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Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (15: Opportunism)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (15: Opportunism)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Confidence, desperate, elite, liberty, opportunist, perspective, power, recapitalisation, venture, revolutionary.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 6

1. Background

Various definitions are offered on the word opportunism. The word is repeatedly redefined by businessmen and doubtful politicians as the “theory of discovering and pursing opportunities”, mostly because of their dislike for the idea that there “could ever be anything wrong with their motivated and ongoing capitalising on the many opportunities that cross their ways”.1:2 From a moral perspective, this is seen as nothing else than self defense. As in politics, this makes it easy to commit enormous delinquencies because the law is not applied in the absence of an efficient police force or prosecuting authority. The failures of these institutions are mostly manipulated by a crooked regime to let them off the hook from prosecution, as reflected by the Zuma regime’s contamination of the political system with hooliganism. What these opportunists, especially the crooked politicians, are not saying is that the others involved in these “grand” schemes are mostly vulnerable people who are lacking resources and knowledge to develop their own opportunities.

The unfortunate players in the political system are governed by a group racially and culturally similar to them. These vulnerable people blindly trust their government, as they were the so-called liberators of their people from their suppressors. En masse, black people accepted the ANCelite as the extraordinary leaders who had freed them from Apartheid. The poor and disadvantaged black people, in their pre-1994 socio-economic and political confusion, were not aware of their liberators’ broader context. The ANC was a political orphan, born out of a Marxist-Leninist ideology, thereby becoming an harsh, self-serving and unscrupulousness machine in adulthood. It is a revolutionary organisation which lacks honesty and humanity, and the ability to create and to develop the country beyond nepotism for its elite and their comrades. These communist ideas remain deeply rooted in their approach, as they were (and are still) extreme opportunists, to the detriment of the state. The various judicial commissions of the ANC from 1994 to 2019 indicate their chaotic governance. The delinquent ANC party gaining power in the country in 1994 was partly accomplished through the systematic misconduct of the naive Apartheid’s regime.2-8

Thirty-two years ago, in 1987, Villa-Vicencio8 already warned the potential voters of the approaching 1994 elections that they need to know what Marxist-Leninist socialism means in politics, especially if a similarly orientated political party obtain power. He writes8:91:

Marxist-Leninist socialism (also known as communism) is committed to the abolition of the oppressive and exploitative concentration of power and wealth in the bourgeoisie and the creation of the equality of a ‘classless society’ brought about by the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ – in fact the dictatorship of the leadership elite of the communist party. Practice has shown that while a totalitarian state is capable of enforcing a more egalitarian distribution of income, this may occur at the expense of liberty and productivity. State planning seems to be less efficient than the results produced by the free play of the market mechanism. The prescriptions of an incompetent and clumsy bureaucracy stifle initiative and versatility and devour resources, while the concentration of power in the hands of a few is even more fearful than that in the free enterprise system.

Villa-Vicencio’s8:91 aforementioned problematic traits of a communist regime (like the presence of a dictatorship of the “leadership elite with the concentration of power in the hands of a few”, the losing of liberty and productivity”, the degrading of state planning and doing,the devour of resources”, the presence of an incompetent and clumsy bureaucracy”, etc.) mirror all of the regime-markers of the ANC-regime, over the course of twenty-five years. It illuminates why there was state capture, why there was cadre-deployment and why the ANC-elite, in their constant and ongoing embezzling of other’s assets, are extreme opportunists. The post-1994 ANC elite became a kind of systematic aristocracy; the new lords and ladies who, as the old colonists did, are taking from the poor, indigenous people in terms of their “theory of discovering and pursing opportunities”.8

Martinez5 also indirectly contributes to an understanding of this robbing of the poor by the ANC elite, driven by their excessive opportunism. He prominently identifies how people are driven from their land and traditional living areas because of poverty and other negative circumstances, resulting in the people and their lawfully-gained assets to become the victims of the “opportunists” or elite. He writes5:153: “There is nothing voluntary about this process. Indeed, it’s hard to see the original appropriation and privatisation of commonly owned resources as anything but theft”.

Martinez5 quotes a paragraph that reflects the resentment from that time, against the exploitation of the poor’s resources and assets by political opportunists. The paragraph reads5:153:

The law locks up the man or woman

Who steals the goose off the common

But leaves the greatest villain loo

Who steals the common from the goose.

 

The law demands that we atone

When we take things we do not own

But leaves the lords and ladies fine

Who take things that are yours and mine.

Since the new Dispensation in 1994, the ANC regime’s projects were saturated with corruption and theft. Especially land projects financed by the state, such as projects that transfer land back to the legal Black owners, have been especially corrupt. A handful of senior ANC elites especially stand out. In light of Martinetz’s5 and Villa-Vicencio’s8 aforementioned descriptions, it is important to begin identifying the many “looters” inside the ANC elite through a thorough understanding of opportunism and the characteristics thereof.

A broad definition of opportunism describes a situation where a person or a group capitalises on the missteps of others. This means that opportunists aim to exploit the opportunities created by the errors, weaknesses or distractions of their opponents to their own advantage. This can be understood as the conscious and self-serving practice of taking advantage of circumstances. Furthermore, human opportunism mostly occurs where people can gain the most for themselves at the least cost to themselves. Rooted in this definition of opportunism is the specific and identifiable response to opportunities: the response has elements of excessive self-interest in combination with the disregard of ethical principles, intended or agreed-upon goals, or the shared concerns of a group. When functioning like this (overriding ethics, goals and concerns), a group cannot be virtuous.1

More precise descriptions include ideas such as1:1:

“Opportunism is the practice of taking advantage of circumstances – with little regards for principles or with what the consequences are for others. Opportunist actions are expedient actions guided primarily by self-interested motives. The term can be applied to individual humans and living organisms, groups, organizations, styles, behaviours, and trends”.

The above definition of opportunism is made more comprehensive and applicable to actions taken by opportunists by the following1:2:

…the moral dilemma implied by opportunism concerns the conflict of self-interest with the interests of others, or with following a principle: either to do what one wants, or to do “what is the right thing to do”. Thus, substantively, opportunism refers to someone who acts on opportunities in a self-interested, biased or one-sided manner that conflicts or contrasts in some way with one or more general rule, law, norm, or principle.

The fact that self-interested action evokes this conflict often implies that the tendency to use opportunities to advantage is excessive or improper, the corollary being a deficiency of character or at least a lack of propriety. Hence the term opportunism often has the pejorative connotation of morally unsound behaviour, or behaviour that sacrifices a greater good for the sake of gaining an advantage foe oneself or one’s own group. Moralists may have distaste for opportunism, insofar as opportunism implies the violation of a moral principle.

It is often difficult for an outsider to understand why an action or an idea is (or is not) “opportunist”, because the outsider does not know the whole story, or the whole context, or the true intention behind it. The way things appear can give an impression which is quite different from the real motivation that is behind it.

A third definition reads1:2:

As a style of human behaviour, opportunism has the connotation of a lack of integrity, or doing something that is out of character (inconsistent). The underlying thought is that the price of the unrestrained pursuit of selfishness is behavioural inconsistency. Thus, opportunism involves compromising some or other principle normally upheld. However, the boundary between “legitimate self-interest” and “undesirable (or anti-social) selfishness” can be difficult to define; the definition may depend on one’s point of view, or position in life.

Some people regard an opportunist stance positively as a legitimate choice, which can be the lesser evil.

Looking to some of the ANC elite’s ongoing and constant delinquent behaviour since 1994 (or since they’ve held legitimate political power), the primary characteristic of opportunism is the lack of integrity and the failure to uphold moral principles. Excessive improper behaviour comprises the principles that are normally upheld, and the presence of anti-social selfishness and the intention to gain an advantage for the self and/or the group ignores the interests and rights of others outright. General rules, laws, norms or other established and accepted principles are violated. The deficiency of character, or at least a lack of propriety, is also applicable inside this definition on some of the ANC elite’s personal functioning.

This aforementioned description1 of the ANC elite’s opportunism, together with the Louw10 checklist markers, will be the criteria used in the evaluation and exploration of opportunism as reflected by members of the ANC’s elite.

Opportunism mostly takes place when internal and external boundaries of behaviour are absent in individuals or groups, and they are pressured to choose and act. In this context, it must be noted that the majority of ANC members and their the leaders were financially underprivileged upon returning to South Africa after 1994. Even their new salaries as MPs, MPLs, ministers and the relatively higher president’s salary did not negate the challenging years of fighting the Apartheid regime without an income. The opportunity to make fast, large sums of money for their own benefit through various forms of state capture (such as the arms deal, the stealing of land, etc.) became attractive to many of the ANC elite. These decisions were also made under pressure, as they took power in 1994. Furthermore, the looting through opportunism created a new habit, custom and tradition inside the ANC elite. This new tradition built on the aforementioned belief that the struggle against Apartheid and their subsequent financial suffering needed to be compensated for in some way. For many ANC members, the role of political opportunists became a choice to serve as a vehicle for self-enrichment on the same basis as many businessmen justifying their crooked roles as opportunists: practicing the theory of discovering and pursuing opportunities. By this token, the political opportunism in the ANC is redefining entrepreneurship as a euphemism for opportunism.

Regarding evidence of the immense (and successful) instances of political opportunism in the ANC’s make-up, the late Jackie Selebi serves as a prime example of looting and delinquency. Books by Myburgh5, Pauw7, and Basson and Du Toit2 are in-depth studies of the facts and details of the ANC’s lawless behaviour. It must also be noted that the ANC’s direct involvement in numerous acts of terrorism and murder before 1994 has an impact on their present day operations; their present moral framework possibly influenced be these extremes. Looking back to the mid-1990s, where the ANC elites were settling in to their new political and executive empowerment, many kinds of “opportunities” were suddenly at hand. Clearly, many members could not refuse the financial reward. Furthermore, the money to be gained often did not require a high level of education on the part of the opportunist. In these circumstances, and inside the inner circle of the ANC, the small group of ANC opportunists developed. From here, the opportunist members and their benefactors were strategically and systematically developed and deployed through cadre-, MK- and friends-and-family-appointments. This can be seen in the capture of ESKOM, SAA, SABC as well as in other state enterprises and the creation of external role players, such as the Guptas and Bosasa that manage and guide opportunistic corruption. [One must consider this unique and sometimes strange behaviour of the ANC’s inner circle within the definition of opportunism that claims it is often difficult for an outsider to understand why an action or an idea is (or is not) “opportunist”. The outsider does not know the full story, or the whole context and the true intentions].1,4-8

The presence of possible psychopathy or psychopathology in the behaviour of some of the ANC elite (either inherent or as a result of extreme situations such as terrorist activities) must also be considered. Gumede4 opens the discussion for possible effects of psychopathy, or at least some form of psychopathology, apparent in the ANC’s history over 25 years. This possible pathology reflects on the leadership as well as the followers of the ANC when Gumede argues why psychopathology in politics took seat in South Africa. He writes4:18:

Mass trauma such as colonialism and apartheid, combined with chronic poverty and unemployment distort the way people make decisions including about how they will vote. The trauma of colonialism and apartheid ends up delivering many maladjusted black leaders who mimic the behaviour of their former white oppressors – cynical exploitation, callousness and dishonesty. At the same time, many of the formerly oppressed tolerate exploitative and corrupt black leaders because although they may be useless, they are at least black – supposedly “one of us”.

Mass trauma has instilled in many black communities’ fear, anger and resentment towards the former colonial and apartheid elites. Not surprisingly, many formerly oppressed see the world as a continuing black/white division between former governing elites (the “insiders”) and the formerly disadvantaged (the “outsiders”).

Yet, as African leaders and governments become entrenched in power, they become the new insiders, the oppressors, only now they are black.

The poor black majority of course remain the outsiders, but because their corrupt, autocratic and incompetent leaders are black and espouse anti-colonial beliefs, black voters see them not as insiders but as part of the “oppressed” group.

Zuma became very wealthy. Many SACP, EFF and trade union leaders are nouveau riche. Yet, they are seen by many poor black supporters as being on their side against privileged white or foreign “interests”.

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 14)

Article 15 is a continuation of the previous article 14, titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability)”. This article is in sequence with articles 11 to 14, which were already published on the ANC. The intention is to analyse and discuss further arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC to carry out land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.2. Aims of article 15 (Continued from Article 14)

The primary intention of this project on the ANC is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by profiling the ANC on the same basis that was applied to the EFF (Article 9) and the DA (Article 10).

In this article, the primary aim is to determine how opportunism has impacted the viewpoints and behaviour of some of the ANC elite as well as the ruling of the ANC regime as the mandated ruler of South Africa.

2. Method (Continued from Article 14)

The research was conducted by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is often used in modern political-historical research where there is no established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to successfully apply land reformation from 2019 onward. The sources included articles from 2018, books from the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers from the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that will guide South Africans when evaluating the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to perform successful land reform from 2019.

The research findings have been presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

The presence of opportunism in the actions of some of the ANC elite became apparent during the various judicial commissions of inquiry on state capture. The Zondo commission’s testimonies show clear criminal behaviour that can be followed up by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the National Prosecution Authority (NPA). The media’s reports on the Zondo commission are substantial in both the quantity of articles and the amount of content. The full amount and detail of the judicial commissions that uncover the ANC elite’s opportunism from 1994 to 2019 is impossible to include in an article with a prescribed word limitation, such as this one. For the purposes of this article, it is more appropriate to concentrate on clear examples of the unprincipled exploitation and ill-planned misuse of the impoverished black communities and all members of the public, through such criminal activities such as land grabbing from other black people and other self-enrichment schemes, such as salaries and benefits.

In this article the public referees of the African National Congress will further be reflected upon, evaluated and described in division 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019. This division focuses on the acceptance and the practice of opportunism as a lifestyle by the ANC elite.

3.2. Louw Appraisal Checklist

The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,10 will be used for the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC. The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s’ manifesto and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts. Lastly, these findings are interpreted by the researcher.10

3.3. The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 14)

3.3.1. ANC’s opportunism
3.3.1.1. The post-1994 damned farming projects
3.3.1.1.1. Failed upliftment programme of young black people in the farming

Whilst articles 3 to 6 already discuss the farming issue and its relationship to land expropriation without compensation in detail, it is appropriate to contextualise this issue with the ANC and their history in mind. In short, the ANC’s 1994 to 2019 land redistribution plan failed not only because of the regime’s own corruption and a lack of insight, strategy, business and project planning and management, but mostly as result of the opportunism culture of the inner circle of the ANC’s state capture and corruption. This present day fraud and stealing of land and assets of the impoverished black communities, activated and driven by the extreme opportunism of some of the ANC elite, is strikingly similar to the white opportunist’s theft of the land of black people between 1652 and 1994. This was the beginning of, ostensibly, black-on-black Apartheid and the birth of the exclusive monopoly of the ANC elite as the new owners of land paid by the state and the impoverished black community. The opportunism of these ANC elite’s land grabbing scheme goes deeper still: the deliberate denial of the black youth to become farmers, thereby having first access to the land grabbed by the ANC elite.11

Recent data reflects that, in 2019, three million members of the black youth wanted to enter the farming sector, but that they did not want to be trapped in the menial, minimum wage agriculture jobs that the ANC elite is trying to force down on them. These millions also did not want to enter the agriculture sector since it is been smothered by the ANC’s overall lack of upliftment in poor black communities. The black youth desire working and workable land, together with farming support, in the same way the ANC elite and their cronies have been “uplifted” into farming since 1994. Prominent examples here are the ANC’s botched training and financing of black people who desire to to work in the agricultural sector. Metelerkamp12 writes that, although agriculture is not a big contributor to the gross domestic product (GDP), its primary future value is in the creation of many jobs in the framework of a greener economy. Indeed, the National Development Plan (NDP) suggests that, even within a conservative estimation, agriculture could be the source of an additional million jobs in 2030.12

The question remains; why did this placement of one million young black people not happen under the ANC, over the 25 years that they have been in power? Furthermore, why has this vision and mission been postponed to another 11 years in the future?

The answer lies in the ANC’s unwillingness to disembark from their opportunistic plans that only share their riches with a small sector of black society. They don’t want to lose some of their land to people outside of the ANC elite’s club of favourites. This problematic perspective led to, firstly, a culture in which they seldom engaged with new policies and strategies, in favour of looting. Secondly, their opportunism lead to a lack of responsibility and accountability to any other cultural or governmental groups.

One of the main arguments of the ANC regime is that the lack of land available in the past remains a substantial obstacle for black people wishing to enter into the agricultural sector. Along with this, the ANC maintains that systematic radical land expropriation without compensation is going to lead to a successful end solution, from 2019 onwards. There is little factual evidence to support these claims. Instead, the evidence leads one to the ANC’s failure to successfully administrate land policies, in an environment where corruption and theft of state funds meant for land redistribution is commonplace. Whilst the implementation of strategies such as BBBEE is intended to empower impoverished black people both economically and in regards to land, these issues remain unsolved. The 1994 to 2019 land redistribution plan was, on all accounts, a failure. This is partially as a result of a corrupt BBBEE system which served to support ANC nepotism. The deeply rooted opportunism of the ANC’s politburo-like politics negates opportunities like the oversupply of land and development funds to ordinary black people. Since 1994, the results of these policies have not uplifted black people working as labourers on other’s land (be they black or white). Indeed, the greater community of black people working (and often living) on other’s land has dramatically diminished between 1994 and 2019; as a result of the political and thereby economic climate rather than the working or rental conditions.

The ANC has attempted to link the diminishing of the rural black farm community as being the result of racial tensions between white farmers and black labourers. Instead, it seems as if the poor and substandard development of the black agricultural community, specifically within the paradigm of black farmers, has stimulated this mass exit by the black community from rural farms. Despite the ANC’s frequent instances of radical rhetoric on land ownership, there has been little concrete action to change the situation. That millions of rural black communities remain impoverished, unemployed and underdeveloped whilst there is an intention to rehabilitate these communities is a symptom om goals being overridden in favour of opportunism. Additionally, a Marxist-Leninist political ideology show a history of leaders who continue to benefit precisely in the chaos of governmental failure. It could be argued that the ANC elite’s characteristics of Marxist-Leninist socialism contributes to a shrugging of accountability and responsibility to the general public.11,12

From within these conditions of nonresponsibility and nonconcern, a milieu has developed that is marked by the lack of integrity, honesty and accountability to the people. This can be seen in the fact that an estimated 10 000 young men and women with tertiary qualifications in agriculture are presently unemployed. These people were trained at great expense to the state, and often at great expense and sacrifice to their economically distraught families. Issues such as these accumulate and grow exponentially in the face of corrupt ANC elites that undermine national agricultural projects with the swindling of state funds.11

Adding to the dilemma of aspiring young black people failing to create a black-owned farming sector is the failure of the State president and his ministers of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, and the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to take responsibility for the situation. The presence of state capture (equal to opportunism) is central to this issue, hindering upliftment at every level. The Festa Tlala programme, for example, was launched in 2014 amid great fanfare by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform together with the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. It was promised that one million hectares of vacant land would be cultivated under traditional authorities by 2019, but, like many other programmes, this was never realised. The ANC elite’s isolation from the concerns of the communities in question contribute to this failure, as they did not see the initiative through to its end.11

The ANC’s failure to utilise and maximise the potential of 10 000 unemployed black agricultural graduates manifest on the macro scale in their treatment of the thirty million impoverished and landless black people, clearly on the brink of dilapidation after 25 years of neglect. In response, the ANC spokespeople refer to statistics that show that less than 3% of South African matric graduates and only 3% to 5% of the black beneficiaries of land actually want to farm, as well as only 4% of subsistence farmers that are under the age of 30. This is to argue that agriculture as a career is not attractive to the youth, which can be misleading. This fails to understand the many reasons why agriculture in South Africa may seem unattractive, precisely because of the aforementioned failures of the ANC regime.

At least outwardly, the ANC has attended to the needs of the disadvantaged black youth in 2018 by the appointment of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture, as well as the formation of the South African Agricultural Development, in order to repair the ANC’s many past failures. Whilst concrete results have yet to surface, the creation of these boards do not negate the ANC elite’s opportunism and its detrimental affect on all of the projects that they undertake.11-13

3.3.1.1.2. ANC farm-flippers

The arguments up to this point reflects on the presence of opportunism in the agricultural sector, as affected by some of the ANC elite in the ANC regime. The presence of highly problematic opportunistic politicians inside the ANC inner circle is further illustrated by the presence of so-called “farm-flippers”. Farm-flippers steal land from the new, legal black owners with a well-planned “estrangement-scheme”, construed by some members of the ANC-elite. The state capture of land especially stands out here, as it carried out through the proactive-land-acquisition-strategy. Through this strategy, the ANC-regime aimed to, through its land redistribution scheme, purchase farms in distress and lease the land to emerging Black farmers, until the farms become self-sustainable enough to establish the tenants as the new owners. It was assumed that this strategy should go together with the recapitalisation and development programme, where a strategic partner was brought on board to mentor emerging farmers and to provide the support necessary to help ensure the success of the venture, writes the editor14 of the Mail & Guardian in May 2019. But in many cases, the outcomes indicated the contrary, alludes the editor14 of the Mail & Guardian. The strategy and detailed plan makes it possible for corruption to take root and for those involved to seek out opportunistic ventures of stealing land for themselves. Situations like these make a mockery of land redistribution. More so, it confirms that opportunistic politicians in the ANC and opportunistic ANC-officials (characterised by their morally unsound behaviour and a deficiency of character) will remain active in the future of the ANC-regime. As these articles prove, the issue of land grabbing without compensation is especially vulnerable to this trend in the ANC.14

In this context of the presence of ANC opportunism, the editor14  of the Mail & Guardian writes14:30:

The rot goes all the way to the top. The former minister of rural development and land reform, Gugile Nkwinti, and his former head of security, Dumisani Luphhungela, have been implicated, along with other politically connected individuals, disparagingly referred to as ‘comrades-in-farms’.

The people who lost their land and hopes in this single instance of corruption are mirrored across South Africa. Land reform is littered with the stories of so many disenfranchised black South Africans.

In May to June 2019, Hazel Friedman15 of the Mail and Guardian did a comprehensive research series on the presence of opportunism and opportunists in the capture of redistributed land by private companies and connected politicians. She refers to those involved as the so-called “Luthuli House comrades-in-farms”. Herein, Friedman15 uncovers the immense corruption via opportunism committed through criminal co-operations between some of the ANC top brass and crooked businessmen, continually stealing through organised land grabbing from the rightful new black owners. On the 7th of June 2019, Friedman15 further reflects on a probe by the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) into 148 land reform projects which found that as much as a quarter were corrupt and that millions of rands has disappeared from the state. The SIU has recommended that 42 people be charged under the Public Finance Management Act. Most of the opportunistic state capture cases serving before the “Ramaphosa commissions”, however, are still underway. This process is further hindered by the incoherent rhetoric of the NPA of criminal investigations and prosecution. Up to this point, not a single culprit has been prosecuted.15

President Cyril Ramaphosa has insisted that land was the core of the “formation of the ANC” in 1912 and that it was the 1913 white apartheid land grabbing that has brought about the contemporary land situation. A case can be made for the contrary: The ANC’s top brass and their cronies’ roles as opportunists in the post-1994 land grabbing – where the black elites blatantly grabbed selected pieces of land through well-conducted schemes from the impoverished black community – looks strikingly similar to the white land grabbing of 1910s. The same refusal of accountability and pre-meditated opportunism that was characteristic of the white mindset around 1913 had also affected the ANC elite’s perspective from 1994 onward. These crooked and opportunistic politicians of the ANC and their lack of accountability and responsibility led to fall of thousands of blacks people into dire poverty. It can also be argued that there is no reason that the opportunistic ANC elites, some of whom already were involved in state capture and land grabbing pre-2019, are going to change their behaviour after May 2019. President Ramaphosa’s role features prominently here; as chair-person, his promotion and sanctioning of the corrupt cadre-deployment scheme that led directly to the exclusive and selective enrichment of the ANC-club is documented by journalists. President Ramaphosa has allowed and supported the opportunism within the ANC-regime, specifically around land transformation, and he has, therefore, been involved in some prior instances of corruption. Ramaphosa and his ANC-cronies’ pre-May 2019 election promises to ‘rehabilitate’ the ANC and its elite from dishonesty, mismanagement and state capture has not been delivered on, indicating the problem reverberates through the entire ANC regime.14,15

There is no guarantee that Ramaphosa’s post-May 2019 Land expropriation Act will bring the “Promised Land” to those that are justified in receiving it; the impoverished and landless black community. The problem is far-reaching, and therefore one of numbers. There is an excessive amount of members of the elite in the Ramaphosa-regime that show signs of the moral corruption common in opportunists, and their actions seem to indicate a set of ulterior goals that are completely detached from the devastating impact that the dishonesty and the theft has on the poor’s meager possession. These corrupt politicians will, most likely, not change their behaviour, even if it is at the cost of their potential voters and those that they have a responsibility towards. The tainted post-May 2019 ANC politicians in the Parliament will thereby assure that the culture of criminal opportunism and its consequences will be remain the norm in the post-2019 ANC-regime.14

3.3.1.1.3. Overall failing of the ANC’s post-1994 Black-farming initiative

It is clear that the chaos in the post-1994 agricultural sector, very much in line with the problems in the other economic sectors, are the eventual result of projects related to the ANC elite’s direct interests, self-empowerment and self-enrichment. This opportunism led to a situation where agricultural projects are forced to be undertaken outside of the ANC elite’s jurisdiction and therefore its corrupting nature. This is not wholly a solution, however, as these independent projects often lack the necessary knowledge and insight, as well as fair political conditions, to bring real success about for the people involved.11

How the ANC’s normal, daily governance has sabotaged the adult black agriculture community throughout its years in power is discussed by Phipson’s11. Through the ANC’s passivity and its lack to initiate a responsible and working agricultural development plan, wherein the financial interests and personal welfare of the black farmers stand central to the strategy, a potential solution is completely thwarted. This agricultural development plan should have uplifted communities in need, as opposed to prioritising the ANC-club’s interests. The results of this failure is wholly clear in the estimation of loss of potential income for the black agricultural community as part of the failed Festa Tlala programme of 2014. Phipson writes11:28:

One million hectares of maize for the 2018 -2019 season conservatively equates to six million tons of maize at R2 500 a ton, giving a gross income of R2.5-billion. This also equates to 50% of the maize crop produced by white commercial farmers. Or to 1 000 new black commercial farmers each farming 1 000ha, or 2 000 new black commercial farmers each farming 500ha.

Added to this is more than 100 000ha of high-yield potential land ideal for fresh vegetable and fruit production, most of it irrigated, which is lying unused or underused. At a gross margin of R40 000 a hectare these moribund land parcels would yield a gross margin of R4-billion a year, every year, create thousands of new young black farmers and provide a work income for 200 000 families.

The inequitable and unethical service that most of the emerging black farmers outside of the inner-circle of the ANC have received from the ANC’s failed black agricultural empowerment between 1994 and 2019 indicates that there is a total lack of concern for them or interest showed in them. The difficulties of this is well-illustrated by the writings of the wife of one such an “emerging black farmer” when she writes16:3:

But this type of farmer is no longer emerging. This type of farmer is beset by First World problems of economics and plagued by the festering, openly weeping and rapidly expanding abscess of Third World rural poverty…

Socioeconomic ills, to touch it in sanitised capitalistic terms. But that terminology ignores the political and cultural aspects. Sociocultural and politico-economic don’t quite work, either – but now we’re just playing with semantics, right? So, who cares?

These aforementioned “socioeconomic, sociocultural and politico-economic ills” of emerging black-farmers are side-lined outside the favoured circle of the ANC-elite, who’s interests were (and are still) looked after by the appropriate ministers. This is also reflected in those cases where farm-claims were successfully determined by the law long ago, but the ANC-regime’s has outright failed to bring finality to the ownership of the land and to resettle the true owners on the land. This failure is in spite of the intention of the Land Claims Commission to settle these matters with clarity and speed.

A prominent example of the failure of the Land Claims Commission is a case of the land successfully claimed and awarded in 2012 in KwaZulu-Natal, in terms of the government’s land restitution programme. The 2 115 hectare Kenbali sugar-farm was valued at R80-million and produced 400 000 tons of sugar cane annually. The farm, that employed 1 200 people, was successfully claimed in 2012 by the Mathulini community, but the transfer to its legal owners was left unfinished by the government until today. This lethargy is a direct outcome of a lack of accountability and the presence of opportunism on the ministerial level, which reflects how unrelated outsiders are possibly reaping rewards in the process of land being reformed. It has now transformed into a dispute between a local chief (who may possibly be part of an opportunistic effort to disown the legal owners from the land), the successfully land claimants and the former owners. This incident has also become the scene of violent protests and attacks. The Kenbali farm confirms how the ANC-regime has failed in re-established legal black owners on their land, as declared in terms of the government’s land restitution programme. Furthermore, the Kenbali farm is only one part of a greater ongoing and unsolved 2012 land-claim which includes another 1 732 hectare sugar farm, a 57 hectare macadamia nut farm, an 8 hectare timber farm and 318 hectare scrub farm. These rich farms form a total of 7 141 hectare, valued at over R300-million.17

The recent Constitutional Court judgement against the ANC regime is another indicator of the full measure of failure of the legalised land-redistribution programme under the ANC. The court’s judgement is strongly rooted in the failing of some of the ANC senior management to remain incorruptible in the face of potential opportunistic ventures and to accept accountability and responsibility for successfully overseeing the project. This judgement is seen as a ground-breaking turn in the halting of the ANC’s misuse of the Parliament and the various vehicles of governing. The Constitutional Court forms the first mechanism that the public may utilise to defend themselves and their interests against acts of opportunism, theft, irresponsibility, unreliability of the state etc. This turn of events give some hope that the general public have gained some power, previously lost the ANC regime and the ANC elite.

The judgment clearly took on the ineptitude of the ANC’s land reform department, together with its lack of responsibility and accountability, to successfully execute land-reform in terms of the Land Reform Act which has already come into effect on the 22nd of March, 1996. This 1996-legislation was designed to contribute to the restitution of land to those deprived of land by racial subordination in the form of Apartheid and colonialism. Tim Fish-Hodgson18 from the Africa team of the International Commission of Jurists, writes that the 1996 Act gives important rights to any person who was a labour tenant on June 2 1995, including the right to work “with his or her family members, to occupy and use that part of the farm” 18:30. This applies to parts of the farm that the people in question had previously lived and worked on. The Act also provides for protection against unlawful eviction of labour tenants living on the farm by the owner(s) of these farms. From the judgement it is clear that the implementation of these rights was deliberately and outright neglected or ignored by the officials of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. The Constitutional Court judgement gives (and confirms) labour tenants the right to acquire ownership of such land through a detailed, complex process that needs to be spearheaded by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. This lack of accepting accountability and responsibility, together with the suspicions neglect of the legitimate rights and interests of other persons outside the ANC club’s interests by the ANC-regime since 1996, led to the department failing to address a total of 30 516 applications over two decades of claims made. This led to the Constitutional Court’s appointment of a special master to supervise oversight of the administration of the applications/claims. The full measure by which the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform suspiciously avoid its accountability (or where opportunism seems to be an element) to solve these land matters and thus outright fail to oversee the law as prescribed by the Parliament, is well-illustrated by the findings and references of the Constitutional Court. Fish-Hodgson reflects18:30:

  •     The court goes on to describe the department as a whole as displaying an ‘obstinate misapprehension of its statutory duties’, ‘unresponsiveness’ and ‘a refusal to account to those dependent on its co-operation’;
  •     The court accepts that the department has a ‘patent incapacity or inability to get the job done’;
  •     It is not the Constitution, nor the courts, nor the laws of the country that are at fault…It is the institutional incapacity of the department to do what the statute and the Constitution require of it that lies at the heart of this colossal crisis;
  •     The department’s glib response to the applicants’ claim was to admit that, because its records keeping was ‘non-existent’ and ‘shambolic’, it would take two years merely to capture the details of these…applications. The Constitutional Court noted that it could take the department between 24 to 40 years to settle the remaining claims given its own [department’s] descriptions of its processes.
3.3.1.1.3.1. “Colossal” constitutional crisis in post-1994 South Africa

It is important to elaborate on the court’s reference of “colossal crisis” created by the Department’s (and thus also the ANC-regime’s) lack of accountability and responsibility, and their clearly deliberate disregard of the constitutional rights of citizens for the judicial institutions, as well as the ANC regime’s general ruling of the country in years to come. It is important to note the court’s reference of the department’s (and thus also its overseer, the ANC regime’s) display of an ‘obstinate misapprehension of its statutory duties’, ‘unresponsiveness’, ‘a refusal to account to those dependent on its co-operation’ and a ‘patent incapacity or inability to get the job done’ in terms of what the statute and the Constitution require.

The highly problematic court-findings on the Department indirectly ask the question whether the ANC regime is able to successfully manage the general ruling of the country. Indeed, it inspires further questions around the ANC regime’s characteristics in relation to the ruling party prescribed by the Constitution; responsible, accountable and compassionate. As such, it poses the question if the ANC regime is honest in its daily execution of its mandate as ruling party. It is therefore crucial to study the Constitutional Court’s findings and guidelines intensively, in all of its judicial complexity, in order to see if the ANC applies its ruler’s mandate on land reform correctly. Not merely on land reform, the Constitutional Court’s structures are also able to provide a measurement of the ANC’s capacity in general matters of state and where it stands on accountability, responsibility and compassion for every citizen on every matter in dispute. The matter of state capture and, subsequently, opportunism is also matters that concern the general public. Indeed, this court’s findings became a very important judicial vehicle for the future of South Africa. The people require a method that is powerful enough to take on the ANC regime when it fails to fulfill its prescribed duties to everyone in the society. For the first time, it brings the prescribed duties of the Parliament clearly into focus, specifically to all members of South African society.  Moreover, any form of state capture and the opportunists behind it is now also a point of direct focus for the court; not only to address culprits and their sentences, but also to intervene and interfere when the process of opportunism takes root or is supported by the ANC regime. This means that the Constitutional Court aims to stop the process even before prosecuting and sentencing the culprits.

Fish-Hodgson18 wrote an article that works to emphasise the ANC regime’s clearly delineated failure on the land-issue, within the broader context of the ANC’s general opportunism and lack of accountability and responsibility when confronted with their other failures. Fish-Hodgson18 states that the Constitutional Court’s findings firstly18:30: “… leaves the Cabinet with nowhere to hide and no so-called “sell out” constitutional property clause to hide behind”. Secondly, the evidence reflects that18:30: “…the court warns that, despite its sensitivity towards the need for the department to have a free hand at performing its constitutional mandate without undue interference, systematic failure to perform may justify, and require, muscular intervention by a court. This is of relevance far beyond the facts of this case and the land issue more generally”. [This reference to “systematic failures” certainly activate the court’s constitutional right of interference in other key service delivery-orientated departments. Examples of service delivery-orientated departments are education, healthcare, housing and social security (such as the Department of Women, the SAPS and the NPA)].18

It remains important to reflect on the Constitutional Court’s treatment and prosecution of the ANC regime’s for its failure, or refusal, to account to those dependent on its co-operation. This is within the context of the electorate that voted on this issue on a national, provincial and local level. Fish-Hodgson18 writes on these sets of rulings set by the Constitutional Court, whilst bearing the electorate in mind. He writes18:30: “The court warned that, because the separation of powers does not ‘imply a rigid or static conception of strictly demarcated functional roles’ and ‘the mythical spell must be broken’ to ensure the protection of Mwelase and his co-applicants’ constitutional rights’, court control of the remedial process’ may be warranted.”

Fish-Hodgson18 further reflects on this legal incidence, with the clear guidance of the Constitutional Court and its reprimand of the ANC regime, when writing18:30: “The department told the court that the appointment of a special master, under the auspices of the judiciary, would amount to a usurpation of the powers of the executive in violation of the separation of powers”. This argument of the department’s judicial independence, as well as its sole, swift and precise responsibility to the Constitutional Court is completely nullified in the court’s response, as follows18:30: “…the court noted that none of those cases it had decided ‘quite match the sustained, large-scale systematic dysfunctionality and obduracy that is evidenced here’.”

The immense failure of the department to impede land reform strategies that are already present in the existing legislation clearly indicate that the current plans to bring changes to Regulation 25 of the Constitution, and its complex political climate, were and are unnecessary. This is because the execution of land redistribution, conducted systematically and structurally, already exists in the South African law. This existing legislation also attempts to establish accountability for a governing body’s unlawful behaviour, such as the well-discussed opportunism in land-grabbing by the group of ANC elites. The change in legislation, therefore, suggest an ulterior goal; to allow the opportunistic politicians of the ANC club and other political opportunists to engage in land grabbing on a larger scale. This pattern seems to repeat in the ANC’s actions around the “state capture enterprise”. Besides the intention of opportunism, as well as the questionable actions around the change of Regulation 25, South Africa’s ruling party and its figure heads and supporters seem to lack knowledge or understanding of its own “Law-bible” and the consequences of disregarding or slackening the law. This is also despite the consequences of this legal ineptitude around land reformation being widely promulgated in 1996. [This brings us back to Villa-Vicencio8 arguments that communist rulers always over-regulate to stay in power and to have the elites of the communists benefit from their system].8 As said, the Constitutional Court’s findings extends further than merely discussing land ownership, as Fish-Hodgson18 points out that18:30:

“…describing the situation as a ‘colossal crisis’, the court is warning the government that it must endeavour to ensure that, as the Constitution requires, its obligations are performed diligently and without delay. Failing which, and irrespective of the success of the mooted constitutional amendments of the property clause, courts may begin to act to the embarrassment of a government whose legitimacy is questioned within and outside of its own political ranks”.

Now that the court has inscribed that the executive must perform its constitutional obligations and accept accountability and responsibility at all times, the fact remains that more and more litigants are going to18:30: “…ask for such supervisory remedial action in the face of [its] systematic failures” from the ANC regime.”

Mthombothi19:19 argues for the absolute need of the court’s intervention to safe guard the interests of South Africans, the Constitution and the State in itself. By force, the intervention reclaimed the right of the court to put these ideals into practice. He states that:

Given the complete collapse of any ethical conduct on the part of our rulers and the damage they’ve done to the country, the courts have become our only saving grace, our last line of defence.

In cleaning up the mess created by politicians, our judges, more often than not, are called upon to make decisions that have huge political consequences, thus inviting the sort of criticism that comes from the likes of Malema [to rid the country of “biased” judges]. But that shouldn’t be their bother. The judiciary should be averted only to politicians’ embrace or praise, not their criticism. After all, their job is to keep the executive on the straight and narrow [without insert blankly in the political terrain]. When politicians exceed their power or when decisions they make inflict pain on the powerless, it is the responsibility to rein them in. To reinforce their independence, judges should therefore eschew any conduct or comment that could be viewed as political or biased. Anything with a whiff of politics should be avoided like the plague.

Mthombothi19 writes on the recent xenophobic violence, and subsequently justifies the right of the judiciary to interfere and to intervene in contemporary South African politics. He discusses this right within the context of the ANC regime’s failure to oversee the xenophobic wave, and investigates the reasons behind the failure. The primary reason for it, he argues, is a failed regime and the presence of political opportunism which manifest in the lack of accountability and responsibility. Mthombothi reflects20:25:

The government’s fault is one of omission, not commission. It had no control over what’s happening in the country.

Ramaphosa’s government is in no position to give any undertaking to anybody, not even to its own citizens, that such maddening violence won’t happen again. It has become a mere spectator to the drama unfolding in the country. It has lost control of the country. The country is on autopilot. The government can’t even protect its own citizens, who are hunted like animals even in their own homes.

The country is literally burning while Cyril and his ANC comrades are busy gazing at their own navels.

From articles such as these, it is clear that President Cyril Ramaphosa’s government seems to be unable to serve any other group, including its own citizens. In regards to the xenophobic attacks, it is currently unlikely that the ANC will be able to control and eliminate any xenophobic violence in the future. This loss of control implies that other powers in South Africa are affecting the country, such as the various criminal structures. This can be seen in the government’s failure to protect its citizens, often in their own homes, at the height of the xenophobic wave.

The court offers a clear and unbiased judicial vehicle that upstanding citizens may purposefully employ to obstruct opportunism in ANC politics and to neutralise the opportunism of the ANC elite. This court action is also the first time, since the ANC has taken power, that the regime is confronted with their own failings.

How much the ANC, now under President Cyril Ramaphosa, promises to finally commit to the people of South Africa, in terms of its accountability and the elimination of opportunism and opportunistic politicians, is indicated by President Ramaphosa’s rhetoric. Amongst other things, President Ramaphosa describes an environment of prosperity in post-May 2019 South Africa, especially for aspirant young black farmers and emerging black farmers through land expropriation with or without compensation from the notable white land owners. Notable figures in journalism, after closely considering President Ramaphosa’s public appearances and communication, predict no change in government that will protect the people against exploitation of their rights. Together with the ANC regime’s problematic history of illegality and corruption, many sources are highly skeptical of change.11,12,17,21

3.3.1.2. ANC opportunists’ abuse and exploitation of the nation
3.3.1.2.1. “Emancipation” of the poor through state capture

The ANC politicians on all levels, as well as its members and supporters, are still unaffected by the broad backlash that the ANC elite’s lack of empathy and accountability, opportunistic political schemes and corruption have created over time. These schemes to enrich themselves at the cost of the Nation is often accompanied by a comprehensive and well-planned goal to stay in power. Apartheid’s exclusiveness, at the hands of a small group of white opportunists who benefited at the cost of the large, growing group of impoverished and landless black people, has led to the racial hatred that is still present in the country. This opportunistic abuse and exploitation of others have, since 1994, been mirrored by the actions and strategies of the ANC’s top decision makers. Those who suffer and are victimised under these conditions are still the same group of underprivileged black people, notwithstanding the highly-commended and well-discussed democratic conditions that the ANC brought under Nelson Mandela.

Whilst often discussed in its ideological role, democracy has not been of practical concern to this group of impoverished black people. The implementation of BBBEE was only focused on the ANC’s inner circle. The false accusations and corrupt justifications of the black ANC elite stand as prominent examples of their exclusive and opportunistic corruption and lawlessness. The main argument used when confronted is that the the existence of “corrupted white-colonial wealth” must be destroyed, although it is the ANC elite themselves that have benefited the most in post-1994 South Africa. Contradictory, the ANC’s wealth are sometimes seen as a sign of “successful statehood by the ANC members” by the large group of underprivileged black people. The opportunists of the ANC club argue that it was an essential and initial step in the longer process of gradually distributing the wealth to every poor black person in the near future. An example of this reasoning, in the context of the land issue, means that there is an expectation that the ANC will provide free land for the impoverished by expropriating land from white people without compensation. In these arguments, there is also the belief that other assets of white people will be transferred to black owners, gratis. In this context, the corrupted ANC elite are able to infer that the ANC elite’s self-enrichment cannot be see as corruption and criminal activity, but a prerequisite to bring an end to white supremacy and white exclusive capitalism.22,23 Mthombothi22 describes the so-called anti-white capitalist motivations of these corrupted acts by the ANC-elite as22:19: “…emancipatory” inside the Black empowerment, opening opportunities to all Blacks and that the present corrupt forms of accumulation by the top brass is indeed advancing the exclude majority of the poor Black”.

The ANC elite’s promises to transfer numerous pieces of land to the underprivileged black communities in post-2019 are undoubtedly true, but their real intention with the new “abundance” of land is suspect. Instead of intending to canalise the wealth of the land to enrich the impoverished black communities, their actions seem to indicate an enrichment of their own, nepotistic interests. The availability of large pieces of valuable land, together with the overwhelming presence of state capture, leads one back to a phenomenon that this paper discussed ealier: the exclusively enriching of the Marxist-Leninist elite of the ANC.

On the corrupt and well-stated argument of the criminal ANC’s opportunistic politicians of their so-called “group emancipation of the poor through State capture”, Tabane writes23:20:

Once there are billions involved, like housing and construction projects, you know that politicians and businesspeople have conspired to steal millions, for themselves or their political parties.

Many parties are guilty of stealing from the public purse in this way through their deployees. Individuals in the process also steal big in the name of raising money ‘for the movement’.

What is sad is that some of the most competent ministers are pressured into theft. This is why I have great respect for someone like Naledi Pandor, who asked why some ministers owned so many assets that were out of proportion to their salaries.

There are some who are ready to excuse the likes of Gwede Mantashe and Nomvula Mokonyane. They are said to have ‘taken one for the movement’. We have yet to be told how installing hi tech security at a home and enjoying obscene amounts of booze and meat benefited the ANC.

It becomes clear from these numerous failings by the ANC’s top brass, as mentioned above, that there is a clear discrimination and a presence of division between the exclusive rich ANC members from the mass of poorer ANC members and supporters. The ANC elite’s motto and custom of “taking one for the movement to benefit solely the party or the ordinary poor people”, is discussed by Pithouse24-28 and others. What becomes prominent here – informed by the definitions on the meaning of opportunism and what the typical character of the opportunist looks like – is that some of the ANC’s elite and their cronies have clearly lost their cognitive ability to differentiate between lies and truth, or virtue and vice. Especially after many years of corrupted, opportunistic and uncontrolled reign, a norm has been established. Delusions are prominent in many of the ANC elite’s political thinking, planning and actions. This is evident in President Cyril Ramaphosa’s third state of the nation address. As is the case with many of the ANC elite’s, their thinking, planning and actions are indeed saturated by a variety of political pathology. Ex-president Jacob Zuma has recently spoke before the Zondo commission, wherein he distanced himself from the very concept of state capture. This was instead of arguing that he was the target of political targeting and that state capture never existed under his presidency. This serves as an example of the ANC’s elite having lost the ability to understand that many of the impoverished black people have begun to disapprove of and reject the ANC as a party. The ANC elite cannot further manipulate black non-member supporters of the ANC to vote for them, evident from the outcome of the recently concluded elections of May 2019. Support has declined overall, with only 49% of the eligible voters participating in the elections, and an ANC voting support count of only 28% of the total eligible voters. The black youth’s immense apathy is especially problematic for the ANC’s aims and future plans in 2019. Self-empowerment and self-enrichment take precedent over the nation.24-28

Solly Mapaila29 of the South African Communist Party (a tripartite partner in ANC regime) slammed specific BEE as so-called “narrow nationalism” that enables state capture. He postulates29:26: “This narrow nationalism delayed our capacity to build and transform the state, and we ended up creating what has now developed into a predatory state. We must go back to this painful journey so that we don’t repeat it, but this painful journey played in a very nice policy framework and was called black economic empowerment. We even legalised it.” In this context, Mapaila29 adds that most of the state institutions of South Africa were paralysed due to looting by those who employed the government’s BEE policy, including specific members from within the ANC led coalition. With specific reference to the contaminating effect of BEE, Mapaila29 clearly states that the ANC’s so-called “developmental state” has provided opportunities a select few ANC groups could exploit to become rich in the name of the nation. He writes29:26:

“The corruption and what we call state capture and the disempowerment of the majority was within the framework of the terrain of the developmental state that we were trying to construct. We took this painful journey to appease particularly the middle strata. Our president is a product of this as well. He is a rich man; there is no doubt about it.”

3.3.1.2.2. Municipalities as milking cows

The development of a culture of state capture, as guided and steered by opportunism and the ongoing misuse and illegal use of public money by many ANC opportunists, has been confirmed and reflected in the decline of the state’s financial situation. The tax-payer is especially aware of these deficiencies, over the past nine years. Although the no-payment culture plays a role in municipalities’ decline in income, this outcome is also the result of clumsy and non-existent administration in the collection of service fees. The financial situation can also be argued to be symptomatic of the ANC regime’s Marxist-Leninist socialism where, in exchange for the voter’s support, free services are provided. This system is unsustainable, of course, and may indicate a possible end to the ANC. Furthermore, the presidencies and their cabinets that were appointed to oversee the lack of accountability and responsibility to law-abiding voters in their governing of South Africa for the period 2008 to 2019, are overly concerned with remaining in power.30-41

Analyses show that the growing shortfalls in municipal budgets stem from the misuse of their funds for things such as high salaries, unsuccessful projects where tender-fraud and the enrichment of cadres outweigh other goals, friend and families appointed to the municipalities’ top management and the use of so-called consultants as a cover for corruption. What these specific problems have in common is the overall disregard that the national government has towards the financial and administrative tasks in the municipalities. No improvement is made in areas where remedial recommendations have been made by the appropriate overseeing bodies. The relative freedom that these members of government have is well reflected by the immense amounts of irregular and unauthorised expenditure by municipalities. The culture of organised corruption, that became established in the municipalities under the Zuma-regime, has continued to grow exponentially.30-41

President Cyril Ramaphosa has, thus far, failed to restructure the problems that faced the municipalities under President Jacob Zuma, since Desember 2017. It could be argued that this phase of government under President Ramaphosa and his regime is the eventual death of the ANC, wherein the motivation behind many of the clearly contaminated decisions of the ANC-opportunists are made in their last efforts to benefit themselves out of the party. These decisions are in addition to their previous large-scale land grabbing corruption. Prominent examples are the enormous abuse and exploitation of state funds by the elite of the ANC regime on local levels, with the main intention being to benefit them exclusively in salaries and benefits. Additionally, state funds are stolen by well-masked tender fraud and various other forms of ongoing state capture. Kgosana32, writing on the opportunistic spending on national, provincial and local levels by the ANC elite (sardonically referred to as “irregular expenditures”), reports as follows32:12:

  1. The amount of irregular expenditure incurred by the national and provincial departments in 2008/2009: R11-billion against 2017/2018: R50-billion;
  2. The combined irregular expenditure at local government level in 2008/2009: R3.2-billion against 2017/2018: R27.6-billion;
  3. Unqualified audits with no findings, recorded in all spheres of the government in 2008/2009: 10% against 2017/2018: 24%.

Immense corruption, political mismanagement and nepotistic cadre-employment on the local municipality level has forced the Parliament to publish a gazette through the National Treasury on the local government cost containment measures, on the 7th June 2019. The introduction of these regulations was seen by a sector in the ANC as “unasked, inappropriate and limiting the empowerment” of the local government, possibly because these regulations curb the ANC opportunists as they continue their state capture and opportunistic crimes. The decline of the integrity and honesty of well-functioning municipalities run parallel to those municipalities that were under ANC rule and has since become bankrupt. Inside this deliberate and well-planned scheme around the finances of the municipalities, a R2-billion loss in the VBS Mutual Bank stand out. This immense loss has resulted from investments by ANC opportunists in charge of the municipalities’ finance.30,34-36,38

On the “untainted” VBS Mutual Bank looting of R2-billion, Matlala indicates that the criminals who had planned and executed the immense fraud – municipal managers, chief finance officers and supply chain managers who all have numerous strong connections to the ANC elite – are left protected and are never prosecuted. Clearly, the ANC regime’s prosecuting authorities also form part of the corrupt system. The excessive influence of the opportunist politicians of the ANC regime is also evident in the fact that the criminals in the Limpopo municipalities continue to draw monthly salaries, whilst others make government deals worth millions [colloquially referred to as golden hand-shakes]. Although some of the managers are currently serving suspensions, there has not a single criminal charge laid against them thus far. The Portfolio Committee on Cooperative Governance, found in October 2019, found that some of these culprits, that are still unaffected and “walking free”, are currently engaging in irregular business practices with their own municipalities in Limpopo. Furthermore, the opportunistic approach of awarding tenders to friends and relatives, and the paying of service providers for work that has not been done, are still frequent procedures in many of the corrupt Limpopo municipalities.33

The condemning Auditor-General’s report37 for the financial year ended June 30 2018 confirms the lack of legal oversight and political leadership in the failed municipalities (and also reflects a failed ANC regime on a national level). The performance of the country, in the terms of this report, is described by the editor37 of the City Press on the 30th June 2019 as37:2: “…one that paints a bleak picture of deteriorating audit outcomes.”

The auditor-general Kimi Makwetu states that the 2017/18 Auditor-General’s report shows the highest level of noncompliance with key governance laws since the 2011/12 financial year report. The lack of accountability and responsibility stands central in these criminal acts inside the municipalities. As opposed to the 14% of municipalities that received clean audits in 2016/17, the 2017/18 report only reflects 8% compliance. This means for 2017/18, only 18 out of 257 municipalities received clean audits, further reflecting that 239 municipalities failed the test. The report indicates that the various local government role-players, such as mayors, councillors and municipal managers, have not taken any of the previous report’s recommendations by the auditor-general into account, and they have not corrected their corrupt and dishonest systems. This echoes the profile of extreme opportunism where the opportunists’ own interest is the primary aim.

This failure to improve is also confirmed by the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) findings. The FFC is a body of constitutionally mandated members that make recommendations to Parliament and the Provincial legislators about the financial and fiscal viability of municipalities. The basis of the municipalities’ failure is the lack of accountability by the political parties to appoint able and responsible councillors and mayors to oversee that able officials are running their councils. The FCC demonstrates the total irregularity of expenditure regarding the R25.2-billion in 2017-18. Eybers31 and Khumalo31 pinpoint the management of the numerous beleaguered state institutions and local municipalities that has reached its highest ever levels of crises, at the end of June 2019: 30 of the municipalities battle to pay salaries, the municipal debt had increased to R60-billion over the past five years, the outstanding debt increased from R105-billion in March 2015 to R163-billion in March 2019. Additionally, It seems that most of these municipalities in crisis have no recovery plans and hope to receive a bail-out by the central government. This failure of most of the country’s municipalities is rooted in the corruption and opportunistic misuse of the municipalities’ finances, together with the poor overall management of it by sub-standard leaders. This setup is a direct outcome of the municipalities’ appointment by a dysfunctional national and provincial leadership under the ruling the ANC regime.31,36,39-41

On the chaos of local governing (much in line with ANC’s chaotic governing on provincial and national level) as reflected by the Auditor-general’s findings, the spokesperson of Cosatu, Sizwe Pamla40, has said that the situation was40:3: “…appalling, frightening and deeply worrisome.” (Note: Cosatu is a partner to the tripartite ANC-regime). In line with other findings of the failure of the ANC regime to assure good local, provincial and national government, especially in the fight against corruption and financial capture by corrupted opportunists, Pamla writes40:3: “This confirms the fact that there is little control over the corrupt abuse and manipulation of tenders and procurement of goods and services. All this shows there is virtually no appetite to abide by the laws across the country. What is even more depressing is that there are virtually no consequences for those responsible.”

Within the context of the appointment of cadres will numerous allegations logged against them and similarly tainted ANC elite in the ANC regime’s failed overseeing of all three levels of government, the editor37 of City Press, when discussing the problem of corruption, incompetence and the culture of opportunism in the politics of municipalities, writes on the 30th June 201937:2:

They should be electing competent and duly qualified people to these positions. But the ANC and the other parties have tended to use these positions to reward friends and fellow party members who have no clue of what is expected of them once in office.

In the few instances where professionals are appointed, they often do not last due to the embedded culture of laziness, bending the rules and employees ingratiating themselves with the bosses. These rare competent officials are often ostracised and effectively worked out of the system.

But the worst phenomenon to emerge over the past few years is that corrupt officials being reshuffled. Instead of being fired, they are simply moved from one municipality to the next. This is born out of a political culture of “looking after our own…” […as the ANC’s list of 22 tainted MPs and MPLs for the May 2019 elections and most of these tainted person’s reappointment in senior ANC-regime positions after May confirm].

The editor37 of City Press emphasises the problematic situation of unethical leaders, persons with a disregard for good governance, compliance and control, and no self-discipline and impunity when it comes to monetary opportunism. A lack of commitment to transparency and accountability in the municipalities is also reflected at the level of state-owned enterprises, as confirmed by the large-scale state capture and bankruptcy there. From here, the contamination spreads to the lower levels of government, as well. He writes37:2: “When political leaders [with seemingly pinpointing the President of the ANC and his intimate cronies] deemed these a feeding trough and deployed enablers of the Gupta empire to run them, they created the rot that drove many of them, such as Denel and Eskom, to financial ruin.”

Plaatjies42, in focusing indirectly on the ANC’s criminal acts as a regime overall, brings the failure of the Public Service Commission (PSC) into account. The PSC has failed to deal with corrupt and unqualified politically-appointed mayors, councillors and municipal managers effectively. He also emphasises the failure of Parliament’s various oversight committees, who’s main function is to handle the 239 outright failed and politically contaminated municipalities. These 239 munipalities are overwhelmingly under ANC rule, and are those that have become plagued by the political games of the ANC’s mismanagement and corruption of the national government.36,42,43

Plaatjies30, on the “intervention and interference silence” of the various parliamentary oversight committees, posits that30:7: “Until now we have not seen the members of these committees taking their responsibilities seriously. It’s about politicking. They need to jack up their responsibilities. ‘I know they’re representing their parties. I know they need to score political points. But my god, start scoring points for the citizens and the country’.”

The failing of the recent 239 municipalities led to a specific set of 30 municipalities in Limpopo, the Eastern Cape, Free State, Kwa-Zulu Natal, Mpumalanga and Northern Cape did not pay their staff’s salaries. Furthermore, these 30 municipalities also failed to pay their staff’s pensions up to the amount of R70-million. Some of the municipalities have been blacklisted while others assets were frozen. It is alleged that the equipment belonging to one of these, the Maluti-A-Phofung municipality in the Free State, was seized by the sheriff of the court due to the failure to pay Eskom. What features prominently inside the financial chaos at municipalities, is that the opportunistic mayors and their senior cronies are still compensated monthly. These mayors and their employees are mostly appointed in terms of the ANC’s cadre-centered and democratic-centralists policies.36,40-48

Cilliers44, in the context of the aforementioned outright and excessive failure of many municipalities, writes44:17: “Werkers en raadslede van die Tswaing-munisipaliteit in Noordwes het nog nie hul Junie-salaris gekry omdat die munisipaliteit se bankrekening glo weens onbetaalde skuld gevries is”, and44:17: “Die provinsiale regering het die munisipaliteit, wat Sannieshof, Delareyville, Ottosdal en die omliggende gebiede bedien, in Mei onder administrasie geplaas weens swak bestuur, wat gelei het tot ‘n ineenstorting van dienslewering”.

This chaos that Cilliers describes – that employees are not being paid and that this lead to a collapse of all municipal services – has forced President Cyril Ramaphosa to acknowledge that the central ANC government assists 57 municipalities in distress. The state capture by corrupt elements of the leadership of many of the mismanaged municipalities is so extreme that it has forced the Auditor-general Kimi Makwetu to admit that his team of investigators has experienced serious threats and intimidation. This extremity is primarily because of the ANC regime’s lack to introduce integrity, honesty, accountability and legitimacy in all levels of governance.36,40,42,43,45-48

In this context of absolute failure and corrupted government (from municipalities up to the Parliament), the editor37 of the City Press clearly brings two suspicious ANC leaders into focus for their criminal acts and to be help responsible, at least in part, for the chaos. He writes37:2:

Two key examples of this are the Free State province and the eThekwini municipality. The Free State, where former premier Ace Magashule micromanaged local government for his own ends and made sure his cronies were installed, has the largest concentration of poorly performing municipalities in the country.

eThekwini, run by the warlord-like Zandile Gumede for the past three years, has gone from being a star performer to one of the country’s most poorly run metros.

Will49 reports that the ANC-managed Matjhabeng municipality (or the Free State Gold Fields) is one of the 10 worst performing municipalities in the country. It takes first place of the 257 municipalities labelled as the worst spenders of taxpayers’ money: it had misspent R169 million for 2017-2018, its outstanding debt for water is R2.3 billion, while its Eskom debt is R1.84 billion. The unauthorised spending of the Matjhabeng-municipality was R873-million for 2018.49

The immense opportunism locked into the ANC’s governing on national, provincial and local levels, and the presence of prominent ANC opportunist politicians that contaminate their environment, is confirmed by many trustworthy resources. Dr Daniel Plaatjies26, chair of the FFC, repeats other examples of opportunism, corruption and theft at most municipalities when he says26:10: “There’s an overwhelming level of fraud and corruption, and tackling that is priority. These issues are systematic and they’ve been flagged for years.” Elaborating further on the failed service to the people by the ANC regime at local governing level, over the last 25 years, the editor26 of The Citizen writes26:10: … it shows that government is failing South Africans daily”. The report, titled: Audit Performance and Service Delivery at Local government Level of June 2019 by the organisation Good Governance Africa. Good Governance Africa reports on clean audits of municipalities and reflects on such services as sanitation, refuse collection, reliability of electricity, education, water and medication availability. They have found that all of these aforementioned services are still seriously lacking. The report reflects, for instance, that inhabitants of only 42% of high-performing municipalities and 40% of low-performing municipalities have access to sanitation outside their homes26. Plaatjies30 describes this immense of chaos as30:7: “… horror scenarios of towns with no tap water, sewage running down streets and industry ‘running away.”

3.3.1.2.1. ANC fat cats

There are prominent examples of the immense abuse and exploitation of the tax-payers’ money by the elite of the ANC regime, especially on national level, with the main intention to benefit them exclusively in salaries and various other advantages.32

How well planned and established this greed and self-enrichment of the ANC’s so-called fat cats are, must be read in its entirety. This presence is confirmed by the misleading revised New Ministerial Handbook, which the Ramaphosa regime approved in June 2019. The handbook indicates that the perks for travel, cars and other luxuries that ministers used to enjoy were cut drastically to “decrease the gap” of inequality between the law-makers and the poor people (propagated by Tito Mboweni: to demonstrate some restraint ourselves). A comparative analysis of the handbook shows the outcome is again one of sole advantage of the “fat cats” of the present ANC elite in the Ramaphosa regime. There are no signs of shame or guilt about the large group of impoverished people who were created by the ANC since 1994. Once again, this is caused by the ongoing policy of gratuitous opportunism by the Zuma regime’s political opportunists (notwithstanding an effort to manipulate the public imagination by Mboweni in his November budget speech, wherein he delcared that the Ramaphosa administration is going to curb the perks of the leaders in the public sector).50,51

Hilary Joffe51 confirms how far the opportunistic culture of the ANC elite has spread and how fast this culture has established itself in the Ramaphosa regime. She writes on the November 2019 medium-term budget speech of Mboweni.51:2

When finance minister Tito Mboweni delivered his medium-term budget speech in parliament on Wednesday afternoon, some small but significant changes had been made to the draft which had been shared with journalists under embargo on Wednesday morning. Specifically, the curbs on ministers’ pay and perks which had been in the speech in the morning had been somewhat diluted by afternoon. The cap on the cost of official cars had been raised from R700,000 to R800,000; a phrase about “downward adjustments” to cabinet and provincial premiers’ salaries replaced with one about “further negotiations”; and a ban on subsistence and travel payments substituted with something fuzzier.

Were Mboweni’s cabinet colleagues more concern about their cars than about the country’s catastrophic public finances? It was hard not to ask, especially after he arrived almost an hour late to brief media after the cabinet discussed the budget in its Wednesday morning meeting.

The fact remains that Parliament is still affected, and often adversely continuing with, its old ways of corruption. Mokone52 writes that, for 2019/2010, the government set aside R750-million to primp the Union Buildings, houses of MPs in Cape Town, as well as ministers in Cape Town and Pretoria. This act of opportunism is addition to 84 free flights a year that each of the 400 serving MPs and ministers receive. Furthermore, they also enjoy heavily subsided three-course meals and liquor at Parliament, a car/travel allowance of R120 000 a year for MPs, whilst also receiving taxpayer-sponsored phones, tablets and laptops. MPs park for free at all the airports across the country and are shuttled by bus daily from their parliamentary villages to Parliament, free of charge. In 2019, a further payment of R111-million in ‘loss of office’ gratuities were made available as ‘golden handshakes’ to 159 MPs who failed to return to Parliament after the May 8 elections. The taxpayers’ money are used on airline tickets for approximately 2 000 current and former MPs, ministers and their dependants, including children and spouses a year, at the value of R120-million a year.52  Describing the MPs reaction on the 1st September 2019, when it was suggested that they cut some of their parliamentary benefits, Mokone52 reports52:1,4:

Pampered MPs, who enjoy taxpayers-sponsored freebies and perks that would make the average South African green with envy, warned this week that they will resist any attempt to trim their generous benefits. And some of them insist they deserve even more gravy – on top of their free flights, accommodation and meals, and alongside salaries that range from R1.2m to R2.4m, depending on the position they hold in parliament.

Pather53 discusses the reckless opportunistic politics of the ANC’s leaders since 1994, as characterised by their self-enrichment and -empowerment at the costs and suffering of more than 30-million impoverished black people. He points out one of the biggest factors still strengthening the presence of crime, disorder, lawlessness in the ANC. Pather writes53:14:

Despite all their big talk about liberating their people from poverty and economic inequality and creating an egalitarian society, most of our leaders are basically slaves to social status and wealth.

They strive each day to build obscenely oversized nest eggs in the limited time they enjoy in office.

While you and I bite our nails down to the elbow worrying about the escalating cost of living, let’s take a peak into the kind of lives our public representatives enjoy.

Cabinet ministers earn a salary of R2 401 633 a year while their deputies will take home R1 977 795.

And that’s not counting their perks of luxury vehicles, first-class travel internationally, business-class local flights, state-owned residences, renovations, cleaning services and other out-of-pocket expenses.

Members of Parliament, both national and provincial, obviously earn a little less than their executive colleagues, but fall into the category of “fat cats”.

Other forms of the ANC regime’s abuse and exploitation of the people’s empowerment and finance – which stems from this “circus of stealing and no accountability” – are fueled by the state’s financial support for former president Jacob Zuma in his appearances before courts of law, as well as before the Zondo commission because of his crimes against the state and the tax-payers) in the past. The legal costs that Zuma has built up via the state’s legal support for his cases stand as a prominent example here. These cases are described as having cost several million rands. Zuma initially got away with free legal support for his court cases, until the beginning of June 2019, through his misuse of the state’s cheque book to fight the various court cases against him. Zuma is described as having prolonged these cases with appeal-on-appeal, despite negative sentences against him. [Zuma managed to forgo all payments and deny his sentences because the state, when presided over by both Thabo Mbeki and Cyril Ramaphosa, illegally undertook to cover Zuma’s legal costs). Rooi54 writes54:8: “Dit volg nadat die hooggeregshof in Pretoria in Desember [2018] bevind het dit was onwettig van oudpres. Thabo Mbeki en pres. Cyril Ramaphosa om te onderneem om Zuma se regskoste te betaal”.

The legal and other costs accumulated by Zuma still need to be accounted for by the state when he appears before the Zondo commission. On Zuma’s defence offered before the Zondo commission – and the extreme costs already accumulated and in danger of growing through more of Zuma’s testimonies, Rooi writes54:8:

Die department van justisie het gister aangedui meer as R1 miljoen is in dié stadium reeds aan Zuma se regsverteenwoordigers by die kommissie betaal.

Voorlopige berekeninge deur regslui toon die koste van Zuma se regspan oor die lewensduur van dié kommissie kan ‘n astronomiese R24 miljoen tot R30 miljoen beloop.

Dit is benewens die koste van Zuma se verdediging in strafregtelike en ander sake wat volgens die DA reeds meer as R15 miljoen beloop. Die EFF raam dié bedrag op R32 miljoen.

Another substantial case of the ANC regime’s opportunistic spending, under the Ramaphosa regime, is the paying of the costs of politicians who testify before the various judicial commissions, including the Zondo commission. They are paid to testify despite the fact that many of them are guilty of state capture themselves and should be charged and not allowed to contribute to legal processes. Hunter55 reports that, when Jacob Zuma’s lawyers put up a fight at the Zondo commission, accusing the Commission of being biased and unfair, the taxpayers payed the bill, via the state’s Department of Justice. These payments are for their communication with the Zondo commission as well as appearing before it. Furthermore, these payments are separate from Zuma’s other costs of inquiry, which are also carried by the state. But Zuma is not benefiting alone: there are others from his regime that are implicated and are testifying before the Zondo commission. An amount of R6 968 000 was paid by the state to cover the legal costs of those appearing before the Zondo commission, like Lynne Brown, Nathi Nhleko, ex-police commissioner Kgomotso Phalan and the former head of the NPA Shaun Abrahams. The legal costs of the three police officers of North West, Lt Gen Baile Motswenyne, Maj Gen Ntebo “Jan” Mabula and Brig Pharasa Ncube, were all paid, while incumbent ministers Pravin Gordhan and Nathi Mthertwa also relied on the state to pay their legal fees. Although there was no comprehensive legal team appointed at the state’s cost to represent civil servants who appeared before the Zondo commission, there were two advocates appointed and paid R220 000 by the state. These two advocates specifically came in to represent the Department of Mineral Resources when its staff appeared before the Zondo commission.55

The full measure of the extremity of ideas held by so-called “fat cats” of the ANC elite is well reflected by their current moves to steal from the country’s prescribed assets, like the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) of R1.8-trillion, as well as private pension and assurance funds. This intention of the ANC opportunists is driven by the 1983 ANC radical economic transformation document – built on the basis of Marxist-Leninist socialist ideas – which instructs that the “billions” of the various pension funds and insurance companies of South Africa will be made available at the disposal of the ANC if it obtains government. Stemmet56, a spokesperson for the Association of Monitoring and Advocacy of Government Pensions (AmaGP) describes the looting of other’s money and belongings by the ANC elite regarding pensions56:7: “The ANC government is making the basic mistake of referring to this as public money. It is not public money; it belongs to the members of the pension fund, not to the government. In effect you’re forcing pension funds to lend money to bankrupt state entities. How can you invest in an absolutely bankrupt entity like Eskom?”

It is clear that the opportunists of ANC regime have already begun to loot from the public fixed assets by using the GEPF as a bank. Stemmet56 argues that the Mpati-Commission’s investigation into the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) already shows evidence of political contamination, for instance the R94.5-billion of GEPF money that has been invested into Eskom already. The same kind of so-called “risky investments” are well masked in Denel, SABC and many others state institutions where state capture is prominent. On this opportunistic steering and misused of other’s money by the ANC-elite, Stemmet warns56:7: “They‘ve done it already. And it’s illegal, of course”. His further warns against further state capture: “Would you accept a guarantee from a bankrupt guarantor? The government is bankrupt. That is why they want to use the GEPF to keep bankrupt SOEs going. If we could have trusted the government this might have been an option. But we cannot trust this government. Even if the government could make such an agreement, how can we believe they’d honour it?”

To argue that the Ramaphosa regime is not opportunistic like the Zuma regime, and that new state capture and self-enrichment will not happen again, is a fallacy. Cyril Ramaphosa was Jacob Zuma’s vice-president for years and he was the chair of the ANC’s corrupt programme of cadre-deployment, which is based on the exclusive self-enrichment and positioning of a selective group of ANC members. It is especially telling that many of the tainted pre-2019 ANC politicians, implicated in various forms of corruption, opportunism and dishonesty, are still in Ramaphosa’s regime as MPs, MPLs, mayors of municipalities, premiers, provincial ministers, cabinet-ministers and chairs of various parliamentary committees. These unpunished culprits are waiting for new “opportunities” post 2019.The ANC’s political opportunists of yesterday are those of tomorrow.

To understand the opportunism of Ramaphosa’s politics, just reads his misleading under-mentioned 2017 election-promises57:9, 58:2:

  • The party that has our nation’s future foremost in its heart.
  • A government that has put in place a specialised anti-corruption unit.
  • The party that insisted on setting up the Zondo Commission to expose and destroy state capture.
  • The party that has led the process of once again getting SARS working at its world class best,
  • The party under whose leadership, a new leadership of the National Prosecuting Authority has been put in place.
  • The party that is restoring the ability of government to provide services fairly to all.

[It is clear that the “saviour” Ramaphosa and his immediate ANC elite comrades may benefit from the learning from the example of Uruguay’s former president, José “Pepe” Mujica, who was previously in jail as a freedom fighter for 14 years. Mujica had donated 90% of his presidential salary to charity and drove around in an old Volkswagen Beetle during his presidency, writes Pather53. Or, as Pather53 further describes, present-day Swedish MPs who live in tiny flats, travel in crowded buses and trains, wash and iron their own clothes in communal laundries and live like the people who put them into office].53

3.3.1.4.3. ANC’s integrity committee

The failure of the SAPS and the NPA to bring any of the ANC elite to justice for state capture, led to a situation where any tainted ANC political opportunist can still participate in official politics. This legal vacuum of official certification regarding a candidate’s integrity to position him/herself as able, trustworthy, honest and free from political opportunism, was denied and avoided by the ANC politburo. They managed to side-step any repercussion by establishing their so-called Integrity Committee (Commission). This aimed to not only to give tainted ANC members entrance to the official politics of post-2019, through the committee’s “certification”, but also to “clear” the contaminated status of many members of the politburo.

To position the tainted ANC members as “virtuous” for the voters and their partners in Parliament, to ensure that they be be re-elected, the ANC’s Integrity Committee (Commission) was established. This committee is in line with most of the Marxist-Leninist regimes’ customs throughout the world, and it works to certify and redeem all of their members through an “official” party body. This led to most of the crooked ANC political opportunists of pre-2019 being elected without obstruction, especially those from the Parliament’s fifth administration. It assured the continuation of mainstay power of the politburo (more or less 90 members, as opposed to the greater ANC’s slightly less than a million members). The resolutions taken by the national conferences, in terms of Marxism-Leninism, has also become more popular after 2019. The overall contamination of the ANC politics of 2019 (and therefore 2019 onwards), forced the editor59 of the Saturday Star on the 16th March 2019 to ask the following59:12:

What does one have to do to get expelled from the ANC? Clearly, allowing a state capture network to take root is not enough. Nor is being charged with corruption. Nor is flouting the constitution.

…not only are those issues not sufficient to get you kicked out of the ANC, you are actually called up to help your comrades fight the upcoming election.

To non-ANC supporters, that clearly shows that the party is continuing under Cyril Ramaphosa, where it left off under Zuma and that the “New Dawn” and Thuma Mina slogans are merely that… words.

These aforementioned corrupt actions and decisions of the ANC’s Integrity Committee stand clearly in line with the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist ideology, which is constant and ongoing since the 1910s. This ideology has often turned extreme, arguably because of its democratic-centralism that underlies the empowerment-umbrella of its politburo: ANC members are only loyal to the ANC, its constitution and the resolutions taken by its national conferences (while the loyal ANC member, notwithstanding the form and comprehensiveness of his/her criminality, is never stripped from his/her public “integrity”). For the loyal ANC member, the party comes first, not South Africa. It would seem that, for the loyal ANC member, the ANC’s constitution is prioritised above the South African Constitution. This has neutralised the effectiveness of the South African Constitution, as its asks absolute loyalty and support of the party’s interests. The integrity, and thus the ability of members to serve on official bodies (Parliament) and official positions (MPs, MPLs, ministers, state-president, etc.) is determined by its Integrity Committee and nothing else.60-62

Despite statutory empowerment being absent from the Integrity Committee, the committee plays a very decisive role in the ANC’s member’s position and their future in the ANC and the country’s politics. Although it lacks the ability to verify the truth of allegations against ANC-members and can only direct the ANC-NEC with moral advice, its recommendations often leads to the false certification of tainted ANC members as “clean” and “able” members, eligible to be elected to Parliament. This contaminated outcome was reflected by the 22 tainted names on the ANC’s list for the May 2019 elections. Notwithstanding the criminal evidence on candidates who indeed went to Parliament after May, the committee is seen inside the ANC, as well by some of the media, as a trustworthy body. This makes the committee a  “certification-body” of the ANC instead, and therefore misleads voters about the integrity of some of the ANC members going to the Parliament.60-62

The functioning of the committee is so that ANC members are arrested for serious crimes but still awaiting trial, and are seen and treated as innocent until proven guilty and sentenced. Problematically, it also sees certain crimes as less serious than others, for instance that murder during acts of of terrorism by ANC members are of low status. The present ANC members that hold top positions in office must be read in the context in this functioning of the ANC; that all of its public representatives can and may continue to hold high offices, even when charged with serious crimes. Paton60, on the unlimited staying on of criminals in the ANC’s official politics through its broken disciplinary system, remarks60:7: “Even when accused of crimes and charged by a court, public representatives stuck to the mantra of “innocent until proven guilty. The result was that numerous ANC public representatives continued to hold high office even when charged with serious crimes.”

The aforementioned scenarios are from the South African democracy promised by the ANC wherein the judicial bodies (the various judicial commissions, the SAPS and NPA) should play a key-role to act against the main culprits of corruption and illegal management under the ANC ruling. Without accepting accountability, the ANC cannot differentiate between right or wrong. This is because most of the ANC elite function in a negative culture which also manifests in its Integrity Committee’s opinions and decisions. Munusamy61 postulates61:20: “The line between wrong and right is indistinct,” and: “…we might doubt what seemed to be irrefutable facts, as well as our sanity. Heroes and villains could swap places.”

Many of the ANC’s personal and party crimes are rationalised and projected as the unavoidable outcomes of Apartheid, or as necessary to fight apartheid. This implies that they either have no control over the outcome, or cannot be held responsible. This rationale masks the exclusive opportunism and the pre-meditated crimes of opportunists. The refusal of accountability for this situation (which seems to be the approach for the erasing of accountability from most ANC member’s mindsets) seems to have become the modus operandi of the ANC members in their avoidance of their political and socio-economic responsibility, as well as their political crimes, since 1994. The extreme opportunists follow their own goals and intentions under the guise of promoting the party’s interests. The failing of the ANC’s integrity committee to uphold strict legal rules and its members’ integrity, as well as regulate its own operations, reflect the same political contamination.59

Saunderson-Meyer62, writes on the failure of the ANC elite to accept accountability in the selection of senior members to its leadership positions, as well as the ANC’s refusal to address their current and historic corruption. On the 13th of July 2019, in the Saturday Citizen, he argues62:12:

William Gumede, associate professor of governance at Wits, writes in Business Live this week [July 2019] that “black victimhood” is used as an excuse to avoid accountability. Songezo Zibi, former editor of Business Day, writing this week on News24, offers nought for comfort. “Until there is a new political school of thought that seeks… to build social structures that deepen accountability, our situation will not approve. We shall continue to degenerate, risking violent social upheaval.”

The ANC’s basis of Marxist-Leninist socialism remains the key to understanding the seeming ignorance (and the cognitive inability) of some of the ANC’s elite to understand the difference between moral and amoral governing (as was recently evident in Jacob Zuma’s rhetoric when appearing before the Zondo commission). These decisions must be read in the context of the ANC’s underlying aim of sole political empowerment of an exclusive group of their elite. Paton60 writes on the irony of the situation60:7: “At the root of the problem is the ANC’s fundamental flaw; its reluctance to hold its leaders to account for even the most flagrant abuses. This process, which should seamlessly occur through the natural workings of the party’s disciplinary processes, is broken. Instead of fixing it, a new structure was created: the integrity commission.”

It could be argued that there is a serious danger that all statutory structures will be further undermined by the ANC opportunists to obtain unobstructed access to state funds and other illegal opportunities. The empowerment of the ANC Integrity Committee, versus the current disempowerment of the NPA, leaves the impression of a deliberate erasing of any official structures which can sabotage the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist elite’s opportunistic plans to obtain exclusive political power and riches. Bateman63 discusses the possible presence of suspicious motives by the ANC’s leader. It is in this setup, amid the unstable and faulty official vehicles of law enforcement, there seems to be an increasing possibility that President Cyril Ramaphosa will follow his predecessors and ensure that the group of corrupt ANC elite keep their positions. This is similar to ex-president Jacob Zuma, when he disbanded the Scorpions and subsequently fired the honest senior officials and senior politicians when they tried to interfere and intervene with his and the ANC elite’s corrupted deeds. President Ramaphosa’s many conflicts with court interdicts against the Public Protector, especially around his controversial CR17 campaign, is suspicious and worrying. In this context, Bateman63 reflects63:2: “…true independence in bodies that probe is the last thing the ANC wants – as evidenced by new outfit still having to report to the executive…” and63:2: “…there’s a comfort clause if the evidence gets too warm for the incumbents, no matter how clean they appear. President Ramaphosa can simply shut it down…”

3.3.1.4.3.1. ANC-elite’s 2019 opportunistic maneuvering

Following the lack of accountability and responsibility, 2019 has indicated that a new phase of opportunism by the ANC elite is in development, especially seen in the operations of the Integrity Committee. This manifestation is, from a political view, not always taken as seriously as it arguable should. The corruption of the committee may be an indication of the ANC’s post-2019 plans, or indicative of the consequences that awaits South Africa. Inside this context of opportunism in the ANC elite and the various conflicting actions of President Cyril Ramaphosa, the negative consequences may outweigh his improvement on Zuma, in the end. Firstly, another prominent example of Ramaphosa’s questionable decision-making is that he, in the ANC’s fifth administration, refused outright to fire the minister in charge of the ANC Women’s League, Bathabile Dlamini (seemingly favoured by Zuma), after she alleged lied under oath. Secondly, Ramaphose included an excessive amount of Zuma’s tainted cronies on the ANC list for the May election. Thirdly, Ramaphosa has appointed many of Zuma’s tainted cronies in the sixth ANC regime. Fourthly, the ongoing “passive and stretched prosecution” of Zuma, without any constructive outcome by the NPA, is a point of concern. Many of the high-level criminals from the Zuma-regime are walking free, whilst being identified by the Zondo and Mpati commissions as tainted by evidence that are grounds for their immediate prosecution by the NPA. Lastly, the powerlessness of a Special Tribunal (ST), established by Ramaphosa to help the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) to recover money lost by the state institutions through irregular and corrupt means during the Zuma-regime, has offered no significant results.63-67

Several political analysts argue that Ramaphosa lacks the will and intention to deeply reform the ANC, and put forward the idea that his disassociation with the Magashule-Zuma clan sabotages any reform. Evidence shows that these three figures are rather linked through ideology; Ramaphosa, Magashule and Zuma underwrite and respect Marxism-Leninism, which is against any stable system that can endanger the ANC’s politburo’s exclusive empowerment of politics and riches. Ramaphosa, as Jacob Zuma and Ace Magashule, can have many ambitions and can be read as individuals, but to be leaders in the ANC political system (and to stay on), all three must respect, underwrite and perform the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist ideology, not their own. The modus operandi of Ramaphosa’s contemporary political decisions are fully in line with those prescribed by the ANC ideology and policy: their power works through the creation of unstable official institutions and the upholding of the ANC elite’s empowerment on all terrains. In this context, Ramaphosa’s behaviour is equally opportunistic to that of Zuma and Magashule, and perhaps more concealed. Ramaphosa’s public facade does not make him less dangerous than his two comrades. The whole lack of progress on the execution of law and order, and thus the establishment of sound and working institutions such as the NPA and the SAPS, are viewed as suspicious by some political analysts and commentators. Opportunists and their opportunism cannot be rehabilitated; opportunists and their opportunistic groups only disappear when both die.63-67

In closing, the question remains: when is the opportunistic politician the most active and most dangerous for a country’s welfare and future? Various answers are offered: perhaps when a country’s people and systems make it vulnerable for attack and dominance, such as the situation in 1994 when a mass of impoverished black people were manipulated by other black people. Captured by Marxism-Leninism, the ANC spokespeople created the dream of a utopia of freedom, wealth, food, happiness, peace, etc. Instead, their voters are in socio-economic crisis and enslaved and subordinate to an opportunistic elite once more. The second answer may be when the opportunistic black elite are rejected as the regime of the day by other black people. The ANC elite find themselves in this position after the May 2019 elections, as the voting outcome at the ballot box in May show the first signs of rejection. The Institute of Security Studies shows, when comparing the outcomes of the 2014 elections versus the 2019 elections, that the ANC is in a permanent downward spiral. But the ballot box’s results only tell half of the story;  the ANC has less than a million inscribed members against a total registered voter population of ±27 million and an eligible voters population of ±37 million. In terms of votes in the May-elections, the ANC obtained an insignificant part of less than 28% of the official voters’ cake. It is clear that the ANC only obtained and held the government for over 25 years by the country’s undemocratic election legislation. Furthermore, Ramaphosa’s election as president of the ANC (and thus also state president) tells a story of insignificance: he was elected by slightly more than 2 000 out of 4 000 delegates (representing 1-million ANC-members) in 2017 at the Nasrec national conference of the ANC (his majority over the next candidate was less than 200 votes). His position of power in the ANC (statistically calculated in terms of 1 million ANC members) is 0.2%. When this meagre amount of 2 000 votes for Ramaphosa by the ANC delegates are calculated in terms of democratic election principles, he only received a 0.06% mandate from the eligible 37 million voters.24,25,59,69-75

Three outcomes become clear here. Firstly, the ANC elite’s Marxist-Leninist model is outdated. Its total failure over 25 years of reign confirms this point. Secondly, the ANC elite know that their 28% portion of the eligible 37 million population of voters means that they are going to lose the 2024 elections if the country’s election legislation is changed to make future elections democratic. Thirdly, Ramaphosa knows that, in a new election dispensation, he will lose power. Behind his arrogance and bravado as the so-called elected South African state president, he is aware that his presidency is a dictatorship forced upon South Africa by the ANC’s communist model. The current opportunists of the ANC elite, especially its “Top Six” leaders, will attempt to remain in power, at the cost of destabilising the country’s legal system. Indeed, in this situation the ANC elite may even attempt a coup before the 2024 elections.24,25,59,69-75

4. Conclusions

It is clear that the post 2017 ANC regime differs very little from the pre-2017 one. The same opportunist politicians remain key role-players and are driven by the same criminal opportunism of the old ANC elite. A definitive profile of a regime in trouble has emerged; a regime in which the elite is desperately trying to uphold its Marxism-Leninism politics. Working to this end, the ANC regime is becoming more and more dangerous.

Tristan Taylor76, a South African political philosopher, writes comprehensively on the post-1994 political situation and opportunistic politics of the country, when he posits76:6:

How did the ANC get to this stage? A combination of considered policy and effective implementation marked the early years of the ANC’s rule. The government electrified townships, built houses and clinics, started to create a black middle class, institutionalised a progressive constitution and attempted to persuade society to live together and not apart.

Then came Thabo Mbeki’s post-truth HIV policy. Denying the link between HIV and Aids and refusing to roll out antiretrovirals was, putting it mildly, contrary to science. But facts were ignored, party loyalty kicked it, delusion reigned and 300,000 people died.

Like the first hit of tik, the taboo against setting government policy opposed to truth was broken. Contemporary examples include the department of basic education lowering the pass rate to avoid addressing inadequate schooling, and the department of agriculture, land reform & rural development completely ignoring the horrendous drought that is wiping out commercial and emerging agriculture in the Cape provinces.

But the greatest current delusion belongs to President Cyril Ramaphosa. The reality is that large swatches of the ANC are corrupt. The rot stretches from high to low. It has become endemic. But he seems to believe that the unity of the ANC can be maintained while corruption is dealt with in a substantive manner.

That’s contrary to reality. A fantasy. Comrades need to be purged and jailed: blind loyalty to the party must go. President Ramaphosa has to break the ANC in order to save the country. But given the lack of arrest for corruption, this looks almost as likely as a President Zille.

Ramaphosa is not incompetent: he is a perfect Marxist-Leninist leader of the ANC. As an ANC opportunist, he knows what he and the ANC elite want from South Africa, as well as how they are going to obtain it. He will never try to break the corruption and opportunism of the ANC: if he breaks the ANC and its corruption, he loses his power and opportunities inside the ANC’s established circle of opportunism. Endemic corruption is ANC culture; corruption is the heartbeat of the ANC’s unity. Marxism-Leninism is the ANC; opportunism is Marxism-Leninism.

In the next (Article 16), titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (16: Outdate ANC)”, the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter, in terms of the political power it received after the elections of 8 May 2019, will further be evaluated.

5. References

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  41.     Watson A. AG’s rogue gallery. The Citizen (News). 2019 June 27; p. 3.
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  43.     Mahlangu I, Madisa K. ‘A-G complains about intimidation. Sowetan (News). 2019 June 27; p. 2.
  44.     Cilliers S. Tswaing-rekening gevries; salarisse nie betaal. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 July 4; p.17.
  45.     Mokone T. Cyril suave defending ‘Sona dream’. Sowetan (News), 2019 June 27; p. 4.
  46.     Morapela K. Municipalities in dire straits. The Citizen (News). 2019 June 14; p. 8.
  47.     Mkhwanazi S. Land reform programme is on track–Ramaphosa. The Star (Opinion). 2019 June 27; p. 26.
  48.     Mkhwanazi S. ‘Pay workers or face a strike’. The Star (Opinion). 2019 June 27; p. 26.
  49.     Will M. Matjhabeng verkwis heel meeste in SA. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 July 4; p. 17.
  50.     Hunter Q Ministers to tighten their Gucci belts. Sunday Times (News). 2019 June 16; p. 4.
  51.     Joffe H. Subtle changes in budget speech signal pushback on perks. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Nov. 3; p. 2.
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  53.     Pather D. ‘Fat Cat’ MPs must serve the people. People (Influence). 2019 June 9; p. 14.
  54.     Rooi J. Druk op Zuma neem oral toe. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 June 23; p. 8.
  55.     Hunter Q. Zuma’s Zondo bill paid by state. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Aug. 11; p. 4.
  56.     Barron C. Peril looms for state pension fund. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Aug. 25; p. 7.
  57.     ANC. A better life for all. #GrowSouthAfrica #VoteANC. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 9.
  58.     ANC. A better life for all. #GrowSouthAfrica #VoteANC. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March 17; p. 2.
  59.     ANC’s tenure at top under threat. Saturday Citizen (Opinion). 2019 March16; p. 12.
  60.     Paton C. The Cat lurks as ANC’s chicken come home to roost. Business Day (Opinion). 2019 May 28; p. 7.
  61.     Munusamy R Hold on to reality as Zuma and his legal team does everything they can to lead Zondo down the rabbit hole. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 July 14; p. 20.
  62.     Saunderson-Meyer W. Optimism shrivels on vine. Saturday Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 2019; p. 1.
  63.     Bateman S. True cost of State Capture incalculable – shocking reprise. [Internet]. [Cited 2019 Nov.9]. Available from     https://www.biznews.com/leadership/2019/03/01/true-cost-state-capture-incalculable/
  64.     Gloves off in ANC turmoil. Business Day (Opinion). 2019 Feb. 26; p. 8.
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  66.     Maughan K. President explains Dlamini’s retention. Business Day. 2019 Feb. 14; p. 2.
  67.     Munusamy R. Ramaphosa should beware SA’s Michael Cohens, toadies who put up a firewall between Zuma and accountability. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March 3; p. 20.
  68.     Use Special Tribunal as a tool to disinfect SA. The Star (Opinion), 2019 February 26; p. 8.
  69.     Bruce P. Would DA rather spar with Julius than work with Cyril. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March 10, p. 18.
  70.     Küsel A. E-tolskuld afgeskryf, sê Outa. Beeld 2019 March 28; p.1.
  71.     Marrian N. Lists scandal will haunt Ramaphosa. Guardian & Mail. 2019 March 15 -21; p. 4.
  72.     Munusamy R. We are stuck with the same old problems because we are stuck with the same old leaders in the same old electoral system. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 Sept. 30; p. 22.
  73.     Prince L. Onafhanklikes: Hof sê in April oor Kieswet. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 March 29; p. 13.
  74.     Rooi J. Laat kiesers self oor die LP’s besluit! Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 March 31; p. 7.
  75.     Wyngaard H. Wysiging van Kieswet kan uitkoms bied. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 March 31; p. 6.
  76.     Taylor T. A society addled by political delusions, from white power to washing clean the ANC. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Nov. 10; p. 6.

PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

 

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (13: Violence and Crime)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (13: Violence and Crime)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Analyst, confidence, desperate, expropriation, journalist, perspective, political party, traumatised, violence.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 4

1. Background

In 1973 the American ex-Mafia boss Vincent Teresa1 revealed in his book: “My Life in the Mafia”, how the Mafia ruthlessly ‘whack out’ their enemies; how film stars and singers are snared by the mob; how the mob infiltrates big business; how the mob steals countless millions of dollars and makes millions of dollars through almost every conceivable crime; how to fix a horse race or corrupt a cop; how to be a top money-maker; how the mobsters live, and what their fatal weaknesses are; and how it is to live in hiding under constant armed guard with a half-million dollar price on your head from the mob for whistle-blowing by an ex-gangster. Citing the dangers and excesses of organised crime , from their numbers to their actions, etc., to serve as a warning that the same can happen anywhere else in the “good” outside world, is far too late for crime-stricken South Africa. Teresa states:1:295-296

Crime families can vary in size. In New York, Gambino had maybe a thousand made men; in our family in New England we had a hundred and fifty. Between New Jersey and New York you might have two thousand five hundred people. In the whole country [USA], there is probably six thousand five hundred. But these are just the made men, remember. There are another two hundred to three hundred thousand mob guys working for the made guys. Nothing gives the mob a bigger laugh than when some expert says the mob is nothing to worry about because there are only six thousand members. Hell, behind those six thousand you’ve got a whole army, not counting all the people who aren’t Italian but who work with the mob.

These Sicilian Mafiosi will run into a wall, put their head in a bucket of acid for you if they’re told to, not because they’re hungry but because they’re disciplined. They’ve been brought up from birth over there to show respect and honour, and that’s what these punks over here don’t have. Once they’re told to get someone, that person hasn’t a chance. They’ll get him if they have to bust into his house in the middle of the night, shoot him, bite him, eat him, suck the blood out of his throat. They’ll get him because they were told to do it.

The above scenario does not seem strange to South Africans living in informal settlements, neglected suburbs and other areas out of the ordinary public’s eyes, or those reading the daily newspapers or listening to the news on radio or following the many television broadcasts of the Zondo commission. Here, we have the same mafia behaviour and inclinations which have become ingrained in the actions of some of the ANC’s top leaders in committing serious crimes, varying from state capture, election manipulation, to murder. We see various kinds of uncontrolled crime, present all over the country, especially from 1994 with the advent of the so-called “first democracy” in South Africa. What differs between the USA and the SA crime scenes, making the situation here much worse than in the USA, is that the American prosecution authorities act constructively and are locking up crooks constantly. However, as the Zondo commission under the guidance of an excellent judge revealed, the many culprits that seem mostly to be part of the ANC’s inner circle are able to get away with their crimes and corruption as the prosecution authorities demonstrate an outright failure to bring these perpetrators to book.

The example of Teresa’s whistle-blowing in the USA presented us with an excellent outcome: 27 top-ranking Mafiosi were jailed in America, while many more had been indicted or charged. Teresa himself was jailed for twenty years for his criminal activities before being paroled. Here in South Africa whistle-blowers are harassed, taken to court for libel and slander by the crooks who committed crimes and who are still walking free under the ANC’s safety-net, while other whistle-blowers are being murdered. The ANC’s policy’s is that if you are not found guilty before a court and have not be sentenced for an alleged crime, you are free to serve in the ANC’s highest positions. That policy includes awaiting the outcome of an appeal so you are considered not guilty until the court comes to a final verdict and thus that you may stay on untouched and comfortable in your position as lawmaker. The ANC list of 22 tainted candidates for the May 2019 elections and the positioning of some of these tainted ANCs later to senior posts in Parliament, confirm this policy very well. Jacob Zuma has been staying out of jail now for years, based on appeal on appeal against his alleged crimes in the arms deal, while the ANC’s top structure was also let off and walking free by the now disgraced Sereti commission.2-5

In this article the presence of crime — especially violence, gangsterism and related phenomena — and how it has infiltrated society and even the statutory institutions under the mandate of the ANC, will be reflected, evaluated and described.

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 12)

Article 13 is a continuation of the previous article (Article 12, titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity)”. This article, with the focus on violence and crime, is in sequence with articles 11 (Introduction) and 12 (Prosperity) already published on the ANC. The intention is also to analyse and to discuss further the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC to effect land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.2. Aims of article 13 (Continued from Article 12)

The primary intention of this project on the ANC) is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by specifically describing the profile of the ANC on the same basis as was done with Article 9 on the EFF and Article 10 on the DA.

Once more, we aim to evaluate the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of the mandate as ruler it received during the election of 8 May 2019.

2. Method (Continued from Article 12)

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to engage in successful land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources have been consulted to assess and to describe the facts that must guide us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to effect successful land reform from 2019 onwards.

The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

The manifestos, self-descriptions and public referees of the ANC were already reflected, evaluated and described in Article 11 (Introduction). The public referees of the African National Congress will further be reflected, evaluated and described in the under-mentioned division 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019.

3.2. Louw Appraisal Checklist

The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,6 will again be used for the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC. The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good classification, were again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s’ manifesto and  the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts, and interpreted as the researcher sees fit.6

3.3 The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 12)

3.3.1. South African violence and related crimes

One of the criteria of a failed state is the inability of a regime to guarantee and assure prosperity. Another one of the criteria for a good regime is to guarantee the presence and maintenance of law and order for its people, and thus to assure a peaceful society free from any crime, especially violence.

Undoubtedly South Africa has become a crime-ridden country, especially over the last two decades. Crime, in its broadest form, is totally out of control. It is practised on the highest levels by some members of our so-called political elite. The various judicial commissions, prominently the Zondo commission, bring this reality under our attention daily where it is alleged that certain top ANCs and their cronies stole millions of rand from the state, where murder in the form of assassinations to silence whistle-blowers is a common phenomenon, and where there is an almost complete lack of an effective prosecution system to punish criminals and murders.

South Africa is today a country of crooks without a single cowboy and a sheriff. If there is any doubt about the present-day South Africa being a gangster state and thus a failed constitutional state, just read the books of Adriaan Basson2, Pieter du Toit2, Pieter Myburgh5 and Jacques Pauw7. Through the mass penetration of crime in their daily dealings some of the political elite have become the South African Mafiosi, counting today nearly as many as Teresa’s1 thousands of Mafiosi in America. Unlike in America, the Mafiosi here are only partly friends with the politicians: many a time they are the politicians themselves. With such an official example it must thus not be a surprise that the practise of crime by some factions of society has become a common lifestyle.1,2,5,7

Crime takes various forms, from common theft, stealing, embezzlement, up to the most extreme form that should be punishable by hanging: Violence. Violence is central today in South Africa as the creator of poverty, political instability, inequality, as well as social, emotional and psychological traumas and despondency. It also tells us why prosperity is absent here. It plays a signifcant role in our country’s service-delivery unrest and the unstoppable chronic anarchy. The immense presence of violence in South African is well indicated by Bawa8 when he writes8:17: “South Africa is one of the most violent countries in the world”. But this violence is not experienced or observed at the same level by all the citizens; meaning that the middle and higher socio-economic groups, living and working in the better-off areas with good security systems, are mostly spared the extreme experience of daily rape, murder, robbery, etc. Predominantly, most sufferers of violence are the poor Blacks living in temporary shelters in isolated areas and informal settlements engulfed by crime and violence, far away from the security of the SAPS safety-net. But today the intensity of crime is spreading also to more developed areas and the poorer suburbs.8-10

Furthermore, it is clear that the statistics on violence and crime are understated, making the violence experienced by the poor far more comprehensive and in-depth than the general public realises. Their living conditions reflect not prosperity but utter adversity and hardship. What makes this crime condition so devastating, as well as a political pressure cooker waiting to explode, is the hard fact that nearly 30 million South Africans are poor, lacking sufficient housing accommodation, healthcare, basic education, work, and most of all not knowing when they or their children are going to be robbed, assaulted or murdered. Visible policing is mostly absent in those poor areas that are sheltering people marred by devastating life conditions that they can neither control nor are responsible for. These unfortunate people have been the forgotten, faceless ones for many years. They are people who are sometimes not only the ones to be robbed, assaulted and murdered, but who have in time become themselves robbers, attackers and murderers to survive in their dark, criminalised world. Some have an uncle, a nephew or brother as a parliamentarian but these have unfortunately forgotten them and their own homeland-past long ago because most politicians become with time blind and deaf to the outside world:  they live their lives ensconced in luxury and abundance.8-10

South Africa’s crime and violence, also as a barometer of the ANC regime as a failed government, will in the various next subdivisions be comprehensively described and be evaluated.

3.3.1.1. Western Cape

Even a cursory glance at South African media, persuades one that gangsterism and other crime-related activities such as the drug trade, theft, unrest, serious violence like assault, rape and murder, have taken over the Cape Flats of the Western Cape. It is not a sudden phenomenon, but a gradual development that has been gaining momentum over the last decade or two. It clearly betrays the ANC national government’s failure to maintain primary governmental structures. Prominent among these failures, must be counted the progressive downward spiral as to the quality of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and its ability to ensure daily crime prevention. It portends a very negative future for especially the poor living in the informal settlements as well as the lower-level socio-economic suburbs. The main sufferers and victims are Blacks, including the Coloureds. The immense long-term criminality in the Cape Flats is well reflected by the entrenched establishment of well-armed gangs, such as the Destruction Boys, which have become “armies” in their their own right. Organised, as well as common crime, associated with a very high murder rate, forced the ANC-regime to order the return of the South African National Defence Force (SADF) to the Cape Flats in July 2019. During the so-called Operation Prosper, the SADF was supposed to render assistance to the failed SAPS in areas identified as crime-ridden hotspots on the Cape Flats. (The “Cape Flats” is the collective name for a poverty-stricken, gang-infested area of more or less 25km between east and west, stretching from Bellville in the north, Blue Downs in the east, Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain in the south to Gugulethu. It totals 11 townships, including the places Lavender Hill, Bishop Lavis, the Steenberg district, Manenberg, Delft, Marcus Garvey, Elsiesrevier, Nyanga, Khayelitsha, Mfuleni, Philippi and Kraaifontein.9,11-17

But what is often overlooked, is that crimes such as gansterism and violence are permanent features of a society in peril and caught in social and economic instability, which is a direct result of South Africa’s poor governance over many years. The almost pathological conditions in the West Cape has seemingly been unknown to the ANC leadership since 1994. It is a situation of which the roots have so far never been addressed by government besides treating the symptoms so as to get the “fever down without healing the illness”. Four years ago the same kind of experiment in intervention was execited when the SADF was used in Operation Fiela, in cooperation with the SAPS, the South African Revenue Service (SARS), Home Affairs and a plethora of other state departments to raid, search and arrest anyone who did not have a reasonable explanation for anything in his/her possession. The immense criminality already established, and basically left untreated from 2014 to 2015, apart from ordinary law enforcement in 3 205 operations, is reflected by the official data in December 2015 when Operation Fiela began to be wrapped up. The data reflect: 41 000 arrests, the recovery of 737 vehicles, confiscation of 375 firearms and 10 homemade firearms. In 2018 Fiela Two was launched again, but seemingly without success. The present hopeless failure by the ANC regime to combat the immense criminality in the Western Cape and the need to activate the emerging use of the SADF, has forced the Police minister Bheki Cele to describe it as a “national effort to combat gangsterism in South Africa”. (This description applies one hundred present to the country’s gangsterism in general, but also specifically to its Parliament, its SAPS and many state enterprises where corruption is seemingly well entrenched).9,11-13,15-18

It seems that the SADF interventions since 2014, as well as the SAPS’s constant presence in the problematic Cape Flats since 1994, have never brought successes; the present ongoing criminal situation in the Western Cape confirms it. Although Fiela One did not bring much bloodshed on the side of the criminals, experts warn that the “Cape Criminality” is a deep-seated phenomenon that has developed over many years. It must be seen in terms of the active unrest and anarchy which have spread all over the country since 1994.  From a security perspective, it seems already to have moved into chronic anarchy, a phenomenon which the ANC regime either does not understand or ignores outright because they do not have the skills and ability to address it. This opinion is strengthened by the ANC’s poor fighting of criminality since 1994 and encouragement to engage in serious crime that the greater society may draw, given the bad example set by the ANC’s own law-makers, some of whom some were jailed for serious offences. Many other ANC law-makers and politicians are serious offenders too, but find themselves still outside jail because they have so far not been prosecuted by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).17,19

The fact that the ANC never took the Cape Flats crime issue seriously, is becoming more and more evident because it is a regime that still lives inside its old culture of lawlessness and disorder, coming from its pre-1994 days as a terrorist-revolutionary organisation. Ritchie19 aptly named it “real-politik at play”. Ritchie19 and Fokazi29 mention that, in light of the ANC’s neglect of the Cape Flats crime issue and their failure to do an in-depth analysis of the causes and to implement prevention and healing, the warning signs are there that Cape Town risks becoming the world’s most dangerous city.19,20

Hyman21 postulates that in reality Cape Town is already the world’s most dangerous city when he aligned its statistics with the world’s — until recently — most dangerous city: Caracas in Venezuela. The same author21 mentions that according to the Cape’s Citizen Council for Public Safety and Criminal Justice, which compiled a listing from official global statistics, Caracas was in 2017 the world’s murder capital with 3 387 murders. Hereto Cape Town’s death-by-murder rate rose from the 15th place in 2017 to the 11th place (with a growth of 15%) in 2018. Now, in 2019, if the body count is maintained in Cape Town with 3 900, Caracas is left far behind. Looking at the analysis of murders per 100 000 people, the rate for Cape Town of approximately 97.3 per 100 000 so far for the first four months of 2019, would propel it into the fourth place for 2018 on the global list where all the top cities in the top 10 are situated in Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil which are all at the centre of the international drug trade, reports Hyman21. A short analysis for 2019 for Cape Town by Hyman21 shows that the murders in the first four months of 2019 were 10.66 per day, while the number of murders between the three days of June 1 and June 3 were 62. The percentage rise in admissions of murdered victims to the Salt River mortuary so far this year has been 46%, while the projected murders for 2019 is 3 893 if the rate of killings continues.21

Other statistics are there to confirm Hyman’s21 labelling of Cape Town as the “World’s most dangerous city”. In May 2019 there were 331 murders in the Western Cape; in the month of June 2019 there were 448 murders in Cape Town (against the 344 murders of June 2018); in the first week of June 2019, 14 people were shot dead within 24 hours in Delft; on 5 July 2019 six women were shot and killed in the Marcus Garvey areas of Philippi in Cape Town, while on 6 July 2019 five men were also killed in the same area. On the weekend of 5 to 7 July 2019, 55 people were murdered in the greater Cape Town area. This year (over the last six months), 2 000 people have been killed so far in gang-related incidents in the Cape. Between January and June 2019 (six months) more than 44 people were killed in Bonteheuwel. The 2018/2019 SAPS report shows that in Nyanga, 289 people were murdered, followed by Delft with 247 murders and Khayelitsha with 221 murders.14,18-24

What the Cape Flats saga further reflects is the killing of persons under 30 years of age mainly, prompting Pinnock15 to call it “a war against young people”. What has been overlooked by the ANC’s bigwigs since their taking political power in 1994, is that most of the youth in the Cape Flats (as in most of the other socio-economically disturbed South African areas) grew up without supportive families, with poor education and no formal employment prospects (there are more or less 350 000 young people under 25 years outside education in the Cape). Many are adolescents who are victims of complex historical conditions, not of their own making, which are mixed into an inflammatory setup wherein Apartheid’s relocations, present-day migration and high levels of alcohol and drug abuse, play a prominent role.15

Looking at the monthly crime statistics, one finds that almost 1 300 murder victims arrived at the Cape Town mortuaries between January and April 2019, while between 1 November 2018 and 30 April 2019 (six months) a total of 1 875 people were murdered in the greater Western Cape. According to figures from Professor Lorna Martin20, head of forensic pathology in the Western Cape, by the end of April 2019 the city’s mortuaries in Tygerberg and Salt River handled 1 280 murder victims, with more than 50% having been shot. Martin20 states to Fokazi20 of the Sowetan that the region’s mortuaries (which can already not cope with the inflow of bodies — in such a way that bodies have to be stored in refrigerator shipping containers) are further overstretched by the storage of more incoming murdered bodies.14,19,20

Martin20, on the undercapacity of the mortuaries, responds as follows20:6: “Even though this is new [the R281-million Observatory mortuary] and we are moving in, it’s already not big enough. With the increase [in the amount of murders] that we’ve had lately, I don’t think we will cope.”

The names of Delft’s so-called “townships” (consisting in total of 500 000 residents), varying from “Blikkiesdorp”, “Tin-Can Town”, the “Hague” (the so-called “Bishopscourt” of Delft) to “Symphony Way” (where most of the evicted people find a “home”), reflect well the criminal and social disorder there. When Hyman25 writes as follows of “Symphony Way”, his description is fully applicable to all of the many “camps” around Cape Town where the city’s outcasts are forced to live and hope not to get murdered25:6:

It’s a place of constant waiting. An internment camp that represents the worst of apartheid’s legacy and the failure of the new governments to deal with it.

Pastor Ray McCauley26, president of the Rhema Family Churches and co-chair of the National Religious Leaders Council, put the situation as follows26:6: “Residents say enough is enough”. He said that 308 people were killed in June 2019 at the Cape of which 139 were shot and 118 stabbed.

In this regard, the editor18 of the Sowetan writes on the nonchalant attitude and lack of concern of South Africans as to what has happened concerning the number of murders at the Cape Flats over the last six months (with 1 875 murders) and the presence of immense crime and violence all over South Africa18:12:

That is a huge number of deaths in just six months but there was no outrage in SA, we carried on with our lives as if nothing had happened. This is the kind of news that would have made headlines every day in other countries until police were seen to be doing something to ensure the safety of innocent citizens.

The essentially permanent breakdown of law and order in the so-called “Cape Flats”, which Ritchie19 describes appositely as “a war zone run by crooks and murderers”, is primarily because the ANC regime failed to bring prosperity to the inhabitants in the form of good training, work opportunities and a safe environment. Instead, they have left the area on its own to struggle on haphazardly. This is a situation which Ritchie19 summarises as follows19:8: “What is happening in Cape Town, what has been allowed to develop on the forgotten and dumped communities of the Cape Flats, has to be a crime against humanity.” How much the ANC failed in the Cape Flats to bring prosperity to the citizens and how the present setup was allowed to deteriorate as a result of the ANC’s poor policing and law-enforcement, as well as corruption in the SAPS, is described by Watson17 as follows17:4: “Gangsters there are unafraid of fighting back as evidenced by the shooting of six police anti-gang unit members in June [2019].”

3.2.1.2. Violence is countrywide

But we must not be fooled to think that the Cape Flats represents an extraordinary, singular “bad” situation and place. Countrywide, crime has been created and maintained by the ANC regime’s poor governance since 1994. Just listen to Cyril Ramaphosa’s own confession in his speech during the state of the nation debate in June 2019 when he mentioned that the anti-gang unit was transferred to national control by police minister Bheki Cele because “hooliganism (gangsterism) is spreading across the country”.

McCauley26 describes the chaos of the constant murder-spree in South Africa at present well when he writes26:6:

The Western Cape is not the only province suffering from the violence. Throughout the country we are hearing of horrific stories where people are hijacked or robbed at gunpoint and their possessions taken.

According to the SAPS, there were 20 336 murders in South Africa, between April 2017 and March 2018, showing a 7% increase from the previous year.

This puts the country’s murder rate at close 36 people murdered per 100 000 of the population – with Cele [Minister of Police Bheki Cele] noting that 57 people are being murdered each day.

Crime in all its forms are indeed present and very active in the country, reflecting a country spinning out of control under the ANC regime. During its reign it has failed to improve the country’s infrastructure, economy and law and order, besides responding time after time by only implementing short-term crime interventions. The overview of Makhetha23 and Marupeng23 of an overwhelmingly crime-beset South Africa, based on the SAPS report for 2018/2019, is very informative, but shocking. They pinpointed Gauteng as a specific point of concern and write that the area of Ivory Park outside Tembisa remains one of the most dangerous areas in South Africa to live in: it recorded the highest number of house robberies with 373 (an increase of 52). The second was the Honeydew area (consisting of Northriding, Strydom Park and Randpark Ridge) with 329 house robberies (a decrease of 31), while Orange Farm (south of Johannesburg) reflects the highest number of rapes, 226. This statistic makes it the most dangerous area for women in the country. Regarding the number of murders committed, Johannesburg Central and its immediate surroundings areas remained the top murdering spot: 123 murders for 2019 against the 93 of 2018 (an increase of 30). In the second spot for high-murder areas are respectively Hillbrow and Jeppe with 111 cases each.23,24

The violent-crime behaviour and other disorders in the northern areas of Port Elizabeth which include Bethelsdorp, have been many years in the making. It has been, like most other crime-infected areas in the country, left essentially unattended by the ANC regime since 1994. In 2018, there was an SAPS intervention, but it was withdrawn later. On the prevalence of the uncontrolled murdering and other serious violent crimes in this area, Sain27 reports that with the SAPS intervention some results were obtained for a short while. Since May 2019 it has started to escalate again, leaving so far this year already 117 people murdered.27 This chaos, or lack of law and order, is well described by Sain27 when he writes27:8: “Impeccable sources say that in the last five months the Gelvandale Mortuary has recorded more than 100 gunshot wound related deaths.” The situation is now so serious that the inhabitants of the northern areas of Port Elizabeth have also started to plead for SADF intervention to safeguard them in some way.27

The presence of serious violent crimes countrywide is also reflected by the murder statistics showing the highest number of murders recorded at the top-30 police stations: Western Cape occupied 10 spots, Gauteng had eight spots and KwaZulu-Natal six spots.24

The 2018/2019 SAPS data28 reveal the following crime statistics countrywide: 21 022 murders (686 more than 2018 or a 3.4% increase), sexual offences increased by 4.6% (2 312 cases, bringing them to a total of 52 420), attempted murder increased by 4.1% (747cases) with 18 980 cases for 2019, common robbery increased by 2% to 51 765 reported cases and farm murders declined from 62 in 2018 to 47 in 2019.28

The latest SAPS statistics (2018/2019) reflects a rise in the reporting of crimes against women from 172 961 to 177 620, with a decline of 5.4% in the murders of women: 2 930 to 2 771. Regarding the reporting of crimes against children, the crimes decline from 43 842 to 43 540.  In this regard, 1 014 children were murdered, reflecting an increase from 985. The rate of sexual offences against women decreased by 0.4% to 36 597. There was an increase in sexual offences against children: 3.8%, to reflect 24 387 children affected. In total, general sexual offences has increased by 4.6 % to reach 52 420 offences (2 312 more). Sexual offences have reduced by over 10 000 cases since the 2009/2010 reporting year. On official rape-reporting stats, Gareth Newham30, head of the Justice and Violence Prevention programme at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), said that on average only one out of nine rape cases is reported, while in some communities it can be as low as one out of 22. Only between 4% and 8% of all rape reporting leads to sentencing).29-31

These SAPS statistics reports that children, affected by their daily lived environment of crime,  themselves joined the stream of murderers: out of 21 022 murders as many as 736 people were killed by children (Eastern Cape : 231, Western Cape: 170), while many of the children killed were victims of other children. In the same way, 4 196 common assaults were committed by  children.24,30,32

The ubiquitous presence of uncontrolled violent crime, intertwined with the constant growth of broad criminality in South Africa, is also evidenced by the call on 19 July 2019 by the DA for more specialised anti-gang units in the Gauteng Province. the presence of uncontrolled gang violence in the province was revealed in the research report of GIATOC, namely Ending the Cycles of Violence, which was focussed on the two areas, Westbury and Eldorado Park. John Moodley33 of the DA emphasised that the ANC regime’s general failure to ensure good law and order via the SAPS in Gauteng, engendered the same kind of chaos through gang violence as in the Cape Flats and had led directly to the undermining of job creation, schooling, youth and community development, further exacerbating the incidence of violent crimes.33

Violent crimes and the breakdown of law and order countrywide, including property crime, are doing one main thing: limiting the growth of prosperity. Until now, it does not seem to be a negative phenomenon for the ANC regime.

A specific category of violent crime which is growing countrywide is kidnapping. The Gauteng annual provincial crime statistics revealed that 125 cases of kidnapping were reported in Kempton Park, reflecting a 14.7% increase (making it the kidnapping capital of South Africa) for the period 2018/2019. In total there were 530 cases of kidnapping in Gauteng, with Free State 511, Eastern Cape 468 and Western Cape 458. Statistics revealed that the predominant motives for kidnappings were for robbery, rape or sexual assault, hijacking, domestic violence and for ransom.30,34

The 2018/2019 statistics show that another category of violent crime that reflects an increase is robbery. Robbery with aggravating circumstances has increased by 1.2% to 140 032 cases (meaning 1 668 more) countrywide. (In this category is included hijackings, cash-in-transit robberies and robberies at commercial and residential properties). Common robbery increased by 2% to 51 765 cases and arson by 5.5% to 4 083 cases (with an increase of 214). There were 113 089 cases of malicious damage to property, reflecting an increase of 1.4% (1 597 cases). In total the contact crimes with a violent element, as listed above, increased by 2.6%.30,34

Gareth Newham30, who made the shocking revelation about the 2018/2019 SAPS report, said that these statistics were almost six months out of date (closing on March 31, 2019) and did not reflect the current spate of high-profile violent crimes reported since 1 April in the media. This means the picture on all kinds of crimes, included violence, can be much worse.30

3.3.1.2.1. Highway violence

Another confirmation that the ANC regime’s maintenance of law and order collapsed, is the overtaking of violent gangsterism of the country’s roads and highways.35,36 On 9 June 2019 Hosken and Singh35 wrote in the Sunday Times35:2: “Motorists have been warned to stay off the N3 between Johannesburg and Durban after dark”.

Why this warning? Because the deadly attacks on foreign truck drivers, which started more than a year ago, are surging.

Hosken and Singh35 report that according to the Police 74 trucks were burnt and damaged, with 50 vehicles torched on the highway since April 2018. In the past year 213 truck drivers were killed of whom 12 were foreigners. The financial loss of cargo and trucks amounts to R1.2-billion. Towhat extent the government failed to protect not only the life of citizens, but the economy, is well described by the CEO of the Road Freight Association (RFA), Gavin Kelly35, when he says35:2: “If the government doesn’t act swiftly against this anarchy, which has increased over the past seven months, with 40 trucks torched in three weeks, RFA will consider taking action, including stopping deliveries across the country.”

How extensive these N2, N3, N7 and other road anarchies have become (in some way equal in seriousness to the chronic anarchy and lawlessness on the Cape Flats), is the control by gangs of the roads by blocking them for up to a day without any intervention by the security services. The ANC regime is utterly silent on the matter.35,37 Hosken and Singh35 report on these various occasions when gangsters took over the roads, as follows35:2:

Between Sunday and Tuesday [beginning of June 2019], gangs searching for foreign truck drivers besieged towns across KwaZulu-Natal  and Mpumalanga , pulling vehicles off the roads in Ermelo, Piet Retief, Newcastle, Amsterdam and Bethal. Foreign drivers were forced to surrender their cargo and vehicles.

An Ermelo truck-stop owner, who asked not to be named as he feared further attacks, said 500 trucks had been ‘held hostage’ at the stopover by the All Truck Drivers Association (ATDA).

Slabbert36 and others37 listed the other roads under attack and described as dangerous, besides the N3, as the R59, R550, R101, N1, N2 and N7.36,37

The permitted anarchic blockade of trucks on the highways without formal police intervention and interference is reflected by the fact that one of the blockades at Van Reenen Pass lasted undisturbed for 24 hours. This result has led with good reason to speculation and allegations of a conspiracy between the truck-blockers and the ANC regime and its law-enforcement institutions. The spread of anarchy as alleged to be perpetrated by the ATDA and other so-called anti-foreign-truck-drivers groups, with very little response to these events by the ANC regime still propagating its illusory policy of South African Prosperity, is further confirmed by Hestony’s managing director, Etuan van der Westhuizen35, who reported six trucks burnt at the beginning of June 2019 in Johannesburg and Cato Manor. Trucking company owner Barend Groenewald was in ICU at the Worcester Mediclinic after his truck was set alight in Touws River in the Western Cape in May 2019. More informative on this road anarchy is the testimony of Claudia Carvalho35, the owner of Hawkeye Trucker Association (HTA) which safeguards trucks on roads with armed escorts. Carvalho35 called it the “Wild West” and said35:2: “…it was ‘complete madness’ on the N3. ‘The situation, which began to develop a year ago, was largely ignored and is now totally out of control’.

Advocate Pria Hassan38, spokesperson of the Positive Freight Solutions Forum, who took a strong stand against the ongoing truck violence, was forced to take safety measures to guard her and her family after serious threats. She reports38:1:

Ons lewe nou elke dag in vrees. Dit is ‘n nuwe soort wetteloosheid wat kan oorspoel na ander bedrywe as die regering nie dringend en daadwerklik ingryp om dit te voorkom nie.

But this truck anarchy is at present going on, intensified and is spreading out westwards from the Cape to attacks on the N7 near Piketberg, Moorreesburg and Piekenierskloofpas, while an attack was recently reported on the N2 near the Strand too. The Cape provincial spokesperson Kenny Africa37 said on the ongoing and intensified truck anarchy which the ANC regime clearly failed to curb37:9: “This can’t keep happening. It’s bad at the moment”. A response or statement of action by the ANC regime’s Transport minister Fikile Mbalula still outstanding.37

Looking at the passive reaction of the ANC-regime on the road anarchy so far, which puts union interests first above those of the country (as enforced by the unions’ seat in the tripartite government alliance), it seems that the ANC regime wants to solve the matter solely as a workplace issue (wherein the appointment of foreign drivers, amounting to only 15% of the total drivers occupies a central position), rather than taking criminal steps against the perpetrators for robbery and murder. The rule of law seems to be placed second to the importance of ongoing anarchy, racism and ethnicity, taking at face value the words of the Police-ministerial spokesperson, Reneliwe Sereo35, when he says35:2: “A workplace joint inspection task team, which is coordinated by the labour department and which consists of various government departments including the police, has been established.”

The extent of anarchy on the roads against specifically foreign truck drivers (motivated by xenophobia, but which the ANC regime sees as criminality, free from racism or ethnicity), and the SAPS’s passivity in intervening, is well illustrated by Du Plessis38 when he writes38:1: “Die polisie het in die verlede magteloos toegekyk terwyl vragmotors beskadig word.”

Again, featuring prominently, is the lack of any official announcement of danger to the general public and anarchy lurking, or the assurance that drastic law enforcement and pertinent policing will be introduced, or the offering of NPA results in the arrest and punishment of the culprits concerned. There is no sign of the constructive cleansing of the criminals from the country’s roads. What is clear, however, is a regime not in control of the country; a regime which is allowing the murderers of  213 truck drivers and the crooks who burnt 74 trucks and did damages to the amount to R1.2-billion, to get off the hook, in the same as the perpetrators of state captue did not get punished and got away with their stolen billions of rand. Further confirming this open tolerance of anarchy, racism, ethnicity, xenophobia and murder by the ANC regime without punishing the criminals, and thus a further reaffirmation that South Africa has an impotent regime in Parliament, unable to safeguard its citizens’ rights and safety, is the arrogant and challenging utterance by the head of ATDA, Sipho Zungu35, when he allegedly said to Hosken and Singh35:2:

We have no problem with foreign trucks coming to SA, rather with foreigners driving for South African companies. South African drivers and their families are starving. Children cannot be sent to school. South Africans are losing jobs to foreigners, who don’t only take our jobs but also our rights to protect jobs.

Slabbert36 points out the “political empowerment” and hostility of ATDA, as reflected by their demand that in future only ATDA members should be appointed as drivers and that foreigners should be fired and that truck owners must pay R350 per month to ATDA for each of its members employed. Slabbert36 writes on the masked threat to companies which dare to “disobey” the ATDA’s demands and extortion36:8: “Maatskappye wat nie hieraan voldoen nie, word gedreig met weerwraak en dat hul voertuie aan die brand gesteek sal word.”

The endangering of the drivers’ lives went so far that a truck company was forced to obtain a court order on 31 May 2019 in the High Court of KwaZulu-Natal which forbade the ATDA to attack or threaten its members. But as the recent attacks at the beginning of September 2019 confirm, the violence is continuing, more intense than ever and spreading all over the country.36,37

The above kind of remarks against the truck drivers and their employers by unions reflect racism, ethnicity, xenophobia and the sanctioning of the murder against foreigners, as well as wreaking massive damage on trucking firms. They are remarks which should be brought under the attention of the Council for Human Rights, as well as the SAPS and the NPA for drastic action.  The passivity of the ANC regime can rightfully be seen as in some way allowing or even supporting such crimes.39

Secondly, in addition, we find the remark of the secretary general of the National Truck Drivers Federation, Siphesihle Muthwa35, to Hosken and Singh35 when he said35:2: “…the issue would go away if ‘employers did the right thing’.” This is undoubtedly an open threat to the lives and property of truck owners which again needs the attention of the SAPS and the NPA to enforce the law.35

The anarchy in the long-distance trucking industry has another aspect, confirming again the lack of a stable government to ensure law and order. This entails robbing trucks of their valuable loads, as well as open theft from trucks on our roads. Slabbert36 reports36:8: “…op die N2-hoofweg tussen Oos-Londen en Kokstad waar vragmotors weens die kronkelende en heuwelagtige paaie so stadig as soos 30km/h ry, spring misdadigers op die vragmotors, sny die seile wat die vrag bedek oop en gooi die vrag af; 36:8: “… in Beaufort-Wes gebeur dit [stropery] sommer by die verkeersligte”; en36:8: “Belhamels gooi rotse van brûe op voertuie om hul tot stilstand te dwing sodat hulle die vrag kan steel”.

The utter failure of the ANC to instill law and order on the roads and the comprehensiveness and seriousness of the problem which is simply being ignored by the ANC leaders is described by Ehlers40 as follows40:10: “The shocking statistics regarding trucks and cargoes burnt within the past 12 months should long ago have been addressed as a national problem bordering on civil war.”

Looking at the chaos and anarchy in the trucking industry created by crooks and murderers, it must be clear for Ehlers40 that we do not have a national government to combat the country’s massive crime, especially violence. We have again been captured by a new kind of “Zuptas of the road”.

3.3.1.2.2. Railway anarchy and violence

The above road anarchy and violence are echoed by the similar railway anarchy and violence. South Africa has suffered many arson attacks on the rail system over many years. It specifically started in the Western Cape and has spread gradually to become a countrywide phenomenon. It  cost the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa) and Transnet  close to a billion rand, with 1 496 rail carriages destroyed. Virtually not a single arrest for the 2017/2018 financial year of the was made by the SAPS.41,42

Pijoos43 refers to the chaotic conditions pertaining to the country’s railway system, on which millions of the poor are dependent for their daily travel to work, schools, shops, hospitals, etc., as43:9: “Stranded commuters, lengthy delays, stolen railway tracks, deadly train crashes and burning coaches — this the state of the country’s railway system”.

Including in this failure is the railway infrastructure, which is itself broken. Besides arson, there is immense vandalism of railway property. A recent cellphone video showed the George Goch station in Johannesburg being stripped of copper cables, windows, doors and even the roof covering within two days during a strike of railway policement. It seems, as with all the other schemes of the ANC regime that have collapsed, that it does not have a long-term solution. On the whole, it does not seem as if the ANC regime cares about the deterioration of South Africa’s railway infrastructure. When it becomes a headache, the ANC-regime, through sporadic, insignificant efforts, addresses the chaos it created by means of a superficial short-term approach, treating the “symptoms without the underlying causes”. For instance, in an effort to “handle” the violence and arson on their trains, Prasa’s short-term solution was the launching of the so-called “railway enforcement unit” whereby about 100 officers were deployed to ensure the safety of trains in the Cape Town area. The input was insignificant and nothing else than political window-dressing: it was only a trickle to rescue the railways.43

How serious the situation is for Prasa (Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa), seen from an economic viewpoint, is reflected by its 2017-2018 annual report. Pijoos43, after studying the report, warns on 10 July 2019 that the long-distance passenger train service of Prasa was declining to lower than acceptable levels. Pijoos43 reflects on the Prasa-report as follows43:9:

Passengers have dropped from 2.8-million in 2009-2010 to 465,647 [19%] in 2017-2018, while trains run have dropped from 6,604 to 1,770 [30%]. Both trains run and passenger patronage have dropped drastically at a rate indicative of a service that has totally collapsed.

3.3.1.3. Extraordinary violent crimes

More recently two further forms of violent crime have broken out country-wide, namely 1) violence against women and children (gender violence); and 2) violent crime against foreigners (xenophobia). Because of the comprehensive attention offered by the media, the public and especially the Ramaphosa regime to it and the outright political opportunism around the two forms of violence, they need to be evaluated and discussed in depth. These two issues are indeed part of the greater crime culture, or better: the crime mentality of many South Africans. To understand it, will help us to understand better the already discussed violence in the Western Cape as well as the epidemic of violent crime in the whole country.

3.3.1.3.1. Gender violence

Regarding another recent tragic phenomenon connected to crime, is the alleged appalling and often brutal way men treat women and children in South Africa. This is being seen in some way as having triggered a nationwide uprising to combat the evil, and described by some in the media as one of the most tumultuous and emotional episodes in our country’s history, the editor44 of the Sunday Times wrote recently. Indeed, the seemingly sudden rise in gender-violent crimes invoked promises of punishment of the male culprits by the ANC’s top leadership, even a presidential promise which reads44:3:

I will propose to cabinet that all crimes against women and children should attract harsher minimum sentences. We agree with the women of the country that the state should oppose bail and parole for perpetrators of rape and murder against women and children.

The minister of justice, Ronald Lamola45, continued where Ramaphosa stopped by saying that the cabinet would consider requests for a referendum on the issue, while the president of the ANC Women’s League, Bathabile Dlamini45, asked for a law to forbid bail for persons accused of violence against women.45

Supporting these “ANC royals” in their “revenge seeking and taking” is the opinion and standpoint of the “Zulu royal”, King Goodwill Zwelithini46 whor recently during Umkhosi weLembe (Shaka Day), addressing hundreds of his subjects, said46:24:

…maybe it would be better if once a man was found to have rape, he should be handed to ‘men like us’ to cut off his manhood. This would end this thing(rape), this should be done in a way that would show the world that the Zulu nation does not tolerate this shame.

Palesa Lebitse47 also brings the present shocking state of rape and gender-based violence to our attention by pointing out that the chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng recently reflected on the complexity of  rape and gender-based violence by showing that we are not confronted here with a sudden pathological surge of evil-doing men, but a deep-rooted problem which has been a long time coming. For Lebitse47, the so-called “phenomenon” of gender-based violence in 2019 is due to the long-term neglect and the “untouchability” of the problem by the various authorities within the ANC government, specifically the Department of Women, the SAPS and the NPA.47,48

To argue, as do Ramaphosa44 and Lamola45 and others inside the ANC circle, that present legislation on gender violence is insufficient, reflect a lack of knowledge by them of the country’s battery of laws on this issue. Indeed, effective legislation exists to tackle and solve the problems.  What is missing is an effective government to govern and which is able to effectively use  the existing laws to address and solve the matters. We will hear for a long time in future horrifying stories of the maltreatment of women and children — as we are constantly hearing the ongoing shocking testimonies before the Zondo and other commissions on state corruption — but both approaches to the offering of “confessions” will bring nothing constructive in the end. Results such as prosecutions will stay absent. Regarding gender-based violence, short-term rhetoric by the ANC’s leaders are being heard daily, exclusively for the opportunistic gains of the ANC and support for the ANC’s calculated diverting of attention away from their regime’s corruption and dishonesty since 1994.31,49-51

The minister of Justice and Correctional Services, Ronald Lamola52, is treading water when he reflects on the recent prominence of gender violence by saying it52:2: “…remains a sore point and requires all of us to do our bit to curb this scourge”, and that52:2: “…establishing more sexual offences courts remained an important step in ‘their quest to eradicate gender-based violence and femicide’.” In this context he further states52:2: “…an additional 15 courts rooms were adapted in line with the sexual offences model and this brought the total number of courtrooms adapted to 90. We are planning a further 11 courtrooms in the current financial year”.

What Lamola52 did not say loudly was that these courts have gathered dust since there establishment, because they are under-used, primarily because the promulgated laws to curb these kinds of crimes are not effectively used and the NPA lacks capable staff while the SAPS fails the people in combatting crime. This makes all the loud talk of Lamola, together with that of Ramaphosa on their supposed fight against gender violence, just hot air, once more.39,53,54

How much Ramaphosa and his ministers are confused and uninformed about the established and appropriate legislation already in place to fight and punish all kinds of crimes against women and children — but also seemingly taken up emotionally by the present protests and apparently orientated to use the situation opportunistically — is evidenced by Versluis31. She writes31:6:

Die minimum vonnisse is reeds jare lank lewenslank vir moord met voorbedagte rade, verkragting wat met roof of aanranding gepaardgaan, ‘n verkragting van ‘n kind, groepverkragting of meer as een verkragting. Vir die meeste ander seksmisdade, roof met verswarende omstandighede, asook moord sonder voorbedagte rade is die minimum vonnis 15 jaar vir ‘n eerste oortreding.

A further contradiction in Ramaphosa and his ministers’ opportunistic power-play that the present crimes against women and children are abnormally high and increasing all over the country, is the evidence that although the total cases in 2019 stand at 52 420 sexual offences, the peak before 2019 was higher and the 2019 number represents a reduction of over 10 000 cases since 2010. The latest SAPS statistics (2018/2019) reflects a decline of 5.4% in the murders on women: 2 930 to 2 771, the crimes against children declined from 43 842 to 43 540 and sexual offences against women decreased by 0.4% to 36 597.29,31,55

In regard to Ramaphosa’s hypocrisy to “commit” the ANC regime to rectify the maltreatment of children that suddenly “emerged” in 2019, it is important to emphasise (on paper at least), that South African legislation already protects and cares for the country’s children through the Children Act which was promulgated by the ANC regime itself in 2005.56 Pearl Boshomane Tsotetsi56, a freelance writer, states that the Act demands that parents ensure their children are financially supported and taken care of, but it is clear for her that the socio-economics under the present regime nullifies the fulfilment of this parental duty, primarily because of the parents’ growing poverty, leaving them destitute and unable to afford the necessities of life for their children. She writes56:20:

…the problem is that ours isn’t a country that encourages poor parents to be self-sufficient, and in turn to effectively take care of their offspring. With such a high rate of unemployable people and the economy in the gutter, how are parents meant to financially support their children when they can’t even support themselves?

On the ANC regime’s failed economics, which are creating only poverty and unemployment for the country’s citizens, Tsotesti56 points out firstly that the R430-a-month social grant for a child is totally insufficient. Secondly, she shows the frightening numbers of the poor who are suffering of hunger, indicating that among pregnant woman aged 12 to 50 as much as 16.3% lived in households where children or adults suffered from hunger because there was not enough food, and that 35% were living in households that ran out of money to buy food for five or more days a month. In this context, there is the bleakness of poverty that makes it difficult for people to better themselves or to ever escape poverty. A permanent culture of poverty and despair plays a role in causing poor mental health and depression, which could have explained why a mother recently killed her four children with rat poison. It is clear that, notwithstanding how much the country, especially the leadership of the ANC-regime were “shocked” by the gender violence in 2019, there is a lack of focus by the media and the public on the specific role of the failed government in these kinds of tragedies around children, primarily because of its outright lack of financial support and provision of a mental help service for struggling mothers. At the moment, as with the “maltreatment of women issue”, the ANC regime of Ramaphosa is fleeing from its direct responsibility to children by their efforts to cast it as a non-political issue, while in reality they stand accused of the tragedies which their failed politics have caused in 2019.56 Tsotesti56 points to the ANC regime’s failure (and their present political opportunism)  when she writes56:20: “Lack of resources, lack of effective politicking and a lack of social workers (while thousands of social work graduates are unemployed) mean single mothers are left to fend for themselves in untenable situations that are not of their own making.

The poverty of women is strongly related to gender violence, especially those women who are single mothers and must care for children on their own. Busi Mavuso57, CEO of Business Leadership SA, points to the presence in the country of an all-over gender inequality which she believes contributes to engendering the suppression of the female and triggering gender violence. Mavuso said that there was a growing crisis in the social construction of the South African society: South African women who are permanently employed earn 22.7% less than men, and the country’s mothers, wives and daughters face a future where their work will be less remunerated than that of their male counterparts. There has been an entrenched lack of equality under the ANC regime since 1994 (for which they now cry foul as part of the mistreatment of women), placing the female in the traditional men’s world, together with female inequality inserted as part of a wider process whereby certain social and racial groups are neglected or discriminated against, the perpetuation of which the ANC regime makes itself guilty. Mavuso writes57:26:

The lack of equality in our own private rooms in a climate of low growth and confidence levels played itself out in a rising tide of femicide, which our country’s statistical agency calls the intentional killing of females because they are females.

The problems of patriarchy, some of whose norms and standards are inherited from our colonial past and some of which come from our different cultural influences, need to be addressed. All of us – the government, business and civil society – need to find common purpose on just how we start to deal with a system that goes against equality.

Professor William Gumede58 of the School of Governance, Wits University, offers Mavuso57 a clear picture of the many wrongs of cultural influences, inherent to the country’s patriarchy which is directly responsible for gender violence. For Gumede58 these aberrations must go first before the ANC regime may dare to speak further of a “sudden” rise in 2019 of gender violence and the “urgent need” for legislation to combat it. He writes58:26:

Patriarchy, which informs most South African cultural, social and religious traditions, is at the root of violence against women.  To end this scourge, any cultural belief, custom or practice that encourages inequality between men and women must be made illegal; all traditions and social practices must be democratised.

Gumede58 enumerates the following cultural beliefs, customs and practices, which have all been supported and maintained by the ANC regime since 1994, notwithstanding the party’s condemnation of gender violence, that should be abolished, erased and nullified58:26:

  • Customary law that made women defer to men and preclude them from inheriting property or becoming traditional leaders;
  • Initiation schools encourage patriarchy, aggressive masculinity and a violent response rejection;
  • Patriarchal traditions such as lobola;
  • The reed-dance ceremonies that objectivise women;
  • Religious practices which undermine the rights of women;
  • Improper school curriculum.

The editor59 of the Sunday Times also shoved the role of established cultural beliefs, customs and practices in triggering gender violence into the lime-light by pointing out our two-tier legal system which is forcing discrimination on the poor and rural Black women with little access to justice. Pertinent here is the ANC regime’s direct contribution to the abuse of the women in society over many years as “good”, which has now been re-established by the Traditional Courts Bill. This Bill was passed at the end of the fifth Parliament, supported by the majority of MPs during which the assenting votes by the ANC MPs including ANC women MPs, were prominent. These MPs also specifically voted to remove a crucial so-called “opt out” clause which would allow rural women to opt out of matters before the traditional courts in order to seek justice in statutory courts. There is further evidence that some women, appearing before traditional courts presided over by male traditional leaders, are sometimes not allowed to attend the proceedings simply because they are women. In other cases where they are allowed to attend, they are not allowed to speak, while the testimonies offered by women were belittled. The Bill, making Ramaphosa’s presidential promises that the ANC regime was going to fight the abuse of women simple hypocrisy, was passed despite a legal guideline that it was unconstitutional. It is now before the National Council of Provinces. [Note: Traditional courts are empowered to adjudicate matters including theft, malicious damage to property, burglary, crimen injuria and other matters in which women frequently experience forms of discrimination such as in a customary-law marriage, guardianship of children and inheritance matters].59

The criminologist, Professor Christian Bezuidenhout31 reflects on the chaos of the present social system in South Africa which the ANC now wants to solve bye means of a quick and easy solution in the form of new laws and new kinds of judicial punishments, notwithstanding the fact that the problem has been created and nurtured over 25 years of rule by the ANC itself.  He postulates31:6:

Dit spruit uit ’n komplekse wisselwerking tussen omgewingsfaktore en die genetiese material van die individu [geslagsgeweld is ‘n ekspressiewe misdaad met ‘n sterk emosionele motivering].

Die probleem in Suid-Afrika is dat kinders in ‘n groot deel van die samelewing konstant aan geweld blootgestel word.

In sommige gemeenskappe word geweld beskou as die medium tot sukses.

Dié tipe misdade is die moeilikste om af te skrik. Dit gebeur ook gewoonlik in die privaatheid van die huis.

Meer polisie of swaarder strawwe gaan nie help nie.

The opportunism of the Ramaphosa regime to misuse the issue of the current gender violence to score political points is proven over and over by supporting evidence. The extreme opportunism of the Department of Women — established as the sole, exclusive government vehicle to better and to safeguard the rights of women and children — is increasingly coming under the spotlight. The question strongly arises as to why the department has not executed on its mandate since its creation, already turning Ramaphosa’s recent presidential promise into reality? It can rightly be asked further which constructive legislation on the rights of women and children has it propagated and promulgated, and what evidence there is to reflect that it is engaged in a comprehensive team effort with the NPA and the SAPS to improve the life circumstances of women and children? Why has there been such a “sudden and immense” rise in crimes related to women and children over the last two years if the department had been doing its utmost to curtail such violence and violations of women’s and children’s rights?60,61

Most importantly, why has the Department of Women not taken the SAPS to the ConCourt on neglect of duty when women accused the SAPS that rape victims had to face uncaring cops who fobbed them off with callous remarks when the wanted to lay charges? Fokazi48 writes in a very focussed manner on these accusations against the SAPS, reflecting the description of the head of the Western Cape’s Thuthuzela Care Centre regarding some of the phrases women often hear when they try to report rape to police48:4:

  • Go home, don’t bathe or wash your underwear for the next few days, and come back on Monday.
  • He only used his finger to penetrate you, it’s no big deal.
  • This case is weak, do you really want to put yourself through this?

It is thus of great importance to consider the actions of the Department of Women to make an evaluation of the ANC regime’s intentions and actions since 1994 around women and child welfare and care. This can also give us an indication if Ramaphosa’s presidential promise on rectifying the affairs of women and children may be taken seriously, in the same vein as all of his political promises made in the May-2019 election and his many other post-May 2019 promises on job creation, an end to crime and invigorated economic growth. As a guideline for evaluating ANC policies on the importance of women and children, as represented by the Department of Women’s actions, one may consult Katharine Child’s61:4 recent article in the Sunday Times of the 8 September 2019, very descriptively entitles: “Plenty of pricey talk, no action”.

Child61 depicts a failed and incapable ANC Department of Women under the leadership of its ministers Bathabile Dlamini and Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, including many highly-paid officials, who were supposed to implement their official duty directive, which reads61:4: “…the custodian of the promotion and advancement of gender quality and the empowerment of women”. Child61 makes it very understandable why the publicly expressed outrage at the high rate of murder and rape of women takes place without the truth behind this chaos. Clichés by the department’s present minister, Mate Nkoana-Mashabane, have dealt with the “ideal man-woman relationship in South Africa”, and she has also said that61:4: “We [women] cannot continue to live lives that are constantly under siege and where we are not all enjoying the fruits of our constitutional democracy. Enough is enough, we need justice”. This is hypocrisy of the highest order. It is at the same time an excellent example of how the ANC’s leadership, specifically that of the Ramaphosa regime, directs the people’s attention away from the real culprits that have abandoned women and children since 1994 with their corrupt governance: the ANC leadership itself.61

It is by no means an exaggeration to say that the Department of Women has constantly failed to address gender-based violence. It has indeed itself acknowledged that it never meets its prescribed targets but “only held dialogues with women” with useless travelling around the country and the world to promote these so-called departmental dialogues to “better” the position of women and children. There were no constructive and concrete outcomes confirmed by the Department of Women in its annual performance indicator which requires true “interventions to enhance prevention and elimination of violence against women and children”. It is amid this chaos (mostly unknown to the public) that Ramaphosa is now shamelessly trying to capitalise on the gender-based violence issue with his sudden so-called “judicial intervention and interference in the acts of criminal men”, while he stays silent on his government’s failed Department of Women.60-62

Child61 gives an in-depth description of the Department of Women’s lack of fulfilling its annual performance indicator. She states that when the Parliamentary oversight committee listened to the Department of Women’s annual performance plan in July 2019, its members were unimpressed. Indeed, in a statement afterwards the committee said61:4: “…it could not understand the issues the department is working on as there is no visible community outreach and it did not see tangible achievements”, writes Child61. The parliamentary researcher Kashiefa Abrahams,61 after studying the most recent report of the Department of Women, describes the official explanations by the leadership of the Department about its “national dialogues” held, which allegedly were set up to discuss gender violence, as “incoherent”.61

To give insight into the failed performance of the Department of Women — confirming also the failed performance of the ANC-regime starting from 1994 and telling us in some way again of the immense state capture between 2008 and 2017 — it is of great value to read Child’s61 summary of the Department’s recent annual report.61 Child61:4 writes that of the department’s R244m budget in 2017/2018 about R80m was allocated to the Commission for Gender Equality, lacking a declaration for how and why the R80 million was used. Of the rest, the lion’s share — R72.4m — went to salaries for the 101 staff members. In addition to these salaries, R13m was spent on travel and subsistence, R11.5m on “property managers” and R6.3m on consultants [with R1.2m last year on consultants to investigate the distribution of free “sanitary dignity products”. This last-mentioned  project has after two years still not been finalised].61

Child61 also mentions that the report stated that staff members went on four official overseas trips (without reporting how many staff went on the trips) which the Department recorded as “achievement”! Of the R13m spent on travel, R4m was for overseas travel to destinations such as New York to attend the UN Commission on the Status of Women conference in 2017. Further there were a three-day meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Swaziland and a five-day AU meeting in Ethiopia. There was again a SADC meeting in Ethiopia to prepare for the next UN Commission on the Status of Women conference in New York in 2018. Moreover, under the category “achievements” listed in the report was attendance at a “moral regeneration movement” meeting in Kimberley in 2017, a Women’s Day celebration on 9 August last year in Kimberley, an interdenominational meeting on gender-based violence in Upington, a “cancer-awareness-raising imbizo”, the launch of the 16 days of activism campaign and a men’s meeting in Port Elizabeth. It also became clear that of the 101 staff 47 were in senior positions, with annual salaries averaging R1 million each. This “salary capture” prompted the IFP MP, Liezl van der Merwe61, to call the Department of Women in Parliament an “employment agency”, asking questions about the need for consultants [with a R6.3m budget] when most of its staff had seemingly high training as reflected by their high salaries.61

Another issue pointing to the failure of the Department of Women under Mate Nkoana-Mashabane to govern properly on behalf of the ANC cabinet the affairs of women and children, is the nonperformance by other ultra-motivated women’s rights fighters, such as  Dlamini, Goodwill Zwelithini, Cele, and other top executives of the ANC regime in addressing crimes against LGBTQ+ people. This passivity of specific politicians undoubtedly led thereto that in the first place there are blind spots in South African data on the crimes against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer community, wrote Hlatshaneni63 recently. This makes SAPS data unreliable and sub-standard while the pending legislation on hate crimes initiated by the ANC regime is blocking data collection on LGBTQ+ crimes. There is not any official effort to calculate the true presence of gender-based violence by trying to establish the incidence of unreported gender violence. Lisa Vetten63, a gender activist and researcher reports that the last official report on the rate of unreported cases of gender-based violence was released 22 years ago.  But from the statistics (starting in 2009), emanating from nongovernmental organisations and their investigations of LGBTQ+ crimes, the presence of these crimes is high (profiled as unreported or unrecorded cases). It has shown a strong upwards trajectory from 2011, writes Vetten63. For a person who has declared him on the side of the victims of gender violence, Ramaphosa has shown ignorance of these LGBTQ+ crimes which may be seen as a selective escape from a kind of gender-based crime which is politically, socially, culturally and religiously controversial, as well as pertaining to a specific lifestyle not accepted by the greater society of patriarchy.57,58,63

The LGBTQ+ crimes are, as a part of gender violence and thus of the same importance, by and large totally ignored by the ANC regime. Ramaphosa’s silence here seems significant. Letsike63, director of Access Chapter 22, writes that LGBTQ+ crimes have occurred in South Africa for decades, forming an important element of gender-based violence, but are completely ignored by the ANC as not having any importance.  There are some shocking cases of SAPS discrimination when it comes such gender cases shocking, especially because it has been tolerated by the ANC regime during its failed crime-prevention programme to eliminate xenophobia and gender violence since 1994. Letsike63 reflects on the discriminatory behaviour of the SAPS against the LGBTQ+ gender group as follows63:2:

We have actually seen research that showed that 88% of crimes against the LGBTQ+ community go unreported or unrecorded.

One of the reasons for this is when investigating officers do not look at hate or bias as possible motive if the person’s gender identity or sexual orientation is known.

Letsiko63 elaborates further63:2:

Another reason the stories of hate crimes against this community went untold was that the criminal justice system still harboured bias against complainants from the LGBTQ+ community.

We still have a very high level of secondary victimisation where police themselves will victim-blame or intimidate a person for instance, and ask “are you a boy or a girl?” These are the things that discourage victims from reporting these cases”.

Lebitsi47 places the ANC’s outright failure over years to safeguard persons through its judicial arms, the SAPS and the NPA, against gender violence, prominently in focus. His analysis again confirms Ramaphosa and his regime’s opportunism in their misuse of the so-called “2019 gender violence”. Lebitsi writes47:13:

And in interrogating issues around cases involving sexual abuse and gender-based violence, I pondered about the National Prosecuting Authority and its role in ensuring that it too interrogates these issues.

I ended up asking myself: where is the national director of public prosecutions, Shamila Batohi, given the gravity of sexual abuse? But I remembered that Batohi has not even uttered a single word about the calamity of sexual abuse.

I did however remember how a friend of mine once told me about a joke at the NPA about certain rape cases: “at the tavern, to the tavern, from the tavern – no prosecution”.

The bottom line is that the way the NPA treats cases may be a major contributor to this national crisis and may also perpetuating rape myths that plague our society.

Giving us another glimpse into previous official promises by the ANC regime which were made to women and children, similar to the one of Ramaphosa, to “wipe out gender violence by the law” which never went further than mere utterances, is that of the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa) a year ago. In June 2018 the newly appointed chairperson of Prasa, Khanyisile Kweyama64, promised to set aside women-and-children-only train carriages on Cape Town‘s Metrorail when she said64:7: “In Women’s month, we will assign terms of reference on how we are going to proceed to implement it”.

A month later in 2018 she apparently made the same commitment to the civil society group #UniteBehind, namely to personally oversee the implementation of the new carriages by August 2018. When #UniteBehind sent a letter with  updates to her in August, it received no response. Further enquiries at Prasa tell another story as to the initial promise of Kweyama: the excuse was that there were other more important issues than the women-and children-only train carriages. Prasa further states that there was a shortage of usable train carriages as well as a lack of security guards available to guard the women and children. So far, until September 2019, requests for updates from #UniteBehind were ignored by Prasa. The official Prasa promise stays just a promise, ignoring the safety of women and children on the Cape Town Metrorail, a negative situation which has now been continuing for years under the ANC regime.44,64

It seems as if the Department of Women is untouchable when it comes to being called to account inside the ANC regime which is characterised by ongoing poor performances and failure. This untouchability is well revealed by Child61,62 when she recounts that when she asked the Department to answer certain questions regarding its 2017/2018 annual report and actions, its spokesperson, Shalen Gajadhar’s only reaction was to send copies of seven speeches made by the Department’s staff! 61,62

It is important to consider, in terms of Ramaphosa’s promise to introduce “extreme laws” to punish men treating women “badly”, that he seemingly lacks an in-depth understanding that South Africa is not only a violent country for women, but also for men. Ramaphosa’s “women’s promise” fails as such to imply an improvement of our failed criminal justice system to serve both gender victims of violence, meaning also men. Moreover: Ramaphosa should have said that South Africa was a violent land for women and men, but he ignored the matter as his regime has been turning a blind eye since 1994 to the violent Western Cape. Lisa Vetten66 of Wits University states in this context that police murder statistics showed that a man was 5.6 times more likely to be murdered than a woman in South Africa. This avoidance in addressing violence against men again highlights the political opportunism of Ramaphosa with his “suddenly selecting and addressing” of the so-called “women’s issue”. He knows well that the chances at this moment of bringing lasting and comprehensive changes to the maltreatment of woman and children are zero. It is a tragic situation which has developed strongly after 1994 under the ANC regime. Evidence shows that the ANC regime can do nothing constructive to the matter. Promises like that of Ramaphosa are all that the ANC can offer South Africans.61,62,65,66 It is a standard part of the ANC’s well-known political practice, what Melody Emmett65;15 referred to as the phenomenon of “lies, lies and more lies” and Child describes as61:4: “Plenty of pricey talk, no action”.

Real evidence contradicts the apparent stereotyping by the ANC leadership of all men as beasts — the “exclusively male transgressors of gender violence” (excluding of course the ANC leadership!) who suddenly arrived in 2019 in South Africa. This profiling of all men as psychopathic characters reflects thankfully only one clear meaning after it was stripped of its emotional and political posturing: an utterly sick political opportunism in the mindset of the ANC.52,67 The author Azille Coetzee’s67 argues that all men are undoubtedly not bad and have not suddenly become perpetrators of gender violence. For her, there is a gender-violence problem, but it is a chronic problem, extending back in the post and in which the behaviour of the ANC and its members also stand accused.52,67

Finally, the question is why the so-called “appalling and often brutal way men treat women in South Africa” was only suddenly recognised in 2019, positioned, and undertaken to be addressed by the ANC regime’s leadership after 25 years of their failed governance. Never in the ANC’s previous elections promises was the matter brought up or recommendations made to rectify it. It is clear that the ANC’s 25 years of poor rule has discredited it on all the levels associated with good governance and excellent leadership. It is forcing Ramaphosa to misuse any emotional and political issue that distracts the attention from the ANC’s delinquent rule and which can easily be used to put him in the lime-light again as the so-called “good” leader after his presidency had started to falter from June 2019. Opportunism seems to be strongly present in the ANC regime nowadays60:4: “…sincerely striving to better the lives of women and children”.

The current one-sided, exclusive over-emphasis of the maltreating of women and children  by the pro-Ramaphosa media and the ANC itself, stands totally in contrast with their ignoring of gang and taxi violence where the gangsters and the taxi bosses and drivers are apparently above the law and the lot of the innocent, suffering people around them deemed insignificant. The ANC fails in this context to issue a similarly public “Ramaphosa empathy” at the individual level to citizens who have been flagrantly abused by public officials by successive ANC regimes. Gumede49 sees a syndrome of “little empathy of Ramaphosa for the mass of victims gripped and suffering in the observable political disorder of the country”. This obvious passivity, observable in the crisis on crimes committed against women, is similar to the passivity that the government shows on crime in general committed against the individual citizen, as well as the passivity recently showed during the crimes perpetrated against foreigners.68-71

The opportunistic effort by the ANC regime and Ramaphosa to reverse the ANC’s present political turmoil by misusing the maltreatment of women and children is wrong. Notwithstanding the tragedy around the abuse of women, children and foreigners, it is a secondary matter when viewed against the total criminal mess the country finds itself in. The main reason for these criminal outcomes is the crooked ANC which created and nurtured these crimes over the past 25 years. To eliminate these crimes, it is also needed to eliminate the ANC as a regime because it fails to practise law enforcement within the existing legal framework, besides their own political and legal transgressions, as well as their lack of taking responsibility for their extensive delinquencies. Pelser45 is very much here correct in emphasising the right of the innocent citizens (including the mass of innocent men) to defend their civil rights, when he writes45:6:

As ons gaan toelaat dat die demone van eiereg, wraaksug en growwe veralgemenings oor mans of buitelanders uit hul hokke kom, om van die soeke na nuwe sondebokke nie te praat nie, gaan ons problem as nasie vererger. Wetstoepassing is die sekerste manier vorentoe.

Hierdie regering gee die barbare in die samelewing al so lank vrypas om te steel en te verkrag en te moor, soms met opset en soms uit blote onbevoegdheid, dat niemand meer die staat se waarborge glo dat reg en orde weer afgedwing kan word nie.

Gumede72 brings a reality to the crimes against women, a matter which the ANC regime has carefully tried to sweep under the carpet for a long time in their frenzied political opportunism, when he writes72:22:

What appears to be a sudden alarming rise in violence against women is in fact the continuation of a rape culture that has been with us since the apartheid dispensation, but which has not been spoken about loudly before, the victims shamed or feared into silence or a stubborn denial of the enormity of the crisis.

What is new, though, is that the spells of silence about the extent of SA’s rape culture – rape, sexual harassment and violence – has finally been broken, and the scourge is now discussed in social, family and public spaces.

This culture has been normalised within social institutions, communities and families.

Even in the military camps of the ANC and PAC, rape culture was pervasive but cloaked in silence. And it also existed within the associated anti-apartheid civil society organisations, including the trade unions and student and youth movements.

It is important for the ANC leadership to own up to the sexual violence that happened within the liberation movement during the struggle against apartheid. Such a move would be an important act of acknowledgment to victims but may also help to bring about a culture change in our present time.

The tragedy was that, for the victims at that time, to accuse liberation leaders of sexual violence was seen as a “betrayal” of the liberation movement, undermining the cause of the struggle and strengthening the hand of the apartheid forces.

Because rape culture is so pervasive, an integrated strategy will be needed to tackle it, focusing on changing the cultural, social and political acceptance of what is “normal”.

3.3.1.3.2. Xenophobic violence

The outbreak of xenophobia is a matter that the ANC regime clearly tries hard to play down as general crime committed by some members of communities in their revenge taken on particular foreigners for their alleged criminal acts, either on their own or as part of local South African crime syndicates as well as foreigner syndicates against so-called “innocent” local South Africans. Another element is that those local South Africans, who are involved in vengeful attacks on foreigners, have been described by the ANC regime specifically as criminals who are attacking small groups of foreigners (on the same basis as if they were attacking  other South Africans) only for opportunistic and self-enriching reasons. The ANC regime does not discern any sign or intention of xenophobia in these attacks: as said, the same kind of attack by the local criminals is directed against other South Africans, as seemingly evidenced by the Western Cape violence. Ramaphosa too, has carefully avoided both the term and the subject of xenophobia in his responses to foreign governments. A case in point was his recent public statement to Nigeria’s envoy, Ahmed Rufal Abubakar, in an effort to calm down the recent conflict between Nigeria and South Africa around the attacks on the lives and property of Nigerians, that these attacks are not xenophobia, but solely the delinquent actions of local criminals against criminal Nigerians for their specific transgressions. Central to the South African-Nigerian conflict was the death of eight South Africans who had allegedly been killed by criminal Nigerians and thus sparked the reaction against  Nigerians which came to be known as xenophobia, worldwide . On the incidence of criminality as a characteristic of a certain group of Nigerians — isolating them as crooks but not as “foreigners”— it is reported that Ramaphosa, stating that South Africans were innocent of any discrimination against any Nigerians or harbouring any xenophobia against them, put forward “justified” actions by the locals to rid the country of crime and criminals (which seems in this case to be sometimes, accidentally, Nigerians!). On the existence of such foreign criminals in South Africa, igniting the recent violence, Ramaphosa even called on Nigeria to assist him with the deportation of some of its citizens who were committing crimes in South Africa and were in the country illegally.68-71

In response to Nigeria’s demand that South Africa compensates the losses of Nigerians here in the unrest (which the Nigerian government sees as xenophobia), South Africa took a hard line of not being guilty of any xenophobia or committing crime against any Nigerians and stated that it would only assist and compensate damaged Nigerian businesses here that where legitimately registered in the country and had their affairs in order with the South African Revenue Service, writes Hunter70. But Hunter70 reports that this “foreign-policy profile” projected on the ethnic unrest involving Nigerians in South Africa, differs from the ANC regime’s local “self-confession” on xenophobia. Hunter70, on the seeming arrogance and deception of Ramphosa in his double-talk with Abubakaro, writes70:1,7: “This was despite Ramaphosa’s acknowledgement of the existence of xenophobia in SA in his address to the nation on Tuesday evening [5th September] in which he condemned the violence and looting”.

That there is no doubt in most of the ANC’s leaders’ minds that xenophobia is real, is well confirmed by their orchestrated effort to lie about it to diplomats. Munusamy writes54:11:

The government has been flat-footed in countering the anti-SA sentiments. SA diplomats have been instructed to keep the line that the violence is as a result of criminality, not xenophobia.

Including in this denial of the presence of xenophobia was the violence against foreigners even relayed to so-called49:8: “conspiracy theories, claiming dark outside forces were ‘organising’ the xenophobic violence”, writes Gumede49. On the lack of an in-depth understanding of the true nature of xenophobia in the country by the ANC and thus to address it correctly, Gumede49 guides us well49:20: “Throughout all these crises, the ANC and government leadership appears to have been out of their depth, many not grasping the severity of the crisis the country is facing.4

It seems as if two ministers in the Ramaphosa regime accepted the reality of xenophobia, without saying it publicly or attributing it to the ANC’s failure to rule correctly and effectively. In avoiding the truth about the ANC’s direct role in the manifestation of xenophobia — as many members of the ANC’s elite mostly do when they are at the receiving end — they play the “blame game”. Other than Ramaphosa who confusingly blamed tribalism and nationalism as a possible reason, the Higher Education Minister Blade Nzimande blamed capitalism, while the International Relations Minister Naledi Pandor attributed it to Apartheid.71

An interesting contradiction arising from the alleged xenophobia phenomenon and Ramaphosa’s view that Nigerians were responsible for committing crime against locals, is that it militates against the ANC’s traditional denial of tribalism and ethnicity in favour of the class struggle and other Marxist concepts of sociology and history. In their statements on the attacks against Nigerians and other foreigners, both Ramaphosa and Magashule therefore acknowledged the existence of ethnicity, a phenomenon which is anathema to the ANC’s revolutionary ideology (besides racism against the Whites as European “colonists” and hence the ANC’s intention to grab their land without compensation).70,71

Saunderson-Meyer71 points out that not only does Ace Magashule reaffirm that xenophobia is based on ethnicity but that the presence of xenophobia is also based on racism (and in September 2019 puts on record the ANC’s most recent official standpoint on Whites). Saunderson-Meyer71 refers to Magashule’s racial and anti-White stand (which can be seen undoubtedly as the open instigation of racial violence), as follows71:12: “Last week Magashule had expressed regret that the violence was being directed at ‘people who have the same skin colour as us’, rather than those many others with a whitish colour’…[who] have never been attacked, because they are also so-called foreigners”. Pelser45 reports on this alleged White racism by Magashule as follows45:6: ““Ace Magashule, sekretaris-generaal  van die ANC, maan swart Suid-Afrikaners om hul woede nie uit te haal op swart mense nie — hulle moet liewer wit mense teiken”.

Also Munusamy50 shows that Julius Malema, the leader of the EFF, tried to refocus the violence against White people rather than foreign nationalists. Referring to this, Pelser45, quoting Malema, writes45:6: “‘Ons woede is op die verkeerde mense gerig. Soos ons almal, verkoop ons Afrika-broers en susters hul arbeid teen ‘n lae prys om te oorleef. Die eienaars van ons welvaart is witmonopoliekapitaal; hul weier om dit met ons te deel’.”

On Ramaphosa’s reaction on the involvement of Nigerians in the latest so-called “crimes” in South Africa and the specific background to it, Hunter45, aligning Ramaphosa’s acknowledgement of tribalism with that of crimes as xenophobia and thus indeed that xenophobia springs from tribalism.  Hunter reports as follows45:1,7: “The president reasserted his publicly held view that rising nationalism globally is affecting the rise of tribalism on the continent”.

In this context Saunderson-Meyer71, on the official standpoint of the ANC on tribalism and thus also indirectly xenophobia, states71:12: “…tribalism is not acknowledged to be the cause of anything, implying as it would, ethnic cleavages within the Black South African society” and71:12: “…xenophobia, the x-word, has joined the k-word as unutterable in SA”.

Magashule, in line with Ramaphosa’s confusion on seemingly what the violence, tribalism and the xenophobia definitions mean, also opened the can further when he referred to some of the violence in which foreigners were involved recently as “tribal battles,” which expressly means ethnicity and xenophobia. These ANC references to tribalism, positioned suddenly by Ramaphosa and Magashule, also brought to the foreground the extreme presence of South African violent crimes in certain communities, such as gangsterism in many so-called exclusively “Coloured” Western Cape areas in South Africa. (As already discussed, the SADF was forced to intervene on the Cape Flats in a crime-prevention role because the SAPS utterly failed to do their job.)  It seems then that some issues are indeed “tribal-orientated” for the ANC’s top managers and thus the reason why the ANC-regime since 1994 has taken such a passive stance on this “Coloured problem” and had left it in the cold.70

Saunderson-Meyer71, on the supposed ANC revolutionaries’ traditional blindness to xenophobia and tribalism, further writes71:12:

While Ace should expect a chiding from the ANC’s political commissars for the little slip, xenophobia and tribal denialism is prevalent among black nationalists. It is simply inconceivable to admit that there is, indeed, a deep-seated antipathy among many black South Africans to their black ‘brothers and sisters’, both here and abroad.

Saunderson-Meyer71 reports that Ace Magashule’s explanation of his rejection of xenophobia, goes this way71:12: “What I know …is that our presidents, the presidents of Africa [Nigeria, Zambia and Rwanda] are talking, and they have analysed this correctly. It is not acts of xenophobia, it’s acts of criminality”.

The editor73 of the Sowetan, in an article dated 13 September 2019, reflects on how the blackjacks in the 1960s, harassing Africans found in urban areas without so-called “dompasses” by going from door to door to pull-out those considered to be “too Black and too different to belong to the other Blacks”. He states that on Wednesday, September 11 2019, in the supposed free South Africa, Blacks again knocked on doors73:14: “Open the door, we want to see your ID. The k-word of the apartheid-era is replaced by an equally derogatory k-word that they reserve for foreigners. …the reality is that there are a significant number of our citizens who are — and are engaging in acts of violence against those they deem foreign”.

If the above editorial description, read together with the descriptions by various local Blacks on the reason why they are burning trucks and killing truck drivers, are not true examples of the presence of extreme xenophobia, what kind of example do we need to offer which would convince the ANC leaders of it?35,36,73

Secondly, contradicting Ramaphosa and his cronies’ standpoint in their overseas rhetoric that xenophobia is purely criminal violence, is the prominent presence of foreigners (legal and illegal) in South Africa as so-called “culprits” in the reasons for the deaths of 11 persons in Gauteng.74,75 Hosken74 refers in this context to the “culprit” foreigners as to be exclusively people who many Blacks classed as persons74:2: “…endangering Black South Africans’ work opportunities, and to be people peddling drugs and committing crimes”.

The reporting of Hosken and Germaner75 of the mobilising in August 2019 of Black communities by the Sisonke People’s Forum, which had spurred locals into action against so-called “delinquent foreigners”, is very informative. Hosken and Germaner75 quoted the Forum chairman Zwelie Ndabe who allegedly said75:2:

Since 2016 our pleas to government have been ignored. We are tired of our kids dying from drugs sold by foreigners, South African business employing foreigners, and of foreigners hijacking buildings for human trafficking and prostitution. That’s why we mobilised. We didn’t expect people to be this angry, and the violence disturbs us. But we won’t stop mobilising.

In 2008 the nationwide so-called xenophobic attacks had claimed the lives of 56, to be followed by regular flare-ups of similar incidents. The deaths of foreigners over the period, from 1994 up to 2019, withing the category of “xenophobia (which is disavowed by the ANC regime), reflect that the ANC regime has no strategy and possibly no intention to stop foreign ethnic hate. This apathy about others’ lives must be read together with the delinquent acst of the police force under the ANC regime in the 2012 Marikana massacre which led to the death of 34 Black miners — which lacks any response seven years later of  a single police officer having been prosecuted or that the recommendations of the Farlam commission have been implemented. The presence of hatred for foreigners, from speaking, intentions and actions, hold serious consequences for the more or less 4 million foreigners living in South African.44,75

But the growing anti-foreigner sentiment (seen by many White South Africans as a masked anti-foreign sentiment of them also as so-called “colonists”), is for political analysts a possible sign that the historical Black tribal infighting (and Black genocide) of the 1800s between the Xhosa, the Zulu, the Tswana, etc., might be restarted as the tribal right to land and resources in the increasingly collapsing economy, as well as the dissolution of the South African state (and nation), become a reality.75

On foreigners, specifically so-called “bad persons, thieves”, etc., it is important to reflect the official ANC and ANC associates’ negative characterisation of foreigners, to see how in-depth xenophobia has become rooted in the psyche of South Africans. Here the KwaZulu-Natal House of Traditional Leaders represents a worrying phenomenon regarding ethnicity and foreigners, much in line with Ndabe’s view above. The remarks of the House’s chairperson, Inkosi Phathisizwe Chiliza76, are a classic case of xenophobe when he responds76:5:

Many foreigners did not respect SA traditions. When you get to those levels, they will tell you they are taking our jobs, the problem is they are here in big numbers and they don’t respect our traditions, and that is what needs to be fixed.

Even ANC ministers of the Ramaphosa cabinet were fast to capitalise on the “not fitting” into South Africa of Black foreign nationals (while at the same time involuntarily revealing their own ethnic mindset and inclination to xenophobia). Pelser reports45:6: “Thulas Nxesi, minister van arbeid en werkskepping, sê xenofobiese geweld is als die ‘elitistiese vryemarkstelsel” se skuld, wat buitelanders toelaat om hul arbeid teen minder as die minimum loon te verkoop”,  en45:6: “Ook David Makhura , premier van Gauteng, reik na populisme toe hy sê buitelanders moet verbied word om ‘sekere tipe sakeondernemings’ in townships te bedryf”.

But this false and ethnic categorisation of foreigners as “crooks” did not stop with Nxesi and Makhura’s negativity. The Gauteng ANC’s community safety MEC, Faith Mazibuko77, ventured77:16: “…we can’t govern with criminals, especially foreign nationals who want to turn our country into a lawless banana republic”.

In this context of “separating” Black foreigners from the Black South African society because “they take our people’s jobs and opportunities” — and thus seemingly: “they were killed in the past, are killed at present and can be killed in future”  for “understandable” reasons — Tony Leon77 points out that the ANC regime’s present ministerial viewpoint and guidance may be of the same dangerous ethnic hostility as that of Zwelie Ndabe and Inkosi Phathisizwe77, when he writes77:16: “According to the minister of justice, Ronald Lamola, the government is ‘developing legislation that will bar foreign nationals from operating in certain sectors of the economy’.”

This view of Lamola makes Ramaphosa’s agreement with the Nigerian government of a guaranteed balanced and good treatment of foreigners (Nigerians) in the future null and void. At the same time it is an early warning of the possible advent of the extreme ethnic politics of Robert Mugabe that led to the death of more than 20 000 Black Zimbabweans because they did not fit into his exclusively “Black Zimbabwe”. More than this: it spells out an ethnocentric South African Black-BEE policy which excludes certain other Black persons.78,79,80-82

There seems to be an encircling as well as an intertwining of the definitions xenophobia, crime, violence, which describe in some way the recent so-called “spree” of xenophobia (remember: in terms of the ANC regime’s view there exists the alleged exploitation by Black foreigners of Black South Africans), Hosken83 gives an excellent overview of the whole process as general criminality, based on South Africans’ internalised, ongoing and actively delinquent acts. It is for him a process wherein the presence of foreigners is only used as an excuse or as a distraction from the real reasons: exclusively looting from the easiest and most defenceless group of people, namely foreigners by some South Africans whose own lives have been degraded in only 25 years into a general life of crime under an equally disorderly and crime-orientated regime. Hosken83 in this context sums up the situation well when he writes83:2:

Looters, armed with guns and self-made weapons, stormed through a 2km stretch of Jules Street burning cars, torching buildings, ransacking businesses and terrorising people on Sunday night and throughout the week. In Alexandra, Crosby, Slove Park, Coronationville, KwaThema and Katlehong, looters turned on foreign-owned shops.

For Henry Mathe, who lives in Crosby’s povertry-stricken Slovo Park informal settlement, the looting was justified. “They killed two of us. It was only right that we went to the Somali and Pakistan shops and took what was theirs.

We just wanted them out. We were not burning or stealing their stuff. They were just told to get out because Solve Park does not need foreigners here. We waited until the cops were gone. We took groceries, cold drinks and Red Bulls. We took revenge, not because we were hungry. They provoked us by killing our people”.

Mathe claims that Isaac Sebeka, a South African who was killed in Coronationville, was shot when he was caught looting.

Hosken83 also describes the reaction of the medical doctor Samir Saha83, a Bangladeshi national who has been living in South Africa for 24 years, of which the last 10 was in Johannesburg. He lost all his assets in the recent “foreigner bashing” and had to flee for his life. Saha’s story contradicts totally Ndabe’s perceptions of the delinquent acts of so-called foreigners as always being wrongdoers against local Blacks or to be job-stealers, when he says83:2:

I have never experienced anything like this before. I am a doctor. I don’t run a spaza or a barber shop and even if I did, how would me running such shops rob South Africans of jobs? Saying I steal South Africans’ jobs is madness. In fact it is the opposite. I employ two South Africans, one as a secretary and the other as my medical assistant.

The above various outcomes show that the execution of violence (undoubtedly driven by internalised aggression and hostility in their mindsets, as well as by the immense poverty of some Black South Africans), which had become focussed on foreigners, is now affecting not only the individual innocent foreigner, but also any innocent South African businessman who dares to employ a single foreigner. This tragic outcome is well confirmed by the already mentioned, recent attacks on South African companies’ transport trucks (which led directly to the murder of various foreign drivers) on our highways and other routes which employ foreigners.

Misago75, quoting the senior researcher Jean-Pierre of the Wits Centre for Migration, says South Africa is becoming a pariah state. Hosken and Germaner75 bring into focus the ANC’s failed crime-prevention capability as a regime and allowing uncontrolled crime to develop and to get internalised in a great part of the society’s mindset as a “normal” condition. Secondly, Hosken and Germaner75 show just how dysfunctional the ANC regime is, including the ANC’s ambivalent thinking on the foreigner issue and the regime’s failed intention and capacity to eliminate violence and crime or at least to handle it from day to day. Misago states75:2: “The situation is complicated by the lack of governance and the delayed reaction to violence. Despite repeated warnings of violence, police were seemingly slow to respond”.

In this context of failed police oversight and a descent by the ANC regime into disorder, crime and violence, the potential that the so-called xenophobia may be transformed into anarchy and even as part of the start of a people’s revolution, Misago75 reflects further75:2: “What happens when those attacks shift to universities, medical institutions and international agencies employing migrants? 

Dr Franz Fanon84, a psychiatrist, who also turned political analyst, confronted us for the first time with one of the main reasons for unrest, crime, violence and xenophobia captured in the mindsets and actions of the poor and side-lined people of the slums, the informal settlements and lower socio-economical townships and parts of towns and cities: the utterly cold-blooded abuse and extremely opportunistic exploitation of the poor, mostly by their own race’s leaders (elite). The end result is violent reactions to all of those that seem to be better off than they the poor or who are assumed to be the cause for their chaotic lives. Fanon84 based his experience on the liberation of Algeria from France, specifically on the immediate outer and inner circle around the origin of violence as xenophobia. He shows that it is an international phenomenon which reflects extreme nationalism, driven by political opportunists without caring for the poor or the minority — essentially for anyone besides themselves. Violence against the foreigner is tacitly encouraged by the elite of the ruling party whose only interest is self-enrichment and political power to keep up their human exploitation. He precisely brought for us the story of South Africa’s economic, political and social failure under the extreme, Marxist-Leninist ANC. Moreover, Fanon84 tells us that our country is on the brink of collapse and why: Because of the ANC elite’s exploitation of Black politics by an exclusive but useless Black African nationalism for 25 years.84

This preaching of nationalism by the ANC’s elite was heard clearly around the xenophobia matter wherein the poor Black people’s violent behaviour against the vulnerable foreigners was justified, albeit in a masked manner. The South African mass of poor, absolutely unhappy and dissatisfied with their chaotic lifestyle, cannot take on their oppressor: the ANC’s elite. Here, as happens worldwide where the masses are exploited by their own people, they turn almost immediately their dissent into direct revenge, focussed on the easiest and most available target without fear for mass counter-revenge. Foreigners, migrants and other poor people stand out as targets because they are extremely vulnerable as a result of their isolation from their fatherland, poor political empowerment and a lack of recognition as a local. Only after the process of the elimination of the migrants is completed, will the poor masses turn with much effort to their real exploiters and oppressors. However, it will mostly be too late because of the immense power build-up by the regime to squash any revolt besides allowing chronic unrest and violence by the poor on the poor, and xenophobia. Buccus84, quoting Fanon84, writes as follows84:19:

Xenophobic violence, often tacitly encouraged by elite figures, has become an omnipresent reality.

Because the national elite “is preoccupied with filling its pocket as rapidly as possible…the country sinks all the more deeply into stagnation”. But, as “the people stagnate deplorably in unbearable poverty, slowly they awaken to the unutterable treason of their leaders”.

Fanon’s84 enlightening view of xenophobia as primarily a people’s unrest against the regime and not really the foreigner (which firstly must be read also in the presence of the immense violent crime in the Western Cape and other parts of the country, and secondly as a sign of a revolution from within) is supported in some way by seasoned local political analysts.

Fred Khumalo85, a seasoned journalist and political analyst writes in this context that inside the so-called xenophobia-violence-crime crisis there is far more negative energy to be read: the simple fact is that the country is teetering on the brink of an abyss because of the wrongdoing and failure of the ANC regime as result of its elite’s self-orientation. Removing the so-called (Black) foreigners will not solve the violence. Buccus84 too, points out that the xenophobic violence is the primary reaction of the mass caught up in poverty, which was solely a process activated by the ANC elite’s capturing of the country, its resources and richness for their self-enrichment and -empowerment and upheld through various manipulations. These manipulations include unleashing a false Black-African nationalism and fictitious anti-colonialism, and then, as the government of the ANC elite started to lose their power over the masses, slowly moving into a process of anti-democracy and the capturing and management of the political, social and economic empowerment of the mass of poor. At the end of this process, the poor will become conscious of their betrayal by their opportunistic revolutionary leaders, commencing in 1994 as the “fathers” of the Black nation. Unrest, crime, violence and pertinent xenophobia are the middle-stage behaviour of the poor masses.84,85

3.3.1.4. ANC as a failed regime inside a constitutional state

Many writings75,83-85 are loud and clear that there is such a thing as xenophobia in South Africa and that it can be practised because of some Black South Africans’ hostility against and hatred of foreign nationals. They also tell us that there are crimes as the ubiquitous violence in the country is channelled into xenophobia because of the internalisation over years of criminality in the psyche of some South Africans. The foreigner falls prey because of he/she has poor defence and is thus vulnerable. These writings tell us also that crimes such as xenophobic violence and other violent behaviour are often committed out of jealousy, for self-enrichment and the inability of poor, undeveloped locals to compete with other people who are seemingly successful or are favoured in some way by the socio-economic and political system. Moreover: the writings tell us that most of these crimes are focussed on other citizens as a way of compensation in not being able to directly engage in crimes such as violence, theft, murder, etc., against the ruler of the country who is basically solely responsible for the poor people’s chaotic lives. The present mixing of xenophobia-crime-violence is very much similar to the crime and violence reflected by the Black masses who had risen against Apartheid and its unjust racial, economic, social and personal discrimination which had denied Blacks their citizenship in the country of their birth and which had reduced them to beggars.75,83-85 Today, postulates Khumalo85, the masses are rising again because our current crooked rulers — many of whom were inside the Struggle of the 1970s and 1980s with the now suppressed and poor Blacks — have lost contact with their own past as well as who the masses of poor and landless Blacks really are. These rulers have become drunk on corruption, insensitivity and self-enrichment.75,83-85

At the root of the current social chaos is a failed political system wherein most of the people are not developed, but are left to plan for their own for survival inside a collapsed socio-economic and political system where there is no law and order and where the criminal has become untouchable by the society and the prosecution institutions. We see it well in the Western Cape’s uncontrolled crimes like extreme violence and murder, and the ANC regime’s inability as well as unwillingness to address it since 1994.

The poor are today venting their anger on each other and those less fortunate than themselves, including the foreigners. Xenophobia, like all violence, exists but is mostly part of organised crime and power plays which the mass poor by times cannot control, nor understand. Their way and method of venting their anger were largely acquired and internalised in the 1970s as the only solution to get attention: the burning of buildings, homes and the destruction of essential structures. They mostly got attention and their way from the previously White rulers. These actions are repeated today, although sometimes in other manifestations.85

On the current social conditions, Khumalo85 comments on the unobserved, ignored and neglected grievances of the mass poor and their present hostile reactions to it, in the following way85:15:

People have come to realise that if you want to have a conversation with the authorities, you burn something down.

What has been happening in pockets here and there seems like a replay from the 1980s. Except that the rulers are no longer arrogant white Afrikaners. They are black like the masses who are rising. Which makes it even more palpable.

The masses can’t help but wonder: how can these people, our own people, act like the oppressors of yore, if not even worse?

The warnings in commentaries66,75 of more evil to can come through “national” violence with its origin in poverty and inequality — issues which the ANC have so far left unattended in their 25 years of rule, and which have in reality nothing to do with “genuine” xenophobia and ethnicity — is further brought into the lime-light by Runji66 in emphasising the immense presence of inequality and poverty. The primary reason for this negative outcome is the fight for primary resources such as water, food, accommodation (which has led over ages to many wars in the world). Firstly, there is the prominent fear by the present economic middle class who are living in areas bordering on poor townships and informal settlements (and who themselves have moved up over the past 25 years from the poor lower economic class), to be dragged down again by any socio-economic instability and new competitors. Competition may lead thereto that they lose their assets, privileges and benefits. In this setup, it is true that the competitors from the present lower economic classes are gunning especially for the middle class’s privileges and benefits, while the middle class is doing anything to stop movements endangering their benefits. The outcome is immense hostility and violence. On the other side one finds the ambitions and often successes by the poor lower economic class (people who are mostly unwillingly “locked up” by their unfortunate conditions in poor townships and informal settlements that are thoroughly affected by mostly established “national” violence), leading to a class restructuring inside the poor townships and informal settlements themselves, which in itself causes a constant strife and even fighting for resources, rights, privileges and benefits there. Instead of growth and improvement, because of the lack of government intervention, the direct outcome is mostly the creation of more inequality, greater competition and hostility between the competing groupings in the poor lower class, which turn into daily behaviour tending to do harm to anyone seen as a competitor, regardless of being a local or a foreigner.66,75

The conflict between local poor Blacks from the shanty towns and informal settlements with the better-off middle class of the suburbs, with inequality the pivot, is at present more than a looming phenomenon. Evidence confirms that this hostility has already transformed into open clashes, for instance the clashes in July 2019 between the better-off middle-class homeowners and the neighbouring lower-class shack dwellers in Ennersdale, Lawley and Lenasia, Gauteng, during which four persons were wounded86. Wicks86 described it as an “all-out war brewing”. It is clearly an issue triggered by the financial inequality of the mass of poor, lower-class Blacks making it impossible for them to own land, and this group objecting violently to the rights, privileges and wealth of the middle class.  This outcome is a clear result of the ANC regime’s empty promises to eliminate inequality since 1994 and to better every citizen’s lifestyle. Wicks writes86:5:

The clashes are the latest chapter in SA’s heated land problems. They come after Alexandra township was effectively shut down in June due to similar issues, with residents facing off against “invaders”. Unabated illegal building had seen structures erected on pavements and in people’s gardens.

An established home-owner of Ennersdale, guarding his property, describes the violent conditions (which have also nurtured the so-called xenophobia for some time) very appositely when he says86:5:

I carry this [knobkerrie] when I patrol. I have to because the fight is coming here. The way these people [illegal shack dwellers] are doing things is uncalled-for, but they are doing it because our government has failed.

In this context Gilad Isaacs86 of the National Minimum Wage Research Initiative at Wits University says the problem is the state’s housing policy86:5: “Forceful occupation is no-one’s first choice, and we have to ask why there is vacant land owned by the provincial government in the first place.”

Runji66 comments on the country’s immense social inequality and the enormous insecurity present in the middle class — “cancerous metastasis” — which have been left untreated for 25 years by the present-day government and is boiling and exploding in various crimes, as for instance violence, xenophobia, etc. She writes66:13:

SA is not a nation at peace with itself. And that peace has been difficult to forge because the rights to life, dignity and liberty that are enshrined in the constitution have failed to find practical expression in the daily experience of millions across the country.

The reality is that many of those who have benefited from the opportunities of social mobility in the last 25 years, who form part of the new middle class, are precarious.

Their economic position hinges on them retaining their employment. As such they are a few pay checks away from falling of that prized middle class rung of the ladder.

They don’t only carry themselves and their picture-perfect families but they provide the remittances which many other relatives rely on to survive — the so-called black tax.

Misago75 traces all these different forms of serious crimes such as violence and specifically the so-called xenophobic attacks, to three origins (which are fully in line with the origins of the deadly violence in the Western Cape). He writes75:2: “Government must act before it’s too late. Government must target the root causes, which are unemployment and poverty”.

Specifically on the  presence of unemployment and poverty, which often serve as primary stimulants in doing violence and attacking other people’s lifestyles and possessions, and which unfortunately also engulf foreigners living in these areas, making them falsely troubled xenophobic areas, Pheto87 gives us in-depth insight when she argues that the unrest-troubled Alexandra has among the highest unemployment rates in the Gauteng province with between 4 979 and 8 758 jobless people per square kilometre.

Misago’s75 view of the incompetent ANC regime’s failed role in putting an end to the violence is supported by Alan Mukoki88, the CEO of the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Sacci).  He prominently blames88:7: “…a lawless environment in which people feel they can do what they like with impunity. The government needs to show that it is serious about law and order”.

Barron88 conveys Mukoki’s88 counter-description of the so-called exclusively “South African xenophobia” when he writes that Mukoki88 is of the opinion that the vast majority of South Africans are not xenophobic and that a few hundred people, engaging in racial and ethnic delinquencies, undoubtedly do not represent 60 million good people. The opinion of Mukoki88 is clearly that it is misleading and dangerous to label the present-day violent outbreaks as xenophobia, but that it is rooted in the results of a failed ANC regime. Barron88 reflects Mukoki’s88 words as follows88:7:

We cannot afford to politicise crime, to say that when people are committing crime they’re xenophobic. Deal with it as crime. When people steal goods and burn property it is crime. Xenophobia is used as a cover to commit crime.

For trust and confidence in SA to be restored, the government needs to demonstrate that it has the capacity and the will to take decisive action to contain violent outbreaks “before they get completely out of control”.

To have any hope of restoring the trust that is vital to investment, business people need a very clear plan from government about what it intends to do to deal with this issue in a way that is decisive.

The best answer to so-called xenophobia…is the “enforcement of existing laws, proper policies, proper leadership, proper values, proper service delivery”.

Ron Derby89 is looking from another angle at the unwelcome current hostility and violence aimed at foreigners (as well as South Africans on South Africans which forms the overwhelming violence in the country) by also putting the ANC regime, together with the various pre-1994 White regimes, in the accused box regarding such violence. Most of the violence now associated with the bad behaviour of foreigners, represents for him the negative outcomes of poor Black townships, the joblessness and poverty there, as well as the isolation from the greater economy of these people, whereby poor, destitute foreigners (fleeing sometimes much more chaos at home) are also forced to survive in an unfavourable living environment. Notwithstanding that these foreigners are forced to survive under equally poor local conditions (sometimes worse) as the local poor Blacks in the making of a living, their adaptable, practical styles of surviving (like doing various forms of trade) are often seen as faults by the locals, even as exploitation of the locals. Many of the politicians and policy-makers inside present South African politics show ignorance of the deeper drivers of violence, crime and thus the so-called xenophobia to which they have personally contributed through their poor governance.89 Derby writes89:9:

We’ve been exposed to some terrible economic planning [which led surely to poor townships, contaminated by joblessness and poverty], and it goes back to land legislation passed more than a century ago and apartheid laws a few decades later, and through the unintended consequences of the many plans for SA post 1994.

Amid this, we have a flood of migrants trying to make a living without the support of our government or their own.

Those of them who are merchants have priced their goods at levels so low that the Shoprites won’t try to match them, operating on margins so narrow that few average South African families would try to survive on them.

In this frustrating low-growth economic environment, immigrants are the easiest targets to blame for everything, from taking jobs to violence and crime.

At the centre of the ongoing violent outburst, Dr Kenosi Mosalakae90 reminds us, is the ANC’s inbred culture of revolutionary politics, wherein the obstruction of order is central and wherein every one of the present-day ANC top leaders had participated en masse in making the pre-1994 functioning systems ungovernable. This has led to an immense outlet of delinquent energy which is still steering the ANC clan on a daily basis in most of their actions. Mosalakae states90:14: “We are where we are because we have never forgotten to ‘render the country ungovernable’, we continue to do so whenever we have a grievance”.

The above established revolutionary culture of the ANC, inbred in its post-1980s members and constantly internalised in its post-1994 generation’s mindsets, has led thereto that lawlessness has almost become the norm, writes Mthombothi91. According to him91:25:

No demonstration or protest seems complete without a spate of violence or looting. There’s a bonfire somewhere every day of the week with the people protesting about one thing or the other. It started with unions trashing towns and cities during labour strikes. The government looked the other way because they were its allies. The students burnt books and buildings, including libraries, and were hailed as latter-day revolutionaries.

Looking critically at the various ANC regimes’ unwillingness and inability to stop and to eliminate prominent mass murdering since 1994, for instance in the Western Cape, and their lack of concern for the murders there (with a massive upswing the last five years or so), it seems wishful thinking to believe that the present Ramaphosa regime is going to do anything constructive to the present crime spree of violence;  it does not matter if it is called xenophobia or plain criminality. The deaths of fewer than 20 people in the context of so-called xenophobia in Gauteng this year are just too insignificant for the ANC mindset: the thousands of deaths by murder on the Cape Flats were seemingly not a real issue, until three months ago, so why really about a few more, newer murders?66,88,89

The ANC since 1994 has been “flying blind” when it came to assuring good governance, basically because its leadership is contaminated with the crooked mentality of revolutionary politics. Ramaphosa’s present actions to “make up” for instance to Nigeria about its citizens’ poor treatment here, will again be limited to the doing of talking but lacking the walking as the surge of conflict between foreign nationals and the SAPS in Cape Town at the end of October 2019 confirms. Criminality has overwhelmed the ANC’s top leadership, as the state capture and their many tainted members in the Parliament reflect. As leaders they are unable to be rehabilitated: they are blind to social disorder, especially inequality in wealth, social and personal status, such as that of the poor caught in the chaos of informal settlements and townships. Here the immense chaos is not limited to one specific informal settlement and township, but extend to the many around the country. The question may be asked with good reason if the ANC regime understands what is really going on in the townships where the poor are mostly forcefully channelled into an unstable and conflicting society. Comparing these problematic informal settlements and townships’ residents’ behaviour with that of residents in middle-class residenatial areas who are mostly stable and happy, the inequalities in wealth and class status reveal a stark picture which is a recipe for violence.66,68,69

Runji66 gives us an insight into the indecisiveness of the Ramaphosa regime when it comes to doing something constructive to mitigate inequality and to defuse violence. Runji postulates66:13:

Research shows that unequal societies tend to be the most violent. Therefore, what will Ramaphosa do to get SA closer to be a nation at peace with itself. He should apply his mind and provide definitive responses to these questions.

The first 100 days of a leader in office is the sole guide to give an indication of what the legacy of his five years in office will be. Looking at the comprehensive criticism of what has gone wrong in these 100 days, the indicator classes Ramaphosa as a failed leader.66,88,89

An intimate view of the life of most of the many people in the informal settlements and neglected townships are given by three testimonies. In the first of the testimonies, under the title: “Top dogs need to feel pain of poor”, the author93 writes93:13:

Millions of my compatriots live in squalid and unsanitary conditions, without electricity, running water and toilets.

So the time has come for a united front made up of the President Cyril Ramaphosa, Mmusi Maimane …and Julius Malema to hold court with the poorest of the poor and feel the pain, the suffering, the hunger pangs, the joblessness.

But, most of all, to feel what it is like to rise from your slumber, and use a “long drop” for relief – 200m away from your shack.

It will be tough to leave their luxurious surroundings, but such a night will re-programme their moral compass.

The second author94 writes94:18:

In this morass, Ramaphsa and his mavens think it is possible for society to gravitate towards a social compact. When people are living with raw sewage flowing down their streets, digging in rubbish bins for food and getting arrested in a police dragnet because they ‘smell Ethiopian’, it is quite difficult to embrace fanciful ideas of nationhood.

The third author95, under the title: “President Ramaphosa is living in dream land”, concludes as follows95:13:

A new day and another addition from the wish list of Cyril Ramaphosa who made a request which turned out to be similar to his “I have a dream of future cities on the clouds and bullet trains”.

Now the president encourages the public “to use public transport to foster social cohesion”.

Has he ever tried to take a ride on public transport? Oh yes, he did once and a 20 minutes ride took him three hours as there was a breakdown and he was fuming.

Has he taken the Metrobus service that only operates between strikes or taken a ride on one of the overloaded killing machines called minibus taxis? Of course not.

It seems he still didn’t learn a lesson and so he dreams and pontificates.

Has he considered as well the crime and thieving and killings on some of the modes of our transport? Definitely not.

That’s why it’s a bit rich coming from him.

Which planet do he and the rest of the clowns in his government come from when they endanger everyone’s lives with their blue light convoys which are screaming through our roads, but encourage everyone else to take public transport?

The fact that the ANC regime over 25 years failed to understand, to respect and to rectify the poor people’s circumstances, is the basis of not only of gangsterism and murder, but also xenophobia. Inequality in its broadest context, notwithstanding the consequences, must first be addressed as it was required to be addressed correctly over the last 25 years. The EFF MP Yoliswa Yako96, reflecting her own negative experience — varying from hope and excitement in 1994 to disappointment and despair in 2019 on the failed 1994 democracy and the comprehensive negative outcomes — tells us of the ongoing, devastating inequality and its many injustices which are gobbling up the South African nation, when she writes96:13:

I was a jovial 11-year-old in 1994. I have fond memories of how my mother proudly spoke of new hope, that everyone would own decent houses and how their children would go to any school of their choice.

She said working conditions would be incredibly better and opportunities would be afforded to all, in particular the previously disadvantage, without racial prejudice.

But all this excitement quickly turned into disdain as I watched my mother continue to toil like before. She continued to work as hard while our lives remained the same. Not much chanced and I grew up and I realised that this new democracy did not deliver on all its promises.

The ANC top leaders in the persons of Cyril Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule are too engaged in their own fighting over power within the present South African regime, making them disconnected with reality and in constant flight from taking responsibility for the massive wrongdoing perpetrated by the ANC since 1994 in the country. Munusamy54 illustrated this well by pointing out the failure of the two to meet the press together in person at Luthuli House (the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg) on 10 September to brief them on the current state of affairs in the country regarding unrest, gangsterism and undoubtedly the economy. The fact is that the two would have had to face a barrage of deep-cutting questions from journalists that would probably not only have exposed their failed leadership, but their lack of response to the multiple crises on their watch. On the present so-called xenophobia, gender and other kinds of violence, Munusamy54 writes that Magashule timidly  took the lead above Ramaphosa alone at the meeting, but  side-stepped his responsibility to the nation (and that of Ramaphosa and the ANC) as the ANC’s secretary general, by simply issuing a statement calling on government’s justice, peace and security cluster54:11: “…to establish the immediate causes of the violence and to identify those involved in fuelling it”. This statement, as expected, was of course never respected.

Of the immense gangsters’ threat to South Africa’s political setup, together with other forms of organised crime, the Deputy State Security Minister, Zizi Kodwa97, said recently that it indeed poses a danger to the legitimacy and stability of the South African state, reported The Citizen97 on 19 July 2019. The acting director general of state security of the ANC regime, Loyiso Jafta97, concurred, saying that there were already signs of erosion of the state by entrenched gangsterism [referring to additional crime, outside the crimes of state capture]. The Citizen of 19 July 2019 reports that Jafta97 stated97:6:

The truth is, and we have already seen elements of this, it does displace the formal structures of the state and once it happens, those who are benefitting, like getting healthcare, education, etc, will have a diminished view of the state, but those who are standing outside of it will also see a very, very weak state and therefore the legitimacy and the integrity of the state will severely subtracted from.

But further to that, if you allow it to mature then it starts corrupting law enforcement authorities, it starts corrupting the judiciary, it start s corrupting the legislature and before you know it, you have a complete narcoleptic state and once that happens it is very, very difficult to reverse the effects of that.

The presence of gangsterism, corruption, theft, state capture, murder and immense wrongdoing inside the South African state go deeper than only the endangering of the legitimacy and the stability of the South African state: it represents a symbol of how the political leadership in the country is wholly ineffectual and disconnected from reality, writes Munusamy54.  This results in a bad economy and a totally insecure citizenship ready to riot, with serious consequences already on view. Munusamy posits54:11: “The state of the economy creates the sense that life in our country is a constant fight for survival and that we are at war with each other”. 

Supporting Munusamy’s54 postulation, Dr Saths Cooper54, president of the International Union for Psychological Science and previously a prominent Anti-Apartheid activist, states that the country’s people are54:11: …“living in a state of psychic emergency and the presence of a sense of ‘deep insecurity’ stemming from the demise of law and order”. Referring to the flaming-up of violence in the middle of July to 16 September period of 2019, especially gender and xenophobic violence, he states54:11:

I don’t think the leadership [ANC] fully appreciates where we are right now. The past two weeks have been the worst psychological moment the country has experienced post-democracy. It is really a new low.

People are living with conditions of imminent emergency, crisis and fear. It is an all-pervasive fear. People are afraid to go out and common spaces are deemed to be unsafe.

Munusamy54, quoting Cooper’s standpoint, writes that for Cooper54 the underlying problem is deep public distrust of officials, either elected or appointed. In this context, she writes54:11:

People have lost confidence in those in positions of authority and we do not have the calibre of leadership to rally the nation; and: : “It is unclear what it would take for government and the ANC to realise that SA is at war with itself and the rest of the continent. While the ANC is hoping that a government that is ‘in touch’ and ‘responsive’ conjures itself out of thin air, people continue to lose confidence and feel under siege.

The economist Thabi Leoka54 is of the opinion that the present chaos in the country, especially the devastating violence, can be laid before the door of the government’s inaction to govern appropriately and effectively. She writes54:11: “The violence is how the poor is responding to the failure of leadership. That is the essence of what is happening”. Leoka54 describes this failed ANC leadership as follows54:11: “The lack of leadership appears almost as if this [the xenophobic attacks] is encouraged by SA’s politicians”.

On the failed ANC regime and the empty utterances and promises of its leader Cyril Ramaphosa who has a bag full of goodies for every South African post-2019, Munusamy50 postulates50:20:

Still, his [Ramaphosa] words and those of other party leaders failed to provide solace and direction. We are beyond the point of promises to fix the bureaucracy.

In a week of turmoil and despair, it was apparent more than ever that our country is surely in need of leadership and change but that it could not come from the president.

Ramaphosa does not seem to have the mettle to lead the way in a time of deep crisis. He does not have a team around him that can read the room, and is therefore constantly on the back foot and fighting fires. The government has no money and does not implement the measures he announces.

On the high level of crime in present-day South Africa there is much warning in the words of Gareth Newham55 of ISS regarding the presence of an incurable crime culture when he writes55:3: “South Africa’s high level of violence is rooted in its violent past and continues across generations”.

Indeed, South Africa seems to be lawless, leaderless and spiralling into the Armageddon of a failed state, notwithstanding that Ramaphosa is president and the ANC in government. The hungers of violence and crime are insatiable; they are busy gobbling up South Africa.

4. Conclusions

There are no signs that the pre-May 2019 election promises of Cyril Ramaphosa and his ANC regime have so far in any way been realised. The many ills of South Africa have still not been healed and there are even more ills. The economy is still in a dire state, while the ANC’s politics is indecisive. The country can indeed be described as being in a state of disparity and despondency. The presence of the Chávez-Madura-elite is also palpable here and the feeling of another Venezuela in the making, may be true.

Our law-enforcement institutions are in disrepair; they just do not have the ability and keenness to combat violence and crime.

Crime, as well as prominent violence in various forms, is well anchored in the South African culture. It is not new, but a phenomenon traceable to pre-1994. The 1994 New Dispensation, with its assumed and preached democracy, peace and justice for everyone, was supposed to erase it, but the internalised revolutionary mentality to destroy within the ANC seems to have aggravated the situation, creating more violence and crime.

The present-day South Africa as a failed constitutional state, masterly captured inside a culture of extreme violence and crime by the Marxist-Leninist ANC, is well summed up by Saunderson-Meyer41 when he writes41:12:

There is virtually not an international comparator that SA has not sagged against. There is not a moral or ethical standard that we have not betrayed. The country is literally grinding to a halt.

In full support of Saunderson-Meyer’s41 opinion Scott98:13 states:

The more one looks at the ANC, the more one can come to no other conclusion than that the only purpose it has is to complete the destruction of the country it claims to love. Everything it touches is destroyed.

South Africa is, as Myburgh claims in his book, a gangster state.5

Within the ganster state, there flickers the vague red light of a planned political-military coup in the making. The fact that the ANC has been ruling undemocratically with only 28% of the eligible voters on its side, reflecting that it is losing power and may lose the next national election, makes its agenda very dangerous. Political unrest, anarchy, but especially revolution, may be seen as the ideal opportunity for the Magashule-Mabuza-Zuma clan to interfere and intervene, and thus to grab the daily government under the pretext of restoring political order and the ANC’s policy of Marxism-Leninism.99-102

To terminate violence and crime, more is asked than just the reform of the ANC as a regime. It would need a total obliteration of the ANC from the country’s politics. To hang on to the ANC as a regime and to try to reform the party will only aggravate further our already uncontrolled violence and crime: Its Marxist-Leninist intentions will put the country on fire. The warning of Majoko103 is clear and precise103:12:  

Political expediency is bad for the overall health of the republic. No matter how badly one wants to deal with a festering wound, amputation of the whole appendage because it’s quicker only creates a bigger long-term problem.

Post-2019 spells chaos for South Africans if the ANC stays in power. Justice Edwin Cameron104 gives the ordinary citizen a warning when he says104:12: “Tough times lie ahead for those who are committed to democracy, governance under law and to social justice for all people in our country — not the enrichment of the inside elite.”

In the next (Article 14), entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability)”, the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of its mandate as ruler it received from the 8 May 2019 election, will be further evaluated.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names

 

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Analyst, confidence, desperate, expropriation, journalist, perspective, political party, traumatised, violence.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 3

1. Background

Many poor, marginalised and desperate black South Africans  regularly support leaders and parties whose policies and behaviour on the face of it run counter to their own interests, only worsening their poverty  and marginalisation.

Supporting populist leaders has been shown in many African countries, such as Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, to have caused more suffering for the poor because populist rhetoric, corrupt behaviour and inappropriate policies crash economies and lead to mass starvation, societal breakdown and violence.

In SA, a case in point is of course the desperate voters who elected leaders such as former president Jacob Zuma; they voted to continue their own poverty and underdevelopment.

The irony is, black poverty increases partly because of the actions of populist leaders, be they in the ANC or EFF, and because much of the support for such leaders comes from the poor, wider poverty means more votes for the populists, even though they act against the interests of their own supporters.1:18

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 11)

Article 12 is a continuation of the previous article (Article 11, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (11: Introduction)”. The research forms part of a project consisting of 10 articles, offered in sequence which started with article 11 on the ANC. The intention of is to analyse and discuss further the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC effect land expropriation successfully as reflected by its CVs and Attestations, starting with article 11 and to be continued in this article (12) and the next article.

1.2. Aims of article 12 (Continued from Article 11)

The primary intention of this project (Part 3 on the ANC) is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by specifically describing the profile of the ANC on the same basis as was done with the previous two articles (Part One: Article 9 on the EFF and Part Two: Article 10 on the DA).

Our primary aim here is to evaluate the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of the empowerment as ruler it received from the 8 May 2019 election. The focus will be on the party’s leadership to detect poor personal and political integrity.

2. Method (Continued from Article 11)

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to do successful land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources have been consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to effect successful land reform from 2019.

The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

The manifestos, self-descriptions and public referees of the ANC have already been partly reflected, evaluated and described in the previous article (Article 11), entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (11: Introduction).”

The public referees of the African National Congress will be reflected, evaluated and described in the under-mentioned division 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019.

3.2. The Louw Appraisal Checklist

The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, will again be used for the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC.2 The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s manifesto and  the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees applicable.2

3.3. The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 11)

3.3.1. South African prosperity

The concept prosperity, either in general or specifically, must and can only be read  within the context of the utmost political, economical and social stability. This approach to analysis and to describe prosperity is applicable to the country as a whole, as well as partial terms as to sub-regions, districts and provinces.

Prosperity does have clear markers in governance, such as the specific presence of good to excellent economics, education, law-abidingness, healthcare, governance, employment, financial sufficiency and independence, safe living and working environments, quality housing and service delivery, equal rights before the law, sufficient and safe public transport, an effective and working police force, an effective and working prosecuting and judicial system, a trustworthy and effective government, law-makers and state officials, equality in wealth and opportunities, the spreading of wealth to and the uplifting of the poor, the presence and promotion of a system of stable family life, etc. These markers, identifying good to excellent actions of a government, bring a clear differentiation between prosperity (goodness) and adversity the (badness). To evaluate and decide on a government’s political integrity, its accountability and responsibility to the voters and the citizens — and thus to evaluate and to decide on the basis of the Louw Appraisal Checklist if it can successfully implement land reform — requires an in-depth analysis of the regime’s daily workings; preferably to be studied over a period of ten years and more. In the case of the ANC, we have a comprehensive archive at our disposal, produced by a large contingent of able and skilled political analysts, political commentators, and investigative and crime journalists, published over 25 years and more.2

Reading the ANC’s and Ramaphosa’s May 2019 election manifestos, it may leave the impression in the average reader’s mind that South Africa is a prosperous state and that a predictable prosperity awaits us all in post-2019 South Africa. But, reading on the other hand the reflections of some critical political analysts and commentators, the contrary seems to be true. Prominent among their criticism is a picture that reflects an ANC characterised by poor integrity, lacking the intention to do “good” to all the people and to bring prosperity in all areas to South Africans, notwithstanding President Cyril Ramaphosa’s sincere promises and undertakings since 2017. Barney Mthombothi3, one of the most experienced senior political analysts in South Africa, sees the party rather than the man when he posits3:19: “We know what kind of animal or monster it is, even with Ramaphosa at the helm.”

On the supposed prosperity of present-day and future South Africa, Saunderson-Meyer quotes an anonymous Canadian journalist4:12:

A Canadian journalist friend used post-1994 to say that South Africans were the most absurdly optimistic people that she had ever met. That optimism is shrivelling, turning sour on the vine.

This negative opinion is supported by other political analysts. The post-2019 ANC, as the pre-2019 one, has become also for them an animal, a monster, an uncontrollable beast, which is going to gobble up the country, including even Ramaphosa, before the end of 2024. South Africa’s so-called post-2019 prosperity-in-waiting is a hoax to them.4-7

In light of the above negative reflection on present-day prosperity in South Africa under the ANC regime it is needed to look comprehensively at those businesses still successfully functioning, the status of the economy, the presence of crime, the state of law and order, the workings of government, in general and specifically, under the iron hand of ANC control, etc. This will be done in the following subsections.

3.3.1.1. Business, finance and economic perspective

Conflicting opinions by the business community on the ANC’s practice and management of the economy, as well as the status of the country’s finances, have been seen since the May 2019 election.

For instance, the international ratings agency Standard & Poor (S&P) believes that the win of the ANC and Ramaphosa in the May 2019 election has ensured growth and that it can be expected that a doubling of growth to 1,6% can follow already before the end of 2019. S&P is of the opinion that the Ramaphosa administration will continue with policy “reforms” and that the country is better off post-May with the so-called “reform-minded united majority ANC-party” than what rule by any of the other 47 parties which competed in the elections, could bring. The Bureau for Economic Research at the University of Stellenbosch underwrites in some way S&P’s view and also believes that the ANC will go on with reform.  Hereto Moody’s is more neutral and allows the ANC space to prove themselves during the rest of 2019.8

But the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is far more pessimistic and, other than for instance S&P, points out the ANC’s broad unclear political policy constantly brings uncertainty. The IMF has cut the country’s growth for 2019 from 1,4% to 1,2 % and classified the ANC as a “less stable” regime.8

On the growth prospects of South Africa, Moody’s Investors Service said in the June 2019 Global Macro Outlook report that South Africa’s economy could experience a technical recession in 2019, while Capital Economics cut the growth forecast for 2019 to 0,5%. Nedbank was likely to reduce its growth forecasts for 2019 from 07% to 0.6% or even 0.5%, writes Brown9:3. George Glynos10 of ETM Analytics reports that the long-term decline in the performance of the South African economy is stretching as far back as 10 years and that the contraction of the economy would likely mean that tax revenue would remain under pressure, while the budget deficit would expand from 4,5% to 5% of GDP.9,10  Mpiyakhe Dhlamini10:4 emphasises that in 2018 the South African economy grew only 0,8% (with the last growth of more than 3% in 2011).

One of the best indicators of a crawling economy and a lack of prosperity is the level and numbers of liquidations. Anderson11 states that the total number of liquidations recorded in the country skyrocketed: it went up by more than half in April 2019. Anderson11 shows that liquidations rose by 53,1%, following year-on-year declines of 12,6%, and 9,6% in February and March 2019 respectively. In this respect, the National Credit Bureau reported for the fourth quarter of 2018 a decline (as a percentage of the total number of credit-active consumers of good standing) of 1,9% quarter-on-quarter and 1% year-on-year, while the number of consumers with impaired records rose to 10,16-million during the quarter. Investec is expecting a GDP growth of about 1% in 2019 and 2% in 2020.11

In terms of the use debt (and getting into it) South Africans are indeed debt-enslaved. The October 2019 statistics of the National Credit Regulator (NCR) show South Africans are over-indebted, writes Ngalonkula.13:19 During the the first quarter (Q1) of 2019, new credits increased by more than 5% to over R134 billion in Q2. One million applications were received for more credit (with nearly 60% turned down). There are 25 million active credit consumers with 10,23 million (40%) behind with their payments. The account-average per customer is 3,5, with the impairment of at least one. There are 80 milion debt accounts in South Africa, with 21 million in arrears by three months or more. Of these customers 12,7% have adverse listings against their names, while 5,1% have judgments and administration orders against them, reports Ngoako Mabeba13 of NCR. Ngalonulu13 mentions that a 2019 financial-reality survey by Debt Safe indicated that 67% of the 1 020 participants were indebted due to the tough economic climate, preventing them from buying basic necessities, 38% were indebted due to education and school expenses for themselves, their children and other relatives, while 29% were indebted due to unforeseen circumstances.

The Ramaphosa-regime is clearly out of touch with ever-growing numbers of poor people in South Africa, currently at 30 million, because of the tough economic conditions which prevent them from buying basic necessities, as well as people saturated with debt which they cannot escape or pay back. It spells a warning that a greater and more devastating “New Marikana violence” awaits us soon. The editor of The Citizen14, commenting specifically on the present-day mass of indebted miners who are constantly sinking deeper into financial chaos with their families as a result of the ANC regime’s permanent, ongoing economic failures, writes14:23:

SA’s mining sector has been particularly hard hit.

Two-thirds of the industry’s 450 000 workers have had unsecured loans and spend an average of 48% of their wages paying off debt.

In 2012, miners’ extreme indebtedness was seen as a root cause for violent labour unrest that culminated in the massacre of 34 strikers at Marikana.

To understand the immense ill-distribution of life chances and the absolute lack of sufficient resources in our cities, suburbs, informal settlements, neglected townships and shanty towns (which have seemingly been missing since 1994 from the observation of the ANC elite), it is important to understand the “normal” lifestyles of many of the unfortunates there.  The comprehensive research and in-depth personal experience of Dr. Chris Jones16 of the Unity for Moral Leadership of the University of Stellenbosch, who lived and worked for a certain time in the neglected township of Lavender Hill on the Cape Flats area, offers an excellent lifestyle audit and description of the conditions there; conditions which require enormous long-term socio- economic, educational and personal uplifting and constructive spending (instead of a waste of money on the  4IR there which will make no impact or serve an immediate goal). This audit, with the specific focus on how the issues of chaos, poverty, extreme crime and social disorder — stretching over a very long period and that are still continuing — shows why the extraordinary remedies planned by the Ramaphosa regime there (as 4IR) are unaffordable, unavailable, inapplicable, unviable and unsustainable. Jones’s observations are worthwhile to quote because they tell us how the basis of revolutions has been laid many times. More than that: they convey to us the possibility of a coming revolution.15-17

Jones16, reflecting on these tragic conditions which involve thousands and thousands of people who cannot easily be socio-economically and emotionally rehabilitated in their lifetimes, writes16:8-9:

Ek het onder meer vir so 90 minute per dag by Farikhaan in sy hout-en-sink-aanmekaar getimmerde winkeltjie deurgebring. Mense kon staan daar met enkele (koper-) muntstukke in die hand. Hulle koop byvoorbeeld R1 se suiker, R2 se koffie, een aartappel, een ui, of een stukkie Weetbix. Hierdie blokkie Weetbix word gedeel tussen twee mense, gemeng met water, omdat hulle nie melk kan bekostig nie.

Ek het gesien hoe mense net vel en been in Lavender Hill rondloop, nie net van honger nie, maar ook van al die pyn wat hulle saamdra. Afgetakel in liggaam en gees. Oë dof van ellende. Vasgevang in ‘n afgryselike, benouende, stik-donker put van ellende en magteloosheid met sy seepgladde wande van armoede, werkloosheid en uitsigloosheid. Hoe gaan hierdie mense hulself ooit hieruit ophef? Hoe “maak” kinders dit wat hier grootword?

The lack of social stability and prosperity can be traced back to the presence of many negative elements in the South African economy and society, such as joblessness, population growth, poverty, poor education standards, unstable family life, gangsterism, crime, etc. The fact that the childhood of South Africa’s youth is described as “not easy” — conditions stretching back decades — must ring a bell of concern when politicians speak of South African prosperity in 2019. Saba18 writes in the Mail & Guardian of 7 June 2019 using the data of STATS SA 2018 [as compiled by the M&G Datadesk from STATS SA 2019 (using the 2018 Figures)] on the “no easy Childhood of SA’s youth” wherein the Black child stands out as the main sufferer. This research shows, profiling the state of family life for the total Republic in terms of the country’s averages, that for the category of “who children are living with”, only 33,8% children are living with both parents,  3,3% living with a father alone, 43,1% living with a mother alone and as many as 19,8% living without a parent. In the Eastern Cape the absence of both parents in the home is as high as 33,1%. It is only in the Western Cape and Gauteng that the presence of both parents is high, namely respectively 53,7% and 48,9%. Many of these instabilities are the outcomes of single-parent births, but many result from the need for the parents to generate an income far away from home as the Eastern Cape statistics reflect.18

Looking specifically at the economics around childcare in South Africa as one of the barometers of prosperity in the country, the writing of Absolom19, based on the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign’s finding, shows that 14 million people go to bed hungry daily, with 53% (29 million) of the nation’s inhabitants experiencing food insecurity, the absence of prosperity. Based specifically on reports published at the end of 2018, more than six million of South Africa’s children regularly go hungry. Shining a further light ont the chaos around the economics of childcare, is a report by the Pietermaritzburg Agency for Community Social Action which states that already in 2017 it cost R578,45 a month to feed a child aged between three and nine years a nutritionally complete diet. Although the government supports some children of unemployed parents by providing a support grant of R380 a month per child, this money is far too little to make up the R578,45 minimum needed. Moreover, not every unemployed parent qualifies for the grant and some of these grants are only temporary.19

Besides this collapse of stable family life due to the poor finances of the country, there is also the threatening implosion of state-run businesses such as Eskom,  as well as those of the private business sector and their ordinary customers. Many economists and analysts note that there is a lack of sincerity by the ANC regime to fix anything, especially the corrupted state-owned enterprises  (which already cost the taxpayers billions of rand and, notwithstanding this, are mostly on the brink of going bankrupt). Prominent in this regard, is the failure of the ANC regime to deliver basic, essential services to the poor.9, 20-26

At least one economic outcome of such disorderly governance, caused solely by the ANC regime in charge of the country, is the contraction of 13,2% in the first quarter of 2019 in agriculture, which has historically bolstered GDP growth. The South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s business confidence index for May 2019 reflected a slump across most major sectors, while for the same month the Absa-sponsored purchasing managers’ Index (PMI) fell to 45,4 index points (1,8 points down from April 2019). The IHS Markit PMI also shows that the private sector across the economy has slipped back into contraction territory, reports Speckman25:5. He further states that fixed investment, which already declined in the first quarter of 2019, is expected to show muted growth and that in most other sectors there was a “complete and utter” lack of confidence in the economy; essentially because the ANC regime apparently does not understand the principles of a sound economy and does not know what to do to create a stable economy.25

In line with the evidence of an all-over slump in business confidence, Dhlamini10:4 states that between 2008 and 2016 (eight years) the country’s position on the Fraser Institute World-index for Economic Freedom dropped from 82 to 110 (down 28 places; meaning a decline in total of 26% or 3% per annum), reflecting the curtailed economic policy of the ANC, which is more and more rooted in its Marxist-Leninist principles and further strongly and negatively driven by the radical trade unions.10

Tony Leon27:20 writes on 28 July 2019 on the failure of the Ramaphosa regime’s economic policy and vision. Instead of facing the immense economic, social and political crisis, Ramaphosa himself has acted aimlessly and without drive. This is essentially because he has been forced into a small corner, permanently subject to the ANC politburo’s overseeing of his actions in terms of the ANC’s democratic-centralism, and of course, being forced to support the ANC’s unity on broad politics, including economics. Leon states that at the end of July 2019 the IMF forecast a dismal growth rate of 0,7%, two thirds lower than the rosy Treasury forecast. Every indication is there that within five years our current unsustainable debt levels will reach stratospheric heights of around 70% in relation to our anaemic GDP. Notwithstanding the economic decline, no fundamentals of policy will be reviewed in the future by the ANC, such as reforming or dropping BEE. On the contrary, it will be intensified, ostensibly permanently, until the ANC’s music ends.27

3.3.1.2. Stagnant job market and growing unemployment

In line with a troubled economy, there is evidence that the job-market is moving further into a phase of devastating job cuts, as the June 2019 cuts at the major corporations confirm. For instance, the following lay-offs will take place (with the number of employees in brackets): sugar producer Tongaat-Hulett (5 000), miner Sibanye-Stillwater (3 450), pay-TV producer MultiChoice  (2194), miner Impala Platinum (1 500), bankers Standard Bank (1 200) and Absa (827), diamond miner Alexkor (238) and construction company Group Five (3 000).28,29

Many economic and political analysts and strategists are seemingly ignoring that the ANC has created chaos in the life styles and standards of the overwhelming part of the South African population, with the result that there are more than 30 million poor citizens (out of a population of 58 million), while more than 17,5-million people, because of their extreme poverty and unemployment, are forced to live as beggars on social grants. When comparing the 2018 total tax revenue of R1 216 464 000 with the social grants paid out for that year at R155 264 000, social grants represent a burden of 12% on gross income. (Then there are also further grants indirectly paid to provincial governments which are not included here). Moreover, this unfortunate and poor contingent of people in need of social grants is constantly growing as a result of the growth in unemployment, rise in living costs and population increase. The statistics reflect that social grants have grown from 2017 to 2018 by 8%, while the growth in gross tax revenue for the period was only 6%.31

The utter failure over 25 years to create jobs by the ANC regime and which directly causes joblessness and extreme poverty, has negatively impacted other outcomes, such as gangsterism, robberies, unrest, public violence, anarchy and other crimes. Another barometer in this context to identify prosperity or despondency is to look at the official statistics: for 2017 to 2018 there were officially 890 523 job seekers registered, but only 21 076 (2,3%) were placed in jobs or internships. This leaves nearly 100% of the applicants still in the cold. Excluded from those still registered jobless of 869 447 in 2018, are the mass of jobless people who are not registered and who have lost hope to ever obtain any kind of work, forget a decent permanent job.32

This failure of the ANC at job creation must be to some extent be attributed to its populist streak, which Makhanya33:2 says forces the ANC to “set unachievable targets and give false hope to the people”. On the other, dark side such outrageous promises may represent a planned, delinquent misleading of the voters, like for instance the regime’s promise in June 2019 to “reduce unemployment from 27.6% to 14% in the next five years”, notwithstanding an economy that is expected to grow an average of 1,3% in 2019, 1,8% in 2020 and to reach at most 2,4% in 2023. Reality is seemingly simple absent from some of the ANC elite’s minds. On the other hand, it seems as if some of the ANC leaders are just not able to deliver on their rosy forecasts, simply because they are incapable, irresponsible and lacking in accountability.33

Professor Hardus van Zyl28 of the University of Pretoria agrees on the failure of the ANC’s economic policy and that the country under the ANC-regime is reaching the end of the road, financially as well as socially. The present-day chaotic job market undoubtedly reflects an excellent example, not only as to the absence of prosperity, but also political instability. He writes on 28 June 201928:23: “The country’s job market is horrible. I am concerned about youth employment; that, for me is really going to nail us.” In this context of ongoing and growing chaos, he seriously warns: “The time to talk is over. If we do not start being reactive now, we are going to have a crisis of incredible proportions in the next two to three years — we are going to see socioeconomic chaos.”

The reality is that there are not enough jobs on all levels for the ordinary citizens outside cadre deployment and BEE intervention, because the economy planned and created by the ANC is in crisis. Van Zyl28 is adamant that the failed economics of the ANC is a direct result of the ANC’s own chaotic job planning and their dogmatic, uncreative politics. He is especially concerned about the fact that the country’s youth counts for almost 66% of the total number of unemployed people. Here, in establishing a cause for the ANC’s economic failure, he points out that the ANC regime28:23: …“is bloated and cannot create jobs”.

The ANC’s “intended” efforts to better South Africa for all its people — mostly built on empty promises — never realised in the past. This was well reflected by Ramaphosa’s failed Work Conference in 2018.  Raymond Willemse31, head of Beeld’s metro projects, refers to the ANC politicians’ many promises “of work to come in the future”, but at the same time “acknowledged themselves their absolute failure to create it in the past”. A jobs plan for the the youth (who represent 55,2% of the latest jobless statistics) to alleviate their growing poverty, is absent. Nor is there any strategy for those 9,4 million South Africans who are unemployed (against 16,3 million in work) out of 38,4 million people of working age between 15 and 64 who  in some way qualify to be employed but aren’t.31,34,35

Ramaphosa’s foolish dream in his Third Sona to save South Africa with a comprehensive effort of mass job creation, especially seen against his inability to bring prosperity to the youth, is well illustrated when he pathetically said on 16 June 2019, on Youth Day31:3: “Moenie hoop verloor nie en moenie dat die die son oor jul drome sak nie”. The fantasies of Ramaphosa and his twisted economic and political views are nothing else than a lot of “Ramaphosa pies in the sky”. The Black youth know it well after 25 years of ANC rule. They know just too well the ANC’s leadership’s “talking without the walking”.31

Referring to the tragedy of youth joblessness within a so-called “South African prosperity” – a prosperity which in real life is confined to those with exclusive capitalistic bonds to the regime and the legitimated favouring of fewer than 10 million South Africans living in a “totally other South Africa” than the one inhabited by more than 30 million poor Blacks, Willemse writes31:3:

…as ‘n mens die SSA [Statistiek Suid-Afrika] se syfers sien oor die groot persentasie jong mense wat ophou werk soek het, die skool verlaat het en nie juis enige planne het om verder te gaan studeur nie, is dit duidelik talle jong mense het reeds hoop verloor en ophou droom. Vir hulle het die son van geleenthede reeds gesak.

Dié realiteit kan waargeneem word in gemeenskappe waar jong mense sonder geleenthede op straat rondrentel. Werkloosheid bring voortdurend maatskaplike en sosiale probleme mee wat nie gaan help om misdaadsyfers te verlaag nie.

Dit is ook ‘n klad op Suid-Afrika se naam wanneer graduandi by verkeersligte met ‘n plakkaat en curriculum vitae in die hand staan op soek na werk.

It is thus understandable why as many as 6 million eligible voters under the age of thirty (forming part of a total of 9,8 million eligible registered voters) did not register for the May 2019 elections. It also explains why there are another 9,1 million registered voters who did not make an effort to vote. The answer is obvious: They have written off the ANC as a legitimate regime; one which is lacking the integrity to ever bring prosperity to greater South Africa.31

3.3.1.3. Fourth Industrial Revolution

Reflecting further on the need for job creation and the unemployment problem as to both youth and adults, it is important to note how the ANC regime tries to distract the attention from their failure to offer constructive solutions and actions on these two matters. It needs to be reflected on, because of the danger which these two populations pose for the country’s stability and greater economy.

It is significant how much the Ramaphosa regime’s leadership, specifically President Cyril Ramaphosa and his Vice President David Mabuza, are misusing unrelated phenomena and situations to cover up the ANC’s failures. One very contradictory strategem they have found is to blame unemployment on the advent of digital technology which is decimating traditional jobs; at the same time, however, they hold forth that the use of information technology and the internet will solve the unemployment problem as part of the “fourth industrial revolution”.28

Outstanding here is their earlier suggestion that the advent and the growth of digital technology is one of the reasons for joblessness. Their arguments are extremely opportunistic and holds no ground. Facts show that digital technology is not involved in the kind of work that most of the jobless people are doing or will be doing in the future. Neither did digital technology force the employed worker into unemployment. Most of the unemployed persons’ training and education simply do not make them part of the various technological job categories. It seems a false argument by Ramaphosa and Mabuza, well-used by them, to escape from the realities of joblessness and their incapacity as leaders to solve the matter. Professor Hardus van Zyl28, specifically on joblessness, said that the ANC-regime allowed two problems to develop: firstly28:23: “…a structural problem of unemployment where ‘we have a huge skills gab, underpinned by, on average, low productivity, which makes the country vulnerable to high unemployment”. A second problem is cyclical unemployment which is caused by an “economy that is not growing”, indicating the truth: South Africa’s economy is in chaos. Ben Scully of Wits agrees on the fallacious scape-goating of digital technology as one of the so-called “creators” of joblessness, making up the “Ramaphosa-Magashule-theory” which regards digital technology as one of the reasons for the present South African joblessness and contributing to the possible growth of joblessness in the near future.  Reflecting on these false arguments, pointing to the real reason for the growth in unemployment, he states28:23: “…it’s a popular sort of idea that a company can use as an explanation when business might not be doing well because of the economy.”

We have already commented that making digital technology a scapegoat as being the cause of the present South African joblessness, Ramaphosa — as happened with many of his other hot-air political statements and opinions — later contradicts his initial suggestion on digital technology.  Most recently, Ramahosa has propagated that digital technology is going to be the “cleaner” of the country’s unemployment problem and as such must be supported and be promoted by government, notwithstanding evidence that the unemployment problem will not be solved and that most of the jobless people will not benefit from the exercise. He insists that 4IR is a vehicle to bring prosperity to all South Africans. The false, ongoing rhetoric regarding 4IR’s benefits is so intense that it seems to have replaced the ANC’s Radical Economical Transformation (RET) as part of its radical political rhetoric. For the objective analyst, the propagating of 4IR is nothing but an opportunistic ruse par excellence to distract the public’s attention from the real issues around extreme poverty, namely poor education, inequality and the lack of opportunities. Moreover: these specific negative determinants are going to block the transfer of 4IR to the mass of poor people. Critically viewed, it is folly to present 4IR, which is part of the “Silicon Valley model”, as a reality that will occur in South Africa. The argument that the establishment of advanced innovation and technology are going to solve our unemployment or other socio-economic and political problems, represents arrogance in the extreme.15,28,36,37

The ANC’s “Silicon Valley plan” is inapplicable to present-day chaotic South Africa and tantamount to wishful thinking37:25: the country’s lack of good basic and high school education and training, together with a failing economy in which unemployment is central, makes it a delusional plan, writes Molopyane. 4IR should not be a current priority. What should be priorities are economic development, foreign investment, job creation, improved education and training. The lower level of the potential labour force must first be developed and empowered by basic skills and work opportunities before the advanced 4IR may be introduced. Within the current conditions, 4IR is going to benefit a very small, already well-educated, trained and economically stable group37.  Ramaphosa’s remark37:25 ,“The digital revolution is an opportunity to build an entrepreneurial state, where government’s own appetite for risk and innovation inspires large-scale entrepreneurship and unlocks economical potential”, is fake news par excellence and tends to mislead the public for political gain.

No-one doubts that 4IR is going to have an impact, but, as said, only on a small group of already advantaged socio-economic and political beneficiaries, leaving the mass of poor still in the doldrums. 4IR spells more poverty and inequality for the mass of poor Blacks.36-39

Rossouw17 shows that the sound existence of sustainable industrialisation (and thus 4IR) depends on the presence of two primary elements. Firstly, it needs the maintenance and further development of basic technology (the so-called “family-lines of rising development”). The start here is the creation of a much-needed basic technology foundation, to be improved and to be extended in complexity during the immediate next phase, followed by another phase of improvement and complexity17:7: “Jy kan nie digitale netwerke en tegnologieë suksesvol instel en bedryf sonder die voorafgaande tegnologie van elektrisitet nie”. Secondly, ongoing or sustainable industrialisation needs constantly rising levels of literacy and numeracy. 4IR requires the education of new generations to understand and use old and new technologies through a functioning teaching system, together with the maintenance of the existing levels of industrialisation. These two prescriptions are missing in present-day South Africa, simply because of the  ANC regime’s failure over 25 years to bring development to poor South Africans. In this context, Rossouw posits17:7:

Ongelukkig is nie een van laasgenoemde twee vandag in Suid-Afrika teenwoordig nie. Onder ‘n regering wat gefikseer is op verbruik pleks van vervaardiging is verskillende nywerheidsorganisaies aan ‘n orgie van plundering en aftakeling onderwerp. Eskom is die uitstaande voorbeeld onder vele meer.

Kortom, dit wat van industrialisering en die beheersing van simboliese stelsels in die land teenwoordig was, is die afgelope 20 jaar en meer stelselmatig afgetakel. Dieselfde mense wat die voorwaardes vir deelnae aan volgehoue industrialisering vernietig het en steeds vernietig, kom bak nou mooi broodjies oor hoe die land moet deelneem aan die “vierde nywerheidsomwenteling”.

Nullifying Ramaphosa’s views and propaganda (the transfer of so-called “facts” back to myths) on the advent and/or existence of 4IR, Roussouw writes17:7:

By nadere beskouing is die ‘vierde nywerheidsrevolusie’ eintlik niks anders nie as bloot nog ‘n fase in die industrialisering van die bewussyn (robotte, kunsmatige intelligensie) en gepaardgaande simboliese stelsels (die kodes onderliggend aan nano- en biotegnologie).

On how the foolish and misleading concept of “4IR” established itself overnight in the mindsets and speeches of many South African university managers and politicians — including ostensibly Ramaphosa — and has became extremely misused and propagated by certain spokespersons and leaders, Rossouw explains17:7:

Eenvoudig: Pres. Cyril Ramaphosa, wat die laaste jare gereeld Davos toe is om die krummels van die tafel van die neokoloniale meesters van die wêreld te eet, het sy meester, [Klaus Martin] Schwab, se papegaai geword [*Schwab, ‘n ingenieur en ekonoom, is die stigter van die Wêreld Ekonomiese Forum (WEF) en lid van die Bilderberg-groep (BG). Die WEF en die BG is hoogs omstrede en het ‘n groot aandeel aan die ekologiese krisis, ekonomiese ongelykheid en die huidige wêreldwye politieke onstabiliteit].

Nog voordat jy “Kophou” kon sê, het die term soos ‘n veldbrand versprei en net nog ‘n leë bestuurscliché geword. Dat politici wat die guns van die neokoloniale meesters soek hulle napraat, verras niemand nie, maar mens verwag meer van universiteitsbesture.

Aangesien Suid-Afrika se eie industriële organisasies en die bemeestering van simboliese stelsels die afgelope 20 jaar stelselmatig vernietig is, sal dit gek wees om hierdie tegnologieë nie met die grootste omsigtigheid te benader nie as ons ons nie bloot verder wil laat koloniseer om ons na die beeld van sinistere korporasies te misvorm nie.

The widespread presence of poverty and inequality in our current society is blocking and stifling any hope to create a comprehensive, inclusive digital economy. Angelo Fick36, the director of research at the Auwal Socio-economic Research Institute,  writes that technology is not necessarily the panacea it is made out to be36:21: “it is indeed de-skilling the under-skilled”. In this context he states that South Africans are suffering from skills deficits that are much more fundamental than the ones they are being urged to address ahead of the 4IR.36

Various authors write that histories of earlier industrial revolutions show that their outcomes were not associated with the interests of the working or under-classes, but were associated with the advancement of capitalism through the so-called “big class of technology”. This means that the 4IR’s outcomes will be the same for present-day South Africa: more poverty, more inequality, more ethnicity and racism, and more exploitation. The mass of the poor Blacks will be outsiders to the benefits of the 4IR and will be the victims because the new setup will exacerbate the existing social, economic and political inequalities, problems and conflicts. It will only, as the ANC’s cadre-employment and selective BEE-employment did, provide prosperity once more to the ANC elites (and possibly a state capture contract). The promotion and welcoming of the 4IR is again one of Ramaphosa’s distractions from the real problems responsible for the country’s backwardness, created and upheld by the ANC regime in many areas, such as education, job opportunities, etc.15,17,36,38

Both of the ANC regime’s two postulations, namely firstly that digital technology has led to people losing their jobs and thus that it creates unemployment, and secondly that 4IR is going to be a job creator and that it will remove the unemployment problem, are outright false.

South Africa’s jobless problem requires logical thinking, planning and doing. It needs the understanding of realities, and of course the acceptance of it. The basic fact, which Ramaphosa and his leadership missed, is that in order to accommodate at least 700 000 young people entering the job market on all levels every year, the country needs an annual growth rate of at least 10%. (In this respect the ANC regime could only manage a current growth rate of 1,5% for 2019, with at most 2,1% forecast for 2021!) Then, apart from this much-needed 10% growth for the more or less 700 000 youths coming onto the job market annually, there are the many other youths and adults already outside jobs because of the economic crisis.  These statistics, together with the mass of jobless, untrained and hungry people, confirm over and over the shameful failure of the ANC regime’s economic and population policies, nullifying the introduction of advanced programmes for digital technology and the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) as a solution for the mostly under-skilled and undertrained poor. It will only, as the ANC’s cadre employment and selective BEE employment did, create prosperity for ANC insiders who constitute a small, selective group within the broader population. The promotion of 4IR by Ramaphosa, as a solution for unemployment, is again one of Ramaphosa’s distractions from the real problems regarding the country’s backwardness in many areas, such as education, work opportunities, poverty, etc., that were created by the failed ANC regime.15,17,36,38

3.3.1.4. Empty state coffers

Our state-owned enterprises’ financial health is in tatters (which is very much in line with the ANC’s general politics and their empty state coffers). There are the continuously failing Eskom, SAA, SABC, etc., as examples. How empty the ANC regime’s purse is, was well reflected in June 2019 by Denel’s announcement that it would not be paying full salaries at the end of the month. Although Pravin Gordan announced after this that a “lender” was found to pay Denel’s salaries, it the chaos within the South African economy and within a government whose day-to-day rule is characterised by constant borrowing.40

The extent to which the South African state under Ramaphosa is approaching financial bankruptcy and an empty treasury, is well illustrated by the recent jobs bloodbath wherein small business owners had to close shop, primarily because the state owes them a staggering R7,1 billion in unpaid invoices. (The amount was R0,6-billion on the national level and R 6,5 billion on the provincial level). The negative situation (and its serious consequences) was summed up by Statistics SA’s indication that unemployment in the labour force (private sector) had increased from 27,6% in the first quarter to 29% in the second quarter of 2019. This shocking figure was revealed by a Ramaphosa minister, the Small Business Development minister, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, in a written reply to Parliament. In this context, it was revealed that invoices of private providers for services rendered should be settled by the state within 30 days. Despite this official rule, the average age of outstanding official debt is several months. This has had serious consequences for the private firms and their employees, a situation which seemingly left the Ramaphosa regime unconcerned. Makinana and Umraw41 report on this chaos, created directly by the government, and its effects on employees and employers as well as their families and communities. They write41:4:

Small business owners who deal with the government have sad stories to tell about the unwillingness to pay them on time. An Eastern Cape based civil engineering firm owner said she had been sent from pillar to post for almost a year over outstanding invoices. ‘We are unable to pay our staff. There are outstanding salaries in our company for about six months. As a result, we are down to two staff members from 11’.

Ramaphosa too, in his parliamentary reply to his Third Sona, confirmed in some way the lack of money in the state coffers and the failure of the economy to generate cash under the present ANC regime. In an effort to escape the growing financial and economic fiasco — further showing up the ANC regime’s lack of business skills to restart the country’s collapsing economy by means of proper planning and management — Ramaphosa has gone on a second investment drive in 2019/2020 after his 2018 $100 billion investment drive was not a roaring success. Marrian40 describes Ramaphosa and Gordhan’s desperate borrowing spree to meet the state’s daily needs, like salaries (and thus to avoid more job cuts), as40:27: “…an illustration of the short-termism and lack of planning afflicting government.

As already shown in the above analysis, general economical stability and normality are lacking in South Africa. For big companies and capitalists, it does not meet the criteria of “prosperity”. It seems as if it is only the pro-Ramaphosa media and the ANC’s top brass who still “believe” in their own myth. Indeed, as already said, South Africa is on the brink of collapse. The unstable and deteriorating economic situation is contradicting the vestiges of South African prosperity. Our failed prosperity is debunked by the independent economist Thalbi Leoka.40 For Leoka40 the primarily reason for this chaos is apparently situated in the mindset of the ANC’s top elite at Luthuli House (which forms an important part of the ANC’s politburo). Luthuli House and the ANC’s politburo lack an understanding of the seriousness of the country’s economic situation: essentially they do not understand that there is such a thing as “good democratic capitalism” outside of the crooked socialism of their Marxist-Leninist convictions. In short: they fail to make a distinction between good and bad economic planning. As Leoka puts it40:4: “…the GDP figures indicate an economy in crisis, while the ANC seemingly speaks of prosperity”.

The CEO of Nedbank, Mike Brown42, also said in August 2019 that Ramaphosa and his regime are at a critical juncture and the country requires urgent action not to crash into an IMF bailout. In his outline of a failed economy, Brown also focussed on the ANC’s internal self-centred leadership struggle, leaving the affairs of the regime in tatters. On a question from the journalist Chris Barron42 if Brown42 believes Ramaphosa is capable of taking politically unpopular decisions which rectifying the business programme requires, Brown42, very tactfully responded42:6:

I’m not qualified to comment on the president’s ability to do these things. But we are left with no option other than to take these difficult decisions.

Immediate remedies to save South Africa’s twisted economy by means of South African private initiatives so as to rescue the country from a Venezuelan or Zimbabwean scenario, are being looked on skeptically for good reason. Any initiative where the ANC-regime is in a way involved to bring correction is doubted. The chaos, created over 25 years of ruling, is putting even an IMF-intervention and –interference, to can bring economical-correction, in doubt. The state-coffer is going to be for a long time on its emptiest ever.

In this context of private saviours coming in to “remodel” South Africa to regain economic and financial integrity, it is important to reflect on a public-private growth initiative project, announced in June 2019, ready for takeoff. The recent statement by the initiative that the first phase of 43 projects has been activated, as part of the so-called Public-private Growth Initiative, and which aims to inject R840 billion into the economy and create 155 000 jobs over the next five years, seems to be wishful thinking at this stage within the current South African politico-economic context. So far it only reveals a theoretical approach. It seems again to be part of the talking without walking politics of South Africa that has had the country  in its grip since 1994. The immense political failure over 25 years by the ANC and South Africa, has caused the international community to cool in its enthusiasm, other than in 1994 when they were eager to assist the ANC and South Africa after apartheid’s wrongdoing.  It seems foreign investors are leaving the ANC and South Africa on their own to see what next catastrophe will follow. Reflectin the difficulty to get foreign entities involved in present South Africa, the World Bank Index is a good place to start: where the country used to rank at number 32 out of 190 economies in those early days of ANC rule, it has now slipped to position number 82 (50 places, or nearly 30%, down).

De Lange43:4 states that the South African economy now may now be compared with the level where the country was in the 1980s when it had a large amount of debt.  South Africa under the ANC, writes Strydom46:3, is a shrinking economic entity in Africa and its growth prospects are much worse than the Reserve Bank’s forecast of expansion in GDP for this year (reflecting a paltry 0,6% against 2018’s equally insignificant 0,8%). In terms of its economic status in the world, South Africa has dropped from the 25th position in 1994 to more or less 35th position in 2018 (10 places down in 24 years). When comparing our economy with those of Poland, Israel, Ireland, Nigeria and Turkey, it has been left behind. Its ability to generate growth of more than 4% a year as was done from 2000 till 2007, is gone. Poor service delivery and constant unrest issues have broken the back of the country’s economy, making South Africa after 25 years of ANC economics “…no longer Africa’s largest economy, but hopefully only Africa’s most advanced economy”. Nothing more is present.17,43-46

3.3.1.5. Third State of the Nation Address (Sona)

An excellent example of the vacillation between political reality and unreality in the mind of Ramaphosa regarding present-day politics and economics was reflected by his State of the Nation Address (Sona). It was published in the public press on 23 June 2019 by Ramaphosa47 after he had delivered it on 20 June 2019. This reporting brings into perspective Cyril Ramaphosa the political talker-but-not-walker. It is based solely on the rhetoric of “we”, “us” and “our” in doing the walking, while there is a lack of “me” (Ramaphosa) to constructively drive the process until success is obtained. To understand the fantasy of the ANC politico-economics, and why the country is moving into collapse, the “Ramaphosa Sona” must be looked at. It reads as follows47:8:

As South Africa enters the next 25 years of democracy, let us proclaim a bold and ambitious goal, a unifying purpose, to which we dedicate all our resources and energies.

Let us agree as a nation and as a people united in our aspirations, that within the next 10 years we will have the South Africa we want.

  • No person in South Africa will go hungry
  • Our economy will grow at a much faster rate than our population
  • Two million more young people will be in employment
  • Every 10-year-old will be able to read for meaning
  • Violent crime will be halved

Let us make these commitments now, to ourselves and to each other, knowing that they will stretch our resources and capabilities, but understanding that if we achieve these 5 goals, we will have fundamentally transformed our society.

We set these ambitious goals not despite the severe difficulties of the present, but because of them.

We set these goals so that the decisions we take now are bolder and we act with great urgency.

Working together, there is nothing we cannot be, nothing we cannot do, and nothing we cannot achieve.

The ungrounded utterances — which frightens every wise investor, local or international — are very much in line with the foolish political utterances of the late President Hugo Chavez and the present President Nicolás Manduro of the failed Venezuela.

Political and investment analysts feel that Ramaphosa must be woken up from his Sona dreams when it comes to the practice of real economics and politics. It is plain foolish and nonsensical to speak and dream in the “last days of the South African economy” in the following manner47:8:

… the new city in the mist, high-speed trains to can travel the country from south to north and west to east, new employment for 2-million youths in a decade, tracking civil claims arising from investigation by the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) of the state capturers, the doubling of the tourists to 21 million in ten years’ time.

The same awakening must be take place regarding his continuing empty promises, coming after the May 2019 elections, offering unrealistic economic growth as well as his fantastical halving of the crime rate!47-50

The editor49 of the Sunday Times reports on 23 June 2019 on this foolish mind-capturing of Ramaphosa, as follows49:20:

The problem, Mr President, is that South Africans are not living in 2030; they are living in the present. Their reality is one of extremely low employment, slow service delivery and dimmed economic prospects. A majority of our children go to schools that do not have the basics – no libraries, and with duplicated buildings. Some schools do not even have proper toilets or running water. Our public health system is in tatters; patients wait in long queues and are often treated by rude and uncaring staff. Crime levels are high. People do not feel safe outside their homes, or even inside them.

We are running out of patience, fast. How long must we wait for violent criminals to face justice? How long must we wait for proper roads to be built, for schools and hospitals to be fixed, for leadership that inspires economic growth so that we can start attracting investments and create jobs?

The editor48 of Rapport writes on the 23 June 201948:2:

‘n Mens moet groot droom, sê ons graag vir ons kinders. Maar die land se kiesers is nie kinders nie. Dis jammer dat ‘n president wat in sy kort tyd aan die stuur reeds só baie reggekry het die kluts in een toespraak so kan kwytraak.

Note that the Afrikaans phrase, “die kluts kwytraak”, means “losing one’s marbles”, which is quite a harsh judgment on Ramaphosa’s character and abilities.

Others have been equally scathing on Ramaphosa, the so-called “unique thinker and planner and great doer as statesman”, who has grabbed the minds of many South Africans since December 2017 because they believed he could bring salvation on his own. De Lange51 brings to us another, but strange dimension regarding the above extreme and visionary “dreaming” of Ramaphosa. He51 states it was not original, but a rehash of a much more comprehensive presentation made earlier by Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma at the ANC’s lekgotla in June at Irene.  More informatively, De Lange writes51:2:

Dlamini-Zuma het nie net gesê ons moet droom oor sneltreine nie, maar ook oor ‘n trein wat ‘binne twee uur’ die 2 000km van die Kaap na Musina kan aflê – wat ‘n snelheid van ‘n hele 1 000 km/h sal vereis [terwyl die wêreld se vinnigste trein in Sjanghai, China tans net 430 km/h haal]’.

The above leaves us with the worrying question: does Ramaphosa have any plan or vision of his own to better the stricken South Africa? This is a very important question after reading Heystek’s20 analysis of the negative Ramaphosa impact on the economy20:3:

Dis opmerklik dat die rand nou die afgelope 17 maande, sedert die verkiesing van pres. Cyril Ramaphosa as ANC-leier in Desember 2017 met bykans 33% teen die Amerikaanse dollar gedaal het. Dít tydens ‘n tydperk wat as ‘Ramaforie’ beskryf word.

3.3.1.6. Failed modern-day 1948 Marshall plan

Helen Zille52 considers the failure of the ANC regime’s economics since 1994, by comparing and contrasting it with the successful outcome of the 1948 Marshall Plan of the USA to rebuild 18 European countries’ economies after the devastating World War II. This financial assistance was $12 billion (more or less $100 billion or R1 507 billion in today’s money). The reasons for the success of the Marshall Plan were drivers that are outright missing in the ANC’s so-called South African economic reform. In this context Zille posits52:7:

Omdat dit goed deurdink en doeltreffend geïmplementeer is om lewensvatbare en volhoubare Europese ekonomieë te bou, eerder as om afhanklikheid te bevorder. En die institutionele meganismes (wat van nuts af herstel of herbou is) het ‘n verantwoordbare uitbetaling van fondsgeld verseker, wat enige moontlikheid verhoed dat ‘n klein invloedryke elite met politieke bande verryk word. Kan ons dieselfde doen? Ongelukkig het die resep ons tot dusver ontwyk.

On the financial input by countries outside Africa to the later “African Marshall Plan”, Zille52 writes on 9 June 201952:7:

Die jongste syfers wat ek kon opspoor, toon dat die top-tien lande wat amptelik ontwikkelingshulp aan Afrikalande verskaf in 2016 $50 miljard aan hulle oorbetaal het. Oor drie jaar gemeet (dieselfde tydperk as die Marshallplan) sal dit $150 miljard, die ekwivalent van een en ‘n half keer die Marshallplan, beloop.

In teenstelling met die Marshallplan is hulp en skuldverligting aan Afrika ‘n volgehoue en herhalende patron – nie ‘n eenmalige oordrag nie. Die totale hoeveelheid ontwikkelingshulp aan Afrika oor die afgelope drie dekades sou baie gekompliseerde Marshallplanne beloop.

On the failed economics of the ANC inside the “South African Marshall Plan”, Zille52 describes a shocking picture. She states52:7:

Sedert 1994 het ons $54 miljard van 21 lidlande van die Organisaie van Ekonomiese Samewerking en Ontwikkeling ontvang – meer as dubbeld die bedrag [$26 miljard in vandag se geld] wat die Marshallplan aan Brittanje (die grootste enkele begunstigde) gegee het en amper vyf keer meer as wat Wes-Duitsland [$11 miljard in vandag se geld] gekry het.

Per capita bereken, is die bedrag wat Suid-Afrika ontvang het selfs meer vrygewig in vergelyking met die Europese lande.

A prominent question is: why are there today at least 9,9 million jobless people against the 3,7 of 1994? This leads Zille52 to ask further52:7:

En hoe is dit moontlik dat ongelykheid binne ons swart bevolking nou net so groot is as tussen die rykste wit mense en die armste swart mense? Hoekom het al hierdie miljarde ons nie gehelp om ‘n inklusiewe ekonomie te bou nie, beleggings te lok en volhoubare groei te verseker nie?

The answer to our failed “South African Marshall plan”, coming since 1994, is quite clear toe Zille52:7:

Ons ken die antwoord: Beleidsonsekerheid, ‘n onbevoegde gekaapte staat, die amperse ineenstorting van ons strafregtelike regstelsel, ‘n swak openbare onderwysstelsel en die omvang van korrupsie en misdaad. Hierdie faktore, in kombinasie, vernietig die beleggingsvetroue wat nodig is vir volgehoue ekonomiese groei.

Matthys53 offers further insight into the issue of inequality referred to by  Zille above, particularly between members of the Black population. He reflects on our position in terms of the Gini coefficient and points out that South Africa is one of the world’s five most unequal countries. Moreover, South Africa is the number one most unequal country in the world with a coefficient of 63,4%! The other four most unequal countries are: Namibia (61,3%), Haiti (60,8%), Botswana (60.5%) and Suriname (57, 6%). This so-called “country association” of South Africa relative to the four under-developed countries referred to, clearly tells the story of how far gone our economic and social constitutions are at present [The Gini coefficient, the most commonly used measure of inequality, measures the statistical dispersion of the income or wealth distribution of a nation’s residents. A Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality against a coefficient of one or 100% which expresses maximum inequality].53

3.3.1.7. South Africa’s failed 2012 to 2018 targets

The latest figures by the World Bank, Statistics SA, Trading Economics and CEIC,54 reflecting how South Africa is meeting its targets set for the period 2012 to 2030, show that the outcomes for the period 2012 to 2018 failed to reach any one of the set targets. The following summary shows it well54:4:

  1. Economic growth: 2012 – 2030 (4%) > 2012 – 2018 (1.5%)
  2. National savings rate: 2012 -2030 (25% of GDP) > 2012 – 2018 (14% in December 2018)
  3. Gini coefficient: 2012 – 2013 (0.6) > 2012 – 2018 (0.63 in 2014)
  4. Average income per person per year: R120 000 > 2012 -2018 (R88 000 in 2017)
  5. People with jobs: 2012 – 2030 (24-million) > 2012 – 2018 (16.3-million first quarter 2019)
  6. Unemployment: 2012 -2030 (6%) < 2012 – 2018 (27.6% first quarter 2019)
  7. Percentage of adults with jobs: 2012 -2030  (61%) > 2012 -2018 (42.6% first quarter 2018)
  8. Labour participation rate: 2012 – 2030 (65%) > 2012 -2018 (58.8% first quarter 2019).

Looking more closely at our missed targets for 2012 to 2018, it is clear that the ANC regime overlooked — or more correctly just blindly ignored — two of the primary factors creating poverty and unemployment: an oversized population, and the uncontrolled constant growth of the South African population.

It seems as if the ANC regime paid scant attention to the hard fact that the country’s population (the Black majority) had grown from 38,78 million in 1994 to 58,78 million in 2019 (representing a 50% growth or 20 million people). This indicatates that the country’s population is growing at 1,43% per annum against the world average of 1,08% per annum (or 850 000 more people per annum in South Africa). This population growth of 1,43% is more than double our present economic growth of ,.6% on a yearly basis.55,56 Saunderson-Meyer56 in this context reports56:12:

While the national fertility rate had dropped from 3,23 in 1996, to 2,67 in 2011 — above the replacement rate of 2.1 — it was particularly high among black Africans at 2,82 and coloureds at 2,57, while below replacement among Indians and whites (1,85 and 1,7).

The immediate implication of an oversized population is the overuse of our resources, high unemployment, a diminishing personal income and more people to feed in a shrinking economy. The end result is that South Africans have been getting poorer since 2014, as statistics show. Looking at our present annual population growth, it is estimated that the economy must grow by 6% yearly to successfully allow the more than 1 million new job-seekers into the labour market, as well as to erase in some way the already existing jobless numbers (note once more: our GDP growth is 0,6% at present). Part of these new-comers to the South African economy, directly and indirectly, is a strong contingent of children under the age of 15 years who lack proper nutrition. (These children are in addition to the fact that nearly 40% of the 58,78 million of population and six out of 10 in the age category under 35 are jobless). Undoubtedly this situation is fast overwhelming the government’s ability to meet the food needs of many children through social grants. Notwithstanding this growing crisis, the ANC regime has not tackled for the last five years any of adverse elements causing economic decline. The current promise of the ANC regime, that for instance the 29% unemployment will be halved in the next five years, is exactly the same unrealistic promise that the ANC made  in 2009 to fully eliminate informal settlements before 2014. The primary fact is that the GDP growth (and available state finance) has been trending downwards for years, while the country’s fertility rate shows a continuation above the average of what is considered the replacement rate.55,56

The ANC’s failed population-planning policy and practice is creating more and more chaos in the lifestyles and living standards of the overwhelming part of the South African population. The direct result is that there are more than 30 million poor citizens (out of a population of 58 million) while more than 17,5 million people, because of their extreme poverty, are forced to live as beggars on social grants. When comparing the 2018 total tax revenue of R1 216 464 000 with the social grants paid out for that year at R155 264 000, social grants stand out as a burden of 12% on the gross income. It must be noted that this unfortunate poor contingent in need of social grants is constantly growing: it grew from 2017 to 2018 by 8% while the growth in gross tax revenue for the period was only 6%.30,31

Smit55:11, in a short summary on the natural growth from 2004 to 2019 (births minus deaths), reports as follows:

2004: 409 2610;
2007: 509 974;
2010: 629 622;
2014: 639 791;
2019: 629 726.

He55 states categorically, based on the 2019 report of Statistics SA, that the population-growth tempo of South Africa increased from ±1% in 2002/2003 to 1,43% in 2019. This growth is strengthened by the decline in infantile deaths, the surge in immigrants from especially African countries, etc., making it clear that the growth is still to increase after 2019.55,56 The Whites, as Saunderson-Meyer56 points out, reached already in 1989 the replacement-border balance, with at the moment minus 0,4% growth (below the equilibrium level, meaning they are in the process of dying out.55,56

It is important to note that the ANC’s radical statutory policy, with its enforced BEE empowerment and other forms of affirmative action, etc., exclusively favouring a part of the Black population, prescribing that the demography of 80,7% Blacks, 8% Coloureds, 7,7% Whites and 2,1% Asians must be reflected in social life and in the workplace , has done enormous damage to the economy as well as race relations.55 The foolishness and irresponsibility around the use of racial quotas by politicians to rule South Africa because “they are our people” — notwithstanding that these quotas may bring famine, uncontrollable revolution and possibly death in the end — is well summed up by Smit when he writes55:11: “Die EFF-leier, Julius Malema, moedig swart vroue aan om meer kinders te hê ‘vir die revolusie’.” The ANC regime’s failure to decrease the above-average growth of the Black population since 1994 must be read in the same negative context as Malema’s utterances.

The prominent imbalance in numbers between South Africa’s racial groups referred to, read together with the various racial groups’ economic empowerment, spells conflict for the future and can be a driving factor for assets and land grabbing from Whites without compensation, as happened in Zimbabwe. There is also the hostility between Black and White, caused by the racial wealth-gap, which is growing because of the introduction of anti-white racism into politics by some political radicals in the ANC and the EFF. The often-ignored demography of South Africa may determine the fate of its various ethnic and racial groups in a future South Africa, either for the best or for the worst, writes Smit.55:11

One way to address the present poverty and joblessness (and undoubtedly the hunger of children), and thus to move the country upwards into at least a “low-level prosperity”, Saunderson-Meyer56 suggests in August 2019 that the ANC-regime become realistic, outside its futile politics, on the reproduction rate of its people. He writes56:12:

Government needs to do everything it can to grow the economy and slow population growth, even though the latter is likely to be a radically flammable issue.

What Saunderson-Meyer56 seemingly suggests to the ANC regime is: don’t use baby-making as a political weapon to empower you with votes. In the end you take the food out of the poor’s mouths after they foolishly voted for you and your false promises. It is already costing you dearly at the moment and is going to cost you dearly in the future. The only other alternative to our over-population, in relation to our chaotic economics, is a constant annual GDP growth of five times the present rate, which is just impossible to obtain in the ANC’s parliamentary term from 2019 to 2024.55,56

3.3.1.8. South African a clone of Venezuela

Looking at the apparent start of South Africa’s death dance (dodedans), is is important to note the death dance of Venezuela, which is now, in slow-motion, coming to an end in comprehensive chaos in that country. What is most worrying, is the fact that some of the ANC elite, like the convicted Tony Yengeni and the previous minister of state-security Bongani Bongo, failed to notice the Venezuelas death dance after they went there in March 2019 on a so-called “fact-finding mission”, supposedly to inform and assure South Africans of the “benificence” of Chávez-Madura-type regimes. Yengeni and Bongo, in describing their visit afterwards, said they had adored Venezuela for its “all-over excellence”.57 John Endres57 of the IRR describes the two’s responses as follows57:4-5:

Volgens hulle (Yengeni en Bongo) het hulle hulle ‘n wonderlike tyd by ‘n straatkarnaval gehad, ‘n opelug-musiekfees bygewoon en op die strand gelê.

Moving away from Ramaphosa’s dreams and now seemingly also Yengeni and Bongo’s dreams, the evidence coming out of Venezuela tells another, much darker story. According to observers,  between January and June 2019, one million of its population fled Venezuela, making that a total of 4 million people (out of a population of 36 million) that are living outside the country to escape hunger and political instability. The base of this poverty is a direct outcome of Nicolás Maduro’s failed socialist economics, his nationalisation of private assets and land grabbing from the rich, as well as his printing of worthless money after he grabbed the country’s Reserve Bank, the useless spending of state money (obtained through the selling of oil) in terms of the Maduro regime’s socialist policies on senseless housing projects, feeding schemes, education and health programmes, while state money was further misused to support extremely radical movements and parties outside Venezuela.

Evidence shows further that more than 50% of children in five of the seven Venezuelan states, under the age of five, suffer from malnutrition and that the average citizen has lost 10 kilograms in weight. Venezuela is the only country in the world experiencing hyperinflation (in 2018 it was 80 000%, rising to 165 000% in 2019), while the country’s GDP sank by more or less 50%. The Chávez-Madura elite internally undermined the Venezuelans’ political and civil rights. The extreme corruption and state capture by the Chávez-Madura elite (in full swing since 1999) further drained the state’s coffers. The fall in the price of oil in 2013, from $97 to $35 per barrel, and the rise of mass poverty, led to the nationalisation of private assets, and an economy policy which sent the prices of all products, especially food, sky-high, with unemployment rocketing.57 This confirms the well-known principle of revolutionary governments: to grab from others but never to create oneself. Endres,57 in an effort to bring some understanding to South Africans of a “similar” Venezuelan-style South Africa that might be coming, writes very comprehensively and in-depth on 23 June 2019 on the Venezuelan death dance as follows57:4-5:

…voorbeelde wys dat byna al Venezuela se ekonomiese probleme tuisgemaak was: sosialistiese idees soos onteiening, nasionalisering, prysbeheer en statsinmenging in die ekonomie. Die dalende olieprys ($100 per vat in 2012 tot $35 in 2013) het net die situasie vererger.

Maduro en sy ondersteuners pak graag die skuld vir sy problem op die VSA en sanksies, maar die feit is dat sanksies hoogs gefokus is – op die binnekring van die regime en die staatsoliemaatskappy, PDVSA.

Die waarheid is dat dit ‘n rampspoedige ekonomiese beleid is wat die ineenstorting van dié land veroorsaak het. Suid-Afrika behoort dié les ter harte te neem.

That South Africa is in a crisis, an immense one, has so far been kept successfully away from the public’s eyes by the pro-Ramaphosa media and of course Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidential rhetoric, echoing the political style of the telling stories as does Nicolás Maduro. Also the use of the word prosperity has become something of a “hate-speech utterance”. But prosperity, crisis and despondency are tripartite partners. They need to be brought into the present-day context of our economy.

Khumalo23, in a broader context, relates the present lack of true prosperity directly to the existence of a comprehensive crisis created by the ANC, as was done by the regimes of Chávez and Madura in Venezuela, which has spread its tentacles since 1994 out to all levels of the South African people. Khumalo writes23:2:

For far too long we have been in denial about the nature of the crisis. The cosmetic changes implemented — a job summit, adding the word “employment” to the ministry of labour — have done little to address the structural issues underpinning our stagnant economy. In the deliberation phase, the nation at large needs to acknowledge that the prevailing paradigms under which such contraventions have been contained — primarily the tense alliance between business, labour and the state — are no longer fit for purpose.

The future cruel socio-economics and politics awaiting South Africa, possibly in the short time of three years, as stated euphemistically by Khumalo23 above, can be read in the political analyst and investigative journalist, Qaanitah Hunter’s50 in-depth article: “Searching for the real Venezuela”, published in the Sunday Times on 1 September 2019 after her visit to the country. Parts of her informative writing and observations are reflected underneath. She writes50:11:

I travelled to Venezuela on a whim last month, prompted by curiosity to see what has been touted by ANC and the EFF as a blueprint for what SA could become.

In SA, the Venezuelan model has been romanticised and vilified in equal measure.

…when I landed at Simón Bolivar International Airport, with its exposed vents and dour concrete, the words of Bonani Bongo ringing in my head. Bongo, an ANC MP, led the party’s fact-finding delegation to Venezuela, and returned with a statement that the country’s problems were caused by “Western imperialism”.

It was important to me not to be swayed by any argument for or against the socialist regime, to fairly observe the reality of life for ordinary people, and to avoid politics althogether,

On my first day in Caracas I understood the appeal. The model of socialism espoused by President  Nicolás Maduro is enormously seductive to someone from a country with a wealth gap such as ours.

On paper at least, there is universal equality, free electricity, housing, water. Health care and education, plus a box of free groceries per household each month. There is also a national minimum wage.

But as one drives out of the capital in the direction of real life in the country, the paper crumbles.

The free electricity comes from derelict generation infrastructure and the country’s grid hangs by a thread. Power outrages last between three and 10 hours. When the free electricity is out, so is the free water. Locals are disparaging about the free education, and some corrupt officials now sell the state-supplied groceries, that should be free, at a premium price — which those on the minimum wage cannot afford. The free health facilities have barely any medicines.

With nothing to sell, many stores were simply shut. Others had two aisles stocked with whatever items – from toilet paper to maize –they had managed to import.

Large department stores, however, were full of Turkish-made snacks and Chinese-made clothes. Shoppers told me that the situation was far better than it had been all year – at one store a 2l bottle of Coke cost $8 (R121) — but still the shelves were bare.

We stopped at a well-stocked convenience store just outside Caracas where more than half the items cost more than the national minimum wage.

A box of digestive biscuits cost the equivalent of about R45 – which is the weekly wage. This was probably why two armed soldiers stood guard over the “luxury” items, which in Venezuela are Coke and ice-cream.

Hearing analysts speak on international news channels about the hyperinflation (80, 000% in 2018) is something entirely different to actually seeing how a sliced bread and fresh milk are luxuries most Venezuelans could not dream of buying.

Butter, for example, is such a prized commodity that one can only physically handle it once one has paid for it. The caps on each bottle of fruit juice are fitted with a lock that can be opened only once the item has been bought.

The national conversation is dominated by how great things used to be, and how bad they now are. People I met asked if they could travel back with me to SA. Warned about crime, they said they would manage it — and they were only half joking.

For those Venezuelans who can afford to buy basic foodstuffs, chances are they will not have the physical cash to do so.

Because the country cannot afford to print its own banknotes, they are now a commodity on their own. In the cities, coffee shops accept bitcoin and other crypto currencies as payment, while informal traders rely on mobile money apps because cash is increasingly scarce.

Also, the social dream is now being eroded by corruption, which is evident almost everywhere.

There e-tolls don’t work — the toll booths are abandoned because nobody has the money to pay. The roads, however, are hardy worth paying for. Instead of potholes they have pot craters.

But the roads traverse a magnificent country, which just over a decade ago was the richest in Latin America, thanks to its massive oil reserves. Now it appears to be on the brink of ruin, thanks to bad politics.

In 2016, ANC policy guru Joel Netshitenzhe, when reflecting on state capture in SA  and comparing it with Latin America, said opportunists simply seize openings created by bad governments.

After 10 days in Venezuela, I now better understand the appeal for the ANC and the EFF. The state has a firm grip on all facets of its people’s lives – from where they live and what they eat to how much they earn.

Venezuela’s socialist model requires a utopia to work. We adopt it at our peril.

I said above that the Venezuela model might only reach us in three years; I was over-optimistic. Looking at the 30 million of our population trapped in poverty — nearly 20 million living on social grants, more than 10 million official jobless, 7,8 million South Africans caught in a debt trap of R225 billion of loans without collateral, our huge and ongoing crime wave, corruption and state capture, and most of all, our enormous inequality, making it well-nigh impossible for the mass of unemployed and poor in the shanty towns and other informal settlements, to merely buy their daily bread, get basic education and basic healthcare and survive — Venezuela is already inside our psyche, our children, our homes and our futures. Is it wrong to replace in Hunter’s article the name Venezuela with South Africa, Caracas with Cape Town and Johannesburg, President Nicolás Maduro with President Cyril Ramaphosa, and socialism with Marxist-Leninist radicalism, to make Hunter’s article applicable to describing present-day South Africa?50,58

3.3.1.9. Zimbabwe in perspective

If Endres’s57 warning of a possible “Venezuelan South Africa” is not enough, it is also important to note the editorial in the City Press of 23rd June 2019, describing the present economic chaos in Zimbabwe. A country devastated economically by the actions of a madman in the mold of Nicolás Maduro, the despotic Robert Mugabe, who was recently given a hero’s tribute by both Thabo Mkbeki and Cyril Ramaphosa at his funeral in September 2019. This tribute reminds us of the many hero’s tributes to the despotic and failed Hugo Chávez of Venezuela at his funeral in 2013.50,57

Speaking volums on the present chaotic Zimbabwean finances and the ongoing seizure of the country by means of corruption, theft, mismanaging and human-rights violations since Uhuru (which includes land and other assets grabbed from Whites), is the current Zimbabwean president’s confession in June 2019 when he said59:3: “I’ve been in government for 38 years as minister and I can’t remember when you ever had a budget surplus”.

Notwithstanding the financial and political mess create by the Mugabe-Mnangagwa regimes themselves, created over decades, the Mnangagwa-regime still shamelessly harbours the opportunistic hope to obtain financing in 2019/2020 from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They even hope for a Eurobond offering to service their state debt and to restart their struggling economy. But, it must be noted that most of these moneys intended to be borrowed is not going for the development of a post-2019 Zimbabwe, but mostly for bridge financing to clear about $1,2-billion (R17,2-billion) of arrears to the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the European Investment Bank. In addition, the Mnangagwa regime is still thinking up plans to restructure debt owed to bilateral creditors! All this money that the Mnangagwa regime wants to borrow must again be paid back, while the country in the meantime should be running, forget about development!59

How little insight and understanding the current Mnangagwa regime have of applicable and sound state economics and proper financial, social and political management of their country, is well reflected by the Mnangagwa regime’s minister of finance, Mthuli Ncube59. His ignorance for instance of the seriousness of IMF finance, especially IMF debt responsibility,  the political, social and economic empowerment of citizens applicable to IMF loans, the strict IMF debt/funding programme which entails the monitoring of government economic progress, etc., are cast to the winds when he says59:3: “Why not? We can only ask, they can only say no. But if we can get funding from the IMF, that would be fantastic. Just additional support on our balance-of-payments position”.  [Sounds very much in line with the economic thinking of the ANC-regime!]

If South Africans are worrying of a Venezuela to come to its shores, it must worrying far more of a Zimbabwe in waiting, especially the Whites: the land and asset grabbing in Zimbabwe under mad Mugabe is a blueprint for land and asset grabbing here. Radical Economical Transformation (RET) is still a temptation for some insanely radical politicians here.

3.3.1.10. Ramaphosa’s economic saviour-partners

It is would be a mistake to ascribe the Ramaphoria which grabbed South Africans after December 2017 — and which was maintained for some time by Cyril Ramaphosa’s promised New Dawn to bring a mass of Christmas goodies — to the person of Ramaphosa as the saviour of South Africa alone. Two other saviours are central to Ramaphosa’s political power and his ability so far to survive the infighting within the greater ANC: Tito Mboweni and Pravin Gordhan. Without his partners’ upport and controversial manoeuvring around the finances and economics of the country, Ramaphosa would have been unseated long ago. Their actions and roles in the present-day politics of the ANC, especially in the demanding in-fights around the Marxist-Leninist economic policy of the ANC, must shortly be commented on.99,20-26

Tito Mboweni

It is important to note the role of Tito Mboweni in our catastrophic economy; a person who is seen and lionised, together with Pravin Gordhan, by the pro-Ramaphosa media and a sector of the White capitalists, as the economic saviour of South Africa. What is at stake is Tito Mboweni and the National Treasury’s so-called “dramatic” proposal of privatisation with their discussion paper entitled: “Economic transformation, inclusive growth and competitiveness: Towards an economic strategy for SA” which is presented by the pro-Ramaphosa faction as a new guideline on future economic development, starting privatisation of state assets and the introduction of private capital into our state-run enterprises. The Mboweni plan is presented as a drastic changer of our future economics. The reality, like most of the ANC’s misleading plans and schemes, reveals a continuation of the Marxist-Leninist economic model wherein the rights of the members of the radical trade unions occupy a central position. The document is nothing else than an effort to revive the failed economic idea of Thabo Mbeki in the 2000s, which had fizzled out at the time because it lacked constructive plans to steer the economy into growth. The Plan was strongly criticised by an important sector of the business community as incapable of creating economic reform, on the hand. On the other hand, the Plan was criticised by Cosatu and the SACP for its lack of kick-starting the economy by means a radical, revolutionary approach. Essentially the Mboweni plan may be described as “an incoherent, ill-thought out and ultimately chaotic intervention”, should it be implemented. Speckman refers to its poor business and political intentions as another “jaws drop” of the Ramaphosa regime.60

Gumede65 describes the “intentions” of the so-ccalled “Mboweni plan” as inappropriate “grand economic experiments”. It is clear that the ANC regime, with this Plan, is again avoiding “real politics”, such as the scrapping of BEE, the stopping of support for dictators in Africa, the blind partnering with China, as well as effecting constructive interventions in curtailing corruption, etc. Instead the plan clings to strategies focussing on so-called “politically easier issues” and thus maintenance the status quo of the ANC’s already failed political and economic policies within its Marxist-Leninist politics. Central to the Plan is keeping the peace with the political radicals, Cosatu and the SACP that are threatening to bring the ANC regime down if the ANC had to introduce any structural capitalism. In practice the plan is a window-dressing exercise in the hope of attracting especially foreign investors and to keep Moody’s and other ratings agencies from demolishing the international economic status of the country. The Plan will  make no difference to our economy, besides temporarily freeing the ANC government from the immense pressure to immediately reform its economic policy by the political opposition, the ordinary public and the greater business community to.61-66

The above outcome in the ANC’s economics is exactly what Khumalo23:2 called “cosmetic changes implemented”. Political opportunism and a misled public, well anchored in a plan that does not address the structural failures underpinning our stagnant economy.23

The foolish element in the Mboweni plan, initiated by the Ramaphosa regime, is further pointed out by Duma Gqubule60, director at the Centre for Economic Development and Transformation, when he said that the even if the privatisation of Eskom realised, it was not going to immediately wipe out its R450 billion debt which is currently smothering the economy, while the whole process of privatising Eskom is not a “one-day clean-up”. It can stretch up to 15 years of direct/indirect involvement of the state at a very high cost. Neither is the Plan’s broader intention to create a total of 142 000 jobs in three years (basically unattainable within the present GDP growth of 0,8% a year). Secondly, the whole Plan’s contribution to job creation is nullified because the demands from the job market is too high in the light of the fact that every year the number of job-seekers are growing by 700 000, leaving in three years a labour force of 2 million looking for work (versus the theoretical growth of a total of 142 000 jobs).  Elsewhere Ted Blom60, an energy analyst, has showed that the Plan is marred by some serious errors and assumptions.

Gqubule60 comments on the confusion created by the Mboweni plan and its so-called “correction” of the economy, bringing us back to political reality when he writes60:4:

But to be frank, I don’t think it’s going to happen. What I heard is that nobody has heard about this report. He [Mboweni] dropped it out of the blue like a record, like a new release. Like Beyoncé.

This is a free marketer’s wet dream. It’s just unbelievable. This is definitely the National Development Plan repackaged in a new bottle.

Pravin Gordhan

On the other economic saviour of the Ramaphosa regime, namely Pravin Gordhan, it is important to note how GDP contracted by 3,2% under his oversight. It confirms how much the country’s economy is already in decline, notwithstanding Ramahosa’s stimulation package in September 2019 of R50 billion and the decade of other comprehensive stimulatory spending by the ANC regime since 2008. But it also reflects back on the much-praised “extraordinary” abilities of the Ramaphosa regime’s cabinet. In this context Mpiyakhe Dhlamini10 lays this economic decline over a decade at the door of Pravin Gordhan. Dhlamini10 points out that under Gordhan’s economic stewardship, bankruptcies, liquidations and joblessness are escalating, while exports have shrunk by 26,4% and fixed capital formation declined by 4,5%. On the ongoing chaos within the economy, predominant under the ANC regime of Jacob Zuma and now repeated under the Ramaphosa regime, Dhlamini writes10:4:

Suid-Afrika ly op die oomblik onder die gevolge van vrot regeringsbesluite. Suid-Afrika het nog nie herstel van die resessie van 2009 nie.

Dhlamini10 considers the instability around South Africa’s current economic failures, that may be traced back to 2009, and blames the Ramaphosa regime’s present inner circle when he writes10:4:

Gordhan, toe minister van finansies, het ons toe geneem op ‘n pad wat daartoe gelei het dat regeringskuld toegeneem het van 22.6% van die BBP tot die huidige 55.6%. Pleks daarvan om die ekonomie te beskerm teen die ‘nege vermorste jare’ het die plunder en ekonomiese stagnasie onder dié minister se neus gebeur, en10:4: Nou asof dit nie erg genoeg is nie, is daar steeds geen tekens van hervormings nie. Die regering bly verbind tot beleid soos onteiening sonder vergoeding in ‘n omgewing waar private beleggings reeds daal.

Zille further high-lights the role of Gordhan in the country’s chaotic economics and ascribes the reason for the absence of prosperity in today’s South Africa to the unavoidable devastation of our economy in future because the ANC’s various disciples will maintain their Marxist-Leninist ideology under its politburo throughout Ramaphosa’s term in office. Zille67 hits the nail on the head when she writes67:7:

Tog het een van ons slimste politici, Pravin Gordhan, die man wat (saam met Ramaphosa) geskilder word as die een wat die land moet red van die magte van duisternis, so onlangs soos verlede week nog sy verbintenis tot die ondersteuning, konsolidering tot die ondersteuning en selfs die uitbreiding van staats beheerde ondernemings bevestig – om in die proses die “tweede fase van radikale sosio-ekonomiese transformasie” te bevorder.

Dit is ‘n duidelike onderskrywing van die doelwitte van die NDR [Nasionale Demokratiese Revolusie].

Solank as wat mense glo dat ons die toekoms van Suid-Afrika sal verseker indien die “goeie ouens” (soos Ramaphosa en Gordhan) die stryd om die siel van die ANC wen , so lank sal ons ‘n land bly wat langsaam misluk.

Die “goeie ouens” is ongetwyfeld minder korrup as die res. Maar dit maak nie die ANC se beleidsraamwerk voordelig of implementeerdbaar nie.

3.3.1.11. ANC’s infighting

The infighting in the greater ANC and between the regime’s leaders, especially their many hostile and contradictory messages, including their open opposition to each other, is seen by many economists as one of the main reasons why the economy has gone into a tail-spin since pre-June 2019. The infighting may have contributed to the GDP’s contraction, by 3,2%. This contraction was the biggest decline in 10 years and is raising the fear of a recession, already in 2019. The political and economic confusion characterising the regime’s policy declarations and executions seem to be created by Luthuli House’s various factions, as well by the leadership of the various ministries within the Ramaphosa regime. This governmental tumult we see, as with the recent announcement of the Mboweni plan, jeopardises the decision-making privileges and independent functioning of the different governmental ministries and sectors. Internally, on a high level, it is seen and experienced as the open sabotage of other governmental institutions’ aims, intentions and planning.9,20-26,63,66

The conflict within the ANC’s top leadership about which faction is to steer the regime and who is the paramount leader (a struggle in which Ramaphosa and Magashule are the central figures) is counterproductive. It is hobbling the South African economy and is also seriously obstructing the proper functioning of the government of the day with often deliberately different and contradictory policies and declarations. From a general point of view, the ordinary citizen discerns an outright lack of sincerity inside the ANC elite when it comes to fixing the impaired and malfunctioning state-owned enterprises or efforts to get the country and its economy functioning.9,20-26

Possibly the economist Iraj Abedian25 tries to tell us something when he states25:5:

SA seems to have moved from policy paralysis to policy sabotage. This is the surest way to push the economy into a prolonged recession. The country has to have one centre of policy-making. A governing party can’t contradict its own government.

How far down the road the ANC as an assumed 100% party and a 100% regime is in October 2019, is well summarised by Malala68, in his perspective on the present-day ANC and its leadership, when he writes68:21: “I believe Ramaphosa and his team have a 55% chance of succeeding and turning the country’s fortunes around”. On the chronic illness of infighting in the greater ANC, but specifically between Ramaphosa and Magashule for the paramount-chief post, Malala responds68:21:

It’s the areas of politics and economics that seem to have led to total despondency. As the leaders continue to tear at each others’ throats for power and pull in different directions on economic policy, many have wondered who, in fact, is driving this thing called SA. Is it Ramaphosa or is it the dreaded Ace Magashule of the Free State? Ramaphosa has seemed eager to please his comrades, allowing Magashule to pronounce naively on everything from quantitative easing [nationalising] (a subject he knows nothing about) to who should be running the country (a subject he knows nothing about).

Ramaphosa has let the insults and acts of insubordination slide. That has consequences: everyone is left wondering who, exactly, is driving this thing. Their confidence dwindles when they realise that it is not: “Safe Pair of Hands” Ramaphosa, but “What’s My Cut” Magashule.

The extent of damage to the economy by an unorganised and poorly unified party, is leading to an image of South Africa in the eyes of the public and of the world with a stigma attached, that of a country characterised by poor political and economic integrity. More precisely, it is pictured as a country with a seemingly disturbed political mindset, clouded by confusion and disorientation: a regime not always accountable for his actions.25,63,66

Khumalo23, like Abedian25, describes the dysfunctional and unconstructive ANC leadership as “engaged in a chaotic civil war”. Their internecine struggles have undoubtedly caused the ANC regime’s failure to come to terms with its own political traumas and crises, and thus its inability to put the party on the road with a map again to bring prosperity for South Africans. The party’s paralysis is an outcome of the present unstoppable infighting around the leadership and power between Ramaphosa and Magashule. The two are caught inside the party’s democratic-centralism and its Marxist-Leninist ideology (a political setup that many people seemingly either do not understand or is unfamiliar with). Khumalo23 reflects in some way on the role of this ANC substrate as follows23:2:

SA has found itself plunged into a chaotic civil war involving economics, statistics and politics. But rather than adopting a line of march aimed at assuring citizens that there is indeed an understanding of the issues, the government plunged itself into a civil war reminiscent of the ANC’s factional battles of 2017 when secretary-general Ace Magashule said an ANC lekgotla had resolved to nationalise the Reserve Bank, amend its mandate and initiate steps towards exploring quantitative easing.

For Cyril Ramaphosa, the problem is that he derives his political legitimacy from the ANC itself, so its resolutions – however impractical they may turn out to be – are regarded as key performance indicators by the party. Unilaterally disowning them is not on the cards for him.

This dilemma has led to a paralysis where his voice been absent from the discourse. The vacuum was filled by market speculation, incoherent press releases and contradictory tweets.

Derby22 pertinently describes, in terms of a retrospective analysis, the present politico-economic mess of the country under the ANC regime as an old, ongoing strife to preserve Marxist-Leninist politics as a22:8: “circus run by their political class in search of the enigma of radical economic transformation”. But in this case it means precisely the ugly face of Marxist-Leninist politics: the execution of radicalism in all the spheres of socio-economic, political and personal life, which is of course beginning to manifest itself more and more clearly in the ANC’s thinking, planning and actions since December 2017.22

In this respect, the editor21 of the Sunday Times, on their foolish destruction of prosperity by the ANC top brass, describes them more elegantly as21:18: “…financially ignorant power-players”.

The above “financial ignorance” referred to by the editor21 of the Sunday Times is undoubtedly the behaviour, mostly exemplified by irrational plans and actions,  by the different ANC top leaders in their various self-centred economic power-plays, lacking knowledge of what is going on at grassroots level, meaning how the ordinary South African perceives and thinks of the ANC’s leadership. Prominent is here, in response the growing unrest of the Black masses, the recent  confession by Magashule of his own ignorance — and that of Ramaphosa and his regime — of what is going on at grassroot levels, when he says24:11: “These latest events underline the need for a government that is in touch with the people and responsive to their needs”. 

The immense failures of the ANC so far to serve  the people and their inability to make specific or general constructive corrections, seems to be catching up with the ANC after their 25 years of delinquent government of the people. Some of the ANC elite seems be grasping the reality, at last. There is no doubt that the revolutionary ANC, since its enthronement by the National Party (NP) and the international world as the sole ruler of South Africa, has never, similarly to the politburos of communist and delinquently socialist regimes in the Soviet Union, Cuba, Venezuela, etc., been really in touch with the mass of poor, landless Blacks. The ANC and its elite have been glorified since 1994 by the mass of poor Blacks South Africans as their saviours, primarily because they “were of us” and were against Apartheid, but not for what they truly did for the poor.  It is with honesty that the editor of the Sunday Times, together with Munusamy24, De Lange43 and Strydom46, can describe the ANC regime as a so-called “less successfull government”. The so-called “good” government of which Magashule above is speaking and dreaming of, can surely not be the ANC’s Ramaphosa regime!21,22,24,43,46

The hanky-panky in the present-day ANC is part of an ongoing, paralysing internecine conflict to crown a skilled Marxist-Leninist next year at the ANC’s national general council as paramount chief. Until then the country’s economy, as in the past 25 years, does not really count.

3.3.1.12. The IMF and Nationalisation

Notwithstanding the many indicators bearing out poor economics and politics, some financial analysts argue that an IMF bailout for South Africa is not needed or wise at this stage. For them, excluding the country from a place in the IMF basket is based on the recruiting of foreign investors, growing exports and the fact that South Africa’s balance of payments risk is safeguarded by its effective management of its balance of payments risk, which is buttressed by its $41 billion in foreign-currency reserves held by the South African Reserve Bank (which is equivalent to 5,8 months’ import coverage).19,69-74

It is important to remember that the ANC under Ramaphosa is desperate for money: preferably easy money without a risk of repayment if their “business” ventures go wrong (which has usually happened in the ANC regime’s history).  In this risk-taking to lend money to the ANC regime it is important to remember that an estimated R1 trillion from South African banks is already exposed to South African state entities and the public sector.72,75-81

The constant threat of the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank and other public and private assets, together with the country’s immensely growing debt and failed SOEs such as Eskom, SAA, SABC, DENEL, stagnant manufacturing and production, collapsing municipalities, a downturn in the world economy and an aversion by the West of the ANC’s politics, are increasingly undermining broad support here. Our constantly worsening governance, etc., can change the situation overnight for the worse. The loud drumming by a strong sector in the ANC who are hanging on to its Marxist-Leninist ideology as the only and primary economic solution for a future South Africa, together with the even louder revolutionary politics of the ANC tripartite alliance’s two partners, the SACP and Cosatu, has already shifted the country into an unreliable political state with an even more unreliable economico-political model.  The country’s post-1994 economics looks more and more gloomy, leaving a very, very small window open to escape International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance, however much the pro-ANC and Ramaphosa prophets try to predict that such intervention would never occur.19,69-74

On the potential ending of the ANC’s much-heard “political music” (although the pro-Ramaphosas ignore the stuporous sounds and preach daily that South Africa is in a “perfect economic condition” and thus does not need IMF or any other intervention in the near future), Leon27 quotes Pieter du Toit27 who mentioned that Johann Rupert had said that South Africa would soon be knocking at the door of the IMF for a bailout, most likely within a year. (About the decline of the country, it is interesting to mention that Rupert recently said that all his children had already left the country because of its instability).  Efforts to discredit Rupert by some of the pro-Ramaphosa elements in the media about his warning, did not work. What it indeed confirms, is how strongly the pro-Ramaphosa clan has penetrated the media (as most communists, masked as “good” or as so-called “democratic socialists”, have done over the years) in their propaganda to falsely tell South Africans that their country’s dying economy is healthy. Indeed, it seems as if some of these pro-Ramphosas successfully mesmerised themselves to believe their own lies.27,42,74,82,83

To state that South Africa is far from IMF intervention and does not need it, is seen more and more as  part of the Ramamaphosa camp’s use of populism to obscure the reality. All the signs are there that the ANC regime will be forced within a year or three, if the economy continues to worsen, to knock on the doors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for structural-adjustment programmes. Although some economists believe the IMF can bring intense socio-economic constraints for the citizens, other economists see such an intervention as a saving grace which should happen as soon as possible. All that can keep the IMF away is how easily the Ramaphosa clan can loot the private and public pension funds.72,84

The Reserve Bank governor, Lesetja Kganyago72, described in August 2019 the intervention impact of the IMF well when he said72:3: “The IMF is so terrible. They give the patient such terrible medication that the patient dies. Only if the patient ate the vegetables, they wouldn’t need to take the medication”.

The ANC, as a revolutionary regime, does clearly not want to eat the IMF vegetables nor drink the terrible IMF medicine. They are looking for soft, easy money targets to defraud the owners. As soft targets — as a new form of state and private capture — the private and public pensions are ideal (to cure their failed SOEs and other financial disasters) instead of going for a strict IMF intervention and the IMF’s constructive control of the Ramaphosa regime’s socio-economics. (It must be noted that the assets of public pension funds in South Africa amount to about R4,2 trillion with 40% of that belonging to the GEPF. In total there is more or less R6 trillion controlled by private and public assets managers).71,75,77-81

The real plan already being prepared by the Ramaphosa regime is to expropriate in some way the R6 trillion of pensions, as was recently clearly indicated by Enoch Godongwa72, the head of the ANC’s economic transformation subcommittee, when he said the asset management industry (which includes pension funds, insurers and other investors) is sitting on R6-trillion and72:3: “…should lend some of this to the state”. What the word “lend” means in the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist politics is only one thing: grabbing without compensation. This delinquent intention of the ANC is  making even the radical Cosatu worried about its own members’ pensions. It was with good reason that Cosatu reacted as follows72:3: “What we want to see is assurance that the money is going to be used for its intended purposes and not corruption, and there will be guaranteed returns”. For the critical political analyst it is a clear case of money never to be paid back as has happened with the millions and millions of rand stolen during the state capture by the ANC elite and their intimate cronies.

Kgosana and Speckman72, alert us to the reality of the ANC’s immediate intention to “overpower” the R6-trillion in the very near future, when they write72:3:

The ANC’s economic policy guru [Godongwa] has reiterated the party’s desire for the government to raid private and public pension funds to raise money to rescue ailing state-owned enterprises  (SOEs) and meet its obligations.

Quoting further Godongwa72, they write72:3:

Why would you go to the IMF and the World Bank and go and raise money when we have sufficient savings in the economy which you can borrow, probably far cheaper, and probably with little exchange rate risk?

Bruce61, in his sometimes practical and simple approaches to serious matters related to the ANC-regime’s delinquent activities and unpredictability, steers us to the “large black hole” of debt that is (hopefully) worrying the ANC regime daily and which makes the prospect of gobbling up both private and public pension funds all the more appealing when he compares interest on state debt to monthly payments on a car61:14:

Every day, officials at the National Treasury have to find around R1bn to repay the interest on our national debt. If it ever happened one day that they couldn’t manage, then we would be, as a country, what you and I would be if we missed a car payment. Buggered.

So while Treasury boffins are busy making sure policemen, teachers and nurses get paid every month by the broken government departments they work for, it’d  be pretty normal for them to wonder why this all has to be so difficult.

De Lange77:4 reports that prescriptions on asset allocation usually come in when something is not working in the economy of a country: in South Africa it is essentially the failed economic policy of the ANC which is causing chaos and therefore the main reason for a further misuse of the tax-payers’ money by imposing prescribed assets (to stave off IMF intervention for a while). The looting of the prescribed assets is unlikely to boost the economy in the long term. But one thing is clear: after the pensions are gobbled up in three years’ time, what other money will be left as cash heist for the Ramaphosa regime to balance its daily budget? Nothing will be left by an Eskom, an SABC and an SAA far down in a large black hole. Can this be prosperity?

Andrew Canter72, the CIO of Future Growth Asset Management, points out that there is only one solution for the ANC regime’s failed economical management since 1994 (a system which pension grabbing and nationalisation cannot solve)72:3:

“There is no magic bullet with prescription, there is no magic bullet with the IMF, there is no magic bullet from anywhere except to run the government better”.

3.3.1.13. Bad Donald Trump and bad USA

The foolishness of Ramaphosa’s Third Sona not only echoed his lack know-how when it comes to constructive political thinking, planning and action to bring economic and political solutions to a country still mired in the “bad” ANC’s politics of the past, but also demonstrated his many shortcomings as a supposed executive leader. This is well borne out by the controversial policy on international relations he has adopted and practices blindly. One issue that stands out is his inability to solve xenophobia inside the country as well as outside our borders. As in many African countries marred by a revolutionary government, he terminated any prospects to create prosperity for present-day South Africa.

His approach to our relations with the USA can only be described as a major mistake, exemplified by his gratuitous criticism levelled against Donald Trump and his Administration for their stance and handling of the USA-China-Huawei matter.24,85-88

This curious international political stumbling by Ramaphosa persuaded Douglas Gibson85, the veteran politician, to write85:6:

Has President Cyril Ramaphosa been studying at the Zindzi Mandela School of Diplomacy?

His recent gratuitous insults to the US and his sucking up to China makes no sense against the background of his overriding aim of the New Dawn: focusing on the economy, attracting foreign direct investment, fostering growth and thus creating jobs for our unemployed millions.

Ramaphosa seems to display gross ignorance of diplomacy, given that he twice confusedly made statements at a world forum that: 1) “…the US is jealous that a Chinese company called Huawei has outstripped it when it comes to 5G technology” (G20 Summit), and: 2) “… the US has been unable to imagine a better future which goes beyond 4-plus-1G (referring to 5G connectivity) at the 4IR-conference. Besides his ostensible lack of an understanding of possible communication manipulation and espionage by China via Huawei, he does not take into account the profound and hidden struggle for hegemony as the USA and China compete for power. He missed out on the benefits of being good friends with both.85-90

However much some pro-Ramaphosa economists try to minimise the impact of such statements with counter-arguments, e.g. that the AGOA agreement has been by untouched by Ramaphosa’s negative rhetoric, the future outcomes of Ramaphosa’s verbal attacks on the USA will only be learnt in time. Other arguments in support of Ramaphosa’s clumsy rhetoric have been advanced, such as88:1: “China’s economy is forecast to surpass the USA in size and that the Chinese are probably more committed in terms of investing in South Africa than the USA”, but are unrelated to the matter. Those are purely political and opportunistic postulations as to a situation far away in the future. The Chinese, on the contrary, have already shown caution regarding South Africa’s unstable politics. In addition, China is an astute investor in Africa, making sure that its own interests in obtaining raw materials are placed first, so that many African countries have already become disillusioned with apparent Chinese largesse when it comes to investments.85-88

Gibson and other political commentators show precisely how Ramaphosa (undoubtedly noticed too by his loyal and pro-Chinese economists in the media and in politics) is committing a major error in selecting the correct country as a future partner to improve our economy (and is making a fool of himself in the Western countries’ eyes). The fact that must basically only count in the making and the upkeep of international relationships, is the trade amount between countries. Data show out that the total RSA-USA-trade for 2018 was as much as $18,9 billion, while between January and October 2018 South Africa had a favourable trade surplus of around R7,9 billion with the USA. This means we sold more to them than they did to us. During the same period South Africa had a hugely unfavourable trade deficit of R96,85-billion with China, meaning we bought far more from China than that they bought from us. Regarding investments in South Africa, the fact is that American investmens in South Africa total R129 billion as against China’s R89,9-billion.86-89

Ramaphosa’s rash attack on the USA forced Gibson85 to put forward the question85:6: “Is there a benefit, other than the ideological satisfaction of poking Trump in the eye?” Thankfully the seasoned politician Gibson, in enlightening us on Ramaphosa’s behaviour, supplies us with a good answer85:6: “But then, there is scarcely a dictator in the world for whom the government does not have a warm feeling and scarcely a democratic Western country that the ANC really like.” The ANC regime’s intimate association with BRICS confirms Gibson’s statement.85

The editor91 of the Sunday Times of 7 June 2019, seemingly also perplexed about Ramaphosa’s rhetoric, asks91:16:

One wonders about the game Ramaphosa is playing, given that the US remains a significant trading partner with SA. Also curious is the extent to which Ramaphosa seemed to be at odds with his own trade & industry minister, Ebrahim Patel  who seems to have adopted a more cautious and even-handed approach in juggling SA’s relations with the worlds two economic superpowers.

Thankfully it seems as if Ramaphosa’s Minister Patel has some political tact and diplomacy, and most of all economic knowhow and political intelligence, when he said that South Africa needed every partner in the world in order to deal with our many economic ills like joblessness.91 Also Ramaphosa’s special envoy to attract foreign investments, Phumzile Langeni87, shows excellent economic skills in circumlocuting Ramaphosa’s mumble when he said that South Africa was continuing to court the USA aggressively.

What Ramaphosa further overlooked in his attack on Donald Trump and the USA, are the benefits that the current African Growth and Opportunity Act (ACOA) of the USA, bring to South Africa. It is indeed a lifeline for South Africa. Any negative political signals to the USA could and would trigger negative actions, which could be devastating for many of our sectors that are benefitting under AGOA. It can bring serious socio-economical consequences. Although AGOA expires in 2025, it does not mean that the Trump-administration, in its growing protectionist stance and isolation of hostile countries, cannot act immediately against hard-line culprits. It must be noted that SA’s exports in industry and agricultural produce to the US have increased threefold since the implementation of AGOA in 2000. It seems to have passed Ramaphosa by that South Africa’s wine-exporting industry, which is totally intertwined with our tourist industry, has enjoyed the largest export growth to the USA under AGOA. Last year AGOA is estimated to have directly contributed up to R32,7 billion of our GDP and that as many as 310 000 jobs of mostly unskilled and semi-skilled workers are dependent of it. The 2018 biennial report on the AGOA implementation shows that the treaty is in our favour, such as the export of transportation equipment to the US which rose from $76 miillion (R1,12-billion at today’s rate)  in 2001 to $1,3-billion in 2017 while it added more than 30 000 jobs here.

Regarding China, Wandile Sihloho, head of agribusiness research at the Agricultural Business Camber of SA, said that South Africa was indeed a small player in Chinese agricultural exports. Our exports, standing at R9,5-billion, was only a 0,5% share of the value of Chinese agricultural imports in 2018. Chances are also slim that our agricultural exports would be increased to China in the near future. In the absence of AGOA or any other agreement, South Africa’s exports would face reciprocal tariffs in the USA as laid down by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the form of Most Favoured Nation tariffs, warned Professor Nhlanhla Mbatha of Unisa’s Graduate School of Business Leadership.86-88,91

It must thus be noted, with specific reference to Ramaphosa’s attacks on the USA’s policies, both in his personal and public capacity as state president, that AGOA’s benefits and outcomes depend almost entirely on decisions of the USA and that it could be quickly reviewed following on his anti-American rhetoric. Indeed, there has recently been a review of the USA’s African development programme after questions were raised on hostile countries active inside it. The following sub-Saharan African countries do not currently benefit from AGOA: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea (graduated from GSP), Eritrea, Mauritania, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Although Ramaphosa’s term as President may be short-lived, the loss of AGOA’s benefits to South Africa before 2025 could be devastating, as many of the ANC regime’s other foolish actions since 1994 had brought devastating outcomes.86,91

Although it is speculated that the egregious anti-American rhetoric by Ramaphosa will not affect the AGOA agreement and that the September 2019 so-called “draft plan between South Africa and the US to develop Ramaphosa’s so-called vision” will assure fruits in terms of AGOA and the US’s new Prosper Africa initiative, only time will show. The statement, as formulated by South Africa and the US after they held their tenth annual bilateral forum (ABF) in September, ran as follows92:6: “Both sides agreed to continue to nurture the relationship.” Such a terse statement is far from a declaration of sincere brotherhood and trust and an agreement of sole cooperation without making the Chinese a third bed-fellow for the ANC in this already “unhappy” relationship.92 Neither does there seem to be any sense in the pro-Ramaphosas’ argument that China was more important than the USA to South Africa because “China’s economy is forecast to surpass the USA in size and that the Chinese are probably more committed in terms of investing in South Africa than the USA”. This Ramaphosa assessment lacks soundness and can come at a price for South Africa.88

The short-sightedness of the Ramaphosa regime flows from its lack of sound business principles. But it goes deeper: It reflects an insidious brotherhood with China and revolutionary countries which has poisoned its economic thinking. Moreover, increasingly present in the ANC regime’s mindset is a hostile anti-Western stance. Its lack of influence within countries that form part of the Western sphere of influence is already reflected by the Ramaphosa regime’s less than successful effort in 2018 to secure $100 million of investments without strict conditions for South Africa in the Middle East, in countries such as Abu Dhabi, the United Emirates, etc., that are all pro-Western and pro-American.44

The billionaire Johann Rupert44, quoted by Pieter du Toit44, author of the book entitled “The Stellenbosch Mafia: Inside the Billionaire’s Club”, has some incisive opinions on the stubborn folly and revolutionary thinking of the ANC’s top brass, stretching back 107 years, which had not only led to their failed $100-million call for “good” investments in 2018, but reflects a financial-investment failure continuing to this day. Rupert states44:4-5:

Wat die Suid-Afrikaners nie verstaan het op hul beleggingstoer na die Golf nie, is dat Ramaphosa se regering sal sukkel om vriende te maak met die VAE en Saoedi-Arabië as hulle voortgaan om die VSA, Brittanje en Israel swart te smeer.

Sonder die VSA se beskerming is die VAE niks nie. Hulle weet dit. So werk hulle saam met Saoedi-Arabië, Israel en die VSA teen Iran.

En nou kom ons, hoed in die hand, om geld by hulle te vra, terwyl ons die VSA en Brittanje soos vuilgoed behandel?

The Chinese, on the contrary, already show signs of reaching saturation point with South Africa’s unstable politics, labour unrest and violent protests. As alluded to above, China is usually the winner when it comes to its investments in Africa, and not the African states where those investments take place.

Ramaphosa continues to side with the BRICS countries (as Jacob Zuma did), which may in the end cost the country dearly. Ramaphosa’s actions start to reveal how the ANC’s concept of constitutional democracy reminds one more and more of the one superficially adhered to by leaders of Soviet Russia and Communist China. Since 1994 in South Africa, it has also been the “party” that is the “state” and which rules through a manipulated and watered-down electoral system and an even autocratic democratic-centralism. Power is concentrated in its politburo from where the secretary general and president of the ANC as two members of the Top Six and the eighty members of the ANC NEC determine the policy and implementation of the state affairs outside Parliament. The main reason for the country’s currently failing economy and a make-believe instead of a real prosperity is directly rooted in a quasi-democratic system that has been corrupted from within.93

3.3.1.14. Bettering the ANC-regime

For the “government to be run better” by the ANC regime seems to be a political analyst’s dream, but a nightmare for a bank manager at risk of losing other people’s good money as “loans” to the ANC in an attempt to better it. Schuitema94 sees the chaotic economics to be seated in so-called “takers” by specifically naming South Africans as a “nation of takers” — an internalised cognitive tradition which is not easily erased from a nation’s mindset. The misused and under-used status of our people — of which the Apartheid regime and even more prominently the ANC have been guilty — led to poorly developed people, wealth disparities and structural imbalances, together with an economy that could easily become the host for a parasitical political elite inside a revolutionary regime which presented itself as the saviours of the suppressed Blacks of pre-1994. Inside the post-1994 pseudo-democracy, with its misleading, opportunistic political aims and intentions, self-gain has overtaken the minds of the elite as well as the poor. This debased cognition is growing, turning into looting and avarice that are negatively impacting economic management, as well as causing social and personal misbehaviour. Such entrenched negative elements cannot easily be rooted out, in an effort to improve the economy. The fact is that these entrenched elements are permanent parts of the ANC’s established Marxist-Leninist ideology, which is maintained and implemented daily by means of the ANC’s democratic-centralism that does not allow the individual to deviate from his prescribed path and ideology, and which makes a rehabilitation of the South African economy nearly impossible, as long as the ANC remains in power.94

Helen Zille67 too, after studying the political system and economics of the ANC, postulates that the reason why  true prosperity has not been reached since 1994 in South Africa and why there can never be such prosperity in the future if the ANC stays in power, is be found in the ANC’s democratic-centralism and Marxist-Leninist political ideology, together with its dogma of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which it inherited from its close association with the South African Communist Party (SACP). Sustaining this ANC political inclination is its pyramidal or hierarchical power structurue with the ANC’s politburo (based on its Marxist-Leninist-ideology) exclusively in charge (on top). The politburo, consisting of the autocratic and despotic Top Six, the eighty NEC members and the secretary general, is the only executive body that may set policies and take decisions in terms of the resolutions taken at the party’s national conferences (attended by more or less 4 000 delegates from all the ANC branches countrywide). This politburo controls and manages the ANC party and every member, and by extension the ANC regime and the South African state.67

South Africa’ economic problems are a product of the ANC politburo’s power structure and its obedience to Marxism-Leninism. Focussing on the supposed prosperity and the false future economic growth as propagated to innocent and uninformed South Africans by the ANC’s top brass (politburo) during their daily promises of rehabilitating the South African state post-May 2019, it must be noted that its Marxist-Leninist politics never means allocating prosperity to the individual citizen but only to its politburo and thus the ANC elite. The Marxist-Leninist ANC started state capture in 1994 under Nelson Mandela and it was refined by the Jacob Zuma regime. It is still current practice by the Ramaphosa regime and Ramaphosa’s economic gurus such as Gordhan, notwithstanding their so-called “political virtue” and sweet-sounding “democratisation speeches”.67

That the Ramaphosa regime is still subscribing today to the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist politics is well illustrated by the ongoing appointment of incomptetent ANC cadres and tainted ANC top cronies in executive positions as required and prescribed by its politburo, clearly not with the intention to heal the economy or to deliver prosperity or to bring clean government. The ANC’s Marxist-Leninist foundation will never allow its political system to be changed or to be improved. It did not change under Mbeki or Zuma and will not change under Ramaphosa the Good. His many commissions on state capture, his fingering of Jacob Zuma as a kind of political and economic culprit or his cornering of the public protector as the perpetrator of improper “prosecutions” of him and Gordhan, represent short-term window dressings to keep the Marxist-Leninist ANC on track to rule South Africa. The ANC leaders, deeply marinated in revolutionary politics, know all too well that an ANC without a Marxist-Leninist foundation would be dead and so would their own political careers.

Inside the Marxist-Leninist tradition of the ANC (as showed by the history of the Soviet Union, Maoist China, Cuba, etc.) we find the primary concept: he who controls the economy controls the politics; and he who controls the politics controls the economy. Mandela knew it, Mbeki knew it, Zuma knew it, Ramaphosa knows it, Magashule knows it, Mabuza knows it and Gordhan knows it. All Marxist-Leninist disciples know it. Intertwined “political economies” as Marxists fondly call them, are the ideal for nation-states presided over by autocrats and despotic emperors. The ANC has nearly perfected this ideal, their dream.67

Zille67 presents an excellent analysis of how successfully the ANC’s leaders since 1994 have masterfully upheld a public image of democracy, while at the same time nurturing Marxism-Leninism in order to unleash at any time a full national-democratic revolution on the country. Undoubtedly our presently failing economy and governance are a direct outcome of the ANC’s planned national-democratic revolution, making any constructive bettering of our economy at this stage far-fetched. Zille writes67:7:

Al die ondersoeke en kommissies sal uiteindelik ‘n mors van tyd en geld wees as hulle nie die fundamentele ontwerpfout, wat aan die kern van al ons problem lé, uitwys nie: die NDR.

Dit is egter omwaarskynlik dat dit ooit sal gebeur en daarom sal ons aanhou om langsamerhand te misluk.

Te veel Suid-Afrikaners is verblind deur die oortuiging dat die goeie ouens die wa deur die drif kan sleep — gegrond op ‘n beleidsraamwerk wat dit onmoontlik maak. Dit is soos om te glo dat ‘n bevoegde vlieërnier ‘n Boeing 737 Max in vryval kan red. Selfs die wêreld se beste vlieëniers kan nie ‘n vliegtuig met ‘n fundamentele ontwerpfout in die lug hou nie.

Two indicators, or rather truths, are clearly related to Zille’s67 opinion above. Firstly, South Africa experienced from day-one with Mandela’s presidency the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist politics which would activate at the right time its national-democratic revolution such as the grabbing of land and the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank, etc. The radicalism of the Freedom Charter was watered down tacitly for politically opportunistic reasons by Nelson Mandela in 1994. Certain pre-steps were first needed, creating a slow, well-disguised descent into autocracy and a systematic sabotage of the economy and the administration of the country, to prepare the political terrain. Secondly, the process to activate the ANC’s national Marxist-Leninist revolution came out of the closet in December 2017 with the arrival of the ambition-driven Ramaphosa and Magashule, as well as their ANC’s instruction to finally implement the radicalism of the Freedom Charter.4,95-97

The ANC’s Marxist-Leninist organisational structure, derived from Soviet Russia and Communist China’s politico- economic system, persuaded the political-veteran Douglas Gibson93 to refer to the existing South African system as a crypto-party dictatorship intentionally set up to make a Western-style democracy and economy fail, while the favoured politico-economic system of the Marxist-Leninist ANC leaders is kept in place.93

Jones95 evaluated the prosperity of a country from a similar viewpoint as Zille (and thus the possibility to improve its economy when adversely affected) in terms of the driving of the economy by a democratic party under a community leadership versus a crypto-party dictatorship. To be able to do this, is it firstly important to compare true democracies which mostly reflect real prosperity and sound economic policies, with semi-autocracies to full autocracies which seldom show prosperity — or as in present-day Venezuela — hold up “pretended” prosperity as a front. Secondly, included in this analysis, one should look at the political alliances of a country with other countries as a clear barometer to confirm prosperity versus economic chaos. As a measurement instrument Jones uses an evaluation guideline on democracies versus autocracies in 2019, and South Africa’s position in it. Although Jones writes that democracy worldwide still rules, his evaluation bears out that since 1994 as many as 75 countries worldwide have moved in the direction of autocratisation. In 2017 alone, 24 countries became autocracies. In comparision, there are only 24 countries in 2019 showing positive tendencies toward democratisation, while 53% of the world’s total countries still qualify as democracies.95

South Africa’s association with BRICS shows how we are slipping away from democracy (notwithstanding how much we try to praise our so-called “good” Constitution and democracy) and our decline into utter poverty and a lack of prosperity. Jones’s95 article refers to research by two Swedish political scientists who currently see a decline in democracy world-wide:

In their fascinating new academic study, two Swedish political scientists, Anna Lührmann and Staffan Lindberg, point out that we are in the sixth chapter of the world’s democratic history. A third wave of democratic decline has hit us — the largest to date.

Among the many countries that have autocratised (in other words, slipped away from democracy) over the past two to three decades are India, Russia and Venezuela. Brazil could also be included.

Because of South Africa’s association with BRICS and countries that seem to form part of increasing autocratisation, we should take it as a serious warning of our imminent decline to the extreme junk status of a Venezuela or a Zimbabwe. Not only are the outward signs of prosperity in South Africa chimeral, but we might be on a precipice of losing even those vestiges of prosperity we still have. Jones95 quotes Anna Lührmann and Staffan Lindberg who sound the following warning95:30:

About a third of all autocratisation episodes … started during a democratic dispensation. Almost all of the latter … led to the country turning into an autocracy. This should give us a great pause in the spectre of the current third wave of autocratisation. Very few episodes of autocratisation starting in democracies have ever been stopped before countries become autocracies.

The innocent voter is mostly misled by the so-called “credibility of elections, the independence of courts and the freedom enjoyed by the opposition parties”, but there is much more to the issue that is not noted correctly. The loss of political and economical freedom take mostly time and is well-planned by the autocrat. Jones informs us95:30:

This shift away from democracy to autocracy is sometimes hidden because it does not necessarily take place overnight as, for example, with a coup. Nowadays, countries are gradually moving in this direction — often in a way that appears to be democratic.

Jones’s95 description of autocracy, strongly in line with Zille’s67 view of a Marxist-Leninist ANC at present ruling South Africa, is confirmed by our imperfect electoral system and our law-makers’ elections that bear similarities to the election process in many autocracies. (Recall again that the ANC regime of today was chosen in May 2019 as ruler by only 28% of the eligible voters, with 51% of eligible voters withholding their votes). South Africa is undoubtedly not one of the 24 so-called true democracies and it seems that the country has moved since 1994, together with as many as 75 countries worldwide, in the direction of autocracy.

Noting the growing autocracy in South Africa, driven by Marxist-Leninist politics, and pointed out by Zille67, Gibson85,93 and Jones95, it is clear why the country’s economy is running into serious trouble after 25 years. On the other hand, it is also evident that this economic approach is favoured and consonant with ANC power because it fits into its political planning for a future South Africa. Bettering, done in terms of Western capitalist principles, may therefore be ruled out.

In light of the above, Munusamy98 and Taylor99 are correct in writing that there are no easy paths to rebuilding or bettering our broken state and to change divisive attitudes in our society. Indeed, those ANC delinquents who are fighting attempts to clean up the corrupted state and set it aright, are all people attempting to escape prosecution and to keep their ill-gotten gains within the protection offered by the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist political model. These political crooks know how to attack the pillars of good and true democracy. To better our economy would need more than “cultured” democracy, it needs an equally robust defence in order to rescue South Africa from its current morass. Munusamy puts it clearly98:18:

“There is no such thing as an idealistic revolution [or an idealistic bettered economy]. Real change takes strong leadership and a bare-knuckle fight [for a clean regime]”.

Taylor99 writes on the absolute requirement to effect constructive changes to the economy, like the implementation of austerity (which also includes changes to the personal, political and social lifestyle of every citizen and most of all the ANC elite), all of which form part of a reality that the ANC desperately avoids. Within the current politico-economic chaos, the ANC has no plan or intention to change, essentially because the regime’s elite does not want to put the nation’s interests before theirs. Political reality is manipulated by the government through personal attacks and baseless declarations, reflecting firstly that lies became the truth for them, and secondly that they cannot and will not do anything constructive to the economy that would contradict their Marxist-Leninist ideology. There is no silver bullet that can re-establish the country’s economy besides a new, better government.

Perhaps because of Scandinavian financial and logistical support for ANC during its terrorist phase prior to 1994, it seems to look at the “Scandinavian model” of marrying capitalism and socialism, otherwise known as “social economics”. The journalist and researcher Ivo Vegter83 very successfully unmasks the ANC politburo’s rejection of exclusive capitalism in favour of so-called inclusive capitalism (or more correctly: their communistic socialism which never ever worked in the long term, as evidenced by Zimbabwe, Venezuela, the old Soviet Union, Cambodia, etc.). Vegter points out that the so-called “social economics” of Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland) are far away from the ANC’s ideas. Scandinavian democratic socialism is just not in the ANC’s fabric. However much it tries, it just does not have the integrity to better itself in any way to be in the class of the Scandinavian countries.

Vegter83, referring to the findings of the Fraser Institute World-index for Economic Freedom, shows that the Scandinavian countries are at the top of the list of the world’s free countries because of their sound judicial and financial systems, protected property rights, balanced immigration and international trade policies, etc. (In comparison, on the Fraser Institute World-index, South Africa under the ANC dropped from 82nd place in 2008 to 110th place in 2016, confirming our impaired Marxist-Leninist economics).10,83

The “ideal” ANC socialist state (the model of the Scandinavian countries of which Ramaphosa undoubtedly dreamed many times in his Third Shona) is a sociopolitical model which the revolutionary and selfish ANC-regime never can or will master. Vegter points out in terms of the Fraser Institute’s report and guideline what it takes to top the list as the Scandinavian countries do, reporting as follows83:4-5:

Die verslag wys dat nasies in die boonste kwartiel van ekonomiese vryheid ‘n gemiddelde bruto binnelandse produk (BBP) per capita het wat ses keer groter is as dié van lande in die onderste kwart.  Die gemiddelde inkomste van die armste 10% van die bevolking in die vryste lande is sewe keer hoër as in die onvry lande s’n, en selfs hoër as die gemiddelde per capita-inkomste van die lande wat die minste ekonomiese vryheid het.

In die boonste kwart ervaar slegs 1,8% van die bevolking armoede, teenoor 27,2%  in die onderste kwart. In die vry lande sterf minder babas en leef mense langer. Politieke en burgerlike vryhede is meer in die ekonomiese vry lande as in die onvry lande. Geslagsgelykheid is groter. Mense is gelukkiger.

The question is thus: why is South Africa under the ANC not at the top of the list, most of its people poor, a government hijacked in so-called “state capture” and is the country waiting for its bankruptcy to be declared? Vegter gives us a clear, precise answer: Because these so-called socialist Scandinavian countries used their wealth constructively and with integrity to create and to establish comprehensive, healthy welfare-states that are functioning politically effectively and correctly.8

Dr. Frans Cronjé100, the head of the Institute of Racial Relations (IRR) attributes the significantly lower evaluation of South Africa by the Fraser Institute to the effects of one clear cause: the utterly bad leadership of the ANC that cannot by any means be improved. The Fraser Institute‘s ranking is simply confirming what we know already: the ANC’s appalling leadership, the evidence of its failed communist-style socialism, revolutionary, radical and delinquent thinking, planning and actions, as well as the dishonest inclination to self-enrichment by the ANC’s elite must lead to eventual economic decline. This entrenched delinquent mentality of the ANC  was again confirmed by the absolute praises sung by both Thabo Mbeki and Cyril Ramaphosa regarding the mass murderer, thief, and despot Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe at his funeral. They lionised him as a so-called good man, a man of integrity, a man who knew how to reign and a man who had benefited his people; notwithstanding undisputed evidence which contradicts and rejects such a view.83,100 The Fraser Institute knows the ANC regime and its post-1994 reign of South Africa just too well when it negatively evaluated it with the number 110 position on its list. As Cronjé muses100:6:

Dit is sekerlik nou vir selfs die grootmoedigste en redelikste waarnemers duidelik dat die ANC ‘n inherent bose organisaie is en dat dit die plig van alle ordentlike Suid-Afrikaners is om alles in hul vermoë te doen om hom van sy mag te ontneem.

Cronjé’s reference to the ANC as a so-called “inherently evil organisation”, redirects us to the many public and media requests that the ANC’s elite should improve the economy through better rule. But in this context the most basic question has so far not a single time been asked: is there a single soul in the ANC’s present leadership to better the ANC itself, let alone to better the economy of the country? If we are look at the failed presidential histories of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, the answer is no. Taking note of Cyril Ramaphosa’s indecisive presidential term so far, the popular narrative seems to be68:21: “…that the president is ineffective, isolated, out of touch and overwhelmed by the fightback in his party”. Taking into account the conclusion of Malala68 that reads68:21: “…Ramaphosa and his team have a 55% chance of suceeding and turning the country’s fortunes around”, it would be foolish to believe that the ANC can better itself, or the country. The ANC’s saviour, who should have a 100% rating, has only obtained more or less 50%. It means the last man standing, went down. There is no leadership in the present-day ANC to do good for itself or the nation. Above all, the reconstruction of the country should be a first demand and priority. Present arguments that it should be a requirement for the ANC regime to better the economy, because of its large parliamentary majority, are not persuasive72. The ANC is leaderless; its politics is too contaminated to let it loose in a future democracy. On the other hand, at this stage to oust the ANC from Parliament by a motion of no confidence or a coup is not feasible. But something must be done as soon as possible to create  a clean government to improve the country’s economy and the people’s quality of life, without a disturbance of the political and societal peace. For Professor William Gumede1 of Wits one of the best ways to install an effective and clean government which can guarantee prosperity, is to educate our voters with knowledge of their civil interests and rights and the mass empowerment they enjoy through their votes: meaning thus to vote the best lawmakers into Parliament and the best party to be the ruler.

Gumede1, on a “better government” that could improve the country’s economy and drag it out of its present despondency, indicates in some way how the mass of Black voters should change their behaviour in electing a government that would act in their interest, and not in the interest of the corrupt elite. What Gumede should have said to us is that the ANC is “irreparable”, a “misfit” as a political party and never intended to bring prosperity to the mass of poor anyway. There is no sense in trying to better it. All the pages and pages written on possibilities to “rehabilitate” the ANC, is inappropriate and inapplicable. There is only one solution to the matter: the voters must themselves reject the ANC at the ballot box. Only after that and under a new regime with integrity, can the process of bettering South Africa be started. Gumede writes1:18:

For the cycle of black poverty to end, poor blacks must stop voting for instance for independence movements and leaders just because of their past opposition to colonialism and apartheid or their current “radical” rhetoric, regardless of their record in government.

People will also have to stop supporting leaders purely because they are loudly against the hated “others”.

In the long term, quality mass education, societal opposition to false beliefs and better quality leaders and political parties are crucial.

Poor blacks should support black leaders because of their competence, behaviour and values. Within black communities, more imagination, maturity and forward-looking approaches are needed to tackle the enduring impact of the trauma of colonialism and apartheid, at both the individual and the societal level.

4. Conclusions

I flew into SA in the second week of spring. This time the new season did not herald hope and renewal. It was the spring of despondency. The country was plummeted into the foulest mood I had experienced among my fellow countrymen in decades. The crime statistics were horrendous. Economic indicators showed we are a country in crisis. The currency was plumbing new depths. — Justice Malala, Sunday Times, 20 October 2019

Studying prosperity in present-day South Africa, the mood reflected does not differ in any way from the one Malala met in September 2019 when he had arrived from the USA and had described it as despondency. All the indicators put forward in this article around the concept prosperity, varying from the availability of jobs, unemployment, business trust, political harmony, leadership, willingness to change, governmental international relations and alliances, etc., showed that South Africa was not going to get more prosperous. On the contrary, there are signs that current South African politics is mired in an autocratic political system whereby the ANC’s previously hidden Marxist-Leninist politics, is starting to steer its policies. The country’s economy has been subject to the ANC’s delinquent intentions as far back as in the days of Nelson Mandela. Here, as in Venzuela, the state is starting to have a firm grip on all facets of our people’s lives — from where we live and what we eat, to how much we earn. We are more in trouble than we think.

There are no signs that the pre-May 2019 election promises of Cyril Ramaphosa and his ANC regime have in any way rectified the ills of South Africa so far. The economy is still negatively impacted, while the ANC’s politics is indecisive. The country can indeed be described as being in a state of disarray, or better, as Malala described it, despondency. The presence of a Chávez-Madura-elite is here too, and the feeling of a Venezuela in the making, might be real.

In the forthcoming Article 13, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective”(13)”, the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of the mandate as ruler it received in the 8 May 2019 election, will be further evaluated.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

 

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (11: Introduction)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (11: Introduction)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Capability, desperate, evaluation, electorate, expropriation, journalism, marginalised, populist, probation, scenario, violence.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 2

1. Background

During the post-May-2019-to-2024 parliamentary term of the ANC, certain political tendencies may be expected to emerge which would have a profound effect upon South Africa. Some may be described as positive, while others may be characterised as extremely negative with the inclination to produce unrest, anarchy and revolution. Post-May 2019 will not necessarily mean the beginning of a golden age in the South African republic, but neither does it mean that it would be impossible for the ANC to be rehabilitated. The installation of the new regime on 9 May 2019 portends two future periods under the ANC with clear outcomes that may bring dramatic changes in its policies and actions: the 2019-to-2022 period (from May 2019 until the national conference of the ANC in 2020), as well as the 2022-to-2024 period (national conference in 2020 until the next national elections in 2024).

The post-May 2019 period may turn out to be a kind of continuation of the pre-2019 system during which the ANC will again be the ruler with the same failures and misdemeanours of the pre-May-2019 period. But, there is the possibility of an emerging post-May political radicalism, such as land grabbing under the ANC (that may be effected together with the other radical parties like the EFF), which transform South Africa at last into the long-expected autocratic and failed country (which is far worst than a failed state) prophesied by conservative commentators. The period from 2019 to 2022 may be full of political intrigues, chaos and of power struggles between splinter groups of the ANC, further aggravated by radical small parties of the EFF calibre. Included herein would be the ongoing economic and social failures, problems with water and electricity, etc. And if this period does not have the potential to bring enough upheaval, unrest and revolution, there will follow the critical period from 2022 to 2024 during which new factions and political groupings may be formed inside and outside the ANC, which may vary from ultra-radicalism to ultra-conservatism. All of this may play out if the main problems of South Africa, such as comprehensive land reform, are not dealt with during the pre-2022 phase. Both these two periods and timeframes have their own uniqueness and may be intertwined, but, as mentioned, may also be seen as distinct and independent from each other. The denouement of each may steer South Africa into incapacity or success.

The line in South Africa between chaos, stability and order is thin. Justice Malala, a writer and commentator, tries hard to comfort South Africans in some way when he writes:

Politics is toxic everywhere in the world right now. The Democrats in the US are moving to impeach President Donald Trump. The UK is run by a buffoon whose ham-handed actions on Brexit continue to imperil Europe. Across the globe, politics are failing the citizenry. Nigerians do not trust President Muhammadu Buhari or the system he represents. South Africans are not the first people to be failed by politics and politicians and won’t be the last.1: 21

The successful execution of the post-2019 land-reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and implementation by a so-called “good” government, together with a “good” leadership in whom integrity and Solomon’s wisdom are essential characteristics. This means a regime that is not blindly on a path of “reaching the goal at any cost” but to effectively achieving an end-result regarding the matter, which would be a success. This requires a regime honestly serving the interests of all its people by following a well-drawn-up roadmap for an orderly land-reform initiative, and steering it into reality.

The essential question here is thus whether the ANC can be theoretically deemed a candidate or may be shortlisted and thus be considered to have the leadership potential to ensure the successful implementation and completion of the post-2019 plan on land expropriation.

The evaluation guidelines for political parties are:

  1.  Its general policies as well as specific positions on aspects such as respect for law and order, and the fighting of corruption, state capture, delinquent behaviour by its MPs and MPLs, including its top brass, as well as the party’s and its leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put forward in its manifesto for the 2019 election;
  2. Public criticism for the period 1994 to 2019 in newspapers, etc., evaluated and expressed by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the party as a political organisation, its members’ and leaders’ behaviours and actions such as corruption, state capture, as well as the delinquency of MPs and MPLs, the leaders, their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the party’s internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions.

1.1. Introduction

This study is a continuation of the previous article (Article 10, titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2—The DA in perspective (10)”.

The focus of Article 11 is on the ANC as the elected present-day regime. The article is part of a series of articles on the ANC, published under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3 —The ANC in perspective”. It purports to analyse and further discuss the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC to effect land expropriation successfully as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.2. Aims of article 11

The primary intention of the publications on the ANC is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by specifically describing the profile of the ANC on the same basis as was done in Article 9 on the EFF and Article 10 on the DA.

The aim is to evaluate the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of its empowerment as ruler received during the election of 8 May 2019. The focus will be on the party’s leadership to detect poor personal and political integrity. The intention of the researcher is thus to see if the ANC as a political party and the ANC’s MPS and MPLs, its top brass and chief executive, as well as other officials at state enterprises have the ability to successfully execute comprehensive land reform.

1.2.1. The exclusive use of newspaper articles and direct quotations in article 11

It must be noted that the emphasis in information collection for this research was on the use of mostly recent South African newspaper reports, seeing that the information was offered daily in describing (with analyses, comments, investigations and discussions) the prominent political, economic and social events. In totality these reports reflect a very comprehensive and in-depth picture of present-day South Africa’s political, judicial and economic life. On how South Africans trust, read and share news, research published by Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019, together with Isabella Maake and Graphics24, shows that printed newspapers are being used by 40% of the South African population to obtain information and insight. Most of the newspapers used in the research as references, may be described, for instance, in terms of their weekly percentage usage by the total population as follows:

Sunday Times: 25%;
Daily Sun: 21%;
Sowetan: 13%;
The Citizen: 12%;
City Press: 12%;
The Star: 10%.

In addition, local newspapers were also used (21%), while other newspapers (Afrikaans) like Beeld and Rapport (of which the percentage usage is unknown) were also consulted as they are being comprehensively used by the Afrikaans-speakers.2:14

On the extensive use in this research of South African journalistic reporting, it is important to note the following comment in the City Press of 23 June 2019, defining the absolute need for critical journalism to fight crime and political delinquency in South Africa. It reads3:13:

Going deep into the belly of governing circles in countries [African] where the majority of citizens are desperately poor, we discovered how local and international business partners assist presidents, ministers and governing party bureaucrats to convert political power, often via access to natural resources, into personal financial reserves and assets.

And:

Support for African investigative journalists as they continue to expose wrongdoing is once again noted as an important need.

That the country’s journalists are under immense strain, as well as physical and emotional attacks by delinquent politicians without any safeguard such as bodyguards, is reflected by the recent (but failed) action of the South African National Editors’ Forum (Sanef) and five journalists to go to the Equality Court for an interdict to stop a specific political party from intimidating and threatening journalists and inciting violence against them. Munusamy4:18 writes:

And this matter goes beyond the realm of individual safety. Our industry is increasingly on the retreat as political attacks and vilifications intensify. Journalists and editors are already self-censoring to avoid being harangued by politicians and denigrated online. Social media is a toxic space where people can direct violent and misogynistic attacks, either themselves or through troll armies, without consequences.

She continues4:18:

The focus of the attacks is now shifting to the judiciary… Our society cannot claim not to see the warning signs of our democracy under attack. The challenge is whether we respond or watch impassively.

Any public utterance or writing by a civil person, another politician or an author pinpointing alleged wrongdoings by controversial politicians or state officials, are fast being taken to court as instances of slander and libel whereby amounts from R500 000 up to R35-million are being claimed as compensation! It must be noted that most of these public utterances and writings occurred with reference to the alleged state capture under the ANC regime, and are often anchored in the testimonies offered to the judicial commissions such as the Zondo one. In perspective, it seems to be many previously deeply-in-love ANC comrades and other cronies that are calling each other names such as liars, fraudsters, apartheid spies, known enemy agents, charlatans, EFF-sleepers, even “extraordinary k****r”. These “calling out” actions have also been observed between the ANC leaders and churches, as well as other parties’ politicians who try the court seemingly as a “money-spinner”. Most of the lawsuits are plain nonsense, juvenile and sorely reflect the poor quality of our law-makers. Furthermore, these revenge actions are wasting the valuable time of the court, while some seem indeed to generate money for the claimants. Critically observed, most of these civil actions seeking revenge or compensation for so-called libel and slander claims, are also attempts at outright distraction from the spotlight on the guilt of the claimants and threats towards those exposing them, in order to stop their investigations and writing on the culprits’ wrongdoing.5-17

It is clear that most of these cases of libel and slender are purely because the SAPS (South African Police Service) has so far done nothing to investigate the alleged law-breaking and the NPA (National Prosecuting Authority) has not prosecuted, leaving crooks many times over untouchable and free in society to continue their crimes.

This research is not investigative, but purely to use existing newspaper articles that were already published and accepted as correct by the general public and critics, given that the persons named or alleged to have committed crimes or corruption, never objected to the articles’ contents nor did  they take action against the newspaper or its investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts. As a researcher I am very thankful to the mass of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts for their information which formed the backbone of my research project on the ANC. It must further be noted that very little of the enormous reporting on testimonies before the various judicial commissions, like the Zondo one, were used in this research. It was just too much to include into the research. I am considering making it part of a future publication, namely: The phantom of the South African Parliament: the ANC 1994 to 2019.

My publications on the ANC are thus in principle a collation of published information and reflections from this gathered or archived information, on the ANC’s activities. Firstly, the preference for this “reflecting” approach follows from the immense amount of available information, just waiting to be collected and currently underused. Secondly, this published information has already been tested and published according to the criteria of “true news”, or as truth which has not been legally challenged as defamation or falsehoods. The publications quoted in this research were thus operating from within the ethics of good journalism, meaning right, trustworthy and credible, with which editors allowed journalists and authors to publish the information in their newspapers. Many of the cases reported on are still awaiting investigation by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and possible prosecution by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). For this reason the terms “alleged” and “alluded”, as used throughout in newspaper articles, are also used as here. The term alleged is applicable to every case reported here: even in cases were culprits were prosecuted and sentenced, these outcomes are treated as “alleged”, seeing that there can be still appeals to the courts. Directly reflecting the allegations made by political analysts, political commentators and investigative and crime journalists, compelled the large-scale use of quotations. This approach brings the reader directly into the picture of the ANC’s politics, while at the same time giving appropriate acknowledgment to the various authors for their hard work. These quotations tell an intimate story which is frequently lost through indirect references, descriptions and paraphrasing. The guideline of Ngwenya12 on good journalism occupies a central position throughout this research project. He writes12:8:

The reflective call in these tricky, dicey, trying times for journalists is to be independent. Sharpen no knives, grind no axes and dig no graves. If journalism is right, trustworthy and credible the dishonourable will feel the weight of public censure to fall on their sword in a grave they dug for themselves.

The descriptions of this subdivision, titled: 1.2.1.The exclusive use of newspaper articles and direct quotations in articles 11, is also fully applicable to all the articles which are following as part of this project on the ANC. Thus, they will not be repeated.

2. Method

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern politico-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to effect successful land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources have been consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in making an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to achieve successful land reform as from 2019.

The research findings have been presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1 Absence of an Electorate-Parliamentarian-Employment Act and an Electorate-Parliamentarian Ethics Code

The serious question that is prominently being asked by political analysts is: how did South Africa end up in its present mess? Various answers are proffered, varying from it being the end-result of Apartheid, to the end-result of the ANC as a failed revolutionary party. Looking at the utter failure and constant economic decline, failed human uplifting and impoverishment of the mass of the people, the fact is clear that the ANC is the main culprit as a revolutionary that never creates, but takes only from the rich without giving—as the good thief Robin Hood would do—to the poor. Moreover, South Africa’s political setup of pre-1994 and its much-praised but in some ways failed Constitution, offered the ANC the opportunity to successfully establish its revolutionary culture of crookedness, mismanagement, state capture and autocracy, unobstructed over 25 years. Central to this power structure is the incapable ANC elite with their sole intention of self-enrichment and utmost power hunger. But the question remains: how was it possible for the ANC to be able to hijack the mass of poor Blacks’ votes and use the South African Parliament exclusively, from one administration to the other, to benefit them solely? One of the answers lies in the fact that there was the lack of a Basic Conditions Electorate-Parliamentarian-Employment Act [equal to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCOEA)] to describe and enforce a mandate between voters and a regime, obliging the regime to govern a country and its people only with justice and rectitude.18,19

3.2 Chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng’s sincere warning and prayer for good governance

To assess and control an elected party during its term of five years (like the ANC again for the period 2019 to 2024, after it had already been ruling for 25 years since 1994), certain basic guidelines should be in place before the election and inauguration of a government (as an employee in service of the people.) There should be basic guidelines, such as to act all of the time while governing solely in terms of its promises made before the election to the voters (the employer, who takes the government as an employee in service). In South Africa such an act or code is absent. It is thus important to outline it here: firstly, to understand how good governance could have been attained from 1994 until now; and secondly, the absolute present need to promulgate such legislation to get rid of corrupted and failed governments. If such a piece of legislation were in place we would not be shamed by the need of the Chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng, when he swore in ministers and their deputies at the Sefako Makgatho presidential guesthouse in Pretoria recently at the start of South Africa’s sixth Parliament, to give them a clear warning. In this context Hunter18:4 shows how Mogoeng digressed significantly from his traditional swearing-in speech to say to these public figures (mostly from the ANC) that “they should shiver if they even think of misspending public funds in their care, while he also warned elected public representatives to take their oath of office seriously and not to act as if the public owe them something”.

In this context he had undoubtedly referred to the totally failed government of the ANC since 1994. His warning was an attempt by him as a last resort to inculcate good employee habits into the mindsets of law-makers in the new Parliament after so many years of failure. Chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng, specifically pointed to the status of law-makers as plain “public employees” and not, as some seemed to have been thinking and doing since 1994, as high-level mighty “employers” in charge of the voters and the public. Mogoeng said that he wanted to ensure that those who took the oath or affirmation know that18:4: “…power doesn’t belong to you, and the resources that come with that office don’t belong to you. You are a servant of the South African public and this is what you are promising those who have employed you. For you to suddenly begin to treat those who have privileged you with an opportunity to serve – especially at a high level – as if they owe you something and be insensitive, almost, to the dire circumstances they find themselves in [is wrong].”

In the context of Mogoeng Mogoeng’s “preaching”, he further read the so-called Riot Act to the law-makers (who in present-day South Africa seem more and more to be acting as schoolchildren going on a picnic), and emphasised that public officers must realise that people suffer the consequences of bad decisions18:4: “So we never forget, just the thought of giving somebody millions that they ought not to get, that are supposed to help elsewhere, should make you shiver. Just the thought of it should make you shiver.”

But it seems as if there was doubt in the Chief Justice’s heart that his verbal and written warning alone was not going to have an effect on the Ramaphosa cabinet and its officials. This is confirmed by the fact that the honourable justice had also included a prayer to those being sworn in, seemingly hoping in this way to impress his prescribed virtue on the minds of the ANC elite.18

From a practical and judicial viewpoint, as spelt out clearly by the Chief Justice above, the business of government and its proper execution, represents a mandate received by a regime to do certain work for the people in exchange for compensation. This means that the appointed ruler (employee) received his mandate from the voters (employers) in exchange for the pre-election promises, meaning that they will execute these agreed-upon actions and policies—neither more nor less. Looking back to the period 1994 to 2019, very few of the ruling party’s officials—from presidents to their most junior officials—had ever respected the voters or had “shivered” in Mogoeng’s sense when diverting funds to their own pockets. Jacob Zuma and the Parliament under the ANC laughed at both the judiciary and the public. Looking at Cyril Ramaphosa and his cronies, since coming to power in 2017, the alleged Phantom of the Parliament has not changed much of its act.

It is thus important to offer a guideline of what should be in position to assure good government for the sixth Parliament during the period 2019 to 2024.

3.1.2. The unborn Electorate-Parliamentarian Act
3.1.2.1. Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCOEA)

Regarding the ANC‘s many failed promises and wrongdoing, nearly bringing the South African state to a fall (thereby failing in its mandate as na employee), there is only one clear guideline to be used in order to fully understand and describe the ANC’s actions as a failed employee within a legal employee-employer relation, namely the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCOEA). A similar Electorate-Parliamentarian Act to the BCOEA should have be promulgated in 1994 to guide the rights of the employee (ANC-government) in its actions and those of the employer (voters) who want certain and specific work done via Parliament. Central to the BCOEA stands the legal concept of probation that needs to be highlighted and which the ANC regime failed to respect in its job contract via Parliament with the people of South Africa.18,20

To illustrate the need for an Electorate-Parliamentarian Act and the clause of probation for a party as a government and its law-makers as parliamentarians, the BCOEA will be made applicable as a voters-and-government agreement, equal to an employer-and-employee agreement and be discussed theoretically, to illustrate the ANC’s utter failure over 25 years and to show how a failed regime can be stopped dead in its tracks with the correct legislation. The basis will thus be to encapsulate the concept of good governance and the use of probation as a means to end the various ANC regimes’ mischief. This comparative discussion clearly shows what is missing with the present mandate of the government and why the ANC-government (the supposed subordinate employee to the voters) had spun out of control from 1994 to 2019, to engage in unobstructed state capture, failing to activate good services as to education and health, ignoring the Constitution, etc. It will also bear out how the voters were sidelined immediately after every new election of the Parliament, and how the MPs and MPLs became an untouchable force of employees after their election, leaving the employer (voters) powerless until the next election. In reality, it reflects a coup d’état by the law-makers, the moment after they were sworn in.20

Michael Bagraim20, a labour expert, writes excellently in The Star of 12 June 2019 on the matter of a failed employee versus the right of an employer to punish such an employee by requiring him to better himself, as opposed to being able to fire him with immediate effect. His clear writing makes it easy to adapt and compare the rules of the BCOEA to politics. Such a comparision enables one to characterise the ANC regime as a failed employee who should be kicked out and its contract terminated very early in its period of probation. It also makes it possible to obtain insight into the rights that would be awarded to the voters should such a voters’ regime agreement become a legal reality and had to have been thoroughly applied since 1994 to the regime and the law-makers of the South African Parliament. It also shows the specific legal obligations of the regime in terms of which the voters could and should have booked it in order to get rid of the regime when it failed. This would mean terminating the employment contract of the regime (employee), cancelling its stay in Parliament for the full term of five years if such a legal agreement existed.20

Bagraim20 writes that in terms of the BCOEA every employment relationship must have a written letter of appointment or contract of employment. (This agreement goes far further legally than the oath of office that law-makers pledged before the Chief Justice: the oath is essentially a plain promise that may, but does not need, to be respected as was born out by the Zuma regime.) One of the conditions of service is a probationary clause in writing which is prescribed for both the employer and the employee to know and understand that there would be an assessment period before the contract became permanent. Probation is a vehicle to assist an employer to possibly terminate the employment relationship if the employer feels the employment relationship is not a perfect fit or the employee is not performing in accordance with the contract of employment, posits Bagraim.20 In this context it means that if the probationary employee’s work does not meet the standards required by the employer, then the dismissal should be able to seen to be fair. The position of a probationary employee is different from that of a permanent employee and both the procedure and merits of that dismissal will be less onerous on the employer. In this context of the probationary period versus the permanent period, is it important to bear in mind that, besides that the probation clause may differ from employer to employer, the duration of the probation period may also differ in time: it will be longer if the position is one of a senior nature. Prominent in this context are the positions of MPs and MPLs on senior level that warrant a lengthy period of assessment. This reference clearly reflects two aspects relating to the status of a regime as an employee: firstly it needs a lengthy period of assessment stretching fully over the five years as elected representatives to Parliament. Secondly the employment of parliamentarians as employees of the people in terms of this constant assessment is limited to five years in duration which makes the employees’ right to permanent appointment zero (no reappointment of a party as regime without a new election). Implicitly, parliamentarians as representatives are supposed to be “permanently on probation” for their full term.20

The BCOEA has an inscribed clause that a probation period may be extended to erase short-comings and better the employees. In the case of law-makers their probationary period, as said, is supposed to be running for a full five years, excluding any shortening of the probation time. Any legal extension of the five years term is not allowed without another election. It means the re-election of a failed regime and its law-makers can indeed be seen as a willing extension of the probation by the voters, as was done for the ANC over six elections notwithstanding a poor record and performance by the regime.20

The BCOEA requires that the standards set by the employer must be fair and reasonable. The probationary clause provision is also intended to protect the employee who might wish to leave the employer because the position was not as the employee envisaged. Further, the standards set by the employer must be fair and reasonable. In the case of law-makers the writing and execution of these standards are totally handed over to Parliament in governing for the period of five years after the election, during which the law-makers are free to rewrite and set their own standards, totally ignoring the people’s wishes after their election.20

Looking at the fine print of the aim of assessment of the BCOEA, when you see it equal to a law-maker-voter agreement, one sees probation’s function of assessing the new employee (meaning in politics the two entities, namely Parliament and its law-makers) and his capacity for fitting into the organisation (meaning in politics the people’s/voters’ interests) and whether that employee is compatible with fellow employees and the immediate management of the employer. Probation is not only a period granted to the employer to assess the employee, but also to give feedback to the employee in order to ensure better performance and better compatibility which may include training and guidance. Firstly, parliamentarians are expected to be well trained, skilled, seasoned and experienced before they move into Parliament because it was during the pre-election exercise that they were selected and elected by the people for their ability to handle their mandate effectively. Secondly, the only feedback in response to parliamentarians and the ruling party’s performance (good or bad) at present available to the people/voters is to vote for the law-makers and the ruling party or to vote them out in the next election.20

Probation in contracts under the BCOEA is not compulsory. Often appointments are not subjected to probation because both parties are aware of the abilities of the employee. This erasure of the probationary period is presently built-in to the law-makers’ contacts because it is traditionally believed that they are highly qualified and of high integrity before making themselves available to stand for Parliament and thus do not need oversight and monitoring from outside by the voters. The only opportunity to moan about or to reject elected law-makers and a regime is, as mentioned, to not vote for them in the next election.20

The BCOEA further states that an employer must constantly monitor a probationary employee, keeping a record for feedback, keeping minutes of discussions and to see to it that the employee receive the necessary development, support and guidance for improvement. In the voters-versus-law-makers relationship the law-makers obtained the sole right to oversee themselves regarding the development and bettering of their training, experience and behaviour. The present setup regarding public oversight of the regime of the day and law-makers, reflects a process whereby there is very little monitoring of the quality and integrity of law-makers during their period of five years in Parliament, as became evident during the so-called Zupta saga.20

In light of the above, it is clear that Parliament’s management, with specific reference to the party which is also the regime in power, as well as the law-makers elected to Parliament, is totally uncontrolled. The Parliament and the mandated regime become independent powers to do as it and the law-makers “see fit”, leaving the individual citizen stripped of his citizen’s rights. The fact that the ANC received only 28% of the eligible voters’ support in the past election and that only 49% of the total eligible voters participated in the May 2019 election, render the ANC in post-2019 South Africa in practice a non-representative ruler, bordering on self-empowered autocracy. This kind of dangerous ruler-empowerment explains why and how the ANC as a regime has become an irresponsible autocratic ruler since 1994, ignoring the concerns of the majority (51%) of South Africans. Corruption, crookedness, state capture and mismanagement became the normal form of rule. In the end the criminal justice system had to deal with the depths of corruption and misrule, with courts and commissions of enquiry bringing to light the delinquent actions of Parliament and a number of its law-makers.19-21

However, thanks to ANC misrule, the criminal justice system is in itself broken, supporting the crooked law-makers, as was recently well illustrated by various testimonies before the Zondo commission. The ex-head of the KwaZulu-Natal Hawks, Johan Booysen22, testified that there existed a web of alleged corruption in the police, the Hawks and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and pointed out that such corruption culminated in those institutions “being subverted to ensure the shielding of certain individuals from criminal sanction”. A submission of 70 pages by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS,) dealing with the crooked relationship between the national executive and the criminal justice leadership, contains the following sentence22:13:

There can be no doubt that the abuse of executive authority in respect of criminal justice agencies has been central in allowing the current proliferation of corruption.

Gareth Newham, the head of justice and violence prevention at ISS said22:13:

There has to be a much broader political project to uncapture these institutions.

The overwhelming evidence of political and criminal-justice delinquency forced the chair of the Zondo commission, Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, to declare22:13:

If we do not have a proper law enforcement agency then we don’t have a country.

To curb the massive delinquency in the South African Parliament, it urgently needs an Electoral-Parliamentarian Act to be promulgated as a priority before the end of 2020. If the BCOEA had applied to Parliament’s law-makers and the ANC-regime specifically, all would have been fired long ago due to poor performance, incompatibility, poor training and experience, as well as misconduct. Moreover, looking at the way in which they are aggressively handling the land-reform matter by threatening the 30 million poor Blacks (a significant part of the population and in reality the ANC’s employer), the ANC regime is indeed victimising its own employer. Their dismissal would be justified in terms of all the criteria of dismissal.19-21

3.1.3. The  central roles of the ANC’s democratic-centralism and the electoral system in parliamentary abuse
3.1.3.1. The ANC’s democratic-centralism ideology

The ANC’s so-called democratic-centralism plays a prominent role in the failed political outcomes of their five post-1994 administrations and portends similar manifestations to be repeated during their sixth administration under Ramaphosa. This uniqueness of the ANC’s party organisation and its steering of the thinking, planning and actions of every one of its members, from the ordinary to its president, are overlooked by many, even political analysts, commentators and journalists.19-21

This ANC’s democratic-centralism and the established power structure of the ANC as a party, nullifies the claim that a specific ANC member, like its president, is the sole empowered person to act and decide on ANC matters (also making his/her authority as President of South Africa subordinate to the ANC’s power). The implication is thus that the interests of the ANC as a party are determined by its national conferences and must be strictly adhered to and be executed by every member. But this also means that the interests of the country, whether inside or outside Parliament, are subordinate to the interests of the ANC. It does not matter if these ANC interests are crooked deals, state capture, corruption, etc.19-21

The principle of the ANC’s interests first and the subordination of every one of its members to the decisions of its national conferences, is well described and acknowledged by Bishop Hangwai Maumela23 of the Lazarus Maumela Foundation. In his defence of the ANC’s so-called “democracy” and the ANC’s so-called “servicing the needs and right of every citizen”, when he swankily writes in the City Press of 30 June 2019 as follows23:4:“…members of the ANC who are in Parliament have been deployed by the ANC. There’s no member who is superior to another. They pay the same affiliation fee to the ANC. They have been allocated various portfolios – some as ministers, deputy ministers, chief whips and chairpersons of portfolio committees. All of them account to the ANC…”

Mthombothi24 also writes on the corrupt democratic-centralism of the ANC which makes all ANCs subordinate to the interests and decisions of the ANC and absolutely not subordinate to the country’s interests, together with the contaminated intertwining of the country’s direct and indirect appointments of parliamentary law-makers and a Parliament only accountable to itself in the Sunday Times24:15:

The men and women who’ll rock up after the elections to be sworn in as our “public representatives” in parliament play absolutely no role in this campaign. They’re insignificant and invisible. They will get their seats as a reward for loyalty to their party, not for their service to the voters or the community. And it has stench of bribery about it. Which is why all the skelms have made it into their party lists – to buy their silence. Choice, the basis of any democracy, is next to nonexistent. The sum total of what passes foe an election campaign is a smiling face on a poster hanging on every pole throughout the country. It’s almost as if the country has been reduced to a single village or community with the same needs, grievances and aspirations.”

Munusamy25, in this context, writes25:20:

Many people lined up by the main political parties to be our public representatives are an insult to our nation. They would not even be able to run a cake sale without eating the cake themselves- or peddling the backing process to their patronage networks.

If an individual has not come to a firm conclusion about the election, that individual will do more for their country/community by not voting, rather than making a mistake.

The clincher: “Supporting the lesser of two evils is still supporting evil”.

The Zondo commission has made me realise how farcical the political system is when corrupt business people are able to control the state by simply buying off politicians and key officials.

The reason there are so many hopeless people vying to be our public representatives is because the political system is closed off to credible, capable leaders who have the potential to modernise and reimaging our future.

We have to revert to the goals of the Freedom Charter, written in 1955, because nobody can think of fresh solutions to society’s current problems.

SA has many great minds who opt to remain on the sidelines or choose to look after their own financial wellbeing rather than the good of society. So it is difficult to invest in a system that is never going to attract or shape good leaders.

Democratic-centralism makes, as said, all the ANC members (from the Number One to the lowest ranked ones) subordinated to the ANC national conference’s decisions. These decisions are again based on the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist political ideology. The outcomes of these decisions are and must be overseen at all time by the top brass of the ANC, as mandated by its politburo as represented by its Top Six executives and NEC (National Executive Committee) of eighty members. Inside this practice of blanket democratic-centralism by the ANC, there is evidence that it has allowed the development of a strong top brass (its so-called Top Six), but that it has limited to some extent the development of an extreme African-leadership syndrome (until Jacob Zuma arrived in the presidency and became the ANC’s and South Africa’s untouchable paramount chief for a while).24,26

Mthombothi24 writes in this respect regarding the paramount chief of the ANC as being associated with the Nazis and the Fascists as well as South Africa’s tribal system24:15:

Everything is centred on the party leader. He’s the fount of all wisdom. This practice has engendered the sort of behaviour or attitude that’s been prevalent in Africa for so many years, of the leader as all-knowing and omnipotent — the so-called Big Man syndrome, often corrupt and autocratic. The Big Men stay too long in power and when they are done, choose their successor, often a member of the family. Which is what Jacob Zuma almost succeeded in doing.

There is more than enough evidence that all the ANC presidents — from Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, up to Cyril Ramaphosa — had challenged as far as their powers allowed according to the ANC’s principle of democratic-centralism in their pursuit of ambitions to become the paramount chief or the “emperor Julius Caesar”, but were politically destroyed in the end. It was specifically Jacob Zuma, through his open and well-planned corrupted self-empowerment, who had neutralised to a great extent and temporarily the ANC’s democratic-centralism and its exclusive parliamentary functioning and statutory empowerment through the ANC’s politburo (consisting of the ANC’s Top Six and NEC). As a result of Zuma’s internal party coup, it has made Parliament and the executive politics of the country extreme dysfunctional, continuing to this day under Ramaphosa. Moreover, it has created in some way the idea of a true democracy framed in a Constitution of excellence, driven and managed by an effective executive team and Parliament, all under an executive-empowered President who has been totally freed by the ANC’s politburo to do his own will: meaning to take independent decisions and actions and to steer the country as he alone thinks suitable. It seems as if the false belief of the ANC’s absolute “democracy” has become overwhelmingly rooted in most of the media and public’s mindsets too.24,29

The above is only theory as long as the ANC stays in power. The ANC’s own constitution — that became the mandated constitution for the president of the ANC and thus also of the State of South Africa since 1994 — essentially nullifies Sections 84(1) and 85(1) of the South African Constitution. It makes the ANC’s politburo directly and indirectly the “head of state and head of the national executive”, nominating their elected ANC president as South African state president while the secretary-general of the ANC in the background remains the real Number One who might “recall” the state president at any time, as happened to Mbeki. Although such secretarial power did not always exist in the past in the same manner and was not as openly exercised by previous secretaries-general such as Alfred Nzo, Kgalema Motlanthe or Gwede Mantashe, we now have a new contender in the form of Ace Magashule, whose strong hands in the politburo is ever-present in the management of the ANC’s appointed state president. The relationship between Ramaphosa and Magashule may be compared to that between Mandela and Mbeki, immediately after 1994. Nelson Mandela was at best a ceremonial president and his deputy Mbeki teh “unofficial” executive president, while both were subject to direct management by the politburo. The rogue rule is: the ANC comes first and South Africa second. This type of pseudo-democratic political culture has characterised the ANC’s modus operandi in the past and will also in future be part and parcel of the ANC’s radical way of governing, as cemented in its Marxist-Leninist ideology and conditioned by its so-called false “democratic-centralism” (which in reality means autocratic-centralism).26-29

A prominent side-stepping of the law by the post-Mandela ANC leaders and followers, when the ANC brass ran into trouble as during the present crisis of integrity in the ANC — mainly created by its democratic-centralism based on Marxist-Leninist ideology — is just to continue with delinquency, while calling at the same time on the late Mandela for forgiveness and salvation. Meaningless clichés are echoed by the pro-ANCs, absolving them from the bad consequences because they have not ruled the country with integrity. Dugmore30 formulates it thus30:20: “The democratic system in our country, so hard fought for by Mandela and his generation, and which involves all our political parties, is at risk if we do not address these urgent needs.” However, never is the question postulated as to what kind democracy is referred to and why democracy is now suddenly at risk while there was essentially an autocracy in place already back in 1994.

To understand how much subjectivity is present in today’s South African politics and the existence of the misconception of the ANC as “democratic” (including its leaders) with the intention to serve every citizen, it is again important to read Mthombothi’s31 claim that the nationalist-militant’s abandonment of democratic liberties leads to fascism, which may be associated with the EFF (otherwise, he once also referred to the ANC regime since 1994 as fascistic due to its “autocratic-centralism”).

Mthombothi31 writes in this context31:19:

There are as many definitions of fascism as there are experts on the subject, but a few characteristics stand out: intolerance, racism (including anti- Semitism), misogyny, militarism, a predilection for violence, with a cult of charismatic leadership which often demands blind and unquestioned loyalty.

The EFF exhibits almost all these traits in its behaviour. The organisation is obviously not yet in power and it is therefore impossible to know how it would behave if it were to hold the levers of power. But on current evidence, the signs aren’t very good. It is aggressively intolerant towards those who disagree with it both within and outside the party.

Mthombothi31 enlightened us further on fascism in profiling the EFF by quoting Robert Paxton’s31 The Anatomy of Fascism. Mthombothi describes31:19: “…fascism as ‘a form of political behaviour marked by obsessive preoccupation with the community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants…abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion’.”

The above view by Mthombothi31 may be true for the EFF and its leaders, but all of those elements are clearly associated with the politics of the ANC before and after 1994: all the traits and characteristics of fascism are emblematic of the traditional ANC. In addition, every one of its leaders as presidents have displayed those traits so far and not only Jacob Zuma. Its fascism became in some way latent immediately after the ANC took power in 1994 because the New Dispensation had forced them to “behave” until they were ready to fully assume political and economic power, which we have seen emerging since 2017 by openly adopting their “autocratic-centralism”. Land grabbing and the nationalisation of the Reserve and Land Banks, Apartheid victimhood, radicalised BEE and cadre deployment are only a few concrete examples of the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist politics awaiting South Africa from 2019 if it stays in power.31,32

The ANC’s unbreakable pre-1994 radical politics (which is now being well-directed by both Ramaphosa and Magashule, notwithstanding that they are locked in a leadership-ambition struggle inside the greater ANC), which the media seems to regard as something of the past, must be specifically compared to the rather meek advent of the fascists and the Nazis via so-called “good people or labour parties”, only to capture Italy and Germany in the end through autocratic-centralism. The two blueprints are being expertly used in post-2019 South Africa. Mthombothi31:19posits:

But of course fascism as an ideology cannot be wiped of the face of the earth. Only its manifestations can be curbed or conquered. But it continues to emerge in different guises and in different countries. Although fascism is identified as a right-wing ideology, there’s no doubt that the Left has contributed to its origin. Mussolini himself, however, was unconcerned about whether fascism was located on the right or the left of the political spectrum. “We don’t give a damn about these empty terminologies and we despise those who are terrorised by these words”, he said. But just as Mussolini, who founded fascism, is a child of the Left, so is Nazism. The Nazi Party is short for National Socialist German Workers’ Party: its precursor was the German Workers’ Party. The intention was to attract workers from left-wing parties. Nazism is short for National Socialism, which became opposed to – and hostile to – international socialism or any other creed of the Left.

The absolute striving towards self-centredness and empowerment of the ANC over South Africans (Black as well as Whites) is well described by Chilenga-Butao33 when he refers to the ANC national executive committee (NEC) lekgotla at the beginning of June 2019 where there was an effort to revive the democratic-centralist habit of the ANC’s politburo power structure against the onslaught by the “Big Man” Ramaphosa who may alone think, plan and do for the ANC. Referring to the ANC’s democratic-centralist framework, Chilenga-Butao33 pointed out that the ANC policy and resolutions, which are taken during conferences, are applicable to all its members, including the presently serving President of the country, Cyril Ramaphosa, as an ANC member.24,33

On the conflicting statements between Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule, the secretary general of the ANC and seemingly the Number One of the ANC in enforcing the post-May 2019 ANC politics directed by democratic-centralism, for example on the change of the Reserve Bank’s mandate as prescribed by its national conference in December 2017, Chilenga-Butao33:30 writes:

Thus democratic-centralism has dissipated and it has happened because the party is not putting South Africa first. The fact that these contradictory statements emerge shows that there are parts of the ANC that are trying to re-establish a form of democratic centralism by saying what they want to see happening in the country and in so doing, arm-wrestle the president into following suit. If they cannot secure democratic centralism in the party, they are hoping to turn their statements into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

But these party members are also using issues such as the Reserve Bank as small battles in the ongoing war to secure their interests and power in the party and over the country. In this way democratic centralism could be used as a tactic in a much larger scheme.

Chilenga-Butao33:30continues: “…the secretary general’s statement contained the bold declaration that the ANC remains the centre of the country and policymaking” and: “This shows that the ANC comes first, especially if that means leading South Africans down the garden path of false hope”.

This ANC comes first was also confirmed when Ace Magashule contradicted Fikile Mbalula who credited Ramaphosa with the ANC’s election win by saying that the electorate did not vote for an individual like Ramaphosa but solely for the party.34,35

The above remarks by Chilenga-Butao33 and Magashule35 confirm our suspicion that the ANC comes first and the country and its people always second. This also brings the focus on the ANC’s capture of the ownership of Parliament since 1994 with its majority of votes obtained in the national elections which does not necessarily mean that the majority of eligible voters had voted for it. With the ANC’s eighty NECs and ANC Top Six’s placing of the ANC as a party and regime always first, Parliament became once more, after having been voted into government on 8 May 2019, their sole property to do with what they want, including its executive powers. The party’s interests come first with the ANC’s application of its democratic-centralism in the selection of its own MPs and MPLs and these law-makers’ sole responsibility to the ANC’s National Conference policies, even apart from the evil it wreaks via Parliament most of the time. There is no role or empowerment — or even the slightest say — for the country’s voters outside the Parliament where the ANC enjoys a vast majority. Or, in terms of the BCOEA, there is not the slightest trace of a kind of employer-employee contract to curb the ANC’s powers.33,35

Our electoral system — which as mentioned, determines that only a political party via the indirect mandate it received at the ballet box, decides and selects the persons who are going to Parliament to represent the party — fits perfectly into the ANC’s democratic-centralist style of government. This entwining of the faulty electoral system with the autocratic democratic-centralism of the ANC government, led directly to South Africa lapsing into a stupor of criminality, criminality and state capture due to the ANC system of cadre and crony-empowerment being employed, since 1994, but especially from 2009 onwards.24,36

In conclusion on the autocracy of the ANC’s democratic-centralism, it can be postulated with utter safety that it has given the ANC a monopoly on political power for 25 years, but at the same has made the ANC a failed regime and South Africa a failed state with the State President merely a figurehead inside its democratic-centralism, captured and controlled by the ANC’s Politburo.23,34

3.1.3.2. South Africa’s faulty electoral system

In the context of receiving a mandate by a political party (as the ANC has managed continuously since 1994) to rule South Africa, it must be noted that South African voters have been caught in an undemocratic voting system. It is a setup of which the ANC has taken full advantage. Ramaphosa himself seems reluctant to part from it and with good reason, because it enables the ANC through the imbalanced proportional system the power of directly selecting and appointing law-makers, without the voters or constituents having a say in who is to represent them, thereby opening the door of government to all of the ruling party’s crooked candidates. There is no opportunity for the ordinary voting public veto them except by waiting another five years and voting against them at the party level. Thus, the present proportional representation system means that MPs and MPLs are only accountable to party bosses (and are being appointed by party bosses on the party’s list) instead of by the electorate.37-40,42 Notable here is Mthombothi’s39 excellent description39:19: “…our MPs and MPLs are plain party representatives and not public representatives”.

The current system creates a total lack of public accountability by the MPs and MPLs, as evidenced many times over by the ANC’s delinquent MPS, MPLs, ministers and even a past President. This chaos, especially pronounced during the Zuma regime, seems to be a process that is going to continue under Ramaphosa.38-42

A private legal action was started in 2019 to reform the election system and to end the present skewed empowerment of the ANC through the electoral system through a court application of the New Nation Movement (NNM), a KhoiSan organisation, to change the Electoral Act (Act 73 of 1998) to make provision for the direct election of MPs and MPLs by voters. This court application was heard initially on 17 April 2019 by Judge Siraj Desai, but was rejected as not urgent. The appeal by the New Nation Movement, Chantal Revelle and the Mediation Foundation for Peace and Justice to the ConCourt was also unsuccessful. In this case Chantall Revelle of the Mediation Foundation said that at present the country was being ruled by a very small minority. Voters do not even know who are representing them in Parliament. Judge Edwin Cameron of the Concourt said on May 8, 2019 that the application was not urgent. For Cameron it was an important and prominent fact that it could take up to August 2019 to run the election if the court agreed with the applicants’ opinion and that already R36-million had been spent on the organisation of the May 8 election. The ConCourt heard the application on 15 August 2019. It must, to bring greater clarity regarding the case, also be stated that the ConCourt had already decided in terms of the financing of political parties, that every adult citizen had the right to stand as an independent candidate for municipal, provincial and national councils but that the present legislation forbade it.38-46

If legislation is promulgated to reform the Electorate Act it would mean the end of favouring the ANC in its ability to manipulate the voters and to continue its spree of looting by crooked candidates without the ordinary people having a say. Moreover, the indication is that this could bring the ANC down in the next election, if it would not have fallen in its own sword already in its governmental term from 2019 to 2024.38-46

In the context of our faulty electoral system, coming from before 1994, there is no doubt that it is keeping the autocratic ANC directly and indirectly in power. The country’s imbalanced and undemocratic electoral system, rooted in the ANC’s corrupt principle of “party interests first”, can, if not immediately corrected, benefit and advantage the Zuma-Magashule clan after 2024 and damage the Ramaphosa clan’s ascendancy immensely. It can play a primary role in the disorderly implementation of land grabbing and the activation of revolution. Our faulty electoral system of public representatives via Parliament is nothing less than the practice of autocracy inside democracy par excellence. This faulty system, together with the ANC’s revolutionary decision-making via mass opinion, had ensured that Mandela, up to Ramaphosa, and now possibly also Ace Magashule, had obtained the ability to maintain their corrupt political power via the “innocent” ballot box. It must be remembered that the controversial Faith Muthambi, Mosebenzi Zwane and Bathabile Dlamini and so on, prominent ANCs who are still in the post-May 2019 Ramaphosa regime because they have not so far been prosecuted for alleged wrongdoing (notwithstanding testimonies before the Zondo and Mpati commissions against them). They have so far avoided legal repercussions because of a well-planned avoidance scheme by the ANC’s top brass for its tainted officials to escape prosecution. Such corrupt figures are not just the face of the present-day ANC: they are, with Jacob Zuma, David Mabuza and Ace Magashule, the soul of the ANC. Democratic parties would not put the names of many of the tainted ANCs anywhere on a list, besides “wanted”. The listing of alleged crooks by the ANC for the May 2019 election and their reappointment as MPs and MPLs as well as in high-ranking parliamentary positions by the ANC, is an excellent example of how the South African political space, especially Parliament, has become toxic and dominated by the same unrepresentative and elderly politicians within the ANC elite and top brass, giving imbalanced dominance to it as a political party, writes Munusamy. It is also significant that the ruling party has less than one million members while there are as many as 37 million eligible voters outside the ANC members’ circle.23,33,34,38-42,47

Mothombothi’s39 writing is clear on the fact that if the people of South Africa could choose themselves their MPs and MPLs directly — as well as their vice-president and president — the ANC would not return to power after the May 2019 election. He writes39:19:

What would astound a visitor from Mars, for instance, would be to hear that the party responsible for these crimes and misdemeanours is set to be returned to power with a thumping majority. That doesn’t square with what democracy is supposed to be. In any other place, a party with that sort of record, especially one that blatantly steals from its people, would be consigned to the political wilderness, never to be returned in power again. And yet, instead of wearing sackcloth and covering himself in ashes as a mark of repentance, President Cyril Ramaphosa, we are told, is almost as popular as Nelson Mandela was at the top of his powers. Instead of embarking on an apology campaign, he’s already on what looks suspiciously like a lap of honour, certain that he’ll be given a mandate to rebuild what his party has wilfully destroyed.

To illustrate once more the imbalance of the Electoral Act, excluding the individual aspirant MP and MPL from becoming independent law-makers but favouring only a political party that fulfils certain prescribed regulations, we may quote the worrying remark of Judge Desai on his rejection of the initial application on 17 April 2019. Marx reports44:6: “Desai het die aansoek verwerp dat die Kieswet gewysig word om onafhanklike kandidate in te sluit en het gesê Revelle kan by ‘n politieke party aansluit of haar eie stig.”

The above remark can undoubtedly leave the view that Desai as a judge does not take an objective stance in relation to the imbalanced political advantage enjoyed by the present-day government by means of what many see as a defective electoral system out. It was and is still indeed the rejection by Revelle of the ongoing prescribed rule to be a member of a political party and to obtain a seat in Parliament through the proportional system that motivated his court application to Desai. Desai’s opinion and conclusion can in a certain context be seen as a confirmation of the constitutional correctness of the present Electoral Act. It can even be interpreted by some critics of the ANC regime and their abuse of the Electoral Act as supporting the ANC regime and Ramaphosa as president who had opposed the application by Revelle and others.38-46

For many antagonists of the current Electoral Act and the ANC’s parliamentary power, Desai’s remarks46:6: “Revelle kan by ‘n politieke party aansluit of haar eie stig”, revive memories of the old Apartheid ways of the judiciary where there was often a profound irritation with the will of the people, as well as fear by the judiciary that they could overreach by siding with the people against the politicians, risking a rejection of any judgement they did not like. Desai’s remarks could even be seen, rightly or wrongly, as a form of oppression. The individual KhoiSan and Kora citizen, who is at present without a direct say in the law-making of the country because the Electoral Act is not correctly phrased and the Constitution is incorrectly executed, may see the functioning of the electoral system and the insistance by the judiciary in defending the present Act, as political and even human oppression.38-46

Many persons, especially the minorities, who feel victimised and penalised by court verdicts, start to observe the statutory and judicial models of their country as incomplete or as a failure, paralysed by a weak chain of justice. Such outcomes can become engraved on the minds of these “physically and emotionally injured” citizens that their country’s law enforcement agencies are subjective and not fit to safeguard their citizen and group rights. Even pristine, good legal verdicts can sometimes have very bad consequences for the judicial system, essentially because they may seem to lack empathy and an insight independent from the regime’s politics.38-46 The “verdict” by Desai can set off such negative attitudes with his interpretation and order of46:6: “Revelle kan by ‘n politieke party aansluit of haar eie stig”. Revelle’s case — for her undoubtedly a case which should not be a legal failure at all — needs to be tested by the ConCourt as being correct or wrong (as the court is now in the process of doing). In South Africa’s confused politics such cardinal issues cannot be left to a single judge’s sole discretion. If Revelle’s appeal is successful, it will signal the end of a system favouring the ANC’s manipulation of the voters and their corruption spree by crooked candidates without the ordinary people having a say in who gets nominated.38-46 It seems as if the judiciary has forgotten what had happened in the past in South Africa (pre- and post-1994) when the judicial system failed to address issues affecting ordinary citizens. The editorial of the Sunday Times, dated 8 September 2019, appositely describes the ongoing series of failures since 1994, during which almost every state institution was grabbed and steered by the crooks for their sole benefit, casting even a cloud of suspicion over the judicial system’s integrity48:18:

The Zondo commission has become a permanent fixture in our lives – entertaining up to a point, but something of a pointless charade. The National Prosecuting Authority seems especially dormant at a time when we would have expected it to be in overdrive. And through all this, promises, fine words, ringing declarations. But little action.

As the situation now stands, our electoral system is a failure. It allowed a dishonest collection of MPs inside the Parliament and and time and again their crooked party managed to rule Parliament as the outcome of the May 2019 national election confirms. The words of Mthombothi49 must ring daily in eligible voters’ ears — as well as those of Desai — when he posits49:21:

Whichever way one looks at this matter, it is hard not to arrive at one conclusion: our system of government lacks proper and effective accountability. It is past time that our electoral system is reformed so that politicians are answerable directly to voters and not their parties.

It is indeed the duty of the judicial system to see to it that this happens.

3.1.4. The lack of Kantian enlightenment in a chaotic South Africa

To accuse Parliament and the rulers of 1994 to 2019 alone of being “political thieves and rapists of the statutory rights” belonging to individual South Africans is incorrect. Most of the individual South Africans were willing participants in this political orgy by shying away from applicable decision-making during elections, as the past 8 May elections confirm wherein 51% of the eligible voters stayed away from the ballot box. Moreover, they failed to vote out the ANC and enforcing the much-needed Electoral-Parliament Act. Pithouse19 relates this citizen’s passivity to Immanuel Kant’s thinking on the waking up versus the failure of self-thinking in the 1780s when Europe had been equally mesmerised.

It seems to a certain extent that in South Africa the “Kantian enlightenment” of human virtue and political empowerment that the 1994 democracy should have brought to the mass of poor and landless Blacks never emerged. Political immaturity, resulting from the so-called “laziness and cowardice” that prevent people from thinking for themselves and from engaging in constructive deeds under less favourable circumstances, prevailed for six parliamentary elections up to May 2019. It is plunging more and more of the Black supporters of the ANC deeper into anarchy, but more precisely, it is thrusting 72% of the voters outside the ANC-supporting voting population into an equal amount of chaos. This is a negative phenomenon, whereby the emergence of a newly-enfranchised class has very little effect on quality of life or levels op development but is rather exploited to further the interests of a new, revolutionary elite. This has been the case in the 1890s in Europe. The shift in power creates and strengthens the poverty, inequality and joblessness of the masses in favour of a small ruling class and group whose interests become paramount. In contemporary South Africa it manifests as well-nigh irreparable chaos.19 This condition was appositely defined by Kant when he said that the19:27: “…lack of property and the estate of direct labour, of concrete labour, form not so much an estate of civil society as the ground upon which its circles rest and move.”

The South African scenario plays out exactly as the European one did centuries ago in form of delinquent acts by the then European capitalists and their corrupt rule. The ANC elite’s organised effort to dominate the masses of poor people with its hijacking of Parliament as an exclusive ANC kingdom has parallels in bygone European class structures. Pithouse19, more precisely, writes19:27: “In other words, the bourgeois public sphere depends, materially, on the impoverishment of the people that it excludes from participation.” The European Enlightenment and its liberal idea that regards all human beings as fully or equally human, is absent in 2019 in the mindset of the ANC leadership. Pithouse19 indirectly brings Kant’s description into focus here regarding the so-called “right of the ANC to mismanage and misuse the mass of poor Blacks at the voting box and in Parliament” because the ANC alone (which is false) freed the people from Apartheid, when he writes further19:27: “In an essay published in 1793 he [Kant] insisted that property was a qualification for citizenship, and that the “domestic servant, the shop assistant, the labourer…are…unqualified to be citizens”.

To break the ANC’s so-called “anti-Kant politics of curtailment of the poor Blacks” does not seem easy. The ANC and its left-bourgeois mentality has been cemented into Parliament, something which will not be erased overnight. The ANC will not allow it, even if they need to carry out a coup d’état to stay in power. Here in South Africa – where the resistance that had led to the fall of the NP was strongly activated by the trade union movement with their Durban strikes in 1973, the community struggles that mobilised millions of people by the 1980s and their building of democracy from below in their focussed dismantling of White supremacy – that political power was hijacked from them in a deliberate way in 1994 by the already crooked ANC elite returning into the mainstream of politics. Shamelessly the ANC elite sent the true and original 1970s and 1980s fighters for democracy “back to the caves” as Pitman19:27 put it. From 1994 the ANC elite (politburo) started to exercise its dominant power “from above”, continuously via Parliament and the ballot box with false promises. This led to the maintenance of ANC political power through the misuse of its electoral vote, writes Pithouse. For Pithouse19, to reverse the present political contradictions brought about by ANC rule from 1994 to 2019, will require an immense counter-input, similarly to the one between 1973 and 1994 by the masses of Black poor. What is needed firstly, is breaking down the ANC’s power which has silenced the impoverished majority of poor Blacks for 25 years. Secondly, the ANC’s so-called legitimacy via Parliament needs to be erased, together with its many well-established cancerous roots in politics, economics and society. Only this will and can erase the ANC’s present-day misuse of Parliament.19

The lawlessness, corruption and dominance, freely appropriated by the ANC regime via Parliament over 25 years in the absence of an Electoral-Parliament Act, together with the lack of a Parliamentary Ethics Code included in the Act, thus forces three immediate questions upon us:

1) Does the ANC under Cyril Ramaphosa hav the ability to reform and to cleanse itself to serve the people of South Africa, their employer, who has appointed them?

2) May any of the promises in the ANC’s May 2019 manifesto be trusted?

3) Is the ANC able to successfully effect land expropriation with or without compensation between 2019 and 2024?

The 51% voters who stay away from the ballot box in May 2019 and the 28% of voters voting for the ANC in those same elections were willing partners in this political orgy by standing aloof from applicable decision-making during the May 2019 elections. The 72% of voters failed also, by choice, in enforcing or promoting anything like the much-needed Electoral-Parliament Act. Pithouse19 compares this passivity and failure with Immanuel Kant’s thinking on the awakening of self-thinking versus the failure of self-thinking in the 1780s. Pithouse writes19:27:

In 1784, Immanuel Kant argued that enlightenment is the emergence from the immaturity that results from the laziness and cowardice that prevents people from thinking for themselves. He asserted, against forces in the state and church, the imperative to respect ‘the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters’.

Kant’s enlightenment sorely escaped the attention of the mass of 30 million poor Blacks. They are strangers to the concept of freedom and individual self-determination: they are strangers because they are delinquently kept there by the ANC elite’s cunning and devious actions. Looking at the ANC’s continuous strengthening of their grip on power over 25 years, it seems the electorate is going to remain captured for many years to come. Given the absence of political reasoning and constructive public debate by the masses outside Parliament and their blind support for a hard-core ANC regime over six elections, one may have serious misgivings about the future of South African democracy. Voter apathy and blind support for the ANC will ensure the continuation of corrupt politics post-May 2019, together with the shameless misuse of Parliament.19,23

3.1.5. The much-needed “sifting mechanism” for political leaders

Kant’s enlightenment not only escaped the attention of the mass of 30 million poor Blacks, but seemingly also that of educated South Africans. What specicially stands out regarding the more learned section of the population, is their fixation with the Constitution as the only means of law-enforcement as regards political practice in country and how the President is selected and elected. The implications and impact of the Electoral Act on politics are disregarded. This Act and the Constitution of the ANC display a totally undemocratic process in the selection and election of the President, which goes against the grain of liberal democracy. It is not a new trend but a custom and policy that has been followed since 1994. It indeed shows that the Electoral Act must dramatically be revised together with the Constitution to make provision for a much-needed sifting mechanism in the selection and election of executive political leaders, meaning the process. The current politically-laden, undemocratic system in the selection of the President was well-illustrated by the tainted Jacob Zuma’s election in 2009 via the ANC’s national conference system which excluded the say of the majority of South Africa’s voters. The lack of understanding of the indirect, non-voters’ election of the President and the skewed process of his selection as leader, may be seen in the recent opinion by Taylor50 in which he defends the election of the President solely “in terms of our so-called liberal democracy as gestalt by the Constitution”. This postulation of Taylor50 is far from the truth and an utmost misunderstanding and a misleading view of our real politics. [The practice of the election in the selection of law-makers of the Parliament, as well as that of the vice-President and the President, was already fully described in the previous two subsections: ANC’s democratic-centralism ideology (See: 3.1.3.1.) and the South Africa’s faulty electoral system (See 3.1.3.2.) and will only shortly be referred to again].

On his so-called “direct democratic selection and election by the voters of the President in terms of their so-called assumed liberal democracy and Constitution”, Taylor50 writes as follows50:20:

The essence of a democracy is that political power flows from the people (the demos) and the people alone. We and no-one else get to decide who will be our president. Every five years parties give us their lists of candidates, we go to the polls and we elect our representatives on the basis of proportional representation. Any of us can put up our hands to be a representative, to be the president, and the demos will vote on our candidacies; there can be no other criteria, no other sifting mechanism. Anything else isn’t democratic.

The constitution has two primary philosophical functions. The first is that it provides the rules for how the temporary transfer of power from the people to representatives works: in other words elections, the structure of parliament, separation of powers and how, for example, the will of the people is realised in the choosing of a chief justice.

The second function is to place restrictions and obligations on how our representatives operate during their five years tenures. Traditionally, human rights serve as barriers against repressive state action. They are lines in the political sand: the state cannot restrict our speech, it cannot deprive us of life, deny our religious beliefs or force religious beliefs upon us, and it cannot prevent us from organising ourselves in unions, associations and political parties. We can hit the the streets and insult our “leaders”. Moreover, human rights ensure equality in law: that none of us is superior to another.

Looking critically at the last (third) paragraph of Taylor’s50 postulation, it is a pile of unrelated philosophical rhetoric which has nothing to do with obtaining and maintaining good executive political leadership. It must be ignored, together with the philosophical postulations of paragraph two. Only then may we focus on Taylor’s resistance to a sifting mechanism to select and elect the President, which boils down to the notion who sees himself fit for office may stand to be elected as President. Paragraph one contains a contradictory element where he praises the proportional representation system of the present Electoral Act, while he seems to be oblivious to the ANC’s policy of democratic-centralism. In the current setup the ANC’s delegates/representatives of less than 4 000 at its national conference select and elect the ANC leader who at the same time becomes the President of the RSA. Furthermore, it must be noted that the ANC has less than 1 million inscribed members out of a ±57 million population (representing less than a 2% ANC impact) and out of a ±35 million eligible-voters population (representing less than a 3% ANC impact). In the May 2019 elections, only 49% of the total eligible-voters population actually voted. Of this 49% only 28% voted ANC. What Taylor50 further missed, is that in many of the modern liberal democracies, as inscribed in their Constitutions, it is compulsory for all their eligible citizens to register and to vote in elections. This statutory shortcoming in our so-called “excellent” Constitution contributed to the fact that 51% of the eligible voters did not take part in the May elections. This absence of an established liberal democracy is part of the conundrum which has contributed to the ANC having been the sole ruling party since 1994 at the national level. The current President, Cyril Ramaphosa, cannot claim to be elected democratically, neither can the ANC pride themselves on being a democratically elected regime representing the total population.50

South Africa needs a sifting mechanism in the choosing of its executive political leaders on all levels written into the Constitution which states certain clear pre-requirements, for instance a minimum educational qualification and a clean integrity certification. The last-mentioned should include any alleged crimes and misdemeanours under investigation and of course a life-style audit. At the moment the ANC “clearing” rests on its so-called “integrity” committee’s decisions as well as the “approvals” of the Top Six and the NEC of the ANC (the so-called ANC politburo). The lists of candidates to which Taylor refers and where for instance the ANC put up their eligible candidates, were tainted by alleged criminals and even murderers. As many as 22 candidates were alleged to have been tainted and many went back to Parliament, not only to be law-makers, but were promoted into senior parliamentary positions. Jacob Zuma would not have qualified if an official sifting mechanism had been in place when he ousted Thabo Mbeki in 2009 to become President. Likewise, Cyril Ramaphosa would not stay a day on as President after the Public Protector’s finding that he misled Parliament about the R500 000 “gift to his election campaign” from the corrupt company, Bosasa. Central its policy of launching crooks into high-level political executive positions — at least for the ANC as a party and regime — is its “declaration” that “no-one is guilty before having been prosecuted and sentenced by a court of law”. The secretary-general of the ANC, Ace Magashule, via the decisions of the ANC Caucus’s Political Committee, the ANC’s General Council and the ANC’s Integrity Committee, made this standpoint clear in the ANC’s reappointments of tainted ANC-leaders in senior positions in the post-May 2019 government. Integrity only counts for the ANC top brass when they are locked up, an outcome that is not easily reachable when it comes to the ANC’s top leadership in post-1994 South Africa. The ANC’s top brass knows it well and rides the crooked judicial system. How crooked the leadership of the ANC has become but still qualifies today in terms of the proportional representation to be included on its tainted lists of parliamentary candidates, has been the subject of multifarious comments by various political analysts and commentators.50-53

Gumede51 identifies ten untouchable groups that must first be tackled before the rule of law and good politics may be restored. Such groups should be eliminated from the regime’s inner circle and positions of power and influence, which they owe precisely to the ANC’s democratic-centralism and our faulty electoral system that lacks a leadership-sifting mechanism. Here he identifies as the primary untouchable group the ANC’s own corrupt but senior politicians at national, provincial and local level, who flaunt their power and corruptly acquired assets and live ostentatiously on public resources.51

But this ideal outcome propagated by Gumede51 is easier said than done, because the ANC’s democratic-centralism and our faulty official electoral system has been rooted in the ANC’s politics and has been expertly used since 1994. It allows someone such as Ace Magashule to evade the law for his alleged delinquencies. Munusamy writes52:20:

ANC secretary-general ACE Magashule can claim to be a victim of a “fake news media conspiracy” because the National Prosecuting Authority has not been able to formulate a case against him despite myriad illegal activities during his term as Free State premier. The line between wrong and right is indistinct.

Gordhan57, referring to the crooked outcomes between 1994 and 2019 resulting from the ANC regime’s veto of any merit system when it comes to leadership appointments, posits57:19:

The past decade has been characterised by the paralysis of law enforcement agencies to act against corruption, the looting of state coffers, the catastrophic dismantling at the South African Revenue Service (Sars), and rise of a parallel security state targeting political opponents of the state capture project.

Gumede51 similarly comments on the state of lawlessness resulting from ANC cronyism and the lack of any mechanisms to select leaders of integrity by saying51:20:

Allowing political, criminal and business gangsters to remain seemingly untouchable, strutting around arrogantly while ordinary citizens live in fear and poverty gives the sense that SA is out of control, lawless and leaderless.

On 28 June 2019 Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng50 saw fit to allude to the anarchy surrounding so-called “state capture” and its concomitant corruption, as revealed by the Zondo and Mpati Commissions. In a speech to corporate South Africa at the Sunday Times Directors Event in Sandton, he posed the following pertinent questions50:20:

How do we choose leaders? Who qualifies to be a leader? Is there a sifting mechanism of sorts? Isn’t it desirable that, for starters, before you can become a president there are very stringent requirements to be met before you can even begin to run?

It is significant that Mogoeng50 too, is proposing the establishment of some kind of sifting mechanism for political leaders, not only internally by the political parties themselves, but also officially by the state. The power of politicians and rulers to shape the fate of the country is simply too great to leave to mere chance, and requires them to be at least morally “fit for office”. It is clear that South Africa’s so-called “liberal democracy” and its Constitution are not foolproof and is open for exploitation by dishonest politicians.50

Taylor’s50 subsequent reaction to the above questions by Mogoeng50 may be seen as not only inapplicable, but inappropriate. It borders on bad faith when he writes50:20: “What is a problem is that chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng doesn’t like our democracy.” In the same breath he continues his attack by addressing justice Mogoeng directly in an open letter as follows50:20:

Chief justice Mogoeng, you are a functionary of the people, not a paramount leader. Your function is to ensure that political power remains with the demos and that means, at the very least, that we are the “sifting mechanism”. We choose our representatives through the electoral process and they rule at our pleasure. Our vote is the most stringent criterion because, ultimately, political power belongs to us.

Looking critically at Taylor’s50 criticism of Mogoeng, it was exactly because of Mogoeng’s position as functionary of the people that he as a justice had put the questions. Taylor50 uncritically places his faith in the act of voting itself, forgetting that in many totalitarian states voters have for years voted in corrupt dictators, whether coerced or not.

Not anyone of us should have the automatic right to stand for political office: every aspirant candidate needs to be scrutinised for a lack of integrity and education. Without such a pre-selection, democracy is absent and freedom misused. It is important to note that for all statutory professions there are pre-requirements in terms of training and integrity to be able to register and practise for instance as a doctor, an attorney, etc. These registrations are further subject to compulsory renewal yearly as long as the practitioner wants to stay on the roll. Negligence and personal deviances/delinquencies may mean the removal of the professional practitioner’s name from the roll and the end of his ability to practise. In comparison, the careers of philosophers, etc. are not seen as statutory professions and anyone, without the slightest training, may practise it. The status of the self-styled philosopher or the well-learned philosopher does not differ very much from the status of the postdoctoral philosopher. Politicians, especially political leaders, are appointed to high-level positions as law-makers, which make them nothing less than statutory professionals. This makes an official sifting mechanism for politicians urgently needed in a future South African political system. If such a system had been in place since 1994, the Zondo and Mpati Commissions would not have been needed today.50

The above also has a direct bearing on Munusamy’s54 absolute need for lifestyle audits to expose corruption among those whom she called our all-too-easily-tempted-politicians [to which may be added: all-too-easily-elected-politicians]. The argument here is that there are always some politicians who want to live above their means and are therefore amenable to corruption, as well as narcissism, writes Munusamy54. More precisely, there are undoubtedly people directly and indirectly in politics using their positions to access additional sources of income, varying from crooked contracts, bribes, up to donations for election campaigns and the corruption around it, in order to enrich themselves, as well as to ensure their selection to positions of great political power. The best means of applying checks and balances to politicians is through official and rigorous lifestyle audits. It must be comprehensively applied not only to an aspirant politician, but also all of his/her associates such as for instance the companies, trusts and his/her secret donors who are giving to his/her election. The so-called Act on Privacy must not play a role in safeguarding crooked politicians from investigation and the state agency evaluating a candidate must have the right to use all means available, from the SAPS to the NPA and SSA, etc., to gather information in detail. The ANC itself has promised since 2016 to introduce lifestyle audits for ministers, government officials and leaders of public enterprises. Indeed, last year Cyril Ramaphosa pledged that everyone in the government including himself, would undergo them, reports Munusamy54.

Featuring prominently in Munusamy’s54 proposal, is the strict requirement that all MPs and MPLs should also be audited. So far, regarding the ANC’s talking the talk but not walking the walk, nothing has realised. Indeed, as previously said, if these law-makers’ audits had been done since 1994 (when persons with serious criminal records were allowed into Parliament because of their exoneration from doing “evil” as result of “Apartheid’s evil”), South Africa would have been saved the current need for running commissions on state capture and crooked VIPs. It would also have saved Ramaphosa the unnecessary and embarrassing attention of the Public Protector concerning his 2017 Nasrec election campaign. Moreover, it would have set in motion the much-needed evolution of the ANC’s economic policies, cemented as they have been in democratic-centralism which emanates from its pre-1994 years and its communist past. As a result of its iron grip on power in South Africa, 86 members serve in the ANC’s autocratic politburo (representing only 2% of the ANC-members) who have never had a lifestyle audit so far and of whom some are even regarded by the ANC’s Integrity Commission as seriously tainted.54,55

Regarding the findings of the ANC’s own integrity committee, these are often rejected in favour of keeping corrupt politicians in office. Commenting on this tendency, the political commentator Justice Malala writes96:

These leaders of the ANC past and present don’t believe they and a large chunk of the electorate are bound by the laws passed by its parliament and enforced by the organs of state: the police, the prosecutorial services and the judiciary.

It’s not just at national level. It cascades down through the entire ANC. Two weeks ago it was reported that the ANC in Gauteng had rejected its own integrity commission’s recommendations to remove several members, including two who are linked to the VBS Mutual Bank scandal.

The integrity commission in Gauteng, headed by Trevor Fowler, recommended that the mayors of Merafong and the West Rand be fired for their complicity in taking ratepayers’ money and unlawfully, despite clear legal advice, depositing it into VBS. They broke the law and they did so knowingly. Yet the ANC in Gauteng, which for the past 10 years many of us gullible fools have been calling “the enlightened ANC”, chose to defend them. As Mbete said, they see things differently in this ANC. They do not see the rule of law.

The above absence of an official sifting mechanism of politicians before being allowed into executive positions, such as lifestyle audits for the ANC politicians seeking parliamentary positions (besides the utter failure of the party’s integrity commission described by Malala), is deeply rooted in its strong democratic-centralism. Its primary aim and intention is the gobbling up of any challenger or opposition to its well established Marxist-Leninist model of power maximisation and permanent rule. As Feketha56, Munusamy54, Gordhan57 and Padayachee et al.55, already showed in some way, Professor William Gumede58 of the School of Governance at Wits takes further, in depth. Besides the ANC’s adherence to and continuing practice of its rigid pre-1994 revolutionary ideology to maintain undisturbed democratic-centralism, Gumede also points to the use by the ANC’s top leadership of racism and “Black victimhood” to secure their position of political power over the last 25 years. The intertwining of three insidious elements led directly to an ANC-sanctioned culture of state capture, corruption and mismanagement while constant, internalised malfeasance created a culture of unaccountability and irresponsibility. In fact, irresponsibility and unaccountability might be described as an insouciant “lifestyle” in its own right. This in turn makes the implementation of lifestyle audits impossible and the 2016 intention of Ramaphosa to introduce it, tantamount to hypocrisy: On the contrary, it became a topic for the top brass to avoid, because it endangers the established democratic-centralism (autocracy) of the ANC and thus will nullify the top brass’s autocratic rule over the greater party, Parliament and the country. Such autocracy is a revolutionary tradition, habit and custom, which has been internalised in the ANC mindset since its terrorist days. It is a system that Mandela, up to Ramaphosa, brilliantly uses when their power is endangered from within the ANC as well as from outside. The same strategy is applicable to Jacob Zuma, Ace Magashule and David Mabuza fighting at present in the ANC for the autocratic soul of the party.54-58

Gumede58 elaborates further on the functioning of the power structure within the current ANC58:16:

The ANC is guided by democratic centralism, where every member has to obey central decisions and where leaders vet even the lowest-level appointments. These are among the reasons why corruption flourished in a system where everyone must support the party leadership, no matter whether it is wrong, incompetent or corrupt. “Deployment” to government or to the private sector is based on loyalty and struggle “credentials”, rather than ability and competence.

There is the belief that the party laws are above those of the country, even above individual conscience. Many ANC members and supporters would rather follow the party line. They uncritically support party leaders. When corruption is exposed, the party faithful close ranks.

In a centralised party system, a small group can capture the party and wield power over life, careers and public resources.

They made centralised decisions that were accepted as edicts. They appointed loyalists to every level of the party and government. They were uncritically supported by the rank and file, under the rubric of loyalty.

The deputy-general of the SACP, Solly Mapaila, has argued that the use by the ANC’s politburo of democratic-centralism-cum-autocracy to develop a predatory state, has been well hidden inside their pretended implementation of Black economic empowerment over the years. This has led to disadvantage the Black majority while propping up a few politically connected politicians.56

On the intention of the ANC politburo to maintain at all times its policy of democratic centralism, rendering the introduction of an honest lifestyle audit, independent of the ANC’s corrupt party politics, impossible, Gumede58 shows how White racism (citing Apartheid going all the way back to 1652) is seen by the politburo as a danger to Black nationalism. He writes58:18:

Many ANC supporters often still back leaders, issues and politics almost exclusively on the basis of race. US scholar of race Cornel West, in a differing setting, warned about reducing every issue to “racial reasoning”. When an individual is corrupt, all one has to do is to claim racism, and people rally emotionally to that person. Misplaced black solidarity often demands closing ranks behind dubious personalities.

If a white person rightly criticises a corrupt black person, the corrupt person is embraced. Misplaced struggle solidarity has the same effect. If a non-ANC person, or an opposition party member or supporter criticises a corrupt ANC leader, the corrupt ANC leader is protected. If a black person is doing the criticism, he or she is a “puppet” of whites as “white monopoly capital” and “selling out” their race.

This organised racial politics of the ANC in assuring its corruption, etc., but most of all its’ politburo’s absolute autocracy, also streamed since 1994 out of its so-called democratic centralism into the cognition of “black victimhood”, sanctioned further the ANC’s politburo’s right to can do anything wrong because it “services the Black-nation”.

Gumede further enlightens us58:18:

Black victimhood also encourages corruption. It appears that almost every wrong government decision, failure and poor policy made by current leaders is blamed on apartheid, colonialism or conspiracies by the white elite or hostile Western countries.

Black leaders in government and the private sector are increasingly using colonialism, apartheid and Western “imperialism” to cover their incompetence, mismanagement and corruption. Many African leaders and government have cynically promoted the idea of Africans being victims. This easy option numbs creative thinking. It means that leaders and governments can shrink their responsibility to voters. It has also made it difficult to hold leaders and governments accountable for wrongdoing, lack of delivery of delivery and corruption.

The introduction of the much-needed “sifting mechanism” in the selection of ANC political leaders and the doing of a lifestyle audit on them as “preached” by Cyril Ramaphosa in 2016, will and can never be executed in terms of uncontaminated and responsible international evaluation criteria. When looking at the many tainted top ANC members in the present Ramaphosa regime “because they have not yet been found guilty in a court of law”, Ramaphosa’s own inexplicable and seemingly desperate efforts to keep the donors to his 2017 Nasrec leadership campaign secret at all costs via the court provides a prominent example. His use of the permanent, age-old, ingrained trick of “stretched values” in the selection of the ANC’s leaders, makes it clear that the testing of the concepts of goodness, integrity, honesty, responsibility and accountability has never been internalised in ANC political culture and will probably never be internalised in the future. They refuse to face accusations in public to prove their innocence. The abuse of the South African courts for civil cases to silence accusations has become the order of the day for many ANC leaders to ride out accusations and allegations. Prominent here is the court order obtained by the suspended chief financial officer (CFO) of the Sol Plaatje municipality, Lydia Mahloko, who had interdicted the Northern Cape’s local governance executive committee members (MEC) from tabling a damning investigation report which recommends that she be criminally charged for flouting supply-chain management processes during the procurement of a fleet, including the purchase of the mayoral vehicle. The mindset of the ANC politiburo is saturated with autocracy as guided and practised by means of democratic-centralism, racism and Black victimhood. Magashule, Zuma, Mabuza and Ramaphosa’s political activities reflect all the manifestations of these syndromes. If Ramaphosa already has a problem with the Public Protector’s elementary investigation of the donors and the “movement and end-allocation” of their so-called “sincere gift money” for his 2017 Nasrec election, what will his counter-attack look like when she launches a full lifestyle audit on him, starting in 1980, and scrutinising every cent he generated as well as from whom, for which service delivered?54,58,59

3.2. Evaluation guidelines for political parties

3.2.1. Overview

The successful execution of the post-2019 land-reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and implementation by a so-called “good” government, together with a “good” leadership in whom integrity and Solomon’s wisdom are essential characteristics. This means a regime that is not blindly on a path of “reaching the goal at any cost” but to effectively achieving an end-result regarding the matter, which would be a success. This requires a regime honestly serving the interests of all its people by following a well-drawn-up roadmap for an orderly land-reform initiative, and steering it into reality.

The essential question here is thus whether the ANC can be theoretically deemed a candidate or may be shortlisted and thus be considered to have the leadership potential to ensure the successful implementation and completion of the post-2019 plan on land expropriation.

The evaluation guidelines for political parties, as already used in the previous Articles 9 (EFF) and 10 (DA) will precisely be re-used to evaluate the ANC as national, provincial and municipal rulers. These guidelines on the ANC are:

  1. Its general policies as well as specific standpoints on issues such as respect for law and order, as well as the fighting of corruption, state capture, the behavioral delinquency of its MPs and MPLs, as well as its top leaders, in addition to the party’s and its leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as evidenced by its manifesto for the 2019 election;
  2. Public criticism for the period 1994 to 2019 in newspapers, etc., evaluated and reflected by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the party as a political organisation, its members’ and leaders’ behaviours and actions such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behaviour-delinquency of MPs and MPLs, top brass leaders, their views on land     expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the party’s internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinion.
3.2.1.1. The Louw Appraisal Checklist

For the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC, the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018 will again be used.60 The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was again applied to all information collated in the literature review of the party’s manifesto and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees applicable. For guiding the gathering of the information on the ANC, the approach used with the EFF and DA, is again set out as follows for better understanding, namely:

1) The Curriculum Vitae (CV) to obtain insight into the candidates’ qualifications, experience, extraordinary skills, etc; and

2) The letters of the referees, the Attestations, to offer, firstly, further insight into the qualifications, experience, etc. of the candidate; and secondly, at the same time give us confidential insight into the good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate, that are well-masked in, or absent from the CV. This referee-data mostly informs us well regarding the “goodness” or “badness” of a candidate, which can make him in the end a failure or a success in the handling of the responsibilities of the post.

In this research the manifesto and self-description offered by the ANC and its leaders will be seen as their CVs. Hereto the public reporting by journalists and other sources will be seen as the letters of referees/references or attestations. The account or verdict awarded to the ANC as a capable and skilled ruler able to successfully execute land reform, will only be calculated in terms of the Louw Appraisal Checklist60 at the end of the final article in the series (article 20).

3.3. African National Congress

3.3.1. Overview

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF: Part 1) and the Democratic Alliance (DA: Part 2) have already been published in the previous two articles (9 and 10) under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”.

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the African National Congress (ANC: Part 3) will be published next, also under the above general title.

It is an open question if the ANC, “mandated” by the voters as the post-2019 government of South Africa, can truly drive the intended land expropriation as an enterprise with honesty and integrity, to bring it to a successful end? Issues that immediately come to mind are the skills, abilities, integrity and capabilities of the ANC as a regime and as a party, together with the skills, abilities, integrity and capabilities of its elite and leaders. Primary among these is the important question of integrity and whether they might be trusted by voters to exercise their mandate. Integrity is not limited to a single plane: it is comprehensive, including social, economic, personal and political trustworthiness and honesty. Looking at the ANC’s pre-2019 regime record, when comparing it with the prerequisites of Patricia De Lille’s61 list of the seven conditions (which she formulated in her Good Party manifesto for the 8 May elections) which a so-called good government must fulfil too, it clearly fails all of these seven conditions. (Notwithstanding this failure, De Lille joined as minister in Ramaphosa’s cabinet!) The problem here is that the ANC’s election manifesto and its 1994 to 2019 behaviour as a regime did not adhere to the cognitive mindset, the psyche, the culture, customs, traditions and habits or the ability to distinguish between good and bad government. It means that if pre-2019 ANC behaviour is repeated in post-2019 South Africa, good governance will stay an unattainable dream within ANC politics. A successful land expropriation plan thus equally unattainable.61-63

The general ANC manifesto can give us some clue as to what positive or negative elements may be expected from the regime for the period 2019 to 2024.

3.3.2. The general ANC manifesto

Regarding the ANC’s general manifesto for the May 2019 election, launched in January 2019, Derby62, Hunter64 and Kgosana63 point out that it was again saturated with a mass of empty promises of more and better work, better health and education, and contaminated with populism. Missing, however, was prudence. The manifesto further reflects some conflicting views, opinions and mostly, hostile commitments: a Ramaphosa version and a Magashule-Zuma–version, contrasting with each other on issues of cardinal importance such as nationalisation, etc. The coexistence of these two versions and a seemingly growing split in the ANC’s general as well as specific politics (which seems to be purely a leadership struggle rather than a true fight around political principles according to many analysts) are still continuing at the close of this article on 31 October 2019.62-64

Kgosana63 described the ANC’s general manifesto, after an in-depth analysis of it, together with a history of the regime as from 1994, as follows63:17:

The manifest failures of the ANC’s manifesto are all around us: The same bright, shiny, shameless promises are repeated each election, never to be actually met.

More specifically on the ANC’s manifesto, Kgosana writes63:17:

Yes, the ANC has done a lot since 1994. Building infrastructure, electrifying homes, connecting people to clean water, ensuring near universal access to basic education. But these achievements are negated by a bloated and uncaring bureaucratic system, corruption, incompetence and indifference. After the nightmare of the Zuma years, the ANC has to do a lot more than repeat empty promises.

Derby62 takes us closer to the “political darkness” inside the ANC soul, as reflected by its manifesto, when he comments62:2:

In a still-precarious position, there’s simply no room for the ANC — or, I’d add, any party looking to lead after this year’s polls — to veer far off a script that speaks of fiscal prudence. The party has blown the surplus position it had more than a decade ago; it has hired all the public servants it can hire and doled out all the political favours it possibly can. On the last one, we can only hope, right?

It will be interesting see what the manifestos still to come will offer as solutions to what’s now a stale tale of woe. And thereafter we‘ll have to wait for the “Naas Botha” commentary that follows to drum up uncertainty. A state, I am starting to believe, that is inescapable for any functional democracy.

Built into the ANC general manifesto for the May 2019 elections must be read the party’s poor track record coming from 1994, writes the editor of the Sunday Times on 10 February 2019. Specific stands here as reference President Ramaphosa’s Nation Address (Sona) in February 2019. Putting into perspective the many promises of Ramaphosa (which had seemingly become a habit with him still nearly six months after the elections) to improve education, accelerate the economy and return the country to the rule of law, etc., it was clear that neither Ramaphosa as a leader, nor the ANC as a party and regime, have what it takes to deliver from 2019 to 2024 what it has promised. South Africans have heard many promises from the ANC’s executive leaders from the same podium as the one that Ramaphosa used in February 2019. The editor of the Sunday Times in this context writes65:16:

Who can forget Zuma’s first promise in 2009 after his election as state president a few weeks earlier? At the heart of our worst recession, Zuma stood in front of the nation promising to create 500,000 jobs every year. He never delivered, despite repeating this promise of creating jobs every year of his nine years in office.

Ramaphosa’s reign has so far echoed Zuma’s failed actions, however much his clan wants to manipulate the truth in their stand-off with the Magashule-Zuma clan, which has now become a daily cry from the Ramaphosa camp to the public to take these myths and lies for the truth.65

Note what Jacob Zuma himself said in April 2019 around the hypocritical “virtue” of the ANC after 1994 — seemingly “anointed” and innocent as an angel just descended from Heaven — in his ANC May election roadshow promoting the ANC’s general manifesto by describing all the post-1994 wrongs under the ANC (wherein the ANC and its elite was the sole governing party) to be simply the after-effects of Apartheid. Cele66, in this context, reports66:8:

He lauds the party for being honest; admits that there had been some difficulties in fixing the wrongs made by the oppressors, saying that it cannot happen overnight. When you vote for the ANC, you vote for a car that is already en route, you don’t vote for a car whose road worthiness you are unsure of. There is no one who can say that the ANC has not worked for its people.

Zuma is not alone in this cloud of empty promises and dreams. The political figure Cyril Ramaphosa also stands out in his empty pre-election promises and undertakings, writes the labour-relations journalist Terry Bell67. Bell refers to these many promises as outlandishness, which he defines as meaning: looking or sounding bizarre. Specifically on the political, emotional and spoken manifestations, Bell writes67:2:

Extravagant – outlandish – promises are the stock of the political elite as they seek the votes to install them at the parliament trough.

Take the guarantee by President Cyril Ramaphosa that the ANC would build 1 million new houses in Johannesburg‘s Alexandra township within five years.

One million houses? For a population of anything up to 500 000 people living on 800 hectares of land, which, government admits, has the infrastructure to only cater for 70 000 residents? The mind boggles.

And older residents, among them trade unionists who were part of the militant Alex anti-apartheid resistance of the 1980s, have heard it all before.

As recently as 2001, former president Thabo Mbeki announced a R1.6 billion Alexandra renewal project that promised between 50 000 and 66 000 new homes within seven years. What happened to the money and the project is still being investigated.

This outright misleading and false information can already give us an indication of what to expect from 2019 to 2024 from the ANC in most of its endeavours of which addressing land ownership will be the most important. In this context the question is how can any person mislead himself so immensely as to accept his own lies as the truth? Political manipulation and empty promises may be part of the politician’s stock-in-trade, but the ANC has take it to a new level, comparable to some of the more outlandish, to use Bell’s term, promises and predictions made by African dictators such as Idi Amin or Mobutu Sese Seko.

Looking critically at the content of the ANC’s manifesto for the May 2019 election, much of it consisted of the recycling of old ideas, as well as failed outcomes disguised as doubtful successes: it says really nothing of constructing a future and bringing value to the people of South Africa. Looking more broadly at what the text of the manifesto tried to address — such as, for example, the erasing of poverty, inequality, unemployment and the maintenance of a capable state, etc. — these are indeed hackneyed themes during ANC rule from 1994 to 2019. These problems were mostly exacerbated by the ANC itself through its immense mismanagement, such as the theft of state money belonging to the poor by the ANC’s cronies. It was only repackaged for ANC propaganda during the May 2019 elections, not so much as to bring healing, but to present their failures as the results of Apartheid, deflecting from ANC wrongdoing. The political researcher, Thokozani Chilenga-Buta33, also sees the endless repetition of the ANC’s populist themes in the run-up to the May elections, when he writes33:30:

Though these are nice ideas, they are not new. They were punted in the National Development plan (NDP) which was endorsed by Parliament in 2013. At the time the ANC had the full support of Parliament, including opposition parties, to implement the ideals of the NDP.

These problems and failures created by the ANC regime, lacking as always a constructive effort to address and solve them at least in some way, were also reflected by the lekgotla of the ANC’s national executive committee (NEC) at the beginning of June 2019. Chilenga-Butao states33:30:

“That in 2019 the NEC lekgotla is propagating the same old rhetoric — without saying why it thought these ideas had failed to be implemented since 2013 — is a major deception.”

3.3.3. The Ramaphosa manifesto

Ostensibly in an effort to imprint his own powerful status upon the minds of both the ANC and the public, Cyril Ramaphosa also published his own pre-May 2019 manifesto. (This was clearly seen by some analysts, firstly as an attempt to undermine the ANC’s democratic-centralism wherein every member, including the President of the South African state, is subordinate to policy and resolutions taken during its conference, and secondly as a direct effort at that time by Ramaphosa to call attention to his saviour-status in his leadership conflict with Ace Magashule, the secretary general of the ANC).

The best reflection of a self-description (and of a CV) of the present-day ANC’s intentions to shamelessly mislead  the public and dishonestly recruit of voters after 25 years of corruption and failed governance, were the nine paragraphs below containing the ANC’s general political manifesto and its president’s seemingly politically confused mindset.33,72.73

This manifesto, emanating directly from Cyril Ramaphosa’s belief-system and political mindset, does not sound different from that of Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa’s message to South Africans to vote for him and the ANC was published on 17 March 2019 in both the Rapport and the Sunday Times respectively. It reads72:9 and 73:2:

Mede-Suid-Afrikane/ Fellow South Africans

Die toekoms van ons land is in die hande van diegene wat die meeste daarvoor omgee. Jy, die stemgeregtigde/ The future of our country is in the hands of those who care about it the most. You, the Voter.

‘n Hernude gevoel van trots – en ‘n nasie vol verwagtinge – berus op die punt van die pen wat jy op 8 Mei 2019 sal gebruik om jou stem uit te bring/ A renewed sense of pride – and a nation bursting with expectations – sits squarely at the tip of the pen that will be using to make your mark on the 8th of May 2019.

Bring dus jou stem uit vir die party wat met dieselfde passie as jy in hernuwing glo/ So, make your mark for the party that believes in renewal with the same passion that you do.

Die party wat ons nasie se toekoms vooropstel in sy hart en ‘n regering wat ‘n gespesialiseerde teen korrupsie-eenheid gestig het/The party that has our nation’s future foremost in its heart and a government that has put in place a specialised anti-corruption unit.

Die party wat daarop aangedring het om die Zondo-kommissie te stig om staatsopname bloot te lê en te vernietig/ The party that insisted on setting up the Zondo Commission to expose and destroy state capture.

Die party wat die proses gelei het om weereens die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens (SARS) gekry het om volgens wêreldgehalte te funksioneer/The party that has led the process of once again getting SARS working at its world class best.

Die party onder wie se leierskap, ‘n nuwe leierskap van die National Prosecuting Authority, daargestel het/The party under whose leadership, a new leadership of the National Prosecuting Authority has been put in place.

Die party wat die vermoë van die regering herstel het om dienste billik aan almal te verskaf./ The party that is restoring the ability of government to provide services fairly to all

Op 8 Mei 2019, maak ‘n onuitwisbare merk vir die toekoms van vernuwing wat Suid-Afrika verdien/. On the 8th of May 2019, make an indelible mark for the future of renewal that South Africa deserves.

Maak jou merk/ Make your mark.

Stem ANC/ Vote ANC.

Saam Sal Ons Suid-Afrika Laat Groei/ Let’s Grow South Africa Together.

[Signed] Cyril Ramaphosa

President van die ANC/ President of the ANC

3.3.3.1. Analysis of the Ramaphosa manifesto

The above message firstly needs to be analysed before the ANC may be considered as a potential ruler (an employee), mandated by the voters (as the employer within our scheme) effect land expropriation with or without compensation. The above nine paragraphs consist of at least eleven misleading items and untruths: it seems to be clear here that in Ramaphosa’s political mind, as  in that of most of the ANC’s top brass, myths have become truths after their 25 years of unfettered rule and extreme power.72:9

The use of the words “renewed, renewal and restoring” is striking, confirming that the ANC itself has recognised that its political integrity, actions and deliveries from 1994 to 2019 have been sorely lacking, apart from its corruption, negligence and mismanagement.72:9

Referring to a renewed feeling of pride, the “renewed” and “restoring” confirm that the period 1994 to 2019 was undoubtedly a period of constant despair and of loss, experienced by the nation exclusively at the hands of the ANC regime. His specific reference to the renewing of the ANC is an acknowledgement by him of his outright failure, as well as that of his party between 1994 and 2019 to fulfil their mandate of providing good government. Pertinent here is the literature which confirms that the ANC’s mindset and behaviour became totally focussed on internal matters with serious wrongdoing and a culture of delinquency.72:9

Ramaphosa’s reference to the repair of the ANC is again an admission of guilt that the ANC was in 2019 a failed party and a failed regime, overseen by equally failed leaders since 1994: A party that would not be trusted or allowed again as the post-2019 government if a sifting mechanism existed. Ramaphosa’s pleading for the rehabilitation of the ANC above reminds one of the empty words of a confirmed psychopathic criminal, asking for forgiveness for his bad actions to society and to be allowed back amongst them, knowing well he is just going to continue with his serious delinquencies, being conscious that his bad character cannot be changed for the better. To speak like Ramaphosa of his party who had put the nation first/foremost from 1994 to 2019, is an utter lie and a hoax. Firstly, the chaos in our economics, the extreme poverty of 30 million Blacks, criminality and corruption, etc., by the ANC elite and their cronies have long ago erased the concept of nation from most South Africans’ minds. The promise to restore the ability of the government to provide services to the citizens, who are the people (employer) who had appointed them, is nothing else than the acknowledgement that never after Apartheid had there again been any services of average standard offered by the ANC, or when sometimes offered, limited to short periods after 1994 and limited to the ANC’s favourites. Secondly, when Ramaphosa speaks of the concept of a nation, he, for vote-gathering, clearly deviated from his party’s previous classification of Whites as non-Africans and as colonists respectively and thus not part of the ANC’s nation concept.72:9

Ramaphosa’s bragging as to the establishment of a specialised corruption unit must let him feel giddy: Who was the ruler from 1994 to 2019 and who was vice-president under Jacob Zuma when the immense corruption, which Ramaphosa now “promises to erase”, started to develop and to reach a climax: the ANC and Cyril Ramaphosa. The founding of the specialised corruption unit is indeed meant to catch the ANC’s elite (although the prosecuting outcome is far from that). Ramaphosa’s specialised corruption unit failed so far at the closing of this research on 31October 2019 to bring to book a single one of the ANC’s top elite who had been identified by the Zondo or the Mpati commissions. With the establishment of the Zondo commission, notwithstanding the fact that it was conducted under the chair of an excellent justice with high integrity, Ramaphosa knows well that is toothless and a masked instrument to strengthen his position against the Zuma-Magashule clan in the hope of underminging their power in the ANC and within the party’s NEC after 2019. It is about his own power struggle and not improving the lot of the voters or that of the country.72:9

For instance, his so-called renewing of SARS means one thing: SARS (the South African Revenue Service) collapsed solely under ANC rule and is still struggling post-May 2019. Evidence suggests that SARS is miles away from rehabilitation and a positive restart. Also Ramaphosa’s stumbling with the NPA as renewed by the appointment of a new leader who has bettered it, is far from the truth: there is a new leader but so far no real high-ranking culprits identified by the Zondo and Mpati commissions, have been arrested.72:9

A further element in the above, is an effort to rehabilitate the ANC and its elite, after their disastrous rule of 25 years, through Ramaphosa’s plea of “please forgive the ANC top brass their failings”, a hint of despondency in Ramaphosa’s message, without saying it directly, that there had been an immense collapse in the ANC from 2009 onwards. The investigative literature offered by many journalists and political analysts prominently point to Jacob Zuma as the so-called “culprit”. This misleading thinking was also confirmed and promoted by the ANC’s head of elections, Fikile Mbalula74 (a prominent Ramaphosa fan), when he notably said74:4:

We have baggage from an era of a president who was not providing leadership but was associated with all the bad things. Literally everyone influential in the republic never believed in the leadership of former president Zuma,

and74:4:

Zuma affected our image because he was viewed in relation to state capture as the president of the country and the ANC, and that caused damage to the ANC”, as well as: “But now we have a new head of state who is doing good things because it is the new dawn, a strategic era that we are in.

Mbalula, as well as Ramaphosa know well it is not true: both Mbalula and Ramaphosa were prominent ANC leaders during the Zuma administration and did nothing constructive to stop Zuma and his cronies.72,74

In reaction to Mbalula and the Ramaphosa clan’s above political folly, all that can be said is that it seems as if Ramaphosa and the ANC were misleading the public with the Ramaphosa manifesto. Just read what Danny Titus75 writes about the ANC circus of fools and crooks — and possibly indirectly reflecting also on the Ramaphosa manifesto — when he posits75:19:

Die politici skud hul vere reg om straat toe te gaan met hul basuine: “Stem vir my, daai ander ouns is net ‘n klomp robbiese!” Enige erkenning oor korrupsie of hoe om dit op te los? Bloedweinig. Enige verwysings na korrupsie en die impak daarvan op doodgewone mense, die kiesers? Vergeet maar daarvan.

Titus75 refers to “election talk” and suggests that there are lies and subterfuge involved in propping up the ANC’s charade of a “free and democratic South Africa”75:19:

Konstrateer daarmee die vetgesmeerde katte van die politiek en die bedryfslewe, luister na die verkiesingspraatjies en dan sien ons die daaglikse leuens waarin in die vrye en demokratiese Suid-Afrika gelewe word.

It seems, reading the Ramaphosa manifesto (as well as the general ANC manifesto), as if even the President of the ANC and President of South Africa, does not understand the meaning of Titus’s specific pinpointing of the serious consequences of the ANC’s corruption between 1994 and 2019 and how the ANC regime cold-bloodedly crooked the innocent and most vulnerable citizens of South Africa over 25 years of their rule. Titus refers in this context to a United Nations report on the impact of corruption on basic human rights (which undoubtedly includes South African) that shows up the many contradictions in the Ramaphosa manifeste and the general ANC manifesto, as well as the illogical thinking of the ANC top brass on good governance. Titus75 states, regarding the devastating effects of corruption under ANC rule75:19:

Korrupsie is ‘n skending van menseregte, ‘n skending van ons Grondwet. Die reg op voedsel, huivesting, gesondheidsorg, die reg op lewe – dit word daagliks geskend deur munisipalteite, provinsiale en nationale regerings. Nie deur onbevoegdheid nie. Die skending vind daagliks plaas deur korrupsie wat ons land soos dryfsand ingesuig het. “Poorest of the poor; inequality; poverty and unemployment” – dié rympie hoor ons nou al jare. Deur volksverteenwoordigers wat willens en wetens hul kiesers belieg en bedreig.

How much the promises of the election manifestos of Ramaphosa and the ANC on the eve of the 8 May 2019 election were devoid of truth, was at last confirmed by Ramaphosa himself when he responded in June 2019 (after his inauguration as President) on the criticism levelled against his Third Sona and his unrealistic dreams by admitting that neither he nor the ANC regime could fix the country’s problems, mostly created by the ANC themselves, in the next five years, or even in ten or more years. He want so far as to admit that there were no shortcuts or quick fixes to solve the problems he had promised in his election manifesto to fix fast.76

Ramaphosa’s manifesto message is not worth the paper it is printed on: it is built on myths and deception. Contradicting the exclusive guilt of Jacob Zuma since 2009, is all the evidence that the ANC has been a failure from 1994 to this day during which Zuma was only one of a mass of corrupt ANC leaders. It is time that Ramaphosa obtained better insight into his “virtuous ANC”, as well as himself as a so-called beloved, good paramount-chief and as an extraordinary saviour to make post-2019 South Africa a success. Looking at his part in the Zuma regime, up to his present actions in the ANC, it is doubtful if he could ever obtain that insight.72

Ex-President Kgalema Motlanthe77 (who had served as interim president from September 2008 to May 2009 and who had also been secretary general from 1997 to 2007 and the party’s deputy president from 2007 to 2012), warned Ramaphosa in public on his foolish election campaign — specifically his promises, but seemingly without impact before the May elections. Firstly, he tells Ramaphosa that he is not the anointed politico-messiah to save the dying ANC, or to save the post-May 2019 South Africa. What Motlanthe77 apparently tried to say was that the ANC is terminally sick. Until the ANC will be finally deceased, the ANC and its leaders pose great dangers for post-May 2019 South Africa’s democracy, economics and the rights of its people. The ANC stayed an opportunistic revolutionary party to this day. The Ramaphosa manifesto confirms it in an exemplary way.77

3.3.4. The extravagance, outlandishness and bizarreness characteristic of some ANC politicians’ mindsets

The seeming extravagance, outlandishness and bizarreness characteristic of some politicians’ mindsets, which were reflected in the run-up to the May 2019 elections by some of the parties’ manifestos and which spell danger for the South African community post-May 2019, became in some way at last understandable when Siyahleba68 introduces us to the weird world of politics with his description of the origin of the naked ambition of politicians. Siyahleba writes68:2:

Delusion of grandeur is the fixed, false belief that one possesses superior qualities, such as genius, fame, omnipotence or wealth. It is most often a symptom of schizophrenia, but can also be a symptom found in psychotic or bipolar disorders, as well as dementia.

Then Siyahleba68 goes on to describe a certain person in the ANC. But looking critically at the ANC’s elite’s delinquent actions in general, it seems as if Siyahleba’s68 formulation is also applicable to some of the ANC’s other leaders, as evidenced not only by their false promises to the voters, but also by their false behaviour in politics over the period 1994 to 2019.

These bizarre promises in reality extend wider as regards the ANC’s elite. Knowing for instance all too well that their Alexandra Renewal Project was a failure, primarily because of their maladministration as ruling party, intertwined with their corruption and theft of state funds. Moreover, the despair created by the ANC regime, commencing in 2006 as a result of their failed Alexandra Renewal Project, is in the process of being steered into serious and comprehensive civil unrests.69 It signifies an identity struggle inside the soul of the ANC. When evaluated in-depth, the ANC leader’s psyche reflects the confusion of a soul in peril, resulting from decades of changes and exposures to new constructive elements, far away from the old, unstable liberation and revolutionary elements. It seems to fit into Siyahleba’s68 theory of schizophrenia, psychotic or bipolar disorders, and dementia. The ANC top brass display more and more delusions of grandeur and faith in a make-believe world where their false promises become realities, good outcomes that are going to realise, that they are geniuses, and that they are the only anointed persons who can save the country and its people. The so-called “big man syndrome” but then in the form of elect saviours.70

The above shows how the strong or “big” men of the ANC have received the entitlement to rule, unobstructed as “anointed” leaders of the liberation party (“…and in a Zuma way, until Jesus comes back to the earth”, according to his famous dictum), cognitively unaware that they are not political geniuses and did not receive mandates for autocratic rule in terms of the extreme and dangerous mood-swings of their minds. These leaders see themselves as “keepers of the liberation heritage”, which they used first and foremost to ensure their own self-preservation as the party’s elites. The whole approach to stay in power is done by means of false propaganda to members, supporters, voters. They became messiahs whose false words and integrities no-one may dare to doubt, as the many political fallacies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and now apparently Cyril Ramaphosa adhere to in their self-confident belief in their own “good” leadership and their so-called “sincere love” for the population, reflect very well.70

Makhanya71 further unmasked this false liberation ideology offered by the ANC leadership in their political manifestos going as far back as 1994. Hereto the promises from pre-and post-May 2019 of the present ANC leader Ramaphosa are central – namely, as a good leader and still a keeper of the ANC’s liberation heritage, he could make promises in the May elections to voters notwithstanding the failure of the ANC’s liberation after 1994. Regarding the fallacious promises of the ANC and thus also Ramaphosa’s promises as its leader which will and cannot be realised after 8 May 2019, Makhanya informs us71:2:

…those who are drunk on Ramaphoria must wake up from the stupor and recognise that the work that must be done is arduous and that the messiah is someone who watched passively from inside the cockpit as Zuma willingly navigated the ship into stormy waters. The man may be our leader for the next five years but he will not be our saviour [especially not through his promises].

How the ANC’s leadership has projected itself during the May 2019 elections to its supporters and voters as “good” and assured the voters that in the past they have only been doing good and that they are going to do only good in the future for them, as well as being the keepers of the future democracy while at the same time in the ANC backroom contradictory thinking and corrupt actions were going on, is pointed out by Bell regarding the ANC’s silent promulgation of their “Bantustan Bill”. Here, in an effort to keep their rural supporters for at the expense of the poor rural Blacks, the ANC’s Traditional and Khoisan Leadership Bill as well as the Traditional Courts Bill (which were for obvious reasons were not a public part of the ANC’s “election promises” in their manifestos) are on the verge of being signed into law, writes Bell67. On the dangers that these two Bills are holding for the innocent and uniformed voters if they become laws – and thus after the ANC leadership’s glowing promises before 8 May, Bell reports67:2:

“Together, they reinforce the Bantustan Balkanisation of the country and remove from the general rule of law some 17 million people who live in what the apartheid state called ‘tribal homelands’.”

3.3.5. Past, present and future South African scenarios

Looking back critically at the 1994 to 2019 political history of the ANC, there are certain signs of growths, developments and actions which show constancy and which form the basis for being able to offer generalisations on the actions to be expected from the ANC post-May 2019. The outcomes flowing from these generalisations may be positive or negative in the end. But, as history’s Joker often does, he can make the post-May 2019 political scenario suddenly and unexpectedly look totally different from the pre-May 2019 scenario. Such an outcome may disturb South African politics dramatically and drastically. To a certain extent we must note it and make preparations for the future, even for “political joking” or unexpected developments in post-2019 South Africa. In the next subdivision a summary of past, present and future scenarios, offered by political analysts, is presented.

3.3.5.1. Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection’s Indlulamithi Scenarios for 2018 to 2030

Makhanya71 reports on the indicators of the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection’s Indlulamithi Scenarios for 2018 to 2030. These scenarios envisage three primary paths for what Makhanya in summary calls the post-Zuma-South-Africa. He writes71:2:

One was when the inequality grows and resentment spills into unprecedented protests and even a mini revolution.

The other envisaged a prospering ‘nation in step with itself’ where we returned to our core values of a caring and pro-poor constitutional state that could even achieve a 4.5% growth rate.

The third was the ‘floundering false dawn’ scenario, in which the promise of renewal in 2018/2019 becomes a mirage, leading to lost hope, social upheaval and state repression in the new decade.

Makhanya71 continues (and warns) on the above-mentioned third scenario’s outcome as follows71:2:

This scenario imagines that whatever new optimism you might find now turns out to be false optimism and instead what we discover is that the extent of corruption, mismanagement, nepotism and cronyism is deeply embedded at provincial and municipal level, further extending far beyond the echelons of government or the private sector.

Unless we act and stop looking for messiahs, this is the scenario that is scariest. Dashed hopes are ingredients for toxic recipes.

3.3.5.2. Bloomberg Misery Index

In line with the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection’s Indlulamithi Scenarios for 2018 to 2030 are the findings of the Bloomberg Misery Index also with a negative classification of South Africa.78

Focussing on the pre-2019 versus the post-2019 South Africa, according to the Bloomberg Misery Index (calculated as the sum of a country’s inflation and unemployment rates with its forecast as of 11 April 2019), South Africa joined Venezuela, Argentina, Turkey, Greece and Ukraine as the most miserable countries out of 62 countries worldwide. This marker shows that South Africa, with its high (negative) index of 32.4 against Thailand’s low (positive) index of 2.1 and Switzerland’s index of 3.1, displays the presence of intense economic stress and scant progress in taming price-growth and getting people back to work. Moreover, it confirms the chaotic politics of the country, which characterises unstable regimes such as those of Venezuela and Argentina where corruption, nepotism and dishonest are prominent daily phenomena.79

3.3.5.3. International Risk Report of the World Economical Forum (WEF)

The International Risk Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF) identified at its meeting in January 2019 in Davos ten possible negative outcomes (in line with Makhanya’s high political risks for South Africa after May 2019). Theo Venter78, a political analyst of the North West University, defined the following 10 negative attribues of sub-Saharan Africa78:17:

  1.     Werkloosheid;
  2.     Mislukking van nasionale regerings;
  3.     Energie-prysskokke;
  4.     Verval van kritieke infrastruktuur;
  5.     Fiskale krisse;
  6.     Mislukking van finansiële meganismes of instellings;
  7.     Mislukking van streekstrukture of instellings;
  8.     Waterkrisisse;
  9.     Voedselkrisisse; en
  10.     Onbeheerbare inflasie.

Essentially the ANC regime, up to 8 May 2019, had failed to get a clean audit on any one of the above ten markers. Venter shows that the biggest risks for South Africa post-2019, in terms of the International Risk Report, are the following: The failure to maintain the national, provincial and local government structures and the undermining of their functioning by ongoing state capture, nepotism, corruption, politicking, etc., meaning outright poor governance and a lack of political integrity. Confirming Venter’s78 warnings is the fact that only 18 metro (local) authorities, out of 257, received unqualified Treasury audits in 2019. Relevant here are the constant failures of the SAPS/NPA for a decade or more to curb corruption — forget about removing it from society and from the lifestyle of the ANC regime. Hand on hand with these, also goes the failure of the ANC regime’s police force to eliminate crime from daily life.78.80

The above analysis by Venter, done in terms of the findings of the International Risk Report, reflects the extreme social instability and the increasing collapse of critical infrastructure which are absolute needed on a daily basis for especially the poor and landless community to live and survive (such as the provision of water, electricity, roads, basic healthcare, basic education, etc.). There are indications of dissatisfaction turning into a possible physical reaction against the ANC regime. Prominent here is the countrywide evidence of unrest, acute anarchy and at times behaviour bordering on acute revolution. This present social chaos, that seems to grow instead of diminishing, confirms the status of a well-established, chronically dysfunctional regime that may trigger outright revolution.78

For example, confirming Venter’s78 analysis, is the evidence of how chaotic the provincial government of the ANC all over the country has become, failing the people who voted them into government. To cite but one instance: after the May 2019 election, storms tore through KwaZulu-Natal so that many villages in the southern-most part of the province still do not have access to clean water today. In response to this chaos, the DA’s councillor for Ward 2 in the Ugu area described this failure of delivery and maintenance to 175 000 inhabitants by the ANC-associated municipality as follows81:14-15:

We have a water crisis here but we don’t have a shortage of water. There is no drought. Other than this current crisis the production of water is fine. The real problem is a dereliction of maintenance and last-mile reticulation: getting water to people’s houses. This is a threat to our society and the people to blame for it are the Ugu council. It’s a failed entity — you can’t bleed R10-million a month and claim you are a going concern.

Reflecting this kind of in-depth failure under the ANC government oversight and rule, and the immense misuse of tax-payers’ money, is the fact that the Ugu municipality received a qualified audit from the auditor general for 2018-2019 over unauthorised expenditure amounting to R243 billion. For 2017-2018 the auditor gave Ugu a similarly negative rating because of the municipality’s inability to account for property and equipment valued at R4 billion. Harper and Verasamy81, as well as Harper82 consider this disaster as just one example of the many failures of the country’s ANC-ruled municipalities to get water to the people.81,82

Venter78, Harper and Verasamy81 further debunks the ANC’s claims when it comes to municipal government and providing “services to the people”81:14-15:

Government says that about 95% of people in South Africa have “access” to water. But, in the Ugu district, access only means that there is infrastructure. It does not mean that water flows out of taps and brings life. By its own admission, the national water department says that about a third of households don’t have regular clean water. That’s 20 million people.

Noting the fact that out of a total population of 57 million as many as 30 million South Africans are utterly poor, more or less 30 million of them are jobless, and more than 15 million are living solely on monthly social grants, the Ugu district chaos speaks volumes about the path of disaster onto which the 28% of the eligible voters, who thoughtlessly voted for the ANC in the May 2019 elections, had willingly placed themselves from 2019 to 2024, together with the other 72% of non-ANC and passive voters83-86.

3.3.5.4. Bawa reference

Khadija Bawa87, a researcher at the Social Justice Coalition in Khayelitsha, Cape Town points out the failure of effective policing in the country and the lack of policing to ensure the personal safety of the individual citizen. Her critical analysis shows that such conditions are often created by the ANC’s poor and failing management at the national level of essential services such as the South African Police Services, which spiral downwards into local mismanagement, thereby creating chaotic living and housing conditions in informal settlements. She recently stated87:8:

South Africa is one of the most violent countries in the world. That violence, however, is not experienced at the same level across the country. Year in and year out South Africa’s statistics reveal that poor, working-class, urban and semi-urban, and predominantly black police precincts carry the greatest burden of violent crime.

Why is it the case that in historically demarcated, still predominantly white areas police patrols are visible while in historically demarcated coloured and black areas they aren’t?

Bawa87 describes the siege of Coloured and Black living areas by crime further by showing the role of poverty and landlessness which had forced jobless Coloured and Black people to live in these informal crime-ridden settlements. The lay-out of these areas, lacking any national governmental support and infrastructure, further exacerbates the already sub-standard policing in such poor settlements. Again the failure of the pre-20019 ANC regime stands out, extending over a period of 25 years, to supply stable living spaces for these unfortunate poor and landless people and to ensure a permanent income for them as promised before elections. She writes87:8:

Even though the lack of visible policing can be blamed on the police service and local law enforcement, other governmental departments are failing these communities, and the police, by not delivering services. The lack of built environment interventions in areas of high informality, have a direct impact on the safety and security of residents.

3.3.5.5. Harvey reference

The political commentator and analyst, Ebrahim Harvey88, reflects specifically on the context of the present-day badly neglected mass of poor Black people in the country — going as far back as the then young people whose role in the so-called Black student uprising of 1976, together with the Black workers in the trade unions and members of various Black communities country-wide, had, through their anti-Apartheid actions, made a decisive impact on the liberation politics of pre-1994 South African and brought the ANC to power in 1994. However, after 1994 these groups were immediately sidelined by the ANC elite and are still today being excluded by the ANC inner circle from being uplifted in a supposedly bettered South Africa. Harvey writes as follows88:8:

Unfortunately, both these major constituencies of the ANC suffered most from the neoliberal policy regime the ANC adopted after 1994.

Harvey88 further elaborates on this post-1994 failure of the ANC — correctly described as “Black-on-Black discrimination and exploitation” — when he posits88:8:

We can see the negative effects of those policies in many areas of our society, but most notably in the very high unemployment rate among the black youth, the protracted problems in all spheres of education, and the serious lack of infrastructure and social justice in townships where by far most still reside.

A walk through most black townships in the country shows starkly the horrific extent of these problems.

Any study of the reasons why youth face these serious problems point to the effects of neoliberal policies, a related serious lack of funds, the incompetence of ANC members deployed to various sites of education, and an increasing corruption within all levels of government.

On the educational failure of the mass of poor Blacks by the ANC regime, specifically during the pre-2019 period and which is going hand-in-hand with the above suppressing and “crashing” of the development and empowerment of poor Blacks that have been advertised by the ANC regime since 1994, Harvey88 sees the role being played by some of the governing party’s affiliates88:8:

There is no doubt that the South African Democratic Teachers Union, strongly linked to the ANC, has in many respects done the youth at schools a huge disservice. Incompetence, corruption and irresponsibility in its ranks have had a blistering effect on our schools and learners.

Harvey investigates this contaminated political environment further and deeper in his writing when he hints that this failure has the potential to activate in these youths’ minds in the post-2019 politics of South Africa a vicious circle of mass obstruction, unrest, anarchy and passive revolution. The existence of dissatisfied, hostile and aggressive youth makes them potential candidates for recruitment by radical groups in South African politics, such as the EFF.

He refers specifically to th EFF’s hostility to racial minorities and its support for a radical land grab. The EFF seems to regard minorities as so powerless and numerically insignificant that they may be insulted or provoked at will. According to Harvey,

People from these “minorities”, which EFF leader Julius Malema in particular likes to attack in his speeches, are not going to always sit back and allow the EFF to attack and walk over them.88

However, there are radicals in the ANC too who share the Afro-Marxist ideology of the EFF. The same radicalism is openly reflected by the left-wing of the ANC, as evidenced by the Magashule-faction (in which the Zuma clan features prominently). Their use of racialised demographic statistics in inviting confrontation with minorities is similar. The possibility therefore exists that in post-2019 South Africa both the EFF and a faction within the ANC could unleash markedly racial confrontations in various social settings. Harvey writes88:8:

I often feel that this distinct danger is steadily gathering pace in many political and social settings. This country, given an immensely violent history and many unresolved social issues, is deep down a tinder box which can explode in their own hands at any time.

The reaction of the minorities may be much more severe in relation to the ANC as opposed to the EFF, given that the ANC is the sole ruler of the land, notwithstanding that it seems to be a very divided party. A blueprint has been laid since 1994 for anarchy and revolution. Anarchy and revolution are waiting to explode in post-2019 South Africa and this may be laid at the door of the ANC’s corrupted elite politics.88,89

3.3.5.6. Mohale reference

Bonang Mohale90 is the chief executive of Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA). He claims that post-2019 South Africa is politically and economically grinding to a political and economic halt. Positive growth seems to be absent, while transgression has become the rule of the country’s politics. He formulates it thus:

There is no doubt that collectively, we have not succeeded in eradicating the legacy of apartheid and the 350 years of colonialism; the economy is on its knees; young black graduates roam the streets hopelessly; inequality has widened; racism is at an all-time high; public schooling is broken; public schooling is broken; public hospitals fail the poor and vulnerable; crucial infrastructure is in decay; lawlessness is rife.90

The rhetorical question is: Why would the ANC change its delinquent and corrupt habits if has managed to obtain parliamentary majorities six times in a row while getting front-page cover for its succession of financial and other scandals from 1994 until now?

The alleged pervasive corruption of the ANC as a political party and as a regime, including many of its leaders, making them gangsters and serious delinquents, has become a feature of South African life. Closely associated with this is the imminent land grabbing, defined as “land expropriation without compensation”.89,90

3.3.5.7. Andrew reference

Andrew91 draws attention to the ANC’s chronic delinquency and corruption, starting from 1994. Similarly to many other political analysts, Ken Andrew, who also happens to be a seasoned politician, puts it clearly that the ANC’s rot did not start with Zuma: the country become mired in a culture of immense corruption, even post-1994, especially on the level of the ANC’s top leaders, which Zuma merely made bigger. The ANC’s rottenness is clearly identifiable from 1994 when it became the ruling party with its many delinquent actions such as theft, corruption and mismanagement around issues like Sarafina, the arms deal, the improper enrichment of the ANC’s front company, Chancellor House, and the dismantling of the Scorpions long before Zuma’s presidency.

The economy went into decline long before Zuma, directly because of poor policies and failed profile building with foreign countries, etc. Andrew also points out that the Eskom debacle was born before Zuma because the ANC lacked even back then a constructive electricity policy. The implementation of inappropriate affirmative action policies at Eskom by the ANC forced out able technical staff. State capture started officially in 1997 with the ANC National Conference’s decision in favour of the deployment of ANC cadres in all spheres of government and state institutions, including the judiciary. Other ANC actions undermining good governance, identified by Andrew91, are the introduction of bad educational policies such as outcomes-based education, the closing of teachers’ training colleges, the voluntary severance packages given to educationists in the late 1990s and the kowtowing to the South African Teachers Union via Cosatu as a partner in the ANC’s corruption and mismanagement.91

3.3.5.8. The Mthombothi view of an ANC permanently drunk from the alcohol of corruption

Mthombothi92 writes in July 2018 that the “ANC is drunk from the alcohol of corruption”. One outcome of chronic alcoholism is causing extreme mental confusion. In the ANC’s case it has clearly has severed its contact with political, social and personal decency and justice. But the ANC’s habitual corruption has not stopped after 8 May 2019. Mthombothi92 predicts that the ANC’s deviant behaviour, extending back to 1994, is going to spill over to post-2019 South Africa with serious consequences.92

The best evidence for the ANC’s condition as a failure and a drunkard through corruption, crooking and political mismanagement is the testimony in March 2019 on the contemporary ANC psyche by ex-President Kgalema Motlanthe77. For Motlanthe, the present-day political integrity of the ANC is the lowest it has ever been since it took power in 1994 and the leader Ramaphosa is unable to effect rehabilitation.74,77,93,94

Motlanthe77 traces the immense inability of the ANC to act as a competent and qualified ruler of post-May 2019 South Africa, back to its clear record of delinquency which stretches over 25 years of misgoverning and utter corruption. More damning on the ANC’s inability do good at any level of government in future after May 2019 and the immediate need for the ANC to disband in order to end its wrongdoing, Hunter77 conveys Motlanthe’s77 opinion on the chaos in the ANC as follows77:4:

[Motlanthe had said that]…he believed that the ANC could only change if it died in its current form and was reborn as a grassroots movement.

Fikile Mbalula, one of the current politburo members of the ANC and at present a minister in the Ramaphosa cabinet, himself admitted the immense mental and political pathology inside the ANC. On this deep-rooted crookedness in his own ANC, which Mbalula describes as an in-depth cancerous infection which needs an equally in-depth treatment, he said95:4: “… you can’t clean a sore without going deep into it — just dressing the wound won’t help”.

The ANC’s infected sore goes to the bottom. To be honest: it is advanced cancer; it is in its brain, body, stomach, its heart, its psyche, its soul. Many political analysts, together with Mbalula and Motlanthe, have put forward the question if the ANC can be rehabilitated, or if it has the potential to “rescue” itself from its own immense wrongdoing, let alone its promises to rescue South Africa! The evidence suggests there is no hope of rehabilitation for the ANC. The ANC became more than a habitual drunkard guility of serious delinquent behaviour; it became a habitual criminal.74,77,92-95

Note: The evaluation and discussion of this division (3.3 African National Congress) will be continued in article 12 under the subdivision: 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019.

4. Conclusions

It is clear that the current South African political system, continuously run by the ANC regime for 25 years, has been captured by an autocratic ideology in which the party’s Marxist-Leninist leanings maintain and steer its democratic-centralism. The right of the individual voter counts minimally while the ANC politburo has consolidated most available power, making the ANC’s constitution more applicable to governing the country than the South African Constitution.

The pre-May 2019 election promises of the ANC, specifically those of Cyril Ramaphosa, to rectify all South Africa’s ills quickly and completely, more and more seem to be lies and myths. The scenarios, reflecting the immediate present, as well as the future awaiting South Africans, are coming across as very problematic, mostly portending a decline in economics, politics and social cohesion. It seems as if the fallacious belief in the ANC’s absolute “democracy” is overwhelming rooted in most of the media’s and public’s mindsets too.

The Code of Ethical Conduct and Disclosure of Members’ Interests to regulate dishonest conduct by law-makers is insufficient. Prominent is also the faulty Electoral Act, as well as the absence of an Electoral-Parliamentarian Employment Act and an Electoral-Parliamentarian Ethics Code as contributors to the establishment of the ANC as the sole regime over 25 years. These legal short-comings seem to be the primary causes of the ANC’s national election victory in May 2019 during which only 49% of the total eligible voters participated and the winning party received only 28% support of those eligible voters. The ANC’s re-election as ruler for a sixth term of another five years (2019 to 2024) was an immense error. It was tantamount to political fraud in the first class.

In the next (Article 12), titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity)” the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of its empowerment as ruler it received after the election of 8 May 2019, will be further evaluated.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.