Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)
Gabriel P Louw
Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).
Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)
Keywords: Badness, candidate, crookedness, delinquency, election, evaluation, expropriate, goodness, leadership, political party, responsibility, scenario, wrong-doings,
Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 3
It is clear from studying the previous two continuous articles (Articles 7 and 8) that myths and lies played an enormous role in misinforming the mindsets of South Africans on the intended land expropriation and the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution. Prominent in this environment of misinformation are the promises during the May 8, 2019 election of the various political parties contesting the place of the utmost ruler for post-2019. Of great importance here are the promises of the three top political parties which emerged from the election on how they are going to address the land expropriation issue — including how they are going to “solve” the many other demanding political, social and economic issues in post-2019 South Africa. But, as the political history of South Africa, coming from as far back as 1652, tells us over and over, there is a massive difference between promises and deeds, especially good deeds. These deeds are required from the voters in exchange for their mandate to the ruler to “think and do” upon their behalf, and the empty promises of politicians and their parties.1
1.1.1 Lack of understanding of political responsibility by political parties and their leaders
The abovementioned outcome is basically because political parties in present-day South Africa do not understand the immense responsibility around the local-global-plan of governance. Every task entrusted to the executive political leader, his top brass and his party as a government, should be successfully executed by him in terms of the voters’ mandate to be a good leader, as well as for the country to be able to fit into the local-global plan of governance. As a pre-requisite included here is the guarantee to be able to be trusted by the voters to deliver only goodness and goodwill to them in the future. Malloch-Brown2 emphasises that South Africa’s invidious local-global prescriptions for good governance will not go away, and neither will the demand for positive change. It is a hard task to master for a political party cum regime, as it always tests the actions of a regime and the correctness of the state by its society. Even the honourable Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma3 during his presidency had to admit in public that it was far more difficult for him as president and the ANC as a regime to run South Africa, than it was for them to fight for its freedom. He failed to deliver such a mandate as leader of an elected regime, which was forced suddenly to act outside the setup of the revolutionaries’ rhetoric, promises and delinquent actions.2,3
This disconnection of the ANC from the voters, allowing them as a regime to act delinquently outside their election promises and their agreed mandate from the voters to only do good to them, is to a great extent cemented in the present corrupt Electoral Act which fully erased direct responsibility to the voters from MPs and MPLs. In this situation, which the ANC fully optimised and misused only for its top brass’ interest, the response and responsibility of MPs and MPLs were relayed only to the party and its top brass, while the top brass drove their own interests far away from that of the voters’ interests, needs and wishes.4-10
There is at the moment a legal action to change the Act in order to make MPs and MPLs directly responsible to voters. This will be the end of the favouring of the ANC to be able to manipulate the voters and to continue their spree of crooked candidates without a say by the ordinary people. Moreover, the indication is that this can bring the ANC down in the next election, if it has not fallen on its own sword already after the May election.4-10
The extent to which the ANC failed the voters was exclusively as a result of serious wrong-doing due to a lack of direct responsibility to the voters. This was not only confirmed by the public admission thereof before the May 9 Election by its top brass, but also the “begging” at the same time by the ANC’s top brass (including Cyril Ramaphosa) for “forgiveness” of the ANC as a party and its leadership, for its crookedness and delinquency since 1994.11-16
Ramphosa even extended his previous begging for forgiveness to the ANC supporters by his admission again after the election to these many ANC-wrong-doings. Prominent here is his confession, seemingly after immense emotional self-torture, of which Munusamy writes17:20:
Ramaphosa arrived at the election results ceremony [of the May 8 election] last Saturday looking like his dog had died rather than the person who had just rescued his party from having to share power in order to govern. But at the ANC’s victory celebration outside Luthuli House the next day, Ramaphosa conceded that the party had been chastened. He promised that the ANC was no longer an arrogant party and had heard the candid message from the electorate.
With honesty it must be acknowledged that the above kinds of political, social and economic failures of the ANC are inherited from most of the South African regimes coming from 1910. We see it in the failures of the various White political parties’ and party-alliances’ reigns between 1910 and 1948, wherein the Blacks’ interests were not only insignificant but criminally treated, equalling the mass wrong-doings of the post-1994 regime of the ANC. The same delinquency and failure were reflected by the DF Malan regime between 1948 and 1950. This period reflects, as does that of the ANC, that the National Party did not have the slightest idea of good governance, besides political mischief in their creation of the post-1950 Apartheid and its immense evils.1
The South African politics inside the post-1994’s so-called First Democracy has been tough on political aspirants and opportunists at the same time (and thus not only on the ANC in highlighting its faults, as well as its inabilities to not be able to survive in troubled situations). This is reflected by the failed outcomes and disappearance of the many political parties that had enrolled for the recent May election in their fight for a place in Parliament. Mvumvu reports18:1: “A record number of political parties contested the elections, but at the end it was the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that smiled all the way to the bank. Of 48 parties that appeared on the national ballot, only 13 will likely see a return on their investment of R200,000, which the IEC requires to register for elections nationally.”
1.1.2. The madness of 48 political parties and 10 000 candidates in the 8th May 2019 National Election
Firstly, it must be noted that for the May election 48 parties were registered, with more than 10 000 national candidates (2 089 in 2014) and 8 000 provincial candidates (6 562 in 2014). All of the 48 parties and the 10 000 national candidates had more than offered to solve the land debacle: they promised solely to solve it if they were elected as the regime. Of these 48 aspirants, as many as 35 failed the test to obtain a seat in the national elections, while of the 13 left as the so-called “winners”, basically only three can be given attention. The three are the ANC, the DA and the EFF.10
With regard to the more or less 10 insignificant parties which made it to Parliament, together with the ANC, the DA and the EFF, political commentator Tabane19 gave us a good pre-evaluation already in February 2019 (three months before the May election), based on his “charismatic requirement of the leadership” of a party to be able to survive, when he wrote19:1:
Derhalwe sal die 2019-verkiesing waarskynlik die doodsklok vir Azapo, die PAC en Agang lui omdat hulle nie charismatiese leiers het nie. Maar Mosiuoa Lekota se Cope, wat eintlik op sy sterfbed moet wees weens gebrekkige organisaie, sal waarskynlik bloot weens Lekota se sterk persoonlikheid ‘n setel of twee behou. Good sal ook baat vind by die blote teenwoordigheid van sy leier, De Lille. Haar naam en vorige pos as burgemeester van Kaapstad sal verseker dat Good ‘n klein teenwoordigheid in die Wes-Kaap en dalk Gauteng en Noord-Kaap sal hê.
The political analyst Muzi Kuzwayo20 writes hereto in April 2019 on Paricia de Lille’s politics, up to her present-day party, named Good20:2: “She first cashed in a few years after she started, her party defunct and moving over to the DA and becoming mayor of Cape Town in return – good deal. Who knows what loot Good will bring her.”
Botha21, in January 2019, wrote on the UDM and its charismatic leader Bantu Holomisa. Botha21 reflects that Holomisa played a prominent role in exposing the alleged corruption in the PIC and was indirectly responsible for the exit of its executive, Dan Matjila. Botha’s21 gut feeling in January was that Holomisa would still play a role in Parliament after May. He postulates21:18:
“Holomisa se integriteit maak van hom ‘n blywende figuur. Hou hom dop.”
Holomisa’s and the UDM’s chances were critically analysed before the May election, due to their popularity within the Xhosa-tribe. It was surmised that they were good to win a seat, or mostly two, in Parliament. The pre-May view was that the Minority Front (MF) which was founded by the late Amichand Rajbansi, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IVP), the Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus), the National Freedom Party (NFP) and the ACDP were all insignificant with regard to gaining a prominent number of seats. They are on their deathbeds.21-23
On the FF Plus’s political future as an entity in Black South Africa, Khumalo24 in April 2019 quoted with good reason the opinion of the BLF leader, Andile Mngxitama24:4:
“You should look at their leadership and tell me if there is any diversity. That party only uses a few black stooges to belie the fact that it is still a racist Afrikaans party. Look at the party’s history: leaders from the former Conservative Party, a party that wished to preserve many aspects of apartheid in its DNA, were assimilated into the FF Plus…”
The false image created by the FF+ as a possible future role-player in the country’s politics by its taking of the fifth-most seats in the National Assembly in the May 2019 election, mostly from the DA, was a temporary outcome of the old NPs “rebellion votes”. This group was until now part of the DA supporters, but had become aggravated by “black rule” inside the DA, and decided to vote for the FF+. Hereto is the FF+ for many political strategists nothing more than a false mirage on the horizon for these old NPs as their new rescuer and saviour. The FF+, as is the EFF, extremely racially orientated, making it a post-2019 failure in waiting.24-25
That Andile Mngxitama’s viewpoint on the FF+ may be correct, is confirmed by Buccus’s view. He writes26:26: “
It is true that the crude racial populism of the EFF and the Freedom Front Plus made some gains, but in the overall picture they remain a minority. Mandela’s vision of racial reconciliation clearly still has the support of the majority of South Africans.”
What the boosters and hopefuls of the FF+ forget, or are not familiar with, is that the Whites as a tribe are diminishing yearly at nearly 100 000, and can thus be phased out in a century’s time. Neither the FF+, Solidarity, AfriForum nor AgriSA are true White rescuers and saviours. They can only by their anti-African standpoint (as seen in their actions on the land reform matter), contaminate the Whites’ future in South Africa.1
To shed more light on the many other opportunists who tried in vain to go to Parliament to eat out of its enormous food trough (and also to change silently and unnoticed from tough freedom fighters to freedom eaters) – a scenario which Kuzwayo20:2 aptly described before the May 8 election as an “alphabet soup on the menu in this election” — there are the African Transformation Movement (ATM) with the crowd-puller Mzwanele Manyi on its staff, the joker party the African Content Movement (ACM) of Hlaudi Motsoeneng, and the Economic Emanicipation Forum (EEF) to outdo the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in radicalism and racism.20,27,28
The final reflection on the May 8 election outcomes confirm Kuzwayo’s20 above reference to the alphabetic failure of a mass with the evidence that 35 parties did not make it further than the ballot box on the voting day.18,29
Munusamy30 also comments about the final end-results of some of the parties when she writes30:26:
“The era of veteran personalities in politics is now waning. The UDM leader Bantu Holomisa, COPE’s Mosiuoa Lekota and the IFP’s Mangosuthu Buthelezi ought to exit the political stage, as the country is clearly seeking fresh talent. Patricia de Lille, however, has proved to be the Meryl Streep of South African politics, able to steal the show in whatever role she appears.”
Okoye31 brings the leader of the African Content Movement (ACM), Hlaudi Motsoeneng, the former SABC Chief Operating Officer, into clear perspective after the May election as a good example of some of the “political leaderships” at our top governmental institutions under the ANC, and of the leaderships of the various political parties which competed in the election (mostly to fail miserably). On Motsoeneng’s so-called “personality as a leader”, Okoye31 reports his alleged words about himself31:6: “He said he refused to hide the fact that he wanted to be president and that leadership was in his blood.” In particular, she quoted his self-praise by using of his own words, namely31:6: “I need to be a person who’s taking decisions. I know how to run South Africa! I have managed a [multimillion-rand] company.” [This of a multimillion-rand company referring to the financially crippled public broadcaster the SABC, which analysts say he helped to run into the ground]. In reaction to Motsoeneng praising himself as the “future president in waiting”, the two political analysts Zamikhaya Maseti and Ralph Mathekga, writes Okoye, labelled him as a31:6: “political comedy that was not to be taken seriously”, that there was “no legitimate cause to appeal,” and that he “bankrupted the SABC” so it was a bad example to refer to his leadership there.”
But this “labelling” must not be seen as exclusive only to Motsoeneng, but indeed inclusive to most of the leaders of the 48 parties that took part in the election and their self-praise of false excellence31:6: “I am a person who’s taking decisions, I know how to run South Africa, I have managed a multimillion-rand company, I have leadership in my blood, I want and am going to be the president.”
It is thus with good reason that Ben Trovato32 could write to the leaders, at least, of these manifold failed parties, as follows32:14: “Dear leaders of the 34 parties that never won a seat, it really is a crying shame that you did so poorly. Let me put that another way. I am crying with laughter at your shame. I do apologise”, and: “How can anyone be filled with so much hubris that they misjudge their popularity this badly?”
But Trovato’s32 above comment of “no-good” for the 34 “losers” is even applicable to the 13 “winners” that have made it to Parliament. This includes the ANC and the three nearest winners to the ANC. The question is: Are these 13 winners truly deserving winners with the potential to better South Africans’ poor, even desperate, circumstances, as well as to solve the land-ownership conflict?15,32
The answer is an emphatic NO, when just looking at the top winner’s most recent classification by the imminent ex-president Kgalema Motlanthe12, namely that the ANC is on its deathbed. Motlanthe12 (the Interim President from September 2008 to May 2009 and also Secretary-General of the ANC from 1997 to 2007 and the party’s Deputy President from 2007 to 2012), says that the ANC is now in a far worse shape than it was before the 2017 Nasrec Conference, that elected Cyril Ramaphosa. This view was confirmed by the poor performance of the ANC in the May election.11,12,14,15
This is an opinion echoed by many political analysts.11,14,15 Motlanthe12 comments on the ANC’s doubtful future, specifically its viability and sustainability, when he says12:4: “The ANC is not in great shape… I think to strengthen the ANC it needs a surgical overhaul from where it is now. It is worse than it was in 2017 [before the Nasrec Conference]”, and: “…that [the] ANC could only change if it died in its current form and was reborn as a grassroots movement”.
1.1.3. The presence of an able political party to successfully steer the land reform initiative
The abovementioned outcome moves me to ask again, as in the Conclusion of the previous Article 8, the prominent question as to whether there is at the moment any capable South African political party, which, either as a sole ruling party or as a partner-party in an alliance, can steer the initiative of land expropriation into the near future with success.
This is a very complex question to answer, but the political analyst Mamokgethi Molopyane33 tries to do so for us, in some way at least, when he writes that the three main political parties, the ANC, the DA and the EFF, were all, after the election, left at a crossroads. In this context the two lower ranking parties, the IFP and the FF+, are ignored: their immediate future in the country’s politics, as significant parties, is zero).24-26,33 All three of the main parties were unmasked to have immense political weaknesses by the election. Prominent in this regard is their arrogance and their foolishness, as reflected by their thinking that they could in the past and still today solely think on behalf of the population and that this thinking was 100 percent correct. In particular in this chaotic setup is their disconnection from the people whom they assumed supported their ideologies and actions. Pertinent here in their confusion, is the matter of extreme land expropriation without compensation and the negative racial context thereof by land grabbing and nationalising of White assets.33
The above postulation of Molopyane33 is in line with the general postulations of various other political analysts and strategists that were quoted earlier, especially the ANC’s troubled position.11,12,14,15
In reflecting on the three main political parties and their possible failure to fulfil to the standards to be a ruler of quality versus the poor status and condition of their present political constitution, Molopyane33 gives further good insight. He writes as follows33:21: “The coinciding decline of the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), contrasted with the below-expectations growth of the Economic Freedom Fighters EFF), are unsurprising developments with far-reaching, unique consequences for each.”
Molopyane33 pinpoints a stern warning when he writes33:21: “Political parties must adapt or reinvent themselves or they’ll find little or no support from SA’s dynamic populance.”
This undoubtedly puts my question: “…are there able South African political parties who can fast steer the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future?” into the foreground. This is a question that not the ANC, the DA or the EFF can escape and must answer themselves. Not one of them honestly can or will do so, however. It is up to the political analysts, strategists and commentators to do it on their behalves, however much they like it or not.
In this context of doubt on the future abilities specific to the ANC as the post-2019 ruler, Molopyane posits33:21:
“The ANC’s support is waning. It’s proving to be devoid of freshness, with leaders who have been in politics for so long they may be reluctant to envision change. The party must undergo a makeover of its leaders and change the perceptions they’ve created. If a credible, attractive opposition emerged, its hold on power would fail. Its biggest hurdle is itself.”
On the DA he writes33:21:
“These elections have shown that having a black man in charge doesn’t translate into resonance with black voters. The DA’s crisis may not be as apparent as that of the ANC, but it’s similarly struggling to contemplate change. Worse, it’s riddled with the fear that it might alienate its white supporters.”
With reference to the EFF, Molopyane postulates33:21:
“We tend to forget the enthusiasm and political cult of youth doesn’t offer value for voters. Populism in the age of social media doesn’t mean the same in real life. The election showed that the red party will have to come up with a new approach. Its change in direction must reflect the challenges faced by a society in an ever-changing globalised economy. Although appearing to make the right noises, voters denied the EFF that 15%. Was it a case of dislike, distrust or low turnout?”
This clear warning by Molopyane33 of the possible diminishing from the political scene in the near future by even the three top “winners” of the recent May election, must not be taken lightly and must be read with Louw’s1 opinion that manipulating and under-performing regimes had only the slightest idea of what they were doing and what the outcome of their political self-empowerment would activate in the end for themselves, as well as for the country they ruled. He writes that these sub-standard regimes’ shelf life is limited. This is confirmed by the various European Empire states of the 20th Century, which mostly collapsed due to their wrong-doings after the duration of an average 45 years. Hereto the corrupt and racial-discriminative NP and its nationalist Afrikaners’ self-styled “mini-empire of multi-nations” (or the unofficially managed “NP Union”) only lasted from 1948 to 1961 (13 years), and their “mini-empire for multi-states” (Republic) from 1961 to 1994 (33 years), while the Union of South Africa (exclusively British-orientated under pro-British Whites), lasted from 1910 to 1948 (38 years). This reflects an average of 24 years for the three regimes in office.1,33
On the limiting-build-in to the reigning of political parties in South Africa, especially in terms of Louw’s1 reference to a maximum period of 24 years in office, Mthombothi34 also speaks in the same context when he, in a short post-mortem of the May 8 2019 election, refers to the “possible limited” status of the ANC in the present-day and future politics of the country after a 25 year reign. His overview and insight need full reference. He comprehensively writes34:19:
The outcome of the elections will be debated and analysed for some time to come, but what is clear is that many South Africans were not particularly impressed or satisfied with what was on offer. After 25 years of democracy, many voters are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable.
There is general disillusionment with the political establishment that seems to cut across all age groups. This seems to be mainly related to, or caused by, the government party. In fact the decline in voter turnout, and even the increasing number of people who failed to register to vote, seems to be in line with the steady decrease in ANC support. The ANC reached its apogee in the 2004 elections when it took 69.7% of the vote, and has been declining since. So has overall voter turnout.
There’s no doubt that the ANC is on a downward slope, even a death spiral. It’s on life support. That 57.5% share of the vote it won could be deceptive. Many gave their vote grudgingly. The only thing keeping the party together and alive is power. President Cyril Ramaphosa saved its bacon in these elections. It could have been condemned to the opposition benches. It’s not clear if there is anything that the ANC can do to stem the tide or reverse it. It seems to have overstayed its welcome. Most liberation movements, in Africa especially, do not survive in power for more than 25 years; unless they declare a one-party dictatorship to save their skins, as in Zimbabwe. The ANC is also hobbled by the fact that it is a broad church, and with its alliance partners it becomes truly ungovernable. Such an approach served it well as a liberation movement, but as a government it needs to be specific in its policy direction.
And of course there’s the corruption en grande that has pitted the pro- and anti-Zuma factions against each other. That, one suspects, is going to be the story of the next five years.
Were the ANC to be judged on its performance, which has been abysmal, even hideous in some instances, it would have been consigned to the political wilderness long ago. Our unique history, the race issue and the poverty of opposition have been its saving grace.
SA, given its past, is not always an easy country to govern. But most people, regardless of race, want the same thing – a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for themselves and their families. They’ll support a party with a unifying message that will make a genuine stab at it.
The time may have come for a new party that will inspire fresh hope in a disillusioned electorate.
Practically speaking, the reigning ANC is a dying party; all the fatal signs are there. It seems to have become suddenly suicidal after 25 years in power. It does not matter if the national voters’ turnout for the ANC in the May 2019 election was 70% or 80%, as Mthombothi34 and Louw1 put it. The ANC has lost its appeal with the mass of poor and landless Blacks. The Piet Promise of the NP became the Jacob Promise and the Cyril Promise of the ANC. Promises are not food, they lack trust and are contemptable.1,11,14,34,35
The above unstable setup makes it very hard to reflect precisely on how the ANC is going to handle the land expropriation matter from 2019 to the next election in 2024, and of course, if it is going to complete its term as mandated by the 2019 election. Here time will tell, but for this article the official status quo of the ANC as the regime until 2024 must be accepted and reflected upon. The cut-off date for the cooperation and the collection of information to evaluate and to discuss the land matter and the ANC as a regime’s role in it was chosen as the 31st May 2019.
But, in terms of the political upheaval inside the present-day ANC, it was decided to also focus on the EFF’s and the DA’s political agendas and actions, in case one of them became overnight the new ruler or a partner in an alliance of the governing regime. These two parties seem also to be caught in political upheavals and insecurity, rendering their inputs to the post-2019 politics open to scrunity.11,13,14,34,35
The land expropriation issue, together with the question of the trustworthiness and the integrity of the three parties, not only to be able to govern the country effectively and properly, but also to successfully execute a comprehensive and justified balanced land expropriation programme, is prominent here. Some political analysts believe that where the DA successfully resists radical politics, its ultra-conservative land reform policy is a loser for the mass of poor and landless Blacks. They believe that both the EFF and the ANC show revolutionary thinking on the assets of the White population, while the ANC furthermore has shown an absolute lack in integrity and trustworthiness in its 25 years of rule. These views will be evaluated further hereunder.26,30,33,34,36
1.1.4. Aims of Articles 9 to 11
Articles 9 to11 form part of the research project on the matter of land expropriation, which was already introduced to the reader by eight previously published articles.
This article [Article 9, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)”], is the Part 1 (reflecting on the EFF) of three articles on the roles played by the three main political parties in the politics of South Africa. The theoretical point of focus here is their capability to be effective regimes in South Africa, if certain limitations, such as voters’ ignorance and prejudice, etc. on politics and confusion with regard to their right to empowerment, do not play a role. In this article the focus is specifically on the EFF.
In the next two sequential articles (Articles 10 and 11) the focus will be respectively on the DA and the ANC. Article 10 represents: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2- The DA in perspective (10)”. Article 11 represents: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3- The ANC in perspective (11)”.
Although the ANC won the right to be the country’s ruler until 2024 with a national majority of 57.7% for a sixth term, and thus seems to be going to be the sole executor to effect land expropriation in terms of its promises made in its political manifesto (its so-called “political CV”) presented for the May 8, 2019 election on land expropriation (which seemingly can include expropriation without compensation in certain appropriate cases), is it an absolute pre-requisite to also reflect on the two strongest opposition parties’ political manifestos for the May 8, 2019 election regarding their promises and abilities to effect land expropriation successfully. The intention here is to see how these two opposition parties (the EFF and the DA) can theoretically be evaluated as good versus bad regimes, should they have won the ruler’s throne in the May 2019 election. This approach will also give a preview of their potential as good versus bad opposition parties on the land expropriation matter, specifically for the period up to 2024).1,11,14,34,35
Closely aligned to these political manifestos (or “political CVs”) in the description of the three parties’ “political characters, qualifications and experience”, are the public’s arguments, opinions and viewpoints as a further descriptive guide to the three parties’ “political characters and potential”. These public arguments, opinions and viewpoints are best reflected by the reporting by investigative and informative journalists, as well as political analysts, strategists, commentators and critics (the so-called “political letter referees or their attestations”). These mentioned “letters of the referees” are seen by many political scientists as the most (and only) decisive guide to be used for the true description of a political party’s and its leaders’ quality and integrity. They are seen as far more trustworthy than the so-called “trust for the party” brought out by the voters at the ballot-box, or as the election manifestos issued by political parties.
The aim of this article is to evaluate the potential of the EFF in terms of its theoretical capability to be an effective regime.
The research was been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case with ownership of South African soil for the period 1652 to 2018. The sources included articles from 2018 to 2019, books for the period 1980 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide and steer us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the EFF as a ruler of South Africa to be able to successfully effect land reform from 2019.
The research findings are presented in a narrative format.
The successful execution of the post-2019 land reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and action of a so-called “good” government. Such an elected government is not allowed to blindly travel a path of trying to come to reach an end-result, but is obliged to use the existing, well-guided informative guidelines and drivers to steer the land reform aims into reality. These existing informative guidelines and drivers, to steer land reform post-2019, will be reflected upon in the following Subdivision 3.2.
3.2. Existing informative guidelines and drivers to steer land reform post-2019
The land expropriation initiative is not without a foundation. There are prominent informative guidelines and drivers to steer the whole process constructively and in an orderly fashion, far away from the blind “land grabbing from White colonists”, as propagated and promised by some political and racial radicals in their political manifestos. These existing informative guidelines and drivers need to be high-lighted.
3.2.1. The Freedom Charter is an indisputable marker and driver of the post-2019 land reform
The ANC’s Freedom Charter’s land clause, dated 1955 and the ANC’s Tanzania-document on future land ownership, issued in 1969, reflect, although indirectly, on the justified comparability and redistribution of land ownership in terms of the South African race-numbers and legal holding of land ownership, as guided by a democracy, for the rights of the individual South African. The indication is clear that all races can be and must be allowed to be land owners, but equally in terms of the proportional numbers of the various racial groups. The present-day South African numbering of ±83% White land owners versus ±13% Black land owners is an immense imbalance, representing inequality, it and needs rectification. It leaves even the moderates in the ANC no other choice but to activate land expropriation with great urgency immediately.37-42
3.2.2. South Africa’s orderly democracy requires and justifies land expropriation
True democracy allows orderly statutory change by righteous actions in order to rectify injustice of the past or present. The implementation thereof can take time, especially when democracy is new born to a country; especially one which had suffered for centuries under autocracy and fascism. Political, social and economic transformations thus require time and patience. Shortcomings in the 1994-Constitution are coming to the foreground, forcing daring challenges to be faced and solved, as previously mentioned, the addressing of the imbalance between the races on land ownership. The 1994 final settlement on land redistribution is, in terms of the prescription of the country’s democracy, far from a fait accompli and is still in a process of evolution.43-47
3.2.3. Land redistribution within post-2019 Black empowerment is a normal process
Uhuru South Africa, with all its many out-branches, such as land ownership, is an unavoidable and non-debateable process. It is presently driven exclusively because the economic upliftment of Blacks through BBBEE since 1994 was not enough. There are very serious consequences which can follow, if a justified transfer of mass land to the poor and landless Blacks is not activated fast. The present-day land reform initiative is thus not in dispute. The inequality, poverty and landlessness of the mass of non-Whites, living and working for generations as poor farm-labourers in the countryside, demand immediate action.37-42
In theory there is very little difference in the present South African thought-process on land occupation as those reflected and practised by the VOC, the British, the Boers, the Apartheid Government and that of Robert Mugabe. All these institutions were overshadowed by lengthy histories of murder, genocide, injustice, impoverishment and suppression of the previous land owners (who were also mostly land grabbers themselves, coming from an earlier period) who had lost their acquired land to new migrants, intruders and conquerors through multiple atrocities. In light of the above background, it is important to note that the present setup of a mass of South African landless Blacks is basically the same: an immense group of people who have been enormously frustrated mostly since the1994-democracy by the lack of improvement to their lifestyle. Land reform, whether it is a Zimbabwe-style act of violence or a democratic and balanced process without conflict or bloodletting, is, as said, a clearly unavoidable and normal process to balance the land ownership process that will have to happen from after the May 2019 elections.1
The decisions on whether certain elements and parts of the intended land reform programme should be with or without compensation, clearly constitutes a democratic act and is, as said, based on majority consultation and decision of the Parliament, as guided by the population, to benefit the country’s interests. This is an essential democratic principle that the Blacks and Whites endorsed with the 1994 Political Dispensation.38
3.2.4. A post-2019 primary land redistribution plan already in place
Notwithstanding the many draconic statements on the land expropriation process, as likely to be exclusive land grabbing, or that there is not any plan in guiding the post-2019 land expropriation, there are actually clear primary guidelines on how the process is going to be activated and steered. Prominent for selection between truth and myth on the issue of land ownership, is the King Solomon’s wisdom approach, wherein the final decisions on what is fact and myth and the process on how land expropriation must and will be logically executed, are solely led by compassion, a good moral compass, and logical thinking and action. An in-depth understanding of the present-day suffering of all South Africans, anchored and driven by a leadership of good characteristics, which is freed from racial, religious and political contamination, are pre-requisites. Prominently, as a guideline, is President Cyril Ramaphosa’s repeatedly assurance of South Africans that the process of “land correction” will be done within the present-day laws and the Constitution.48
22.214.171.124. The land expropriation’s primary guidelines
Notwithstanding the initial immense hot headed rhetoric, commissions, committees, much senseless and opportunistic talk and argument, and ongoing threats by radicals, for instance in the Northern Cape ANC, such as the compilation of lists of productive farms to be expropriated immediately before changes to Section 25 are even approved, etc., it seems that other positive outcomes have manifested.
Firstly, it seems that the EFF, which had mainly activated the process on land reform in Parliament, was before the dissolution of the 2019-outgoing Parliament basically absent from attending the Parliamentary Committee on Land reform, which is the primary body doing research, publishing information, and deciding on the outcome of the final process. Only the members of the DA and the ANC attended as many as 50% of the meetings, while the three members of the EFF only attended the first meeting, bringing in a total of only 20% EFF-attendance. Cope, the UDM, the APC, the DSA, the VF+ and the NFP did not attend a single meeting. This passivity and lack of responsibility to the voters, led thereto that the committee failed to deliver a report before the closing of the present Parliament. This means that the issue will have to be run by the new legislature again from June 2019.49
The above undoubtedly reflects a growing detachment and disinterest by the main role-players in the so-called “land grabbing intentions” of parliamentary radicals.49
It seems furthermore that from the ANC side, as specifically reflected in the first hectic Parliament debate on land expropriation without compensation, there developed an observable passivity by the majority of ANC parliamentarians to the whole matter. This passivity is however seen as an opportunistic safeguarding by some ANC parliamentarians: here stands the fact that some of the ANC MPs and MPLs own more than two properties and thus they can, in some way, also be negatively affected if a radical land policy is implemented. This outcome shifted the whole thinking process and final responsibility on land expropriation of the ANC’s greater inner-circle. This seems to have already put strain on the ANC’s top brass, making it clear to them that extreme land radicalism is not the average member’s wish. On the other side there is a genuine opinion with some ANC parliamentarians that the whole land expropriation process must be toned down in order to balance land reform.49
Based on the “unofficial” opinions and viewpoints of the ANC’s inner-circle – as reflected by some trustworthy “inside rumours”, “unofficial evaluations” and “leaks” by the lesser radicals of the ANC elite – clear primary guidelines seem already to have been compiled by the ANC to guide us. The basis of this post-2019 land redistribution primary plan is shortly described in the following eleven subdivisions:
1) Land reform and redistribution is unavoidable and prescribes an immediate constitutional prescription to be implemented. It needs to be implemented fast, but in well-planned phases, without any disturbance of the racial, political, social and economic stability.49,50 About the many failures on land reform in the past, which need now to be avoided, Nortje maintains that50:9: “Like it or not, SA’s existing land reform policy has not been effective in achieving its goals. In terms of the acquisition of land by the state, there has been partial success, but redistribution and transformation of the agricultural sector have by and large been a failure”.
2) Future land ownership must reflect proportionately the ethnicity and races of South Africa. These same ethnic and racial proportions should reflect in the farming sector, with relation to farmers and labourers. In this context the editor of the Sunday Times on the 10th March 2019 wrote the following under the heading51:18: “Quotas not wrong, those who oppose them are,” with regard to a very well-balanced description of the correct post-2019 South Africa. He put it clearly for himself and the greater Black society, which includes the ANC regime that future land transformation doesn’t seek to replace White with Black, but to ensure all races are included, to ensure that there’s an accurate representation of society. The editor of the Sunday Times further writes51:18: “If there’s something Solidarity needs to understand, it’s that transformation targets are here to stay – and they’re not just about numbers. They form part of a heart-and-minds approach that seeks to address the imbalances of the past”.
This balanced representation on land ownership was indeed, in terms of equality and human rights, a prescribed pre-requisite from 1652 with the arrival of Whites in South Africa. The intended equalisation of land ownership after 2019 must thus not be seen as a “favour” which the Whites are now doing to Blacks through so-called quotas in land ownership, work-placement, sport or education, etc. The centuries long outstanding initiative to erase the imbalance in land ownership in South Africa (read together with the imbalance in wealth and inequality), has led to an immense discrepancy between White land owners and Black land owners, making an immediate large scale equalisation within an orderly political dispensation basically impossible. The editor51 of the Sunday Times is clear on this gradual process of transformation, especially in land ownership, where food production, the need for finance to buy out farms, etc., are central. Transformation is not the central problem here, but the issue is those who (mainly Whites) steadfastly refuse to understand the future of South Africa’s politics after 2019. Prominent for the editor51 of Sunday Times is the main obstruction to phase out the inequality and proportional land ownership which is exclusively vested in White hands.51-54
Obstructive alleged role-players are seen to be Solidarity, AgriSA, AfriForum, the Freedom Front Plus, together with the White exclusive capitalists and the White farmer community. They form a contingent of obstructionists, to which one writer, in his despair on the conflicting and seemingly unchangeable land ownership matter, refers to as “remnants of verkramptes and rooineks resisting change”.51-54
In the context of the ANC’s good intentions on a moderate land reform outcome, Khumalo55 writes specifically of a clear differentiation by the international rating agency Standard and Poor (S&P) between the radical concept of a policy of land expropriation with or without compensation (which has become the antagonists “wildcat”-vehicle of attack on the ANC in pinpointing them as political radicals) versus the ANC’s true intention of the introduction of a conservative policy of land reform. On the S&P opinion of the introduction of a conservative land reform plan by the ANC after 2019, Khumalo posits55:15: “On land expropriation, we think that in as much as the discourse talks about expropriation, we believe it has to do more with land reform. We think the ANC have been conservative in the past. They will remain conservative in the way they manage the land issue.”
3) The land reform plan will be interpreted and implemented as described by the ANC’s Freedom Charter, which reflects a strict implementation of democratic principles on land ownership and rights around land ownership. The intention is clear that the whole land transformation plan must not be radical and will be far from the postulated outcome predicted by the antagonists. It will not be in line, for instance, with the delinquent actions of the White NP between 1970 and 1979 when 240 555 Blacks were removed from so-called “Black spots” located in White land bought by Afrikaner communities prior to the controversial land legislation of 1913. In addition, land expropriation will not again form the type of removal of Blacks as was done with the NP’s social engineering wherein Blacks were removed from so-called “legitimate White land” and relocated to “Bantustans” and other so-called “Black-areas”. In this process more or less 3.5-million people (described by Malan as the “Surplus People”), some 10% of the entire population, were subjected to forced removal.53,56
4) The general prescription that only certain categories of land will be expropriated without compensation refers specifically to abandoned buildings, unutilized land, commercial property held unproductively and purely for speculative purposes owned privately by South Africans and the state, as well as under-utilised property owned by the state, and land farmed by labour tenants with an absentee titleholder (irrespective of race), agricultural land owned by Church groups, and the land owned by closed-down mines. In addition to the abovementioned categories is the free-will handing-over of land by private owners/businesses, etc. to the state for land expropriation.
5) These above categories of land will be expropriated with compensation in terms of realistic and balanced market prices.56
6) Rural families living under traditional leadership in the former Transkei and rural KwaZulu-Natal will get title to the land upon which they live and work.
7) Land expropriation will be done in various steps or phases, to assure minimum political, personal and racial conflict. The first phase will be of the less conflicting land of the state and the surrendered land from the private sector. The State will in Phase One make a lot of its own land available free of cost to new Black farmers and to other homeless Blacks, as serviced plots with title deeds to build their own homes near their work places in or nearby urban centres.56
8) The reference to “race” in terms of present-day South Africa’s richness, poverty, inequality and landlessness are prominent in the land expropriation initiative. These imbalances, specifically regarding land ownership, will be addressed, but only with justice, empathy and correctness. Prominent here is the declaration by the Deputy President, David Mabuza, in March 2019 in Parliament that it is not the intention of the ANC regime to push out the White farming community and that they must stay to produce food. Clearly there is no intention of revenge for the past on the White owners of land.56
9) The base for land relocation is that every South African citizen has the right to own land in the country, as guided by the Freedom Charter. This ownership needs to reflect in equality the proportions (numbers) of races and ethnicities (guided by the various Black tribal orientations, as well as so-called other non-White orientations, like Coloured, Indian, etc.), as represented by the present population statistics.1,57.58.59
Statistics reflect the present total population of South Africa as ±57.5-million, represented by the following races numbers: Blacks: ±44.5-million; Coloureds: ±4.8-million; Whites: ±4.5-million; Indian/Asians/Other: ±1.5-million. The various proportional statistical ratios (calculated out of 100) are as follows: Blacks 80; Coloureds 9; Whites 8 and Indian/Asians/Other 3. The primary intention is to bring the present more than 80% of the land in White hands (a group forming only 8% of the total population), gradually down as far as possible in terms of a democratic reform, to only 8%, while the Blacks, Coloureds and Indian/Asians/Other need respectively to own 80%, 9% and 3% of the land.1,57,58,59
The process of majority consultation and decision-making, to be able to activate the intended land reform, is a principle that the NP regime on behalf of the Whites endorsed when they transferred their political power in 1994 to the Black majority and is thus not disputable. The only fault was that this endorsed agreement was not fully and truly activated from 1994.1
A prominent fact here, which is been mostly ignored due to political opportunism and Marxist-revolution orientation by a minority of radicals in the politics, is that the “Blacks” are not one single group to be served by land reform, but are represented by various tribes and further sub-tribes. These tribal and sub-tribal people are mostly established in certain parts of South Africa as majority groups there. (It is only the White tribe, specifically the Afrikaners as a sub-trlbe, that is basically spread over the whole country. The Afrikaners can themselves be divided into at least six sub-groups). Land redistribution will thus, in terms of this tribal-region-orientation be done. This means for instance that the placement of Zulus on traditional Venda land and vice versa can be catastrophic, as were the old “Bantustans” and Apartheid’s other foolishnesses. The First and Second Black Colonisations, with their resulting bloodshed, will be the outcome. The fact that the Zulus before 1994 fought for federalism and the present stand and propaganda of a “physical separation” from the Republic by the King of the Zulus, must serve here as a sharp warning. The growing political demands of traditional leaders’ (especially the kings with their own regimes and traditional empowerment) inside this tribal-regional system, as well as the greater South Africa as a region, also nullifies any argument inside the ANC of one Black Nation, which is to be treated to a simple land reform approach. This so-called Black-unity was a pre-1994 short-term approach to bring Apartheid down, but has now gradually been over-run by tribal nationalism and patriotism, as the EFF’s 10% vote in the May election confirms. Note must also be taken of the claims from the so-called “indigenous Brown people” (KhoiSan, Griqwa, Namakwa) that the land expropriation policy of post-2019 must also favour them fully.1,60,61
The constant declaration and blind acceptance of a “South African democracy” which is exclusively underwritten, driven and promoted by a sole Blackness, seems to be out of contact with the country’s political, social and cultural realities, as well as Africa’s comprehensive confrontation at the ballot box by the many ethnicities and the tribalism of the Black voters. The so-called “Pure Black nationalists” may be in for a surprise – and a most deadly surprise – in South Africa in the future, due to the advent of real Black tribal separation and Black tribal nationalism.62 In this regard, Monyae and Matambo write62:19: “They also do not help entrench democracy on a continent where voting along ethnic and tribal lines is common. The most ideal circumstances for democracy’s success in Africa [and South Africa] could be reconciling voters to the ideas rather than identity sensibilities.”
The EFF’s last mentioned outcome on an exclusive Black-nationalism will not easily be blocked if we look to the growth of the EFF after the May election in votes in some of the northern parts of South Africa — a party whose policy is undoubtedly, besides White-bashing, characterised and steered by deadly Black ethnicity and tribalism and the division, including the break-up, of the so-called “pre-1994 Black Nation”. It is important to note that the EFF’s radical cultural and political empowerment has now slowly spread from Limpopo to Mpumalanga and the North West Provinces, making it the official oppositions there.34,63,64
On these delinquent ethnic and tribal manifestations in the EFF, to capture its deprived and political poor and often times under-developed supporters’ planning in the doubtful and devastating elements of ethnicity and tribalism, Trovato writes64:14: “Nice work, though. It doesn’t matter if all three have a combined GDP of R28.50 and a bit of a witchcraft problem.”
Mthombothi34 also pinpoints this deadly foundation after the May election in the EFF, especially its leadership’s immense fault-line when he postulates34:19: “…the EFF’s existence and its survival depend largely on the whims of its leader. It often appears as though it’s a meteor that will rise but ultimately burn itself into oblivion. Also, its propensity for race-bating rules it out as a genuine contender for real power.”
10) The land expropriation is planned to be executed in such a way that it will not harm the economic or political status of the South African State, albeit in the short or long term. Although the implementation of the primary plan will require an enormous financial input by the government, this cost will be balanced in five to ten years’ time, hopefully bringing profits to the country after ten to fifteen years.
11) The first stage of land transfers must be complete before but not later than 2022 (whereby state rural land is been handed to Black farmers and their establishment on these farms ins in place). Included in this time-limit is the transfer of privately-owned abandoned buildings and under-utilised property and land in urban areas (without or with compensation), together with the transfer of the State’s abandoned buildings, under-utilised property and land in urban areas, to the poor and landless Blacks, to be owned by them for accommodation, and upon which to farm and build homes.
3.2.5. A post-2019 secondary land distribution guideline already in place
126.96.36.199. Land grabbing not an issue
There is no intention to grab well-functioning White private property and land without compensation, without clear reasons to benefit the people of the country and the balanced consideration of the loss to the disposed owner. Neither is the intended land transfer scheme going to target even all the so-called more than 80% of the present land of Whites, which radicals are alleging to be “stolen” from Blacks. That would be undemocratic. Neither is the intention the exclusive grabbing of land from one race group while leaving others untouched. The State’s own high-potential land of multiple millions of hectares of agricultural land, which has not been collateralised and is not productive, will, as already said, firstly become part of the intended land expropriation. Land cases under dispute before 2019 will be the prominent focus for settlement. Primarily there is no intention to travel back in history to punish any so-called “White culprits” for their so-called “alleged stealing of land from Blacks”.48
In this context Nortje confirms50:9: “The good news is that, behind all the noise and political positioning around land reform, the ANC has been consistent in its intentions. The December  policy document does say that expropriation without compensation ‘should be among the key mechanisms available to the government’, but this is followed by an even stronger statement that land reform interventions ‘should focus on government-owned land’ and ‘prioritise the distribution of vacant, unused and underutilised state land’.”
This consistency in the ANC regime’s expropriation plan will not to harm the private White land owner by confiscating his land without compensation, and is further confirmed by Nortje’s pinpointing that only state land will directly be incorporated in the first phase of land redistribution. In co-operation with the redistribution of state land, will also be the buy-out of a new group of White land and the buy-out of White land under dispute. Of the good intention of not to do land grabbing by the ANC regime, notwithstanding the antagonists roaring statements and the political noise of radicals within the ANC itself, and especially within the EFF, there is clear evidence in the February 2019 budget on the buy-out of White land and the immense funds made available to be able to do it.65,66
Hleko, in his analysis of the budget of 2019, writes65:16:
The linkage between the President’s State of the Nation address (Sona) and the Minister of Finance’s Budget speech created a proportionate posture that the government is hard at work making South Africa a better place for all who live in it.
The budget speech planted anew and sowed the seed of renewal. The R3.7 billion set aside to assist emerging farmers seeking to acquire land for farming, is a seed that the government is sowing today to propel emerging farmers to prosper in future.
This allocation will assist the 250 000 emerging farmers, whom the president referred to in his Sona, that are working the land and need support to fully develop their businesses.
The R1.8bn that is allocated for the implementation of 262 priority land reform projects over the next three years will be a shot in the arm for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform to expedite land reform projects.
This further echoes the president’s remark that an accelerated programme of land reform has the potential to expand agricultural output and promote inclusion.
On the 10th April 2019, Ramaphosa himself (who is again the President in the Sixth Parliament), to reign in all the false noises around the land matter, assured White farmers that they did not have to fear land reform48:1:
“I can assure you that the land reform process is something we should never fear. It is to be done in accordance with the rule of law and the Constitution. It is not going to be land grabs where land is grabbed outside of the parameters of the law. We need to look at the practical reality.”
Specific to the Expropriation Amendment Bill, which will be finalised after May 2019 by the new incoming Parliament, Ramaphosa puts it that the Act’s intentions are, as was already well-spelled out in governance and ANC papers, to look at land owned by the state, land owned by state-owned entities, land not used and land sometimes illegally acquired.48:1:
“There is a great future for all farming people, be it workers or farm owners. We need to address the key challenges. We must address some of the sensitive issues – evictions and where the people have no land. We want consensual solutions.”
The secondary good intention of not to land grabb, is further the announcement that the Land Bank will financially support smallholders and leverage partnerships with other financial institutions in their start-up of new incoming Black farmers and to develop existing Black farmers. The main aim here is to disburse R3-billion in the next fiscal year to the farming sector, with more Land Bank financial input later to be facilitated for the farming community.66
188.8.131.52. The 1994 Political Dispensation: a worrying issue which needs urgent comprehensive readdressing
The South African land ownership matter was ignored outright since 1994 and silently shelved in terms of the 1994 Political Dispensation. The 1994 Political Dispensation masked main intention was clear: to exclusively serve the White land owners and farmers, as well as the exclusive capitalists who include Whites as well as Blacks, especially those who misused BBBEE to get rich. South Africa’s economic evolution did not work because it offered nothing to the mass of the poor since 1994. The rise of unrest, acute anarchy and the possibility of a revolution by the mass of poor and landless Blacks, and of course the mass poverty of ±29-million Blacks, served as a wake-up call to a small group of concerned South African politicians, humanists and citizens to take on the matter.48,50
184.108.40.206.1 The neglect and unrepaired situation of ±29-million landless and poor Blacks within the present empowerment of 257 municipalities to be able to do land expropriation
With regard to the abovementioned post-1994 ongoing negligence and unrepaired situation of ±29-million landless and poor Blacks’, Nortje50 can with honesty, with great doubt on the ANC regime’s initial intention to uplift this mass of Blacks, write50:9:
The bad news is that expropriation without compensation will remain a high-stakes political bargaining chip. Indeed, had Ramaphosa‘s hand not been forced at the national elective conference in December 2017, I wonder if our land reform policy would have been re-examined at all. In this case the EFF and factions within the ANC have done South Africans a massive favour by forcing us to scrutinise and improve policy that has massive potential for social redress, job creation and economic development”.
The time-frame left for the ANC to institute and to physically activate a clear, final plan and scheme after 25 years of failure since 1994, is at most two years. Politicians from all of the parties, White land owners and exclusive holders of White capital, must accept it unconditionally. This eye-opening and political life-change includes the DA, the FF Plus, Solidarity, AfriForum and AgriSA.50,60,67
Any delay holds serious consequences, specifically for the ANC as a regime to be able to bring about justified land reform and in general for South Africa in the form of anarchy, unrest and revolution. This instituting of a final plan comprises the definite establishment of a permanent caretaker deeds statutory body (separate from the present deeds office) which will stand free from political and party influences. It will specifically handle the transfer of land to the state and the registering of the deeds of these properties initially in the name of the State, the compilation of clear legal guidelines for the rights of citizens to receive land, and the pre-as well as post-prescriptions to be able to farm, to take ownership of this land, the describing of a proof period as a candidate-farmer, directing the reselling and estranging of the property after allocation to Black owners. It will need to limit opportunistic profit-taking, state-capture and racketeering, as well as corruption around these allocated properties. The allocation of full ownership, and thus the transfer of title deeds, can be subjected to five years. Although private loans on the properties and lands will be allowed (specifically to be able to make debts for development and the running of the farms), this will be subordinate to the permission of the State as the first loan-holder and thus allocated with the right of the first call to buy-back or to reposess expropriated land when necessary. To control over-debt and the exploitstion of the poor new farmers against loan sharks, the intention is to provide comprehensive loans/other funding via the State to the incoming farmers for up to 20 years. This approach will overcome the many failures of the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution plan, because the State failed many times to supply funding or ancillary agricultural services to the incoming farmers who lacked their own capital. This will also phase out the unrealistic short periods required from the incoming Black farmers to become profitable. (Prominent in this respect, in order to guide stable future ownership of expropriated land, the ANC regime already put the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy in place, which was adopted in 2006, to stop beneficiaries of land reform from selling opportunistic properties which they had acquired. In terms of this ruling, land was leased since 2006 to the majority of beneficiaries while the state retained ownership).50
Another outcome foreseen in the post-2019 empowerment of the incoming Black farmers is that the type of farming production will be steered by the government to assure maximum profit and the needed products for the local, and where possible, for foreign markets. Funding and the training of the new farmers will be steered in terms of the produce on the allocated land.50
It is clear that this Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy adopted in 2006 will be “improved” with new legislation, such as the fundamental restructuring of institutions such as the Land Claims Commission and the Land Claims Court, etc., not only to safeguard those losing their property through land reform, but also to protect those poor Blacks in line to receive land. The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) will also be improved. The rule of law in the process of land reform will be maintained in order to avoid Zimbabwe’s lack of accountability or the Zuma-state-capture. An example thereof is Ngcukaitobi’s68 opinion of the establishment of a land ombudsman or land-rights protector (with the same powers as the present public protector). The state custodianship (temporary) of expropriated land will be spelled out clearly in the post-2019 proposed land redistribution and agrarian reform legislation. In addition, how the process of land transfer will be activated and upheld, will be executed through the creation of various new legislation, such as a Land Acquisition Act as well as a Land Redistribution Act, wherein the suggested land ombudsman or the land-rights protector, is central as the supervisor.68,69
220.127.116.11.2. The present empowerment of 257 municipalities to do land expropriation
The present anomaly in the change to Section 25 of the draft expropriation bill, which can give 257 municipalities the right to expropriate property without compensation, is at the moment under consideration. The seeming intention is to remove their rights and to make the empowerment of land and other property expropriation seated in a single statutory body on national level.69,70
With reference to the concerns of the bill’s empowerment of the local government municipalities, as well as that of the central government bodies, is it important to note that the biggest need for land is in urban areas under municipalities where there is a vast corruption problem. Evidence shows that only 33 municipalities of the total of 257 obtained clean audits in 2018. As such, the municipalities cannot be trusted to implement land expropriation without compensation fairly and to execute administrative justice, as demanded by the constitution.69,70
Furthermore, the clause will address the intended empowerment of the local and central government, wherein the bill gives five examples where nil compensation would be justified and states that expropriation without compensation can be “stretched”, which can allow invalid grabbing of land. In addition, the definition on land (located in municipalities) for speculation (which undoubtedly has financial value for the present owner and is mostly acquired at a cost), is unclearly defined. Lacking a legal description to state clearly what land for future expansion means — which seems to stand outside the expropriation without compensation clause – is a further point of concern that will be addressed. The concept-definition of what is property in the bill seems to apply also on the confiscation of anything, varying from intellectual property to shares in a company, if it is in the so-called “interests of the public”. This therefore needs a revist, in order to clear confusion and possible capture.69,70
18.104.22.168.3. The mandate of the Land Bank needs immediate attention
To activate land expropriation successfully, the lack of finance to start up and run a farm stands out specifically. Here, in financing the incoming Black farmers, is the commitment of the ANC-regime to change the mandate of the Land Bank so that it is truly development-orientated and financial-friendly to the mass of poor Blacks.68,69 This will be done without “nationalising” it, as some of the antagonists and White capitalists try to argue when the mandate of the Land Bank is put forward as a possible financial vehicle to successfully expropriate land and facilitate the urgent uplifting of 29-million poor and landless Blacks. Own government financial support is just too little to change the present landscape of under-funding of Black farmers. Ngcukaiboti69 writes, on the reason for the present passivity (and isolation) of the Land Bank to be able to support the mass of poor incoming, aspirant Black farmers, as follows69:20-21:
“In 2002, the ANC changed the mandate of the Land Bank so that, for all practical purposes, it operates like any ordinary commercial bank. In Section 26 of the Land and Agricultural Bank Act, the bank’s mandate is to provide land and agricultural finance ‘against security’. It can be safely assumed that the persons who need Land Bank finance the most have no security.”
22.214.171.124.4. The farming-styles, culture and intentions of new Black and other non-White farmers
The farming-styles, culture and intentions of new Black and other non-White farmers will be prominent in guiding the execution of the land reform programme. In this context, the candidate-farmers — not as during the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution where pre-training training and constant mentoring were absent – will first be pre-selected on certain characteristics, abilities, skills and interests to assure maximum success as potential candidate-farmers and then pre-trained (as was done in the 1930s with the poor Whites at the Kakamas- and Keimoes-schemes by the government and the DRC). The intention is to extend the Agricultural Colleges training to district-centres countrywide, with the offering of an initial six months as a start-up course for the learner-farmers, while further continuous learning and training will be provided after the establishment of the new farmers for a minimum period of five years. The post-2019 exploitation of agricultural-export potential is a first priority through the small farmers’ setup.1,69
The entire country will be divided into various regions for land transfer, meaning thus concentrated small farms in the more water-rich areas, with the more spread out of larger farms in the dryer regions. Developments beside constant flowing rivers and near established transport and other facilities will form the first phase of the start-up.1
One of the most important oversights in the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution under the 1994 Dispensation were the absence of homesteads, other much needed farm-buildings and infrastructure and equipment to support farming production and activities by the new farmers. There was frequently outright neglect in this regard from the government’s side even to install any infrastructure and the offer of working equipment at the time of the handing over of farms to the new farmers. Funding to support these enterprises was also lacking most of the time, while constant monitoring, in order to identify shortcomings and failures over time, as well as the development of new needs of the new-farmers-model, were also absent. These pre-requirements will be put in place before allowing farmers to take up their farmer-appointments.69
Other infrastructure needed is the upfront founding of marketing instruments, such as own markets, the installation of entities for farmer-community-businesses to build and run independent Black farming centres for the selling of the surplus of their produce, as well as the creation of community business-bodies to buy farming equipment and which will deliver services to small farmers to make it possible for them to get their farms working and functioning at affordable costs.69
One of the most hampering elements to land ownership in South Africa has so far been the Western custom and tradition that land can for an unlimited amount of time be owned by a certain person and his immediate family. The ownership of land came under exclusive White capitalism and politics as the untouchable right of the individual (mostly Whites) to be able own land and to do with it as the owner saw fit. Included here is, as said, the untouchable present right of inheritance from generation to generation. The utmost exploitationof this model is well-illustrated by the selective upkeep of the exclusive White ownership (8% of the population) of at least 60% of the South African land. Firstly, in stopping this thinking, it is important to note that land is a national asset and not a personal asset, to be separated from the State and society. Secondly, the occupation of any land, as sealed by a deed of conveyance, is only for the purpose of improving the land and making a living from it – it is always only a solely temporary right issued to the individual of care-taking of the state’s assets. Included hereto stands the effective management of land as a democratic and civil right by the individual who holds the deed of conveyance. This legal setup is solely based on majority consultation and decision-making by the population of South Africa via Parliament, as primarily guided by the country’s Constitution. There is thus in modern-day South Africa a clear pre-requirement emerging on the ongoing legal ownership of land: it is temporary and open to change by the State at any time. This is now what is planned with the process of land expropriation.1
There is already a process in place to re-install the old hereditary tenure with a time-limit, better known as the tenure by long lease, as already activated in Namibia, Zimbabwe and Malawi for the period of 99-years of lease. This was also done at the early Cape. This model of time-limiting of land ownership is by far a better one for the State, as well as the individual citizen. Indeed specific to the South African setup around ownership per se, data shows that very few of the present farms are owned for 99 years or more by the same (White) family. Although data is scarce on the matter, it seems that most (White) owners and their families hang on to land for less than 49 years.1
In terms of the development of a new land culture, South Africa thus also undoubtedly needs a total repositioning of the so-called model of endless-land ownership to the model of tenure by long lease of 49 year-land ownership. Such a model will help to support the intended land expropriation initiative and to dismantle an imbalanced racial and economic-privilege farming community, free from monopolies and the exclusive benefit of certain groups and families.
The intended land expropriation programme to establish the poor and landless Blacks will be far removed from the 1994 to 2019 rigid programme and be easily adaptable to new circumstances as prescribed by the country’s economic, political and civil rights. Much was learned from the 1994 to 2019 failures. Future success lies in the re-examination of the old land reform processes from pre- as well post-1994.50 Nortje posits50:9: “These failures are frustrating but it is encouraging – and indeed correct – that existing land reform policy is being re-examined. Policy by its nature should be a process rather than a prescript. Good policymakers measure the actual and intended outcomes of their policies regularly in order to make adjustments when necessary”.
What is most worrying at the moment is the fact that the Ramaphosa-regime had in the mean time shifted seemingly successfully the land reform matter before the May 8 election from the “urgent” national agenda. This led thereto that to a great extent the debate died down. Notwithstanding the finding of Ramaphosa’s 10-member advisory panel on land reform (appointed in September 2018), which is now to be followed-up and enlightened by the post-May 8 Parliament, the present problematic setup around poverty and landlessness of a mass of Blacks can become extreme, with acute unrest. Anarchy, moving into a chronic stage, can make revolution a prominent feature later in the 2019-2024 ruling-mandate of the ANC.50
3.2.5. The antagonists are unrealistic and opportunistic to already demand in 2019 a fully-fledged land expropriation plan from the ANC
Too offer a more precise plan as the above theoretical one at this stage, is impossible, seeing that Section 25 is still to be amended. Further consultations by all the lawmakers of the Parliament with the general public, must firstly be held and funding allocated, to be able to start up the project and to turn it from theoretical to practical. Furthermore, the above theoretical plan must and cannot be seen as a final, absolute one. As discussions and outcomes follow during the rest of 2019-2020, changes, adjustments, additions, further descriptions and definitions, etc., can follow. There is no doubt that before any land expropriation will be activated, further land redistribution and agrarian reform legislation will be introduced.50,69
It must be clear that the current agricultural monopolies will have to be dismantled or reigned in, see at present the overpowering of the agricultural sector by the extremely well-established South Africa White agribusinesses and their exclusive White capital. There will be cooperation with the White agribusinesses in the activation of the Black agricultural sector, but away from and outside their White dominance of every sector in agriculture. Land expropriation, its planning and action and its benefits, will be shifted from the few White rich to the mass Black poor. It will be the rule, not the aim. The present exclusive marginalisation of the Black farming communities and Black small-scale farmers will be ended. Ngcukaitobi69 misreads the “un-breakability” of the White empowerment and dominance of the country’s agriculture in the ANC’s planned land expropriation programme when he writes69:20-21: “We can expect that these monopolies will, with the support of the State, multiply their profits, while giving a “helping hand. More of the same. Large agricultural entities, it seems, will be “nudged” to support emerging and small-scale farmers.”
Doubts about the present theoretical plan are unfounded. Firstly, the registration of title deeds of the expropriated land will be handled the same way as the present-day title deeds, although this will preferably be done on a separate register to oversee the land expropriation process. This will be done precisely to avoid corruption, state-capture, etc. and to make the re-registration of land to the new Black farmers easy to control, and to oversee the constant management and execution of the end-part of land expropriation and the success of each of the individual cases.50,69
It must be clear that the transfer and registration of land to the new Black farmers will not be more complicated or strange than that of the starting-up in the 1890s of the Vanwyksvlei Dam’s Agricultural and Farming Settlement of Whites. Here the so-called Crown land (which was also occupied by the Cape Government as “uninhabited land”, but was indeed for a long time the land of the driven-out KhoiSan) was transferred to Whites as private property under certain pre-requirements to work and to inhabit it permanently. The same principal of ownership was repeated after the Second World War when White soldiers of the South African Armed Forces were, after their demobilisation, established as farmers on so-called “free farms”, again on Crown land, in areas such as the districts of Vanwyksvlei and Kenhardt situated in today’s Northern Cape Province.1,71-74
4.1. A short perspective
From the above is it at this stage clear that there is already in some way a theoretical plan in place on how land expropriation will and can be executed. But here are two clear energies in opposition: it is one thing to theoretically argue a plan, but it is totally something else to implement such a plan in practive with success. South Africa’s political history, since the first day of Jan van Riebeecks’s arrival, is drenched with many political failures. Prominent in this context is the ANC’s somewhat failed post-1994 land reform initiative to establish Black farmers.1,75-80
The essential question is thus who can now after May 8, 2019 be the role-player(s) to assure the successful implementation and completion of the plan on land expropriation.
The May 8, 2019 election’s outcome leaves us with only three significant parties: the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the African Nationalist Congress (ANC). On the third level of significance stands the EFF, in second place the DA and on the first level the ruling ANC. An indication of the potential of the EFF or the DA to be declared a “good” or “bad” ruler, is the fact that they have never ruled South Africa nationally. of the two the EFF is the most inexperienced one. It has a very limited alliance in municipality management as compared to the DA, and was most of the time less successful and too conflicting to assure an evaluation of outright good. The DA was in the past and is still very successfull after the May election, with regard to governing on provincial level in the Western Cape, as well as with municipal management countrywide.26,30,34,36
4.1.1 Evaluation guidelines of political parties
To evaluate the three parties’ potential as national, provincial and municipal rulers, the following guidelines will be used respectively:
Their general policies as well as specific standpoints on aspects such as the respectof law and order, and the fighting of corruption, state capture, behavioural delinquency of MPs and MPLs, as well as their top brass leaders, the party’s and leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put in perspective through their manifestos for the 2019-election.
The public critique in newspapers, etc., by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the three parties as political organisations, their members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behavioural delinquency of MPs and MPLs and top brass leaders, their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the parties’ internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions, especially on land expropriation, evaluated and reflected for the period 1994 to 2019.
In this subdivision of the research project the interpretations will be done solely in terms of the interpretation of facts and truths. The information gathered will be evaluated in terms of the Solomon’s wisdom approach and will not be guided by religious and legal/statutory contamination. The focus of the discussion will be to determine, theoretically in terms of a so-called “clean and constructive political record” of each of the three parties, which of them are the best qualified to effect the land expropriation plan from 2019 and onwards. For this classification and measuring of political records of each party, the under-mentioned Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, will be used.81-84
126.96.36.199. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201881
As an evaluation instrument to quantitatively classify the three political organisations, their members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action, the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, will be used.81 The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, were applied to all information collected in the literature review of the parties’ manifestos and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and will be interpreted as the researcher deems it applicable.81
In light of the political sensitivity of this study, the researcher assured at all times, as prescribed by the Checklist, that the political-historical data were carefully reviewed and coded. Generalisations were not made beyond the capability of the data to support statements. The researcher guarded against his own expectations, misperceptions and the need to find answers that would support his preconceived notions. For the basis of interpretation and evaluation of the data, the Solomon wisdom approach serves throughout as a guideline.81-84
188.8.131.52. The use of election manifestos of political parties as Curriculum Vitae and public reporting on political parties by journalists and other sources such as Letters of Referee/Attestations to determine the governmental abilities of political parties
When any candidate applies for a responsible post in the top level of an organisation, there are two primary elements to guide the employer in making an appointment or not. These two elements are:
1) The Curriculum Vitae (CV) to obtain insight into the candidate’s qualifications, experiences and extraordinary skills, etc; and
2) The letters of the referees, the attestations, to offer firstly further insight into the qualifications, experiences, etc. of the candidate; and secondly at the same time to tell us confidentially about good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate that are well-masked by or absent from the CV. This referee data mostly informs us of the “goodness” and “badness” of a candidate, which can make him a failure or a success in the end in the executionof the responsibilities of the post.
In this research the manifestos and self-description offered by the political parties and their leaders will be seen as their CVs. Hereto will the public reporting by journalists and other sources be seen as the letters of referees/reference or attestations.
184.108.40.206.1. Evaluation-criteria for a party and its leadership to be short-listed
In terms of the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, the three parties will be awarded points in terms of an evaluation-criteria of a maximum of 82 points. To qualify for the shortlist as a so-called candidate (party), the candidate (party) must receive 58 points (70%) and higher.81
With specific reference to a retrospective evaluation and description of the political history of political leaders in terms of the Checklist, it is true that information obtained from newspapers, political and historical books, authorised and unauthorised biographies and autobiographies can be seen as subjective, but subjectivity is an inherent part of any text on politics. We cannot escape this reality. Such sources are consulted in terms of the Solomon wisdom approach for this subdivision, with the single aim of building a viewpoint on the party from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is commonly used in modern historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research, as is the case with the quality of the current political leadership of South Africa and the political parties’ functioning with regard to integrity. The information offered in the literature review has not been empirically tested. It relies on the independent opinion of the public as reflected by the independent media and has been accepted by the public as a good reflection of reality.81-84
The research does not offer a comprehensive statistical model to make advanced statistical inferences to be able to test a hypothesis, but the information (data) can be subjected quantitatively to the statistical cycle of research to make it comparable with other research and to evaluate it with hypothesis testing in the end. Advanced statistical inference is outside the intent of the study.81
There has never been such a collection, evaluation and description of information on the actions of the political leaders and regimes of South Africa with the primary focus on their ability to be able to steer land reform for the period 1994 to 2019. Despites the limitations of the various sources, it is a pioneering study that addresses a mostly ignored subject.81-84
4.2. The manifestos, self-descriptions and public references of the three parties
The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) will be reflected in this article (Article 9) as Part 1 of three articles under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. In Part 2 (Article 10) and Part 3 (Article 11) the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the African National Congress (ANC) will respectively be reflected as sequence articles under the main title of “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”.
4.2.1. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)
In the recent May election, the EFF nearly doubled its political power by winning 44 seats in Parliament (rising from 6% to 10%). One the first utterances by Julius Malema, the Commander-in-Chief of the EFF after obtaining this win, was to clearly spell out that the EFF’s immediate task in the Sixth Parliament would be the completion of the work that could not be done by the Fifth Democratic Parliament and of which the Amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution, to allow for expropriation of land without compensation and the amendment of the SA Reserve Bank Act to discontinue private shareholders in the bank, would be central. In this context of political radicalism, is it old news that the EFF believes that the state should be the custodian of land and that full-out nationalisation without compensation is the way to go.85,86
In this environment a new role is foreseen by some political commentators for the EFF in the post-2019 politics, directly within the ANC regime to assist the ANC to get the two-thirds majority vote which it needed to enact the ANC’s December 2017 resolution to amend Section 25 to be able to expropriate land without compensation (EWC). There is doubt on the outcome of such an alliance, given that a strong sector (the Ramaphosa-faction) in the ANC does not share the Malema hunger for extreme land expropriation and radical politics. They prefer a watered down window-dressed-version of the status quo on the land matter, writes Hlatshaneni.85:4
Furthermore, it seems that there is still after the May election a kind of “brotherly love” between the EFF and the DA on municipal-level cooperation, which can also put it in a strong position of political empowerment. On the 17th May 2019 the Beeld reports on this possibility after seeming talks between the EFF and the DA. Selebano writes87:1: “Die Tshwane-metroraad in Pretoria kan ‘n EFF-lid as burgemeester kry, terwyl Herman Mashaba [DA] in sy pos as burgemeester van Johannesburg bly.” Malema himself reports as follows on the matter of a new post-2019 alliance with the DA on municipal-level87:1: “Ons praat reeds met die DA, ons deel die mag in Johannesburg en Tshwane. Kom ons doen dit op ‘n manier wat nie ontwrigtend is nie.”
It is thus of great importance to see how the EFF can play out its role in the post-2019 politics in general and specifically in the solving of the so-called “White-occupation” of Black land. The question is: can the EFF be a significant role-player in the post-2019 politics? To answer this question is it important to study the EFF’s CV and Attestations in-depth and to evaluate its performance on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018.81
220.127.116.11.1. The EFF manifesto
In the EFF’s manifesto under the heading: “The EFF is ready to govern as demonstrated by the detailed blueprint for economic emancipation as set out in its manifesto”, Julius Malema, as in his daily politics, tries to play the card of “African nationalism”. But the “Malema-African nationalism” is an exclusive new version: one belonging to and driven by the South African post-1994 born Blacks, who are jobless, poor and most of all: landless. Excluded from his group of “African nationalists” are clearly the so-called BEE-marked and other successful Blacks who were born before 1994. Prominent of course are also the Whites in general as the culprits in his radical-Marxism as the sole origin of these Black youth’s poverty, landlessness and unhappiness (and undoubtedly seemingly also Malema’s “own poverty” and unhappiness!). To grasp this absurdity, and by times seemingly confused political mindset, just read the following from his propaganda88:19:
“We are not part of the 1994 elite pact. We are a completely new generation, with new demands. And our demands, unlike those of the 1994 generation, will not be postponed. We refuse to be silenced with so-called reconciliation. We want justice now. We want our land now. We want jobs now. We demand the economy now!
On his so-called “White-problem” philosophy and solution, note the following88:19:
The economy in SA continues today to be under the ownership and control of white minority settlers, whose ownership and control of land, in particular, were gained through settler colonialism and its corollary, the dispossession of the black colonised.
Other sectors of the economy, such as retail chains, industry and the financial sector, are also owned and controlled by the white minority in SA. All the means of economic survival and existence continue to be controlled by the white minority.
Imraan Buccus89, a seasoned researcher and academic, and a well-respected political analyst, after he studied the EFF’s manifesto for the May 2019 election and the party’s practice of politics since its foundation, reflects in-depth in his writing the characteristics of the EFF’s politics if it should had win the election or form a senior partnership in an alliance to be a ruler. Its ruling seems for Buccus to be characterised by the following89:18:
“The manifesto from the EFF is about as ridiculous as it is long. It veers, incoherently, from far right neoliberal economics measures, like export processing zones, to classic far-left politics, like radical land reform. Wildly outlandish promises are made – R1m payments to successful PhD students and orthodontists in every school, for instance – that are impossible to implement in reality.”
In reality the EFF’s election promises, if they are to be implemented in political madness (besides that it is just impossible!), will bring total bankruptcy and steer the country into the same hole as Venezuala and Zimbabwe, writes Buccus89. Moreover: immense poverty, hunger, unrest, violence, to be followed by revolution, will fast be the outcomes. This will end in the mass suppression of the population and dictatorship. Inequality would become out of hand, which, looking critically at the EFF’s politics, seems to be Malema’s main intention and plan. The speaking by the EFF of the creation of a sovereign wealth fund means just another state capture and a looting again of the SAA, Eskom, the PIC and various kinds of VBS Mutual Banks to be robbed again by the EFF-kind of political elite. Buccus89 is very clear when he, on the involvement and trustworthiness per se of the EFF in the management for instance of a sovereign wealth funds, says89:18:
“But, as we all know, the EFF has been closely associated with cross forms of corruption, and is openly defending individuals known to have been at the centre of the state capture project. The EFF simply could not be trusted to run a sovereign wealth fund.”
Bell90, in reference to the EFF’s promises, describes them as absurd, bizarre and outlandish. He writes in this context: “An EFF government, they promised, would provide every informal settlement dweller with a proper house with flushing toilets, and hot and cold running water, within two years.” On the land issue and the EFF, Bell reports90:2:
“Here it is that some of the more – no pun intended – outlandish comments are made, including an EFF promise to ‘immediately’ give away to ‘the people 50% of all government land’.”
The EFF promises and political, economic, racial and social thinking are plainly bordering on fantasy; they are drowned in populism and cognitive dissonance. The EFFs are more than just crude opportunists; their political madness, as reflected in their promises, will take South Africa not like Jacob Zuma to the brink of a complete collapse: they will immediately bring about a total collapse of the country. The political dysfunctional mindset of its leaders have already been reflected in their weird public behaviour. Their violence and unruly behaviour and dislike of order are well reflected by their violent and disrespectful actions in Parliament, as well as at council meetings where they participated in municipalities. This cognitive chaos inside the EFF leadership is understandable when noting that the EFF hailed Robert Mugabe as a hero. In this utmost political instability of the EFF is it understandable why its MP Zolile Xalisa had no other choice but to leave it for the African Transformation Movement (ATM).The political instability in the EFF also drove out the EFF-MP Thembinkosi Rawula.89,91
18.104.22.168.2. The EFF’s performance after the May 2019 election
To now call the EFF one of the major parties in South Africa due to its so-called third position (ranking) of voters’ representation, which it obtained mostly by our imbalanced indirect Electoral Act, is misleading. Some so-called political analysts became mixed-up between ranking and statistics: the EFF only obtained 10% of the votes in the 2019 elections (and 6% of the votes in the 2014 election), meaning that at most 10% or a 10th of the total votes. Seen from a political analyst’s view, neither did the EFF really successfully master the so-called SWOT characteristic of the “political MBA” to bring them into the league of “good” parties. They misused and exploited the serious conflicting political, social and economic issues of the country which have already put the country into paralysis many times. As a party it fails to offer constructive solutions or ideas, and misuses empty populism to activate aggression and hostility with a 10% sector of the voters as an empowerment vehicle to stay upright. They do not understand basic politics and democracy, neither how to govern even the simplest social organisation. They cannot even can manage the ethics of their own party, as is evident from their support of the looting of the VBS Mutual Bank.85,86,89,92
Their involvement with the DA in municipal affairs shows one thing: destabilisation of good order. Their constant attacks on the ANC seems from the outside a strong and winning outcome for the EFF. But it is far from the truth. Firstly, is it misleading and secondly, there is a good reason for the EFF’s so-called successful attack on the ANC. In this context it must firstly be remembered that their parent-party, the ANC, is in a vegetative state, with a 50% part cemented with the EFF into political-radicalism. This ANC failure had a negative impact over 25 years on the mass of poor and landless Blacks. It is the same deprived group who the EFF also not could enrich and uplift since its founding as a “party of the people”. In addition, it placed them directly into conflict with the authorities and law and order. The creation of unrest, anarchy and revolution seems the ultimate intention of the EFF here.85,86,89,92
Secondly, there is not a single fact in the EFF’s actions to associate it with the positivity which characterised the political ideology of Nelson Mandela. To describe the EFF, as Kanyane92 tried to do, as the new don of South Africa politics, is wishful thinking. The correct reference is: new mischief-monger. Kanyane’s92 insight and thus also his propaganda, are lacking understanding of the principles of basic politics and sound political thinking. There is not a hunger by the mass of South African Blacks for a so-called “liberation”, or revolution in terms of land ownership or races. We saw the improper infusion thereof already in Venezuela and Zimbabwe, as well as the Zuma-regime of state capture under the mantle of “Black-African/African-Black liberation”. Eugene Terreblanche and his AWB tried the same kind of “political joke of mischief” with Afrikaner-liberation, as what Malema and his cronies are now trying to do, just to be rejected at the end. This rejection was not by the Black population, but by the Afrikaner/White population. This happens the same way with the ultra Afrikaner-nationalist leader Hans van Rensburg and his Ossewa-Brandwag (underwriting Nazism and extreme White nationalism) in the White politics of the 1940s. It failed miserably.1,85,86,89,92
22.214.171.124.3. The post-2019 erasing of the EFF’s founding aims and intentions
The May 2019 election shows that radical racial parties such as Andile Mngxitama’s Black First Land First (BLF), the African Content Movement (ACM) led by Hlaudi Motsoeneng and the Social Revolutionary Workers Party (SRWP) of Irvin Jim lost voter support and recognition, writes Mvumvu18. But this loss of voters’ support goes broader, affecting also the two other racial radical parties, namely the EFF and the FF+. Mthombothi93 highlights the dilemma wherein the bitter-ender radical parties such as the EFF, the ACM, the BLF and the ATM had run in the May election due to their expectation that their pushing of the expropriation of land without compensation would reap rich rewards for them (a misconception, which also swayed the ANC to join that bandwagon). It did not work. The racial radical parties of the EFF and the FF+ vote increase in the May 2019, is further misleading. There is no evidence of black voters excitedly flocking to proponents of amending the Constitution with the sole purpose of grabbing other people’s property on which both the EFF and the FF+ build their politics (although that of the FF+ politics is in reverse by their fuelling the Whites with a fear for land grabbing and an outcome which the FF+ has falsely positioned itself to be able to prevent it). This outcome means that there is no role to play in the near future for the EFF. For the EFF (as for that of the ACM, the BLF and the ATM) its primary founding aim and intention to effect exclusive land grabbing from Whites specifically, is firstly nullified. Secondly, its sole purpose of exclusive land grabbing, which held the party on the road and assured its members’ enrolment, is erased. It is indeed the spelling out in the near future of the end of what a party such as the EFF saw initially as a new, but false beginning in the May elections’ with its gains in Parliamentary seats. The South African grassroots politics of post-2019 is no more established in the racial radicalism that characterised the manifestos of parties such as the EFF, the BKF, the ACM, the SRWP, the ATM and the FF+. The combined might of the South African capitalist class from all racial groups and the respect for democracy by most Blacks, notwithstanding their suffering under Apartheid had nipped in the bud permanently the popularity and empowerment of these racial radicals, leading to the EFF’s, FF+’s and ATM’s insignificant positions in the Sixth Parliament.93,94
A good example (similar to that of the EFF’s winning of votes from short term disgruntled ANC members and voters), is the said sudden “increase” for example of the right-wing Freedom Front Plus (FF+) in the May election. Its rise in votes is also simply the result of disgruntled White DA-voters who respond foolishly to the FF+’s slogan of “Fight Back”, seeing the FF+ as a rescuer of their so-called “eroded White-rights”. It is not a radical, lasting political improved outcome waiting for the disgruntled Whites. It holds the same limitations and a phasing-out in waiting as for the EFF. It is equal to those reflected by radical Afrikaners in the short-lived days of the AWB. Both the “growths” of the EFF and FF+ are the same racial contamination.36
It is important to critically look further at the belief that socialism is favoured by the mass of South Africans; a direction Malema seemingly wants now to steer his EFF into after the voters’ rejection of his exclusive Black-nationalism, land grabbing and nationalising of every citizen’s assets. The absolute failure of the SRWP which was undoubtedly a nasty shock for socialist supporters of the change away from socialism and radicalism in political thinking on grassroot-level is prominent here. This party, initiated by the 370 000-strong National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) and supported by its affiliated federation, the more or less 800 000-strong South African Federation of Trade Unions (Saftu), received only 24 439 votes (meaning a miniscule 0.14% of the total vote).26
This reflects the dilemma of a dark future waiting for the EFF. Its political foundation is precisely that of the doomed BLF, the ACM, the SRWP and the FF+. Botha95 pinpoints that the above outcome of rejection of the land expropriation without compensation and its racial radicalism, was evidence that the populist and socialist opinion about politics, as held until the May election by the labour-unions [but surly also the BLF, the ACM, the SRWP and the EFF], is presently without standing and a myth.95
On the failed racial radical politics coming from the past election around land expropriation and the parties caught up in it, Botha95 refers specifically as an example to the racial radical BHF [whose policy is openly a combination of Marxism and Leninism (an ideology to which the EFF prominently also lends itself) and the implication which had led to the immense financial chaos in Zimbabwe and Venezuela]. Botha95, in a comparison of the EFF with the BHF, writes as follows on the BLF95:10:
Die…Black First Land First (BLF), wie se leier hom gereeld skuldig maak aan onsinnigheid in die algemeen en haatspraak in die besonder en ook sy volgelinge (wat maar dun gesaai is) aanhits tot onwettige optrede, veral oor die besetting van grond.
Dié party het sowat 0.11% van die stemme ontvang, wat beteken dat sy steun vir ‘n radikale benadering tot nasionalisering van eiendom beperk is tot slegs een persoon uit 1 000 wat gestem het.
Thus in comparing the EFF and its leaders’ racial radicalism with that of the BLF above in how both are driving their politics, there is no real difference, besides the foolish arrogance and self-orientation of the two group’s leaders, thankfully blocking the formation of a foolish alliance. There seems, as for the failed BLF, that the EFF also has a limitation to be able to move into the future, namely as a hindrance, besides its contaminated racial inclinations, its unpredictable and strange leadership. To survive the post-2019 politics, the EFF is now forced to make a drastic change in its politics if it wants to survive until 2024. But, for the EFF to move more racially and economically radical to the left on nationalising the public’s private assets, there is no more space in post-2019 South Africa. To move right and moderately, there is also no place for the EFF: there are already well functioning parties here which will fast gobble up the EFF. Both outcomes are going to leave “Kaiser Julius Malema” walking naked out of Parliament very near in the future. Neither would an alliance with the other radicals such as the BLF, the SRWP and the ACM save the day. As mentioned, these parties are already basically phased out from the post-2019 politics due to their racial, political and economic radicalism, especially on the matter of land. To go to bed with the ATM for Malema’s EFF in a last dying compulsion, will be a fatal coupling for the EFF. It is clear that the ATM, born out of sympathy for Jacob Zuma because of his ousting from the presidency, is just another diminutive party which made it with “luck from somewhere” to Parliament. It is of political insignificance and only costs the taxpayers money by their sitting in Parliament.95
It must be noted that Malema is the EFF and the EFF is Malema. Stripping Malema from his EFF-clothing indeed means the forever departure from politics of Julius Malema, as well as his absurd political ambitions and aspirations. Taking Malema out of the EFF means the outright collapse of the EFF. It will thus take a far more constructive change inside the EFF and its leadership’s mindset to make it and them more acceptable as a party with moderate Blacks and Whites. Malema’s latest political rhetoric-trick after the post-2019 election, as with the many other political jokes, strangeness and obscurities uttered in his politic career, reflects excellenty the EFF’s and Malema’s political confusion and in-depth cementing already into the political wilderness. Prominent is his recent senseless and confused political title-tattle which undoubtedly reflects a serious memory loss on what he extremely racial-radically had said before on Whites and their assets – rhetoric which included serious threats to their property as well as their personal security. His senseless and confused political title-tattle tells us a lot when he said96:7: “We are focusing on all voters generally, not a specific race group. The only issue with white people and our policies is not that they are anti-white. Our policies are anti-white privilege and white people tend to enjoy white privilege at the expense of black people.”
In the face of this false “new good politics”, including a sudden and confusing “White love” as recently declared publically by Malema on behalf of himself and the EFF, Buccus26 guides and warns us on the dark, masked side of the EFF and Malema. Buccus posits26:26: “The EFF is clearly aligned to the mixture of crude nationalism, authoritarianism and gross looting of the state that has characterised the Zuma faction of the ANC.” Buccus26 takes further this unchangeable racial radicalism politics of the EFF (and that of the FF+ from the White side of racial radicals) in the post -2019 politics when he writes26:26: “It is true that the crude racial populism of the EFF and the Freedom Front Plus made some gains, but in the overall picture they remain a minority. Mandela’s vision of racial reconciliation clearly still has the support of the majority of South Africans.”
For the EFF to move into an alliance with the ANC in an effort to block the EFF’s erasing as an entity from the country’s politics, can only possibly happen if the Zuma-faction overtakes the general ANC. But this outcome also seems also impossible, in terms of the EFF’s radical ideology, for any alliance if the doves of the Ramaphosa-clan obtain the upper hand. Even if the present status of internal conflicting-politics activated by the Zuma faction stays on within the ANC, the May 8 election shows that the ANC in general has successfully forced down for the moment the radicals inside it and had already disowned the Zuma-aligned ACM, the BLF and the ATM as possible future partners. Munusamy30 writes specifically in this context on the EFF’s radicalism and racial-contaminated shortcomings, making it already unacceptable as a possible partner to the ANC. Munusamy postulates30:26: “The EFF could have used its popularity on the ground to partner with the ANC in government. But its politics are underlined by malice and brutish behaviour, making a working relationship with any party unfeasible.
Buccus26, on the outcome of the election results of only a 10% stake instead of 15% and more which has forced down an empowerment cap on the EFF, as well as that of its possible radical partners in the ANC, in terms of their further practising of radical politics, writes26:26: “This outcome means that SA is doing relatively well in avoiding the curse of populism. The populists in the ANC have been seriously weakened by Ramaphosa’s success. They will be further weakened by the now much more credible criminal justice system.”
Indeed, the advent of a post-2019 credible criminal justice system may be the strongest eraser of the leadership of the EFF, together with the basically already invisible political movements such as those of the ACM, the ATM, the BLF, by their calling to book for political delinquency.26
126.96.36.199.4. Alleged inner-circle mischief at the EFF home
When it comes to the measuring of the integrity of a political party and its leadership, it is unavoidable to reflect on the EFF’s inner-circle’s politics and the allegations around it. Important to note in this respect are fresh allegations of financial impropriety against Julius Malema by members of his central command, according to Harper98. In his resignation letter, the previous EFF-MP, Zolile Xalisa, accused Malema of failingto account for R2-million a month collected in levies from councillors, MPLs and MPs. It is also alleged that Malema did not account for about R20-million which the party received from the legislatures every quarter.91,97,98
In this context Harper98 reports that in his public resignation, Xalisa also accused Malema of not accounting for about R1.7-million a month collected in levies specific from the EFF’s 825 councillors. It is alleged that since the 2016 elections, each councillor had paid a levy of almost R2 000 a month. Xalisa said98:10: “You [Malema] never reported about this money in the CCT [central team] and the war council. You refuse to be held accountable nor account for these funds.”
Regarding the levies of the 61 MPs and MPLs, Xalisa reports that just under R7 000 a person a month – which totals R427 000 a month for the 61 members, were collected – and there was no proper accounting done by Malema. All of the abovementioned money was meant to go into a constituency fund for EFF parliamentarians to do their constituency work. Furthermore, Malema is accused by Xalisa of forcing the central command team to themselves pay weekly deployment costs, including car hire, accommodation, party T-shirts and food for supporters.91,98
The other EFF-MP that resigned, Thebinosi Rawula, also accused Malema of alleged financial irregularities.91,97,98
In addition is the fact that Julius Malema has not yet been cleared from prosecution of earlier corruption charges in connection with government tenders in Limpopo. Now that the NPA is renewed and the Zuma-capture thereof it is starting to be cleared, Malema can become a point of focus.97
The madman-looting of the VBS Mutual Bank by many political fools and their cronies is now ready for prosecution. In this context, writes Bruce99, the fraud and pillage at the VBS Mutual Bank and the demonstrable benefit from the looting of it by Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu, which indeed forced their arrest, handcuffing, perp-walking, charging and then releasing on bail before the May 8 election is a clear and easy case for the law-enforcment agencies. Besides this, there is the allegation against the EFF of the receipt of funding from the tobacco underworld that needs the attention of the NPA, SARS and the SAPS, posits Munusamy.100
The arrest of Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu – Bruce’s99 description of “their handcuffing, perp-walking, charging and then releasing on bail before the May 8 election”, which was the moral and politically correct action — was seemingly only to avoid by the ANC’s opportunism not to lose some votes to the EFF for these arrests before the election and/or of a possible partnership between the ANC and EFF after the election. Notwithstanding all this political covering against their earlier arrest, Shamila Batohi and some trustworthy and law-abiding members in the Hawks, the NPA and the SAPS are hopefully waiting patiently for them. Bruce postulates that hopefully their arrests will come during 2019, with the possible outcome of leaving the EFF leaderless already in 2019.99-102
It seems that criminal law has at last arrived at the EFF’s door. It was reported that the EFF MP Marshall Dlamini had appeared on the 15th April 2019 in the magistrate’s court of Cape Town, due to his alleged assault of a police officer in Parliament on the 7th February. It seems that the deputy leader of the EFF, Floyd Shivambu, will also appear in court about his alleged assault of a journalist in March on the Parliament terrain. The 4% rise and glory of the last election can fast make place for the erasing of the EFF and its leaders, if the law is properly executed. The need to take them to court for past wrong–doings is highlighted by various investigative journalists.99-102
188.8.131.52.5. Julius Malema is an acolyte of Peter Mokaba in his underwriting of narrow African nationalism
Julius Malema, the EFF’s top leader, is “an acolyte of Peter Mokaba”, reflects the seasoned political analyst and the political editor of the Sunday Times, Sibongakonke Shoba103, in March 2009. This Malema political inclination is well-illustrated by Shoba103 by clearly showing Malema’s focus of his politics on a narrow “African nationalism”; a political ideology that had already failed to gain ground in the ANC and even the broader South African community. (Narrow White-nationalism was also the reason for the failure of the Afrikaners as a tribe in South Africa and brought down the NP with its racial and discriminative Apartheid; a party which was intimately built around it and its wrong-doings).1,103
Malema and his EFF, writes Shoba103, are a product of Mokaba’s teachings. He had undoubtedly become a believer in and a supporter of the worst form of African nationalism. Shoba writes103:19: “He has hijacked the political space once occupied by the PAC and the Azanian People’s Organisation. Even though Malema may, on occasion, invoke the names of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo, his politics have been inspired by Pan-Africanist rhetoric. His attacks on white people and South Africans of Indian origin show that his idea of African nationalism is extreme, and has an element of right-wing demagoguery.”
What Shoba103 missed out on and also needs to say, is that Malema’s ideology of the “encircling of a greater South African African-nationalism” has been cemented into a well-masked “Venda-African-nationalism” or plain “Venda-tribalism”. It is a deadly, abnormal Black ethnicity and tribalism. This Venda-nationalism-tribalism carries in ordinary South African politics absolutely no empowerment or status and will go nowhere. To underwrite and propagate it would let Malema remain for ever faceless, unknown and powerless in South African politics, and of course, out of Parliament and its feed-trough. The reflection of and presentation thus of a “greater” South African African-nationalism”, is nothing more than masterminded-politics by Malema, purely for opportunistic reasons and his personal gain. (This “Malema-initiative” is to a certain extent a pure mimicing of the Zuma clan’s failed policy through which they tried to represent “African-Black nationalism” or “Black-African nationalism” away from African-nationalism for their political gain, such as activating and upholding of state capture, land grabbing and the nationalising of White capital, etc.).34,63,64,103
Prominent in Malema’s attacks on so-called “non-Africans” (meaning “non-Black” Africans) are the names of Pravin Gordhan (also a target of Mokaba) and Shamila Batohi. And then there are the Afrikaners/Whites, especially the farm owners and White-capitalists.99,104 Excellent examples here are the many politically and racially delinquent utterances of Malema between 2016 and 2018, such as: “We are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now” and his statement that: “…people of Indian decent tend to mistreat black workers” – both utterances which the South African Human Rights Commission found to be OK!104,105 Then there is Malema’s nonchalant pronouncement of Pravin Gordhan as a “…dog of white monopoly capital who hates Africans”, as well as Shivambu’s authored blog post, accusing as follows: “Gordhan of running a cabal and operating a parallel state”.104,105 These kinds of utterances, if used by a White, undoubtedly would mean a jail sentence plus.
The allegation of the “future that the EFF is seising” and the “freshness and creativeness” that the EFF allegedly is bringing to the so-called “South African old politics of liberation”- as seen and propagated by Kanyane92 – is going to be very short-lived. The EFF has gained temporarily more votes in the May-election through racism and extreme radical-politics, only because the greater ANC as well as the DA shy away from this kind of political delinquency. But it is going to cost the EFF dearly in post-2019 politics. It must be noted, on the other side, that this political and racial contamination which has beset the EFF will spread into its co-partners if the EFF is successful in misleading either the DA or the ANC into a post-2019 trap of cooperation.103
An exclusive and selective African nationalism (equal to the one which Malema propagates) cost the PAC and Azapo dearly, putting them into permanent regression as groups after 1994, writes Shoba103. The “struggle of Africans” in South Africa, as Malema with great mischief reflects, is not limited to small group of African-Blacks, but includes all the racial groups who are a permanent part of South Africa and thus Africa. It is clear that with regard to the ultra-African nationalism, it is today only Malema and a very small group of remnants of the old revolutionaries that are still stuck with this cognitive idea. The EFF’s propagation and spreading of it spells revolution and genocide that are not part of the thinking of the majority of South Africans. Looking at this delinquent-internalised mindset of Julius Malema, is it undoubtedly with a tongue in his cheek that Shoba fatherly advises Malema103:19: “If Malema is serious about realising his childhood ambition to ascend to the highest office in the land, he will have to change tack.” From experience Shoba103 must know very well that Malema cannot change; neither does he understand the meaning “tack”, or what it means to be responsible after ascending to the highest office.
184.108.40.206.6. Malema and his merry men mostly dressed in Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits
On Julius Malema’s bi-polar presence in the South African politics — and surely an effort to give us insight into the many colours a chameleon can take, even those in the South African politics — De Waal writes106:33:
Thabo Mbeki at the Rand Easter Show! How thrilling. The diminutive former statesman was wheeled out of retirement by the ANC to counter the presence of his former foe, Julius Malema, who now leads the ANC’s external ultra-left wing, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). First, though, a little back ground. It was Malema, then leading the ANC Youth League, who said he would kill for Jacob Zuma, who was then challenging Mbeki for the ANC leadership. Later, in one of those historical ironies one can only relish, Malema himself was booted out of the ANC – by his former patron and glorious leader, Zuma, for comparing him unfavourably with his predecessor, Mbeki!
How we chuckled.
It’s rather odd that, now, with both Mbeki and Zuma out of power, Malema is backing Zuma’s bagman, Tom Moyane, to the hilt, and demonetising Pravin Gordhan, Zuma’s bête noir, for all he’s worth. But that’s a puzzle for another day.
To unlock the above puzzle around the specific Julius Malema political mindset and actions is very easy and does not need another day. We just have to look back to his yesterday and his not so far-back history of politically delinquent actions and how easily he changes from his Dr Jekyll suit to his Mister Hyde suit when the situation opportunistically fits him.
Firstly, witness his delinquent political action excellently reflected when Cosatu, under his leadership in 2002, unleashed chaos in the Johannesburg CBD, leading to loses by pedestrians, vendors and shopkeepers who were mugged and robbed during the rowdy illegal march.107This kind of unleashing of chaos-behaviour in public was alleged again to be caused by his EFF’s involvement at the more recent unrest in the township of Alexandra on land occupation. It was prominently alleged at the last sitting of the Alexandra Inquiry in May 2019 that the EFF was directly involved. At a meeting of the Inquiry, the Alexandra councillor, Teffo Raphadu, said that the EFF perpetrates land invasions in Alexandra in such a delinquent way “that [it] put people’s lives in danger,” according to Okoye.108
Furthermore, it seems, that there is only one approach for Malema109 to obtain land reform (especially the transfer of White “settlers’ so called stolen land” to the landless and poor Blacks, and that is through violence, anarchy and revolution. He declares himself open to the use of violence, anarchy and revolution in the settling of the land matter, ignoring the fact that a mandated black government, the ANC, is reigning and he himself is a MP of the respected South African Parliament and not a non-conforming member of a bush-bar. He is supposed to be a role-model and is expected to promote integrity. The intention to incite unlawful violence, anarchy and revolution in order to overthrow the government of the day is well illustrated by his following writing on the 22 July 2018109:22:
There is simply no way Parliament can retreat on this question any longer. After all these consultations, one thing is clear: to retreat and betray our people on the demand for land expropriation will be to risk a direct revolution, which they will conduct on their own, wherever they are.
On that day, when our people take the land by force, the EFF will join in because the power of the day would have refused to co-ordinate a peaceful, democratic and inclusive process that empowers the previously oppressed to have access to the land.
When further examining his EFF Manifesto presented for the recent election, the same kind of disorder politics is preached by him. The basis is over and over the threatening of the order of society and the instigation of anarchy, constantly and continuously. It reads89:18:
“We are not part of the 1994 elite pact. We are a completely new generation, with new demands. And our demands, unlike those of the 1994 generation, will not be postponed. We refuse to be silenced with so-called reconciliation. We want justice now. We want our land now. We want jobs now. We demand the economy now!”
But there are more than just the Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits that Malema and his cronies from the EFF seem to dress themselves in daily: there are seemingly also their witch-hunter suits that need to be highlighted, because this also, as Teffo Raphadu said of the EFF’s alleged delinquent activities in Alexandra, “puts peoples’ lives in danger.”108,110
At the end of this article the Citizen of the 29th May 2019 reports on the politics of the bizarre that comes from the EFF leader Malema’s alleged death threats towards the Scorpio’s investigative journalist Pauli van Wyk.110 This reaction followed after her report on the 28th May 2019 on how the EFF had apparently benefitted from the looting of the now defunct VBS Mutual Bank, as well as the EFF’s deflection from claims of corruption to a spirited defence of the public protector. Watson110, on these alleged actions of the EFF-cronies, writes110:2: “When the story – titled “Cruising nicely on VBS: EFF’s Parties, Lies and Looted Money” – was released on Monday night, Malema’s response on Twitter was: “We are still cruising nicely, bana ba balei [children of witches] are not happy. Go for kill fighters, hit hard…[sic]”. ▼
Watson110 writes that Van Wyk110 allegedly had noted in her article that the EFF’s fourth birthday bash in Durban in July 2017 was seemingly funded by a part of the money of the illegal R16.1-million Brian Shivambu’s company Sgameka Projects received from VBS that was ultimately channelled to the EFF. Watson also writes that it is alleged by Scorpio that it has so far isolated about R4.13-million in VBS loot paid to the EFF. Watson110 reflects that the article of Van Wyk is currently (29th May 2019) on the Daily Maverick with apparent copies of bank statements around these payments. He writes110:2: “…which, on the face of it, explain the flow of cash in “a scheme designed to mask the origin and ultimate beneficiaries of the funds. VBS money flowed through companies over which Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu have ultimate control”.”
In response to further enquiries to Malema by Van Wyk110 about the leadership of the EFF and its treasurer-general Leigh-Ann Mathys, alleged Watson110 that had Malema said110:2: “I won’t be answering any questions from the moloi [witch]; she can write anything she wants to write. I’ve responded to all her questions before and won’t be doing it going forward. She is extraordinarily personal [sic] and I’m not answerable to a white madam. She can go to the nearest hell.” ▼
Watson110 reports further that, in a seeming effort at deflecting from the VBS Bank matter, the EFF Deputy President Shivambu110 compared Van Wyk to a lizard and Pravin Gordhan to a crocodile110:2: “We really have no time fighting lizards when the crocodiles are the real enemy forces.” This brings us again to the foreground of Van Wyk’s110 earlier note in the Scorpio on the “strange” and for “what unknown” reason, the “spirited defence of the public protector” by the EFF who is herself at the moment under scrutiny by the various political bodies for her actions.
How far the politically delinquent actions, especially on the contamination of good racial-relations, of persons such as Malema and his intimate cronies in their Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits have tragically already penetrated a sector of the Black society mindsets with their dangerous anti-White culture and radicalism, was well-illustrated by the crowd’s booing of ex-President FW de Klerk (the man who puts Blacks – and thus also Julius Malema and his cronies – in charge of South Africa in 1994) at the recent inauguration of President Cyril Ramaphosa.111 Bachtis111 writes as follows on this indication of the vile racial tensions that exist in the country111:13:
This was a naked display of intolerance of one race group against another. Sickening in the extreme, as white people in this country were given notice that they are abhorred, and regarded as undesirable.
It took the master of ceremonies some time to bring the crowd to order. Sadly, many in that crowd were dignitaries from countries across the African continent, witnessing vitriolic sentiments.
This show of disrespect heralds the new South Africa, a country where white-skinned people, born in this country, are regarded as being of no importance.
The white diaspora will continue, and this country will continue to entrench reverse racism and apartheid.
That the Whites must start to fear for their lives if Malema and his cronies win the empowerment of the country’s politics, is further confirmed by his racially delinquent utterance of:
“We are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now”.103-105
The above words, which echo perfectly Julius Malema’s history of racial rhetoric, have excellently put in the foreground Julius Malema’s and the EFF’s all-over political mischief of agitation and the instigation of disrespect for the individual’s rights, democracy, and political order. This negativity is not only applicable to the Whites, but also to the greater Black population.89,107,108,110,111
Political jokers and clowns bring laughter and can sometimes change for the good, even inside the political circus, but political fools can, masked as jokers and clowns, be very dangerous in the short and long run for the minorities and a country’s stability: remember Idi Amin and Adolf Hitler. Thankfully, the delinquencies and foolishnesses of these political fools’ mostly disable themselves in the end.99-102
Malema and his cronies at the EFF will hopefully soon learn that their outdated and poor fitting Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits do not fit into today’s respectable politics. Neither can their witch-hunter suits qualifying them for jokers and clowns. To be dressed in these outfits much longer can cost them dearly.99-102
▲ It is important for Julius Malema with regard to his alleged calling Pauli van Wyk a witch, to take note of the main aims of the Witchcraft Suppression Act No 3 of 1957, namely112:
To prevent any person or a community to identify a specific person (notwithstanding his position or doing, to justify such an identification) to be a “”wizard”” through witch-finding;
To prevent that this identified person (“wizard”) is harmed (threatened, terrorised, victimised or even murdered) in any way by the “witch-finder” or the community;
To prevent a person to call himself a ‘wizard’ by prohibiting such self-naming / declaration as a crime, with the sole aim to safeguard him against harm by his own wrong-doing, to be identified as a ‘wizard’ by the ‘witch-finder’ and the community. [For full text see Section 1(a) to (f) (i) – (iv) of the Act].
This means that Malema’s alleged calling of Ms Pauli Van Wyk a moloi (witch) and the alleged use of the words: bana ba balei [children of witches] are not good. Go for kill fighters, hit hard…[sic]”, can be a serious matter and lead to his criminal prosecution and being sent to jail. It can be as serious as looting the VBS Bank’s money and committing high treason.110,112
220.127.116.11.7. The EFF is a boys’ club of dinky-toy players
The EFF is a boys club of dinky toy players; it does not have political potential, quality or maturity. The majority of democracy-loving South Africans know it well. It is only the politically poorly informed voters and some present-day confused and disillusioned ANC members, together with a pocket of political radicals, that still believe in the EFF’s kindergarten stories and their so-called “saviour and messianic” leaders, the honourable MPs Malema and Shivambu, to bring about their Utopia.12,92,99,100,113-115
The EFF’s Manifesto, propagated by Julius Malema under the heading: “The EFF is ready to govern as demonstrated by the detailed blueprint for economic emancipation as set out in its manifesto”, is not worth the paper on which it has been written. There is an immense difference between a detailed manifesto of plain nonsense and a detailed record of an excellent practice of politics. The last mentioned is a good characteristic which the EFF is totally lacking. Prominent from the reading of the EFF Manifesto is Malema’s instigation of violence, racism, minority-bashing and radical-Marxism and the solving of politics and economics with the typical chaos-revolutionary business model where the ruler does not create new economic growth, prosperity and richness, but only transfers the assets of the one group to the so-called poor and landless people, who, at the end, stay landless and poverty-stricken. At the end of such a chaotic regime, when the economics come to a standstill and poverty and chaos reigns, the ruler collapses and escapes the scene with his loot.33,88,103,114,115
The EFF is, in its juvenile stage of development, already a failed political experience. Hopefully, if the NPA at last starts to do its work, Malema and his immediate cronies will be out of circulation in 2019.88,110,114 The heartbreak which Julius Malema experienced when he mourned the death of his grandmother115:7: “I am broken, finished” may be his same words in the future with his departure and that of his beloved EFF from the country’s politics.
History can be hard and cruel on foolish politicians and their parties. This punishment can be harder for an irresponsible boys club of dinky toy players. Sorely for the EFF, it seems to be one of these historical cases.
18.104.22.168.8. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018
On the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, the EFF is awarded eight points out of a possible 82 points.81
This measure shows that the EFF does not have the ability or a single talent to take on a simple government task or duty; forget the implementation of the nationalising and the grabbing of land. The EFF and its politics is like a dog chasing a car for years and then one day the car stops, giving the dog the opportunity to try to bite the tyres and to take the car captive, but without success, leaving it with the enormous problem of what to do with the stranded car it was chasing for years. The EFF has indeed been stranded between its inciting, foolish and hostile rhetoric and its lack of knowhow to be able to do constructive deeds. And then there is its extremely unpredictable politics, bordering on political insanity. The EFF’s mastery to distract the attention from their own delinquencies and inabilities through the excellent misuse of social media are also thankfully diminishing fast under the onslaught of investigative and constructive journalists. The fact is, and the public is beginning to learn this well, that the EFF and its leaders’ political warts on their hands and faces make them just too visible.12,92,99,100,108,113-116
On the decision to vote for the EFF or not in the recent May 2019 election, Munusamy118 gave the voters before the election clear, advice: “…holding our noses to vote for the least-odious party” when she guides118:20: “To make a decision to vote requires that law-abiding, conscientious people ask themselves which political party is least offensive to their own values and principles.” When the “is least offensive” requirement has been applied, it could not be the EFF. Thankfully also, to support Munusamy’s118 guideline, most of the voters have excellent values and principles. They showed it clearly in the election by their isolation of the EFF, together with its cronies, such as the ATM, the ACM and the BLF, from future serious politics. Indeed, the voters put the lid on radical racial politicians. The EFF’s politics, reflected by its contaminated political thinking, planning and action, spell only disaster all over for the county’s well-being.116,118
If people are disgusted by the possible inclusion of some of the 22 listed disgraced ANC top brass as parliamentarians, they must be just as disgusted to see Malema and Shivambu back in Parliament as MPs.92,99,100,113,114,116 But, on the other hand, to be noted on this uncommon phenomenon, people must remember, as Retief119 says, this is Africa. Seemingly this country now has its own style of the practice of politics and the underwriting of political integrity.
All South Africans, especially the Whites, know that serious land reform is absolutely needed; it is an immediate imperative and there is a strong contingent of Whites willing to participate in reasonable land transfer to Blacks. The EFF and its leaders’ incoherent land grabbing policy, together with their cognitive political mal-thinking, spell revolution and can lead to the cost of thousands of innocent lives. Mandela’s sole reason for entrance into the 1994-Dispensation was because too much blood of the Black majority had been spilled. The EFF wants a Rwanda in South Africa. The EFF and the Malema-crowd are on the way, if they get the opportunity, to spill blood again, but this time a mass of Black, Coloured, Indian and White blood.75-80
It is clear that the EFF’s CV is very thin. It lacks the prescribed qualifications and documents as well as the prescribed experience to be a ruler. They played off this meaningless CV very well in the May election, without anyone really contacting their referees. The Attestations or letters of the referees on the EFF’s and its leaders’ trustworthiness, integrity and qualities – besides one or two subjective, uninformed and unqualified referees — are totally rejecting the EFF as a ruler or partner to a ruler for post-2019 South Africa. The referees of the EFF, in evaluating it as the ideal government to activate, steer and finalise land expropriation, with (or without) compensation, erases them summarily from the list of candidates.
The count awarded to EFF and its leadership in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201881, is a mere 8 (9%) out of a possible maximum of 82 (100%). This means, together with its leadership, an outright failure as a political institution of stature.75-80
Mischief-doing is the only ability of the EFF and its leadership. The present holding of mass land ownership by Whites is basically the only initiative left to the EFF to be able to perpetuate mischief too, basically because it can be contaminated unobstructedly through the EFF’s Parliament privilege racial relations without the taking of responsibility or the calling to book if a fiasco follows. Coetzee120 warns on this post-2019 possibility and the serious consequences for the country by these dinky-toy players’ actions120:14: “Die moedswillige skade wat die Julius Malemas, Magashules and Mlamleli’s met hul opruiery van grondbesetters aanrig, is onberekenbaar.”
The ANC’s own radical racism is strengthening the opportunity for the EFF’s boys club to make some noise, as in the past, in Parliament on the land matter. Coetzee writes120:14: “Naas die korrupsiestryd, gaan die grondkwessie in dié vyfjaar-termyn ‘n brandpunt wees. Die arena waar die wetlike stryd hom grootliks gaan uitspeel, is in die parlement, waar die ad hoc-kommittee vir die wysiging van die Grondwet se art.25 deurgedryf gaan word.” It is the same Parliament where the EFF had shown in the past its unlimited political gangsters and violence. The land reform matter can, if the EFF is not favoured and supported by the other parliamentarians in doing it in “Malema-style”, change to serious Parliamentary conflict and violence.
The EFF cannot be trusted in any way to be in charge of land expropriation. Moreover, they totally lack the experience to handle such a project.
The applicant status of the EFF, to be considered as an able candidate to be able to rule South Africa after May 8, and thus to successfully activate land expropriation (with or without compensation), is so low that it and its leadership should not ever be considered and be allowed on the first list of applicants to be a ruler. The application of the EFF must be completely rejected and its application papers should be sent back. It cannot be shortlisted.
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Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The author declares that he has no competing interest.
The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.
UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS
Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa. (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanisation and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.