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Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3—The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3—The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Accountability, capacity, effective, governance, inequality, reprimanded, tenancy.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 5

1. Background

Ginsberg1 reprimanded South Africans for their passivity over many years not to take on parliamentarians and ruling parties for their immense failures. He makes it clear that the electorate owns and controls the country, that they are the ones who hold the power in South Africa and are the final judges as to whether our leaders and politicians have succeeded in the tasks entrusted to them. At least, this may be the theory, but in the 25 years of the ANC’s well-planned Marxist-Leninist ideological policy rule, this unique political empowerment of voters appears to have faded into one where the voters’ empowerment has been impaired, where they lack the ability to make a direct contribution to change our doomed setup. Opposition to the ANC’s dereliction of duty is driven by a one voice, basically a puny, lone one, not audible to the deaf and blind ANC, a party sorely lacking a sense of righteousness, justice or accountability. To move away from this “voter capture” would require immense sacrifices from voters to erase such delinquencies. To hold a regime accountable and force them to always rule with integrity and honesty, is the primary prerequisite for assured prosperity, the way to assure a good socio-economic and political system, to erase violence, criminality, inequality and poverty and bring about harmony in the greater society.1

South Africa has been waiting for a spark somewhere in the country to ignite an explosion. South Africans, captured by mass poverty and unemployment, all sitting on a racial powder keg as well as a corruption powder keg, realise that such an explosion is imminent. The November 2019 medium-term budget showed how much our economy has suffered, basically because the ANC regime has never since 1994 been called to account on any of its wrongdoings.2 Kgosana2 highlighted this chaotic state of the country’s economy very well – revealing that ANC never tried to better it because accountability was not essential for the regime – when he writes2:22:

If SA were a person, its finances would be in dire shape. Credit cards, loans and overdraft facilities would be in the red, she would be borrowing more each month just to cover interest on loans.

Her debt is fast approaching 70% of her household’s entire assets. She is insolvent.

Left with no choice but drastic frugality, she would look hard at her finances and spending. It’s what happens when you spend more than you earn.

Looking back into South Africa’s chaotic politics, it seems as if accountability as a requirement for a decent government over the last 25 years, had been nullified. Indeed, South Africa has become vulnerable to all kinds of dangers such as state capture, poor statutory service providers, a self-centred political elite which is focussed on only self-enrichment and the gradual suppression of the poverty-stricken masses. South Africa may already be beyond repair because of the ANC’s lack of accountability, a fact which was clearly highlighted by the senior researcher of ASRI and fellow in the School of Social Sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Imraan Buccus3, when he reflected on the issue:3:22

As we all know, SA is one of the most unequal countries on the planet. Millions are without work, and unemployment is getting worse rather than better. The patience of the poor will not be infinite. We just have to look around the world to see this. Right now the poor are on the streets in Chile, Ecuador, Haiti and Lebanon, demanding more justice and democracy. We already have one of the highest rates of protest of any country. It is only a matter of time before the wave of protests, sometimes termed “the rebellion of the poor”, which stretch back to 2004, cohere into a national force. This seems inevitable. The urgent question that faces us all is what form this will take.

Ginsberg’s1 advice that the creation of good governance should the voter’s duty in holding the ANC regime accountable, seems to have been all but ignored in present-day politics. The ANC elite has remained out of reach to the ordinary, good voter to hold it accountable. Ever since 1994, when the ANC cadres entered Parliament, they have never shown any respect to voters, and neither have they seen them as significant role-players. In the ANC’s politburo’s mindset, planning and endeavours, the autocratic electoral regulations moreover have made it possible for the cadres to continue their power grab; emboldened to disrespect the Constitution and to shrug off their accountability.  At this stage, only two possibilities are left for the voter, either to oust the ANC at the ballot box, which seems to have been too daunting a task over the past 25 years, or to remove it with a revolution as Buccus3 reflects. To understand the capture of South Africa by the ANC inside the framework of its Marxist-Leninist disregard for other persons’ and groups freedoms and rights, together with its total lack of accountability, it may be timely to reflect on Ginsberg’s1 guidance on what South Africans should have expected from a new regime in terms of accountability. It will in some way also underscore this study’s intention to determine the measure of accountability in the ANC regime. Ginsberg posits1:20:

Members of our present and future governments should not be treated as untouchables, no matter how courageous their leaders may have been or how many years they may have struggled to achieve leadership positions. By voting them into power we have sufficiently rewarded them for their years of struggle and sacrifice. The longer we wait to demanded results and answers to the harsh realities our country faces, the deeper the hole will become which we have dug ourselves into.

It is our role as the electorate to ask tough questions and to demand answers of the people we put in power. They are our servants, not the other way around.

We are the shareholders of government – the current management team is only temporary, and can be replaced by a new team with new ideas every five years.

We the people must be respected by our tenants — they are our temporary tenants: we own the houses our ministers live in at Grootte Schuur and next to the Union Buildings in Pretoria. Until we confront our politicians with tough questions and demand specific answers, they will continue to ignore us, while hobnobbing with the same special interest groups at the various functions so many of our politicians seem to attend so regularly.

1.1. Accountability versus unaccountability

It appears that from 1994, with the start of the ANC’s first administration, that the concept of accountability and respect for the law have been treated as foreign notions by the ANC’s top brass. On the established delinquent character of the ANC and thus the possibility that the many misdemeanors will continue post-2019, Helen Zille4 sensibly reflects on the 5th May 20194:12:

You see the essence of a democracy is accountability. Now the reason corruption carries on unabated is because there is no accountability in the system.  Normally, when a government loots and steals people’s money on the scale we have seen, the voters vote it out. We heard Cyril said at the weekend, don’t punish the ANC at the polls. Polls are there to punish a corrupt government, so if people vote for the ANC again, and they get exactly the same people on that list [of who are 22 contaminated top brass members of the ANC] – to me if you vote for that list, you are an accomplice to corruption.

It seems that over 25 years of corrupt ANC reign, the rule of law that is embedded in the essence of accountability, was also gradually being erased from the expectations of many  South Africans. On the lack of accountability and the ease with which corruption has been allowed to expand unpunished as was pinpointed by Zille4, McKaiser5 writes on the absence of the principle of respect for the rule of law in the ANC’s psyche. For McKaiser5 following the rule of law should be done out of respect for doing what is right and not be a kind of good behaviour solely driven by the fear of prosecution for wrongdoings. In pre-2019 South Africa, it seems that the notion of respect has been absent from the mindsets of many politicians, especially in some of the ANC’s top brass and their provincial cronies as the massive testimonies before the Zondo and Mpati commissions confirmed all too well. These politicians have no qualms about their decrepitude either. Even the realistic perception that criminality will be reigned in as the result of the rule of law, by law-enforcement based on prescribed laws, seems to be absent in the mindsets of these culprits. This reflection brings us back to Zille’s4 prerequisite of good character, and McKaiser5 notion about the lack of good character prevalent among the ANC’s top brass and their cronies. Such is the quality of the people currently once again populating the executive of the post-2019 regime. The ANC’s law-makers, untouched and unconcerned by their bad and crooked pasts have been voted into positions where they can easily replicate their actions in future.4,5

This absence of guilt shown by some politicians and the unwillingness of the ANC regime to prosecute its top brass, forced McKaiser5 to ask5:27: “But how many corrupt South Africans, to now test these normative ideas, have been jailed? How many politicians and business people are struggling to sleep at night because they know that our specialist economic crime-busting agencies are close to arresting them? 

The answers to these questions above were: none in the pre-2019 ANC-regime period, and so far also none in the post-2019 South Africa under the new ANC regime. People like Ace Magashule, Jacob Zuma and Julius Malema and even Cyril Ramaphosa all seem to sleep well – and continue to show little remorse. 

1.2. Introduction (Continued from Article 13)

Article 14 is a continuation of the previous article 13, titled: “Critical in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (13: Violence and crime)”. This article is part of a sequence together with articles 11 to 13 which were already published on the ANC. The intention also is to analyse and discuss the arguments in further depth, and to offer various opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC to pursue land expropriation successfully as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.3. Aims of article 14 (Continued from Article 13)

The primary intention of this project on the ANC is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties specifically in order to describe the profile of the ANC in a similar way as was demonstrated in Article 9 on the EFF and Article 10 on the DA.

In this article, the primary aim is to determine how the ANC regime as the mandated ruler of South Africa accepts accountability for its socio-economic and political endeavours and thus if it is able to fulfill its promises regarding land expropriation. The focus will be on the party’s leadership, to detect dysfunction and to describe their personal and political integrity.

2. Method (Continued from Article 13)

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as it develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case with the abilities of political parties to eventually successfully navigate land reform in the future — from 2019 onwards. The sources include articles from 2018, books for the period between 1944 to 2018 and newspapers from the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must serve as guides in offering an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the sole ruler of South Africa to enable successful land reform from 2019.

The research findings have been presented in a narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

The manifestos, self-descriptions and some of the public referees of the ANC were already reflected, evaluated and described in the previous Article 13. In this article the public referees of the African National Congress will further be reflected upon, evaluated and described in the under-mentioned division 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019. The focus is on the acceptance and respect for accountability by the ANC. 

3.2. Louw Appraisal Checklist

The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,6 will again be used for the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC. The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, were again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party manifesto and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees it as applicable.6

3.3 The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 13)

3.3.1. ANC’s accountability

One of the criteria of a failed state is the inability of its ruling regime to take responsibility for its own performance. These doings can vary from the misuse of money, corruption, poor management, unresolved poverty or the upliftment of its people, self-enrichment, or autocratic and fascist behaviour. Of these various criteria to evaluate accountability, the effective functioning of state’s institutions are key, for instance the law-enforcement services that include the police, the courts, as well as the effective functioning of schools, the state administration, etc. Law-enforcing institutions South African Police Service (SAPS)

The apparent inability of the SAPS to comprehensively fulfil its prescribed duties such as the practice of effective law-enforcement, have undoubtedly contributed to crime becoming endemic in many of the poor parts of the country, as witnessed for instance in the Western Cape. This failing to enforce laws effectively as well as the growth of criminal enterprises, have massively contributed to the economy of these parts being entrapped in a death spiral. What has emerged in the first place, is the ANC regime’s failure to hold the police force accountable for this chaotic situation which blocks socio-economic development, prosperity and the creation of stable families. Not only the police are to blame, but also the ANC regime itself is guilty of failed accountability and is thus also a perpetrator together with the SAPS in the rise of violent crimes such as murder and manslaughter.  Basically because the ANC regime itself had long ago on national level bid farewell to its responsibility to combat crime and assure a peaceful society of law-abiding citizens, this dire situation exists. The ANC regime failed in its role of overseeing the SAPS, facilitating the fact that a large part of the SAPS is currently without answerability, and responsible to no-one.

Evidence reflects that inside this culture of unaccountability some of the police lost their ability to differentiate between good and bad, leading to crime and other delinquent behaviours besetting members of the SAPS and funding their often luxuriant lifestyles.  It seems as if the SAPS to a certain extent a body only responsible to its own criteria of accountability. This is confirmed by evidence that the SAPS is itself ridden with serious remissness, such as extortion and rape, which have percolated down not only to junior members, but is also evident in the SAPS’s higher ranks. This outcome is telling us more or less why the SAPS is seen by many as a toothless force, ineffective to effectuate law-enforcing; one seemingly stripped of responsibility and accountability. This statement is based on the findings of a research report of GIATOC: Ending the Cycles of Violence7, with its focus on the presence of crime and the presence of gang violence in the two areas Westbury and Eldorado Park, in Gauteng. This report reveals that corruption itself in the SAPS and its inefficient practice of policing in the area, are two significant problems. It not only has a negative impact on all the strategies to deal with gang violence or crime in these areas, but has furthermore negatively impacted on the existing crime-contaminated societies, unable to establish a minimum standard of prosperity. This delinquency of the SAPS comprehensively undermines development in poverty-stricken areas, blocking job creation, obstructing better schooling, youth and community development, making the poor areas totally unsafe places to live in and promoting the growth of crime.7 This tragic reality for the unfortunate and harassed citizens in Westbury and Eldorado, are compounded by the many allegations of police misdemeanors with accusations that officers have been acting in collusion with the hooligans, Moodley7 reports7:4: “Residents no longer feel safe in their homes and on the streets, and do not believe that the police are able to deal with the crime, especially in areas that are riddled by gang violence.”

The clear failing of the SAPS to fulfil with decency and integrity its task of keeping citizens safe, is specifically mentioned in the findings of the GIATOCI report7 on the presence of crime in the SAPS and its inefficiency to perform acceptable policing, Moodley7 reflects as follows7:4: “Furthermore, the report also found that it will not matter what strategy the South African Police Service [Saps] implements, as it will only be effective if the issue of corruption is addressed within the police service.”

The above quote is a harsh statement, and it begs the question of whether it could actually be true? But, as seen and heard from the Zondo commission, crime has infested the mindset of some of the ANC’s leadership as well as their intimate cronies, making the GIATOCI report7 not only credible in a small part of Gauteng, put applicable on the whole country. The accusations of corruption and ineffectiveness of the SAPS, and the extent of unaccountability which is being deleted from the police’s culture, will fully further be evaluated and discussed. What is important to underscore at this stage is that when a government fails at combatting crime – and thus becomes a failed regime – there is a direct link between the delinquent doings of law-enforcement and judicial institutions in effectuating this failure. What is obvious, is that if such institutions are ineffective, sub-standard, corrupt and infiltrated by the Mafiosi,8 the the spread of violence and its related crimes taking root in society is a “normal” phenomenon. As already stated, at the forefront are the actions and status of the SAPS in dealing with fighting crime as well as being actively involved in perpetrating crimes, together with the status and outcomes of the various judicial commissions such as the Zondo and the NPA, both specific entities functioning within the failed ANC regime.7,8

On the massive infiltration by the gangsters of the SAPS, Watson quotes Simone Hayson9, a senior analyst at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime (GIATC)9 based in Geneva. Watson writes on the contamination of some members of the SAPS by criminal actions4:

One of the fundamental drivers of why the gangs are so powerful in the Cape Flats is because there is a very big drug market.

Research on the corrupting effect of the drug economy on the police is obvious to see.

There was a high level of interaction between police officers on the streets and dealers, with the latter treated like ATMs by the police.

At a higher level, there’s a long history of senior police officials being implicated in corrupt relationships with the Cape gangs.

Remember (former Western Cape Provincial Police Commissioner) Arno Lamoer.

And while there was probably less chance the SANDF could be corrupted, given their lack of powers, it wouldn’t hurt to keep an eye out for potential problems.

Various other references are made of the SAPS officers allegedly involved in doing crime via crime syndicates. How deeply the ANC police service’s own staff’ is alleged to be engaged and involved in crime, is seen in the case of General Lemoer9 since his is not an unusual or deviating case. Evidence reflects a much broader network of senior police officers associated with the crime world. The finger is also being pointed at Maj. Gen. Andre Lincoln, the anti-gang unit boss, on whose behalf the Western Cape police recently decided to ask the Supreme Court of Appeal to overturn its exoneration for corruption in the Palazzolo case.10,11 Then is there the former Crime Intelligence boss Gen. Richard Mdluli who is waiting for sentencing on two counts of kidnapping, two counts of common assault, two counts of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and four counts of intimidation,  committed in 1999 against a said Oupa Ramogibe (who was shot dead in 1999 by an unknown killer)10,11. Mdluli has also been implicated before the Zondo  commission in the alleged looting of the State Security Agency (SSA)’s funds and of other alleged cases involving fraud and corruption.12,13

More recently there were allegations by the suspected underworld boss Nafiz Modack that Maj. Genl. Jeremy Vearey, the Cape head of detectives and alleged would-be police commissioner, has been soliciting bribes. In one of various affidavits signed on the 10th April Modack complained to the police at the Parow police station that he was being extorted by Veary and officers under his command for the amount of R10 000 in cash and firearms, writes Hyman14. (An allegation rejected by Vearey). Hyman’s14 writes further on the problematic Cape police top structure, alleged to be contaminated by political influences and ethnicity; influences which are alleged to contribute to the lack of the top structure’s accountability and trust and thus its ability to function effectively and bringing an end to crime in the Cape. He reports as follows14:8:

A Western Cape ANC insider said Vearey, a former uMkhonto weSizwe member, still had allies from the liberation struggle. These are relationships that were forged in the trenches. The one element of it is loyalty to one another, seeing one another deployed to different parts of government…These are old cliques. They are a clique of coloured stalwarts.

Vearey and his ANC comrades Peter Jacobs – now national head of crime intelligence – and Andre Lincoln, head of the anti-gang unit, have been controversial figures for several years.

Slabbert,15 using the guidelines set by Corruption Watch and the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) on the need and functioning of a trustworthy SAPS crime-intelligence unit to erase organised crime, reflects on unauthorised cadre appointments in the top ranks of the SAPS of incapable, tarnished and doubtful characters. Slabbert15 posits as follows15:8:

Die bekommernis is dat daar die afgelope paar jaar op groot skaal afgewyk is van geloofwaardige werwingspraktyke. Dit was moontlik omdat dele van van die polisie se indiensnemingsregulasies daarvoor voorsiening maak dat die aanstelling en bevordering van senior polisiebestuurdslede “in oorleg met die minister” gedoen word sonder om normale aanstellingsvereistes na te kom.

Dit het volgens die organisasies die ruimte gelaat vir politieke inmenging in aanstellings. Khomotso Phahlane, voormalige polisie-kommissaris, het byvoorbeeld 80 sulke aanstellings in een jaar gedoen en Berning Ntlemeza, voormalige Valkehoof, het agt van sy nege provinsiale hoofde vervang.

The delinquent actions and hooliganism of the disgraced ANC leader and cadre-appointed former commissioner of police, the late Jackie Selebi, ended in him branded as an ordinary jailbird.16 

In relation to the recent xenophobia cases in Johannesburg, and the various police raids on foreign traders in the beginning of August in Johannesburg before the xenophobia outcomes, Okoye17 reports that in the Johannesburg CBD ten cops were charged for allegedly attempting to sell counterfeit goods confiscated in the raids, as well as facing various charges of theft, extortion, defeating the ends of justice and corruption.17

About the alleged ineffective SAPS – an SAPS infected by the ills of a failing ANC regime, unable to root out crime despite its parliament mandate and other statutory institutes – the half-heartedness with which it has been combating crime committed on the inside of the SAPS itself has been striking, especially as evidenced by the failure of some of the SAPS staff to commit their time and energy in fighting crime as their work contracts have prescribed. Their passivity and even obstruction to effectively collaborate with law-enforcement officials outside of their union rules and guidelines have been patent. Tumelo Mogodiseng’s18 interview with the secretary general of the South African Police Union (Sapu), reflected in the Rapport of the 21st July 2019, tells us the real story of one of the role-players underpinning the Cape’s crime scourge in eviscerating the accountability of police officers. In this context, the Sapu making known its dislike for the SADF presence in the Cape without their “permission”, acknowledged that the issues of “over-time pay” and “free time” as applicable on SAPS members, help to weaken the manpower input and to keep officers from fulfilling their duties because “angered” officers cannot combat crime in the Cape areas. The SADF intervention in combatting crime without consulting first with the SAPS, seems to have been not an insignificant part of the problem, triggering passivity in the SAPS ranks and an unwillingness to fully participate in crime prevention efforts. The issue is clear: union rules comes before the duties of police officers and even though they are funded by taxpayers. Mogodiseng18 reflects the Sapu’s standpoint on this passivity, notwithstanding consequences passivity had wreaked on the country’s security as follows18:3:

Die problem is, ons lede gaan negatief wees omdat hulle nie ordentlik gekonsulteer is nie. Ons lede moet oortyd werk en ons is nooit ingelig oor ‘n oortydbegroting nie. Die ouens van die bende-eenheid kla juis nou oor hul nie genoeg rusdae het nie.

Furthermore, there seems to be a rich-man-poor-man approach prevalent in the ANC regime as well as in the Ministry of Police’s in their locating and placement of police officers to the different socio-economic areas around the country, ignoring a glaring lack of sufficient police officers in the poor, crime-ridden areas resulting in the unnecessarily high murder rates in such afflicted areas. This irresponsible attitude by the SAPS’s top structure, not held liable for their missteps by the ANC regime, has exacerbated the poor delivery of service in terms of policing to areas such as informal settlements and the struggling, lower socio-economic townships and suburbs while good policing is limited the well-off areas (mostly the financially secure class in affluent white areas).11 This so-called “discriminative” policing service was confirmed in the ruling by the Western Cape High Court in December 2018, namely that the allocation of police in the Western Cape was discriminatory, reports Hendricks11.

This imbalance in manpower at police stations have led to some police members becoming over-worked as well as burdening some officers in dangerous areas with enormous stress factors, making them less effective in serious crime fighting. On the other side, as already indicated, the lack of sufficient police officers in the crime-ridden areas undoubtedly contributed to the immensely high murder rates there. The discriminative distribution where fewer police officers are dispatched to poor areas against a higher number allocated to rich areas has specifically been reported by the editor19 of the Sunday Times and the journalists Hosken and Wicks20 on the 15th September 2019. Prominent is the the pertinent revelations on police data relating to the unequal distribution of police resources at stations across the country, confirming the significant discrimination against the poor, black communities. For example, in Diepkloof in Gauteng there is a ratio of 80 police officers for every 100,000 residents, whereas the ratio in affluent Rosebank, Johannesburg, is 987 for every 100 000. It is reported that eMondlo (near Vryheid, KwaZulu-Natal) faces the country’s second worst staff shortage with 70 officers for every 100,000 people, against the ratio of 1,844 officers per 100,000 people for Pietermaritzburg. At the Flagstaff police station (Eastern Cape) 56 police officers are allocated to 100,000 residents against Port Alfred’s 1,485 members per 100,000. The Sophiatown police station, which must handle Westbury, south of Johannesburg, an area which has been weathering a strong element of gangsterism, is alleged to have only 240 officers instead of 275 and only three vehicles to services the area.11,19-21

It seems that the legal battles by the Social Justice Coalition (SIC) and the Equal Education and Nyanga Community Policing Forum, squaring up over three years in the Equality Court with the SAPS, has indeed brought forth on paper some corrections on this discrimination in the allocation of the police manpower. Also, by strictly applying the court’s ruling on the liability of the behaviour in the SAPS which it so far dodged for a long time, some headway has been made, at least on paper. On December 14, 2018 judges Nolwazi Boqwana and Mokgoatji Dolamo ruled on the way police resources were being allocated is discriminating against poor black people.20 On August 6, 2019 the court ordered police management to provide a plan to remedy the situation by September 1, 2019, writes Hosken and Wicks20. Hosken and Wicks20, quoting Dali Weyers20, point out specifically how police-allocated resources discriminated against people clearly on the basis of race and income. Weyers20 posits further20:5:

There has been a cycle where specific communities have been underserved. At some stations the discrimination is dire. If you look at murder rates, which have increased and which are the highest at some of the country’s most under-resourced stations, one would have expected the police to put more resources into such stations. What this data shows [is that] this is not the case.

It is thus not a surprise that the residents of poor (and dangerous) areas, such as that of the eMondlo community, were forced to form a vigilante private “force” to deal with criminals to compensate for the lack of responsibility and accountability of the top structure of the SAPS and the ANC regime to safeguard them. As a result of this reigning chaos of poor and discriminative policing it thus came as no surprise that the Nigerian government wanted to send its own police to South Africa to safe-guard its citizens after the recent so alleged xenophobic attacks.20,22-25

Highlighting this South African political chaos, born out of the fact that crooks have been allowed to take hold of some of the institutions which are supposed to serve society — and Nigeria’s duty to its citizens to safe-guard them 24-hours a day — Tau25 writes on the 8th September 2019 in the Rapport as follows25:9:

Die Nigeriese regering wil graag hul eie polisie na Suid-Afrika stuur om hul burgers hier teen xenofobiese aanvalle te beskerm. Dis die boodskap wat die Nigeriese regering se spesiale gesant, Muhammadu Buhar, blykbaar die afgelope week in Pretoria kom lewer het.

The impropriety within the SAPS to initiate effective law-enforcement in the Western Cape, has been caused by the immense infighting inside the SAPS top ranks there about who gets to be in the pound seats of the organization. It has contributed further in making the policing service there almost ineffective, together with the deficient structuring and management of police units, such as the anti-gang unit itself in taking responsibility for the risk of police officers are involved in (in the application of anti-gang measures).10,19 Hyman10 writes in this context10:1,4:

While politicians’ bicker and police commanders wage their own civil war, hundreds of poorly trained officers have become sitting ducks for the gangs”. Six anti-gang unit officers were shot during an operation in Philippi on June 12. The attack followed a 54-hour period in which 62 murder victims arrived in Cape Town mortuaries.

On the current disorderly administration of the SAPS — which has mimicked the ANC regime’s own disorderly governmental administration of all its allotted tasks — Hyman10, quoting Johan Nortje10, the lawyer of Lincoln, on the anti-gang unit’s malfunctioning which in terms of the Police Ministry is supposed to “dislodge and terminally weaken the capacity of the Cape gangs, writes as follows10:1,4:

The people are seconded, they’re not appointed to official positions. There are no clear guidelines about who is being reported to. The guys in the stations don’t know if they should get involved in gang violence cases because there is now a unit for that. The unit doesn’t know exactly what its mandate is. The gangs can see what’s going on. They are laughing at the police because it looks like the police themselves don’t really know what they’re doing.

The ANC regime’s inadequate rule (in lacking responsibility and accountability) has meanwhile cemented the above-mentioned chaos in the SAPS, diminishing their ability to fight crime, especially the present murdering spree and gangsterism in the Cape, David Bruce10, an independent researcher who specialises in policing, guides us in some way when he said10:1,4: “…the government had ‘never responded in a coherent way to violent crime”.

It seems that the sudden statement about “rehabilitation” of the Cape Flats by the Western Cape community safety MEC Albert Fritz came in response to the stated concerns of mismanagment of resources, as9:4: “…his office would establish a parallel inter-ministerial collaboration to facilitate intelligence gathering and sharing, and the rollout of integrated social programmes to encourage job creation, increased school programmes, sport and culture programmes, youth development and community programmes”. It is a very  late acceptance by the authorities of some form of responsibility and accountability to oversee the safety of inhabitants after many years of deprivation of a small area of 25 km of the country. The question is why the ANC regime has been absent on national level as well as on provincial level since 1994 with constructive intervention, such as job creation, etc., in the Cape Flats, to better it permanently instead of their present opportunistic so-called “initiative to bring prosperity” there in July 2019. How can they hope to repair the integrity of the areas, creating stable communities, and acceptable living conditions in the future? The “reformers” and the “new Police” are the same people with little integrity who now want to fight the same criminals that they as a regime since 1994 gave a free hand to establish themselves and to prosper.9,26 Indeed, prosperity for ordinary citizens is in short supply and will be in the future for all of South Africa, and this is well reflected by the above example of the absolute chaos present in the small part of the country known as the Cape Flats when Fritz9 reacts in July 2019 as the SADF readies to be deployed to fight crime with the remark9:4: “…the SANDF deployment was a massive relief for the people of our province who can now look forward to be safe in their own communities and homes”. He not only confirms the lack of accountability by the SAPS, the ANC regime and the provincial authorities in the Cape Flats but also the impotence of the ANC as a regime after 25 years of rule to bring about prosperity for the greater South Africa. Most of all, it confirms the outright failure of the ANC regime and all its affiliates of being trustworthy rulers.9,26

On the damning score card in the name of the SAPS on furthering corruption and other delinquencies, Brian Sokutu27 refers to the 2019 Analysis of Corruption Trends Report of the independent graft watchdog Corruption Watch, published in August 2019 on corruption trends in the government. This report points out two further serious shortcomings in the SAPS, namely 1) the high level of abuse of power and 2) the high level of the presence of bribery. The SAPS’s officials’ behave like gangsters and hooligans, making the wrongdoings of of officials in the sectors of schools, health and local government look insignificant by comparison.  In this context the SAPS percentage for the abuse of power is at 35.7% and 30.6% for bribery. (For schools’ corruption is at 30.6% with the most common form of corruption related to embezzlement of funds and theft of resources. For the health sector the most prevalent form of corruption is in employment irregularities with 33.3%, followed by procurement with 15.1%.).27,28

Botha29 reports an additional shocking picture on the presence of other criminal behaviours inside the SAPS, especially against women. He writes29:13:

To give you a scary insight into some of the failures; in 2018 between April and September, 55 police officers were investigated for rape. Of these, 32 were by off-duty policemen and 23 happened when the policemen were on duty.

Since the beginning of the year some half-hearted efforts were announced by the SAPS to tackle violence in the country anew. The intention by the SAPS to set up a committee to monitor violence and crime stands out as one of the measures to be taken. But, as with all the SAPS window-dressing in the past, all these efforts once again seem to be quite unrelated to how well-organised and established bodies would accept the responsibility to steer and oversee the stated intentions of erasing violent crimes, especially rampant murder.26,30,31 

It is however important to give credit to a faction inside the SAPS membership regarding integrity and the acceptance of accountability. There is no doubt that some of them have inherited certain good attributes and are not only police officers par excellence who do not hesitate to take responsibility for their behaviour, but are also citizens par excellent and operate outside the hooligan network. It is clear that it is not only innocent people on the street and at their homes and work who are suffering violent deaths, but also the members of the SAPS who have to suffer daily from South Africa’s growing political and socio-economic disorder. The recent National Commemoration Day, held on the 1st Septembre, confirmed this. The tragic wording used in advertising the day in the Sunday Times of the 25th August 2019 tells the story of a country wading in anarchy. Taking responsibility and being accountable for the general poverty-stricken population’s wellbeing have been totally ignored by the executive while police officers doing their job have fallen prey to the crooks and murderers. The advertisement reads32:4:

Remembering our fallen heroes and heroines – police officials and reservists who lost their lives while serving the nation between 01 April 2018 and 31 March 2019. Gone BUT not forgotten. Together let us say NO to police killings and attacks.

Okoye, referring to the above, reports that for the period 2018/2019 the SAPS statistics revealed that 84 police officers were murdered.33

The SAPS has to a great extent become unaccountable for its behaviour, primarily in the first place because of an inept leadership in place, and secondly because of the failed ANC regime that in its politics ignores accountability as a main tenet. South African Defence Force (SADF)

Looking at Ramaphosa’s and Magashule’s many rhetorical utterances on the various crime fighting intentions conceived by the ANC regime, specifically or in general, it is clear that no political or socio-economic constructive outcomes were noted besides the shifting of responsibility to solve especially violence, onto the shoulders of the disorganised Department of Justice, the SADF and the crippled SAPS, while at the same time ignoring the last-mentioned organization’s own leadership inability to effect constructive law enforcement.26,30,31

The SADF’s deployment undoubtedly in some way had brought relief to the people of Cape Flats. It is reported by Dan Meyers35 that since the military entered the Western Cape in mid-July 2019, as many as 1,004 suspects were arrested, 806 wanted suspects were traced and arrested, 45 firearms were confiscated along with 1,036 rounds of ammunition, while an assortment of drugs and illegal substances were also confiscated. Furthermore, a total of 20 members of gangs have been put on trail. Hyman34, on the other hand, reports that notwithstanding the SADF’s presence, that the number of murders has risen in the Western Cape: In the 55 days between the 15th July 15 and Saturday 8th September 2019, the Western Cape provincial forensic service recorded 682 murders or 12.4 murders a day (against the 10.9 murders a day for the year 1 April 2018 to 31 March 2019), reflecting a growth of 14%.34,35

The SADF’s forced intervention and interference in combating gangsterism and other crimes happened because the SAPS had failed the people, but the deployment is at most only a short-lived solution in many ways. This is a task that they are not equipped to do, and neither should they be held accountable for a good outcome. The SADF’s primary task is to defend the country against an enemy. When it is needed to act in a civil setting, it is mainly to address emergencies created by natural disasters such as earthquakes and flooding, etc. When the army is called upon to act against its own people internally, it means something is seriously wrong in the political management of the country. Indeed, the danger of a coup on behalf of a government that has been losing its grip and control over the voters, is but one issue. To erase gangsterism and crimes such as violence, are more complicated to deal with during a military intervention in a time of peace. To offer a solution on this matter, the army at this stage is not geared or prepared to do. A socio-economic and political solution must be found and implemented by the ANC regime instead of its present skirting of the demanding problem. Prolonging the SADF presence over a period of one to two years in the Cape Flats can be an excellent exercise for them in studying how to handle civil society when it becomes the capture by means of a revolution. For civil society to constantly live under martial law, spells conflict and serious concern, however. The fact is that during peace time and democratic rule, the constant and ongoing presence of any military presence undermine the Constitution and civil rights of the individual. It must be noted that the Cape’s anti-gang measures are not only directed at the ongoing violence, but also encompasses an in-depth and comprehensive presence in a variety of serious crimes such as theft, fraud, rape, etc., which have for many years plagued society. Further is there a masked political agenda at play which the ANC regime has either been ignoring or misreads, namely the growth of Coloured nationalism and a resistance by the Coloureds in the Western Cape to being suppressed by the state.36

On the presence of a growing Coloured nationalism – something the ANC rejects in its Marxist-Leninist political project, and which incidentally nullifies individuals’ and minority groups’ civil and tribal rights as per the ANC’s constitutional concept of democratic-centralism – there must there be no doubt. The anti-Coloured sentiment in the ANC is easily recognized in the regime’s indifferent attitude towards the Western Cape’s gang violence and its accompanying socio-economic chaos which has prevented group-forming within the Coloured community. There is more to it than the simple explanation that the ANC allowed it because the province is DA territory. It is a majority Coloured area and mostly anti-ANC. The deep-seated anti-Coloured tribalism harbored within the ANC while ignoring of the Coloureds’ interests and their safety – is obvious in Bheki Cele’s response of denialism on the matter. The editor of the Rapport on the 14th July 2019 reflects on the lack of accountability, responsibility and involvement of the ANC regime with regard to the Cape Coloureds even as the murder rate in the Western Cape started to rise dramatically (from 385 to 509 over two years) and the additional support of the SADF to stem the failings of the SAPS finally had to be admitted to37. The Minister of Police, Bheki Cele reacted on 6 May 2019 on TV to narrate the events and he said37:2: “…hy “twyfel” of misdaad in die Wes-Kaap wel toegeneem het. Die Wes-Kaapse regering “lieg” oor hoeveel polisielede daar in die Wes-Kaap per inwoner is.  Nog ‘n gunsteling verskoning was dat dit politici was wat die weermag in die Kaap soek”.

Instead of taking responsibility for law-enforcement, the ANC cadres were constantly probing on a national level as well as provincially and locally on how best they could evade being held accountable, notwithstanding the loss of human lives. The editor37 of Rapport, on this obvious lack of accountability by the ANC regime and to prevent the many murders and deaths arising from their mismanagement, writes in July 201937:2: “Die nasionale regering het bloed aan sy hande. Pretoria, hoor nou die boodskap van beangste moeders en vaders dat hulle ook Suid-Afrikaners is. Die oorlog op die Kaapse Vlakte is ons almal se oorlog.”

The presence of the SADF has only been mandated for at most six months. The SADF cannot offers any long-term solutions. In the end, not only will it fail to bring about a kind of temporary balance, but can make the problem worse if the “occupation” lasts longer than one year. Many realities disqualify the SADF as the proper instrument to fight violence, etc. in the Cape (and any other place in South Africa). Firstly, the army has not been trained to curb gangsterism: their actions can activate hostility from the law-abiding citizens. Secondly, it can trigger a sense of “revenge” criminal and violent actions by gangs. Thirdly, as was reflected in the past with the army’s intervention at the Cape, all the markers are already indicating that the present exercise is going to bring neither short term nor long term corrections, let alone permanent fixes. The fact is that the Cape Flats problem is both a socio-economic and political failure. An immense uplifting initiative, lasting well over a decade before some positive outcomes can be expected should be prescribed. At the moment the Ramaphosa regime has been applying a treatment aimed at curing symptoms only because it does not know how to treat the causes.36

On facing the inadequacies of the SADF as the “new” saviour of the Cape Flats, Pinnock36 reflects on three possible negative outcomes that could result from the deployment (and in some way must be read as a possible countrywide warning that anarchy and revolution could ensue because of the ANC’s failure to assure good governance). He firstly writes that almost no invading army has ever been able to successfully dominate a dense urban area where the locals are familiar with all the routes and hiding places and have some community support. Secondly, Pinnock36 highlights that gangs are merely street manifestations of much larger crime syndicates and other supply routes36:19: “If you ‘take out’ a street-corner gang, another will simply take over their sales turf”. Pinnock36 further demnonstrates how a much more serious negative outcome of the army’s intervention could become a reality. He writes36:19: “The third danger is more complicated, as the Brazilian military found in its attempt to police gang-controlled favelas. It became impossible for them to be withdrawn because in Brazil – and the same is true in SA – SWAT-type interventions do not alter the conditions that caused the problems in the first place. Once the army is in place it becomes increasingly difficult to do the work that is necessary to improve those conditions.”

Heinecken38 sketches the inefficiency of the SAPS to curb crime and violence by themselves (inside its culture of unaccountability) and (hopefully) the temporary presence of the SADF in order to ensure a minimum of law and order – which confirms the SAPS and the ANC regime’s failure to offer lasting solutions regarding law and order – linking it to wider social ramifications, of which two are most prominent: 1) the upkeep of violence; and 2) rule by an undemocratic state. These outcomes are intertwined with a corrupt government trying its best to stay in power. Firstly, it could facilitate the possible starting up of “security forces inside various security forces”, directly as a result of the failed state’s inability to provide safety from crime and violence. Therefore, citizens may be inclined to set up their own armed groups. This vigilantism has the potential to escalate into further violence and lawlessness because of citizens’ “policing and kangaroo courts”. Secondly, the deployment of the military throughout the country would foster a culture of militarism, in preparation of an eventual coup, which would favour the autocracy and despotism of the ANC regime and thus the potential to establish itself as the sole, unauthorised regime for many years to come.38 Heinecken38 is succinct in this concern38:6: “This, in turn, could be linked to broader social processes of militarisation within society at the economic, political and ideological levels”. Judicial Commissions

When the Ramaphosa regime came to power, leading the sixth administration in the post-1994 Parliament, it initially appeared to want to make good on one of its promises: to prosecute the alleged state capturers under the Zuma regime. But this endeavour has thus far not advanced much under the new regime, suggesting in some way that it was not really the intention of the Ramaphosa regime to either prosecute themselves or their comrades from the Zuma regime. Instead another option, with less risk to the ANC elite’s and their cronies’ delinquent actions, was chosen and pursued; the setting up of various judicial commissions to gather evidence from persons and institutes on the alleged persons and groups who had allegedly had stolen from the state, as well as the amounts of money involved in this alleged stealing. Indeed, these commissions, especially the Zondo and Mpati, brought to light (and are still uncovering) the shocking amounts in rands alleged stolen, as well as the names of a contingent of ANC elites and their cronies as the main culprits. But the expected arrests, prosecution and sentencing of the many culprits have since stopped altogether. So far not a single bigwig of the ANC inner circle has been arrested and jailed. Indeed, all of the alleged criminals are still walking free, and it seems as if not a single one of the ANC regime’s various manipulators will be arrested and neither will the crooks in its inner circle will be brought to book in the near future by the NPA.

The Zondo commission for instance gives us an in-depth insight in the immense amount of corruption that has taken place in the past under the ANC regime, but it also tells an intimate story of how the ANC elite distanced itself from any form of accountability. In the foreground, the recent testimony of Jacob Zuma before the Zondo commission is etched out, specifically detailing the acute lack of official accountability for any number of transgressions under his watch. The ANC’s highest official, namely their president and the State President has been implicated, but little has resulted from this fact being known.  Smillie39, in this context pointed out how Zuma spiritedly defended his role as the president of South Africa until December 2017 as one characterized by only good deeds. Zuma has distanced himself from the concept of state capture and indeed stated that state capture doesn’t exist, notwithstanding other testimonies before the Zondo commission that had confirmed the reality of it and Zuma’s direct alleged involvement in it. In contrast to his denials of his alleged involvement in state capture, he continued his testimony by advancing the narrative that he was the target of political trickery which had falsely framed him by accusing him of alleged state capture.39-42

The Zondo thus became a senseless exercise in getting any clarity on the role-players behind state capture, besides the many very irrational and unrelated testimonies to distract the public intention from the real dealings done by crooks during the Zuma regime. The astonishing “revelation-testimony” of the former SABC boss Hlaudi Motsoeneng, is notable and he is described by Madisa43:1 as the “nutty professor”, “Hlaudi circus leaves Zondo in stitches”, as well as his nonsensical speech before the Zondo commission when he said that he was the43:1: “…big fish (leader) the SABC catch when the institution appoints him”; 43:1 “…that although he does not have a matric certificate he is an intellectual who has addressed and lectured at a lot of universities” [ a statement which publicly denied by the universities]. The bag of circus tricks were brought forth by the witnesses’ rights to act in any irrational way without being interrupted by the various commissions’ chairs since they would complain about being “victimised” by the authorities who were trying to bring a sense of direction and focus into the proceedings.43-45

Another strategic lie was to discredit the work done by the commissions by portraying them as being politically and racially motivated to move against Black businessmen and politicians. Pertinent was the allegation for instance by the National Association of Democratic Lawyers (Nadel) that the commissions, especially the Zondo, was targeting Black executives as culprits.  Nolitha Jali46, the secretary general of Nadel postulates46:4: “On closer inspection, it appears the commission that investigating state capture and corruption is only focusing on some high-profile politicians and executive managers – especially black professionals in senior management – who are publicly branded as corrupt.”

What Jali46 missed out is the fact that the BEE and the cadre-deployment politics of the ANC had led to many Blacks without skills or abilities and several without integrity being appointed in senior positions in the civil and part-civil services, and because they had been nurtured in the ANC’s corrupt culture, many of these Black people in most cases were found guilty in corruption probes in the public and the private sector. The Zondo commission had no other choice than to call on these persons to hear their testimonies in an effort to obtain some insight in the matter. On the other hand, the commission offered the public the rare opportunity to witness the defence against allegations of state capture as well as seeing all the key role-players involved — a rare perspective. But it stopped there: allegations are not yet established facts. The acceptance of testimonies as either true or false rests with the NPA.46

The above efforts to derail the aim and workings of the various judicial commissions, resulted  in any whistleblower or even culprits who had wanted to come clean, becoming the target of attacks by the real culprits instead of having an outcome that should have been quite the opposite.

It is important, in terms of the above reference to note that those criminals involved in the state capture were once more empowered in the post-May 2019 ANC regime, as per Munusamy’s47 reference that the Zondo inquiry is some times more harrowing for witnesses than for the perpetrators who are still living comfortably abroad or are back as MPs and MPLs in the new sixth administration led by Ramaphosa. These culprits are enjoying their freedom, seemingly permanently, bound by the fact that only after the Zondo commission closes down, can there be any hope for prosecutions to follow. At most Zondo’s present intentions are, it seems, only to identify crooks and then to leave them to remain forever free, as the non-prosecutions of Jacob Zuma and his intimate cronies have confirmed. The question for Munusamy47 (and for many political analysts) on the Zondo commission (as well as the other judicial commissions running at present) is pertinent47:18 “What will the commission ultimately achieve? Right now, it does not seem to be clear.”

A prominent other outcome of this harrowing experience for witnesses, is that it seems that anyone who dares to take on the corrupt ANC top brass and their high-ranking cadres during their testimonies before the Zondo and other commissions, are handed over to face libel and slander charges to the tune R100 million and more, or are either served with court interdicts and other interventions to silence them. Even the actions of the law-enforcing Public Protector, Busiswe Mkhwebane, clearly became a prime target for many of the tainted ANC top brass when she tried to follow up on testimonies.48-51

The various judicial commissions’ revealed information – allegations which can be lies, myths, but which can undoubtedly also include facts and truths – but which will never be tested in an open court because the ANC elite had launched successful court interdicts around it to stop exposing the role of VIP-ANC politicians in various transgressions.

Observing from a critical point the intentions and abilities of the various judicial commissions, Munusamy’s47 doubt on the real role of commissions in solving state capture and other political and socio-economic wrongdoings, is not without reason. A deeper look into the Ramaphosa regime’s political power-play, manipulation and the planned distraction, would therefore not be superfluous. Drawing attention to the ANC’s serious delinquencies since 1994, also reveals the real modus operandi behind the use of the commissions. The various judicial commissions are excellent vehicles with which the angry public can vent their frustrations, but it seems after the hot air had escaped, the status quo of the corrupt political setup of the ANC regime remains untouched. This must be seen in the context of the ANC’s debased politics and suspect values, bad customs and traditions, which have all been been burning issues to discuss or to address. Central in this venting, all hot air and no action to end the reign of this corrupt elite, the sole purpose of the ANC’s dubious politburo is to avoid any challenges to its leadership.47,52-54

This well-planned strategy by the Ramaphosa regime, in line with the ANC politburo’s resolve to block any NPA intervention on the findings for instance of the Zondo commission, can be clearly read from the dearth of prosecutions of the many culprits, notwithstanding the concrete and hard evidence being produced from the Zondo enquiry. The editor55 of the Sowetan reflects on the unwillingness and hopelessness of the Hawks to arrest and prosecute culprits who are comprehensively indicted by damning testimonies before the Zondo. He points out that Deputy chief justice Raymond Zondo, the chairperson of the Zondo commission of Inquiry into State Capture, had at various times asked the NPA and the Hawks to launch prosecutions against the culprits, but that his requests were seemingly ignored. The editor55:14 writes:

The commission of inquiry into capture has on several occasions instructed its legal team to contact law enforcement agencies, in particular the Hawks, on serious allegations of criminality that are brought before it.

The Hawks’ inaction on these serious acts of criminality [including murder and threats of murder] again highlights the harm beneficiaries of state capture did on the criminal justice.

That the agencies were diverted from their primary role and manipulated for political and personal gain we knew based on reports long before the commission was established.

Also, the blatant passivity exhibited by Ramaphosa and company towards the head of the NPA, Shamila Batohi, to leave her alone and not to act on Judge Zondo’s recommendations to prosecute some of the ANC elite, is at best very disconcerting and strange. This passivity stands in contrast to Cyril Ramaphosa’s own immense efforts to interfere and to intervene in the present Public Protector’s office and to oust her from office because she dares to take on specifically some of Ramaphosa’s cronies and other ANC bigwigs in his regime.45,55

It seems as if the commission’s design was perhaps deliberately done in such a manner that they are not only powerless to force NPA prosecutions for crimes committed because the body has been unable to advance without obtaining court interdicts. Neither can it coax the NPA into constructive actions (which will jeopardised the commission’s aims and intentions and could mean entering the domain of subjective politics), and are moreover even unable and powerless to reigning in witnesses who have shown a masterly skill at delaying the work of the commissions or are busy misleading it with false testimonies.56

This has been a replay of unaccountability displayed by the ANC regime since 1994. The most prominent example of how the ANC executive lack any accountability (as part of their planning to proceed with transgressions without fearing the consequences) was the recent erasing of the Siriti commission’s finding on the absence of corruption by ANC-VIPs. Davis and Mutemwa-Tumbo57 revealed how some of the ANC-VIPs had misconstrued the law since 1994 for instance by deciding that a commission of inquiry (like the Seriti) could not to be held liable or accountable for corruption or self-enrichment and could escape prosecution for life. He writes57:20: “Sadly, this is not what happened with the Seriti commission. Instead, its non binding yet far-reaching findings were used by the ‘powers that be’ and alleged culpable individuals to justify their impunity and avoid accountability. This was a miscarriage of justice in the truest sense…”

The editor58 of the Sunday Times also examines to what extent avoiding responsibility and accountability for their wrongdoings, the ANC’s top brass in the past chose a legally escape via the judicial Sereti commission (a setup which evidence now suggests the Ramaphosa regime seemingly intends to redo with the present commissions). The editor quotes judge Dunstan Mlambo’s judgement on the failed Seriti commission58:20: “For the first time, an entire commission’s findings have been upended. It is clear that the commission failed to inquire fully and comprehensively into the issues, which it was required to investigate on the basis of its terms of reference. Seriti’s conduct cries out for scrunity.”

This lack of accountability in the outcomes and findings of the Seriti commission (wherein the presidencies of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma seemed to have played a prominent a role in casting a dark shadow over the integrity of the judicial system), stands out, and he writes59:8: “…die kommissie se base het duidelik ‘n ‘alternatiewe agenda’ [gehad]”, en59:8: “…pleks daarvan [om die volle waarheid te bepaal omtrent die wapentransaksies te bepaal] is ons ondersoeke in veiliger’ rigtings gestuur terwyl die publiek se aandag van die kritieke faktore weggelei is.”

It must be noted that the Ramaphosa regime’s backroom dealings and efforts to allow its key members to escape any accountability of their wrongful activities as indicated by the Zondo commission, may indeed have been successfully achieved, but only in the short term. As the fallen Seriti commission shows, they can be called to book in the long term, especially if a new political regime comes in power after 2024. The editor58 of the Sunday Times clearly deliberates on such a future outcome when he pinpointed the nullifying of the Seriti commission by the findings of judge Dunstan Mlambo. The editor58 of the Sunday Times’s writes58:20: “Trust in our courts has been confirmed”, and58:20: “... judge Dunstan Mlambo… judgement this week provided a flare of hope amid the dark shadow that state capture and political criminality have cast over our public life.”

Hopefully future investigations by the Public Protector’s office will shine more light on the ANC elite’s other “secret” doings around state capture and more recent issues such as the CR17 funding.

Mirrian60 reflects the scepticism felt by many South Africans about the constructive outcomes in the form of the prosecution of transgressors pinpointed by the many commissions that Ramaphosa had set up. But it rather looks as if the many testimonies are more and more in line with religious “confessions” of sinners revealing their sins to their monks in order to be set free from God’s wrath and the King’s punishments, not to mention letting them off the hook to continue with their nefarious acts. It is not without good reason that these various commissions are seen as mere window-dressing to cover up the ANC’s delinquencies since 1994. The reference60:3: “No individuals involved have been yet been held to account”, underscores the already  familiar theme — the lack of comprehensive prosecutions for what should have been high-level political jailbirds in South Africa.

Three issues must be made clear. The first is that the various judicial commissions on corruption undoubtedly highlighted the activities of culprits inside the ANC’s inner circle in very real and well-focussed manner. Secondly, they cannot be blamed — and are not accountable — for the failing of the NPA to do its work properly. The NPA’s ongoing foolish excuses to not go after the crooks despite the offences committed, is laughable and can indeed reflect higher political interference and intervention to block the prosecution of the ANC elites who are culprits. Thirdly, the judicial commissions’ intentions have often been misunderstood by the public, as they had expectations that these bodies would eventually serve to lock up the crooks. That is, of course incorrect and this faulty notion has encouraged the negativity currently being associated with the good intentions of the commissions.60-61

To understand the proper judicial role and powers of the various commissions, the guideline set out by Judge Johann van der Westhiuzen62, retired from the ConCourt, is a helpful tool. Judge van der Westhuizen62 emphasised that the Zondo commission is not a court of law. It can not find a person guilty for committing a crime and was created in terms of Article 84(2)(f) of the Constitution by way of Proclamation 3 of 2018 by the President. It functions as per the regulations stipulated by the Commission Act of 1947. He tells us that commissions can in an orderly way expose the evil of unlawful acts, theft, state capture and corruption, which had taken hold of the heart of a regime and identify the ease with which a state can be captured under a failed regime. It is within this framework that it is able to hear testimonies such as the ones heard by the Zondo commission.62

Dr. Phindile Ntliziywana45 of the University of Cape Town guides us well when remarking that the commissions can, in cross-examining witnesses (especially those implicated), serve as a probe to check the veracity of the evidence that implicates them or others and that the refusal or absence of a witness in giving his/her testimony at a commission, could lead to grounds for a fine/imprisonment. This possibility of legal route is evident in the following punishments45:2:

  • Summons to attend and give evidence, or produce any book, document or object before a commission, but failed in doing so without sufficient cause;
  • Failure to attend commission proceedings at the time and place as specified in the summons;
  • Failure to remain in attendance until the conclusion of the inquiry, or until he is excused by the commission chairperson;
  • Refusal to be sworn or make affirmation as a witness after being required by the commission chairperson to do so; or
  • Failure to answer fully and satisfactorily any question lawfully put to him or her.

But to reach a verdict of “guilty” by the various testimonies before the Zondo, for instance as on Jacob Zuma presidency’s alleged state capture and to accept that “evidence” offered there by various persons as Angelo Agrizzi, Themba Maseko, Rajesh Sundaram, Fikile Mbalula, Vytjie Mentor, Ngoake Ramatihodi and Nhlanhla Nene to find Jacob Zuma “guilty”, can directly lead to being prosecuted by the commission, is a misunderstanding. The testimonies are claims made at most and can be false and part of revenge actions, etc. against a so-called “culprit” and must be tested by an open court of law. The evidence collection by the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) to eventually be handed over to the NPA for prosecution, for instance on claims against Motsoeneng by the SABC to the value of R21 million, is something outside the powers of the various commissions. Commissions can at most render conclusions and recommendations. Commissions are not the saviour of a nation to rescue it from the devil, neither is its chair a saviour who locks criminals on his own behalf. In the end, a commission can be an outright failure, as the Seriti and the TRC commissions were by being whitewashing bodies to let the crooks of the hook. The final step towards punishment for wrongdoing via the courts is the sole duty of the NPA.62-65

Van der Westhuizen62 pertinently writes on the actions needed to charge the culprits identified by the commissions as follows62:4-5: “Om by straf uit te kom, moet die nasionale vervolgingsgesag nie wag vir die kommissie se aanbevelings nie, maar dadelik getuienis byvoorbeeld uit bankrekenings en deur middel van eedsverklarings insamel en vervolgings begin”.

On the complexity around the crimes of state capture (and other crimes eminating from the ANC’s cadre deployment and BEE politics) and private corruption intertwined with the state’s unlawful activities and thus the exclusive need of an able and active NPA doing its work, Van der Westhuizen62 guides clearly on how the NPA (and the media and public) must understand its task and how it must finally initiate efforts in 2019 to send the culprits to jail, when he writes62:4-5:

In ‘n hedendaagse komplekse handelswêreld vol houermaatskappye, filiaalmaatskappye, aandeelhouers en korporatiewe sluiers is handelsmisdade nie so maklik om te bewys nie. Benewens wetgewing in verband met byvoorbeeld die bestuur van openbare finansies en talle staatsdiensreëls, is veral bedrog en korrupsie hier ter sake. Bedrog is wesenlik om voordeel te probeer verkry deur ‘n wanvoorstelling, soos wanneer jy lieg oor kilometres om jou voertuig te verkoop. Korrupsie kom meestal op omkopery neer.

‘n Beskuldige se opset om wederregtelik op te tree moet bo redelike twyfel bewys word. Hoe bewys mens byvoorbeeld dat Nommer Een opsetlik opdrag gegee het of geweet het dat spesiale reëlings getref is om die Guptas se bruilofsgaste op die Waterkloof-lugmagbasis te laat land? Hy sweer hoog en laag hy het niks daarmee te doen gehad nie. Hoorsêgetuienis is slegs by wyse van uitsondering toelaatbaar. Gerugte is onvoldoende. Indien ‘n amptenaar dapper of suur genoeg is om onder eed te getuig dat hy die opdrag direk van die president ontvang het, of persoonlik by was toe dit gegee of goedgekeur is, sal Zuma se advokate hom lank kruisondervra en elke teenstrydigheid oor gebeure van lank gelede eindeloos uitbuit.

Misdadigers is dikwels nie geloofwaardige getuies nie. Indien hulle godsvresend-eerlik was, sou hulle nie aan onwettigheid deelgeneem het nie. Hulle pas hul storie aan om minder skuldig te lyk.

In examining the absence of judicial powers of the various commissions that have not been equipped to direct criminal prosecutions and sentence culprits, it became clear from the appearance of Zuma’s and other high-fliers before the Zondo commission, that the top brass  in the ANC who had been implicated in the charges of state capture, and who had committed corruption, theft, etc., that they would not easily be held accountable, and in fact may never be brought to book. Instead, in the post-May 2019 set-up, the chances are beyond reasonable that the ANC’s cycle of impunity will continue to reinforce the unjust systems that have previously enabled state capture. It must be remembered that Cyril Ramaphosa is not a newcomer to the South Afrucan political scene: he served as Zuma’s vice president and was the head of the ANC regime’s corrupt cadre-deployment programme. Moreover, he is part of the ANC politburo which advocates Marxism-Leninism and which had disregarded all the ANC elite’s crimes. To obstruct the ANC’s involvement in delinquencies means the end of Ramaphosa serving as the ANC-president or the State President. The various judicial commissions can therefore actually be understood as mere political mock-ups to keep the ANC dominos from coming tumbling down.39-42

The misdemeanors committed by the revolutionary top brass of the ANC thanks to their leverage on the masses of poverty-stricken citizens, those dependent and innocent blacks who have had to endure their grip on power for over 25 years, is almost like a scene from new The Lion King film by Disney, depicting in an unequivocal way a society where the weak have learnt to worship at the feet of the strong. To the poor masses of black people, the ANC has forcefully sold a seductive worldview in which absolute (but questionable) power goes unquestioned, and where the weak and vulnerable are fundamentally inferior (the poor), writes Hassler-Forest66. For Hassler-Forest66 it implies that the ANC imposed on many South Africans a political writ from which there seems to be no escape post-May 2019. Accountability in any sphere of political, judicial and economic life has always been and is seemingly still today a word unknown in the vocabulary of the ANC’s top brass. The good intentions and just aims of various judicial commissions have all fallen prey to the party.37,66 National Prosecuting Authority (NPA)

In South Africa the successful prosecution of criminals who commit serious crimes seems to be locked in a downward spiral and has been now for years now. Especially when there is a whiff of political association with the ANC elite, the blind-spot that the deeds done by these criminals elicit, becomes obvious. When there is indeed any sort of charge activated, it remains stuck in the category of mostly allegations that must be comprehensively investigated at first before an arrest can be made. The NPA’s poor record of prosecution so far is masked by excuses such as a lack of funds and staff to carry out such prosecutions. In reality, there is not yet a single prosecution process in play awaiting the ANC’s top brass and their many cronies on the issue of state capture.47,49-51,67

The Hawks’ National Clean Audit Task Team, which in June 2019 already netted some 14 politicians and which is alleged to be closing in on more delinquents, is being presented as evidence of how successful crime-fighting by the Ramaphosa regime is being tackled, is however misleading. The 14 politicians do not represent the big wigs of the ANC elite involved in alleged crimes. As a crime-busting unit the Hawks have done a lot, as with the submitting of 1,800 completed cases brought to the NPA regarding corruption, serious economic crimes and priority crimes in state institutions, especially in municipalities characterised by maladministration, fraud and corruption, but in the end they are dependent on the NPA’s efficiency to prosecute culprits. Evidently, the arrests are being stalled at the NPA, as Mashego68 reports68:5: “The Hawks are now awaiting decisions from the prosecutors (NPA) which will inform them whether the cases are ready for arrests or if they need further investigation.” It is alleged that the Hawks are also understaffed as is the case with the NPA, while in addition experiencing other serious problems of its own. In this context Mashego68 writes that one of the Hawks’ top officials, the anti-corruption task team unit head, a said Zinhle Mnonopi68 was implicated by former deputy finance minister Mcebisi Jonas at the Zondo commission. Mnonopi68 allegedly tried to quash a case in which Jonas accused Ajay Gupta of trying to bribe him with R600 million as well as offering him the job of Finance Minister. (Note: Jacob Zuma’s son Duduzane, who is at present out on bail, was also implicated in this case). Mnonopi meanwhile appears to have been suspended for a suspicious case of fraud amounting to more than R35 million.68

It is especially the Gupta brothers who had focussed on the failings of the NPA and enabling it to eventually become intertwined with the ANC regime’s manipulations to cover up their missteps. The recent imposition of sanctions on the three brothers, Ajay, Atul and Rajesh and their associate Salim Essa by the US Government’s Treasury is an indictment of our law enforcement agencies, caught the attention of the editor of the Sunday Times on the 11th October 2019.53

This intervention was an embarrassment for the so-called promises of “cleaning up corruption” by Ramaphosa and his cronies. The Guptas’ involvement in state capture started up in 2009. (They fled the country in December 2017 under very suspicious circumstances and are living a life of luxury in the United Arab Emirates). So far there has been no effort by the Ramaphosa regime to seize any of the ill-gotten funds that the Guptas have stowed away in US and UK banks nor to bring the Guptas back from the UAE to face justice in South Africa. Instead, the ANC regime under Ramaphosa have undertaken not a single action against them, as was clearly reflected by the official sluggish pace of the state capture investigation and the manifold excuses that there was a lack of funds and too little manpower to advance their prosecution. It was only after the American interference that the ANC minister Ronald Lamola announced the appointment of a team of top legal experts to start up active investigations and prosecution of cases around state capture. Suddenly an amount of R20 million was allocated to the Department of Justice to do this clean-up by the experts. The Treasury also has now agreed to allocate R102 million to the NPA to start investigations and prosecutions on state capture. Lamola even mentions that the Department of Justice had approached eight countries for mutual legal assistance in an attempt to have the Guptas extradited to face state capture allegations.52,53,69,70

On this sudden “rehabilitation” of the NPA’s efforts to lock up the three Gupta brothers, the head of the NPA, Shamila Batohi, quickly showered all hope in icy water when she noted at the beginning of October that the NPA “is experiencing particular difficulties” with requests for mutual legal assistance (MLAs) from India and the UAE to extradite the three Guptas, notwithstanding that India together with South Africa is part of BRICS and that South Africa does have seemingly have some a kind of an extradition agreement with the AUE.52,70

The US’s constructive action against the Guptas stands out against the outright failure of South Africa to take action after nearly two years. Naki71 describes this NPA and ANC regime failure in no uncertain terms but tactfully as71:4: “South Africa should be ashamed for not taken action itself” and that the US interference and intervention71:4 “…might have been aimed to inspire reciprocal action by SA against corruption”. The hard fact is that the constructive US move was egg on South African faces, basically because the South African government lacks accountability to prosecute and sentence the state capturers.71-73

On the real reason of why the ANC will not fight to round up the Guptas and other delinquents here, Dennis Bloem71-73 of Cope reflects71:4: “It is shameful that people like Jacob Zuma and ACE Magashule behave as if it is business as usual when they faced serious allegations. Cope can only come to one conclusion as to why the Hawks and NPA are not taking action against corrupt elements – because the entire Luthuli House will implode”.

What is not clearly stated, is that the reciprocal action in the US was because of the ANC regime’s lack of accountability to the South African citizens and that this flaw has had a knock-on effect on relations with the international community, allowing the Gupta network to aggressively take root even in the US and other countries dealing with the US.71-73

On other so-called “successful” prosecutions, like the one against former prison boss Linda Mti who appeared in court for the first time in May 2019 for fraud and corruption relating to the Bosasa investigations (and Jacob Zuma who appeared in the high court also in May 2019 facing 16 charges that include fraud, corruption and racketeering), the damning evidence is that since advocate Shamila Batohi’s appointment as the new national director of National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) six months ago, not a single bigwig state capturer has been prosecuted nor jailed.61,74,75

Batohi’s reflection that she had ordered a full audit (list) of cases handled by the anti-corruption task team, has been sorely lacking in concrete outcomes. To say that 118 outstanding cases involving politicians and government officials, some dating back 10 years, is under investigation, is insignificant in light of the NPA’s poor post-2009 track record. For Batohi to state that the NPA had asked for a report on the outstanding cases which include the arms deal charges against Jacob Zuma, the Nelson Mandela Bay metro’s integrated rapid transport system matter, Bosasa (a SIU report was already completed showing evidence of corruption in four tenders awarded  to the tune about R1.5 billion to Bosasa) and the Camel Rock housing development in the Eastern Cape, as well as revisiting the cases that had been removed from the list to see if any should be reinstated, such as the withdrawal of a case against controversial Eastern Cape ANC leader Pumlani Mkolo and 10 other implicated in the Nelson Mandela memorial-service fraud scandal, are mentioned as intentions only and will be for a long time to come. Further is there is the case of the previous boss of Eskom, Brian Molefe, who unlawfully obtained pension benefits worth at least R30 milion, but who has been refusing to pay the money back, notwithstanding orders by the High Court and an Appeals Court finding that he must pay it back.74,76

Another excellent example of stalling inside the NPA and the SAPS, has been noted in cases where the prosecution of alleged criminal cases involve specific politicians, as is the case of Julius Malema after his remark made in Newcastle in June 2016 in the northern KwaZulu-Natal. At this event Malema is alleged to have told his supporters to occupy land because it belonged to blacks only while white people have no legitimate claims of ownership on South African land. He has since been accused of contravening the Riotous Assembly Act. He appeared again on July 2019 (three years) later before the court but his case was postponed to the 9th September 2019 (Note: Malema is charged for the same offence in Bloemfontein, Free State  after he made a similar remark in 2014 but was never prosecuted and thus a verdict on the case was bnever issued.)77

Also the case against Nkola Motata, whom the editor of the Sowetan described on 16 May 2019 as:12: “…the infamous racist, drunken judge, however, makes one question whether justice will prevail in this case”, further focuses on the country’s general  inability to deliver justice in the post-1994 South Africa when VIPs are involved in any legal matter. [Motata crashed his car in 2007, was convicted of drunken driving but it took 11 years before he was called to account before the Judicial Conduct Tribunal (JCT). While he was being prosecuted, he nevertheless held onto his position as an appointed judge – although he did not serve on the bench because he was suspended, he had drawn a salary of more than R16 million during the time of his suspension. He will after retirement further be paid 60% of his salary — estimated at R1.4 million a year — until he dies, while a surviving spouse will be entitled to half that amount.78

The malfunctioning judicial system is careful not to focus too much on the racial pronouncements by the judge — since such pronouncements can easily be construed as hate speech. Motata is however a symbol of a divided country, South Africa, as well as being an individual coddled by the judicial system to such an extent that for more than 11 years he was never put on the spot and finally he was even let off the hook. The editor78 of the Sowetan writes about his case that78:12: “…we wonder whether the kid gloves treatment of Motata is a sign of double standards”.

But the Motata case reflects other judicial complexities wherein the presence of the NPA also manifested as the prosecuting authority. The Sowetan’s description on the 16th May 2019 of Motata as78:12: “…the infamous racist…judge…”, seems to be wrong when it reflects on his alleged racism, as the Saturday Citizen of the 12th October 2019 confirms on the finalised finding of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) on determining Motata’s fate. The outcome of the long drawn-out Motata case (as with the outcomes of Jacob Zuma’s many criminal cases as well as the one of Julius Malema and the recent nullifying of the findings of the Seriti commission on the arms deal) are rather begging the question regarding the quality of judicial service in the country. The Motata case thus needs to be reflected upon in terms of the post-1994 political landscape run by the ANC. It is particularly important when seen in light of the Chief justice Mogoeng’s calling out the accusers of judges who they had accused (falsely Mogoeng states) of judicial corruption in especially the CR17 debacle.78 Barney Mthombothi’s80 specific accusation that Mogoeng has been meddling shamelessly in the political sphere because of his habit to jump from one podium to the next while pontificating on every subject under the sun, must be read together here.78-81

Mthombothi80, on the controversial so-called “political” doings of Mogoeng, reflects80:19:

He seems lately to have been making more political than judicial pronouncements. To reinforce their independence, judges should therefore eschew any conduct or comment avoided like the plaque”, and: “If the judiciary is to retain its independence, if it’s wrong for politicians (for anybody for that matter) to act in a way that belittles or damages the reputation of the judiciary, it can’t be right for the chief justice to be going around making speeches as if he is running for political office. He can’t carry political baggage. Worse, the subject has sounding off about may yet land before him in court. The office he holds surely deserves a certain decorum. Politics is a dirty game. Like mud wrestling, anyone involved in it cannot avoid the splatter of mud.

The editor81 of the Saturday Citizen, on the JSC finalised finding about the Motata case with its alleged racial inclination that seems to can contaminated judicial findings seriously, writes81:12:

It is unrealistic, perhaps even naive, to think that South Africans’ can put the issue of race behind them in their day-to-day lives; there’s just too much baggage for that.

Yet, we had hoped that, in the judicial system, the influences of skin colour and culture would be firmly put aside when assessments are made or judgments passed.

Sadly, the long drawn out case of drunken judge Nkola Motata – which has just been finalised, after more than a decade – indicates that may not be the case.

Firstly, the Judicial Services Commission (JSC), in determining Motata’s fate, noted that one of its own members, Advocate Izak Smuts, as an alleged instigator of a complaint against Motata in terms of judicial rules. Had chaired earlier deliberations over Motata and had not disclosed his involvement or recused himself.

Smuts is white and Motata black. Was there bias there, conscious or inconscious?

More disturbing, though, is the decision by the JSC that Motata was guilty only on “misconduct” and not “gross misconduct” because he had used racially inflammatory language after driving his car into a Johannesburg man’s wall. That man was white.

Motata claimed his outburst was to reaction to being call the “k-word” by the homeowner. The man, however, denies that claim emphatically and no evidence has been produced that he did use the word.

Despite that lack of evidence, the JSC found, as a fact, that Motata had been provoked by the homeowner and, consequently convicted the drunken judge of a lesser transgression.

Does this mean that unsupported claims can pass for evidence in our courts? Does it mean that the word of a black judge, who conducted himself poorly, is accepted over the word of a white man?

We worry that this JSC judgment sets a disturbing precedent.

Looking at how superficially the prosecution of the many culprits of state capture, corruption and fraud, have been handled, as the Zondo commission appositely highlighted, together with how successfully Zuma played the NPA and the judicial system in general to not face prison anytime soon and the ongoing successful interdicts of Ramaphosa against the Public Protector’s office, as well as Mogoeng’s dabbling in politics while he is supposed to represent the face judicial impartiality, the question can be asked if there are not justified reasons for the broad public to distrust our judicial system. The ongoing struggle of the NPA to do their job as required is a  central theme contributing to this rising distrust.78,79,81

The above criticism is not an isolated one. There are many other allegations of the NPA’s failure to prosecute ANC bigwigs. Recently also SARS head, Edward Kieswetter82, stated that the NPA’s failure is fomenting revolt in the ranks of the ordinary taxpayer because tax-avoiding criminals and tax dodgers are not been prosecuted. At the same time SARS never have to face criminal sentences if they confiscate illegal assets of crooks, as those funds illegally obtained for instance in state capture. Kieswetter confirms also that notwithstanding strong evidence against culprits and a memorandums of understanding with the Special Investigating Unit (SUI) and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to charge income-tax criminals, not a single of the bigwigs involved in state capture has so far faced legal proceedings by these bodies.82

The present-day lack of constructive actions by the NPA and SAPS to bring culprits to court is also well reflected by the hard evidence that it took 14 years to get the alleged Tigon fraudsters to court.  Slabbert83 reports that Gary Porritt and Sue Bennett, the accused in the matter, were arrested in 2002 and 2003 respectively, but that their criminal trial of an alleged fraud of R1 billion only kicked off in September 2016 and has been following a snail’s pace even still in June 2019 with no clear outcomes on how the issue is going to be addressed by the NPA. This is evidenced in the Steinhoff case too around alleged serious fraud. The testimonies of criminality and fraud exposed by the various state-capture commissions, both in some way similar to the Tigon case, are going to drag on for years, even possibly forever, without the culprits even having to face any form of justice under any of the ANC administrations.83

Slabbert15 reflects on the passivity of pursuing prosecutions as well as on the decline in the number of criminals caught by the SAPS and the NPA and offers evidence of how this has been happening for a long time. Specifically he speaks about the real chaos in the present-day NPA (and other law-enforcing bodies), and quotes from the written presentation of Corruption Watch and the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) before the Zondo commission as follows15:8:

In die Zuma-era het die getal voorvalle van roof met verswarende omstandighede met 40% toegeneem en moord met 31%. Van 2009-’10 tot 2015 ’16 het suksesvolle vervolgings met 12% afgeneem. Dit het sedertdien effens herstel, maar dit is steeds onder die vlak van 2009-’10.

Om die strafregstelse te herstel, sal meer gedoen moet word as om net twyfelagtige leiers te vervang.

Daar is ‘n hele lang lys senior amptenare in die polisie, veral in die misdaadintelligensiediens, die Valke en die nasionale vervolgingsgesag (NVG) wat in die Zuma-tyd aangestel is omdat hulle staatskaping ter wille was. Tensy dié groep ook verwyder word, sal nuwe leiers soos genl. Khehla Sithole, kommissaris van polisie, adv. Godfrey Lebeya, nuwe hoof van die Valke, en adv. Shamila Batohi,  nuwe hoof van die NVG, alleen staan.

Slabbert15, in terms of the above presentation of Corruption Watch and the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), continues15:8:

Luidens hul voorlegging is die strafregstelsel al tydens die Mbeki-presidentskap gemanipuleer, maar dis is onder Jacob Zuma meer doelgerig en aggressief gedoen.

Die polisie se misdaadintelligensiediens is veral gebruik om Zuma se politieke teenstanders te teiken, en die Valke en NVG is gemanipuleer om straffeloosheid vir Zuma en sy meelopers te verseker. In die proses het die hele stelsel se werksprestasie in die slag gebly en georganiseerde misdaad gefloreer.

Slabbert15 reconfirms the immense present-day presence of political interference by the ANC elite in the appointments of senior SAPS officers, as well as in the replacements of other senior officers who seemingly does not to agree with the ANC elite’s nefarious dealings and have thus become an obstacle to these politicians and their doubtful schemes. Slabbert15 points out that the previous police commissioner Khomotso Phahlane made 80 such appointments in one year, while the previous head of the Hawks, Berning Ntlemeza, replaced eight of his nine provincial heads.

It has become a new way of “attacking” criminals outside of criminal law (one in which the NPA is not needed), with civil acts to recapture stolen money from crooks without stigmatising them with criminal records and jail sentences.85 In the illegal VBS Mutual Bank scheme (which the editor of the Sowetan calls looting) amounting to a lost R2 billion, the names of prominent ANC cadres and associates in municipalities, as well as prominent EFF politicians popped up, serving as an example of how the only outcome as punishment against some of the culprits will be civil actions/claims involving only money paybacks.84

But the success of civil actions being launched against the culprits remains low. How the NPA, the Hawks and the SAPS are going to address the commercial crimes of South Africa for the period 1 February 2018 to 31 March 2019 alone, is a very big puzzle. Manie van Schalkwyk, the executive director of Southern African Fraud Prevention Services and the journalist Ntando Thukwana85 report in the Sunday Times of the 15th September 2019 that for the period 2018/2019 the latest statistics from the SAPS show a total of 83 823 commercial crime cases that were reported (note: reported, but not prosecuted). This number reflects an increase of 14% on the previous 2017/2018 commercial crimes reported. The only remedy from the business and private communities at this stage is to revise their strategies with the focus on reducing at least commercial crimes at their own businesses and to avoid any reliance on assistance from the SAPS and the NPA.85

Mabuza86 reads the NPA’s selective memory on the prosecution of serious cases back to so far as the days of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). It must be noted that at the end of its work in 1999 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) referred to the NPA for further investigation and prosecution more than 300 cases of people who were denied or did not apply for amnesty. However, only one case has been brought before the court so far, namely that of Joao Rodrigues, reports Mabuza86. Above not only confirms a history of the NPA not able to properly prosecute culprits, but also the immense failure of the ANC regime to see to it that serious crimes are effectively dealt with and the culprits who committed it, are prosecuted.86

Slabbert83 and Smith64 note that the lack of accountability by the ANC regime to see to it that the NPA do its duty in the TRC criminal cases of 1999 were the result seemingly of political interference to safe-guard the personal interests of some ANC leaders. Smith64 writes that in the beginning of June 2019 the NPA was informed by a full bench of judges in the South Gauteng High Court that it had serious questions to answer about its lack of action and failure to deal with executive interference in its mandate to prosecute cases arising out of the work of the TRC.  It seems that the present willingness of the NPA to pursue TRC-related prosecutions, is also superficial. The notion exists that the families of victims of Apartheid crimes are not going to be served by justice from the NPA or the ANC regime because they lack accountability.64,87

Smith64, reflecting in some way on the present disinterest in prosecuting cases by the NPA — that the unsuccessful referrals for instance by the Zondo-commission for prosecution could be politically fueled in order to block arrests and the prosecution of culprits — also confirms the presence of political involvement that has been prevlent since 1999 in the TRC cases. Smith writes64:20:

The NPA, while acknowledging that political interference did occur, wants us to believe that it did the best it could under the circumstances. Now, With the court’s decision to dismiss the stay of prosecution application by former security cop Joao Rodrigues, implicated in the death of activist Ahmed Timol, and with the recent decision to reopen an inquest into the death of Dr Neil Aggett, the prosecuting authority would have us believe it is back on track to help families finally obtain the justice they have spent decades searching for.

The above stalling as a result of comprehensive political interference by high-level individuals inside the ANC in the prosecution of (mostly individuals apparently from the ANC elite) by the NPA who were identified by the TRC in the 1994s, is his focus, particularly on Thabo Mbeki in person as the main blocker of these prosecutions. Smith64 writes64:20:

However, thanks to documents and affidavits submitted by the Simelane family  in support of their call for prosecution…it is now known and even accepted by the NPA that there was an attempt to use political influence to interfere in the prosecution of cases before by the TRC, by members of the Mbeki government, including the former president himself and his justice minister, Brigitte Mbandla.

One of the main reasons for the top ANCs to block the TRC prosecutions, Smith87 pinpoints, was because of the potential embarrassment and reputational damage it would mean for the ANC elite if their apartheid-era spy secrets were revealed. Fear that apartheid-era perpetrators could reveal information about members of the liberation movement who might have been collaborators, forced ANC leaders such as the late former commissioner of police Jackie Selebi to use their positions in the post-apartheid government to intervene in the process and shut it down.87

Today the ANC regime and its top brass have to confront the same dilemma of possible exposure for wrongdoing although it would be in another domain. In the 1990s, their misdeeds were perpetrated under the white Apartheid benefactors of black politics, while the present-day criminals are the same ANC leaders and their cronies, but their wrongdoings are now theft and and embezzlement and exploiting their poor black brothers and sisters, not to mention the immense crime of state capture and other self-enrichment schemes conjured up by the ANC elite. The same potential embarrassment and reputational damage to the ANC elite can follow from these illegal enterprises as with the spy saga in 1999.  Therefore they cannot allow these misdeeds to be exposed. As with the blocking of the TRC’s criminal prosecutions, the ANC has since 2008 followed the same method of blocking of the proper functioning of the NPA. We see that this obstruction under Jacob Zuma left the NPA system in tatters, and it seems that no-one inside the ANC inner circle will ever be able to repair the damage that was done.

The ANC elite today are too cowardly to face the truth of the 1999 fiasco, much like they are afraid of truth about their failings coming to light in 2019. What they need to do is to confess and apologise to the poor black people they have exploited and mislead since 1994. In order to do  so, they should consult Smith’s16 under-mentioned proposal as a guide to come clean16;20: “It is noteworthy that notwithstanding considerable publicity on these matters over several years, neither the ministers of justice or police, nor anyone else in government, have issued a single statement acknowledging the problem, or apologising to victims or undertaking to take expeditious steps. The silence has been deafening and demands an explanation”.

It is important to understand the milieu in which chaos and conflict in the NPA is being perpetuated and bred, and the way in which it stumbles from one mess to another. Central in the this unsavory situation is the ANC elite’s mishandling of appointments by pushing forward loyal cadres and employees that appear willing execute the ANC elite’s schemes. As the ANC regime’s socio-economic, political and institutional failures and lack of accountability are presented as an acceptable state of affairs by the ANC elite by misrepresentations and excuses, the NPA’s failures and lack of accountability have also been made to seem acceptable by the ANC elite in order to serve their own interests. In order to maintain the NPA’s so-called “good” social status inside the contaminated politics of the ANC and to keep some of the ANC elite out of jail and safe, various tactics have not only been used by the ANC regime to disrupt its functioning, but also various excuses have been offered by the regime on why the NPA cannot function as it should at this stage (The disruption was already happening in the days of Nelson Mandela when the ANC’s secrets were in danger of being exposed.)87

The list of the NPA’s misrepresentations and excuses is long. The most common lame excuse officially wheeled out is that Batohi’s work is hindered because of a lack of staff and money. (This alleged lack of money is so serious that Ronald Lamola, the Minister of Justice, announced in July 2019 that the government of Ramaphosa is considering private donations to finance the NPA! This foolishness could of course imply state capture via the NPA by white capitalists and other role-players).88,89

This outcome of non-prosecution by the NPA because of a lack of money is unforgivable, seeing that Ramaphosa has bound himself to the promise in the May 2019 election that he would stamp out corruption via the NPA and bring the culprits to book. The most urgent question is why Ramaphosa has failed so far in disbursing money directly from the state’s coffers to make it available to the NPA forthwith?

But there is another inconvenience to the failure of the NPA to deliver on the prosecutions of the state capturers: De Lange61 refers to it as a “lack of support from in the NPA staff and resistance of them to Batohi”. This outcome is nothing else than an acknowledgment of the presence of the old crooks of the Zuma regime still present in the NPA and that they are still empowered today as they were in the past. From a criminal point of view, if this allegation is true, means it the yet unpunished sabotage of the judicial system which the Ramaphosa regime is allowing.61

Zuzile,75 on this serious sabotage of the NPA and the undermining of justice meted out, reports75:2: “Last month [May] Batohi lifted the lid on the mess she inherited at the NPA, revealing that she even struggled to find colleagues she could trust.  Batohi said she had underestimated the extent of decay in the NPA. She had been left stunned by some of the decisions taken by her predecessors”.

This confirms the lack of a true will to rehabilitate the judicial and political systems run by the ANC regime, specific now under Ramaphosa administration. Most importantly, it can be seen as a failure by Ramaphosa himself to activate the constructive prosecution of the ANC’s bigwigs and their cronies. Once again the lack of accountability is a feature in both the NPA and the ANC regime’s reluctance to move forward as far as justice is concerned.61,74,88,89

De Lange61 describes the chaos, inability and lack of accountability in the present-day NPA, (together with the same phenomenon in the ANC regime) as follows61:2:

Selfs lojale aanklaer-personeel wat al meer as tien jaar daar is van voor die Zuma-bewind, is dislojaal teenoor haar [Batohi]. Dit lyk asof hulle op ‘n soort sloerstaking is.

Ander kenners van toestande by die NVG sê talle personeellede onder Batohi  asook in die ondersoekdirektoraat van adv. Hermione Cronje is steeds lojaal aan adv. Shaun Abrahams, vorige NDOV, en sy twee adjunkdirekteurs – advocate Nomgcobo Jiba en Lawrence Mrwebi, wat albei deur pres. Cyril Ramaphosa geskors is, maar in die howe daarteen veg.

‘n Mens moenie onderskat hoeveel mense daar is wat Jiba en Mrwebi ondersteun nie en wat steeds NVG-personeel intimideer nie. Hulle kry ook hulp van politici en invloedryke mense in ander gekaapte staatsinstellings selfs uit die parlementêre koukus van die ANC. Dit moet baie moeilik vir Batohi wees om enigiemand te kry wat sy kan vertrou.

Ramaphosa’s reaction to this failure of the NPA to produce jailbirds has been one of willful insouciance. De Lange61, on a parliamentary question by the MP Ahmed Shaik-Emam of the NFP in August 2019, reports Ramaphosa’s so-called “powerlessness” to bring the prosecutions of the state capturers to act, as follows: “Ramaphosa het Donderdag in die parlement toegegee dat daar ongeduld met vervolgings weens staatskaping is, maar benadruk dat hy nie kan ingryp nie omdat die NVG onafhanklik is en moet wees.”

Mthombothi74 is justified to ask immediate and constructive actions from the NPA, specifically from its heads Batohi to clean up the NPA mess, when he writes74:21:

It’s about time the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) got to move on. We’re getting tired of excuses about why things can’t be done. Most of the culprits are not only known, they’re prancing around giving the public the two-finger salute while they live large on ill-gotten gains. Shamila Batohi has been at the helm at the NPA for more than six months now and all we‘ve heard from her so far is what a shambles the place is. But that’s why she was hired: to fix the place. She needs to get on with it now.

For most of the ordinary South Africans, living a lifestyle of honesty and goodness, the ANC regime’s inability to govern and to assure a system in which the principles of law-abiding is respected by every one of its MPs, MPLs, ministers, the State President, directors of the government departments and political party officials, is the main concern. This wrought, unhealthy and contaminated setup seems to be a feature which is unique to the ANC’s culture.

To expect from the Ramaphosa regime any reform of the 2019 ANC and its wrongdoing, meaning that the culprits of state capture will be tried and sentenced in the near future, is not realistic. Cyril Ramaphosa, as Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma, are all convinced Marxist-Leninist comrades. The ANC’s political disease is found in their politics. The three will continue their political misdeeds as long as they live or as long as the ANC exists. They are partners in crime in creating the current chaos in South Africa. They will never abandon their comrades to face justice. The existence of a dynamic NPA, a SUI or a SAPS to reign in the ANC of South Africa, will only come about if these institutions are allowed to function normally, and most of the ANC elite languish behind bars.16,64

Smith’s64 postulation makes sense when he writes64:20: “We live in the real world and we live in the post-Zuma era, so we know that the idea that a state institution, mandated to act without fear or favour and purely in the interests of justice and the will of the people it serves, is a fairy tale.” South African Revenue Service (SARS)

The state capture’s seemingly mostly unpunished outcomes seem to have resulted in the present-day set-up of a crack team in the office of the new commissioner of the South African Revenue Service (Sars), Edward Kieswetter. Kieswetter60 states the intention of the team is firstly to collect unpaid taxes to overcome Sars’ failure not to reach its revenue target for 2019 and onwards. Secondly the team’s aim is to bring the culprits of state capture to book. Kieswetter60 said in this context60:3: “…invariably behind the tax issues sits a criminal intent, so that is why we are working very closely with the prosecuting authority and the investigating authority so that we don’t miss the opportunity to collaborate”, and to60:3: “…make sure that those people who have been actively involved in the capture of the state are brought to book”. Indeed, this “Kieswetter declaration” sounds like the introduction of a policy of accountability, not only to hold the staff of Sars accountable for their behaviour from 2019 and onwards, but to call to book delinquent staff members for any criminal behaviour committed.60

In this context of Sars to be cloaked in a “new post-May 2019 good governance” and thus to support accountability for its’ employees’ behaviour, Marrian60 warns that60:3: “Sars is by no means out of the woods after former commissioner Moyane’s ruinous reign”. At the forefront is the ongoing questionable presence at Sars of these many tainted culprits, who do not fear the Kieswetter’s intention to fire the so-called “team coming from Moyane’s ruinous reign”. This state of affairs has cast immense doubt on whether state capture culprits will truly be be rooted out at Sars. Most of all, it creates the sickening feeling that some culprits are still working and hiding in the system without having to face either civil and criminal punishment. Marrian60 warns here of this possibility when she posits60:3: “He [Kieswetter] is not working with the Moyane-aligned executive committee he found when he [Kieswetter] arrived at Sars, describing it as ‘on pause’ rather than being completely disbanded”. This contaminated Sars committee mired in controversy is identified by Marrian60 is described as the ones who3: “…took critical decisions, together with the previous commissioner [Moyane], about the running of the tax agency”;60:3 while “… the damage inflicted during the Moyane years”;60:3: “The [Moyane/Bain & Company] restructuring [during the Zuma regime] displaced more than 200 Sars senior managers and sidelined critical and experienced employees”;60:3: “The Nugent report … identified a few individuals on the executive committee who played an insidious role under Moyane”;60:3; and60:3: “The Sars story is not over, with dodgy politicians still training their arrows at it”.

The above reference of a “few individuals on the executive committee” of Sars who played an “insidious role under Moyane” and who are quite possibly still part of the present Sars executive committee with immense powers and influence to maintain their firm grip on the institution, furthermore begs two questions: Firstly, did there, after Kieswetter’s appointment to Sars to free it from corruption, mismanagement, etc., also arrive the practice of accountability inside Sars as a state institution and are all its employees bound to the rightful collection of taxes for the state. Secondly, why were these alleged criminal figures not removed from Sars, not only as leaders, but also as employees, since their histories of deliquency has been known. One cannot uphold accountability with a mixture of goodness and badness; neither can one be a thief as well as an honest judge at the same time. To think for a moment that accountability had finally arrived in post-2019 at Sars is a foolish way of thinking. This present contaminated setup fits perfectly into the ANCs value set of double standards, where the concept of accountability is erased by their distorted mindset because of what they perceive to be understood as responsibility, accountability and justice. Here they are well guided by the ANC’s Integrity Committee’s contaminated ruling to accommodate the most tainted members as “good and acceptable” because a court has not yet found them guilty of any wrongdoing.

Kieswetter82 states that the NPA’s failure is fomenting revolt among the ordinary public because criminals and tax dodgers are not prosecuted. The failure to prosecute the ANC bigwigs also has a negative effect on the South African Revenue Service (Sars) in collecting taxes because their illegal and stolen assets are for the moment out of reach of the Sars income-gathering network. Kieswetter82 admits that notwithstanding memorandums of understanding with the Special Investigating Unit (SUI) and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), not a single one of the bigwigs involved in state capture and guilty of tax-dodging has so far been criminally prosecuted by these two bodies.

4. Conclusions

There are no signs that the pre-May 2019 election promises of Cyril Ramaphosa and his ANC regime have turned into reality. It is evident that the ANC regime’s institutions have failed to turn unaccountability into accountability. It seems that the ANC elite’s misdeeds are still afflicting most of the state institutions. Some suspicious and doubtful characters have been central players in the planning and execution of the duties of these institutions, making them the ideal vehicles for the ANC elite to cover up their past and present misconduct.

The ANC as a party and as a regime has all but abandoned its initial purpose and is beginning to approach a politically irreparable state, as has been been evidenced by the unprecedented memos in February 2019 of the five world powers of Germany, the UK, the US, the Netherlands and Switzerland to Ramaphosa89:1-2: “…that there should be a ‘clear, unqualified and manifest political committing to the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and to honest and ethical business practices’.” (These five countries account for 75% of foreign direct investment in the country). 

Furthermore did the five countries instruct Cyril Ramaphosa that there89:1-2: “…needs to be action to back up the words about tackling corruption. For there to be fresh investments, the CEO’s need arguments to take to their boards about why it is time to make commitments to SA. It is difficult to make that when we haven’t seen a single person jailed.” 

It seems from the 1994 start of the ANC’s first administration that the concept of accountability and respect for the law were foreign ideas to the mentality of the ANC’s top leadership. On the entrenched delinquent character of the ANC and thus the possibility that its crooks are going to carry it on post-2019, Helen Zille4 writes on 5 May 20194:12:

You see the essence of a democracy is accountability. Now the reason corruption carries on unabated is because there is no accountability in the system. Normally, when a government loots and steals people’s money on the scale we have seen, the voters vote it out. We heard Cyril said at the weekend, don’t punish the ANC at the polls. Polls are there to punish a corrupt government, so if people vote for the ANC again, and they get exactly the same people on that list [of who are 22 contaminated top brass members of the ANC] – to me if you vote for that list, you are an accomplice to corruption.

Accountability was and seemingly will not ever be a virtue of the ANC.

In the next (Article 15), titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3—The ANC in perspective”(15: Opportunism)”, the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of the power it holds, bestowed on it by the 8th May 8 2019 election, will further be evaluated.

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Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.


The author declares that he has no competing interest.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.


Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.