decade. It has become a racist party; corrupt to its core and focused on the progress a small group of Blacks (This political manoeuvre stripped the ANC of its hard-fought political integrity, putting it fully into the league of the despotic and racial National Party of pre-1994 South Africa). Mthombothi51 refers to these 30 pages offered by Mbeki as the Mbeki intervention on land grabbing.51 He writes as follows in this regard51:21:

“It’s almost as if he’s saying those in charge of the organization [ANC] neither know what they’re doing nor understand the implication of their actions”.

The antagonists are well aware of the possible impact of the plans of the schizophrenic ANC cabinet of 2019 on the future rights of Whites as land owners. The antagonists feel that they have much to fear.

3.4.2. A farewell to the Freedom Charter of 1955

Putting his arguments, opinions and viewpoint on the ANC’s current political delinquency in perspective, Thabo Mbeki51 charts the evolution of the ANC as an organisation from its founding in 1912 and reflects prominent events in its history. The drafting of the Freedom Charter in Kliptown in 1955 stands out, as do the breakaway of the Africanists in 1958 and the expulsion of the Gang of Eight in 1969, events that have shaped the ANC to unite all South Africans specific under a non-racial and non-discriminative policy as guided by the Freedom Charter. Mthombothi51 points out that Mbeki bases his view of the wrongness of the expropriation of land without compensation from Whites on two fundamental prescriptions in the Freedom Charter, namely 1) South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White; and 2) that the land shall be shared among those who work it. With land grabbing, both these prescriptions will be violated. Mbeki responds51:21:

“If the ANC abandons these two principles and strategic positions”, he says: “…it must accept that it is turning its back on its historical position as ‘the parliament of the people’”.

In this context the expropriation of land from one national group without compensating them to redistribute it to another national group is a radical departure from the traditional ANC and its prescription to trustworthy policies, cemented into its culture over 105 years. Mthombothi51 reflects as follows on Ramaphosa’s policy on land ownership (in conflict with the Charter)51:21:

“SA belongs to all who live in it, black and white, except as this relates to land”, and “All national groups are equal before the law, except as this concerns land”.

The Freedom Charter’s land clause, dated 1955, is not the only guidance Mbeki had for his political arguments on racial freedom and race-free property ownership. The clear declaration of 1955 is also reaffirmed by an ANC document issued after the historic conference in Tanzania in 1969, making it clear that the ANC was cognisant that the redistribution of land would include all race groups, writes Tabane52:6:

“It makes bold to say that the restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended and all lands shall be open to ownership and use by all people irrespective of race.”

Mbeki’s recent pamphlet is clear of the “second phase of transition” ideology that is driving the present Ramaphosa land grabbing initiative. The insecurity of the Ramaphosa faction is evident from the personal attack on Mbeki because he dared to doubt their lack of knowledge about the ANC’s history and principles and their lack of integrity. The infective language of the secretary-general of the ANC when he called on Mbeki “to shut up” shows where the ANC leadership is in 2019. Tabane brings us back to reality when he posits52:6:

“The current position is at best misguided and at worst a demonstration of the loss of its moral compass by the ANC – and the fact that it is purely fictional to consider the ANC a leader of society anymore.”

Looking closely at Mbeki’s pamphlet, it is clear for the antagonists that the current ANC’s character has changed, as did its mission at the recent 54th national conference. As a party it has transformed to where Jacob Zuma has long wanted it, namely an exclusively Black party, recognising it self that it does not represent all the people of South Africa anymore. Where the “old” ANC always regarded itself as the absolute opposite of the Apartheid NP that divided people along racial lines, there is now a “new” ANC that is dividing people along racial lines. There is no hope that the current ANC would change back to 1994, recalling its new 2018 policy on land grabbing. The ANC has changed permanently because the country’s political terrain has changed drastically. It has become radical, making it the home of selfish, opportunistic and political radicals who lack the conscience of the cadres of the “old” ANC. After testing the politics for 24 years, the ANC has become a Black NP that cannot recognise its own 1955 roots. It’s a new political party with a new vision and mission, the old name just remained. This outcome spells doom for Whites in general, and White land owners specifically, according to the antagonists.51,52

Mthomboth51 puts words to this state of affairs with his decisive conclusion on the “new” ANC51:21:

It’s now operating in a different setting. It is no longer waging a thankless liberation war away in the deserts of exile, but it’s now back home in the lap of luxury and in charge of the most sophisticated economy on the continent. It’s no longer led by the selfless, wise old men and women who sacrificed everything for the good of all, but it’s now controlled by BEE types, shysters, a thug or two and the odd murderer, all in it for a slice of the action. Greed now trumps selflessness.

Whites, the antagonists say, must note Mthombothi’s51 unwritten conclusion: they can expect much more political delinquency from Ramaphosa (or from Ace Magashule, if he and the Zuma faction successfully oust Ramaphosa in 2019 and redeploy Ramaphosa in a subordinate role to Luthuli House). Ramaphosa’s actions, especially with regard to land grabbing, can ultimately be much worse than Zuma’s endeavours.50-53

3.4.3. The new Ramaphosa and his new ANC

Munusamy’s51 description of what is wrong with the “new” ANC offers two warnings. Firstly, the expectations of the poor and landless Blacks will never be met. The leaders of the new ANC have other intentions with the land they want to confiscate. Secondly, it does not matter how failed and corrupted the whole exercise of land grabbing turns out, the antagonists should accept that land expropriation without compensation is here to stay as long as the “new” ANC rules. This can only change if the ANC loses at the ballot box. Munusamy49 is clear49:22:

How do we find the path to basic human decency and morality when we surrender our country to an endless cycle of power-drunk, greedy people who exploit our vulnerabilities and have no desire to help the people they serve?

In the cabinet, in parliament, in provincial government and in municipalities, there are too many people who see their positions as entitlement to wealth and perks.

Unless there is a complete overhaul of society and the political system, there is little chance of the deadwood being cast out and inspirational, resourceful and courageous leaders rising.

When the ANC radicalism is examined more closely, it is clear that their growing political relationship with autocratic Russia and China is a crucial element. These countries were the ANC’s best companions during Apartheid. Although the ANC leaders see South Africa as the opposite of China when it comes to human rights and the suppression of individual freedom and human engineering to suit communism, the ANC’s outdated version of communism and their autocratic behaviour, including land grabbing, make the two twins. The ANC masks this with false friendly and opportunistic contact with democracies like the US, Japan, Europe, in an effort to profile “democracy”. When Ramaphosa announced his land grabbing intention he first visited China to obtain “approval”, which he of course “received” indeed, while at the same time he dared South African Whites, the UN and Trump to test his right to make a radical decision on the matter. Since 1994 the ANC has slowly decreased contact with democracies like Europe, the US and Japan while they made friends with political radicals, not only China and Russia, but Zimbabwe, Venezuela and Brazil (and even Libya under the late Kaddafi).49-56

Under Ramaphosa China is, as under the Zuma regime, selectively respecting South Africa’s sovereignty in economic relations and interests. Munusamy and Mbeki are wrong to expect a positive overhaul of Ramaphosa politics. These politics were already “overhauled” by China and Russia into political, social and economic radicalism where the racial factor of the White man is central. Ramaphosa and his cronies indeed see a “White problem” that must be addressed. Julius Malema has found a comrade at last.49-56

The current South Africa of Cyril Ramaphosa and his cronies are not at ease with White rights, privileges, benefits and riches. Land expropriation without compensation ignores the ANC’s founding manifesto. The ANC has lost its golden past. This makes the ANC elders like Thabo Mbeki and most of the Whites strangers in South Africa.

The antagonists believe, as Mbeki illustrates, that the radical ANC under Ramaphosa and his followers will take the last pieces of land from the back pockets of Whites in the near future.

3.5. Lies and myths versus facts and truths

The antagonists see multiple facts, lies, myths and truths that surround the ANC elite’s rejection of the 1994 dispensation’s land redistribution programme. So far most of these lies and myths remain unchallenged. The ANC regime’s perspective and untested allegations to justify their right to take land should be addressed, evaluated and be put into perspective. This is done in the following eight subdivisions, namely: 1) the people’s dissatisfaction with the 1994–2018 dispensation’s land redistribution; 2) Blacks prefer land occupations above the option of financial compensation for land lost between 1913 and 1994; 3) a large group of aspiring Black farmers is waiting for rural land; 4) the ANC has a clear expropriation and redistribution plan for the greater Black South African community; 5) there is an urgent need to balance the racial demographics of the country’s land and home ownership by placing Blacks in traditionally White areas; 6) the ANC has since 1994 successfully guided poor Blacks to financial independence; 7) Blacks are indigenous South Africans and Whites are European settlers; and 8) the Tsar and Stalin’s collective farm projects in rural Russia were great successes.

3.5.1. The people’s dissatisfaction with the 1994–2019 dispensation’s land redistribution

The ANC has publically claimed that the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution programme was characterised by incompleteness and dissatisfaction and that the programme did not deliver on the promise of transferring the prescribed land to Blacks as agreed by the 1994 dispensation and the Constitution. In their view, this makes land grabbing an absolute need. However, Opperheimer3 offers evidence to the contrary. Opperheimer3 posits that according to the Institute of Race Relations (IRR), the Land Claims Court has resolved more than 95% of the claims that have arisen in the past 23 years in terms of the 1994 dispensation’s prescriptions. More than 1.8 million individuals have received compensation in the form of pay-outs or land.3,58 Omri van Zyl58, the executive director of Agri SA, puts the amount paid towards redistribution at R45 billion and the amount paid towards land reform at R43 billion.

According to Opperheimer3 fewer than 3 500 (out of 76 000) or 5% of the claims remain unresolved. This gives an average of 3 152 claims resolved per annum of the total 73 500 claims successfully addressed since 1994. The still 3 500 outstanding claims will take at most one or two more years to complete (more or less to be completed in 2020) if the present debacle around land expropriation without compensation doesn’t hinder the process. There is no evidence of any incompleteness or dissatisfaction around land transformation as run by the 1994–2019 governments. There is no urgent need or reason to address the remaining 5% of claims with such an “attack” on White land ownership without compensation. The land transformation agreed upon in 1994 has, in the view of the antagonists, basically been completed.3

What is most worrying for the antagonists, given the near completion of the process, is that the ANC suddenly wants to “enlarge the pie” of land ownership at cost of their initial partner, the Whites. This breach of contract by the ANC regime under Ramaphosa needs the attention of the Constitutional Court.3 It is clear for the antagonists that the ANC regime’s claim of dissatisfaction among “the people” in relation to the 1994–2019 dispensation’s land redistribution is without any base. The 1994 to 2019 land reform programme served the people well.

For the antagonists is it clear that the new ANC and its merry men will not be pacified easily. They are into stealing and doing harm to the White farmers. For the opponents the ANC elite’s present intention of land grabbing is only a smokescreen for other future trespasses against Whites.

3.5.2. Land occupation versus financial compensation

With reference to the ANC’s argument that the majority of Blacks prefer land to cash pay-outs, reports showed as early as 2013 that of the roughly 76 000 rural land restitution claims disposed in terms of the described programme as decided by the 1994 agreement, more than 70 000 (91.5%) of the claimants had chosen to take compensation in cash rather than reoccupy the land they had lost. This means that of the 95% cases resolved, the choice of compensation in the form of receiving land per se as a vehicle for compensation, only 8% of the beneficiaries chose to receive land.3

The antagonists’ counter-argument is that the ANC’s recent claim of an absolute need for land for the poor and landless Blacks and for farming per se, is false. This finding means that the 1994 agreement worked well. The antagonists suspect that the land issue is being put forward by the ANC to mask the motives of some Black political leaders and radicals in the ANC. Political delinquency seems central to the whole land expropriation issue. The fact that 92% of Black land claimants did not wish to take back their ancestral land serves as proof for the antagonists that there is no drive for land on the side of the masses.3

For the antagonists there is enough evidence that a transfer of White land to Blacks is not the dramatic political issue of the moment; nor is there evidence of great numbers of Black farmers in rural areas. The resolution of the remaining 5% of cases is almost insignificant and cannot be the reason for the supposed great disappointment with the 1994 to 2018 redistribution programme. The statement of the propagandists that claimants prefer land occupation over and above financial compensation for land lost between 1913 and 1994 can therefore be rejected.3

3.5.3. Aspiring Black farmers waiting for rural land

There is a specific argument that there is an immense need and opportunity for more commercial Black farmers in South Africa’s rural areas. This contradicts the experience of the White farming community and the organised and formal business sector. Their data on land redistribution is often more scientific and analytical, free of emotional rhetoric. The organised farming and formal business sectors fully support land redistribution and underwrite its urgency, but in an orderly manner.3,59,60

The antagonists also point to the fact that replacing White farmers with Black ones will only accommodate a fraction of the poor and landless Blacks, making the whole exercise a failure from day one. A disaster is looming if there is no large-scale job creation outside the agricultural sector for the rest of the 90% of poor and jobless Blacks, whether or not land redistribution comes into effect. The large contingent of unemployed and untrained Blacks is becoming a national disaster that could easily result in anarchy.3,59-61

Exacerbating the problem of the contingent of poor and landless Blacks is the hard fact of a negative growth in the agriculture sector as reflected in September 2018 (-24%). [In this context of negativity, the estimated growth for South Africa for 2018 is between 1.2% and 1.8%, meaning the ANC regime’s economy has stagnated and technically fallen into recession].3,59,60

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has reported in 2018 that Africa’s urban population will double within a generation, contradicting the point of masses of people wanting to occupy rural land. The fact is that Africa’s peasantry is dying off. This phenomenon, as already cited in this subdivision with tested facts, is also present in South Africa. Farming has become one of the less lucrative South Africa careers, and farming has become very expensive and time-consuming. The number of commercial farmers is already on the decrease due to problems such as the cash flow needed for mechanisation and the risks involved in farming.4,51,59,61

The ANC should in fact focus on more urban land for housing for Black working citizens. Ramphele4 points out this reality when she writes4:21:

“The fourth myth is that land restitution is mainly a rural and farming matter. Cape Town, the seat of parliament, exemplifies the cruelty of the failure to redress the spatial geography of apartheid cities.”

It is clear from the above evidence that there is not an immense group of aspiring Black farmers waiting for rural land. It is a false postulation and a myth. The evidence also reflects that even if there was truly a large group awaiting farmland, the farming environment lacks the potential to accommodate them.

3.5.4. The ANC’s plan

The antagonists point out that the ANC regime has failed to offer the public full legal and descriptive details on the land expropriation matter. The whole initiative is driven by and based on Malema and Ramaphosa’s rhetoric, while a simple basic plan on paper remains absent. If expropriation without compensation is really on the cards, how long will the process be? Who will hold the title deeds? How will Black beneficiaries be selected? Will new Black farmers receive funding or mentoring? How will viable and sustainable markets be created? How will the correct produce be selected? How will this affect the short- and long-term food security of the country and what would be the specific role of Black farmers in this regard?3,59-61

This vagueness is worrying, seeing that the ANC’s similar processes of BEE and AAA to uplift the “poor non-Whites” since 1994 could not attain true success and are still in running, seemingly indefinitely. The vagueness of the 1994 programme mostly favoured the ANC elite. The antagonists stress that Ramaphosa has thus far offered only empty emotional and political rhetoric, filled with aggression against Whites. The ANC regime’s knowledge on implementing such a system stops with its various spokespersons’ rhetoric, basically because they are “uneducated, untrained and inexperienced on the complicated processes around land expropriation”.3,59-61

The formal business sector has also requested a guideline and constructive plan from the ANC. Barron63 makes it clear that the political intention of expropriation is one thing, but successful implementation based on sound ethic, business, economic, judicial and cognitive principles, is something total different. Besides that, it can be very complicated and time-consuming, and can be devastating to economic and political stability if it goes awry. Just defining a theoretical framework (hopefully by outside experts) can take up to three years. Implement such a “sound” theoretical plan in practice can takes a further five to ten years. The programme implemented in 1994 has not been concluded after 24 years. This estimate does not even include rejection by the formal business sector or experts if the framework is developed by opportunistic, foolish and short-sighted law-makers and political radicals in the contaminated ANC, EFF and PAC. Verwoerd and his followers attempted similar folly in 1955 with the Tomlinson Commission, which recommended that the best political, social and economic solution for South Africa would be to dismantle Apartheid. The Tomlinson Commission predicted the current dilemma.3,59-61

Barron63 quotes the insights of Professor Mills63, head of the University of Cape Town Graduate School of Business on land redistribution63:9:

The government needs to spell out how expropriation without compensation will feed into the National Development Plan and contribute to the overall national development objectives of the country.

What is their priority? Is it land expropriation or creating jobs? Young people living in rural areas want to live in urban areas. They are not interested in farming or land, they want jobs. So what is expropriation without compensation going to do for them? How is it going to bring them jobs?

Hereto Makgoba64 also writes64:21:

“I have not heard anyone [ANC] spell out an overarching vision which takes all the complex practical and emotional factors into account. Nor have I heard a satisfactory answer to the fundamental question: expropriation to do what?”

Ramphele4 refers to the ANC regime failure to offer an appropriate plan of land redistribution as4:21: “…the lack of a national spatial plan due to the lack of political will at all levels of government to tackle land reform”.

The formal farming and business sectors view Ramaphosa’s62 talk of land redistribution (with or without compensation) as unclearly formulated. His guarantees that the outcome will not hurt the economy or foreign investment in the short or long term are unspecific and undoubtedly open to various political and judicial interpretations. The antagonists see either a lack of a sound understanding of basic economics, or the deliberate masking of radicalism. Indeed, Ramaphosa’s hesitation when it comes to making clear decisions and his growing vague rhetoric, signals possible ulterior motives in the view of the antagonists.65

The antagonists and formal business sector fear that land redistribution will hurt the economy, and the ANC’s nonchalance about this worries them. They also feel that it would destabilise racial relations in South Africa to the same extent that Apartheid did.65

3.5.5. Balancing the demography with land ownership

The ANC regime argues that the racial demography of South Africa’s land- and home-ownerships is imbalanced as result of the socioeconomic and political inequality between Whites and Blacks, which the ANC radicals allege is due to the richness and racial privilege of Whites. This wealth inequality is alleged by the ANC regime and propagandists to be responsible for the development of exclusive high-quality White areas and White farmers with better living standards and conditions than that of the Blacks working and living on the farms. The demographics of the country thus reflect a clear division between Blacks and Whites in terms of race and socio-economic classing. For the average Black it is just impossible, because of his/her immense poverty, to break out on his or her own from the impoverished living areas and circumstances and to penetrate the exclusive White areas. In this rich man–poor man model the issue of farmland became mixed up with urban land, making it one issue that could be solved by land expropriation.

In an effort overcome above imbalance of the racial demographics the ANC regime argues that land redistribution without compensation is essential. Free land is the ANC regime’s key to unlock this “White exclusiveness”.

In terms of the imbalanced racial demographics, Opperheimer3 offers counter-evidence. He states, based on research by the IRR, that in 2015 the various racial groups’ ownership of homes was almost perfectly proportional. This postulation by Opperheimer3 is supported by the government’s own recent land audit. Regarding the ownership of property (not farm land), this audit shows racial parity with 49% erven owned by Whites and 46% owned by Blacks. The audit reflects more or less the same ratio for sectional title ownership. This data, argues Opperheimer3, indicate that redistribution, when it includes home ownership per se as a focus point, is unsubstantiated. Opperheimer3 does not feel that the racial demographics of the country need immediate correction through land expropriation. The antagonists see the negative ANC propaganda on racial demographics as a well-planned social engineering initiative by the ANC leadership to support RET and RST, to limit the socioeconomic and political privileges, rights and positions of Whites in greater South Africa and to force the integration of Whites into the greater Black community.3,6

In this context, with the focus on the ANCs discrepancy between Black and White when it comes to ownership, the antagonists point out that although there is unhappiness and discontent with the new South Africa, only 18% of the population’s discontent is about poor accommodation. Opperheimer3 points out that research shows that less than 1% of South Africans were concerned with owing land. For South Africans of all the races there are much more worrying issues. There are indeed three serious matters worrying the public, namely unemployment (40%), lack of and poor service delivery (34%) and poor education (15%). These are all results of the failed ANC regime. For the antagonists it is clear that the ANC regime’s present attack on White “rich” lifestyles as reflected by White living standards, etc. and the ANC’s hostile plans to equalise the “imbalanced demographics between Blacks and Whites”, is nothing else than an effort to cover up their failure as a regime since 1994 to erase unemployment, poor service delivery in Black areas and to improve Black education. The present poverty, unemployment and inequality stem from the ANC regime’s failures and not from imbalanced racial demographics.3,6

In response to the so-called disturbed racial demographics of the country as alleged by the ANC regime and its radicals, the antagonists argue that such disturbed racial demographics is a misrepresentation of the truth for political gain. Opperheimer3 states that only 3% of South Africans are worried about the race factor. Race in relation to the present ownership of land and Black discontent with the general South African political, social and economic situation is insignificant and the ANC gives a false reflection.3

The IRR found that 71% of Blacks (and 74% of Whites) have no concerns about race per se in their daily life. This absence of a desire for land grabbing among ordinary Blacks is further supported by the findings of the Caro Institute in the USA. The main reasons why South Africans are the 5th most depressed and unhappiest people in the world are not racial conflict or racial hate, but unemployment, inflation and high interest rates. For the antagonists this reflect badly on the ANC regime and its elite.3

3.5.6. The ANC has since 1994 successfully guided poor Blacks to financial independence

The ANC has bragged that they have guided poor Blacks to independence, implying that the ANC regime has changed the lives of the poor and landless Blacks for the better since 1994 in terms of basic living standards.

The basic question for the antagonists is: does the ANC truly develop the poor so that become self-sufficient enough to buy daily food and to afford basic accommodation, schooling and medicine?

Victory Research’s recent report is very significant here. It reflects that a great number of South Africans (Black and White) feel that their basic needs are not fulfilled in any way by the ANC regime. They not only feel that certain basic services are lacking, but that it has become unaffordable for them to afford these services. Unemployment is prominent. This has led many poor Blacks (an estimate 29-million) not having food on the table or basic accommodation on most days.67

The respondents (seemingly from the middle class and thus less exposed to the extreme poverty and living conditions of poor and landless Blacks) who took part in Victory Research show that their top concerns and dissatisfaction (measured by percentage with satisfaction 0% and dissatisfaction 100%) with the ANC regime centres on unemployment (47%), crime and security (20%), corruption (18%), poor education (18%), accommodation (14%), basic service delivery (12%), poor healthcare (8%) and high living costs (7%).67 It is clear that there is not a White-Black issue here. If the middle class feels this negative about the ANC, how must the poorest feel?

When looking to research reflecting on the living conditions and “satisfaction” of the poor and landless Blacks, it contradicts the ANC regime’s view that they have empowered the Black community. This data make the ANC’s claim of “doing good” to the poor and landless Blacks seems absurd.68,69

Derby68 reflects that in 2018 the financial circumstances of most South African households, not only the poor, were worrying. Prominent is the fact that the percentage of households in South Africa that is receiving at least one form of a social grant, is in the high 40% region, or 17 million persons (with 55% South Africans living in abject poverty). This is a direct outcome of down-sizing mines and other industries, causing unemployment, as well as the overall unemployment culture of the country (officially nearly 30%, unofficially 50%–60%). The unemployment is so severe that many people with good training are left jobless. The ANC regime’s failure to develop entrepreneurship and SMEs to create new jobs, especially for the lower socioeconomic and less trained classes is a major cause. The fact is that the contingent of jobless (and thus mostly foodless) people is growing daily, forcing at least 40% of the total population into financial dependence, poverty and indirect begging from the state (who in reality should generate work opportunities and income to make these people independent citizens).68,69

The extent to which the absolute poverty is starting to overwhelm even the South African middle class is evident from the need for the National Credit Amendment Bill in terms of which consumers earning less than R7 000 a month and with unsecured debt up to R50 000 will be absolved of their debt if they are deemed highly indebted by the National Credit Regulator.68,69

The spreading lawlessness and disorder is proof that unemployment is pushing people to the edge. Theft of food and money to buy food has increased. Central to these many asocial and anti-social behaviours stands what perpetrators see as the ANC regime’s betrayal of their rightful (and which the ANC promised them at every election) claim to basic services such as clean water, medical services, work, basic housing, etc. Dissatisfaction is becoming evident from unrest around the country. The growth and intensity of the masse dissatisfaction with the ANC regime are observable in how the initial unrests changed from a clear focus on only poor service delivery, to serious unrest and protests with a focus also on a lack of education, crime and a lack of personal safety, healthcare, transport, the unavailability of plots/land to erect houses and other forms of accommodation. The protests are also increasing in violence.70

The evidence shows that the main focus of these angers is the failure of the ANC regime to deliver on its post-1994 promises and the ANC’s failure to use budgets to aid the landless poor. Angry protesters point who are been caught up in corruption, state capture and the self-enrichment to the ANC regime and its elite at the cost of the poor. Their view is that the ANC regime not only failed as a regime to offer accommodation and land within the boundaries of the 1994 land reform programme, but often just ignored the urgent needs of the poor and landless Blacks. It is important to look at some examples of the behaviour and reactions of people from the Black community on the ANC regime’s failure to take care of their interests. It indeed reflects an outright dislike for the ANC regime and its elite.68-70

The testimony of a tin shack dweller living in a sprawling Durban shantytown, a said Mrs Lindiswa Mhlanga70, about her fantasies “to live in a brick house with windows, walls, bedrooms and perhaps a garden for her children to play” like the ANC elite, is heart-breaking, not only because of the tragedy around it, but also because it most probably going to remain a fantasy. A despairing neighbour of hers, a said Mrs. Tembu Xulu70, gives a poignant description of her utmost despair about her living conditions since the new 1994 democracy when she said in 201870:14:

“I can’t live like this anymore. It’s been 11 years I’m here. We have one room and one bed that eight of us share. What life is this? We have snakes under the shack. I want a life of dignity.”

Blacks are responding on these failures of the ANC with a clear warning to the Ramaphosa regime. S’bu Zikode70, the founding president of the national organisation Abahlali (of which 16 leaders have been killed since 2009 under very suspicious circumstances) which has approximately 50 000 members who are fighting for the rights of the poor and landless in informal settlements, says70:14:

“Many of us have given up hope that there will ever be any change or delivery to our people. What makes us hopeless is that every year the government has a budget announcement and out of those billions, very few communities are benefiting. We know that as long as the ANC is in power, shack dwellers and black people are not going to benefit anything from the government.”

This despair goes deeper than the experience of hopelessness, bringing the unavoidable result of political self-empowerment and lawlessness to the foreground. It is possible that extreme violence directed at the ANC regime is in the making. The antagonists not only consider the failure of the ANC as a party to serve the interests of the poor and landless Blacks, but also the presence of criminal role players inside the ANC regime who trample on the dignity of their poor Black brothers. The poor and landless Black activists highlight the open misuse of the benefits meant for the Black poor by some ANC councillors, instead of helping the homeless Blacks to make them independent citizens who can live a normal life as a worker with an income and a house. Zikode70 is especially succinct in when he reports70:14:

“We believe that many of them eat the money meant for the people. Some of the councillors have told me straight to my face that I am disturbing them from eating. It is their turn to eat. They are there to enrich themselves and it’s obvious. We are reaching a stage where we are saying: ‘Could we accept that we don’t have a government?’”

It would be a mistake to think the hostility of the Black poor and homelessness is limited to speaking out on the matter: their discontent has already moved to militant thinking. We are in a stage of aggressiveness, bordering on militant actions. Zikode’s70 words are prominent as he puts the immediate political decision and destiny of the poor and homeless Blacks on the table against the ANC regime70:14:

If you listen to us carefully, we are no longer talking about homelessness, we are talking about landlessness, the reason being we have accepted that there is no money for housing.

That is why our focus is now on the land question. Can you rather release land for us to see what we can do?

From the onset promises were made and broken, lies were put before truth and money and business were put before human needs. We have been calling for land in our cities for a long time.

Of course we support the call for the expropriation of land without compensation, but it is what we have already doing – it’s what we call land occupation.

It’s really about the redistribution of land from below. People are taking back the land.

Most of the settlements that we have occupied have not been given on a silver plate. People have had to occupy vacant land, because nobody will ever give you land.

Which is why today there are hundreds of casualties.

If you were to ask where all these assassinations and death threats come from: two sources – the police and politicians.

But despite the death threats we are receiving, we will not be silenced.

For Zikode70 there is undoubtedly one immediate dangerous enemy of the poor Blacks in their struggle to survive as humans: the ANC and its favoured elite. This outcome is more than enough evidence that the notion that the ANC has developed the poor and landless Blacks into financially independent and functioning citizens is a lie and a myth.

3.5.7. Blacks are indigenous South Africans and Whites are European settlers

Who are the rightful franchisees of South African land? Which of the Black and White tribes deserve South African land ownership? The current argument of the ANC and EFF is that it is only the Blacks. Most of these statements are purely meant for political opportunism and emotional rhetoric. It also reveals political leaders’ lack of an understanding of the political history of South Africa.

It is thus of great importance to separate myths and lies from the truth to determine who counts as non-indigenous colonists (so called land predators), who counts as true indigenous people (natives) and who are indigenous colonists (foreigners who over time indigenised) to South Africa, writes Louw6. The claim of Blacks as indigenous South Africans and Whites as European settlers, making Blacks the rightful sole owners of the country’s land and the intended land redistribution without compensation by the Blacks justified, should be evaluated.

The pre-1900 South Africans can be divided into six broad racial and ethnic groups, namely the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, the Black tribes, the White tribes, the Coloureds and the Asians/Indians/Malays. Louw6 shows that earlier inhabitants (settlers) of South Africa, before the Europeans and Blacks arrived, were undoubtedly the KhoiSan and the KhoiKhoi. The Cape Settlement was infused an Asian/Indian/Malay bloodline and this resulted in a new race in South Africa. It meant that two more peoples over time became indigenous to South Africa, namely the Coloureds and the Asian/Indians/Malay. This unique constellation of South Africa brings into focus the many political clichés of who are the rightfully franchisees of South African soil and who should have South African land ownership.6,71 KhoiSan

The KhoiSan were probably the first inhabitants of South Africa. It seems they migrated from central Southern Asia. It is theorised that their migrating resulted from a scarcity of food or as if they were driven out by other stronger races from Asia. The initial tribe split up in three sub-tribes: one group moving south-east to the Malaysian Peninsula, the Philippines and as far as Australia; the second group moving west as far as Spain and the third group moving into North Africa and from there constantly Southwards as result of attacks by the Hamites who were living around the Nile region. Other parts of this third group of KhoiSan moved downwards from the eastern part of Africa, to gather south of the Zambezi after the 1600s, ending up in the Southern African region as far South as the Cape. The KhoiSan are now only present in diminutive numbers, and they are politically and economically disempowerment. They have not made any direct claims to land ownership, although through inbreeding with the Blacks, Coloureds and KhoiKhoi, they can also lay claim to land ownership to a certain extent.6,71 KhoiKhoi

The KhoiKhoi probably have their origin as result of a mixture in Somaliland between KhoiSan and Hamites. It seems that they migrated Southwest down into Africa to the region of the Great Lakes, and, after staying several centuries, they moved further Southwards more or less around 600AC, to reach the Orange River where they initially established on the banks of the river and along the West Coast, from Walvis Bay to the Umtamvuna River. Later on they started to split up into smaller tribes, with each an individual name and customs, moving again further Southwards.6,71

Notwithstanding the fact that they were one of the first migrants to establish themselves in South Africa as an ethnic group, the KhoiKhoi have very little impact because of their small numbers and early political marginalisation. In terms of equality and justified human rights of the South African Constitution, they must, as the KhoiSan, be given the right to claim rightful ownership of the South African soil.6,71 Indians/Asians/Malays

Indians/Asians/Malays, although late-comers to South Africa as labour to Natal in 1860, have, like all the other races in South Africa, became indigenous to the country. Many of their forefathers or tribal associates were Asian/Indian/Malay female slaves who came to the Cape Refreshment Settlement between 1650 and 1670. Many of these women had children with Whites at the Cape, making the Indians/Asians/Malays rightful claimants together with the Whites to future land ownership. (The direct, first infusion of “non-White blood” into the White parent stock of today’s Afrikaners can be as high as 75%).6,71

It is clear that the Asians/Indians/Malays’ claim to South African land ownership as indigenous people is not limited to their South African identity, but also through their early inbreeding with the Whites and the Coloureds.6,71 Coloureds

The vertical biological development of a closed and outcast group of mixed people, mostly excluded from the White nucleus that formed the modern Afrikaners, is surely true as evidenced by the South African Coloureds and other mixed people of today. However, the superficial split between Coloureds and Whites is confirmed by historical evidence of an immense horizontal biological impact of “Coloured blood” on Afrikaners’ genes, contradicting earlier numbers of only 6% to 10.7% of mixed Afrikaner descendants and the separate vertical development of the Coloureds as a separate ethnic group. This brotherhood between White Afrikaners and Brown Afrikaners makes the claims of White Afrikaners on land ownership fully applicable to the Coloureds and vice versa. The further mixing of the Coloureds with KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi and Blacks makes these three groups’ claims on land ownership also fully applicable on the Coloureds and vice versa.6,71

Notwithstanding this birth right and the fact that the Coloureds are the second largest tribe in the country, they are still politically, economically and socially as deprived as in the pre-1994 dispensation.6,71 Blacks

The South African Blacks, like the South African Whites, are both comparative newcomers to Southern Africa. The South African Blacks’ probable initial home was Central Asia, from where the moved into Africa en masse, splitting in two: one group moving down to the middle of Africa and the second group moving along the East Coast to reach Sofala in the 10th century. When the Portuguese established themselves on the East Coast, these various East-bound Black groups reached Natal and in the 1650s the area around the Kei River. The middle group of Blacks also moved Southwards to establish themselves in the vicinity of the Vet and Caledon Rivers the 1750s.6,71

After the early First and Second Black Colonisation of South Africa between 1810 and 1840, Blacks become permanent settlers with time and obtained indigenous status (especially through land grabbing, war and the complete termination of their opponents).6,71

The constant reference of Black politicians to the Afrikaner as an “alien, murderous colonist” in South Africa, or to the Whites as the only colonist in South Africa, is false. Louw’s6 study shows that it is an undeniable fact that the current Black population are also foreign to South Africa and indeed in the same boat as the Afrikaners.

The South African Blacks have no more right to land ownership than the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds, Asian/Indians/Malays, Whites and Afrikaners. Land redistribution can only be executed in their favour in terms of their shared indigenousness with the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds, Asian/Indians/Malays, Whites and Afrikaners due to a time factor of living in South Africa. Their portion of land to be received in terms of the intended land expropriation project can only be calculated and determined based on the total South African population versus the ratio of the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds, Asian/Indians/Malays, Whites and Afrikaners. Their present claims to land and the intention of land redistribution without compensation, is land grabbing and terrorism, similar to what their forefathers did when they settled here as foreigners.6,71 Whites and the Afrikaner tribe

The popular view that the “Afrikaner” is a unique and “pure” White race that had its origins at the Cape Settlement in 1652 is wrong. Miscegenation and a multiracial component involving the South African Indians/Asians, Coloureds, KhoiKhoi and Blacks is a fact.6,71

The multiracialism of today’s Afrikaners makes their legal claims to land ownership of the South African soil equal to that of South Africa’s Asian/Indians, KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds and Blacks. The Afrikaners have become indigenous, as did the Asian/Indians, KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds and Blacks, to South Africa.6,71

The radical Black politicians’ claim that Blacks are indigenous South Africans and that Whites are settlers, is false and misleading. Indians/Asians, Coloureds, KhoiKhoi, Blacks and Whites are all foreigners (migrants) to South Africa who became indigenous over time.

3.5.8. The claim that the Tsar and Stalin’s collectivist farming projects in rural Russia were great successes

The radicals in the ANC often argue that the communist countries’ form of land ownership could work here. This is especially true for Julius Malema of the EFF who believes in the full nationalisation of all South Africans assets. When one looks critically at the similarities between the present-day political intentions of the ANC elite of South Africa and that of the Russian regimes as reflected by the Russian political history between the 1860s and 1950s, the similarities are startling: the same political radicalism, masked agendas, misuse of the problem of poverty and landlessness for own political and personal enrichment by the elites, the intentional lack of a clear land reform plan, political revenge on the previous beneficiaries of the old regimes, disrespect for the civil rights of individuals and for humanity, and the outcome of an even worse political end results. In both cases the end result of the land ownership issue was either revolution(s) or the possibility of revolution.4,6

It is therefore important to the antagonists to test the notion that the Tsar and Stalin’s collectivist farming projects in rural Russia were great successes and interventions that could be applied to the land expropriation model of the ANC regime. The historian Professor Niall Ferguson73 gives us great insight into this matter with his comprehensive book on the world’s political history titled: The War of the World. Ferguson73 writes73:198:

In the summer of 1931, in his seventy-fifth year, the playwright George Bernard Shaw paid a nine-day visit to the Soviet Union. What he saw — or thought he saw — was a workers’ paradise under construction.

Here was a symbol of the apparently realizable dream of state socialism, and Western visitors like Shaw reacted ecstatically. They had seen the future, and — compared with the apparently defunct capitalist system — it seemed to work.

Granted an audience with Stalin himself, Shaw was ‘disarm[ed]… by a smile in which there is no malice but also no credulity… [He] would pass…for a romantically dark Georgian chieftain’. In an impromptu speech in Leningrad, Shaw declared enthusiastically: ‘If this great communistic experiment spreads over the whole world, we shall have a new era in history…If the future is the future as Lenin foresaw it, then we may all smile and look forward to the future without fear’. ‘Were I only 18 years of age,’ he told journalists on his way back to England, ‘I would settle in Moscow tomorrow.’

Shaw73 elaborated further in 1931, writes Ferguson73:198-199:

“Stalin has delivered the goods to an extent that seemed impossible ten years ago, he rhapsodized. ‘Jesus Christ has come down to earth. He is no longer an idol. People are gaining some sort of idea of what would happen if He lived now.”

But Shaw was not the only famous and important Brit who was mesmerised by the communists’ benevolence to the poor in the 1930s: with him on his “tour of believing” were also Nancy and Waldorf Astor, and the Marquis of Lothian, Philip Kerr.73

Shaw’s73 “goodness” that came to the peasants (the poor and landless Russians) in the countryside under Stalin is now also seemingly on the way for poor and landless Blacks in South Africa. However, it is important to note that a limited form of land redistribution already took place in Russia under the Tsar with his abolition of serfdom in the 1860s and the transfer of land by a form of land ownership to them.73

The bid by the Tsar to build a new class of “thrifty peasant proprietors” by means of a form of land redistribution, had limited success for various reasons. The specific belief that their “independence” from the rich and the mega-landowners and their own say in agriculture would transform the poor and landless Russians into successful commercial farmers overnight, failed. Although the peasants’ input with agricultural produce boosted the Russian economy, it just introduced another form of inequality. More or less 80% of ordinary Russians living in the countryside remained poor and deprived of benefits and dependent on the Tsar’s whims. Although the living standards of the peasants improved, they were still far from those living in towns and cities. The backlash of the Tsar’s abuse of the poor and landless under the mantle of their economic and political empowerment, upliftment and independence only to enrich his elite circle, doomed the project to a failure right from the start. In real life the masses of poor and landless Russians gained nothing.73 Ferguson writes73:14:

“The hope that they [80% of the population] would gain land as well as freedom among the peasants by the abolition of serfdom had been disappointed.”

What becomes clear is the absence of a definitive plan and the focused intention to uplift the poor and landless Russians to empower them and not only the doings of the corrupted Tsar-elite.73

The vagueness of Ramaphosa’s plan of who would receive land, the allocation of deeds and what would be expected from these individuals, seems to be conflict in the making. In the Russia of the 1860s there were also different (often opposing and discriminative) socio-economic groups (as in the present-day South Africa), aggravating the battle for land ownership. This not only laid the foundation for immediate political conflict in Russia, but also a revolution. Ferguson73 reflects on this infighting73:14-15:

“A disgruntled peasantry, a sclerotic aristocracy, a radicalized but impotent intelligentsia and a capital city with a large and volatile populace: these were precisely the combustible ingredients the historian Alexis de Tocqueville had identified in 1780 France [and its revolution]. A Russian revolution of rising expectations was in making…”

It is more than clear from the Russian tsar’s failed experiment that neither extreme land grabbing nor orderly land redistribution bring immediate socio-economic and financial solutions and satisfaction for the poor and landless, especially when their numbers are large and the liberation regime’s intentions with land expropriation is based on political delinquency.

The above Russian experiment on land expropriation did not stop with the later doomed Tsar regime. It was later continued by the dictator and political delinquent Josef Stalin as president of Russia.

Stalin73 lends another dimension to the presence of the peasantry and its grievances inside the greater Russian community in the 1930s. Described in a differences: the misuse of the peasants through their “grievances” (here in South Africa the antagonists refer to this Stalin opportunism in terms of Ramaphosa’s politicking as the “people wants, needs and demands”), to promote and to benefit exclusively Stalin’s elite’s interests and sick political visions.

As in South Africa at present, the politics of socialism all over Russia was Stalin’s solution to address the peasant problem and their upliftment via “land ownership and wealth”. But, “What Stalin meant by ‘socialism in one country’ was a new revolution – an economic revolution that he, the self-styled ‘man of steel’ would lead”, writes Ferguson73:199. The “public” outcome of Stalin was one of “promoting” the interests of the poor and landless peasants living in the countryside (filled with grievances about their living conditions from the time of the Tsar), while in reality he killed them off to promote solely his own self-interests through military force and the greater Russian economy needed for military power via the agricultural economics. His economic revolution of masse industrialisation, secondary to social transformation, offered Stalin the opportunity of misusing the peasantry as the new proletariat (especially in the urban areas) to keep him and his elite in power without really awarding them significant political and economic power. It also limited the political and economic empowerment and aspirations of the peasantry still living in the countryside, tilling the soil for the Stalin elite’s benefitting. Ferguson posits73:199:

“By forcing a huge transfer of manpower and the resources from the countryside into the cities, he aimed to enlarge at a stroke the Soviet proletariat on which the Revolution was supposedly based.”

At the same time Stalin attacked the surviving elements of the pre-revolutionary society – “…former capitalists, nobles, merchants, officials, priests and kulaks with all their class sympathies, anti-pathies, traditions, habits, opinions, world views and so on…”, who he saw as remaining threats to his regime, writes Ferguson.73:199 Stalin’s policy of collectivisation of the Russian agricultural sector and its people was only superficially an attempt to improve Soviet agrigulture73:199:

“Its true goal was the destruction of the class enemy – to be precise, ‘the liquidation of the kulaks as a class’”.

Ferguson73 brings us nearer to the above events when he points out73:200:

“Predictably, the consequence of the systematic annihilation of any farmer suspected of being a kulak was not economic growth but one of the greatest man-made famines in history. As Party functionaries descended on the countryside with orders to abolish private property and ‘liquidate’ anyone who had accumulated more than the average amount of capital, there was chaos”.

In reflecting here on the destiny of the private land owners and the rich of the countryside (equal to the White farmers of South Africa), Ferguson stipulates the following six criteria set out in 1927 (revised in 1929) by the Soviet Ministry of Finance in their doomed evaluation of wrongdoings of the rich Russians (as Apartheid’s wrongdoings also reflects)73:200:

  1. The hiring of two or more labourers;
  2. Ownership of three or more draught animals;
  3. Sown area of more than 10–16 desyatims (the threshold varied by region);
  4. Ownership of any kind of processing enterprise;
  5. Ownership of a trading establishment; or
  6. Ownership of one or more agricultural machines or of a considerable quantity of good-quality implements

Looking at the above extreme criteria makes it clear that the more or less 35 000 commercial farmers in South Africa would have qualified in 1927 to be liquidated, making their fear for the radicals inside the ANC elite with their extreme land transformation (and sometimes open hostility against Whites, especially the Afrikaners) understandable.3

To understand better the liquidation of anti-Stalin and anti-Soviet farmers (and seemingly rich farmers) by communistic Russia through their good land expropriation policy in the 1920s, Ferguson takes us on an in-depth journey with a clear warning about the political, social and personal madness of Stalin and his cronies [a similar warning the antagonists have tried to send out to the world (like the note to Donald Trump) of what can comes in South Africa if the ANC regime, besotted by its political madness, stays on after 2019, noting the ANC’s revolutionary foundation and Stalinist orientation]. Ferguson73 text is of such importance that it is fully mentioned here. Ferguson73 writes73:200-202:

Who exactly was a kulak? Those who had been better-off before the Revolution or those who had done well since? What exactly did it mean to ‘exploit’ other peasants? Lending them money when they were short of cash? Rather than see their cattle and pigs confiscated, many peasants preferred to slaughter and eat them, so that by 1935 total Soviet livestock was reduced to half of its 1929 level. But the brief orgy of eating was followed by a protracted, agonizing starvation. Without animals fertilizers, crop yields plummeted – grain output in 1932 was down by a fifth compared with 1930. Grain seizures to feed Russia’s cities left entire villages with literally nothing to eat. Starving people ate cats, dogs, field mice, birds, tree bark and even horse manure. Some went into the fields and ate half-ripe ears of corn. There were even cases of cannibalism. As in the 1920-21, typhus followed hard on the heels of dearth. Perhaps as many as eleven million people died in what was a wholly unnatural and unnecessary disaster. In addition, almost 400 00 households, or close to two million people, were deported as ‘special exiles’ to Siberia and Central Asia. Many of those who resisted collectivization were shot on the spot; perhaps as many as 3.5 million victims of ‘dekulakization’ subsequently died in labour camps. It was a crime the regime did its utmost to conceal from the world, confining foreign journalists to Moscow and restoring the Tsarist passport system to prevent famine victims fleeing to the cities for relief. Even the 1937 census was suppressed because it revealed a total population of just 156 million, when natural increase would have increased it to 186 million. Only a handful of Western reporters – notably Gareth Jones of the Daily Express, Malcolm Muggeridge of the Manchester Guardian, Pierre Berland of Le Tempe and William Chamberlin of the Christian Science Monitor – had the guts to publish accurate reports about the famine. The bulk of the press corps in Moscow, notably Walter Durancy of the New York Times, knowingly connived at the cover-up for fear of jeopardizing their access to the nomenklatura.

The notion of the propagandists that the Tsar and Stalin’s collectivist farming projects in rural Russia to uplift and empower the poor and landless Russians were great successes is false. Indeed, for antagonists the tragic political history of Russian land reform spells disaster for South Africa. The Mothlante Report points out that the 1994 to 2018 land redistribution under the auspices of the ANC regime failed, not so much because of poorly qualified farmers, but because of the stealing of politicians and officials of the money allocated to farmers. The question for the antagonists is why would this setup not replay itself now?73

3.6. The presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa in perspective

3.6.1. The impact of Ramaphosa’s political baggage

One of the strong critics against Ramaphosa is the conclusion of the antagonists that he is only going to bring further misery to South Africans in general and to Whites specifically, making him just another “political monster” and a leader unable to handle the land expropriation with true justice and political balance inside the ANC elite. This conclusion is based on the view of the antagonists that Ramaphosa is a Zuma collaborator per excellence. The antagonists are constantly pointing out his long “passive” presence as an ANC member and later as vice-president during the Zuma’s time of transgression. It is justified for the antagonists to bring this matter to the table in the now stormy hurricane which is called land expropriation and in which Ramaphosa stands central with the radicals of the ANC. Munusamy74,75 and Mthombothi76,77 put this “involvement reality” on paper when they point out that he was the deputy-president and has sat through cabinet meetings where Zuma and several of his crooked ministers tried to take action on instruction from the Guptas. Munusamy75,78 and Mthombothi76,77 emphasise that he, as the deputy-president, attended numerous of the ANC’s top-six and national executive committee meetings where state capture was contested. He was also a direct figure in cases where state capture was at least clear to the eye, like the attempted heist of the National Treasury by firing three anti-corruption ANC politicians, namely Nhlanhla Nene, Pravin Gordhan and Mcebisi Jonas by Jacob Zuma in March 2017. The critics also say that Ramaphosa has been influenced and steered by the politically uncontrolled Julius Malema, especially on the land issue.74-77,80,81

Some political analysts look critically at Ramaphosa’s rhetoric on land redistribution (which they see as similar to EFF politics) from another angle. Firstly, his immediate radical enthusiasm about a fast and decisive land expropriation programme is seen by the antagonists as simple opportunism to win power inside the ANC for support against the pro-Zuma and Zupta-derailing movements to oust him before or during the 2019 election. Secondly, to stay on as supreme leader of ANC, his primary priority at this stage is to save the ANC regime from defeat in 2019 by hook or by crook. Failure will mean his automatic defeat as a figure in the future politics of the country. It is speculated that he is trying to play the long game and that he will wait until after the elections to consolidate his power base to fit exclusively his opportunistic needs.74-77.80,81 Barron63 writes63:9:

“Right now it’s about self-preservation, it’s about winning the 2019 election, feeling threatened by the EFF, feeling vulnerable…”

The whole issue around White land has become an irritating affair for Ramaphosa that is unnecessarily being stalled by Whites. It is now limiting his strength as president and ambitions. The Whites’ enthusiasm about Ramaphosa as their saviour as he replaced Jacob Zuma’s hostility, seems misplaced: Ramaphosa’s political baggage is just too much for him to accommodate the Whites as a group with all their needs and demands: things can get worse for the Whites under Ramaphosa, antagonists feel.82,83

At present Ramaphosa’s impatience about a lack of progress on land redistribution and White resistance since 1994 is growing. President Donald Trump’s questions about the ANC’s land expropriation has aggravated him.63 In his political arena the Whites’ future interests are not important. This mindset makes him a very dangerous to the White community and their future, argue the antagonists. For the antagonists Ramaphosa shows signs of having lost contact with the bigger political picture of long-term economics and nation-building. Indeed, it seems as if the Zuma-scenario of hostility against Whites have not disappeared.84,85

The matter of land expropriation without compensation can become Ramaphosa’s Achilles heel as a president. The months up to the possible May-2019 election can be a bruising battle for the Ramaphosa camp. They can get any side of the coin, which can both have devastating outcomes in the end. Ramaphosa is accused by the antagonists of constant double-talk and of creating many unrealistic expectations among poor Blacks.48 Some antagonists see the present identification of Whites as exclusive land owners as nothing else than the misuse of an “itching political-racial matter” to draw away attention from the ANC regime as a party in crisis to get votes in the next election. It is reminiscent to the White regime’s misuse of an itching political-racial matter in the 1930s when they played of the “poor Afrikaner problem” against the “Black and English dangers” of that time to get Afrikaner votes in exchange for financial benefits to secure their reign of South Africa. The Carnegie Commission then not only revealed this misuse of insecure voters by the nationalist Afrikaner leaders to obtain Afrikaner votes, but also warned against it as a crooked way getting votes. Geen71 reported well in 1939 on this matter71: 201:

The Commission also drew attention to the danger of allowing people to retain the vote if they were in receipt of government aid, over and above the privileges that fall to all citizens. “There are signs that voting power and political influence are being abused to an increasing degree in order to obtain State assistance” was the unanimous view of the commissioners. The opinion has been expressed that those who accept government assistance should forfeit the valued right to vote.

This unethical and crooked way of getting votes is applicable to the 2019 land intentions of the ANC regime and party.71

Ramaphosa’s integrity as politician and as previous vice-president of the ANC regime is doubted by the antagonists and thus the White community. Mthombothi76 refuses to deviate from his initial question in this regard and puts it clearly that Ramaphosa should react to these concerns before he could be cleared as a clean outsider, truly unconnected to the Zuma and Gupta cronies. The antagonists argue that Ramaphosa’s anti-White behaviours since July 2018 further complicated his trustworthiness as president of South Africa. Mthombothi’s76 writing echoes the questions of many antagonists about Ramaphosa into the presidency through the front door. Mthombothi posits76:17:

And because Zuma, the villain of the piece, is gone, we’re now encouraged to wake up to a new dawn. It’s a confession of sorts. Dawn is preceded by darkness. The suggestion is that we’re emerging from a nightmarish, dark place into a glorious sunshine and that we should be grateful to our saviour.

But hang on a minute. Not so fast. To suggest that state capture is all Zuma’s doing is not only a lie but a complete cop-out. It’s akin to arguing that Hendrik Verwoerd alone was responsible for apartheid. That’s pulling the wool over our eyes. The entire party, especially the top leadership, is complicit.

What is missing – and what those who smugly sat in the inner sanctums of power with Zuma want to avoid — is full and honest disclosure. During the Watergate scandal in the US, a high-ranking Republican senator put this seminal question to Richard Nixon: what did the president know, and when did he know it? President Cyril Ramaphosa and his cohorts need to respond to such a question. What was their role in the state capture debacle and why did they choose to stay silent, which was itself a criminal dereliction of duty?

Ramaphosa needs to level with the public. He should take it into his confidence. Be honest with us. Opening up is not a sign of weakness. To the contrary, it may strengthen his position. Trust is an important component in leadership.

The ANC spurned numerous opportunities to remove Zuma. It stood by him. Those who called for his scalp were mocked and disparaged. Now they’ve made a U-turn and are urging everybody to join in their thuma Mina kumbaya.

A pig with lipstick is still a pig.

The antagonists need not look further than Cyril Ramaphosa’s83,86 inaugural speech as the ANC’s leader at the party’s 54th National Leaders Conference in December 2017 to see Ramaphosa’s blindness to Zuma’s “bad” lipstick while he was vice-president83:6:

Finally, I would like, on your behalf, to thank President Jacob Zuma for the 10 years he has spent as the president of our movement and for a lifetime of service to the people; or

We cannot close down the 54th national conference of the ANC without to bring tribute to your [Zuma] contributions over decades in the struggle for Freedom, democracy and development [Own translation].

Mthombothi’s76 diagnosis of a pig with lipstick is still a pig seems to fit Ramaphosa’s political actions after June 2018. For the antagonists there is only one of two solutions for the land expropriation matter: get rid of the pig or clean its lips of lipsticks! But this seems easier said than done in the ANC regime’s corrupted setup where there seems just too many “holy pigs” to handle.76

Gary Eisenberg79 and John Steenhuisen87 put into perspective the cloudy, one-sided and privileged politics of the pre-2019 top circle of the ANC. The ordinary people were held to a different (higher) standard of administrative justice than the ANC’s top leadership (a system in which Ramaphosa was a prominent member together with his boss Zuma and of which he must now be answerable to all South Africans).87,76 Like Mthombothi76, Eisenberg79 is also questioning this ANC integrity79:17:

How can a regime of law exist with integrity when access to administrative justice is only possible through a shadow decision-making authority outside of the rule of law?

This principle cannot be more poignantly articulated than in the celebrated words of US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis: “If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy”.

Zuma and his regime became law-breakers and laws unto themselves, leading to immense anarchic outcomes. The question at this stage is where Ramaphosa stands in relation to personal and political honesty versus crooking. Any future perception of him as a puppet serving the ANC NEC under the Zuma-faction can be fatal to his credibility as leader Number One.79,87,88

The fact is, as indicated already, that the Guptas and top ANC leaders would not been in position to allow such constant state capture without the help and approval of other ANC-leaders in the top structure of the party and in the Zuma cabinet. Does a parallel Zuma regime still exist in the Ramaphosa regime? And, most of all, the honest question: Who are all the pigs with lipstick in the Ramaphosa cabinet and in his inner circle?76,79,84

The above questions of Mthombothi76, Steenhuisen87 and Eisenberg79 about Ramaphosa’s possible double role in the present South African politics are growing, also in the minds of the antagonists. It may be their single greatest worry.

Ramaphosa’s possible double role may be a factor in other events. Prominent here is the allegation of ongoing political terrorising and extortion of the Ramaphosa camp by Zuma and the Guptas. Is it a possibility that these alleged powers are making the Ramaphosa regime toothless to fire ministers and state officials from the Zuma regime and to kick out Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma from his inner circle? Is extortion making it impossible for Ramaphosa to depart fully from the established Zuma leftist and corrupted system, leading to his ongoing open support for crooked cadres? There is a die-hard suspicious rumour of a secret list (seemingly only known to Jacob Zuma, Oliver Tambo, Joe Nhlanhla and Nelson Mandela) of current prominent ANC members who are alleged to have been Apartheid spies and collaborators. It is now the time for Ramaphosa to address this matter with urgency. As with an open answer on his possible involvement or not in the Zuma regime’s wrongdoings, President Cyril Ramaphosa and his cohorts need also to respond with a clear answer about extortion by the Zupoids regarding their political and personal past. Ramaphosa has to level any possible dark past to the public. For the antagonists to trust Ramaphosa the question is prominent: Can Ramaphosa afford to respond publicly?82

The seasoned political and investigated journalist Barney Thombothi89 refuses to allow Ramaphosa to escape the present political reality in which he prominently positioned himself, seemingly washing his hands in innocence. Mthombothi89 takes justice further by postulating that accusing “uBaba” Jacob Zuma alone as the evil in state capture, fraud and stealing, is wrong and false. The truth, he writes, is89:21: “…uBaba’s ANC-party as a whole went along with him on his looting journey, making every step with well-planning with him”. This includes Ramaphosa as MP, member of the ANC NEC and vice-president. Ramaphosa’s present brain-washing of the ordinary man on the street with the appointment of various commission, investigations, inquiries, summits and conferences to investigate Zuma should not succeed. Ramaphosa is trying to steer the mess away from him self. It is only the inquiries of Raymond Zondo and Robert Nugent that seem to be of value thus far (but they did not lead to comprehensive criminal prosecutions by the NPA).19,89

The problem with the Zondo inquiry, as opposed to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of the 1990s, writes Mthombothi89:21, is that the perpetrators being investigated by the Zondo inquiry are still in power. Mthombothi89 points out this ANC contamination well89:21:

“They decided on its mandate, and it will be up to them to act on its recommendations, almost akin to an accused who has a remit to decide whether to abide by his sentence.”

The ANC elite’s effort to attribute all wrongdoing to Zuma is a failed strategy to escape responsibility: the fact is Zuma was appointed by the ANC out of their own free will and offered a free hand. He was no autocrat who grabbed the power directly. Indeed, he could have been stopped at any time by the ANC NEC. Mthombothi89 writes89:21:

“They were inside the tent with him cheering him as he plundered and looted with gay abandon. So they’re not simply complicit; they’re responsible for the awful mess the country’s in.”

The prominent question is why did Ramaphosa not testify so far to the Zondo inquiry: If he is not guilty of wrongdoing, why the avoidance? His contribution can be valuable and can open a door on the doings of the inner circle of the ANC from 1994 to 2018. Mthombothi89 is on the spot when he says89:21:

The Zondo commission gives Ramaphosa an opportunity to level with the public. As Zuma’s deputy, there is very little that could have escaped his attention. What did he know, and why didn’t he do anything about it? He should therefore be leading all ministers who served under Zuma to give evidence, mea culpas included, to the commission. These things took place under their noses. They must tell us what happened. We will be all ears.

With the above heavy baggage Ramaphosa is carrying, very few antagonists see Ramaphosa as an independent executive leader or futurist who is serving every citizen and community. Many see him as a person politically contaminated by his pre-1994 exposure to revolutionary “radiation”, still driven rigidly by this contaminated past.89 The inclination to misuse power and radical autocratic behaviour and disrespect for rules and traditions is well-illustrated by the fact that Ramaphosa openly ignored the parliament’s decision first to test the public’s sentiment on land expropriation without compensation. He started-up the process of land expropriation without official permission of the Parliament. Mthombothi89 reports on this as follows89:21:

It reduced the entire process to a sham: the currency was knocked off its stride and it’s continued its inexorable slide since.

Ramaphosa seems to be too contaminated to appear before the Zondo commission.

The request of the antagonists to the Ramaphosa regime is: Be honest with South Africans before the Zuptoids tell “their secrets” first to the outside-world.90,91,92 Look what happened with Nene after the Guptas “started to walk” again in daylight! Bruce90, like Mtombothi89, says90:12:

“Do it now, before the 2019 election. Opening up is not a sign of weakness. To the contrary, it may strengthen Ramaphosa’s and his intimate men’s positions. Trust is an important component in leadership. It can bring only confidence to the Ramaphosa regime, and most of all: to himself.”

Coming back to the failed and corrupted ANC period of reign between 1994 and 2019 and any constructive change possible to its reign in the near future, many political analysts rightly see very little change in the post-Zuma hundred days and more of Cyril Ramaphosa and that of Jacob Zuma. The antagonists describe it as an ongoing Zupta-ANC-NEC regime, which is still run direct and indirect by many controversial figures, the likes of Anoj Singh, Bruce Koloane, Mark Pamensky, Rajesh Naithani, Faith Muthambi, Fikile Mbalula, Lynne Brown, Daniel Mantsha, Des van Rooyen, Mosebenzi Zwane, Tom Moyane, Jonas Makwakwa, Supra Mahumapelo, Arthur Fraser, Shaun Abrahams, Brian (not Popo) Molefe, Matshela Koko, Malusi Gigaba, ACE Magashule, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and others. Anti-Zuma and non-corrupt persons in the ANC of the calibre of Vusi Pikoli, Senzo Mchunu and Pravin Gordhan are just too few in number to assure a positive governmental overhaul and the taming or cleansing of the corrupted Zuma-ANC-NEC. The spooky networks of dirty tricks (Bell Pottinger), rogue spying (governmental) and propaganda (Infinity Media, The New Age, ANN7) are still too involved in the Ramaphosa reign.53,76,79,84,93-105

The antagonists see a shadow hanging over the heads of some of Ramaphosa’s intimate political cronies. In this regard Mthombothi2 writes2:3:

Let’s look at Ramaphosa’s own record. In David Mabuza, he has a deputy who, as premier of Mpumalanga, turned that province into a den of thieves, where whistle-blowers are killed with impunity. The ANC head office is headed by Ace Magashule, who’s left the Free State in a shambles and who’s personality involved in enabling the Guptas to benefit in the Estina scandal.

This week it emerged that an ABC employee at Luthuli House has been arrested for involvement in cash-in-transit heists. One ANC apparatchik was heard to express shock at this, but such delinquent behaviour is par for the course. There are many upstanding people in the ANC, but sometimes it’s hard to escape the conclusion that the party has become a criminal syndicate.

There was a devastating exposé in August 2018 in The New York Times (arguably the world’s most respected English newspaper) with specific reference to Ramaphosa’s deputy president David Mabuza’s alleged corrupt activities and mismanagement while he was Mpumalanga premier, write Imraan Buccus106 and Asha Speckman107. Buccus106 reflects on these controversies in the intimate Ramaphosa inner circle as follows106:17:

From this point on he will, at best, be seen as the head of a divided party and of a government that includes the worst dregs of the Jacob Zuma era.

On the international circuit any talk of a “New Dawn” or a “crackdown on corruption” will now be immediately followed by the question: “Yes, but what about Mabuza, and his ilk?

If Ramaphosa cannot remove Mabuza and others like him from the party and the government, his presidency will be paralysed.

The New York Times (NYT) foregrounds the incompetence and lack of insight on Ramaphosa side to involve persons with clean hands into his cabinet and into the ANC NEC, together with his lack of political insight to understand the consequences of land grabbing on the human and economic components of the country107:10: “…saying South Africa needed [looking seemingly to Ramaphosa, the failed statesman] another ‘enlightened leader like Nelson Mandela but keeps electing imitations of Robert Mugabe’.”

In this context the NYT clearly pinpoints Ramaphosa’s failure as an executive leader and tears his foolish argument that land restitution without compensation would unlock economic growth, into pieces. The fact is, as the antagonists also see it: the emperor is naked and sadly he does not know it.107

For the antagonists poor quality of political decisions, supported by other condemning evidence, seems to be cemented into the Ramaphosa regime from day one.2,53,57,76,79,84,93-100,102-105

The antagonists are more than justified to say that it seems more and more as if the ANC (and South Africa) and Ramaphosa are all still stuck in the Zuma syndrome of delinquency and that South Africa will be stuck with this negativity as long as the ANC forms the regime of the day.2,53,57,76,79,84,93-100,102-105

The propagandists’ argument that Ramaphosa’s way of governing by consensus and the use of tactics in negotiation the ANC internal politics, has required him to put some of his key opponents into powerful ANC positions, like the national spokesman Pule Mabe and secretary-general Ace Magashule, is laughable. These decisions are part of Ramaphosa’s radical political ideology. Even if the strategy approach to Ramaphosa was true, it is just a repeat of the earlier failed version in 1994 by Mandela with Ramaphosa as his adviser when they placed political opponents in the cabinet. As Ferial Haffajee108 puts it108:2: “It didn’t work then, and it’s not working now”. It just points to a lack of political insight.2,53,57,76,79,84,93-100,102-105

Ramaphosa’s political baggage is just too heavy, packed with old, stinky and infectious clothes and inadmissible goods. The antagonists are looking forward to what will happen in 2019 when he tries to make a border crossing.

3.6.2. A Ramaphosa utopia versus a Ramaphosa dystopia

Cyril Ramaphosa chooses his words carefully — very carefully. Certainly, he is genial and relaxed, but he is too good a politician to allow himself to get carried away in his pronouncements.

And so, like a skilled artist trying hard not to give away too much, he culls his words most adroitly while also managing to remain warm and engaging.109:15

Is the above a description of an interview with Cyril Ramaphosa after his election as the president at the 54th National Conference of the ANC in December 2017? No, the words were uttered by Ramaphosa 25 years earlier in 1994 in an interview with the former political editor of The Star, Kaizer Nyatsumba.109 In 2019 he is the same seasoned and unchanged politician with the same political enigma: encircled by unpredictable thinking and behaviour and mysterious agendas.

One thing is clear: Ramaphosa did not change his political disposition; it is still embedded in radical African liberation and ANC revolutionism, and still not political finessed. The only obvious change between 1994 and 2019 is that he was 43 years old in 1994 and is now 69 years in 2019!109

Cyril Ramaphosa, like FW de Klerk, entered as Number One as the man of the moment, but like De Klerk’s auk! (greatness), Ramaphosa’s aura also has started to wash out: just much faster. In Ramaphosa’s case it started after only 100 days. The antagonists point out that Ramaphosa made initially a dramatic impact on the ANC and the country’s politics. In retrospect, his actions are bathed in controversy, basically aimed at overcoming and outliving his insecurity and endangering as leader of the disorganised and disunited ANC. This negativity is spilling to his presidency. Two dramatic, suddenly outcomes (totally unexpected for Whites) are prominent: 1) his intention to change Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution to implement land expropriation without compensation, and 2) his intention to estrange the White part of the population from the Black community and the greater African community.110

Critics of the intended land reform initiative of Ramaphosa and all that surrounds it lay the problems at the door of the person and politician Cyril Ramaphosa himself. Analysts see the sudden political radicalism of Ramaphosa as a direct outcome of a politically impoverished president of the ANC party as well as the state South Africa. Ramaphosa may have won the ANC’s leadership battle in 2018, writes Mthombothi111, but he’s lost the ideological one. He came out of the Nasrec conference wearing the mantle of leadership, but burdened by the opinions of a divided top six and a national executive committee of 80 members, bodies crawling with his political enemies.111

Mthombothi111 enlightens us111:21:

Ramaphosa leads a party that’s pulling in different direction from where he wants to go. As one activist puts it, the head is cut off from the body. A bit extreme perhaps, but it will be interesting to see how Ramaphosa goes about stitching the two together”. To stitch the ANC-party together seem more and more impossible for the antagonists: the head is under witch-doctor’s care at Nklanda and the perfumed half-decayed body stored at Luthuli-house.

Firstly, as Mthombothi111 says, it is becoming a question in which direction Ramaphosa and the ANC elite want to go: A Western type of capitalist democracy or a combined African-styled Chinese-Venezuelan autocratic socialism. His land expropriation intentions reflect a combined African-styled Chinese-Venezuelan autocratic socialism.

Secondly, Ramaphosa as a president is hamstringed by the leftish Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and her radical cronies (as well as the spooky Jacob Zuma who is still looking at every decision of the ANC elite, regime and party), who is still well-established in the background. The intention to oust Ramaphosa before 2019 or after the election is seemingly part of the Zuma-faction’s plan. This insecurity makes Ramaphosa the powerless head of a divided and corrupted ANC. It has gotten so out of hand that Ramaphosa, as last resort, had to appeal (not demand!) at the end of September 2018 for unity in the ANC as a prerequisite to winning the coming election. His rebuke of party bosses regarding their independent conflicting messages was clearly not successful. The fact further that Ramaphosa’s seemingly intimate friend Gwede Mantashe is also arm-in-arm with Ace Magashule (who is undoubtedly not an intimate friend of Ramaphosa), makes his present position extremely difficult. This conflict and disempowerment of Ramaphosa refer back to Ramaphosa’s possible involvement in the Zuma wrongs, or his direct knowledge of it as vice-president.112 As Mthomboth112 puts it precise112:4:

“Mantashe‘s entanglement presents Ramaphosa with a challenge. It constrains his scope to act or confront allegations of corruption by the likes of Magashule and others. His chair and trusted ally is knee-deep in it. The plot thickens.”

The antagonists feel that the radical economic transformation (RET) narrative has won at Nasrec and that the Zuma group of the NEC is arm-in-arm with the EFF ideology (Economic Freedom Fighters). The ANC’s unexpected radical metamorphosis (undoubtedly a driver of Ramamania specifically) was described well by Mthombothi111 in March 2018111:21:

“Early last year the ANC in Parliament voted against an EFF motion to expropriate without compensation, but almost days later Zuma started campaigning for exactly the same thing. The call was taken up by many branches of the ruling party, especially those supporting Dlamini-Zuma.”

On Ramaphosa’s sudden pliancy to the Zuma and Dlamini-Zuma inclinations of land expropriation without compensation, Tabane113 writes113:6:

“It is fascinating that President Cyril Ramaphosa seems to be very much alive to the possible chasm that may be an unintended consequence of the wild and generalized approach to the issue. Earlier this year he even sought to assure the Afrikaner community that the constitution will not be amended.”

The belief of the antagonists is that the Zuma group of the ANC NEC’s radical classic Marxist view is becoming cemented into the ANC base. It is echoed more and more by Ramaphosa himself since July 2018 with his public declaration that “we” (ANC) are going to take land without compensation. This was followed by his very provocative challenge, although indirectly, to three specific role players, namely the South African Whites, Donald Trump and the UN to do something about his (Ramaphosa) intended land expropriation. For a leader like Ramaphosa, with a built-in segment of radical liberation coming from the old ANC, these kinds of announcements and decisions are not recallable outcomes. It’s a final decision by Ramaphosa, without deviating one inch from his old radical political ideology. This Black radicalism, antagonists argue, includes the belief that White monopoly capital captured the entire South African economy and that the only panacea for this is radical economic transformation (RET), which includes dramatic and radical land reform to cleanse the country of socio-economic apartheid and the presence of the inequality and poverty of Blacks solely at the costs of the Whites (who Ramaphosa identified as the sinners). The status of the Whites seems more and more to be second-class citizenship, stripped from its traditional common law rights.111

The opponents of land expropriation are of the opinion that although it initially seemed as if Ramaphosa does not subscribe to land grabbing from the Whites in his heart, he, in line with his liberator’s instinct, has become part and parcel of the “new” ANC’s radical view on the “colonists Whites” and their “stolen land”. This is a direct outcome of the Ramamania and Ramaforia that forced Ramaphosa to stay empowered inside the current ANC NEC and ANC regime.111

What makes Ramaphosa so dangerous in the minds of the antagonists is that it is seemingly important to Ramaphosa to hold the office of president by underwriting the mantra of the Zuma group in the NEC (and indirectly the Malema faction) at all cost, ignoring sound political justice and nationhood. Many of the antagonists doubted his half-hearted assurances that the ANC’s planned land seizure will happen in such a way that it does not jeopardise economic growth or food production from the start. The meaning and possibilities of this rhetoric is so wide that an ox wagon can turn in it! The antagonists see this kind of “presidential testimony” as just safeguarding the ANC regime’s “good” image. The same goes for Ramaphosa’s vague assurances that land reform does not mean full capture. For the antagonists the potential for extreme land grabbing is great. Ramaphosa is clearly not satisfied with the present land ownership and the favoured position of Whites.111

Ramaphosa showed his radicalism on White land in an interview with the journalist Kaizer Nyatsumba of The Star as far back as 1994 when he voiced his disagreement with the 1994 dispensation by pointing out that the major two challenges facing the ANC then were: 1) a clear future political strategy; and 2) the setting of tactics to prosecute the next phase of the struggle, like countering the favouring of White business communities at the expense of Blacks.86,109,111 Revolutionism has not diminished in his mindset, as his 2017 inaugural speech at Nasrec clearly confirms, where Ramaphosa86 said86:15:

“We serve them [principles of the ANC] because we [revolutionary democrats] have chosen, each one of us, to become selfless agents of revolutionary change.”

Antagonists view the present hamstringing of Ramaphosa as a president by the Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma gang as a failure to get rid of the corrupted and crooked ministers and high-level officials of the Zuma government. Political analysts refer to this mustering of renewed power by Jacob Zuma against Ramaphosa as a very dangerous political rebirth, coming from KwaZulu-Natal, one which can intensify in 2019 just before the election. The journalist Ranjeni Munusamy114 describes it as114:22:

“War drums in the political battlefields of KwaZulu-Natal will echo throughout the ANC and the country”.

The “angst” that Ramaphosa showed after King Goodwill Zwelithini’s threat to take up arms if his trust land becomes part of land reform, is good evidence in this context. Is he in fear of his life, seeing that political murders are already a permanent fixture in KwaZulu-Natal? Are the various Zuma reappointments by Ramaphosa in other ministerial or governmental positions or in the ANC executive leadership part of this fear of Ramaphosa? His willingness to pay Zuma’s immense court costs from the state’s fund is not only absurd, it reveals his fear. (Note: Zuma’s estimated legal bill per day is R290 000; the number of fraud, corruption and racketeering charges against Zuma is 16; while the number of payments alleged to have been paid as bribes to Zuma is 783).115-118 Mthombothi referred to this financial support as82:21: “…dishonesty doing by Ramaphosa, written all over, if not being patently fraudulent”.

Mthombothi82 posits82:21:

“Ramaphosa’s explanation in parliament last week was evasive, and not at all in keeping with the spirit of Thuma Mina. It reeks of the very odour he claims to want to eradicate.”

The political misbehaviour of Ramaphosa as reflected by the Zwelithini land case and Ramaphosa’s blind disregard for the sound recommendations of the parliamentary High-level Panel Report of Motlanthe for a strict but justified land redistribution programme, spells doom, making Ramaphosa a political factor to be feared in the future.3,82,111,119-122

Munusamy75 warned in April 2018 as follows on Ramaphosa, the leader and his limitations and shortcomings75:22:

Ramaphosa might have great plans for South Africa’s recovery, but it would appear that his own organization is weighting him down.

Instead of focusing on stabilising the state and creating an optimum climate for the investment and economic growth that would hopefully result in job creation, he must fight the ANC’s internal problems
Meanwhile, other ANC leaders are ineffective, dogged by scandal or engaged in sideshows.

While Ramaphosa is able to send his lions on the hunt for investment, it is a pity he does not have beasts at his disposal to deal with the nuisances in the ANC.

Ramaphosa’s ongoing failures, specifically earlier in his capacity as vice-president for many years when he had to oversee the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act to do justice to the poor, landless Blacks living on Black trust land are also prominent in the antagonists arguing. For the antagonists the question is that if he failed the Blacks, how can he been trusted to do good to Whites? The antagonists see him as a leader who underwrites a total pro-Black (radical) sentiment on land redistribution and rights.109,111,112

The negativity of critics about the planned land reform under the presidency of Ramaphosa is aggravated further by Ramaphosa’s contradicting and vague remarks on the land issue, which is seen more and more as an escape route he uses out of a situation he does not understand, nor knows to handle. 3,82,111,119-122

The ANC regime went down the drain from 1994 to 2019. Prominent is the rising national debt. Ramaphosa as vice-president was associated with the Zuma regime’s fraud, theft and corruption.3,82,111,119-122 Bruce73 indicates that the country’s debt rose from $20-billion with the start-up of the Zuma regime to more than $80-billion at the closing of the Zuma regime, with Ramaphosa as the vice-president. Bruce73:22 posits that by 2021 the interest to be paid by South Africans on the country’s debt will average more than R850 million per working day. This reflects not only failure by the ANC regime in general up to 2018 but also failure by Ramaphosa as vice-president and second-in-command of the South African state. The state capture during the Zuma regime and the failure of Black farming projects and other government enterprises were often the direct result of corruption, fraud and theft from inside the ANC elite and not so much always the inabilities or irresponsibility of Black farmers. The question for the antagonists is how Ramaphosa can improve the crooked and failed political system? Their answer is that he can’t, he is a crippled political leader. Under Ramaphosa South Africa has gone into a technical recession and so far, besides his political and emotional rhetoric, nothing constructive has happened.3,82,111,119-122

Ramaphosa’s41 naivety on the present recession is further reflected by his own emotional, foolish denial of its existence and seriousness when he said41:4: “We should not be fearful and think we are in a recession. We are not.” The ANC has failed to create income for many years, and the government simply does not have the funds for land redistribution. This dire financial situation means that the ANC has to trade confiscated White land in exchange for votes to stay in power.3,82,109,111,119-122

The political week of 11 to 18 November 2018, in the view of the antagonists, reflects the truth about the ongoing Zuma corruption inside the unpredictable Ramaphosa regime after Cyril Ramaphosa’s shocking admission that an amount of R500 000 was disclosed in parliament by DA leader Mmusi Maimane was in fact to help fund his campaign. It was not for work that his son Andile had done for the Bosasa logistics group (presently known as African Global Operations), which has been named as benefactor of several other high-profile ANC figures.123 Qaanitah Hunter writes123:1:

“President Cyril Ramaphosa’s ambitious drive to rescue the ANC and the country from the state-capture debacle is facing its sternest test yet. Today, the president has been forced onto the back foot after he admitted this week a R500,000 donations from the politically Watson family.”

This condemning situation must be read together with the under-mentioned series of condemning setbacks for his presidency, writes Hunter.123:1-2

In this context Hunter123 points out the shock resignation of finance minister Nhlanhla Nene after he was exposed as having lied about his visits to the Gupta compound, the resignation of Malusi Gigaba after the public protector found that he lied in court under oath, and the admission by public enterprises minister Pravin Gordhan that he met the Gupta family. There was also a slew of bad economic markers indicating that Ramaphosa’s economic remedy to fix South Africa in any way is a failure.123 Critics believe Ramaphosa knows about the donation and is not forthright when he responded by saying that he “just learn now of it”. DA leader Mmusi Maimane said123:2 “…this was no different to how the Guptas captured individuals in the government,” while the leader of the EFF Julius Malema said123:2: “Ramaphosa ‘must take full responsibility and admit that he lied to parliament, and he knows what happens to people who lie to parliament’”. The possibility that his presidency seems to be a short-lived one, is forcing him into irrational politics in an effort to outlive his enemies inside the ANC elite. This situation can make his future actions devastating, unpredictable and untrustworthy.3,82,111.119-123

Ramaphosa’s41declaration41:4: “…we are going to take land and when we take land we are going to take it without compensation’”, is not for the antagonists a myth or a lie, nor is it meaningless and aimless rhetoric. It is a hard fact, a final outcome and a guideline to understand Ramaphosa’s future extreme political intentions with Whites. His extreme decision has a momentum of its own, writes Corrigan110:22: “…it is not going to stop and anyone believing that Ramaphosa is going to back off from his land grabbing intentions of White-land is in for a surprise”. The antagonists now have Ramafear, a fear to go on, even after the Ramaflop at the end.110,124

The CEO of the Altron Group and a Yale World Fellow, Mteto Nyati125, puts the confusion in which the current ANC finds itself under Cyril Ramaphosa into words when he reflects on the abilities of the leader Ramaphosa125:9: “Everything but vision from Cyril”. Nyati125 points out the role of land expropriation from Whites in this political and moral besetting of Ramaphosa and his arrogance and ignorance to publicly rebuke the US President Donald Trump for his comments on the land issue, when he writes125:9: “…it was a strategy mistake on the president’s [Ramaphosa] part. We cannot talk about growth and ignore the US. Our national interests have to inform our choice of partners”, and: “The big threat to Ramaphosa’s turnaround strategy is the lack of a unifying and compelling vision. The vision that the president had was derailed by the land issue.”

For the antagonists the reality, which Nyati does not say, is that the ANC and Ramaphosa have a compelling vision: a vision that is based on live-long national Black radical liberation, one that cannot even be derailed by delinquency such as land grabbing and that makes it clear that South Africa does not belong to all who live in it.125

The antagonists find closure in the words of Mthombothi126 on Ramaphosa and his intimate ANC elites, when he concludes126:14:

“When he speaks, the words often sound as though they come from an empty space, devoid of emotions. He drones”,


“Ramaphosa does not have it in his locker. His words have to be respected simply because they carry the stamp of his office.”

The antagonists’ respect for him and his elite as good leaders is long gone.

Munusamy127 helps to assure the antagonists that their disrespect (and fear) of the leadership of Ramaphosa and his cronies is correct when she posits127:16:

SA’s sixth democratic poll is just six months away yet there is no coherent discourse about leadership and major national issues. Anti-corruption should have been Ramaphosa’s flagship campaign issue but there are concentrated efforts to discredit the clean-up of the state and undermine investigation into corruption. Journalists are branded enemies. There are hidden forces, including criminal syndicates, impacting on our politics. A surprise outcome in the elections is not far-fetched as we might think.

Cyril Ramaphosa is a willing but an inapt president. As PW Botha was unfit to be the king of the modern Zulus due to his White supremacist views, so Ramaphosa with his Black supremacist views is unfit to be president of modern South Africans. For the antagonists South Africa is caught in Ramaphosa dystopia.

4. Conclusions

The many perspectives of the antagonists on any change to Section 25 and their rejection of expropriation of land without market-related prices as described in articles 3 and 4 provide an overview of the political scenario of South Africa, especially for the period 1994 to 2019. The antagonists show how land expropriation is symptomatic of a gradual change in the ANC. It therefore forms, with the manifold other elements, a political unity, linking the land issue with the ANC’s political and economic management as it is primarily guided and steered by the aims of Black liberation and revolutionary politics. The antagonists see delinquent elements and role players that aim to make the political and socioeconomic system of South Africa dysfunctional.

When aiming to understand the aim and intentions of the ANC elite with their land expropriation without compensation, it is crucial to describe and to understand the post-1994 politics of South Africa. This approach was followed in putting forward the many perspectives of the antagonists. Some of their arguments are based on sound foundations while others are emotionally laden and lack depth. In the end, the antagonists want to make their case against land expropriation without compensation as strongly as possible in an effort to secure a win. From a critical vantage point it must be noted that in general the perspective of the antagonists is not representative of the total White or Afrikaner population, but mostly of the contingent of White farm- and land owners, White capitalist business groups with direct and indirect interests in agricultural economics, as well as self-appoints White “saviours and rescuers” that claim to fight unselfishly for the interests of the White farming community and for the Constitution and dispensation of 1994. The antagonists are a minority group, estimated to represent less than 10% of the White population which in reality is another minority group, more or less 8% of the total South African population. They do have immense financial influence and interest in the country’s present economics and politics and its private land ownership model. They feel threatened by and fearful of any socioeconomic and political change away from exclusive democratic-capitalism.

The antagonists know very well that they have reached a watershed in the South Africa political history. They have become easy prey for the radicals inside the ANC, not only for political disempowerment, but also to be robbed of all their assets. Louw gives guidance in this regard6:175-176:

However, as said, criminal proceedings are not enough for many of the apartheid victims. Many of these victims want financial compensation from those who were directly involved in criminal actions, while others wish for compensation from the Afrikaner community and business sector as a whole as they have benefitted from favoured business deals, the many other interests and the jobs etc. that apartheid offered them. Prominent are certain Afrikaner and nationalist Afrikaner business leaders and magnates who benefitted greatly from the apartheid system. They were favoured for business deals, contracts and other benefits. The current battle regarding Radical Economic Transformation (RET), seen by many Blacks as the second leg (economic revolution) in continuation of the first leg of the 1994 dispensation (political revolution), are excellent indicators of the Black call for “pay-back” of White capital obtained from apartheid-incongruities.

For the antagonists the ANC is a politically bankrupt and dangerous political organisation. To say now, as some ANC elites do, like Vusi Mavimbela128 [who worked previously as adviser to Thabo Mbeki, as director of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and as director-general in the first presidency of Jacob Zuma]128:10: “The ANC delivered liberation. What happened subsequently is not what we wanted to see happening”, is a self-acquittal that can only be accepted from a derailed politician who lost his/her memory of the delinquent liberation and revolutionary energy unique to the ANC.128 It was on this liberation ticket that the ANC came to power in 1994 and continuously committed corruption, theft and mismanagement. Mavimbela128 himself admits the negative turn of the ANC in the Zuma days128:10: “Corruption was institutionalized, state institutions were decimated and the ruling alliance brought to the brink”.

The antagonists’ objections against a change to Section 25 hold merit, making their case a strong and well-reasoned one. They believe that a total land grab is outside the reach of the ANC. The party lacks the judicial power, but their unpredictable governing since 1994 is a threat.18,72,129-137

For the antagonists, the period 1994 to 2019 under the ANC regime has been a dark period of criminality, state capture, confused violence, thuggery and race-baiting. It is reminiscent of Apartheid, and it has a momentum that will not slow as long as the ANC is in power.126,127,138-149

The antagonists have an unshakable belief that the general public and the parliament itself will reject any change to the Constitution or would not allow land grabbing from Whites. They also believe that the South African courts, including the Constitutional Court, will denounce any illegal and unconstitutional actions by the ANC that could lead a one-sided policy of land expropriation without full compensation. They base this on the recent failures of the ANC and their failure to do anything about the salvation of the poor. Both Julius Malema and Cyril Ramaphosa are political bluffs that will disappear from the country’s politics.138, 127,139-150

The antagonists agree fully with Bruce151 when he describes this coming cleansing of the ANC from the South African politics, obliterating any remaining fears of land grabbing. He wrote on 16 December 2018151:18:

But wait until Moyane gets arrested and tried, until Julius Malema, Floyd Shivambu and the ANC’s Danny Msiza and a host of others implicated in the looting of VBS Mutual Bank are arrested and tried. Wait until Ace Magashule, Supra Mahumapelo and perhaps even DD Mabuza and Malusi Gigaba and, yes, Bathabile [Dlamini], are arrested and tried for corruption. Wait until the Gupta brothers are extradited and tried. Wait until the whole slimy dough of corruption is unearthed and put on display before disappearing into jail cells around the country. Add Markus Jooste, Brian Molefe and Ben Ngubane to this list.

The antagonists see South Africa as just another failed “liberated” African country, experimenting time after time with failed “visions” and driven by failed leaders.150

Mthombothi150 describes the failed ANC leaders well and calls them to book for their political and criminal delinquency150:17:

Africa is let down by its [Black] politicians. They’ve been an obstacle to its people’s progress. Whichever way one looks, whichever problem one may think of, whichever boulder or ditch that’s ever been a bar to its advancement, the politicians have in the main been responsible for it. They are the authors of our misfortune.

While Mandela sought a better and humane way for Africa, Thabo Mbeki, his successor, in his desire to be the spokesman for the continent and its diaspora, decided not to rock the boat. He turned a blind eye to its misconduct. And he would brook no criticism of its wrongdoings. One, however, suspects that he knew better.

Jacob Zuma had no time to either think or defend anybody else. He descended into some of worst corrupt practices of his fellow African leaders. And he dragged the country [South Africa] from the young and promising democracy that it was to one of probably the most corrupt countries on Earth. Quite an Achievement.

But it should begin with us: we should be brutally frank and intolerant of the misdeeds of our leaders.

The antagonists take this failed leadership of the present-day ANC, as identified by Mthombothi150, back to the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and the White rulers categorising Blacks one-hundred and eighteen years ago as too incompetent and uncivilised to run the country South Africa. Prominent is the dooming testimonies of two well-known White politicians and leaders of that time who attended the Cape Convention in 1908 to design and to establish the Union Act.71 The historian MS Geen, in his book, The Making of the Union of South Africa. A brief history: 1487–1939, reflects71: 54,60:

1) General Christiaan de Wet of the Free State Colony71: 60:

Providence has drawn the line between Black and White and we must make that clear to the Natives and not instil into their minds false ideas of equality. To his mind, the greatest kindness and the greatest justice the Convention could do to the Blacks were to inform them that they are unequal to Whites.

2) Sir Frederick Moor of the Natal Colony71:54:

… White and Black races in South Africa could never be amalgamated. The history of the world proved that the Black man was incapable of civilization and the evidences were to be found throughout South Africa today. Almost every race in the world could point to its stages of civilization but what traces of Black civilization could South Africa produce though the Native people had been brought into contact with civilization for ages?…Sir Percy Fitz-Patrick has spoken of a test of civilization. What was a civilized man? Was it not a man who proved himself adaptable to a civilized community? The Native were incapable of civilization because they were incapable of sustained effort.

However inhumane these comments may seem within the modern context of human rights and political correctness, the events of the past year cause the antagonists to consider for a minute whether these persons were correct.71

The antagonists have two prominent questions at this stage:

  1. Can the ANC regime really erase the remnants of the Black-White struggle by taking revenge by means of land grabbing from Whites, in the process perpetrating the same crimes as their own oppressors?
  2. Can the ANC regime really better South Africa for all its people with land grabbing after they have mostly failed in every category of political, social and economic sphere from 1994 to 2018?

The pertinent question for an objective and seasoned judge will be if the arguments of the antagonists are well founded enough to be heard and to be considered. In considering this question, the counter arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the propagandists should first be considered.

The next two articles (5 and 6), titled: “The propagandists arguments, opinions and viewpoints on changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible: Parts 1 and 2”, examines the perspectives of the propagandists and their efforts to turn the public’s sympathy to win the case for the ANC regime to change Section 25(2)(b) to implement a policy of land grabbing without compensation.

5. References

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25. Munusamy R. No long-term game plan in SA’s handling of Israel’s attack on Gaza and contradicts our history of conflict mediation. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 May 20; p.18.
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30. Bruce P. Integrity and boldness must be Ramaphosa’s strategy. Sunday Times. (Opinion), 2018 Apr 29; p. 16.
31. We have waited long enough for Ramaphosa to axe Mahumapelo. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Apr. 29; p. 16.
32. Leon T. On expropriation, let’s not be glad to settle for half a loaf. Sunday Times. 2018 May 27; p. 18.
33. Malema J. Land restoration began five years ago with the birth of the EFF. Sunday Times. 2018 July 22; p. 3.
34. Fuzile B. Not yet the promised land for MK vets. Sunday Times (News). 2018 July 8: p. 6.
35. Collins F. ‘No vacant land in city is safe from occupation. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Apr. 1; p. 4.
36. Nombembe P. Cyril’s word seen as land grab go-ahead. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Apr. 1; p. 4.
37. Nair N. MK veterans arrested for South Coast house grab. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Apr. 1; p. 4.
38. Umraw A. True voice of the people on the land question is being drowned out by a politicachorus. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Aug. 12; p. 18.
39. Jansen J. ‘Besetting gebeur net te glad en gou’. Rapport (Nuus). 2018 Aug. 5; p. 4.
40. Umraw A. State identifies farms for expropriation test cases. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Aug. 5; p. 4.
41. Nair N. Take us or leave us – Cyril on land reform. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Sept. 9; p. 4.
42. Cele S, Rooi J. 139 plase op ANC-lys. Rapport (Nuus). 2018 Aug. 5; p. 2.
43. Hleko TM. Insecurity of tenure hinders farm productivity. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Aug. 26; p. 20.
44. Cele, and all the South Africans, must end this carte blanche for crime. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 May 20; p. 16.
45. Shocking revelations at Zondo inquiry must lead to prosecutions. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Aug. 26; p. 20.
46. Looting a disgrace in the nation or neighbourhood. Sunday Times Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Sept. 2; p. 24.
47. Child K, Masweneng K. ‘Risky-food’ hysteria fuels looting. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Sept. 2; p. 12.
48. Masweneng K. ‘Spoilt SA locals loot on any pretext’. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Sept. 2; p. 12.
49. Munusamy R. We are stuck with the same old problems because we are stuck with the same old leaders in the same old electoral system. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Sept. 30; p. 22.
50. Jonas M. The work of saving democracy requires us to focus on the people, not the political party. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Sept. 30; p. 22.
51. Mthomboth B. Mbeki’s intervention on land collides head-on with the direction of the new greed ANC. Sunday Times. 2018 Sept. 30; p. 21.
52. Tabane OJJ. Mbeki’s take on land is a necessary provocation. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Oct. 7; p. 6.
53. Leon T. A sober, if small, voice amid the trumpeting herd. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Sept. 30; p. 22.
54. Van der Walt S. ‘Gwede se perk is nie rasioneel’. Beeld. 2018 Aug. 16; p. 1.
55. Botha R. SA regering se gevry na China is ‘n verleentheid. Rapport (Sake). 2018 Sept. 23; p. 4.
56. Cyril’s stimulus can help our economy – and our sovereignty. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Sept. 23; p. 20.
57. Galetti D. Mahlobo’s nuclear deal or Ramaphosa’s Deal: Let the delegates decide. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2017 Dec. 10; p. 22.
58. Van Zyl O. Grondhervorming in SA móét geprivatiseer word. Rapport (Weekliks). 2017 Dec. 24; pp. 8-9.
59. Bruce P. EFF’s Dr Charming pulls a fast one on TV. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 May 20; p. 16.
60. Speckman A. Little consumer relief in GDP data. Sunday Times (Business). 2018 Sept. 2; p. 3.
61. Tomlinson South Africa. Unie van Suid-Afrika. Samevatting van die verslag van die Kommissie vir die Sosio-Ekonomiese Ontwikkeling van die Bantoegebiede binne die Unie van Suid-Afrika. Pretoria: Government Press; 1955.
62. Joffe H. Urgency needed in fixing problems that fed into recession. Sunday Times (Business). 2018 Sept. 9; p. 2.
63. Barron C. Tread carefully on new land reform. Sunday Times (Business) 2018 Aug. 26; p. 9.
64. Makgoba T. Community needs, not politicians, should lead the redistribution debate. Sunday Times. 2018 Sept. 23; p. 21.
65. Hafffajee F. Judging the ‘Cyril effect’ after 100 days. Sunday Times (Business). 2018 May 27; p. 8.
66. Haffajee F. Who owns the land? It’s not all black and white, audits reveal. Sunday Times (Business). 2018 Aug. 12; p. 6.
67. Pelser W. EFF-steun verdubbel. Rapport. 2018 Sept. 23; pp. 1-2.
68. Derby R. Instead of swelling social grants, why not a basic income for all? Sunday Times (Business). 2018 Sept. 2; p. 2.
69. Speckman A. Debtors’ free pass is hard for creditors to swallow. Sunday Times (Business). 2018 Sept. 2; p. 10.
70. Govender S. Paying in blood for a shack to call home. Sunday Times (Insight). 2018 June 3; p. 14. .
71. Geen MS. The Making of the Union of South Africa. A brief history: 1487-1939. New York: Longmans and Green; 1947.
72. Bruce P. With Zuma reduced, Ramaphosa needs to get cooking. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Apr.8, p. 18.
73. Ferguson N. The War of the World. London: Penguin; 2006.
74. Munusamy R. No further delay needed in bringing to book the state capture criminals who plundered with impunity. Sunday Times. 2018 May 27; p. 18.
75. Munusamy R. It’s a pity Ramaphosa’s “investment lions” can’t kill the destructive beast in his own party. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Apr. 22; p. 22.
76. Mthombothi B. Gupta heist was an inside job, but the insiders are about to get away with it. Sunday Times. 2018 May 20; p. 17.
77. Mthombothi B. Cyril needs a bit more swagger and a bit less schmoozing to put Julius in his place. Sunday Times. 2018 Apr. 22; p. 21.
78. Derby R. Black business bears brunt of the excesses of ruinous Zuma era. Sunday Times. 2018 Apr. 29; p. 2.
79. Eisenberg G. A shadow regime has hijacked control of SA’s borders. Sunday Times. 2018 May 20; p. 17.
80. Nyatsumba K. Patience is key as Ramaphosa plays by the rules before ousting the lazy and corrupt. Sunday Times. 2018 May 27; p. 18.
81. Shoba S. Alarm in ANC over possible 2019 disaster. Sunday Times. 2018 May 13; p 4.
82. Mthombothi B. Ramaphosa has sacked most of the lickspittles but Zuma himself will be harder to banish. Sunday Times 2018 Mar. 25; p. 21.
83. Ramaphosa C. Dit is wat Cyril gesê het. Beeld (Nuus). 2017 Dec. 22; p. 6.
84. ANC finally wakes up to the fact its grip on power is slipping. Sunday Times. (Opinion). 2018 May 13; p.16.
85. Mokone T, Makinana A & Deklerk A. Cyril takes over North West. Sunday Times (News). 2018 May 13; p. 2.
86. Ramaphosa C. ANC will serve the people. The Star (Inside). 2017 Dec. 22; p. 15.
87. Steenhuisen J. The ANC certainly has a case to answer on state capture. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Sept. 2; p. 24.
88. Maimane reasserting his leadership to steer his party on a new course. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 June 3; p. 16.
89. Mthombothi B. Jacob Zuma was no autocrat – the party went along with him on his looting spree. Sunday Times. 2018 Sept. 9; p. 21.
90. Bruce P. Careful moves as the endgame begins. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2017 Dec. 31; p. 12.
91. De Groot S. The politics of perspective and the power of dissent. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Apr. 15; p. 16.
92. Tshabalala M. Beware, the snake myth be dead but these who share its secrets can still bite. Sunday Times. 2018 Jan. 7; p. 13.
93. Haffajee F. Gordhan’s Gornado shakes up public enterprises. Sunday Times. 2018 May 27; p. 2.
94. How leaks foiled the king’s gambit. Sunday Times (News). 2017 Dec. 31; p. 4.
95. Deklerk A, Hunter Q. ANC moves to keep Supra in post. Sunday Time. (News). 2018 Apr. 15; p. 4.
96. De Lange R. Nog taks wink vir SA se rykstes. Rapport (Sake). 2018 Apr. 15; p. 1.
97. Henderson R, Anetos P. Moyane to answer for SARS decay. Sunday Times (Business). 2018 May 6; p. 1.
98. Hunter Q. Youth brass rap Maine for Gupta ‘confession’. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Apr. 15; p. 4.
99. Modak AR. ANC stuck in Zuma syndrome. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 May 13; p. 16.
100. Munusamy R. The Guptas may be heading for the dock, but there is other like them lying in wait. Sunday Times (Opinion).2018 Jan. 21; p.18.
101. Pauw J. Now is the time to clean the spy agency rot. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Apr. 22; p. 22.
102. Roodt D. Wat gedoen kan word aan ongelykheid in SA. Rapport. 2018 Apr. 29; p. 4.
103. Light is being shone in dark, festering places all over the country. Sunday Times. 2018 May 27; p. 16.
104. Chambers D, Jika T. SA set to put the moves on the Guptas. Sunday Times (News). 2017 Dec 31; p. 4.
105. Mthethwa B. State goes easy on Nklanda scapegoats. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Apr. 29; p. 2.
106. Buccus I. Only the Left can save us from crisis of EFF and Zuma populism. Sunday Times. 2018 Aug. 12; p. 17.
107. Speckman A. Business needs to wake up – and speak up. Sunday Times (Business) .2018 Aug. 12; p. 10.
108. Haffajee F. No more Mr Nice Guy, Cyril. Sunday Times (Business). 2018 July 15; p. 2.
109. Nyatsumba K. Ramaphosa reveals his thoughts in 1994. The Star (Inside). 2017 Dec. 22; p. 15.
110. Corrigan T. There’s madness in the land debate, but not in pointing out the risks. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Aug. 26; p. 22.
111. Mthombothi B. Ramaphosa may have won the leadership battle but he’s lost the ideological one. Sunday Times. 2018 Mar. 11; p. 21.
112. Mthombothi B. Plot thickens as Mantashe’s involvement presents Ramaphosa with a challenge. Sunday Times. 2018 Sept. 23; p. 21.
113. 113.Tabane OJJ. Mbeki’s take on land is a necessary provocation. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Oct. 7; p. 6.
114. Munusamy R. War drums in the political battlefields of Kwazulu-Natal will echo throughout the ANC and the country. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2017 Sept. 17; p. 22.
115. Matiwane Z. ANC’s predicament is to keep Zuma at arm’s length while embracing his supporters. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 July 29; p. 20.
116. Maughan K. Zuma hires top silks in spite of Cyril’s squeeze. Sunday Times (News). 2018 July 22; p. 4.
117. Mnguni L. ANC needs a political solution in KZN rather than a legal one. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2017 Sept. 17; p. 22.
118. Shoba S. Zuma’s hidden hand in ANC’s KwaZulu-Natal crisis. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2017 Sept. 17; p. 20.
119. Shoba S, Mthetwa B. Ramaphosa bends the knee to Zulu king on tense land issue. Sunday Times (News). 2018 July 2018; p. 4.
120. Cousins B. Your land rights may be trampled every day if you’re an ordinary black South African. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Mar. 11; p. 22.
121. Is Ramaphosa willing to sacrifice our rights to the Zulu king’s blackmail? Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 July 8; p. 22.
122. Munusamy R. Amid high theatre and spectacular blunders, it’s up to the Zondo inquiry to gauge the full extent of the rot. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Mar. 11; p. 22.
123. Hunter Q. Dodgy cash turns up heat on Cyril. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 18; pp. 1-2.
124. Kgosana C. ANC seeks China’s help to win votes. Sunday Times (News). 2018 July 29; p. 4.
125. Nyati M. Everything but vision from Cyril. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 11; p. 9.
126. Mthombothi B. When MPs treat parliament as a shebeen, Cyril must remind them where they are – and lead. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 11; p. 14.
127. Munusamy R. The misreading of Trump led to his reactionary regime…might the same happen in SA, where dark forces hover over politics? Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Nov. 11; p. 16.
128. Kgosana C. The struggle and all that jazz. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 11; p. 10.
129. Tabane OJJ. Calling the ANC’s dangerous bluff on land reform. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 June 3; p. 18.
130. Deep in unbanked country, a sophisticated heist relies on political cover. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Oct. 14; p. 20.
131. Munusamy R. Despite VBS scandal, Malema will continue to fill the leadership vacuum and concoct bogeymen. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Oct. 14; p. 22.
132. Munusamy R, Kgosana C. NO, NO NENE! Sunday Times. 2018 Oct. 7; pp. 1-2.
133. Stadler H, Malherbe P, Essop P, Selebano B. EFF rooi in die gesig. Beeld. 2018 Oct. 12; p. 1.
134. Leon T. TV expropriation debate enters realm of Neverland. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 July 29; p. 20.
135. Joshua 11:14, 11:16 and 11. 23; pp. 325-326. In: Life Application Bible. The living Bible. Illinois: Tyndale House Publishers; 1988.
136. Bruce P. A better way to reach for the promised land. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Mar. 4; p. 14.
137. Munusamy R. Cyril plays nice while Julius seizes moment to change game. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Mar. 4; p. 16.
138. Derby R. ‘Sober’ ANC must step up if Cyril is to salvage SA’s fortunes. Sunday Times (Business). 2018 Nov. 4; p. 2.
139. Don’t confuse violent thuggery and race-baiting with vibrant politics. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Nov. 11; p. 10.
140. Extreme measures for desperate times. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Nov. 11; p. 14.
141. Gordhan P. How to rescue a state that been pillaged by the corrupt and greedy. Sunday Times. 2018 Oct. 28; p. 5.
142. Hunter Q. ‘Not ill’ but Mabuza in Russia on sick leave. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 11; p. 1.
143. Kgosana C. Big firearms to protect VBS looting kingpins. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Nov. 4; p. 6.
144. Kgosana C. Minister purges ‘slush fund’ spies. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 11; pp. 1, 4.
145. Kgosana C, Hunter Q. VBS looting: ANC got R2m. Sunday Times. 2018 Oct. 28; pp. 1-2.
146. Matiwane Z. Zuma cronies lobby against KZN chair. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Nov. 4; p. 4.
147. Mokone T. Maimane to move on Andile deal. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 11; p. 4.
148. Munusamy R. Bank honcho gloated over Treasury visit. Sunday Times. 2018 Oct. 28; pp. 1-2.
149. Naidoo L. Time for bold leadership to rid SA of the scourge of corruption. Sunday Times. 2018 Nov. 4; p. 21.
150. Mthombothi B. Africa is being betrayed by its leaders – now it’s up to us to hold them to account. Sunday Times. 2018 June 3; p. 17.
151. Bruce P. Due process, grinding slowly, will be exceedingly fine. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Dec. 16; p. 18.


Not commissioned; Externally peer-reviewed.


The author declares that he has no competing interest.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa.


Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution (3)

Full title: The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible. Part 1: The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime (3)

Gabriel P Louw


Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PUCHE), DPhil (PUCHE), PhD (NWU)


Keywords: antagonists, opponents, compensation, contamination, crookery, custom, expropriation, land grabbing, land ownership, opposition, poverty, radicalism, redistribution, wealth.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 2: 1


1. Background

1.1 Introduction

The EFF can’t tell you with a straight face how exactly the expropriation of land without compensation would work. It is time someone pointed out to it that, with 8% of the vote, it will not be able to implement it without the ANC’s say-so.

Everyone is in such euphoria over the long overdue airing of the land question that we have suspended our reasoning about how disastrous this policy could be.

Let’s be frank: the ANC is stringing along the EFF and those who believe it on the land question, lulling them into thinking that it is on the same page. The ANC cannot afford to hand over the land question on a platter to the EFF as an election tool. It has to take some credit for an impending land revolution – except that such a revolution is not near!

The ANC is bluffing.1:18

February2 agrees that Julius Malema, as a master manipulator of the media, is, like all populists, well-schooled in offering very simple solutions for very complex challenges and problems, ultimately leaving a bomb that can explode at any moment. Add to this the senseless utterances of Malema’s sidekick Floyd Shivambu, and land ownership is turning into a time bomb.2-7

February2 describes Malema as a dangerous rabble-rouser with his radical opinions of land ownership and reform. His reference to Malema’s naïve remark on farming, finance, citizenship and land ownership reveals Malema’s political foolishness and short-sightedness. February says that Malema’s message to his followers is in essence2:16: “You are here in large numbers because you are jobless. But if you had land you would be at home tilling your land” [Own translation].

The EFF’s Gauteng chairwoman, Mandisa Mashego8, has shown where she learned her flawed understanding of the economics and politics applicable to land management and ownership when she said on the eNCA TV show Let’s Have it Out, that the EFF–style expropriation without compensation is equal to that of the so-called Singaporean model of expropriation without compensation (which is actually done only in terms of market prices).8 The English proverb: A little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing, seems quite applicable to many of the EFF leaders when it comes to serious politics.2-8

1.2 The land narrative in South Africa    

When Joshua conquered the entire Levant as Israeli territory, they “loot[ed] all the cattle, ravaging all the cities and killing all the inhabitants in the area”.9 A repeat in South Africa is unlikely, as indicated by the political journalist and commentator Onkgopotse Tabane1. He also does not see the “godly higher hand” and “a loud voice coming from heaven” that guided Moses and Joshua in their tremendous religiously, politically, economically, ethically and socially deviant land grabbing. Indeed, Tabane1 posits that the final outcome in South Africa after the 2019 election will be the opposite. Tabane1 believes that the whole Ramaphosa exercise of land expropriation will ultimately be toothless. He feels that the ANC elite is been playing a well-planned mind-game with the poor and landless Blacks. For Tabane1 the ANC regime is just continuing on the path of failing to empower the poor Black masses, as has been the case since 1994 with its ineffective implementation of Section 25 (2)(b) of the Constitution. The opinion is that the ANC party and its regime’s actions, like the testing of the public opinions with the submissions on the land issue, is only part of a manipulated and planned process of political window-dressing. It is seen as nothing else than a 2019 election trick to counter the EFF’s craziness and to optimize the DA’s passivity on the land issue, which the ANC themselves know they are also unable to solve, even if they remain in power for the next 24 years.1,9-11

In short: the argument of a strong faction of political analysts, which includes many prominent Black political thinkers, politicians, journalists and commentators, is that many of the smooth talkers in parliament will not make any change to Section 25(2)(b) or any other part of the Constitution. Tabane writes1:18: “The parliamentary process will not result in a constitutional change that will give the state any more power to expropriate land than was agreed to by Ramaphosa’s ANC at Codesa.” Section 25 as it stands at present is more than enough to bring effective land redistribution and, as said, the ANC’s process of land redistribution has failed to bring real change under its land reform minister Gugile Nkwinti over the last nine years.1,12

The simple questions in the minds of critics are therefore: What will more political and judicial power bring the ANC? Is it just more planned corruption and political delinquency, state capture and self-enrichment by the ANC elite? Is a masked corrupt Chinese deal with farmland in the making, like the doomed Zuma-Putin-Mahlobo nuclear deal that nearly wrecked South African security? Will South Africa become a subordinate Chinese province in extreme poverty with the Marxist suppression of the masses? What is really behind the ANC’s planned land expropriation without compensation?

The antagonists feel that South Africa has been knocking at the door of the Chinese state since 1994 under the corrupted ANC regime and its elite who is more than willing and ready to put its sovereignty on a silver platter for the taking. Land expropriation without compensation is only a small part of the ANC’s deception. Is this a far-fetched thought? No. Three Indians showed this with their crooked enslavement of some of the ANC elite.13-15 Mthombothi focuses partly on above questions when he says12:15:

The amendment wants to go further than current laws allow. If we are to right what President Cyril Ramaphosa calls an original sin, where do we start? Do we have full knowledge or understanding of the original lie of the land, as it were? And at the end of the process, will every black person be entitled to a piece of land or plot gratis? The Khoisan people will vehemently dispute the prevailing idea that Black people are the original owners of the land.

There are just too many imponderables.

Also, Archbishop Thabo Makgoba16 points out the bewilderment in the minds of many of the ANC elites on the land expropriation matter when he writes16:21: “I have not heard anyone spell out an overarching vision which takes all the complex practical and emotional factors into account. Nor have I heard a satisfactory answer to the fundamental question: expropriation to do what?”

Mthombothi is very specific when he writes about Ramaphosa17:19:

President Cyril Ramaphosa, having been blindsided by the ANC, have thought he could muddle through it. He’s now a convert who thinks he, like a magician, can grab private property without compensation and grow the economy at the same time.

He’ll squeeze water from a stone. It also remains to be seen how a scheme that targets taking land from one race group while leaving others untouched can pass constitutional muster.

Thabo Mbeki is also clear on this anomaly in the current ANC’s politics on land ownership with their prominent targeting of Whites and its immense long-term impact on the race relations of the country. Tabane writes18:6:

Amid the insults now emanating from the ANC [because Mbeki has blown the lid of the disorganized and unprincipled approach of the ANC on the land question], Mbeki underlines that it is sad that in the name of populism the ANC is willing to depart from its century-long commitment to non-racialism.

Makgoba16 elaborates further, putting into perspective another side of the lack of insight chief leaders of political parties, like Ramaphosa and Malema, have on the complexity of land expropriation16:21:

I do not think land reform will work if it is driven only from Tshwane or Cape Town, or only by business. We should decentralise the process by allowing people to work out local solutions backed by laws and policy provided by the government.

A fully developed policy of redistribution needs both to take into account that there is more demand for urban land than for rural land, including clear proposals for education and practical help for those who want to work the land. It should not be a political tool but a tool for real transformation, to address inequality of opportunity and unemployment.

1.3 Research intentions

The research aim of this article is to evaluate and describe how the antagonists see the dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of ANC regime that supports and promotes land grabbing. Opposing this dysfunctional system is central to the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the amendment of Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution make land redistribution without compensation legal.

This article forms the first part of an article in two parts titled: The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible: Part One. The next article, titled: The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible: Part Two, reflects further on how the antagonists see the dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime that supports and promotes land grabbing.

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern political-historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research on the topic, in this case ownership of South African land for the period 1652 to 2018 in South Africa. The sources include articles from 2017 to 2018, books for the period 2000 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2018. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the current arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists in favour of keeping Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution as is and therefore the continuation of the present land redistribution policy with compensation in place since 1994.

The research findings are presented in narrative form.

3. Discussion

A study of the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints reveals a broad range of elements and role players that affect the political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime. All these elements and role players either support and promote the intended land grabbing of White land by the ANC regime for transfer to poor and landless Blacks, or see land grabbing as an important part of a greater international political and socioeconomic process of the ANC regime as it benefits the party’s revolutionary and Marxist-socialist policy. Literature on the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints on land expropriation reflect a variety of determinants that they believe directly and indirectly promote and steer the matter. They point out actions, politics and mindsets that they feel characterize the ANC regime and its elite. Examples include their so-called support for the corrupt business and political ideologies of BRICS and the Russian and Chinese Marxist imperialism; their tendency to be anti-West; anti-capitalist and anti-White; the presence of psychopathological politics; the tendency towards anarchy in their political practices; and revenge for Apartheid. These determinants and many others form part of the antagonists’ objections to the amendment of Section 25 and the land expropriation without compensation that accompanies it. Only a comprehensive study of the primary and secondary determinants can present the case of the antagonists so that it can be evaluated justly.

The primary aim of this article (Part One) and the next one (Part Two) is therefore to reflect in detail on the various elements and role players the antagonists perceive. It is only with such a comprehensive presentation that we can conjure a picture of the antagonists’ civil right to uphold the Constitution in its present form and of their legitimate efforts to oppose land grabbing.

The various elements and role players that enter the argument of the antagonists are presented below in six subdivisions. In the next article (Part Two) this presentation of the various elements and role players continue with another six subdivisions.

3.1. The Malema-Ramaphosa element

This section reflects on the role of the empowerment of the radicals in the ANC and the EFF with land grabbing as a central matter. The section divides into the following subsections: 1) The danger of Malemania and Ramamania, 2) The foolishness and similarity of Malemania and Ramamania and 3) The rise of a new ANC.

3.1.1. The danger of Malemania and Ramamania

It is a mistake to argue that the views of Malema and Ramaphosa (described in the media as Malemania and Ramamania) on land expropriation without compensation is mere propaganda. Notwithstanding the sound arguments of various seasoned political analysists1,10,12,17 that the present talk of land grabbing will ultimately be toothless, there is evidence to the contrary that the demands from Blacks for more legal ownership of South African land will increase after 2019. It won’t matter if Malema or Ramaphosa are still active in politics. The demand for land can become a driverless vehicle, speeding uncontrolled on a busy highway, taking out other cars and many lives, creating massive damage. Prominent in this whole argument is firstly a mass of poor and landless Blacks, hanging on to any kind of promise or solution for their poverty. These are often people who lack a basic understanding of politics, economics and risk-taking.12,17,19-29

The EFF’s ideology (now seemingly also part of the post-2019 ANC’s political ideology) includes a push for classical Marxist land ownership for South Africa, with the state as the sole owner of land, property and financial institutes. This radical inclination stands in total opposition to the intentions of some of the antagonists and propagandists who support a just land redistribution outcome, leaving all the players (Whites and Black) with sufficient land and an economy still reasonably stable.12,17,19-29

The EFF has a very small number of parliamentary seats, but they are exceptionally vocal. The reality is that Malema’s message of land grabbing is influencing the minds of many of the landless and poor Blacks. Malema’s openly hostile rhetoric on Whites as “illegal” citizen of South Africa and his support for radical land grabbing are red lights. The impact of the radicals, who are sometimes criminals or rogues in the EFF, ANC and PAC, must be seen as dangerous political markers with the potential to radically change the South African political, economic, social and judicial models. The political system seems to be restructuring very fast. The Whites, be they land owners or not, seem to be the target as “culprits”.12,17,19-29

Regarding the growing radicalism on land expropriation without compensation and the political delinquency reflected by some of its prominent role players, Bruce10 reflects as follows10: 14: “Over at the EFF, its leader, Julius Malema, insists that not only will White people lose their land, but all Black people too. He wants to nationalize all the land…”

3.1.2. The foolishness and similarity of Malemania and Ramamania

The former leader of the DA, Tony Leon8, writes that the EFF’s Mandisa Mashego equates the EFF’s land expropriation with the well-established Singaporean expropriation of land. However, Mashego deliberately refuses to acknowledge that the Singapore Academy of Law Journal already stated clearly in 2010 (eight years before the Ramaphosa-land grabbing initiative) that in the event of a forced Singapore expropriation, there would be compensation and that the compensation for land will be based on open market value. In practice, the Singaporean regulations are far clearer and it has more specific safeguards for land ownership than the current system in South Africa, even with the unchanged Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. The lack of insight on the side of the EFF, ANC and PAC quickly emerges when they start arguing with seasoned opponents. Leon8 describes this kind of primitive reasoning of those in favour of radical land reform excellently8: 20: “If you ask what is 2+2 and your opponent says 5, you can still have a discussion: but if he answers 87 [the alleged percentage of White land ownership], you are on different planets. So this proved in our debate about land in South Africa. We were Venus and Mars”.

The EFF and the ANC’s increasingly racist rhetoric on the land matter is a serious point of concern.17 Mthombothi emphasizes17: 19: “It’s the sort of bigotry that comes straight out of Hendrik Verwoerd’s playbook, and to which, we had hoped, the new dispensation had dealt a fatal blow”. It seems as if the opposite happened with the EFF, and it is now also prominent in the ANC’s political psyche: the ANC is just preaching racism.

Bruce30 tries to give us some positive reassurance of the average individual and political goodwill of South Africans outside the extreme racial context of the ANC and the EFF.30 He writes30: 2: “I suspect very few people know how much trouble [financially and debt-ridden] South Africa is in. It’s not that we’re approaching a racial civil war. I think South Africans are far too sensible for that. They don’t want their country destroyed. They want a [justified, not stolen] stake in something with a future.”

But, objectively seen, Bruce’s guideline, although undoubtedly coming from a very wise man, is truly at this stage that of a very “lone voice in our political desert and wilderness”.30

The most important question still remains for the antagonists: who will curb the ongoing irresponsible war-mongering and the destructive and dangerous incitement of politicians like Julius Malema and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (and now also Cyril Ramaphosa) after the 2019 election, even if land grabbing from Whites is successfully implemented? It is common cause that the EFF thugs (and ANC radicals) are seeking new targets for their ongoing aggression against Whites. The only positive assurance in the face of “anti-Whites” like Malema and Dlamini-Zuma, is that the EFF seems unlikely to obtain more than 6% of the votes, leaving them politically castrated. It also seems as if Dlamini-Zuma is falling into disrepute among the broader base of ANC voters. They make false claims about the extent of their support.17,28,31

3.1.3. The rise of a new ANC

One of the most prominent current dangers for the antagonists is that the ANC has failed to discipline its radicals. The ANC itself remains a dangerous component in politics: the fact that predictions indicate that the ANC can obtain 60% or more of the votes in the 2019 election, which would give them a free hand, could make the practice of law and order more and more difficult. Thabo Mbeki18 recently voiced public concern on the bad racial intentions of the ANC in 2018, even suggesting that the current ANC has become a failed political entity.18

Mthombothi31 emphasizes that the ANC has become drunk from the “alcohol of corruption”. Indeed, corruption is the ANC’s lifeline and further power for them after the 2019 election spells doom for the country in the same way as the EFF’s intentions on land and citizens’ rights, argue also the antagonists. Mothombothi writes31: 3:

Having jettisoned non-racialism and with the paucity of its performance in power, what exactly does the ANC stand for now? What is its culture? By culture I mean its guiding principles, customs and social behaviours. Corruption seems to tower above all else. I’d therefore argue that corruption has become its abiding culture. It’s endemic, it’s systemic, it’s ingrained. In fact, corruption is the glue that holds the ANC together. To the ANC, corruption is like a drink to a drunkard who’s at an advanced stage of alcoholism. He has to keep drinking, or he dies.

Mthombothi12 shows how the current ideas on land redistribution has resulted in resistance from White land owners (as individuals and as farmers’ associations) to the contravention of their land rights.12

Current media debates reveal that there is a possibility that dramatic outcomes, different from those postulated by Tabane1, February2, Mthombothi17 and Bruce10, can follow with the ANC’s revisiting of Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. It is argued that if these radical factions win, the outcome can and will change the South African political, racial and socioeconomic scene adversely forever.4,10,12.19-24,26,28-35

3.2. Political scenarios after 2019

Two clearly opposing possible outcomes await us after the 2019 election. Number one: A possibly moderate profile varying from a social-capitalist, but democratic state in which everyone will benefit financially, with an inflow of foreign capital and an improved governing style, leading to development and improvement of the country’s infrastructure, curbing of joblessness and poverty. This setup will to a great extent be an undisturbed continuation of the present status of a free market of land ownership as vested in hands of Whites or other persons (Blacks/Whites) who want to and/or have agreed to buy land at market-related prices. Number two: it reflects a hard-core communist state under autocratic/fascist rule, saturated with corruption, theft and political murders; a country ravaged by total poverty and lawlessness, leaving not only the present White land owners and White rich landless and penniless, but also the masses of other South Africans in the same devastating boat of poverty and distress. 4,10,12.19-24,26,28-35

When considering this, it is important to take into account the present pressure for a better land ownership model, which includes creating a comprehensive Black land ownership and a farming community. One should consider the legal claims by the majority of Blacks on land and the injustice locked into the South African political-historical setup, mostly responsible for the Blacks’ dire personal and group circumstances. But, most of all: it must be addressed in an orderly, accepted and representative way, outside our overwhelming contaminated politics. At the moment the arguments from the different sides are so emotional that it makes a reasonable and rational solution impossible.4,10,12.19-24,26,28-35

3.3. White initiatives to uplift the poor and landless Blacks

The various White initiatives to uplift poor Blacks are described in the following two sub-divisions, namely 1) the White farming sector’s initiatives and 2) White financial and business sector’s initiatives.

3.3.1. The White farming sector’s initiatives

The negative picture painted of the White farming sector as land-grabbing and racist colonists is not entirely accurate.36-38 Many individual farmers and farmers’ organizations have been involved in uplifting farm workers and rural communities since 1994. A good example (although extraordinary) is that of farmers David and Elaine Potter of the Nieuwe Sion Farm between Paarl and Franschoek, who built a R30 million village of 4ha named Lumière, consisting of 22 houses and a crèche, aftercare and entertainment centre for their staff. The cottages and the village became the property of the workers with the title deeds of the 22 cottages being transferred to them.36

There are various other good examples of upliftment by individual farmers and the organized White farming sector to establish commercial Black famers and to help poor Black farmers. One White farmers’ entity, the SA Varkvleis Produsent–organisasie (Savpo) had much success with training support and a financial development contribution of R5.8 million to incoming Black producing farmers in 2016 and 2017 in the North West province, KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Western and Eastern Cape provinces.37,38

Katoen SA supplied financial and other support in the period 2016 to 2017, including training through mentorship to 700 cotton farmers in Nkomazi, Mpumalanga, while they also organized financial support for 718 Black farmers to the value of R19.7 million by means of 18 cooperation projects.37

The SA Suikervereniging has helped 6 523 Black farmers in 2016 to 2017 with R124.8 million.37

From the wine industry’s side, Vinpro made a contribution of R2 million to 232 projects by 2017, including 9 588 Black farmers.37

Grain SA, the country’s biggest organization for grain producers, contributed R19.7 million to 718 Black farmers for 2016–2017. It is further involved with 3 800 small grain farmers countrywide in an assistance programme with the government.36, 37

Other White farming entities involved in training and giving financial support to Black farmers is the Wolkwekersvereniging with a contribution of R19.6 million to 330 Black communities and more than 10 000 Black farmers for the period 2016–2017. There was also a support programme for another 108 307 Black beneficiaries in 2016–2017, which includes 55 000 new Black farmers. 36, 37

Agri SA, for instance, is already engaged in upliftment projects with various Black farmers. In 2017 the body paid the guardianship of 22 Black farmers and the veterinary costs of these farmers. The body is also directly responsible for financing the four development farms for Blacks.36,37 Agri SA’s initiative

Agri SA under its president, Dan Kriek, has shown a willingness to work with the government to develop a collaborative approach to land restitution and reform right from the start. Agri SA and its affiliates are already very active with constructive contact with the ANC, for instance with their acceptance of the Expropriation Bill (which was unsuccessful before parliament in 2016) and a comprehensive plan that focused on agriculture, land reform and the rural development for Black farmers.39,40

Agri SA feels that the populist and emotional concepts tied to land ownership by the ANC will only endanger the country’s food security. They make it clear that the present demand for more land ownership by “African Blacks” and the annexation of the farming sector by the Ramaphosa regime is a direct result of how the ANC bungled the approved land reform scheme since 1994. Agri SA feels that the intended land grabbing will not solve the matter of enlarging the contingent of commercial Black farmers without a proper development plan: one with a focus on financing and training. The government’s present hostile and aggressive approach will only create more problems around land ownership and endanger the immediate food security of South Africa.39,40 Omri van Zyl, the CEO of Agri SA, puts it as follows39: 9:

The government can expropriate land without paying for it, but what then?

There’s no follow-on financial solution, or sustainable agric financing for the farmers they put on this land, as we have seen with the land reform projects which have failed.

A recent Agri SA land audit shows much of South Africa high-potential land is in government hands.

Government is sitting on multiple millions of hectares of agricultural land which has not been collateralized and is not productive.

If the aim is to chase after the goals of the National Development Plan and Operation Phakisa, then the lowest hanging fruit is obviously to look at government land and give title to farmers on that land.

The moment you do that, those farmers can go to the bank and collateralize it so they can borrow money to develop their farms.

There’s a massive amount of capital that can flow into that land.

On their part Agri SA believes that some kind of agricultural development agency based on a public-private partnership to provide capital for developing farmers must first be established. Their aim is to create a vehicle that offers a form of subsidized capital to circumvent the security of tenure issue. In light of the ANC’s constant failure to implement proper land reform since 1994, Agri SA is of the opinion that properly incentivized private sector involvement will speed up transformation very quickly and with great success without endangering the country’s food security.39

Van Zyl41 believes that there is very little difference between the government’s empowerment plan for Black farmers and that of Agri SA. He writes41: 4-5:

The White farmer community agrees that South Africa must have a much greater contingent of Black commercial farmers and not subsistence farming which is sentimental only and laden with aggressive and hostile politics. At the end these peasants will have to be feed from the country’s national account which is in reality tax-payers’ money. They feel their advice, inputs and various other contributions were so far totally ignored by the government on the creating of a community of Black commercial farmers. Much more they cannot do. Not even the fact that Pieter Mulder served as an adjunct-minister of agriculture under Zuma brings any bettering.

The efforts of White farmers are sincere and comprehensive. The government’s efforts to side-line them seem to be based on pure racism and Marxism.41,42

3.3.2. The initiatives of the White financial and business sectors

As with the White farming community, the ANC often also criticizes the South African financial and business sector for apathy towards the problems of the poor and landless Blacks. Prominent is the ANC’s criticism on the financial and business sector’s public stance on its intended land reform policy. These negativities of the ANC are contradicted by the evidence offered by their opponents. The willingness of the business and financial sectors

The public declaration of the South African Top 100 Companies on 8 April 2018 shows the business sector’s willingness to get involved in a constructive way in erasing Black poverty, unemployment and inequality, as well as to initiate and finance various kinds of training and job appointments to get Blacks active in the labour market. What these companies clearly oppose is any government policy and initiative of land grabbing where the market-related compensation for land is absent. They are not in any way against the justified transference of land to the poor and landless Blacks and the promotion of commercial or small-scale Black farmers. Indeed, as in all well-planned and functioning business communities, they welcome a strong component of commercial Black farmers, especially in light of the decrease in the numbers of the Afrikaner and White populations, which could affect the country’s food security. They also underwrite sound and healthy business principles, which indicates that dramatic land reform means the impoverishment of the existing land owners, the damaging of the food chain and affordable food delivery to the masses, of which most are poor, as well as the creation of political, social and economic disorder, which would not only flatten the whole governmental setup of the country, but also the government’s international standing and trustworthiness. The business sector does not view land reform as money well spent.37, 39-42

The opponents of the ANC emphasize that the business sector seems to doubt if the ANC elite and its current leadership have a basic understanding to run a country by creating well-planned new enterprises, jobs, income and taxes by means of the constructive support of the private sector instead of the liberation thinking of taking from the rich to keep the poor alive. The calls of radicals in the ANC and EFF to nationalize the banking and other financial and business institutions, the mining industry, even the houses and assets of individual citizens and the assets of foreigners in South Africa, is a dangerous political inclination that will cause anarchy.37,39-42

The South African business sector has always been willing and able to bring financial improvement to the poor and landless Blacks without the ANC’s misplaced policy of land redistribution without compensation. The first constructive effort needed before the ANC can hope to better their business and financial record, is that they fix their relationship with the business sector and assure the business sector of their sincerity as a partner of integrity.39, 43-45

Barron39 quotes Soko in this regard39:9: “There need to be ‘honest, courageous, uncomfortable conversations’ between the government and business about what is causing the trust deficit and how it should be addressed”.

The constant failure of the ANC regime to deliver on promises and contracts after honest, courageous, uncomfortable conversationswith the business sector is evident from for instance the ANC’s New Growth Path, which articulates the Green Economy Accord that was signed by the government with great fanfare in 2011 with the organized labour and business sectors. The government has failed to make an inch of progress to advance a green economy.39,43-45

South Africa’s so-called 14-Point Plan and List of Structural Reforms, which Ramaphosa promised will increase the economic growth rate and bring more jobs, failed from day one in terms of the principles formulated by the business sector because these plans and lists lack action plans that detail targets or timeliness. Even the Treasury’s list of five reforms, estimated to raise the country’s potential growth rate from 1.5% to 4%, provides, as the 14-point list, little detail on what exactly these measures entail or when they will be implemented, making it a risky undertaking for the private sector to put private money into the endeavour. Moreover, for the opponents all these governmental “wonderful” lists and their promises still failed to stop South Africa from falling down the cliff into recession in September 2018.46

For the business and financial sector, political and business integrity must be a central principle in the ANC’s intended theoretical frameworks for land redistribution or poverty alleviation. The business sector finds Ramaphosa’s recent bragging that “if a referendum was held in 1994 on land redistribution the outcome would be a massive vote collection for land grabbing”, to be lacking evidence. The political views on capital ownership lack the business and political sense associated with democracy and capitalism. It spells doom for the private sector’s assets in which private citizens’ money is prominent.42,45

Soko’s39 view is that it is39:9: “…time for the South African business sector to open its wallet to support the ANC regime if last mentioned mends its delinquent ways”. Private initiatives have far more success and profitable outcomes than the intended job creation through land reform of the ANC can ever bring. In March 2018, Ramaphosa gained the support of the business section by launching the Youth Employment Service (YES). YES intends to link Black empowerment points to corporations that take young interns into one-year work opportunities with a salary. This has already brought into placement 40 000 interns (the intention is a placement of one million). The intent is to later expand the goodwill of the business sector to higher education entities.47,48

The formal business sector, as a primary generator of capital, economy and jobs, stands central: it is indeed the only sector that can steer the South African economy to functionality again.49,50 The increase in distrust

As with most antagonists (opponents) of drastic land expropriation, the South African private domestic business community’s distrust is caused by the ANC regime’s doubtful intentions and actions and the ANC’s intention to start RET (Radical Economic Transformation) and RST (Radical Social Transformation). This justified distrust is the primary reason why the formal business side does not promote domestic investments. This is clearly not an anti-ANC lobby per se, but plain a safeguard against losses of public moneys through the ANC’s irresponsible political, social and economic adventures.47, 48

The business sector’s level of distrust is quite clear from the R71 billion that is being invested elsewhere, such as in Ghana. This kind of money that is flowing around in the private sector is why Malema so badly wants to nationalize private banks and the other financial institutions. The recent massive looting of the VBS Mutual Bank and the earlier capturing at Transnet under its former CEO Siyabonga Gama are excellent examples of the many losses citizens have suffered to ANC “infrastructure development” and “upliftment”.46-48, 51-53

The business sector is concerned about the lack of understanding and insight in the ANC after 24 years of rule. They have done little that has been constructive and they still adhere to the belief that taking White capital will free the country from poverty. They have not helped Black citizens like the Afrikaners helped themselves on their own in the 1930s. The little penetration of Black business people into mining, for instance, occurred with the help of White-led companies and the BBBEE model. There are Black mines and other enterprises that have been and are successful, among others those of Cyril Ramaphosa and Tokyo Sexwale. There have also been Black enterprises that have failed, and in those cases it had nothing to do with a lack of support from the White business sector.54-57 Opponents of the ANC rightfully point out that the ANC has had enough power in the last 24 years to change the situation. Corruption is killing the positivity the business sector had about South Africa’s future. The antagonists eagerly want to support a future South African regime free from political evils and they want to lift the country’s economy out of the international rating agencies’ red listings.58

The former AngloGold CEO, Srinivasan Venkatakrishnan58, a prominent business leader who was involved in the Minerals Council SA and who was also a director of Business Leadership SA (BLSA)—a person well-known for his hard work behind the scenes to raise business voices against corruption in the post-1994 government—assures South Africa of a certain future if business speaks up when he says58: 2:

Corruption is like cancer. If you don’t catch it early on it spreads very, very quickly. You need to nip it in the bud. That corruption was happening here and was endemic across certain parts [is true].

Business is an important voice and it was lost in the wilderness before, and historically it sat on the side-lines, worrying about how speaking up would impact its business. We had to do introspection and see where we were at fault, make corrections and then move forward. This was all important for us. It was an absolutely critical moment where potentially SA was about to jump over a cliff and it had to be pulled back.58

On the question of whether Zuma’s corruption had been caught early enough and if the country’s economy and integrity can be mended, Venkatakrishnan says58:2: “Honestly, no, but better late than never. It should never happen in the first place. Here, it was probably caught a bit later but before it was too late. It can be reversed. It won’t be a walk in the park, but if there’s a will and co-operation of people saying, ‘not another time. We’ve nearly lost the country once and we won’t make that mistake again.” The prominence of the banking sector

The banking sector seems to be regarded as an easy cow to milk by the likes of Black First Land First, SACP, Cosatu, EFF and the ANCYL. Jacob Zuma accused the banking sector in public of “thwarting the growth of Black business and as contributors to inequality.” The ANC regime’s radical liberation politics and ideology of taking from the one to give to others without generating anything constructive for the state’s coffer led to early resistance and counter-actions from the private financial and business sector. The sector put limitations on possible abuses of banks and other financial institutes, which created fertile grounds for ANC radicals to attack them.59

The CEO of First Rand Group, Johan Burger59, tried hard to teach ANC radicals about the realities of economics and finance and the basic principles of responsible financial management of other people’s assets.59,60 Burger posits59:10:

To the extent that the economy grows, to the extent that there’s capacity for people to take on debt, we will extend credit. It’s our business to extend credit.

To the extent that the economy struggles we will find it difficult to extend credit.

It’s not about whom we extend credit to. If there is no demand and no affordability, we cannot extend credit. This is not about small business or large business or about black entrepreneurs or white entrepreneurs. It’s just a fact of economic life.

At the end of the day, it’s about affordability. If the affordability is not there you can’t expect us to extend credit into that environment.

It needs to be understood that we’re dealing with other people’s money. We’re dealing with savers’ money. We have an enormous fiduciary duty to make sure that we extend credit in a responsible manner.

Banks rightfully oppose land grabbing in any form because they deal with other people’s money, as the CEO of First Rand Group61 clearly states. Expropriation without compensation can bring not only bankruptcy to banks, but also to their investing individuals. The direct impact of the intended land grabbing by the Ramaphosa regime is already affecting the banking system. Professor André Louw61, an agricultural economist of the University of Pretoria, reports that farmers are already experiencing the sudden cancellation of purchase contracts because of the intensifying uncertainty around land ownership. According to the statistics of the Bank Association of South Africa (BASA), banks’ exposure to bonds amount to more than R1 600 billion: Of this amount more or less R133 billion is for agricultural land and R1 068 billion for residential property only. [Their exposure to agricultural debts is around R80 billion, the cooperative banks carrying R9.3 billion and the Agricultural Bank R38 billion (of which 90% is to White farmers whose land is now under possible ANC and state capture)]. Land expropriation without compensation or semi-compensation will endanger the whole South African banking system.60,61

Pierre Venter,61 the manager for human settlements at BASA, gives us insight into the chaos that land grabbing has meant for bank systems when he writes61: 1: “Many banking crises worldwide started when property prices dropped and this negatively impacted on the trust of markets” [Own translation]. In South Africa this devastating phenomenon is beginning to manifest as markets are exasperated by for example the rhetoric of Olly Mlamleli, the ANC mayor of Mangaung, when he said that60: 4: “…the ANC is looking forward to redistribute grabbed farms and plots around Bloemfontein”. ANC’s democratic and capitalist economics

It is an open question for the antagonists whether the ANC really understands the model of democratic and capitalist economics as compared to so-called “liberation” economics. In the view of the ANC’s opponents this “grabbing instinct” is the main reason why the ANC has failed as a responsible and creative regime since 1994 and why the formal business sector is shying away from them. It is far less risky to invest in Kenya, Nigeria and other African countries. The South African scene is dominated by a racial rhetoric that seeks retribution for past injustices.59,62,63

Bruce64 confirms64: 16:

The lesson in all of this for President Cyril Ramaphosa to learn and hold on to – is that the private sector can help (indeed it wants, still, to help) but the state has to be cautious with its money. Assuming Ramaphosa makes no (more) unnecessary gaffes on land expropriation without compensation, ensures that land invasions are resisted and begins to spell out and sell his vision of how an orderly process of expropriation might trigger an economic recovery, the private sector will probably stick to him.

However, if the Wall Street Journal publishes an editorial comparing Ramaphosa to Robert Mugabe and South Africa to Venezuela, Ramaphosa and the ANC must be in trouble. Impressions are sticky and hard to shift once they take hold, writes Bruce64: 16: “If Ramaphosa and the ANC could negotiate the death of Apartheid, why are they so foolishly besotted with poor economic thinking and doing like extreme land-reform, asks the business-sector.”

The question is whether the private business sector would still want to help Ramaphosa and his government in the future.

3.4. Basic questions of immediate interest around land ownership

When reading and listening to the rhetoric on land expropriation, certain questions arise. In some ways these questions have become forces that have to be addressed.4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65,66

In short these questions on rightful land ownerships in South Africa and the legal integrity of land grabbing are the following:

  1.     Which of the many arguments, opinions and viewpoints are truly grounded in reality and facts? Which are emotional, naïve and even bizarre or outright political falsities and myths?
  2.     Who are the people with all these many contrary views, opinions and arguments and what are their agendas?
  3.     What are the direct and indirect interests of the many parties to land reform?
  4.     What does lawful land ownership really when referring to the claim of the individual     citizen?
  5.     Why this serious infighting between South Africans about a changed Constitution based on a single Section?
  6.     What is really meant with the concept “land hunger by the masse” and “poor and land     landless Blacks”:
    1. Is it rural land for farming that Tabane and others are referring to, or is it urban land for housing settlements, situated near industrial and business hubs?
    2. Is the issue of urban land for housing not really the main issue?
  7. In general, are persons like Tabane, Mothombothi and Bruce false prophets with their     promises of a prosperous and basically unchanged South Africa in the waiting?:
    1. Are these political writers and commentators visionaries who can really and truly read the South African future?
    2. Are they correct to think that the Ramaphosa regime will be successful in steering the landless and poor Blacks and the many extreme political militant propagandists in their demands for land in a constructive, non-violent direction?

The evidence for both sides in answer to the above questions is overwheliming.4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65,66

3.5. The harsh reality of land reform in 2019

The current push in parliament to change the South African Constitution’s property clause [Section 25(2)(b)] to give the state the right to expropriate land without compensation is eliciting strong opposing arguments. Some of the crucial questions include:

  •     Is the view that Ramaphosa’s focus on land expropriation is purely political     accurate?
  •     Is it true that the desire for land is purely based on retribution and hate for Whites?
  •     Is it true that the ANC wants White land because those farms are successful?
  •     Is land expropriation up front because the ANC is still at heart a terrorist organization?
  •     Are the calls for land expropriation all unfounded?

The following sub-division presents the arguments of those who oppose land expropriation.

3.6. The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime

For the antagonists opposing land expropriation without compensation, the current debate is intertwined with the dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of South Africa in which the ANC stands central. It is crucial to take a look at the causes of the current state of affairs and the aims of the ANC if one wants to consider what went wrong since 1994 in the South African political setup.

The sections below provide a comprehensive overview of the direct and indirect elements, determinants and role players that brought us here, including political histories, economics, politics, the judiciary, etc.

3.6.1. The ANC’s drowning of the 1994 democracy

According to those who oppose land reform, the undermining of the South African democracy started in 1994 with the ANC taking power. Fascist thinking quickly formed a foundation for ANC action. It is illustrated by their present direct attack on the Constitution and their intended land expropriation without compensation. This makes the ANC a troubled regime and a direct danger to the civil and democratic rights of South Africans in the eyes of the antagonists. Their disregard for White rights to land ownership and their plans to specifically harm Whites financially, show how they are drowning democracy. The antagonists refer to five clear political outcomes when they make this argument: 1) the decline of the democracy, 2) the use of populism, 3) the still fragile South African democracy, 4) the uncertain economy in a fragile democracy, and 5) land grabbing as a fascist act.4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65,66 The ongoing decline of the democracy

The antagonists see the land grabbing from Whites by the ANC regime as part of a dangerous democratic decline in South Africa. In the book State Capture in Africa by Melanie Meirotti and Grant Masterson, published by the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa is identified with various other African countries to be under attack for state capture in various forms by private groups and individuals (as happened with the “Zupta” state capture). In this context the agendas and strategies of the political leaders are often masked and their personal needs are sold as that of the population (land expropriation without compensation is also being sold as something on behalf of the population who wants it urgently).4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65-67

John L Stremlau67, a visiting professor of international relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, describes the modus operandi of state capture when he writes67:11: “Dictators can do this at will. Those who are elected democratically face obstacles. They must subvert democratic norms and hollow out state institutions, all the while obscuring their real purposes, often exploiting populist fears and resentments.”

For the antagonists, land grabbing is one of the outcomes of how South African state institutions have been hollowed out from 1994, implying the subversion of democracy. Evidence is plentiful that many remnants of this delinquent model are still functioning inside the Ramaphosa regime. The Zuma-orientated ANC NEC still strongly reflects in the ANC government of 2019. 4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65-67

To stay in power, the ANC is gathering as many as possible votes from the masses, primarily by the exploiting populist fears and resentments.67 Land grabbing has also become a vehicle for secondary wrongdoings, like channelling riches to the ANC elite. They offer reasons such as Black empowerment, but in truth Luthuli house is steering the process as state capture has become entrenched in the post-Zuma regime. The way in which Ramaphosa addressed the nation “officially” only as president of the ANC with respect to the ANC’s decision on land expropriation and his disregard for parliament’s authority with his announcement of a policy on land expropriation decided on and approved by Luthuli house, reminded of an authoritarian regime and a fascist leadership.4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65-67 The antagonists no longer feel as if they have any say in the matter. The use of populism

Derby68 shows that populism is still a tantalising and easy option to use to mesmerize certain segments of society. As result of the failure of the ANC regime over two decades, its leadership is jumping on the revolutionary bandwagon of land to win votes.68

Derby warns68: 2: “Never believe a politician whose mission is draining the swamp”. This echoed for the antagonists’ one of the many reasons why the ANC, driven by their opportunistic and corrupted ANC leaders, has failed the country and why our democracy is in a process of drowning.

The former KwaZulu-Natal premier and a member of the ANC’s National Working Committee, Senzo Mchunu, clearly indicates the power Luthuli house has to override parliament in official decision-making and the execution of decrees regarding the land reform issue.69 Prominent is the public downplaying of the parliamentary Motlanthe Report by Ramaphosa himself as well as by the ANC NEC. Mchunu69 declared69: 4: “Comrade Kgalema has expressed a view, it shouldn’t be confused as the ANC having come to a conclusion”.

The un-parliamentarian and authoritarian ANC conclusion that led to the “official” implementation of land expropriation by the 80 members of the ANC NEC is seen by the antagonists as the final decision on land expropriation. But for the antagonists this is also a warning of how undemocratically the ANC will be ruling in future.69

The opponents note, with good reason, that the ANC, as the present ruling party that is losing its majority, can stay in power unconstitutionally by means of traditional dictatorial or authoritarian rule (well-known in post-colonial Africa). The present forcing of land grabbing reminds of these practices.67, 70-72 The still fragile South African democracy

Land expropriation could be the tip of the iceberg of retribution and revenge. Those who oppose it are all too aware that democracy is not a given, it is sustainable only in certain conditions.67 Stremlau67: 11 writes: “But no democracy is ever secure, even the US. That case study points to historic and current examples of how oligarchs masked as patriots and democrats, can exploit the fears and resentments of key constituencies to win elections, disarm democratic protections, and diver public resources to the privileged few.”

There are just too many old comrades in the “renewed” ANC. They parade as the saviours and rescuers of the poorest Blacks, fronting the White problem as reason for all ills. Mchunu’s69 following naïve remark reveals a lot about the word manipulation of the ANC leadership as they cover up their real intentions69: 4: “We are cautioning against unnecessary and inflammatory statements that are not conductive to peace. The land debate must move without any political populism of any kind.”

The good intentions of the ANC leaders are contradicted daily by their actions. The ANC elite reflects a lack of understanding of the concept of keeping peace and the enormous difference between expropriation with compensation and without compensation, as well as the difference between justice and injustice, reconciliation and revenge.69

The ANC may win the 2019 election (the sixth post-1994 general election) by jeopardising the country, but chances are good that they may lose soon after 2019 because of the bankruptcy of the country. This is basically because they lack sensible domestic policies, besides radicalism, to generate work opportunities and to create money to erase poverty and inequality: something that land grabbing cannot bring to the table. It only can aggravate the already chaotic situation.73,74 Uncertain economy of a fragile democracy

The antagonists believe that other constructive approaches and solutions are needed for South Africa’s many ills and crises. Bruce says73:22: “That leaves only one other route – sensible domestic policies that, even in the face of external events, can serve as a floor from which to build viable defences of our own.”

Prominent here is cutting government debt (it quadrupled in Zuma’s time to $80 billion) by cutting public sector jobs, selling off the SAA, SABC, Transnet and Eskom and training the masses. There is a clear choice and message for the ANC regime73:22: “…cut government’s debt and make money and stop exploiting through land grabbing and over-taxing the hard-working citizens of South Africa to make-up for your governmental impotence.”

If the ANC wants to persuade people to invest in their government and the country, they must first have the necessary potential and integrity to convince investors that they will make profits without risks73:22: “To prove it to them you put every piece of legislation you pass through just one stress test – will it attract or repel investors?”

The legislation on land expropriation will not pass this test. It not only repels investors, it is driving local and international investors’ away.73 ANC’s intent to grab land

Those who oppose land expropriation feel that the policy stems from a fascist seed.75, 76 The question is what is fascism? The former US politician, Madeleine Albright75, points out that it is in the first place difficult to define fascism75:11: “First of all, I don’t think fascism is an ideology. I think it is a method, it’s a system…a means of seizing and holding power.”

Albright75,76 brings us into the ANC elite’s state of mind: fascism and not so much communism is what drives the ANC elite. It tells us for the first time the reason why the ANC elite wants to seize power and how they hold power.75,76

One should understand fascism to understand the possible course of politics in South Africa after 2018. Land expropriation without compensation is only the tip a massive iceberg. It is useful to reflect Albright’s description of fascist leaders and their fascist systems. Albright 75:11 posits:

Fascism’s leaders have an “aptitude for spectacle”, a cult-like ability to establish emotional links to the mob and bring to the surface “deep and often ugly” feelings. Theirs is an intolerant, antidemocratic “doctrine of anger and fear”, marked by strong ethnic identification, as well as vilification and discrimination against non-members.

It often draws its energy from “a memory of humiliation” that percolates upwards from the general populace. The more painful the grounds for resentment, the easier it is for the fascist leader to build his following by “dangling prospects of renewal or vowing to take back what’s been stolen”.

It relies on intimidation and, often, violence. For it to succeed, the traditionally independent institutions of democracy, such as the police, the prosecutorial services, the judiciary, and civil service, all have to be brought under partisan control.

After reading the above, can anyone doubt who the ANC elite or what the ANC regime represents? Their opponents know very well that rooting out fascism is not easy: it is like cancer. Land grabbing is one of its most serious manifestations, the first of many other manifestations to come as the cancer penetrates the system. As long as the ANC is the ruler, land grabbing will thrive.

3.6.2. Land expropriation’s effects on the economy

Land grabbing is fully intertwined as a financial and economic generator within the South African economy. It does not matter to whom land belongs or who is producing what on it, it has intrinsic value. The income and the value of land of course depend on the sound political, socioeconomic and financial system of the country in which it functions. If it is functioning in an unstable political environment the income from and the value of land is mostly poor, leading to poverty, unemployment and inequality between urban and rural inhabitants. Land grabbing itself mostly generates distrust of the government, leading to a low foreign investment culture, seldom improving the situation of the poor and landless. If land grabbing is engineered in an already down-spiralling economy characterized by political instability, it can only spell economic and political disaster. It is in such an unfavourable socioeconomic and political environment that extreme land reform is planned in South Africa. Besides land grabbing as part of the ANC’s plan to improve the South African economy, they are planning various other schemes with which land expropriation is intertwined.4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65-67

In this division the attention is on the following three subdivisions: 1) Ramaphosa’s Stimulus Package, 2) the devastating unemployment in South Africa, and 3) the constant decline politics and economics. Ramaphosa’s “Stimulus package”

Antagonists see land grabbing as signs of a failed economy in which all kinds of escape routes from reality are being tried out by a government stripped of the ability make an economic turn-around. It is often started by regimes simultaneously with attempts at economic development and other so-called “bettering” of fiscal plans to distract negative attention from the grabbing process where mostly a certain prosperous group is harmed to benefit another less meritorious group. Other times it is used in an effort to offer some credibility to the particular regime’s continuously failing economic reforms and upliftment schemes to serve as a guarantee for the poor people and voters of a regime that has somewhere in the future a free assistance plan in place to help them.

At the moment is it old news that the Ramaphosa regime is in deep financial trouble, making drastic actions such as land grabbing, either as an attention distracter or, as Ramaphosa seemingly believes, a money generator, an unavoidable part of his many promises of dramatically reforming the South African economy. The present plans around land grabbing by Ramaphosa must be read together with his bigger stimulus plans as a supporting source of income or finance and voter recruiting. Ultimately this will do little good.4,10,12,19,20-24,26,28,29,32-35,65-67

Firstly, it is important to look to Ramaphosa’s various economic plans together with land grabbing, like his Stimulus Package with which he promises to invigorate the economy. In the context of the current economic stagnation of South Africa, Derby74 paints a very distressing picture, mentioning an economy bereft of any substantive investment over the past decade and a national psyche drenched in tales of corruption centred on the ruling party and the role of its former president. This failed governance of the ANC regime dented the confidence of consumer and business to levels last seen more than 30 years ago [during Apartheid]. Notwithstanding Ramaphosa’s various promises to the nation, especially to his electorate, there are negative realities that are overwhelming. In this failed economic state, land grabbing is undoubtedly becoming tempting, an excellent way to put some of the political and economic demands at rest, at least for the short term.74

Derby77 discusses the country’s present economic fiasco by looking at Ramaphosa’s much talked about Stimulus Package as presented during his economic address on Friday 21 September. He writes77: 2:

Finally, some sobriety. That is my take from this Friday’s economic address by President Cyril Ramaphosa and his team. There were no grand announcements of billions flooding into the economy from friends in Asia, no promises of the creation of millions of jobs in whatever catalogue of time frames politicians dust off the shelf. And importantly, it also wasn’t the matter-of-fact economy diagnosis that former finance minister Malusi Gigaba once delivered that sent everyone into a mad panic

What emerged most for me from the Ramaphosa “stimulus” announcement was this cabinet, or at least those members of it that are in his corner, have a grip on the reality of the situation.

Lumkile Mondi78, a senior lecturer in economics at Wits University, says that the Ramaphosa plan is simply a recovery package rather than a stimulus one. He concludes that South Africa has energy, water, transport healthcare and educational problems that need comprehensive fixing78: 8: “We have a huge infrastructure deficit that requires trillions of Rands to get it going for a modern economy. We don’t have capital at all. The money the IDC and others have is not enough for us to address the infrastructure deficit in our country.”

The above reflection is in line with the view of Joffe79, who also writes that Ramaphosa’s economic stimulus package is not a stimulus package at all, but the plain replay of a budget previously done79:2:

There is no new public money going into the economy, and that’s no bad thing given that the government doesn’t have the money to spend. The R400bn of public money that will go into the new SA Infrastructure Fund is simply the infrastructure spending – minus that of the state-owned companies – that government already had on the budget for the next three years. And the R50bn that’s going into new priorities such as black commercial farmers, township and rural economies and bedding for public hospital patients is being shifted somehow from other budgets.

Bruce80 describes it as a neither a negative nor a positive plan, but a fiscally neutral one, lacking any improvements to the chaotic economy of the country, while Khumalo81 says81: 10: “…that to everyone he spoke see it as negative” and that it was merely a reprioritization of money already in the coffer, and indeed no more than a reversal of bad policy decisions and fixing some obvious missteps by Jacob Zuma”.

For Khumalo81 the best description of the different analyses by commentators is 81:10: “…was once again the prophesying of an imminent Armageddon for the South African and its economy”. Khumalo81 him self, tactfully as a professional, describes it the best as follows81:10: “In layman’s terms, the president, in his capacity as the head of the home, told his family: “Hello guys. We are broke. There is no more money coming. I am not getting a raise. I am not getting a bonus. And I cannot borrow any more money from the bank”.”

The SA Infrastructure Fund is already a mess, writes Joffe79:2. It is unclear how the new fund will work and how it will be governed, but it seems to be intent only on re-collecting the billions rands already allocated to the government’s fragmented and ineffective infrastructure spending programme. It seems indeed a desperate last effort to steer the money budgeted more effectively and creatively, as well as a hopeful last effort to incorporate outside the fiscal other funds and skills to rehabilitate the economy. The private sector is interested in the recruitment of local private sector funding outside the fiscal, like the private sector’s pension funds and various other sources of private sector funding to improve the economy, but again, when considering the poor financial CV of the ANC regime and their poor relations with the South African private sector, the private sector will be hesitant in the coming three to five years if the ANC wins the 2019 election. The fact that national debt is nearing 60% of revenue (with the potential of growing) and the fiscal is also burdened with the immense liabilities of the SOES and financial collapse of more and more municipalities, makes Ramaphosa’s mission to turn around South Africa’s economy almost impossible. Recovery for South Africa, even under a new responsible and respected political party and government, is a long way off.74,77-79,82,84,85

In the economic and financial chaos it is understandable why it is tempting for Ramaphosa and his men – in an effort to lessen the people’s political and growing economic pressure on him to erase in some way their immense poverty – to execute an extreme land grabbing programme as fast as possible.74,77-79,82-85

Ramaphosa himself describes the outcome of the ANC’s political and economic actions as follows78: 8: “The state is unable to raise borrowing. SA has a debt-to-GDP ratio of about 53%”.

South Africa’s debt-to-GDP leven is 53%, and the general view is that for emerging market nations, the healthy debt-to-GDP level is about 40%. It is not advisable to go beyond this as South Africa has done. Ramaphosa’s planned Stimulus Package seems to be a long term dream and an ideal that can only be reached under an able and competent regime, requirements that the ANC does not meet in the eyes of the antagonists.74,77-79,82,84,85

Land expropriation with full compensation is totally outside the financial ability and reach of the ANC regime. However much the regime would have liked to do it (if it was politically correct), it lacks the capital to do so. In the current unstable South African economy, radical land expropriation is the only option.74 Unemployment in South Africa

Ramaphosa’s further admission that the country’s growing devastating unemployment is an immense problem is another condemning failure of the ANC. The ANC regime promised and undertook constantly from 1994, before every election, to rectify the unemployment. This constant promise of the ANC regime to rectify unemployment was again manifested in the Ramaphosa Stimulus Package. This promise of Ramaphosa failed dolefully before it started.74,77-7982,84,85 When presenting his Stimulus Package, reflecting wistfully on “bettering” the record of the present high unemployment that sits above 27%, Ramaphosa says74: 1: “Governments [as the ANC] are “… usually not very good at creating jobs…We do our little part’. Overall, we are not good at creating jobs. We should be at the top of our game when it comes to being an enabler and being a catalyst.”

With his admission of the ANC’s failure as a government with a specific mandate from its voters to offer them sufficient work opportunities and of their long term failure to run successful job creation programmes in over 24 years of rule, Ramaphosa offers insight into why land expropriation without compensation could be used as a vehicle to solve unemployment.

In this context of the present unemployment of the masses, it is important to mention that when Jacob Zuma came into office (with the support of Ramaphosa as vice-president), he promised to create 5 million jobs in 10 years (2 million per year). Of course, as with the most other ANC promises, this was not met, leading to a situation where the state ended up with a bloated and rather expensive public service instead (by offering jobs in state services to unemployed Blacks and in this way buying votes for the ANC through loyalists). Again, notwithstanding the failed unemployment record of the ANC (and the manifold empty promises), Ramaphosa is trying again to pull a rabbit out of his hat, knowing very well there is not a rabbit to grill for the poor and jobless Blacks. Another way must be found to offer the masses of poor and unemployed Blacks many fat rabbits to grill: land grabbing.74 For the antagonists there is clearly one specific outcome at their costs: more land grabbing to solve the hunger of Ramaphosa’s millions of unemployed persons.

For the antagonists South Africa has basically been bankrupted by the ANC and there is no other way for Ramaphosa and his cronies to find the immense capital needed to erase unemployment in their own funding model other than a free hand with land grabbing in the hope to keep in short term the unemployed and landless poor Blacks silent.

The unemployment crisis is central to the ANC’s constant failure with serious political matters and their failure to make a constructive correction away from the foolish and useless so-called 2018 Stimulus Package Plan. They are masking a far more disastrous future situation of an unofficial unemployment percentage of far higher that the reflected official 27%. It has the potential, in combination the other negative political and economic determinants, to derail the political state with anarchy and revolution in the near future. This negative set-up needs further reference. Firstly, to think that the recent control taking of economic structures by the presidency will be a cure to the country’s ineffective economy is wishful thinking. Secondly, the Ramaphosa regime’s belief that they will bring unemployment to zero (0%) in 2030 is laughable. Even lowering the percentage will be to 14% in a decade or two is just not possible in an ANC regime.74,77,78,81,86

These “fantasies” are part of the ANC’s political history, coming from 1994 with their: “we have a good story to tell”. The ANC’s political stories, like their political doings, lack trustworthiness for the antagonists. The ANC regime and its elite are in a mess.74,77,78,81,86

Bruce80 consolidates this present mess under the ANC regime well, especially the ANC elite’s constant excuses and proclaimed innocence of involvement in this mess that came with the 24 years of their reign80: 20: “On a more mundane level, we all make choices all the time. Most of us. One creature that never has to make choices is the ANC. It always manages to combine everything it wants into one choice. Come the next election, I guarantee you it will dream up a new list of Five Priorities, whatever they are”.

The next election is in 2019, meaning more new fantasies and promises come from the ANC! Ramaphosa himself is doing exactly what Bruce80 identifies as a failing politician80: 20: “…to put a list on top of his priorities instead of putting a priority on top of his list”. The ANC has become well-known for propagating falsities before elections and what has happened in reality is that unemployment (as well as crime, murder, state capture) has gotten out of control in ten years.74,77,78,81,86

Ann Bernstein87, the executive director of the Centre for Development and Enterprise, reports that the country’s unemployment crisis is the worst in the world. She reports there are 37.8 million work-age adults, of whom 11.9 million are not economically active (mostly students and school learners), reflecting an unemployment of more than 32%. Of the remaining 25.9 million people, as many as 9.6 million cannot find any work, making it almost two out of every five adults (40%). In terms of the 37.8 million work-age adults, these so-called “not economically active adults” of 11.9 million and the 9.6 million failing to find work, represents nearly 52% of unemployed adults. Seen from another angle, Bernstein87 shows that only 43% of adults work (while globally this number is 60%), meaning that 57% are out of work. The growing chaos into which the ANC regime has forced its people, is confirmed by the fact that between 2008 and 2018, the number of work-age adults has grown by 6.3 million, while only 1.9 million (30%) had been employed and 3.2 million stayed unemployed (thus more than 50%). The hard truth is that there is a daily increase of 900 unemployed people in the population. This has been the case for ten years, but Ramaphosa and his ANC elites are very quiet about this as they sit in their highly paid jobs.87

Bernstein87 delves deeper into the tragic realities created by the ANC since 1994 by reflecting that the position of young people is even worse. They have an unemployment rate of 50% and 400 000 fewer people were employed in 2018 than in 2008 (ten years earlier) despite that he number of young people increasing by 2 million between 2008 and 2018. She writes87: 21: “The 9.6-million unemployed mean that there are more people looking for work in SA than there are people living in seven out of nine provinces, and, if you wanted to reduce the unemployment by half, you would need to create industries that employ 11 times more people than are currently working in the entire mining sector.”

The reasons she offers for unemployment is comprehensive, like the prescription of relatively high minimum wages by the government, the considerable legal protection from dismissal, the failure of job creation projects, most only benefitting a small group of jobseekers, constraints on private firms when employing people, a lack of SMEs and a lack of constructive governmental support to generate such entities, etc.87

The writing of Sifiso Skenjana88, an investment and economic research specialist, describes Bernstein’s87 epitaph on South Africa further in an effort to give Ramaphosa a free diagnosis of the economic reasons for the looming death of the country. He writes that South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies globally in terms of income and wealth distribution. The bottom half of the local workforce receives a meagre 12% of all wages. In this context, he pinpoints that the Oxfam report88:9, “Reward Work, Not Wealth” reflects that the cost of supporting the needs of one person monthly in South Africa is about R6 460-00, while the minimum wage from the 1st May 2018 is R3 500-00 (reflecting a shortage of R3 000). Using the World Bank’s measure of SA’s Gini-coefficient, it is the highest in the world at 0.63. [Income inequality on the Gini ranges from 0 (excellent) to 1 (worst)]. Skenjana88 also shows that poverty levels are rising, quoting Stats SA’s recent report “Poverty Trends in South Africa”, which says that the poverty head count increased from 53.2% in 2011 to 55.5% in 2015. Taking into account that the down-spiral of the country is a constant feature (like the debt-to-GDP ratio accelerating from 32% in 1990/91 to 53% in 2017/18), there is no hope of a turn-around on any of these statistics, only a desperate hope to decrease some of this negative numbers.88

The above comprehensive profile on South Africa’s economic chaos brings us back to the “Ramaphosa solution” in which poverty, inequality and unemployment are seen as the same things that can and must be tackled simultaneously to be nullified. In his solution land grabbing is one of the main means and the easiest solution to better the ANC’s poor financial profile. White land grabbing offers an open door to get entrance to exclusive capital, to not only generate free capital without cost to the state so that they can satisfy the poor and landless’ growing needs and demands, but also to assure cohesion inside the ANC’s voter contingent. But, as with most of the ANC’s solutions for politics and economics, these radical ANC politicians lack the ability to reason and tell how they are going to do the land grabbing, writes Bruce80: 20. What these ANC politicians miss as a result of their lack of expertise, is that the causes of and the solution to unemployment, poverty and inequality differ immensely, making land grabbing as a solution to any one of these three problems, null and void. As a guideline for the Ramaphosa regime Bruce profers80: 20: “Poverty is caused by the absence of money or assets. Inequality results from the presence of money. Poverty is the first priority to fix [and must thus be on top of the list as a priority]. Unemployment is often caused by employers being deterred from hiring people”. This means to bring down unemployment there must be less rigid and senseless official employment rules inside the country’s unstable politics. Bruce80 writes further80: 20: “…but then politics makes an appearance, because to lighten the load on employees, or to make it worthwhile to be an employer, requires, to an extent, disempowering the trade unions and we can’t have that [because Cosatu and its affiliates are alliances of the ANC]. At the end the ANC has become his own prison warden”.

This emphasis on the mismanagement of the current South Africa points to Albright’s identification of the presence of fascism in the ANC’s government system so that the partisans’ (like the trade unions) obtain part or full control of the traditionally independent institutions of democracy, making the economics and democracy of the country a failure on the one hand, while on the other hand the capital and assets of the moderate to rich persons look attractive for grabbing. When the unions and the partisans come from the majority of the population and they also formed the radical government of the day, outcomes such as the ANC elite’s decision to do land grabbing become an obvious and a natural reaction in an uncontrolled and disorderly society under an uncontrolled and disorderly regime.75,76,80

The alliance with the workers and their primary (individual, citizen, worker and so-called false democratic) rights at the cost of the functional private business sector and individuals is closely linked to its economic failure. These distinctions are taking on a racist tone, with the minority group of Whites as the losers). In this context the ANC’s basic political and economic policies, thinking, planning and doing has become cemented in revolution and fascism via the unions. This explains the shying away of the private business sector and their fight to keep sustainable democracy and private capital out of reach of the ANC’s tentacles in South Africa. Prominent in this grabbing of Whites assets is Cosatu and its affiliates’ contaminated political roles and influences in the past inside the ANC alliance, together with their current continuation of foolish and outdated revolutionary political thinking and doing. It is many times more radical politically than the already politically and socioeconomically radical ANC. It is impossible for the ANC to end its relationship with the trade unions: they are instead forced to pamper their sacred partners because of the basic empowerment by the partisans of the ANC to stay in power after 2019.85,89

Khumalo’s89 question on the future of the labour unions is significant89:13: “…one couldn’t help but wonder whether Cosatu, and the trade unions in general, still have relevance to the workers of SA”. This irrelevance was erased by the indestructibility of the ANC’s dependence on the unions’ ongoing massive power at the voting boxes. The arrogant ideas and demands of the secretary-general of Nafcor, Monga Phaladi85, that billions in cash in the private sector must be made available to the public sector by means of a “social compact” is a good example of how the unions abuse their power.85,89

Phaladi85 seems to overlook the risk that private money would go down the drain, as happened with the state’s money when it was captured by the Zuptoids with this obligation he puts on the private business sector to service the needs of the unions by whatever means they think well. His suggestion85:13: “From corporations’ side, it would be an extremely good gesture if the CEOs of the top 40 on the JSE donated their 2019 increases to a fund run by a council of eminent South Africans to support good causes that have an economic impact”, shows a lack of understanding of sound business principles. Phaladi85 makes no reference to the ANC MPs and ANC ministers or of himself making the same kinds of contributions to his 2019-helpline. Or is this expected donation by the top 40 on the JSE in line with the ANC’s grab-and-run policy from its early revolutionary days that is echoed by their intended land expropriation?85

The closed-door politics of the private business sector and their immense fighting by all means behind the curtains of the political hooligans in the ANC and EFF on the nationalization of private assets and capital has made it impossible since 1994 for the radicals in the ANC to put their hands on the private funds in the private business sector. The White farming sector has less of a defence against the land expropriation attack of the radicals in the ANC because of the open door that the Apartheid history created. This situation makes land ownership ideal as a first step towards their greater project of nationalization of White assets. At the same time land expropriation as a mean of nationalization offers direct free capital/assets with which the ANC regime can solve the Black unemployment, Black poverty and inequality. Thirdly, land expropriation can become a political powerbase for the ANC regime to obtain voters’ support from the poor and landless Blacks in the 2019 election. Constant decline of politics and economics

On inspection is it clear that the dire economic situation of South Africa will only continue to worsen, unless the ANC regime of 2019 can reform itself and stabilise its governing system, policies, vision, mission and short- and long-term aims to assure greater confidence so that they can get private support and capital by creating and promoting of a healthier environment for the business sector. The Ramaphosa regime has thus far failed on all the business and political markers to do a positive turn-around. It is significant that the Zuma regime’s crooks have not yet been purged from the system. In one of South Africa’s partners in BRICS there has been a cleansing of corrupted state servants. Until June 2018, 144 executives, bureaucrats and political actors had been sentenced to more than 1 464 years in jail, while the Gupta’s and Zuma specific are still all free and respected burghers.90

The antagonists believe that South Africa’s crisis of governance that started in 1994 has led to an economic crisis with time, bringing down democracy and its good rules. It is now at the point where it is making criminal behaviour in government possible. The ANC is turning to land-grabbing to distract the attention from the ANC regime’s manifold failures and unsolvable crises. They also offer the poor and landless false hope and financial solutions for the poverty, unemployment and inequality. Land expropriation without compensation from Whites is central to this false solutions.90 Davies pinpoints the only solution to these manifold crises very well with his short remark90: 3: “Until the politics are fixed, there is little vision for the economy”.

For the antagonist, the above proves that Ramaphosa and the ANC do not have the political ability and trustworthiness to be mandated rulers of South Africa. Nelson Mandela failed to turn Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa into good political heirs. The antagonists have started to publically questioning the continuation of the present Ramaphosa-ANC regime after analysing the recent insignificant Ramaphosa economic Stimulus Package and Ramaphosa’s many ongoing commissions of inquiry through which it seems he is walking a political path without a destination.74,77,78,91,92

Mthombothi91 rightfully describes the worrying aetiology of the many useless Ramaphosa commissions without a clear destinantion91:17: “We now have these commissions coming out of our ears. It seems our president can’t help himself”. Mthombothi91elaborates further91:17:

The commissions could end up tripping over each other though. We have the all-compassing state capture commission under Raymond Zondo and the Nugent inquiry into the devastation at Sars. This week Ramaphosa obliged with another, one that will investigate poor decisions and possible corruption at the PIC that could cost the country billions.”

Bruce92 elaborates on Ramaphosa’s use of commissions to indicate how it relates to his failing leadership92:16: “Now he is thinking about a parallel inquiry into the so-called “rogue unit” story at Sars, which led to the forced departures of some of its best managers”. (Note: these good managers departed not only under Zuma as president, but also under Ramaphosa as vice-president). Bruce92 pinpointed this leadership failure of Ramaphosa further with the reference92:16: “Ramaphosa has an inspired way of “not doing anything”. For the antagonists the question is essential: if there is not quality and sound leadership in the ANC at present, how can there be quality and sound economics? In this context the antagonists feel that the hard facts already show that there is no quality and sound economics at the moment in South Africa under the ANC and that the country is in a constant down spiral of politics and economics. The question is pertinent for the antagonists: What are awaiting South Africans in general and the Whites under attack specific because of their land ownership?

Mthombothi91 further reveals the current comprehensive political instability of the Ramaphosa-ANC regime. In addition, the ANC regime under the stumbling leadership of Ramaphosa has to cope also with a low-level civil war in parts of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), specifically among the ANC members. Mthombothi91, in reference to the status of the ANC leadership of Ramaphosa in KZN, reflects91:17: “[the] region where he is least popular is almost an understatement. He is reviled by some in his own party”. Mthombothi91 elaborates further91:17:

People are being butchered almost daily in townships and even small rural villages up and down the province. The country averts its eyes. It doesn’t want to know. AS KwaZulu-Natal premier Willies Mchunu noted when tabling the report [the Moerane commission of Inquiry into political killings in KwaZulu-Natal] before the legislature last month, these killings are taking place at local government level. And they continue unabated. Another councillor was gunned down in Umlazi, outside Durban, on Thursday night. No big deal. It’s when high-profile politicians, such as Sindiso Magaqa, the former secretary-general of the ANC Youth League, are killed that the country takes note. Violence has almost become our way of life.

The problem for KZN is that the police and its intelligence services have been compromised. They have found to be complicit in most of the murders, killing for one faction or the other, or simply turning a blind eye.

Bruce92 also reflects on the growing insufficient governing of the total South Africa by the Ramaphosa-ANC regime.

For the antagonists, two questions become pertinent when they look at the way the ANC regime has cranked the South African economy lifeless; their current senseless actions like land-grabbing to solve unsolvable economic problems; and their focussed attack on the racial unity created by Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. Firstly, are these fatalistic actions of Ramaphosa and the ANC elite culminating of their political obituaries written in anticipation?74,77,78 Secondly, as it becomes more and more clear for the antagonists that the country is moving towards a total collapse fast due to the failure of the ANC as a democratic and effective regime, is there any sense to hang on to land ownership while their lives can be the first to be lost? The anarchy in the Black areas of KZN and the failure of the police and the intelligence services to safeguard even other Black lives in KZN is becoming a wake-up call for antagonists all over South Africa to think very, very deeply about their future in South Africa after 2019. Prominent, as said, is land ownership.91

What is prominent for the antagonists at this stage is that as the country’s economy becomes more lifeless, the more extreme land expropriation without compensation will be forced down on the Whites to draw every sent of their assets and to distract attention from messes of the politically ill ANC. Only a new political party can make a turn-around and even then it will take the new regime years to re-establish some form of stability and self-respect in the country’s psyche.

3.6.3. The ANC’s political and business models

The antagonists argue that the ANC regime’s business and political model with which to plan and to run large state enterprises with success from 1994 to 2019 is one enormous failure. This stems basically from the ANC party’s inability as a liberation organization to create and to add to the value of any existing enterprise under its jurisdiction (This inclination to fail is a world-wide phenomenon of most of liberation movements that came to power as governments). The ANC’s financial and managerial failures are aggravated by the corruption inherent to the system, which is reflected by the state capture on all the financial and political levels during its governance of South Africa.93-97 State enterprises

Steenhuisen98 points out when reflecting on the ANC’s various forms of financial delinquency, that in state-owned entities alone it has resulted in R161 -billion being wasted on bailouts, subsidies and capital injections since 2008, while at the South African Revenue Service, state-capture and mismanagement has gobbled up R140 billion in lost revenues. The known losses suffered are be more than R300 billion (22% of the national revenue budget for the period 2017/2018).98

What is of further concern for the antagonists is the financial mismanagement inside the civil service. The total turn-over of the state enterprises under the supervision of the Department of Public Enterprises for 2017 to 2018 was R284 billion, but in total they incurred a loss of R1.6 billion. (The total assets of these state enterprises are more than R1100 billion, with 124 616 employees). Some of these enterprises current financial functioning is so poor and substandard that many experience difficulty to pay their employees’ monthly salaries, while creditors are often not paid. Many of these enterprises are under strain just to stay viable in the short term, while long-term sustainability is a question. What makes it very problematic to obtain a full profile of the financial status of civil enterprises in the past regarding their loss and corruption/fraud count is the absence of legal leverage to force them to indicate illegal spending. Corruption also goes unpunished.99

Constant failures include the SABC, SAA, Denel, Transnet, Telkom, public education and healthcare, public universities, municipalities. Added to this there is the ANC regime’s inability to oversee and control private enterprises to safeguard the state and the public’s money as reflected by the fraud that characterized over a long period the VBS Mutual Bank, the African Bank and Steinhoff.100,101

The mismanagement of the municipalities where the ANC is mostly in charge shows a chaotic history of stealing, corruption, poor service delivery, etc. Prominent is the lack of water delivery to residents or the unlawful actions and lack of respect for democracy. Regarding the delinquent behaviour and actions of many ANC-run municipalities that cut off water to living areas, Phephelaphi Dube100, the director at the Centre for Constitutional Rights, said municipalities must in such a case provide alternative ways to provide residents with access to water. These kinds of delinquent behaviours are indeed juridical misdemeanours and should result in criminal prosecution, but there are never court cases.100 A said Kagiso Mere100 reports that the lack of water at his area forces him to take three hours off work every day to collect water for household use. The total chaos in which he must try to live every day, he describes in short but comprehensive100: 6: “My boss understands, because he’s also affected. The municipality has endangered our lives. There is s**t everywhere. They were meant to provide us with services, but instead they build themselves nice homes with tar roads to the mayor’s guesthouse”.

At Koster in the North West province, the mismanagement of the ANC mayor and her cronies lead to a situation where she and ten of her councillors had to flee for their lives and hide in “a safe place” in Rustenburg in June 2018, reports Hosken100: 6.

Municipal IQ economist Karen Heese101 reports that the situation for municipalities is very negative, specifically those situated in Limpopo, the Northern Cape and North West where the ANC is mostly in charge. It is mostly due to poor managerial capacity and substandard performances of officials and councillors representing the ANC. It started with a lack of provincial oversight of financial planning by the ANC regime. Only 40% of the municipalities have enough cash or cash equivalents to pay their creditors. It reflects the failure of the ANC regime’s local government business model. A critical analysis shows that only 7% of the country’s municipalities are classified as well functioning, 31% as reasonably functional, 31% as almost dysfunctional and 31% as dysfunctional or distressed.100,101

In most of these clear failures it seems that the ANC elite are often the prominent culprits who engage in money capture and fraud or through associated crooked enterprises. These excellent examples of the ANC elite’s inabilities and lack of skills to manage the country on middle level, further aggravated by their practice of corruption as a daily custom in their work capacities and responsibilities, are in the view of the antagonists also now present in their land reform initiative to create a so-called immense contingent of Black farmers in the future and to erase Black poverty and landlessness. The lack of integrity and honesty with regard to financial and political matters in the government, together with widespread corruption, nepotism and fraud, as well as the well-planned execution of state capture by the top brass of the ANC regime between 1994 and 2019, and their attitude of “don’t care” for the poor and landless Blacks, is seen as ominous for any form of land redistribution from 2019 and onwards. There is no safety net for corruption and misuse. This emphasizes failure of the ANC due to its liberator’s heritage.43,44,93-97,102 The Reserve and Land Banks under attack

With regard to business entities like the Reserve Bank and the Land Bank, these entities do their best to steer clear of direct conflicts with the ANC regime on the matter of land grabbing. The fact is that the Reserve Bank can with little effort be nationalized, seeing that only the Act on the Reserve Bank must be changed, which in practice can be done with a general majority decision in parliament. It will be more difficult for the ANC to attack the Reserve Bank’s mandate, seeing that is written into the Constitution and needs a 67% majority to activate change. Given how tempting this is for the ANC and EFF radicals, the Reserve Bank has warned the ANC regime that nationalization is an exercise of which the long-term consequences can be very expensive for the government.103,104

The Land Bank survived years of corruption, looting and maladministration to make a wonderful comeback to become South Africa’s only professional and profit-making state-owned running institution. The irresponsible land grabbing hunger and talks of persons like Ramaphosa and Malema forced its CEO, Tshokolo Nchocho103, to take a tactful stand by warning of the collapse of the Bank if the ANC fails to adhere to some economic sanity. The CEO pointed out the present ANC leadership’s failure to respect the constitution and their interest in using the Land Bank as another vehicle to promote land grabbing as well as state capture103: 9: “…the noise and the uncertainty make our work difficult as development bankers using commercial solutions and commercial resources to address social needs such as employment and enterprise creation”; and: “It is deeply regrettable that this kind of work gets contaminated in the dust of political rhetoric”.

It is clear for Nchocho103, as it is for the antagonists that in this dust of political rhetoric the ANC elite, including Ramaphosa, fails to sort out for themselves what they mean with an “explicit” policy on land expropriation. Even the previous finance minister, Nhlanhla Nene, who must know the results of land grabbing and nationalization well and must surely be well-informed on the matter after his intimate experience with the Guptas, seems to have, as the rest of the ANC’s radicals, limited insight on the matter if the following remark of Nchocho103 is true103:9: “Finance minister Nhlanhla Nene has now instructed the Land Bank to provide him with a risk assessment on what expropriation without compensation could mean for the bank”. For a seasoned senior minister, trusted with the keys of the money coffer of the country, to ask such a basic question, is seen by the antagonists as an indication that the nationalization of the Land Bank in the near future has become a reality (again, notes the Guptas in Nune’s earlier past). It emphasizes for the antagonists the blurred and troubled mindset into which the ANC leadership has drifted on human rights, racial doctrine and business ethics.103

To highlight why the Land Bank is a tempting vehicle to promote land grabbing, the following can be mentioned. Firstly, farmers owe the bank R49 billion while the bank itself has liabilities to the tune of R41 billion, meaning every sent will be at risk if farms are confiscated. The bank is completely dependent on outside funders like the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the local fund management industry, the European Investment Bank and the World Bank. These are strong role players in advocating for a good government and who can, if they pull the plug, or just partly back out for fear of land expropriation without compensation, erase the bank’s credit status, bringing fast bankruptcy. It is clear that any action that affects the credit quality of loans and endangering loan repayments will cause its funders to step back. What is the ANC radicals don’t see is the fact that the bank is already a crucial funder of commercial as well as emerging Black farmers. A substantial portion of its loans are production loans, meaning that a pullback by funders will affect agricultural productivity and food security, jobs and transformation of ownership to Black farmers.103,105 Nchocho pointed out the following103:9: “If expropriation without compensation is not handled carefully, the likely consequences don’t bear thinking about”; and: “…the worst-case scenario in the event of widespread expropriation and the removal of property rights is ‘the real destruction of the economic base of agriculture, as well as the economy of the entire country’”.

The plain fact is that bank loans are guaranteed by the National Treasury, and if it must make good on banks that default, it would cause a financial burden on the Treasury, which is already under strong financial pressure. Economic and financial chaos can follow fast.103 The risk for commercial banks in a mad exercise of land expropriation without compensation, whether or not it secures credit for farmers or not, can descend into a chaos in the country’s banking sector and specifically for the Reserve Bank as a pivot.103,105 Our weak economy means that the Reserve Bank cannot take a negative financial experience of this kind alone as Nortjè points out105:9: “There isn’t enough fat in the system for the Reserve Bank to bail out another bank [like African Bank]. Impact of the current rule

The chaotic outcome described above103,106,107, activated by the autocratic and blind man style of political thinking and rule of the ANC since 1994, is also well-illustrated by Kuseni Dlamini106, the chair of Aspen Pharmacare and Massmart Holdings, in his perspective on the 10th BRICS Summit of July 2018, by identifying three crucial shortcomings in the ANC regime’s (and now also Ramaphosa’s) reign since 1994106:9:

1) A lack of investors’ confidence and growth-enhancing structural reforms under the ANC. Prominent in this total context are the absence of fit-for-purpose state-owned enterprises as result of the ANC’s style of tolerance of mediocrity and corruption, lack of a culture of high performance, lack of accountability, and a lack of consequence management and leadership of integrity and quality. The question is: how can the country attract foreign investors as its local investors lack trust in the government;

2) The ANC’s aimless and confusing intention of land expropriation without compensation is a driver away of investors: they want to know precise the imbalance in land ownership is going to be executed. So far the ANC only reflects their outdated liberation instinct;

3) The ANC’s failed policy on the mining economy and its future ownership as result of the ongoing policy of uncertainty and unpredictability of the ANC regime on a clear and sound Mining Charter. The hard fact is that the South African mining-sector is a thin shadow of its past as a contributor to the country’s coffer or to employment. Where in the 1970s to 1980s every R100 made in the economy so much as R21 came from the mining, is it contributed now only R7 to the economy.

The ANC’s radicals who promote RST and RET, which includes land- and mine expropriation, don’t see the devastating effect on the upkeep of current employment when dead and dying gold- and other kinds of mining towns emerge and the sources of salaries, which assure the functioning of poor towns in Eastern Cape, stop. Add to this the food shortages that can follow after the land grabbing of White farms and the collapse of food production, as happened in Zimbabwe. This makes the antagonists fear a fourth industrial revolution. Again, in this present chaos of the country’s economics, Black poverty and joblessness, promising already only better lifestyles for a few fortunate ones, while unemployment among the untrained in the diminishing labour market will gear-up at high speed. It seems as if the radicals lack some constructive and responsible future and strategy on what economics, work availability (forget growth), society- and family stability are.103,106,108

The basic outcomes of above aimless political thinking, planning and actions by the ANC elite have led to a lack of trust and cooperation for the local business sector. This is a situation which is further aggravated by the government’s ignoring of the talents of the local business sector to bring know-how and solutions to the government’s (mostly self-created) problems. The local business sector should take a prominent position in policy-making to advance the greater society’s interests directly in government. It’s a setup which will mean balanced control of state affairs and the end of the ANC’s way of ruling. Instead the local business sector is made a permanent and sometimes a very hostile opposition.106

Indeed, distrust of the ANC regime as a governmental safe-keep of taxpayer money is very high amongst many South Africans, not only for the antagonists. An international 2016 study that tested the opinions of the citizens of various African countries as percentages indicates respectively the following trust counts: 73% for Namibia, 71% for Tanzania and 50% for Mozambique, while the count was only 40% for South Africa. This outcome offers strong support for the anti-land-transformers’ objections to any form of future land redistribution; basically because it is seen as another public enterprise failure: not only because the ANC regime lacks managerial ability and skills, but because it lacks most of all honesty on money-matters. The ANC regime is soaked in corruption and theft of state assets. These, again, are all actions, as already indicated, which seem to be driven by ANC’s liberator’s selfishness and opportunism and its aim to the exclusive enrichment of a few ANC elites.93-97

The antagonists associate what they think is a certain devastating “Zuma corruption outcome” of the ANC’s pending land redistribution as something that is cemented in most liberation organizations when they come to rule. Such organizations, notwithstanding many political face-lifts, never change their corrupted mindsets. Radical political thinking, planning and doing stay the centre of al liberation movements and it becomes clear when the regime starts to fail the country and its people’s interests. Extreme actions (like we are seeing in Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Sudan), ignoring the short- or long-term consequences to assure political and racial harmony and economic stabilities, follows and it takes years to repair. The way Angola went down-hill during the reign of José Eduardo dos Santos and the crooked Dos Santos family’s endemic corruption for the duration of his 38-year reign (only 14 years more than the ANC’s reign where a Jacob Zuma and his son Duduzane and daughter Duduzile were allegedly also busy with delinquent actions), could not be turned around by Joäo Lourenço since 2014. This is basically because, although the new president tried in public his best to remove members of the Dos Santos family from top government posts and charges were laid against crooked officials, the country leadership fails again because the new leader, Lourenço, was a contaminated member of the Dos Santos regime that he now tries to fight. As the leaders in current Zimbabwe after Mugabe, he is just continuing on another path of political sickness in a corrupted African liberation movement and it is devastating Angola’s economics and international integrity (although less openly as under José Eduardo dos Santosa.38,43,44,69,73,102,109–117

The above Angolan political delinquent path, the antagonists reflect, is fully in line with the ANC’s political delinquency since 1994 and a regime in which Ramaphosa as the new president was also a prominent role-player as parliamentarian and vice-president from day one. Political chaos and economic chaos go hand-in-hand in the future ANC regime. For the antagonists the IMF’s structural adjustment programme that Angola is now facing is not far away for the incurable South African political sickness. Note and remember the reality: The ANC is a prominent liberation-movement-cum-government: indeed, the oldest in Africa.38,43,44,69,73,102,109,111-117

Venezuela is very similar to the ANC’s foolish political reign since 1994. The antagonists point out that in Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro at present reigns, the currency Bolivar was previously nearly a dozen times devalued by his predecessor Hogo Chávez (1999–2013); a process started for the first time by his predecessor president Luis Herrera Campins in 1983. Chávez himself chopped three zeroes off the currency a decade ago. In August 2018, Venezuela started with a currency devaluation of 95% under Maduro, taking the country further into hunger and hyperinflation. At present the country’s inflation is running over 100 000%. Food and medicine are scarce, while more than 3 million citizens have fled to neighbouring countries. Maduro’s economic plan, as Zuma’s and now it seems Ramaphosa’s, was marked by inconsistencies, lacking clear specifications on aims, developments and plans, and of course saturated by corruption and disrespect for the Venezuelans. Maduro is turning Venezuela into a basket case, far removed from its previous status as one of Latin America’s wealthiest countries. South Africa is moving in the same direction in the view of the antagonists.118

For the antagonists South Africa’s similar failure loomed with the technical recession in August 2018. Ramaphosa’s search for $100 billion in foreign investments will become a hollow call if his expropriation without compensation starts to run. Money can leave the country faster than it comes in. His attraction of foreign capital since he took the leadership based on “secured commitments of R464 billion worth of investment from China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the UK”, is prominent in his political rhetoric. These “letters of intent” are something else than true investments: last is determined by political stability, not the instability in the class of Angola, Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Sudan.43,44,119

The resistance by critics, especially the White land owners and capital holders, to the ANC’s intended land redistribution, is more than justified and understandable in the context of the ANC’s liberation and crooked inclinations and doings in this context since 1994. For the antagonists the present conflict around land ownership has one tragic outcome: There is going to be one winner: the ANC, and one loser: the White land owners.

3.6.4. The ANC’s economics viewed critically The failure of the ANC’s economic plans since 1994

Current South African political and economic researchers are in agreement with Geen’s opinion of more than 80 years ago that a an improved economy and social functioning for South Africa can only be delivered by the job market of urban areas, and not an economy bound to the rural farming setup. The antagonists believe that this must be also the main aim and focus of the ANC regime. The current opportunistic and radical socioeconomic reform by the ANC regime, with their emphasis on a “back to the country” redeployment of masses of poor and landless Blacks on farmland to be expropriated exclusively from White farmers, needs evaluation and description. This planned socioeconomic engineering is reminiscent of the communist regimes in Russia under Stalin and China under Mao. As in the failed Russian-Chinese-experiment on land-reform and their redeployment of people to the countryside, “masses” of people are central in the planned Ramaphosa-ANC-back-to-the-country-scheme. In terms of South Africa’s population of between 50 and 55 million, “masses” means nothing less than the majority of people, which can be between 25 and 30 million persons. The rural placement of even 10% of the South African population (meaning 5 to 6 million of the population out of 50 to 55 million) for a successful living on the “to be expropriated” White farmland, is not in any way economically viable or sustainable. It is a doomed scheme. This dooming last resort by the ANC regime to address the country’s many seemingly unbridgeable economic ills and crises with radical actions like land grabbing, makes it prominent to ask the question what the ANC regime did so far in terms of other economic plans and initiatives since 1994 to better South Africa before they fell into despair.120-122

In light of above economic and financial negativity, is it important to reflect on the business plans and initiatives based on an urban-rural-orientation of the ANC regime since 1994. Firstly, the ANC’s must promote the National Development Plan (NDP) of job creation via small and medium enterprises (SME) as a successful policy intervention for upliftment the poor Blacks. A research project by the SBI (the old Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut) shows that the ANC misuses estimates that lack hard evidence in the reflection of their so-called SME-successes, writes Joffe.121The ANC regime has failed to create small enterprises, notwithstanding it’s NDP “caring policy”. This outcome of failure was reflected by the Indaba on small businesses held in July 2018, which pointed out the ANC’s failed economic policy to nurture small and medium enterprises. Indeed, the notion of the National Development Plan that SMEs will create most of South Africa’s growth and jobs (the vision of the sector is to create 90% of 11 million new jobs by 2030 and contribute 60% to 80% of the GDP growth), is “little more than a pipe dream”.120-122

Joffe121 shows, using the findings of the SBI, that the formal SME-sector (defined as firms registered for tax purposes and which employ fewer than 200 people) is much les than as the ANC’s rhetoric reflects (disarming their claims of a strong SME-sector). This group (classed as small- medium and micro-enterprises) represents only about a quarter of a million (250 000) enterprises with a contribution to employment to South Africa of only 28% job absorption (against a global of 60% to 70%), notwithstanding the fact that it forms 98.5% of all the registered firms in 2016. This finding is drastically lower than the estimated 1.2 million between 6 million postulates by the ANC regime in reflecting on their initiative to better the South African economy. Fifty-six per cent of jobs are provided by 1 000 larger enterprises, which includes the government as an employer (which is show to over-employs wherein political loyalty at the voting-box plays a strong role). A study by RED13X3 of the University of Cape Town reveals that the informal business sector, consisting of 1.4 million enterprises which are functioning outside the tax-net, provides only more or less 17% employment, mostly at a very low level of payment. Most formal SMEs are struggling in a very hostile business environment, varying from regulatory hurdles, red tape, as well as a lack of access to capital and skills development. Their contribution to the cross inland GDP is also relatively lower than previously reflected by the ANC regime in praising their false economic initiatives. Joffe121 also reports that more than 60% of them employ fewer than 10 people and that about 70% of them fail within the first two years of start-up.120-124

Research by the Small-business Institute, supported by data of South African Income Services(SAID), shows in short the following South African setup in 2016: 176 333 micro-enterprises (fewer than 10 workers, accommodating 5.1% workers), 68 494 SMEs (11 to 50 workers, accommodating 11% workers), and 17 397 middle-level enterprises (51 to 200 workers, accommodating 12% workers). In total SMEs accommodated 3 863 104 persons, or 29% of working South Africans.121,124

For the antagonists this failure by the ANC regime is a clear warning of an economy in decline, reflecting growing poverty and a failed ANC regime coming from 1994.121 In this regard is it important to note that in 2011 the South African economy was R5.7 trillion, while it retracted to R4.8 trillion in 2018.121,125

Exclusive land redistribution without compensation as a successful way to reform South Africa’s collapsing economy, racial inequality and Black poverty, is a failed option as Stalin’s Russia and Mao’s China already confirm and which the present radical land reform in Venezuela is in the process of confirming. Land redistribution without compensation will only contribute further to decrease and to degrade the South African economy. If the ANC’s economic plans and initiatives since 1994 could not move the country positively, how can land stealing do better?121-123,126

Speckman123 warning is pertinent when writes123: 5: “South Africa is on the brink of a fiscal cliff and unless the economy improves significantly the government could find itself in Washington, cap in the hand, begging a rescue package from the IMF.”

The technical recession that kicked in September 2018 can be the final straw breaking the ANC regime’s back. They have already started begging as its BRICS-partner, Brazil, is already doing.123

Derby125, with his eye on a seemingly unavoidable future IMF intervention in South Africa as a result of the ANC regime’s ongoing economic failures, notwithstanding their attempts, points out the origin of it in its revolutionary and radical economics foundation, spelling only doomed economic and political outcomes. This focuses the attention on the immense lack of economic and political talent of Ramaphosa and his men to bring a New Dawn to current South Africa, to be the result of “birds of the same feathers coming from the failed Zuma regime”; in the present political context only the “sound bites have changed”, like the absence of the term “radical”, when government officials and ANC politicians speak of economic transformation. Does this absence of political and economic radicalism now mean that the nationalization of banks and mines are dead? Derby’s125 answer in this context is sharp125:2: “The answer is quite simply no. It’s an argument that will live again, but, with the country closing in on possible IMF assistance (should the economy not move into high gear, and soon), it’s one that lies dormant. However, as an idea, it lives on and will be recycled some time in the future, when the state of plays allows.”

The ANC elite’s radicalism on land grabbing may also become dormant in 2019 in the ANC regime’s search for IMF assistance. It will become more aggressive in practice when the circumstances for ANC radicalism arise again. The safe-net of the Western economy, notwithstanding the “re-colonization” of South Africa after 1994 by the Chinese and Russians and the ANC’s hostile rhetoric against the West, especially the USA, can be the only rescuer of South Africa after 2019.125

For the antagonists the fact is there that the country is in a far worse position at present than when the ANC regime implemented their other economic plan, namely the five-year Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Strategy (Gear) in 1996. It was supposedly focused on privatization and the removal of exchange control, but it failed because of the revolutionary/liberation ideology that incorporated the radicalism of the trade unions and the communists on the ownership of land. Notwithstanding a short-term improvement in the economy with raw-material exports to China after 1994, this economic positivity was erased inside the ANC’s failed economic-political system, while the ANC’s failed policy brought constant economic uncertainty. This poor economic situation was further aggravated by the failure of the state-owned institutions to be free from corruption, mismanagement and state capture (while last-mentioned came down directly because of the ANC regime’s revolutionary/liberations ideology that had effected its integrity, political standards and ethics).123,127,128

South Africa’s debt-to-GDP, as well as the growing annual shortfall versus income, is another good example of the constant failure of the economic plans and initiatives of the ANC regime, which is bringing the country in economic disarray. From a 27.8% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2008 it has risen to record high of over 53% in 2017, moving upwards to the 60% notch now. The debt-to-GDP ratio forecast by the Treasury for the 2020–2023 financial year, is 56% (from the previous 60%). Although this number is far from the 180% of Greece, George Glynos warns, the MD of ETM Analytics, the movement to the 60% mark spells danger. It is important to note that the GDP has risen from 25% at the end of Trevor Manuel’s tenure as finance minister with a pick-up on the start-up of the Zuma presidency and the followed-up ministers to rise to 50%, before moving to 53%.123,127-129

With regard to the country’s income it is important to reflect that the National Treasury collected R71.34 billion for the 2017–2018 financial year and is predicting an additional R1.22 billion for 2018–2019, leaving shortfall of nearly R48 to R50 billion. This shortfall is pushed-up by Zuma’s feeble fee-free higher education and training scheme (accepted without obstruction by the ANC regime and its leaders like Ramaphosa), accepted in December 2017 and requiring a further R57 billion in new allocation over the next three years. This means a deficit of R28 billion and R57 billion (R85-billion) respectively for 2018–2019, funding that is only solvable by borrowing or by the rising tax, which has a domino effect on investment, consumption, standard of living, job creation and inequality. The severity of this domino effect of constant and growing shortfalls is confirmed by the paying of R180 billion this year alone in interest charges. For Khumalo the present failed ANC regime’s economics only spells chaos when he looks at the allocation of R85-billion against a mere R36-billion from tax increases in this year’s budget.123,127,128

It must also be noted, writes Speckman,129:4 that, notwithstanding a spending cut of R85 billion for 2018–2019 and the revising of the budget deficit over the next two years down to 3.6% from 4.3%, the total expenditure in reality for the coming year is R1.67 trillion, which negatively represents a 2% real growth in expenditure. David French, tax consulting director of Mazars, points out that South Africa has been steadily increasing its official spending levels for a number of years now, with negative consequences for the economics, as the technically recession starting in September 2018 confirms. This failed economic setup of the ANC regime makes the constant worry over the growing debt-to-GDP understandable. Inside this failed economic network it is also clear why the value of land deprecated with nearly 30% this year, even before land grabbing became a prominent and controversial issue.123,127-129

As were with Stalin and Mao in their ongoing failed political regimes (driven by a political system of Communism characterized by corruption, suppression, state-capture under autocracy), the present ANC regime and Ramaphosa need a drastic attention distraction from their ongoing failed economic policy to stay in power after 2019. Inside the context of distraction and political manipulation, the internalized characteristics of the ANC as a revolutionary movement, offers land expropriation without compensation, an excellent opportunity for the ANC regime to do the so-called “donkey’s carrot” kind of economic upliftment of its poor and landless Black supporters while costing the ANC regime basically nothing.123,127-129

For the antagonists the ANC regime with its total failure to create wealth through SME and to erase the debt-to-GDP, together with their intended land expropriation without compensation, is as a wantonly agent, not only to impoverish the land’s White agriculture sector, but to keep in place the syndrome of a masses of “poor and landless Blacks” as a “partisan powerbase” to overrule and limit the democratic statutory institutes and the Constitution. This crooked political setup that had kept the ANC in power since 1994 with its executive top-leader, was the basis of Jacob Zuma’s reign and is now spilling over to the Ramaphosa-reign. The main aim of this ANC political delinquency is to diminish and limited the development and presence of a strong Black middle class [leaving a small group of favoured and empowered crooked ANC elites at the top and a massive class of extremely poor people on the lower socioeconomically level; a group who mostly sees and accepts the ANC regime and its elite as their unquestionable saviours (many of this group have become financial and emotional dependence in their daily living of the ANC regime, as reflected that so much as 40% of them receives in one form at least a social grant)]. The Black middle class, who mostly oppose the autocratic and crooked politics of the ANC regime, underwrites democratic capitalism and are thus mostly anti-ANC. This group is essential to economic growth and to addressing inequality because they create jobs and stimulate a large economic umbrella to uplift the poor and landless Blacks, especially outside the agricultural sector.130,131

This ANC’s economic and governmental failings and their political short-sightedness and delinquency, not only drives away the Black middle class, but has also forced them into poverty. This outcome has a serious negative impact on the upholding of the economic initiative in the country.130,131

The loss of the Black middle class, together with the capitalist business sector and the labour sector, which has become anti-ANC due to the ANC’s corruption, is a prominent determinant in cutting the political size of the ANC, making it a dwarf of its past.132,133 Musyoka132 describes this diminishing of the ANC precisely132:18: “The emperor was left with no clothes, having lost support from three influential constituencies – capital, labour and the black middle class”

Regarding the Black middle class’ present economic empowerment and status, Musyoka132 shows that they as a group (forming 20% of the total population) contributes more than any other group to tax revenue, forming 40% of the labour force (although they tend to be a stagnant group of around eight to nine million), receives between 30% to 35% of the employment income, owns just under 10% of the country’s wealth and represent 85% of all that is spent in the country notwithstanding their 20% part of the population. They are being side-lined by the ANC regime and left under-developed to generate wealth for the country and to contribute to tax revenue.132,133

The current income of the middle class is shown by research of National Income Dynamics Study and Southern Africa Labour and Development Unit (SALDU) of the University of Cape Town at this stage to be much lower than the previous official estimates. From this data only one in five (20%) South Africans have a disposable income of at least R2 900 per month (earning gross around R 7000 per month) and are at all times open to falling into poverty. This 20% group is faced with financial obligations to jobless and poor family members, making them very sensitive to poverty status.133The presence of a burgeoning Black middle class is “a figment of the national imagination”, posits Professor Murray Leibbrand133:5, the director of SALDU.

The underdevelopment of the Black middle class are especially driven by the lack of an established SME sector, a lack of training and education, and the injustices done by BBBEE to enrich only a selective small group of Black elites. The ANC regime’s allegation that the lack of farmland and farming opportunities is a role player underdevelopment of Blacks are factors is false. This outcome confirms again the ANC’s failure to execute its’ promised economic plans and initiatives.132,133

The antagonists argue, as Geen134 did 80 years ago, that the cornerstone to erase Black poverty and landlessness is education to equip poor Blacks to fulfil to the demands and functions of highly paid jobs. This makes urbanization crucial. Land expropriation without compensation lacks the ability and pittance for the masses of poor Blacks to make a financial turn-around. The land matter serves only as a front to cover up the ANC’s manifold political failures, as reflected above by their inability to develop a successful SME sector and a flourishing Black middle class.132-134

The sudden A-h-a-experience of the ANC regime that the farming sector is one of the least transformed sectors and that through land expropriation without compensation the situation can and will be corrected is an untruth that shows the failure of ANC regime to understand the economy and where in the economic and business sectors the solutions lie. Tshandu108 points out that the retail sector of South Africa is the least transformed sector in terms of ownership, despite its 59.97% contribution to GDP through consumer spending. The Department of Trade and Industry’s rhetoric that White domination of the retail sector is not acceptable and that “new players should emerge, especially those owned by Black people”, is an empty promise to address the racial inclusivity of the retail sector, notwithstanding a strong Black labour union present in the sector to force change. Tshandu108 reports that according to Empowerdex’s 2017 Most Empowered Companies List, the grocery chain Spar Group has only Black ownership of 6.35%, while its female Black ownership stands on 2.35%. Africa’s largest retailer, Shoprite, has a Black ownership of 8.65% and a female Black ownership of 4.29%. The Black ownership of Clicks is 18.5% with a female Black ownership standing on 8.75%. The exception possibly Woolworths with a Black ownership of 37.2% and a female Black ownership standing on 16.02%.108,135,136 The answer to this failed transformation of the retail sector is described by Nomozamo Xaba108, an executive of Empowerdex, as follows108:10: “Customers such as you and me are unlikely to inquire about our supplier’s contribution to BBBEE before we buy bread and milk…and so there is little pressure for this sector to transform”.

In the above context the question is why the White farmers sector is the focus while less than 3 500 (10%) of farmers provide more than 90% of the country’s food? Why the pressure on the agricultural sector to transfer? As often reflected in this research, the antagonists believe there are more sinister reasons behind the land grabbing of the ANC regime that have nothing to do with sound economic plans and initiatives.108,135,136

This “passivity of customers in the retail trade” bring the antagonists back to the sudden positioning of the agriculture industry and land ownership in the mindsets of the post-Zuma leadership: Are White land ownership and the White-farmers’ contribution to BBBEE, besides their successful constant delivery of affordable food produce to customers, really a concern of the masses of Blacks of whom so much as 90% do not want to farm or to live on rural farmland as they have adopted a Western culture? For the antagonists a much more masked political agenda, driven fiercely by a segment of political radicals, is present: the presence of Whites in general. The White farmers are a first target, basically because of their political isolation and their vulnerability on isolated farms. In this context the opinion of some antagonists is that land redistribution without compensation is plain a lingering hate of some radical Blacks and their revenge on earlier White supremacy and wrongdoings. This is also an exercise driven by the ANC’s internalized culture of terrorism, which includes land terrorism and –grabbing to take the best (the good and developed farmland of Whites in 2018) for themselves without paying for it. This reminds one of the “Zupta” state capture.41,108,135,136 The ANC’s ongoing economic battles

As history always confirms when it comes to politicians and their antics: politicians never learn – they get into the same wars for the same reasons as hundreds before them, only to suffer the same endings. Sometimes they lose the battles but win the war; sometimes they win the battles but lose the war; and then sometimes they lose the battles and the war, leaving them with no hope or opportunity to return to their previous glory. It happened with the KhoiKhoi and KhoiSan who took on the migrating Blacks and Whites. They were wiped out of the South African politics.137,138

Now in 2019 we see it again with the foolishness of the ANC regime, supported by a segment of the landless and poor Blacks in exchange for their votes in the 2019 election. The antagonists view Ramaphosa’s view on land redistribution as a power game with the masses. 138,139

Viewing land redistribution as a financial comes at a heavy cost in the end. 26, 50-76 Land expropriation is political “adventure” that the ANC government cannot pay from the state’s coffer and normal taxes or from national/international loans because of their dubitable intentions.140 One easy and tempting way out of it, in terms of its political drive as a terroristic-cum-liberation-cum-democratic political party, is for the ANC to fall back on their basic political philosophy of grabbing and destroying, as Mthombothi140 reports140:17: “…to destroy stable economic systems because they were unable to run from 1994 a passable governments and must now fall back by the “redistribution” of the wealth of their “conquered” rich Whites through land grabbing and stealing from the minority and non-defendable individuals and groups.”

Khumalo141 roots the behaviour of the ANC well141:10: “At some point, especially with limited resources, we need to prioritise, or as young people say, ‘we need to pick a struggle’ ”.

This ANC’s “struggle-picking” is a long-standing culture, cemented into it a terrorist and liberation instinct to obtain without input, like their practices of RET and RST, where land-grabbing is now a primary element. The antagonists’ comments on the economic and judicial wrongdoings of the ANC are confirmed by the scepticism of the formal business sector that the ANC can create wealth in a honest way because of their lack of political integrity, business inability and bad political intentions. 26, 50-76

There are many negative realities related to land redistribution that must be spelled out all involved, from existing land owners to new land owners and banks, to prepare everyone involved and to handle it as applicably and practically as possible. One must remember that although the ANC’s ongoing losing economic battles will cost the country and the good South Africans enormously in personal and economic integrity and values. The ANC elite will be left untouched (as Jacob Zuma) for their manifold wrongdoings coming from 1994. The good South African must prepare him/her for this one-sided suffering. Derby142 brings these negative (and conflicting) realities well to the foreground and openness when he writes142:2:

But of course, as part of land reform, some farmers will find themselves having to carve up their lands; one can’t ignore our shared history.

Land reform comes with great upheaval as it involves taking land from those who have it and giving it to those who don’t. To unleash it, title deeds are necessary. Landowners, white farmers, the government and our chiefs and kings need to buy in so South Africa can reap the economic rewards.

The issue of land reform should not be left to political parties to use as a populist ticket either for or against. It’s necessary to fix the structural fault lines in the South African economy. Killing the goose that lays the golden egg

The arguments, opinions and viewpoints offered by the ANC regime that drastic land reform is unavoidable to uplift the poor and landless Blacks financially to give them entrance to farming and the economy, together with their idea that the whole process of land expropriation will in no way affect South Africa’s economic status in general, is seen by antagonists as either a total ANC myth dissociated from any reality, or a well-masked plan of evil-doing to Whites. In this context, the criticism is specific that the ANC regime (and many of Black politicians, activists and radicals promoting land exportation) plainly lacks a sound understanding of the negative principles of economics: the comprehensive negative impact of nationalization of any private asset(s) is prominent. In the Ramamania it seems to be specific White assets. In terms of the antagonists’ argumentation it is propagated that forcible redistribution without compensation will have disastrous effects (not only for the rich Whites), but all over for the South African economy to include the masse of poor Blacks with time. It is argued that the ANC regime land expropriation scheme, even before it is in practice, will kill the goose that lays the golden egg. The outrage of big private enterprises is already significant and it foresees the coming loss in foreign investments that will make South Africa more and more a risk for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to rescue.143

The term golden egg refers to the broader South African economics in which the land expropriation issue can be seen as one link among many that form the chain of the current South African troubled economy and its many ills. To understand in the first place the three elements poverty, unemployment, inequality in relation to poor economic planning and policy, homelessness, economic aggression and conflict, racism etc., which all stand central to land expropriation, some economic role players, determinants and drivers are evaluated and described in this sub-division. Poverty can devour all riches

If the ANC regime is hoping that the effects of land grabbing on the economics would be minimal when they do it as a once-off quick and hard cleansing by implementing land grabbing with absolute no changes thereafter, they are in for a surprise argue the antagonists. Also, to argue that such a fast, hard solution by the ANC regime of land grabbing will work because investors and individuals can accept and deal with losses fast and that they only dislike short-term uncertainties reflects a lack of understanding of the basic principles of economics. The loss of land ownership is a loss that is different from the individual shareholders of a company that went bankrupt (or is even nationalized). Farmers lose their much loved land, their source of income and their basic assets for their old age. Then there is the clear racism factor of political, social and economic discrimination because the losers are in the ANC’s case only Whites. They don’t even offer them sound evidence as to why they are losing their land versus the outcome as winners only Blacks without any reasons to show why they have to benefit.144

An all-out RET, of which land grabbing is a primary component, will still leave poor South Africans poverty-stricken. Fourie143 shows that if the total wealth of the approximately 38 500 millionaires of South Africa (which includes a significant number of Blacks) is paid out in cash to each South African citizen, the amount received by each citizen will be a single payment of R38 282.00. If this amount is wisely invested for 10% interest (tax-free), the monthly income would only be R319.00 per month, which is not much of an income if the current average monthly income of R7 750.00 for Black households is insufficient to take them out of poverty. For the antagonists it is clear that persons like Ramaphosa, Malema and their intimate cronies, besotted with land grabbing from Whites, do not really understand the basics of economy.143

Research shows that if the more or less 35 000 commercial farmers active in 2018 is halved, there will be only 17 500 farmers in the system. For these 17 500 farmers to be successful in terms of Western/White or even modern African lifestyles and standards and to be sufficient in own financial needs (which the 35 000 existing farmers are already struggling to do) without raping the present economic and farming system or directly or indirectly harming the livelihoods of others involved in the farming sector, is just not possible. The fact that farm labourers are some the lowest paid workers and some the poorest people in our country, have not changed when they moved from commercial White farms or subsistence Black farms. It is simply impossible to create new opportunities for more farmers and labourers in the agricultural sector in a decent compensation/payment-system when the whole setup goes broke.135,143

When the more or less 35 000 commercial farms today active in South Africa (and which as a total group currently contribute 95% of South Africa’s food output,) are each turned over to ten Black families, it will only create work for 6% of the South African jobless. In this kind of “informal” farming there will be an immense cost to produce, while the individual structures to upkeep farming will not be affordable given the income generated. It is postulated that this kind of subsistence farming model will not generate enough for a single family to live on, not even speaking of producing food for the country.143 The Ramaphosa myth of successful land expropriation and the establishment of a mass of successful Black farmers, is interpreted by the antagonists as just another failed African economic dream and a failed ANC experiment. It is wishful thinking, nothing more.135,136,143

The antagonists, look at the above facts, find it difficult to listen to the claim of Mamphele Ramphele38 of ReimagineSA during her promotion of land expropriation as a governmental instrument to return land to Blacks as a source of pride, wellbeing and for sustainable social stability to Blacks, as well as job-creation in the farming sector, null and void when she postulates38:21: “Why can’t the promotion of jobs and better education be part of more land restitution within a well-planned development process?”. Her much argued other postulations, offered with enthusiasm about the relevance of blind land expropriation as an absolute need for survival of the individual, turned out to be myths lacking economic intelligence. It is echoed by the failure of the experiment of socialism/Marxism in Venezuela by Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro.38,103,136,143

The potential and ability of Ramaphosa and his cronies to bring economic success to poor and landless Blacks and the country as a whole with land expropriation without compensation of White land, the anti-reformers reflect again on the ANC’s well-known continuing farming failures (The postulation here is that the ANC regime only obtained a 10% success in the placing new farmers from 1994 to 2018). Soko103 pinpointed these constant failures of the ANC, especially on farming103: 9: “That’s because it’s one thing to give land to people, but if you don’t give them adequate support and advice and so on, it’s not going to work”.

Glorifying the exclusive farming enterprises to absorb more Black workers and farm owners, like with the lone-standing macadamia-nut farming where the produce of just over 700 South African farmers gives the country a 34.4% of the world market in 2017 (against Australia’s 37%), is a false bravado to support land expropriation. Firstly, this kind of structured specialist farming is an expensive and long-term investment, but it does not need many workers. Secondly, this sector forms part of a very competitive world market. There is a lack of understanding (besides the presence of loads of aimless emotions in their propagation of the creation of a large contingent of farmers) by propagandists of land expropriation of the limitations South Africa’s geography puts on farming. The downsizing of expensive farming is well-illustrated by the effect of mechanising to side-line the high costs created for farming by regulation agricultural labour. To reinvigorate agriculture via land expropriation to offer the poor and landless Blacks richness, or even an affordable life-style, is only a fantasy of the ANC. Statistics confirms this over and over. In 2017, agriculture, together with forestry and fishing, contributed a meagre 2.6% to the country’s GDP and could only accommodate 5.3% employees of the total labour market. (At the moment agriculture is growing at a negative of less than -20%). If the numbers double positively through land reform, the contribution to the GDP and employment will only be 5.2% and 10.3% respectively.38,44,103,127,136,143

Derby145 takes this issue further by pointing out the chaos in waiting with land grabbing (even with compensation) to cut poverty and unemployment and to phase out inequality between Black and White. The established farming sector is already financially unstable and risky. He writes145: 2:

I’m certain that in the farming sector today, you’d find quite a few farmers more than willing to offload their assets to the state. With only 4% of farms in the country generating a turnover of more than R5m, and the vast majority indebted to the tune of more than R160bn to both private bankers (R129bn-plus) and the Land Bank (R40bn), there’ll be many willing to sign off all their liabilities.

These are just some of the financial realities of farming, which are best captured by the struggles of milk farmers in the Free State, the North West and Mpumalanga – realities that we need to consider rather carefully as we seek to speed up what has been a land reform process that has been blighted by bureaucratic failure of the state.

The ANC’s intentions can destabilize the presently stable farming sector and rob it of its richness and devastate its successful farmers, leaving the country food insecure overnight. Rural poverty as a public killer

Robust growth of the South African economy in terms of training, the availability of work, and industrial development is needed to solve the socioeconomic problems now prevalent, not land-grabbing. The country’s political setup and integrity must be able to generate inland capital and growth on its own. The way to move towards this is immediate bettering of the regime’s relationship with the country’s business sector for direct all-over investments and developments, and not increasing dependence on unstable foreign capital flows.146

The IMF’s “Article lV” of August 2018 reports that the South African state under the ANC has become caught up in irresponsible debt-making. The report reflects on why our public debt doubled in the past decade. At the core stands mismanagement of state funding, theft and corruption and inappropriate development of useless projects. It shows that the ANC regime’s debt has doubled since the 2008/2009 global crisis to reach now 53% of the GDP. The IMF147 reflects that this was entirely driven by the government’s irresponsible constant increased spending on the public sector wage bill as number one, followed by interests on debts and social grants. The wage bill and social grants expenditures are mostly for political opportunism at the voter box. They do nothing to boost growth, but indeed boost growing debt, making the IMF very doubtful of the country’s financial future.147

This IMF147 outcome is in line with Soko’s103: 9 view that the Black youths “are not interested in farming or land, they want jobs”, basically because of the poverty catch in agriculture. This postulation is also confirmed by the IRR-finding and the government themselves in that only 8% of land compensations that were awarded between 1994 and 2018 to Black claimants were in the form of land as compensation. The story of Ramaphosa and his cronies that farming by Blacks can bring work and sound economics – for which they need much land, making land grabbing the most logical (but undoubtedly the cheapest) way to provide land, is nothing but an economic farce. The base of truth is that land as a source of income per individual cannot deliver the same income as a job. The constant decline in the number of South African farmers from 116 000 in 1950 to more or less 36 000 in 2018 (± 1 000 per annum) confirms this reality about the viability and sustainability of a career in farming. The failure (50%) of the placement of seemingly well-qualified and selected Whites (mostly Afrikaners) in the 1930s in a land redistribution scheme by the White regime and the Dutch Reform Church (DRC) to solve the Poor Whites Problem, confirms that the placement of masses of poor people on land mostly does not work. The solution to the present poverty and inequality is to promote urbanization with the development of cities with modern facilities and infrastructure, the development of industries to create jobs, better education and training, etc.38,103,136,143

Africa has become the world’s most rapidly urbanizing continent, reports Pilling148. A study of the World Bank indicates that 472 million people in sub-Sahara are already living in cities. High birth rates and migration from the countryside has caused the African urban population to double to 1 billion people by 2014. From 2015 to 2045 the Mckinsey Consultancy148 estimates that 24 million more Africans will be living in cities each year, basically as a result of the rate of real GDP-growth due to the productivity in cities. South Africa is part of this immense urbanization trend: neither the ANC regime, nor Ramaphosa will be able to stop it.148

Farming careers in the present South African farming situation is risky. Aggravating this by adding masses of poverty stricken Blacks spells only disaster. There are better solutions to improve the situation of poor and landless Blacks. This is a situation in which the formal business sector as a primary activator and generator of capital, economy and jobs, stands central. Indeed, it is the only entity with the power to steer the economy of the country to functionality. However, the ANC has failed to enter into a partnership with the business sector.50

Ruralisation and its farming setup as a primary artery for the country’s economics was dropped nearly 80 years ago in South Africa after an earlier similar effort to address inequality and poverty, specific among the Whites. It was clear for the then White regime of South Africa that exclusive land ownership and –work in the rural area as an instrument for the upliftment of the Poor Afrikaner, were not favourable. Interestingly, this early report also referred to the poor and landless Blacks in the country-side. It also mentioned that exclusive land ownership and –work in the rural area as an instrument for the upliftment of the Poor Blacks were less favourable. As for the Whites, it was also believed that working and living in towns would bring financial and economic rehabilitation. Geen134 writes in 1939s, nearly 80 years ago, as follows on this troubling matter (which antagonists say is now re-emerging by the ANC’s foolishness in South Africa)134:20:

… the development of South African industries will provide more work for all classes of the community, including the Poor Whites, many of better sort of whom have found employment in the towns, for example in the mining industry or in the police force. The Carnegie Commission did not consider that the best place for the Poor Whites was necessarily on the land. In fact, in their Report the commissioners stated that industrial work in the towns was “one of the most potent means of bringing about their economic rehabilitation”.

The ANC regime’s present economic plan and initiative of land expropriation to redeploy masses of poor and landless Blacks to the country-side as farmers and labourers is nothing else than the planned killing of these people through extreme poverty and famine.

3.6.5. The ANC’s politics viewed critically The ANC’s capitalist-democratic failure

The myth of the ANC as the sincere care-taker of all South Africans, guaranteeing rights like land ownership, even respecting the simple citizen’s rights of Blacks, is a farce in the view of the antagonists. South Africa under the ANC is at the edge of an abyss, shackled into captivity by masses of parasites, acting even against the poor Blacks masses with contempt. The broadcast journalist and author, Redi Tlhabi,149 touches on the truth when she remarks149: 18: “Sometimes it feels like this government [ANC] hates Black people, like its predecessor [NP]”.

If some of the sincerest members of the ANC start to distrust the Party, how can they expect the opposition or those against the ANC’s land-reform inclinations, to trust them? Read the reaction that Mongane Wally Serote150, a South African award-winning poet and novelist, a long-standing member of the ANC and chairman of the ANC Stalwarts and Veterans, wrote on the 12th November 2017 in a well-known local newspaper on the failing and corrupted ANC150: 18: “The crisis resides in the hijacking of the ANC by corrupt elements who, despite their rhetoric, are completely bereft of the basic civic consciousness that had been the hallmark of ANC genealogy for many decades”.

But is Serote150 a late-comer to the choir bemoaning the current ANC’s corruption? Not at all: The ANC icon, the most honourable president Nelson Mandela151, pointed out in a public speech in 1999 (20 years before Serote’s remarks and only five years after the “1994-independence”) the immense corruption in the ANC when he said151:571:

Among the new cadres in various levels of governance you find individuals who are corrupt – if not more – those they found in government. When a leader in a provincially legislature siphons off resources meant to fund service by legislators to the people: when employees of a government institution, set up to help empower those who were excluded by apartheid, defraud it for own enrichment, then we must admit that we are a sick society.

Even the South African Communist Party (SACP), well-known for its radical Marxist ideology, has reflected on the present integrity of the ANC regime, which went down the drain the day of Jacob Zuma’s reappointment as president in 2007. The SACP states that although the ANC’s bad improved for a while after 2007, the integrity crisis restarted soon thereafter, not only with greater magnitude, but with the worst of corruption cemented into its foundation. In short, even for the SACP, also a liberation movement by excellence, it has become clear in 2018 that state power and a Constitution shaped for presidential autocracy is too important to be left in the hands of the corrupted ANC as a regime. This “formal letter of disapproval” by the SACP is also applicable to president Ramaphosa and his regime, reflecting back on his intended drastic land reform with its disastrous outcome for White land owners, poor Blacks and the country’s economics.152

The Zondo Commission of Inquiry is an excellent example for the antagonists of the political (if not also mental) madness of the ANC as a regime and as a party (and the danger for South Africa if they stay on as the regime after 2019). Zizi Kodwa54, the ANC’s head of the presidency at Luthuli House, made an arrogant declaration in the Sunday Times of 26 August 2018, reading54: 22: “The ANC is not on trial at the commission of inquiry into state capture”. It reflects not only a lack of consciousness what is right or wrong in the ANC elite, but also the lack of ability and integrity to take responsibility for their involvement in corruption as a regime and party from 1994 up to today.54

Mr Kodwa and his co-leaders in the ANC elite are seemingly newcomers from Mars. The ANC and all its tentacles lack shame.98,153,154

Steenhuisen98, DA MP, the chief whip of the opposition in the parliament, hits it right on the spot when he nullifies Kodwa’s and the other ANC’s like Ramaphosa’s plea of innocence when it comes to state capture and crookery, which flourished over the last eight years, when he says98: 24: “Those in the ANC who latterly claim they were not aware of what was happening, including President Cyril Ramaphosa, are frankly insulting the intelligent South Africa public. It is simply inconceivable that the capture of the state and associated shenanigans were unknown to a large segment of the ANC top leadership”.

For the opponents it is of interests that Kodwa54 and the remaining Zuma cronies in the ANC and the present leaders have to appear before the Zondo Commission to explain how the South African state was stolen under their watch. Such cleansing can give some insight into the role land expropriation without compensation played in present and past state capture. Land expropriation without compensation seems to have its roots into the Zuma-Gupta-ANC elite, reflecting again another well-planned outcome to bring riches for the ANC’s elite, instead of helping the poor and landless Blacks. On Kodwa’s “innocent plea” of not guilty on behalf of himself and the ANC in total, Munusamy153 gives him sound and wise advice153:26: “It is not acceptable for the ANC to wash its hands of accountability for state capture simply because it removed the chief enabler from power”. What she should have added is that the “other enablers” are still inside the ANC elite and regime, and that their hands are very, very dirty.153,154

The antagonists do not have to gather their own evidence of contamination of the country’s politics: numerous political overseers have done it well for them.155-158

The seasoned political journalist, Ranjeni Munusamy153,159, did it when she reflected on how the ANC’s 54th national conference at Nasrec in December 2017 just rubber-stamped the Zuma regime’s crookery: not only ignoring Zuma’s ousting of persons of integrity in the ANC elite and senior posts, but approving it. The Guptas’ state capture and the undermining of state security were by the ANC leaders denied, even contradicted as false. It is totally contradicted by the dangerous extent of Zuma’s criminality: his crooking with the Guptas went as far by them trying to clinch a deal on the five stored South African nuclear warheads, forcing the CIA in 2009 officially to warn the South African authorities to prevent this.153,159

The denial of wrongdoings by Zuma’s and some of the leaders of ANC at the Nasrec-conference are contradicted by hard facts. Munusamy153 refers as follows153:22:

  •     The ANC national     executive committee (NEC) had been told that the Guptas had prior knowledge of Zuma’s 2010 and 2011 cabinet reshuffles. In fact, the Gupta-owned newspaper The New Age in 2011 published an accurate prediction of Zuma’s cabinet changes before he announced them.
  •     These were just some of the signals that the Guptas had commandeered control of the state and the capture of the ANC’s highest elite [to make South Africa a tripartite governmental state: on lowest level the Parliament; on middle-level Luthuli-house and its ANC NEC; and on top-level the Gupta-clan].
  •     Yet the ANC did not question the usurping of its political power, did not come out in     support of Nene when he was fired, and allowed Jonas to dangle in the wind when he exposed the Guptas.
  •     The ANC NEC shut down an internal investigation into state capture and buried its     head in the sand.
  •     Not even the great Zuma vanquisher, President Cyril Ramaphosa, had anything to say     about the Gupta infestation in the state until he was ready to make a bid for the ANC leadership.

The crookedness of some of the ANC’s elite with the Guptas is even more evident from the testimony of Mcebisi Jonas153 before the Zondo Commission when he said that after his refusal to take a bribe of R600 million of the Guptas, they threatened to kill him if he disclosed what had transpired. There was another threat to Jonas by Ajay Gupta who said the Gupta family has the ability to destroy his political career.153

On the corrupted Gupta management of Jacob Zuma, Munusamy153 reports as follows on Jonas’s testimony153: 22:

The whole state was in favour of state capture”, Jonas said. He said the Treasury was utterly dependent on political support, particularly from the president, but it did not have it.

He testified about how Gupta bragged that he and his brothers were the de facto rulers of SA. “You must understand, we are in control of everything”, Jonas alleged Gupta told him, citing the NPA, the Hawks and the intelligence services. “The old man [Zuma] will do anything we want him to do”.

There is no indication that this was not true. Zuma made no attempt to distance himself from the [Gupta] family or to act to protect the state from their looting spree.

All the evidence shows that the ANC is not able to steer a land redistribution programme. This means that their potential to make the comprehensive land expropriation programme a success is doubtful. Tony Leon160, a former leader of the opposition in the South African parliament and a former ambassador to Argentina, writes that the ANC regime cannot even ensure regular electricity or even basic sanitation at primary schools, or safely care for psychiatric patients, but, notwithstanding these failures, they in their foolishness want to govern every facet of life, economics, and politics in South Africa. This failure includes for the opponents also their lives and belongings.160

Leon160 is correct with his postulation that South Africa is already in chaos. Claims that civil society is currently doing the best ever and that the credit agency Moody’s decision not to down-scale South Africa can be taken as evidence of a healthy economy are false. These postulations are based on short-term manifestations that mask the reality of a greater collapse in waiting (It was expected that a further degrading of the country for instance by Moody in March 2018 to lower than Baa3 and an outlook of stable, could have immediately trigger the exit of about R100 billion). South Africa’s reprieve with Moody is only a short-term improvement of the economy before end of 2018/early 2019 and it was done to give the country under Ramaphosa a chance “to sort out South Africa’s problems”. Moody is clearly not going to take off pressure off the country. Remember: Moody’s is the only one of the three largest international rating agencies still to have the government’s foreign- and rand-denominated debt on investment grade.119,160-164

Looking to the various rating agencies’ probations of the financial behaviour of South Africa, Joffe165 reflects165:9: “Chances are that the rating agencies will wait to see what happens at election time [2019]. But SA’s fiscal and growth risks could well see them put us back on watch for a downgrade before the end of this year [2018]”. With the revenue shortfall estimated by PwC at R6 billion (It could be so much as R10-billion), the chance of the worst is high.165

A degrading factor for the rating agencies that can evoke a fast the exit of R100 billion and more is the formal constitutional implementation of land grabbing and the loss of investor trust in the ANC regime. It be noted that Africa as a whole is facing a new wave of debt distress as the US hikes signal the end of cheap money, which can bring a funding crisis. Confidence is one of the key drivers to get South Africa into the international economy: The South African economy has been lacking international and national trust for a long time and will lack it for a long time in the future. The sweet-talk of pro-ANC economists and senior appointments in South African institutions are not going to help much.119,161-164

Leon160 points out that the ANC still has an appetite to encroach ever further into the sections of the country’s economy and that this actually appears to bring more chaos160: 22: “All these our political masters want to control. Or anaesthetize. Or close down”.

The failure of the ANC as a trustworthy regime and as a party, reflecting again on their unpredictable and inappropriate behaviour on the land expropriation issue, lies in their lack of a culture of integrity. It doesn’t matter for the ANC if its leaders committed murder or other wrongdoings, as long it is for the “party’s benefit” and inside its “ideology of liberation”. The party remains loyal to the accused and their doings, even after they have been found guilty. On the 29th of July 2018 no less than 26 tainted individuals held positions in the national (NEC) and provincial (PEC) executive committees, varying from 12 in NEC positions to 14 in PEC positions. These culprits form such a contingent in the power-base of the ANC that they are referred to as “The Rogues Gallery”. Despite being convicted of fraud, Tony Yengeni, Ruth Bhengu and Bathabile Dlamini sit on the NEC, while the ANC whip Jackson Mthembu was convicted of drunk driving. The present minister of policing, Bheki Cele, was fired as the National Police Commissioner in 2011 after being found guilty of improper conduct and maladministration and a finding of being unfit to hold office. The immediate question for the antagonists is how a serious matter like land expropriation can be entrusted to these people if they cannot even can handle their own affairs with honesty and dignity.27

The antagonists’ most poignant question is why these ANC rogues are being allowed into important political positions by the ANC-party and regime. The ANC’s spokesman, Pule Mabe27 (himself sanctioned by parliament for failing to declare his interest in a company doing business with the rail agency Prasa), gives the answer27: 4: “…there was nothing wrong with convicted people occupying influential positions, as the ANC believes in rehabilitation. ‘When individuals rise out of their own shortcomings, regardless of what those could be, they must be given an opportunity to come back and be part of a fully-fledged society’.”

This “humanistic-criminal rule” can be acceptable in some cases for the non-dangerous person who derailed, but it becomes a problem to maintain an honest government if a significant part of its leaders are “rehabilitated criminals” and psychopathic individuals. The questions for the antagonists are: 1) Why are the ANC attracting the interest and membership to its leadership of such a high percentage of delinquents and criminals?; and: 2) Why in the first place did these leaders “fall” into delinquency and crime?; 3) Seen from a psychological point of view, what are their so called “shortcomings” (is it psychopathic or what else?)? The ANC’s answer on the presence of rogues in its top structure is very simple, namely that it believes that members who have been charged in court can remain in good standing because they have not yet been convicted. ANC’s leaders, like Mike Mabuyakhulu who is out on R50 000 bail after being arrested for alleged corruption, Mathabo Leeto who stands accused of awarding a R15 million contract without due process, Nozillo Mashiya who stands accused of using a council credit card to buy R10 000 of liquor, Zukiswa Ncitha and Sindiswa Gomba who are facing charges related to the Nelson Mandela funeral scandal, are prominent ANC’s deemed “innocent until proven otherwise” in terms of Mabe’s explanation. The antagonists’ gut feeling is that the expropriation of land without compensation is going to be a great temptation for many of the seasoned criminals in senior ANC positions. The antagonists’ view that state capture via land grabbing will continue, seems more and more to be correct.27

Leon160 feels that the current South Africa, captured by the ANC, resembles Otto Bismarck’s view of the ambitious but short-sighted 19th-century Italy160: 22: “It has a large appetite but poor teeth”. A new kind of state capture

The myth presented by the ANC regime and its leaders is that the intended land expropriation of Whites is solely aimed at rectifying so-called White injustices committed against Blacks during Apartheid and colonialism, which, as they argue, created the current immense problems of poor and landless Blacks. Antagonists see this point of view as false. These kinds of utterances and rhetoric are seen by the antagonists as habits and customs of the ANC to distract the attention away from their own past and present wrongdoings and their current delinquent intentions. The antagonists read other more serious intentions into the whole process. What underlies the land grabbing is state capture. The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints are not unfounded in this regard: all the signs of capturing are present. The vagueness about what the process will entail and how it would increase landownership for the poor holds potential for state capturing, either through bribes, fraud or the theft of these “new government properties” freshly taken from the White farmers. Zuma’s corrupt cronies are still present in the system, some in very senior positions. Many of these persons are undoubtedly directly involved in driving the expropriation scheme.111,166-179

At the recent parliamentary hearing at Rustenburg, North West in 2018 on the suggested change to Section 25, the Black community gave voice to their immense distrust in the ANC regime to handle the process honestly. For them the ANC regime’s land expropriation is just a possible ongoing state capture, as illustrated when a said Rubosweni Mmelene35 says that he wants to support the change but feared the effects of rampant corruption in the North West province, which is run by the ANC, and which in the end can result in an outcome that can leave the poor and landless Blacks untouched by any improvement. Mmelene states35: 22: “I understand 87% of land belongs to whites. I want to agree with the amendment but because of the corruption in this province, it is difficult”.

The above confirms the fears of the antagonists. The antagonists especially point to the radicals in the ANC elite’s refusal to state how the expropriation is going to happen, specifically who will hold the titles deeds, who the recipients of the land would be, how people will qualify for land, for what the land will be used, etc. The other concern is the numerous corrupt ANC members in office. The question is what and who is going to stop them in the future: Did Ramaphosa or the ANC regime reappointed them for a specific purpose?111

This existence of delinquency and crooked officials in the current Ramaphosa regime is well-illustrated in an editorial of the Star111, dated 2018 July 16. The editor writes111: 10: “The dismal side is that so many on the public payroll continue to palm millions surreptitiously while supposedly serving South Africans, in spite of repeated and widely publicized instructions against this”.

In this regard the editorial states that 721 of the country’s most senior public servants are moonlighting without disclosure, forming part of a total of 1 943 public service managers who are directors of private and public companies, while there are hundreds of senior officials doing remunerative work outside the public service. KwaZulu-Natal (also the base of Jacob Zuma and his faction in the ANC NEC) seems to be the provinces the most guilty of misconduct by officials: 30 top officials, including two director-generals, two deputy DGs, five chief directors and 21 directors, received alone gifts worth close to R900 000.111,166-179

The level of corruption is illustrated by the high-level official with the rank of director-general in the provincial Eastern Cape government in the looting of the state funds in relation to the memorial and funeral services for Nelson Mandela, as well as her further involvement in a tender scandal of R171 million and a misdirection of the provincial government in 2013 into channelling about R300 million of taxpayers’ money into the Eastern Cape Development Corporation. This entrenchment of corruption means that the financial outcome of land distribution can leave both Black and Whites poor and landless.111,166-179

There has also been a loss of officials with integrity as the Zuma and his cronies systematically attacked these individuals from 2009 and ousted them. Some of the Zuma cronies are still there. The editor179 of the Sunday Times wrote with great concern on the 3rd December 2017 on this matter of crooks who have now captured even Luthuli House, as well as resurfacing of these bad guys soaked in Zuma-kinds of manipulating and crookery, to clear out the last portions of integrity left of the country’s official system (Prominent are theses crooks steering further the country of the various state-agencies, even the security agency).179 The editor writes179: 20:

What makes this problematic is that his [Zuma] only interest with such agencies is that they protect him and his associates from any harm, and not necessarily the country.

His appointments to the top jobs in the intelligence ministry as well the state security agencies have always been of his close comrades, who he believes would secure his interests. Any sign that a minister, a director-general or any other senior official was putting the interests of the country ahead of those of the president and his associates has often led to the immediate dismissal. Just ask Moe Shaik, Gibson Njenje, Sonto Kudjoe, Simon Ntombela and other securocrats who have found they rubbing the president and his associates up the wrong way.

A further indicator of the ANC regime’s administrative collapse, starting immediately in 1994, is reported by the May report (2016–2017) of the Office of the Auditor-General180. It is sobering and depressing reading. The report shows that only 33 out 257 municipalities received clean audits, while irregular expenditure at local government level amounted R28.37 billion.180-182 (If the wasted money was managed correctly, 1.3 million of South Africans could be accommodated in public work job programmes for a full year, 3 500 pit latrines at schools could be replaced, 14% of shack-dwellers could be accommodated in properly built homes and VAT reduced instead of increased.)180-182 The lack of proper financial management (mostly due to corruption, theft and fraud) by the ANC regime is further evident from the way municipalities failed to collect money for services rendered to inhabitants, the private sector and governmental departments inside municipalities. In total municipalities are owed R139 billion by service users, meaning they don’t have the funds to pay Eskom for electricity used. In total, municipalities, as a result of service users not paying, owe Eskom as much as R27.8 billion. The total debt of the ten municipalities with the most debt amounts to R11.8-billion. 180-183

These failed municipalities are well described by Dan Sebabi182, a senior member of the South African provincial legislature’s cooperative governance and traditional affairs committee. He points out specifically the role of crooked politicians and corrupt municipal officials in theft from the deposits transferred of municipalities’ union funds to the now VBS Mutual Bank under curatorship (more than R1,5 billion is involved).181,182

It goes deeper as many political and financial analysts already have indicated. The ANC regime is largely ignoring all these warning signs of the presence of corruption because its intimate members are directly and indirectly involved. When the ANC elite is faced with a problem (which they can either not solve or do not want to stop because of their criminal benefitting from it) they simply try to lay it to rest with extreme, unworkable political promises that generate more conflict (and more opportunity for theft), like offering free land to the landless and poor Blacks via land expropriation without compensation from Whites. Sebabi182 reacts to these failures, thefts and corruption by ANC-cadres as follows182: 2: “You are plunging Limpopo into a ball of fire. You tell our people you invest money when they don’t have water, when they don’t have roads. What do you expect our people to say? How do you expect them to respond?”

This corrupted setup around many of the ANC regimes’ governing bodies and leaders did not, as illustrated by the antagonists, change in culture or after staff replacements following the departure of Zuma. The ANC’s “new era” under Ramaphosa looks for the antagonists much like the ANC’s “old one” under Zuma. There are just not any constructive signs of true political renewal and integrity under the leadership of Ramaphosa to steer land reform honestly to benefit the poor and to isolate the opportunity for land capturing.111,181,182,184

The following editorial writing confirms the immense culture of corruption inside the ANC regime and the state well111:10: “The extent of the undesirable practices it [Public Service Commission – PCS] found points to the monumental task facing Ramaphosa in cleaning up the government. It will take years, great stamina and the will to be ruthless wherever the rot is found”.

The telling stories of Sidimba and Sifile185 on the above kind of dodgy and highly irregular transactions all over South African under the ANC – something that can quickly spills over to land redistribution – reaffirm the current corrupted culture still in the post-Zuma period in the South African government, when they write185: 1: “Shocking widespread corruption, fraud, theft and mismanagement of hundreds of millions of rand at the Municipal Councillors’ Pension Fund (MCPF) has been referred to the Hawks by its curators”. How serious these dodgy deals are, is the fact that its referral to the Hawks was in terms of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act.

3.6.6. ANC regime inside the BRICS-kabaya

South Africa’s position in BRICS was supposed to bring massive growth. However, the fact is that not even a quarter of what the ANC promised became a reality. What is clear is that South Africa already started to barter away its political and economic independence. An editorial186 in the Sunday Times praises the importance of South Africa being a BRICS-partner as follows186:18: “For South Africa, it is important that we remain in this powerful group, even though it may seem as if we don’t belong”. His comment is foolish: it indeed seems as if South Africa does not belong in this partnership. The cruel facts are there. It is clear that the ANC elite want to belong to BRICS for other questionable reasons and intentions. These delinquent intentions are also applicable to Russia and China, eyeing South Africa for more than noble reasons.186-188

The claim that the five BRICS countries comprise 40% of the world’s population (3 billion persons) with a growing portion of the world trade – producing more than 30% of manufacturing goods and 50% of agricultural products, that it is responsible for 22% of world’s GDP and that the inter-BRICS transactions form 17% of world trade and investments and has growth in 2017–2018 with 10%, and that the inter-trade between BRICS countries has risen from R203 billion in 2010 to R460-billion in 2017 – is misleading. It is precisely this over-populations (the populations of China and India make up 87% or 2.7 billion of the total BRICS’s population of 3 billion) and poverties associated with it, which is keeping true development away. At the end of 2017 the collective size of BRICS (four initial BRIC members without South Africa) was valued at $19 trillion (R256 trillion) and it is alleged that the Block will overtake the Group Seven (G7) by size of economy in 2035. In truth, is it only China and India that are growing, with South Africa, Brazil and Russia sitting in the low level of growth (with South Africa the clear odd one). South Africa’s contribution to the total BRICS GDP of $16 000 billion in 2016 was only 2%, placing it far below Russia’s 7%, Brazil’s 11%, India’s 13% and China’s 67%. Our GDP is only $300 billion compared to China’s $11 trillion, while Brazil, India and Russia have all passed the trillion dollar GDP mark. Furthermore, our unemployment situation is chaotic in comparison with the four other BRICS countries: for South Africa is it officially a staggering 26% (unofficially it can be between 55% and 60%), while for China it is 2.2% and the other three partners beneath 10%. Our investment imbalance with BRICS results in outflows of $60 billion in cash to purchase goods and services from our BRICS partners while the inflow of cash from them into South Africa is only $18 billion. Looking at it critically, South Africa under Ramaphosa could be vulnerable to the same kind of opportunistic Zuma abuse by its BRICS partners.186-188

This reality makes the remark we have much to gain from the block by the editor186 of the Sunday Times laughable. The fact that South Africa is small fry alongside the BRICS giants makes the whole BRICS set-up controversial and a dangerous political and economic play by the ANC regime.186

The South African minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Lindiwe Sisulu’s view that South Africa is a star in BRICS, is also laughed off by the antagonists. Very little of the foreign investment of $750 billion that China is planning will be allocated to South Africa. Although the two-way China-South African trade reached $39.17 billion, it is an imbalanced one with China in the exporter position, with South Africa as the loser. There are more dangerous determinants for South Africa in BRICS, something the ANC regime knows well, but it does not like to reveal this to the public and their voters. The danger of a repeat of the corrupt Mahlobo-nuclear-Zuma-Putin deal is prominent.187-188

Jim O’Neill188, the former Goldman Sachs executive and an expert on BRICS, put ideas of an advanced and rich South Africa in making in BRICS to sleep when he said in May 2018188: 22:

…almost since the day the political leaders agreed to invite South Africa to join the club Brics, South Africa has been disappointing. Frankly, I wouldn’t have made that decision because even if South Africa had enjoyed strong GDP growth, it is never going to be an especially large economy as it doesn’t have a lot of people. Even if it enjoyed enormous productivity growth it would never get to the size of the top 20 economies of the world.

The ANC elite became confused by their own false doctrine of South Africa’s importance in the international trade and politics, a manifestation O’Neill188 already points out. To say South Africa played and is playing an active role in the creation of the G20 and that the country under the ANC has established itself in many international forums as a strong voice, is a farce. What is prominent is that it aligned itself with the radical elements running many of the failed autocratic and Marxist impoverished world states that had become more and more isolated from respected stable democracies. At most one can say that at the time of its inclusion into the G20 South Africa was the largest economy on the African continent, characterized by established capital markets, relatively modern infrastructure, a robust regulatory environment and strong institutions, but since the entrance of the Zuma regime these many good descriptions became sorely ghosts from the past. Even its partnership with BRICS’s New Development Bank can not make much good to South Africa’s constant down-spiral and political chaos.189

The BRICS New Development Bank’s vice-president and CFO, Leslie Maasdorp189, makes the following very poignant remark189: 7:

Commentators interpret this R1-trillion target as foreign direct investment, but in most instances, including China, only a small percentage of gross investment comes from outside its borders.

The bulk of the investments in infrastructure and new equipment typically come from domestic savings. Stimulating domestic investment in South Africa is the most critical task.

In the same breath Maasdorp189 tries to relate domestic investments in South Africa to the China, Singapore and Korea economical solution. It is far-fetched. Maasdorp relates189: 7: “Some of the most successful investment destinations, such as China, Korea, Singapore and others, have built up their investments rates at between 30% and 45% of GDP. What this means is that out of R100 of income, on average R30 to R45 is re-invested in the form of new factories, new infrastructure and equipment.”

What Maasdorp189 and many other propagandists miss, is the simple fact that the ordinary South Africans are poor, domestic savings are minimal because there is no money left to save. There is immense distrust between the ANC regime and private investors. South Africa’s economic development is delayed by the demands of the labour unions, which are essentially part of the ANC regime. The country’s institutions are saturated by state capture and corruption, while Marxist extremism has been the basis of government since 2009. These outcomes nullify the entry of new factories, new infrastructure and equipment, even the good aim of the BRICS Bank to uplift South Africa.

Looking critically at the BRICS constellation, O’Neill188 shows that BRICS’s success stands solely on China’s relevance and dominance188:1: “Who would care about BRI, or BRIS, without China”, asks O’Neil188. Notwithstanding the low level position of South Africa in BRICS and its poor chances to really ever benefit immensely from the BRICS-kabaya, South Africa has value for China’s “imperial dreams”: it is primarily a bridgehead into Africa for China to steer its political (and growing military) influence and trade of essential products. These aims, visions and doings of Communist China are seemingly in line with that of some of the radicals in the “new” revolutionary ANC-party who put the country’s interests in second place to their self-enrichment and empowerment via China.188

South Africa’s membership of BRICS reflects a clear picture of a failed state coming from 1994 that is hanging onto the other radical states in an effort to survive the present. For the antagonists South Africa has since 1994 become a politically failed state under the ANC regime and its political radicals. Its failed economics is a direct result of this. André Perfeito90, the chief economist at Gradual CCTVM, describes the twining of Brazil and South Africa’s failed situations when he says90: 3: “Brazil’s problem is not economic, it’s political, so is South Africa’s problem”.

Martyn Davies90, the MD of Emerging Markets and Africa at Deloitte, also emphasises that there are other stark similarities, varying from economic to politics, between the two countries that do not bode well for South Africa. Prominent is corruption scandals involving state-capture. Most of the politicians of both states are contaminated with crookery: in July 2017 the Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison for accepting bribes (Zuma has thus far missed this fate and it seems more and more that he is not on his way to be a prisoner like Lula da Silva), while Lula da Silva’s successor, Dilma Rouseff, was impeached in August 2016 for creating an artificial budget surplus by unlawfully allowing loans from state-owned banks to the treasury. Around the corruption monster is it likely that the present Brazil president, Michel Temer, is going to suffer the same kind of fate in the near future. Notwithstanding corruption as a prominent similarity between South Africa and Brazil, Brazil shows still some kind of other goodness that is lacking already South Africa. One is, as said, the failure by the ANC regime to prosecute Zuma and his cronies (of whom many are part of the present ANC elite).90

Davies90 reports between South Africa and Brazil on the prominence and difference on genuine efforts to prosecute political crooks as follows90:3: “According to Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption Perception Index, South Africa and Brazil are in 64th and 77th position respectively. But despite Brazil’s dismal ranking, its judicial system at least continues to function”.

Davies90 writes further on the other many bad similarities between the two countries90:3: “Given the worrying similarities between the leadership of both countries, South Africa could follow in Brazil’s economic footsteps, with a two-year lag”.

At this stage for the antagonists it does not matter if Zuma or if Ramaphosa is the president of the Republic of South Africa, an outright failure and misuse of the whole intended land redistribution is a reality. This is a conclusion that seems difficult to contradict and much of this chaos to execute actions with success is vested in the ANC’s liberation contamination. Ramaphosa, as Zuma, became also fast and easily steered into the political mindsets of the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and China.

With South Africa’s partnership in BRICS, both the two South African leaders’ feet are helped to be cemented in the liberation and revolutionary thinking, planning and doing of their patrons, Brazil, India, China and Russia on the practice of corruption, disrespect for human rights and political manipulation to benefit the regime’s elite. For South Africa it is more and more a case of “re-colonialisation” by its two BRICS partners, namely Russia and China.

Basically, in the South Africa’s re-colonialisation only the country’s foreign mentors and masters changed between1948 to 1994 and from 1994 to the present day: for the NP-regime (1948-1994) the mentors and masters were Western Europe and the USA, and for the ANC regime from 1994 these mentors and masters are China and Russia. Louw138 points out that in 2018, as in 1795, the country is still being governed inside a colonial model by a self-serving minority (this time Blacks of the ANC elite who Boon192 refers to as the African Takers, and similar in style of reigning as that of China and Russia) located at Luthuli House in the name of the masses. This “Black colonialism” and exploitation of other Blacks are internalised in the failed ANC regime, the Gupta-kind-factor of crooking, cadre employment, state capture, extreme corruption and nepotism, with as background South Africa’s Chinese and Russian masters. This ANC regime’s autocratic liberation setup is also seemingly for the antagonists driving their present land-grabbing initiative.138,192

South Africa’s present revolutionary mentality makes it more and more a twin brother with China and its equal revolutionary mentality on business and human ethics and principles. The country’s growing shying away from the USA, Japan and Europe is because the low level of political and business ethics South Africa do practice present-day do not fit in with them anymore. But this shyness to political order drives the country’s currency daily more and more in disorder.193

The editor194 of the Sunday Times points out that when the rand plunges (as it is doing now constantly) it starts immediately to feed into not only political chaos, but intensively economic chaos of a country, eroding its economic and financial foundation independence (and with time also its political base), making it also losing it’s sovereignty. The editorial shows194: 20:

Once a central bank loses its most important attribute, credibility, and that comes with its independence in following its core mandate, a currency is left to the wolves of Wall Street.

At that point, what would be the buying power of the state? Would it ever be able to play its part in stimulating the economy without having to resort to big-money loans from the IMF or the Chinese state? That is where sovereignty is lost.

The ANC regime of South Africa already knocked at the doors of the Russian and Chinese states, putting its sovereignty on a silver tea-tray to be taken.13,15,117

Indeed, for most of the anti-propagandists’ against land reform, the politically contaminated thinking on the regime of Ramaphosa has turned from Ramaphoria to Ramaphobia and Ramareality, and is now heading for Ramafear, and possibly in Ramaflipflop. The White farmers are caught inside this Ramaphoria-Ramafear.73,190,191 Russia and the Zuma-Putin-mega-nuclear-deal

The Mahlobo’s nuclear deal points for the antagonists to the built-in negativity of the BRICS-factor to stimulate corruption inside the ANC regime’s lack of sound strategy planning and financial insight and its ever-present corruption. Prominent stands here the obtaining of unaffordable nuclear power from Russia by the corrupted Jacob Zuma and his cronies in collaboration with Russia and its Vladimar Putin. If the disastrous Zuma-Putin-mega-nuclear-deal (better known as the Mahlobo’s nuclear deal, which would include a massive nuclear reactor – besides the acquisition of eight other smaller nuclear power plants), was accepted and activated, it is clear that South Africa’s debt to Russia would be so immense that South Africa went bankrupt and need restructuring to meet its debts, ending in a failed economy and mass unemployment. (To get insight into this immense fraught and corrupted deal just follows the Zondo-commission’s testimony of the ex-Finance minister Nhlanla Nene to see the unaffordable 2015 project’s value for Russia was R1.6-trillion, as approved by the Zuma-cabinet on the 9th December 2015. Note also: Nene went down as minister at the end because of his Guptas-connection). A direct negative outcome (and the most probably if the deal had realised, which was near finalising when Zuma was ousted as president), could be that Russia re-entered the ANC-South African financial-disaster around the ANC’s failure to pay for the nuclear deal by taking possession of South Africa’s guarantees of minerals and mines for the back-up finance of the nuclear-deal to help and to stop bankruptcy of the ANC regime. Through mechanising our mines and direct job-loss by the Russian intervention and interference, a further down-grade economy would follows, activating a totally down-grade of the South African economy with permanent recessions, to create more debts and further mineral concessions to Russia, leading locally not only to massive unemployment, but a total collapsed industry and widespread famine. In such a disastrous outcome — well planned and steered by the self-enrichment of Zuma and his collaborators — very little of South Africa’s sovereignty would remain.195-198

Dino Galetti195, a researcher at the Universities of Johannesburg and Yale, describes the possible catastrophic outcome if the Mahlobo’s nuclear deal would had been accepted, as follows195:22: “Ultimately, we become a colony of Russia in all but name, since we owe them a never-decreasing amount even when they own much of the country’s resources”.

For the antagonists the ANC elite, up to the presidency, lack the basic integrity to guard the interests of the individual South African. Neither do they have any consciousness about impoverishing the South African Nation life-long. Re-colonisation by a foreign country does not bother the ANC elite at present, as their affiliations with Russia and China confirms. Even the revised Ramaphosa New Nuclear Deal shows signs of possible corruption and the potential to bring, as the Mahlobo’s nuclear deal, at the end the same way of devastating economy for South Africa and making the country a subordinate of Russia: a distant part of “Putinland” wherein opposition leaders are assassinated, where Ukraine is disempowered and the Putin-Eurasian-Union of autocrats, oil and gas, are reigning. Although Ramaphosa has recently put on ice the Mahlobo nuclear deal and allowed only the building of two nuclear reactors in South Africa by Russia, is there still alleged remnants of corruption and theft coming from the initial Mahlobo’s nuclear deal valued at R1.6-trillion.195,196,198,199 The ANC regime’s growing brotherhood with Communist China

The ANC regime’s twinning with other leftish and Marxist regimes — regimes also cemented in the old-age liberation ideology and mostly saturated in corruption and the utmost autocratic reigning of their people — did not stop with the Russians. This reality is becoming more and more obvious with their present brotherhood with Communist China. China (a blood partner in which direction the post -1994 South Africa in a great extent seems more and more is starting to move) never accepted an economy built around open markets and liberal-democratic western values. The Chinese leaders’ strategies of politics and economics are driven and motivated by their commitment to the upkeep of the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on domestic political power, and as said, ignoring the spirit of democracy and disrespects liberal rules and norms. For South Africa, in his growing relationship with and dependence of China to finance its bankrupted treasury, there is, as with the doomed Zuma-Putin nuclear deal, the possibility of another financial disaster under Ramaphosa in making. The much advertised drive of Ramaphosa to collect $100-billion in investments from overseas in five years, reflects two potential disasters in making for the country.13,119,193,200

Firstly, is it seen by the antagonists as an exclusive opportunistic political act by Ramaphosa. If he is successful to obtain foreign investments it undoubtedly will reflect him as a good leader and serves him as an empowerment instrument to establish a leadership of excellence inside the ANC regime, -elite and –party. Such an outcome, argue the antagonists, can cover his leadership short-comings, like a lack of empowerment and popularity inside the greater ANC. The changes will be good that the strong political-radical Zuma-faction in the NEC can be expelled and the hostility of the KwaZulu-Natal ANCs against him also be erased. The second outcome holds the same kind of catastrophic outcome as had the fully Mahlobo’s nuclear deal been accepted. Unavoidable go with development investments/loans guarantees and pre-requisites to assure that the investments/loans are been back-paid with profits. No lunch is free, as the Zuma-Putin-nuclear-deal had shown when the tin of beans was open. The R10–billion by Mercedes-Benz at its East London plant, the $10-billion pledges by Saudi-Arabia and United Emirates respectively and the $14.7-billion pledge from China and $2.5-billion from the China Development Bank for example in Ramaphosa’s effort to collect $100-billion in investments from overseas in five years, all come undoubtedly with pre-requisites that can have clauses which can struggle at the end South Africa’s economy and its political independence. How the ANC regime is doing loans and investments (seemingly in line with the Communist China’s corrupted business and human ethics) inside this hopeful $100-billion Ramaphosa-investment-drive without a definite aim and plan, and a lack of openness to give insight of the possible presence of corruption and fraught, was confirmed by the fact that the Bob Davies, the Trade and Industry Minister, could not give any details for instance at the recent BRICS-summit on the $14.7-billion Chinese investment, and only could mention the $2.5-billion as a “loan” by the Chinese Bank to Eskom. It is excited big money, but it has “snacks” for the country as a whole on the long term.13,119,193,200 The question is prominent that if Ramaphosa and his cronies are suddenly ousted, what are going to happen with his deals?

The doubts and concerns of Munusamy’s200 about Ramaphosa’s and his intimate cronies’ business attics are justified. It must be also the doubts and concerns of the ordinary South African. At least are here concerns and doubts in-depth shared (and treated as a possible new effort of state-capturing) by the antagonists, when she writes200:20: “We can only hope that investment and loans still mean different things, and that we do not have to pay back the “investments” money to the Chinese. But if Davies does not know what these vast amounts of money are pledged towards, how are the rest of us supposed to drink the Kool-Aid?”

Bruce13 takes this specific concern further by asking, after a very in-depth reviewing of the Chinese investments, if it is at the end not going to cost South Africa’s its sovereignty as the Russian Mahlobo’s nuclear deal nearly did? Far fetch? Not at all, posits Bruce13, reflecting on the political empowerment already inside South Africa by the Chinese. Bruce writes13:16:

“It already happened recently with the ousting of a journalist of the Independent newspaper group of Iqbal Survé, which Survé bought a fewer years ago with a strong financial input by the Chinese, dare to critisise the discriminative and suppressive racial and religious treatment of China’s Muslim population.”

For the South African poor masses, burdened by VAT and fuel price rises (and betrayed by the ANC regime since 1994 to better their financial disposition), it would be important to know what these investments pledges really mean before the 2019-Election.13,119,193,200

What is clear from this secrecy of the ANC elite is that some of these loans are to be paid in dollars, like the $2.5-billion (R37-billion) recently loan to Eskom. The recent pledges of investment/loan made by the Chinese of almost R400-billion to South Africa, again also lacks details in what currency the investment or the loan might be denominated in, or what it will be spent on.13,14,15,117,186,200

Notwithstanding this blanket on information, is the only assurance by the ANC regime regarding their deals with China, the ANC regime’s remark that South Africa is in no danger of losing anything, writes Bruce13. The minister of International Relations and Co-operation, Lindiwe Sisulu defends these mysterious new Chinese loans and investments simple by arguing that the country wants to be free from its previously European ties and wants to develop its industries on the back of somebody they can depend on inside the ANC’s ideological route of revolutionaries. This, say the antagonists, gives a very in-depth insider-view of the gobbling up of South Africa by China and our growing dependence of finance by China at all cost to can survive our failed economics13:16: “We ‘falling into the arms of the Chinese not because we want, but because we have to’”, posits Bruce13. But it goes further: the introduction of South Africa into the outdated and failed communistic political system where autocratic and suppression of South Africans will become the rule and all private land and assets be nationalised.

Xi Jinping, president of China makes no secret about China’s ambitious plans to enlarge its global influence, while it’s common knowledge that in all these actions China’s short and long term interests come first. (This is reflected well by China’s basically exclusively buying at cheap South Africa coal, iron-ore and other mining products, ignoring constructive trade that can better the value-chains in South Africa’s economy.) And the Chinese like to make new markets fitting exclusively to their own needs and plans by building workable infrastructures, like harbours, roads and buildings, to serve exclusively their own import and export needs in their “financial dependent” African allies, like South Africa. Take for instance Ramaphosa’s signed deal with his beloved China on their building of a new coal power station of 4 600 MW (an equivalent to another Medupi), effectively owned by them, which is seemingly not going to feed into the national grid, but instead will feed a 60km2 metallurgical zone in which the Chinese will produce power to run a Chinese owned integrated steel-mill and a large variety of other iron and steel projects. This Chinese development setup will collapse any local labour input and permanent employment in South Africa. This project, still to be developed, was well-selected by the Chinese for their exclusive interest because it sits on the railway line north into the rest of Africa.14,117

On the well-masked attack of South Africa’s political and economic sovereignty, allowed by Ramaphosa and his Minister Sisulu to their partner, the political radical China, to stream into the South Africa’s industrial heart via loans, projects and investments and the occupying of its soil, Bruce13 writes13:16: “It’ll be interesting to see how many local firms and how much local labour goes into China Zone. Because once signed and sealed, it’ll be all but Chinese territory. All we can hope is that Ramaphosa has extracted a price commensurate with the privilege he’s given to Xi Jinping”.

For the antagonists are there much more involved. Prominent stands here the present land expropriation and the possible role of China in “helping” the incoming Black poor farmers to set up a Black farming sector and the finance around it.13-15,117,186

The editorial of the Sunday Times, dated the 29th July 2018, showing praise for Xi Jinping and China’s efforts to “uplift South Africa” and alleged that South Africa has already safeguards in place against Chinese investment terms that do not favour the country’s interest in the long run. But the editor admits in the same breath that Xi Jinping is a master at “realpolitik” and that China is known to shun local labour, skills transfer and localisation in foreign projects. Contradicting himself, the editor at the same time (notwithstanding his earlier safeguarding remark), asks himself the question if South Africa had safeguard its interest during negotiations! More in this context of Chinese opportunism, it is important to note that the China Zone has the potential for further Chinese development and of their South Africa possession-taking through some of the recent masse investments promised by China to Ramaphosa and, guided in some masked way by these secret China-deals, to can steer Ramaphosa to build new corridors for further Chinese development from the China Zone in Limpopo to Richards Bay. Free and cheap land for Chinese use stand clearly out.13-15,117,186

Zuma failed to make provision when doing his exclusive Mahlobo’s nuclear deal with Putin for such a commensurate (besides of course state-capture!). Can Cyril Ramaphosa, coming also from the Jacob Zuma-stable, really be trusted with the country’s front-door keys to can handle the eagerly knocking Chinese? The question for the antagonists is: Can the gratis availability of masse White-farmlands and other land grabbed from Whites without compensation, not also going to fit well into the Chinese-ANC-scheming of more Chinese developments inside a so-called China Farming Zones?

Regarding the darkness of the general public by the Ramaphosa-regime about most of their present business doings with the Chinese and the possibility that nasty surprises can spring suddenly from it, the journalist Bronwyn Nortjè makes reference of the so-called conspiracy theory already presence, namely that the sole aim of land expropriation without compensation by the ANC is to make land cheaply available for Chinese farming projects in corporation with the poor and landless Blacks, making the start-up and running costs of the post-2019 policy on land expropriation for the ANC regime minimal. This “absurd” viewpoint is not without merit, seeing that most of the dealings with the Chinese by Ramaphosa and his intimate team, as said, are mostly under a cloud of secrecy without any good reason offered to defend this secrecy (The whole intended project of land-expropriation also falls in the same category of secrecy, cutting out the public of the intentions, new ownerships, etc., beyond the vague “announcement” that it is meant for the poor and landless Blacks). With a reasoned concern of further wrongdoing of all kinds by the ANC, it is important to note that the Zondo Commission shows that the ANC regimes previous so-called “business deals on behalves of the country” is undoubtedly something more comprehensive heinous than just state-capture. Crookery, corruption, self-enrichment and political manipulation are salted in the ANC regime’s planning, thinking and doing over a broad terrain, with the state and the country the two easiest lambs to kill. Is the absurd story of a relation between a Chinese urge for South African farmland and land-grabbing not indeed a smoking gun, ask the antagonists.13-15,117,186

It is indeed a smoking gun if the Akkerland farm incident serves as example. Hereto Dr Theo de Jager40, the president of the World Agricultural Union, gives as some answer with regards to the rumours of land grabbing, specific for corrupted Chinese interests, wherein Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, the minister of land-development and land-transformation and other prominent ANC elite’s stand central with their hastily and forcing expropriation intentions. With reference to the first farm in this expropriation-drive, namely Akkerland in Limpopo – which was intended to be expropriated at a fraction of its real value for the “community” – it came to light that this was a cover-up because the land was urgently needed by a mining company which wants to mine coal on it for a Chinese industrial development project which is also going to form part of a massive Chinese power-station and metal-layouts/plants between Louis Trichardt and Musina. (The expropriate order of her was in the meantime halted by the land-claim’s court).40

The hard economic, social and political facts that the Western-orientated South Africa and China do not play the same rules all-over, is seemingly missed out in Ramaphosa’s and Sisulu’s political mindsets. Or is there another kind of capture and state-reorientation in making with the growing new ANC-China-brotherhood?201

The fact that South Africa is in serious economic trouble, lacking strong executive political leadership with integrity across the society, makes the awareness of new state wrongdoings under the blanket, as in the time of Zuma, prominent around the new love affair with China.189,202 Munusamy’s202 warning brings as again back to our contingent of failed ANC-leaders who can again start-up immense wrongdoing like land-capture. About the much needed strong executive leaders in the present-day South Africa, especially the ANC regime, she writes202:18: “That leadership is not evident anywhere, certainly not in politics. The lesson from experience of state capture is that the government should never be trusted with too much power and the citizenry always needs to be aware of the activities of their elected representatives”.

Looking critical to China’s economic intentions with South Africa, it is clear that it is using South Africa opportunistic as it is also doing with the many other instable Africa-countries it had encircled as so-called business-partners. China’s intention and inclination are primarily to get it self here well-established to put the hand on South Africa’s cheap, vast deposits of platinum group metals, gold, manganese and chrome. Further are there South Africa’s economically affordable mangoes, apples, plums, oranges, pears, grapes, cherries and wines which are much popular in China. Besides above recent promised investments of R17.2-billion by China, the country already investments in South Africa infra-structure are estimated to be $25-billion, with a further $5-billion in wind-power in Northern Cape and R220-million in the clean-cement industry. The already silently rooting of the Chinese supremacy into South Africa is the further indicator that China is in total involve in 300 investment projects and helped to create work for so-called 400 000 jobs here. The immense Chinese growing network and its rooting into the ANC’s structure of politics and economics in South Africa, is evidenced in the fact that the China-South African trade has increase with 25 times from 1994 after the ANC’s power-taking.188

But above picture of an “increase with 25 times” from 1994 to 2018 is in reality very imbalanced and misleading. It does reflect overall “trading movements”, missing out on the presence of real good trading benefits for South Africa. True to Xi Jinping’s “realpolitik” is China the sole winner. The economist Dr Roelf Botha193:4 reports in this context that the South Africa export of manufactured products to China was only 7% of the total exports to China while the imports of these kinds of products from China were more than 90% of the total imports from China. This endangers the existence of the local manufacturers of South Africa which already are struggling. The poor quality of these cheap manufactured Chinese products, as well as their industrial products, specific like the 2014 Transnet’s buying of 591 locomotives, is excellent examples. Further is the negative outcome of these Chinese imports visible in the fact that the over the last five years the local manufacturing sector grows only 2% while the growth in imported manufactured products from China has risen to more than 30%. Botha193 shows that if the metals and mineral exports to China are excluded, South Africa’s trade deficit in 2017 was R167-billion with China, reflecting a 34% deficit, which is more than the total trade deficit of South Africa to the USA, India, France, Italy, Japan, South-Korea and Britain.193

Central in the new Chinese largesse to South Africa as a BRICS-partner, stands China’s so called Belt and Road development-scheme, based on the Chinese comprehensive and sincere relationship with Africa, where through the Chinese government lent to various Africa-governments around $100bn (R536 trillion) to finance large infrastructure projects. This Chinese venture already led thereto that Chinese exports to Africa doubled from 2009 to 2015, to make China Africa’s largest trading partner. While the initial outcome of this Chinese-presence was experienced as positive by some African-countries, the Chinese Belt and Road scheme became more sinister from 2014, making mostly the Chinese the only beneficiary.15 Only five African countries are not running a significant trade deficit, writes Bronwyn Nortjè. Jeremy Stevens, the Chinese-economist at the Standard Bank Group, reports that Kenya for example shipped only $166-million of goods to China while it imported $5-billion from China in 2017 (This included the equipment used to build the $4-billion Chinese-funded railway in Kenya).15

Excluding South Africa, accounts the Chinese debt of the total debt contracted by sub-Saharan African countries, around 14%. China’s so-called “assistance” to Africa countries was enlarge in September 2018 with another $60-billion in new development funding, stretching over three years. A further prominence with these Chinese loans, reports Stevens, is that it contains many times clauses that lock-up new markets for capital goods and equipment as well as work-opportunities exclusively for Chinese-labour, making opportunities for the growth and development of the in-debited countries limited. The promise by the Chinese president that “heavily indebted and underdeveloped countries don’t have to worry about paying back the loans”, spells masked-opportunism from the Chinese. Nortje15 can with good reason the Chinese intentions questioned when she says15:9: “…can anyone be that nice?” Remember further over and over her warning: there is not such a thing as a free lunch. Never ever!

Although the Chinese Communist government fronted their impact into South Africa also innocently as part of the Chinese comprehensive and sincere relationship with Africa, is the arriving of the new Chinese largesse in South Africa a point of great concern for the antagonists, seen from a political and economic viewpoint. The question for the antagonists is if the incoming Ramaphosa – Xi Jinping politic-socioeconomic-venture is not, as said before, again a repeat of the dangerous previous Zuma-Putin-Mahlobo-venture wherein it was alleged that South Africa’s uranium deposits as well as its mineral-rights as guarantees stood central. Further is there for the antagonists the land expropriation issue wherein the Chinese can become very prominent role players. And of course stands here for the antagonists again prominent the allegations of enormous bribes in the rewarding of contracts which surely can include the present land of Whites.15,188,193 BRICS-kabaya’s “realpolitik” of the re-colonisation and enslaving of South Africans

For South Africa, arguing the antagonists, is a prominent outcome of the whole China-South African-trade-venture via BRICS, the “Chinese chains” accompanying it, like the possible rising of the debt obligations bonded to the Chinese loans/investments and our ability to finance that debt, the snatch up for cheap by the Chinese of our raw materials and a growing dumping place of Chinese poor quality products in South Africa. Hereto stands also China’s undoubtedly infiltration of the South African politics and governance system. Inside the present strong political-economic impact on South Africa by China, can the Chinese final outcome be far-away from an altruistic one as Ramaphosa and his cronies as well as Xi Jinping’s try to project to the world.

For the antagonists it can be the beginning of a gobbling-up of the country over a broad spectrum by China. Re-colonisation through “realpolitik”, as previously indicated, by the antagonists, seems a possible outcome. Easing for the Chinese to can infiltrate the South African politics and economics stand for the antagonists the corruption and willingness by some of the ANC elite in their handing-over of the birth-rights of South Africans to the Chinese, as was shown by the well-planned think-out corrupted Mahlobo-nuclear-Zuma-Putin deal. The fact that the ANC lacks funding and know-how to start up an immense Black farming sector, make the Chinese with their so-called “development capital” and their seasoned farming expertise an ideal partner to manage and to develop the masse of White farm land they intent to expropriate without compensation.15,188

The already corrupted ANC elite’s brotherhood with BRICS represents at this stage for the antagonists another crooked root growing fast into the already dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of South Africa. The political contamination of South Africa can bring full out the nationalizing of private assets and the suppression of minority groups as the Whites.

4. Conclusions

It is clear for the antagonists that numerous contaminating elements and role-players are making the political and socioeconomic system of South Africa dysfunctional. The ANC is a prominent player in this regard. Land expropriation without compensation is entangled with all the ANC’s governmental processes and procedures. For the antagonists land expropriation is intimately linked to the ANC’s failed political and economic management, which is exclusively based on Black liberation and revolutionary politics. It is revenge for the past.202-225

Louw138, in this context of the possible vengeful intentions of the ANC on Whites, which is now a primarily motivator for land grabbing by the ANC regime, writes as follows138:173:

Cries for revenge for the injustices surrounding apartheid are still prominent among some Blacks, even after 23 years of the independence from statutory apartheid. Many Blacks still mourn loved ones who were mistreated or killed by the apartheid managers and their accomplices. Many struggle to escape the impoverishment they suffered at the hand of White regimes, especially by the nationalist Afrikaners after 1948. These negative feelings, emotions and thinking are not limited to the poor, lower socio-economic Black classes who form the majority of Blacks, but is also reflected more and more in present-day by the Black upper classes as well. Most feel that there has not been real legal, civil and financial transformation and correction after 1994 to rectify wrongdoings of Whites on Blacks during apartheid. This negative and unbounded psychological energy manifests in various problematic and conflict behaviours in today’s South Africa.

Dr Albertina Luthuli (daughter of the late Chief Albert Luthuli) says that the present flood of racial polarizations could be expected, because she believes the past cannot just be forgotten to suit the needs of the Whites who want to survive in South Africa. The TRC failed in its attempt to bring the past to the present. For many Black persons who had been wronged by the apartheid system, there seems to be no future in South Africa if the past is not first addressed. These persons still seem to think about rectification of the past as a process of revolution, a forced and physical correction of the past. They are caught in the Castro thinking of the 1960s: …a revolution is a struggle between the future and the past…” They want to exorcise the past in a way that will constitute full-blown revenge for apartheid instead of reconciliation.

For the antagonists the ANC regime and its fixation on revenge for their tragic suffering in South Africa’s political history, is sadly ignorant of the wisdom of the proverb (RT Bennett):

The past is a place of reference, not a place of residence;

The past is a place of learning, not a place of living.

For the antagonists it is clear that they will never escape the ANC’s hate and grudges: they must take on the ANC regime everywhere and in every way to stop their revenge on Whites, it can end in the genocide of Whites. Land expropriation without compensation is for the antagonists only the first step to genocide. The antagonists, looking to the intended stealing of the land of Whites, have no other choice in their fight of the ANC’s present-day delinquent leaders and elite than that prescribed by Mthombothi226:17 when he says: “But it should begin with us: we should be brutally frank and intolerant of the misdeeds of our leaders”.

With this article the antagonists did exactly what Mthombothi226 prescribed: they are pointing out the comprehensive dysfunction of the political and socioeconomic system of South Africa since 1994 with its contaminated elements and role-players, created deliberately by the ANC to execute corruption, criminality and extreme racism. Land expropriation without compensation is only one root in the political and socioeconomic delinquency of the ANC. But it can be a poison root with the ability to kill the innocent and to bring devastation to South Africa.

In the next article, titled: “The antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25 (2)(b) of the South African Constitution to make land redistribution without compensation possible: Part 2”, the various contaminated elements and role-players that make the political and socioeconomic system of the country dysfunctional, will be described further and evaluated in depth.

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Not commissioned: Externally peer-reviewed.


The author declares that he has no competing interest.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa.


Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

Perspectives on the background to the land ownership dispute (2)

Gabriel P Louw


Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author: Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PUCHE), DPhil (PUCHE), PhD (NWU) Email:

Keywords: land dispute, expropriate, land-grabbing, land ownership, land reform, realities, political history, radicalism, redistribution, revolution.

Ensovoort, volume 39 (2019), number 1: 1

1. Background

1.1 Introduction

Al-Khalili writes1, pp.7-8: One of the biggest drivers of change today is population growth, which is possible only because of technological change. We could not sustain a planet of 7½ billion without the changes in agriculture and food production that have taken place since the nineteenth century: in particular, the so-called Green Revolution that, in the middle decades of the twentieth century, combined the development of high-yielding crop strains with the availability of artificial fertilizers. Without those advances, billions would probably have starved.

But it is not clear that we can sustain a planet with more than 9 billion people on it, as it is predicted for 2050, without substantial further innovations, particularly in food growth and production and water resources. Most of the population growth will be in Africa and Asia – in countries that lack economics and infrastructural resources to easily accommodate it.

South Africa is one of the unfortunate African countries Al-Khalili refers to where the population is growing rapidly and where the economy has steadily gone down hill since the ANC took over with its orientation towards liberation and revolution. Poverty has begun to cloud the daily lives of especially the majority of the Black population. Infrastructure has deteriorated, leading to substandard education for the masses and an immense shortage in primary, secondary and tertiary training opportunities. South Africa is being overshadowed by growing unemployment; a lack of knowledge on education, economics and the future; poor agriculture management; ineffective use of land; and a national strategy blinded by racism. In this context there is one clear reality we might have to manage as soon as 2019: avoiding the devastating events that occurred in Zimbabwe and Venezuela from happening here. South Africa needs sound and emotionally balanced leaders, supported by an overseeing political leadership that is free from the post-1994 blemishes of corruption. Only leaders of high calibre would be able to plan the financial and economical future of the country.1-6 The warning issued by the CEO of Agri SA, Omri Van Zyl, sets off the alarm bells about the ANC elite’s ideas on ensuring foodsecurity:7: 9

If we say by 2050 there’s 80 million people in South Africa, we really need to protect the production base… rather than erode it.

The emotions around landownership can spell doom for South Africa if there is no rational thinking and economic wisdom to see the possible dangers for food and political stability. Hunger is already prominent globally – one in nine of the world’s population did not have enough food to eat in 2017. It is anticipated that by 2050, food production would have to be double that of today to meet the world’s basic needs. People who suffer hunger total 821 million, reflecting a rise over past three years. A report of the UN, titled8: 13: The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World, shows that the most hunger occurs in those countries where land is not managed wisely and strategically to generate enough food and where there is political radicalism with disrespect to landownership. Various food agencies warn that hunger is on the rise worldwide, especially in Africa8: 13: “Undernourishment and severe food insecurity appear in almost all sub-regions of Africa, as well as South America, whereas the under nourishment situation is stable in most regions of Asia”.

Local statistics released for 2017 to 2018 reflect that over 55% of South Africans live in abject poverty and with food insecurity. Almost 14 million have incomes that put them below the food poverty line (R17.48 a day), 17 million (20% of the total population) depend on state welfare for their daily survival, while 27.2% of the workable labour force is unemployed (a percentage that could be in reality as high as 50% and more). South Africa has been in a constant economic decline since 2008, with a continuously rising GDP debt and throws the country into a recession every now and then. The Western world may go into another recession by about 2021, and South Africa and some of the BRICS partners may be pushed into further poverty and an immense food shortage and job losses. Hopefully the next recession would not be the magnitude of the 2008/9 crisis or the Great Depression of the 1930s.9-13 Mulder14 reflects that more than 80% of farmers in Africa farm on two hectares or less, putting them into the category of subsistence farmers who can only produce for their families’ needs. This means that 35 sub-Saharan African countries lack food security and must import food. In addition, South Africa is set to have a 70% urbanized population soon, putting immense pressure on stable food production. This necessitates an effective commercial farming sector that uses land optimally. Mulder’s question is significant14: 4-5: “Do we want to move back to subsistence farming or instead satisfy the need for land in cities?” [Own translation]. In this context the editor of the City Press, Mondli Makhanya, writes14: 4-5: “We are wasting valuable time and energy trying to restore people to their peasant ways. Ordinary South Africans either do not want land or just do not have the capacity to work it. They want to go to cities and work in modern economy…” As far back as 2010 the Sunday Times reported14: 4-5: “The money and energy that is spent on getting peasants back into subsistence (farming) would be better used to create a strong class of black commercial farmers who actually do farm for commercial rather than sentimental reasons”.

In South Africa the harsh present realities are illustrated by the fact that only 30% of Black small-scale grain farmers out of about 3 800 are really productive. It seems to specifically be the small-scale grain farmers with farms of between 10ha and 50ha who are going nowhere.3: 10 The constant decline in the number of small-scale dairy farmers in the Free State — from 929 in 2009 to only 190 in 2018 (a total decline of 739), with 30 more farms in the process of closing down — is further evidence of the inability of small-scale dairy to be productive and to reach commercial farmer status. It seems that many of these 3 800 small-scale farmers failed even as subsistence farmers.3 The CEO of the national Milk Producers Organisation (MPO), Chris van Dijk15, reflected as follows on the inability of small-scale dairy farmers15: 3: “You cannot expect to make money by milking 100 cows. To break even on a dairy farm you need at least 320 cows, which a lot of Free State and North West farmers don’t have”.

The above indicates that irresponsible land reform can hamper farming with for instance grain and milk to a point where massive imports would be required, which would result in dramatic price increases, putting the poor under even more pressure. This should serve as a warning about the consequences of radical land reform. Overly emotional thinking and political manipulation should not be allowed to enter the mindsets of the poor and landless Black masses of South Africa so that they start seeing land grabbing as a solution to their immediate dire life circumstances, be it poverty, inequality or unemployment.3,15 When the masses become emotional and desperate so that they start viewing land redistribution as an absolute must, it can result in a replay of the far-reaching and tragic Cattle Killing (also described as the National Suicide) of the Xhosas under Kreli in Kaffraria and in the Black territories east of the Kei in 1857. This event caused the death of thousands of Blacks. Today such an event can result in devastating hunger so that millions of South Africans can perish of famine and internal conflicts in a fight for food.16,17 Ngcukaitobi’s18 argues that land redistribution goes further than just handing over White land for emotional reasons. He points out that if18: 23: “…the legacy is to be undone, the return of the land should be restorative of African humanity. Transactions about the ‘return’ of the land are incomplete without restoring the dignity of those whom the land was taken”.

He explains what was lost and pleads for the restoration of African identities, freedom, equality and political autonomy18: 23: “Land is not the only asset that was lost through colonial occupation. Cattle, farming implements, labour and human potential were taken away. African societies were broken up, their cultures ravaged and their identities erased”.

He views a “forward-looking” comprehensive reparative land project as most urgent, seemingly involving the expropriation of more than just land from Whites. For Ngcukaitobi18 land reform is only one facet of the process of radical economic transformation. His18 argument is still an emotional one, but it goes deeper than only the right of the “indigenous” Blacks to get ownership of their birth land and the right to live there. It seems to be based on a desire for Black empowerment to the extent where the South African soil is owned exclusively by Blacks. This is not necessarily an economically responsible system that would benefit society or the country as a whole. It is true that the past is linked to the present by emotion, but the present reality is no longer compatible with all the identities and customs of the past. Some of the Black African ideologies, freedoms and egalitarian practices are no longer reconcilable with the demands of modern life. Ngcukaitobi18 realizes this and he acknowledges the new realities and the fact that ideological thinking may perhaps not offer all the solutions18: 23:

“World Bank studies show an urbanization rate of more than 60% in the past 20 years in South Africa. The message is clear: the pure agrarian society in South Africa has been disrupted irrevocably. Access to rural or farmland will not satisfy land hunger. Urban land must be factored into the frame”.

It is clear that economic realities are becoming more important than political affiliations and emotional yearnings for the past. Economic and educational upliftment has spread to the poorest of South African society, and this changed the thinking of the masses. They live in the city and work at industries or businesses instead of living from the land.18 The extent to which the emotional rhetoric is a danger to the country is clear from Julius Malema’s words. Should these sentiments take hold, it can lead to anarchy19: 3:

We celebrate nothing else, because all other achievements are meaningless without the land being restored to our people. There is no more fear or doubt in their hearts; they know that it must be done, and say it openly.

Malema elaborates further19:3:

There is simply no way parliament can retreat on this question any longer. After all these consultations, one thing is clear: to retreat and betray our people on the demand for land expropriation will be to risk a direct revolution, which they will conduct on their own, wherever they are.

On that day, when our people take the land by force, the EFF will join in because the powers of the day would have refused to co-ordinate a peaceful, democratic and inclusive process that empowers the previously oppressed to have access to the land.

What makes this statement so irresponsible and so dangerous to future food production in South Africa, is the fact that Malema’s party has no clear understanding of democracy, economics, governance, human rights, legal rule or any idea of how to address the country’s problems with food shortages and unemployment. All they know is emotional rhetoric.20-22 What is more is that populists and aggressive activists forget that much of the best land in South Africa is in the hands of the state. The government is sitting on millions of hectares of agricultural land that is not productive because the Black tenants cannot raise capital. The ANC has failed miserably to support these farmers.7 The failure of the ANC to do something productive by helping Black farmers deserves more attention. According to Grain SA3, the country’s biggest organization for grain producers, nearly 70% of the Black grain farmers on small farms in the government’s assistance programme have failed to produce any crops because they have little or no access to financing to manage their enterprises. Jordan3 points out that the vast majority of these grain farmers, about 3 800, farm on government-owned land and therefore have no individual title deeds to offer as collateral to get loans from credit providers. This raises concern about the ability of the ANC government to make anything of land expropriation that could actually mean something to the poor and the landless.3

Grain SA3 shows that about 800 Black small farmers with farms of between 10ha and 50ha are basically dormant because of this finance stalemate. Jannie De Villiers3, the CEO of Grain SA, reports on them as follows3: 10:

“These are all potential commercial farmers but all of their land belongs to government. There is no finance there because they don’t have title deeds”.

This highlights the paradoxes in the land policy of the ANC. They want to establish masses of Black small farmers on repossessed White land, but if they failed to assist them over the last two odd decades since 1994, how on earth will the ANC regime supports them in the future? In this context Grain SA3 says that their own assistance programme for Black grain farmers teaches that when farmers have access to financing, the outcome is phenomenal. In their programme, 150 Black farmers produced more than 250 tons of grain annually. Grain SA’s successful intervention programme for subsistence farmers typically increased farmers’ yields from about one ton to more than four tons.

Proponents of land expropriation, such as Ramphele, Malema and Ramaphosa, seem to overlook the facts described above. There is little probability that the ANC would successfully establish large-scale Black farming.3,16,19,23 De Villiers3 and Grain SA3 have more questions about how the ANC government aims to manage the result their land expropriation plan. Who will be placed where, what will they produce, and with what funding?3: 10:

The issue is whether they will expropriate with or without title deed. If you are without [title deed] then we influence food security.

De Villiers writes further3:10:

In our pool, only about 30% of black farmers are productive, the rest are forced to just sit on the land. This is why we are saying we want a sustainable land reform programme. It must solve the problem, otherwise it will just expand the problem.

The ANC’s emotional responses to any criticism on the land expropriation policy reflect radicalism. South African billionaire Johann Rupert24 in September 2017 in Geneva openly criticized Zuma and the ANC’s “need for change in land ownership” by calling it “a mere cover for theft”. The ANC reacted by calling his criticism “ill-advised” and “Rupert rhetoric” without addressing any of his concerns. Land has clearly become a carrier of a Black-on-White aggression; it is no longer a White-on-Black assault. What is more, the debate on land has been carried by populistic journalism, with investigative journalism being all but gagged.24 The editorial of the Sunday Times of 17 September 2017 shows how even journalists steer towards liberation ideology when evaluating Rupert’s words. It reads25: 20:

Given the country’s history, where skin colour played a major role in whether one became rich or poor, he should have been more sensitive to the restlessness of the majority over the slow pace of change.

While we recognize the fact that Rupert has been on the receiving end of a racist propaganda campaign that has sought to shift the public spotlight from state capture by President Jacob Zuma‘s friends the Guptas by blaming the country’s problems on him, we do not believe that denying the need for a radical shift from current ownership patterns helps his case.

Rupert, and the [White] business community in general, need to accept and embrace the need for change as the status quo – where much of the economy is concentrated in a few hands – is unsustainable.

The editor has no acknowledgement of the part the ANC has played in the slow land reform. The editor has become an equal role player with his clear warning to Rupert that radical land transformation is a finality; A subject on which the White billionaire and every ordinary White citizen should keep quiet. He also fails to mention the millions of poor and landless Blacks, or the Black billionaires like Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale or Jacob Zuma — all of them landowners. He also says nothing about the sustainability of the resulting farms. The debate is becoming a power play with Black and White positions being reversed.25-28 Land ownership in perspective, is in South Africa a serious matter, and if we look beyond the rhetoric, it is clear that there are a number of problems. The first mistake was that the 1994 Constitution closed down the discussion on land transfer, and the leadership has not addressed it since. Khumalo29 indicates the confusion in people’s mind about this issue and the polarization between the different sides.

Khumalo writes in this regard29: 10:

The first policy debate out of the blocks this year is land. Land policy has gone through various rebranding, having started as land restitution, land redistribution and lately land reform, while the implementation kicked of as “willing buyer, willing seller”, then became “just and equitable”.

Now we are firmly in “land expropriation without compensation”, with a few caveats around food security.

All this should be a warning that ignoring or postponing the wrongs of the past and hoping they would sort themselves out is not sustainable. Hope is not a strategy.

The matter of land has to be settled soon and the solution should be viable and sustainable. It is a legitimate problem that has been ignored for too long. The writing of Ellapen Rapiti30 on the sensitive and explosive matter of land redistribution, with or without compensation, offers a wise warning that can not be ignored:30: 20

One can only hope that the ruling party will handle this delicate situation of land expropriation with prudence and caution before we end up with anarchy and civil war or become a pariah of the international community, something we can ill-afford after years of Jacob Zuma’s terrible leadership.

Land expropriation without compensation is something much more complicated and comprehensive than what the arguments, opinions and viewpoints show. For one thing, it is central to the ANC’s failure to rule effectively since 1994. The taking of White land will not solve Black poverty, inequality and unemployment. The ANC government does not add value to the economic, social and juridical integrity of South Africa. Land grabbing is a desperate attempt to find a short-term solution to the ANC’s crisis. It is also something sinister — farms is just the first in line in a long row of asset categories that can fall like dominoes in future.2,31 The issue of land goes deeper than just ownership. The inculcation of radicalism is one thing that should be discussed. It stems from a long history, and the article now turns to a discussion of the different radical points of view in an effort to sketch the background to the land issue.

1.1.1 The objectors to land grabbing

There is a clear initiative by some individuals and groups to oppose the envisioned change to the Constitution and land expropriation without compensation. It is not a uniform group and their motivations, agendas and aims differ. It will be correct to say there are some instances of opportunism, selfishness and racism; sometimes openly, but mostly hidden. The main adherents are White, of which the Afrikaners are the most.

At the same time, there is strong opposition from the formal business sector, which is capitalistic and democratically orientated. Their concern is the short and long term economic health of the country and its people, as well as the individuals and groups whose financial interests they manage. On the whole, the business sector is free from racial and ethnic interests in this debate.

Among journalists, there is also a strong group of anti-reformers, mostly representing the Afrikaner and White English-speaking media. Prominent is the presence of a strong group of seasoned Black journalists and experienced White English-speaking journalists who have become known for their objective, well-reasoned political arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the land reforming issue. They do not shy away from taking on the political role players of the country, be it the ANC or the Freedom Plus, Mandela or Verwoerd. This group forms a core that offers the public a balanced and constructive view on current politics.2,32-35 On the Afrikaner side, the most prominent organizations are Agri SA, AfriForum, Agbiz, Afri Agric, Solidarity, and the Institute of Race Relations (IRR), as well as Afrikaans newspapers such as Die Burger, Beeld and Rapport. Opposition political parties have an informal alliance to resist changes to the Constitution to allow land expropriation without compensation. This includes Cope, the DA, ACDP, Freedom Plus and IFP. There is also an ad hoc group of 17 organisations consisting of role players such as AfriForum, the Helen Suzman foundation, the Reformed Church, the FW de Klerk foundation, the DA, the FF-Plus, Cope, Agri Limpopo, and various business or cultural bodies like Solidarity and the IRR. These various entities are focused on the ANC’s attack on democracy and the present political discrimination against Whites with the undemocratic capture of White farms and capital. 2,32-39

These Afrikaner organisations, often sold to the public as the saviours of the Afrikaner, mostly address the land matter by means of legal avenues, financial support and public campaigns to request the public to support the resistance to land expropriation. They have also attempted to reach out to political leaders like President Donald Trump and the UN in terms of its Article 17 on human rights.2,32-35 The business sector is mostly represented by prominent institutions like the Minerals Council SA, Business Leadership SA, the Land Bank, Agricultural Business Chamber (Agbiz) and the Reseve Bank. At the moment, all those who oppose expropriation are anxiously waiting for the outcome of the parliamentary hearings and the ANC’s possible actions via the parliament or the country’s courts of law to change the Constitution. Once this happens, these groups intend to use the courts and to approach foreign governments. The outcome of the test case on the interpretation of Section 25 could also affect the process.5,36-39

Ramaphosa’s determination with respect to this issue and his public challenging of Donald Trump has made it clear to the Afrikaner/White farmers that Ramaphosa intends to put them under much more strain in the future. Nair40 reflects this intention of Ramaphosa when he reports40: 4:

Land expropriation without compensation is going to happen whether South Africans, US President Donald Trump and the UN General Assembly like it or not.

President Cyril Ramaphosa made this clear at a business breakfast in Pietermaritzburg, where he told black professionals that he would not be apologetic about the government’s land reform programme.

The reaction of Donald Trump to the South African land reform matter was the direct outcome of AfriForum’s actions. The decision the ANC made at Nasrec has caused the objectors to rethink their efforts to avert land expropriation without compensation.36,41-43 For some Afrikaners the battle against expropriation is a last effort to regain lost power.42 They are aware of the danger they are in at present, as Munusamy11 shows: the country is characterized by a sustained political, economical, moral and societal decline that shows a permanently violent society at war with itself. She writes11: 18:

The rapid degeneration and erosion of values, the restlessness of people stuck in a perpetual cycle of poverty and the lack of leadership can only mean that social upheaval in our country is inevitable”.

I do not know how the descent of our society will be depicted or remembered.

But it is unlikely that the political players who caused the collapse will pay for it.

The most profound suffering will be that of the victims of the fall.

Rumusamy reports further11: 18:

Violent crime, such as armed robbery, rape, carjacking, mugging, and ‘smash-and-grab’ attacks on vehicles, is common. There is a higher risk of violent crime in the central business districts of major cities after dark.

Demonstrations, protests, and strikes occur frequently. These can develop quickly without prior notification, often interrupting traffic, transportation, and other services; such events have the potential to turn violent.

However, there is also conflict among these organizations fighting the ANC’s land expropriation intentions. Agri SA is often seen as not really representing the interests of farmers. Their views differ from those of AfriForum and the IRR. Theo de Jager2 sees this internal conflict among White farmers as a direct result of the ANC’s ability to create discord between farmers’ associations and a political environment where AgriSA stands out because of its direct communication with the ANC.2,37,38,40 White landowners (especially the Afrikaners) see their ability to attract the attention of Donald Trump as confirmation that they are victims of the ANC and Ramaphosa’s political wrongdoings, which has indeed became an international matter. They see the Trump tweet: “I have asked Secretary of State@SecPompeo to closely study the South Africa land and farm seizers and the expropriations and large scale killing of farmers”, as an international warning to the ANC to mind their ways when it comes to human rights and the Afrikaners. The indignant response of proponents of land expropriation on Trump’s tweet perhaps reveals that he had touched a raw nerve. The first touch to this nerve came a few months before when the Australian home affairs minister said he wanted to fast-track the immigration of White farmers to Australia because they are victims of the ANC’s ongoing political wrongdoings.2,11,37,40-48 The journalist Peter Bruce37 writes in this regard37: 20:

There’s no doubt AfriForum has had great success spreading its message of racial victimhood around the world. Last week it was Trump. A few months before it was Peter Dutton, the Australian home affairs minister…

With their role of warmongering in land grabbing, the intentions of political radicals, to make a change to the present ownership of land, go much deeper than radical land reform; it is an attempt to dismantle the 1994 dispensation and the Constitution. They regard the fact that the country has had a working democracy with very little strife or conflict for more than 25 years as something of very little importance. They feel that Whites are still being advantaged and that there has not been enough restitution. This argument is not without merit, but it does reflect a lack of understanding of the events of 1994 and the economic and political conditions the ANC inherited. Had the ANC called for a more aggressive Constitution in 1994, they would have started a war. The NP and its security forces were in a strong position in 1994 and for some time after that. The aim of the Constitution was also to safeguard racial peace and to facilitate the creation of a New South Africa. It put in place a system that was workable for bringing civil rights and capital to the Black majority. However, the ANC did fail the test of statesmanship and they did not improve the economy, but rather managed it into chaos. That being said, the Constitution with its clauses on land saved the country from a war that the radicals now want to restart.49-59 Calls for land reform are not limited to the EFF and the ANC, but also come from some members of the PAC. This political aggression is highly contagious and could have very negative consequences for the poor, unemployed and landless. Populistic rhetoric, bordering on warmongering aimed at White landowners, is prominent. The past is often described as Africans losing their own country to a minority of hostile and armed European colonists. This rhetoric holds great danger for the country’s political and economic stability and the people’s safety.29,49,56 Mthombothi56: 15 describes the risks56: 15:

There are those, of course, who won’t mind an outcome. It is fashionable these days to ridicule the settlement as a sell-out. Like the biblical Samson, they want to pull the house down. War is not a picnic. But if this lot were in charge of the negotiations in 1994, the country would probably have been plunged into a civil war worse than Rwanda.

Mthombothi’s56 warning is amplified by the various civil wars, like the war in Syria that has thus far left more than 12 million Syrians homeless and at least another 500 000 dead. It will take decades for Syria to recover to the point of being a functioning state. In Rwanda, East Africa, tribal massacres led to the death of 800 000 people in just 100 days (8 000 a day) in 1994.56,60 Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s inciting remarks about Whites give us an idea of the gravity of the situation. She is a respected member of the present ANC government and an ex-wife of Jacob Zuma. She uses radical myths bordering on hate speech to fuel the hate for Whites as landowners. Politicians like Dlamini-Zuma and Malema are prepared to sacrifice South African political stability to push their ideologies. Radicals have long painted Whites as criminals to gain support to strengthen their own political careers.50-59 Unsworth61 for instance quotes Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as saying61:1:

They [Whites] have been stealing ever since their arrival in this country. They stole our land.

Professor Ruth Hall63 of the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), Western Cape University, emphasizes the recent parliamentary decision to accept the transfer of landownership without compensation from Whites, reflects official approval that it is “morally correct”. As result of the ANC government’s failure as a regime, the general populace is dissatisfied with the slow progress on urban land (plots and homes), work opportunities, affordable transport and service delivery.62,63 The recent land invasions, especially urban land, speak to more than just opportunistic and politically driven radicals. It is a kind of civil action on behalf of the poor. The ANC does not address this because it draws the attention away from the party’s inefficiency.62,63 The ANC regime needs a new, easy socioeconomic intervention to satisfy the revolting and impoverished Blacks.

1.1.2 The thorns you scatter can prick your feet one day

Many nationalist Afrikaners saw Apartheid as unbreakable and they believed in the integrity of NP leaders such as DF Malan, JG Strydom, HF Verwoerd and JB Vorster. The Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) was their trusted think tank, promising all nationalist Afrikaners a great future. In 1994, they thought that the Constitution buried the injustices in the past. But, in terms of the Herodotus Curse, injustice always returns in the form of revenge. In their political naivety, the nationalist Afrikaners never thought that the Blacks would act exactly like they themselves acted in the heyday of Apartheid. The envisioned land redistribution seems to be a bitter lesson for the Afrikaners/Whites that the thorns they scattered would come to prick their bare feet. The intended changes to Section 25 of the Constitution should be viewed within the context of the country’s past.42 Apartheid and its land grabbing was not an accidental phenomenon. It artificially protected the interest of the Whites. Their political thinking was short-sighted, opportunistic and selfish.42

However, the same can be said of the Blacks. During the Mfecane migrating tribes seized land and completely wiped out several tribes. Never did these early Black conquerors of South Africa think their reign would come to an absurd end. History and the vicious circle of conqueror–conquered are inseparable. The South African political history shows this well.42 History shows that any social class without capital of its own that is in conflict with an economically powerful class, tends to use state capital once it has gained power in an effort to initiate its own economic growth. It is therefore normal that the ANC did not hesitate to make the state an entrepreneur in the economic sphere to uplift the economically disadvantaged non-Whites. However, the land issue also involves retribution.42 Very few Black politicians are honest enough to acknowledge the bad governance of the recent years and the Black-on-Black exploitation in the history before the 1840s. Even the Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg offers visitors the false history that portrays all Blacks as native and innocent. A professor of theological and social ethics at Fordham University in New York, Bryan Massingale65, was mesmerized by the portrayals of history after visiting the museum. He professes in his writing65: 6:

One of my most moving experiences was an afternoon spent at the Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg. Yet I discovered that many South Africans are only dimly aware of the history narrated there, and many were never taught it at all. I believe that there is an urgent need for a truthful account of the nation’s history, including the realities of colonialism and apartheid and the struggles to overturn them.

What Bryan Massingale65 fails to see is that there are earlier political histories in South Africa than White colonialism and apartheid. Very few are willing to acknowledge or discuss the earlier Black history. The seasoned top journalist Barney Mthombothi56 and the writer and researcher Hlumelo Biko64 (the son of the late Steve Biko and Mamphela Ramphele), are willing to do so. Biko writes64:4:

In South Africa’s history, different historical periods have handed socioeconomic privilege to different groups. As many apartheid apologists like to hint, this predates European invasion of our beautiful country.

It is true that for some period in our history Bantu tribes dominated Khoi and San tribes. It is also true that the Mfecane further reallocated privilege across Southern Africa between vanquished and victorious tribes. Nguni/Bantu people should admit that this has led to inherent socioeconomic privilege in favour of multiple generations of our people.

However, Mthombothi56 and Biko64 still do not admit that the South African Blacks are, like the Whites, migrants to South Africa. This fact sheds light on the constant historical power play between Blacks and Whites and the conflict on ownership. The claim that Blacks have more right to the land is in actual fact a lie.42 Both Blacks and Whites have had turns to be in power. There seems no in-between, no compromise. The KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Indians and the Coloureds have never been fortunate enough to taste this power. These racial minorities are waiting for their turn to be in charge of the country, so the Blacks should take care in what they do.42,56,64

The question White landowners have is: What must I do now regarding my further landownership and the intentions of the Black regime? The final outcome of the matter will influence the future of their citizenship. This makes the question on land redistribution more comprehensive: What was done in the past, what is being done now and what can be done in the future around South Africa’s explosive issue of landownership to reach the best outcome?

1.1.2. The winner writes the history

Considering the current events in South Africa in light of its history may be correct, but then only with great caution. History can be abused and misinterpreted to suit the agendas of policy makers or activists, often with dire consequences.

De Groot66: 16 quotes John Berger’s words to illustrate this anomaly:

History is rewritten because new information emerges all the time. Fresh accounts of experiences, sometimes from unexpected sources, can alter the way we look at the past and change our minds about what we thought we knew.

De Groot66 elaborates further66: 16:

The relation between what we see and what we know is never settled. What we see is not only interpreted through a filter of context and knowledge; our perceptions are also shaped by what we want and moulded by what we need.

The current discourse on land is an excellent example of the mechanism described above. Part 1 of this series shows that colonialism, internal war and displacement and nativism are all intertwined in the making of all the various peoples of South Africa and they are joint heirs to the soil. For further insight the literature, political writings and histories on which all the arguments, counter-arguments and threats with respect to land reform are based, must be studied. There are two sides to the coin of land ownership and land grabbing: the haves and have-nots, the legitimates and illegitimates, the thieves and the nobles. It is sometimes unclear who is who is often very, very unclear. This project of seven articles aims to unravel this.

1.1.3 Research overview

The background to the current land debate must be put into perspective to understand the roles of the various role players, processes and procedures on land expropriation without compensation and the intended change to Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. Only then can the different points of view be evaluated. The intention of this article (number 2 in the series) is to put the background into perspective and to describe and evaluate the determinants and role players involved in the process. The following articles of the series (Numbers 3 to 6) subsequently evaluate the arguments, opinions and viewpoints.
The different parties to the land debate in South Africa have started to form a kind of informal public court with the formulation of arguments, opinions and viewpoints and counter-arguments, opinions and viewpoints. The different parties offer evidence in the form of documents, journalistic writings or speeches.

The findings of the parliamentary commission who is investigation the nation’s views on changing the Constitution could kick-start a formal process to change the law. This will be followed undoubtedly by formal litigation in courts of law to counter or to support this change and to start land expropriation. The ANC’s intent to fight the current formulation of the Constitution is centre to this dynamic.

The process described above does not really reflect the general population’s view and preferences on the matter. A more in-depth look at the nation’s position on the change to Section 25 and expropriation without compensation is crucial. The only way to do this is to look at what the media reports on the matter. The project of which this article forms part, presents the arguments offered outside the walls of a formal court of law. It is only after such a presentation that an objective political and moral verdict can be made. It is clear that the histories of both groups are saturated by land grabbing. Labelling the two opposing groups in this dispute as the accused or transgressors versus victims or martyrs, would be incorrect, misleading and subjective. The ANC government in a sense functions as the defenders of the move to change the Constitution while those opposed function as the complainants who claims that their citizen’s rights and property rights are in danger. Articles number 3 and 4 examine the views of the complainants (mostly in this project refer to as antagonists), while articles number 5 and 6 examine the views of the defendants (mostly refer to as propagandists).

The present land debacle must not be seen as a duel of two fighters with one devastating intention: to kill the other one and the winner to grab the bait. Far from it: it must be seen as a civilised dialogue between two opposing blood-brothers, arguing the just dividing of the land they inherited from their late father. A solution to this troubled land matter must be found and for that they need an impartial conciliator to listen to both sides’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints to make sense, to come to a conclusion and to offer constructive suggestions, bringing a holding solution. This conciliator can be a judge, an objective member of the public or it can be you, the reader. Therefore I like to invite you to read in-depth further this project. I am looking forward to hear your anonymous pacification at the end (Please see my e-mail address above). It can be the ultimate solution the country is looking for.

1.1.4. Research aim and objectives

The aim of this article is to do justice to John Berger’s words in an effort to present new information that may alter the way in which both Blacks and Whites look at their communal South African past. The goal is to help all South Africans understand their past and present better so that they can make South Africa a better place in future.66 The information that emerges from the available literature on the matter of land redistribution brings us to two research objectives, namely: To examine the arguments in favour of keeping Section 25 of the Constitution as it is and continuing on the path of land redistribution with full compensation as from 1994 (Part 3); and: To examine the arguments in favour of a change to Section 25 of the Constitution for the implementation of a land redistribution policy without compensation (Part 4).

The first view would mean that land redistribution must be done in line with land expropriation in Singapore where the owner of the expropriated property is fully compensated based on market prices.

The second view would mean that although a change to Section 25 does not necessarily mean that land would always be expropriated without compensation, it would be possible. The ANC at this stage argues that it would only happen in extraordinary cases.

The main aim of this article (Number 2) is to describe the background to all of this as a foundation to reflect the arguments, opinions and viewpoints respectively of the antagonists (articles numbered 3 and 4) and the propagandist (articles numbered 5 and 6) later on.

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern political-historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research on the ownership of South African land for the period 1652 to 2018 in South Africa. The sources included articles published in 2018, books for the period 1956 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2018. These sources were consulted to offer a perspective on the background to the dispute around landownership and contextualize the thoughts, views and opinions on today’s land grabbing as an age-old custom in South Africa.

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

3. Results

3.1. South African historical-political sinkholes

As said previously, history is often written by the winner. As such, history can change as circumstances change and as new unique demands and people become involved.

The current debate serves as proof of this dynamic. The depiction of Whites as aggressors and Blacks as victims is a simplification of history. State president Cyril Ramaphosa for instance owns large and valuable pieces of land. Thirty per cent of the province of KwaZulu-Natal (± 3-million hectares) is owned by the contentious Zulu Ingonyama Trust. These riches have kept the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, in place since 1994.67,68 The matter of Black land ownership by large trusts and scores of people living on tribal land should receive some attention to clarify some of the arguments from both sides.

3.1.1 The untouchable Black property trusts

The Zulu King Zwelithini’s concern that the Ingonyama Trust will also fall prey to the intended land reform policy, led to his call on Zulus to defend their Zulu land as locked into the trust. He makes his threat to defend his monarchy’s land in Zulu: Uzolimala mawungalaleli (If you don’t obey, you will get hurt). Zwelithini’s went even further, pushing for KwaZulu-Natal to secede, forgetting that his kingdom makes up only 30% of the province. After Zwelithini’s hostile response to possible land grabbing, Ramaphosa immediately travelled to Richard Bay, bending the knee of the mighty Zulu king and assuring him that the government has no intention to seize their land. Some Zulus see Ramaphosa’s humble act of kneeling before their king as a gesture of emotional maturity, avoid a Khuzeka-scenario where someone gets hurt.67-72 This was a revelation, especially for the White landowners under attack. Ramaphosa’s assurance and promises to the king reveal how the whole process is about, namely taking land from Whites. Ramaphosa said to the King68: 4:

I said to the king as the ANC we have no intention whatsoever to ever touch the land under the Ingonyama Trust. The recommendation by the high-level panel [remains] a recommendation of the panel…we are not going to dissolve the trust.

I said, with respect, as the ANC government we have no such intention…the expropriation of land without compensation is not targeting the 13% of land under the control of traditional leaders.

Communal land is going to continue be under the control of traditional leaders because they hold that land on behalf of our people. The land we are going to target for expropriation is the 87% of land.

Ramaphosa’s promise on 6 July 2018 must be read together with the recommendations of the the High-level Panel on the Assessment of Key Legislation and the Acceleration of Fundamental Change (from here onwards High-level Panel). Ex-president Motlanthe was appointed by the speaker of the National Assembly in 2016 to chair the panel that had to review hundreds of pieces of legislation on a cross-section of issues. This panel specifically recommended that the Ingonyama Trust must be repealed or substantially amended. Ramaphosa’s guarantee to Zwelithini overrules the Motlanthe panel’s recommendations and the report of the South African parliament. It demonized Motlanthe as if he alone made the recommendations and targeted Zwelithini. More important though, Ramaphosa prepared the path for a policy of not touching any established Black interests (including his own). The Ramaphosa decision is clearly based on the sentiments of the ANC party, dictated from Luthuli House and the ANC’s national executive committee (NEC). Zuma has elevated the ANC NEC to the unofficial parliament of the country, showing that state capture is not limited to money, but can also involve the legal system.67-71 The Motlanthe report was handed to Parliament in November 2017. It was only in May 2018 that ANC radicals and the various Black kings began to object after Motlanthe said that the majority of traditional leaders act like “village tin-pot dictators” and as independent rulers within the greater South African political system. He is in fact correct. There are a total of 840 traditional councils, a significant tribal influence on the ANC and in parliament. After Ramaphosa effectively exempted the Zulu king, the ANC-dominated parliament started to ignore its own report’s findings.71: 22 Ramaphosa’s view on the Motlanthe recommendation is described well by Shoba and Mthethwa68: 4: “He also assured the king that the high-level report is not the position of government and has not been adopted as government policy”. The ANC government does not see itself as subject to parliament. Apparently has Ramaphosa assured the rest of the king’s men, like the honourable Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi, that this is a final decision. With this Ramaphosa put KwaZulu-Natal back in the final days of Apartheid. The province is once more ruled again by laws passed at the behest of the IFP and Buthelezi, forcing down the structures of traditional rule. Ramaphosa, as was done in 1994, confirmed Zwelithini’s power – political, social and economical – but it undermines democracy and prevents land reform free from racism and ethnicity. The ANC is siding with the powerful capitalists (but now Black), ignoring of the ordinary Black people, especially the poor.67,68

Who is Zwelithini and why is the trust so important? What is the Ingonyama Trust and what is Zwelithini’s position in it? How does the politics of KwaZulu-Natal fit into the South African land redistribution issue? Who is Zwelithini and why does he have such a hero status? In some way the talks occurred between a redundant tribal king and an insecure president from Venda (viewed as a lesser people than the Zulus) who represents a divided party. The excerpt of Mthobothi70 is very informative. It reads as follows70: 23:

The [Ingonyama] Trust is meant to exist and function subject to existing land rights under customary law and not act in ways that undermine and abrogate such customary and other underlying land rights. However, the Trust in some instances regards itself as the outright owner of land and therefore not subject to any duty to consult or to obtain community consent in dealing with the land. This has given rise to instances where the Trust has leased land to external third parties (for example the shopping centres) without having first consulted and obtained the consent of those whose informal or customary land rights were subsumed by the shopping centre.

The trust has introduced draconian rules, including 10% yearly rent increases, compelling lessees to fence the land within three months and the cancelling of leases for failure to pat rent. Moreover, structures on the land remain the king’s property.

Significant revenue is generated for the Ingonyama Trust by such lease agreements. In the 2015-16 period, rental income was R96 130 563. There is little evidence that the revenue generated by leases is used for the benefit of communities or their material wellbeing.

By 2020, the trust will earning over R100 million a year.71 The legitimacy of Zwelithini as the king of the Zulus has always been controversial. This includes his family’s inheritance of the Zulu throne the Ingonyama Trust. The ruling that made him the only monarch in KwaZulu-Natal is especially debatable. Mnguni’s69 research proposes that the Hhlapo Commission traces the establishment of the Zulu monarchy back to Shaka (a leader known for his murderous inclinations) after he took power over the Zulus in 1816. The present kingship comes from that line. The Nhlapo Commission indicated that the Zulus composed of several communities before 1816, a kind of loose federation. The Ingonyama Trust is a trust that was hurriedly created a mere three days before the 1994 general election as a direct outcome of the political events of that time. It has nothing to do with the traditions and customs of the Zulu people or the Zulu monarchy. There is no similar trust in the country. It is a land administration tool, subject to being repealed or to change. This is in line with the Motlanthe finding and contradicts Ramaphosa’s interpretation.69,71

Many South Africans do not know the difference between the Zulu monarchy and the Ingonyama Trust, something that suits the king. The trust is in reality land that belongs to the Zulu people and not to the monarchy, although Zwelithini has great influence. The monarchy owns only the Osuthu palace in Nongoma. Without the trust, there really is no great Zwelithini monarchy. The Motlanthe panel found that the Ingonyama Trust Act (3-million hectare of KZ of 1994) is an imperfect piece of legislation. The intent was that the land (now for all practical intents and purposes used as the land of the monarchy) would be measured out into specific properties and then transferred to the tribes and communities who live on the specific piece of land as stipulated in the Bantu Authorities Act (68 of 1951). In reality, the trust land has been divided (but never transferred) among clans under the leadership of traditional leaders, who are responsible to the king in terms of customary law. The Ingonyama Trust is headed by the sole trustee, King Goodwill Zwelithini.69,71,73

Mnguni69 writes on the many contradictions of the Ingonyama Trust69: 24:

This [transfer] has never happened. The king is benefiting from having smartly navigated the country’s vulnerability before the 1994 elections. He wishes to continue benefiting from such an imperfect deal. The king, as the Motlanthe panel found, exercises far greater influence than the national minister does in similar areas elsewhere in the country. This means people in KwaZulu-Natal suffer a more precarious state of land tenure than do rural folks elsewhere.

The ANC government has failed to transfer the land to communities and individuals as required by the Bill of Rights. Mthombothi70 describes Zwelithini and his empire as follows70:23:

It’s become a state within a state: he controls the land and people pay taxes to him. No wonder he feels threatened by attempts at land reform.70

Mthombothi’s70 view is echoed by Ngcukaitobi18 and Cousins71 who emphasise that in these cases the land ownership indirectly lies with the state. The land is under the custodianship of traditional leaders countrywide. The state has the power to redistribute the land to enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. The trusts and custodianships have been subject to much abuse. Tribes act like mini-states. This is evident from the numerous deals chiefs and mining companies in North West, Limpopo, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. It is not only the Ingonyama Trust that could be affected by the intended land reform.

Ngcukaitobi18 writes as follows on the dissolution of these trusts18:25:

The [present] constitution was intended to reverse this [White colonial state] by recasting the relationship between African communities, their chiefs and the land.

Thus, for redistribution to succeed, it should uproot the colonial state and its surviving tentacles: the people, not the chiefs, should control the land.

There are also instances where Black communal land has been seized to please homeland regimes like that of Buthelezi and Zwelithini. One example is the 345 hectares of farmland that makes up the farm Blinkklippen in the North West province. It was legally sold to the family Moeletsi/Mogale for ₤511 in 1913. The family Moeletsi/Mogale’s ownership rights were transferred to the Bakgatla Ba Kgafela tribe in 1936 without any choice or compensation by the native government and then to the government of Bophuthatswana in terms of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act (21 of 1971), leaving the family landless to this day.74

Notwithstanding clear constitutional guidelines (including Section 25) president Ramaphosa seems to wants to maintain the powerful tribal Black leaders, to the detriment of the poor masses. He bases seemingly his views on the ANC’s document Ready to Govern, published in 1992, which referred to the acquisition of land through expropriation.18 Greed and self-enrichment is undoubtedly a motive of the Ingonyama Trust. The trust has built up very substantial financial reserves. It is an excellent money-making scheme for Zwelithini. These riches support his political power. He influences the ANC, as he could call for war in KwaZulu-Natal. The National Party of the 1990s similarly feared Buthelezi and his IFP. The ANC-run KwaZulu-Natal province contributed R65.8 million to the trust in 2018 and paid the king an annual salary of R1 million. The ANC leaders have always been running to please him. Zuma, before his exit as president, visited him; Ramaphosa and the top six of the ANC paid homage to him after their election at Nasrec in December 2017; even Mmusi Maimane and Julius Malema went to Nongoma to honour him.67-71,75

Mthombothi70 provides insight into these tribal chiefs with whom Ramaphosa now sided to recreate the old Bantustan system that the Constitution and the ANC (especially their leaders Mandela and Mbeki) themselves sought to demolish in 1994.70 He writes70: 23:

Why have the tribal chiefs who were apartheid’s handmaidens not so long ago and on the run from comrades during the turbulent 1980s suddenly become assertive and even bellicose in the era of democracy? They lived large under apartheid and they’re still, as it were, lords of the manor in the new dispensation.

Mthombothi70 shows that chieftainship is the very antithesis of a democratic system because of its autocratic and suppressing inclinations, stripping the voters of their rights and interests. With Ramaphosa’s re-empowerment of chiefs and their trusts, he shamelessly re-establishes dictatorial enclaves within the democratic South Africa. Mthombothi70 reflects70: 23:

…they don’t want people to own land, or have title deeds. They want all land to be owned by the government and for people to lease. That’s not freedom; that’s slavery. It takes us back to the 99-year leasehold that used to be offered to black people under apartheid.

The ANC’s submission to traditional leaders led to them dropping the crucial clause in the Traditional Courts Draft Bill that gave citizens the right to refuse to be subject to traditional courts. This was done despite opposition from civil right activists and the parliamentary warning that this would render the bill unconstitutional. The government argues foolishly that the opt-out clause would nullify the existence of traditional courts and the power of traditional institutions like the National House of Traditional Leaders and the Congress of Traditional Leaders of SA (Contralesa). The Bill empowers the traditional courts to rule on monetary matters involving up to R15 000 and bars those aggrieved by the decisions of traditional courts from challenging these in the magistrate’s or high courts. This implies that appeals could be filed with only the traditional high courts (the headman’s court, the chief’s court and from there to the king or queen’s courts). The chair of the justice portfolio committee, senior ANC MP Mathole Motshekga, supports the creation of another independent Bantustan model with a discriminative independent traditional court system. In his view there is a clear need because76: 4: “…some magistrates and judges know nothing about indigenous law”.

The present courting of the old Bantustans is in conflict with former president Zuma’s announcement in 2010 that six of the 13 kingships in place then would be ended when the incumbents died. The focus on White land reflects racism. This is a tragic reality that White landowners must face. Land redistribution can be radical and could end in destruction. Sections 9 and 195 of the Constitution, which Ramaphosa himself helped draft, describe the equality of every citizen, White and Black, landowner and landless, rich and poor. Subservience to tribal leaders and political Black radicals is incompatible with equality. Equality, for Ramaphosa, lies in his understanding of “his people”, which seems to be elite Blacks. Ramaphosa is bringing disaster to land reform by not implementing the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (31 of 1996) to stop abuses of trust land by crooked chiefs; not only through by stealing the income generated from these trusts, but also by losing large areas of arable and grazing land and to mines and allowing the pollution of the water sources of communities and individuals.69

It has become an open question how the ANC government hopes to make a success of their intended land reform. They could not make a success of their own plans to reform Black trusts to benefit Black individuals and communities. Cousins71 gives a simple, but clear declaration71: 22:

In addition, there has been mounting evidence of corruption in relation to land, including the notorious Mala Mala land claim and many cases involving South African Fruit Exporters and Bono, their BEE partner.

Debates about expropriation are raising the temperature for the middle classes, capital and the urban elite. Sadly, few seem concerned about continuing processes of dispossession of ordinary black South Africans.

Cousins71 also describes the hand of the ANC government and its elite in these crooked set-ups Cousins71:22:

The ANC government has colluded with both chiefs and mining companies in these forms of exportation without compensation.

Nkwinti [previous minister of rural development and land reform], as trustee of state land, failed to require elites to consult people, or to ensure that his department implemented the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, and sided with traditional councils against community members.71

The planned land redistribution is said to be aimed at uplifting the poor and landless Blacks at the cost of the beneficiaries of apartheid. The question is, will the intended land redistribution be another failure? Will only the ANC elite benefit? The response of a Mister Rubosweni Mmelene74 at the North West hearing at Rustenburg in July 2018 says it all when he said he wanted to support the constitutional amendment but feared the effects of rampant corruption in the North West will make the exercise fruitless74: 22:

I understand 87% of land belongs to whites. I want to agree with the amendment but because of the corruption in this province, it is difficult.

Ramaphosa has thus far failed to address the corruption, what will change now? He initially warned against land grabbing, but he has become either silent or more extreme.56: 15 It seems the ANC wants to erase South Africa’s past. There have even been efforts to erase the Whites’ past by efforts to forbid the sale of any Afrikaner of White memorabilia, even an old chair from the Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorwegmaatskappij (NZASM) dating from the old Kruger republic.42 Haji Mohamed Dawjee wrote in the Sunday Times as recently as the 7th July 201877: 18:

Why is this [selling of Afrikaner-memorabilia] allowed? The sale and auction of Nazi memorabilia, for example, is banned in several European countries, including Germany and France. Why? Well, firstly, because they are reminders of monstrous crimes against humanity. Another reason is that preventing their sale means preventing (to an extent) anti-Semitic [seemingly here anti-Black] behaviour.

People in many countries who want to glorify Nazi Germany and all that it stood for by collecting relics and creating shrines in their own homes will find it very, very hard to do so because it is illegal to purchase or sell any material that is a manifestation of that fascism.

In South Africa, it is the opposite.

When will we draw this line?

Grey60 describes the above racial cold-bloodedness and irrational thinking of political radicals as follows60: 144:

“Human beings had incredible ways of inventing rational excuses for what they did or were going to do”; and: “Persuasion came through habit as much as logic, and human beings were indeed incredibly suggestible”.

Rwanda’s 800 000 deaths in 100 days of civil war, and Hitler and Stalin’s murdering of millions and millions of opponents in the eight years of World War II, confirms the tragic outcomes of these invented rationales, driven by habits, logic and suggestibility.42,60 Readers who are concerned about their property and their citizenship are advised to read Thabo Mbeki’s South African Reconciliation Act and his views on humanity and citizen’s rights. It reveals the intentions of some Black political radicals to eliminate Whites as citizens in South Africa and to end their land ownership.77-79 Thankfully the trust land issue can cause the intended grabbing of White land to boomerang under the watchfully eye of the courts. Bruce posits80: 20:

The ANC will have to take on traditional leadership. And it cannot make laws that distinguish between white and black. The courts would tie it up forever.

3.1.2. The Royal Bafokeng Nation

The events surrounding the Ingonyama trust begs the question of what waits the Royal Bafokeng Nation’s land trust and its riches. Will this land trust and its king, King Leruo Molotlegi, be treated the same as King Zwelethini and its Ingonuyama Trust?67-72 The context of the Royal Bafokeng should be considered here because it is very important to see if Ramaphosa will recognize their trust land as part of the 13% of Black land exempted from expropriation or if the platinum-rich Bafokeng land will be attractive to the ANC. The Bafokeng are fewer in number and they have less political power than the Zulus. This section compares the Bafokeng, the Zulus and the ANC with regard to leadership. Noor-Mahomed73 comments on the important role of effective and honourable leadership in the correct and honest management of land to improve the socioeconomic conditions of communities and to ensure political stability. Land grabbing is not part of such a scenario. Noor-Mahomed writes73: 9: “…we must…examine the equality of our leaders and study their narratives to see whether their interests align with the rostrums of democracy on which they so proudly stand”.

The successes of King Leruo Molotlegi and his traditional leadership structures and elected village and regional representatives stand out in this regard. They directly consult with the people at several levels to foster an economically and socially strong Bafokeng community, totally in contrast to King Goodwill Zwelinthini and the elites of the ANC.

Since coming to the throne, Molotlegi, with visionary and democratic leadership, has improved the socioeconomic status of his Bafokeng community of 150 000. They live in 29 villages on 1 200km2 of land in the North West province. Molotlegi unselfishly focused on relevant development and fresh and creative thinking. Their land holds the world’s richest platinum reserves, bringing unprecedented wealth for the community. Molotlegi turned these reserves into businesses. They have a 13% share in Impala Platinum; they are the majority shareholder in their own mining and refining company; and they hold interests in companies in the financial services, telecommunications, property and transport services sectors, writes Noor-Mahomed73. What is important is that all the resources are held in trust on behalf of the Bafokeng people, while the investments are managed by a company, Royal Bafokeng Holdings. Although Moltlegi leads as king, he does not make decisions alone when it comes to how the collective resources of the Royal Bafokeng Nation are used. The traditional leaders and village and regional representatives all participate. The income generated is used to better the living conditions of the people, creating employment for 4 000 people and spending more than $700 million (R9.3 billion) on improving infrastructure like roads, utilities, schools and clinics in their area. The group’s visionary leadership is evident from their strategic planning for further socioeconomic growth. Three branches have been established to develop, benefit and support the entire community.73 The ANC can learn a lot from the Royal Bafokeng Nation.

3.2. Testing the ideas around land reform and expropriation without compensation

3.2.1. Is there a need for an Afrikaner/White farming sector?

It is important to examine the current land ownership. The total Afrikaner population stands at about ± 2.7 million (total White population: ± 5-million). The ratio between the ±35 000 commercial farmers to the rest of the Afrikaner population is 13:1000 or 1.3%. If all 35 000 farmers are Whites, which they are not, the ratio would be 7:1 000 or 0.7%. There is an almost insignificant correlation between the broader Afrikaner/White population and the Afrikaner/White farming population in terms of financial interest, like ownership or income from farming. The direct impact of lost farmland on most Afrikaners/Whites outside the farming sector would be minimal.42 Louw42 shows that many Afrikaners have started to cut the cord with the “Afrikaner-volk”, especially the younger generations. What these neo-Afrikaners want is political stability and a good living standard with affordable food on the table — it does not matter if the food is from Zambia, Argentina, produced by a White or Creole or Black Brazilian or South African. These Afrikaners do not really mind who rules the country, as long as it is a stable and responsible regime. Many of the emotive rhetoric on land grabbing does not come from the broad Afrikaner/White population, but a small band of Afrikaners/Whites individuals and groups with direct financial interests in agriculture, like Agri SA, AfriForum, Solidarity, some Afrikaner media and the FFP, who Louw42 calls the Afrikaner/White’s self-appointed rescuers and saviours. These groups represent at most 15% of Afrikaners/Whites based on their membership.2-5,16,19,23,42

Some of their rhetoric is as dangerous, inapplicable and inappropriate as that of Julius Malema and Cyril Ramaphosa. Much of this rhetoric reflects the old ideology of hard-core Apartheid. Rhetoric from the English media (which includes Black and White voices) is mostly focused on land for housing and the financial loss that expropriation without compensation can bring for present landowners. The English media is also more focused on the effect that land grabbing can have on future local and foreign investments. One can safely say that the Whites and neo-Afrikaners outside the farming sector have accepted that a new generation of South African farmers has to be born as quickly as possible to ensure food security. These new generations of farmers can be, and must be to a certain extent, Blacks.2-5,16,19,23,42

Part of the irrational thinking and often false presentation of land as a matter of great concern to all members of the “Afrikaner volk” and White society, are the false argument on the absolute need for an Afrikaner/White farming sector because only they can ensure food security. It is plain nonsense. Any race can contribute constructively as farmers if their circumstances are optimal. This is actually how the Afrikaners/Whites established themselves. There are American, Asian, British, Nigerian, Palestinian, Jewish, Algerian and many other farmers who are not only successful commercial farmers in their own countries, but also contribute to global markets. In South Africa there are established commercial Black farmers already contribute to food security. The evidence shows that when Black farmers receive the necessary financial and technical assistance, they become excellent farmers. Why would Blacks not be able to become successful farmers in South Africa?3,16,19,23

The fact that Afrikaner numbers are declining while the Black population shows a constant growth also means that a new generation of farmers would have to replace the current generation of farmers. Why must these replacements only be Afrikaners? In this regard Mthombothi asks81: 25:

There is also the question of whether white farmers are a special breed who requires special protection.

The over-estimation of Afrikaner/White farmers as a special, untouchable group in South Africa is also contradicted by Dr Theo de Jager2, the president of the World Agricultural Union and Galileo Capital. He mentions that even if all White farmers voted for one political party, these votes will not be enough to assure one parliamentary seat. He remarks2: 3:

On a count-group basis the white farmers are irrelevant. The ANC does not need to take notice of farmers [Own translation].

In systems where the majority gains control of the politics and economy, the best balance between the interests of the majority and the minority is attained by way of a natural process and sometimes statutory prescription. Land ownership and farming are such prominent issues. Sometimes land transformation happens in a very orderly fashion and sometimes they are chaotic. South Africa is now in the middle of this normal process of economic, political and statutory balancing. Land reform should not be an emotional issue, but a rational issue.

South Africa currently has about 5 million Whites versus ± 55 million Blacks, or a statistical ratio of less than 1:10 or 10%. The ratio of White farmers to Black farmers looks significantly different. There is definitely a need for able Black farmers with financial backing. To answer Mhtombothi’s81 question: White farmers are not a special breed and do not require special protection to ensure food security.81

Does the ANC favour Black Africans over Coloured, Indian and White Africans? The same mechanism at play between Blacks and Whites on land ownership is developing between Blacks and Indians and Coloureds. It was only in 1969 that the ANC at last admitted all races as members. Jacob Zuma’s said at the World Economic Forum in 2017 that when South Africa talks about radical economic transformation (RET), it means a change that leads to inclusive growth, which includes forced land redistribution, Black ownership and management of companies, and the hiring and training of Black people. The focus is undoubtedly on Africans and not on all non-White races. Brun82 explains the focus on Black empowerment as follows82:22:

There has to be an acknowledgement that during Apartheid Black South Africans were treated unfairly at different levels, with Africans being discriminated against the most. The current transformation legislation now treats all Blacks equally.

To get to this outcome, legislation must be adjusted, as intended with the change to Section 25(2)(b), to aim RET specifically at Africans. They view Coloureds and Indians as “merit Blacks”, not as deserving of empowerment.

The ANC has allowed anti-Indian sentiment into its political and racial ideology from 2002. Mbongeni Ngema’s anti-Indian song AmaiNiya; Fikile Mbabula’s comment in 2007 that “transformation had turned the University of KwaZulu-Natal into nothing but Bombay”; Mzwanele Manyi’s suggestion “that there were too many Indians in KwaZulu-Natal”; the claim of an “over-concentration of Coloureds in the Western Cape”; and Julius Malema’s derogatory reference in to Indians as amakula in 2010 as ANC Youth League leader, serve as examples. Professor Milton Shain84:22, an emeritus academic at UCT, shows how this is a departure from the 1969 decision to regard these races as fellow victims of apartheid. Shain posits that the Freedom Charter and the social contract of the ANC with the people to guarantee equality in 1969, started unravelling in the days of Thabo Mbeki.84 Ramaphosa, Zuma and Malema have also pointed to the Whites as the only land grabbers in history. Shain writes84: 22:

…more recently, he has described whites as central to South Africa’s problems. He even added the qualification ‘at least not now’ after claiming that blacks were not calling for the slaughter of whites.

No white person, he says, is a rightful owner of land in South Africa and the whole African continent. As far as he is concerned, whites unhappy with expropriation of land without compensation ‘can go to hell’.

Onkgopotse JJ Tabane,85 a radio and TV talk show host, an author and a former member of Cope (Congress of the People), takes the degrading of the Whites further in reaction to Mosiuoa Lekota’s remark that it will be safer and more manageable for the government to place Black refugees in need of care in refugee camps. Lekota, in response to the ANC’s claims that Whites are not indigenous South Africans, dared to ask the question: Who are our people? Tabane immediately classified these refugees as “fellow Africans and comrades”, while going on to attack the Whites (and Lekota) as follows85: 26:

According to your bizarre logic, white people who stole land from our people must be left alone to own that land because when the ANC argues that land must be returned to our people your retort is: ‘Who is our people?’ So whites are our people and African refugees are not. Wow, Ntate Lekota, you are no different from Helen Zille, who called black people refugees in the Western Cape and glorified colonialism by seeing a silver lining in it.

However senseless and absurd Tabane’s85 remark is, it reflects the views of a large contingent of radicals in the Black political community. This view is now expanding to include Coloureds and Indians.84,85 Shain’s84 reflection on Malema’s views, which is similar to that of the radicals at Luthuli house and in the Zuma inner circle in KwaZulu-Natal, should serve as a dire warning and wake-up call for Whites, Indians and Coloureds84: 22:

Malema’s discourse reflects wider intellectual currents. But his oeuvre is not classically fascist. He shares none of the innovative thinking associated with serious fascist thinkers. On the other hand, as was the case with many European fascists, Malema’s political instincts are impressive. He shares with them an ability to build alliances and co-operate with elites. Political space is, after all, necessary for success. His populism and hostility towards whites find fertile grounds in a society with glaring racial inequality and poverty.

Today Malema holds a sword over whites. Will he abandon respect for democratic liberties in a violent search for redemption and internal cleansing? We do not know.

What we do know is that historically the trajectory of each fascist movement has been related to the national context, cultural traditions and contingent circumstances. Malema knows and understands this well.

Revolutions can be born slowly over years, as under Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Idi Amin and Robert Mugabe. At other times, like with the Russian Revolution of 1917, it begins quickly. When looking at the ANC government from 1994, one sees a slow-developing political revolution. All that is needed is to steer the views of Malema and Ramaphosa towards the fertile soils of disillusionment, inequality and poverty-stricken Blacks and to paint the White society as the evil and the primary reason for all the problems Blacks and the country is experiencing.24,42,86 Can exclusive capitalism ever be replaced by inclusive capitalism to solve South Africa’s poverty, inequality and unemployment?

South African land reform is needed. Comprehensive upliftment and orderly capital redistribution is needed, something in the line of Barack Obama’s focus on inclusive capitalism. This is a very fluid concept, but there should be a focus on social capital that benefits the whole society as the primary beneficiary, not on individual, exclusive capital. The Obama economic ideology is far removed from the views of the radicals within the ANC. The ANC has a “grab and run” approach to the riches of Whites, but it has failed to improve the lives of Blacks since 1994. Comprehensive and orderly socioeconomic and personal development is central to inclusive capitalism.87-90 An excellent example of what inclusive capitalism is not and how the ideology can be hijacked and abused by the radicals of the ANC, is the writing of Oscar Mabuyane90, the ANC’s Eastern Cape provincial chairman90: 18:

At the heart of the priorities of the ANC is to grow South Africa’s economy so that we can radically transform our socioeconomic fabric by eradicating the poverty, unemployment and inequality ravaging our communities.

In the January 8 statement read by Comrade President Cyril Ramaphosa, we committed to fundamentally renew the ANC, restore its credibility and bring it closer to the masses of the people it was formed to serve so that we can unite South Africans around a shared vision of transformation.

We believe this will be the foundation on which we will be able to mobilize social partners and other patriots behind the economic recovery plan to grow the economy beyond the levels that existed when Comrade Thabo Mbeki was president.

We agree that to be able to drive the recover of our economy, we must confront corruption and all forms of state capture. We need to cleanse the ANC and the government. Equally, the private sector and society must be cleansed of corruption.
We are committed to achieving the vision of free higher education for the poor. When working-class children receive education, skills and training, they will have opportunities to start their own businesses through the support of government agencies, benefit from the public and private-sector procurement, and get jobs.

The private sector must commit to large-scale transformation so that together we may train young people and give them contracts to supply goods and services to all sectors of the economy.

In line with the resolution to expropriate land without compensation, we will accelerate land redistribution and agricultural development so that those who receive land through land reform programmes will use that land productively by engaging in commercial agriculture.

The outdated Marxist terms of “we” and “comrades” are prominent in Mabuyane’s writing90, even though the ANC is at the moment estranged from the hard-core communists in the SACP and Cosatu. The whole “declaration” is based on things the ANC has acknowledged in public that it has failed the public since 1994. The question is how can they do better from 2018 onwards, especially in the light of their declining political power? Where does Mabuyane90 get his strange ideas on the South African economy? Mabuyane’s90 views do include expropriation without compensation. This idea of stealing from the rich to empower the poor has occurred in communist Russia, China, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. It has never worked, and what will happen to the poor after all the wealth of the White rich has been taken, redistributed and wasted? The simple answer is just more poverty and inequality for the Black masses.

We do have to move away from exclusive capitalism, which sometimes maintains exclusive political empowerment. However, we should also move away from a vague inclusive capitalism promoted by liberals who at the same time underwrite and practice exclusive capitalism. We should move to a new capitalism that is responsible, humane and truly democratic, but without disturbing the economy of South Africa. The ANC’s plans are reminiscent of Zimbabwe’s land grabbing

The collapse of Zimbabwe’s economy, for many years run successfully, is an excellent example of what could happen to South Africa. The similarities between the two countries are clear. There was a slow build-up of hostility towards Whites, culminating in the vilifying of Whites to distract the attention away from the failures of the government. It seems now as if the Cyril Ramaphosa-era is going to be a true Mugabe-culture of land-grab. Should South Africa end up in the same position, it would take generations to find a clear roadmap again.97,98 It is important to reflect in short on the political history of Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe to understand the fears of those in South Africa who feel that the current conditions in the country are just too similar for comfort.97 One prominent point of reference is Zimbabwe’s Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act, dated 2008.97,98 In this context the reporting of journalist Ray Ndlovu is very informative. He writes that in March 2008 Robert Mugabe signed this act into law to give Black Zimbabweans a 51% stake in all foreign-owned companies in the country. This followed Mugabe’s earlier policy in 2000 to start the forceful takeover of White-owned commercial farms, mostly by way of violent farm seizures. However, the ownership of most of these White farms did not pass to the poor and landless Zimbabweans, but to the Mugabe elites. The 2008 law targeted foreign companies, such as mining houses, banks, insurance firms and retailers. In time, the 2008 law became more aggressive towards foreigners, especially Whites. It later reserved certain sectors for Zimbabweans. Mugabe, as quoted by Ndlovu, even arrogantly declared that97:8:

Forty-nine percent is a hell of a lot of equity; it is only the foolish ones who will say no. Wise ones will take it up.

South African firms like Zimplats and Stanbic were rattled by the persistent threats by the Mugabe government to cancel their operating licences. The direct outcome was that investment in Zimbabwe stopped. By the time of Mugabe’s fall in November 2017 the country could only attract about $300 million (R3.5 billion) in investments compared with Mozambique’s $3 billion in investments. Agricultural production has plummeted, erasing Zimbabwe’s status as the breadbasket of the Southern African Development Community, making it a net importer of agricultural products like grain on a broad base. Zimbabwe has also failed to uplift the majority of Blacks. Poverty and the suppression of political and human rights followed, leading to an outflow of thousands of Black Zimbabweans to South Africa and other African countries just to make a basic living.97,98 The new president now has to clean up the mess in Zimbabwe. His first move was to recall the 2008 act, opening Zimbabwe to investment. Twelve sectors are reserved for Zimbabwean citizens. Investors from outside the country can thus own 100% of their investment once more and is no longer required to have a Zimbabwean partner save for above prescribed exclusions. In terms of the amendments brought by the Finance Act of 2018, business ownership is also no longer organised along racial lines.99,100 Ndlovu posits97: 8:

The Zimbabwean rebirth will be a long and painful one. For many years to come, Zimbabweans will have to work much harder than their neighbours to gain the trust of investors.

One should remember that the new President Mnanagwa was close to Mugabe in his cabinet, making him guilty of the same atrocities as Mugabe. This is similar to Ramaphosa and Zuma. Mnangagwa was Mugabe’s vice-president, as was the case with Ramaphosa and Zuma. Thankfully, for South Africa, Ramaphosa does have political and personal integrity. His closeness to Zuma was not contaminated by corruption. Mnanagwa was Mugabe’s minister of state security and was directly involved in the massacre of an estimated 20 000 people during ethnic cleansing in Matabeleland from 1983 to 1987 by the Fifth Brigade, a Zimbabwean army unit trained by the North Koreans.99,100 President Mnanagwa’s new racial and economic policies have already resulted in a first deal in of $4.2-billion with the Cypriot investor Loucas Pouroulis March 2018 to develop a platinum mine and refinery. There are promises of more investments from China and previously estranged countries. However, it remains to be seen if the markets will ever truly trust Mnanagwa. The signs are not good. It reminds us of Ramaphosa’s past as a revolutionary within the ANC. The concern of political analysts and strategists is that there has thus far not been any political, economic and democratic improvement under Ramaphosa as president. Another correlation between Mnanagwa and Ramaphosa is that Mnanagwa only gained a 50.8% majority with 44.3% of votes, in line with Ramaphosa’s weak support within the ANC NEC.97 South Africa is already in need of a rebirth after the failure of the ANC regime since 1994. If the country goes down the path of land grabbing by changing the Constitution, a rebirth may be impossible. As with Zimbabwe’s violent land seizures, many White lives can be at risk. Not a single antagonist will ever forget Malema’s warning:

We will kill you, but not for now.

As said, inclusive capitalism cannot replace exclusive capitalism to solve South Africa’s poverty, inequality and unemployment. Exclusive capital, driving business development and the creation of work opportunities can indeed bring inclusive capital to the poor and unemployed in time, but only outside the failed business, economic and political principles of the ANC and their model.

3.2.2 Ramaphosa’s view that approximately 87% of South Africa’s land belongs to Whites

Ramaphosa is completely out of touch with his statement that more or less 87% of the country’s land belongs mostly to Whites.103 He deliberately ignores the fact that the land owned by municipalities and the government itself is substantial. Unsubstantiated claims about the true facts around land ownership make up a large part of the rhetoric on the expropriation of land without compensation by the ANC. The ANC, after 24 years of rule, still fails to understand the ramifications of its vision of land ownership and that the manipulation of facts since 1994 are not going to help them in the coming 2019 election.104 Regarding the anomaly of who owes what percentage of land to whom in South Africa, Haffajee writes105: 6:

After 24 years, neither the private sector nor the government has been able to give a substantive figure on who owns the land, suggesting that even the ownership of the 139 the ANC says are in its crosshairs is unclear.

But, if you put together the industry’s Agri SA audit of land and the state’s land audit last year, a picture of such complexity emerges that it’s clear it will take years before expropriation without compensation can take place because the ANC has committed itself to first passing a proper record of deeds before passing the constitutional amendment to enable more muscular land expropriation without compensation.

Neither the audit of Agri SA nor that of the state is usefull. Agri SA finds that agriculture land makes up 76.3% (about 93.3 million hectares in 2016) of the total land area. Of this, the Agricultural Business Chamber finds that 26.7% is Black-owned and 70% of the total agricultural land is White owned. From 1994 to 2016, 8.9 million hectares were bought by Blacks and the government (to the value of R90.3 billion) and Agri SA confirms an ongoing transfer of White land to Blacks.105 The state’s audit identifies 24% of farms and smallholdings as Black-owned compared to 72% that is White-owned. These numbers are complicated by the fact that vast land is owned by trusts, companies and community-based bodies. This category can form as much as 60% of all private landownership, making the state’s finding untrustworthy with respect to the precise ownerships of the 60% of all the private land. From other data available, it reflects the ownerships of land as follows: trusts 31%, companies 25%, community organizations 4%, cooperations 4% and individuals 39%.105

The state’s audit focused only on land that is registered at the deeds office, which records the private ownership of farms, agricultural holdings, stand-alone houses, and sectional title units. In the Limpopo and Eastern Cape provinces there is as much as 7.7 million hectares of unregistered state land. The race, gender and nationality of the landowners are not recorded in the deeds register.105There is indeed a racial parity in who owns houses. Forty-nine per cent of the land classed as erven are owned by Whites, and 46% by Blacks.105Ramaphosa is clearly mistaken when he claims that 83% of land is owned by mostly White individuals. It seems to be far less, as low as 60%. Secondly, is it very difficult to classify people as landowners or non-landowners. Thirdly, the difference between rural and urban land is not specified, nor land for farming versus land for houses (erven and small non-agricultural urban plots). If the ANC governments proceeds with land expropriation without compensation, it would first struggle to determine true ownership, making land redistribution to the poor and landless such an enormous task that it would take years.105 When it comes to land used exclusively for commercial farming by White farmers, the picture becomes even more confusing. It is important to mention that the land that municipalities and the government owns is substantial, while the farms owned by Whites, which provide food security and earn valuable foreign currency and offer employment, only account for about 10% of the country’s total land area. This means that Ramaphosa and Malema’s dreams to give land to masses of poor and landless Blacks and that they would all be able to make a decent living as commercial farmers unrealistic.104,105

3.3 The testimonies of South Africans at the country-wide parliamentary hearings on a change to Section 25 and land expropriation without compensation

It is insightful to reflect on some of the presentations by South Africans at the various parliamentary land expropriation hearings held country-wide. It gives us a look at the lack of understanding of the complexity of the Constitution’s function to uphold of rule of law. People are also confused of who are indigenous and who not. It is clear why Mkhondo106 warns that the parliamentary hearings to hear so-called “testimonies” cannot be used to give a “true opinion” on the land reform matter and that the chances are good that the whole exercise will fail. The process cannot provide statistically trustworthy information.106 Nonetheless, a look at these testimonies may provide some insight of how the general population thinks about the issue.

The Gauteng hearing on land exportation, for instance, shows significant naivety on the political history of land grabbing in South Africa. At the Gauteng hearing Solly Mkhize107 stated that the ANC government can not shy away from the redistribution and the transfer of land, firstly because of107: 6: “…all the wars that were fought for the land by the Blacks”, and secondly because of: “…the 1913 discriminative legislation which had unjustified forced Blacks out of their own land”. Mkhize reaches only one conclusion107: 6:

How can we give whites compensation for land that was stolen?

For many others like Mkhize107, the Gauteng hearing became an excellent platform for a racial onslaught, far removed from reason. In many instances, “Whiteness” was used as the measure of guilt. Critics of the hearings and the expropriation process see the hearings as a failed exercise since it involved politically influenced masses commenting on a process they do not understand. It reminds of the English proverb: A little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing. The Gauteng hearing descended into chaos after Phumla Boloshi107 , allegedly from the DA, warned107: 6:

We don’t need to change the Constitution. We need government action. Our young fellow Africans are lazy. What are they going to do with the land anyway? They cannot till the land.

She saw the ANC government since 1994 as a failure, specifically with regard to using the existing Section 25 of the Constitution to manage landownership. Filipe Macuacua107 testified at the Gauteng hearing that he had been fighting since 2004 with the different [ANC] government institutions, including more intense efforts in 2009 and 2014 with professional assistance, for a piece of land. His conclusion was that the present government is of no help, forcing him, as result of their failure to allocate land, to live in a squatter camp.107 At the Vryheid hearing in KwaZulu-Natal, some attendees claimed to be acting on behalf of God. Who of us can argue with God? Ntombela108 said108: 22:

The land is people’s birthright and this is what God would have wanted. If you read Genesis, God created heaven and Earth and said we must multiply, which means that no one can own the land alone. All the land belongs to the people.

Mr. Buthelezi108 claimed that God had intended for Blacks to own the land because they are the rightful indigenous owners of the land108: 22:

There is one thing I want to say, that God gave us the land to work it and benefit from it. Our land was taken from us without compensation.

Another claimant, Mthethwa108, after telling of his constant suffering at the hands of a White farmer since 1952, said108: 22:

This committee is asking about something for which they already know the answer. They know that the land is ours and should be returned.

Even King Zwelithini has claimed divine purpose. His daughter Nandi publically remarked109: 3:

We [Zwelithini-royals] did not bring ourselves here. God put us where we are.

His son, Phumuza Zulu, stated109: 3:

I want to tell you that big things are coming about this family. He [the king] said everyone who wronged him must come and apologise because God is moving. All people who are against this kingdom, I am telling you right now, this is a prophecy, you are all going to be in trouble because God is in control, he is taking everything, so you must come to the king and apologise.

A White farmer from Paulpietersburg also got onto the divine bandwagon at the KwaZulu-Natal hearings. Mr. Engelbrecht108, who is opposed to both changing Section 25 and maintaining the present landownership balance, declared108: 22:

Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s servants, animals, or anything else. We must make sure that everybody has a piece of land and a title deed and is able to build a house they can leave for their children. We all want our kraals to be full of livestock, to plant maize and reap and be happy.

Engelbrecht’s108 emotional-religious argument mirrors that of Julius Malema. It is also interesting to note some of the rhetoric of Whites at the hearings. Much of it is as emotional and inapplicable as the arguments of the Blacks. A representative of the Melmoth Farmers Association in Vryheid, KwaZulu-Natal, Mr. Harris108, reflected at the hearing that the group was strongly opposed to the change the Constitution and to land redistribution without compensation, basically because they believe that land grabbing would destroy the lives of millions of South Africans. He said108: 22:

Apart from the injustices that it will cause to millions of loyal citizens of this country who have for generations worked the land and have built it up to become viable commercial farming enterprises, such as an amendment of the constitution will also destroy one of the most important corner-stones upon which our democracy is built.

However, he fails to mention which millions of citizens they support and on whose behalf they act.108 In this context is it important to note that there are more and less 35 000 commercial farmers, who are mostly Afrikaners/Whites, and the total Afrikaner population is only 2.7 million in number. To speak confidently on behalf of 2.7 million Afrikaners, of which fewer than 2% are commercial farmers and own farmland, is misleading.42 Julius Malema19 also fires at the argument of Mr. Harris19:3:

Many Africans have asked their white fellow residents a simple question: ‘When your white ancestors disposed black people of their lands, did they offer consolation? Was there a dialogue and democratic chance to hear everyone’s views?

A remark during the hearings at the Oudshoorn by a representative of the Khoi people, Julia le Roux111, the morning after Ramaphosa’s sudden and surprising announcement that the ANC supports the motion to change the Constitution, brings a new dimension to debate. She pointed out that Ramaphosa’s announcement was in reality an insult to the South African people and that it is unacceptable to make such a “government decision” before the hearings had been completed. She asked what they were all doing at the hearing at Oudtshoorn, seeing that the ANC government had already made a final decision on the matter.111 Another Khoi-San representative, named Marius111, addressed the commission as follows111: 4-5:

The land for which we are all washing out their mouths here belongs to no other than the Khoi-San. We are not going to deal with the parliament [Own translation].

Jacob Theron111, a Khoi-Khoi headman in Oudsthoorn, took the argument in favour of their right to South African soil back to Jan van Riebeeck and argues that the cut-off date for land redistribution must be changed from 1913 to 1652. He could not offer sound reasons, as reflected by the following opinion111: 4-5:

Jan van Riebeeck arrived on three ships, the Reijger, the Goede Hoop and the Drommedaris. How much land was on those ships? [Own translation].

Amil Umraw, a journalist who attended the various hearings, is of the opinion that it was doomed to failure from day one. He starts by reflecting on the unsuccessful efforts of a 91-year-old man, Isaac Mogale112 of Rustenburg, to reclaim his ownership of 345 ha of farmland that was dispossessed during Apartheid. Umraw writes112: 18:

But like many others who attended parliament’s hearings on the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution, Mogale’s views were drowned out by politically affiliated hordes who crammed the hearings venues across the country.

In every province, the hearings were marked by people in red, yellow or blue regalia streaming out of buses and lining up to address the committee. It seemed to be a strategy based on quantity over quality: the more heads in attendance, the better the chance of the party’s stance being expressed. And it was perfectly executed, especially by the EFF.

In an almost choral rendition of party policy, supporters mimicked their leaders’ rhetoric and, in some cases, like in Mahikeng, berated any speaker with an opposing view.

Umraw112 asks whether Cyril Ramaphosa’s comment that it is112: 18: “…patently clear that our people want the Constitution to be more explicit about expropriation of land without compensation, as demonstrated in the public hearings”, has been based on the views of the majority of South Africans or on those of the interest groups whose voices were the loudest at the hearings? Umraw112 takes his question further112: 18: “And how would he [Ramaphosa] unequivocally know what ‘our people want’ when parliament is yet to complete its consultative process?”

One positive outcome of the hearings is that it offered the different groups an opportunity to hear the views of the others. The public hearings meant that the ball had at least started roll in some way to somewhere.42,49,108,112

4. Discussion

4.1 The process of the public hearings on the change to Section 25

The parliamentary committee responsible for the public hearings to hear the public’s inputs on changes to Section 25(2)(b) and on land redistribution without compensation, completed its sessions in August 2018. After this the committee consulted further with various stakeholders, including academics, non-governmental organizations and private companies dealing with land and buildings. They used these evidence to present a final report for consideration by parliament.33,74,107,113

In retrospect it clear the task of the committee was just too comprehensive: to obtain valid and reliable evidence to guide the parliament on the decision to change Section 25 to allow land expropriation without compensation. The opinions and views of the public were often incoherent and unspecific. The hearings had also become contaminated by testimonies of unrelated past political and socioeconomic wrongdoings, historical and political myths that became truths in the minds of a great portion of the population, a lack of an understanding of the effect of contaminated economics on a stable food chain, a lack of knowledge on international and national laws on land grabbing, and a lack of an understanding about who counts as indigenous South African people.

The data were often conflicting and of no value. The masses of data collected were reworked by a private company, Isilumko Staffing, to offer some opinion to the parliament on the people’s needs, opinions, and demands on land expropriation with or without compensation. Reworking qualitative data to present it as quantitative data is a complex process that requires expertise in statistics, research design and the social sciences around politics. Outsourcing this analysis is highly questionable.

The final report divided the qualitative information into various categories: presentations on agricultural land, urban land, etc., and listing the arguments for or against change to Section 25. The whole process of analysing and classifying the data was subjective. It could be contaminated by bias and manipulation. The categorizing of the final data was executed according to the research company’s own guidelines. There were too many uncontrollable determinants that could have contaminated the whole process of the analysis. Various researches expressed doubt as to the applicability and correctness of the process.114-117

Political research is complicated and needs a clear-cut research design before the start of the research to find clear answers in response to clear questions to them. Starbird’s117 doubts are clear when he says117: 66:

The most fundamental idea of democracy is that the government responds to the will of the people. Usually, the will of the people is ascertained through voting. An election takes the individual opinions of each voter and assembles those many opinions into one societal decision, the election winner – the will of the people.

Starbird117 warns that there is an unfortunate and counter-intuitive reality to the election process117: 66:

An election’s outcome may have less to do with the voters’ preferences about candidates [political matters] than with the voting [research] method employed. A method by which the voters’ preferences are combined to determine the winner [political matter] is a means of making a statistical summary of data. We will see that such summaries are fraught with peril.

The final decision of the voters [presenters] on a change to Section 25 offered in parliament is intrinsically problematic. The presenters made up 1% of the population. The research cannot serve as a valid and trustworthy guideline for parliament. The whole exercise was nothing other than political window-dressing.23,117,118

The best way to understand this is with Starbird’s117 lecture titled “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics”. He said117: 92:

In this lecture, we will learn some effective ways to lie with statistics. Lying with statistics means one of several things. We might, of course, simply present false data. But more interesting methods involve taking perfectly valid data and distorting their meaning by using misleading presentations or by drawing improper inferences.

The vote on the change to Section 25 in parliament will be done in terms of party membership. This in reality means the outcome will depend on party policy.23,117,118

The best way to settle the matter would be three questions on a ballot. These three questions should be: 1) Are you in favour of keeping Section 25 as it is and the continuation of the land redistribution policy in place since 1994? or 2) Are you in favour of a change to Section 25 for the implementation of a land redistribution policy with compensation? or 3) Are you in favour of a change to Section 25 for the implementation of a land redistribution policy without any compensation?

The whole process could also be completed at much less cost with a referendum. It is further alleged that the ANC’s top six, after it became clear that the majority of the presenters at the parliamentary hearings were against amending the Constitution (and thus land expropriation without compensation), decided to ignore the outcome of the hearings.23,106

An overview of the hearings shows that the general public holds far less extreme views than the ANC and the EFF. The report of Isilumko Staffing shows that there were 630 609 written submissions, of which 176 780 were duplicates, with 3 602 empty and a further 592 non-applicable. The result was 449 522 presentations, reflecting a 34.2% in favour of the change and 64.7% against it. The parliamentary committee acknowledged that it would be impossible for them to consider every one of the presentations in detail.2,23 The drafted amendment must first be accepted by National Assembly, which can happen at the earliest in March 2019. After that the concept amendment must also be considered by the National Council for Provinces. The National Council of Provinces is forced by law to allow six weeks for consideration for its members to take part in a public discussion. This means that the Constitution can be amended by middle May 2019 at the earliest. 2,23

If the ANC’s majority decreases after the 2019 election, their opportunities to amend the Constitution also decrease. The ANC will need the help of the EFF and other smaller parties to get enough votes. The election has to be before August, but Ramaphosa has hinted that it may be earlier.23,119

Referendums are seldom used in South Africa. Mkhondo106:18 warns that they are not fool proof. After FW de Klerk used a referendum to ask permission to continue negotiations with the ANC, some felt that he interpreted the results as giving him permission to hand the power to the majority, while they only meant to give him permission to negotiate.42,106 However, referendums could be a good option in a situation like this. Mkhondo106: 18 states that such a referendum will counter citizens’ cynicism, inter-party fighting and political manipulation and end the mandate of political leaders who speak falsely on behalve of the individual. It is time to acknowledge the demands of masses in South Africa.

In Switzerland more than 900 such plebiscites have been held since the 17th century, while more recently Italy and New Zealand used referendums to force radical changes to voting systems and drastic changes to of some of their political institutions.106 Mkhondo106: 18 provides a clear guideline for politicians to follow when using referendums to solve political matters. Firstly, the referendum questions must be neutral, clear and concise, preferably requiring a simple yes/no answer to avoid invalidity and incredibility. Referendums should also supplement rather than supplant political decision-making. It is undoubtedly time to look critically at the legal processes, the foundation and subjects on which battles are being fought106. Mkhondo106 states a clear constitutional dilemma that has to be addressed when he posits106: 18:

For nearly 25 years, our constitution has enshrined our values and given legal expression to our vision as a country and has been a fundamental source of guidance for elected officials. But our constitution is showing signs of wear and tear: Our democracy is becoming irrelevant.

Is the Constitution still valid for our circumstances? Mkhondo106: 18 writes precisely and clearly about our lack of sophistication with respect to the complexity of public policies on the Constitution and on human and property rights. He sees five prominent shortcomings that result from an autocratic-democratic constitution that suited Nelson Mandela at the time. It gave him the ability to place political allies in critical positions. South Africa has not really had a true democratic Constitution since 1994. Saying that Jacob Zuma misused the Constitution is false: South Africans created the faulty Constitution themselves, giving Zuma immense presidential power.106 Mkhondo106 pens down five very simply, straightforward yes-no questions for the voter on the Constitution106: 18:

  • Do you prefer the president of the country to be elected to office directly by voters?
  • Do you prefer that the president of the country be elected by their political party?
  • Should mayors and premiers be elected directly by voters?
  • Should all MPs, or a proportion of them, be elected through the mechanism of a party list?
  • Should South Africa continue to have nine provinces, or fewer?

Mkhondo106 takes the issue of land much deeper that the parliamentary committee’s superficial hearings. The current process is simple patchwork to a sick constitution, and its other shortcomings will resurface in the future on various constitutional matters and can become untreatable. Mkhondo106 writes in this regard106: 18:

We need a referendum, for example, on whether it is time to amend the constitution, and the electoral system it outlines. Is our proportional representation system still relevant? A referendum would test whether our constitution still embodied the bedrock values of our democracy, including effective participation, transparency, responsiveness, inclusiveness and accountability.

Cyril Ramaphosa120 claims that the land debate almost ended in a referendum in 1993, but instead the property clause was crafted to acknowledge the rights of property owners as well as those without land. Embedded in this clause …was the ability to speed up land reform, but this had not been used to good effect.

However, there was never any serious intent in 1993 to have a referendum on land expropriation without compensation, primarily because it would have ended in war at that time.42,108,120-122

4.2. Questions around the ANC attack on the 1994 Constitution and Section 25 to allow expropriation

4.2.1. Are Section 25 and the Constitution unchangeable?

Central to future dramatic land reform stands the South African Constitution and Section 25(2)(b) of its Bill of Rights. Anti-reformers argue that Section 25 already provides a clear roadmap for further land reform. Since 1994 a total of 76 000 land claims have been filed, 95% dealt with unsuccessfully. More than 1.8 million individuals have received compensation, either monetary or in the form of land.123 They also argue that Section 25 does give the state the ability to expropriate property in the public interest. The government has all it needs according to this line of argumentation. 124 Opperheimer explains Section 25(2)(b) when he postulates124:18:

It empowers the state to expropriate property in the public interest, which includes land reform. A classic case would be the construction of the Gautrain project, which needed to run through privately owned land, or the acquisition of land to build RDP homes. The constitution recognizes that in such cases private owners deserve compensation, which is worked out according to relevant circumstances.

In August 2018 the government indeed served papers of expropriation on four farm owners in Limpopo without court intervention, seemingly after the transfer of the ownership of the farms stalled because the state and the owners could not reach an understanding on the selling price and the owners contest the land claim in court. These expropriations were founded on Art 42(e) of the Act on the Restoration of Land Rights, which refers to recourse in the case of a deadlock.

AfriForum and Institute of Racial Relations (IRR) as made the claim that there is a list of 139 farms that the government intends to expropriate with compensation. Rendani Sadiki125, the acting director-general in the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, categorically denies the existence of such a list. Sadiki125 says it is a list of 139 farms (sometimes in media reported to be 194 farms) identified by the ANC NEC at their lekgotla as cases where no consensus could be reached on the selling prices that have to be put on the register for arbitration by the court. They are test cases for the expropriation of farms in terms of the valuation-general’s register of disputed farms (selling prices versus the land court’s pricing) to finalize the cases on the register.125,126 They are therefore not classified as expropriation without compensation, although the owners may not receive market value. The officials refuse for some sinister reasons to name these 139 properties, although are already on the register for disputed land. Rendani Sadiki125 and Maite Nkoane-Mashabane125 have acknowledged that this secrecy is a specific step by the government to prevent farmers from taking legal steps to defend their property.

The opinion of legal experts is that in certain extraordinary cases the government can expropriate land without compensation in terms of Art 42(e), but courts of law have thus far not given a decisive answer on the matter. Aggrieved land owners can thus still challenge the unacceptable compensations offered for their farms in the court in terms of the legality of the expropriation. Linda Page, spokesperson of the Department of Land Reform, emphasises that the minister can take steps to buy, to obtain or to expropriate with compensation (not necessarily at market prices) farms for land reform in terms of Art 42(e) and that there have been 23 such cases since 2007.

An attorney, Bertus van der Merwe, an expert on land expropriation, also indicates that there has thus far not been a single successful case of direct land expropriation by the government without some form of compensation. Maite Nkoane-Mashabane seemingly wants to create a legal precedent that favours the state in case of future cases of land expropriation without compensation, thereby overcoming the need to change Section 25(2)(b). Evidence suggests that the state in most instances pay semi-full /semi-half compensation (± 60% of market price), meaning that it would be difficult to force a pay-out above 60% in court.48,125,127 This testing of how compensation must be calculated indicates the failure of the ANC regime, because they did not use the courts as a final decision-maker and guide on the compensation process from the start. They instead followed a political process. If the court of law was used it would have resulted in a clear guideline on the correct calculation of compensation, preventing the current conflicting principles of willing seller-willing buyer.

In defence of their initial legal passivity, now replaced by an active process in court to force down expropriation in terms of the state’s pricing guideline, the ANC government argues that the market prices in time caused the buying process to slowed down because the prices were driven up unrealistically and artificially.34,48,125,129,130 Umraw128:4 reports that the expropriation of the 139 listed farms is expected to be carried out before the end of December 2018. An ANC NEC member, Ronald Lamola, revealed the truth that the ANC at its lekgotla in December 2017 adopted a plan to speed up land expropriation, including the alleged 139 farms selected for expropriation, because the ANC wanted to test the principles of the Constitution. Lamola reports128:4:

We said we will take a multipronged approach to land. We don’t know when the process for amendment will be finalized.

And it’s not a given that when we put the amendment to parliament, we will get a two thirds majority vote. We will continue to expropriate land this way, and the parliamentary process for a constitutional amendment for expropriation without compensation will run parallel.

Kodwa125:2 pointed out that even if this test run with the 139 farms is successful, the ANC would still seek an amendment of the Constitution to help them avoid future legal conflict in the process of land expropriation without compensation. Weighted compensation is only a short-term solution. Full-scale land grabbing is still the goal.125 Umraw128:4 reports that according to insider information on the ANC legotka, ANC members of the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) conceded that as the Constitution presently stands, “the state was already able to expropriate land without compensation if it wished”, but did not do so because of certain blocks in the country’s political set-up. The political power of the ANC has now reached the point where there is more radical thinking on the economic and social empowerment of the Black population. In this context, the members of the CRLR felt that the matter must be addressed by means of direct land grabbing. Affected landowners could be referred to the courts, from there the ANC’s eagerness to take test cases to court.128
Umraw128 writes128:4:

Party [ANC] insiders who attended the two-day lekgotla of the party’s national executive committee (NEC) this week, the ANC’s highest decision-making body between conferences, gave details of the legislative plans and the expropriation “guinea pig” scheme.

In addition to pushing for an amendment to section 25 of the constitution to allow for expropriation without compensation, the ANC’s plans include: Drafting a land records bill aimed at documented all landowners, both formal and informal, and ensuring security of tenure; Drafting a redistribution bill that would provide a framework for the deciding who gets priority access to land once the reform programme rolls out; and Amending the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act to recognize those who have lived on the property for three years or more as the de facto owners who cannot be dispossessed without consent.

Party members at the lekgotla are said to have wanted the process of passing and implementing the Expropriation Bill expedited. Once Section 25 of the constitution has been amended, the bill can be changed to allow for expropriation without compensation, effectively doing away with the willing buyer–willing seller principle.

Hunter131:4 says that the ministry of rural development had received specific instructions from its minister to pursue the matter right up to the Constitutional Court as test cases. The intention is not to relent if the White farmers take the department to court to object to the valuer-general’s valuation, but to obtain a pronunciation and guideline from the Constitutional Court on what Section 25 of the Constitution really means. The ANC wants the farmers to go to court. Although the head of the ministry of rural development, Mashile Mokono131, said that131:4: “…the department had set aside funds for the farms’ paying and if there were no disagreement, the department would have gone ahead and bought them”, he did a sudden turn-about on pay-outs when he said131:4:

The department believes the current provisions of the constitution may allow for farms to be expropriated with the value of the farm set at zero rands.

When land is evaluated, we take different things into consideration. If we consider the fact that maybe that land was given to the farmer by the apartheid government, then that farmer got soft loans, and when there was drought, he further got more…so the valuation might be that the farmer doesn’t get anything. Zero.

Mokono131:4 also posits that the government does not expect the present parliamentary process to amend the constitution to be concluded by the end of this administration, making a Constitutional Court order on the matter of crucial importance to the ANC. Hunter131:4 reports further that a member of the ANC’s executive said that it’s likely that once the Constitutional Court proclaims on any of the 139 cases, Section 25 may not need to be overhauled, because the Constitution is then functioning correctly in terms of the ANC’s concept of justice. This is in line with what Ramaphosa said to the Zulu King in July 2018, namely that the land targeted for expropriation is limited to the land of mostly White South Africans.68 On the 21st September 2018, Ramaphosa132:1 in an interview with Business Times elaborated further on his previous utterances. Derby132 reports132:1:

He and his party have backed changes to the constitution in order to ensure that land expropriation without compensation takes place to speed up transformation with regard to landownership.

Derby further reflects132:1:

Ramaphosa said the state would target land from state-owned enterprises and private sector businesses that have large tracts of unused land — such as forestry giants Sappi and Mondi.

The packaging and paper manufacturer Mondi Group and the pulp and paper company Sappi already accepted the unavoidable realities of landownership and publicly indicated they are not interested in owning land in future, but instead wants permission to use state or communal land to produce wood-products. Although the research of the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agricultural Studies (PLAAS) shows that as much as 40% of the large plantations are subject to land claims. They look at these claims in terms of their business models. Their priority is future access to wood resources instead of land ownership, making the transfer of land to communities less complicated and demanding.132,133 Above statements by various ANC elites on land reform and the contradictions, the ANC’s biggest problem is that it does not have a lucid policy on land134:4. They have only a series of decisions taken at various meetings sold as empowerment to the radical elements in the voter corps.

Munusamy writes134:4:

The land question could turn out to be SA’s Brexit if the ANC continues to chase votes without a coherent policy position and game plan.

Tabane135 postulates as follows135:4:

The elevation of the land question to a central election issue has made the ANC act in a desperate fashion, exposing policy schizophrenia,


This must be one of the most disorganized policy approaches to befall the ruling party since 1994.

Professor Ben Cousins136:1 of the Department of Science and the Technology and National Research Foundation and a chair in Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies at the University of Western Cape, warns about the lack of a policy on land. He agrees that land redistribution is a core issue that must be addressed136:1:

We’ve got to change the racial ownership of land, but as a long-term project. Does the ANC have a clear redistribution plan?

Cousins136, Haffajee138 and Derby137 emphasizes that a properly described official redistribution programme is crucial. The ANC simply lacks expertise.136-138 Cousins136 reflects as follows136:1:

We’ve got a massive problem with the restitution programme, which is now massively dysfunctional. We’ve got to fix those problems and resolve the restitution claims, possibly through lots of cash pay-outs. We’ve got to resolve the issue of the insecure land rights of people in informal settlements, in backyards shacks, in cities, communal areas and on farms. We need that tenure-reform component.

A new Land Records Act, which records, registers and secures people’s land rights, whether these are private title deeds or whether they are given tenure rights – a proper way of securing those rights against arbitrary eviction – is a third key element of a proper land reform programme.

The “cash payouts” Cousins136 refers to has become a problem. It seems to have dried up, forcing the ANC to take desperate measures. Another troubling idea is the prominent remark by Ronald Lamola128 that the ANC considered at the December 2017 lekgotla to introduce a land tax or a kind of levy on land for so-called absent landowners as a way to force the full use of land or to open up such land to the poor and landless. To add to the confusion, Enoch Godongwana125, chair of the ANC’s sub-committee of economic transformation, said the ANC had no intention to expropriate productive land without compensation distanced the ANC from the EFF125:2:

We strive to different kinds of landownership, including private land, state-land, communal land, etc.

What he omits is what percentage of land ownership the ANC would allow. If the models of Zimbabwe, Zambia or Mozambique are anything to go by, the percentage of White ownership will be very low, mostly limited to tenure by means of long lease.125 When considering the current situation where the ANC is in a hurry to push through land expropriation without compensation and Ramaphosa is attempting to clinch his position as president of the ANC of the country, chances are good that the ANC will strike a deal with the EFF and other radical parties in parliament before the 2019 election to withdraw the Expropriation Bill and to amend it to make explicit those categories of land (as a first step) likely to be expropriated without compensation and the conditions in which this may happen.138 Haffajee138:2 describes these properties as follows: “…possible abandoned buildings, unused land, unproductive commercial property held for speculative purposes, underutilized state property, and land farmed by labour tenants with an absentee titleholder”.

The earmarked properties clearly also include those farms with disputed prices and the so-called “soft Apartheid farms” (described by Mashile Mokono131:4 as farms obtain by nationalist Afrikaners because Apartheid favoured them).138 Derby137 is concerned about the consequences of land expropriation without compensation. He asks137: 2: “Just how will the state handle indebted land, even if a farmer is not compensated? Would there be compensation to the banks, and if not, just where it does it leave a bank like Absa, one of the largest lenders to the agricultural sector?”

This is just one risk of an untidy resolution to what is a structural fault line in the South African economy – access to land. If banks are susceptible and face a real prospect of some of their loans being wiped off their books, a crisis will follow. How will they be able to provide loans to new Black farmers?

This is admittedly alarmist, as there is much uncertainty about exactly what and how the changes to the Constitution will unfold. What will it mean for private property and house prices? There are just so many different objectives to the land debate. Apart from historical redress, there’s the promotion of land ownership of rural land. This calls into question the role of our traditional leaders such as the Zulu king. In these areas, just how we deal with the question of land tenure for women will be a minefield to navigate.

Plaintiffs have two prominent misconceptions about the ANC and its land reform. In contrast with the Westernized, capitalistic and democratic thinking of landowners, the ANC leaders have a revolutionary mindset based on the theory of chaos. Secondly, is the belief of some plaintiffs that the statutory change to the Constitution will stop with the change to Section 25. However, Section 25 seems to be only the first step of a low-level change to the Constitution to fit the ANC’s present needs, paving the way for more comprehensive and complicated changes to follow.42 To understand the ability of the ANC leadership to manipulate the facts is reflected in the ease with which they side-stepped the matter after President Donald Trump tweeted that he has instructed his minister of Foreign Affairs, Mike Pompeo, to investigated the ANC’s land grabbing and the murder of White farmers. After the ANC-leadership took Pompeo’s chargé ď affaires at the American Embassy in Pretoria under their hand about the “arrogant” Trump-tweet, Pompeo only wants from the ANC-regime “to explain its land reform policy better”. The report of journalist Llewellyn Prince139 on how easily Pomeo’s enquiry with the South African minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Lindiwe Sisulu, was laid to rest, is striking139:2:

South Africa must explain its land transforming policy better.

This was in New York the message of Mike Pompeo, the American minister of Foreign Affairs to Lindiwe Sisulu, the minister International Relations and Cooperation.

Sisulu yesterday, on her monthly information session, said to journalists Pompeo had said to her he and the American government understands what South Africa likes to reach, but that there are people which do not understand it. “After we called in the American Embassy’s chargé ď affaires after the tweet (of pres. Donald Trump), the American department issued a balanced elucidation”.

She [Sisulu] said the government will use every opportunity to explain.

The chances are good that the ANC will introduce comprehensive changes to the Constitution to implement RET from 2019 if the ANC stays in power after the 2019 election. They indeed do have a clear and guiding redistribution plan in place. The legal foundation of the process of land expropriation with or without compensation

For a change to the Constitution, a two-thirds majority is needed in parliament and an approval from six of the nine provinces, while the ordinary Bill on Expropriation that is serving before parliament at the moment only needs an approval vote of 50% by the parliament.125,138,140 Two sections of the Constitution will have to be amended — 25 and 31. Section 25 is applicable to the property clause that allows for expropriation, and 31 is the limitations clause that outlines when rights, to, for example, property, can be limited.125,138,139 The ANC at moment has 62% of the seats and the EFF 6% of the seats of parliament, meaning an alliance can give 68%.125,138,140

Advocate Paul Hoffman of Accountability Now postulates that although a two-thirds parliamentarian majority is needed to Section 25 (Article 25) of the Constitution, it ultimately depends on a 75% parliamentarian majority vote as guided by Article 74(1) of the Constitution.125,138,140 To change the Constitution the amendment must be approved and accepted by the National Assembly, after which the concept amendment must also be considered and accepted by the National Council for Provinces.23 Laws aimed at streamlining the expropriation process without constitutional changes are the Employment Equity Act, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act and Codes, the Skills Development Act, the Levies Act and the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act. These legislations are supported by for instance the National Development Plan and the Black Industrialist Programme. Land expropriation in terms of democratic principles and African empowerment, is clearly described by Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, while the redistribution of agricultural land is further partially covered in the Agri BEE codes. This begs the question of why the sudden intended changes to the Constitution for land redistribution are needed?82

It is becoming more and more clear that the ANC is also setting their sights on various other traditional financial, legal and statutory institutions. The intention is undoubtedly to increase the ANC’s power over these traditional financial, legal and statutory institutions. Not even the South African courts will necessarily escape trespassing and disempowerment in the near future.

One direct outcome of the expropriation initiative is the abuse of the various legal vehicles to manipulate the prices of land. Plaintiffs criticise the calculation of the value of land when sold in terms of Art 42(e) of the Act on Property Valuation. They argue that the valuation-general uses an illegal formula to do the calculation for compensation, which should be based on six criteria, namely the 1) present market value of the property, 2) improvements, 3) present use and income-generation component, 4) the way the property was acquired, 5) the amount of financial state support the owner received over the years, and 6) the primary aim of the expropriation, like land-transformation, etc. The plaintiffs indicate that the open market value and the valuation of the valuation-general often differ as much as 50% and more, making the forced sale of the property a loss to the affected owner. Ms. Annelize Crosby48 of AgriSA puts it at more or less 60%, while Dr. Theo de Jager110, chair of the World Agricultural Organisation, puts it on an average of 40%. The valuation-general sometimes contracts private valuation groups to estimate the value of farms to ratify this low evaluation as the final expropriation offer.

The plaintiffs see this whole process with all its cancerous roots as nothing less than land expropriation without compensation.48,110,127,128-130 De Jager110: 4-5 says in this regard that the fact that the Land Claim Commission has been offering only 60% of the market value since September 2007 means that some farmers could not pay their outstanding bonds to banks when expropriation took place. This is nothing other than land expropriation without compensation for the White farmer.110 The banks in most cases get back the full amount of their bonds, which is seldom above 60% of the market value of farms. This assures that the banking sector’s involvement and their lending to farmers is not affected negatively in anyway. It means that farmers carry the financial losses alone as individual (White) citizens, while the shareholders/investors in banks are not affected. Bankruptcy is unavoidable for the White farmers who land in this situation. De Jager110: 4-5 reports that when the first pay-out of only 60% occurred, the banks lowered land bonds and informed farmers with bonds that they would still be responsible for shortfalls when land is expropriated by the government at 60% of the market value.

Another way in which the ANC is trying to limit White land ownership is with the concept legislation on the regulation of landownership issued in March 2017. It will probably be put to Parliament for approval in March 2021. This legislation suggests that land ownership be limited to 12 000 hectares, but that the ceiling of 12 000 hectares must not be absolute. The final size will depend on various factors, such as the location of the farm (for instance semi-dessert which needs large areas to make a living versus wetter areas where intensive farming is practiced on a small area), the quality of the land, the availability of water, distance from markets, capital requirements for farming and the number of the people already living and working on the farm. Gwede Mantashe (previously the secretary-general of the ANC and now minister of mineral resources) tried on 15 August 2018 to side-step the legal process with a further demand that the change to Section 25 should include limiting White land ownership to 12 000 hectares. However, in reality only 0.22% of farms are affected. The idea is that the land above the limit must be confiscated without compensation. This hostile behaviour on the one hand shows the lack of knowledge on the part of the ANC and on the other the growing hostility towards White landowners31,34.48,141-143.

This legislation will give the government the power to limit the right to own 12 000 hectares even further in some instances, depending on climate and the quality of the soil, etc.34 Another limitation on land ownership was suggested by Zuma in 2015, namely foreign landownership.34 Official statements on land expropriation is ever more conflicting, inciting the poor and landless to grab land. They have been waiting in the background, eagerly anticipating their promised free land. Munusamy144 expresses the popular expectations well144:22:

Following the ANC’s decision to amend the constitution to allow for land expropriation, there are all manner of expectations: Some people think title deeds for land will be handed out like free chilli sauce with a takeaway meal…

Since the Whites have been labelled the transgressors of the past, the question is if Whites will be allowed any land ownership whatsoever.142 The current fight against land grabbing will not turn around the ANC in the long run, only the voters can bring change. Arguments like that of Opperheimer124 ultimately only offer emotional support. Opperheimer writes124:18:

Almost all victims of land dispossession have been compensated. Home ownership matches racial demographics. Barring a few opportunistic politicians, almost no one view land reform as a burning issue. The transfer of functioning farms to ill-equipped beneficiaries has been a spectacular failure. Expropriate without compensation has been tried in communist regimes, where it has harvested riches for a few and devastation for everyone else.

We have an internationally lauded constitution premised on freedom, dignity, and equality. We have never altered our Bill of Rights and the evidence shows that there is no reason to do so now.

You can’t remove property rights and have a flourishing economy. Foreign investors won’t risk having their land confiscated when they can pick any number of other nations that will protect their investments.

4.3. The future of White farmers in South Africa

However much Whites are protesting, land reform is a reality. Those who do not fight it, but react with wisdom and calmness are often regarded as traitors when they consult with the authorities..31,97,98,101,102,112,125 This category of land owners sees the land issue as a valid concern that should have been addressed already, while many farmers still yearn for their apartheid rights.31,97,98,101,102,112,125,145 Those farmers who have adjusted are aggrieved by the rigid thinking of White farmers in general. They see the current efforts of the leaders of many of the pro-farmer groups like AfriForum, Solidarity and the FFP Plus as opportunistic and more focused on conflict than constructive discourse that could improve the relationship between the White farmers and ANC radicals. Van Rensburg145: 10 focuses our attention on this conflict with a comparison between the 1994 Constitution and the useless agreement the British Premier Neville Chamberlain made with Adolf Hitler in an effort to avoid the Second World War. He writes145:10:

After his return from Munich he cast around a note with the message: “I believe this is peace in our time”. Within a year Europe was plunged into war.

The 1994 Constitution has many short-comings. It is not absolute and will not protect White rights forever.110,145 Theo de Jager110: 4-5, chair of the World Agricultural Association, warns that Whites will not escape dramatic changes. They are naïve to think the Constitution will guard them. The ANC is losing power, and as in Zimbabwe where the Mugabe regime latched onto the rhetoric of punishing Whites for the past when they started losing power, the ANC wants to disempower Whites to regain power. De Jager110 shows that Section 25 of the Constitution does not guarantee market-related compensation for expropriation at all. What is more, the Land Claims Commission also has the power to decide on the specific value of farms under expropriation as is evident from the many pending disputes between farmers and the government. Only 10% of farms have been transferred up to 2018. De Jager110 makes it clear that the conflict with respect to land is not only the fault of the ANC government. He writes110: 4-5:

Our farmers have known for more than two decades that landownership and land transformation can become political dynamite. We saw what happened in Zimbabwe, but learned very little from it. The ANC asked in 2008 for suggestions for a land reform plan and we did not suggest one. Even the partnership model of the National Development Plan was shot down aggressively until the expropriation-without-compensation-scenario brought the established agricultural organisations to other insights.

To reject every new land reform plan as unconstitutional, ANC-friendly or as interference in the free market (as if it was not interference in the free market that plunged us in the present landownership dilemma), creates the impression that we speak left but is running right. History is going to judge us harshly for our inability to devise a workable plan [Own translation].

De Jager110 is clear and robust on the only choice available110: 4-5:

It is this or losing everything. It is not business as usual. We can certainly not sit down and believe that the problem will disappear [Own translation].

The White farmers should urgently change their attitude of obstruction, conflict and hostility and start to cooperate with ANC regime. They stand to be the only losers.110,146 The research of Pieter Steyn146, a South Africa journalist who recently toured Zimbabwe to do comprehensive interviews with Black and White farmers, officials and politicians, takes De Jager’s110 urgent warning of “adapt or die” even further. He reflects on the absolute right to land ownership and compares it with the situation of the Zimbabwean farmers. Steyn writes146: 12:

You do not need to own land to farm successfully and profitably. This fact is seldom acknowledged in the angry talks on land which are heard today in South Africa, this sentiment is seldom raised [Own translation].

For Steyn146 it is clear that Zimbabwean Black and White commercial farmers have started to think differently about land ownership and farming as a lifestyle and as a source of income. In Zimbabwe, as in Zambia and Mozambique, land is now more often owned by the state and rented out in terms of tenures of long lease (99 years) to farmers. A White Zimbabwean farmer, Ken Drummond146: 12, reflects that South Africans — from the farmers to the government — must look carefully at the events in countries like Kenya and Zambia. They had bloody revolutions about land, while in Zimbabwe White farmers lost their lives. He regards hanging on to land as foolish, and many of the White farmers in Zimbabwe who selfishly and rigidly clung to their land in the Mugabe period, lost it in the end.146 Basil Nyabadza146: 12, chair of the Agricultural and Rural Development Council of Zimbabwe and a high profile member of Zanu-PF, confirms that the only solution in Zimbabwe for all the parties involved was to transfer land ownership to the state. White farmers re-entered the agricultural sector by renting land for 99 years. For him is it important that South Africans look at all the unnecessary mistakes made in Zimbabwe since the 1960s. He emphasizes that it resulted in food shortages, murder and plundering, racism, and the South African situation has the potential to turn out the same. Drummond’s146: 12 advice to South African White farmers, in line with what De Jager110: 4-5 is advising, is to begin constructive talks with the ANC regime and to work towards something creative, even if it means selling farms under expropriation at lower than the market prices. One possibility is expecting of all persons who want to farm to be licensed as a farmer.146 The direct advice of Scott Masala146, a businessman and cattle farmer of Bulawayo, to White South African farmers is that they should take a look at the real amount of land they need to be productive and profitable146: 12:

If you own 30 000 hectares but uses only 1 000 hectares or only need 1 000 hectares to be productive, give away the rest [Own translation].

Drummond146: 12 agrees whole-heartedly and says that if a constructive thinking process was followed from day one in Zimbabwe, the end result would have been different.146 Both Masala146 and Drummond146 see the use of the courts as needless and ineffective in the end. It only delays the process. Masala146 and Drummond146 point out that this route has never worked and will not work here.

It is important for the business and farming sectors to get involved in the land transformation issue and that they must not allow themselves to be steered by politics. These sectors are currently passive, and this has led to the process being taken over by politicians.146,147 The various self-appointed bodies should also be replaced by a single body that represents all farmers at all levels, Black and White. For instance, the threats of Agri SA to use its influence with Business South Africa (BUSA) and the International Business Chamber and its interaction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other entities that lend money to the South African government, to fight expropriation, can have more disadvantages than benefits.31

The Afrikaner farming community is also playing a diminishing role in South Africa. Their current resistance to even a balanced land expropriation process is leading to unreasonable farm prices. Some of the organizations that speak for them are actually hindering the success of land reform and the cause the banking sector to be reluctant to support options such as a 99-year tenure system. Resistance is largely also why early reasonable efforts in Zimbabwe failed.42,130,146-149 The farmers who have embraced the process supports the viewpoint of the Zimbabwean farmers based on their lessons, namely that the ANC’s idea to look for farms/land that are not in full use and to redistribute these farms.

Barack Obama pointed to the greed to “own more than you need or you can utilize” in his recent Nelson Mandela annual lecture on 17 July 2018 in Johannesburg. White South African landowners must make a change from exclusive capital and move towards inclusive capital ownership. If the process of land expropriation is supported by the White farmers, it could be a moderated process.146 Although some of these White farmers feel that White farmers are ultimately unwelcome, they feel that cooperation could go far in ameliorating the current conflicts.146,149

4.4. Who will rule South Africa after 2019?

The change of Section 25(2)(b) and the implementation of land expropriation with or without compensation greatly depend on the outcome of the 2019 election. If the ANC or an ANC-EFF alliance wins more than 67% of the votes, radical land reform will be a given. A cursory look at the numbers of the three main parties could perhaps shed light on the current situation.

The ANC is currently popular with a certain segment of the population. The fact that it equalling the EFF in terms of radical ideas on land reform means that the EFF is losing ground. Present estimates reflect a rise in the popularity of the ANC attributable to the land debate from 50% to 60%. Despite this, there are several indications that this will not hold.19,57,112,152.153-155

Firstly, the parliamentary hearings revealed that only about 34.2% of the population really supports radical land reform. This means that the new-found radicalism of the ANC may not translate into votes. A recent Victoria Research report shows that the greatest worries of South Africans (Black and White) are unemployment (47%), drugs (23%), crime (20%) and corruption (18%). The ANC has failed to address any of these. The issue of land reached only 6%. What is more, this 6% represents an average. Only 4% of Blacks have an issue with land, while 11% of Whites express concern. Racism featured in only 7% of the answers, so the race care may not work either. Black groups indicated a 16% dislike for Black illegal immigrants, indicating that this is more of an issue.19,57,112,152-157

Since Ramaphosa has come into power, the ANC has attracted fewer votes in 33 out of 47 by-elections. Further is the Ramamania fast making place for Ramaconfusion, -depression and -failure. A large segment of the Black middle class prefers the DA as the favoured party. This is very important, seeing that the growing Black middle class makes up 40% of the labour force, 30% to 35% of the employment revenue generated and nearly 10% of the country’s wealth.19,57,112,152-157

Another blow to the ANC is the ever widening gap between the party and the SACP and Cosatu since the 54th ANC conference in October 2017. Ramaphosa could thus far not heal the rift. His election as president of the ANC came with the exclusion of the SACP’s senior leaders and Cosatu’s top unionists from the ANC’s 80-member national executive committee (NEC). The SACP has also recently started to criticize Zuma and the ANC openly.158,159

A further factor that can deter voters is the continued corruption.160,161 Onkgopotse Tabane161, a well-known journalist, the author of Let’s Talk Frankly and the host of Power Perspective on Power 987, writes161: 14:

The NEC’s continuation of a culture of a missing backbone will turn off voters in big numbers, as they will be convinced that the Ramaphosa-led ANC is still being remotely controlled by Zuma, who is a wrecking ball across the economy. This is the singular threat to the ANC’s electoral fortunes…

The ANC itself is aware of its decline as the favoured party. This is evident from the Boksburg document that was compiled by the ANC during their April 2018 Boksburg conference. The following quotation dated the 13 May 2018, comes from the April 2018 conference. It reads162:4:

If we want to make a significant impact on voter mood we need to use the next 15 months to demonstrate political will, concrete actions, and the capacity to deal with these issues.

This includes concrete and drastic action (not just statements) against corruption, especially among our leaders, and [to] strengthen the capacity of the state to investigate and prosecute offenders.

We also have to provide clear action and proof that we are prioritising job creation and economic development and our efforts are bearing fruit.

The election of 2019 is a threat to the ANC. They are already doing fancy political footwork to stay in power. The internal document of April 2018 after the Boksburg conference reflects a sombre mood within. They have real concerns about losing Gauteng, North West, Free State, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. The ANC’s own admission in this document that they “have squandered the goodwill they enjoyed from voters for the past 24 years” and that they intend “to rectify their bad actions immediately in the less than 15 months before the election” is telling. Land redistribution is a desperate attempt to show goodwill towards the voters. Ramaphosa is vulnerable at the moment, and as already indicated, his decision-making could be affected by the up-coming election.91,112,124,163,164 The ANC is trying everything to stay in power. Consider the rhetoric of Zizi Kodwa45, the ANC’s head of the presidency at Luthuli house, in his address to the nation, dated 26h August 201845: 22:

As we celebrate the centenary of Nelson Mandela and Albertina Sisulu, we must rededicate ourselves to the ANC’s founding values.

We are under no illusion that the path we have yet to traverse as a Nation towards the realisation of a truly emancipated society free of corruption and all forms of discrimination is a long one. This [Zondo] commission presents us with an opportunity not only to learn from our mistakes, but to also build resilient institutions that can withstand scrutiny and enjoy the confidence of all South Africans.

Ranjeni Munusamy165 brings some much-needed rationality to the table165: 22:

Next year, the ANC will swamp us with election campaign messages about how it will serve our interests. It will beg us to return it to power. Judging by how it failed our nation and let down those who showed courage under fire, why should we believe it?

Munusamy165 shows that there is tremendous distrust in the integrity of the ANC. Poor service delivery, unemployment and the immense dishonesty within the ANC elite have turned the tide against them. The ANC’s intended land grabbing is the final straw for the Black middle class.165 The ANC’s promises have become unconvincing. They fact that the ANC is asking China for help also sends off a red light.166,167 Bruce indicates80:20:

Left to the ANC alone, there is no prospect of any of this getting better. The party simply doesn’t have the will to manage our vast social and mechanical complexity on the ground.

Land expropriation can cost the ANC its rule. Bruce80 describes this possibility poignantly:80: 20
Rich or poor, you will probably, in your heart, have already decided these people [ANC] can’t help you. The land issue will take years to resolve, if it ever is.

I’m not scared, just disappointed. My house isn’t going to be expropriated. Neither would my farm be, if I had one. Even if it wanted to the ANC simply doesn’t have the ability to make land reform happen. It should hand the entire process over to AgriSA, tell it to find x-million hectares and partner with and take responsibility for the new farmers it puts on the land.

That’s easy. The hard part is recasting our politics into something that represents the structure of the economy instead of merely the race of people in it. That will take decades but, mercifully, it’ll end in the demise of the ANC – which, right now, seems to me to be a dream worth work shopping.

Tabane’s12 short “obituary” of the ANC reflects a party that has failed the Black people: a phenomenon he calls the death of Black humanity, where the12:18: “…disappearance of norms and values, leading to dysfunctional families, unstable communities and a society whose sense of outrage have become an optional extra, while the concept of ubuntu has all but disappeared”.

The ANC’s mismanagement of the economy and failure to address service delivery, work, healthcare and education, spells disaster for the party. Tabane12 sees the ANC as the cause of a new Black opposition and the loss of unity. Munusamy11 emphasizes that the world, including ANC supporters, are now aware that the country was run by a shadow state for ten years and that its crooked leadership has not been taken to book. She writes11: 18:

The ANC is instead plotting against itself, ready to place the country in peril again in another reckless battle for power. It is alarming how much ANC leaders distrust one another and how their primary motivation is self-preservation rather than the national interest.

One of the biggest blemishes on the ANC is the Marikana massacre six years ago. The government has yet to take responsibility. Tabane calls it the lowest point in the new South Africa, white-washed by the Farlam commission. The question is, can Blacks lives be entrusted to the ANC regime after 2019?144,168,169 Ramaphosa’s failure to get everyone linked to the Zuma-Gupta scandal out of his cabinet has caused concern. It leaves us thinking that the AND elite is just too untrustworthy, unpredictable and self-centred to be the government of the day.170-172 Eric Naki writes160: 3:

…Ramaphosa, then deputy president, was informed by a major shareholder at VSB early last year that money was being stolen. He allegedly promised to do something about the matter but did nothing.

The political analyst Professor Lesia Teffo takes it to the door of the man who is now supposed to run South Africa with integrity. He writes160: 3:

Ramaphosa kept mum because he was looking after his own interests.

The ANC’s support dropped to an estimated 52% after Ramaphosa’s land expropriation programme was announced.12,75,111,173-176 The present indication is that the ANC will not be able to turn around the distrust before the election. Some analysts project 60%, others as low as 50% (2004: 69.69%, 2009: 65.9%; 2014: 62.1%). The Ipsos poll shows 60%, while the DA’s research reflects less than 50%. The ANC’s own poll by its Luthuli house research team came to 48%.156,157,177

However, the DA cannot take this as a victory yet. The party still has a “Whitish image”. They are not able to attract any of the populistic votes as they do not embrace radical land reform. The DA is also accused of not being open to new ideas, but in practice this criticism is insignificant compared to the emptiness of the ANC and EFF. Another criticism is that their policies are of reminiscent of a party struggling with the dual ambitions of being a national and a regional power. However, this is equally true for the ANC and especially the EFF, which is mainly established in the Venda region and lacks a basic presence in Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal.177-183 There also seems to be a negative political culture in the DA. The editor of the Sunday Times wrote as follows in this regard on 12 August 2018:184: 16

The DA is desperate, and worried. The possibility of losing support in next year’s election is real. A recent poll by Ipsos’ predicts that the DA, which received 22% in 2014, could lose as much as 9%. The research says the infighting in the Western Cape could even lead to the DA losing its grip on the province. This would be disastrous, and the DA knows this. Losing the Western Cape, the only province it governs, would render the DA irrelevant.

Initially the thought was that the DA may lose votes to the ANC once Cyril Ramaphose takes over, but this seems doubtful given his plans of radical land reform. The electoral analyst Dawie Scholtz points out that the DA has managed to strengthen their position in the 12 by-elections held since Ramaphosa became president.150,185-187 Some of the most well-known political commentators and journalists are very positive about the DA’s chances in the coming election, pointing out that the DA’s politics is relevant for concerned voters whose politics are based on democracy and capitalism and a Western orientation. These analysts project a possible increased voter turn-out, placing the DA in a stronger position. The findings of the Victory Research project shows that the support of Black voters for the DA has grown between 6% and 10%. This strong Black contingent of followers was evident at the official launch of the DA’s 2019 election campaign at Mary Fitzgerald Square in Newtown, Johannesburg on 22 September 2018. The DA also shows no traces of the scandals that have marked the ANC and EFF.157 Their honesty about South Africa’s immense challenges and their clear guidelines that steer clear from empty promises has made them an attractive party. Their opposition to the growing racial nationalism (Black) not only attracts White votes, but also middle and upper class Black votes. It is worthwhile to quote the words of the DA-leader, Mmusi Maimane188. He writes188: 22:

There is no doubt we lost our way as a country. The SA of today bears no resemblance to the country we envisaged for ourselves at the start of our democracy in 1994. Corruption and mismanagement have become endemic to the government, and the result is a country that lags behind its peers on just every measure you can image. Our country still has deep divisions of colour, of gender and religion. But the biggest division in our society is between those on the inside – people with jobs, good education and access to opportunity – and the millions still locked out of our economy.

The Victory Research estimates 23% for the DA in the 2019 election. The steady path of the DA shows that it has a qualified leadership with integrity. They party has grown steadily since 1994.157,189

The EFF in turn is a radical political party, openly and unapologetically hateful of Whites. Land grabbing is central to their policy. They call for the nationalisation of property. Most researchers agree that the party is propelled by extremism, but that they have limited impact. This is not surprising given the general citizenry’s lack of interest in land reform and their deep-seated worry about factors such as unemployment and crime. Even their racist rhetoric does not seem to attract the crowds.19,57,112,152-157 The political scandals in which the party has been involved has also detracted from their support. There is the alleged transfer of R16.1 million to Brian Shivambu, the organizer of the EFF recruiting parties on campuses, and a brother of Floyd Shivambu, deputy-leader of the EFF. It is alleged that R10-million ended up in Floyd Shivambu’s pockets, while only R1.3 million was paid into the EFF’s bank account. It is also alleged that Floyd Shivambu acted as a facilitator of PIC deals and receiving large payments for his time.170,190-192 In reaction to Malema’s denial of the allegations, Munusamy192 reflects:192: 22

Strangely, even when the EFF has been implicated in corruption, its leaders still have the space and ability to manipulate public opinion.

The EFF went on the offensive, attacking people in the National Treasury, commentators and journalists for suggesting these allegations should be investigated and that Shivambu should subject himself to a lifestyle audit.

Malema claimed that these calls emanated from a ‘mob’ of racists and paid ‘Stratcom’ agents.

Malema tweeted this week that his members should remain vigilant and focused as ‘the enemy is attacking’.

Because of the dearth of leadership, many people will take his cue and chase after whomever he defines as the enemy. Even though the EFF’ hypocrisy is exposed, Malema will continue to dictate the national agenda for as long as nobody else does.

Munusamy continues:194: 18

“If it is not invective from the EFF’s leaders that journalists and commentators have to endure, it is the online onslaught from the party’s supporters, including race baiting and death threats”.

Bruce shows that things can go wrong for the EFF in the run-up to the election. He writes:195:16

“By the time we go to the polls, the SARS inquiry will be done and Moyane gone. There’ll be a new head at the National Prosecuting Authority. Arrests will have been made and charges laid”.

The SAPD is also looking around to make arrests, as Bruce193 confirms:193: 20

“If Julius cannot get the EFF out of the corner it is in and goes into the 2019 election visibly damaged, those wavering white voters might relax and stick with the DA”.

In middle October the EFF, after a good run in student council elections on minor campuses, was thumped by the ANC at Wits in Johannesburg.195 Victory Research estimates an outcome of 13%, doubling the votes the party got in its first attempt in 2014 (6.34%). Victory Research also indicates that 25% of ANC voters are interested in voting for the EFF in 2019).19,57,112,153-157

Despite this, it seems the party’s inputs will remain dependent on alliances and focused on controversies. The broader population is just not comfortable with the EFF’s ideology of land grabbing and political instability. Derby178:2 shows that even though some proclaim the EFF as the “centre of a new politics”, the party’s roots represent the thinking and interests of a faction of the ANC, while its economic policies are outdated and framed by those of the ANC, the SACP and the PAC. This limits their growth.178,185 Bruce185 estimates that they will struggle to get 10% of the votes next year.

4.4.1. Overview: South African politics 2018–2019

Despite all the polls and projections, a completely different picture may appear. If the DA gets between 35% and 40%, a different political model can emerge from the present one where the ANC targets the Whites as a racial group thrives on corruption, theft, state capture and a foolish and outdated economic and political communist orientation. A new anti-radicalism can also mean the end of the EFF, as happened with the PAC and the AWB.

An alliance between the EFF and the ANC is unlikely. The EFF has virtually no policy. Their main aim is to disturb the ANC. Their alliance with the DA proved unsuccessful due to their unruliness. The ANC and EFF together could have changed the Constitution already since they share their radical views on land reform, yet the EFF elected to partner with the DA. They promptly proceeded to stab the DA in the back by ousting Athol Trollip as the mayor of Nelson Mandela Bay. This means that sudden game-changing alliances seem unlikely.111,150,151

It is a political-historical fact in South Africa that voters rarely change their national government, writes Leon.150:22 The NP won 11 consecutive general elections, and since 1994 the ANC has won five general elections successfully.12,150,179,186,196 However, surprise is a political-historical fact. Not even the strongest regimes last forever.150:22 The Indian Congress Party, the Israeli Labour Party and the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party are excellent examples of such diminishing regimes, although it took between thirty to seventy years to play out.150 Louw42 is supportive of Leon’s150 finding and shows that multi-ethnic mini-empires of multi-nations mostly collapse in a short amount of time. Louw42 writes that their shelf-life is indeed limited, as confirmed by the various empire states of the 20th century: the duration of the Bolsheviks’ Social Union lasted from 1922 to 1991 (69 years); Bismarck’s German Reich 1871 to 1918 (47 years); Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich 1938 to 1944 (12 years); Japan’s Colonial Empire 1905 to 1945 (40 years). The average duration for reigning were 42 years.42 In a South African context, the NP and its nationalist Afrikaner style mini-empire of multi-nations (or the unofficial managed “NP Union”) only lasted from 1948 to 1961 (13 years), and its mini-empire for multi-states (Republic) only from 1961 to 1994 (33 years), while the Union of South Africa under strong British influence lasted from 1910 to 1948 (38 years). This reflects an average of 24 years for the three regimes. In terms of the average of 24 years, the ANC will reach the end of its shelf-life at the end of this year.42 If all the above is true it means the ANC would not have the power to change the Constitution.

5. Conclusions

South Africans don’t know each other across the racial divide, despite the fact that there are more similarities than differences between the various South African groups.24,41,86 Since 1994 the Whites have been reminded of the sins of apartheid in every single speech, and the recent developments on land has brought them to the point where they doubt they will ever be treated equally.2,7,42

South Africa has one of the highest rates of unemployment in the world and has one of the most unequal societies. Although the roots of these scourges go back to 1671, it is also true that very little has changed since 1994. The improvement will not come from taking from Whites to give to Blacks. What will happen to the poor when nothing is left but very inefficient state machinery? Inequality can only be erased by large-scale permanent employment, affordable housing, better training and education, and the establishment of a stable political environment. We are far from that given the current climate.1-7,14,15

The recent writings of the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, Thabo Makgoba,198 summarize very honestly the South African issue of land expropriation without compensation. This article aimed to join the discussion by showing the complexity of the matter. The current political environment is marked by old myths, misconceptions of our own history, and fear to address crucial issues.198 As Magoba198 highlights, going back into history means going back to the time before the 1600s when Black tribes colonised the KhoiSan and the KhoiKhoi. Viewing the Blacks as indigenous people deprived of their land is inaccurate. However, the beginning of apartheid stretches back to 1671 at the Cape. It was a slow process of social engineering to benefit Whites.198

Redistributing land without compensation will not solve this. It can only aggravate the matter, as Makgoba198 shows. Although the inequality in the country means that redistribution should occur, it should not be offered as a panacea for poverty or be based on arguments about who is indigenous and who is not.

The fact is that redistribution is a symbolic act for emotional relief; it is not going to change the lives of the poor. Makgoba198 highlights the fact that the radicals in the ANC don’t really know what they want to do with the expropriated land. There is no sound plan. It’s all about revenge and Whites can rightfully be worried about it.

The relationship between Blacks and Whites is in reality much better than what the radicals in the ANC and EFF want to make it. Threats of war are far-fetched,42,84,157,189 but enormous economic distress is not, and this could be the fuel that ignites racial hate. Venezuela has seen more than three million of its people flee the country as they grow desperate for basic food and medicines.42,199 We must solve these problems constructively, now.199 Archbishop Makgoba’s argument on the land issue is a fitting conclusion to this discussion:198:21

Although I don’t want to turn the current fight over land reform into a free-for-all, we cannot afford to ignore the seizure of land before the current cut-off date of 1913. Expropriation going back to colonial times has sentenced many generations to utter poverty and shame. Laws and practices were maintained by force of arms, leading to a system of landownership and economic development disproportionately based on race.

However, we must recognize that going back to the colonial era raises difficult questions. What happens to white families who have long since sold the land originally seized by their forebears and invested the proceeds? And what about those who bought land for the first time more recently, using big loans from banks? If the banks lose their money, what damage does that do to the economy?

What about the land given in the 19th century to those of our ancestors who helped the colonizers defeat other groups of African people? Who adjudicates those disputes?

While our history gives us no choice but to redistribute land, I am not happy with the way politicians are playing on people’s hunger for redress and their yearning for better lives. In people’s minds, the unjust distribution of land has become a proxy for economic disadvantage, and “expropriation without compensation” is being sold as an instant solution to all our problems, from failed land reform to unemployment. Expropriation does not automatically improve the lives of our people.

I have not heard anyone spell out an overarching vision which takes all the complex practical and emotional factors into account. Nor have I heard a satisfactory answer to the fundamental question: expropriation to do what?

What South Africa needs is a wise man. At the moment the ANC leadership is paralysed. Mthombothi writes:171: 21

They don’t know where to start. And so they tarry or push them aside, hoping they will go away.

The current problems are just too enormous for the current political leadership to solve. When they do attend to the matter, they do it on an explosive and conflict-ridden way, creating more complex problems and crises.171 Mthombothi171: 21 points out that the “normal human reaction when disaster strikes, is to cower”, instead of being ardent, challenged, opportunistic and motivated. South Africa needs a Winston Churchill, who said:171: 21

“Never let a good crisis go to waste”.

We need an executive leader who also knows it’s a time to be bold, to act decisively and think out of the box. It seems that we do not have such a leader at present, neither Black, nor Coloured, Indian or White.200-204

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Not commissioned; Externally peer-reviewed.


The author declares that he has no competing interest.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa.


Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

Who are colonists and who are indigenous people in South Africa? (1)

Gabriel P Louw


Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)


Keywords: Age-old custom, colonist, frontiersman, humanity, impoverishment, indigenous people, land grabbing, landless, land ownership, land redistribution, political history, radicalism, terrorism, unemployment

Ensovoort, volume 38 (2018), number 12: 1

1. Background

1.1 Introduction

So Joshua conquered the entire land – the hill country, the Negeb, the land of Goshen, the lowlands, the Arabah, and the hills and the lowlands of Israel. The Israeli territory now extended all the way from Mount Halak, near Seir, to Baal-gad in the valley of Lebanon, at the foot of Mount Hermon.1

All the loot and cattle of the ravaged cities were taken by the Israelis for themselves, but they killed all the people. For so the Lord had commanded his disciple Moses; and Moses had passed the commandment on to Joshua, who did as he had been told: he carefully obeyed all of the Lord’s instructions to Moses.1


So Joshua took the entire land just as the Lord had instructed Moses; and he gave it to the people of Israel as their inheritance, dividing the land among the tribes. So the land finally rested from its war.1

The Jews became colonists, and with time indigenous colonists, and at last indigenous people to a part of Palestine and of today’s Jewish nation-state of Israel. The Western and Christian world believe this as the truth and the only truth, and acknowledge today these Jews as indigenous people of Israel and as true and rightful owners to it. The fake stories of the Jewish past became the grandparents of the fake news of today’s Israel and Israelis.

When one reads Old Israel’s political and biblical history, it is striking how similar South African political history reads. Only the geography, regional names, the names of leaders, participating tribes and historical periods are different. These histories boast the same radical ideologies on racism, cultural dogmas, doctrines, religious blindness and murderous intentions. The Jews of the Old Testament perpetrated violence tantamount to a rape of humanity, shedding the blood of the innocent. It did not matter if the victims were men, women and children in their own homeland. Their actions were justified as a divine command. Today these murderous biblical acts of ethnic and racial cleansing and land grabbing would be classified as psychopathic and mentally disturbed behaviour on the part of political and religious leaders.1,2

In South African history, we see this abnormality in the murderous sprees of Shaka [Chaka], the King of the Zulus, during the Mfecane and Lifaqane wars. He not only murdered the warriors of the many Black tribes he conquered and whose land and cattle he stolen, but also the women and children of these tribes, just like Joshua. We also see it in the history of the early Afrikaners, the White frontiersmen. They murdered the KhoiSan and captured their women and children to keep as slaves in their hunger for land, money and political power in the early Cape. We see this abnormality in the genocide of Boer women and children during the Anglo Boer War (1899–1902) under Alfred Milner. His British Empire had an insatiable hunger for self-enrichment, political power and control of the land in South Africa.2,3

What stands out here is land ownership and physically taking land with war, killing and murder. These killings and murderous acts always lead to a vicious cycle of more wars; killing and murder ensure “legal” land ownership through land occupation and forced land transfer. This land transfer is simply land grabbing. Other direct outcomes of the efforts to maintain power and ownership include the development of exclusive political and economic government models, like racial domination. The Grand Apartheid of the Afrikaners and the European supremacy of the British through their Empire serve as examples.2 Enclosed here stands the distortion of history, leading to each group embracing a “fake story”.

The fake stories of the South African Blacks and South African Whites gave birth to the fake stories and fake news that dominate the relationship between South African Blacks and Whites.

The main aim of this project of seven articles is to examine the land redistribution debacle harrying South Africa now in the light of the country’s history of land grabbing as an age-old custom. The article series offers a perspective on the current troubled political state of South Africa and the possible future awaiting the country if the envisaged land redistribution fails.

The aim of this first article is to evaluate and describe land ownership in the period 1652 to 2018 by considering the following:

  •     Who pass as indigenous peoples, colonists and indigenous colonists?
  •     Legal indigenous land ownership versus predatory land ownership
  •     The role and influence of the land terrorism and land grabbing in South Africa’s past

The evaluations and descriptions outlined above are contained in the Results and Discussion sections (Sections 3 and 4).

2. Method

The research was been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case with ownership of South African soil for the period 1652 to 2018. The sources included articles from 2016 to 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2016 to 2018. These sources were been consulted to evaluate and to describe past and present land ownership in South Africa. This would put the different thoughts, views and opinions on land grabbing as an age-old custom in South Africa into perspective by identifying indigenous and colonial people; indigenous, legal and predatory land ownership; and the role and impact of land terrorism and land grabbing in the past of South Africa.4-6

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1 Land ownership obtained by means of modern terrorism in South Africa

Land ownership has always been problematic in South Africa. Problems started when the early proto-Afrikaners, supported by the VOC at the Cape, drove the KhoiKhoi off their traditional land in the Liesbeeck Valley (Western Cape) during the KhoiKhoi War (1658–1660).2,7 Geen7 describes it as the first commissioning of White terrorism perpetrated on non-Whites in South Africa in the form of planned land grabbing. This early White terrorism meets all the requirements of the current British definition of terrorism, which reads8:9:

  1.     Violence against a person or serious damage to property;
  2.     Designed to influence a government or an international organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public with the aim of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

It is politically-historically correct to describe the moment that Jan van Riebeeck planted the VOC-flag at the Cape in 1652 to establish the Cape Refreshment Station as the first land grabbing by Whites in South Africa. However, generally speaking, land grabbing in South Africa goes further back to the southwards migrating fore fathers of the modern Black South Africans. They ousted the KhoiSan and KhoiKhoi from their South African territories, which these tribes in turn possibly grabbed from earlier unknown inhabitants.2,7,9

It is interesting that in South African land ownership is been established along the same route as that of land ownership in the time of Joshua’s Old Israel (land/property being stolen from inhabitants, who in turn settled there by stealing it from another group by means of terrorism). The recently established (1948) new democratic Jewish state of today looks similar. Kaari Ward10 writes as follows on this type of land ownership during Joshua’s time10:101:

Land ownership, was a matter of family inheritance. In Scripture, the tradition can be traced back more than 1,000 years to when Joshua distributed the lands of the newly conquered Canaan among the tribes of Israel according to God’s plan. Ownership was supposed to pass in an unbroken line down through the generations, from father to sons, the eldest receiving double the share of any of his brothers. As the younger sons usually received shares too small to sustain independent farms, they had little choice but to shell their inheritance to the principal heir, who was thus able to keep the ancestral family farm intact. The then landless younger sons might remain in the village, taking up a trade or working as farm labourers for their brother, or they might leave the village to join the large numbers of migrant workers who found casual labour where they could, or they might even resort to becoming brigands. If a landowner died, leaving no sons, the property went to his daughter or if he had no daughter to his brothers, uncles, or nearest relative.

The above ownership of land (of the land obtained by their ancestors through land grabbing), that is passed on to the ordinary Jew through inheritance, has changed dramatically. The Jewish political environment and the country’s executive political leadership were been taken over by powerful foreigners (colonists) and rich and politically untouchable Jewish groups (indigenous colonists). Land ownership changed during the Roman occupation and rule. The Romans favoured Jewish civil and religious elites. This left many of the ordinary Jews landless as peasants and labourers, living in poverty. The same metamorphosis is apparent when one looks at South African history. Early Afrikaners (colonists) and later Afrikaners (indigenous colonists) experienced a growth in their land ownership and riches as result of land grabbing from non-Whites. This left most of these non-Whites (indigenous colonists) landless and poor, and that state of affairs lasted up to today.1,2,3,7,9 Ward comments as follows on the Jewish experience10:100:

…in some parts of Palestine, the best properties at this time were in the hands of a relatively few landowners – mainly Rome’s rulers, the Herodian family, and the priestly aristocracy. In these places, the farmers working the land might have been tenants or even slaves.

South Africa currently has to balance two strong opposing views on land ownership at present. There is a clear division between those who favour land transfer and -redistribution with compensation on the one hand, and those in favour of land grabbing without compensation on the other. This mostly Black-versus-White issue started in 1652 and results in a daily growth in hostility. In this context is it the landless Blacks, mostly unemployed and impoverished, who are standing up against what they see as South Africa’s modern “Rome’s rulers, the Herodian family, and the priestly aristocracy” of Whites”; the people who are also still the land owners of the country. The developmental economist Jason Musyoka11 emphasises that the South African land reform issue has become more than a showdown between Blacks and Whites. It is now a fight between two types of South African localized nationalisms – one progressive and the other conservative. The basis of the conflict centres on whether the Blacks or the Whites are the rightful franchisees of the South African land. Musyoka11 classifies the two opposing role-players, each representing various subgroups, as follows11:18:

The progressives (or left-wingers) consist of the Nationalist left (the EFF), the social democratic left (the ANC and alliance partners), and solidarity groups such as the Black Management Forum, and others. The conservative nationalists (right-wingers) range from the centre-right DA, agriculture-based associations – most of which represent the interests of White commercial farmers – to far-right groups as the Freedom Front Plus and solidarity groups such as AfriForum.

The support of the progressives mostly comes from the poor masses of blue-collar workers and the untrained rural population. The conservatives are more representative of the minority richer classes and the financial sector, with a strong foundation in the global economy. Although there is undoubtedly a clear Black-versus-White inclination here, Musyoka11 emphasises that there is a crossing of Blacks and Whites to both sides of the dispute over land ownership, making it a critical issue that should be addressed urgently.11,12

The fact that more than 24 years have passed since 1994 without land ownership having been addressed in a balanced and just manner, draws attention to the failure of the new democracy to serve the individual citizen. This failure equally pertains to farmland and plots for housing in urban areas near the financial hubs. The poor landless and unemployed Black population attribute (rightly so) much of their misfortune to Grand apartheid and the years of White political domination. However, the failure of the ANC regime to address land reform constructively in the course of their 24 years of reign is also prominent8.12-14 Land ownership is becoming a political stew pot. Musyoka11 in this regard warns11: 18:

South Africa’s land reform is therefore no longer an innocent national conversation. Rightly so, given that two decades have passed since the country became a democracy, and South Africa’s half-a-generation-old miracle moment is well in the rear-view mirror. It would be naïve, therefore, to imagine that the outcome of land reform is a fait accompli simply based on public utterances and intentions from either the right or the left.

Worse still, Zimbabwe bungled its land reform process, thereby becoming the rulebook of what expropriation of land without compensation in South Africa might look like.

On this basis, even if the South African government follows a different methodology, it is difficult to imagine any different outcome. Zimbabwe’s nationalism blunder has become the reference point for the nationalist right in South Africa.

Like language and culture, while land is a national asset, it reflects a struggle for nationalism – and these have been unkind to the history of the last century. The nationalisms of the 20th century are howling from the other side of the grave, and South Africa’s current land debate is answering their call with enthusiasm.

3.2 “Uhuru” has arrived in South Africa at last

Musyoka’s description11 of the present-day conflict surrounding land ownership is excellent. His precise rendition shows that land ownership far more than a general, one-sided emotional debate. Uhuru has arrived in South Africa at last, although sixty years too late. Musyoka’s11 emphasis that land is a national asset is clearly meant as a wake-up call to the predominantly White farmer class and many ordinary Afrikaners who argue (and seem to genuinely believe) that land ownership is (and always was) the exclusive right of a certain group. Musyoka points out that it is a right to all South Africans, a national asset, not a personal asset. Any occupation of land sealed by a deed of conveyance for the purpose of improving the land and making a living from it is always a temporary right of care of the state’s assets, nothing more. South Africa’s political history from 1652 reflects this well. Land ownership changed involuntary from the KhoiSan and KhoiKhoi to the migrant Black tribes from North Africa and later to the colonial White frontiersmen (early Afrikaners) who came from Europe and moved north from Cape Town. The ownership of the Black tribes in northern South Africa changed to the White frontiersmen (Trekboers and later Voortrekkers). This chain of tragic South African events confirms the vicious cycle of war, bloodshed and terrorism, built on a foundation of ethnicity and racism.2,7

The envisaged process of Black occupation of White farmland and other land – land that Whites obtained from the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi and Black tribes by means of force from 1652 onwards – is therefore a normal and unavoidable process in the post-1994 South Africa. The decisions on whether land reform should be with or without compensation clearly do not constitute a first autocratic act as portrayed by especially White landowners. It is a democratic act based on majority consultation and decision. This process of majority consultation and decision-making on the country’s interests is a principle that the Afrikaners endorsed when they transferred their political power in 1994. They cannot deny this reality or try to obstruct it with all kinds of foolish arguments and actions.2

It does not really matter how the process of land transfer takes place. Whether it is a Zimbabwe-style act of violence or a democratic process without conflict or bloodletting, it will happen, perhaps as soon as this year given the ANC’s clamouring for votes in the 2019 elections. There is very little difference in the thought process at the foundation of land occupation by the VOC, the British, the Boers, the apartheid government and Robert Mugabe. All these instances are overshadow by a lengthy history of murder, genocide, injustice, impoverishment and suppression of the previous landowners who had lost their land to outside intruders and conquerors through multiple atrocities. What is different in South Africa is that many White citizens have erased knowledge of the cruel and unjust political history of land grabbing from 1652 to 1994. They have selective amnesia, brought on by a political history that deceived them to perceive themselves as good. White Christian capitalism is central to this skewed perception, although Christian principles always came in second to the Afrikaner drive for self-enrichment at the cost of non-White South Africans.2

3.3 The Herodotus Rules as predictors of South Africa’s current land dispute

The current uncertainty on land ownership is been saw as the curse of revenge and counter-revenge. This mechanism is not only apparent from the teachings of the Old Testament, but also of the Greek historian Herodotus. This is undoubtedly belief systems that the Afrikaners and the Blacks have embodied from early on. Land transfer, radical economic transformation (RET) and radical social transformation (RST) is an inevitability awaiting the Whites in South Africa if one views it in the context of revenge. The Herodotus Rules were been formulated more than 2 500 years ago as a guideline for good governance. The goal is respect for other persons in governing, no matter their race, religion or status. Herodotus reasoned that any ruler (or ruling group) should adhere to six rules to stay in power and to lead a long and happy life as a ruler. The rules are meant to ensure that when a group is no longer in charge, there would not be reprisals and retaliation from aggrieved subordinates or conquered groups and their descendants.2,15,16

The six rules that a good ruler should underwrite, practice and respect are2:

  •     Always act with fairness and wisdom towards your subjects;
  •     Empower each individual politically, legally, socially, and economically;
  •     Do not favour or put certain individuals or yourself above others;
  •     Act with self-control at all times;
  •     Do not be self-enriching at the expense of your subjects, and
  •     Given the power of a ruler, avoid and be free of power mismanagement and     emotional and physical exploitation, abuse and misuse of your subjects.

The above six basic rules provide an excellent explanation of the deep-seated views among Blacks about racism and its accompanying land grabbing by the Afrikaners. One of the revenges is grabbing land “back” from Whites, a sentiment fuelled by the EFF and other radical Black politicians. The current hostility of some Blacks towards Whites, especially Afrikaners, and their rejection of Afrikaners as an indigenous tribe is a predictable political, psychological and pathological response within the framework of the Herodotus philosophy. It makes a dramatic land redistribution policy and programme inevitable. It will happen and Whites must enter the process less rigidly and address the situation constructively.15-17

3.4 The shortcomings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with respect to addressing land ownership

The TRC’s main aim was to bring reconciliation between Afrikaners and Blacks with respect to apartheid crimes, a task that they mastered to a certain extent. Criminal prosecutions and civil action against the culprits of apartheid are the primary tasks of the NPA and of course the ANC regime itself.18

South Africa’s complexity of politics, racism, discrimination, Black and White colonialism and need for Black empowerment asks for more than the emotional catharses of forgiveness for politically and morally reprehensible behaviour by individuals and groups that characterized the TRC proceedings. The TRC left many Black persons not only with unsolved personal, emotional and psychological issues, but also with enormous financial difficulties rooted in the racial discrimination that began in 1652. Most of these issues are exacerbated by landlessness, either for farming or for housing.3,18-20

The ANC is now emphasising the rectification of apartheid wrongdoings and the role Afrikaners played in the previous regime. Other Black factions are joining in to mobilise the poor as voters, using false rhetoric to reclaim land that has never really been the land of the Blacks. A kind of Land Reconciliation Commission (LRC) seems needed. A Poverty Obliteration Commission is needed.

There has indeed not been any real legal, civil and financial transformation and correction in the form of criminal prosecutions of apartheid leaders and their immediate accomplices after 1994. The TRC could not rectify wrongdoings, like the land grabbing of Black land during apartheid. There has been no organised effort by the ANC regime to repossess the properties and assets of the Whites who benefited or to compensate those who lost their land or the land of their fore fathers.3,18-22

Many of the poor, landless and jobless Blacks of yesterday are still waiting for a restitution process that would do them justice at last. Many are of the opinion that grabbing White property, land and assets, a more radical BEE, and reducing government protection of the rights of Whites, is an unavoidable process that must start soon.3,15,21-21,30-32,35-36

However, at the centre of South African legal land ownership is the question of who should be regard as a colonist and who should be see as an indigenous person who could claim. Emotional and political rhetoric and opinions became intertwine; overshadowing logical, historical and legal reasoning. Whites are been regarded as the sole thieves of South African land and as unwelcome and uninvited settlers. South African land is seen always having belonged to Blacks; arguments that are not always true representations of the facts.29-35

3.5 The failure the National Prosecution Authority to start land reform

The envisaged efforts by the NPA to prosecute individuals for apartheid crimes (which includes the possibility of compensating the victims by repossessing properties and assets if found guilty), are too late and will surely involve only a few prosecutions. This is a task which should have started in 1994; most of the NP culprits are deceased or have left the country. Only a programme of immediate, dramatic and fast land reform would solve the “long outstanding land-reforming issue” to which Musyoka11 refers. He sees it as a “crucial issue” that can address the NPA’s failure to start some form of redistribution in 1994. This suggestion is the wish of many wronged Black persons who are still living in dire financial situations on White farms, caught in abject poverty and economic deprivation. The present post-1994 political dispensation offers these unfortunate citizens no hope of escaping poverty or becoming farmers or homeowners. Essentially, their lives are very similar to the pre-1994 political setup. Land redistribution is the only solution to get them out of this hole. Anyone who sees the failed land reform policy introduced in 1994 as a fait accompli is underestimating this troublesome matter. Terrible violence is waiting if the matter is not successfully settled.11

The South African government and its justice system failed the Blacks in terms of addressing their loss of land over many years as Whites grabbed land without compensation. Land ownership should be immediately after 1994 be addressed, but the political system was manipulated and inefficient. Had this matter been settled, there would have been better reconciliation between White and Black, instead of the present ongoing uncertainty and fighting around land ownership (which is becoming more and more racially laden).18,20,36

3.6 The failure of the ANC to offer a sound programme of land redistribution from 1994

It is important to understand why land redistribution is now only after 24 years of democracy and Black rule addressed. The ANC regime’s failure to create an LRC in 1994 was not due to a lack of political will, but rather a lack of political power (which includes military). It is important to note the nationalist Afrikaners under their NP leadership was well armed in 1994. Any provocative action, like the large-scale prosecution of the political and military leaders, or redistribution of land, assets and property of the nationalist Afrikaners would been seen as a threat to the Afrikaner’s immediate safety and rights. It would have triggered a White military intervention that could have thwarted the transfer of power to the Blacks. The late Nelson Mandela and his counsellors knew this well and took the wise route of not prosecuting the NP-regime and its elite immediately after 1994.2,15,21,22,37-42

The further failure of the ANC to correct the imbalance in land ownership later on between 1994 and 2018 when the ANC had the political and military power is not a strange case of political failure. The constant manipulative efforts of Whites to de-empower Blacks – politically, socially and economically – are cemented in South Africa’s political history. This manipulation began in 1652 and involved brute force from 1853 up to 1994. It is a still present in South Africa’s political dynamics; planned, steered and dominated by the country’s mighty business bullies and their political associates. At moment, it takes the form of well-organized opposition to any form of land redistribution.43

This outcome of a disempowered Black populace – politically, socially and economically – are traced in more detail below to show why 2018 brings with it an awakening from political passivity, leading to an overemphasis on land redistribution.

3.7 The sidelining of Blacks from politics and land ownership from 1853 to 1994

3.7.1 The Cape Constitution of 1853, Constitution Ordinance Amendment Act of 1872 of the Cape Colony and the Union of South Africa of 1910

The Cape became in 1853 a colony of the British Crown. The Queen instituted in the same year a parliament in terms of the Cape Constitution of 1853.7,9,46- 48

This first Parliament (1854–1858)7:81-82 gave the vote to all British adult male subjects who earned at least ₤50 a year or who had occupied a property with a minimum rental value of ₤25 per annum for at least a year. This Act was been applied to its logical conclusion with Ordinance 50 that prohibited any discrimination on the grounds of race or class. This created a non-racial qualified franchise. The same qualifications for suffrage applied equally to all males, regardless of race. However, the impoverished non-Whites experienced what Geen7 refers to as the so-called “liberal franchise” awarded to British subjects as discriminatory. The Cape Constitution of 1853 used wealth as a selection criteria to deny non-Whites their right to political decision-making, including their right to vote on matters related to land ownership. The Blacks found themselves in a situation of declining political power and the matter of land ownership that had been contentious from 1652, became the worst it had ever been.7,9,46- 48

Eighteen years later the Constitution Ordinance Amendment Act of 1872 upheld the non-racial nature of the Cape Constitution of 1853 as a core value. The universal qualification for suffrage of ₤25 was seen low enough to ensure that most owners of any form of property or land could vote. The political position improved for Blacks, seeing that their economical welfare was much better than in 1853, while the franchise requirements of 1953 had not been amended.7,9,48 This improvement in the financial position of Blacks led to the registration of large numbers of new rural Xhosas voters on the frontier on the grounds of communal land ownership. Geen’s7 “liberal franchise” was quickly becoming a “Black danger” for the Whites with respect to political, social and economic power because of the growing political self-empowerment of the new Black voters. The Cape Whites mobilised to limit the liberal policy on Black political rights propagated from London to keep Blacks from gaining a possible majority at the Cape. Such a majority would have had a great impact on the government and land possession.7,9,48

The Whites’ political manipulation to de-empower Blacks with the 1886 adjustment of voting qualifications was to counter the possible influx of Black voters as result of the annexation of British Kaffraria in 1865. When the Transkei territories were been incorporated into the Cape Colony, bringing more potential Black voters, the White parliament enacted a bill that disqualified Black voters specifically. It read7:86: “No person [could] be deemed to be a registered voter by reason of holding land on tribal or communal tenure”. There was already a differentiation between “Coloured non-Whites” and “Black non-Whites” in 1886, showing the worsening political situation of Blacks when it came to human rights, equality and unrestricted rights to land ownership in South Africa, then the Cape Colony. The “Coloured people” had a slightly better deal when it came to voting, but they were in truth also being kept out to ensure White power.7,9,46,48-50

The above discriminatory changes of 1886 were been upheld when the franchise laws were amended in 1892 during the premiership of Cecil Rhodes. Geen7 reports that this had to 7:86: “prevent the ‘blanket’ Kaffirs of the Transkeian territories from the right of voting”. They had to be cut out of White and Colonial politics.7,46,49

The law was been amended in 1892 and the salary qualification was abolished. The occupational qualification was been raised from ₤25 to ₤75 per annum. The Act was also been amended with the stipulation that voters had to be able to write their names and occupations. This change was racially oriented, although well masked. The fact that no drastic change was been made to the liberal franchise created by the 1853 Cape Constitution, reflects a thoroughly considered racially discriminative plan on the side of the Cape Whites to get the 1872 dispensation going without obstruction by London. On the surface, the legislation gave equal rights, but the door was left wide open for future human rights abuses without interference from London. The 1872 negative change to the Cape Constitution was a result of the hidden intentions of the Cape parliament to discriminate against Blacks later on.7,9,46,48,49

The 1853- and 1872-constitutions were nothing more than paper constitutions when it comes to the political, economic and social rights of non-Whites in South Africa. Both constitutions ensured that the country would be steered by the Whites, mostly at the costs of the Black inhabitants. The British Empire’s ability to uphold the rights of non-Whites and to safeguard them from White opportunism was limited from 1892. From 1892 onwards, Black political rights were gradually limited, especially given the post-1892 passivity of London with respect to the political, social and economic rights of non-Whites in South Africa. Black land ownership and just political policies never reached maturity in the Cape Colony. This discriminatory policy, although liberal in comparison with that of the Transvaal and Free State republics (British colonies after 1902) was later transferred to the Union of South Africa in 1910. By then the liberal Cape Dutch inhabitants were politically trounced by the racial Transvaal and Free State burghers and the wheels had been put in motion for ever-limiting policies of discrimination against non-Whites, ultimately culminating in the Grand apartheid of 1948 to 1994. Land grabbing from Blacks and land ownership became an issue that needed urgent attention, but it was bluntly and blindly ignored by the Whites. The fact that non-Whites were the majority from 1652 caused the Whites, especially the Afrikaners after 1910, to see this as the “Black problem” or the “Black question”. The Whites conquered by means of military, social and economic domination, so one could say there was actually a White problem. The British imperial mentality at the time was that numbers did not count in politics and government, only military and political power. The White problem continued uninterrupted up to the end of apartheid. This “problem” is now very visible in the dissatisfaction of the Black masses with respect to land ownership, the enforcement of restitution and the completion of the transition to new dispensation and its constitution.7,9,46,48-50

The great political injustices committed in South Africa from 1652 bring Blacks and Whites into direct conflict on land ownership. It all started with the rather innocent intention to establish the Cape Refreshment Station as a temporary settlement. Now there is an age-old conflict between the White colonists or settlers and the indigenous Blacks. Under below is the validity of the claim that all Whites are colonists and all Blacks are indigenous, as the foundation for the legality of the demands from Blacks with respect to land redistribution, evaluated.

3.8 The dilemma of ignorance about the indigenous status of the South African peoples

3.8.1 Myths, lies and facts on the rightful franchisees of South African land

Political clichés on the rightful franchisees of South African land and on which Black tribes and White groups have rights to South African land ownership have become prominent over the last five years.2,11 Many of these statements are purely political, filled with emotional rhetoric. They often reflect the speaker’s lack of understanding of the political history of South Africa, and, most of all, a lack of basic knowledge on political governance and science. Remarks range from Blacks referring to Whites as colonists who stole Black land, to threats to kill the White colonists, with a cursory “but not yet” added on. On the other, some Afrikaners claim ownership based on their fore fathers who took possession of undeveloped, uninhabited and barren land. References to the Boer victory over Dingane of the Zulus in the Battle of Blood River, are frequent.7,9 This kind of rhetoric is many times fake news, but fake news is only a very small part of political misinformation and intolerance. Governments worldwide use the media to stay in power and to crush any opposition. The NP was and the ANC is a master of the art of exterminating enemies. History and false histories are part of this political misinformation and intolerance.

It is therefore of great importance to separate myths and lies from the truth to determine who the non-indigenous colonists (the land predators) are, who the true indigenous people (the native or natural people) are, and who the indigenous colonists (foreigners who become natives over time) are. Only then can the various claims of who the rightfully owners of the country’s land is, be discussed. It will help us determine if the intended land redistribution without compensation by the Blacks is justified, or if a process of land redistribution with reasonable compensation should be followed to do justice to all South Africa’s people. Early inhabitants and their indigenousness

The earliest inhabitants (settlers) of South Africa, before the Europeans and Blacks arrived, were undoubtedly the KhoiSan and the KhoiKhoi. It is unknown who the people were before them, if there was any. The settlement at the Cape brought an infusion of an Asian, Indian and Malay blood, resulting in a new race in South Africa, namely the Coloureds. This kind of a mixed race was commonly in the Far East, the Middle East, or in European territories. In addition to the Coloureds, this infusion resulted in an Indian population that has become as indigenous as any White, Black, KhoiKhoi and KhoiSan group. This unique constellation of ethnic groups in South Africa brings the many clichés on who the rightful landowners are to the foreground. The pre-1900s South Africans’ were six broad racial and ethnic categories, namely the KhoiSan, the KhoiKhoi, the Black tribes, the Whites, the Coloureds and the Indians. Their history and arrival in South Africa are discussed below.2,7 The KhoiSan

This group, probably the first inhabitants of South Africa, seems to have migrated from the central parts of Southern Asia. The theory is that their migration to South Africa was by a scarcity of food and/or that they were been driven from Asia by other stronger races. The initial tribe ultimately split into three sub-tribes: one group moving south-east to the Malaysian Peninsula, the Philippines and as far as Australia; the second group moving west as far as Spain and the third group moving into North Africa and from there southwards as result of attacks by the Hamites in the Nile region. A subgroup of this third group moved downwards from the eastern part of Africa to gather south of the Zambezi in the 1600s.

The KhoiSan was nomadic hunters, living largely on game and gathering roots for their daily food. Geen7 describes them as follows:7:10

Their family and tribal ties were weak, their ideas of religion rudimentary and their vocabulary limited, but they had considerable artistic talent; and

…their neighbours, both the Hottentotte [KhoiKhoi] and Bantu [Blacks], doubted whether they were quite human and so it is not surprising that the Europeans also proved enemies, and that today Bushmen [KhoiSan] remain only in very small numbers in the Kalahari Desert and South-West Africa.

Today the KhoiSan are not prominent role-players when it comes to land due to their small numbers and lack of political and economic power. The KhoiSan of today sadly finds themselves in the age-old position of the winner(s) takes all. They can claim land based on their history of miscegenation with Blacks, Coloureds and the KhoiKhoi. The KhoiKhoi

The KhoiKhoi are slightly bigger and a little darker than the KhoiSan. They probably owe their origins to an intermingling of KhoiSan and the Hamites in Somaliland. Geen7 states that it seems they travelled south-west down into Africa to the region of the Great Lakes, and, after staying several centuries, they moved further southwards around 600AC to reach the Orange River. They established themselves along the banks of the river and the West Coast, from Walvis Bay to the Umtamvuna River. Later on, they split into smaller group, each group with a name and their own customs.7

The KhoiKhoi were pastoralists and hunters. During the 1713 small pox outbreak, many died.7 Geen writes7:10: “…today few pure-blooded Hottentots exist, but their blood has been absorbed by the Griquas and the Cape Coloured people and, in varying degrees, by many Bantu tribes”.

As a group in itself, apart from their intermingling with the Coloureds and Blacks, the KhoiKhoi have very little impact on today’s land ownership debacle. However, in terms of equality and human rights as protected by the South African Constitution, they should as a group given the opportunity to claim ownership of the South African soil. The Indians, Asians and Malays

These late comers to South Africa, mainly as result of the import of labour to Natal in 1860, have like all the other races in South Africa, become indigenous to the country. Many of their fore fathers or tribal associates were Asian, Indian and Malay female slaves who came to the Cape Refreshment Station between 1650 and 1670.2

It is important to mention that research adds a 7.2% to 10.7% Indian influence into the Afrikaners’ matrilineal gene pool from Malaysian and other slave women (up to the early 1800s, 80% of the slaves came from India. It was only from 1730 onwards that the import of slaves from Madagascar was intensified).50,51

These historical facts reflect a horizontal biological association between the races in the Cape, especially immediately after the introduction of the free burghers in 1657 up to 1671. The fact is that three out of four children born to slave mothers during 1650 to 1670 had White fathers (meaning that the direct, first line infusion of “non-White blood” into the White parent stock can even be as high as 75%). Between 1657 and 1671, the early male ancestors of the Afrikaners at the Cape also took Black and KhoiKhoi women. These non-White women were accepted into the White community as either concubines or wives. They, together with some White women, became the parent stock of the White population and the later Afrikaners. These non-White women’s children, especially the females, were mostly assimilated into White society directly and horizontally to make up for the shortage of women without any discrimination or stigmatisation.2,50,52,53

It is clear that the Asians, Indians and Malay claim on South African land ownership is not limited to their South African identity, it is strengthens by their interbreeding with the Whites and the Coloureds.2 The Coloureds

There is an erroneous argument that the early Cape Settlement’s intermingling with non-Whites was limited to a small number of White families, and that these 6% to 10.7% mixed Afrikaner descendants were pushed from the White society to form the new Coloured population at the Cape. A vertical biological development of a closed and outcast group of mixed people, mostly excluded from the White nucleus that formed the modern Afrikaners, is surely true as evident from the existence of South African Coloureds and other mixed people of today. The fact is that the situation can be described as a “schizophrenic” split between the Whites and the Coloureds, peoples of the same bloodline, basically because the one group supposedly has “more non-White blood”. One can explain it as the same father having children by two different women (the Arabs and the Jews have the same “schizophrenic” origin). Evidence of an immense horizontal biological impact of “Coloured blood” on Afrikaners’ genes confirms the superficiality of this split between Coloureds and Whites. This contradicts the idea that there is only 6% to 10.7% of mixed Afrikaner descendants and of an exclusive separate vertical development of the Coloureds as a separate ethnic group. This fellowship between White Afrikaners and Brown Afrikaners makes the claims of White Afrikaners on land ownership applicable to the Coloureds and vice versa.50,54,55

Looking more critically at nationhood in South Africans is it only the Coloureds who can pride themselves on being a true mix of the various racial and ethnic groups in South Africa. They are indeed South African Creoles to the quick. Notwithstanding this right of birth and the fact that they are the second largest tribe in the country, they are still politically, economically and socially marginalises as in the previous dispensation.2 The different Black tribes

The first real physical contact between the White settlers and the Black settlers occurred more or less in the 18th century. The Blacks, like the Whites, are comparative newcomers to Southern Africa, writes Geen7:10. The South African Blacks probably came from Central Asia. They moved into Africa en masse, splitting in two: one group moving down into the middle of Africa and the second group moving along the East Coast to reach Sofala by the 10th century. When the Portuguese established themselves on the East Coast, various eastbound Black groups moved as far down as Natal and in the 1650s the area around the Kei River. The central group also moved southwards to establish themselves in the vicinities of the Vet and Caledon Rivers in the 1750s.7

Geen7 describes the unique characteristics of these various groups of Blacks, moving as foreigners southeast and southwards into Southern Africa. They constituted an ethnic group who matched the power and political intentions and motives of the White frontiersmen from day one at the Eastern border of the Cape Colony. Geen says the following7:11: “The Bantu [Blacks], mentally alert and physical strong, had a complex tribal system with hereditary chiefs whose powers were limited by their councils of headmen”.

Looking critically at the tribal and leadership customs and traditions of the early Blacks during their First and Second Colonization of South Africa between 1810 and 1840, we see similarities with Joshua and Moses and their conquest and creation of a New Israel. The Blacks wanted to become permanent settlers with indigenous status (especially through land grabbing, war and the extermination of their opponents by robbing them of land and cattle).2,3

The constant references to the Afrikaner as an alien, murderous colonist in South Africa, the only colonist in South Africa, are clearly false. It is an undeniable fact that the current Black population are also foreign to South Africa and is indeed in the same boat as the Afrikaners. The term “alien murderous colonists” is also applicable to them.

The Blacks have no more right on land ownership in terms of citizen-rights than the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds, Asians, Indians, Malays, Whites and Afrikaners. They are simply a larger population and can therefore occupy proportional more land as the smaller groups. Their present claims on land and their focus on land redistribution without compensation amounts to land grabbing and terrorism, as did their fore fathers when they settle here as foreigners.2 Whites and the Afrikaners

The widely accepted and propagated views that the Afrikaner is a unique and “pure” White, European and Caucasian race that had its cultural origins in 1652 at the Cape Settlement, is, as indicated above, wrong. The proof in literature of miscegenation and a multiracial component is a fact that most Afrikaners hush. The White Afrikaners’ earlier Afrikaner families are descending from various racial and ethnic bloodlines to form the trunk (nucleus) of the Afrikaner family tree that branched out to today’s Afrikaners.52,56

The multiracialism of today’s Afrikaners makes their legal claims on land ownership equal to that of South Africa’s Asian, Indians, KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds and Blacks. The Afrikaners have become indigenous, as have the Asians, Indians, KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds and Blacks.50-53,57,58

3.9 Liberation, terrorism and land grabbing in South Africa

As indicated in the title of the article, land grabbing is an age-old practice in South Africa. The question is by whom. Two main ethnic role players are prominent: Whites versus Blacks. From a modern political perspective, the two main role players are the National Party (NP) up to 1994 and the ANC after 1994.

3.9.1 The liberation and terrorism heart of the ANC elite and their supporters

An in-depth analysis of the political history of the ANC is helpful for understanding more of the political heart of the party and its leaders in 2018 and of their demand for land grabbing. Mhtombothi writes23:17 that the ANC’s modus operandi, their raison d’être and their main skill is to destroy rather than to build. Liberation movements (like the ANC) in Africa, Latin America and East Asia have been unable to run passable governments or to improve the quality of life of the people beyond giving them handouts. These handouts come from the redistribution of the wealth of the “conquered” groups. Instead of growing the cake, they redistribute what is already in existence by means of land grabbing and stealing from the minority and defenceless individuals and groups. What is more, there is an unbalanced allocation of these resources to party cadres and elites.23,59-64

Historical and modern land grabbing alike are been founded on liberation and terrorism. This has to be high light here. The official British description of terrorism (See: 3.1Land ownership obtained by means of modern terrorism in South Africa) is quite applicable to the South African situation. Terrorism is been described as serious violence against a person or serious damage to property to influence a government or an international organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public with the aim of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.8

The ANC’s current ideas on land grabbing are rooted in the first Black colonization of South Africa. Their fore fathers simply sought freedom and a better life in Southern Africa. This soon turned into fighting with the other incoming Black tribes and local non-White tribes and groups. The resulting land grabbing and murder of the legal owners of the territories by the fore fathers of the present ANC, was nothing else than terrorism. The unique characteristics that we associated with many of the ANC’s executive political leaders are the same as those associated with their fore fathers, who were without doubt freedom fighters, terrorists and liberators.2,3,8,26,52,65,66-67

Many of the current behaviours of Black leaders, like their intentions of land grabbing, RET and RST, are part of a culture passed on from their fore fathers. The unjustified oppression they experienced at the hands of the Whites (specifically the early Afrikaners and Afrikaners between 1910 and 1994) undoubtedly exacerbated their desire for terrorism and land grabbing with the focus on Whites specifically.2

These early negative values, internalized long ago as good customs, traditions and habits inside the Black culture were been transferred over the years to later generations. Many of the modern South Africa Black leaders who come from this culture have captured the unstable political setup after 1994 for their benefit and to spread their terrorist thinking among their Black supporters.23,27,59-62,68-71

The Black population initially migrated to South Africa to settle in areas that were at that time mostly KhoiKhoi and KhoiSan territory (territory that they also occupied as settlers earlier). These occupations were illegal in terms of modern international law. The establishment of a permanent stronghold in their new homeland is been seen, as said, as the first Black colonization of South Africa. However, the initial colonization did not last long. There was infighting over land, livestock, water resources and political rights. This led to brutal wars in the newly occupied areas. Groups tried to drive each other out of the new territories. These series of expulsions are been regarded as the second Black colonization of South Africa. The years 1810 to 1840 (known as the Mfecane in the coastal areas and the Difaqane inland) led to widespread Black-on-Black bloodshed in the northern parts of South Africa. This “Black re-colonisation” process took place more or less simultaneously with the northward migration of the Trek Boers and Voortrekkers into the interior from the Cape Colony.3,7,9

In this second Black colonization, King Shaka, the king of the powerful newly formed Zulu kingdom is been pinpointed as the main culprit of wrongdoings. His murderous behaviour around 1819 led to political, social and economic chaos and large-scale land grabbing. He was the main perpetrator of Black colonialism and land grabbing between 1810 and 1840, leading to the eradication and re-colonization of other Black tribes. The remnants of these broken Black tribes fled and settled away from the Zulus and other occupying tribes. This led to the depopulation of large parts of South Africa because of further infighting and land grabbing. Intense food shortage followed and it is been estimated that more than 28 independent Black tribes were completely wiped out. The total death toll has never been determined, but the estimation is between one and two million.3,7,9

Mzilikazi (Msilikazi), the king of the Matabele in Transvaal between 1826 and 1836, also played a prominent role in this genocide. He also ordered widespread killings of other Black tribes and the removal of all opposition to his new Ndebele order.3,7,9

These first and second Black colonisations represent South Africa’s first genocides. This is a political-historical fact that is been ignored and hidden from the public eye in the present context of the ANC’s post-1994 policy on guarding the Blacks’ political power and unity. Today, Black South Africans seem to refuse to accept personal blame and responsibility for their ancestors’ colonial atrocities. These atrocities were committed simply to obtain new land.2,3

3.9.2 The liberation and terrorism heart of the early and later Afrikaner leaders and their supporters

The current noises of land redistribution without compensation are making some Afrikaners nervous, especially White farmers. However, they are wrong to point a finger at the ANC when it comes to land grabbing. The early proto-Afrikaners grabbed land from the early 1700s up to 1910, where after the Afrikaner Nationalists continued from 1910 to 1994.2,3,9,48,52,67,72-74

The Afrikanerism of the early and later Afrikaners represents terrorism, supporting and upholding a liberation movement. It often became radical and extreme, especially between 1948 and 1994. The modus operandi of the early proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaner Nationalists and the liberation principles of the ANC is the same. In the Afrikaners’ case, their initial early enemies were the English. Later, the “Black danger” came to the foreground as the most pertinent issue. The tendency of Afrikaner leaders to see themselves as the liberators of the Afrikaner tribe and to pursue White supremacy, were found necessary to explore. 2,48,52,62,71,72,74,75

The history of the Afrikaners, from the early days of the Cape Colony to the later Boer republics, the period from 1910 to 1948 and the Afrikaner Nationalists from 1948 to 1994, reflect active and destructive terrorism by a liberation movement. This was long before the ANC appeared on the scene. The timeline concurs with that of Shaka and other Black leaders. Both the White and Black groups destroyed the opposition and preyed on their assets. Afrikanerism also meets the British definition of terrorism, just like the ANC. Land terrorism and land grabbing without compensation (but with bloodshed) as propagated by ANC was part and parcel of the way in which Afrikaners took possession of land from 1652 to 1994. It brought the Afrikaners in possession 85% of the South African territory. In other words, the ANC is not planning anything that the Afrikaners did not do.2,3,7,9 Both of the two prominent role players were and are nothing other than political mobsters. Boon3 describes their characteristics as follows3:75:

Selfishness; delinquent inclinations all-over; strategies total stripped of all democratic principles, traditions, thinking, planning and doings; absolute intolerant; anti- order; minorities are quickly eradicated; coercion actions characterized by destruction, threat, killings and brutalities; aim the creation of a delinquent mob-reign; aim the exclusive of executive political mob-leaders to reign the country.

Just as some of the bad early political-history of some of the Black-tribes of in South Africa became part of ANC’s culture, the years 1652 to 1910 cemented certain thought patterns in the Afrikaners. From 1910 up to 1994, it took an extreme form. The Malan manifesto of 1948 that introduced Grand Apartheid confirms this.48,52,71,72,74-76

The radical racist land grabbing behaviour of 1948 to 1994 on the side of the Afrikaner Nationalists has a much deeper aetiology that dates from the 1700s. Some of the deviant behaviours are been founded in the history of the Boers on the borders (Grensboere) and the migratory Boers (Trekboere). Geen7 describes these groups as White frontiersmen. Some deviating behaviours became entrenched as acceptable in the minds of these White frontiersmen.2,7,52,76

Geen7 quotes Deneys Reitz’s book titled “No outspan on the early Afrikaners”, as follows7:69: “Knowing my countrymen as I do, I think the cause of their leaving [Great Trek] was not so much hatred of British rule as a dislike of any rule”. Reitz7 reflects on the foundation of the racist and defiant thinking of the early Afrikaners. They expressed their Afrikanerism without inhibition, among other things by means of terrorist attacks on Blacks. Geen7 writes7:69:

The frontiersmen – and it was they and not the well-to-do farmers of the western districts who went on trek – were stock-farmers and hunters with a low standard of living who were used both too isolation and trekking, so that though the Trek implied an uprooting it did not mean a change in their way of life. The dangers of the interior were undoubtedly great, but at any rate, the leaders of the various parties knew that of all the tribes the Griquas, Matabele and Zulus alone were to be feared. Any other people but the Boers might have rebelled in similar circumstances, but since the trek-spirit was in-born farms were either sold or abandoned and their holders went off into the interior, where cheap land and labour would be plentiful and government interference of the slightest. It seems probable that the Great Trek would not have happened had the scene not been South Africa and the actors Boers.

Geen7 continues to describe the defiance of the White frontiersmen and their refusal to submit to law and order. He states7:68-69:

Traditions of government in the Cape Colony were bad, as the frontiersmen had been used to too little control in the days of the Dutch Eastern India Company, when they had provided their own defence and so had become their own law. They had become a race of extreme individualists with an inherited suspicion of any authority and discipline, so that they viewed with dismay the steady extension of magisterial districts, which in their eyes meant stricter government control and, moreover in 1828 involved the abolition of the representative Courts or Heemraden.

It is very important to pause for a moment to consider this early Boer mentality and their views of what is civilized and uncivilized behaviour, of what is right and wrong. Land grabbing and suppression of other groups were part of their way of doing. This was been transferred to the Boer republics and later to the modern Afrikaners. Geen continues7:72-73:

For many years, the trekkers and their descendants led a roving life in the interior cut off from educational facilities and other civilizing agents. Their education was first that of the open veld and then that of the isolated farm, but it was neither literary nor industrial and made the Boers far more backwards than their counterparts in Australia and the American Middle West. The isolation in which the children and grandchildren of the trekkers grew up has helped to create the Poor White problem of today [1946], for the civilizing work of the original trekkers was superficially done and was spread far too thinly over a wide area.

The fact that the Boers constantly moved northwards confirms that: “they wanted to do things their way”. Their way was not always within the limits of the law (like land grabbing and the planned termination of non-Whites like the KhoiSan). It resembled terrorism as described by Powell8 and Boon3. Their terrorist behaviours, as already indicated, reappeared during the Great Trek when the Voortrekkers started to occupy land that they argued and rationalized as “uninhabited and ownerless,” while in reality it was the property of Black tribes who used it as hunting grounds and pasture for their cattle and as a defence zone between hostile tribes. Despite this reality, the Boers occupied the land, often by brute force and the loss of Black lives. This first forceful occupation of Black land north of the Cape Colony’s border took the same form as the killing and atrocities during the migration of Black tribes southwards with the first and second colonization of South Africa.2,52,76

It is important to look at Powell’s8 description of terrorism again. When considering the actions of the Boers, it resembles Saddam Hussein’s unlawful occupation of Kuwait that caused the world to react with full military force. In modern times, the behaviour of the early Boers would bring them before the International Criminal Court for terrorism, the unlawful occupation of foreign land and murder.8,77

The aggression of the Boers escalated with the large-scale occupation of Black territory to form the Boer republics. They drove away or killed the Black owners. They used the same tactics that Shaka used to take over the land of other tribes. This early occupation facilitated the founding of the two Boer republics, both of which supported racial discrimination. This shows how much terrorism and Boer liberation are internalized in the minds of the Afrikaners.2,9,47,52,65,66,67

The purpose of the terrorism and land grabbing of the Boers was to create an economic system that would be theirs exclusively. Their dehumanization of Blacks also served this purpose. Chomsky78 says it well78:28:

Concentration of wealth yields concentration of political power. And concentration of political power gives rise to legislation that increases and accelerates the cycle.

After the fall of the two Boer republics, the Transvaal and the Free State, the Boers gained the political upper hand again with the formation of the Union of South Africa. They were still been driven by their rigid racism (which included the dehumanization of Blacks and the capture of Black interests). This negative energy was been channelled into the racial policy of the Union and from there into the Grand Apartheid of the Verwoerd Republic, which only ended officially in 1994.2,52,68,69,76,79

Researchers have thus far refrained from studying the land grabbing of the early Boers in the Transvaal and the Free State because it is so politically sensitive. The same goes for the earlier actions of Whites in Cape Colony and later in the greater South Africa. The South African situation does not differ much from the early American terrorism against the Native Americans (Red Indians) in their land grabbing. Martinez80 writes as follows about the ignored colonial history of the Americans80:151:

 When freedoms clash, some must take priority over others. In the economy, the     mechanism that determines which freedoms are prioritized is the property rights system. Property rights bestow the freedom to control and profit from what is owned. They determine who has     decision-making authority over a given commodity. Ownership is     necessarily exclusive: as soon as one person owns something, the     rest of the world does not. When the Wild West pioneer claimed to     own ‘newly discovered’ land and made it his home, he appropriated resources that had been the preserve of Native Americans for thousand s of years.

Martinez80 reports further80:153:

The history of colonialism and imperialism poses further challenges to the legitimacy of property rights today. From the fifteenth century onwards, European nations took control of much of North, Central and South America, large swathes of Asia and, by the twentieth century, most of Africa. Indigenous populations were wiped out or pushed off their land, communities were devastated and resources were appropriated for Western profit; and

There is nothing voluntary about this process. Indeed, it is hard to see the original appropriation and privatisation of commonly owned resources as anything but theft.

Geen’s7 description of the early Boers’ land grabbing by terrorism is reminiscent of the White Europeans early land grabbing from the indigenous populations of Norh, Central and South America, large parts of Asia and most of Africa (1500s to 1800s). The behaviour of the Whites, aggravated further after 1910, has contaminated all possibilities of successful and civilized land transformation in South Africa. Land grabbing is an evil that has affected all the populations of South Africa. Geen7 writes as follows in the context of the tragic chain reaction of early White land grabbing7:73:

As the Trek is responsible in some measure for the Poor White problem of the present so also it made the segregation of the Bantu [Black] tribes forever impossible. Despite the wars of Chaka and Msilikazi in the land into which the trekkers moved was by no means empty of population for Native [Black] wars were not unduly destructive of life. Having subdued the Native tribes the trekkers soon disposed them of their lands and thus helped to create a landless class of Natives, which is the source of many of the Union’s economic troubles at the present time [1946].The trekkers hardly exemplify a judicious Native policy, for their haphazard apportionment of land often without survey at all mean that the Natives became mere squatters on their own tribal land; and in looking at the things exclusively from the point of view of European interests the trekkers set the disastrous fashion of ignoring the very existence of the Native population. Sir T. Shepstone was near the truth when he wrote to the Colonial Office in January 1880 that “the government of the (Transvaal) Republic never thought it necessary even as a matter of mere prudence, to set apart land for the occupation of the natives”. The Native Problem that exercises the attention of S. African statesmen today [1946] is largely the creation of the trekkers, who in the interior provinces of the Union laid the foundation of a civilization based on a landless Bantu proletariat and a rigid maintenance of the Colour Bar in State and Church.

Looking at the current landlessness of many Blacks and their dire ongoing poverty, the above words are applicable to the South Africa of 2018. The fact that the Afrikaner Nationalists are no longer in power makes it possible for widespread land redistribution to start at last to erase the injustices of the past.

4. Conclusions

The political dispensations of Cape Colony of 1853 and 1872 and the Union of 1910 offered excellent opportunities to redistribute land and hand it back to Blacks to create an open, just South African society. The much later 1994-dispensation failed completely. This makes the current land redistribution, which may also just become land grabbing, a natural and unavoidable interference and intervention. Land redistribution is a necessary must. It is unavoidable. It needs a solution.

From 1652 to 1994, many Whites in South Africa had it good, especially the Afrikaners. They still see their possession of certain valuable land as normal, rightful, certain and permanent in 2018. This is an illusion that has lasted nearly four centuries because of the Afrikaner’s refusal to become an indigenous South African and to make the change from an outdated European to a modern African identity.

The bad parts of South African history are as intertwined as the bloodlines are. South Africa’s Blacks and Whites are indeed equals when it comes to freedom fighting, land terrorism and land grabbing. Now is there only one prominent difference between the two: The Afrikaners own most of the land that the Blacks want. The prominent question is how the transfer will take place: Will it be another land grab; or will there be a reasoned, a balanced and a just land transfer and redistribution? The last option has been absent for all of South African political history.

The refusal on the part of the Whites to surrender capital to the Blacks is concerning. Not even the various political consequences of the post-1994 dispensation could detangle and break down the intertwined self-enriching politics and economics of especially the Afrikaners.

Louw writes in this regard2:93:

Negative thought patterns like racial discrimination, forged by years of exposure, examples and compensation, will not be erased easily from the thinking of most Afrikaners, especially if they are not rational. The lost privileges, rights, benefits and empowerments are seldom reclaimable. Most Afrikaners find themselves in an unbearable dilemma today.

The Afrikaners as individuals and a tribe are over-estimating their current importance and role in South Africa. They do not see the fact that they are probably moving towards dissolution in a century’s time. Some of the ANC elite and other radical Black politicians know this well.2 For these Blacks, especially those still thirsty for revenge after apartheid, the prominent question is: So why care about the Afrikaners’ rights and concerns? Did the Afrikaners care for non-Whites from 1652 to 2018?

Land redistribution has the potential to become a much more devastating and life-threatening phenomenon than Europeans have ever seen in the history of Africa. It has the potential to overshadow the murderous acts of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe or Patrice Lumumba in the Belgium Congo. In this new South African history there seems to be only one short-sighted loser: the Afrikaner landowner. The position of the Whites will certainly be far less favourable than their present one if there is a orderly land redistribution, but the alternative is anarchy that the Afrikaners would be lucky to survive.2,68,69,79

The Blacks have no more right to land ownership than the KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds, Asian, Indians, Malays, Whites and Afrikaners. The present claims by some Blacks that they have the sole right to grab land, are been based on a false indigenous identity. It is a new land terrorism, similar to what their fore fathers did when they settled here as foreigners.2

What is been needed is an appropriate, equal land redistribution programme in terms of the tribal proportional numbers of the Blacks, KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Coloureds, Asian, Indians, Malays, Whites and Afrikaners. The issue of land for the poor should take centre stage. This will bring some justice and harmony to the South African population at last.2

The Blacks and the Whites of South Africa are equally foreign, equally indigenous, equally colonialist. The claims that the Blacks deserve to be here more in anyway, are based on a denial of history.2,3,7,9,81

Mthombothi82:21 write as follows on the lack of a South African patriotism:

Sometimes we view other people either as enemies or as the source of our problems.

One often wanders why some South Africans, for instance, are filled with love for complete strangers from Europe or other parts of Africa – which is a good thing – but at the same time show an aversion for some of their compatriots who happen to be of a different colour.

Perhaps South Africans on the whole are still struggling with the notion of identity. We’ve been rudderless for a while. Are we one people or a collection of different nationalities who happen to inhabit a single geographic area? And where in the political cosmos do we belong?

Mthombothi82 is correct when he posits that South Africa is not an empty landscape: that it is flesh and blood and its people needs respect. To address land expropriation needs first the healing of South Africans’ estrangement from each other. If we addressed this matter many years ago, we would be a united nation today.

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Not commissioned; externally peer-reviewed.


The author has no competing interests to declare.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.


Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). These terms do appear in dated documents. These terms or translations are use for the sake of historical accuracy in this article. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of the South African: 1652 to 2018. Part 5: Performance profiles of executive political leaders and regimes for the period 1652 to 1795

Gabriel P Louw


Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw


Keywords: appraisal, black, executive, history, leaders, performance, political, profile, regime, white.

Ensovoort, volume 38 (2018), number 7:3

1 Background

1.1 Introduction

When does History begin?

This was a daring question that the eminent historian, JM Roberts, forced to the foreground in 1976 in his brilliant and comprehensive work: History of the World.

Roberts writes1:3:

It is tempting to reply ‘In the beginning’, but like many obvious answers, this soon turns out to be unhelpful. As a great Swiss historian once pointed out in another connexion, history is the one subject where you cannot begin at the beginning. We can trace the chain of human descent back to the appearance of vertebrates, or even to the photosynthetic cells and other basic structures which lie at the start of life itself. We can go back further still, to almost unimaginable upheavals which formed this planet, and even to the origins of the universe. Yet this is not ‘history’.

Common sense helps here: history is the story of mankind, of what it has done, suffered or enjoyed. Even when historians write about a natural process beyond human control, such as the ups and downs of climate, or the spread of disease, they do it only because it helps us to understand why men and women have lived (and died) in some ways rather than others.

One outcome from ‘history’ reflecting the uniqueness of the human species, is not its possession of certain faculties or physical characteristics, but what it has done with it: the human species’ achievements as protraited in its remarkably intense level of activity and creativity, its cumulative capacity to create change. The human culture alone is progressive and was in the past and is presently built up by increasingly conscious choices and selection within it, as well as by accident and natural pressure, supported by the accumulation of a capital of experiences and knowledge, which humans have and have exploited.1:4

Roberts adds that1:4:

Human history began when the inheritance of genetics and the behaviour, which had until then provided the only way of dominating the environment, was first broken through by conscious choice. Of course, human beings have always only been able to make their history within limits. These limits are now vey wide indeed, but they were once so narrow that it is impossible to identify the first step which took human evolution away from the determination of nature. We have, for a long time, only a blurred story, obscure both because the evidence is fragmentary and because we cannot be sure exactly what we are looking for.

Looking to the South African ‘history’ it was and is to date a blurred story, obscure both because the evidence is fragmentary and because we cannot be sure exactly what we are looking for: an exclusive White “history” or an exclusive Black “history”, both saturated with falsities, subjectivities and emotionality, misused over the years until 1994 by the Afrikaners and from 1994 by the ANC regime in their opposing policies of political correctness.

Of a “pure”, true and honestly written South African history was there in the past and will there be in the future not one. History is and was always written by the winner and ruler: objectivity is out of the mindset in South Africa’s political schizophrenia: not the best psychiatric drug can bring about mental clearness and mindset reality. At most, we can talk about a South African political history, inundated by racial conflicts, discrimination and manifold social, psychological, economic and political wrongdoings. In the appraisal of the executive political leaders for the period 1652 to 1795, we must take note of this unavoidable factor of contamination of our history, spreading like cancer into its leaders’ thinking, planning and actions over time.

Before we go into a journey of our past, is it important to note how our official political history (commencing in 1652) compares in age with countries of the greater world and what was the human-political thinking in the middle 1600s when Commander Jan van Riebeeck arrived at the Cape of Storms, renamed the Cape of Good Hope (which seems a more and more faulty name-change), as the first White to be officially mandated to start up a refreshment post, manned initially exclusively by Whites, solely for White interests.

Is South Africa’s political history really impressive in age and a grey-headed “elder” among the world’s countries, as our history books sometimes try to propagate? Roberts1 offers us a time-clock to understand our age when he states1:5:

The roots of history lie in the prehuman past and it is hard to grasp just how long ago that was. If we think of a century on our calendar as a minute on some great clock recording the passage of time, then white Europeans began to settle in the Americas only about five minutes ago. Slightly less than fifteen minutes before that, Christianity appeared. Rather more than an hour ago a people settled in southern Mesopotamia who were soon to evolve the oldest civilization known to us. Thus it is already well beyond the furthest margin of written record. According to our clock, people began writing down the past much less than an hour ago, too. Some six or seven hours further back on our scale and much more remotely, we can discern the first recognizable human being of a modern physiological type already established in western Europe. Behind them, anything from a fortnight to three weeks earlier, appear the first traces of creatures with some manlike characteristics whose contribution to the evolution which followed is still in debate.

The South African political history, coming from the 1600s, is a suckling baby, still totally dependent on outside care to survive. But the positivity to this is that this baby has the youth on its side to be able to grow into a wonderful adult with time, if he/she receives the right parental care and guidance. Indeed, what went wrong so far in the country’s past can be rectified with ease by its people, depending on the ability, integrity and vision of the regimes they are going to allow to reign over them.

But to understand the above reference: first White to be officially mandated to start up a refreshment post, manned initially exclusively by Whites solely for White interests, and thus the bringing about and the anchoring of an extremely problematic political history for South Africa, it is important to reflect on those first Whites’ arrival in 1652 at the Cape. These establishers of an exclusive European culture at the Cape, and their political thinking, planning and actions, were strongly vested in the 1600-1700s’ rigid European negative dogma, doctrine and ideology on non-European races.

In this respect the historian and writer Niall Ferguson2 mentioned that race had been a powerful and violent preoccupation already in early times; it is not exclusive to modern times only. This predisposition brings to the foreground the question why this long-coming race inclination? He writes2:li:

An answer that suggests itself – also, as it happens, from the literature on evolutionary biology – is that racism, in the sense of a strongly articulated sense of racial differentiation, is one of those ‘memes’ characterized by Richard Dawkins as behaving in the realm of ideas the way genes behave in the natural world. The idea of biologically distinct races, ironically, has been able to reproduce itself and retain its integrity far more successfully than the races it claims to identity.

In this context Ferguson elaborates that2: li-lii:

As is well known, the first ostensibly scientific attempt to subdivide the human species into biologically distinct races was by the Swedish botanist Carolus Linnnaeus (Carl von Linné). In his Systema Naturae (1758), he identified four races: Homo sapiens americanus, Homo sapiens asiaticus, Homo sapiens after and Homo sapiens europaeus. Linnaeus, like all his many imitations, ranked the various races according to their appearance, temperament and intelligence, putting European man at the top of the evolutionaty tree, followed (in Linnaeus’s case) by American man (‘ill-tempered…obstinate, contented, free’), Asian man (‘severe, haughty, desirous’) and – invariably at the bottom – African man (‘crafty, slow, foolish’). Whereas European man was ‘ruled by customs’, Linnaeus argued that African man was ruled by ‘caprice’.

Ferguson2 writes that when the American Revolution arrived, the above “Linnaeus thinking” was immensely wide-spread in the greater European communities. All that was outstanding was whether racial differences reflected gradual divergence from common origin or the lack of such a common origin, as propagated by the polygenists. Racial theorists had with time devised more elaborate methods of categorizing race differentiation, like the skull size and its shape, etc, but the basic ranking system never changed. In his book, Hereditary Genius, published in 1869, the polymath Francois Galton devised a sixteen-point scale of racial intelligence, which scaled the Australian Aborigines at the bottom versus Ancient Athenians on top.2

This was, with the above already discriminatory cognitions, internalized into their mindsets for generations when the first Cape settlers arrived. It must be noted that during the period 1652 to 1671, when there was an immense shortage of European womenfolk, but many Black slave womenfolk available, the basic human sexual needs of the White men overcame, to a certain extent, these racial taboos, which led thereto that three out of four children born to slave mothers had White fathers. It was only after 1671 with the Godske Instruction and the Netherlands Authority’s direct intervention at the Cape on race relations and racism, that the Linnaeus dogma of White superiority won again and the “first apartheid law of South Africa was promulgated”. From there onward the South African history became a White political history: steered, driven and written by Whites. In particular, it became an Afrikaner history representing “Afrikanerdom” glorification, thinking and promotion. It is in this unfortunate context of the South African history and its executive political leaders, that their leaderships and regimes of governance will be appraised for the period 1652 to 1795.3-9

To understand the context of my above remark, read what Afrikaner historians write about this 1652 to 1795 exclusively Afrikaner-created history, with the Afrikaner as a European the single focus as the creator and saviour of Southern Africa, ignoring the non-European contribution totally. In his autobiography General JBM Hertzog, published in 1944, the well-known Afrikaner writer and Afrikaner novelist CM van den Heever, writes10:9-10:

The Dutch national group lost their ties to their motherland as a result of isolation and as one generation gave way to the next. The French Hugenots and the Germans were soon absorbed into this group, and their language disappeared and became a new one, leaving behind only a trace here and there of the original Seventeenth Centuary Dutch language (Own translation).

The new citizen did not let his ties to the motherland go on his own. He left behind the crux of the new culture as he went further into the interior as he followed a northerly path. This helped to prepare the new, wild world for the Afrikaans culture, which has its roots in farming life (Own translation).

At the beginning of the Eighteenth Centuary, clear indications of a feeling of separation from Holland became apparent, a realization that the “Afrikaner” was forming an “apartheid”. This tendency, with increasing self-determination and external pressure, would become greater. The Afrikaans type, including physique, language and outlook on life, was formed. For this Afrikaner, far from Western European cultural sources and trapped in the isolation of the loneliness of the veld, the Bible remained the only source of culture, and life was aimed at the Hereafter (Own translation).

With regard to racial relations in 1944, Van den Heever10 writes about the same degrading view of Blacks as persons and as a group of “danger”, a viewpoint that had been raised thirty-six years earlier in 1908 at the Cape Convention, by some of the most prominent Afrikaner leaders in their discussion of all the races in the to be formed Union of South Africa. Prominent were verbatim remarks then by polically famous delegates, like11:18-19: “…Perhaps at bottom I do not believe in politics for them at all as a means for the attainment of the highest ends, but certainly so far as the Natives are concerned, politics will to my mind only have an unsetting influence”; and: “I do not like the Natives at all and I wish we had no Black man in South Africa”.

In this context of strong racism, Van den Heever also writes10:9-10:

This requires that all kinds of relationships must be captured, most importantly those regarding natives. Jan van Riebeeck was still groping around in this respect, particularly with the consept of a heathen being allowed to marry a white person. Life habits, born out of land circumstances, helped to build an attitude in which the white culture’s future would be protected. By the end of the Eighteenth Centuary, the attitude of the Afrikaner towards the coloured people was alreasdy crystalised, and the Great Trek would sharpen it further. It had become clear to them that very strict handling of the dividing line between White and non-White people was necessary, if they did not want to sink into the barbarism around them (Own translation).

The historian and writer MS Geen12 writes in 1945 in his book: The Making of the Union of South Africa, in the same one-sided way on the history of the country as an exclusive White one, wherein the color Black is seemingly an unknown role-player (also carefully examine his reference hereunder)12:216:

There must also be the fullest appreciation of the contributions that all have made to the making of the Union of South Africa. Alongside the tributes we should proudly pay to the tenacity of the early Dutch settlers, to the courage of the Cape frontiersmen and to the self-sacrifice of the Voortrekkers and their descendants, there must be admiration for those of British stock who have played a notable part in the building of South Africa—administrators and soldiers on the Cape eastern frontier, missionaries, early settlers in the Albany District and in Natal, Lord Milner’s “Kindergarten”, and engineers and financiers, whose knowledge, enterprise and capital built up the great diamond and gold industries with the aid of European and Bantu labour.

The only reference by Geen12 to Blacks was the contribution of cheap labour by Bantus for Blacks (but also similar to the abusive names of natives, kaffirs and barbarians used in Geen’s book) in the diamond industries; in this context to bring at the lowest pay, fortunes to the British mine owners. His praises were exclusively for the engineers’ and financiers’ knowledge, enterprise and capital, which he saw as the persons who solely built up the great diamond and gold industries. With regard to a place in history, taking the lead and making valuable contributions to it, it seems that the Blacks, in terms of Geen’s12 report, were not contributers in the country’s history or even able to make such contributions.12

This notion of non-existence in the 1652 to 1795 period in South African history by Blacks, as reflected by Van der Heever10 and Geen12 is also present in many other South African written histories. Where references come to the surface, it is mostly in a negative context.

* Please note that the author is aware of the fact that the words Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (some are criminal) to use in general speaking and writing in modern-day South Africa. The terms do appear in dated documents and are so translated for the sake of historical accuracy and it is thus unavoidable not to reflect them in their original naming here. It is also pertinent used in this article to reflect on some South Africans’ extreme racism thinking, speaking and writing of sixty years and less ago. These names are part of a collection of degrading names which especial Afrikaner historians commonly used in their books and references of pre-1994 in the heydays of Apartheid. In the reflecting on the profiles of executive leaders and their regimes, these degrading names need to be reoffered here to bring racism, dehumanizing, distancing and the suppression of Blacks prominent to the fore-ground. It is important here to can make a classing in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification of executive political leaders and regimes. These negative names do not represent the author’s view-point and he distances him totally from it as commonly speaking and writing language. In his research and writings on the South African populations and political-history he uses names as Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloreds, KhoiSan (Bushman), KhoiKhoi (Hottentot) and Boers, etc., as applicable descriptive names.

1.2 South African literature on executive political leaders from 1652 to 1795

South Africa lacks in-depth literature on the quality of executive political leadership as practiced by its various executive political leaders and their regimes from 1652 to 1795. It is in fact totally absent. Limited references are found on the behavioural and political practices, driven and promoted by the executive political leaders and their regimes.

Biographies on South African executive political leaders, as well as autobiographies by these leaders themselves, are very lacking in information and descriptions on the precise kind of leadership associated with them as the country’s executive political leaders. Most of this South African leadership data reflected in historical and political books, as well as autobiographies and biographies, offers postulations, opinions, viewpoints and “facts” which are mostly subjective and influenced by party- and self-conceit, intentions to promote political gains and frequently the personal glorification of sub-standard and corrupt political leaders and their governments. It is overwhelmingly used to divert attention, especially from the failure of the leaders. Even on failed and low levels of political leadership, some of these political leaders became icons, some even with worldwide status, with very little criticism lodged against them about criminality, psychological malfunction and other behavioural deviations. It is only more recently that our newspapers, sometimes near-defamatory in their reporting, describe the behaviour of our political leaders. In this context we already see some efforts to limit informative reporting in terms of the hate speech legislation.

To make an evaluation on the quality of leadership of South African executive political leaders and governments for the period 1652 to 1795, the descriptions by various political and historical writers on political leaders and governments, as well as the writings of business and management experts on business executive leaders, were consulted.13-26

The aim of this article is to evaluate and to describe the performance profiles of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa for the period 1652 to 1795.

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern day historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research, like the functioning of executive political leaders and their regimes of governance for the period 1652 to 1795 in South Africa. The sources included articles from 2017 to 2018, books for the period 1961 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2016 to 2018. These sources were consulted to evaluate the functioning of executive political leaders and to put thoughts, views and opinions on the South African political leadership for the period 1652 to 1795 in perspective.27-29

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

2.1 Problem statement

The research problem is: Did the executive political leaders of South Africa during the period 1652 to 1795 make extraordinary contributions to the country and its people; and was their behaviour as leaders and as people extraordinary and impeccable?

* ”People” refers to all the South African groups – the various races, cultural groups and tribes, etc. It includes the minorities as well as the majorities – it excludes any sole grouping in terms of dominant political party, etc.

* ”Country” refers to today’s greater South Africa as represented by the Republic of South Africa, while it also refers back into the history of the Cape Settlement and the Cape Colony, etc.

2.2 Research aims

  • The first aim of the research is to determine whether the South African executive political leaders and regimes of the period 1652 to 1795,  during their time in office, made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people.
  • The     second aim of the research is to determine whether the behaviour of     the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to     1795 as leaders and as people was extraordinary and impeccable.

In light of the above two research aims, questions must be asked and answered reflecting this argument of truth on the South African executive political leaders. In line herewith are two objectives, as well as two hypotheses and two alternative hypotheses, formulated in terms of the research aims, also to be asked, tested and answered.

2.3 Research questions of the study

The following two research questions focus the research intentions:

RQ1: Did the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795 make extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their time in office?

RQ2: Was the behaviour of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795 extraordinary and impeccable as leaders and as people?

2.4 Objectives of the study

The following two objectives guide the study:

RO1: To determine whether the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795 during their time in office made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people.

RO2: To determine whether the behaviour of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795 was extraordinary and impeccable as leaders and as people.

2.5 Hypotheses

The following two hypotheses and two alternative hypotheses are assumed:

H1: The South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795 made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their time in office.

H1A: The South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795 did not make extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their time in office.

H2: To determine whether the behaviour of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795 was extraordinary and impeccable as leaders and as people.

H2A: The behaviour of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795 was not extraordinary and impeccable as leaders and as people.

3. Results

3.1 The Dutch East India Company

When looking back into the history of South Africa, the Twentieth Century person thinks in terms of an established country with borders, developments, infrastructure, health and educational services, a police force and other security services to safeguard its citizens, etc., mostly missing out on how the fairest Cape looked in 1652: a barren area without buildings, shelters, land under agriculture and just possibly the occasional sighting of a KhoiSan (Bushman) or a KhoiKhoi (Hottentot). It was a total contradiction to what the modern day citizen of Cape Town is used to today. This new beginning in the foreign land was led by Jan van Riebeeck and his group of 80 volunteers on behalf of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), which began the first European ownership of the Cape. (Its legal entity name was the Generale Vereenighde Nederlantsche G’octroyeerde Oostindische Compagnie; in short referred to as the VOC). The VOC, founded in 1602 when the four Netherlands trading companies of Amsterdam, Zeeland, de Maas and the North Quarter almalgamated, fast became a prominent European chartered company. In six years it had broken the Portuguese monopoly of Eastern trade and seized the Moluccas, Java, Amboyna and a large part of Timor. Within thirteen years the VOC owned eight hundred vessels and paid excellent dividends. After that it expanded to China, Japan and Siam and it occupied Mauritius, St Helena and Ceylon and became the founder of the Dutch Empire in the island world of the Far East.4,11,12,30-32

In name the VOC was a private company, but in reality it was a national concern with the Dutch Government as the main shareholder and only Dutch subjects could hold shares, preferably in large amounts. Its titular chairman was the Stadtholder, while the States-General gave the VOC its charter. Its management, like that of the United Provinces of Netherlands, was federal in constitution with the Council of Seventeen in charge, consisting of representatives of the chambers of the four original companies. The ultimate trading operations were controlled by this Council of Seventeen [also called the HERE XVll: the 17-Members: 8: Amsterdam; 4: Zeeland; 2: de Maas (Rotterdam and Delft); 2: the North Quarter ((West Friesland) while the 17th member was elected in consultation by Zeeland, de Maas and the North Quarter]. The Council of Seventeen governing its colonial possessions, maintaining its army and taking responsibility for treaties with foreign powers. The government of the Cape of Good Hope was subordinate to the Governor-General and Council of India which controlled all the Eastern possessions of the VOC from its headquarters at Batavia.12

It was in this context that Commander Jan van Riebeeck on the 6th April 1652 (with the rank “als koopman en opperhoofd’) anchored with three small ships, the Goede Hoop, the Drommedaris and the Reiger, in Table Bay, to start up a refreshment station for the VOC. More importantly, this start up was also the introduction to South Africa its first official executive political leader. Moreover, it signaled the beginning of the country’s political history, based exclusively on White supremacy which drove all thinking, planning and action until 1994. Initially, central to this contaminating outcome, were the Netherlanders as founding fathers of South Africa, and as this political history will soon reflect, also became the only dominant and discriminative role-player until 1795 at the Cape.4,11,12,30-33

It is in this context that this article intends to evaluate and to describe whether the South African executive political leaders and regimes of the period 1652 to 1795 during their time in office made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people. The intent is also to determine whether the behaviour of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795 was extraordinary and impeccable.

In light of the domino effect, starting up a chain reaction of governmental oversight in 1652, which ran unbroken for 150 years under various executive political leaders of the VOC, is it thought wise to reflect first at this stage on a chronological list of these various officials’ names and times of office.33 This gives insight into what immense processes are involved in the ruling of a country and how easily the political tides can turn against its inhabitants by the delinquent actions of hostile, delinquent rulers and authorities, as well as the resistance and counter-actions that can follow against such poor rulers and regimes. This list furthermore gives us insight as to why there is reference in this article to a White political history for the period 1652 to 1795 — of Black faces or names there are no significant signs in this list of 72! It seems that only Simon and Adriaan Willem van der Stel were Coloreds, reflecting only a 2.8% representation of non-Whites in the top leadership over a period of more or less 150 years!12,33-36

In addition, the fact that, of this enormously long list of executive political leaders, some were too briefly in office to leave an impact as rulers, provides insight as to why this article on leadership and governance (which is absolutely limited by length, time and costs) can not extract comprehensive data for the total executive political leader population for 1652-1795 (μ=30).33

In 3.2 List of Commanders and Governors for the period 1652 to 1795, the leaders’ names and their times in office, is reflected.33

3.2 List of Commanders and Governors for the period 1652 to 179533

3.2.1 Dutch Cape Colony (1652-1795) Commanders3 Governors (The rank of Commander was changed in 1691 to Governor)12

3.3 First Dutch Authorities

3.3.1 First Executive leader: Commander Jan van Riebeeck of the Cape Refreshment post (1652-1662) Establishment of the Council of Policy

When Commander Jan van Riebeeck arrived on the 6th April 1652 at the Cape of Good Hope to found a refreshment station for the VOC, he also introduced the first administrative and juridical body to manage the affairs of Whites at a South African outpost. Indeed, he got the first Whites rooted in South Africa. The executive body of the VOC, the Council of Seventeen, already identified in the 1630s the need for a halfway station between Amsterdam and Batavia to provide fresh water and food for the crews of VOC ships. The beheading of Charles I of England by Cromwell on 30 January 1649 and the new British ruler’s hostility to the interests of the Netherlands worldwide, had made the Cape of absolute strategic importance as a location to defend the interests of the VOC and the Netherlands Government.4,11,12,30

Van Riebeeck, besides his instructions on how to get the refreshment station going, also received South Africa’s first instructions on how to rule. He was to control as Commander a Council of Policy. As Commander he took the oath of obedience to the Governor-General at Batavia (an outcome that, regarding fast and effective administration concerns, did not always work properly because control over the Cape was slowed down by the distance and a lack of fast communication). Comparing the year 1652 with the year 1795, the whole governing system at the Cape changed very lttle during its possession by the VOC.12

As officer in charge of the station, Van Riebeeck was also the chair of a temporary management board, consisting of designated officials. The first meeting of this body already took place on board the ship Drommedaris, Van Riebeeck’s quarter during the travel from the Netherlands, and for a time his abode while waiting for the construction of the first dwellings at the Cape. When there were no visiting ships in harbor the chief-officer, the secunde, the sergeant in charge of the soldiers and the bookkeeper formed a kind of executive managerial body [later called the Council of Policy (Politieke Raad)]. The secretary, whose main duty it was to keep record of the council’s meetings and its resolutions, did not have any voting rights. The executive managerial power of this start up management body was with time extended by the Administrators of the Board of Amsterdam (Council of Seventeen) to give visiting admirals of home-bound fleets of the VOC from the East the right to act as Commissioners at the station. These Commissioners’ orders had to be implemented by the Cape Commander and his management board. On the other hand, these Commissioners could not act independently without first consulting the Commander and the executive members of the temporary board. Furthermore, the admirals were obliged to report fully to the Council of Seventeen on their orders to Van Riebeeck and the situation at the Cape when they arrived back in the Netherlands.12,31

It is clear that this early Council of Policy intended to assure good administration, but left very little scope for broad political input by all the officials, incoming free burgher farmers and other free burghers. Overbearing leadership was central to management, although it seems as though Van Riebeeck’s treatment in this context of the officials and free burghers showed no signs of under par leadership in terms of administration. The limitation on the authority of Van Riebeeck as chief executive officer – and the exclusion of the incoming free burgher farmers from any say in their occupation and political rights – was reflected when Commissioner Rijckloff van Ghoens, during his visit at the Cape from the 17th March to the 19th April 1657, overrode certain of Van Riebeeck’s contracts with the incoming free burgher farmers. Although Van Ghoens gave the free burghers permission to trade live stock directly with the KhoiKhoi on the condition that all trading material had been bought from the VOC and they did not pay more than the VOC, this privilege was withdrawn by Van Riebeeck himself in May 1658. Furthermore, Van Ghoens changed the three year tax-free period from three to twelve years for incoming free burgher farmers, but he autocratically forbade them to plant tobacco and instructed them to concentrate only on the cultivation of wheat. He also scaled down their unlimited plough land to only 13.5 morgen in size. But most autocratic of all was his decision that the prices to be paid by the VOC for the free burgher farmers’ produce would be decided alone by the Council of Seventeen of Amsterdam. This autocratic price-fixing was immediately a problem because a year later, the VOC still had not publically fixed the prices, although they were already well known to Van Riebeeck on the 16th April 1657. This problem was at last solved (although temporailry) in 1659 by Van Riebeeck himself with a request to the Council of Seventeen of Amsterdam. Other autocratic behaviour experienced in Van Riebeeck’s reign by the free burghers was the restriction on many of their business rights, such as the selling of their produce only at fixed prices to the VOC, not being allowed to trade with the KhoiKhoi and that they could only sell their produce to ships after three days of their arrival at the Harbor (only up to 25 ships per annum visited then).12,31 Executive leadership practiced by Commander Jan van Riebeeck

In retrospect considering the leadership of Commander Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape, three clear impacts must be taken into account: firstly, the refreshment station was initially seen only as a temporary workplace and business enterprise outside the Netherlands borders. As such the various persons working at the station were initially treated as employees of a business (which the VOC really was) and not as members of a specific juridical entity rooted permanently with its own governing rules and governing body at the Cape. This kind of entity only started to manifest after the Council of Seventeen of Amsterdam gave permission on the 30 October 1655 (some sources indicate 1657) for the officials of the VOC to become independent entrepreneurs as free burghers, if they agreed to stay for a further ten years (some sources put it at 20 years) at the Cape in this capacity. This exercise started up with nine married men that were released from the service of the VOC. But even in these circumstances, the VOC was clearly still not in favour of colonization and saw the so called free farmers officially as mere purveyors of corn and wine to supplement the VOC’s own produce at the Cape. Accompanying this emerging judicial entity of “statehood” was the allocation of farms which were unlimited in size to cultivate wheat to the free burghers by Van Riebeeck. Although Van Ghoens later limited this property ownership to only 13.5 morgen, the right to stay and make a living at the Cape under the guardianship of the Council of Seventeen of Amsterdam and the VOC, with Van Riebeeck as their executive overseer at the Cape, confirms the possible birth of statehood via a permanent place of living at the Cape. Furthermore, these free burghers were taxed (but their land was free from land tax), as was done in most juridical entities worldwide. Van Riebeeck clearly activated the start-up process for the founding of a permanent colony at the Cape during his tenure, although he did it with some hesitation.12,31

Secondly, Jan van Riebeeck’s position as an executive (and the “government” of the Cape of Good Hope) was subordinated to the Council of Seventeen of Amsterdam, the VOC and the Governor-General and Council of India, controlling all the Eastern possessions of the VOC from its headquarters at Batavia. Also to be taken into account were the overseeing powers of management by admirals of the VOC when visiting the Cape. This broad management system of inputs by various persons in service of the VOC clearly hampered the activation of a true regime of good leadership. An identifiable regime of leadership to serve as a permanent guideline for future leaders (commanders) failed to emerge. The sole powers of the Executive Commander of the Cape and his Council of Policy, the VOC’s initial business intentions and the constant challenging social and economic circumstances to deal with everyday matters, without sufficient empowerment to execute effective solutions by Van Riebeeck himself on his own initiative and thinking, brought to the foreground a clear differentiation between a temporary leader inside a system, which was nothing other than an autocracy defined from outside by governing bodies thousands of kilometers away. A system of a permanent regime of leadership, as found in a true democracy where all the inhabitants could make decisions on consensus, was absent here. This autocratic system, although improved over time with small “rights” to the free burghers, became internalized in the Capetonians’ mindset and formed the political thinking, planning and action at the Cape by the executive leaders as appropriate and correct (and was accepted by many of its inhabitants as “normal and correct”) for centuries to come.12,31

Thirdly, on the other hand, there were also the first signs of extreme handling of punishment for transgression of the Cape “Government’s” and the refreshment station’s rules, if needed, as imposed from the Netherlands authorities on subordinates outside the motherland. Again, here is a clearly identifiable sign of autocratic management, which undoubtedly became a permanent disposition in the first settlers’ mindsets and which was also transferred into the mindsets of the later proto-Afrikaners. For instance, Van Riebeeck as commander was empowered with a high level of juridical powers, such as being able to jail the inhabitants of the Cape for transgressing the legal guidelines prescribed by the Council of Seventeen of Amsterdam, the VOC and the Governor-General and Council of India, which were all formulated on the rules of the State-General of the Netherlands. Van Riebeeck was even empowered to hand down the death penalty.12,31

He was instructed and empowered to militarily defend the Cape station against any hostile attacks, internal as well as external, without pre-permission from abroad. This independent empowerment shows the gradual rising of a unique juridical entity at the Cape, which was undoubtedly vested in the powers of an executive political leader to be able to handle certain tasks at his own discretion. Indeed, this was the beginning of a kind of a regime of leadership, although it should not necessarily be associated with good leadership.12,31

With regard to the reference to autocratic leadership executed by Van Riebeeck and instituted by the VOC, is it clear that Van Riebeeck, similar to South Africa’s present president, as well as the country’s previous presidents and prime ministers, was never democratically voted in as the first executive chief officer of the Cape (South Africa) by the population of the early Cape refreshment station. He was exclusively selected, appointed and paid by the VOC to act only on their behalf and interests. Though there seems to be a general satisfaction with Van Riebeeck’s direct behaviour as a leader to the employees of the VOC and free burghers – he, for instance, never enacted the strict legislation of the late 1600s or handed down the death penalty. He set free many persons from jail who showed good rehabilitation. It is clear that during Van Riebeeck’s time (1652 to 1662) at the Cape, there was no introduction of a regime of good leadership to the burghers or of the true reform of the Council of Policy to become a democratic law-making body from day one. Both the executive and legislative empowerments were centered in the hands of officials, with the free burghers in a nominal role. This absence of a true democracy awarded to every inhabitant of South Africa from 1652 onward, is a fact too long ignored by subjective Afrikaner political-historical writers, seemingly afraid to pinpoint a possible defective cognition, internalized through bad experiences and bad examples of delinquent leaders, or a congenital defect transferred to the Cape’s earlier European settlers by their European forefathers, and then to the later Afrikaners. What was needed, not so much to be enacted by Van Riebeeck alone, but mostly by the VOC and its associated foreign rulers of the Cape, was the enactment of a clear and definable regime of good leadership and governance that could form a system of permanence to be followed by Van Riebeeck’s successors through to today, to serve everybody, notwithstanding class, race, creed, or from Africa or Europe.12,31,40

In support of why Van Riebeeck did not immediately activate a sound governmental system, it must be mentioned that, when he landed at the Cape, he had with him precise instructions from the Council of Seventeen that were undoubtedly not so much the founding of a “governmental system” – that was a “secondary” outcome – but to adhere to his primary aim,namely the establishment of a refreshment station to supply produce for the VOC ships and to secure the Cape of Good Hope as a military stronghold against Britain, France and the Portuguese. The whole venture was treated “clinically” as a business enterprise, with a sole owner in charge, whose main intention was to oversee that his employees did their work for which they were compensated; nothing more. Moreover, it must be noted again that the station was not seen initially as a permanent settlement, and as such, it did not need a well rooted political and governmental system, as was practiced in the Netherlands or in the East Indies, already a VOC possession. “Governmental” referred at most to the maintenance of order and the Netherlands law amongst the more or less eighty soldiers who were installed to safeguard the station against internal (indigenous people) and foreign attacks. This secondary focus on a balanced “governmental system” by the VOC, is confirmed by the fact that the initial “Van Riebeeck government” setup changed very little during the VOC’s ownership up to 1795. There were, as indicated, improvements to the organization of the “political system” to exclusively benefit the VOC at the Cape, but these had little impact on the individual’s political rights.12,31

Economics, to be activated by the inhabitants, and not their practice of politics, was central in the late 1600s. But the two factors are inter-locked and it was foolish for the VOC as well as Van Riebeeck not to realize that, as the station became a settlement. Politics was going to claim its justified part, specially when the role of capitalism and private ownership and enterprise became dominant.37-40 Indeed, the table was laid by Van Riebeeck, unknowingly and possibly unwillingly, for South Africa’s tragical political history to be written, as the historian Professor Eric Walker writes12:13: “All the economic and social problems which exercise South Africa today had begun to take shape before Van Riebeeck’s eyes. For, in South Africa at least, there is nothing whereof it may be said, ’See, this is new’.’’

Van Riebeeck’s immediate point of focus was the building of a fort for protection of the inhabitants and the safeguarding of the freshwater source, to make a garden for fresh produce for the VOC ships, to establish good relations with the indigenous people and the instituting of a cattle trade with them. But this initiative was not a success from the beginning.12,31,40 Geen writes12:12: “… for four or five years the little settlement hovered on the brink of ruin in its capacity as a refreshment station for the victualling of Dutch ships going to and coming from the East Indies.”

Looking back to Van Riebeeck’s impact on the later racial disharmony of South Africa, there are clear contradictions in his “governmental” style on race relations. He never put a prohibition on race miscegenation between the European burghers, the Negro and Asiatic slaves and the KhoiKhoi. [The sad reliving of the racism of Carolus Linnnaeus (Carl von Linné) and his Systema Naturae came later in 1671 under the Commander IJsbrand Godske’s ruling with his Instruction, which officially began racism and discrimination in South Africa, undisturbed until 1994].4 But at the same time he practiced and allowed racial discrimination in the most extreme form with the introduction in 1658 of non-European (note: not European) slaves to the Cape: 170 slaves came from a captured Portuguese slave ship, while another 200 came from the Guinea Coast. Most of these first batch of slaves became the property of the VOC, although some where sold to free burgher farmers (for between ₤4 and ₤8 each!!). After Van Riebeeck’s departure the custom of the import of slaves was sped up in numbers. The slaves’ womanfolk became the central role players in miscegenation, so that before the end of the 1600s most of the slave children were “half-castes”, as Geen12 degradingly named them. This not only led to the creation of South Africa’s own Creole people, today’s so called Coloreds or Brown-Afrikaners (who number more than the White-Afrikaners), but also to the “infusing” of so called “Black” blood into the South African Whites’ “pure” bloodline; so much so that 75% of today’s Afrikaners may be “contaminated” by “Black” blood.4, 12,30,31,41

Van Riebeeck’s further siding against non-Whites at the Cape, in line with his views of non-Whites to be owned as slaves by the VOC, as well as the free burghers – and to buy and sell these slaves as “human livestock” – was his contribution to punitive actions against delinquent KhoiKhoi groups. The KhoiKhoi War (1658-1660) spells the first driving out of non-Whites, the KhoiKhoi, from their traditional lands in the Liesbeeck Valley. This was undoubtedly the first commision of White-terrorism to non-Whites in South Africa and land grabbing by Whites, as guided by the British definition on modern day terrorism, which reads42:9:

1) Violence against a person;

2) Serious damage to property;

3) Designed to influence a government or an international organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public;

4) With the aim of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

This pinpoints again the possibility of the internalization of a delinquent cognition into the mindsets of the early Europeans at the Cape (which formed the nucleus of the proto-Afrikaners and later Afrikaners) to do with the ease of infringing of human rights of non-Whites, as the Voortrekkers later did with their illegal occupation of the Transvaal and the Free State areas with terrorist actions a century later. Indeed, the so called White frontiersmen or Border Boers showed this terrorist behaviour on a large scale in the early 1700s, in the areas inside and outside the colony’s borders.4 This seemingly “normal” behaviour of aggressiveness and delinquency which Van Riebeeck allowed to be perpetrated on the KhoiKhoi, reflects back to what Boon15:75describes as political mobocracy, and brings about the question on the determinants and drivers behind the later Afrikaner-Nationalists’ Apartheid, as well as the place and the time of the learning of Apartheid’s wrongdoings.4,12 Professor Eric Walker’s postulation,, namely that all South Africa’s economic and social problems of today can be laid before Van Riebeeck’s “office door”, is not far fetched.12:13 Van Riebeeck, the first White “honest” cheater and state capturer

When studying the literature published by Afrikaner historical writers on the Afrikaners’ assumed heredity as a “nation”, starting with Jan van Riebeeck as their progenitor, it seems to be a very troubled one from the beginning. It declares possibly the beginning of the Afrikaners’ many deviating behaviours, the most well known to be Apartheid and the racial discrimination and domination of non-Whites.12.31

Undoubtedly Van Riebeeck was the first White official, in terms of his VOC instructions, to activate discrimination and the domination of non-Whites with his treatment at the Cape of the KhoiKhoi as well as the slaves. This troubling behaviour goes much deeper than merely rasism: it also seems to be the beginning and embedding of planned corruption, “boereverneukery” or “cheating of the farmers” and state capturing in the mindset of an executive leader at the Cape.12,31

Afrikaner historians treated Van Riebeek very gently on his delinquent behaviour, undoubtedly with great respect for his position as “Father of the Afrikaner Nation”, by offering all kinds of excuses and arguments with reference to his wrongdoings, basically to activate sympathy and to nullify said wrongdoing. Arguments to minimize the seriousness of his actions are: that he was “not the only official to commit transgressions and that others in higher positions did the same”, or that he, as many of the other officials guilty of delinquent and inappropriate behavior, “were forced to resort to these types of incomes” because of their underpayment by the VOC, and thus that he and others had to rely on delinquent behavior to make a living. The violation of the principle of honesty in this early behavior is in reality not very different from the allegations now laid at the door of Jacob Zuma and his cronies (and which have already led to Zuma’s recal and even possible prosecution and jailing). To argue that the comprehensiveness and intensity of the alleged mal-behaviour of Zuma are much more serious than that of Van Riebeeck, is inapplicable. Dishonesty is dishonesty, theft is theft, corruption is corruption, and nothing else. Top leaders must be treated the same as the lowest rank of citizen.4,12,13,18,31

Van Riebeeck’s delinquent actions already began before his appointment as commander at the Cape (Zuma’s alleged delinquent behaviour also started before his appointment as president). Van Riebeeck’s actions in generating a private income outside his position as commander at the Cape, undoubtedly reflect a clear line of the continuation of behaviour which can be associated with corruption and embezzlement until the end of his stay at the Cape (it is also alleged that Zuma committed the same inappropriate acts in his presidential capacity via state-capture).4,12,13,18,31

At this stage of the research in the evaluation of South Africa’s types of political leaders and its regime of leadership, from 1652 to 1795 in this study, four prominent questions are manifested:

  • If Van Riebeeck himself failed the test of honesty as the highest ranking official at the Cape, to what extent had he allowed his subordinates and cronies to commit inappropriate actions without reprimand and prosecution?
  • Did a culture of crooked political leaders and under par leadership become rooted in 1652 at the Cape, which had overflows into today’s South Africa?
  • Can any honest Afrikaner historian object to the postulation that the seed for today’s Nklandas, Zuptaism, corruption, nepotism, cronies and state-capture, which are rife at present in the politics of South Africa, was sown seemingly by the first executive leader in the capacity of Van Riebeeck’s personal opinion and practice of stretch values on what is morally and criminal correct and what is not correct?
  • Are there really differences in the personalities and modus operandi of Jan van Riebeeck and Jacob Zuma as leaders? Are there any fundamental differences in their executive ruling and governing of subordinates and the management of the purse of a country?

But, back to the behaviour of Jan van Riebeeck as a person, separate from his executive leadership as commander.

It seems as though Van Riebeeck presented himself as an honest and hard worker in the service of the VOC, especially in the last period of his stay in Tonkin, the city which had belonged to the Chinese and where the VOC opened a business entity in 1637. After the death of the under merchant and the departure of the paramount chief of the entity, Van Riebeeck was appointed in December 1645 as acting paramount chief of the station. This appointment was renewed in July in 1647, with Van Riebeeck promoted to the rank of merchant and secunde, and in status became the second person in the Council of Policy of Tonkin. Then, after applying to be appointed permanently in the position of paramount chief at Tonkin, the red light suddenly started to flicker for Van Riebeeck when it was referred to in his application evaluation that he can not be trusted seeing that he was involved in unauthorized “particular trade” (the precise meaning of “particular” is unclear, but it seems to be corruption and self-conceit by the generating of an illegal income via trade besides his salary and in competition with the VOC). He was basically fired from his appointment as merchant in Tonkin in 1647. As punishment he also lost his salary for two months and seven days and was sent back to the Netherlands. On his way back to the Netherlands, his ship the DE Coningh van Polen, stopped for eighteen days at the undeveloped Cape, giving him an idea of the Cape and its surroundings (and this possibly caused his application five years later for the post of commander at the Cape). Back in the Netherlands his various appeals to the Council of Seventeen to nullify his sentence were unsuccessful, while no further new appointment was offered. This shows the seriousness of his delinquent behaviour. In December of 1651, four years after his sacking, he was appointed again by the VOC as commander to establish the refreshment station at the Cape. This position, it seems, offered less opportunities for temptation to practice “particular” activities or other dishonesty and was clearly of a lower rank as that of paramount chief of Tonkin.12,31

It has been confirmed that Van Riebeeck showed a love for “particular trade” by the fact that he also allocated a farm to himself and farmed as a second income to his salary as commander (as one Afrikaner historian mentioned: “because this was the only way an official could supplement his small income at the Cape because the opportunity for particular trade was totally absent”). This is a very crooked view, well in line with the ANC’s top-brass saying they are forced to theft, corruption, nepotism and self-conceit in the New South Africa, because Apartheid disqualified them from making money before 1994!). But Van Riebeeck’s self-enrichment goes deeper – he undoubtedly made a profit in competition with the free burgher farmers whose interests he had to promote at all times. (He became the judge and prosecutor for sentencing and punishment of the free burghers; a punishment, which he seemed to be free from in his farming actions). His farming endeavours surely meant further loss of direct income for the VOC. Without doubt these farming activities of VOC officials at the Cape were frowned upon, seeing that the VOC prohibited it in 1668. Regarding the size of Van Riebeek’s farm the following data is reflected from the records of 1659: 84 morgen were cultivated of which Jan Reijniers and Hendrik Boom owned respectively 11 and 10 morgen, while the VOC owned 46 morgen and Van Riebeeck himself kept 101 morgen. Commissioner Rijkloff van Ghoens, during his visit from the 17th March to the 19th April 1657 at the Cape, also seems to have awarded Van Riebeeck some land to plant fruit trees. This property was situated behind Lion’s Head, and he exchanged it for property southeast of the Windberg (Wind Mountain), calling it Bosheuvel. Here he planted 1,200 plants including grapes which he obtained from the VOC’s garden and started to produce his first wine from 1659. Van Riebeeck also imported a variety of fruit trees and other plants for his farming on Bosheuvel from the Netherlands, East and West India, Japan, Madagascar, Mauritius and St Helena, which seems to be an expensive exercise for a poor official. He had undoubtedly become a well established farmer in his ten years at the Cape, seemingly generating a sideline income which made up for his lack of opportunity to practice “particular trade’’, as he apparently did easily and without remorse at Tonkin, as well as at the Cape!12,31,40

That Van Riebeeck handled his “Cape particular activities” with great discretion without annoying or estranged the inhabitants, is clearly evident from the fact that the first petition (one of many to follow about farming conditions, including later dissatisfaction with the Van der Stels) in December 1658 by the most influential farmers of the Cape to the VOC, never accused him of self-conceit, corruption or nepotism.12,31

Looking back in retrospect to Van Riebeeck’s various forms of practicing “particular” trade, either in Tonkin, China or at the Cape, the temptation is great to not say that Van Riebeeck introduced South Africa to its first Nklanda and state capture. What prevented Van Riebeeck from not overstepping his authority and getting more active in any form of “corruption” was possibly the small population of officials and free burghers at the Cape. (In 1659 the total White population was 144). His choice of a circle of intimate friends and cronies within the more or less 144 inhabitants was undoubtedly limited, making the opportunity for serious craft small in fear of a backlash by outsiders for overstretching his powers by self-conceit and dishonesty.4,12,31

Van Riebeeck was always assumed to be an executive leader with “clean hands” at the early Cape, notwithstanding a tendency to continuously practice “particular trade”. This is a worrying phenomenon and one which laid the bad example that wrongdoing works and is a payable venture, and already jeopardizes the establishment in the 1660s of an acceptable regime of leadership. The well planned and well executed “particular actions” of the two Van der Stels, the father Simon and the son Willem Adriaan, governors from 1662 to 1707 at the Cape, will be an eye-opener for the most consciousness Nationalist Afrikaner about their proud “clean and honest” Afrikaner heritage. These early happenings also make the present day Zuma debacle around poor leaders and a regime of under par leadership, to a certain extent, explicable and understandable.12,13,18,31

3.3.2 Leaderships and regimes of the Agricultural Colony of the Cape (1662-1679)

To better understand the Van Riebeeck regime and the autocratic “governmental system” practiced at the Cape from 1652 (which gradually became an accepted way to be ruled and to rule at the Cape), as well as the beginning of racism, it is also important to note that already in the time of Van Riebeeck the differences between Whites and non-Whites at the Cape became more and more prominent. This negative situation flowed into the leadership of his followers, starting with Zacharias Wagener (Wagenaar) to Hendrik Crudorp and to be addressed by Simon van der Stel when he accepted the Cape’s leadership in 1679. This outcome required not only special abilities and skills, but also special behaviour and actions by Van Riebeeck and the later commanders/governors. Particularly troubling was the behaviour of the KhoiKhoi as non-members of the Cape refreshment station, as well as the influx of more and more slaves. These were points of focus. Both non-White groups were, similar to the Whites, without direct voting rights, but also without the official status and rights which the White officials and burghers enjoyed. Where the Whites enjoyed property rights and could present petitions to the authorities in the Netherlands about their problems, these two groups were discriminated against outright from day one: the slaves became property of the VOC and burghers, and were deprived of basic human rights, while the KhoiKhoi, living as independent persons outside the borders of the station, were used as labourers in terms of the wishes and labour practices of the Whites. Clear or defined work or burgher rights were totally absent for non-Whites, and there were no powers of speech or petition. “Apartheid” in its basic form was introduced and undoubtedly became a new inherent part of the permanent regime of the young and under par leadership at the Cape (and spread into the later South Africa).4,12,40

Two other developments which are prominent around the judicial status of the refreshment station – and its immediate regime of leadership – were respectively the extention of the empowerment of the Council of Policy and the legal change in the status of the station from a temporary enterprise (rooted in foreign soil outside the Netherlands and managed by the VOC) to a legal permanent foreign colony. This shift in the juridical status from a station to a colony is well illustrated by the fact that new migrants to the Cape had to take the Oath of Allegiance of the State-General, the Prince of Orange and the VOC. This happening is historically of enormous significance and can be seen as the first juridical founding of South Africa, a legal thread spreading into the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 2018. In 1691 the status of the commander was uplifted to that of governor, with much more executive political empowerment than a commander. The first person to be appointed in this capacity was Simon van der Stel, who was already appointed in 1679 as a commander. Many see this as the conferring of the unofficial status of the “first president” of the Republic of South Africa on Simon van der Stel and not on Jan van Riebeeck.12,40

With regard to the Council of Policy, this body also became more officially organized and statutorily applicable to the norms associated with a “government” when, from 1685 it consisted of the commander, the secunde, the fiscal who was a law official with duties similar to a public prosecutor, three senior merchants of the VOC (the chief salesman, the bookkeeper and the treasurer) and two military officers. The powers of the council were the executive and the legislative. It could decide on all the issues of governance and its resolutions (as proclamations or placaaten) which became Cape laws as long they were in line with the Roman-Dutch Law and the Statutes of the Council of India. A High Court was introduced, consisting of seven members of the council, together with three representatives of the free burghers nominated by the governor for a year. This body was empowered to hear cases and to do sentencing, but was subjected to the right of appeal to the Council of India. The Court’s other duties were attending to the roads, to advise on problems around the burghers, to fix the selling prices of the burghers’ produce to the VOC, etc. Another three legal bodies created in 1682 were the Court of Commissioners to try petty cases at Cape Town, in 1676 the Matrimonial Court and in 1764 the Orphan Chamber. In 1689 an independent fiscal was appointed, independent of the powers of the governor, with responsibility to only the Council of Seventeen in the Netherlands. His task was to track and find VOC officials engaged in illegal private trading. This appointment was seen by many inhabitants as one of activating corruption and nepotism without really solving the illegal trade of officials. He also activated a power play with the governor which led many times to direct conflict with the governor, while the free burghers saw him as a part of the corrupt VOC.12,40

The reason for the change of the Cape refreshment station to the Agricultural Colony of the Cape was the outbreak of war between the Netherlands and England and the possibility of an attack by England and France on the Cape. This new world political situation seriously endangered the East-Indian ocean lane of the VOC. This new strategy position of the Cape transferred it without any counter argument into a permanent juridical entity to defend the Cape. To overcome the costs of a much needed garrison of soldiers for defense, the Council of Policy believed that a settled civil population could do service as part-time soldiers in times of conflict, and minimize the cost of a large garrison at the Cape. This end result could be obtained through more migrants and a permanent colony, making the positions of the commanders/governors at the Cape comprehensive in leadership and governance responsibilities. The fact that the refreshment station overcome a multitude of obstacles in five years’ time and was successful in producing fruit, vegetables and meat, surely reflects good leadership. But in perspective, so far this leadership was already autocratic in its political power recognition and steering, and extremely racially oriented to exclusively benefit the VOC and to a great extent also only the White population. A regime of good leadership, to be in-corporated in a permanent leadership and governance set up for all the people of the Cape (and to lay the foundation for a non-racial and democratic South Africa of the future), was again absent.12,31,40

The fact of an incoming permanent, unchallengeable Whiteness at the Cape already in the mid-1600s, is well illustrated by the building of the Castle to defend the station against the French and the British. The first stones were laid on the 2nd of January 1665 by Zacharias Wagener. The stalwart Afrikaner historian, Dr GD Scholtz, describes in 1953, during the rising of DF Malan and his doctrine of the Afrikaners, the “historical Afrikaner landmark” of the building of the Castle in 1665, confirming the proto-Afrikaner’s uniqueness and supremacy as a European in Africa, as follows43:33: “In how many intimate ways the common lot of the Cape was connected to that of the White outer world is illustrated by a poem which was especially written about this occasion” (Own translation):

Soo worden voort en voort de rijcken uijt gespreit,

Soo worden al de swart en geluwen (geel) gespreijt,

Soo dat men uijtter aerd eene steene wal opbrechten,

Daer ’t donderend metael seer wijnigh van ophechten,

Voor Hottentoosen waren ‘t altijts eerde wallen,

Nu komt men hier met steen voor anderen ook brallen,

Dus maekt men dan een schrick soowel d’European,

Als voor den Aes, Amer! En wilden Africaen. The Godske instruction of 1671

The role of LJsbrand Godske (1672-1676) in bringing down the curse of racism, and the dividing of the people of South Africa into peoples (Black and White), needs to be highlighted. It is clear that there is very little difference between him and the later DF Malan and his Apartheid.4

The Dutch settlement of Van Riebeeck was marked by intimate social association and miscegenation between the different races, including the slaves (Indian-Malaysians and Blacks from Madagascar). In 1658 slaves started to arrive from Malaysia and other places, and indigenous people such as the KhoiKhoi and sometimes the KhoiSan entered slavery as well. The system of free burghers at the Cape in 1657 changed the society and workforce from strictly controlled VOC officials and employees and the practice of conservative European lifestyles, to that of private entrepreneurs, characterized by a much less rigid behavioural code from the VOC’s moral restrictions, such as the prohibitions on social association and intermixing with other races. The shortage of female citizens stimulated social interaction and miscegenation between White free burghers and other racial groups. Racial mingling progressed so fast that 75% of all the children born to slave women between 1650 and 1670, had White fathers.4,6,9,10,30

The narrow minded Calvinistic autocratic local ruler of the Cape, the VOC, quickly restricted this social interaction and miscegenation between White free burghers and other racial groups. An official instruction in 1671 from the commissioner (who also acted as commander from 1672-1676) Isbrand Godske, prohibited sexual intercourse between Whites and slaves, while the Council of Policy also forbade extramarital sexual intercourse between White men and young slave women in 1678. This was followed by a prohibition on marriages and extramarital sexual relations between Whites and freed slaves in 1685. The focus of racial discrimination was initially on foreign peoples (slaves of Indian-Malaysian origin and Blacks from Madagascar) and other indigenous people like the KhoiKhoi. It seems as though indigenous Blacks, like the Xhosas, were not initially included in the South African racial discrimination that started in 1671. Indigenous Black assimilation only started around 1730 with the first contact between the proto-Afrikaners and the Xhosas on the borders of the Cape Colony.4,6,9,10,30

Louw writes that4:62:

The racial discrimination described above, exclusively based on skin colour and officially recorded in 1671 with the Godske instruction, can be regarded as the first apartheid law of South Africa. Godske was the first White proponent of organized racial discrimination, eventually against all people of colour. However, this discrimination seemed to adhere to a view where ethnicity is seen in terms of class, meaning that the poor, and therefore to a certain extent the underdeveloped non-Whites at the Cape, were regarded as having a lower socio-economical standing and as “untouchables.” The slaves especially were stripped of their human rights and dignity and their financial and personal independence. They were impoverished. Also, the initial problems with the behaviour of the first slaves in 1658 and the Hottentots in terms of work and social habits and aggressiveness already manifested from 1652. This contributed further to levels of social differentiation and discrimination between certain sectors of the White community and other racial groups in general (specifically guided and practiced officially by the Cape authority). It is in this context that the VOC implemented a strict policy of separation between Whites and the other races such as the slaves, Hottentots and Blacks from 1671. Later the Xhosas, with whom the Whites started to make contact in 1730, were included. This was extended to all Blacks and to all other races in South Africa from the 1850s onwards, especially in the republics of the Transvaal and the Free State. The year 1671 can therefore be considered the beginning of socio-controlled racial manipulation and engineering in South Africa, specifically with the aim of Whites limiting and managing the personal and group rights of all other racial groups in some way.

Racial discrimination, based on skin colour, was thus legally established in South Africa in 1671 by the VOC. It was managed from the Netherlands, and not initially by the White incumbents. Notwithstanding this early legal discrimination, illegal clandestine relationships and illegitimate relations between the different races still continued in South Africa, right up to 1994, when the Immorality Act, which legally prohibited sexual relations and miscegenation between Whites and non-Whites, was struck off the law books.

As already reflected in the early learning and internalization of “bad” behaviour into the mindsets of the proto-Afrikaners and later the Afrikaners, the majority of the early Cape Whites were not only introduced to statutory racial discrimination and domination by the authorities from 1652 onwards, but also became acclimatized to racial discrimination due to the formal human and political wrongdoings of the authorities towards other races. On this impact and its outcome, Louw writes 4:63:

Formal discrimination became internalized in the thinking of the proto-Afrikaners as “normal and correct” and this was strengthened by the many benefits that the system brought them. The immediate result was that they started to practice discrimination themselves on a continuous and extreme basis.4,17,18

Besides Godske’s negative impact on racism, Van Riebeeck’s seven immediate successors’ impacts on the Cape’s executive leadership with regard to good governance and the establishment of a regime of democracy, were minimal (their sojourns in the post of commander were on average two years in duration).33

These commanders were33:

3.3.3 Simon van der Stel (1679-1699)

After the fast succession of various commanders, and their failing to build constructively on Van Riebeeck’s leadership’s initiative and the creation of a much needed regime of leadership, Simon van der Stel was appointed on the 12th of October 1679 as commander. Van der Stel fast became one of the most prominent executive leaders of the Cape Colony during the Dutch reign. His more liberal policies initially towards the White inhabitants were extraordinary, bringing about an improvement of their financial circumstances and some political benefits for the White free burghers. He also activated some “self-management” for the new countryside of the Stellenbosch region by the establishment in 1682 of a Court of Heemraden, consisting of four members. Although this body’s duties and powers were initially vague, it seems as though it was meant to solve small differences and conflicts between the burghers of Stellenbosch. With time it was allocated more managerial empowerment until it was replaced by the Court of Magistrates and Heemraden to manage the countryside more effectively. During his appointment of 20 years (1679-1699) colonization was speeded up, as well as the enlargement of the colony’s borders into the countryside. Notable for his time in power was that the price of wheat rose and the labour problem was to a great extent solved by the import of more slaves (a decision which worsened the already existing division between Whites and non-Whites in terms of justified human, social and economic rights, further sinking the hopes for a balanced interracial and non-racial regime of good leadership for the new colony). Although there was still not a full democratic government, selected by the burghers for the Cape Colony, and there was serious discrimination against non-Whites, making a regime of good leadership null and void, Van der Stel’s overall behaviour and outputs as chief executive for the VOC, is described as a that of a dynamic leader inside the VOC’s autocratic ruling of the Cape Colony. But the basis for this praise is the profits and “goodness” which he brought about for the VOC, and not necessarily to the free burghers or the non-Whites. These appraisals by the VOC are well reflected by the fact that he was promoted by the Council of Policy in 1691 to the rank of governor and was in 1692 also awarded the high rank of Extraordinary Counsel to the Council of India (Extraordinaris Raad van Indië).12,40

During the visit of Commissioner Hendrik Adriaan van Rheede in 1685, an official only answerable to the Council of Seventeen and whose instruction was to rehabilitate the ailing VOC, he, to a great extent, agreed with Van der Stel’s actions and ruling. Certain improvements of the “government” of the colony were introduced by Van Rheede: the enlargement of the Council of Policy to eight officials; two additional seats for free burghers selected for one year were created on the High Court of Justice; a permanent landdrost was pointed at Stellenbosch to watch over the VOC interests and to act as chairman of the Court of Heemraden. The form of local government inaugurated by Van der Stel seems to have been a great success and remained part of the Cape Government for a century and a half.12,40

Van Rheede brought about improvements for the nearly 300 slaves at the Cape. The punishment of slaves was restricted to be authorised by the government; half-breed slaves could obtain their freedom on reaching the age of twenty-five for men and twenty-one for women; negroes born in the Cape could also ask for freedom on attaining the age of forty years of age and the payment of nearly ₤9 on the condition of good character, having a knowledge of Dutch and professing Christanity. In addition, marriages between Whites and Blacks were forbidden, but it was allowed for a White to marry a half-caste. In addition, slave children, many of mixed breed, were to be taught reading and writing in terms of Christian education. Van Rheede’s request that officials be allowed to farm was refused, although Van der Stel himself was allowed to keep his farm, Constantia. During Van der Stel’s time the first batch of Protestant Huguenots (1688-1689) arrived and were placed at Drakenstein, Frans Hoek and Paarl. The French people fast became a “problem” for Van der Stel, primarily because of their open resistance against his autocratic government.12,40

It is clear that although there seemed to be an improvement in “government” processes during Van der Stel’s reign, a democratic foundation was still, as with Van Riebeeck’s reign, absent. Although the slaves’ situation improved, these unfortunate people were still slaves without real human rights and dignity, and in general they were still commodities to be sold like livestock.12

The finance and economics of the Cape Colony did not always fare well under Van der Stel, as a result of poor prices for produce, many trading restrictions and the presence of corruption and nepotism. The illicit and lucrative cattle trade with the KhoiKhoi by the free burgher farmers fast established the Trekboers (Travelling Boers) and their trekking beyond the colonial frontier (named the frontiersmen). People its seem can not always be controlled by the law and traditional conventions. Prominent were their racism and their love for the cheap slaves’ labour to help run their farms. Many of these Boers and their descendants eventually became the Voortrekkers, who numbering between 10, 000 and 14, 000, later made the Great Trek away from the British rule.12

It seems that Simon van der Stel from the start as governor played the prominent role of a good man of integrity who cared intensely for the VOC and the inhabitants of the Cape Colony. General historical reviews by Afrikaner writers of van der Stel referred to him as a man of great importance in South Africa’s history, in that he stands symbolicly head and shoulders above all of his predecessors, that he was very able and competent, hard-working and very trustworthy. But was he really that trustworthy and good in terms of integrity? Literature by some Afrikaner historians, similar to much other emotion laden research on the Afrikaners in general, finds that they contradicted themselves many times on these “good”, “honest” and “trustworthy” characteristics. Critically analyzing data shows that the basis to his character’s malfunction seems to be anchored in corruption, state-capture, nepotism and outright dishonesty, no matter how much historians try to mask it behind his so called good administration capacities.12,40

What was the root of Simon van der Stel’s crookedness? Simply put: the liking and love of and the desire for immense earthly material belongings. The ownership of immense (and beautiful) material belongings seems to have totally possessed his mind at the end, overshadowing his so-called sound cognitive thinking, alleged wisdom and integrity as an executive leader. This contamination also spread to be a bad example of excellence, and, similar to Van Riebeeck’s self-conceit in 1652 to 1662, a failing to cement a foundation for the establishment of a regime of good leadership between the years 1679 and 1699.12,40

This process of Simon van der Stel’s possession by self-conceit and a down-spiraling into corruption began in 1685 with three clear events. In 1685, Commissioner HA Rheede, as compensation for Van der Stel’s service of excellence to the VOC (an action of giving against the guidelines of the VOC which was already forbidden in 1668), presented him with a large farm, called Constantia. In 1691 his rank was promoted from commander to governor and in 1692 he was elevated to the high rank of Extraordinary Counsel of India. These glorified actions from the side of the VOC made him very important, basically untouchable by the inhabitants at the Cape. It set him more and more on a road where he could willingly ignore the opinions of the inhabitants and do just what he pleased, right or wrong. But more seriously, it seems as though this position of “high-standing in the VOC regime” psychologically triggered a dormant disposition in Simon van der Stel’s mindset, activating dishonesty and grandiose thinking and behaviour.12,40

Although South African historians constantly tried over the years to argue that his farming activities did not interfere with his task as governor, or that his farming activities did not handicap the farming activities and profits of the farmers, it shows that Van der Stel lost more and more interest in the Cape Colony’s administration and that he spent increasing time on Constantia. To say further that his farming did not interfere with that of the farmers because they “still had a market for their produce”, is historically misleading: he competed with his great harvests directly with the farmers at the markets, influencing prices in terms of supply and counter-supply in times of over-supply. To further argue historically that Simon van der Stel’s only mishap was that he was a bad example of leadership for his son Willem, who followed him as governor, is absurd and untrue. Of course he was a bad example, not only for Willem, but for all the inhabitants of the colony.12,40

Van der Stel, a strong Netherlands-Nationalist, also reflects ethnic discrimination in addition to racial discrimination. The focus of his discrimination was the French Huguenots who arrived between 1688 and 1700 at the Cape, a group he clearly was not fond of and openly distrusted as citizens, disliking their language and culture. This delinquent ethnic action of his is well illustrated by refusing them the founding of their own church congregation and council at Drakenstein and issuing a strict warning to them to behave at the Cape. The denationalization of the Huguenots and the phasing out of French as a church and school language, are strongly associated with Simon van der Stel. An appeal to the Council of Seventeen in 1690 by the Huguenots to found their own church at Drakenstein, was successful, although certain pre-requirements were put forth by the Council of Seventeen. This outcome for the first time turned the situation against Van der Stel’s completely autocratic behaviour to many of the Cape inhabitants, and slowly started to set the stage for his departure as governor and the end of his corrupt leadership. This was denied by Nationalist-Afrikaner historians for many years. His resignation as governor in 1699 was by free will, but the odds were against him and it was possibly a well timed decision before the tide could turn against him, even by his cronies and cadres in the VOC.12,40

Van der Stel Senior’s corruption and nepotism lived forth, not only in a failed regime of under par leadership left behind, but in his ability to activate the selection process of his son Willem as his successor as governor, who unfortunately was even more corrupt than he was. The evil of men live after them – in Simon van der Stel’s case, William Shakespeare was so very correct!12,40

The racial intentions reflected by Van der Stel, especially those against the KhoiKhoi, which rest on outright distrust, also caused the further deteriation between Black and White and social isolation. It undermined any hope for the establishment of a regime of leadership where racial inferiority, separation, discrimination and domination are absent and where all the segments of the population are happy with the leadership and accept it.12,40

It is clear that Simon van der Stel’s corruption, nepotism and self-enrichment were well masked. This vicious circle of good masking can be seen in the fact that his networking of intimate friends, cronies and officials was possibly much greater and better organized than that of Van Riebeeck. In addition, the Cape’s population was much larger in the 1680s (in 1688 it was 573 persons), with more widespread interests of their own and less involvement with the executive leader of the VOC as in the time of Van Riebeek. Van der Stel’s self-enrichment, which can seldom be dismantled from corruption and nepotism, no matter how well it was covered up, seems to be reflected in line with the present day alleged schemes of self-enrichment and criminal cover ups of Zuma.13,16,18,40

3.3.4 Willem Adriaan van der Stel, the capable Zuptoid (1699-1707)

Simon van der Stel was followed in 1699 as governor by his son Willem. Willem is praised in that during his appointment, he brought about significant change and improvement to the farming sector, extened the borders of the colony and offered farms to the growing migrants. But regarding his direct and openly benefitting the officials of the Cape Colony’s Administration (who called themselves the “wedlock children” of the VOC and the colonists the “illegitimate children” of the VOC) – would today be described as nepotism and cronies-capturing – criminal behaviour. The colonists were increasingly wronged by him on various levels: his constant and growing self-enrichment, today better know as corruption, fraud and state-capture. He fast demonstrated under par leadership characteristics, blocking any hope of improving on Simon van der Stel’s and Jan van Riebeeck’s input to obtain some level or kind of a regime of good leadership and good governance. This unsatisfactory executive leadership reflected by Willem van der Stel goes much deeper and is evidence of an in-depth lack of integrity of character, the shameless promotion of corruption, nepotism, theft and mal-government by Whites at the Cape.12,40

Geen describes his few “good” and many “bad” qualities as an executive political leader, as follows12:18:

Willem Adriaan van der Stel, whose governship was to prove the stormiest in the rule of the Dutch East India Campany at the Cape, owed his appointment in the first instance to the directors’ approval of the work his father had done in the colony. He had been born in Batavia and, after many years in the service of the Company in its eastern possessions, had been made a magistrate at Amsterdam. He was a man of some ability and enterprise, who in the few years he was at the Cape settled the Land of Waveren, sent an expedition to Natal in search of timber, imported better breeds of sheep and tried, though without success, to start a silk industry. But the good that he did has been overshadowed naturally enough by his quarrel with the colonists, which came to a head in 1706 and was due in no small measure to certain defects of character that van der Stel had developed in the Company’s service in the East, where corruption was rife.; and

In view of the stir that the agitation against the governor created in the little colony, it is as well to consider the causes of the dispute, which show that corruption was as prevalent at the Cape as elsewhere in the Company’s empire, though naturally on a smaller scale.

Willem van der Stel is frequently praised in the South African history books as the person who activated successful stock breeding and farming as an industry, who influenced the colony’s economy positively and began the enlargment of the borders of the Cape Colony to include regions like Tulbagh. But within this capturing of improvement, Willem was, as his corrupt father Simon before him, also fast gobbled up by his psychological disposition of large scale corruption, nepotism, autocracic ruling, and the cover-up of his tracks of criminality, self-enrichment and outright fraud. It seems that he fast built up an intimate group of even more corrupt officials and burghers than himself to effectively promote his interests and safeguard his back for backlashes from the inhabitants as well as the VOC, that could topple him. In reality, Jan van Riebeeck and Simon van der Stel were dwarfs in comparison to the wrongdoing of the giant of crooked activity, Willem van der Stel.12,40

As in most crimes, criminality cannot be maintained indefinitely and the culprit is brought to order in the end and called to be accountable (although accountability is sometimes super-physical and time consuming, as is demonstrated by the ten years of going scot-free of Jacob Zuma). In Willem van der Stel’s case accountability was fast brought to reality. (Is it from Willem’s case that Julius Malema of the EFF coined his striking phrase: It is time to pay back). Only eight years into his reign (1699-1707), Van der Stel was successfully stopped in his tracks from serious further wrongdoing.12,40

Soon after his appointment, Willem van der Stel started to do mega-farming, notwithstanding that the Council of Seventeen had in 1688 forbidden it, as well as decreeing in 1699 that officials could not own farms and farm on a great scale. (It seems that he had successfully hidden his farm and farming activities from the eyes of the VOC for years). But nepotism and corruption, in the case of Van der Stel, already ran deep by the illegal donation of a farm of 400 morgen in Hottentots-Holland to him by Commissioner Wouter Valkenier. To keep other officials happy, possibly also Willem’s intimate friends, various other officials received farms. Secunde Sameul Elsevier, the bailiff Johan Blesius and the reverend Petrus Kalden, all received large farms, while officials of lesser status, like the magistrates Starrenburg, De Wet en Ten Damme, received sixty morgen. These officials received in total more than half so much as all the colonists put together. This subdivision of property, allocated to cronies in his office, was well-planned to divert the attention from Willem as a transgressor of the 1688 and 1699 prohibitions. A direct outcome was that Willem as well as others stayed away from their offices for long periods, as did his co-farming officials.12,40

In 1703 Van der Stel continued his nepotism, corruption and stealing from the VOC by the donation of 117 morgen to his crony, Jan Hartog, and then bought it back as his property to enlarge his original farm. He fast developed the farm, today knows as Vergelegen, by building a beautiful homestead and extensive outbuildings, while the farm was intensively cultivated. In a short time he cultivated 61.5 morgen under grapes, counting more than 500,000 stocks with the potential to deliver six hundred leaguer of wine per annum. These 500,000 stocks represented a quarter of the total stocks of the colony. His wheat harvest represented 1,100 muids (bags) of the total 4,331 muids harvested in 1705 to 1706 at the Cape. He also began to intensively farm with livestock, which included hundreds of cattle and thousands of sheep, especially in the present day Caledon, where no other farmer was allowed to farm.12,40

To farm his land and carry out other labour he bought more than 200 slaves, a workforce allegedly supported by more than 100 VOC slaves and more or less sixty White menial servants paid by the VOC. Furthermore, he obtained building material from the VOC stores seemingly without paying for it. He also forced the colonists to transport these materials to his farm without any compensation. The farming of Willem and his officials soon started to endanger the farming incomes of the colonist farmers. These farming officials also started to manipulate the markets, creating monopolies and assured sole benefits to them in the selling and pricing of their produce. Van der Stel Junior even began to manipulate the awarding of the wine leases in 1705, by awarding them to a listed criminal friend of his, a man named Phijffer. The farmers objected fiercely and prepared a petition to be sent to the Council of Seventeen in the Netherlands, describing the corruption of Van der Stel and his cronies, reporting about the bribes they had to pay to him for normal services as well as other wrongdoings. (This was the second petition: in 1705 a petition was sent to the Higher Government in India, but all that happened was that the body asked on 1706 that Van der Stel must answer to the allegations).

In blocking any effort to unmask him, Willem van der Stel showed his corrupt mindset.12,40 First he activated a petition himself which portrayed him as an honest, hard-working and religious man, as well as a good executive leader working exclusively for the benefits of the colonists. To obtain signatures for his petition he invited and treated all Capetonians to the Castle. Here he dropped his discrimination inclination to a certain extent by inviting the lower social and worker classes, such as labourers, slaves, and traders such as fishermen! Moreover, he sent the magistrate Starrenburg into the country to obtain further signatures to favour him, but with very little success. In the end he obtained 240 signatures to back up his case, seemingly from lower class farmers, slaves and even exiles, while the chances were also good that some signatures were forgeries.40

Secondly, Willem van der Stel did the same flip-flop as is done by most autocrats and crooks when time starts to run out for them. Van der Merwe40 compiled the following on his autocratic behaviour40:81-82:

He arrested the leader of the petitioners, Adam Tas, and from his documents Van der Stel became aware of the full contents of the second petition, especially the accusations against him, as well as the names of the inner circle of the petitioners;

He arrested some of the 63 petitioners on charges of sedition and rebellion and decided to send five to Amsterdam to defend themselves there on these charges, which Van der Stel believed the HERE XVII would hold against them;

Then he appointed a commission from the Council of Justice to prosecute the leaders of the movement against him. His intention was to persuade through these kind of threats to stop further actions against him. To cover up his wrongdoing and to steer an outcome in his favour, he appointed all the officials accused in the petition to serve on the commission while a colonist loyal to him was to represent the colonists;

The magistrate Starrenburg was appointed as prosecutor, and not as required the fiscal whose work it was to act as public prosecutor;

Van der Stel hid his direct involvement in the proceedings well by not taking a seat on the bench. Indeed, he was still manipulating the proceedings and the outcome of the prosecution by sitting in a room next to the court and where he was constantly consulting Starrenburg;

The hearings of the accused were separated and they were brought one by one before the bank. First they were asked to change their minds in favour of Van der Stel. If they failed to offer a testimony in favour of Van der Stel, they were taken back to the cells. If a prisoner after a certain time still refused to recall his views on the governor, he was threatened with being locked up in the “Donker Gat” (Dark Hole) in the Castle, an underground space without any light or fresh air which was well known for its fast and devastating effect on the health. Threats were further used such as the withholding of food (only water and bread), to use the pain rack or to be banned to Mauritius. (Indeed, some accused were held for weeks in unhealthy cells before confessing, three were sent to the “Donker Gat”, while two of the accused were already on a ship to Mauritius before confessing);

Van der Stel rewote these confessions of the accused and styled them to favour his honesty, before the HERE XVII saw them, and sent them to the Netherlands with his own defence as well as a declaration on the delinquent behaviour of the accused. Pay-up time, Mister Willem van der Stel!

But the writing was on the wall for Willem Adriaan van der Stel. Unbeknownst to him was the second petition of the colonists, sent in secret with one of the ships of the same fleet to the Netherlands. It was one of the ships that carried Van der Stel’s own petition and other evidence against the colonists, as well as the five leaders of the “rebellion”.12,40

So assured of the cover-up of his “good case” was Van der Stel, that he merely continued his prosecution of “delinquent” colonists, under the guidance of magistrate Starrenburg. But public resistance became strong, with many colonists ignoring requests of assistance for food delivery or to appear before the court.12,40

At Amsterdam in the Netherlands things went badly wrong for Van der Stel, and a situation manifested that he did not expect and for which he was totally unprepared. But this was not a sudden insight in the mindsets of the directors of the Council of Seventeen of Amsterdam – indeed they were well informed by various other petitions bemoaning the growing criminality in the mindset and actions of Willem van der Stel and his cronies. All that they were waiting for was the return fleet from the East to bring documentation with more clear information. The Council of Seventeen stepped in fast and offered judgment in favour of the colonists. The end result was that Governor Willem van der Stel, Secunde Samuel Elsevier, Reverend Petrus Kalden and Magistrate Starrenburg were fired and recalled to the Netherlands, while the banned colonists were brought back to the Cape at the cost of the VOC. In addition, all colonists in prison at the Cape were set free and all the charges against the colonists laid by Willem Van der Stel and his official cronies, were recalled. The material possessions of Willem Van der Stel, which he obtained by crooked means, were confiscated from him – his farm was divided into four sections and it, with its buildings, sold publically. Van der Stel’s monopolies of the wine and meat trade were nullified.12,40

Willem Van der Stel failed outright, not only as executive leader in 1707, but he was one of the greatest failures as a leader so far in the South African history. But this failure goes deeper: it completely devastated any remnants left by Jan van Riebeeck and Simon van der Stel of a kind of a regime of leadership and an example of governance to guide future leaders in the then South African history still to be made. If there was until that time some kind of a regime of leadership, even at the lowest levels, it was totally erased from the mindsets of the upcoming politicians of the 1700s, officials of status as well as that of most of its colonists at the Cape.12,40

3.3.5 Period 1707 to 1795 under the VOC

Subsequent to the departure of Willem van der Stel, basically nothing changed in the way of ruling at the Cape Colony. The population was growing, although at a slow pace. In 1700 the number was 458 adult colonists, while a decade later there were 656. Indeed, from 1707 the VOC, guided by the Council of Seventeen, reverted to their original policy of not supporting immigration, which led thereto that in the 18th Century immigration became a small stream. Stock farming also started to accelerate, forcing the necessity for more land. A nomadic kind of stock farming began, away from the Cape, in the countryside. Indeed the area bought in the 1800s under VOC control was large in relation to its small population of colonists.9,44 This land expanded into the interior, and was assisted by the VOC. The Border and Travelling Boers (White frontiersmen) were left free to indulge in cattle trade, provided they did not impinge on the VOC’s rights. Geen writes12:21:

Thus was the dispersal of the colonists into the interior of Southern Africa begun. In the years after 1707 it was neither the citizens of the presentable little city of Cape Town nor the agricultural farmers of the surrounding districts that were to play the foremost part in the history of the colony, but the pastoral farmers on the ever-changing frontier.

The eighteen governors that followed after Willem van der Stel showed no controversial behaviour. Basically the style of government, enforced by the VOC, and the lack of true democracy since 1652, prevailed. Only five governors stayed six years and longer and need reference in terms of the establishment of a bad versus good model of leadership and governance. The eighteen governors for the period 1707 to 1795 were33: Maurits Pasques de Chavonnes (1714-1724)

De Chavonnes, a person described as “a man of some ability”, tried to overcome the old economic problems of the colony, namely its unprofitability, by raising the production of farms to yield more produce at lower running costs. In 1717 the Council of Policy thought it could address this problem by the import of more slaves, because they saw White labourers coming from Europe as “lazy and incompetent and as being more expensive than slave labour”.12:22 The fact is that Black slave labour was cheap and easy to manipulate and subordinate, whereas White labourers would not allow this kind of treatment.

The plea in 1717 of Captain Dominique de Chavonnes (brother of the governor and the commander of the Cape garrison) against slave labour and the wisdom around it, was totally ignored by the already racial predisposition of White farmers on cheap Black slave labour and the dehumanizing that the slave population already underwent at the Cape. The Biblical “baas-kneg” was central here, with the Blacks as acceptable subordinates, already stripped of their human dignity, while the White labourer seems not to be part of the lower social hierarchy whereto to slaves had belonged since the social stratification of races introduced by Godske in 1671. The rigidity of the Whites’ mindsets already captured by racism led thereto that they missed out on Dominique de Chavonnes’ wisdom when he said12:22:

“…white artisans were better workers than coloured slaves” and pointed out that “because they earned more they also spent more”. This would create a larger home market, making the colony more defensible and that the absence of slaves would encourage the development of habits of industry and lead to smaller farms that could be worked properly.

The end outcome was the importation of more slaves to the Cape for the exclusive benefits of the Whites and more perpetration of inhumanity on non-Whites. It is important to note that the slave laws had with time become more barbarous and punishments consequently more severe, making the “management” of slave labour and their behaviour much better and easier than that of free White labourers.12

The above quotation was specifically placed here with the focus on the later, further misuse of cheap Black labour and work reservation to exclusively benefit Whites during Apartheid. The further remark of Baron Gustaf Willem van Imhoff, who stayed (during the appointment of Governor Hendrik Swellengrebel: 1739-1750) for some time in 1743 at the Cape, must be read in the same context of the rooting of Apartheid’s later benefits for Whites, coming from this earlier time. Van Imhoff also reported, as Dominique de Chavonnes had done more than twenty-five years back, on the evils of slavery, by identifying an interesting cognition, already then seemingly in existence, to be reflected later by many of the forthcoming Afrikaner- Nationalists, in their use and misuse of cheap non-White labour inside the “baas-kneg” setup, which was strictly practiced until 1994. Van Imhoff’s view of the White farmer of the 1740s of the Cape was far from flattering when he said12:25:

I believe it would have been for the better, had we, when the colony was founded, commenced with Europeans and brought them hither in such numbers that hunger and want would have forced them to work….But having imported slaves every common or ordinary European becomes a gentleman and prefers to be served than to serve…We have in addition the fact that the majority of the farmers in this colony are not farmers in the real sense of the world, but owners of plantations, and that many of them consider it a shame to work with their own hands.

In 1662, Commander Zaharias Wagener also referred to some of the free burgher farmers who ceased to farm in a much more derogatory tone to that of Van Imhoff’s remark nearly a century later, when he said10:7-8:

“versopene, luije, lompe vlegels”, that despite all threats and measures of duress went to live at the Fort, where they ran boarding houses, in order to try and exploit sailors and visitors, and proceeded to sit idly on their porches, endlessly drinking and being idle, which allows for the Devil’s work”. (Own translation)

It seems as though the choices of the VOC of their “settlers” to the Cape were not always the best to form a nation in the end. The fact that the VOC’s executive leaders at the Cape also failed the tests of “goodness” in many cases, strengthen this view. It is thus important to briefly look further into the profiles of some of the governors after de Chavonnes (1714-1724). Hendrik Swellengrebel (1739-1750)

During Swellengrebel’s appointment, the Khoi-Khoi, KhoiSan and Xhosa problems were prominent. These problems were especially prevalent between 1737 and 1739, and serious racial disharmony and bloodshed ensued. In this period the KhoiSan, and less often the KhoiKhoi who were over time driven out from their original living areas around the Cape, started in reprisal to raid the White frontiersmen’s farms.8,9,12,,22,40

The KhoiKhoi were eventually no longer a problem, and seemed to submit to their subordinate position under the Whites. The bulk of the KhoiKhoi stayed within the the borders of the colony, becoming part of the farming environment as labourers, where they were absorbed into the growing Colored group. Some smaller groups withdrew from the incoming White frontiersmen, forming communities on their own, such as Adam Kok’s group, who moved from Piketberg to Kamiesberg, allowing his group to absorb half-breed KhoiKhoi to form the Griqua tribe.8,9,12,22,40

It seems to be the KhoiSan who refused to be part of this subordinate plan of the VOC Government. The White frontiersmen illegally occupied their traditional hunting areas and so they started an organized resistance in the form of attacks, in an effort to drive the Whites out. They where initially in some cases very successful, but their primitive weaponry in the form of bows and poisoned arrows and their restriction of moving by foot, made them easy targets for the White frontiersmen, moving fast on horses in large groups with guns. Most of the onslaughts by the KhoiSan, starting from 1715, were a kind of guerilla attack, spreading out over the vast borderline of the colony. The counter measures of the Boer frontiersmen were to organize commandos to subdue the KhoiSan. These punitive actions of the Boers were mostly extremely uncontrolled. In many of these KhoiSan hunting parties the VOC Government gave formal permission to the White frontiersmen to undertake these killings, leading thereto that hundreds of Bushmen were “terminated” in punishment actions which had been authorized.8,9,12,22,40

These uncontrolled killings of especially the KhoiSan were also prevalent during the time in office of Ryk Tulbagh (1751-1771), Swellengrebel’s successor, and that of Baron Joachim van Plettenberg (1773-1785), and continued until the end of VOC rule at the Cape. It also spread out against the Xhosas, whose land the White frontiersmen also illegally penetrated and occupied (although many Afrikaner historians ignore this reality in their books).8,9,12,22,40

The period from the early- to late 1700s was characterized by Whites and non-Whites coming face-to-face about illegal land occupation due to the failure of the VOC government at the Cape to handle the White frontiersmen’s increasingly delinquent behaviour to indigenous South Africans and their unrelenting illegal grabbing of the KhoiSan and Xhosas’ land. This set the stage for immense conflict, bloodshed and the creation of permanent hatred between Whites and Blacks. The fact that land grabbing by the Whites was the main reason for all these conflicts, leading to attacks and counter attacks and mass bloodshed, was ignored outright by the VOC. There was no effective border policy and strict ruling of their White subjects, whose ancestors they had brought to South Africa to settle initially only around Cape Town. IJsbrand Godske theoretically started up successful “apartheid” in South Africa in 1671, but the racism and racial disharmony which has been the country’s main problem up until today, was created directly by the White governors of the VOC, especially starting with Swellengrebel, and continuing undisturbed until the end of VOC rule with Sluysken as executive political leader in 1795. It is important to provide some insight into these early happenings, specifically the prominent roles of the White, KhoiSan and Xhosa frontiersmen in this later political mess.8,9,12,22,40 White frontiersmen

We have already noted Geen’s12 reference to the disorderly and law-evading actions of the travelling and border Boers, or so-called White frontiersmen, who became in their own right sheriffs, cowboys, outlaws and crooks in a completely unorganized border area. Geen writes12:23-24:

In fact, since that it had appeared as though the central government was leaving the defence of the borders to the frontiersmen, so that in time they came to look upon themselves not only as their own defence but as a law unto themselves. In this same year (1739) one Etienne Barbier, a runaway soldier, who had attempted to raise a revolt among dissatisfied burghers at the Paarl, was captured and executed and thereafter yet another ineffective edict was published against intercourse with the native tribes.

These White frontiersmen’s delinquent behaviour was not only mostly ignored by the Cape Authority, but indeed assisted with their tacit allowing of the White frontiersmen to enlarge the colony’s area constantly by their shifting of the one official border to the following border; deeper and deeper inland, and the taking over of non-Whites’ traditional land and thus the creation of a more disorderly government. What is most important, is that these Boers and their children, who were frequently not law abididng, with strong views on race differentiation and the belief of the baas-kneg-system, which characterized the later Grand Apartheid of the National Party (NP), formed the greatest bulk of the early 1800s Voortrekkers. They undoubtedly transferred complex negative cognitions, customs, traditions, beliefs and views into the later two Boer-republics.4,12,22

Their reasons to “trek” were undoubtedly the easily availability of farms, but also the “free roaming” of an uncontrolled lifestyle, away from the Cape Authority which the White frontiersmen saw more and more as useless and uneconomic, and more of a burden than a support in their daily life.9,12,22,31

The abundance of soil and favourable conditions of the interior for stock farming, as well as little resistance from the KhoiKhoi and KhoiSan, contributed fast to a self-sufficient lifestyle. This isolation, although mostly free from the nuisance of the VOC Government, claimed a price. Within two generations, negative outcomes followed as a result of their cultural isolation and lack of good law and order, seriously affecting their traditional “Cape and European culture”. Their pastoral and nomadic way of living, where cattle bartering with the KhoiKhoi, hunting of an overabundance of game and management of the grazing of their stock were their day-to-day existence, and were undoubtedly both attractions and benefits. But their isolation, lack of educational facilities, lack of cultural and life-enriching influences and lack of sound policing of their behaviour, brought about a down-scale in their European standards of living – a serious shortcoming which was carried with them as they moved further north, west and east as the first frontiersmen. Their culturally deprived children and grandchildren carried this “cultural poverty” with them as they moved beyond the Vaal River and further north.9,12,31

Geen writes about this frontier culture of theirs as follows12:29:

…but the isolation and difficulties of frontier life also made them limited in their outlook, impatient with all forms of control and so intensely individualistic that it became difficult to unite them in effective co-operation. They lost most of their civilization on the way to the Promised Land. Some could write, still more could sign their names, many read the Bible, especially the Old Testament, into which they read a justification of themselves, their beliefs and all their works, but for the rest, learning and the affairs of the great world were closed books to them.

These frontiersmen, spreading out to the north to form with other proto-Afrikaners the Transvaal and Free State Republics, were seen in the pre-1836 period as part of a group of people, who the post-1836 British Government at the Cape had viewed as people from a backwards colony (to use the historian CW Kiewiet’s words)12. These were the people who the British were forced to make “acceptable and fitable” into the new British Empire. To fulfill this British “uplifting” ideal, it cost, in less than a half century, from the British Empire two Boer wars, millions of British pounds and the loss of thousand of lives. This leaves a great doubt as to whether the comprehensive neglect by the long rule of the VOC of the proto-Afrikaners, namely the frontiersmen and Voortrekkers, was not transferred into the mindsets of their descendants, the Transvaal and Free State burghers, and after 1910 into the Afrikaners of the Union, and whether this was ever erased.4,12 The official termination of the KhoiSan frontiersmen

The KhoiSan did not cultivate land or own any livestock, but lived from nature’s produce such as game and edible plants. Although the KhoiSan were hunters and not farmers, land and territory was very important to them. Certain areas of South Africa, notwithstanding a lack of inhabitants or a population, were claimed over many years by the KhoiSan as their exclusive hunting grounds and property, from which they had even driven out the incoming Blacks. These traditions and customs of the KhoiSan were principles that were not well respected by many of the unruly White frontiersmen, who started to occupy the best grazing land of the KhoiSan. For the KhoiSan this “White barbarism” of continuous land-grabbing was a serious threat to their future existence and a reason for justified war. They organized four “wars”, more like guerilla onslaughts, in 1715, 1731, 1738 and 1754 against the White frontiersmen and successfully drove them from their newly occupied farms. It was especially in times of drought that the KhoiSan started to intensively attack and to rob the White farmers.9,15

In their attacks aimed at driving the White frontiersmen southwards back out of their traditional territory, the Khoisan resorted to much cruelty – methods similar to those which are seen today in much terrorism and guerilla fighting.

Van der Walt writes about these cruelties, which meted out as much pain as possible and damage on the enemy, which characterized the KhoiSan’s warfare, as follows9:101:

This explains the frequent apparently senseless cruelty of the Bushmen. They did not just murder cattle watchmen, but tortured them with incredible cruelty. Stolen cattle were mistreated and frequently maimed as they fled. The cattle watchmen were sometimes murdered and their sheep or cattle were stabbed to death, without any thought being given to using them for food. (Own translation).

After the 1770s, the conflicts between White frontiersmen and the KhoiSan worsened, leading thereto that during the period of the early 1770s to the late 1780s, the White frontiersmen were successfully driven out of areas like the Nuweveld, bringing about serious loss of lives, livestock and damage to property. With regard to the immense losses for the period 1786 to 1788 of the White frontiersmen at the hand of these various KhoiSan guerilla attacks, Van der Walt reports9:102:

According to the calculations of Magistrate Woeke, in the Graaf-Reinet district, in the two and a half years between 1 July 1786 and 31 December 1788, 107 cattle watchmen were murdered, and 99 horses, 6,299 cattle and 17970 sheep were stolen or killed. During the last thirty years of the centuary, a bloody guerilla war full of hatred and bitterness developed. The Bushmen did not lose any chance to steal or destroy, to burn down farm houses and to murder farmers or cattle watchmen. The farmers shot all the Bushmen that they could get in their sights, and commandos were destroyed as often as possible. In 1777 the government approved a war of extermination (Own translation).

About the tragic outcomes for the KhoiSan brought on them by one of these official wars of extermination of the KhoiSan, to which Van der Walt above refers, Geen reports as follows12:28:

The relations between the frontier farmers and the Bushmen were far less satisfactory. In the ten years after 1754 there where frequent Bushmen raids on the farms each followed by a punishment commando that killed many of the raiders and made apprenctices of the captured women and children. In 1774 the Council of Policy organized a large commando under Godlieb Opperman, which ranged over three hundred miles of the borderland and, for the loss of one burgher, took over two hundred prisoners, most of whom were apprenticed to members of the commando, and killed over five hundred Bushmen. It was a sorry business and by no means the end of the matter, as for years to come, these raids and counter commandos continued.

The question must be asked as to whether the constant and senseless killing of the KhoiSan, driven from their original living space by the White frontiersmen since 1652, differs from crimes against humanity and whether it was not genocide? Was this not a well-planned scheme to wipe the KhoiSan from the face of South Africa, as the Nazis tried to do with the Jews and other minorities in the Second World War? Geen’s12 undermentioned description of who the KhoiSan were and how they were treated in the 1600s to 1700s (and possibly are still treated today) may offer us some insight into the dehumanizing and distancing as human beings which the KhoiSan underwent since the Cape Settlement started up in 1652. This process of dehumanizing was executed by the Whites, but activated and allowed unobstructed by the VOC’s executive political leaders at the Cape; persons who were supposed to be responsible for the rights and life of every South African. It also gives some insight as to how South Africans’ respect for the lives and the happiness of other people already went wrong in the 1700s. Most of all, it gives an in-depth insight as to how some of our executive political leaders between 1652 and 1795 failed all South Africans, including the KhoiSan. To issue the approval for the cold-blooded mass termination of other humans – people who were here in South Africa long before the Europeans, and basically to steal their land for self-enrichment – is unforgiveable. Any person or group wiping out a tribe, not only by their direct killing, but also by robbing them of their economics and livelihood and erasing them from society, is/are real Frankenstein Monsters. On the tragic reaching of the end of the road for the KhoiSan frontiersmen and their families as a significant tribe or group, Geen offers us a short historical reflection12:9-10:

The Bushmen, little yellow-skinned people barely five feet in height, were the least advanced of the three races [Blacks, Hottentots and Bushmen] occupying Southern Africa at the time of the arrival of the Europeans. An examination of instruments and mounds suggest that they were, perhaps, the first inhabitants of South Africa, probably having been compelled to migrate from central Southern Asia, either by scarcity of food and space, or by a stronger race. According to one theory, one section going south-east occupied the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines and Australia, another section travelling west entered Spain, while a third found its way into Africa, where they were gradually pushed south by the stronger Hamites occupying the Nile region. In succession other races entered Africa from the east and by the Sixteenth Century there were probably no Bushmen north of the Zambesi River. Being nomadic hunters, they lived largely on game and roots. Their family and tribal ties were weak, their ideas of religion rudimentary and their vocabulary limited, but they had considerable artistic talent as we know from their drawings and paintings to be found in rock shelters all over South Africa. These are in many ways similar, and in some respects superior, to those extant on the walls of caves in southern Spain. However, their neighbours, both the Hottentots and Bantu, doubted whether they were quite human and so it is not surprising that the Europeans also proved enemies, and today Bushmen remain only in very small numbers in the Kalahari Desert and South-West Africa.

This “animalizing” of the KhoiSan is worse than dehumanizing can ever be, and is further well illustrated by the fact that during the Difaqane (the period 1810 to 1840 of Black-on-Black violence inland in Northern South Africa) they fell victim to cannibalism and were hunted as game by various Black tribes like the Bafokeng, in the mountain areas where they took shelter.4,12,15 As also described by Geen12 their presence as “a people” and their status as humans in Southern Africa, seen from the White frontiersmens’ view of the 1700s, was as “only a nuisance”, undoubtedly equal to the nuisance of a predator. The KhoiSan was “just a Bushman”.

Of the KhoiSan tribe’s early empowerment, strong enough initially to successfully fight the White and Black frontiersmen from 1652, there was, by the beginning of the early 1800s, basically nothing left. They could also not be spoken of as a tribe anymore. Sadly in the 1800s there was not yet an International Criminal Court (ICC) to prevent the termination of the Bushmen.

The demography of the indigenous people of South Africa, having evolved over hundreds, if not thousands of years, was irreversibly changed in one hundred and fifty years of European progress. Infantile geo-politics arrived in the 1800s for South Africa. Black frontiersmen

Unil the early 1700s, the White frontiersmen’s immediate indigenous enemies were the KhoiKhoi and KhoiSan, who they forced to move north-, east- and westwards with ease, further away from the Cape Authority and further over the official borders of the Cape Colony. This constant extension of the colony’s authority, from the Breede River to the Fish River, forced Baron van Plettenberg to extend the frontier “officially” to the Fish River in July 1775. In September 1778, during a visit of Van Plettenberg to the Fish River border, he found two opposition groups living suddenly in close proximity to each other: the Xhosa frontiersmen, moving south, and the White frontiersmen, moving north. The first real battle line between Black and White about land ownership in South Africa was clearly and precisely drawn.8,912,22,40

But what was important of this first clash, was that the Xhosas were not to be a pushover for the White frontiersmen, as the KhoiKhoi or KhoiSan had been. The Boers found their match after more than hundred years of uncontrolled subjugation of the KhoiKhoi, KhoiSan and Cape slaves. These first clashes in the Fish River region formed the beginning of the future infighting between Blacks and Whites, running continuously over more than two centuries, until 2018.8,912,22,40

Geen12 describes the needs and reasoning of Blacks as well as Whites of that time (which do not differ very much from their needs and reasoning in 2018, and which also form the arguments of the leader of the EFF, Julius Malema, which he is constantly hot-bloodedly voicing in Parliament in favour of his land-capture). Geen writes12:28:

The clash with the Bantu in the region of the Fish opened a new chapter in South African history, which was to prove both long and stormy, for both the Bantu and the Boers were pastoralists whose wealth lay in their herds of cattle and sheep and whose chief object in life was the search for new water and pastures. What made the clash all the more severe was the fact that the new eastern frontier lay in an area of uncertain rainfall and drought. Moreover, to intensify the struggle, the area of unreliable rainfall lay behind the Boers and that of the more plentiful rainfall behind the Bantu.

But the concept of land and the fighting about it goes much deeper than just grazing and a livelihood through farming, as many White historians, like Geen12 (also quoting Professor WM Macmillan in this respect) interpret by saying12:30:

‘The little understood Kaffir Wars are properly to be regarded as the struggle between two streams of colonizers for the possession of valuable land’. This struggle was complicated by the fact that the European and Bantu ideas on the holding of land differed fundamentally, the former being based on ownership, while according to Bantu customary law, a chief could neither sell nor cede land, but could merely grant the right of using it in a particular way. For a long time this difference of conception was a stumbling block to peace in South Eastern Africa.

This view of Geen’s12 is far from the full truth: the truth was that the constant northern, western and eastern moving White frontiermen were not interested in leasing or buying land. They “stole” land which had become over a long period, mostly by fighting and then occupation, the exclusive property of the Black frontiersmen (it did not matter if it was under a chief’s customary holding). (Mostly it seems that the chiefs were not willing to relinquish their land anyway). It was unlawful land grabbing, mostly by force, by the White frontiersmen. When these Black frontiersmen reacted by raids into their lost land, these actions led to “justified” reprisals by the Whites in the form of the various Xhosa wars (or, as Geen12 called them, the Kaffir Wars).

Although the Blacks were the majority in these first clashes, they made their own pre-modern weaponry and were thus unequal in fighting ability, when compared with the White frontiersmen, who were well equiped with weapons and horse mobility. They became the losers in the long term political history of South Africa. But this victory for the Whites did not come with ease, and never really eased up, not even in 2018.

Geen writes about the inequality between the White and Black frontiersmen battling for empowerment and the good outcomes for the White frontiersmen from their better military striking power, as follows12:28:

In the struggle that followed it was the [White] frontiersman that had the advantage, for his horse gave him greater mobility, his gun gave him irresistible fire power and his tented wagon enabled him to turn conquest into settlement by bringing up his family and household goods, as they were.

This inequality in military empowerment against the Whites stayed with the Blacks (as with the other non-Whites, like the Coloreds and Indians) for centuries, and could not even be cracked by the ANC’s MKs’ best tries. But in these conflicts, originating in the late 1700s, the Blacks also lost out immensely on politics, economics and social life: the winner takes all; all ways. The same which had happened with the Whites’ political, emotional, cognitive and economical deprivation at the Cape Colony under the VOC regime of nearly two centuries, had unfortunately also happened to all non-Whites in South Africa, due to their suppression from 1652 onward. The same process to make people from a backwards country acceptable and fit for a modern country — as was tried by the British Empire with the Whites in the Cape Colony after their years of ordeal at the hands of the VOC – had also been followed since 1994 in South Africa. Unfortunately not all South Africans have so far been successful in overcoming their immense deprivation, coming from as far back as1652.4,12 Joachim van Plettenberg (1773-1785)

After the Willem van der Stel debacle, the relations between the Cape Authority and the colonists were stable, although there was no real change to a democratic government and open society. The political power was still solely vested in the governor and his Council of Policy and the VOC owners of the Cape Colony. For the Cape Government, which was the sole representative of the VOC, the business interests of the VOC were essential, while the colonists’ interests were secondary. But it seems that gradually extortion, self-conceit, corruption and nepotism inside the VOC by its officials began to emerge once again, especially among the higher ranking officials. Prominent was the top-heavy number of officials working for the VOC (with a ratio of one official for every five burghers!) and their under-payment, making them corrupt and nepotistic in order for them to be able to make a living. The influence of the successful revolt of the American English colonies against the trading restrictions forced upon them by the British Empire began to take a hold in the mindsets of the burghers. In this regard it must be mentioned that the free burghers still had no direct share in the government of the day, while there were numerous trading restrictions imposed on them which smothered the development of trade and the beginning of any industry. At the same time the VOC was in the process of declining, making the burghers a target for a greater income generating source for the VOC and the Cape Colony’s administration.8,9,12,22,40

There was also a new misuse of juridical power inside the undemocratic VOC management against the colonists. It was highlighted with the appointment of the Independent Fiscal, Willem Cornelis Boers, who was only responsible for his behaviour to the Council of Seventeen to judicially oversee cases without any say by the governor. He also discriminated against the status of the colonists (White, but of local birth) and the inhabitants of the Netherlands. This inclination led further to an “uplifted” view of the VOC officials’ status with the colonists “stripped” of their “status”, resulting in more and more objections by the colonists against the governor, the Council of Policy and specifically WC Boers.8,9,12,22,40

A petition to the Council of Seventeen gave a better view of the unsatisfactory Cape situation to the council, although little negative was mentioned of Van Plettenberg himself as governor, notwithstanding his extreme policy against any opposition, which had already led to his deportation of eighteen burghers. As previously mentioned, prominently in focus during that time were WC Boers and his crony officials. The burghers put forward certain demands, like the codification of the laws; demanding that seven burghers should be members of the Council of Policy when matters concerning the colonists were under discussion; that two of these burghers should retire annually and that their places should only be replaced by the nominees of the burgher councillors; they asked for equal representation with the officials on the High Court of Justice and for the right of appeal to the Council of India. Regarding the immediate improvement of their economics, they demanded the abolition of private trading by the officials, the grant of free trade with foreign ships and the VOC, and a reduction in farm rents.8,9,12,22,40,43

Van Plettenberg, in reaction to the Council of Seventeen’s enquiry, argued that the petitioners were in the minority (only four hundred out of three thousand burghers signed it). The outcome was that only the demand about the same number of representatives as that of the officials on the High Court was granted, but having representatives on the Council of Policy was refused.8,9,12,22,40

After this negative outcome the burghers sent a deputation to the State-General in the Netherlands in 1785, bringing some, but limited improvement in 1876 to the Cape’s governance, such as the introduction of a committee of the High Court consisting of three officials and three burghers, chosen by the Council of Policy to fix prices, but only to make suggestions on new forms of taxation. Included in their duties were also the control of public works and acting as a municipal council for Cape Town. The political rights of the burghers were still non-existant.8,9,12,22,40,44

The successors of WC Boers – Jan Jacob Serrurier and Van Lyden van Blittersrijk – showed the same judicial arrogance. New reactions by the burghers began to take place. Central to these actions were various unnamed writings, which started to circulate in the Cape Colony. The central sentiments in these writings were the right to live in a democracy and to have political rights and freedom, something so far unknown at the Cape. Uncontrolled wrongdoing by the VOC officials and governor, against the colonists, also became prominent subjects. More and more requests for resistance by the White frontiersmen were put on paper. Anti-VOC secret meetings were being held. This battle for freedom, lead by 444 colonists, ended in a comprehensive Burgher petition (a political and juridical document of very high standard) which they wanted to send to the Netherlands, but this was refused by the governor and the Council of Policy. In the end it was sent in 1779 in secret to the Netherlands, where it was presented to the Council of Seventeen by four colonists as representatives of the Cape burghers. Although many of these 1779 requests of the colonists were refused, some were accepted.12,22,44

A later petition in 1782, the Nadere Memorie, was mostly also unsuccessful. Most of all, the beginning of democracy was blocked, as Beyers explains43:118: “The principle of free election in all burger-like matters, which were pleaded for in art 7 of the Nadere Memorie and in art 9 and 13 of the Burgerpetisie, were not approved by the HERE XVII (Own translation).

On the other hand, positive political outcomes followed, some slow but some fast, such as the resignation of some of the prominent corrupt and underperforming high officials, namely the Independent Fiscal WC Boers, the Equipage Master Damien Staring and the Head of the Cape Militia, Van Prehn. But most of all at last sound political thinking and planning on the side of the burghers did prevail. The colonists started to ignore the Council of Seventeen and the VOC and turned for help to the State-General of the Netherlands in their quest for democracy. The organization of the colonists into a political unity led to the founding in 1784 of a political party, the Patriotte. In 1784 this party addressed the State-General three times with requests that the Cape Colony’s statutory position should be changed to a “Volkstaat subordinate to the State-General” for political governance. These three addresses in 1785 were without real success. As a last resort, they again sent a delegation in 1795 to the Netherlands, and again addressed the State-General, but again without success.12,22,43

Geen12 summarized the immense failure of Van Plettenberg as a governor very well with the following inscription12:33: “The record of van Plettenberg’s governorship make for dismal reading…”. However, the reading of the records of the other commanders and governors before him, from as far back as 1652, also make for dismal reading.8,9,12,22,31,40,43 Cornelis Jacob van de Graaff (1785-1791)

In 1786, during the office of Cornelis Jacob van de Graaff (1785-1791), another petition was sent to the State-General in the Netherlands, but again it failed the test.

But the Cape Patriotte had a taste now for freedom and democracy. Basically the driving force was that they believed in their right to be able to select their own political representatives and the right to rule themselves. This was now the main thinking of and planning by the burghers. In the meantime, the VOC started to lose authority and to fall into financial dispair as a business entity. The need for independence was fast activated at Graaff-Reinett and Swellendam. The burghers of Graaff-Reinet, which was declared a separate District in December 1785 by the Cape Authority, started, especially as a result of their poor economic conditions and the continuing attacks by the Xhosas, for which they received no help, to take the first steps towards “independence”.

The founding of Graaff-Reinet as a separate district by the VOC sounds more glorious than it was. It was mainly constructive in improving the governmental order of the VOC between the Gamtoos and Fish Rivers, and changing the White frontiersmen’s delinquent and disorderly behaviour. The Graaff-Reinet district, most of which fell between the two rivers, fast became a headache for the VOC. The VOC’s various edicts, recalling all burghers to the colonial side of the Fish River, and their forbidding of the burghers to go into the Xhosa territory to trade, was, as the many previous VOC proclamations, null and void, basically because there was no VOC police force to enforce the edicts on the many Boers who trespassed constantly. (It is doubted whether the VOC Government was ever actually intent on stopping border crossings and trade). This ongoing expansion of the Cape Colony and White territory by the uncontrolled and more and more independent White frontiersmen, activated direct conflict between the burghers and the Xhosas, leading to the Second Xhosa war (1789-1793) and the Xhosa’s focused driving out of the burghers from the Zuurveld by their chief Ndhlambi. The stage was set for future and more White frontiersmen’s conflicts with the Black frontiersmen and the intensification of the growing “Black-White problem” of South Africa. Central here was the legal land ownership of established Xhosa areas (although without card and transport), ongoing confiscation by the White frontiersmen and the VOC Government themselves. Vague international legislation was available but for the Xhosas, as for the KhoiSan, it seems to have not been available in the South African 1800s of “cracked” European justice.9,12,40 Abraham Josias Sluysken (1793-1795)

On the 1st February 1793 the newly established French Republic declared war on Great Britain and Holland, leaving Sluysken as governor in charge of the VOC’s Cape Colony with a very insecure position. He upheld the interim situation of the failing frontier policy of the VOC by basically doing nothing. As a result, the situation became more and more restless, mostly due to the disorderly activities of the White frontiersmen. The end outcome was that the frontiersmen started to ignore the Cape Government, which they saw as not having protected them and, in terms of the liberal Maynier policy, having forbidden them to protect themselves against the KhoiSan and the Xhosas. This political instability of the VOC Government and sudden political opportunity for a break-away, gave birth to the long dreamed of ideal of the free burghers own republic spirit.

Geen writes12:35:

… on the 27th Augustus 1795, the seething dissatisfaction came to a head, when Adriaan van Jaarsveld and JC Trigardt, in command of forty burghers, drove Maynier from his drostdy at Graaff-Reinet and appointed a provincial landdrost and heemraden. Subsequently they proclaimed a republic with a National Assembly of its own of which van Jaarsveld was president. On the 16th July 1795 the Swellendam ‘Nationals’ followed suit and chose H Steyn as president.12, 43

These two declarations as “republics” must in addition be seen as declarations of “independence from the VOC”, rather than a total break-away from the Cape Colony. Although there was some unclearness with the burghers of Graaff-Reinet and Swellendam on their political and judicial positions in the Cape Colony, it seems as though they saw themselves as part of the free Republic of the Netherlands, either as republics or as colonies. The most important outcome of these happenings was that they saw themselves to be “unchained from the slavery of the VOC”. It seems that Stellenbosch and Cape Town also considered “independence”, but their plans were fast blocked by the arrival of a British military force at the Cape in June 1795. For the burghers of Graaf-Reinett and Swellendam, a British occupation of the Cape Colony was less favourable in terms of their existing lack of respect for law and order, than it was for the politically finessed and law-ordered Stellenbosch and Cape Town. Graaf-Reinett and Swellendam saw the coming of a possible British rule over them as endangering their “delinquent” freedom and uncontrolled activities which they had been allowed by the VOC. Notwithstanding some military resistance, the Cape Colony was handed over to the British Forces on the 16th September 1795. With this transfer, the VOC disappeared forever from the Cape Colony. In 1796 Graaff-Reinett accept British rule. The same happened with Swellendam. The dream of political freedom of the White colonist farmers and White frontiersmen, coming from as far back as 1652, ended absurdly a hundred and fifty years later in 1796. Notwithstanding this disappointment, the foundation was laid for a new political struggle for freedom.12,22,43 The beginning of Xhosa and KhoiSan racism

The above-mentioned overview of the executive political leaders of the Cape Colony shows a new, clear separation between Whites and non-Whites in the colony, additional to the earlier separation at the Cape Settlement since 1652. This racial separation was now based on the economic, social and cultural factors. It laid the foundation in the mindsets of non-Whites, such as the Blacks and the Khoisan, that the Whites did not respect their culture and habits, customs and traditions, as well as their “property rights and laws”, despite how undefined and “pre-modern and uncivilized” these “rights and laws” were in terms of the “standards” seen from European stereotypes. For the non-Whites, the Whites were undoubtedly seen as “European barbarians” who did not deserve a place in the African context. For many of the non-Whites, modelled into their pre-modern psyche, the killing of the enemy was the natural way (and the only way) to assure their continuation as a group and reinstitute their previous rights and properties. (This behaviour is still apparent today in the USA’s activities in the Middle East against the indigenous Afghans, Iraqis and Syrians who dare to oppose their will or endanger their interests). In this context the non-Whites were fast classified by Whites to be a “dangerous species”; one without a justified place in the modern society, and with very good reason because of their constant murderous behavior. Their killings on sight were justified and constantly practiced, while the “extermination” for instance of the KhoiSan, was a legal and natural process. Inhumanity began to be internalized into the mindset of the Whites, while racial discrimination in the form of White supremacy, was undoubtedly activated to lay the foundation for later phenomena such as Apartheid.4,9,12,22

From the above it is clear that the executive political leaders of the White farmers, as well as the executive leaders of the government, in their actions to solely safeguard the lives and property of the White farmers (notwithstanding the illegal possession thereof from the indigenous non-Whites) by the “formal extermination” for instance of the KhoiSan, were undoubtedly seen as “good”, or even “great” leaders from the White side. This policy of “extermination” was further undoubtedly transferred with time into the mindsets and ruling culture of the Cape regime’s executive leadership, to be followed in time by future White executive political leaders, to uphold peace and security seen from a White perspective, and only to benefit the White inhabitants. In the end it became the only “correct, justified and applicable way” of dealing with South Africa’s masses of non-Whites.9,12

The non-White South Africans, such as the Xhosa and the KhoiSan, had however, clearly developed totally different views to those of the Whites on the concepts of good leaders and good regimes of leadership. The non-Whites’ disapproving and opposing views are reflected in their “formal extermination” of White farmers (and even their non-White servants) in the 1700s to the 1800s in their war against the White occupiers. This means undoubtedly that they viewed their own leaders, enacting these murders, as “good” leaders, acting in line with their established pre-modern regime of leadership, which had prescribed for a long time, from generation to generation, the murdering and outright killing of their enemies.9,12,22 But to say that there was not the same quality of leader, or the same type of regime of leadership with the Xhosas or KhoiSan, as had been maintained by the Whites at the Cape since 1652, is totally untrue. Just study once again the inhumanity of installing non-Whites as slaves and their cruel treatment at the Cape, the grabbing of the Xhosas’ and KhoiSan’s land, together for instance with the hunting of the “animal’, the Bushman. This makes the quality of the indigenous non-Whites and that of the “European” Whites, equal, notwithstanding the poor quality of this behaviour.4,9,12,22

For the South African non-Whites, namely the Xhosa and KhoiSan, the only clear cognition reflected for them in the constant killing spree against them by the 1700s-1800s Cape Whites, was that they were losers against the dominant White winners, missing out on their own pre-modern murderous and cruel behavior against the Whites which made them targets. Although the Khoisan was basically in terms of group empowerment and numbers wiped out from public life through the Cape Government’s and the colonists’ policy of “termination”, hate for the proto-Afrikaner and the Whites lived on in the mindsets of their small group of descendants, and also their descendants who mixed with other non-Whites whose forefathers had suffered the same unfortunate lot at the hands of the Whites. This hatred was also apparent among the mass of Xhosas against the Whites.9 The end of the VOC and its Cape Colony ruling in 1802

The golden age of the VOC started to come to an end when the Cape refreshment station was founded in 1652, slowly moving into decline in the 18th Century. A direct reason for this decline was the two English Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660, aimed at the Dutch carrying trade. Both the acts were followed up by indecisive naval wars between England and Holland (1652-1654 and 1664-1667). In the meantime, Holland was also involved in four wars with the French. After the death in 1702 of William of Orange (who was also King of England as William lll), Holland was ruled under an oligarchic form of republican government until 1747. These outcomes, as well as Holland’s involvement in the Austrian Succession War between 1740 to 1748, and the American War of Independence from 1780 to 1783, brought huge financial and other loses, as well as the loss of much of her shipping activities and movements. The restart of war between the French Revolution Republic and the restored House of Orange led to the flight of the Stadtholder to England and the establishment of the Batavian Republic in the Netherlands. The eventual downfall of the Netherlands as a great naval and a commercial power, also spelled disaster for the VOC in the end. The costs of the VOC and the mismanagement of the Council of Seventeen, together with immense corruption, forced the VOC to declare its last dividend in 1782, and twelve year later it was declared bankrupt.8,9,12

After the Prince of Orange fled to England, the Patriot Party of the Netherlands came to terms with the French, forming the Netherlands into the Batavian Republic as a vassal state of the French Republic. In this context the Prince of Orange asked the British Government to protect the Cape against a French occupation. With the treaty of Rustenburg, signed on the 6th September 1795, the Cape Colony surrendered to Great Britain, ending the rule of the VOC at the Cape after 143 years forever. Furthermore, with the establishment of the Batavian Republic, the VOC lost its governing powers and was legally dissolved after a chequered career of almost two hundred years.12

4. Discussion

For this study, taking the period of 1652 to 1795 into consideration, to be able to make an evaluation on the quality of leadership of South African executive political leaders and governments, the descriptions by various political and historical writers on political leaders and governments, as well as the writings of business and management experts on business executive leaders, were consultated.13-26

The period reviewed was over one hundred and forty-three years, covering twenty-nine commanders and governors as the chief executive officers of the VOC Government at the Cape. It became obvious from day one of the study that the South Africa political history is an exclusively White one, wherein the South African non-Whites played a minimal role. Where there are references to Black leaders such as Tshaka, Ndhlambi, Gaika, Adam Kok, Moroko, and Mosheh, to mention a few, it was within a negative context, reflecting them to be aggressive, murdering and anti-White orientated. Their constructive contributions to the history of South Africa from 1652 to 1795 seem not to exist, besides their so called “constant path of bloodshed”. 8,9,12

The profile of the executive political leaders and their regimes, appraised over this period of one hundred and forty-three years in totality, undoubtedly reflects some good points, such as the instalation in 1652 of a fast, workable farming unit by Jan van Riebeeck, which activated in a few years a basic farming and sheltering environment wherein the first inhabitants could successfully survive. Here the successful instalation of a kind of administrative management to run the refreshment station by him as a leader, was prominent.8,9,12,31

What is notable is that future planning and strategic thinking with regard to the long term future of the settlement and its inhabitants was lacking from day one. This shortcoming, aside from the simple daily function of existence, was created by the fact that the VOC, although a semi-governmental institution of the Netherlands Government, failed to be a truly statutory institution, driven by the political, social, personal and economical needs, thinking, planning and activities of its inhabitants from the beginning. Profit making for the VOC was central to all activities, leading to an exclusive business mentality of thinking and management wherein the employer was the sole decision maker. This business culture stayed with the VOC at the Cape until it went bankrupt, and led to an autocratic governmental system until 1795, with the end of the VOC, leaving a legacy of many of the later Cape burghers having a cultural, economic and politically backwards setup.8,9,12

On leadership per se, the subordination of the commanders and governors to the various higher empowered bodies overseeing them, like the Council of Seventeen and the Council of India, was an enormous impediment to institute in the long term any improvement to the legal ruling of the settlement and later the colony. The Council of Policy at the Cape was always an autocratic body, serving as a power base for the Council of Seventeen, as well as for the executive leaders to enforce their foolish political views and beliefs. Herewith went the opportunity which this autocratic system offered to the executive leaders to allow corruption and nepotism by their cronies and to enrich themselves by crooked activities. With regard to allegations of crooked activities, state capture and misused power, which are being laid at the door of Jacob Zuma at the moment, persons like Jan van Riebeeck and Simon and Willem van der Stel were masters at these delinquencies. Indeed, the modern day South Africa was started up by a crook in 1652 and corruption and dishonesty have been rife among its officials from day one. It was not only Australia which was started up by criminal forefathers: South Africa, looking back on our political and historical tracts from 1652, leaves us with the question in 2018: can we ever be rehabilitated?8,9,12

One point of light in the constant political rhetoric around Jacob Zuma’s innocence or not, is that if he has stolen, it was a BEE action, fingering the Whites as the only “colonist thieves” with Jan van Riebeeck in the lead. This pin-points in our political history two contradictions which makes Whites, Coloreds and Blacks equal: Blacks, Coloreds and Whites are all colonists and it is not only Zuma to be accused of crookery, but also Van Riebeeck as a White and Willem van der Stel as a Colored! This makes us triple-blood-brothers of crooks! South African Blacks, Coloreds and Whites seemingly are all the same when it comes to delinquency!31,33-36,40

Looking critically at the appraisal checklist of the executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795, they failed to solve short and long term economic and political problems, especially the racial issue. They undoubtedly did good for the inhabitants in many ways, but when asking who these “inhabitants” were, they are overwhelmingly the Whites. The South African non-Whites have zero status on all terrains of life in this 1652 to 1795 environment. This inclination goes much deeper: the KhoiSans were killed by the authorities as though they were animals, while the White frontiersmen also had a free hand in these atrocities. The introduction of slaves under the auspices of the Cape’s executive leaders, starting with the White Jan van Riebeeck in the lead, laid the foundation for crimes against humanity, Apartheid and discrimination. To argue that slavery must be seen as an acceptable custom in the 1600s to 1700s timeframe and in line with Biblical traditions, is without any logical foundation. Allowing slavery into the Cape’s system was a massive moral mistake, demonstrated by the actions of Cape leaders and VOC overseers like Captain Dominique de Chavonnes in 1717 and Baron Gustaf Willem in 1743. Slavery at the Cape was for one purpose only: the self-enrichment of the Cape White farmers of today’s Western Cape. The Cape’s leaders were not only guilty of crimes against humanity by allowing it, they practiced it themselves in the buying of slaves for the service of the VOC, as well as that of their own farming. Van Riebeeck as well as the two Van der Stels were prominent slave owners in this context. Also the capturing as apprecntices of KhoiSan womenfolk and the children of the KhoiSan men, who the White frontiersmen had killed in their punitive expeditions (apprecntices being forced slaves), confirm these crimes against humanity which saturated the South African mindset over time. But slavery goes deeper: it had at its base a view of non-Whites such as the Blacks, Malaysians, Indians and KhoiSan as “dehumanized” beings in the mindsets of many Whites. Non-Whites had become objects which could become property of Whites, without free choice, as though the slave was a wagon or sheep, etc. The prominent question about the period 1652 to 1795 is: Why did the English not go into Scotland, Ireland and Spain, or the Netherlanders into Spain, to catch some of those Whites and to sell them as slaves at the Cape? Why the differentiation between White slaves versus Black slaves? Does this unanswered question not give us some insight into the racially contaminated mindsets of some of the Whites settled at the Cape refreshment station and later the Cape Colony?8,9,12,22,31,40

It seems as though most of the executive leaders at the Cape came from “good” family stock and had also received above average training and education. (Only one governor was born here, namely Hendrik Swellengrebel). Many, as previously mentioned used these personal qualities to benefit the colony, but, as happens in most political outcomes, became persons contaminated with self-enrichment and self-empowerment for themselves and the autocratic VOC Government, erasing the “good” which they could do for the inhabitants. Where improvement was brought into the Cape Government, it was requested by the inhabitants, and this improvement was also limited and not focused on empowering the inhabitants politically. Never in the various records of the Cape’s executive leaders is strong resistance reflected by them against the VOC’s many wrongdoings to the inhabitants, such as the VOC’s policies or the actions of senior VOC officials, commanders and governors. The VOC’s interests always came first; and then of course their own interests as commander or governor.8,9,12,22,31,40

Some historians use the description of “goodness” of Ryk Tulbagh (1751-1771) as an example of the “excellence” of Cape executive leaders. However, this is totally misleading, as the following example tries to show12:25-26:

“His [He] indeed was a fine character and his kindness, courtesy and generosity made him the best loved of all the Dutch governors at the Cape. The new governor was nothing if not honest and did everything possible to check the corruption of his subordinates and to counteract any official tendency to introduce into the Cape the luxurious way of life in the East by the imposition of sumptuary laws”.

This “curbing” by Ryk Tulbagh of officials’ lifestyles was clearly to generate extra money to fill the coffers of the VOC (which was moving into bankcrupcy). Moreover, how on earth could he be best loved by the KhoiSan whom he had allowed to be slaughtered without limitation by the White frontiersmen [See The official termination of the KhoiSan frontiersmen. The uncontrolled killings (terminations) of KhoiSan were extremely reflected during the offices of Ryk Tulbagh (1751-1771), Swellengrebel’s successor, and that of Baron Joachim van Plettenberg (1773-1785)].

Of characteristics as leaders who were fanatically driven and infected with an incurable need to produce sustained results for the Cape and its people, to make the colony great, to take on opportunities, to study in-depth its various problems, to nourish and to propagate a lifestyle among the inhabitants and a “nation-culture” of high ethics, and to collect an excellent team of democratic confidants around them to make their leadership of top-quality, there were no real signs in the study of the profiles of the various executive leaders of the period 1652 to 1795. More precisely: not a single one of these leaders reached the status of a world-statesman after leaving the Cape, neither did they even reach the status of a good executive leader in terms of the appraisal checklist.8,9,12,22,31,40

Most of all, these early executive political leaders missed out on South Africa’s indigenous realities: of different races with different cultures, religions, customs, traditions, beliefs and development stages they seem to have had very little understanding. Furthermore, they missed out on how to think outside their color cognition of Whiteness as the only good “color” of a human being, ignoring and missing out on the immense energy locked within Black-empowerment, that was waiting to overrun the White frontiersmen’s dreams, arrogance and sense of reality (although Black empowerment was only enacted in South Africa in 1994, it was clearly visible in 1795). The respect of the personal and human rights of non-Whites and the international law on territories (in terms of which many European Wars had already been fought in the 1600s) were totally absent in the South African context of an exclusive European thinking, planning and doing in the period 1652 to 1795, with regard to lawful land-ownership. Land-ownership from 1652 onward formed the basis for racial tension and hate. Instead of addressing it with wisdom, insight, justice and a balanced objectivity, the issue was addressed by killing, subordination and dehumanizing of the non-Whites and the conquering of their land. Knowing very well that the persons who control the economics of a country also rule its politics, and they who are in charge of the politics of a country own the economics, these early Cape executive leaders kept the non-Whites completely out of the political scenario (most of the Cape’s White inhabitants experienced this too). There were not the slightest signs in the mindsets of the early Cape executive political leaders of honest development of all the Cape’s people. These political inclinations of autocracy and intolerance against subordinates, mostly of course against non-Whites, were transferred and internalized into the mindsets of the Cape’s White inhabitants by their own bad experiences at the hands of the Cape’s corrupt officials, as well as the bad examples set by the corruption practiced not only by the officials, but also by the commanders and governors. The contamination of the mindsets of the Cape’s inhabitants by serious delinquency such as murder is evident by the growing uncontrollable and unruly behaviour in the early 1700s of the White frontiersmen, and their practice of a misplaced Christian religion which was contaminated by extreme racial politics. (With regard to the Black frontiersmen’s behavior there is also evidence of growing uncontrollable and unruly behaviour in the early 1700s, not more tolerant or less murderous as that of the White Frontiersmen’s actions).8,9,12,22,31,40

The fate of the missionaries of the Moravian Brethren, during the sojourn (1737-1747) of the missionary George Schmidt at Genadendal, confirms the contaminated extreme racial politics on all levels of the White society. Geen reports as follows on this inclination12:24:

Prior to Swellengrebel’s appointment, the Moravian Brethren, a Protestant sect with a considerable following in Bohemia and parts of Germany, sent George Schmidt to the Cape as a missionary to work among the Hottentots. He founded a flourishing mission at Baviaan’s Kloof, to be known later as Genadendal, where he laboured from 1737 to 1747 to teach the Hottentots the Christian faith and to raise their standards of living and work. However, when he wished to baptize some converts, he roused the enmity not only of the ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church, but also of the colonists, who did not look upon missionary endeavour with much favour. There was no religious toleration in the colony and so George Schmidt, who was a Lutheran, was forced to abandon his work and return to Europe. It was not until almost half a century later that the Moravians returned to South Africa and took up their work at Genadendal again.

This political outcome of 1747, contaminating the mindset of many of the early Cape Whites, is what Louw4 refers to in the Afrikaners’ lifestyle as a White Christianity versus a Black Christianity and a White Jesus versus a Black Jesus.

The executive political leaders at the Cape for the period 1652 to 1795 undoubtedly created a trend by setting an example of bad leadership. The first leaders were persons who lacked integrity and morality, creating a vicious cycle of flawed political, social, religious and political thinking and behaviour among many of the Cape Whites. Sadly, this mindset that obscured sound thinking, reasoning and behaviour, also developed in the non-Whites, creating manifold problems such as racial hatred, intolerance and most devastatingly, ideas of revenge against Whites for the treatment they received during the country’s political history of 1652 to 1795.

The checklist makes it easy to classify a plethora of political behaviours by political leaders and regimes from 1652 to 1795 as bad when measured against its criteria.

From this article it is clear that there is an urgent need to evaluate also the executive political leaders and regimes from 1796 to 2018 (μ=53). The intention is to do this as a separate project with time (Project Two). At the moment some political scientists are not yet convinced of the value of statistical political science with respect to responsible political analysis and sound governmental planning, which means that funding for such research as Project Two is limited. At present many political scientists still rely on intellectual analysis and opinion for political comments and predictions. The subjectivity and superficiality of such commentary make it dubious, even dangerous.

In light of the above appraisal of political leaders and regimes for the period 1652 to 1795 (μ=30), it is important to mention that the Democratic Alliance (DA) successfully uses a similar approach to judge the performances the ANC-regime’s leaders and their standard of governance over the last ten years according to a basic 10-point scale. However, it seems as if the ANC’s elite have never taken on any of the lessons that come out of such appraisals. The DA itself has failed to measure their own performances as a party and that of their leaders with the same diligence.

The checklist (see Part 4: A basic checklist for the appraisal of executive political leaders and regimes) presented in this research, aims to evaluate retrospective the performances of executive political leaders and regimes, in this instance specifically for the period 1652 to 1795. Its contribution will be much greater if it can be standardized with reliability and validity as a checklist not only for retrospective and present-day perspective evaluations of the performances of executive political leaders and regimes, but also specifically for sifting and selecting South African politicians for top public posts, such as president and vice-president. The Canadian government’s selection of its top managers through an approach known as the Career Assignment Programme (CAP) is a good example.44 Gregory’s44 writing gives a good guideline of how we can get rid of political crooks long before they reach the gates of the political world and at the same time cultivate leaders of excellence.

It is doubtful if the South African government or political parties would ever subscribe to a selection programme such as the CAP or a checklist such as this one. It would mean that political crooks would be locked out of state capture and political abuse. Their primary argument will be that such a process would be undemocratic (it violates citizens’ rights and invades the politician’s privacy). In practice (as we have seen from this research) the opposite is true: such an appraisal checklist is democratic as it forces undemocratic persons out of the democratic government.

5. Conclusions

The two objectives of this study were to discover whether the South African executive political leaders and their regimes of the period 1652 to 1795 (μ=30) had, during their time in office, made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people; and to determine whether the behaviour of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795 as leaders and as persons were extraordinary and impeccable.

The conclusions that are drawn from this study are presented in accordance with the aims and hypotheses as postulated in 2.2 to 2.5:

H1: The South African executive political leaders and their regimes of the period 1652 to 1795 had during their time in office made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people.

The findings of this study show that the South African executive political leaders and their regimes of the period 1652 to 1795 had during their time in office failed to make extraordinary contributions to the country and its people. # Hypothesis H1 must be rejected.

H2: To determine whether the behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795 as leaders and as persons were extraordinary and impeccable.

The findings of this study show that the behaviors of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 1795 as leaders and as persons failed to be extraordinary and impeccable. # Hypothesis H2 must be rejected.

South Africa is a beautiful country, with beautiful people and many, many other beautiful things, but it missed one essential component in its being for the period 1652 to 1795, as the following African Proverb tells us: If there is character, ugliness becomes beauty; if there is none, beauty becomes ugliness. This character seems to have missed out most of the executive political leaders and regimes of the period 1652 to 1795.

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  30. Maree K, Van der Westhuizen C. Head start in designing research proposals in social sciences. Cape Town: Juta; 2009.
  31. Afrikaners are Black [Internet]. [Cited 2018 Mar. 8]. Available from http://www.news24/Afrikaners-are-black-20130223
  32. Boëseken AJ. Jan van Riebeeck en sy stigtingswerk: 1652-1662. In: AJH Van Der Walt, JA Wiid, AL Geyer. Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika. Cape Town: Nasou; Annon.
  33. Louw GP. Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe only a century away? Part 6: The preparedness of Afrikaners to deal with the threats and challenges of the new South Africa. Ensovoort, 37(2017);11(2):1-51.
  34. The story of the first two ‘coloured’ governors at the Cape-Simon and Willem. [Internet]. [Cited 2018 Apr.18]. Available from
  35. Simon van der Stel. [Internet]. [Cited 2018 Apr.18]. Available from
  36. I’m Not Black, I’m Coloured. [Cited 2018 Apr.18]. Available from
  37. Know your nation: who was Simon van der Stel? [Cited 2018 Apr.18]. Available from
  38. Barber M. How to run a Government. London: Penguin; 2015.
  39. Chomsky N. Masters of Mankind. London: Penguin; 2015.
  40. Martinez R. Creating Freedom. Edinburgh: Canongate; 2016.
  41. Van der Merwe PJ. Van Verversingspos tot Landbou-Kolonie: 1662 – 1707. In: AJH Van Der Walt, JA Wiid, AL Geyer. Geskiedenis van Suid- Afrika. Cape Town: Nasou; Annon.
  42. Louw GP. Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe only a century away? Part 1: Who is the Afrikaner? Ensovoort, 37(2017); 9(1):1-46.
  43. Powell J. Talking to Terrorists. London: Penguin; 2014.
  44. Beyers C. Binnelandse Beroering en Ondergang van die Kompanjie, 1779-1795. In: AJH Van Der Walt, JA Wiid, AL Geyer. Geskiedenis van Suid- Afrika. Cape Town: Nasou; Annon.).
  45. Gregory RJ. Psychological Testing: History, Principles and Applications. New York: Pearson; 2004.


Not commissioned; Externally peer-reviewed.


The author declares that he has no competing interest.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652 to 2018. Part 4: A basic checklist for the appraisal of executive political leaders and regimes

Gabriel P Louw


Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw


Keywords: appraisal, characteristic, checklist, compiling, description, designing, leaders, government, job, profile,

Ensovoort, volume 38 (2018), number 7:2

1. Background

1.1 Introduction

Understanding how to run a government effectively is important because the success or otherwise of governments is fundamental to the prosperity and the well-being of all of us, wherever we live. There is a tendency in the West, especially in the US, to see government as the problem, not least because a lot if the time government is hapless or worse. Government can be a problem, but you only have to look at what life is like when it breaks down to realize how important good government is.

—Michael Barber,1:xiii How  to run a Government so that citizens benefit and taxpayers don’t go crazy, published in 2015.

Delivering good governance to a country’s total people and fully endorsing and enacting the good intentions of a county’s constitution and its democracy, require rigid, non-negotiable principles. Central to such a political culture of integrity, sincerity and incorruptible love for the nation, stands the good executive political leader and his regime.1

Barber1 emphasizes that politicians frequently make promises they don’t keep, rendering not only the political party that runs the country a failure, but most off all, bringing this failure also to the citizens lives. It threatens the economy, safety, healthcare, education, personal security, etc. Moreover, not only the present is under attack, but also the immediate future. Two intertwined powers go hand-in-hand in a successfully governed country: good politics and good economics. Economics, it seems, is the more powerful of the two, driving good politics and its maintenance.2,3,4 Barber writes as follows on the importance and centrality of economics in governing1: xiii:

And it matters to the success of economics, at both national and global levels, because even where government is small, it takes up over 20 per cent of GDP. In many countries it is 40 or 50 per cent, and if it is unproductive it is a huge drag on economic growth.

The modern pressure on leaders to keep acting with integrity, force them to meet a new kind of expectation from the voters. The higher standards of accountability that modern electorates prescribe create new dimensions that many leaders fail to negotiate. The modern media’s scrutiny is deeper and more critical, especially when it comes to financial and political power abuses and corruption. Of course there are talented and honest executive political leaders, but there are also many failed and corrupted leaders that have been appointed to the highest offices of their countries.1

Ginsberg5 writes that South Africans must hold their executive political leaders accountable, but to do so, the voters need a better understanding of their leaders’ job description and the challenges that face them. This will allow the voters to monitor the leaders’ performances from an educated point of view as they would be in the position to gain a better understanding of the problems that leaders may encounter. Better informed voters will surely have sympathy where leaders fail due to no fault of their own. However, well-informed voters will also be able to read the signs of inability, crookedness and corruption in leaders’ failures. Voters have a constitutional right to judge a leader and to label him a bad leader if he is unsuccessful with the implementation of the policies that the voters entrusted him with or shows undemocratic behaviour and political solecism in conflict with his oath to the highest office of the country. Ginsberg offers a firm guideline here5:98:

Their job description is for them not to enrich themselves at our expense, but rather to serve us, the people who put them in power. If they do not measure up we should be free to replace them according to the rules of our democratic constitution. (Shape up or ship out).

Boon6 gave a clear warning to South African voters in 1996 (two years into Mandela’s reign) that top executive leaders can fail in South Africa. There is the potential that a leader in office could abuse his power by for instance showing autocratic behaviour, bad decision-making, or transgression of the Constitution and the Parliament6;72-73:

Autocrats very seldom create excellent teams. People usually work very hard and do what they should out of fear of such leaders. In teams led by autocrats there will be a corresponding lack of trust because of fear. People can be fired or severely disciplined by the autocrat with very little recourse. There can be no openness, no honesty and no sharing of weakness for fear of dismissal or retribution. There can be no trust, because each member of this team runs according to his own agenda in the effort to protect himself at all costs. To achieve this involves currying favour with the powerful and occasionally treading on colleagues.

In May 2009 Boon’s6 warning gave way to fear and then became reality when Jacob Zuma took the oath of office.7 Jacques Pauw,7 an investigated journalist and political writer, writes7:78:

There is no dispute: Jacob Zuma has ripped the society and state to shreds. He swore at his inauguration to be faithful to our country and that he would observe, uphold and maintain our beautiful Constitution. It was all bullshit. From the moment he became president, the Republic was in the market. Under his rule, South Africa has become a two-government country. There is an elected government, and there is a shadow government – a state within the state.

Nothing came of Ginsberg’s5 1996 statement that “if they do not measure up we should be free to replace them according to the rules of our democratic constitution.” When executive political leaders became autocratic, arrogant and corrupted, no Constitution can stop them. What made Zuma so dangerous was the fact that he was of the view that God was on his corrupted side as well as on the corrupted ANC’s side. It took nine years to convince “god” to recall him from office.7

However, bad leadership is not a new post-1994 occurrence. South Africa has a long political history of bad executive political leaders. Our memories are sometimes conveniently erased to numb our feelings of guilt or because of forgotten pasts and flattering myths. In this regard we can point an accusing finger to DF Malan, HF Verwoerd and BJ Vorster. The investigative journalist Tyron Smith8 reports on the behaviour of BJ Vorster, who was the NP Minister of Justice (1961–1966) and later Prime Minister (1966–1978). Between 1963 and 1985 fifty-six political detainees died in the custody of the SAPS, which Vorster oversaw by means of draconian laws of suppression. Smith writes8:18:

No man did more to create the environment in which thousands of anti-apartheid activists were detained and tortured by the security forces than by Balthazar Johannes Vorster – know as BJ or John Vorster.

The blood of those who died in detention is as much on the hands of the man created the conditions for these deaths as it is on the hands of these who actually pushed Timol to his death [Ahmed Timol, a journalist, was murdered while in detention].

1.2 Whose testimony should we believe when we evaluate executive political leaders and regimes?

How can one make an objective appraisal of the behaviour of executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa for the period 1652 to 2018 given the discrediting references to them in literature on our political history? Ginsberg5 suggests that the starting point is that we “must have a better understanding of the job descriptions of political leaders, must inform ourselves of the challenges facing them and the problems they may be encounter and maybe, in light of this information, we will understand their problems better and have sympathy on them”. Barber’s1 view is much the same when he suggests in his book an existential approach where we try to look at the world through the eyes of the executive political leader, or as he describes it: “from the centre of the government looking out.” Psychologists often follow this as a therapeutic approach in an effort to look at the world through their patients’ eyes with unconditional and unprejudiced empathy for how their patients see and experience their world, be it a realistic or an unrealistic view. Barber writes1: xiii:

The aim is to convey to the reader what it feels like to be in there looking at the world beyond and trying desperately to get something done so that the citizen benefits. From the outside, people at the heart of government look all-powerful; on the inside, they often feel helpless, stretched to and beyond breaking point by the weight of expectations on the one hand and the sheer complexity and difficulty of meeting them on the other side.

However, Barber1 has so much empathy that it contaminates his ability to judge a leader objectively. If we could speak to Vorster on the other side of the grave and to Zuma in the here and now, they will both tell us lengthy stories to vindicate themselves. For most South African leaders, “get[ting] something done” means promoting their own interests. One can just read some of the many biographies on our executive political leaders to see how their personal and political lives were built on lies and more lies, fraud and more fraud. Jacob Zuma claimed that he was doing his best for his people but that they just expected too much from him. He made this comment in the midst of accusations of state capture and dealings with the Gupta family.9-16

Even trusting political parties to oversee leaders is a futile exercise that serves only to promote further lies and fraud.7,10,12,13 After Zuma’s long list of ill deeds became known while in office and the ANC’s top management was contacted for reaction, the editor17 of the Sunday Times wrote17:20:

The ANC national executive committee undertook to conduct introspection and “deal with the perceptions of the ANC being arrogant, self-serving, soft on corruption and increasingly distant from its social base”.

But the ANC has done nothing to carry out this promise. Its arrogant, self-serving and corrupt leaders have been shielded in the name of unity.

South African journalists and political commentators are subjective about the country’s political leaders. Their stories about the good leadership, integrity and quality are contradicted by international research on leaders that confirms their lack of integrity and trustworthiness.9-16 Coggan reports18:2:

In January 2013 a survey of Americans found that Congressmen and Congresswomen were less popular than cockroaches and traffic jams. A YouGov opinion poll in January 2012 found that 62% of Britons agreed with the statement that ‘politicians tell lies all the time – you can’t believe a word they say’.

This 62% has risen to 80% or more among voters who support the fringe political parties such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the Greens and the British National Party (BNP). In addition, 57% Britons who watch political programmes like the BBC’s flagship programme Newsnight, agreed with the statement that “politicians tell lies all the time.” The British Social Attitudes Survey shows that where 47% of Britons in 1987 “trust British governments of any party to place the needs of the nation above the interests of their party,” this fell to 20% in 2010.17 A further finding of the YouGov 2012 is that when Gallup’s statistics of 1954 which reflected that 38% of the electorate believed that their representative was doing a good job is re-examined in 2012, only 12% believed that their representative was doing a good job.18

YouGov reported in January 2012 that only 24% of Britons thought that their parliament debated issues of public concern in a sensible and considered way, while only 16% thought it reflected the full range of people and views of the British electorate. Only 15% thought that the parliament represented the interests and wishes of people like themselves and only 12% thought the parliament understood the daily lives of people like themselves.18 Voters also revealed negativity on the integrity and intentions of the British Parliament and its members in the YouGov 2012. Coggan reflects18:50:

Those polled believed MPs paid more attention to the views of people who run large companies, civil servants in Whitehall and the EU and the owners of tabloid newspapers than they did to their actual voters.

The political journalist Mthombothi gives clear guidance on the South African situation when he evaluates the incoming new president Cyril Ramaphosa as compared to the recalled president Jacob Zuma and the two’s communal parent, the ANC19:17:

For all his criticism of corruption and state-capturing, Ramaphosa has stood loyally behind Zuma since Mangaung in 2012. He helped Zuma win a second term and is therefore as much an enabler of corruption as any of the other candidates.

Forget about a messiah ever emerging to save South Africa from the corrupt rabble. The party should be consigned to the wilderness where it’d have all the time to reflect anew and undisturbed on its mission in life.

It is clear from above evidence that it makes no sense to trust politicians themselves when one wants to draw up a profile of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa. There is just too much political schizophrenia in what they say. Their opinions and claims are contradicted by the evidence we find in the writings of authorities. In most cases they are outright untrustworthy and without integrity, locally and internationally. Since most of these leaders have passed away, one cannot speak to the leaders themselves. An analysis of the various sources of our political history is undoubtedly the most appropriate approach to draw conclusions on the leadership quality of our executive political leaders and regimes.

In an effort to evaluate and describe the performances of political leaders and regimes for the period 1652 to 2018, I will study the information, descriptions, views and opinions reflected in political and historical books, authorized and unauthorized biographies and autobiographies, as well as the mass of information presented by investigative journalists, whose comments are becoming more critically every day. If the many allegations and reflections are untrue, the various political leaders who are implicated, especially at present, in political delinquency, had more than enough time to object and offer evidence to the contrary.7,10,13,20-38

1.3 A retrospective evaluation and description of the political history of political leaders

The information obtained from political and historical books, authorized and unauthorized biographies and autobiographies can be seen as subjective, but subjectivity is an inherent part of any text on politics. We cannot escape this reality. Such sources are consulted for this study by means of a literature review, with the single aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is commonly used in modern historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research, as is the case with the quality of the current political leadership of South Africa. This article does not offer a comprehensive statistical model to make advanced statistical inferences to test a hypothesis, but the information (data) can be subjected to the statistical cycle of research to make it comparable with other research and to evaluate it with hypothesis testing at the end. Advanced statistical inference is outside the intent of the study.39-43

The information offered in the literature review has not been empirically tested. It relies on subjective opinion, although it has been accepted by the public as a good reflection of reality.39-43

There has never been such a collection, evaluation and description of information on the political leaders and regimes of South Africa for the period 1652 to 2018. Despite the limitations of the various analytical articles, it is a pioneering study that addresses a most ignored subject. This series does not claim to be the Alpha and Omega, but rather serves to inspire further and deeper research on the matter.

The secondary focus and intention of the series is to offer a tool to evaluate political leaders and their regimes based on a checklist that helps us to classify a leader’s performance. The intention is to determine if the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa from 1652 to 2018 succeeded in making extraordinary contributions to the country and its people and if their behaviour as leaders was impeccable. Due to a lack of space, only the most prominent leaders are evaluated.39-43

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research, as is the case with work on the quality of the current political leadership of South Africa. The databases used include articles from 2016 to 2018, books for the period 1958 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2016 to 2018. These sources were consulted to reflect on the political leadership from 1652 to 2017 and to put the thought, views and opinions on the South African political leadership in perspective.44-46

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

3. Results

3.1 Background to the appraisal of South African political leadership and governance

An understanding of how important it is to have an executive political leader who runs his country effectively is central to most democracies. This characteristic is fundamental to the country’s prosperity and the well-being of its citizens. There are excellent examples of political leaders who made enormous contributions to their countries’ development, growth and international status. Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt of the USA and King Henry VII of England are prominent examples. Then of course were there the many less successfully leaders, like Charles I, who became King of England, Scotland and Ireland in 1625, but who lost his head on 30 January 1649 on a cold morning in Whitehall, London, for his royal mismanagement and political delinquency. Many other delinquent political leaders have in the past gotten the order of the boot by assassinations, dethroning, up-risings and forced resignations. Many hanged on in office, doing immense damage to the psyche of the citizens and to the state coffers of the country.1

Anthony Ginsberg5 in his book South Africa’s Future emphasizes that South African voters must at all times judge the performances of their elected politicians and executive political leaders and hold them accountable if they fail in their tasks and duties. Ginsberg writes5: 20:

Members of our present and future governments should not be treated as untouchables, no matter how courageous their leaders may have been or how many years they may have struggled to achieve leadership positions. By voting them into power we have sufficiently rewarded them for their years of struggle and sacrifice. The longer we wait to demand results and answers to the harsh realities our country faces, the deeper the hole will become which we have dug ourselves into.

It is our role as the electorate to ask tough questions and to demand answers of the people we put in power. They are our servant, not the other way around.

We are the shareholders of government – the current management team is only temporary, and can be replaced by a new team with new ideas every five years if need be.

It is of utmost importance to select only a person of the highest integrity to the top office. Candidates for the position of chief executive officer (CEO) of top companies often first have to undergo psychological and psychiatric evaluation to determine their cognitive and conative fitness and emotional stability. Then of course there is the prerequisite of the absence of a criminal record. Usually the job requires a high level of tertiary and professional training.6,39 This is not the case for the office of president. Persons with criminal records for murder, rape, theft, fraud and assault are sitting in parliament today.7,10,12-17,19

An in-depth review of official and popular literature on South African executive political leaders and regimes shows a very one-sided, superficial and unscientific research approach to the country’s executive political leaders and regimes. It reflects an approach that is often based on repeated quotation of very subjective and not always trustworthy information. Discussions lack objective descriptions and analyses based on sound research on historical events and facts, reliable and well-reported statistics and other supportive evidence to enlighten the role of our executive political leaders.5-17,19-38

Many of the profiles of South Africa’s political leaders before and after 1994 offered to the general public are aimed at political and personal gain. Political rhetoric about political leaders and regimes have become standard remarks in speeches, articles and other publications, which is misleading.13,19-38

Although the main focus of this article is to design and compile a checklist to determine the quality of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa, it must be noted that the information obtained from this checklist will be used as part of a general literature review and description of our political leaders and regimes. Separate analytical articles will evaluate South Africa’s executive political leaders of various periods.41

Part 1 of the series indicated that very little is known in terms of an appraisal of South Africa’s executive political leaders and regimes. Most of the political histories of South Africa as well as the manifold biographies on the country’s political leaders have failed to make such a classification. Critical perspectives have been focused on individuals and not on a total appraisal.19-38 There are no tested scales to do this.

In an effort to overcome the absence of a checklist to evaluate the quality of the leadership of South African executive political leaders and their governments for the period 1652 to 2018, this article aims to compile such a checklist. Descriptions by various political and historical writers and the writings of business and management experts on business executive leaders were consulted.7,10,13,20-38

There are many standardized tests to measure industrial and organizational attitudes and to do values assessments on different kinds of leaders, but their use and applicability to this research is limited because it is largely a historical analysis. The same goes for performance appraisals. In cases where tests are to some extent applicable, it would be an indirect testing situation that requires a complex reworking and restructuring of qualitative data so that it could be used as quantitative data, which would make the reliability and validity of the experimental effort null and void. It is in light of these considerations that the checklist was developed.41

3.4 Experimental design

3.4.1 Problem statement   

There are no trustworthy appraisals of South African executive political leaders and regimes outside political and emotional rhetoric and other superficial literature. If the assumed descriptions and superficial literature are used, it will be false. To put executive political leaders and regimes into perspective, the political and historical books, authorized and unauthorized biographies and autobiographies, as well as articles and newspaper overviews, must first be analysed in depth and interpreted as the starting point of research and discussion. Only after that can any assumptions, generalizations, deceptions and myths around the position and role of the South African executive political leader and governance can be taken into account for discussion.

The research problem is: Did the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa during the period 1652 to 2018 make extraordinary contributions to the country and its people; and were the extraordinary executive leaders’ behaviour as leaders impeccable?▼

▲The period 1652 to 2018 is divided into different timeframes for discussion in separate articles. The total description (1652 to 2018) will be used through-out the descriptions in this article to avoid unnecessary repetition to the various timeframes, seeing that the research problems for the different articles (as well as the research aims) are exactly the same.

People refers to all the South African groups – the various races, cultural groups, tribes, etc. It includes the minorities as well as the majority.

Country refers to today’s greater South Africa as represented by the Republic of South Africa, while it also refers to the history of the Cape Settlement and Cape Colony.

Extraordinary behaviour reflects behaviour not shown daily by the ordinary citizen. Other names used are: exceptional, unusual, uncommon, special, etc., in terms of very favourable, creative, constructive and positive behaviour outcomes.

▲The impact of impeccable behaviour is far more comprehensive than excellence: it refers to behaviour totally free from any criminal, social, economical, personal and political delinquency. Guiding theoretical argument

The main presupposition of in this study is that the performances and leadership qualities of South African executive political leaders and regimes should be extraordinary in standard, free from any suspicion of criminality, greed and self-enrichment, racism and political mismanagement and self-empowerment. The leaders of South Africa have never been tested in this regard. The past and current performances and leadership profiles of executive political leaders in the South African politics should therefore be analysed, evaluated and judged as either bad or good.41,43,46

The above approach underpins all the articles. All the arguments, literature, statements and assumptions regarding South African executive political leaders’ broad profiles are regarded as true until the contrary can be concluded with facts and evidence.

Each of the analytical articles included in this study pursues one or more specific perspectives on South African executive political leaders. They ask a true–false question, thus a hypothesis versus alternative hypothesis (the checklist makes a bipolar bad versus good classification).41,43,46

It is prominent that no such study has been done. There is a dire need for an in-depth study that focuses primarily on the analysis of the performances and leadership profiles of executive political leaders and regimes. A basic analysis and classification of historical and political facts on South African executive political leaders and regimes for the period 1652 to 2018 is therefore a priority at this stage.

The research aims are:

  • to discover if the South African executive political leaders and regimes of the period 1652 to 2018 made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their time in office;
  • to determine if the behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 2018 as leaders and as persons were impeccable.

The two aims above lead to two objectives, as well as two hypotheses and two alternative hypotheses. Research questions

The following two research questions focus the research intentions:

RQ1: Did the South African executive political leaders and regimes of the period 1652 to 2018 make extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their times in office?

RQ2: Were the behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 2018 impeccable? Objectives of the study

The following two objectives guide the study:

RO1: to discover if the South African executive political leaders and regimes of the period 1652 to 2018 made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their times in office;

RO2: to determine if the behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 2018 as leaders and as persons were impeccable. Hypotheses

The following two hypotheses and two alternative hypotheses are assumed:

H1: The South African executive political leaders and regimes of the period 1652 to 2018 made extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their times in office.

H1A: The South African executive political leaders and regimes of the period 1652 to 2018 did not make extraordinary contributions to the country and its people during their times in office.

H2: The behaviours of the South African executive political leaders for the period 1652 to 2018 as leaders and as persons were extraordinary and impeccable.

H2A: The behaviours of the South African executive political leaders of the period 1652 to 2018 as leaders and as persons were not extraordinary and impeccable.

3.4.2 Methods

In light of a lack of sound and in-depth research findings on the executive political leaders and regimes of the period 1652 to 2018 and their contributions to the country and the quality of their behaviour, each of the analytical articles start out with a single, defined viewpoint or hypothesis to test. The researcher thus sought to build a viewpoint and to form a conclusion from the ground, derived directly from the evidence as it appears as the research develops. It is an interactive process of looping back and forth, developing ideas, testing it against new information, revising the ideas, building a basis to be broken by new evidence and to rebuild it anew. This is a continuous process of research, repeated over and over until everything forms a final whole of concepts, ideas and viewpoints to tell a coherent story. A literature review based on a descriptive method to reflect on the political life histories of the South African political leaders and regimes seems the most appropriate.41,43,46

The research design of each of the analytical articles is qualitative in nature as a phenomenon from the “real world” is explored. The lack of trustworthy information on South African executive political leaders and regimes forces down an exploratory and descriptive research approach with the simple goal of gaining insight into the situation, phenomenon and legal position of the executive political leaders and regimes based on research evidence. Basically, the thesis tells a story in the appropriate order. Sources in this exploratory and descriptive research included contemporary journals and newspapers, government documents, archive collections, memoirs and collected papers, as well as manuscript collections, political and historical books, autobiographies and biographies. (See also above: 2. Method)10-17,19-38

Although the various analytical articles are independent, they are ultimately intertwined. Research approach

The different analytical articles followed two discussion approaches:

  • A general research approach where the analytical articles form a unit     that reflects, analyses and describes the South African context as a     whole; and
  • An analytical research approach where each individual article attempts     to analyse and to describe a specific focus point.
  • Compilation of the checklist.
3.5.1 The complexity of evaluating politicians, top public officials and regimes

Various approaches are followed in the evaluations of people’s skills, abilities, temperaments, attitudes and behaviours to evaluate their potential or performance. Prominent methods include job analysis, psychological tests, psychological assessments, bio-data, cognitive ability tests, personality and temperament tests, as well as the appraisal of work performance. These methods are shortly discussed to provide insight into the complexity of evaluating the performances of South Africa’s executive political leaders and regimes, especially given the fact that it is virtually impossible to involve them in such a study, even if they are still alive.39

The short overview explains why a limited appraisal (based on bio-data) on indirect information obtain from historical and other sources is done and why certain steps of some of the methods can only be used to a limited extent in this study. This overview also gives an indication of the appraisal items included as well as the population focus and the statistical validity of the information obtained on executive political leaders for the period 1652 to 2018.39,40,43 Job analysis method

In any organization that relies on employees, the individual jobs performed by specific employees at specific levels are important. An organization would first define the particular jobs and then identify the skills and behaviour an employee would need to be able to perform the job. This process, known as job analysis, includes two major components: job description and job specification. Job description identifies the physical and environmental characteristics of the work to be done, whereas the job specification details the personal characteristics necessary to do that work.39 The basic intention of the job analysis is to provide a valid basis for personnel decisions. Various methods can be used to perform a job analysis, like 39:402:

  •     Direct observation of job incumbents
  •     Structured interviews with workers
  •     Collection of critical incidents from supervisors
  •     Checklists of duties and skills
  •     Questionnaires

Only one of the above methods can be used to a certain extent in this study, namely the collection of critical incidents from supervisors, which is more or less in line with the collection of data from published sources on South Africa politics and history. This approach to collecting data must be seen as equal to the bio-data method of data collection used in this research.39,46

The US Department of Labor has been busy with an ambitious process to analyse virtually all jobs in the economy according to the content or work-activities required, indicating the importance of this kind of data.39

It is clear that many jobs are not clearly defined, but a formal job analysis is not an easy task. Various structured, quantifiable questionnaires for job analysis exist, but many have significant limitations and from a scientific viewpoint are still in infancy.39 The Position Analysis Questionnaire (PAQ), dating as far back as the 1970s, gives us some indication of the qualities, characteristics, personality traits, training and experiences to look for when appraising a political leader39:403:

  • Information input: How and where does the worker get the information needed for the     job?
  • Mental processes: What kind of reasoning, planning, and decision making are required by the job?
  • Work output: What are the physical activities performed and the tools or devices used     by the worker?
  • Personal relationships: What kind of relationship with others is inherent to the job?
  • Job context: What are the physical and social contexts in which the work is performed?

The political and historical books and many of the other sources consulted for the writing of the literature reviews on the profiles of executive political leaders and regimes as reflected in the following article (Part 5: Performance profiles of executive political leaders and regimes for the period 1652 to 1795) give some retrospective information (although they are indirect observations) in terms of the above descriptions. Psychological tests and assessments

It is often assumed that psychological tests and assessments can solve the problem of job performance. Unfortunately the reality shows that the application of employment selection procedures is fraught with psychometric complexity and legal pitfalls. Gregory writes39: 404-405:

The psychometric intricacies arise, in large measure, from the fact that job behaviour is rarely simple, unidimensional behaviour. There are some exceptions (such as assembly line production) but the general rule in our post-industrial society is that job behaviour is complex, multi-dimensional behaviour. Even jobs that seem simple may be highly complex.

Personnel selection is therefore a fuzzy, conditional, and uncertain task. Guion (1991) has highlighted the difficulty in predicting complex behaviour from simple tests. For one thing, complex behaviour is, in part, a function of the situation. This means that even an optimal selection approach may not be valid for all candidates. Quite clearly, personnel selection is not a simple matter of administering tests and consulting cut-off scores.

We must also acknowledge the profound impact of legal and regulatory edicts upon I/O testing practices. Given that such practices may have weighty consequences – determining who is hired or promoted, for example – it is not surprising to learn that I/O testing practices are rigorously constrained by legal precedents and regulatory mandates.

These legal constraints are basically applicable to any method (test, questionnaire, etc.). One cannot publish the data of a president, and this makes such an approach inapplicable. Biographical data

For purposes of personnel selection the following methods are also applied39:405:

  •     Auto-biographical data
  •     Employment interviews
  •     Cognitive ability tests
  •     Personality, temperament, and motivation tests
  •     Paper-and-pencil integrity tests
  •     Sensory, physical, and dexterity tests
  •     Work sample and situational tests

Seeing that most of the executive political leaders focused on in this study are deceased, the auto-biographical data method can only be used in as far as we have past data. The rationale behind the bio-data approach is that future work-related behaviour can be predicted from past choices and accomplishments. Bio-data have predictive power because certain character traits that are essential for success also are stable and enduring. In practice, bio-data items include attitudes, feelings and value positioning. The use of bio-data in the case of the “living” are also sometimes prohibited, like questions on age, race, sex, religion, etc.39 Cognitive ability and personality and temperament tests

Cognitive ability and personality and temperament tests are widely used in employee selection. There are hundreds of cognitive ability tests on the market. One clear problem is that such instruments may result in a negative impact on minorities as a result of its item selection as it can favour a particular group. Some personality tests are used for employee selection, but it seems that in most cases they are very weak predictors of job performance. Cognitive ability and personality and temperament tests are inapplicable for use in this study because the intention is not to make evaluations for future reference, but on the past. If past results are indeed available, caution must be shown in terms of the race factor as well as outdated items in test results.39 Appraisal of work-performance method

The appraisal of the work performance of employees is of great importance as a guideline to see where personnel must improve. Its uses centre on four major elements, namely comparing individuals in terms of their overall performance levels; identifying and using information about individual strengths and weaknesses; implementing and evaluating human resource systems in organizations; and documenting or justifying personnel decisions. Performance evaluation is a perplexing problem that needs comprehensive solutions. Peer ratings and self-assessments have mostly limited application. One of the greatest problems in the assessment of job performance is the proper description of appraisal criteria. One of the consequences of this problem is the over-generalization of one element of a worker’s behaviour (the halo effect), making the employee look much better than what he is in reality. Rater bias also plays a prominent role.39 Gregory reflects39:432:

Leniency or severe errors occur when a supervisor tends to rate workers at the extremes of the scale. Leniency may reflect social dynamics, as when the supervisor wants to be liked by employees. Leniency is also caused by extraneous factors such as the attractiveness of the employee. Severity errors refer to the practice of rating all aspects of performance as deficient. In contrast, central tendency errors occur when the supervisor rates everyone as nearly average on all performance dimensions. Context errors occur when the rater evaluates an employee in the context of other employees rather than based on objective performance. Perspective

Considering the above reflection on subjectivity, leniency and bias in the appraisal of people, it is clear why evaluating a leader is so complex. The fact that psychological, personal and performance appraisals and temperament tests result are unavailable and that personal observation and interviews are impossible, puts strain on the appraisal of these leaders. The only way is to compile a checklist of the profiles of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa to evaluate them indirectly based on the information offered by other researchers and writers, some of whom were fortunate enough to have personal contact with the leaders. Such an appraisal must thus not be seen as a case of absolute finality, but at most as a study that opens up the conversation. It must be seen as part of the greater literature review on executive political leaders and regimes.39

The complexity of the exercise is reflected in the fact that the legal definition of the job President of the Republic of South Africa is actually quite unclear. When does a person fail in the job as Jacob Zuma is accused of doing. Secondly, there is no comprehensive identification of the skills and behaviours necessary to perform the job of President of the Republic of South Africa effectively. To be honest, is there any valid basis against which to judge a leader as a person or to judge his behaviour as either awful or extraordinary? Did Zuma really fail the test of excellence as president? Should the oath of office that he took in May 2009 have stopped him from continuing with criminal and immoral behaviours?39

In light of the above vagueness about the president’s job description and specification, is it important to look how public bias has contaminated South African people’s thinking on Jacob Zuma as president. If you study newspaper reports there is clearly a part of the citizenry that sees him as not guilty of doing any wrong. He was sheltered for nearly a decade in Parliament by most of the ANC lawmakers, while a strong sector of the ANC’s ordinary members gave him their full support as an honest, excellent president. On the other hand there is a strong faction of especially Blacks who openly label him as a crook. Prominent here are the many Black journalists who condemning of him as a person and as a President in their public writing.5-19

However, this conflict of opinions is not unique to Zuma. If we look at South Africa’s politico-history critically, the same controversies hang around the necks of DF Malan, HF Verwoerd, FW de Klerk and Nelson Mandela. It shows people’s subjectivity when judging what is correct and what is wrong and the extent of the country’s delinquent thinking as a lifestyle.21,29,38

The discussion above brings us back to various writers’ references to the responsibility that political leaders have to their voters and the right of the voters to call them to book when they fail.1-2,5-6 This begs the question: At what point can we say that a leader has failed? We already saw from literature that political leaders’ words can rarely be trusted as true or sincere.1-15 But can we trust the opinion of critical writers as outsiders?1-5 Is Boon6 wrong when he claims the following from an African perspective on leadership and governance 6:123-124:

Let the manager have a written list of his community-appraisal strengths and weakness.

If it were not for this stipulated appraisal, a leader in a senior role… can quite easily get away with reprehensible behaviour. Such behaviour could be affecting many people in his community. It is therefore crucial that the community understands the nature and workings of the appraisals in detail. They must understand that the leader is accountable to them and that they can call for an appraisal of the leader if issues appear to have been forgotten.

In conclusion, senior leadership accountability takes into consideration the enhanced position of influence. Essentially, the more senior one is, the more ‘perfect’ one has to be. Roots-up appraisals emphasize that a shared community concern regarding behaviour is sufficient to activate public guidance and, where necessary, even chastisement.

Criticizing a leader is completely in tune with traditional African culture.

No, Boon6 is not wrong, nor are those writers who support his opinion on the need for evaluation and the possible recall of failed political leaders.1-5,39 This has already been done internationally with great success. There are systems that force top politicians to be responsible and accountable. Most South Africans still think of true democracy and good leadership based on a pre-modern political context where honesty and integrity are not prerequisites for becoming an executive political leader, resulting in the opposite of true democracy and good leadership. Our democracy has been captured by the masses, many of whom are still stuck in the disorderly conduct they learned during the pre-1994 liberation of South Africa.29,48

Many countries have had programmes in place for years to help them select persons of high integrity for training as leaders in the civil service. In South Africa we are still far away from a culture of good governance and a sound system to select and to train only good persons as politicians.39

Nearly thirty years ago the Canadian government started to select its top managers through an approach known as the Career Assignment Programme (CAP).39 Gregory’s39 writing gives us a good guideline for how we can get rid of criminal politicians long before they reach the gate to the political world and how we can cultivate leaders of excellence with the use of assessment centres. He writes39: 421:

An assessment center is not so much a place as a process. Many corporations and military branches – as well as a few progressive governments – have dedicated special sites to the application of in-basket and other simulation exercises in the training and selection of managers. The purpose of an assessment center is to evaluate managerial potential by exposing candidates to multiple simulation techniques, including group presentations, problem-solving exercises, group discussions exercises, interviews, and in-basket techniques. Results from traditional aptitude and personality tests also are considered in the overall evaluation. The various simulation exercises are observed and evaluated by successful senior managers who have been specially trained in techniques of observation and evaluation. Assessment centers are used in a variety of settings, including business and industry, government, and the military. There is no doubt that a properly designed assessment center can provide a valid evaluation of managerial potential.

This was exactly what the Canadian government did thirty years ago, bringing great success to their leaders’ corps today.39

3.5.2 Descriptive items for selecting and classifying information

The aim of this article is to design a basic checklist to appraise the performance profiles of executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa. Its design must be such that it can be applied for any period of reign, including the period 1652 to 2018 for South Africa as a whole, or the Cape Colony’s various regimes, for instance the VOC government (1652-1795), British rule with executive governors (1796-1872), British rule with self-government under a prime minister (1873-1909), the Union of South Africa (1910-1961), the first republic of South Africa (1961-1994) and democracy (1994-2018). This first pr