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Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Badness, candidate, crookedness, delinquency, election, evaluation, expropriate, goodness, leadership, political party, responsibility, scenario, wrongdoings,

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 4

1.1. Introduction

This study is a continuation of the previous article (Article 9, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)”. This article (Article 10, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)”], is, as previously mentioned, the second part in the sequence of three articles on the roles of the three main political parties at the moment in the country, namely the EFF, the DA and the ANC. It intends to analyse and further discuss the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the DA to be able to effect land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its CVs and attestations.

1.2. Aims of Articles 9 to 11 (Continued)

The primary aim of this article (Part Two: Article 10) in the sequence of three articles is thus to continue the reflection upon the profile of the DA on the same basis as was done with the previous article (Part One: Article 9). Prominent here is the ability of the DA to be able to take care of the land expropriation matter, should it have been elected on May 8, 2019 into government. At the same time, its ability and integrity is evaluated, in order to see how it is positioned, as an opposition party, to be able to successfully handle the land matter until 2024. This also includes the capability of the DA as a partner of the ruler, the ANC, should such an outcome manifest. Important here is the saying: the test of the pudding is in the eating thereof.

In the context of much manipulation and misleading around the South African land expropriation matter by political parties in terms of how they are going to execute it should they become the ruler, is it important to note that Chomsky1 points out that modern politics is often hampered by the parties’ leadership’s poor personal and political integrity. This unfortunate contaminated political setup of parties in the end blocks the pursuit of their previously agreed on mandate with the voters, who have given them permission to take decisions upon their behalves, as well as the development of the critical role of leaders of integrity and the independent creative actions of the party as a whole. This notion is applicable to the thinking, planning and action of South Africa’s land ownership matter. Central here is the intention of the researcher to unmask a political party as a failure.1

For Chomsky1 it goes much further and deeper: politically mandated people in terms of the Constitution, for instance those who are MPS and MPLs and chief executives at state enterprises, must at all times reflect integrity, goodwill and the intention of order in their thinking, planning and action. He postulates that it is not enough for these political and executive leaders to be able to think “cleanly” and critically, but that ethnic imagination and an immense sense of social responsibility and accountability are characteristics that are imperative for them. Undoubtably the main intention of many delinquent politicians is to exploit the South Africans who are fighting with regard to land ownership. The lack of knowledge and cognitive understanding of many of the ordinary Black and White South Africans on the land matter, is absolutely misused by these delinquent politicians in steering the country’s demanding land ownership issue in such a way that it exclusively benefits the interests of the top brass of their party.1

By the critical evaluation of the CVs and attestations of political parties and their leaders, the mass of political crooks and gangsters are shaken out, leaving the few political knights standing out clearly. Such a shake-out of possible masked crooks and gangsters amongst leaders in the DA is the primary intention of the undertaking of an evaluation and conclusion in this article. It will be in line with the intention of the evaluation and conclusion of the previous article (Article 9) on the EFF.

The single aim in this context of evaluation and conclusion is to accept or to reject the DA as a potential candidate (political party) to be able to successfully effect land reform as part of its political mandate in post-2019 South Africa.

2. Method (Continued)

The research was been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case about the abilities of political parties to successfully effect land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us so as to steer successful land reform from 2019 in South Africa.

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

3. Results and Discussion (Continued)

3.1. Overview

The successful execution of the post-2019 land reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and action of a so-called “good” government. This means a regime that is not blindly on a “path of try and come to” to be able to reach an end result on the matter, notwithstanding whether it is a success or a failure. This requires a regime that honestly serves the interests of all its people by its use of a good road map on an orderly land reform initiative so as to steer it into reality.

The essential question here is thus whether the DA can theoretically be a candidate to be shortlisted due to its potential to assure the successful implementation and completion of the post-2019 plan on land expropriation.

3.1.1. Evaluation guidelines of political parties

The evaluation guidelines of political parties, as were already used in the previous Article 9, will be precisely replicated in order to evaluate the DA as national, provincial and municipal rulers. These guidelines for the DA are:

  1. Its general policies, as well as specific standpoints on aspects such as the respect of law and order, the fighting of corruption and state capture, the behavioural delinquency of its MPs, MPLs and its top brass leaders, as well as the party’s and its leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put in perspective through its manifesto for the 2019-election.
  2. The public critics for the period 1994 to 2019 in newspapers, etc. These include evaluations and reflections by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the party as a political organisation, its members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behavioural delinquency of MPs, MPLs and top brass leaders, and their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the party’s internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions.
3.1.1.1. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018

For the quantitative classification and measurment of the political records of the DA, the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,2 was used again . The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s’ manifesto and to the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees it applicable. For guiding the gathering of the information on the DA, the approach used with the EFF, is again as follows reflected for better understanding, namely:

1) The Curriculum Vitae (CV) in order to obtain insight into the candidates’ qualifications, experiences, extraordinary skills, etc; and

2) The letters of the referees, the attestations, to offer firstly further insight into the qualifications, experiences, etc. of the candidate; and secondly, at the same time, to tell us confidentially about good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate, that were well-masked in or absent from the CV. This referee data mostly informs us of the “goodness” and “badness” of a candidate, which in the end can make him a failure or a success in the execution of the responsibilities of the post.

In this research the manifesto and self-description offered by the DA and its leaders will be seen as their CVs. The public reporting by journalists and other sources will be seen as the letters of referees/reference or attestations.2

3.2. The manifestos, self-descriptions and public references of the three parties (Continued)

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) were already reflected upon in the previous Article 9 (Part 1 of three articles) under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. This article (Article 10: Part 2) will reflected specifically on the Democratic Alliance (DA) under the title of “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. In the next article (Article 11: Part 3) reflection on the African National Congress (ANC) will take place.

3.2.1. The Democratic Alliance
3.2.1.1. Introduction

In his post mortem of the DA’s so-called successes versus its so-called failures in the recent May election, and how the party must be rated in the post-2019 South African politics, the editor of Beeld, Barnard Beukman, on the 17th May 2019 offered an in-depth and critical analysis on the present day DA. This is far removed from those of some of the populist political commentators who ignore long term politics and suffer cognitive clear-sightedness away from the propaganda of the ANC. An in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the dynamic and important role that the DA can play in the mainstream politics of post-2019 is offered by Beukman3 when he writes3”11:

Met net vier LP’s minder – 85 pleks van 89 – en ‘n stemdaling van minder as 2 persentasiepunte, moet die DA beslis voel hy word onbillik behandel deur ontleders wat hom op die daad as die “groot verloorder” van die verkiesing brandmerk.

Hy kan tereg so voel as hy sy uitslag met byvoorbeeld die ANC s’n vergelyk word. Alles in ag geneem, is die DA se verkiesingsuitslag eindelik heel redelik en voel hy oorwegend sekerlik verligting. As sommige meningspeilings reg was – dat hy net ‘n maand voor die verkiesing minder as 20%-steun gehad het – het hy beslis in die pylvak steun teruggekry of onseker kiesers oorreed.

Die groot teleurstelling is eerder met sy vertoning in vergelyking met die wat hy wou en moontlik kon reggekry het en dat hy nie gewys het dat hy minstens die 30%-vlak aanval nie, want ‘n tweede party met meer as 30%-steun sou die eerste tasbare bewys van ‘n komende politieke herskikking gewees het.

3.2.1.1.1. The voter outcome at the ballot box on May 8, 2019 tells much

Beukman’s3 profile on the post-2019 DA firstly forces us to look critically at the facts pinpointing the May elections’ outcome in terms of voter participation. Of particular importance is his reference to a so-called necessary 30% vote count for the DA, to enable it to be a possibly dominant role-player in South Africa. This was seemingly the minimum requirement for it to successfully participate in the country’s ruling in the near future. This needs attention. It again brings us to the playing off of myths and lies versus facts and truths in South African politics and the absolute need of the Solomon wisdom approach to get myths and lies refuted. Thus, before any further evaluation of the DA as a political party with the assumed potential to be able to be the ruler in terms of its CV and attestations can proceed, is it necessary to look at the legitimacy of the May 2019 election in terms of a democratic voter mandate which truly represents the total contingent of legal voters.

Firstly, of paramount importance is the number of voters who gave the parties their support at the ballot box. This consideration is also fully applicable to the ANC, the EFF, as well as the eleven dwarf parties that arrived in Parliament at the end of May 2019 to take their seats.3

Secondly, also of importance is the total number of voters who participated in the election versus the total number of registered voters who stayed away from the ballot box.

Thirdly, and probably the most ignored fact by most of the so-called political wise men on the so-called “true politics” of present day South Africa, is the amount of citizens who qualified to be voters, but refused to register as such for specific reasons.

An analysis of the May voting shows the seats of the 14 parties which made it, as follows4:

  1. ANC: 230
  2. DA: 84
  3. EFF: 44
  4. IFP: 14
  5. FF+: 10
  6. ACDP: 4
  7. NFP: 2
  8. UDM: 2
  9. Good:2
  10. Cope: 2
  11. ATM: 2
  12. AIC: 2
  13. PAC: 1
  14. Aljama: 1

It is also reflected by statistics that there were 35.9 million South Africans who were eligible to register as voters for the May 2019 election, but that only 26 756 649 had formally registered. This means that only 74.5% of those who could register had registered (thus leaving ±9 million outside the voting system). From the 26.7 million formally registered voters, only 17 671 616 actually voted (again leaving ±9.3 million eligible voters further out of the system). This means that the 17.6 million voters active at the ballot box, only represent 49% of the total eligible voters in South Africa, while 51% of potential voters (±18.2 million) did not bring out a vote (consisting of ±9.1 million non-registered voters and ±9.1 million stay-away voters). Although it was the 18.2 million abstaining voters own choice not to vote, this comprehensive passivity places in the first place a question mark on the applicability of the legal status of 14 parties which were selected to Parliament by a “passive no-voting” (which is nothing else than a rejection choice by 51% of the voting population).4-7

What is worrying is that these 14 parties are going to be with South Africans as the so-called “chosen law-makers’, notwithstanding their rejection or at least being ignored by at least 51% of the voters-corp. Furthermore, seeing the overall decline since 2014 of trust in and support for political parties selected into Parliament, the chances are good that this decline is going to continue after 2019, leaving a far higher rejection than the present 51% by the voters. The outcome can with time become an immense resistance to the empowerment of the ruling party, the ANC, up to 2024. This will not only make its reign impossible, but in the process of the rejection of the ANC, the situation can activate immense unrest, anarchy and revolution as a final outcome.4-7

It is not without good reason that Mthombothi8, eleven days after the May election, put his finger directly on the sore of this voting passivity when he wrote8:19: “The outcome of the elections will be debated and analysed for some time to come, but what is clear is that many South Africans were not particularly impressed or satisfied with what was on offer. After 25 years of democracy, many voters are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable.” He continues further8:19: “The menu [parties] on the table is obviously not appetising for the voter. The prevailing conditions are therefore probably ripe for a realignment of political forces or a new political party altogether. We may have reached a typical Gramscian interregnum where “the old is dying and the new cannot be born”. We are at a standstill, and rot tends to set in if there is no movement.”

However, in second place, is the question of Beukman’s3 when he referred to the “ideal of the collection of 30% votes for the DA to make it a party to notice in the South African politics”. Here emerges the next question, namely on the presence of true democracy under which the ANC rules the country at the moment up until 2024.3

Once again on democracy and the constitutional rights of its citizens (and thus eligible voters), Mthombothi8 reflects a warning when he writes8:19: “We may still be cock-a-hoop about our democracy – best constitution in the world and all that! – But the enthusiasm is apparently no longer widely shared. Voter turnout has shown a calamitous decline in recent years, from 88% in 1999 to 65% this year – a drop of more than 20 percentage points in 20 years. Such figures should jolt us out of our complacency. Our democracy is not at all in rude health.”

But, when Mthombothi8 speaks of a “65% voter turnout for the 2019 election”, he failed to say how this percentage was reached. The answer is that it was the 17.6 million voters who had voted out of a possible 26.7 million voters on the voter role. This 65% is a political myth: the fact is that the turnout should be calculated in terms of the 17.6 million voters who had voted versus the 35.9 million South Africans who were eligible to vote. This gives a turnout of only 49% (which is 16% lower than the “official” voting account. This means that South Africans’ democratic interests are politically and statutorily managed by 386 law-makers in Parliament who were sent to it by the minority (49%) of eligible voters. This is not democracy! Mthombothi8 would be jolted himself if he knew that the 65% voter turnout is an complete myth. The hard truth is that it is only 49%. But this truth has another more sinister outcome for the ANC’s so-called democratic empowerment via the May election, and their ability to rule South Africa from 2019 to 2024: the ANC’s 10 026 475 votes at the ballot box (out of a possible 35.9-million) means that it only received approval from 28% of the eligible voters to be the government of the day. For the ANC and its leaders such as Cyril Ramaphosa and his cronies to claim that they have the peoples’ mandate to effect land expropriation without compensation, is a falsity. It is a myth and a great one!4-8

This is not democracy and it is an excellent example of a well-masked illegal reign of South Africa by the ANC.4-8

Taking into perspective the true voter support of the DA and the EFF, in terms of the total eligible voters of 35.9-million, their factorial support is only 10% and 5% respectively.4-8|

It must thus be clear that the ANC is faultily observed as a strong and untouchable political force, which seems to represent (but falsely) 57.5% of the population in terms of its more or less 60% formal voting count. In reality, the ANC is a minority and a hung regime (legally put into Parliament as the ruler by a 28% voters mandate out of a 100% voter population) when we are looking to the indirect suppression of the democratic right of the individual citizens’ passive votes. In this environment, South Africa’s present inauspicious political setup (and thus its political ruling-system based on democracy where the so-called “majority” became the ruler on a minority vote), is excellently described by Labuschagne when he posits9:6: “Suid-Afrika kan in wese, de jure en de facto, as ‘n eenpartystaat bestempel word”.

The abovementioned outcome is a situation that can and must only be accepted firstly as a temporary situation, which can change dramatically overnight when the ±18-million (51% unrepresented) passive voters take a stand at the ballot box or in an alternative way which may be unconstitutional. The DA and the other opposition parties know that this unreal setup provides the possibility that they can at the right time bite away the ANC’s Achilles heel.9

The decline in empowerment of the ANC and its possible phasing out of the mainstream of politics is a reality, even in the mindsets of the ANC’s top brass. It was already before the May election echoed by the Head of the ANC Election, Fikile Mbalula10 when he admitted10:4: “…the ANC is not going to regain all the lost ground overnight, with its image having suffered immensely in the previous decade.”

Mthombothi8 is with good reason worried about the outcome after 2019 of the Mandela-democracy of 1994. The reality is that South Africa is going to be governed from 2019 to 2024 by an illegal autocratic regime with mostly no respect for the voters, while there is also no respect for them by 51% of the voters who did not vote for them. The ANC’s politics are driven and practised exclusively for the ANCs top brass’ interests: it was so in the past and it will be so in the future. The abovementioned reality not only declares the arrogance and political recklessness of the ANC in its practice of delinquent politics since 1994, but also the arrogance and political recklessness of the EFF (See Article 9). The EFF knows very well that they will never, in a true democracy with only their 5% voter mandate, be of importance or receive the attention as a so-called third party in the top rank of parties. In a true democracy their political and personal antics, as well as their extreme irresponsibility and delinquency would not be endured: they would long ago have been put into permanent safe-care.4,6,7,10

Looking from another perspective at the very unstable South African politics – which intensely contaminated its democracy – it must it be clear that things can change – also sometimes very fast – in the post-2019 politics, to end for instance the ANC regime’s formation of new political groupings overnight. Marriam11 quotes the view of the CSIR on the profiles of the various parties’ vote receiving in the past elections and the unknown future around politics. She reports, from another perspective to that of the traditional political analysis11:4:

The CSIR does say things could change before 2021 [local elections]: “It should be kept in mind that the quantitative patterns cannot be counted on to capture all the sentiment behind the votes [2019 elections], it may just provide some warning signs for parties as to what could happen if nothing changes. Many things could change between 2019 and 2021 – there could be changes in the general economics and political climate, but a difference in voter turnout rates could also affect changes in the patterns.

Johnston12, on this fast-changing post-2019 political climate writes12:4-5: “Ten spyte van die oënskynlike stabiliteit van die ANC se oorheersing, vind groot verskuiwings plaaas. Die kieserskorps word baie meer vloeibaar en minder partyvas. Ons he gevind dat meer as 25% van al ons respondent óf van party verander het óf besluit hey om nie te stem nie. Die grootste vloei vloeibaarheid is onder swart kiesers gevind, waar 17.1% van party verander het.” Johnson12, in this context of change, also writes12:4-5: “Daarbenewens is die ANC-stem toenemend broos. Onder alle swart kiesers het slegs een derde gesê hulle sal ANC stem ongeag wie die leier was. 27,3% het gesê hulle sal nooit ANC stem nie terwyl 19,4% gesê het sal ANC stem omdat hulle vetroue in Ramaphosa het, alhoewel daar baie skelms op die ANC-lys is.”

The question, in light of the abovementioned information, is how has the DA in terms of its true voter mandate of only 10% handled its politics in the past, is handling it at present and can be expected to handle it in future in our much quoted “country of milk and honey”. The primary counter-question is: is it similarly irresponsible and arrogant, with the same signs of autocratic and delinquent actions, as the EFF? This question will be evaluated further in this article. [In the next article (Article 11) the same evaluation approach will be followed with regard to the ANC].

3.2.1.2. The DA manifesto of 2019

Reading the DA manifesto, it is clear that it differs from the previous one of the EFF, as it avoids ridiculous promises and “nonsense-speaking”. It is totally focused on concrete action during the pre-2019 years and undertakes in terms of this good record (strongly confirmed by its CV and attestations) to make a constructive input to post-2019 South Africa. Reality is taken into account and examples of good political management on provincial and local levels are offered. Looking at the DA’s track record, it stands head and shoulders above those of the EFF which was previously evaluated.

In terms of the DA manifesto, the leader of the DA, Mmusi Maimane13, in his writings to the public, reflects as follows13:18:

Election 2019 is our chance to effect real change. And when deciding on a new bus, the only thing that matters is a party’s track record.

Thirteen years in Cape Town, 10 years in the Western Cape and two years in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay have given the DA a chance to demonstrate the DA difference, and not just to talk about it. The results – the ones that really matter when it comes to closing the gap between economic insiders and outsiders – speak for themselves. On all the objective indicators, the DA runs the best government in the country.

The DA-run Western Cape leads on every measure of good provincial governance. Over the past year, over half the jobs created in SA were in the Western Cape, thanks to an obsessive focus on attracting investment, growing tourism and supporting a farm sector hard hit by drought.

The Western Cape Government got 83% clean audits in the last Auditor-General Report. Our track record says that we don’t tolerate corruption and mismanagement of public funds.

Maimane continues14:22:

The DA can deliver to the whole country what we have delivered in the Western Cape, which accounted for half of net job creation in the past year (95,000 out of 188,000 jobs, Q3 2017 – Q3 2018) and where broad unemployment (23%) is 14 percentage points lower than the national average (37%).

The DA strives to provide everyone with access to opportunities. For example, the Western Cape has the highest percentage of households living within 30 minutes of a health facility and we retain by far the most children in school between Grades 10 and Matric (64%), whereas no other province retains the abovementioned.

You will find solutions to getting the basics right, such as our action steps to provide schoolchildren with teachers who can actually teach them to read and do arithmetic. The SACMEQ 4 Report showed that the Western Cape achieved 72.7% in advanced reading, compared to 36.1% nationally.

We don’t tolerate corruption. The Western Cape achieved 83% clean audits in the last financial year, well ahead of second placed Gauteng at 52%. The DA-led Coalition in Nelson Mandela Bay Metro took it from the second least to second most trusted city in SA (after Cape Town). In the DA-run Johannesburg, the value of investigations into corrupt tenders under the former ANC administration is R23.6bn.

3.2.1.3. The pre-2019 road-mapping of the DA
3.2.1.3.1. The DA’s original birth-certificate in perspective

The answer to the question as to why the DA did not overtake the ANC in the last election and is still in a gradual process to win votes from the ANC and the other smaller parties, must be seen to be cemented in its many foundations. Professor Pieter Labuschagne9 guides us hereunder to understand why opposition against the ANC reflects a low voter outcome for all those opposing parties since 1994. This can be likened to the previous mighty NP’s only 20.4% in 1994 and the 22.3% and 20% of the DA respectively in 2014 and 2019.9

Firstly, the founding model of the ANC stands out here, namely its anti-Apartheid ideology, through which it initially became an inclusive “catch-up” party for all those pre-1994 suppressed persons and groups who opposed the wrongful politics of the NP (and the Afrikaners/Whites). All types gathered in this potpourri-ANC from before 1994. It varied from hard core communists, socialists, anti-capitalists, anti-White and anti-Afrikaner, pro-Black, pro-African, democrats and anti-democrats, as well as hard-core terrorists, etc. These were persons and groups mostly seeing the ANC as an entrance ticket for their personal gains and to satisfy their ambitions. Most of the ambition and opportunism have stayed on until 2019 in some way within some of these groupings, such as the communists and the unionists.12

In its start-up process, the DA was in the first place an exclusively White-orientated party with a political ideology based on a narrow liberal-democracy, but with roots still entrenched in White-supremacy. The immense hard-line stand of the maintainence of exclusive White capitalism was prominent, and the mass of poor and landless Blacks would never get entrance thereto. For the Blacks, their inequality and poverty (±30 million out of a population of ±60 million) is a direct result of the White supremacy of pre-1994. The DA as a cum Black-cum White political party became from day-one an easy target for the Black revolutionaries in the ANC, who labelled it as anti-Black with the intention to promote and uphold only White interests. This is a process that is ongoing and will only be eroded if the DA becomes overwhelmingly Black in members and in leadership.

3.2.1.3.2. The DA’s policy not to subsidise and enrich the poor

Entrenched in the ANC’s revolutionary ideology of uplifting the people and freeing them from oppression, is its policy of taking from the rich and giving to the poor, which the DA opposes. This characteristic of the ANC is well reflected by its actions such as state capture, the mismanagement of finance and the botched-up 1994 to 2019 land redistribution, the obtaining of “compensations, gratifications and bait” through the misuse of BEE and other instruments under the propaganda of “enriching” the people (Black). Here the ANC’s top brass and their cronies stand out as priority beneficiaries. The ANC’s actions, when compared to those of the DA, are a complete contradiction in terms of the “case of the constant and ongoing illegal compensation” of the so-called “freedom fighters” and those who “suffered under Apartheid”, directly and indirectly in every possible way from the state coffers.

Within this exclusive ideology of uplifting of the ANC, the immense group of poor and landless Black people were kept in embargo by the ANC, without progress or improvement of their circumstances. This setup of continuous, immense poverty and financial dependence of the mass of poor Blacks, fast became a handle for the ANC’s top brass to keep a large contingent of dependent voters, who were daily in need of the ANC’s help, on its list of supporters. This was firstly obtained by keeping these Black voters without training and work opportunities, so as to create not only further poverty and unemployment, but to enlarge this sector constantly, in order to ensure political empowerment via the “ANC’s helping hand of the poor Blacks”.12,13-22

Secondly, this “Black question” was in-depth and broadly propagated by the ANC as a sole White outcome from Apartheid: not only to establish sympathy for them in the minds of the poor, in that the ANC “knew” of their immense, constant needs and was doing as much as possible for them, but at the same time to create ongoing hostility against any White presence in the post-2019 politics. Prominent in this regard was Apartheid’s wrongdoings and the reflection by the ANC of a repeat of such suffering at the hands of Whites in future politics; a process wherein the “White” DA was pertinently positioned as the main culprit. With regard to the needs of the mass of poor Blacks, reflected as the so-called exclusive sufferers of Apartheid, the ANC effectively responded through the state coffers by paying mass contributions to them. These financial contributions are still growing. The ANC, as the ruler and the holder of the state’s purse, entrenched itself within the “greater and higher” tasks of doing good by the hand-out of free awards, grants and other subsidies from the tax-payers’ hard earned money.

This made these “dependent” voters work shy and absolutely dependent on the ANC’s so-called goodness, while the vicious circle of growing poverty and joblessness was aggressively upheld. At the same time a policy of fear was created in this mass of poor and jobless minds that any regime change, such as the coming to power of the DA, would lead to the recall of these comprehensive free awards, grants and subsidies paid from the taxpayers.

The DA’s vague policy on the doubtful existence in future of these awards, grants and subsidies, if they come into power, only strengthened the ANC’s political mesmerising of this mass of poor people with misleading falsehoods. This served as an excellent empowerment vehicle for the ANC to block votes away from the DA. Johnson‘s12 recent research confirms this well, as he found that 40% of the Black respondents indeed believe this rumour of the ANC of the DA as a “danger” to their subsidies.12

The DA and the ANC both know that this unlimited system of subsidising the poor without the simultaneous development of a mass of jobs and good training to replace it, cannot be upheld for much longer into the future. This has so far been ignored by the ANC’s top elite, notwithstanding that the continuation of the scheme will bankrupt the country’s funds and spells out a human disaster in waiting. The outright failure of the DA on the other hand to immediately put an alternative in place to this immense politically opportunistic subsidising scheme, besides saying that they will create jobs in time and offer training, has totally isolated them from the mass of poor people, who constantly and immediately need these subsidies. It does not matter for the poor if the system is wrong or unsustainable – for them it is about immediate survival and voting for the party that upholds and improves this subsidy system.10,12,23-25

3.2.1.3.3. BBBEE and its vehicles of land expropriation

As mentioned above, the ANC’s policy on BBBEE also forced the DA into reverse. This is due to the portrayal of the DA as White capitalists and the safe-guarding of their immediate interests. This obvious hostility to Black upliftment pushed the DA away from the mass of poor and landless Blacks.

It is evident that the DA’s dislike for BBBEE must be changed in some way with regard to its solid rejection policy thereof. What is urgently needed is the implementation of an acceptable change to the DA’s present model of outright rejection, in order to bring about balanced nation-building and to improve the already tense racial relations. It is necessary to create an environment to support a reasonable form of BBBEE. The DA’s clear policy of a racially free society must reflect Black upliftment as a primary principle. BBBEE is unavoidable and was implemented in many countries to benefit the unprivileged and the poor. It was not an extraordinary action in South Africa by the ANC, but so far the DA under its White right-wing blindly rejects it. There must be some confirmation of support of BBBEE as fast as possible by the DA. Maimane’s reference to the DA pushing for the tabling of a private members’ bill on intelligence-related matters and jobs may be the first constructive step, but it is doubtful whether this is enough, and it is far from the BBBEE offered by the ANC.21,26,27

BBBEE is seen by most Whites as extreme discrimination after 25 years of so-called “democracy”, as Bachtis26 writes with justification26:13: “BEE is a racist, exclusionary mechanism designed to destroy any vestiges of whiteness.” BBBEE, in contrast to its primary aims, was undoubtedly applied by the ANC with outmost dishonesty and corruption in order to benefit mostly the ANC top brass, bringing riches to them and their cronies between 1994 and 2019. Billions of rand were also stolen via state capture and other crooked schemes by politicians, government officials and private citizens under the ANC regime, which was in value far more than the total collected by BBBEE for the so-called upliftment of the so-called poor Blacks’ suffering under Apartheid. This confirms that there are many other acceptable ways (besides corruption and dishonesty) to uplift the mass of poor Blacks.

The misuse of BBBEE is furthermore seen by many Whites as pure revenge-taking on Whites for the past.

Other, better ways must be found by the DA to get involved in BBBEE and to directly uplift the poor. Firstly, the present experience by Whites of BBBEE as a punishment to impoverish Whites, especially the White youth, must be counteracted by the DA with reasoned actions. Whites must be allowed to compete freely within the South African business and employment environment, without the direct and indirect “punishment”. As policy, the DA must firstly support an ongoing strictly managed BBBEE system for at most the duration of another term, after which it must be totally erased from the statute books. Secondly, the planned land redistribution scheme, wherein the transferring of state-owned land and buildings, etc., is central, must be a direct replacement for BBBEE inside the DA’s policy of a “helping hand to the Blacks in the post-2019 politics”. Included in this BBBEE scheme must be the free training of Black farmers and the free provision of equipment and produce such as cattle and grain for the mass of incoming Black farmers to make a living on the farms.

3.2.1.3.4. The DA’s policy of land expropriation without compensation

The policy standpoint of the DA was until now to reject the ANC’s land reform of expropriation without compensation. Prominent therein is the the DA’s perception of the ANC’s foundation of confused political radicalism, beset by neo-Marxism, specifically as part of the ANC’s opportunistic elite’s driving of the ANC’s land expropriation policy. In addition, the failed 1994 to 2019 land redistribution programme of the ANC is an indication for the DA of how unplanned, undemocratic and populist land reform can get. This has lead to the passivity of the DA to in any way, either on its own or with the ANC, get involved in constructive land redistribution. The fact that the DA is not shying away from even going to the highest court in South Africa to nullify any ANC legislation on land transformation if needed, does not sit well with the mass of landless Blacks.

The DA believes that there is not a need to tamper with the present Constitution, because the state’s land is available in large amounts, waiting for redistribution directly to the mass of poor and landless people. Indeed, for the DA, this state land is so massive in size and its redistribution potential so overwhelming, that any initiative with private land cannot be addressed successfully before 2025, if not later. The DA notes in this concern that the state at present has a property portfolio of more than 93 000 buildings and more than 1.9 million hectares of land. Just to create an orderly official institution to oversee the handing out and assurance of legal rights of the land and buildings to new private owners, would take up to three to five years to complete by a well managed government. Then there is a further timetable to stretch over another three to five years to establish the infrastructure and award the property to the applicants in waiting, to do training and to supply finance to the mass of incoming farmers. The so-called “White land expropriation”, even with compensation, can only take place after twenty or more years from 2019.10,16,20,28

But, from a critical statutory as well as political and socio-economic point, is it clear that the DA’s land redistribution policy is vague and clearly practised in terms of White interests. It is window dressing and empty rhetoric. It is unavoidable for the DA to get directly involved in the land ownership matter in the post-2019 politics. The DA’s leadership must stop allowing the right-wing of Whites in the DA, who are guided effectively with great political contamination by the so-called Afrikaners/Whites rescuers and saviours, to handle the matter in public and with the government. The DA did shed most of these white hardliners and their sympathisers successfully in the May election – possibly not only at the ballot box, but also on their list of membership. This is now allowing the true DA to come out of the closet with its Black members’ wishes, thinking, planning and action on balancing land redistribution for Blacks.

Firstly, the FF+ must openly be confronted with a public stand by the DA, demonstrating the falsity of the empowerment that the FF+ can help the Whites farmers to hang onto their land. The reality must be delivered to White farmers and the White community that if not enough land is peacefully redistributed fast to the mass of Blacks, land will physically be confiscated from them in a revolution which can happen very soon.29,30 The DA must find a declaration, matching fully and effectively the following declaration by the FF+-leader in Kwazulu-Natal, Duncan Du Bois, which reads30:7: “I think they [FF+] were beneficiaries of people dumping the DA because of the DA’s policy on affirmative action and BEE and also because the FF Plus is very clear on its land policy and the DA is not quite as sharp on that.”

The DA urgently needs a public reference, reading: “The DA is a beneficiary of votes because it is clear on its land policy, with the Freedom Charter declaration as its manifesto on land ownership that all South Africans have the right to own land and that land must be owned racially proportionally before 2024.” 29,30

For Maimane, such a change would be easy and a small step, especially in light of the pronouncement by Johnson12 of him “as a previous ANC supporter who still thinks in terms of the politics of the ANC.” The fact that Maimane, as alluded to by Johnson12, had already estranged the Brown and White Afrikaans speakers, as well as his failure to defend the Afrikaans language and culture rights, forced thousand of angry and dissatisfied Afrikaans and White people out of the DA, makes this step easy if true.12,29,30

3.2.1.3.5. The proof of the DA pudding is not always in the eating

The DA is mostly worried about present day South Africa. It developed, where in charge, styles and approaches, in an effort to fix most of the enormous failures created by the ANC reign. Where the DA was put in to govern, it did not panic and has addressed immense challenges with duty, pride and success.15

The actions of the DA were sometimes deliberately blown up by the press and their political opposition. The ANC propagandists used this to distract attention from their own serious and comprehensive delinquency. In some cases, however, alleged activities of the DA made them no better than the ANC and need the same condemnation.15-20

Seeing that political oversight by the broad public and media is a priority for all public figures and parties, and the fact that it is the criteria on which a mandate to rule has been issued, these accusations need to be highlightened and evaluated. It is important to see if there is proof in the DA pudding after eating it. This will be done hereunder.

3.2.1.3.5.1. The DA’s seemingly ongoing own internal strife

Prominent for instance, but indeed a small matter in the end, was the allegation that Helen Zille of the DA leadership had in 2014 contravened the Constitution and the Ethical Code for Members of the Executive due to an alleged tablet issued to her son who worked as a teacher for the Western Cape Education Department in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. This action against her, brought onto the books by the controversial Public Protector (PP) Busiswe Mkhwebane, in an attempt to prosecute her, failed. (This PP action was nullified by an interdict against the PP in the Johannesburg high court. The PP was also shown to be wrong by the courts in two other cases).15-20

Then there was Helen Zille’s so-called #taxrevolt-plan, which attracted critics from the ANC and some sectors of the public. But, in light of the failed prosecution for theft, corrupt ANC politicians and state officials, racketeers, crooks and tax-avoiders in the ANC, this actually attracted much strong support from law-abiding citizens as an instrument to punish the useless ANC regime.15-20

Furthermore, there was the so-called Patricia De Lille saga wherein the DA was initially accused of racism, etc., because De Lille was allegedly forced out of DA politics by its leadership. This criticism seems to have been contradicted by an independent investigation which alleged that De Lille deliberately misled the Cape Town City Council and triggered a further allegation against her, namely to have interfered with and manipulated city tenders, reports Malatsi31. In nullifying the DA’s and Maimane’s so-called “record of wrongdoing” against De Lille, Malatsi31 writes31:18: “De Lille and her chief lieutenant, Brett Herron, are facing criminal charges for their involvement in these instances of serious maladministration or worse.”

But the De Lille case’s handling by the DA cost them much honour in the eyes of the general voting public and was undoubtedly one of the reasons for the exodus of a strong contingent of votes from the DA to Good. Nyatsumba32 foregrounds the immense negative impact on the DA and the idea of a flawed leadership left by the De Lille case, when he writes that many inside the party in the Western Cape had their daggers drawn at her and wanted her out summarily, ignoring, in his opinion, the right firing process. After a vote of no confidence in the Cape Town City Council failed, the process of her ousting continues, writes Nyatsumba32. He further reflects32:25: “…they continued to manufacture lies about her and to throw mud at her in the hope that some of it would stick. To their chagrin, De Lille emerged victorious each time and they ended up with bloodied noses. And yet, still they continued to lie to the public, right until the elections, that they fired De Lille as a member when, in fact, she had resigned.”

Then there were two other controversial recent cases in the DA household before the May election. Both were fully described in the Sunday Times of the 17th March 2019. From the reports it seems that the DA was in the accused box. In the one a woman member was left off the party’s parliamentary list after accusing a colleague of sexual harassment, while in the other case a senior woman member accused of racism and xenophobia was kept on the list of the DA’s candidates for the sixth Parliament.33

In the first case a DA councillor in Ekurhuleni, a said Thina Bambeni, was alleged to be delisted on the recommendation of the party’s Gauteng leader, John Moodey, after she accused the council’s caucus chair, Shadow Shabangu, of sexual harassment. A provincial disciplinary committee cleared Shabangu due to a lack of evidence and advised the provincial executive to charge Bambeni instead, as reported by Mvumvu and Makinana33. (Note: It is the same said Shabangu who is alleged further on in this reflection to have contravened Section 4 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act because it is alleged that he received a R1 220 000 kickback from the developers of the Springs Mall). In the end Bambeni was removed from the list of candidates, together with Siphesihle Dube (a spokesperson for the MEC of Transport in the Western Cape, due to posting pictures which he took with Patrica De Lille). Dube and Bambeni’s exclusions from the candidate list led to court actions against the DA.33

Regarding the second case within the DA’s inner circle, it was reported by Mvumvu and Makinana33 that Louw Nel, the DA’s parliamentary operations director, had taken legal action against Kohler Barnard after the party bosses allegedly failed to act against her. This is an outcome that follows after Barnard allegedly made racist remarks at a strategy meeting of the DA. It is also alleged that Barnard made offensive statements against Zimbabweans in South Africa (Note: Kohler Barnard was accused of racist behaviour in 2015 and her DA membership terminated in 2015 over a Facebook posting calling for the Apartheid president PW Botha’s “comeback”. Her expulsion was overturned and the DA retained her as an MP on condition that she was not found guilty of a similar offence, according to Mvumvu and Makinana33). It is further reported by Mvumvu and Makinana33 that Louw Nel had been suspended after taking the matter to the Equality Court (because he allegedly did not follow the party’s so-called “procedures” to call Barnard to book). He was however then reinstated.

It seems as though the DA is frequently characterised by unnecessary and doubtful senior level conflicts. Many seem to be unclear about the reasons and motives, while others contend that this is due to much self-empowerment and self-love by individuals inside the party’s structure. The racial factor seems to frequently also to be a culprit. For instance, the exit of the policy head, Gwen Ngwenya, of the DA from the leadership before the May election seems to reflect such a political struggle around the leadership. Professor Kotze22 claimed that the resignation of Ngwenya, who is alleged to have become disillusioned with the DA’s unsteady stance on a pro-Black policy, contributed further to existing uncertainty in the DA as a future political home for Blacks. This is seen as one of the various possible catalysts for Black voters moving from the DA in the past election. There were and are still also sagas around the persons of Helen Zille, Patricia de Lille and Lindiwe Mazibuko – wherein the “Black colour” factor seems not always so very innocent.16,17,19,22,24,31,34

For the DA to qualify as “good” in terms of the referees’ letters of reference, it must undoubtedly settle these kinds of internal leadership issues effectively, without negative roots of doubt. However, it would have been best if they were totally avoided from day-one by the appointment of the correct persons in its leadership. The De Lille saga for instance could have been avoided if sound selection principles were applied and she was never allowed into the DA as a member nor promoted to a leader’s position.16,17,19,22,24,31,34

The writings of the political analyst Muzi Kuzwayo35 in April 2019 on Patricia de Lille’s politics, including her present-day party named Good, and her appointment as an honourable minister in the Ramaphosa regime of post-2019, seems to be a good guideline to follow and to use before making an appointment. Kuzwayo writes35:2: “She first cashed in a few years after she started her party which became defunct and moved over to the DA and became Mayor of Cape Town in return – good deal. Who knows what loot Good will brings her.” Indeed, the loot is there! As a minister in the Ramphosa regime, facing the post-2019 politics, she is receiving a salary of R2.4-million yearly (besides many other allowances such as free flights, subsidised luxury cars, etc.)!35

3.2.1.3.5.2. The DA’s merry men and their alleged hands in the cookie jar

Although it seems that the DA prides itself to not hesitate to call political, economic and social delinquents in the party to book, notwithstanding their seniority or empowerment in the party, it seems that this is not always the true case, as alleged by critics. Looking critically at the DA’s attestations, it seems that although the amount, level and intensity of the delinquencies in the DA are far less than those characterising the ANC, it must be noted on the other hand that when it comes to any wrongdoing and the required appropriate handling thereof, the criteria of punishment must be on an equal level required in public from the ANC to act against its delinquents. The basis cannot and must not be the allowing of any kind of wrongdoing. A single case is as evil as one hundred delinquencies. This, it seems, the DA has missed out on sometimes.15-20

Prominent here are the allegations that the DA lacks fast and decisive actions on the expulsion of delinquents in its executive circle. The so-called Shadow Shabangu case, which echoes seemingly the same failing of the ANC to act against its culprits, is noteable. Shadow Shabangu, the DA’s caucus chair of the Ekurhuleni Council, was before the end of the fifth Parliament accused that he received a R1 220 000 kickback from the developers of the Springs Mall. Immense data was offered in the case.15-20

On the alleged wrongdoing by Shabangu, as specifically spelled out by a report of the Ekurhuleni Council, Mvumvu writes19:4: “The contract required him [Shabangu] to protect the interests of the developer instead of those of the municipality and those of his constituents, which is a direct conflict of interest. Furthermore, it was found that there might be an existence of a corrupt relationship between the developer and Shabangu, under the veil of the so-called facilitation agreement.”

The report alleged that Shabangu’s actions were in contravention of Section 4 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. It has also been alleged that Shabangu received a gift of a hotel payment worth about R1 720 – R2 290 from a friend of the developers of the mall that he did not declare to the council. So far the accused is alleged to still be active in DA party politics, equalling the Ace Magashule and others’ “not guilty till sentenced” stand-off.15-20

The failure of the DA to act decisively and strictly on the allegations against Shabangu undoubtedly made them in the eyes of potential voters in the recent May elections not an acceptable and a good ruler, empowered to be able to take on rumours of corruption in its own circle and respond with criminal prosecution. It seems for the critical voter as though the DA follows the same kind of “stretched” policy as the ANC, notwithstanding their preaching of a so-called “clean character” of the party and its leaders.

It is old news of the DA’s co-operation at three metros with the controversial EFF. It has been alleged that this “DA-EFF-brotherhood” has led thereto that the EFF’s practice of politics has become part of the DA’s thinking, planning and action. This “DA-EFF-brotherhood” is alleged to be driven inside an alleged opportunistic way of functioning and surviving for the DA. It is alleged in a report that the recent support for Moeketsi Mosolo of the EFF, to be an ongoing member of the Tshwane Council, notwithstanding serious allegations, was the outcome of this contaminated DA-EFF-brotherhood. The allegation is that alleged misconduct by Mosolo was ignored by the DA, primarily to bolster and to assure the DA’s empowerment in the council. The perception by the broad public of the good ethics of the DA and their strong showing up of the alleged corruption of the ANC elite, was thereby nullified. On the Mosolo case it is evident that the DA indeed recently wanted him ousted from the council, due to his alleged part in the awarding of a contract valued at R12 billion by the Tshwane Metro Council to the construction group GladAfrica, to manage all the Metro Council’s infrastructure projects. Hereafter, it is alleged, the DA suddenly made a fast turnaround on Mosolo to keep him on the council. The basis for this, it is alluded, was not to offend the EFF because the DA needed the EFF’s support in the council against the ANC at a time when the DA’s empowerment may have been erased. On Mosolo’s alleged wrongdoing, the Auditor-General’s Report alleged that Mosola took unauthorised control as a council member of the appointment of GladAfrica as a service provider, which was is in the first place in conflict with municipal legislation. Secondly, there was the allegation of the presence of corruption via the contract of the City of Tshwane with GladAfrica. As recently as 25 January 2019 the then DA Executive Mayor of Tshwane, Solly Msimanga, alleged that a payment of R317 million to GladAfrica was “irregular” under the management of Mosolo. The existence of a damaging formal report on Mosolo by the firm Bowmans, seemingly reflecting extremely negatively on the R12 billion contract, is alleged to have been ignored by the DA in their continued support of Mosolo in the council.9,36-38

In this context of an allegedly contaminated “DA-EFF-brotherhood”, it has also been alleged that Solly Msimanga, representing the DA as Executive Mayor in Tshwane, was pushed out of the mayoral post by his own DA party, because his efforts to oust Mosolo had angered the EFF and endangered the empowerment environment in the council for the DA with the EFF.9,36-38

The investigative journalist Marrian39 also took the GladAfrica scandal to the door of Solly Msimanga, the DA’s previous mayor, by recently alleging that he is now facing investigation with Moeketsi Mosolo over the multi-billion rand contract which the Auditor General found was awarded irregularly. She further alleged that he had jumped ship at Tshwane City and failed to see through his first mayoral term after he was seemingly “selected” by the DA to be its premier candidate and the face of its campaign to win Gauteng (which did not help the DA much). Marriam39 also alleged that Msimanga faced allegations of nepotism and that his brother had allegedly stolen 100 computers from the City of Tshwane.39

Marrian,39, as well as the political commentator Peter Bruce,40 focused on the actions of the DA’s Johannesburg Mayor, Herman Mashaba. Marrian39 alleged that shortly after he was elected and had formed a government, allegations emerged that a member of his mayoral committee, a said Sharon Peetz, had taken her mother along on an official trip to Spain. Marrian39 reports that this alleged wrongdoing was met with profuse denials by Mashaba and the city council, and that Mashaba even provided evidence that the trip was legal. But he then suddenly fired Peetz some months later after alleged irrefutable evidence of wrongdoing in the case surfaced. Marrian39 also showed the presence of failed service delivery under the mayoral oversight of Mashaba. She alludes that this happened after the city failed to renew a contract with Avis SA for vehicles to collect street rubbish. According to a report by the investigative journalism unit amaBhungane, Marrian reports that the Avis contract was cancelled and the fleet management deal was handed to Afrirent which allegedly in return paid kickbacks to an account belonging to the EFF. Bruce40 further reports that many of Mashaba’s DA causus members insist that he is closer to the EFF than he is to the DA. These members alleged that he allowed the EFF to influence contracts and appointments. This allegation, reading Marrian’s earlier allegations on the Afrirent contract, seem to can make some sense somewhere.39-40

3.2.1.3.5.3. The Marrian test case of the DA as an effective ruler in metros

There are other prominent critics that the DA’s political planning and action on the metro-level reflect widespread lack of constructive and dynamic action and that it does not offer its voters and the inhabitants of the metros where it is in charge, any better services than its opponents, the ANC or the EFF. It seems thus to be a prerequisite to see if the DA pudding has taste.16,17,20

An article by Marrian39 on the 17th May 2019 about the DA reflects it as a party that is unsuccessfully executing its municipal mandate. This requires a frame of reference. A short analysis and description to measure the article’s value in political standing is offered to get some insight as to whether the allegations hold water. The article’s introduction title reads39:32: “The Democratic Alliance’s unsatisfactory performance in the 2019 general elections reflects its poor governance record in the metros it took control of in the 2016 local government election.”

Looking firstly at her reference to the DA’s so-called “unsatisfactory performance in the 2019 elections”, Marrian39 is clearly missing out on all of the primary reasons for the decline of 2% in votes for the DA. Political analysts posit that the 2% decline was clearly a normal and long overdue shedding of the White ultra-conservatives. These drop-outs are now starting to run away because land expropriation is going to be a reality that the DA has to face from 2019 and must constructively handle in reality politics (other than these DA drop-outs’ seemingly new political home, the FF+, which blindly refuses to recognise this reality and promises them false land security). Nullifying Marrian’s 39 postulation is the well-defined and -reasoned opinion of the editor of the Beeld3 offered earlier, which put it clearly that the DA indeed did well in the election with its 20% voter outcome.3,39

Regarding her reference to the DA’s so-called “poor governance record in the metros it took control of in the 2016 local government election”, it is a postulation without roots: the only way to make an analysis of poor performance, is to compare it with the ruling ANC’s outputs in the various municipalities since 2016 (and the EFF which is basically missing in this context). In this context of governance it must be noted that not a single municipality under the DA management failed to obtain a clean audit, while most of the municipalities run by the ANC are contaminated by the lack of clean audits and the presence of constant corruption, fraud and theft, etc.9,16,17,20,39

The chaos in some of these ANC run metros is echoed by the recent arrest of the ANC Durban Mayor Zandile Gumede, chair of the powerful eThekwini region. Together with her, 62 ANC councillors of the eThekwini region stand accused of R208 million tender fraud. (For the record: she has already appeared in court and is out on R50 000 bail).41,42

For Marrian39 to speak vaguely as follows39:32: “…the DA did not live up to its own promise of better and clean governance in the metros it won in 2016. There are ample examples in Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay and Johannesburg of a party out of its depth in governing complex cities”, is plain mischief-making. Marrian39 failed to offer facts besides generalisations, meaning that her evidence is missing to put the DA in the dog box. As it has been offered it is fake news! Firstly, it needs to be noted that the DA only took over these entities three years ago and they had been messed up before by the ANC. The DA’s first tasks were to put remedial actions in place to get them working once again. This was mostly achieved in the three years, as the overall successes in these municipalities confirm.9,16,17,20,39

Marrian39 remarks that the DA had taken over the crown jewels of South Africa’s city scape, namely the big budget Johannesburg, the administrative capital of Pretoria in Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay in coalition deals and informal agreements with the EFF. She simplified the outcomes of these three metro’s complex management, which is prominently reflected by her unconvincing focus on Nelson Mandela Bay, with a specific outcome which she describes in political jargon as39:23: “Three years later, two of the three DA mayors have been removed and the party lost control of Nelson Mandela Bay”. Her “focus” clearly reflects a lack of understanding of the pre-2016 contaminations in all three of the metros which the DA has been trying to rectify since 2016 with the EFF. Secondly, which she knows well, but failed to pinpoint, is the political instability of the EFF as a co-partner and the party’s extreme customs and habits of mischief-making. This mischief-making intention and inclination by the EFF is evident where there is the opportunity for it, where it can scurrilously deviate from normal and orderly politics, even with the other mischief-maker, the ANC, in order to obstruct good governance. The constant change of DA mayors in PE was such an outcome and was not a public rejection of the DA’s mayor.39

To associate the DA’s Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba’s so-called popularity with the decline in DA votes there in the May elections, does not hold water: Marrian39 herself states that the DA’s decline was all over the country, and not only located in Johannesburg; so where does Mashaba really come into the picture, besides his random and subjective selection as a so-called “culprit”? Her postulations39:32: “…that last year bins in Johannesburg’s streets overflowed with rubbish”, and that: “Johannesburg entities, from City Power to Pikitup, degenerated under Mashaba’s watch…”, do not hold any specific evidence of outright and continuous political failure or misdoing by the DA or Mashaba. Marrian, as a salted political analyst, must know this. Her remarks are primarily nothing more than generalised political allegations, failing to bring the DA or Mashaba to book with specific and confirmatory evidence on the specific story of rubbish bins. Furthermore, these claims, if they should be true, are seemingly the extraordinary to the ordinary of every day. Strikes, which are a general phenomenon in all the metros and lead unavoidably to streets overflowing with rubbish, are mostly run by Cosatu and its affiliates, which are alliance members to the ANC regime. Furthermore, the country-wide daily road blocks of burning tyres and unrest, etc., are basically due to the municipalities under the ANC’s management’s constant and ongoing failures for the delivery of services. In the failed service delivery at ANC-run municipalities, the presence of rubbish which overflows the streets is only one problem of many more serious failures to the inhabitants, of which Marrian seems oblivious or prefers not to mention.39

Marrian’s39 overview of the DA’s so-called fight with the then Cape Town mayor Patricia de Lille, seemingly lacks an understanding of the background to the alleged matter, which forced the DA to react with serious steps against her. It seems to be a matter that the DA is still investigating although she has left the party. Her remark39:23: “The electorate clearly turned up their noses at the DA’s antics in the metros over the past three years…”, is an effort by Marrian39 to pinpoint the story behind the so-called “noses-up” of the electorate.. However, it lacks any evidence or political commentator’s depth. In perspective, it seems to be a reflection of a kind of political mischief against the DA. Again, on the “antics” of the DA – as done in all her other reflections on the DA’s so-called many failures in her article – she failed to offer a comparison of the DA’s “bad” antics with the ANC’s “good” antics in all the metros where it is active, knowing that the DA would come first as the best ruler.39

In conclusion, many critics are inclined to say “where there is smoke there is fire”. 39 Viewpoints must be lent an ear. The evidence of poor management and corruption in municipalities all over the country is plentiful: from the smallest village to the biggest metro. What really is needed is that the Cape Town, Johannesburg, eThekwini, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay municipalities must be scrutinised for corruption, theft and nepotism, etc., by commissions such as those of Zondo and Mpati. This will show not only possible wrongdoings by the ANC’s cronies, but also possibly those of the DA’s cronies. Such an outcome may put flesh to Marrian’s39 present vague and unconvincing allegations on the failures of the DA. It will also test the DA’s manifesto for truth and see whether its promises are going to hold water. South Africa needs to see which of the three dominant political parties and their leaders are sufficiently capable and skilled to solve the demanding land redistribution issue. Most of all, we must ascertain which of the three parties’ politics are characterised by poor governance and serious delinquencies.

3.2.1.3.6. The DA’s horse-trading with extreme oppositions as partners

A prominent critic, which could have also played a role in the loss of voters in the 2019 elections, is the opposition of conservative voters (mostly Whites) of the DA’s association with the EFF. Indeed any association with a radical opposition, even the ANC, seems unacceptable for this sector.39,40,43

No-one can escape the hard fact that the DA’s coalition and informal co-operation with the EFF has cost them support. The fiasco in their loss of control of Nelson Mandela Bay and the removal of the DA’s mayors there, has become more than a black mark on the DA’s record of integrity and good governance.39,40,43

This kind of DA-EFF cooperation is seen as nothing more than horse-trading, to use the excellent coining of a phrase by Bruce. It seems for some critics to be extreme opportunism by the DA’s leadership to stay in power and to reap benefits, instead of truly putting the country and its voters’ interests as a priority.39,40,43

At the moment there are a lot of rumours of a repeated coalition with the EFF in the metro councils of Tshwane and Johannesburg. The EFF alleged that such consultations and discussions with the DA are ongoing. But on this outcome, as with the DA’s pre-2019 politics, Maimane43 has thrown cold water by stating43:1-2:

…the DA would co-operate only with parties that shared its values of non-racialism, a capable state, eradication of corruption and a market-based economy that was inclusive of those who were left out.

This discussion on co-operation with the EFF must be based on those principles, and if ultimately parties do not agree on the principles we will not sell those out. We will stand firm and move on from there.

The DA’s pre-2019 association with the EFF and its leaders has, as mentioned, with good reason placed a question mark on the DA’s integrity.34,39,43 Further contamination of the DA’s character by the EFF can make Marrian’s39 remark that39:32: “…the DA did not live up to its own promise of better and clean governance in the metros it won in 2016”, suddenly and irrevocably meaningful. In addition here is Marrian’s request that the DA must do some introspection. It seems to be necessary, not only with regard to its association with the EFF, but also on many of the other so-called “delinquencies” of the DA, of which Marrian39 has spoken many times with a tongue in her cheek.

A fact which cannot be ignored: as a result of its initial construction as a party, the DA has many times been characterised by outright opportunism which has nurtured the party’s unfortunate “EFF-love”. It must be phased out, together with the EFF contamination.27,39,43,44

The DA cannot honestly call itself a unique party: a party free from racism, corruption, state capture, revolutionary politics, etc., as long the EFF is part of its inner circle. The past EFF association has cost the DA as many Black right-wing votes as it did to drive its White right-wing’s departure. Selisho34 quoted the political commentator Leeto Nthoba who said that the DA’s initial loss of voters to the FF+ in the May elections was strongly driven by the DA’s previous association with the EFF. The loss of more Whites from the DA will further be speeded up by a new alliance with the EFF. There is not a single good principle to support the DA to again be involved with the EFF in a future co-operation.34

In this context is it clear that Maimane has started (seemingly for the moment) to cold shoulder the EFF and confirms that the DA’s intention is only that of a positive co-operation with “equal-value” parties to the DA in the post-2019 politics. Maimane reflects further that the DA wants to establish a “caucus of the opposition” with parties that share their values and are identified with the centre of politics. In this context the DA already has a kind of “alliance” with the FF+, the ACDP, the IFP and the UDM, while the EFF is not a member, but is seemingly supported sometimes.27,44-46

However, for the DA to come clean in the post-2019 politics from their previous serious EFF-contamination, remains to be seen. The first prerequisite to be clean is integrity; something that no-one can cheer about in the DA if the EFF is its bed-partner. If the stream goes against Maimane’s cold shouldering of the EFF, the DA is sleeping at the same time with the right-wing FF+ and underwriting the dominant voice of the aggrieved, conservative White and Coloured minorities, while at the same time sleeping with the left-wing EFF and underwriting the voice of the discontented, impatient and even angry Black majority. This is not what is called middle-ground politics: it is political schizophrenia and political psychopathy, two serious psychoses, intertwined in one single party. The end result will be the DA’s ongoing Black-versus-White conflict, but in extreme form. This would also confirm the views of many critics that it lacks a sound political policy in any area of politics. As a party it will fit in nowhere, because it is not positively repositioned. Most of all, it will be without supporters and its rich funders.32,47

For the DA to argue that the previous backing of the DA by the EFF and vice versa has not been without benefit, for instance in Johannesburg, holds no water. There is no fact to contradict the statement that all the inhabitants of Johannesburg would benefit if the ANC alone was the boss, possibly more than the DA-EFF alliance. One thing is clear (and a great concern for a corruption free DA) and that is the enormous benefit for the DA-EFF councillors in pay and their political empowerment. When John Mendelsohn46, a DA councillor, postulates that the DA alliance with the EFF was a “precariously positioned one wich required skilful management by Mashaba” it seems as though both Bruce40 and Marrion,39 seemingly with good reason, frowned on it. The DA would benefit from a little introspection, as Marrian advises.39,40,46

The public have the right to be sceptical on any DA-EFF brotherhood. Mendelsohn’s46 reflection on Bruce’s40 critique on the DA’s actions in the Johannesburg City Council, with specifically the EFF as a prominent empowered partner, read46:18: “The message to Bruce is that the arrangement with the EFF was not entered into simply as a “greedy decision”. It was done for the best of reasons, namely to rid the city of corruption and get some growth going in the local economy.”This has just too much reference to the words “greedy, corruption, best of reasons”, as if coming directly from the Zuma period. It is not convincing. 39,40,46

Postscript: On the 29th May 2019 the Citizen reports that the DA had given the ANC the Chair-position of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa)4 in the Western Cape Provincial Legislature. As motivation for this offering the DA said it was done in the interests of transparency, accountability, cooperative governance and good democratic practice (characteristics the DA constantly accuses the ANC of lacking!). Notwithstanding the DA’s argument that the chair is given traditionally to a member of the strongest opposition party in the government (which the ANC is in the stern Cape), it is in conflict with Maimane’s earlier promises that the DA would stay away from any future cooperation with doubtful partners.49

The advent of post-2019 Malema cooperation with the DA in metros can steer the DA back to its practice of dishonourable horse trading. This does not seem impossible. On the 28th May the Star48 reported that it looks set that the DA is going to do a power-sharing deal again with the EFF in Tshwane and Johannesburg.48

3.2.1.3.8. The DA’s use of the Malloch-Brown model for provincial and municipal political empowerment

There are some serious critics of the opinion that to speak of the DA as a national regime, to in any way be able to govern South Africa after the May election 2019, must be handled with care. The DA, it was felt, just could not brag of doing so, because this experience is totally missing from their CV. There are even critics that believe that on provincial and local level the DA seems to falter. The emergence of various small political groupings and so-called community parties in the Western Cape, the DA’s stronghold, is offered as dissatisfaction with the DA by communities and the inhabitants of regions where the DA is strongly active. Given that these groupings did not make much inroad into the DA’s domain in the Western Cape or Cape Town in the past elections, this contradicts a general indication of poor DA ruling or unpopularity with the broad society of the DA on specific municipal level.22,25,36,50

This outcome erases the critique that the DA does not have the ability or will to be the national ruler in the post-2019 politics. The results of the May election contradict thus firstly the lack of interest of the DA in national politics, and secondly that the DA has neglected the national issue. What most of the critics have missed is that the DA, with very good reason, is focusing its political intentions and role-playing on provincial level to tackle local issues, instead of over-addressing the national issues of South Africa.22,25,36,50

Looking to the arguments and modus operandi of the DA’s leadership since 2014, it becomes clear that there exists cognition inside the party that the first step to be able to move into national government successfully requires the pre-step of a well established provincial level involvement and empowerment by the DA all over the country. Included here is the local level of governmental occupation by the DA in an effort to firstly repair the integrity of municipalities and to again obtain clean audits, and secondly to serve the inhabitants’ needs and demands through this improved system. This will allow them to obtain and establish a foundation to move into provincial and then on into national levels of government. Only after this double stage has successfully been mastered, based on a sound governance foundation, experience and empowerment, can the DA move aggressively into the national sphere from 2024 onward .22,25,36,50

This double stage intention and approach on provincial and local levels of government establishment was evident from the words of Makashule Gana50 of the DA national campaign team for the recent May 2019 election, when he pinpointed that the party was primarily and specifically campaigning on community issues that were close to the ordinary peoples’ daily lives50:15: “We stand more chance of being in government if we pour our hearts into the provinces and grow our votes there.” Prominent here are the constructive efforts of the DA to explain on local level major national issues in such terms that help voters to understand how bad or good decisions taken in the top echelons of government affect their day-to-day lives, write Matiwane and Deklerk25.

How much the quality of the DA’s political structure and know-how are on the standard of international politics, and how intensively they apply the principles of good governance on all levels of their strategy and planning, is especially reflected and confirmed by their insight to go as an opposition in the first place for local and domestic politics. Their aim is mostly, other than some of the ANC top brass like Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, to find an international solution for local problems. No-one can reject the important role of international politics, but if a local policy of management is absent and the basic grievances of the local people on village level are ignored and fail to be addressed – as the ANC mostly did for over 25 years with their minds occupied by national government – international politics not only fails to have an impact, but, where it is applied randomly, brings in most cases only further chaos to an existing local problem. Their exclusive local focus with the use of local approaches, is working positively where the DA is strongly involved in the local level of government. This is not only to repair the local mess at municipalities previously run by the ANC, but at the same time to start to bring about the much needed basic facilities and contacts that are prominently lacking on local level and whereto international solutions mostly are not applicable.

In this context, wherein the DA’s local orientation to politics is correctly focusing on the single aim to altruistically serve the individuals’ needs above personal gains and self-empowerment, an inclination that is at the moment negatively overwhelming the country’s politics on national level, is the supportive narrative of Mark Malloch-Brown51 with regard to the DA’s initiative on local level politics. For the record, Malloch-Brown51 is undoubtedly one of the most qualified internationally recognised persons to understand and evaluate the actions and qualities of political parties and governments worldwide. The insight of Malloch-Brown51, an experienced political correspondent for the Economist, the Vice-President of External Affairs of the World Bank, Head of the United Nations Development Programme, the UN Deputy Secretary-General under Koffi Annan, and later Minister of State at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who worked closely within the Middle East and African political turmoil, is fully echoing the DA’s practise of politics. He can speak of successes and failures and hard lessons to learn from local to national governance, especially on the British environment.51

Malloch-Brown51, writes about Gordon Brown’s hard lesson to learn on the importance of local politics when he became the UK Prime-Minister51:221:

Hit in his early months in office by credit, food and energy crises that were clearly international in origin, he publicly sought international solutions, only to be confronted…with complaints that he was not sensitive enough to people and their problems. Why, the British people asked, was he talking about all these irrelevant international matters?

The dilemma of the modern politician is that the answers are abroad but the votes at home. And so Brown, like Blair before him, had to find a language and narrative of politics that is deeply rooted in the at-home. Among political leaders, neither the natural globalisers nor the nationalists are able to cut themselves free from the strings of domestic politics. That is the forum to which they all remain beholden.

Malloch-Brown51 also writes in this context of the importance of local government about his own experience (and another hard lesson to learn) as a UK minister. He reports51:221: “And local is a tough taskmaster. Coming back to the U.K. as a minister to help Brown drive his internationalist agenda, I was brought down to earth by the weekend’s newspaper headlines that blamed the government for uncollected garbage in London’s streets. It does not get much more local than that.”

How sensitive the DA is in its encircling of good politics and its following every letter of the principles to obtain the best empowerment through addressing the local issue, is clear in their aim to take over city metros as a first step to a later national takeover. Noteworthy here is the DA’s insight to put forward strong leaders of quality in order to lead excellent cities and by doing so, to win the hearts of the local people. Malloch-Brown51, on the empowerment of local government through the installation of persons of integrity in care of these municipalities, writes51:221: “… mayors solve problems that are close to home: violent crime, drugs, public infrastructure. They have to care about schools, social services, police and public investment.”

On the immense empowerment of the local entities and their empowering energy-streaming, not only into the provincial and national levels of a country, but also into the international sphere, because their excellence and know-how can be exported, Malloch-Brown51 writes further51:222: “The world looks good for mayors and other local leaders. The fortunes of cities like Moscow, Cape Town, and Chicago have often been countercyclical to those of their region or country, often due to the leadership of strong mayors.”

The DA’s successful pre-2019 occupation and management of Cape Town (as well as the Western Cape region in which it is anchored) reflects such counter action to erase poor governance and leadership, standing out from the ANC’s failed South African state and its municipalities where they reign.51

In addition, the DA’s political successes, again at the provincial level, especially in the Western Cape in the May election, are a confirmation of their ongoing political manifesto of an orderly taking of power in South Africa, even if it must wait until the 2024 election.22

3.2.1.3.9. The DA as a party of everything for everyone, pre-and post-2019
3.2.1.3.9.1. The DA’s White dilemma

Post-election critics bring various reasons to the door of the DA as to why it did not make a dramatic inroad on the voters. Prominent here is its seeming inability to properly handle the various forces, both positive and negative, active in the DA’s own dynamics. It is often suggested that it tries to be a party of everything for everybody. This is an approach which is seemingly not working anymore. The party’s open kind of politics in which they try to satisfy both the Black interests as well as the White interests seem not to work in 2019 and are not going to work in future. This is damaging to both sides. The basis here is a policy ambiguity, mostly activated by the conservative NP remnants of the White sector of the DA. This opposition, and fear by the doves in the DA of losing White support if they took them on, led to not only a vague but many times an absolute lack of a clearly declared policy on Black empowerment and affirmative action, driving away the middle class and even the lower economic classes of Blacks. On the other hand, there is the suspicion by White DA members of Maimane to have sympathy for dramatic land reform, which echos in many aspects that of the ANC doves. This is a direct reason for a DA internal power struggle. This was also well-reflected by critics as the so-called driving out of Whites as members and supporters in the May elections. This in-house power struggle is immense, although well hidden. It frequently equals the present in-fighting in the ANC on the self-empowerment of individuals. The Black racism within a certain sector of the ANC is in reverse echoed by White racism in the DA.28,32 Nyatsumba writes25:25: “The harder Mmusi Maimane tried to position the DA as a social democratic party that would appeal to black voters, the more conservatives “fought back” against him and his ideals.

Naki, in quoting Professor Dirk Kotze22 of Unisa on this conflicting context and the fight for the soul of the DA, reports22:4: “Blacks wanted reform, but conservative whites opposed liberal policies, which put the DA in a dilemma. Both the constituencies abandoned the party at the polls in favour of the ANC and the FF+.”

This indication is undoubtedly true: as many as 470 396 voters left their DA home and contributed undoubtedly to the FF+ gaining 249 093 votes since the 2014 election. These DA voters who absconded to the ANC also helped the ANC to limit its’ loss to only 1 410 446 votes in the May election.5-8

The post-2019 politics make it clear that the DA has reached its peak of White voters and supporters, but the loss of more or less 249 093 White DA voters to the FF+ was an unavoidable outcome. It was part of the ultra-conservative Whites’ build-up against Black empowerment that could never be solved reasonably inside the DA of the future. Most of these ultra-conservative Whites, a political mix between NPs, ABs and Herstigte-NPs, have opportunistically hung on to the DA for years after losing their own political homes, doing more harm than good to the DA’s political soul.28,52 Mokone, Deklerk and Hunter52, quoting a DA insider on these seemingly politically confused and estranged Whites in the DA, write52:22: “Yes, we have lost support to the Freedom Front Plus, but perhaps it’s about time we lost the right-wing conservatives in the party because we are trying to build a party that represents the interests of all South Africans. Perhaps that will also help us to continue increasing support in black areas, which is what we did in this election.”

3.2.1.3.9.2. A Black ex-ANC as the present leader of the DA

How much these right-wing conservatives have penetrated the soul of the DA with their White racial contamination, was clearly reflected by their efforts to sack Maimane for what they see as his “Black liberation” inside the DA. Other DA right-wingers allude that he is an ex-ANC walking around with the ANC manifesto under his right arm. The intention to oust him at present is very clear. Indeed, it seems that they tried to do this at the DA’s Federal Executive (Fedex) on the 13th May, without success. It seems that they are also gearing up to try to oust him later in June at the DA’s Federal Council’s meeting. (The FC is the DA’s highest decision-making structure between conferences). There are also rumours of a call for an early national congress next year, instead of the scheduled congress of 2021, to muster enough votes to be able to topple Maimane12,52

Mokone, Deklerk and Hunter52 describe these detractors of Maimane to include current and former MPs and MPLs from the DA’s neo-conservative grouping, known in the DA’s circles as the “old guard”, which does not agree with the DA’s “blacking” politics and a more responsible view on true democracy, as opposed to the one catering exclusively to White privilege. A spokesperson on the inside of the DA says52:6: “They are gloating. Even before the results started coming in, there were so many of them that were waiting for Mmusi to fail.”

How focused and poisonous these attacks are on Maimane, especially from the Afrikaner right-wing, is well reflected by Pelser53 when he, without a factual base, writes53:6:

Danksy Maimane se oorhaastige kantkiesery in rassetwiste wat gewissel het van Ashwin Willemse tot Schweizer-Reneke, kry die DA 472 000 stemme minder op 8 Mei, want hoewel sy party se prestasie in regering gerespekteer word, verstaan veral wit kiesers ook wat Maimane wil doen, naamlik om klokslag op sosiale media sy eie onberispelike bona fides wat betref ant-swart rassisme ten toon te stel nog voordat hy al die feite het.”

The double standards of these White right-wingers applied to the correctness and indeed the prescribed duty of Maimane to punish deviant behaviour of party members, especially of the top brass of the DA, knowing it is inappropriate and delinquent – is again reflected by Pelser’s53 public down-playing (seemingly because their political antics fit him) of the seriousness of the deviances of three DA seniors who Maimane (after consultation with his top brass) recently called to book for contravening the party’s media rules and for getting involved in racial politics. Pelser writes53:6:

Die DA-LP Ghaleb Cachalia, seun van die struggle-ikone Amina en Yusuf Cachalia, is weer onder ‘n tipe sensuur geplaas as ‘n ongedissiplineerde kader omdat hy dit gedurf waag het het om die uitgesproke Radio 702–aanbieder Eusebius McKaiser te belg.

Ook Helen Zille, wat as premier die doeltreffendste regering gebou het wat Suid-Afrika in 25 jaar gesien het, en wat nou ‘n gewone DA-lid is, sal na die DA se federale uitvoerende raad verwys word nadat sy op Twitter geskryf het dat daar ook deesdae iets soos “black privileges” is (sy stel dit onder meer gelyk aan grootskeepse geplunder sonder gevolge).

These growing and well-planned attacks on the “Black priest” Maimane as DA leader, are not done alone by single persons or a small group of White right-wing-went-off-DAs, but are also as mentioned done from inside by the mostly White “old guard” of the DA top brass where these attacks are less expected. These attacks are spreading to all the intimate members of Maimane’s team. Important to note is the focus on the DA’s head of elections Jonathan Moakes, and the chief executive Paul Boughey, seemingly also with the intention to oust them for the “alleged” poor performance of the DA in the 2019 elections12,39,53

Moakes did indeed resign recently and referred to the internal fights in the DA, wherein seemingly the detractors of Maimane are central, as: “…’toksiese, abnormal omgewing’ waar ‘interne gevegte, vertrouensbreuk, (en) onenigheid …die norm geword het’,” reports Boonzaaier.54:1

Bringing the fight closer to Maimane and his intimate cronies, Marrian writes39:4: “Knives are said to be out for the young leader, despite him getting ‘a round of applause; as he entered the Fedex meeting on Monday.”

3.2.1.3.9.3. The DA present-day leadership saturation by right-wing Old Guards

The knives of the “old guard” are out for the wrong “emperor” and these detractors of Maimane, similar to those who stabbed Julius Ceasar, learned later that a hefty price needs to be paid in the end.

From a political analysis point of view, it seems more and more that the DA’s drop in share in the national votes from the 22.23% under Helen Zille to 20.77% in 2019, bringing a decrease from 89 to 84 MPs in the National Assembly, was to a great extent directly as a result of the negative impact of these “old guard’” “white-politics” inside the DA, specifically about Maimane’s “Black” presence as its leader. One prominent root of these DA neo-conservatives’ ultra-politics, is their association with the so-called antagonists against land expropriation in any form – and the fighting off of any form of upliftment for the mass of the poor and landless. They are clearly aligned to the so-called and mostly self-styled “Afrikaners/White rescuers and saviours”, such as the FF+, AfriForum, AgriSA, Solidarity and other obstructionists of the unavoidable and much needed land reform plan. The future planning and political model of this “old guard” for the DA does not include the intention to build a party that represents the interests of all South Africans. Prominent here is their exclusive safe-guarding of an imbalanced White land ownership and exclusive White capital at the cost of ±30 million poor and landless Blacks. 21,28,47,52

Critically considered, is it clear that they do not represent the view of most of the ±5 million White South Africans. Moreover, they do not have the majority support of these Whites for their racial politics inside or outside the DA. They can cost the DA a split, but, as said, this split needs to occur as fast as possible under the leadership of Maimane, in order to make the DA a party of the people of South Africa.21,28,47,52

But political analyst Ralph Mathekgo55, quoted by Naki55, contends that the flight of White voters from the DA must also be interpreted from another angle and not outright because they are all against the DA’s so-called activation of a process of “blacking” itself. They were forced out by fear of the EFF’s extreme anti-White and land grabbing policy (and their own selfishness to be rich, empowered and to have unlimited White privilege), and thus ran to the FF+ as their only rescuer in this unfortunate setup. This opinion is confirmed by various other political analysts.21,28,32,47,52,55

Mathekgo55, in line with the above findings, writes55:5: “The EFF helped the Freedom Front Plus to consolidate the white voters. It positioned itself as an opponent of the EFF policies, including the expropriation of land without compensation.”

The exit of the White antagonists (who, as mentioned, did not really belong from day one to the DA’s Black orientated political culture), has undoubtedly on the other hand opened the door in reverse for the influx of the middle and lower classes of Black supporters. This positive and growing process will start to erase the White shortfall in members and the White funding of the party (which also seems to have become a leverage of how these right-wing Whites, especially the White capitalists, have manipulated and captured the DA’s soul for a long time). 21,28,32,47,52,55

To be a party of the future, the DA will need to increase their drive for the collection into the DA of Blacks to make it an overwhelmingly moderate Black party. This is a dramatic move away from the contaminated presence of the (mostly departed) right-wing Whites which have so far blocked any “black-liberalism”. This was done in-house by them, at the cost of the status of Maimane’s leadership, by their internal propaganda to profile him as a poor leader. In this process the media was thoroughly used, especially the Afrikaans media.21,28,32,47,52,55

3.2.1.3.9.4. Good management for change politics

The abovementioned change in politics of the DA from White to Black can bring about enormous winnings for the DA in the next local urban elections of 2021. This political acceptance could be extended to the rural areas wherein the DA so far has been under-performing against the ANC and the EFF. (In the 2019 elections, of the 3.6 million votes which the DA received, 2.9 million came from urban areas, with 152 000 from rural areas, 500 000 from farm areas and 9 000 from mixed areas). This means that the DA has to be progressive in order to improve its position locally.22,56 Marrian56 is correct when she says that the DA’s results in the metros in 2019 show that it will have to work hard to retain control of them in 2021, particularly in the Tshwane and Johannesburg metros which it now governs through unstable coalitions. This includes their sole governing in Cape Town, where their support has dropped from 67% to 56%. However, on the other side, the decrease in votes for the ANC is much more significant, confirming the presence of various negative determinants and not a sole one such as leadership per se.56

With regard to the future politics of the FF+ in the post-2019 politics (which has enlarged its presence in Parliament from 4 to 10 MPs) – it is the party to which the DA shed an assumend ±250 000 voters – there is, besides obstruction together with the various White/Afrikaner rescuers and savers such as Solidarity, AfriForum, the IRR, etc., very little hope. The FF+ is an artificial political setup, still saturated in racism, and as the election outcome reflects, it is not popular with the majority of South Africans who stand strongly against racism. Also for the 250 000 DA members, fleeing the ship to the FF+, the future looks doomed there and they knew very well that the DA is the only party that can bring about ordered and balanced land reform. The failed Pieter Mulder escapade as deputy minister of the FF+ in the Zuma cabinet was an expensive lesson to learn for Whites who tried to channel their politics and interests exclusively through the FF+.5-8

The chance is good that many of these disloyal (and many times displaced) DA supporters, who turned to the FF+ as voters, are going to return to the DA. Kotze22 reflects22:4: “The FF+ support is artificial, caused by DA supporters upset with the way the party was managed at the top.” The question must be asked as to whether the DA wants them back? To argue that the DA is stripped of its White voters/supporters with the departure of the 250 000 right-wing jumpers to the EFF+, is a myth. It must be noted that most of the DA members/supporters are still White and are undoubtedly satisfied. Moreover: the fact is that the Whites (including Afrikaners), especially the youth, have very little sympathy for right-wing Whites and their opportunistic Afrikaner/White saviours and rescuers. The same passivity against the right-wing is present within the 5 million Whites with regard to the political trouble-making of the ±35 000 White farmers and their farms. Although it is impossible to calculate precisely the number of White supporters of the DA, the voting totals of the 2019 statics of the eligible voters (±36 miilion) as well as the total voters (±18 million) at the ballot box out of a total population of ±58 million, can be brought into calculation with the White population of ±5 million. If the eligible White voters are calculated, as many as 3 miilion Whites can support the DA. If the passive vote, as reflected in the 2019 voting, is brought into calculation, as many as 1.5 million Whites can still be supporters of the DA. (The total vote for the DA in 2019 was 3.6 million). This calculation means that the loss of ±250 000 White votes reflects basically a loss of between ±8% and 17% Whites by the DA, which can easily be replaced with Black votes.5-8

It can be expected that many of the Black and Brown voters who jumped ship will return as soon as the ANC restarts its tricks. The politics of the ANC, the SACP and Cosatu, are still bordering on radicalism with regard to race, economics and land reform, etc. This politically radical thinking just does not fit into the mindset of established DAs. 22,63

For South African politics in general, which includes the DA’s future planning, thinking and action, there lurk serious consequences as a result of the right-wing FF+ successes in the May election (a warning also applicable to the EFF’s danger). This holds political dangers, which somewhere in the future, the government of the day may be forced to curb, even by dramatic intervention. On this racial polarisation and risky outcome, Mondi Makhanya,64 the editor of City Press, writes a clear warning64:11: “Pieter Groenewald, VF Plus-leier, het ná die verkiesing in ‘n onderhoud hieroor gekraai. “Mense begin nou besef dat jy toegelaat word om wit te wees, ‘n minderheidsgroep, ‘n Afrikaner, sonder om ‘n rassis te wees.”

On the above response of Groenewald, Makhanya64:11continues:

Deur dit te sê, het hy die terugtrek van ‘n aansienlike deel van die wit bevolking – meestal Afrikaanssprekendes – in ‘n rasse-laer van waar hulle hulself as afsonderlik van hul medeburgers beskou, as lofwaardig beskou.

Die ongelukkige aspek van demokrasie is dat dit elke nou en dan uitslae soos dié bewerkstellig. As demokrasie moet ons dit respekteer.

Suid-Afrikaners moet egter nou reeds die realiteit konfronteer dat ‘n giftige nasionalisme aan die regterkant van ons politieke spektrum herrys. Die goeie ding is dat dit binne die grense van ons grondwetlike bedeling geskied.

Dit kan steeds op demokraties wyse ontman word – mits diegene wat ons republiek lei dit herken en dit met breinkrag eerder as spierkrag beveg.

It is now the duty of the DA to rid itself of the Groenewalds, the racial AfriForums and its associated organisations. There is no place to fire up White resistance and poisonous ultra-White nationalism in the DA. The opportunity is now there for the DA to rid itself of racial domination and contamination. This can be done fast and successfully. For that the DA needs a tough, but balanced Black leader.64

It is clear that Maimane and his intimate cronies are very sure of themselves in the post-2019 DA with their future “blacking”. He is not hesitating to take on the White ultra-conservatives in the party’s top brass. It seems Maimane successfully bottled them together with persons such as Helen Zille and “her regrets of promoted Black leaders in the DA”.43,53,65,66

Maimane43, on this future path of DA politics, said43:1-2: “We have set the direction of the organisation and that is the route we will go”.

His growing success was seen with the recent appointment of his preferred candidate Jacques Julius as deputy chief whip in the place of Mike Waters, who is regarded by Maimane and his cronies as part of the conservatives who obstruct the change of the DA. It shows strong support for Maimane from senior DA MPs. This direct vote within the party’s caucus was undoubtedly the victory Maimane needed to continue fast with his diversity of the racial composition of the DA’s higher echelons. It is also clear that the DA MP Phumzile van Damme is successfully leading a progressive group to dislodge many of Maimane’s detractors.65

Mokone and Deklerk65, quoting DA inside sources, say that Julius not only strengthened Maimane’s empowerment on the DA’s Fedex, but that the support of the senior DA MPs show65:4: “… that there are people in the party who support the vision he’s laid out, who want to continue with the vision of our SA for all.”

This clear and decisive policy finality arriving at last, the previous lack of which cost the DA votes in the recent elections, was concretely demonstrated on the 21st May 2019 when Maimane took on Helen Zille in public (an action long overdue). This clearly reflects his assertion of power in the post-2019 DA politics. He has at last obtained his grip on the party. His undermentioned public speaking shows this clearly.43

Firstly, he recommitted the DA to being the South African party of the centre, with the sole intention to serve every citizen43:1-2: “We will not pander to the right or pander to the left. That is not the space we want to occupy. We are in the centre of politics and we must lay out that stall. Populism and nationalism are on the rise. It doesn’t change the fact that our historical mission to get all South Africans working together is an ideal worth fighting for.”

Secondly, in fighting off the attacks on him as leader, as driven by the ill-disciplined comments of some high profile DA members on Twitter, he initiated disciplinary actions against three prominent DA members, namely Helen Zille and the two DA MPs Galeb Cachalia and Michael Cardo.43,67

Maimane43,67 taking a clear position on the DA”s centre politics and how this will be driven, as well as how he is going to erase the right-wing Whites, has responded as follows43:9 and 67:1-2:

I do not agree with the views that have been put forward by the former premier of the Western Cape.

The discussion about privilege in this country is a function not only of our history which advantaged a particular race over another, but it’s also that in the last number of years in government here, we have failed to create access to opportunities for South Africans and ensure that more can be included in our economy .

White South Africans needed to be “cognisant of the fact that the majority of people who are left out are black South Africans.”

On the conflicting racial matter, also prominent in the DA and which was clearly put into the foreground by the Zille tweets, Maimane67 comments as follows67:9: “Any view that seeks to polarise South Africans on the basis of race is not a view I will support. Our focus must be working together as South Africans, black and white, to recognise those injustices and work to address them.”

3.2.1.3.9.5. The DA is finally at the centre of politics and is laying out its stall

To be honest, the DA was before and still is after the election (as shown by the arrogance of Zille’s tweets), undoubtedly saturated in the belief capture of some right-wing Whites seeing themselves as the sole rescuers of the party (undoubtedly true in terms of funding) when it seems to be in trouble. The pertinent use of Helen Zille and Tony Leon to collect votes, but surely only White votes, was an excellent example of this mistaken perception of these right-wing Whites of their future importance in the DA. The presence of people such as Zille and Leon activated immense Black anger. It was planned belittlement. It was for White empowerment.64,66,68 A DA member of the party’s campaign team reflects68:7: “Why in the dying days were the fossils rolled out? Because they wanted to focus on the white vote. That vote was already gone, it was clear even in by-elections.”

There is a false belief that a Black DA is doomed, which may be true if it is solely entrusted to a future of White voters and putting them first. But the intention is clear to keep only those Whites who are committed to an open society, free from the present DA racial undertones. For Johnson12 to write as follows on this White remedy of the post-2019 DA is pie in the sky12:4-5: “Daar is eise dat die koppe van al die topleiers moet rol en vrese dat, tensy die skip vinnig omgedraai word, verdere verliese in 2021 se munisipale verkiesing die party in die gesig staar.” Firstly, it is doubtful whether people such as Johnston are welcome on the post-2019 DA ship. Secondly, if the Black top leaders of the party are now fired, the White racial DA will in 2019 already face losses and be diminished to the FF+’s status (into which its White right-wing fits very well with their extreme racial ideology).

The immense presence of doubt on the so-called “expert leadership” of Whites in the DA’s top echelons and with good reason the growing rejection of persons (who Malema called the pensioner-politicians) such as Helen Zille, who totally overstayed her welcome in formal DA politics, and her present actions of enormous damage to the DA and to Maimane, is confirmed by her growing anti-DA writings and recent utterances. Specific in this respect were her recent admissions of her seemingly “own fault” as the previous DA leader to “blacken” the DA. Even the DA’s top brass intended to crash her “political profile” to get rid of its White image before the May election (which she named “vernietige Zille-stategie). Zille66, on the 26th May 2019 in the Rapport on these “facts and others”, reflecting back to her so-called ousting in 2017 about her “colonialism-tweets”, writes as follows66:7:

Diegene verantwoordelik vir die DA se verkiesingstrategie (ironies genoeg, die meeste van hulle wit) het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat as hulle my in die openbaar sou verpletter, die DA uitendelik sy beeld as ‘n “wit party” sou verloor. Dit is nie ‘n samesweringsteorie nie. Ek het ‘n dokument wat na die party se federale uitvoerende raad gestuur is, wat dit verduidelik.

Ek is tydelik geskors, en toe dit nog nie werk nie, het hulle my prober aanmoedig om Suid-Afrika te verlaat. Die DA het selfs ‘n skenker gevind om hul strategie te financier. As ek verdwyn, so het hul gereken, sal die party uiteindelik as “getransformeer” beskou word.Toe ek beleef weier om as premier van die Wes-Kaap te bedank en die land te verlaat, is ek verbied uit alle party-aktiwiteite.

With regard to the above – which sounds like pages from the chronicles of the FBI and the KGB! – the DA top brass offers some contradictory facts, such as that they never offered her a job overseas, but that the job offer was made independently by two British universities, and that she was indeed asked to leave the premiership due to the damage done by her view on colonialism and race (as she is doing again). To make her an eminent exile to St Helena, similar to Napoleon, seems to be in her dreams. What is clear is that Zille has her own agenda to do the DA as much harm as possible. She has become her own destroyer in the DA’s politics, as well as the county’s politics. Thankfully for her there is a place and sympathy for a pensioned joker in politics, even world-wide.54

For Maimane the above, namely the possible presence still today of a small but strong empowered group of right-wing mischief-makers in the DA who not only can oust him, but can also send him overseas in the near future or to St Helena! Be aware!

What is clear, Maimane and also the DA’s other leaders learned well from the recent elections, is that a party cannot be unlimited everything for everyone: you can be a party for everyone, but one based on clear moral principles, free from racism and free from the sheltering of politically contaminated opportunists whose foundations rest in pre-1994 racial and self-centred South Africa. A centre party or a social democratic party requires clear borders to the left as well as to the right, far away from the vague bordering on political policy of the present DA. Furthermore, there are signs of stagnation in the DA, as its election results in the May elections reflect. This is due, again as abovementioned, to a certain extent because of the DA’s circling around its middle ground position in politics wherein its’ fine, clear value proposition to voters, after their years of exposure to the ANC’s rude politics, did not always come through correctly or was appreciated.32,45,67

To be a winner in the post-2019 politics, the DA’s ideal composition of members must be proportionally 10 Blacks to 1 White. This ideal is also appropriate for its leadership. In its Constitution the Freedom Charter must be central.

3.2.1.3.9. Pastor Mmusi Maimane: a perspective
3.2.1.3.9.1. The “Poor” leader

There are some very strong critics of the leadership of Mmusi Maimane of the DA. Pivotal here is the allegation of his lack of a so-called “Zille-driving motivation-politics”. Many see him as another failed so-called “Tony Leon with his fight-back-strategy”, without bringing constructive politics to the table, other than constantly showing up Jacob Zuma’s and Cyril Ramaphosa’s failures and their empty promises.36

Descriptions of Maimane as a kind of sub-standard leader, a directionless leader, a powerless leader, a poor leader, etc., became prominent references since 2018 by some journalistic sectors. Included in this “Maimane-bashing”, frequently ignoring the modus operandi of Maimane and the present 2019 politics of the DA, is it important to note that the DA underwent a dramatic metamorphosis since 2014, writes Tabane.77 Maimane undoubtedly inherited a sometimes confused party, one leg in Black politics as well as one leg in White politics. It is still undergoing change today. It is a process wherein White empowerment was shifted to Black empowerment to a certain, but limited, extent. This was a shift that angered many of the White-NP-remnants in the DA, who has moved over to it when the NP passed away. This ongoing change in the DA’s identity brought the much needed activation into its foundation (as well as conflict) of more Black rights. Prominent here was also the erosion of exclusive White capitalism and the activation of inclusive capital, the fighting in some ways of Black inequality, poverty and landlessness of the mass of Blacks, the effort to phase out White supremacy in the party’s structure and policy, etc. This has so far not really been successfully done in terms of a clear one-White-citizen versus one-Black-citizen plan. This outcome is not a result of Maimane’s failure, but of White DA obstructionists and underminers trying to torpedo the party’s unity, potential and growth, and to make Maimane the scapegoat for everything that is wrong in the DA.12,22,36

Maimane, to make the DA a viable and sustainable party, undoubtedly tried in the past and is trying presently to challenge the upholding of White privilege and empowerment inside the DA’s structure, although not always openly and with the aggression so characteristic of persons such as Julius Malema, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma. He is starting to eye the shortcomings of the 1994 Dispensation, which was forced down on all Black South Africans. This intention is aimed at resettling the stagnant situation of the DA, coming from 1994. This gradual, but dramatic activation, Maimane handled and is still handling with grace. But it seems that there is not only outside the DA, but also inside the DA much dislike for his so-called “mild” approach to politics. Inside the DA both its left wing (Blacks) and its right wing (Whites) reflect hostility: the Blacks feel that his efforts to reform the DA are political diminutives while the Whites see his reforms as a threat to their “citizens’ rights” and this is in line with the so-called “discrimination” they have experienced since 1994 under the ANC. This “confused and projected anger” by the DA’s opposing groups seemingly activated their decision not to vote for the DA in the May 2019 election (470 396), but instead voted either for the FF+ (mostly Whites) and the ANC (mostly Blacks).12,24

The fact that the DA was doing to a certain extent better on the provincial level than on the national level has nothing to do with the leadership of Maimane, as some journalists tried to reflect. In declaring this tendency they must first look at the intention of the DA to go firstly for the provincial and municipality levels, before they aim for the national level. The differentiation in votes on national and provincial levels — wherein the DA did less well on the national level than on the provincial level and where the poor national outcome is blamed on Maimane as leader, is far fetched. The truth lies in the fact that two different kind of leaders were standing for the DA and two different political setups present for the DA in the recent elections. Kotze24 puts this misleading by mischief of political commentators to “label” Maimane a poor leader in terms of the post 2019 elections results in perspective when he writes24:11: “DA supporters might have voted for the party at provincial level and for someone else at national level.”

What most of the critics of Maimane ignore in their constant attacks on his “poor” leadership, is their own faulty mindsets, which became contaminated by the ANC top brass’ character and leadership and what is meant by a “poor” and “good” leader. Prominent here is some of the ANC leaders’ alleged involvement with stealing, bribery, corruption, state capture, mismanagement, nepotism, crookery, self-enrichment, hostile and aggressive behaviour against anyone opposing their actions and murder, etc., which have it seems become “accepted” and “correct” characteristics of the present-day leadership politics (the so-called “good” leaders) of South Africa. These are delinquent leaders, many of which would be locked up in other so-called “democracies” and indeed would end their lives before a firing squad in China or North Korea if they committed the same crimes there. The intense moral and political degeneration of the executive leadership of South Africa since 1994 wherein the “bad” instead of the “good” became the criteria, is confirmed by the election as parliamentarians and top brass leaders of the ANC with serious allegations against them to the sixth Parliament. Maimane, in this environment, stands out for his integrity, but at the same time, his extraordinary difference makes him a clear target for vicious attacks.24

3.2.1.3.9.2. The who is who of Mmusi Maimane

Maimane comes from a totally different culture of moral cleanliness, leaving the impression indeed of Maimane as the reluctant politician in the present South African politics. This may be true to a certain extent, but this contaminated political setup undoubtedly also already caused other would-be-politicians of his moral quality and character to shy away, unwilling to get involved in such a political mess which seems incurable. But Pastor Maimane undoubtedly sees a call to provide an example of better quality than the political leadership examples of the ANC which the country’s citizens have been forced to endure since 1994. Undoubtedly, South Africans need him, as they needed the late Sir De Villiers Graaff as leader of the opposition to counter the political evils and actions of the leaders of the NP and the AB from 1948 to 1994. Maimane’s political maturity, vision, leadership, focused strategy and balanced planning for the country’s future, are not only found in his good upbringing and cultural lifestyle, his career as a reverend and years on the pulpit, but are also evident in his advanced studies and training in theology and psychology (he holds masters degrees in both disciplines). Furthermore, his mindset is free from the murderous contamination of the revolutionary setup and the disorder of grabbing and plundering which seems to have become a permanent fixture in many of the ANC’s top brass, especially those coming from pre-1994.12,24

Maimane’s leadership is undoubtedly not characterised by the so-called weakness and shortcomings, as Jason Lloyd24 has tried to reflect in his undermentioned writing on Maimane before the May 2019 election. It seems as though Lloyd has a limited understanding of quality executive leadership (outside that of the EFF and the BLF). He wrote in February 2019 without fact as follows24:35: “The Democratic Alliance (DA) has had a very incompetent and weak leader in Mmusi Maimane.”

In this context Lloyd continues24:35:

The DA is currently rudderless and without any useable ideas or policy to provide answers to the complex post-apartheid political, social and economic challenges.

The latest Ipsos opinion survey indicates that the DA will receive only 14% of votes in the upcoming elections – compared with 22.23% in 2014 – which is possible proof of Maimane’s inadequate leadership.

Maimane has also failed to command authority and respect from mainstream black political parties such as the ANC and the EFF. Worse, he has failed to maintain authority in the DA itself. Against this background, it is probably not difficult or unfair to conclude that this must be at least partly because Maimane is black.

It is very important to look in depth at Lloyd’s myth writing. When studying Lloyds’s article24:35: “The rise and fall of Mmusi Maimane,” it seems to be saturated with political subjectivity wherein White supremacy seems to have a strong founding and driving force. On what the characteristics are of the ideal executive political leader (here seemingly a Black one), there is a total lack of description to use to make comparisons. The only leadership guideline offered by Lloyd seems to be an indirect comparison of Maimane with Ramaphosa and Zuma, who both failed the test of the ideal executive political leader. To contradict Lloyd’s postulation that the DA would only receive 14% of the votes in the May election due to Maimane’s presence as leader, the DA received 20% with Maimane as leader! On the indirect assumtion that Ramaphosa as number one would save the ANC and would bring it a 70% vote outcome in the election, only an ANC outcome of 57.7% arrived! (This outcome that was far worse than that under Jacob Zuma in 2014!) To hint that the DA lost 2% or 470 396 votes in the election under Maimane, he missed that the ANC under their “wonder boy” and messianic leader Ramaphosa, shed three times more votes, namely 1 410 446 votes! So from whence did Lloyd’s condemning classification of Maimane as a poor leader come?1-8,21,56-62

With regard to the reference to the “command of the ANC’s leadership” by Lloyd24 — undoubtedly a hint by Lloyd24 of the presence of a “respected ANC leadership from 1994 to 2019”– which disrespects Maimane, is it important in the first place to point out that such a characteristic of goodness, activating respect to the outside world by the ANC top brass, was absolutely absent from 1994 to 2019. (Forget that he further speaks of a “respected” EFF leadership, as a comparison with that of Maimane. Such respect has not for one day been present in the EFF since its foundation, as was well reflected by the only 10% of voters who supported the EFF at the ballot box). With reference to the so-called absence of “ideas” of Maimane (and the DA) versus the assumed ideas of the ANC and the EFF on ruling, these ideas of the ANC are saturated in political opportunism, anarchy and revolution, while the present-day ideas of the ANC were already present in its terrorist days. Thus: when Lloyd remarked on a lack of credible leaders in the DA, the question is: who is credible in the ANC or the EFF? What are his criteria of credibility? Since 1994 the ruling party’s leaders had only one, including the credibility of Nelson Mandela, as a credible leader, and that was Motlanthe. Ramaphosa is now trying his best, but it seems that since 2017 that success is missing out on him. Where did the chaos in the ANC as a ruler start?: In 1994 with Mandela and the introduction of corruption by a sector of the ANC top brass that forced the late Nelson Mandela to pinpoint it when he was president. Just listen to the witnesses at the Zondo- and Mpati- (and the other) commissions now underway, to see that there are very few of the ANC top brass that are “clean” and who’s respect Maimane longs for. The complex post-1994 political, social and economic problems were created and are today still further created exclusively by the ANC elite, not the DA or Maimane. To measure or compare Maimane’s leadership in terms of the ANC’s or EFF’s sick leaderships is extreme foolishness.16,17,20,24,70,71

The accusation that Maimane “is not respected by the black parties such as the ANC and the EFF” is incorrect or better yet, it is political confusion as to what respect, leadership and politics, per se mean. Firstly, neither the ANC’s or the EFF’s leadership are a criteria of status for Maimane against which to evaluate his leadership, or for the public to evaluate Maimane. Maimane, in absolute contrast to many of the ANC top brass, is free from extra-marital affairs, stealing, state capture, murder or terrorism, etc. The article by Lloyd24 is, as is much of the critique against him, seemingly intended and designed to personally take on Maimane, specifically before the May election. Studying it critically, it seems to be driven and orchestrated by the intention of character assasination, instead of an honest personal and leadership evaluation. Undoubtedly before the election there was a well orchestrated intention to curb the power of Maimane and the DA, for fear of their positive impact on the then upcoming election by way of demoralising possible DA supporters. These kinds of “attacks” are well reflected before the election by the execution of reports such as “Cyril’s appeal prompts DA to lower its poll ambitions”, “ DA poll a setback to coalition ambitions”, “The rise and fall of Mmusi Maimane”, and “Cyril more popular than ANC – poll”. Another political cliché in the Afrikaanspress reads: “Mmusi Maimane is nie juis baie gewild onder DA-lede in Gauteng nie. Tog pryk sy foto op die meeste DA-straatplakkate in die provinsie.” Another one reads “’n netto syfer van [net] 19% [IRR-poll] van DA -lede het boonop aangedui Maimane kom die mas op as opposieleier.” 16,1720,24,69-71,73-75

It seems as though the intention of some of these critical anti-Maimane journalists (especially Whites), with specific advice that Whites must vote for the ANC and Ramaphosa instead of the DA and Maimane, is centred in White self-interest. Some of them are seemingly deeply politically confused (and highly frightened) by their own position in post-2019 South Africa. 16,17,20,24,69-71,73-74

With the criticism of Maimane as leader of the DA, it is clear that most of the fight is specifically because Maimane is Black and that the DA’s continuation must be stopped at all costs. The White Zilles and White Leons must come back to be the boss of the DA. These White supremacists seem to believe that there are still going to be 5 million Whites (more: even 30 million!!) living in South Africa in a century’s time and thus that Whites still have “to be catered for as extraordinary” at present (together with their White capital and traditional rights to drive and steer the DA) at their will. The reality is that the Whites, by their lack of breeding and natural dying out, will be between 10 000 and 30 000 left in a century’s time. Maimane knows this well and is in the process not only of bringing the mass of poor and landless Blacks a better life, but also to assure the Whites a part in the country’s future by his transformation of the ultra-White politics inside the DA to equality politics.16,17,20,24,69-71,73-76

It is true that in the South African voting context the personality of the leader counts sometimes more than his party’s policy and popularity. The intention with the “popular giant Ramaphosa” was to take the “dying” ANC in the election away from the brink of death. But Ramaphosa’s magic did not work, as evidenced by the ANC’s 57.7% in the May election. It must be remembered that Nelson Mandela, far more popular even than the so-called popularity of Ramaphosa, and his ANC party of 1994 could not get beyond 63% of the votes. Ramaphosa failed to make it higher than 57.7%. It is important to note that Ramaphosa’s popularity declined in three month’s time from 73% to only 58% in April 2019, losing 15% in weight. This 58% popularity of Ramaphosa seems to be in line with the 57.7% of votes which the ANC received in the election, making the Ramaphosa factor as an exclusive “election-power” basically zero. It also confirms and emphasises Motlanthe’s view that Ramaphosa is not a political or messianic leader, nor that he can improve an ailing ANC. The blind hero-position constantly awarded to Ramaphosa above Maimane in most of the anti-Maimane rhetoric, as well as the comparison of bad (Maimane) versus good (Ramaphosa), with the view that Ramaphosa is the messianic leader of South Africa, is the evidence that firstly, Ramaphosa is not such a gifted messianic leader, and secondly that his name will be remembered as outstanding in the South African political history. Maimane’s chances are excellent to become a formidable leader in the near future. The phrase: “In South Africa’s voting setup the personality of the leader counts sometimes more than his party’s policy and popularity”, can await Maimane in post-2019.70,77

To describe Maimane as24:35: “…inexperienced in politics, a reluctant political participant who has never really had a well-seasoned political strategy and vision, operating (like most clergymen) from a theological reference frame that has little or no space for other social influences” against the “credible modern technocrat Ramaphosa who is getting rid of the Zuma baggage and building a new ANC”, is nonsense. It reflects not only political “short-sightedness”, but the inability to read future politics. For a political commentator, this is a serious defect in his or her political dynamics. 24,76

In line with the above clichés or allegations of “poor leadership” around Maimane, is it not a surprise when RW Johnson12 also rates him low. But what is a surprise, is his personal attack, perhaps not so extreme as the one reflected by Lloyd. But what needs to be reported, is the religious foundation of the attack. It needs to be reflected, specifically because it can border on the introduction of religious intolerance in South Africa.12,24 Johnston writes12:4-5: “Die feit dat die 38-jarige Maimane jonk en onervare is, ‘n voormalige ANC-ondersteuner wat steeds in ANC-terme dink en ‘n prediker in ‘n fundamentalistiese kerk wat evolusie verwerp, het ook nie gehelp onder die DA se tradisionele liberale Engelse basis nie.” What on earth Maimane’s Christian religious preferences and church-affiliation in a Christian society, as well as a secular state, have to do which his leadership, without reflecting on it with the seeming intention of mischief, is totally unclear. Also the unasked “English contamination” in Maimane’s leadership is neither fish nor flesh. It seems to reflect back to Johnston’s long stay in Britain and the internalising of unfit cognition there which he now applies here. It only brings us back to one clear fact and that is how intensely the “Christian Black” Maimane is under attack, because he accepted the leadership of the till now exclusively pro-White DA.12,24

3.2.1.3.9.3. The good “Graaff characteristics” of Maimane

Maimane has the “Graaff characteristics” to pull the DA and the social democrats into the government of the day. Not so much immediately post-May 2019, but before the 2021 local elections. Maimane, similar to Sir de Villiers Graaff, is also one of the few top politician-gentlemen ever to sit in Parliament. Moreover, other than Graaff who could not bring down the despotic NP in his life, Maimane and his political grouping can be successful in bringing down the ANC.24,78-82

To bring the (poor) leadership of Maimane in line with the DA’s (poor) performance in the past election, as done by many political analysts in the postmortem of the May elections, is absolutely unscientific and nothing but mischief-making speculation. The chair of the DA’s Fedex, Athol Trollip, explains that the reason that the ANC won the election over the DA with 57.5% versus 20%, is the fact that the South Africans will vote ANC come hell or high water. It is seated in the revolutionary background of the ANC. The DA is still a White party for them, hostile to Black interests. The fault is not with the DA, requiring them to soul-search with regard to their performance under Maimane and their future in post-2019 politics, but with these South Africans who support the ANC and who blindly vote for such a corrupt bunch and who are prepared to accept mediocrity and maladministration over and over. Closely aligned herewith is the outdated Apartheid ticket which is still used by the hypocratic ANC who swims together with radicals such as the EFF in a tide of racial nationalism and populism. With regard to the critique that the DA under Maimane did not made inroads for instance in the Eastern Cape with only a 15% voter outcome, it is clear that none of the other parties made an inroad there either. Indeed, the DA increased its votes in Soweto from 5% to 13%. The DA under Maimane is still the second largest party, twice the size of the EFF.28,83

On the foolish efforts and suggestions of the removal of Maimane, various political commentators and analysts, such as Sefara86, Nyuatsamba32, Beukman3,84 and Essop85 are much more direct when guiding us than most political commentators, who are used to sit on two chairs. Their statements are uniform: he must stay on.3,84-86

Firstly, Sefara86 reflects on the loss in votes for the DA in the recent election, by showing that, as many other commentators have already indicated, it was to a great extent indeed a direct outcome after Mainane started to draw the line on greater Black empowerment in the DA that some right-wingers fled to the FF+. There is indeed an incomplete spelling out of strong affirmative action and the land ownership matter in the DA. But Maimane’s activation of a clear policy on land ownership and speaking out as a Black on the DA’s critical affairs was limited by the right-wing in the DA. Their internal mischief in the DA’s racial politics led to the flow of right-wing Whites to the FF+ (±150 000 votes) and not Maimane’s inability as leader. The public missed that the right-wingers assured that Maimane was not fully in charge of the DA’s leadership and the party’s politics, to be able to take much needed significant and sometimes dramatic decisions on Black interests. This was an identity crisis which the DA, as well as Maimane, innocently as the new appointed head, ran into before the May election, costing the DA both Black and White voters.

Secondly, pinpointing this present crisis wherein the DA is still functioning two months after the election, Sefara writes86:26: “And therein lies the DA’s existential question: will the removal of Maimane and his replacement by a white leader help the DA grow beyond 22% in the next polls? Is the loss of conservative white voters to the FF+ a necessary catharsis for the DA to start positioning itself as a genuine alternative – not a party of right-wingers with a black leader at the top?

Sefara86 and Beukman3,84 are fully correct in their opinion that to remove Maimane, without firstly addressing the DA’s policy incoherence, will hurt the DA and can spell its end. It will be a statement of impatience with its first Black leader, as well as the reflection of an unchangeable White party and a party which lacks internal dynamics, either as an opposition or as a ruler, to be able to constructively change South Africa. Maimane, for Sefara86 as for Beukman3,84 and Essop85, must be retained as the party’s top leader with the full power to reposition the party further and where necessary, dramatically. He must be allowed to unrestrictedly sell his vision to the broad public.3,84-86

On Maimane in future politics, Beukman3,84 contends that he is not long in the post and was forced to address the immense growing pains of the last five years. He is not a light-weight and learned a lot and is clearly focused not only on making the DA a better party, but also contributing to a better post-2019 South Africa. Beukman concludes84:11: “Baie meer ervare leiers wêreldwyd het al slegter as hy daarvan afgekom.”

Thombothi87 puts his finger possibly best on Pastor Mmusi Maimane’s leadership dilemma in South African society, where since 1994, bad became gradually intertwined with good to overwhelm it fully in the end, making bad ultimately good. Secondly, bad became the norm. The phasing out of the traditional bi-polar division of good versus bad lead to the evaluation of all behaviour in terms of the grading of bad, worse and worst, with bad the most reflected and acceptable behaviour. On Maimane’s leadership dilemma, he was caught up in this normalised bad culture of the South African politics wherein corruption, theft, murder and specifically land expropriation without compensation, are central and have became the rule of the day. Thombothi writes87:11: “Maybe Mmusi Maimane, in his opposition to expropriation, was judged not to have been sufficiently gung-ho. But Maimane is a pastor. He can’t preach compassion on Sunday and hatred every other day. He also doesn’t seem to have a nasty bone in his body, which appears to be a prerequisite in politics these days. Slaan terug would not sit well in his studio.”

But, it must be emphasised, this dilemma is not unique to Maimane as leader of the DA. It is also part of the dilemma of the DA as a centrist party, which cannot reflect hatred to one of its factions while at the same time bathing another faction in compassion. Not the best and most god-begging prayer can really help Maimane or his DA in this dilemma. Thankfully we have still the Solomon wisdom approach to cognitively handle our immediate crises in the New Dawn South Africa, until goodness is reborn somewhere in the future.

3.2.1.3.10. Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018

The count awarded to the DA and its leadership in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, is 59 (72%) out of a possible maximum of 82. 3,79

Our initial decision to allow the application of the DA onto the list to be considered as a possible candidate to be able to rule South Africa after the 8th May 2019 was correct and appropriate. Its application qualifies to be allowed onto the shortlist of candidates.

5. Conclusions

Looking in retrospect at the DA’s political history, it is clear that millions of South Africans have seen their communities improved under the DA’s good governance. They have also watched the DA take up the fight in Parliament and hold the ANC government to account for every community which has had their rights denied by the ANC government. The people have appreciated the DA’s fight for justice.

The DA and its leaders’ overall evaluation shows that they are still short of 23 (28%) points out of a possible 82 to be the ideal candidate for appointment as the capable ruler to execute land redistribution. Although their CV shows that their qualifications are excellent and comprehensively obtained from top accredited institutions, and their attestations show that they are trustworthy, with immense integrity and that their leader, Mmusi Maimane, has the character and overall potential to run as president of the land, are there shortcomings in their experience due to their youth in politics. Important here is their lack of experience on land reform – and specifically on land expropriation without compensation. Where the issue of the land matter emerges in the DA’s politics, it seems to be determined and driven by White interests, rather than the interests of the poor and landless Blacks. There seems here to be strong signs of a White-stan mentality, very much like the dreadful Bantustans which were run from the Cape Parliament by the National Party and its Afrikaner nationalists.21,57-62,79-91

The critics’ mention of the country having been poorly served on the land ownership matter by the DA and that the party over the past two to three years has frequently stumbled is true. This allowed the ANC a free pass again in the May elections to without obstruction redeliver its past mischief up to 2024. The critics’ view is that the DA’s inclination to oppose the government by any means in some instances stopped progress in the country. The issue of land expropriation, with or without compensation, is an inappropriate fight by the DA. The failure by the DA to write a mandate to serve the citizens of South Africa on just and balanced land ownership within a democratic plan for instance with the ANC as a partner, has lead to the present conflict around land ownership and the possibility of immediate land expropriation that can spell land grabbing and revolution.

The DA must take some advice and criticism to heart: South Africans are looking for a change in a social, economic and political direction, not just public relations branding or window-dressing. In this hopefully new direction, the DA must not mind about its right flank streaming to the confused FF+, which since 1994 has been travelling in circles in the desert, or that its left flank is running to a temporary revitalized ANC, which is trying hard to climb back from its deathbed. There are enough good people at the centre — people who can go nowhere else and who do not want to go anywhere else — to change and to build up the DA.

It is time for the DA to accept that the landownership matter has been exaggerated for a long time by the ±35 000 White farmers (of which only between 5 000 and 7 000 really contribute to the country’s essential daily food supply). The opportunistic group of the rest of the ±30 000 White farmers, with their self-appointed White rescuers and saviours, represent less than 0.1% of the total South African population and less than 1% of the White population. If the mesmerised White sympathisers with the White rescuers and saviours movement are taken into account, the number is far lower than 300 000 of the White population of 5 million, representing at most 6%. It is time for the DA to purify itself from this 300 000 White individuals’ contamination. They must be repositioned to where they belong: outside the DA. The other nearly 5-million Whites also have citizen-interests but are sidelined and ignored outside the 35 000 White farmers’ priority-interests. This priority granted to 35 000 White farmers and there land led also to the ignoring of the interests of nearly 30-million poor and landless Blacks in the post-1994 Democracy. It just can go on this way.4-8

Although the DA was allowed onto the shortlist of candidates, it needs still 28% (a lack of nearly 30%) to reach the maximum points of 100% for the final evaluation of the next national election in 2024. It is up to the DA to improve its experience and know-how, and to reposition its attestations to reach the 100% mark. A clear policy on land redistribution must be formulated. The ability to effect land redistribution with justice and balance needs to be improved by the DA.

In this context the DA must take note of three important facts. First the words of Mthombothi’s8 when he said many South Africans are not particularly impressed or satisfied with the present political parties and that they, after 25 years of democracy, are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable. The second is the fact that 18.2-million potential voters (51% of the total voters’ population) stayed away from the ballot box in the 8th May 2019 elections.4-8 They are waiting and hungry to support and to vote for the correct party. The third, enclosing to the second fact, is that most South Africans are looking sincere for that extraordinary party of goodness, as Mthombothi said8:19: “regardless of race, want the same thing – a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for themselves and their families. They’ll support a party with a unifying message that will make a genuine stab at it. Time may have come for a new party that will inspire fresh hope in a disillusioned electorate.” Why can this party not be the reformed DA?

Maimane can be just too optimistic about the future soul of the DA when he said92:4: “We must occupy the centre. We cannot pursue the left or the right. This election has confirmed more than ever that the centre is where we need to be. We just need to be clearer about who we are and what we are about.” But to be the future ruler it goes far beyond the centre of politics in present-day South Africa. It requires an understanding of existential politics to can make sense of centric politics. It goes thus far beyond left or right politics versus central politics. It is about the life-long permanent fused-in of Black and White conflict-politics, like the issue of land-grabbing and -terrorism coming from 1671. It means far more than just the practice of adapt or die politics to can survive for a party. It can mean the “killing” of a nation’s personality.

In its present form the DA does not exhibit the ability to be able immediately to affect successfully land reform on its own. It has the potential to do it with an experienced and seasoned political partner, within an orderly framework. Otherwise it must change itself immediately to a basically new party; one that can, as a dynamic party, brings at last the peace, security and prosperity for what South Africans are longing for so much

The journey to the 2024 elections for the DA may be easy, but it can also never be reached without an immediate and dramatic turnaround in its politics. Time will tell.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa. (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanisation and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan or Khois (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Badness, candidate, crookedness, delinquency, election, evaluation, expropriate, goodness, leadership, political party, responsibility, scenario, wrong-doings,

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 3

1. Background

1.1.   Introduction

It is clear from studying the previous two continuous articles (Articles 7 and 8) that myths and lies played an enormous role in misinforming the mindsets of South Africans on the intended land expropriation and the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution. Prominent in this environment of misinformation are the promises during the May 8, 2019 election of the various political parties contesting the place of the utmost ruler for post-2019. Of great importance here are the promises of the three top political parties which emerged from the election on how they are going to address the land expropriation issue — including how they are going to “solve” the many other demanding political, social and economic issues in post-2019 South Africa. But, as the political history of South Africa, coming from as far back as 1652, tells us over and over, there is a massive difference between promises and deeds, especially good deeds. These deeds are required from the voters in exchange for their mandate to the ruler to “think and do” upon their behalf, and the empty promises of politicians and their parties.1

1.1.1 Lack of understanding of political responsibility by political parties and their leaders

The abovementioned outcome is basically because political parties in present-day South Africa do not understand the immense responsibility around the local-global-plan of governance. Every task entrusted to the executive political leader, his top brass and his party as a government, should be successfully executed by him in terms of the voters’ mandate to be a good leader, as well as for the country to be able to fit into the local-global plan of governance. As a pre-requisite included here is the guarantee to be able to be trusted by the voters to deliver only goodness and goodwill to them in the future. Malloch-Brown2 emphasises that South Africa’s invidious local-global prescriptions for good governance will not go away, and neither will the demand for positive change. It is a hard task to master for a political party cum regime, as it always tests the actions of a regime and the correctness of the state by its society. Even the honourable Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma3 during his presidency had to admit in public that it was far more difficult for him as president and the ANC as a regime to run South Africa, than it was for them to fight for its freedom. He failed to deliver such a mandate as leader of an elected regime, which was forced suddenly to act outside the setup of the revolutionaries’ rhetoric, promises and delinquent actions.2,3

This disconnection of the ANC from the voters, allowing them as a regime to act delinquently outside their election promises and their agreed mandate from the voters to only do good to them, is to a great extent cemented in the present corrupt Electoral Act which fully erased direct responsibility to the voters from MPs and MPLs. In this situation, which the ANC fully optimised and misused only for its top brass’ interest, the response and responsibility of MPs and MPLs were relayed only to the party and its top brass, while the top brass drove their own interests far away from that of the voters’ interests, needs and wishes.4-10

There is at the moment a legal action to change the Act in order to make MPs and MPLs directly responsible to voters. This will be the end of the favouring of the ANC to be able to manipulate the voters and to continue their spree of crooked candidates without a say by the ordinary people. Moreover, the indication is that this can bring the ANC down in the next election, if it has not fallen on its own sword already after the May election.4-10

The extent to which the ANC failed the voters was exclusively as a result of serious wrong-doing due to a lack of direct responsibility to the voters. This was not only confirmed by the public admission thereof before the May 9 Election by its top brass, but also the “begging” at the same time by the ANC’s top brass (including Cyril Ramaphosa) for “forgiveness” of the ANC as a party and its leadership, for its crookedness and delinquency since 1994.11-16

Ramphosa even extended his previous begging for forgiveness to the ANC supporters by his admission again after the election to these many ANC-wrong-doings. Prominent here is his confession, seemingly after immense emotional self-torture, of which Munusamy writes17:20:

Ramaphosa arrived at the election results ceremony [of the May 8 election] last Saturday looking like his dog had died rather than the person who had just rescued his party from having to share power in order to govern. But at the ANC’s victory celebration outside Luthuli House the next day, Ramaphosa conceded that the party had been chastened. He promised that the ANC was no longer an arrogant party and had heard the candid message from the electorate.

With honesty it must be acknowledged that the above kinds of political, social and economic failures of the ANC are inherited from most of the South African regimes coming from 1910. We see it in the failures of the various White political parties’ and party-alliances’ reigns between 1910 and 1948, wherein the Blacks’ interests were not only insignificant but criminally treated, equalling the mass wrong-doings of the post-1994 regime of the ANC. The same delinquency and failure were reflected by the DF Malan regime between 1948 and 1950. This period reflects, as does that of the ANC, that the National Party did not have the slightest idea of good governance, besides political mischief in their creation of the post-1950 Apartheid and its immense evils.1

The South African politics inside the post-1994’s so-called First Democracy has been tough on political aspirants and opportunists at the same time (and thus not only on the ANC in highlighting its faults, as well as its inabilities to not be able to survive in troubled situations). This is reflected by the failed outcomes and disappearance of the many political parties that had enrolled for the recent May election in their fight for a place in Parliament. Mvumvu reports18:1: “A record number of political parties contested the elections, but at the end it was the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that smiled all the way to the bank. Of 48 parties that appeared on the national ballot, only 13 will likely see a return on their investment of R200,000, which the IEC requires to register for elections nationally.”

1.1.2. The madness of 48 political parties and 10 000 candidates in the 8th May 2019 National Election

Firstly, it must be noted that for the May election 48 parties were registered, with more than 10 000 national candidates (2 089 in 2014) and 8 000 provincial candidates (6 562 in 2014). All of the 48 parties and the 10 000 national candidates had more than offered to solve the land debacle: they promised solely to solve it if they were elected as the regime. Of these 48 aspirants, as many as 35 failed the test to obtain a seat in the national elections, while of the 13 left as the so-called “winners”, basically only three can be given attention. The three are the ANC, the DA and the EFF.10  

With regard to the more or less 10 insignificant parties which made it to Parliament, together with the ANC, the DA and the EFF, political commentator Tabane19 gave us a good pre-evaluation already in February 2019 (three months before the May election), based on his “charismatic requirement of the leadership” of a party to be able to survive, when he wrote19:1:

Derhalwe sal die 2019-verkiesing waarskynlik die doodsklok vir Azapo, die PAC en Agang lui omdat hulle nie charismatiese leiers het nie. Maar Mosiuoa Lekota se Cope, wat eintlik op sy sterfbed moet wees weens gebrekkige organisaie, sal waarskynlik bloot weens Lekota se sterk persoonlikheid ‘n setel of twee behou. Good sal ook baat vind by die blote teenwoordigheid van sy leier, De Lille. Haar naam en vorige pos as burgemeester van Kaapstad sal verseker dat Good ‘n klein teenwoordigheid in die Wes-Kaap en dalk Gauteng en Noord-Kaap sal hê.

The political analyst Muzi Kuzwayo20 writes hereto in April 2019 on Paricia de Lille’s politics, up to her present-day party, named Good20:2: “She first cashed in a few years after she started, her party defunct and moving over to the DA and becoming mayor of Cape Town in return – good deal. Who knows what loot Good will bring her.”

Botha21, in January 2019, wrote on the UDM and its charismatic leader Bantu Holomisa. Botha21 reflects that Holomisa played a prominent role in exposing the alleged corruption in the PIC and was indirectly responsible for the exit of its executive, Dan Matjila. Botha’s21 gut feeling in January was that Holomisa would still play a role in Parliament after May. He postulates21:18:

“Holomisa se integriteit maak van hom ‘n blywende figuur. Hou hom dop.”

Holomisa’s and the UDM’s chances were critically analysed before the May election, due to their popularity within the Xhosa-tribe. It was surmised that they were good to win a seat, or mostly two, in Parliament. The pre-May view was that the Minority Front (MF) which was founded by the late Amichand Rajbansi, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IVP), the Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus), the National Freedom Party (NFP) and the ACDP were all insignificant with regard to gaining a prominent number of seats. They are on their deathbeds.21-23

On the FF Plus’s political future as an entity in Black South Africa, Khumalo24 in April 2019 quoted with good reason the opinion of the BLF leader, Andile Mngxitama24:4:

“You should look at their leadership and tell me if there is any diversity. That party only uses a few black stooges to belie the fact that it is still a racist Afrikaans party. Look at the party’s history: leaders from the former Conservative Party, a party that wished to preserve many aspects of apartheid in its DNA, were assimilated into the FF Plus…”

The false image created by the FF+ as a possible future role-player in the country’s politics by its taking of the fifth-most seats in the National Assembly in the May 2019 election, mostly from the DA, was a temporary outcome of the old NPs “rebellion votes”. This group was until now part of the DA supporters, but had become aggravated by “black rule” inside the DA, and decided to vote for the FF+. Hereto is the FF+ for many political strategists nothing more than a false mirage on the horizon for these old NPs as their new rescuer and saviour. The FF+, as is the EFF, extremely racially orientated, making it a post-2019 failure in waiting.24-25

That Andile Mngxitama’s viewpoint on the FF+ may be correct, is confirmed by Buccus’s view. He writes26:26: “

It is true that the crude racial populism of the EFF and the Freedom Front Plus made some gains, but in the overall picture they remain a minority. Mandela’s vision of racial reconciliation clearly still has the support of the majority of South Africans.”

What the boosters and hopefuls of the FF+ forget, or are not familiar with, is that the Whites as a tribe are diminishing yearly at nearly 100 000, and can thus be phased out in a century’s time. Neither the FF+, Solidarity, AfriForum nor AgriSA are true White rescuers and saviours. They can only by their anti-African standpoint (as seen in their actions on the land reform matter), contaminate the Whites’ future in South Africa.1

To shed more light on the many other opportunists who tried in vain to go to Parliament to eat out of its enormous food trough (and also to change silently and unnoticed from tough freedom fighters to freedom eaters) – a scenario which Kuzwayo20:2 aptly described before the May 8 election as an “alphabet soup on the menu in this election” — there are the African Transformation Movement (ATM) with the crowd-puller Mzwanele Manyi on its staff, the joker party the African Content Movement (ACM) of Hlaudi Motsoeneng, and the Economic Emanicipation Forum  (EEF) to outdo the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in radicalism and racism.20,27,28

The final reflection on the May 8 election outcomes confirm Kuzwayo’s20 above reference to the alphabetic failure of a mass with the evidence that 35 parties did not make it further than the ballot box on the voting day.18,29

Munusamy30 also comments about the final end-results of some of the parties when she writes30:26:

“The era of veteran personalities in politics is now waning. The UDM leader Bantu Holomisa, COPE’s Mosiuoa Lekota and the IFP’s Mangosuthu Buthelezi ought to exit the political stage, as the country is clearly seeking fresh talent. Patricia de Lille, however, has proved to be the Meryl Streep of South African politics, able to steal the show in whatever role she appears.”

Okoye31 brings the leader of the African Content Movement (ACM), Hlaudi Motsoeneng, the former SABC Chief Operating Officer, into clear perspective after the May election as a good example of some of the “political leaderships” at our top governmental institutions under the ANC, and of the leaderships of the various political parties which competed in the election (mostly to fail miserably). On Motsoeneng’s so-called “personality as a leader”, Okoye31 reports his alleged words about himself31:6: “He said he refused to hide the fact that he wanted to be president and that leadership was in his blood.” In particular, she quoted his self-praise by using of his own words, namely31:6: “I need to be a person who’s taking decisions. I know how to run South Africa! I have managed a [multimillion-rand] company.” [This of a multimillion-rand company referring to the financially crippled public broadcaster the SABC, which analysts say he helped to run into the ground]. In reaction to Motsoeneng praising himself as the “future president in waiting”, the two political analysts Zamikhaya Maseti and Ralph Mathekga, writes Okoye, labelled him as a31:6:  “political comedy that was not to be taken seriously”, that there was “no legitimate cause to appeal,” and that he “bankrupted the SABC” so it was a bad example to refer to his leadership there.”

But this “labelling” must not be seen as exclusive only to Motsoeneng, but indeed inclusive to most of the leaders of the 48 parties that took part in the election and their self-praise of false excellence31:6:  “I am a person who’s taking decisions, I know how to run South Africa, I have managed a multimillion-rand company, I have leadership in my blood, I want and am going to be the president.”

It is thus with good reason that Ben Trovato32 could write to the leaders, at least, of these manifold failed parties, as follows32:14: “Dear leaders of the 34 parties that never won a seat, it really is a crying shame that you did so poorly. Let me put that another way. I am crying with laughter at your shame. I do apologise”, and: “How can anyone be filled with so much hubris that they misjudge their popularity this badly?”

But Trovato’s32 above comment of “no-good” for the 34 “losers” is even applicable to the 13 “winners” that have made it to Parliament. This includes the ANC and the three nearest winners to the ANC. The question is: Are these 13 winners truly deserving winners with the potential to better South Africans’ poor, even desperate, circumstances, as well as to solve the land-ownership conflict?15,32

The answer is an emphatic NO, when just looking at the top winner’s most recent classification by the imminent ex-president Kgalema Motlanthe12, namely that the ANC is on its deathbed. Motlanthe12 (the Interim President from September 2008 to May 2009 and also Secretary-General of the ANC from 1997 to 2007 and the party’s Deputy President from 2007 to 2012), says that the ANC is now in a far worse shape than it was before the 2017 Nasrec Conference, that elected Cyril Ramaphosa. This view was confirmed by the poor performance of the ANC in the May election.11,12,14,15

This is an opinion echoed by many political analysts.11,14,15 Motlanthe12 comments on the ANC’s  doubtful future, specifically its viability and sustainability, when he says12:4: “The ANC is not in great shape… I think to strengthen the ANC it needs a surgical overhaul from where it is now. It is worse than it was in 2017 [before the Nasrec Conference]”, and: “…that [the] ANC could only change if it died in its current form and was reborn as a grassroots movement”.

1.1.3. The presence of an able political party to successfully steer the land reform initiative

The abovementioned outcome moves me to ask again, as in the Conclusion of the previous Article 8, the prominent question as to whether there is at the moment any capable South African political party, which, either as a sole ruling party or as a partner-party in an alliance, can steer the initiative of land expropriation into the near future with success.

This is a very complex question to answer, but the political analyst Mamokgethi Molopyane33 tries to do so for us, in some way at least, when he writes that the three main political parties, the ANC, the DA and the EFF, were all, after the election, left at a crossroads. In this context the two lower ranking parties, the IFP and the FF+, are ignored: their immediate future in the country’s politics, as significant parties, is zero).24-26,33                                                                                                                                                                          All three of the main parties were unmasked to have immense political weaknesses by the election. Prominent in this regard is their arrogance and their foolishness, as reflected by their thinking that they could in the past and still today solely think on behalf of the population and that this thinking was 100 percent correct. In particular in this chaotic setup is their disconnection from the people whom they assumed supported their ideologies and actions. Pertinent here in their confusion, is the matter of extreme land expropriation without compensation and the negative racial context thereof by land grabbing and nationalising of White assets.33

The above postulation of Molopyane33 is in line with the general postulations of various other political analysts and strategists that were quoted earlier, especially the ANC’s troubled position.11,12,14,15

In reflecting on the three main political parties and their possible failure to fulfil to the standards to be a ruler of quality versus the poor status and condition of their present political constitution, Molopyane33 gives further good insight. He writes as follows33:21: “The coinciding decline of the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), contrasted with the below-expectations growth of the Economic Freedom Fighters EFF), are unsurprising developments with far-reaching, unique consequences for each.”

Molopyane33 pinpoints a stern warning when he writes33:21: “Political parties must adapt or reinvent themselves or they’ll find little or no support from SA’s dynamic populance.”

This undoubtedly puts my question: “…are there able South African political parties who can fast steer the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future?”  into the foreground. This is a question that not the ANC, the DA or the EFF can escape and must answer themselves. Not one of them honestly can or will do so, however. It is up to the political analysts, strategists and commentators to do it on their behalves, however much they like it or not.

In this context of doubt on the future abilities specific to the ANC as the post-2019 ruler, Molopyane posits33:21:

“The ANC’s support is waning. It’s proving to be devoid of freshness, with leaders who have been in politics for so long they may be reluctant to envision change. The party must undergo a makeover of its leaders and change the perceptions they’ve created. If a credible, attractive opposition emerged, its hold on power would fail. Its biggest hurdle is itself.”

On the DA he writes33:21:

“These elections have shown that having a black man in charge doesn’t translate into resonance with black voters. The DA’s crisis may not be as apparent as that of the ANC, but it’s similarly struggling to contemplate change. Worse, it’s riddled with the fear that it might alienate its white supporters.”

With reference to the EFF, Molopyane postulates33:21:

“We tend to forget the enthusiasm and political cult of youth doesn’t offer value for voters. Populism in the age of social media doesn’t mean the same in real life. The election showed that the red party will have to come up with a new approach. Its change in direction must reflect the challenges faced by a society in an ever-changing globalised economy. Although appearing to make the right noises, voters denied the EFF that 15%. Was it a case of dislike, distrust or low turnout?”

This clear warning by Molopyane33 of the possible diminishing from the political scene in the near future by even the three top “winners” of the recent May election, must not be taken lightly and must be read with Louw’s1 opinion that manipulating and under-performing regimes had only the slightest idea of what they were doing and what the outcome of their political self-empowerment would activate in the end for themselves, as well as for the country they ruled. He writes that these sub-standard regimes’ shelf life is limited. This is confirmed by the various European Empire states of the 20th Century, which mostly collapsed due to their wrong-doings after the duration of an average 45 years. Hereto the corrupt and racial-discriminative NP and its nationalist Afrikaners’ self-styled “mini-empire of multi-nations” (or the unofficially managed “NP Union”) only lasted from 1948 to 1961 (13 years), and their “mini-empire for multi-states” (Republic) from 1961 to 1994 (33 years), while the Union of South Africa (exclusively British-orientated under pro-British Whites), lasted from 1910 to 1948 (38 years). This reflects an average of 24 years for the three regimes in office.1,33

On the limiting-build-in to the reigning of political parties in South Africa, especially in terms of Louw’s1 reference to a maximum period of 24 years in office, Mthombothi34 also speaks in the same context when he, in a short post-mortem of the May 8 2019 election, refers to the “possible limited” status of the ANC in the present-day and future politics of the country after a 25 year reign. His overview and insight need full reference. He comprehensively writes34:19:

The outcome of the elections will be debated and analysed for some time to come, but what is clear is that many South Africans were not particularly impressed or satisfied with what was on offer. After 25 years of democracy, many voters are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable.

There is general disillusionment with the political establishment that seems to cut across all age groups. This seems to be mainly related to, or caused by, the government party. In fact the decline in voter turnout, and even the increasing number of people who failed to register to vote, seems to be in line with the steady decrease in ANC support. The ANC reached its apogee in the 2004 elections when it took 69.7% of the vote, and has been declining since. So has overall voter turnout.

There’s no doubt that the ANC is on a downward slope, even a death spiral. It’s on life support. That 57.5% share of the vote it won could be deceptive. Many gave their vote grudgingly. The only thing keeping the party together and alive is power. President Cyril Ramaphosa saved its bacon in these elections. It could have been condemned to the opposition benches. It’s not clear if there is anything that the ANC can do to stem the tide or reverse it. It seems to have overstayed its welcome. Most liberation movements, in Africa especially, do not survive in power for more than 25 years; unless they declare a one-party dictatorship to save their skins, as in Zimbabwe. The ANC is also hobbled by the fact that it is a broad church, and with its alliance partners it becomes truly ungovernable. Such an approach served it well as a liberation movement, but as a government it needs to be specific in its policy direction.

And of course there’s the corruption en grande that has pitted the pro- and anti-Zuma factions against each other. That, one suspects, is going to be the story of the next five years.

Were the ANC to be judged on its performance, which has been abysmal, even hideous in some instances, it would have been consigned to the political wilderness long ago. Our unique history, the race issue and the poverty of opposition have been its saving grace.

SA, given its past, is not always an easy country to govern. But most people, regardless of race, want the same thing – a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for themselves and their families. They’ll support a party with a unifying message that will make a genuine stab at it.

The time may have come for a new party that will inspire fresh hope in a disillusioned electorate.

Practically speaking, the reigning ANC is a dying party; all the fatal signs are there. It seems to have become suddenly suicidal after 25 years in power. It does not matter if the national voters’ turnout for the ANC in the May 2019 election was 70% or 80%, as Mthombothi34 and Louw1 put it. The ANC has lost its appeal with the mass of poor and landless Blacks. The Piet Promise of the NP became the Jacob Promise and the Cyril Promise of the ANC. Promises are not food, they lack trust and are contemptable.1,11,14,34,35

The above unstable setup makes it very hard to reflect precisely on how the ANC is going to handle the land expropriation matter from 2019 to the next election in 2024, and of course, if it is going to complete its term as mandated by the 2019 election. Here time will tell, but for this article the official status quo of the ANC as the regime until 2024 must be accepted and reflected upon. The cut-off date for the cooperation and the collection of information to evaluate and to discuss the land matter and the ANC as a regime’s role in it was chosen as the 31st May 2019.

But, in terms of the political upheaval inside the present-day ANC, it was decided to also focus on the EFF’s and the DA’s political agendas and actions, in case one of them became overnight the new ruler or a partner in an alliance of the governing regime. These two parties seem also to be caught in political upheavals and insecurity, rendering their inputs to the post-2019 politics open to scrunity.11,13,14,34,35  

The land expropriation issue, together with the question of the trustworthiness and the integrity of the three parties, not only to be able to govern the country effectively and properly, but also to  successfully execute a comprehensive and justified balanced land expropriation programme, is prominent here. Some political analysts believe that where the DA successfully resists radical politics, its ultra-conservative land reform policy is a loser for the mass of poor and landless Blacks. They believe that both the EFF and the ANC show revolutionary thinking on the assets of the White population, while the ANC furthermore has shown an absolute lack in integrity and trustworthiness in its 25 years of rule. These views will be evaluated further hereunder.26,30,33,34,36

1.1.4. Aims of Articles 9 to 11

Articles 9 to11 form part of the research project on the matter of land expropriation, which was already introduced to the reader by eight previously published articles.

This article [Article 9, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)”], is the Part 1 (reflecting on the EFF) of three articles on the roles played by the three main political parties in the politics of South Africa. The theoretical point of focus here is their capability to be effective regimes in South Africa, if certain limitations, such as voters’ ignorance and prejudice, etc. on politics and confusion with regard to their right to empowerment, do not play a role. In this article the focus is specifically on the EFF.

In the next two sequential articles (Articles 10 and 11) the focus will be respectively on the DA and the ANC. Article 10 represents: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2- The DA in perspective (10)”. Article 11 represents: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3- The ANC in perspective (11)”.

Although the ANC won the right to be the country’s ruler until 2024 with a national majority of 57.7% for a sixth term, and thus seems to be going to be the sole executor to effect land expropriation in terms of its promises made in its political manifesto (its so-called “political CV”) presented for the May 8, 2019 election on land expropriation (which seemingly can include expropriation without compensation in certain appropriate cases), is it an absolute pre-requisite to also reflect on the two strongest opposition parties’ political manifestos for the May 8, 2019 election regarding their promises and abilities to effect land expropriation successfully. The intention here is to see how these two opposition parties (the EFF and the DA) can theoretically be evaluated as good versus bad regimes, should they have won the ruler’s throne in the May 2019 election. This approach will also give a preview of their potential as good versus bad opposition parties on the land expropriation matter, specifically for the period up to 2024).1,11,14,34,35

Closely aligned to these political manifestos (or “political CVs”) in the description of the three parties’ “political characters, qualifications and experience”, are the public’s arguments, opinions and viewpoints as a further descriptive guide to the three parties’ “political characters and potential”. These public arguments, opinions and viewpoints are best reflected by the reporting by investigative and informative journalists, as well as political analysts, strategists, commentators and critics (the so-called “political letter referees or their attestations”). These mentioned “letters of the referees” are seen by many political scientists as the most (and only) decisive guide to be used for the true description of a political party’s and its leaders’ quality and integrity. They are seen as far more trustworthy than the so-called “trust for the party” brought out by the voters at the ballot-box, or as the election manifestos issued by political parties.

The aim of this article is to evaluate the potential of the EFF in terms of its theoretical capability to be an effective regime.

2. Method

The research was been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case with ownership of South African soil for the period 1652 to 2018. The sources included articles from 2018 to 2019, books for the period 1980 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide and steer us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the EFF as a ruler of South Africa to be able to successfully effect land reform from 2019.

The research findings are presented in a narrative format.

3. Results

3.1. Overview

The successful execution of the post-2019 land reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and action of a so-called “good” government. Such an elected government is not allowed to blindly travel a path of trying to come to reach an end-result, but is obliged to use the existing, well-guided informative guidelines and drivers to steer the land reform aims into reality. These existing informative guidelines and drivers, to steer land reform post-2019, will be reflected upon in the following Subdivision 3.2.

3.2. Existing informative guidelines and drivers to steer land reform post-2019

The land expropriation initiative is not without a foundation. There are prominent informative guidelines and drivers to steer the whole process constructively and in an orderly fashion, far away from the blind “land grabbing from White colonists”, as propagated and promised by some political and racial radicals in their political manifestos. These existing informative guidelines and drivers need to be high-lighted.

3.2.1. The Freedom Charter is an indisputable marker and driver of the post-2019 land reform

The ANC’s Freedom Charter’s land clause, dated 1955 and the ANC’s Tanzania-document on future land ownership, issued in 1969, reflect, although indirectly, on the justified comparability and redistribution of land ownership in terms of the South African race-numbers and legal holding of land ownership, as guided by a democracy, for the rights of the individual South African. The indication is clear that all races can be and must be allowed to be land owners, but equally in terms of the proportional numbers of the various racial groups. The present-day South African numbering of ±83% White land owners versus ±13% Black land owners is an immense imbalance, representing inequality, it and needs rectification. It leaves even the moderates in the ANC no other choice but to activate land expropriation with great urgency immediately.37-42

3.2.2. South Africa’s orderly democracy requires and justifies land expropriation

True democracy allows orderly statutory change by righteous actions in order to rectify injustice of the past or present. The implementation thereof can take time, especially when democracy is new born to a country; especially one which had suffered for centuries under autocracy and fascism. Political, social and economic transformations thus require time and patience. Shortcomings in the 1994-Constitution are coming to the foreground, forcing daring challenges to be faced and solved, as previously mentioned, the addressing of the imbalance between the races on land ownership. The 1994 final settlement on land redistribution is, in terms of the prescription of the country’s democracy, far from a fait accompli and is still in a process of evolution.43-47

3.2.3. Land redistribution within post-2019 Black empowerment is a normal process

Uhuru South Africa, with all its many out-branches, such as land ownership, is an unavoidable and non-debateable process. It is presently driven exclusively because the economic upliftment of Blacks through BBBEE since 1994 was not enough. There are very serious consequences which can follow, if a justified transfer of mass land to the poor and landless Blacks is not activated fast. The present-day land reform initiative is thus not in dispute. The inequality, poverty and landlessness of the mass of non-Whites, living and working for generations as poor farm-labourers in the countryside, demand immediate action.37-42

In theory there is very little difference in the present South African thought-process on land occupation as those reflected and practised by the VOC, the British, the Boers, the Apartheid Government and that of Robert Mugabe. All these institutions were overshadowed by lengthy histories of murder, genocide, injustice, impoverishment and suppression of the previous land owners (who were also mostly land grabbers themselves, coming from an earlier period) who had lost their acquired land to new migrants, intruders and conquerors through multiple atrocities. In light of the above background, it is important to note that the present setup of a mass of South African landless Blacks is basically the same: an immense group of people who have been enormously frustrated mostly since the1994-democracy by the lack of improvement to their lifestyle. Land reform, whether it is a Zimbabwe-style act of violence or a democratic and balanced process without conflict or bloodletting, is, as said, a clearly unavoidable and normal process to balance the land ownership process that will have to happen from after the May 2019 elections.1

The decisions on whether certain elements and parts of the intended land reform programme should be with or without compensation, clearly constitutes a democratic act and is, as said, based on majority consultation and decision of the Parliament, as guided by the population, to benefit the country’s interests. This is an essential democratic principle that the Blacks and Whites endorsed with the 1994 Political Dispensation.38

3.2.4. A post-2019 primary land redistribution plan already in place

Notwithstanding the many draconic statements on the land expropriation process, as likely to be exclusive land grabbing, or that there is not any plan in guiding the post-2019 land expropriation, there are actually clear primary guidelines on how the process is going to be activated and steered. Prominent for selection between truth and myth on the issue of land ownership, is the King Solomon’s wisdom approach, wherein  the final decisions on what is fact and myth and the process on how land expropriation must and will be logically executed, are solely led by compassion, a good moral compass, and logical thinking and action. An in-depth understanding of the present-day suffering of all South Africans, anchored and driven by a leadership of good characteristics, which is freed from racial, religious and political contamination, are pre-requisites. Prominently, as a guideline, is President Cyril Ramaphosa’s repeatedly assurance of South Africans that the process of “land correction” will be done within the present-day laws and the Constitution.48

3.2.4.1. The land expropriation’s primary guidelines

Notwithstanding the initial immense hot headed rhetoric, commissions, committees, much senseless and opportunistic talk and argument, and ongoing threats by radicals, for instance in the Northern Cape ANC, such as the compilation of lists of productive farms to be expropriated immediately before changes to Section 25 are even approved, etc., it seems that other positive outcomes have manifested.

Firstly, it seems that the EFF, which had mainly activated the process on land reform in Parliament, was before the dissolution of the 2019-outgoing Parliament basically absent from attending the Parliamentary Committee on Land reform, which is the primary body doing research, publishing information, and deciding on the outcome of the final process. Only the members of the DA and the ANC attended as many as 50% of the meetings, while the three members of the EFF only attended the first meeting, bringing in a total of only 20% EFF-attendance. Cope, the UDM, the APC, the DSA, the VF+ and the NFP did not attend a single meeting. This passivity and lack of responsibility to the voters, led thereto that the committee failed to deliver a report before the closing of the present Parliament. This means that the issue will have to be run by the new legislature again from June 2019.49

The above undoubtedly reflects a growing detachment and disinterest by the main role-players in the so-called “land grabbing intentions” of parliamentary radicals.49

It seems furthermore that from the ANC side, as specifically reflected in the first hectic Parliament debate on land expropriation without compensation, there developed an observable passivity by the majority of ANC parliamentarians to the whole matter. This passivity is however seen as an opportunistic safeguarding by some ANC parliamentarians: here stands the fact that some of the ANC MPs and MPLs own more than two properties and thus they can, in some way, also be negatively  affected if a radical land policy is implemented. This outcome shifted the whole thinking process and final responsibility on land expropriation of the ANC’s greater inner-circle. This seems to have already put strain on the ANC’s top brass, making it clear to them that extreme land radicalism is not the average member’s wish. On the other side there is a genuine opinion with some ANC parliamentarians that the whole land expropriation process must be toned down in order to balance land reform.49

Based on the “unofficial” opinions and viewpoints of the ANC’s inner-circle – as reflected by some trustworthy “inside rumours”, “unofficial evaluations” and “leaks” by the lesser radicals of the ANC elite – clear primary guidelines seem already to have been compiled by the ANC to guide us. The basis of this post-2019 land redistribution primary plan is shortly described in the following eleven subdivisions:

1) Land reform and redistribution is unavoidable and prescribes an immediate constitutional prescription to be implemented. It needs to be implemented fast, but in well-planned phases, without any disturbance of the racial, political, social and economic stability.49,50  About the many failures on land reform in the past, which need now to be avoided, Nortje maintains that50:9: “Like it or not, SA’s existing land reform policy has not been effective in achieving its goals. In terms of the acquisition of land by the state, there has been partial success, but redistribution and transformation of the agricultural sector have by and large been a failure”.

2) Future land ownership must reflect proportionately the ethnicity and races of South Africa. These same ethnic and racial proportions should reflect in the farming sector, with relation to farmers and labourers. In this context the editor of the Sunday Times on the 10th March 2019 wrote the following under the heading51:18: “Quotas not wrong, those who oppose them are,” with regard to a very well-balanced description of the correct post-2019 South Africa. He put it clearly for himself and the greater Black society, which includes the ANC regime that future land transformation doesn’t seek to replace White with Black, but to ensure all races are included, to ensure that there’s an accurate representation of society. The editor of the Sunday Times further writes51:18: “If there’s something Solidarity needs to understand, it’s that transformation targets are here to stay – and they’re not just about numbers. They form part of a heart-and-minds approach that seeks to address the imbalances of the past”.

This balanced representation on land ownership was indeed, in terms of equality and human rights, a prescribed pre-requisite from 1652 with the arrival of Whites in South Africa. The intended equalisation of land ownership after 2019 must thus not be seen as a “favour” which the Whites are now doing to Blacks through so-called quotas in land ownership, work-placement, sport or education, etc. The centuries long outstanding initiative to erase the imbalance in land ownership in South Africa (read together with the imbalance in wealth and inequality), has led to an immense discrepancy between White land owners and Black land owners, making an immediate large scale equalisation within an orderly political dispensation basically impossible. The editor51 of the Sunday Times is clear on this gradual process of transformation, especially in land ownership, where food production, the need for finance to buy out farms, etc., are central. Transformation is not the central problem here, but the issue is those who (mainly Whites) steadfastly refuse to understand the future of South Africa’s politics after 2019. Prominent for the editor51 of Sunday Times is the main obstruction to phase out the inequality and proportional land ownership which is exclusively vested in White hands.51-54

Obstructive alleged role-players are seen to be Solidarity, AgriSA, AfriForum, the Freedom Front Plus, together with the White exclusive capitalists and the White farmer community. They form a contingent of obstructionists, to which one writer, in his despair on the conflicting and seemingly unchangeable land ownership matter, refers to as “remnants of verkramptes and rooineks resisting change”.51-54

In the context of the ANC’s good intentions on a moderate land reform outcome, Khumalo55 writes specifically of a clear differentiation by the international rating agency Standard and Poor (S&P) between the radical concept of a policy of land expropriation with or without compensation (which has become the antagonists “wildcat”-vehicle of attack on the ANC in pinpointing them as political radicals) versus the ANC’s true intention of the introduction of a conservative policy of land reform. On the S&P opinion of the introduction of a conservative land reform plan by the ANC after 2019, Khumalo posits55:15: “On land expropriation, we think that in as much as the discourse talks about expropriation, we believe it has to do more with land reform. We think the ANC have been conservative in the past. They will remain conservative in the way they manage the land issue.”

3) The land reform plan will be interpreted and implemented as described by the ANC’s Freedom Charter, which reflects a strict implementation of democratic principles on land ownership and rights around land ownership. The intention is clear that the whole land transformation plan must not be radical and will be far from the postulated outcome predicted by the antagonists. It will not be in line, for instance, with the delinquent actions of the White NP between 1970 and 1979 when 240 555 Blacks were removed from so-called “Black spots” located in White land bought by Afrikaner communities prior to the controversial land legislation of 1913. In addition, land expropriation will not again form the type of removal of Blacks as was done with the NP’s social engineering wherein Blacks were removed from so-called “legitimate White land” and relocated to “Bantustans” and other so-called “Black-areas”. In this process more or less 3.5-million people (described by Malan as the “Surplus People”), some 10% of the entire population, were subjected to forced removal.53,56

4) The general prescription that only certain categories of land will be expropriated without compensation refers specifically to abandoned buildings, unutilized land, commercial property held unproductively and purely for speculative purposes owned privately by South Africans and the state, as well as under-utilised property owned by the state, and land farmed by labour tenants with an absentee titleholder (irrespective of race), agricultural land owned by Church groups, and the land owned by closed-down mines. In addition to the abovementioned categories is the free-will handing-over of land by private owners/businesses, etc. to the state for land expropriation.

5) These above categories of land will be expropriated with compensation in terms of realistic and balanced market prices.56

6)  Rural families living under traditional leadership in the former Transkei and rural KwaZulu-Natal will get title to the land upon which they live and work.

7) Land expropriation will be done in various steps or phases, to assure minimum political, personal and racial conflict. The first phase will be of the less conflicting land of the state and the surrendered land from the private sector. The State will in Phase One make a lot of its own land available free of cost to new Black farmers and to other homeless Blacks, as serviced plots with title deeds to build their own homes near their work places in or nearby urban centres.56

8) The reference to “race” in terms of present-day South Africa’s richness, poverty, inequality and landlessness are prominent in the land expropriation initiative. These imbalances, specifically regarding land ownership, will be addressed, but only with justice, empathy and correctness. Prominent here is the declaration by the Deputy President, David Mabuza, in March 2019 in Parliament that it is not the intention of the ANC regime to push out the White farming community and that they must stay to produce food. Clearly there is no intention of revenge for the past on the White owners of land.56

9) The base for land relocation is that every South African citizen has the right to own land in the country, as guided by the Freedom Charter. This ownership needs to reflect in equality the proportions (numbers) of races and ethnicities (guided by the various Black tribal orientations,  as well as so-called other non-White orientations, like Coloured, Indian, etc.), as represented by the present population statistics.1,57.58.59

Statistics reflect the present total population of South Africa as ±57.5-million, represented by the following races numbers: Blacks: ±44.5-million; Coloureds: ±4.8-million; Whites: ±4.5-million; Indian/Asians/Other: ±1.5-million. The various proportional statistical ratios (calculated out of 100) are as follows: Blacks 80; Coloureds 9; Whites 8 and Indian/Asians/Other 3. The primary intention is to bring the present more than 80% of the land in White hands (a group forming only 8% of the total population), gradually down as far as possible in terms of a democratic reform, to only 8%, while the Blacks, Coloureds and Indian/Asians/Other need respectively to own 80%, 9% and 3% of the land.1,57,58,59

The process of majority consultation and decision-making, to be able to activate the intended land reform, is a principle that the NP regime on behalf of the Whites endorsed when they transferred their political power in 1994 to the Black majority and is thus not disputable. The only fault was that this endorsed agreement was not fully and truly activated from 1994.1

A prominent fact here, which is been mostly ignored due to political opportunism and Marxist-revolution orientation by a minority of radicals in the politics, is that the “Blacks” are not one single group to be served by land reform, but are represented by various tribes and further sub-tribes. These tribal and sub-tribal people are mostly established in certain parts of South Africa as majority groups there. (It is only the White tribe, specifically the Afrikaners as a sub-trlbe, that is basically spread over the whole country. The Afrikaners can themselves be divided into at least six sub-groups). Land redistribution will thus, in terms of this tribal-region-orientation be done. This means for instance that the placement of Zulus on traditional Venda land and vice versa can be catastrophic, as were the old “Bantustans” and Apartheid’s other foolishnesses. The First and Second Black Colonisations, with their resulting bloodshed, will be the outcome. The fact that the Zulus before 1994 fought for federalism and the present stand and propaganda of a “physical separation” from the Republic by the King of the Zulus, must serve here as a sharp warning. The growing political demands of traditional leaders’ (especially the kings with their own regimes and traditional empowerment) inside this tribal-regional system, as well as the greater South Africa as a region, also nullifies any argument inside the ANC of one Black Nation, which is to be treated to a simple land reform approach. This so-called Black-unity was a pre-1994 short-term approach to bring Apartheid down, but has now gradually been over-run by tribal nationalism and patriotism, as the EFF’s 10% vote in the May election confirms. Note must also be taken of the claims from the so-called “indigenous Brown people” (KhoiSan, Griqwa, Namakwa) that the land expropriation policy of post-2019 must also favour them fully.1,60,61

The constant declaration and blind acceptance of a “South African democracy” which is exclusively underwritten, driven and promoted by a sole Blackness,  seems to be out of contact with the country’s political, social and cultural realities, as well as Africa’s comprehensive confrontation at the ballot box by the many ethnicities and the tribalism of the Black voters. The so-called “Pure Black nationalists” may be in for a surprise – and a most deadly surprise – in South Africa in the future, due to  the advent of real Black tribal separation and Black tribal nationalism.62 In this regard, Monyae and Matambo write62:19: “They also do not help entrench democracy on a continent where voting along ethnic and tribal lines is common. The most ideal circumstances for democracy’s success in Africa [and South Africa] could be reconciling voters to the ideas rather than identity sensibilities.”

The EFF’s last mentioned outcome on an exclusive Black-nationalism will not easily be blocked if we look to the growth of the EFF after the May election in votes in some of the northern parts of South Africa — a party whose policy is undoubtedly, besides White-bashing, characterised and steered by deadly Black ethnicity and tribalism and the division, including the break-up, of the so-called “pre-1994 Black Nation”. It is important to note that the EFF’s radical cultural and political empowerment has now slowly spread from Limpopo to Mpumalanga and the North West Provinces, making it the official oppositions there.34,63,64

On these delinquent ethnic and tribal manifestations in the EFF, to capture its deprived and political poor and often times under-developed supporters’ planning in the doubtful and devastating elements of ethnicity and tribalism, Trovato writes64:14: “Nice work, though. It doesn’t matter if all three have a combined GDP of R28.50 and a bit of a witchcraft problem.”

Mthombothi34 also pinpoints this deadly foundation after the May election in the EFF, especially its leadership’s immense fault-line when he postulates34:19: “…the EFF’s existence and its survival depend largely on the whims of its leader. It often appears as though it’s a meteor that will rise but ultimately burn itself into oblivion. Also, its propensity for race-bating rules it out as a genuine contender for real power.”

10) The land expropriation is planned to be executed in such a way that it will not harm the economic or political status of the South African State, albeit in the short or long term. Although the implementation of the primary plan will require an enormous financial input by the government, this cost will be balanced in five to ten years’ time, hopefully bringing profits to the country after ten to fifteen years.

11) The first stage of land transfers must be complete before but not later than 2022 (whereby state rural land is been handed to Black farmers and their establishment on these farms ins in place). Included in this time-limit is the transfer of privately-owned abandoned buildings and under-utilised property and land in urban areas (without or with compensation), together with the transfer of the State’s abandoned buildings, under-utilised property and land in urban areas, to the poor and landless Blacks, to be owned by them for accommodation, and upon which to farm and build homes.

3.2.5. A post-2019 secondary land distribution guideline already in place
3.2.5.1. Land grabbing not an issue

There is no intention to grab well-functioning White private property and land without compensation, without clear reasons to benefit the people of the country and the balanced consideration of the loss to the disposed owner. Neither is the intended land transfer scheme going to target even all the so-called more than 80% of the present land of Whites, which radicals are alleging to be “stolen” from Blacks. That would be undemocratic. Neither is the intention the exclusive grabbing of land from one race group while leaving others untouched. The State’s own high-potential land of multiple millions of hectares of agricultural land, which has not been collateralised and is not productive, will, as already said, firstly become part of the intended land expropriation. Land cases under dispute before 2019 will be the prominent focus for settlement. Primarily there is no intention to  travel back in history to punish any so-called “White culprits” for their so-called “alleged stealing of land from Blacks”.48

In this context Nortje confirms50:9: “The good news is that, behind all the noise and political positioning around land reform, the ANC has been consistent in its intentions. The December [2018] policy document does say that expropriation without compensation ‘should be among the key mechanisms available to the government’, but this is followed by an even stronger statement that land reform interventions ‘should focus on government-owned land’ and ‘prioritise the distribution of vacant, unused and underutilised state land’.”

This consistency in the ANC regime’s expropriation plan will not to harm the private White land owner by confiscating his land without compensation, and is further confirmed by Nortje’s pinpointing that only state land will directly be incorporated in the first phase of land redistribution. In co-operation with the redistribution of state land, will also be the buy-out of a new group of White land and the buy-out of White land under dispute. Of the good intention of not to do land grabbing by the ANC regime, notwithstanding the antagonists roaring statements and the political noise of radicals within the ANC itself, and especially within the EFF, there is clear evidence in the February 2019 budget on the buy-out of White land and the immense funds made available to be able to do it.65,66

Hleko, in his analysis of the budget of 2019, writes65:16:

The linkage between the President’s State of the Nation address (Sona) and the Minister of Finance’s Budget speech created a proportionate posture that the government is hard at work making South Africa a better place for all who live in it.

The budget speech planted anew and sowed the seed of renewal. The R3.7 billion set aside to assist emerging farmers seeking to acquire land for farming, is a seed that the government is sowing today to propel emerging farmers to prosper in future.

This allocation will assist the 250 000 emerging farmers, whom the president referred to in his Sona, that are working the land and need support to fully develop their businesses.

The R1.8bn that is allocated for the implementation of 262 priority land reform projects over the next three years will be a shot in the arm for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform to expedite land reform projects.

This further echoes the president’s remark that an accelerated programme of land reform has the potential to expand agricultural output and promote inclusion.

On the 10th April 2019, Ramaphosa himself (who is again the President in the Sixth Parliament), to reign in all the false noises around the land matter, assured White farmers that they did not have to fear land reform48:1:

“I can assure you that the land reform process is something we should never fear. It is to be done in accordance with the rule of law and the Constitution. It is not going to be land grabs where land is grabbed outside of the parameters of the law. We need to look at the practical reality.”

Specific to the Expropriation Amendment Bill, which will be finalised after May 2019 by the new incoming Parliament, Ramaphosa puts it that the Act’s intentions are, as was already well-spelled out in governance and ANC papers, to look at land owned by the state, land owned by state-owned entities, land not used and land sometimes illegally acquired.48:1:

“There is a great future for all farming people, be it workers or farm owners. We need to address the key challenges. We must address some of the sensitive issues – evictions and where the people have no land. We want consensual solutions.”

The secondary good intention of not to land grabb, is further the announcement that the Land Bank will financially support smallholders and leverage partnerships with other financial institutions in their start-up of new incoming Black farmers and to develop existing Black farmers. The main aim here is to disburse R3-billion in the next fiscal year to the farming sector, with more Land Bank financial input later to be facilitated for the farming community.66

3.2.5.2. The 1994 Political Dispensation: a worrying issue which needs urgent comprehensive readdressing

The South African land ownership matter was ignored outright since 1994 and silently shelved in terms of the 1994 Political Dispensation. The 1994 Political Dispensation masked main intention was clear: to exclusively serve the White land owners and farmers, as well as the exclusive capitalists who include Whites as well as Blacks, especially those who misused BBBEE to get rich. South Africa’s economic evolution did not work because it offered nothing to the mass of the poor since 1994. The rise of unrest, acute anarchy and the possibility of a revolution by the mass of poor and landless Blacks, and of course the mass poverty of ±29-million Blacks, served as a wake-up call to a small group of concerned South African politicians, humanists and citizens to take on the matter.48,50

3.2.5.2.1 The neglect and unrepaired situation of ±29-million landless and poor Blacks within the present empowerment of 257 municipalities to be able to do land expropriation

With regard to the abovementioned post-1994 ongoing negligence and unrepaired situation of ±29-million landless and poor Blacks’, Nortje50 can with honesty, with great doubt on the ANC regime’s initial intention to uplift this mass of Blacks, write50:9:

The bad news is that expropriation without compensation will remain a high-stakes political bargaining chip. Indeed, had Ramaphosa‘s hand not been forced at the national elective conference in December 2017, I wonder if our land reform policy would have been re-examined at all. In this case the EFF and factions within the ANC have done South Africans a massive favour by forcing us to scrutinise and improve policy that has massive potential for social redress, job creation and economic development”.

The time-frame left for the ANC to institute and to physically activate a clear, final plan and scheme after 25 years of failure since 1994, is at most two years. Politicians from all of the parties, White land owners and exclusive holders of White capital, must accept it unconditionally. This eye-opening and political life-change includes the DA, the FF Plus, Solidarity, AfriForum and AgriSA.50,60,67

Any delay holds serious consequences, specifically for the ANC as a regime to be able to  bring about justified land reform and in general for South Africa in the form of anarchy, unrest and revolution. This instituting of a final plan comprises the definite establishment of a permanent caretaker deeds statutory body (separate from the present deeds office) which will stand free from political and party influences. It will specifically handle the transfer of land to the state and the registering of the deeds of these properties initially in the name of the State, the compilation of clear legal guidelines for the rights of citizens to receive land, and the pre-as well as post-prescriptions to be able to farm, to take ownership of this land, the describing of a proof period as a candidate-farmer, directing the reselling and estranging of the property after allocation to Black owners. It will need to limit opportunistic profit-taking, state-capture and racketeering, as well as corruption around these allocated properties. The allocation of full ownership, and thus the transfer of title deeds, can be subjected to five years. Although private loans on the properties and lands will be allowed (specifically to be able to make debts for development and the running of the farms), this will be subordinate to the permission of the State as the first loan-holder and thus allocated with the right of the first call to buy-back or to reposess expropriated land when necessary. To control over-debt and the exploitstion of the poor new farmers against loan sharks, the intention is to provide comprehensive loans/other funding via the State to the incoming farmers for up to 20 years. This approach will overcome the many failures of the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution plan, because the State failed many times to supply funding or ancillary agricultural services to the incoming farmers who lacked their own capital. This will also phase out the unrealistic short periods required from the incoming Black farmers to become profitable. (Prominent in this respect, in order to guide stable future ownership of expropriated land, the ANC regime already put the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy in place, which was adopted in 2006, to stop beneficiaries of land reform from selling opportunistic properties which they had acquired. In terms of this ruling, land was leased since 2006 to the majority of beneficiaries while the state retained ownership).50

Another outcome foreseen in the post-2019 empowerment of the incoming Black farmers is that the type of farming production will be steered by the government to assure maximum profit and the needed products for the local, and where possible, for foreign markets. Funding and the training of the new farmers will be steered in terms of the produce on the allocated land.50

It is clear that this Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy adopted in 2006 will be “improved” with new legislation, such as the fundamental restructuring of institutions such as the Land Claims Commission and the Land Claims Court, etc., not only to safeguard those losing their property through land reform, but also to protect those poor Blacks in line to receive land. The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) will also be improved. The rule of law in the process of land reform will be maintained in order to avoid Zimbabwe’s lack of accountability or the Zuma-state-capture. An example thereof is Ngcukaitobi’s68 opinion of the establishment of a land ombudsman or land-rights protector (with the same powers as the present public protector). The state custodianship (temporary) of expropriated land will be spelled out clearly in the post-2019 proposed land redistribution and agrarian reform legislation. In addition, how the process of land transfer will be activated and upheld, will be executed through the creation of various new legislation, such as a Land Acquisition Act as well as a Land Redistribution Act, wherein the suggested land ombudsman or the land-rights protector, is central as the supervisor.68,69

3.2.5.2.2. The present empowerment of 257 municipalities to do land expropriation

The present anomaly in the change to Section 25 of the draft expropriation bill, which can give 257 municipalities the right to expropriate property without compensation, is at the moment under consideration. The seeming intention is to remove their rights and to make the empowerment of land and other property expropriation seated in a single statutory body on national level.69,70

With reference to the concerns of the bill’s empowerment of the local government municipalities, as well as that of the central government bodies, is it important to note that the biggest need for land is in urban areas under municipalities where there is a vast corruption problem. Evidence shows that only 33 municipalities of the total of 257 obtained clean audits in 2018. As such, the municipalities cannot be trusted to implement land expropriation without compensation fairly and to execute administrative justice, as demanded by the constitution.69,70

Furthermore, the clause will address the intended empowerment of the local and central government, wherein the bill gives five examples where nil compensation would be justified and states that expropriation without compensation can be “stretched”, which can allow invalid grabbing of land. In addition, the definition on land (located in municipalities) for speculation (which undoubtedly has financial value for the present owner and is mostly acquired at a cost), is unclearly defined. Lacking a legal description to state clearly what  land for future expansion means — which seems to stand outside the expropriation without compensation clause – is a further point of concern that will be addressed. The concept-definition of what is property in the bill seems to apply also on the confiscation of anything, varying from intellectual property to shares in a company, if it is in the so-called “interests of the public”. This therefore needs a revist, in order to clear confusion and possible capture.69,70

3.2.5.2.3. The mandate of the Land Bank needs immediate attention

To activate land expropriation successfully, the lack of finance to start up and run a farm stands out specifically. Here, in financing the incoming Black farmers, is the commitment of the ANC-regime to change the mandate of the Land Bank so that it is truly development-orientated and financial-friendly to the mass of poor Blacks.68,69 This will be done without “nationalising” it, as some of the antagonists and White capitalists try to argue when the mandate of the Land Bank is put forward as a possible financial vehicle to successfully expropriate land and facilitate the urgent uplifting of 29-million poor and landless Blacks. Own government financial support is just too little to change the present landscape of under-funding of Black farmers. Ngcukaiboti69 writes, on the reason for the present passivity (and isolation) of the Land Bank to be able to support the mass of poor incoming, aspirant Black farmers, as follows69:20-21:

“In 2002, the ANC changed the mandate of the Land Bank  so that, for all practical purposes, it operates like any ordinary commercial bank. In Section 26 of the Land and Agricultural Bank Act, the bank’s mandate is to provide land and agricultural finance ‘against security’. It can be safely assumed that the persons who need Land Bank finance the most have no security.”

3.2.5.2.4. The farming-styles, culture and intentions of new Black and other non-White farmers

The farming-styles, culture and intentions of new Black and other non-White farmers will be prominent in guiding the execution of the land reform programme. In this context,  the candidate-farmers — not as during the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution where pre-training training and constant mentoring were absent – will first be pre-selected on certain characteristics, abilities, skills and interests to assure maximum success as potential candidate-farmers and then pre-trained (as was done in the 1930s with the poor Whites at the Kakamas- and Keimoes-schemes by the government and the DRC). The intention is to extend the Agricultural Colleges training to district-centres countrywide, with the offering of an initial six months as a start-up course for the learner-farmers, while further continuous learning and training will be provided after the establishment of the new farmers for a minimum period of five years. The post-2019 exploitation of agricultural-export potential is a first priority through the small farmers’ setup.1,69

The entire country will be divided into various regions for land transfer, meaning thus concentrated small farms in the more water-rich areas, with the more spread out of larger farms in the dryer regions. Developments beside constant flowing rivers and near established transport and other facilities will form the first phase of the start-up.1

One of the most important oversights in the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution under the 1994 Dispensation were the absence of homesteads, other much needed farm-buildings and infrastructure and equipment to support farming production and activities  by the new farmers. There was frequently outright neglect in this regard from the government’s side even to install any infrastructure and the offer of working equipment at the time of the handing over of farms to the new farmers. Funding to support these enterprises was also lacking most of the time, while constant monitoring, in order to identify shortcomings and failures over time, as well as the development of new needs of the new-farmers-model, were also absent.  These pre-requirements will be put in place before allowing farmers to take up their farmer-appointments.69

Other infrastructure needed is the upfront founding of marketing instruments, such as own markets, the installation of entities for farmer-community-businesses to build and run independent Black farming centres for the selling of the surplus of their produce, as well as the creation of community business-bodies to buy farming equipment and which will deliver services to small farmers to make it possible for them to get their farms working and functioning at affordable costs.69

One of the most hampering elements to land ownership in South Africa has so far been the Western custom and tradition that land can for an unlimited amount of time be owned by a certain person and his immediate family. The ownership of land came under exclusive White capitalism and politics as the untouchable right of the individual (mostly Whites) to be able own land and to do with it as the owner saw fit. Included here is, as said, the untouchable present right of inheritance from generation to generation. The utmost exploitationof this model is well-illustrated by the selective upkeep of the exclusive White ownership (8% of the population) of at least 60% of the South African land. Firstly, in stopping this thinking, it is important to note that land is a national asset and not a personal asset, to be separated from the State and society. Secondly, the occupation of any land, as sealed by a deed of conveyance, is only for the purpose of improving the land and making a living from it – it is always only a solely temporary right issued to the individual of care-taking of the state’s assets. Included hereto stands the effective management of land as a democratic and civil right by the individual who holds the deed of conveyance. This legal setup is solely based on majority consultation and decision-making by the population of South Africa via Parliament, as primarily guided by the country’s Constitution. There is thus in modern-day South Africa a clear pre-requirement emerging on the ongoing legal ownership of land: it is temporary and open to change by the State at any time. This is now what is planned with the process of land expropriation.1

There is already a process in place to re-install the old hereditary tenure with a time-limit, better known as the tenure by long lease, as already activated in Namibia, Zimbabwe and Malawi for the period of 99-years of lease. This was also done at the early Cape. This model of time-limiting of land ownership is by far a better one for the State, as well as the individual citizen. Indeed specific to the South African setup around ownership per se, data shows that very few of the present farms are owned for 99 years or more by the same (White) family. Although data is scarce on the matter, it seems that most (White) owners and their families hang on to land for less than 49 years.1

In terms of the development of a new land culture, South Africa thus also undoubtedly needs a total repositioning of the so-called model of endless-land ownership to the model of tenure by long lease of 49 year-land ownership. Such a model will help to support the intended land expropriation initiative and to dismantle an imbalanced racial and economic-privilege farming community, free from monopolies and the exclusive benefit of certain groups and families.

The intended land expropriation programme to establish the poor and landless Blacks will be far removed from the 1994 to 2019 rigid programme and be easily adaptable to new circumstances as prescribed by the country’s economic, political and civil rights. Much was learned from the 1994 to 2019 failures. Future success lies in the re-examination of the old land reform processes from pre- as well post-1994.50 Nortje posits50:9: “These failures are frustrating but it is encouraging – and indeed correct – that existing land reform policy is being re-examined. Policy by its nature should be a process rather than a prescript. Good policymakers measure the actual and intended outcomes of their policies regularly in order to make adjustments when necessary”.

What is most worrying at the moment is the fact that the Ramaphosa-regime had in the mean time shifted seemingly successfully the land reform matter before the May 8 election from the “urgent” national agenda. This led thereto that to a great extent the debate died down. Notwithstanding the finding of Ramaphosa’s 10-member advisory panel on land reform (appointed in September 2018), which is now to be followed-up and enlightened by the post-May 8 Parliament, the present problematic setup around poverty and landlessness of a mass of Blacks can become extreme, with acute unrest.  Anarchy, moving into a chronic stage, can make revolution a prominent feature later in the 2019-2024 ruling-mandate of the ANC.50

3.2.5. The antagonists are unrealistic and opportunistic to already demand in 2019 a fully-fledged land expropriation plan from the ANC

Too offer a more precise plan as the above theoretical one at this stage, is impossible, seeing that Section 25 is still to be amended. Further consultations by all the lawmakers of the Parliament with the general public, must firstly be held and funding allocated, to be able to start up the project and to turn it from theoretical to practical. Furthermore, the above theoretical plan must and cannot be seen as a final, absolute one. As discussions and outcomes follow during the rest of 2019-2020, changes, adjustments, additions, further descriptions and definitions, etc., can follow. There is no doubt that before any land expropriation will be activated, further land redistribution and agrarian reform legislation will be introduced.50,69

It must be clear that the current agricultural monopolies will have to be dismantled or reigned in, see at present the overpowering of the agricultural sector by the extremely well-established South Africa White agribusinesses and their exclusive White capital. There will be cooperation with the White agribusinesses in the activation of the Black agricultural sector, but away from and outside their White dominance of every sector in agriculture. Land expropriation, its planning and action and its benefits, will be shifted from the few White rich to the mass Black poor. It will be the rule, not the aim. The present exclusive marginalisation of the Black farming communities and Black small-scale farmers will be ended. Ngcukaitobi69 misreads the “un-breakability” of the White empowerment and dominance of the country’s agriculture in the ANC’s planned land expropriation programme when he writes69:20-21: “We can expect that these monopolies will, with the support of the State, multiply their profits, while giving a “helping hand. More of the same. Large agricultural entities, it seems, will be “nudged” to support emerging and small-scale farmers.”

Doubts about the present theoretical plan are unfounded. Firstly, the registration of title deeds of the expropriated land will be handled the same way as the present-day title deeds, although this will preferably be done on a separate register to oversee the land expropriation process. This will be done precisely to avoid corruption, state-capture, etc. and to make the re-registration of land to the new Black farmers easy to control, and to oversee the constant management and execution of the end-part of land expropriation and the success of each of the individual cases.50,69

It must be clear that the transfer and registration of land to the new Black farmers will not be more complicated or strange than that of the starting-up in the 1890s of the Vanwyksvlei Dam’s Agricultural and Farming Settlement of Whites. Here the so-called Crown land (which was also occupied by the Cape Government as “uninhabited land”, but was indeed for a long time the land of the driven-out KhoiSan) was transferred to Whites as private property under certain pre-requirements to work and to inhabit it permanently. The same principal of ownership was repeated after the Second World War when White soldiers of the South African Armed Forces were, after their demobilisation, established as farmers on so-called “free farms”, again on Crown land, in areas such as the districts of Vanwyksvlei and Kenhardt situated in today’s Northern Cape Province.1,71-74

4. Discussion

4.1. A short perspective

From the above is it at this stage clear that there is already in some way a theoretical plan in place on how land expropriation will and can be executed. But here are two clear energies in opposition: it is one thing to theoretically argue a plan, but it is totally something else to implement such a plan in practive with success. South Africa’s political history, since the first day of Jan van Riebeecks’s arrival, is drenched with many political failures. Prominent in this context is the ANC’s somewhat failed post-1994 land reform initiative to establish Black farmers.1,75-80

The essential question is thus who can now after May 8, 2019 be the role-player(s) to assure the successful implementation and completion of the plan on land expropriation.

The May 8, 2019 election’s outcome leaves us with only three significant parties: the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the African Nationalist Congress (ANC). On the third level of significance stands the EFF, in second place the DA and on the first level the ruling ANC. An indication of the potential of the EFF or the DA to be declared a “good” or “bad” ruler, is  the fact that they have never ruled South Africa nationally. of the two the EFF is the most inexperienced one. It has a very limited alliance in municipality management as compared to the DA, and was most of the time less successful and too conflicting to assure an evaluation of outright good. The DA was in the past and is still very successfull after the May election, with regard to governing on provincial level in the Western Cape, as well as with municipal management countrywide.26,30,34,36

4.1.1 Evaluation guidelines of political parties

To evaluate the three parties’ potential as national, provincial and municipal rulers, the following guidelines will be used respectively:

Their general policies as well as specific standpoints on aspects such as the respectof law and order, and the fighting of corruption, state capture, behavioural delinquency of MPs and MPLs, as well as their top brass leaders, the party’s and leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put in perspective through their manifestos for the 2019-election.

The public critique in newspapers, etc., by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the three parties as political organisations, their members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behavioural  delinquency of MPs and MPLs and top brass leaders, their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the parties’ internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions, especially on land expropriation, evaluated and reflected for the period 1994 to 2019.

In this subdivision of the research project the interpretations will be done solely in terms of the interpretation of facts and truths. The information gathered will be evaluated in terms of the Solomon’s wisdom approach and will not be guided by religious and legal/statutory contamination.  The focus of the discussion will be to determine, theoretically in terms of a so-called “clean and constructive political record” of each of the three parties, which of them are the best qualified to effect the land expropriation plan from 2019 and onwards. For this classification and measuring of political records of each party, the under-mentioned Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, will be used.81-84

4.1.1.1. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201881

As an evaluation instrument to quantitatively classify the three political organisations, their members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action, the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, will be used.81 The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, were applied to all information collected in the literature review of the parties’ manifestos and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and will be interpreted as the researcher deems it applicable.81

In light of the political sensitivity of this study, the researcher assured at all times, as prescribed by the Checklist, that the political-historical data were carefully reviewed and coded. Generalisations were not made beyond the capability of the data to support statements. The researcher guarded against his own expectations, misperceptions and the need to find answers that would support his preconceived notions. For the basis of interpretation and evaluation of the data, the Solomon wisdom approach serves throughout as a guideline.81-84

4.1.1.3. The use of election manifestos of political parties as Curriculum Vitae and public reporting on political parties by journalists and other sources such as Letters of Referee/Attestations to determine  the governmental abilities of political parties

When any candidate applies for a responsible post in the top level of an organisation, there are two primary elements to guide the employer in making an appointment or not. These two elements are:

1) The Curriculum Vitae (CV) to obtain insight into the candidate’s qualifications, experiences and extraordinary skills, etc; and

2) The letters of the referees, the attestations, to offer firstly further insight into the qualifications, experiences, etc. of the candidate;  and secondly at the same time to tell us confidentially about good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate that are well-masked by or absent from the CV. This referee data mostly informs us of the “goodness” and “badness” of a candidate, which can make him a failure or a success in the end in the executionof the responsibilities of the post.

In this research the manifestos and self-description offered by the political parties and their leaders will be seen as their CVs. Hereto will the public reporting by journalists and other sources be seen as the letters of referees/reference or attestations.

4.1.1.3.1. Evaluation-criteria for a party and its leadership to be short-listed

In terms of the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, the three parties will be awarded points in terms of an evaluation-criteria of a maximum of 82 points. To qualify for the shortlist as a so-called candidate (party), the candidate (party) must receive 58 points (70%) and higher.81

With specific reference to a retrospective evaluation and description of the political history of political leaders in terms of the Checklist, it is true that information obtained from newspapers, political and historical books, authorised and unauthorised biographies and autobiographies can be seen as subjective, but subjectivity is an inherent part of any text on politics. We cannot escape this reality. Such sources are consulted in terms of the Solomon wisdom approach for this subdivision, with the single aim of building a viewpoint on the party from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is commonly used in modern historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research, as is the case with the quality of the current political leadership of South Africa and the political parties’ functioning with regard to integrity. The information offered in the literature review has not been empirically tested. It relies on the independent opinion of the public as reflected by the independent media and has been accepted by the public as a good reflection of reality.81-84

The research does not offer a comprehensive statistical model to make advanced statistical inferences to be able to test a hypothesis, but the information (data) can be subjected quantitatively to the statistical cycle of research to make it comparable with other research and to evaluate it with hypothesis testing in the end. Advanced statistical inference is outside the intent of the study.81

There has never been such a collection, evaluation and description of information on the actions of the political leaders and regimes of South Africa with the primary focus on their ability to be able to steer land reform for the period 1994 to 2019. Despites the limitations of the various sources, it is a pioneering study that addresses a mostly ignored subject.81-84

4.2. The manifestos, self-descriptions and public references of the three parties

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) will be reflected in this article (Article 9) as Part 1 of three articles under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. In Part 2 (Article 10) and Part 3 (Article 11) the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the African National Congress (ANC) will respectively be reflected as sequence articles under the main title of “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”.

4.2.1. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)
4.2.1.1. Introduction

In the recent May election, the EFF nearly doubled its political power by winning 44 seats in Parliament (rising from 6% to 10%). One the first utterances by Julius Malema, the Commander-in-Chief of the EFF after obtaining this win, was to clearly spell out that the EFF’s immediate task in the Sixth Parliament would be the completion of the work that could not be done by the Fifth Democratic Parliament and of which the Amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution, to allow for expropriation of land without compensation and the amendment of the SA Reserve Bank Act to discontinue private shareholders in the bank, would be central. In this context of political radicalism, is it old news that the EFF believes that the state should be the custodian of land and that full-out nationalisation without compensation is the way to go.85,86

In this environment a new role is foreseen by some political commentators  for the EFF in the post-2019 politics, directly within the ANC regime to assist the ANC to get the two-thirds majority vote which it needed to enact the ANC’s December 2017 resolution to amend Section 25 to be able to expropriate land without compensation (EWC). There is doubt on the outcome of such an alliance, given that a strong sector (the Ramaphosa-faction) in the ANC does not share the Malema hunger for extreme land expropriation and radical politics. They prefer a watered down window-dressed-version of the status quo on the land matter, writes Hlatshaneni.85:4

Furthermore, it seems that there is still after the May election a kind of “brotherly love” between the EFF and the DA on municipal-level cooperation, which can also put it in a strong position of political empowerment. On the 17th May 2019 the Beeld reports on this possibility after seeming talks between the EFF and the DA. Selebano writes87:1: “Die Tshwane-metroraad in Pretoria kan ‘n EFF-lid as burgemeester kry, terwyl Herman Mashaba [DA] in sy pos as burgemeester van Johannesburg bly.”  Malema himself reports as follows on the matter of a new post-2019 alliance with the DA on municipal-level87:1: “Ons praat reeds met die DA, ons deel die mag in Johannesburg en Tshwane. Kom ons doen dit op ‘n manier wat nie ontwrigtend is nie.”

It is thus of great importance to see how the EFF can play out its role in the post-2019 politics in general and specifically in the solving of the so-called “White-occupation” of Black land. The question is: can the EFF be a significant role-player in the post-2019 politics? To answer this question is it important to study the EFF’s CV and Attestations in-depth and to evaluate its performance on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018.81

4.2.1.2. Overview
4.2.1.2.1. The EFF manifesto

In the EFF’s manifesto under the heading: “The EFF is ready to govern as demonstrated by the detailed blueprint for economic emancipation as set out in its manifesto”, Julius Malema, as in his daily politics, tries to play the card of “African nationalism”.  But the “Malema-African nationalism” is an exclusive new version: one belonging to and driven by the South African post-1994 born Blacks, who are jobless, poor and most of all: landless. Excluded from his group of “African nationalists” are clearly the so-called BEE-marked and other successful Blacks who were born before 1994. Prominent of course are also the Whites in general as the culprits in his radical-Marxism as the sole origin of these Black youth’s poverty, landlessness and unhappiness (and undoubtedly seemingly also Malema’s “own poverty” and unhappiness!). To grasp this absurdity, and by times seemingly confused political mindset, just read the following from his propaganda88:19:

“We are not part of the 1994 elite pact. We are a completely new generation, with new demands. And our demands, unlike those of the 1994 generation, will not be postponed. We refuse to be silenced with so-called reconciliation. We want justice now. We want our land now. We want jobs now. We demand the economy now!

On his so-called “White-problem” philosophy and solution, note the following88:19:

The economy in SA continues today to be under the ownership and control of white minority settlers, whose ownership and control of land, in particular, were gained through settler colonialism and its corollary, the dispossession of the black colonised.

Other sectors of the economy, such as retail chains, industry and the financial sector, are also owned and controlled by the white minority in SA. All the means of economic survival and existence continue to be controlled by the white minority.

Imraan Buccus89, a seasoned researcher and academic, and a well-respected political analyst, after he studied the EFF’s manifesto for the May 2019 election and the party’s practice of politics since its foundation, reflects in-depth in his writing the characteristics of the EFF’s politics if it should had win the election or form a senior partnership in an alliance to be a ruler. Its ruling seems for Buccus to be characterised by the following89:18:

“The manifesto from the EFF is about as ridiculous as it is long. It veers, incoherently, from far right neoliberal economics measures, like export processing zones, to classic far-left politics, like radical land reform. Wildly outlandish promises are made – R1m payments to successful PhD students and orthodontists in every school, for instance – that are impossible to implement in reality.”

In reality the EFF’s election promises, if they are to be implemented in political madness (besides that it is just impossible!), will bring total bankruptcy and steer the country into the same hole as Venezuala and Zimbabwe, writes Buccus89. Moreover: immense poverty, hunger, unrest, violence, to be followed by revolution, will fast be the outcomes. This will end in the mass suppression of the population and dictatorship. Inequality would become out of hand, which, looking critically at the EFF’s politics, seems to be Malema’s main intention and plan. The speaking by the EFF of the creation of a sovereign wealth fund means just another state capture and a looting again of the SAA, Eskom, the PIC and various kinds of VBS Mutual Banks to be robbed again by the EFF-kind of political elite. Buccus89 is very clear when he, on the involvement and trustworthiness per se of the EFF in the management for instance of a sovereign wealth funds, says89:18:

“But, as we all know, the EFF has been closely associated with cross forms of corruption, and is openly defending individuals known to have been at the centre of the state capture project. The EFF simply could not be trusted to run a sovereign wealth fund.”

Bell90, in reference to the EFF’s promises, describes them as absurd, bizarre and outlandish. He writes in this context: “An EFF government, they promised, would provide every informal settlement dweller with a proper house with flushing toilets, and hot and cold running water, within two years.” On the land issue and the EFF, Bell reports90:2:

“Here it is that some of the more  – no pun intended – outlandish comments are made, including an EFF promise to ‘immediately’ give away to ‘the people 50% of all government land’.”

The EFF promises and political, economic, racial and social thinking are plainly bordering on fantasy; they are drowned in populism and cognitive dissonance. The EFFs are more than just crude opportunists; their political madness, as reflected in their promises, will take South Africa not like Jacob Zuma to the brink of a complete collapse: they will immediately bring about a total collapse of the country. The political dysfunctional mindset of its leaders have already been reflected in their weird public behaviour. Their violence and unruly behaviour and dislike of order are well reflected by their violent and disrespectful actions in Parliament, as well as at council meetings where they participated in municipalities. This cognitive chaos inside the EFF leadership is understandable when noting that the EFF hailed Robert Mugabe as a hero. In this utmost political instability of the EFF is it understandable why its MP Zolile Xalisa had no other choice but to leave it for the African Transformation Movement (ATM).The political instability in the EFF also drove out the EFF-MP Thembinkosi Rawula.89,91

4.1.1.2.2. The EFF’s performance after the May 2019 election

To now call the EFF one of the major parties in South Africa due to its so-called third position (ranking) of voters’ representation, which it obtained mostly by our imbalanced indirect Electoral Act, is misleading. Some so-called political analysts became mixed-up between ranking and statistics: the EFF only obtained 10% of the votes in the 2019 elections (and 6% of the votes in the 2014 election), meaning that at most 10% or a 10th of the total votes. Seen from a political analyst’s view, neither did the EFF really successfully master the so-called SWOT characteristic of the “political MBA” to bring them into the league of “good” parties. They misused and exploited the serious conflicting political, social and economic issues of the country which have already put the country into paralysis many times. As a party it fails to offer constructive solutions or ideas, and misuses empty populism to activate aggression and hostility with a 10% sector of the voters as an empowerment vehicle to stay upright. They do not understand basic politics and democracy, neither how to govern even the simplest social organisation. They cannot even can manage the ethics of their own party, as is evident from their support of the looting of the VBS Mutual Bank.85,86,89,92

Their involvement with the DA in municipal affairs shows one thing: destabilisation of good order. Their constant attacks on the ANC seems from the outside a strong and winning outcome for the EFF. But it is far from the truth. Firstly, is it misleading and secondly, there is a good reason for the EFF’s so-called successful attack on the ANC. In this context it must firstly be remembered that their parent-party, the ANC, is in a vegetative state, with a 50% part cemented with the EFF into political-radicalism. This ANC failure had a negative impact over 25 years on the mass of poor and landless Blacks. It is the same deprived group who the EFF also not could enrich and uplift since its founding as a “party of the people”. In addition, it placed them directly into conflict with the authorities and law and order. The creation of unrest, anarchy and revolution seems the ultimate intention of the EFF here.85,86,89,92

Secondly, there is not a single fact in the EFF’s actions to associate it with the positivity which characterised the political ideology of Nelson Mandela. To describe the EFF, as Kanyane92 tried to do, as the new don of South Africa politics, is wishful thinking. The correct reference is: new mischief-monger. Kanyane’s92 insight and thus also his propaganda, are lacking understanding of the principles of basic politics and sound political thinking. There is not a hunger by the mass of South African Blacks for a so-called “liberation”, or revolution in terms of land ownership or races. We saw the improper infusion thereof already in Venezuela and Zimbabwe, as well as the Zuma-regime of state capture under the mantle of “Black-African/African-Black liberation”. Eugene Terreblanche and his AWB tried the same kind of “political joke of mischief” with Afrikaner-liberation, as what Malema and his cronies are now trying to do, just to be rejected at the end. This rejection was not by the Black population, but by the Afrikaner/White population. This happens the same way with the ultra Afrikaner-nationalist leader Hans van Rensburg and his Ossewa-Brandwag (underwriting Nazism and extreme White nationalism) in the White politics of the 1940s. It failed miserably.1,85,86,89,92

4.1.1.2.3. The post-2019 erasing of the EFF’s founding aims and intentions

The May 2019 election shows that radical racial parties such as Andile Mngxitama’s Black First Land First (BLF), the African Content Movement (ACM) led by Hlaudi Motsoeneng and the Social Revolutionary Workers Party (SRWP) of Irvin Jim lost voter support and recognition, writes Mvumvu18. But this loss of voters’ support goes broader, affecting also the two other racial radical parties, namely the EFF and the FF+. Mthombothi93 highlights the dilemma wherein the bitter-ender radical parties such as the EFF, the ACM, the BLF and the ATM had run in the May election due to their expectation that their pushing of the expropriation of land without compensation would reap rich rewards for them (a misconception, which also swayed the ANC to join that bandwagon). It did not work. The racial radical parties of the EFF and the FF+ vote increase in the May 2019, is further misleading. There is no evidence of black voters excitedly flocking to proponents of amending the Constitution with the sole purpose of grabbing other people’s property on which both the EFF and the FF+ build their politics (although that of the FF+ politics is in reverse by their fuelling the Whites with a fear for land grabbing and an outcome which the FF+ has falsely positioned itself to be able to prevent it). This outcome means that there is no role to play in the near future for the EFF. For the EFF (as for that of the ACM, the BLF and the ATM) its primary founding aim and intention to effect exclusive land grabbing from Whites specifically, is firstly nullified. Secondly, its sole purpose of exclusive land grabbing, which held the party on the road and assured its members’ enrolment, is erased.  It is indeed the spelling out in the near future of the end of what a party such as the EFF saw initially as a new, but false beginning in the May elections’ with its gains in Parliamentary seats. The South African grassroots politics of post-2019 is no more established in the racial radicalism that characterised the manifestos of parties such as the EFF, the BKF, the ACM, the SRWP, the ATM and the FF+. The combined might of the South African capitalist class from all racial groups and the respect for democracy by most Blacks, notwithstanding their suffering under Apartheid had nipped in the bud permanently the popularity and empowerment of these racial radicals, leading to the EFF’s, FF+’s and ATM’s insignificant positions in the Sixth Parliament.93,94

A good example (similar to that of the EFF’s winning of votes from short term disgruntled ANC members and voters), is the said sudden “increase” for example of the right-wing Freedom Front Plus (FF+) in the May election. Its rise in votes is also simply the result of disgruntled White DA-voters who respond foolishly to the FF+’s slogan of “Fight Back”, seeing the FF+ as a rescuer of their so-called “eroded White-rights”. It is not a radical, lasting political improved outcome waiting for the disgruntled Whites. It holds the same limitations and a phasing-out in waiting as for the EFF. It is equal to those reflected by radical Afrikaners in the short-lived days of the AWB. Both the “growths” of the EFF and FF+ are the same racial contamination.36

It is important to critically look further at the belief that socialism is favoured by the mass of South Africans; a direction Malema seemingly wants now to steer his EFF into after the voters’ rejection of his exclusive Black-nationalism, land grabbing and nationalising of every citizen’s assets. The absolute failure of the SRWP which was undoubtedly a nasty shock for socialist supporters of the change away from socialism and radicalism in political thinking on grassroot-level is prominent here. This party, initiated by the 370 000-strong National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) and supported by its affiliated federation, the more or less 800 000-strong South African Federation of Trade Unions (Saftu), received only 24 439 votes (meaning a miniscule 0.14% of the total vote).26

This reflects the dilemma of a dark future waiting for the EFF. Its political foundation is precisely that of the doomed BLF, the ACM, the SRWP and the FF+. Botha95 pinpoints that the above outcome of rejection of the land expropriation without compensation and its racial radicalism, was evidence that the populist and socialist opinion about politics, as held until the May election by the labour-unions [but surly also the BLF, the ACM, the SRWP and the EFF], is presently without standing and a myth.95

On the failed racial radical politics coming from the past election around land expropriation and the parties caught up in it, Botha95 refers specifically as an example to the racial radical BHF [whose policy is openly a combination of Marxism and Leninism (an ideology to which the EFF prominently also lends itself) and the implication which had led to the immense financial chaos in Zimbabwe and Venezuela]. Botha95, in a comparison of the EFF with the BHF, writes as follows on the BLF95:10:

Die…Black First Land First (BLF), wie se leier hom gereeld skuldig maak aan onsinnigheid in die algemeen en haatspraak in die besonder en ook sy volgelinge (wat maar dun gesaai is) aanhits tot onwettige optrede, veral oor die besetting van grond.

Dié party het sowat 0.11% van die stemme  ontvang, wat beteken dat sy steun vir ‘n radikale benadering tot nasionalisering van eiendom beperk is tot slegs een persoon uit 1 000 wat gestem het.

Thus in comparing the EFF and its leaders’ racial radicalism with that of the BLF above in how both are driving their politics, there is no real difference, besides the foolish arrogance and self-orientation of the two group’s leaders, thankfully blocking the formation of a foolish alliance. There seems, as for the failed BLF, that the EFF also has a limitation to be able to move into the future, namely as a hindrance, besides its contaminated racial inclinations, its unpredictable and strange leadership. To survive the post-2019 politics, the EFF is now forced to make a drastic change in its politics if it wants to survive until 2024. But, for the EFF to move more racially and economically radical to the left on nationalising the public’s private assets, there is no more space in post-2019 South Africa. To move right and moderately, there is also no place for the EFF: there are already well functioning parties here which will fast gobble up the EFF. Both outcomes are going to leave “Kaiser Julius Malema” walking naked out of Parliament very near in the future. Neither would an alliance with the other radicals such as the BLF, the SRWP and the ACM save the day. As mentioned, these parties are already basically phased out from the post-2019 politics due to their racial, political and economic radicalism, especially on the matter of land. To go to bed with the ATM for Malema’s EFF in a last dying compulsion, will be a fatal coupling for the EFF. It is clear that the ATM, born out of sympathy for Jacob Zuma because of his ousting from the presidency, is just another diminutive party which made it with “luck from somewhere” to Parliament. It is of political insignificance and only costs the taxpayers money by their sitting in Parliament.95

It must be noted that Malema is the EFF and the EFF is Malema. Stripping Malema from his EFF-clothing indeed means the forever departure from politics of Julius Malema, as well as his absurd political ambitions and aspirations. Taking Malema out of the EFF means the outright collapse of the EFF. It will thus take a far more constructive change inside the EFF and its leadership’s mindset to make it and them more acceptable as a party with moderate Blacks and Whites. Malema’s latest political rhetoric-trick after the post-2019 election, as with the many other political jokes, strangeness and obscurities uttered in his politic career, reflects excellenty the EFF’s and Malema’s political confusion and in-depth cementing already into the political wilderness. Prominent is his recent senseless and confused political title-tattle which undoubtedly reflects a serious memory loss on what he extremely racial-radically had said before on Whites and their assets – rhetoric which included serious threats to their property as well as their personal security. His senseless and confused political title-tattle tells us a lot when he said96:7: “We are focusing on all voters generally, not a specific race group. The only issue with white people and our policies is not that they are anti-white. Our policies are anti-white privilege and white people tend to enjoy white privilege at the expense of black people.”

In the face of this false “new good politics”, including a sudden and confusing “White love” as recently declared publically by Malema on behalf of himself and the EFF, Buccus26 guides and warns us on the dark, masked side of the EFF and Malema. Buccus posits26:26: “The EFF is clearly aligned to the mixture of crude nationalism, authoritarianism and gross looting of the state that has characterised the Zuma faction of the ANC.”  Buccus26 takes further this unchangeable racial radicalism politics of the EFF (and that of the FF+ from the White side of racial radicals) in the post -2019 politics when he writes26:26: “It is true that the crude racial populism of the EFF and the Freedom Front Plus made some gains, but in the overall picture they remain a minority. Mandela’s vision of racial reconciliation clearly still has the support of the majority of South Africans.”

For the EFF to move into an alliance with the ANC in an effort to block the EFF’s erasing as an entity from the country’s politics, can only possibly happen if the Zuma-faction overtakes the general ANC. But this outcome also seems also impossible, in terms of the EFF’s radical ideology, for any alliance if the doves of the Ramaphosa-clan obtain the upper hand. Even if the present status of internal conflicting-politics activated by the Zuma faction stays on within the ANC, the May 8 election shows that the ANC in general has successfully forced down for the moment the radicals inside it and had already disowned the Zuma-aligned ACM, the BLF and the ATM as possible future partners. Munusamy30 writes specifically in this context on the EFF’s radicalism and racial-contaminated shortcomings, making it already unacceptable as a possible partner to the ANC. Munusamy postulates30:26: “The EFF could have used its popularity on the ground to partner with the ANC in government. But its politics are underlined by malice and brutish behaviour, making a working relationship with any party unfeasible.

Buccus26, on the outcome of the election results of only a 10% stake instead of 15% and more which has forced down an empowerment cap on the EFF, as well as that of its possible radical partners in the ANC, in terms of their further practising of radical politics, writes26:26: “This outcome means that SA is doing relatively well in avoiding the curse of populism. The populists in the ANC have been seriously weakened by Ramaphosa’s success. They will be further weakened by the now much more credible criminal justice system.”

Indeed, the advent of a post-2019 credible criminal justice system may be the strongest eraser of the leadership of the EFF, together with the basically already invisible political movements such as those of the ACM, the ATM, the BLF, by their calling to book for political delinquency.26

4.1.1.2.4. Alleged inner-circle mischief at the EFF home

When it comes to the measuring of the integrity of a political party and its leadership, it is unavoidable to reflect on the EFF’s inner-circle’s politics and the allegations around it. Important to note in this respect are fresh allegations of financial impropriety against Julius Malema by members of his central command, according to Harper98. In his resignation letter, the previous EFF-MP, Zolile Xalisa, accused Malema of failingto account for R2-million a month collected in levies from councillors, MPLs and MPs. It is also alleged that Malema did not account for about R20-million which the party received from the legislatures every quarter.91,97,98

In this context Harper98 reports that in his public resignation, Xalisa also accused Malema of not accounting for about R1.7-million a month collected in levies specific from the EFF’s 825 councillors. It is alleged that since the 2016 elections, each councillor had paid a levy of almost R2 000 a month. Xalisa said98:10: “You [Malema] never reported about this money in the CCT [central team] and the war council. You refuse to be held accountable nor account for these funds.”

Regarding the levies of the 61 MPs and MPLs, Xalisa reports that just under R7 000 a person a month – which totals R427 000 a month for the 61 members, were collected – and there was no proper accounting done by Malema. All of the abovementioned money was meant to go into a constituency fund for EFF parliamentarians to do their constituency work. Furthermore, Malema is accused by Xalisa of forcing the central command team to themselves pay weekly deployment costs, including car hire, accommodation, party T-shirts and food for supporters.91,98

The other EFF-MP that resigned, Thebinosi Rawula, also accused Malema of alleged financial irregularities.91,97,98

In addition is the fact that Julius Malema has not yet been cleared from prosecution of earlier corruption charges in connection with government tenders in Limpopo. Now that the NPA is renewed and the Zuma-capture thereof it is starting to be cleared, Malema can become a point of focus.97

The madman-looting of the VBS Mutual Bank by many political fools and their cronies is now ready for prosecution. In this context, writes Bruce99, the fraud and pillage at the VBS Mutual Bank and the demonstrable benefit from the looting of it by Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu, which indeed forced their arrest, handcuffing, perp-walking, charging and then releasing on bail before the May 8 election is a clear and easy case for the law-enforcment agencies. Besides this, there is the allegation against the EFF of the receipt of funding from the tobacco underworld that needs the attention of the NPA, SARS and the SAPS, posits Munusamy.100

The arrest of Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu – Bruce’s99 description of “their handcuffing, perp-walking, charging and then releasing on bail before the May 8 election”, which was the moral and politically correct action — was seemingly only to avoid by the ANC’s opportunism not to lose some votes to the EFF for these arrests before the election and/or of a possible partnership between the ANC and EFF after the election. Notwithstanding all this political covering against their earlier arrest, Shamila Batohi and some trustworthy and law-abiding members in the Hawks, the NPA and the SAPS are hopefully waiting patiently for them. Bruce postulates that hopefully their arrests will come during 2019, with the possible outcome of leaving the EFF leaderless already in 2019.99-102

It seems that criminal law has at last arrived at the EFF’s door. It was reported that the EFF MP Marshall Dlamini had appeared on the 15th April 2019 in the magistrate’s court of Cape Town, due to his alleged assault of a police officer in Parliament on the 7th February. It seems that the deputy leader of the EFF, Floyd Shivambu, will also appear in court about his alleged assault of a journalist in March on the Parliament terrain. The 4% rise and glory of the last election can fast make place for the erasing of the EFF and its leaders, if the law is properly executed. The need to take them to court for past wrong–doings is highlighted by various investigative journalists.99-102

4.1.1.2.5. Julius Malema is an acolyte of Peter Mokaba in his underwriting of narrow African nationalism

Julius Malema, the EFF’s top leader, is “an acolyte of Peter Mokaba”, reflects the seasoned political analyst and the political editor of the Sunday Times, Sibongakonke Shoba103, in March 2009. This Malema political inclination is well-illustrated by Shoba103 by clearly showing Malema’s focus of his politics on a narrow “African nationalism”; a political ideology that had already failed to gain ground in the ANC and even the broader South African community. (Narrow White-nationalism was also the reason for the failure of the Afrikaners as a tribe in South Africa and brought down the NP with its racial and discriminative Apartheid; a party which was intimately built around it and its wrong-doings).1,103

Malema and his EFF, writes Shoba103, are a product of Mokaba’s teachings. He had undoubtedly become a believer in and a supporter of the worst form of African nationalism. Shoba writes103:19: “He has hijacked the political space once occupied by the PAC and the Azanian People’s Organisation. Even though Malema may, on occasion, invoke the names of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo, his politics have been inspired by Pan-Africanist rhetoric. His attacks on white people and South Africans of Indian origin show that his idea of African nationalism is extreme, and has an element of right-wing demagoguery.”

What Shoba103 missed out on and also needs to say, is that Malema’s ideology of the “encircling of a greater South African African-nationalism” has been cemented into a well-masked “Venda-African-nationalism” or plain “Venda-tribalism”. It is a deadly, abnormal Black ethnicity and tribalism. This Venda-nationalism-tribalism carries in ordinary South African politics absolutely no empowerment or status and will go nowhere. To underwrite and propagate it would let Malema remain for ever faceless, unknown and powerless in South African politics, and of course, out of Parliament and its feed-trough. The reflection of and presentation thus of a “greater” South African African-nationalism”, is nothing more than masterminded-politics by Malema, purely for opportunistic reasons and his personal gain. (This “Malema-initiative” is to a certain extent a pure mimicing of the Zuma clan’s failed policy through which they  tried to represent “African-Black nationalism” or “Black-African nationalism” away from African-nationalism for their political gain, such as activating and upholding of state capture, land grabbing and the nationalising of White capital, etc.).34,63,64,103

Prominent in Malema’s attacks on so-called “non-Africans” (meaning “non-Black” Africans) are the names of Pravin Gordhan (also a target of Mokaba) and Shamila Batohi. And then there are the Afrikaners/Whites, especially the farm owners and White-capitalists.99,104 Excellent examples here are the many politically and racially delinquent utterances of Malema between 2016 and 2018, such as: “We are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now” and his statement that: “…people of Indian decent tend to mistreat black workers” – both utterances which the South African Human Rights Commission found to be OK!104,105 Then there is Malema’s nonchalant pronouncement of Pravin Gordhan as a “…dog of white monopoly capital who hates Africans”, as well as Shivambu’s authored blog post, accusing as follows: “Gordhan of running a cabal and operating a parallel state”.104,105 These kinds of utterances, if used by a White, undoubtedly would mean a jail sentence plus.

The allegation of the “future that the EFF is seising” and the “freshness and creativeness” that the EFF  allegedly is bringing to the so-called “South African old politics of liberation”- as seen and propagated by Kanyane92 – is going to be very short-lived. The EFF has gained temporarily more votes in the May-election through racism and extreme radical-politics, only because the greater ANC as well as the DA shy away from this kind of political delinquency. But it is going to cost the EFF dearly in post-2019 politics. It must be noted, on the other side, that this political and racial contamination which has beset the EFF will spread into its co-partners if the EFF is successful in misleading either the DA or the ANC into a post-2019 trap of cooperation.103

An exclusive and selective African nationalism (equal to the one which Malema propagates) cost the PAC and Azapo dearly, putting them into permanent regression as groups after 1994, writes Shoba103. The “struggle of Africans” in South Africa, as Malema with great mischief reflects, is not limited to small group of African-Blacks, but includes all the racial groups who are a permanent part of South Africa and thus Africa. It is clear that with regard to the ultra-African nationalism, it is today only Malema and a very small group of remnants of the old revolutionaries that are still stuck with this cognitive idea. The EFF’s propagation and spreading of it spells revolution and genocide that are not part of the thinking of the majority of South Africans. Looking at this delinquent-internalised mindset of Julius Malema, is it undoubtedly with a tongue in his cheek that Shoba fatherly advises Malema103:19: “If Malema is serious about realising his childhood ambition to ascend to the highest office in the land, he will have to change tack.” From experience Shoba103 must know very well that Malema cannot change; neither does he understand the meaning “tack”, or what it means to be responsible after ascending to the highest office.

4.1.1.2.6. Malema and his merry men mostly dressed in Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits

On Julius Malema’s bi-polar presence in the South African politics — and surely an effort to give us insight into the many colours a chameleon can take, even those in the South African politics — De Waal writes106:33:

Thabo Mbeki at the Rand Easter Show! How thrilling. The diminutive former statesman was wheeled out of retirement by the ANC to counter the presence of his former foe, Julius Malema, who now leads the ANC’s external ultra-left wing, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). First, though, a little back ground. It was Malema, then leading the ANC Youth League, who said he would kill for Jacob Zuma, who was then challenging Mbeki for the ANC leadership. Later, in one of those historical ironies one can only relish, Malema himself was booted out of the ANC – by his former patron and glorious leader, Zuma, for comparing him unfavourably with his predecessor, Mbeki!

How we chuckled.

It’s rather odd that, now, with both Mbeki and Zuma out of power, Malema is backing Zuma’s bagman, Tom Moyane, to the hilt, and demonetising Pravin Gordhan, Zuma’s bête noir, for all he’s worth. But that’s a puzzle for another day.

To unlock the above puzzle around the specific Julius Malema political mindset and actions is very easy and does not need another day. We just have to look back to his yesterday and his not so far-back history of politically delinquent actions and how easily he changes from his Dr Jekyll suit to his Mister Hyde suit when the situation opportunistically fits him.

Firstly, witness his delinquent political action excellently reflected when Cosatu, under his leadership in 2002, unleashed chaos in the Johannesburg CBD, leading to loses by pedestrians, vendors and shopkeepers who were mugged and robbed during the rowdy illegal march.107This kind of unleashing of chaos-behaviour in public was alleged again to be caused by his EFF’s involvement at the more recent unrest in the township of Alexandra on land occupation. It was prominently alleged at the last sitting of the Alexandra Inquiry in May 2019 that the EFF was directly involved. At a meeting of the Inquiry, the Alexandra councillor, Teffo Raphadu, said that the EFF perpetrates land invasions in Alexandra in such a delinquent way “that [it] put people’s lives in danger,” according to Okoye.108

Furthermore, it seems, that there is only one approach for Malema109 to obtain land reform (especially the transfer of White “settlers’ so called stolen land” to the landless and poor Blacks, and that is through violence, anarchy and revolution. He declares himself open to the use of violence, anarchy and revolution in the settling of the land matter, ignoring the fact that a mandated black government, the ANC, is reigning and he himself is a MP of the respected South African Parliament and not a non-conforming member of a bush-bar. He is supposed to be a role-model and is expected to promote integrity. The intention to incite unlawful violence, anarchy and revolution in order to overthrow the government of the day is well illustrated by his following writing on the 22 July 2018109:22:

There is simply no way Parliament can retreat on this question any longer. After all these consultations, one thing is clear: to retreat and betray our people on the demand for land expropriation will be to risk a direct revolution, which they will conduct on their own, wherever they are.

On that day, when our people take the land by force, the EFF will join in because the power of the day would have refused to co-ordinate a peaceful, democratic and inclusive process that empowers the previously oppressed to have access to the land.

When further examining his EFF Manifesto presented for the recent election, the same kind of disorder politics is preached by him. The basis is over and over the threatening of the order of society and the instigation of anarchy, constantly and continuously. It reads89:18:

“We are not part of the 1994 elite pact. We are a completely new generation, with new demands. And our demands, unlike those of the 1994 generation, will not be postponed. We refuse to be silenced with so-called reconciliation. We want justice now. We want our land now. We want jobs now. We demand the economy now!”

But there are more than just the Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits that Malema and his cronies from the EFF seem to dress themselves in daily: there are seemingly also their witch-hunter suits that need to be highlighted, because this also, as Teffo Raphadu said of the EFF’s alleged delinquent activities in Alexandra, “puts peoples’ lives in danger.”108,110

At the end of this article the Citizen of the 29th May 2019 reports on the politics of the bizarre that comes from the EFF leader Malema’s alleged death threats towards the Scorpio’s investigative journalist Pauli van Wyk.110 This reaction followed after her report on the 28th May 2019 on how the EFF had apparently benefitted from the looting of the now defunct VBS Mutual Bank, as well as the EFF’s deflection from claims of corruption to a spirited defence of the public protector. Watson110, on these alleged actions of the EFF-cronies, writes110:2: “When the story – titled “Cruising nicely on VBS: EFF’s Parties, Lies and Looted Money” – was released on Monday night, Malema’s response on Twitter was: “We are still cruising nicely, bana ba balei [children of witches] are not happy. Go for kill fighters, hit hard…[sic]”. ▼

Watson110 writes that Van Wyk110 allegedly had noted in her article that the EFF’s fourth birthday bash in Durban in July 2017 was seemingly funded by a part of the money of the illegal R16.1-million Brian Shivambu’s company Sgameka Projects received from VBS that was ultimately channelled to the EFF. Watson also writes that it is alleged by Scorpio that it has so far isolated about R4.13-million in VBS loot paid to the EFF. Watson110 reflects that the article of Van Wyk is currently (29th May 2019) on the Daily Maverick with apparent copies of bank statements around these payments. He writes110:2: “…which, on the face of it, explain the flow of cash in “a scheme designed to mask the origin and ultimate beneficiaries of the funds. VBS money flowed through companies over which Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu have ultimate control”.”

In response to further enquiries to Malema by Van Wyk110 about the leadership of the EFF and its treasurer-general Leigh-Ann Mathys, alleged Watson110 that had Malema said110:2: “I won’t be answering any questions from the moloi [witch]; she can write anything she wants to write. I’ve responded to all her questions before and won’t be doing it going forward. She is extraordinarily personal [sic] and I’m not answerable to a white madam. She can go to the nearest hell.” ▼

Watson110 reports further that, in a seeming effort at deflecting from the VBS Bank matter, the EFF Deputy President Shivambu110 compared Van Wyk to a lizard and Pravin Gordhan to a crocodile110:2: “We really have no time fighting lizards when the crocodiles are the real enemy forces.” This brings us again to the foreground of Van Wyk’s110 earlier note in the Scorpio on the “strange” and for “what unknown” reason, the “spirited defence of the public protector” by the EFF who is herself at the moment under scrutiny by the various political bodies for  her actions.

How far the politically delinquent actions, especially on the contamination of good racial-relations, of persons such as Malema and his intimate cronies in their Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits have tragically already penetrated a sector of the Black society mindsets with their dangerous anti-White culture and radicalism, was well-illustrated by the crowd’s booing of ex-President FW de Klerk (the man who puts Blacks – and thus also Julius Malema and his cronies – in charge of South Africa in 1994) at the recent inauguration of President Cyril Ramaphosa.111  Bachtis111 writes as follows on this indication of the vile racial tensions that exist in the country111:13:

This was a naked display of intolerance of one race group against another. Sickening in the extreme, as white people in this country were given notice that they are abhorred, and regarded as undesirable.

It took the master of ceremonies some time to bring the crowd to order. Sadly, many in that crowd were dignitaries from countries across the African continent, witnessing vitriolic sentiments.

This show of disrespect heralds the new South Africa, a country where white-skinned people, born in this country, are regarded as being of no importance.

The white diaspora will continue, and this country will continue to entrench reverse racism and apartheid.

That the Whites must start to fear for their lives if Malema and his cronies win the empowerment of the country’s politics, is further confirmed by his racially delinquent utterance of:

“We are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now”.103-105

The above words, which echo perfectly Julius Malema’s history of racial rhetoric, have excellently put in the foreground Julius Malema’s and the EFF’s all-over political mischief of agitation and the instigation of disrespect for the individual’s rights, democracy, and political order. This negativity is not only applicable to the Whites, but also to the greater Black population.89,107,108,110,111

Political jokers and clowns bring laughter and can sometimes change for the good, even inside the political circus, but political fools can, masked as jokers and clowns, be very dangerous in the short and long run for the minorities and a country’s stability: remember Idi Amin and Adolf Hitler. Thankfully, the delinquencies and foolishnesses of these political fools’ mostly disable themselves in the end.99-102

Malema and his cronies at the EFF will hopefully soon learn that their outdated and poor fitting Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits do not fit into today’s respectable politics. Neither can their witch-hunter suits qualifying them for jokers and clowns. To be dressed in these outfits much longer can cost them dearly.99-102

▲ It is important for Julius Malema with regard to his alleged calling Pauli van Wyk a witch, to take note of the main aims of the Witchcraft Suppression Act No 3 of 1957, namely112:

To prevent any person or a community to identify a specific person (notwithstanding his position or doing, to justify such an identification) to be a “”wizard”” through witch-finding;

To prevent that this identified person (“wizard”) is harmed (threatened, terrorised, victimised or even murdered) in any way by the “witch-finder” or the community;

To prevent a person to call himself a ‘wizard’ by prohibiting such self-naming / declaration as a crime, with the sole aim to safeguard him against harm by his own wrong-doing, to be identified as a ‘wizard’ by the ‘witch-finder’ and the community. [For full text see Section 1(a) to (f) (i) – (iv) of the Act].

This means that Malema’s alleged calling of Ms Pauli Van Wyk a moloi (witch) and the alleged use of the words: bana ba balei [children of witches] are not good. Go for kill fighters, hit hard…[sic]”, can be a serious matter and lead to his criminal prosecution and being sent to jail. It can be as serious as looting the VBS Bank’s money and committing high treason.110,112

4.1.1.2.7. The EFF is a boys’ club of dinky-toy players

The EFF is a boys club of dinky toy players; it does not have political potential, quality or maturity. The majority of democracy-loving South Africans know it well. It is only the politically poorly informed voters and some present-day confused and disillusioned ANC members, together with a pocket of political radicals, that still believe in the EFF’s kindergarten stories and their so-called “saviour and messianic” leaders, the honourable MPs Malema and Shivambu, to bring about their Utopia.12,92,99,100,113-115

The EFF’s Manifesto, propagated by Julius Malema under the heading: “The EFF is ready to govern as demonstrated by the detailed blueprint for economic emancipation as set out in its manifesto”, is not worth the paper on which it has been written. There is an immense difference between a detailed manifesto of plain nonsense and a detailed record of an excellent practice of politics. The last mentioned is a good characteristic which the EFF is totally lacking. Prominent from the reading of the EFF Manifesto is Malema’s instigation of violence, racism, minority-bashing and radical-Marxism and the solving of politics and economics with the typical chaos-revolutionary business model where the ruler does not create new economic growth, prosperity and richness, but only transfers the assets of the one group to the so-called poor and landless people, who, at the end, stay landless and poverty-stricken. At the end of such a chaotic regime, when the economics come to a standstill and poverty and chaos reigns, the ruler collapses and escapes the scene with his loot.33,88,103,114,115

The EFF is, in its juvenile stage of development, already a failed political experience. Hopefully, if the NPA at last starts to do its work, Malema and his immediate cronies will be out of circulation in 2019.88,110,114 The heartbreak which Julius Malema experienced when he mourned the death of his grandmother115:7: “I am broken, finished” may be his same words in the future with his departure and that of his beloved EFF from the country’s politics.

History can be hard and cruel on foolish politicians and their parties. This punishment can be harder for an irresponsible boys club of dinky toy players. Sorely for the EFF, it seems to be one of these historical cases.

4.1.1.2.8. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018

On the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, the EFF is awarded eight points out of a possible 82 points.81

This measure shows that the EFF does not have the ability or a single talent to take on a simple government task or duty; forget the implementation of the nationalising and the grabbing of land. The EFF and its politics is like a dog chasing a car for years and then one day the car stops, giving the dog the opportunity to try to bite the tyres and to take the car captive, but without success, leaving it with the enormous problem of what to do with the stranded car it was chasing for years. The EFF has indeed been stranded between its inciting, foolish and hostile rhetoric and its lack of knowhow to be able to do constructive deeds. And then there is its extremely unpredictable politics, bordering on political insanity. The EFF’s mastery to distract the attention from their own delinquencies and inabilities through the excellent misuse of social media are also thankfully diminishing fast under the onslaught of investigative and constructive journalists. The fact is, and the public is beginning to learn this well, that the EFF and its leaders’ political warts on their hands and faces make them just too visible.12,92,99,100,108,113-116

5. Conclusions

On the decision to vote for the EFF or not in the recent May 2019 election, Munusamy118 gave the voters before the election clear, advice: “…holding our noses to vote for the least-odious party” when she guides118:20: “To make a decision to vote requires that law-abiding, conscientious people ask themselves which political party is least offensive to their own values and principles.” When the “is least offensive” requirement has been applied, it could not be the EFF. Thankfully also, to support Munusamy’s118 guideline, most of the voters have excellent values and principles. They showed it clearly in the election by their isolation of the EFF, together with its cronies, such as the ATM, the ACM and the BLF, from future serious politics. Indeed, the voters put the lid on radical racial politicians. The EFF’s politics, reflected by its contaminated political thinking, planning and action, spell only disaster all over for the county’s well-being.116,118

If people are disgusted by the possible inclusion of some of the 22 listed disgraced ANC top brass as parliamentarians, they must be just as disgusted to see Malema and Shivambu back in Parliament as MPs.92,99,100,113,114,116 But, on the other hand, to be noted on this uncommon phenomenon, people must remember, as Retief119 says, this is Africa. Seemingly this country now has its own style of the practice of politics and the underwriting of political integrity.

All South Africans, especially the Whites, know that serious land reform is absolutely needed; it is an immediate imperative and there is a strong contingent of Whites willing to participate in reasonable land transfer to Blacks. The EFF and its leaders’ incoherent land grabbing policy, together with their cognitive political mal-thinking, spell revolution and can lead to the cost of thousands of innocent lives. Mandela’s sole reason for entrance into the 1994-Dispensation was because too much blood of the Black majority had been spilled. The EFF wants a Rwanda in South Africa. The EFF and the Malema-crowd are on the way, if they get the opportunity, to spill blood again, but this time a mass of Black, Coloured, Indian and White blood.75-80

It is clear that the EFF’s CV is very thin. It lacks the prescribed qualifications and documents as well as the prescribed experience to be a ruler. They played off this meaningless CV very well  in the May election, without anyone really contacting their referees. The Attestations or letters of the referees on the EFF’s and its leaders’ trustworthiness, integrity and qualities – besides one or two subjective, uninformed and unqualified referees — are totally rejecting the EFF as a ruler or partner to a ruler for post-2019 South Africa. The referees of the EFF, in evaluating it as the ideal government to activate, steer and finalise land expropriation, with (or without) compensation, erases them summarily from the list of candidates.

The count awarded to EFF and its leadership in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201881, is a mere 8 (9%) out of a possible maximum of 82 (100%). This means, together with its leadership, an outright failure as a political institution of stature.75-80

Mischief-doing is the only ability of the EFF and its leadership. The present holding of mass land ownership by Whites is basically the only initiative left to the EFF to be able to perpetuate mischief too, basically because it can be contaminated unobstructedly through the EFF’s Parliament privilege racial relations without the taking of responsibility or the calling to book if a fiasco follows. Coetzee120 warns on this post-2019 possibility and the serious consequences for the country by these dinky-toy players’ actions120:14: “Die moedswillige skade wat die Julius Malemas, Magashules and Mlamleli’s met hul opruiery van grondbesetters aanrig, is onberekenbaar.”

The ANC’s own radical racism is strengthening the opportunity for the EFF’s boys club to make some noise, as in the past, in Parliament on the land matter. Coetzee writes120:14: “Naas die korrupsiestryd, gaan die grondkwessie in dié vyfjaar-termyn ‘n brandpunt wees. Die arena waar die wetlike stryd hom grootliks gaan uitspeel, is in die parlement, waar die ad hoc-kommittee vir die wysiging van die Grondwet  se art.25 deurgedryf gaan word.” It is the same Parliament where the EFF had shown in the past its unlimited political gangsters and violence. The land reform matter can, if the EFF is not favoured and supported by the other parliamentarians in doing it in “Malema-style”, change to serious Parliamentary conflict and violence.

The EFF cannot be trusted in any way to be in charge of land expropriation. Moreover, they totally lack the experience to handle such a project.

The applicant status of the EFF, to be considered as an able candidate to be able to rule South Africa after May 8, and thus to  successfully activate land expropriation (with or without compensation), is so low that it and its leadership should not ever be considered and be allowed on the first list of applicants to be a ruler. The application of the EFF must be completely rejected and its application papers should be sent back. It cannot be shortlisted.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa. (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanisation and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

Perspectives on the background to the land ownership dispute (2)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author: Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PUCHE), DPhil (PUCHE), PhD (NWU) Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: land dispute, expropriate, land-grabbing, land ownership, land reform, realities, political history, radicalism, redistribution, revolution.

Ensovoort, volume 39 (2019), number 1: 1

1. Background

1.1 Introduction

Al-Khalili writes1, pp.7-8: One of the biggest drivers of change today is population growth, which is possible only because of technological change. We could not sustain a planet of 7½ billion without the changes in agriculture and food production that have taken place since the nineteenth century: in particular, the so-called Green Revolution that, in the middle decades of the twentieth century, combined the development of high-yielding crop strains with the availability of artificial fertilizers. Without those advances, billions would probably have starved.

But it is not clear that we can sustain a planet with more than 9 billion people on it, as it is predicted for 2050, without substantial further innovations, particularly in food growth and production and water resources. Most of the population growth will be in Africa and Asia – in countries that lack economics and infrastructural resources to easily accommodate it.

South Africa is one of the unfortunate African countries Al-Khalili refers to where the population is growing rapidly and where the economy has steadily gone down hill since the ANC took over with its orientation towards liberation and revolution. Poverty has begun to cloud the daily lives of especially the majority of the Black population. Infrastructure has deteriorated, leading to substandard education for the masses and an immense shortage in primary, secondary and tertiary training opportunities. South Africa is being overshadowed by growing unemployment; a lack of knowledge on education, economics and the future; poor agriculture management; ineffective use of land; and a national strategy blinded by racism. In this context there is one clear reality we might have to manage as soon as 2019: avoiding the devastating events that occurred in Zimbabwe and Venezuela from happening here. South Africa needs sound and emotionally balanced leaders, supported by an overseeing political leadership that is free from the post-1994 blemishes of corruption. Only leaders of high calibre would be able to plan the financial and economical future of the country.1-6 The warning issued by the CEO of Agri SA, Omri Van Zyl, sets off the alarm bells about the ANC elite’s ideas on ensuring foodsecurity:7: 9

If we say by 2050 there’s 80 million people in South Africa, we really need to protect the production base… rather than erode it.

The emotions around landownership can spell doom for South Africa if there is no rational thinking and economic wisdom to see the possible dangers for food and political stability. Hunger is already prominent globally – one in nine of the world’s population did not have enough food to eat in 2017. It is anticipated that by 2050, food production would have to be double that of today to meet the world’s basic needs. People who suffer hunger total 821 million, reflecting a rise over past three years. A report of the UN, titled8: 13: The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World, shows that the most hunger occurs in those countries where land is not managed wisely and strategically to generate enough food and where there is political radicalism with disrespect to landownership. Various food agencies warn that hunger is on the rise worldwide, especially in Africa8: 13: “Undernourishment and severe food insecurity appear in almost all sub-regions of Africa, as well as South America, whereas the under nourishment situation is stable in most regions of Asia”.

Local statistics released for 2017 to 2018 reflect that over 55% of South Africans live in abject poverty and with food insecurity. Almost 14 million have incomes that put them below the food poverty line (R17.48 a day), 17 million (20% of the total population) depend on state welfare for their daily survival, while 27.2% of the workable labour force is unemployed (a percentage that could be in reality as high as 50% and more). South Africa has been in a constant economic decline since 2008, with a continuously rising GDP debt and throws the country into a recession every now and then. The Western world may go into another recession by about 2021, and South Africa and some of the BRICS partners may be pushed into further poverty and an immense food shortage and job losses. Hopefully the next recession would not be the magnitude of the 2008/9 crisis or the Great Depression of the 1930s.9-13 Mulder14 reflects that more than 80% of farmers in Africa farm on two hectares or less, putting them into the category of subsistence farmers who can only produce for their families’ needs. This means that 35 sub-Saharan African countries lack food security and must import food. In addition, South Africa is set to have a 70% urbanized population soon, putting immense pressure on stable food production. This necessitates an effective commercial farming sector that uses land optimally. Mulder’s question is significant14: 4-5: “Do we want to move back to subsistence farming or instead satisfy the need for land in cities?” [Own translation]. In this context the editor of the City Press, Mondli Makhanya, writes14: 4-5: “We are wasting valuable time and energy trying to restore people to their peasant ways. Ordinary South Africans either do not want land or just do not have the capacity to work it. They want to go to cities and work in modern economy…” As far back as 2010 the Sunday Times reported14: 4-5: “The money and energy that is spent on getting peasants back into subsistence (farming) would be better used to create a strong class of black commercial farmers who actually do farm for commercial rather than sentimental reasons”.

In South Africa the harsh present realities are illustrated by the fact that only 30% of Black small-scale grain farmers out of about 3 800 are really productive. It seems to specifically be the small-scale grain farmers with farms of between 10ha and 50ha who are going nowhere.3: 10 The constant decline in the number of small-scale dairy farmers in the Free State — from 929 in 2009 to only 190 in 2018 (a total decline of 739), with 30 more farms in the process of closing down — is further evidence of the inability of small-scale dairy to be productive and to reach commercial farmer status. It seems that many of these 3 800 small-scale farmers failed even as subsistence farmers.3 The CEO of the national Milk Producers Organisation (MPO), Chris van Dijk15, reflected as follows on the inability of small-scale dairy farmers15: 3: “You cannot expect to make money by milking 100 cows. To break even on a dairy farm you need at least 320 cows, which a lot of Free State and North West farmers don’t have”.

The above indicates that irresponsible land reform can hamper farming with for instance grain and milk to a point where massive imports would be required, which would result in dramatic price increases, putting the poor under even more pressure. This should serve as a warning about the consequences of radical land reform. Overly emotional thinking and political manipulation should not be allowed to enter the mindsets of the poor and landless Black masses of South Africa so that they start seeing land grabbing as a solution to their immediate dire life circumstances, be it poverty, inequality or unemployment.3,15 When the masses become emotional and desperate so that they start viewing land redistribution as an absolute must, it can result in a replay of the far-reaching and tragic Cattle Killing (also described as the National Suicide) of the Xhosas under Kreli in Kaffraria and in the Black territories east of the Kei in 1857. This event caused the death of thousands of Blacks. Today such an event can result in devastating hunger so that millions of South Africans can perish of famine and internal conflicts in a fight for food.16,17 Ngcukaitobi’s18 argues that land redistribution goes further than just handing over White land for emotional reasons. He points out that if18: 23: “…the legacy is to be undone, the return of the land should be restorative of African humanity. Transactions about the ‘return’ of the land are incomplete without restoring the dignity of those whom the land was taken”.

He explains what was lost and pleads for the restoration of African identities, freedom, equality and political autonomy18: 23: “Land is not the only asset that was lost through colonial occupation. Cattle, farming implements, labour and human potential were taken away. African societies were broken up, their cultures ravaged and their identities erased”.

He views a “forward-looking” comprehensive reparative land project as most urgent, seemingly involving the expropriation of more than just land from Whites. For Ngcukaitobi18 land reform is only one facet of the process of radical economic transformation. His18 argument is still an emotional one, but it goes deeper than only the right of the “indigenous” Blacks to get ownership of their birth land and the right to live there. It seems to be based on a desire for Black empowerment to the extent where the South African soil is owned exclusively by Blacks. This is not necessarily an economically responsible system that would benefit society or the country as a whole. It is true that the past is linked to the present by emotion, but the present reality is no longer compatible with all the identities and customs of the past. Some of the Black African ideologies, freedoms and egalitarian practices are no longer reconcilable with the demands of modern life. Ngcukaitobi18 realizes this and he acknowledges the new realities and the fact that ideological thinking may perhaps not offer all the solutions18: 23:

“World Bank studies show an urbanization rate of more than 60% in the past 20 years in South Africa. The message is clear: the pure agrarian society in South Africa has been disrupted irrevocably. Access to rural or farmland will not satisfy land hunger. Urban land must be factored into the frame”.

It is clear that economic realities are becoming more important than political affiliations and emotional yearnings for the past. Economic and educational upliftment has spread to the poorest of South African society, and this changed the thinking of the masses. They live in the city and work at industries or businesses instead of living from the land.18 The extent to which the emotional rhetoric is a danger to the country is clear from Julius Malema’s words. Should these sentiments take hold, it can lead to anarchy19: 3:

We celebrate nothing else, because all other achievements are meaningless without the land being restored to our people. There is no more fear or doubt in their hearts; they know that it must be done, and say it openly.

Malema elaborates further19:3:

There is simply no way parliament can retreat on this question any longer. After all these consultations, one thing is clear: to retreat and betray our people on the demand for land expropriation will be to risk a direct revolution, which they will conduct on their own, wherever they are.

On that day, when our people take the land by force, the EFF will join in because the powers of the day would have refused to co-ordinate a peaceful, democratic and inclusive process that empowers the previously oppressed to have access to the land.

What makes this statement so irresponsible and so dangerous to future food production in South Africa, is the fact that Malema’s party has no clear understanding of democracy, economics, governance, human rights, legal rule or any idea of how to address the country’s problems with food shortages and unemployment. All they know is emotional rhetoric.20-22 What is more is that populists and aggressive activists forget that much of the best land in South Africa is in the hands of the state. The government is sitting on millions of hectares of agricultural land that is not productive because the Black tenants cannot raise capital. The ANC has failed miserably to support these farmers.7 The failure of the ANC to do something productive by helping Black farmers deserves more attention. According to Grain SA3, the country’s biggest organization for grain producers, nearly 70% of the Black grain farmers on small farms in the government’s assistance programme have failed to produce any crops because they have little or no access to financing to manage their enterprises. Jordan3 points out that the vast majority of these grain farmers, about 3 800, farm on government-owned land and therefore have no individual title deeds to offer as collateral to get loans from credit providers. This raises concern about the ability of the ANC government to make anything of land expropriation that could actually mean something to the poor and the landless.3

Grain SA3 shows that about 800 Black small farmers with farms of between 10ha and 50ha are basically dormant because of this finance stalemate. Jannie De Villiers3, the CEO of Grain SA, reports on them as follows3: 10:

“These are all potential commercial farmers but all of their land belongs to government. There is no finance there because they don’t have title deeds”.

This highlights the paradoxes in the land policy of the ANC. They want to establish masses of Black small farmers on repossessed White land, but if they failed to assist them over the last two odd decades since 1994, how on earth will the ANC regime supports them in the future? In this context Grain SA3 says that their own assistance programme for Black grain farmers teaches that when farmers have access to financing, the outcome is phenomenal. In their programme, 150 Black farmers produced more than 250 tons of grain annually. Grain SA’s successful intervention programme for subsistence farmers typically increased farmers’ yields from about one ton to more than four tons.

Proponents of land expropriation, such as Ramphele, Malema and Ramaphosa, seem to overlook the facts described above. There is little probability that the ANC would successfully establish large-scale Black farming.3,16,19,23 De Villiers3 and Grain SA3 have more questions about how the ANC government aims to manage the result their land expropriation plan. Who will be placed where, what will they produce, and with what funding?3: 10:

The issue is whether they will expropriate with or without title deed. If you are without [title deed] then we influence food security.

De Villiers writes further3:10:

In our pool, only about 30% of black farmers are productive, the rest are forced to just sit on the land. This is why we are saying we want a sustainable land reform programme. It must solve the problem, otherwise it will just expand the problem.

The ANC’s emotional responses to any criticism on the land expropriation policy reflect radicalism. South African billionaire Johann Rupert24 in September 2017 in Geneva openly criticized Zuma and the ANC’s “need for change in land ownership” by calling it “a mere cover for theft”. The ANC reacted by calling his criticism “ill-advised” and “Rupert rhetoric” without addressing any of his concerns. Land has clearly become a carrier of a Black-on-White aggression; it is no longer a White-on-Black assault. What is more, the debate on land has been carried by populistic journalism, with investigative journalism being all but gagged.24 The editorial of the Sunday Times of 17 September 2017 shows how even journalists steer towards liberation ideology when evaluating Rupert’s words. It reads25: 20:

Given the country’s history, where skin colour played a major role in whether one became rich or poor, he should have been more sensitive to the restlessness of the majority over the slow pace of change.

While we recognize the fact that Rupert has been on the receiving end of a racist propaganda campaign that has sought to shift the public spotlight from state capture by President Jacob Zuma‘s friends the Guptas by blaming the country’s problems on him, we do not believe that denying the need for a radical shift from current ownership patterns helps his case.

Rupert, and the [White] business community in general, need to accept and embrace the need for change as the status quo – where much of the economy is concentrated in a few hands – is unsustainable.

The editor has no acknowledgement of the part the ANC has played in the slow land reform. The editor has become an equal role player with his clear warning to Rupert that radical land transformation is a finality; A subject on which the White billionaire and every ordinary White citizen should keep quiet. He also fails to mention the millions of poor and landless Blacks, or the Black billionaires like Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale or Jacob Zuma — all of them landowners. He also says nothing about the sustainability of the resulting farms. The debate is becoming a power play with Black and White positions being reversed.25-28 Land ownership in perspective, is in South Africa a serious matter, and if we look beyond the rhetoric, it is clear that there are a number of problems. The first mistake was that the 1994 Constitution closed down the discussion on land transfer, and the leadership has not addressed it since. Khumalo29 indicates the confusion in people’s mind about this issue and the polarization between the different sides.

Khumalo writes in this regard29: 10:

The first policy debate out of the blocks this year is land. Land policy has gone through various rebranding, having started as land restitution, land redistribution and lately land reform, while the implementation kicked of as “willing buyer, willing seller”, then became “just and equitable”.

Now we are firmly in “land expropriation without compensation”, with a few caveats around food security.

All this should be a warning that ignoring or postponing the wrongs of the past and hoping they would sort themselves out is not sustainable. Hope is not a strategy.

The matter of land has to be settled soon and the solution should be viable and sustainable. It is a legitimate problem that has been ignored for too long. The writing of Ellapen Rapiti30 on the sensitive and explosive matter of land redistribution, with or without compensation, offers a wise warning that can not be ignored:30: 20

One can only hope that the ruling party will handle this delicate situation of land expropriation with prudence and caution before we end up with anarchy and civil war or become a pariah of the international community, something we can ill-afford after years of Jacob Zuma’s terrible leadership.

Land expropriation without compensation is something much more complicated and comprehensive than what the arguments, opinions and viewpoints show. For one thing, it is central to the ANC’s failure to rule effectively since 1994. The taking of White land will not solve Black poverty, inequality and unemployment. The ANC government does not add value to the economic, social and juridical integrity of South Africa. Land grabbing is a desperate attempt to find a short-term solution to the ANC’s crisis. It is also something sinister — farms is just the first in line in a long row of asset categories that can fall like dominoes in future.2,31 The issue of land goes deeper than just ownership. The inculcation of radicalism is one thing that should be discussed. It stems from a long history, and the article now turns to a discussion of the different radical points of view in an effort to sketch the background to the land issue.

1.1.1 The objectors to land grabbing

There is a clear initiative by some individuals and groups to oppose the envisioned change to the Constitution and land expropriation without compensation. It is not a uniform group and their motivations, agendas and aims differ. It will be correct to say there are some instances of opportunism, selfishness and racism; sometimes openly, but mostly hidden. The main adherents are White, of which the Afrikaners are the most.

At the same time, there is strong opposition from the formal business sector, which is capitalistic and democratically orientated. Their concern is the short and long term economic health of the country and its people, as well as the individuals and groups whose financial interests they manage. On the whole, the business sector is free from racial and ethnic interests in this debate.

Among journalists, there is also a strong group of anti-reformers, mostly representing the Afrikaner and White English-speaking media. Prominent is the presence of a strong group of seasoned Black journalists and experienced White English-speaking journalists who have become known for their objective, well-reasoned political arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the land reforming issue. They do not shy away from taking on the political role players of the country, be it the ANC or the Freedom Plus, Mandela or Verwoerd. This group forms a core that offers the public a balanced and constructive view on current politics.2,32-35 On the Afrikaner side, the most prominent organizations are Agri SA, AfriForum, Agbiz, Afri Agric, Solidarity, and the Institute of Race Relations (IRR), as well as Afrikaans newspapers such as Die Burger, Beeld and Rapport. Opposition political parties have an informal alliance to resist changes to the Constitution to allow land expropriation without compensation. This includes Cope, the DA, ACDP, Freedom Plus and IFP. There is also an ad hoc group of 17 organisations consisting of role players such as AfriForum, the Helen Suzman foundation, the Reformed Church, the FW de Klerk foundation, the DA, the FF-Plus, Cope, Agri Limpopo, and various business or cultural bodies like Solidarity and the IRR. These various entities are focused on the ANC’s attack on democracy and the present political discrimination against Whites with the undemocratic capture of White farms and capital. 2,32-39

These Afrikaner organisations, often sold to the public as the saviours of the Afrikaner, mostly address the land matter by means of legal avenues, financial support and public campaigns to request the public to support the resistance to land expropriation. They have also attempted to reach out to political leaders like President Donald Trump and the UN in terms of its Article 17 on human rights.2,32-35 The business sector is mostly represented by prominent institutions like the Minerals Council SA, Business Leadership SA, the Land Bank, Agricultural Business Chamber (Agbiz) and the Reseve Bank. At the moment, all those who oppose expropriation are anxiously waiting for the outcome of the parliamentary hearings and the ANC’s possible actions via the parliament or the country’s courts of law to change the Constitution. Once this happens, these groups intend to use the courts and to approach foreign governments. The outcome of the test case on the interpretation of Section 25 could also affect the process.5,36-39

Ramaphosa’s determination with respect to this issue and his public challenging of Donald Trump has made it clear to the Afrikaner/White farmers that Ramaphosa intends to put them under much more strain in the future. Nair40 reflects this intention of Ramaphosa when he reports40: 4:

Land expropriation without compensation is going to happen whether South Africans, US President Donald Trump and the UN General Assembly like it or not.

President Cyril Ramaphosa made this clear at a business breakfast in Pietermaritzburg, where he told black professionals that he would not be apologetic about the government’s land reform programme.

The reaction of Donald Trump to the South African land reform matter was the direct outcome of AfriForum’s actions. The decision the ANC made at Nasrec has caused the objectors to rethink their efforts to avert land expropriation without compensation.36,41-43 For some Afrikaners the battle against expropriation is a last effort to regain lost power.42 They are aware of the danger they are in at present, as Munusamy11 shows: the country is characterized by a sustained political, economical, moral and societal decline that shows a permanently violent society at war with itself. She writes11: 18:

The rapid degeneration and erosion of values, the restlessness of people stuck in a perpetual cycle of poverty and the lack of leadership can only mean that social upheaval in our country is inevitable”.

I do not know how the descent of our society will be depicted or remembered.

But it is unlikely that the political players who caused the collapse will pay for it.

The most profound suffering will be that of the victims of the fall.

Rumusamy reports further11: 18:

Violent crime, such as armed robbery, rape, carjacking, mugging, and ‘smash-and-grab’ attacks on vehicles, is common. There is a higher risk of violent crime in the central business districts of major cities after dark.

Demonstrations, protests, and strikes occur frequently. These can develop quickly without prior notification, often interrupting traffic, transportation, and other services; such events have the potential to turn violent.

However, there is also conflict among these organizations fighting the ANC’s land expropriation intentions. Agri SA is often seen as not really representing the interests of farmers. Their views differ from those of AfriForum and the IRR. Theo de Jager2 sees this internal conflict among White farmers as a direct result of the ANC’s ability to create discord between farmers’ associations and a political environment where AgriSA stands out because of its direct communication with the ANC.2,37,38,40 White landowners (especially the Afrikaners) see their ability to attract the attention of Donald Trump as confirmation that they are victims of the ANC and Ramaphosa’s political wrongdoings, which has indeed became an international matter. They see the Trump tweet: “I have asked Secretary of State@SecPompeo to closely study the South Africa land and farm seizers and the expropriations and large scale killing of farmers”, as an international warning to the ANC to mind their ways when it comes to human rights and the Afrikaners. The indignant response of proponents of land expropriation on Trump’s tweet perhaps reveals that he had touched a raw nerve. The first touch to this nerve came a few months before when the Australian home affairs minister said he wanted to fast-track the immigration of White farmers to Australia because they are victims of the ANC’s ongoing political wrongdoings.2,11,37,40-48 The journalist Peter Bruce37 writes in this regard37: 20:

There’s no doubt AfriForum has had great success spreading its message of racial victimhood around the world. Last week it was Trump. A few months before it was Peter Dutton, the Australian home affairs minister…

With their role of warmongering in land grabbing, the intentions of political radicals, to make a change to the present ownership of land, go much deeper than radical land reform; it is an attempt to dismantle the 1994 dispensation and the Constitution. They regard the fact that the country has had a working democracy with very little strife or conflict for more than 25 years as something of very little importance. They feel that Whites are still being advantaged and that there has not been enough restitution. This argument is not without merit, but it does reflect a lack of understanding of the events of 1994 and the economic and political conditions the ANC inherited. Had the ANC called for a more aggressive Constitution in 1994, they would have started a war. The NP and its security forces were in a strong position in 1994 and for some time after that. The aim of the Constitution was also to safeguard racial peace and to facilitate the creation of a New South Africa. It put in place a system that was workable for bringing civil rights and capital to the Black majority. However, the ANC did fail the test of statesmanship and they did not improve the economy, but rather managed it into chaos. That being said, the Constitution with its clauses on land saved the country from a war that the radicals now want to restart.49-59 Calls for land reform are not limited to the EFF and the ANC, but also come from some members of the PAC. This political aggression is highly contagious and could have very negative consequences for the poor, unemployed and landless. Populistic rhetoric, bordering on warmongering aimed at White landowners, is prominent. The past is often described as Africans losing their own country to a minority of hostile and armed European colonists. This rhetoric holds great danger for the country’s political and economic stability and the people’s safety.29,49,56 Mthombothi56: 15 describes the risks56: 15:

There are those, of course, who won’t mind an outcome. It is fashionable these days to ridicule the settlement as a sell-out. Like the biblical Samson, they want to pull the house down. War is not a picnic. But if this lot were in charge of the negotiations in 1994, the country would probably have been plunged into a civil war worse than Rwanda.

Mthombothi’s56 warning is amplified by the various civil wars, like the war in Syria that has thus far left more than 12 million Syrians homeless and at least another 500 000 dead. It will take decades for Syria to recover to the point of being a functioning state. In Rwanda, East Africa, tribal massacres led to the death of 800 000 people in just 100 days (8 000 a day) in 1994.56,60 Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s inciting remarks about Whites give us an idea of the gravity of the situation. She is a respected member of the present ANC government and an ex-wife of Jacob Zuma. She uses radical myths bordering on hate speech to fuel the hate for Whites as landowners. Politicians like Dlamini-Zuma and Malema are prepared to sacrifice South African political stability to push their ideologies. Radicals have long painted Whites as criminals to gain support to strengthen their own political careers.50-59 Unsworth61 for instance quotes Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as saying61:1:

They [Whites] have been stealing ever since their arrival in this country. They stole our land.

Professor Ruth Hall63 of the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), Western Cape University, emphasizes the recent parliamentary decision to accept the transfer of landownership without compensation from Whites, reflects official approval that it is “morally correct”. As result of the ANC government’s failure as a regime, the general populace is dissatisfied with the slow progress on urban land (plots and homes), work opportunities, affordable transport and service delivery.62,63 The recent land invasions, especially urban land, speak to more than just opportunistic and politically driven radicals. It is a kind of civil action on behalf of the poor. The ANC does not address this because it draws the attention away from the party’s inefficiency.62,63 The ANC regime needs a new, easy socioeconomic intervention to satisfy the revolting and impoverished Blacks.

1.1.2 The thorns you scatter can prick your feet one day

Many nationalist Afrikaners saw Apartheid as unbreakable and they believed in the integrity of NP leaders such as DF Malan, JG Strydom, HF Verwoerd and JB Vorster. The Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) was their trusted think tank, promising all nationalist Afrikaners a great future. In 1994, they thought that the Constitution buried the injustices in the past. But, in terms of the Herodotus Curse, injustice always returns in the form of revenge. In their political naivety, the nationalist Afrikaners never thought that the Blacks would act exactly like they themselves acted in the heyday of Apartheid. The envisioned land redistribution seems to be a bitter lesson for the Afrikaners/Whites that the thorns they scattered would come to prick their bare feet. The intended changes to Section 25 of the Constitution should be viewed within the context of the country’s past.42 Apartheid and its land grabbing was not an accidental phenomenon. It artificially protected the interest of the Whites. Their political thinking was short-sighted, opportunistic and selfish.42

However, the same can be said of the Blacks. During the Mfecane migrating tribes seized land and completely wiped out several tribes. Never did these early Black conquerors of South Africa think their reign would come to an absurd end. History and the vicious circle of conqueror–conquered are inseparable. The South African political history shows this well.42 History shows that any social class without capital of its own that is in conflict with an economically powerful class, tends to use state capital once it has gained power in an effort to initiate its own economic growth. It is therefore normal that the ANC did not hesitate to make the state an entrepreneur in the economic sphere to uplift the economically disadvantaged non-Whites. However, the land issue also involves retribution.42 Very few Black politicians are honest enough to acknowledge the bad governance of the recent years and the Black-on-Black exploitation in the history before the 1840s. Even the Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg offers visitors the false history that portrays all Blacks as native and innocent. A professor of theological and social ethics at Fordham University in New York, Bryan Massingale65, was mesmerized by the portrayals of history after visiting the museum. He professes in his writing65: 6:

One of my most moving experiences was an afternoon spent at the Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg. Yet I discovered that many South Africans are only dimly aware of the history narrated there, and many were never taught it at all. I believe that there is an urgent need for a truthful account of the nation’s history, including the realities of colonialism and apartheid and the struggles to overturn them.

What Bryan Massingale65 fails to see is that there are earlier political histories in South Africa than White colonialism and apartheid. Very few are willing to acknowledge or discuss the earlier Black history. The seasoned top journalist Barney Mthombothi56 and the writer and researcher Hlumelo Biko64 (the son of the late Steve Biko and Mamphela Ramphele), are willing to do so. Biko writes64:4:

In South Africa’s history, different historical periods have handed socioeconomic privilege to different groups. As many apartheid apologists like to hint, this predates European invasion of our beautiful country.

It is true that for some period in our history Bantu tribes dominated Khoi and San tribes. It is also true that the Mfecane further reallocated privilege across Southern Africa between vanquished and victorious tribes. Nguni/Bantu people should admit that this has led to inherent socioeconomic privilege in favour of multiple generations of our people.

However, Mthombothi56 and Biko64 still do not admit that the South African Blacks are, like the Whites, migrants to South Africa. This fact sheds light on the constant historical power play between Blacks and Whites and the conflict on ownership. The claim that Blacks have more right to the land is in actual fact a lie.42 Both Blacks and Whites have had turns to be in power. There seems no in-between, no compromise. The KhoiSan, KhoiKhoi, Indians and the Coloureds have never been fortunate enough to taste this power. These racial minorities are waiting for their turn to be in charge of the country, so the Blacks should take care in what they do.42,56,64

The question White landowners have is: What must I do now regarding my further landownership and the intentions of the Black regime? The final outcome of the matter will influence the future of their citizenship. This makes the question on land redistribution more comprehensive: What was done in the past, what is being done now and what can be done in the future around South Africa’s explosive issue of landownership to reach the best outcome?

1.1.2. The winner writes the history

Considering the current events in South Africa in light of its history may be correct, but then only with great caution. History can be abused and misinterpreted to suit the agendas of policy makers or activists, often with dire consequences.

De Groot66: 16 quotes John Berger’s words to illustrate this anomaly:

History is rewritten because new information emerges all the time. Fresh accounts of experiences, sometimes from unexpected sources, can alter the way we look at the past and change our minds about what we thought we knew.

De Groot66 elaborates further66: 16:

The relation between what we see and what we know is never settled. What we see is not only interpreted through a filter of context and knowledge; our perceptions are also shaped by what we want and moulded by what we need.

The current discourse on land is an excellent example of the mechanism described above. Part 1 of this series shows that colonialism, internal war and displacement and nativism are all intertwined in the making of all the various peoples of South Africa and they are joint heirs to the soil. For further insight the literature, political writings and histories on which all the arguments, counter-arguments and threats with respect to land reform are based, must be studied. There are two sides to the coin of land ownership and land grabbing: the haves and have-nots, the legitimates and illegitimates, the thieves and the nobles. It is sometimes unclear who is who is often very, very unclear. This project of seven articles aims to unravel this.

1.1.3 Research overview

The background to the current land debate must be put into perspective to understand the roles of the various role players, processes and procedures on land expropriation without compensation and the intended change to Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. Only then can the different points of view be evaluated. The intention of this article (number 2 in the series) is to put the background into perspective and to describe and evaluate the determinants and role players involved in the process. The following articles of the series (Numbers 3 to 6) subsequently evaluate the arguments, opinions and viewpoints.
The different parties to the land debate in South Africa have started to form a kind of informal public court with the formulation of arguments, opinions and viewpoints and counter-arguments, opinions and viewpoints. The different parties offer evidence in the form of documents, journalistic writings or speeches.

The findings of the parliamentary commission who is investigation the nation’s views on changing the Constitution could kick-start a formal process to change the law. This will be followed undoubtedly by formal litigation in courts of law to counter or to support this change and to start land expropriation. The ANC’s intent to fight the current formulation of the Constitution is centre to this dynamic.

The process described above does not really reflect the general population’s view and preferences on the matter. A more in-depth look at the nation’s position on the change to Section 25 and expropriation without compensation is crucial. The only way to do this is to look at what the media reports on the matter. The project of which this article forms part, presents the arguments offered outside the walls of a formal court of law. It is only after such a presentation that an objective political and moral verdict can be made. It is clear that the histories of both groups are saturated by land grabbing. Labelling the two opposing groups in this dispute as the accused or transgressors versus victims or martyrs, would be incorrect, misleading and subjective. The ANC government in a sense functions as the defenders of the move to change the Constitution while those opposed function as the complainants who claims that their citizen’s rights and property rights are in danger. Articles number 3 and 4 examine the views of the complainants (mostly in this project refer to as antagonists), while articles number 5 and 6 examine the views of the defendants (mostly refer to as propagandists).

The present land debacle must not be seen as a duel of two fighters with one devastating intention: to kill the other one and the winner to grab the bait. Far from it: it must be seen as a civilised dialogue between two opposing blood-brothers, arguing the just dividing of the land they inherited from their late father. A solution to this troubled land matter must be found and for that they need an impartial conciliator to listen to both sides’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints to make sense, to come to a conclusion and to offer constructive suggestions, bringing a holding solution. This conciliator can be a judge, an objective member of the public or it can be you, the reader. Therefore I like to invite you to read in-depth further this project. I am looking forward to hear your anonymous pacification at the end (Please see my e-mail address above). It can be the ultimate solution the country is looking for.

1.1.4. Research aim and objectives

The aim of this article is to do justice to John Berger’s words in an effort to present new information that may alter the way in which both Blacks and Whites look at their communal South African past. The goal is to help all South Africans understand their past and present better so that they can make South Africa a better place in future.66 The information that emerges from the available literature on the matter of land redistribution brings us to two research objectives, namely: To examine the arguments in favour of keeping Section 25 of the Constitution as it is and continuing on the path of land redistribution with full compensation as from 1994 (Part 3); and: To examine the arguments in favour of a change to Section 25 of the Constitution for the implementation of a land redistribution policy without compensation (Part 4).

The first view would mean that land redistribution must be done in line with land expropriation in Singapore where the owner of the expropriated property is fully compensated based on market prices.

The second view would mean that although a change to Section 25 does not necessarily mean that land would always be expropriated without compensation, it would be possible. The ANC at this stage argues that it would only happen in extraordinary cases.

The main aim of this article (Number 2) is to describe the background to all of this as a foundation to reflect the arguments, opinions and viewpoints respectively of the antagonists (articles numbered 3 and 4) and the propagandist (articles numbered 5 and 6) later on.

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern political-historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research on the ownership of South African land for the period 1652 to 2018 in South Africa. The sources included articles published in 2018, books for the period 1956 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2018. These sources were consulted to offer a perspective on the background to the dispute around landownership and contextualize the thoughts, views and opinions on today’s land grabbing as an age-old custom in South Africa.

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

3. Results

3.1. South African historical-political sinkholes

As said previously, history is often written by the winner. As such, history can change as circumstances change and as new unique demands and people become involved.

The current debate serves as proof of this dynamic. The depiction of Whites as aggressors and Blacks as victims is a simplification of history. State president Cyril Ramaphosa for instance owns large and valuable pieces of land. Thirty per cent of the province of KwaZulu-Natal (± 3-million hectares) is owned by the contentious Zulu Ingonyama Trust. These riches have kept the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, in place since 1994.67,68 The matter of Black land ownership by large trusts and scores of people living on tribal land should receive some attention to clarify some of the arguments from both sides.

3.1.1 The untouchable Black property trusts

The Zulu King Zwelithini’s concern that the Ingonyama Trust will also fall prey to the intended land reform policy, led to his call on Zulus to defend their Zulu land as locked into the trust. He makes his threat to defend his monarchy’s land in Zulu: Uzolimala mawungalaleli (If you don’t obey, you will get hurt). Zwelithini’s went even further, pushing for KwaZulu-Natal to secede, forgetting that his kingdom makes up only 30% of the province. After Zwelithini’s hostile response to possible land grabbing, Ramaphosa immediately travelled to Richard Bay, bending the knee of the mighty Zulu king and assuring him that the government has no intention to seize their land. Some Zulus see Ramaphosa’s humble act of kneeling before their king as a gesture of emotional maturity, avoid a Khuzeka-scenario where someone gets hurt.67-72 This was a revelation, especially for the White landowners under attack. Ramaphosa’s assurance and promises to the king reveal how the whole process is about, namely taking land from Whites. Ramaphosa said to the King68: 4:

I said to the king as the ANC we have no intention whatsoever to ever touch the land under the Ingonyama Trust. The recommendation by the high-level panel [remains] a recommendation of the panel…we are not going to dissolve the trust.

I said, with respect, as the ANC government we have no such intention…the expropriation of land without compensation is not targeting the 13% of land under the control of traditional leaders.

Communal land is going to continue be under the control of traditional leaders because they hold that land on behalf of our people. The land we are going to target for expropriation is the 87% of land.

Ramaphosa’s promise on 6 July 2018 must be read together with the recommendations of the the High-level Panel on the Assessment of Key Legislation and the Acceleration of Fundamental Change (from here onwards High-level Panel). Ex-president Motlanthe was appointed by the speaker of the National Assembly in 2016 to chair the panel that had to review hundreds of pieces of legislation on a cross-section of issues. This panel specifically recommended that the Ingonyama Trust must be repealed or substantially amended. Ramaphosa’s guarantee to Zwelithini overrules the Motlanthe panel’s recommendations and the report of the South African parliament. It demonized Motlanthe as if he alone made the recommendations and targeted Zwelithini. More important though, Ramaphosa prepared the path for a policy of not touching any established Black interests (including his own). The Ramaphosa decision is clearly based on the sentiments of the ANC party, dictated from Luthuli House and the ANC’s national executive committee (NEC). Zuma has elevated the ANC NEC to the unofficial parliament of the country, showing that state capture is not limited to money, but can also involve the legal system.67-71 The Motlanthe report was handed to Parliament in November 2017. It was only in May 2018 that ANC radicals and the various Black kings began to object after Motlanthe said that the majority of traditional leaders act like “village tin-pot dictators” and as independent rulers within the greater South African political system. He is in fact correct. There are a total of 840 traditional councils, a significant tribal influence on the ANC and in parliament. After Ramaphosa effectively exempted the Zulu king, the ANC-dominated parliament started to ignore its own report’s findings.71: 22 Ramaphosa’s view on the Motlanthe recommendation is described well by Shoba and Mthethwa68: 4: “He also assured the king that the high-level report is not the position of government and has not been adopted as government policy”. The ANC government does not see itself as subject to parliament. Apparently has Ramaphosa assured the rest of the king’s men, like the honourable Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi, that this is a final decision. With this Ramaphosa put KwaZulu-Natal back in the final days of Apartheid. The province is once more ruled again by laws passed at the behest of the IFP and Buthelezi, forcing down the structures of traditional rule. Ramaphosa, as was done in 1994, confirmed Zwelithini’s power – political, social and economical – but it undermines democracy and prevents land reform free from racism and ethnicity. The ANC is siding with the powerful capitalists (but now Black), ignoring of the ordinary Black people, especially the poor.67,68

Who is Zwelithini and why is the trust so important? What is the Ingonyama Trust and what is Zwelithini’s position in it? How does the politics of KwaZulu-Natal fit into the South African land redistribution issue? Who is Zwelithini and why does he have such a hero status? In some way the talks occurred between a redundant tribal king and an insecure president from Venda (viewed as a lesser people than the Zulus) who represents a divided party. The excerpt of Mthobothi70 is very informative. It reads as follows70: 23:

The [Ingonyama] Trust is meant to exist and function subject to existing land rights under customary law and not act in ways that undermine and abrogate such customary and other underlying land rights. However, the Trust in some instances regards itself as the outright owner of land and therefore not subject to any duty to consult or to obtain community consent in dealing with the land. This has given rise to instances where the Trust has leased land to external third parties (for example the shopping centres) without having first consulted and obtained the consent of those whose informal or customary land rights were subsumed by the shopping centre.

The trust has introduced draconian rules, including 10% yearly rent increases, compelling lessees to fence the land within three months and the cancelling of leases for failure to pat rent. Moreover, structures on the land remain the king’s property.

Significant revenue is generated for the Ingonyama Trust by such lease agreements. In the 2015-16 period, rental income was R96 130 563. There is little evidence that the revenue generated by leases is used for the benefit of communities or their material wellbeing.

By 2020, the trust will earning over R100 million a year.71 The legitimacy of Zwelithini as the king of the Zulus has always been controversial. This includes his family’s inheritance of the Zulu throne the Ingonyama Trust. The ruling that made him the only monarch in KwaZulu-Natal is especially debatable. Mnguni’s69 research proposes that the Hhlapo Commission traces the establishment of the Zulu monarchy back to Shaka (a leader known for his murderous inclinations) after he took power over the Zulus in 1816. The present kingship comes from that line. The Nhlapo Commission indicated that the Zulus composed of several communities before 1816, a kind of loose federation. The Ingonyama Trust is a trust that was hurriedly created a mere three days before the 1994 general election as a direct outcome of the political events of that time. It has nothing to do with the traditions and customs of the Zulu people or the Zulu monarchy. There is no similar trust in the country. It is a land administration tool, subject to being repealed or to change. This is in line with the Motlanthe finding and contradicts Ramaphosa’s interpretation.69,71

Many South Africans do not know the difference between the Zulu monarchy and the Ingonyama Trust, something that suits the king. The trust is in reality land that belongs to the Zulu people and not to the monarchy, although Zwelithini has great influence. The monarchy owns only the Osuthu palace in Nongoma. Without the trust, there really is no great Zwelithini monarchy. The Motlanthe panel found that the Ingonyama Trust Act (3-million hectare of KZ of 1994) is an imperfect piece of legislation. The intent was that the land (now for all practical intents and purposes used as the land of the monarchy) would be measured out into specific properties and then transferred to the tribes and communities who live on the specific piece of land as stipulated in the Bantu Authorities Act (68 of 1951). In reality, the trust land has been divided (but never transferred) among clans under the leadership of traditional leaders, who are responsible to the king in terms of customary law. The Ingonyama Trust is headed by the sole trustee, King Goodwill Zwelithini.69,71,73

Mnguni69 writes on the many contradictions of the Ingonyama Trust69: 24:

This [transfer] has never happened. The king is benefiting from having smartly navigated the country’s vulnerability before the 1994 elections. He wishes to continue benefiting from such an imperfect deal. The king, as the Motlanthe panel found, exercises far greater influence than the national minister does in similar areas elsewhere in the country. This means people in KwaZulu-Natal suffer a more precarious state of land tenure than do rural folks elsewhere.

The ANC government has failed to transfer the land to communities and individuals as required by the Bill of Rights. Mthombothi70 describes Zwelithini and his empire as follows70:23:

It’s become a state within a state: he controls the land and people pay taxes to him. No wonder he feels threatened by attempts at land reform.70

Mthombothi’s70 view is echoed by Ngcukaitobi18 and Cousins71 who emphasise that in these cases the land ownership indirectly lies with the state. The land is under the custodianship of traditional leaders countrywide. The state has the power to redistribute the land to enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. The trusts and custodianships have been subject to much abuse. Tribes act like mini-states. This is evident from the numerous deals chiefs and mining companies in North West, Limpopo, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. It is not only the Ingonyama Trust that could be affected by the intended land reform.

Ngcukaitobi18 writes as follows on the dissolution of these trusts18:25:

The [present] constitution was intended to reverse this [White colonial state] by recasting the relationship between African communities, their chiefs and the land.

Thus, for redistribution to succeed, it should uproot the colonial state and its surviving tentacles: the people, not the chiefs, should control the land.

There are also instances where Black communal land has been seized to please homeland regimes like that of Buthelezi and Zwelithini. One example is the 345 hectares of farmland that makes up the farm Blinkklippen in the North West province. It was legally sold to the family Moeletsi/Mogale for ₤511 in 1913. The family Moeletsi/Mogale’s ownership rights were transferred to the Bakgatla Ba Kgafela tribe in 1936 without any choice or compensation by the native government and then to the government of Bophuthatswana in terms of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act (21 of 1971), leaving the family landless to this day.74

Notwithstanding clear constitutional guidelines (including Section 25) president Ramaphosa seems to wants to maintain the powerful tribal Black leaders, to the detriment of the poor masses. He bases seemingly his views on the ANC’s document Ready to Govern, published in 1992, which referred to the acquisition of land through expropriation.18 Greed and self-enrichment is undoubtedly a motive of the Ingonyama Trust. The trust has built up very substantial financial reserves. It is an excellent money-making scheme for Zwelithini. These riches support his political power. He influences the ANC, as he could call for war in KwaZulu-Natal. The National Party of the 1990s similarly feared Buthelezi and his IFP. The ANC-run KwaZulu-Natal province contributed R65.8 million to the trust in 2018 and paid the king an annual salary of R1 million. The ANC leaders have always been running to please him. Zuma, before his exit as president, visited him; Ramaphosa and the top six of the ANC paid homage to him after their election at Nasrec in December 2017; even Mmusi Maimane and Julius Malema went to Nongoma to honour him.67-71,75

Mthombothi70 provides insight into these tribal chiefs with whom Ramaphosa now sided to recreate the old Bantustan system that the Constitution and the ANC (especially their leaders Mandela and Mbeki) themselves sought to demolish in 1994.70 He writes70: 23:

Why have the tribal chiefs who were apartheid’s handmaidens not so long ago and on the run from comrades during the turbulent 1980s suddenly become assertive and even bellicose in the era of democracy? They lived large under apartheid and they’re still, as it were, lords of the manor in the new dispensation.

Mthombothi70 shows that chieftainship is the very antithesis of a democratic system because of its autocratic and suppressing inclinations, stripping the voters of their rights and interests. With Ramaphosa’s re-empowerment of chiefs and their trusts, he shamelessly re-establishes dictatorial enclaves within the democratic South Africa. Mthombothi70 reflects70: 23:

…they don’t want people to own land, or have title deeds. They want all land to be owned by the government and for people to lease. That’s not freedom; that’s slavery. It takes us back to the 99-year leasehold that used to be offered to black people under apartheid.

The ANC’s submission to traditional leaders led to them dropping the crucial clause in the Traditional Courts Draft Bill that gave citizens the right to refuse to be subject to traditional courts. This was done despite opposition from civil right activists and the parliamentary warning that this would render the bill unconstitutional. The government argues foolishly that the opt-out clause would nullify the existence of traditional courts and the power of traditional institutions like the National House of Traditional Leaders and the Congress of Traditional Leaders of SA (Contralesa). The Bill empowers the traditional courts to rule on monetary matters involving up to R15 000 and bars those aggrieved by the decisions of traditional courts from challenging these in the magistrate’s or high courts. This implies that appeals could be filed with only the traditional high courts (the headman’s court, the chief’s court and from there to the king or queen’s courts). The chair of the justice portfolio committee, senior ANC MP Mathole Motshekga, supports the creation of another independent Bantustan model with a discriminative independent traditional court system. In his view there is a clear need because76: 4: “…some magistrates and judges know nothing about indigenous law”.

The present courting of the old Bantustans is in conflict with former president Zuma’s announcement in 2010 that six of the 13 kingships in place then would be ended when the incumbents died. The focus on White land reflects racism. This is a tragic reality that White landowners must face. Land redistribution can be radical and could end in destruction. Sections 9 and 195 of the Constitution, which Ramaphosa himself helped draft, describe the equality of every citizen, White and Black, landowner and landless, rich and poor. Subservience to tribal leaders and political Black radicals is incompatible with equality. Equality, for Ramaphosa, lies in his understanding of “his people”, which seems to be elite Blacks. Ramaphosa is bringing disaster to land reform by not implementing the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (31 of 1996) to stop abuses of trust land by crooked chiefs; not only through by stealing the income generated from these trusts, but also by losing large areas of arable and grazing land and to mines and allowing the pollution of the water sources of communities and individuals.69

It has become an open question how the ANC government hopes to make a success of their intended land reform. They could not make a success of their own plans to reform Black trusts to benefit Black individuals and communities. Cousins71 gives a simple, but clear declaration71: 22:

In addition, there has been mounting evidence of corruption in relation to land, including the notorious Mala Mala land claim and many cases involving South African Fruit Exporters and Bono, their BEE partner.

Debates about expropriation are raising the temperature for the middle classes, capital and the urban elite. Sadly, few seem concerned about continuing processes of dispossession of ordinary black South Africans.

Cousins71 also describes the hand of the ANC government and its elite in these crooked set-ups Cousins71:22:

The ANC government has colluded with both chiefs and mining companies in these forms of exportation without compensation.

Nkwinti [previous minister of rural development and land reform], as trustee of state land, failed to require elites to consult people, or to ensure that his department implemented the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, and sided with traditional councils against community members.71

The planned land redistribution is said to be aimed at uplifting the poor and landless Blacks at the cost of the beneficiaries of apartheid. The question is, will the intended land redistribution be another failure? Will only the ANC elite benefit? The response of a Mister Rubosweni Mmelene74 at the North West hearing at Rustenburg in July 2018 says it all when he said he wanted to support the constitutional amendment but feared the effects of rampant corruption in the North West will make the exercise fruitless74: 22:

I understand 87% of land belongs to whites. I want to agree with the amendment but because of the corruption in this province, it is difficult.

Ramaphosa has thus far failed to address the corruption, what will change now? He initially warned against land grabbing, but he has become either silent or more extreme.56: 15 It seems the ANC wants to erase South Africa’s past. There have even been efforts to erase the Whites’ past by efforts to forbid the sale of any Afrikaner of White memorabilia, even an old chair from the Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorwegmaatskappij (NZASM) dating from the old Kruger republic.42 Haji Mohamed Dawjee wrote in the Sunday Times as recently as the 7th July 201877: 18:

Why is this [selling of Afrikaner-memorabilia] allowed? The sale and auction of Nazi memorabilia, for example, is banned in several European countries, including Germany and France. Why? Well, firstly, because they are reminders of monstrous crimes against humanity. Another reason is that preventing their sale means preventing (to an extent) anti-Semitic [seemingly here anti-Black] behaviour.

People in many countries who want to glorify Nazi Germany and all that it stood for by collecting relics and creating shrines in their own homes will find it very, very hard to do so because it is illegal to purchase or sell any material that is a manifestation of that fascism.

In South Africa, it is the opposite.

When will we draw this line?

Grey60 describes the above racial cold-bloodedness and irrational thinking of political radicals as follows60: 144:

“Human beings had incredible ways of inventing rational excuses for what they did or were going to do”; and: “Persuasion came through habit as much as logic, and human beings were indeed incredibly suggestible”.

Rwanda’s 800 000 deaths in 100 days of civil war, and Hitler and Stalin’s murdering of millions and millions of opponents in the eight years of World War II, confirms the tragic outcomes of these invented rationales, driven by habits, logic and suggestibility.42,60 Readers who are concerned about their property and their citizenship are advised to read Thabo Mbeki’s South African Reconciliation Act and his views on humanity and citizen’s rights. It reveals the intentions of some Black political radicals to eliminate Whites as citizens in South Africa and to end their land ownership.77-79 Thankfully the trust land issue can cause the intended grabbing of White land to boomerang under the watchfully eye of the courts. Bruce posits80: 20:

The ANC will have to take on traditional leadership. And it cannot make laws that distinguish between white and black. The courts would tie it up forever.

3.1.2. The Royal Bafokeng Nation

The events surrounding the Ingonyama trust begs the question of what waits the Royal Bafokeng Nation’s land trust and its riches. Will this land trust and its king, King Leruo Molotlegi, be treated the same as King Zwelethini and its Ingonuyama Trust?67-72 The context of the Royal Bafokeng should be considered here because it is very important to see if Ramaphosa will recognize their trust land as part of the 13% of Black land exempted from expropriation or if the platinum-rich Bafokeng land will be attractive to the ANC. The Bafokeng are fewer in number and they have less political power than the Zulus. This section compares the Bafokeng, the Zulus and the ANC with regard to leadership. Noor-Mahomed73 comments on the important role of effective and honourable leadership in the correct and honest management of land to improve the socioeconomic conditions of communities and to ensure political stability. Land grabbing is not part of such a scenario. Noor-Mahomed writes73: 9: “…we must…examine the equality of our leaders and study their narratives to see whether their interests align with the rostrums of democracy on which they so proudly stand”.

The successes of King Leruo Molotlegi and his traditional leadership structures and elected village and regional representatives stand out in this regard. They directly consult with the people at several levels to foster an economically and socially strong Bafokeng community, totally in contrast to King Goodwill Zwelinthini and the elites of the ANC.

Since coming to the throne, Molotlegi, with visionary and democratic leadership, has improved the socioeconomic status of his Bafokeng community of 150 000. They live in 29 villages on 1 200km2 of land in the North West province. Molotlegi unselfishly focused on relevant development and fresh and creative thinking. Their land holds the world’s richest platinum reserves, bringing unprecedented wealth for the community. Molotlegi turned these reserves into businesses. They have a 13% share in Impala Platinum; they are the majority shareholder in their own mining and refining company; and they hold interests in companies in the financial services, telecommunications, property and transport services sectors, writes Noor-Mahomed73. What is important is that all the resources are held in trust on behalf of the Bafokeng people, while the investments are managed by a company, Royal Bafokeng Holdings. Although Moltlegi leads as king, he does not make decisions alone when it comes to how the collective resources of the Royal Bafokeng Nation are used. The traditional leaders and village and regional representatives all participate. The income generated is used to better the living conditions of the people, creating employment for 4 000 people and spending more than $700 million (R9.3 billion) on improving infrastructure like roads, utilities, schools and clinics in their area. The group’s visionary leadership is evident from their strategic planning for further socioeconomic growth. Three branches have been established to develop, benefit and support the entire community.73 The ANC can learn a lot from the Royal Bafokeng Nation.

3.2. Testing the ideas around land reform and expropriation without compensation

3.2.1. Is there a need for an Afrikaner/White farming sector?

It is important to examine the current land ownership. The total Afrikaner population stands at about ± 2.7 million (total White population: ± 5-million). The ratio between the ±35 000 commercial farmers to the rest of the Afrikaner population is 13:1000 or 1.3%. If all 35 000 farmers are Whites, which they are not, the ratio would be 7:1 000 or 0.7%. There is an almost insignificant correlation between the broader Afrikaner/White population and the Afrikaner/White farming population in terms of financial interest, like ownership or income from farming. The direct impact of lost farmland on most Afrikaners/Whites outside the farming sector would be minimal.42 Louw42 shows that many Afrikaners have started to cut the cord with the “Afrikaner-volk”, especially the younger generations. What these neo-Afrikaners want is political stability and a good living standard with affordable food on the table — it does not matter if the food is from Zambia, Argentina, produced by a White or Creole or Black Brazilian or South African. These Afrikaners do not really mind who rules the country, as long as it is a stable and responsible regime. Many of the emotive rhetoric on land grabbing does not come from the broad Afrikaner/White population, but a small band of Afrikaners/Whites individuals and groups with direct financial interests in agriculture, like Agri SA, AfriForum, Solidarity, some Afrikaner media and the FFP, who Louw42 calls the Afrikaner/White’s self-appointed rescuers and saviours. These groups represent at most 15% of Afrikaners/Whites based on their membership.2-5,16,19,23,42

Some of their rhetoric is as dangerous, inapplicable and inappropriate as that of Julius Malema and Cyril Ramaphosa. Much of this rhetoric reflects the old ideology of hard-core Apartheid. Rhetoric from the English media (which includes Black and White voices) is mostly focused on land for housing and the financial loss that expropriation without compensation can bring for present landowners. The English media is also more focused on the effect that land grabbing can have on future local and foreign investments. One can safely say that the Whites and neo-Afrikaners outside the farming sector have accepted that a new generation of South African farmers has to be born as quickly as possible to ensure food security. These new generations of farmers can be, and must be to a certain extent, Blacks.2-5,16,19,23,42

Part of the irrational thinking and often false presentation of land as a matter of great concern to all members of the “Afrikaner volk” and White society, are the false argument on the absolute need for an Afrikaner/White farming sector because only they can ensure food security. It is plain nonsense. Any race can contribute constructively as farmers if their circumstances are optimal. This is actually how the Afrikaners/Whites established themselves. There are American, Asian, British, Nigerian, Palestinian, Jewish, Algerian and many other farmers who are not only successful commercial farmers in their own countries, but also contribute to global markets. In South Africa there are established commercial Black farmers already contribute to food security. The evidence shows that when Black farmers receive the necessary financial and technical assistance, they become excellent farmers. Why would Blacks not be able to become successful farmers in South Africa?3,16,19,23

The fact that Afrikaner numbers are declining while the Black population shows a constant growth also means that a new generation of farmers would have to replace the current generation of farmers. Why must these replacements only be Afrikaners? In this regard Mthombothi asks81: 25:

There is also the question of whether white farmers are a special breed who requires special protection.

The over-estimation of Afrikaner/White farmers as a special, untouchable group in South Africa is also contradicted by Dr Theo de Jager2, the president of the World Agricultural Union and Galileo Capital. He mentions that even if all White farmers voted for one political party, these votes will not be enough to assure one parliamentary seat. He remarks2: 3:

On a count-group basis the white farmers are irrelevant. The ANC does not need to take notice of farmers [Own translation].

In systems where the majority gains control of the politics and economy, the best balance between the interests of the majority and the minority is attained by way of a natural process and sometimes statutory prescription. Land ownership and farming are such prominent issues. Sometimes land transformation happens in a very orderly fashion and sometimes they are chaotic. South Africa is now in the middle of this normal process of economic, political and statutory balancing. Land reform should not be an emotional issue, but a rational issue.

South Africa currently has about 5 million Whites versus ± 55 million Blacks, or a statistical ratio of less than 1:10 or 10%. The ratio of White farmers to Black farmers looks significantly different. There is definitely a need for able Black farmers with financial backing. To answer Mhtombothi’s81 question: White farmers are not a special breed and do not require special protection to ensure food security.81

Does the ANC favour Black Africans over Coloured, Indian and White Africans? The same mechanism at play between Blacks and Whites on land ownership is developing between Blacks and Indians and Coloureds. It was only in 1969 that the ANC at last admitted all races as members. Jacob Zuma’s said at the World Economic Forum in 2017 that when South Africa talks about radical economic transformation (RET), it means a change that leads to inclusive growth, which includes forced land redistribution, Black ownership and management of companies, and the hiring and training of Black people. The focus is undoubtedly on Africans and not on all non-White races. Brun82 explains the focus on Black empowerment as follows82:22:

There has to be an acknowledgement that during Apartheid Black South Africans were treated unfairly at different levels, with Africans being discriminated against the most. The current transformation legislation now treats all Blacks equally.

To get to this outcome, legislation must be adjusted, as intended with the change to Section 25(2)(b), to aim RET specifically at Africans. They view Coloureds and Indians as “merit Blacks”, not as deserving of empowerment.

The ANC has allowed anti-Indian sentiment into its political and racial ideology from 2002. Mbongeni Ngema’s anti-Indian song AmaiNiya; Fikile Mbabula’s comment in 2007 that “transformation had turned the University of KwaZulu-Natal into nothing but Bombay”; Mzwanele Manyi’s suggestion “that there were too many Indians in KwaZulu-Natal”; the claim of an “over-concentration of Coloureds in the Western Cape”; and Julius Malema’s derogatory reference in to Indians as amakula in 2010 as ANC Youth League leader, serve as examples. Professor Milton Shain84:22, an emeritus academic at UCT, shows how this is a departure from the 1969 decision to regard these races as fellow victims of apartheid. Shain posits that the Freedom Charter and the social contract of the ANC with the people to guarantee equality in 1969, started unravelling in the days of Thabo Mbeki.84 Ramaphosa, Zuma and Malema have also pointed to the Whites as the only land grabbers in history. Shain writes84: 22:

…more recently, he has described whites as central to South Africa’s problems. He even added the qualification ‘at least not now’ after claiming that blacks were not calling for the slaughter of whites.

No white person, he says, is a rightful owner of land in South Africa and the whole African continent. As far as he is concerned, whites unhappy with expropriation of land without compensation ‘can go to hell’.

Onkgopotse JJ Tabane,85 a radio and TV talk show host, an author and a former member of Cope (Congress of the People), takes the degrading of the Whites further in reaction to Mosiuoa Lekota’s remark that it will be safer and more manageable for the government to place Black refugees in need of care in refugee camps. Lekota, in response to the ANC’s claims that Whites are not indigenous South Africans, dared to ask the question: Who are our people? Tabane immediately classified these refugees as “fellow Africans and comrades”, while going on to attack the Whites (and Lekota) as follows85: 26:

According to your bizarre logic, white people who stole land from our people must be left alone to own that land because when the ANC argues that land must be returned to our people your retort is: ‘Who is our people?’ So whites are our people and African refugees are not. Wow, Ntate Lekota, you are no different from Helen Zille, who called black people refugees in the Western Cape and glorified colonialism by seeing a silver lining in it.

However senseless and absurd Tabane’s85 remark is, it reflects the views of a large contingent of radicals in the Black political community. This view is now expanding to include Coloureds and Indians.84,85 Shain’s84 reflection on Malema’s views, which is similar to that of the radicals at Luthuli house and in the Zuma inner circle in KwaZulu-Natal, should serve as a dire warning and wake-up call for Whites, Indians and Coloureds84: 22:

Malema’s discourse reflects wider intellectual currents. But his oeuvre is not classically fascist. He shares none of the innovative thinking associated with serious fascist thinkers. On the other hand, as was the case with many European fascists, Malema’s political instincts are impressive. He shares with them an ability to build alliances and co-operate with elites. Political space is, after all, necessary for success. His populism and hostility towards whites find fertile grounds in a society with glaring racial inequality and poverty.

Today Malema holds a sword over whites. Will he abandon respect for democratic liberties in a violent search for redemption and internal cleansing? We do not know.

What we do know is that historically the trajectory of each fascist movement has been related to the national context, cultural traditions and contingent circumstances. Malema knows and understands this well.

Revolutions can be born slowly over years, as under Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Idi Amin and Robert Mugabe. At other times, like with the Russian Revolution of 1917, it begins quickly. When looking at the ANC government from 1994, one sees a slow-developing political revolution. All that is needed is to steer the views of Malema and Ramaphosa towards the fertile soils of disillusionment, inequality and poverty-stricken Blacks and to paint the White society as the evil and the primary reason for all the problems Blacks and the country is experiencing.24,42,86 Can exclusive capitalism ever be replaced by inclusive capitalism to solve South Africa’s poverty, inequality and unemployment?

South African land reform is needed. Comprehensive upliftment and orderly capital redistribution is needed, something in the line of Barack Obama’s focus on inclusive capitalism. This is a very fluid concept, but there should be a focus on social capital that benefits the whole society as the primary beneficiary, not on individual, exclusive capital. The Obama economic ideology is far removed from the views of the radicals within the ANC. The ANC has a “grab and run” approach to the riches of Whites, but it has failed to improve the lives of Blacks since 1994. Comprehensive and orderly socioeconomic and personal development is central to inclusive capitalism.87-90 An excellent example of what inclusive capitalism is not and how the ideology can be hijacked and abused by the radicals of the ANC, is the writing of Oscar Mabuyane90, the ANC’s Eastern Cape provincial chairman90: 18:

At the heart of the priorities of the ANC is to grow South Africa’s economy so that we can radically transform our socioeconomic fabric by eradicating the poverty, unemployment and inequality ravaging our communities.

In the January 8 statement read by Comrade President Cyril Ramaphosa, we committed to fundamentally renew the ANC, restore its credibility and bring it closer to the masses of the people it was formed to serve so that we can unite South Africans around a shared vision of transformation.

We believe this will be the foundation on which we will be able to mobilize social partners and other patriots behind the economic recovery plan to grow the economy beyond the levels that existed when Comrade Thabo Mbeki was president.

We agree that to be able to drive the recover of our economy, we must confront corruption and all forms of state capture. We need to cleanse the ANC and the government. Equally, the private sector and society must be cleansed of corruption.
We are committed to achieving the vision of free higher education for the poor. When working-class children receive education, skills and training, they will have opportunities to start their own businesses through the support of government agencies, benefit from the public and private-sector procurement, and get jobs.

The private sector must commit to large-scale transformation so that together we may train young people and give them contracts to supply goods and services to all sectors of the economy.

In line with the resolution to expropriate land without compensation, we will accelerate land redistribution and agricultural development so that those who receive land through land reform programmes will use that land productively by engaging in commercial agriculture.

The outdated Marxist terms of “we” and “comrades” are prominent in Mabuyane’s writing90, even though the ANC is at the moment estranged from the hard-core communists in the SACP and Cosatu. The whole “declaration” is based on things the ANC has acknowledged in public that it has failed the public since 1994. The question is how can they do better from 2018 onwards, especially in the light of their declining political power? Where does Mabuyane90 get his strange ideas on the South African economy? Mabuyane’s90 views do include expropriation without compensation. This idea of stealing from the rich to empower the poor has occurred in communist Russia, China, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. It has never worked, and what will happen to the poor after all the wealth of the White rich has been taken, redistributed and wasted? The simple answer is just more poverty and inequality for the Black masses.

We do have to move away from exclusive capitalism, which sometimes maintains exclusive political empowerment. However, we should also move away from a vague inclusive capitalism promoted by liberals who at the same time underwrite and practice exclusive capitalism. We should move to a new capitalism that is responsible, humane and truly democratic, but without disturbing the economy of South Africa.

3.2.1.1. The ANC’s plans are reminiscent of Zimbabwe’s land grabbing

The collapse of Zimbabwe’s economy, for many years run successfully, is an excellent example of what could happen to South Africa. The similarities between the two countries are clear. There was a slow build-up of hostility towards Whites, culminating in the vilifying of Whites to distract the attention away from the failures of the government. It seems now as if the Cyril Ramaphosa-era is going to be a true Mugabe-culture of land-grab. Should South Africa end up in the same position, it would take generations to find a clear roadmap again.97,98 It is important to reflect in short on the political history of Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe to understand the fears of those in South Africa who feel that the current conditions in the country are just too similar for comfort.97 One prominent point of reference is Zimbabwe’s Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act, dated 2008.97,98 In this context the reporting of journalist Ray Ndlovu is very informative. He writes that in March 2008 Robert Mugabe signed this act into law to give Black Zimbabweans a 51% stake in all foreign-owned companies in the country. This followed Mugabe’s earlier policy in 2000 to start the forceful takeover of White-owned commercial farms, mostly by way of violent farm seizures. However, the ownership of most of these White farms did not pass to the poor and landless Zimbabweans, but to the Mugabe elites. The 2008 law targeted foreign companies, such as mining houses, banks, insurance firms and retailers. In time, the 2008 law became more aggressive towards foreigners, especially Whites. It later reserved certain sectors for Zimbabweans. Mugabe, as quoted by Ndlovu, even arrogantly declared that97:8:

Forty-nine percent is a hell of a lot of equity; it is only the foolish ones who will say no. Wise ones will take it up.

South African firms like Zimplats and Stanbic were rattled by the persistent threats by the Mugabe government to cancel their operating licences. The direct outcome was that investment in Zimbabwe stopped. By the time of Mugabe’s fall in November 2017 the country could only attract about $300 million (R3.5 billion) in investments compared with Mozambique’s $3 billion in investments. Agricultural production has plummeted, erasing Zimbabwe’s status as the breadbasket of the Southern African Development Community, making it a net importer of agricultural products like grain on a broad base. Zimbabwe has also failed to uplift the majority of Blacks. Poverty and the suppression of political and human rights followed, leading to an outflow of thousands of Black Zimbabweans to South Africa and other African countries just to make a basic living.97,98 The new president now has to clean up the mess in Zimbabwe. His first move was to recall the 2008 act, opening Zimbabwe to investment. Twelve sectors are reserved for Zimbabwean citizens. Investors from outside the country can thus own 100% of their investment once more and is no longer required to have a Zimbabwean partner save for above prescribed exclusions. In terms of the amendments brought by the Finance Act of 2018, business ownership is also no longer organised along racial lines.99,100 Ndlovu posits97: 8:

The Zimbabwean rebirth will be a long and painful one. For many years to come, Zimbabweans will have to work much harder than their neighbours to gain the trust of investors.

One should remember that the new President Mnanagwa was close to Mugabe in his cabinet, making him guilty of the same atrocities as Mugabe. This is similar to Ramaphosa and Zuma. Mnangagwa was Mugabe’s vice-president, as was the case with Ramaphosa and Zuma. Thankfully, for South Africa, Ramaphosa does have political and personal integrity. His closeness to Zuma was not contaminated by corruption. Mnanagwa was Mugabe’s minister of state security and was directly involved in the massacre of an estimated 20 000 people during ethnic cleansing in Matabeleland from 1983 to 1987 by the Fifth Brigade, a Zimbabwean army unit trained by the North Koreans.99,100 President Mnanagwa’s new racial and economic policies have already resulted in a first deal in of $4.2-billion with the Cypriot investor Loucas Pouroulis March 2018 to develop a platinum mine and refinery. There are promises of more investments from China and previously estranged countries. However, it remains to be seen if the markets will ever truly trust Mnanagwa. The signs are not good. It reminds us of Ramaphosa’s past as a revolutionary within the ANC. The concern of political analysts and strategists is that there has thus far not been any political, economic and democratic improvement under Ramaphosa as president. Another correlation between Mnanagwa and Ramaphosa is that Mnanagwa only gained a 50.8% majority with 44.3% of votes, in line with Ramaphosa’s weak support within the ANC NEC.97 South Africa is already in need of a rebirth after the failure of the ANC regime since 1994. If the country goes down the path of land grabbing by changing the Constitution, a rebirth may be impossible. As with Zimbabwe’s violent land seizures, many White lives can be at risk. Not a single antagonist will ever forget Malema’s warning:

We will kill you, but not for now.

As said, inclusive capitalism cannot replace exclusive capitalism to solve South Africa’s poverty, inequality and unemployment. Exclusive capital, driving business development and the creation of work opportunities can indeed bring inclusive capital to the poor and unemployed in time, but only outside the failed business, economic and political principles of the ANC and their model.

3.2.2 Ramaphosa’s view that approximately 87% of South Africa’s land belongs to Whites

Ramaphosa is completely out of touch with his statement that more or less 87% of the country’s land belongs mostly to Whites.103 He deliberately ignores the fact that the land owned by municipalities and the government itself is substantial. Unsubstantiated claims about the true facts around land ownership make up a large part of the rhetoric on the expropriation of land without compensation by the ANC. The ANC, after 24 years of rule, still fails to understand the ramifications of its vision of land ownership and that the manipulation of facts since 1994 are not going to help them in the coming 2019 election.104 Regarding the anomaly of who owes what percentage of land to whom in South Africa, Haffajee writes105: 6:

After 24 years, neither the private sector nor the government has been able to give a substantive figure on who owns the land, suggesting that even the ownership of the 139 the ANC says are in its crosshairs is unclear.

But, if you put together the industry’s Agri SA audit of land and the state’s land audit last year, a picture of such complexity emerges that it’s clear it will take years before expropriation without compensation can take place because the ANC has committed itself to first passing a proper record of deeds before passing the constitutional amendment to enable more muscular land expropriation without compensation.

Neither the audit of Agri SA nor that of the state is usefull. Agri SA finds that agriculture land makes up 76.3% (about 93.3 million hectares in 2016) of the total land area. Of this, the Agricultural Business Chamber finds that 26.7% is Black-owned and 70% of the total agricultural land is White owned. From 1994 to 2016, 8.9 million hectares were bought by Blacks and the government (to the value of R90.3 billion) and Agri SA confirms an ongoing transfer of White land to Blacks.105 The state’s audit identifies 24% of farms and smallholdings as Black-owned compared to 72% that is White-owned. These numbers are complicated by the fact that vast land is owned by trusts, companies and community-based bodies. This category can form as much as 60% of all private landownership, making the state’s finding untrustworthy with respect to the precise ownerships of the 60% of all the private land. From other data available, it reflects the ownerships of land as follows: trusts 31%, companies 25%, community organizations 4%, cooperations 4% and individuals 39%.105

The state’s audit focused only on land that is registered at the deeds office, which records the private ownership of farms, agricultural holdings, stand-alone houses, and sectional title units. In the Limpopo and Eastern Cape provinces there is as much as 7.7 million hectares of unregistered state land. The race, gender and nationality of the landowners are not recorded in the deeds register.105There is indeed a racial parity in who owns houses. Forty-nine per cent of the land classed as erven are owned by Whites, and 46% by Blacks.105Ramaphosa is clearly mistaken when he claims that 83% of land is owned by mostly White individuals. It seems to be far less, as low as 60%. Secondly, is it very difficult to classify people as landowners or non-landowners. Thirdly, the difference between rural and urban land is not specified, nor land for farming versus land for houses (erven and small non-agricultural urban plots). If the ANC governments proceeds with land expropriation without compensation, it would first struggle to determine true ownership, making land redistribution to the poor and landless such an enormous task that it would take years.105 When it comes to land used exclusively for commercial farming by White farmers, the picture becomes even more confusing. It is important to mention that the land that municipalities and the government owns is substantial, while the farms owned by Whites, which provide food security and earn valuable foreign currency and offer employment, only account for about 10% of the country’s total land area. This means that Ramaphosa and Malema’s dreams to give land to masses of poor and landless Blacks and that they would all be able to make a decent living as commercial farmers unrealistic.104,105

3.3 The testimonies of South Africans at the country-wide parliamentary hearings on a change to Section 25 and land expropriation without compensation

It is insightful to reflect on some of the presentations by South Africans at the various parliamentary land expropriation hearings held country-wide. It gives us a look at the lack of understanding of the complexity of the Constitution’s function to uphold of rule of law. People are also confused of who are indigenous and who not. It is clear why Mkhondo106 warns that the parliamentary hearings to hear so-called “testimonies” cannot be used to give a “true opinion” on the land reform matter and that the chances are good that the whole exercise will fail. The process cannot provide statistically trustworthy information.106 Nonetheless, a look at these testimonies may provide some insight of how the general population thinks about the issue.

The Gauteng hearing on land exportation, for instance, shows significant naivety on the political history of land grabbing in South Africa. At the Gauteng hearing Solly Mkhize107 stated that the ANC government can not shy away from the redistribution and the transfer of land, firstly because of107: 6: “…all the wars that were fought for the land by the Blacks”, and secondly because of: “…the 1913 discriminative legislation which had unjustified forced Blacks out of their own land”. Mkhize reaches only one conclusion107: 6:

How can we give whites compensation for land that was stolen?

For many others like Mkhize107, the Gauteng hearing became an excellent platform for a racial onslaught, far removed from reason. In many instances, “Whiteness” was used as the measure of guilt. Critics of the hearings and the expropriation process see the hearings as a failed exercise since it involved politically influenced masses commenting on a process they do not understand. It reminds of the English proverb: A little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing. The Gauteng hearing descended into chaos after Phumla Boloshi107 , allegedly from the DA, warned107: 6:

We don’t need to change the Constitution. We need government action. Our young fellow Africans are lazy. What are they going to do with the land anyway? They cannot till the land.

She saw the ANC government since 1994 as a failure, specifically with regard to using the existing Section 25 of the Constitution to manage landownership. Filipe Macuacua107 testified at the Gauteng hearing that he had been fighting since 2004 with the different [ANC] government institutions, including more intense efforts in 2009 and 2014 with professional assistance, for a piece of land. His conclusion was that the present government is of no help, forcing him, as result of their failure to allocate land, to live in a squatter camp.107 At the Vryheid hearing in KwaZulu-Natal, some attendees claimed to be acting on behalf of God. Who of us can argue with God? Ntombela108 said108: 22:

The land is people’s birthright and this is what God would have wanted. If you read Genesis, God created heaven and Earth and said we must multiply, which means that no one can own the land alone. All the land belongs to the people.

Mr. Buthelezi108 claimed that God had intended for Blacks to own the land because they are the rightful indigenous owners of the land108: 22:

There is one thing I want to say, that God gave us the land to work it and benefit from it. Our land was taken from us without compensation.

Another claimant, Mthethwa108, after telling of his constant suffering at the hands of a White farmer since 1952, said108: 22:

This committee is asking about something for which they already know the answer. They know that the land is ours and should be returned.

Even King Zwelithini has claimed divine purpose. His daughter Nandi publically remarked109: 3:

We [Zwelithini-royals] did not bring ourselves here. God put us where we are.

His son, Phumuza Zulu, stated109: 3:

I want to tell you that big things are coming about this family. He [the king] said everyone who wronged him must come and apologise because God is moving. All people who are against this kingdom, I am telling you right now, this is a prophecy, you are all going to be in trouble because God is in control, he is taking everything, so you must come to the king and apologise.

A White farmer from Paulpietersburg also got onto the divine bandwagon at the KwaZulu-Natal hearings. Mr. Engelbrecht108, who is opposed to both changing Section 25 and maintaining the present landownership balance, declared108: 22:

Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s servants, animals, or anything else. We must make sure that everybody has a piece of land and a title deed and is able to build a house they can leave for their children. We all want our kraals to be full of livestock, to plant maize and reap and be happy.

Engelbrecht’s108 emotional-religious argument mirrors that of Julius Malema. It is also interesting to note some of the rhetoric of Whites at the hearings. Much of it is as emotional and inapplicable as the arguments of the Blacks. A representative of the Melmoth Farmers Association in Vryheid, KwaZulu-Natal, Mr. Harris108, reflected at the hearing that the group was strongly opposed to the change the Constitution and to land redistribution without compensation, basically because they believe that land grabbing would destroy the lives of millions of South Africans. He said108: 22:

Apart from the injustices that it will cause to millions of loyal citizens of this country who have for generations worked the land and have built it up to become viable commercial farming enterprises, such as an amendment of the constitution will also destroy one of the most important corner-stones upon which our democracy is built.

However, he fails to mention which millions of citizens they support and on whose behalf they act.108 In this context is it important to note that there are more and less 35 000 commercial farmers, who are mostly Afrikaners/Whites, and the total Afrikaner population is only 2.7 million in number. To speak confidently on behalf of 2.7 million Afrikaners, of which fewer than 2% are commercial farmers and own farmland, is misleading.42 Julius Malema19 also fires at the argument of Mr. Harris19:3:

Many Africans have asked their white fellow residents a simple question: ‘When your white ancestors disposed black people of their lands, did they offer consolation? Was there a dialogue and democratic chance to hear everyone’s views?

A remark during the hearings at the Oudshoorn by a representative of the Khoi people, Julia le Roux111, the morning after Ramaphosa’s sudden and surprising announcement that the ANC supports the motion to change the Constitution, brings a new dimension to debate. She pointed out that Ramaphosa’s announcement was in reality an insult to the South African people and that it is unacceptable to make such a “government decision” before the hearings had been completed. She asked what they were all doing at the hearing at Oudtshoorn, seeing that the ANC government had already made a final decision on the matter.111 Another Khoi-San representative, named Marius111, addressed the commission as follows111: 4-5:

The land for which we are all washing out their mouths here belongs to no other than the Khoi-San. We are not going to deal with the parliament [Own translation].

Jacob Theron111, a Khoi-Khoi headman in Oudsthoorn, took the argument in favour of their right to South African soil back to Jan van Riebeeck and argues that the cut-off date for land redistribution must be changed from 1913 to 1652. He could not offer sound reasons, as reflected by the following opinion111: 4-5:

Jan van Riebeeck arrived on three ships, the Reijger, the Goede Hoop and the Drommedaris. How much land was on those ships? [Own translation].

Amil Umraw, a journalist who attended the various hearings, is of the opinion that it was doomed to failure from day one. He starts by reflecting on the unsuccessful efforts of a 91-year-old man, Isaac Mogale112 of Rustenburg, to reclaim his ownership of 345 ha of farmland that was dispossessed during Apartheid. Umraw writes112: 18:

But like many others who attended parliament’s hearings on the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution, Mogale’s views were drowned out by politically affiliated hordes who crammed the hearings venues across the country.

In every province, the hearings were marked by people in red, yellow or blue regalia streaming out of buses and lining up to address the committee. It seemed to be a strategy based on quantity over quality: the more heads in attendance, the better the chance of the party’s stance being expressed. And it was perfectly executed, especially by the EFF.

In an almost choral rendition of party policy, supporters mimicked their leaders’ rhetoric and, in some cases, like in Mahikeng, berated any speaker with an opposing view.

Umraw112 asks whether Cyril Ramaphosa’s comment that it is112: 18: “…patently clear that our people want the Constitution to be more explicit about expropriation of land without compensation, as demonstrated in the public hearings”, has been based on the views of the majority of South Africans or on those of the interest groups whose voices were the loudest at the hearings? Umraw112 takes his question further112: 18: “And how would he [Ramaphosa] unequivocally know what ‘our people want’ when parliament is yet to complete its consultative process?”

One positive outcome of the hearings is that it offered the different groups an opportunity to hear the views of the others. The public hearings meant that the ball had at least started roll in some way to somewhere.42,49,108,112

4. Discussion

4.1 The process of the public hearings on the change to Section 25

The parliamentary committee responsible for the public hearings to hear the public’s inputs on changes to Section 25(2)(b) and on land redistribution without compensation, completed its sessions in August 2018. After this the committee consulted further with various stakeholders, including academics, non-governmental organizations and private companies dealing with land and buildings. They used these evidence to present a final report for consideration by parliament.33,74,107,113

In retrospect it clear the task of the committee was just too comprehensive: to obtain valid and reliable evidence to guide the parliament on the decision to change Section 25 to allow land expropriation without compensation. The opinions and views of the public were often incoherent and unspecific. The hearings had also become contaminated by testimonies of unrelated past political and socioeconomic wrongdoings, historical and political myths that became truths in the minds of a great portion of the population, a lack of an understanding of the effect of contaminated economics on a stable food chain, a lack of knowledge on international and national laws on land grabbing, and a lack of an understanding about who counts as indigenous South African people.

The data were often conflicting and of no value. The masses of data collected were reworked by a private company, Isilumko Staffing, to offer some opinion to the parliament on the people’s needs, opinions, and demands on land expropriation with or without compensation. Reworking qualitative data to present it as quantitative data is a complex process that requires expertise in statistics, research design and the social sciences around politics. Outsourcing this analysis is highly questionable.

The final report divided the qualitative information into various categories: presentations on agricultural land, urban land, etc., and listing the arguments for or against change to Section 25. The whole process of analysing and classifying the data was subjective. It could be contaminated by bias and manipulation. The categorizing of the final data was executed according to the research company’s own guidelines. There were too many uncontrollable determinants that could have contaminated the whole process of the analysis. Various researches expressed doubt as to the applicability and correctness of the process.114-117

Political research is complicated and needs a clear-cut research design before the start of the research to find clear answers in response to clear questions to them. Starbird’s117 doubts are clear when he says117: 66:

The most fundamental idea of democracy is that the government responds to the will of the people. Usually, the will of the people is ascertained through voting. An election takes the individual opinions of each voter and assembles those many opinions into one societal decision, the election winner – the will of the people.

Starbird117 warns that there is an unfortunate and counter-intuitive reality to the election process117: 66:

An election’s outcome may have less to do with the voters’ preferences about candidates [political matters] than with the voting [research] method employed. A method by which the voters’ preferences are combined to determine the winner [political matter] is a means of making a statistical summary of data. We will see that such summaries are fraught with peril.

The final decision of the voters [presenters] on a change to Section 25 offered in parliament is intrinsically problematic. The presenters made up 1% of the population. The research cannot serve as a valid and trustworthy guideline for parliament. The whole exercise was nothing other than political window-dressing.23,117,118

The best way to understand this is with Starbird’s117 lecture titled “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics”. He said117: 92:

In this lecture, we will learn some effective ways to lie with statistics. Lying with statistics means one of several things. We might, of course, simply present false data. But more interesting methods involve taking perfectly valid data and distorting their meaning by using misleading presentations or by drawing improper inferences.

The vote on the change to Section 25 in parliament will be done in terms of party membership. This in reality means the outcome will depend on party policy.23,117,118

The best way to settle the matter would be three questions on a ballot. These three questions should be: 1) Are you in favour of keeping Section 25 as it is and the continuation of the land redistribution policy in place since 1994? or 2) Are you in favour of a change to Section 25 for the implementation of a land redistribution policy with compensation? or 3) Are you in favour of a change to Section 25 for the implementation of a land redistribution policy without any compensation?

The whole process could also be completed at much less cost with a referendum. It is further alleged that the ANC’s top six, after it became clear that the majority of the presenters at the parliamentary hearings were against amending the Constitution (and thus land expropriation without compensation), decided to ignore the outcome of the hearings.23,106

An overview of the hearings shows that the general public holds far less extreme views than the ANC and the EFF. The report of Isilumko Staffing shows that there were 630 609 written submissions, of which 176 780 were duplicates, with 3 602 empty and a further 592 non-applicable. The result was 449 522 presentations, reflecting a 34.2% in favour of the change and 64.7% against it. The parliamentary committee acknowledged that it would be impossible for them to consider every one of the presentations in detail.2,23 The drafted amendment must first be accepted by National Assembly, which can happen at the earliest in March 2019. After that the concept amendment must also be considered by the National Council for Provinces. The National Council of Provinces is forced by law to allow six weeks for consideration for its members to take part in a public discussion. This means that the Constitution can be amended by middle May 2019 at the earliest. 2,23

If the ANC’s majority decreases after the 2019 election, their opportunities to amend the Constitution also decrease. The ANC will need the help of the EFF and other smaller parties to get enough votes. The election has to be before August, but Ramaphosa has hinted that it may be earlier.23,119

Referendums are seldom used in South Africa. Mkhondo106:18 warns that they are not fool proof. After FW de Klerk used a referendum to ask permission to continue negotiations with the ANC, some felt that he interpreted the results as giving him permission to hand the power to the majority, while they only meant to give him permission to negotiate.42,106 However, referendums could be a good option in a situation like this. Mkhondo106: 18 states that such a referendum will counter citizens’ cynicism, inter-party fighting and political manipulation and end the mandate of political leaders who speak falsely on behalve of the individual. It is time to acknowledge the demands of masses in South Africa.

In Switzerland more than 900 such plebiscites have been held since the 17th century, while more recently Italy and New Zealand used referendums to force radical changes to voting systems and drastic changes to of some of their political institutions.106 Mkhondo106: 18 provides a clear guideline for politicians to follow when using referendums to solve political matters. Firstly, the referendum questions must be neutral, clear and concise, preferably requiring a simple yes/no answer to avoid invalidity and incredibility. Referendums should also supplement rather than supplant political decision-making. It is undoubtedly time to look critically at the legal processes, the foundation and subjects on which battles are being fought106. Mkhondo106 states a clear constitutional dilemma that has to be addressed when he posits106: 18:

For nearly 25 years, our constitution has enshrined our values and given legal expression to our vision as a country and has been a fundamental source of guidance for elected officials. But our constitution is showing signs of wear and tear: Our democracy is becoming irrelevant.

Is the Constitution still valid for our circumstances? Mkhondo106: 18 writes precisely and clearly about our lack of sophistication with respect to the complexity of public policies on the Constitution and on human and property rights. He sees five prominent shortcomings that result from an autocratic-democratic constitution that suited Nelson Mandela at the time. It gave him the ability to place political allies in critical positions. South Africa has not really had a true democratic Constitution since 1994. Saying that Jacob Zuma misused the Constitution is false: South Africans created the faulty Constitution themselves, giving Zuma immense presidential power.106 Mkhondo106 pens down five very simply, straightforward yes-no questions for the voter on the Constitution106: 18:

  • Do you prefer the president of the country to be elected to office directly by voters?
  • Do you prefer that the president of the country be elected by their political party?
  • Should mayors and premiers be elected directly by voters?
  • Should all MPs, or a proportion of them, be elected through the mechanism of a party list?
  • Should South Africa continue to have nine provinces, or fewer?

Mkhondo106 takes the issue of land much deeper that the parliamentary committee’s superficial hearings. The current process is simple patchwork to a sick constitution, and its other shortcomings will resurface in the future on various constitutional matters and can become untreatable. Mkhondo106 writes in this regard106: 18:

We need a referendum, for example, on whether it is time to amend the constitution, and the electoral system it outlines. Is our proportional representation system still relevant? A referendum would test whether our constitution still embodied the bedrock values of our democracy, including effective participation, transparency, responsiveness, inclusiveness and accountability.

Cyril Ramaphosa120 claims that the land debate almost ended in a referendum in 1993, but instead the property clause was crafted to acknowledge the rights of property owners as well as those without land. Embedded in this clause …was the ability to speed up land reform, but this had not been used to good effect.

However, there was never any serious intent in 1993 to have a referendum on land expropriation without compensation, primarily because it would have ended in war at that time.42,108,120-122

4.2. Questions around the ANC attack on the 1994 Constitution and Section 25 to allow expropriation

4.2.1. Are Section 25 and the Constitution unchangeable?

Central to future dramatic land reform stands the South African Constitution and Section 25(2)(b) of its Bill of Rights. Anti-reformers argue that Section 25 already provides a clear roadmap for further land reform. Since 1994 a total of 76 000 land claims have been filed, 95% dealt with unsuccessfully. More than 1.8 million individuals have received compensation, either monetary or in the form of land.123 They also argue that Section 25 does give the state the ability to expropriate property in the public interest. The government has all it needs according to this line of argumentation. 124 Opperheimer explains Section 25(2)(b) when he postulates124:18:

It empowers the state to expropriate property in the public interest, which includes land reform. A classic case would be the construction of the Gautrain project, which needed to run through privately owned land, or the acquisition of land to build RDP homes. The constitution recognizes that in such cases private owners deserve compensation, which is worked out according to relevant circumstances.

In August 2018 the government indeed served papers of expropriation on four farm owners in Limpopo without court intervention, seemingly after the transfer of the ownership of the farms stalled because the state and the owners could not reach an understanding on the selling price and the owners contest the land claim in court. These expropriations were founded on Art 42(e) of the Act on the Restoration of Land Rights, which refers to recourse in the case of a deadlock.

AfriForum and Institute of Racial Relations (IRR) as made the claim that there is a list of 139 farms that the government intends to expropriate with compensation. Rendani Sadiki125, the acting director-general in the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, categorically denies the existence of such a list. Sadiki125 says it is a list of 139 farms (sometimes in media reported to be 194 farms) identified by the ANC NEC at their lekgotla as cases where no consensus could be reached on the selling prices that have to be put on the register for arbitration by the court. They are test cases for the expropriation of farms in terms of the valuation-general’s register of disputed farms (selling prices versus the land court’s pricing) to finalize the cases on the register.125,126 They are therefore not classified as expropriation without compensation, although the owners may not receive market value. The officials refuse for some sinister reasons to name these 139 properties, although are already on the register for disputed land. Rendani Sadiki125 and Maite Nkoane-Mashabane125 have acknowledged that this secrecy is a specific step by the government to prevent farmers from taking legal steps to defend their property.

The opinion of legal experts is that in certain extraordinary cases the government can expropriate land without compensation in terms of Art 42(e), but courts of law have thus far not given a decisive answer on the matter. Aggrieved land owners can thus still challenge the unacceptable compensations offered for their farms in the court in terms of the legality of the expropriation. Linda Page, spokesperson of the Department of Land Reform, emphasises that the minister can take steps to buy, to obtain or to expropriate with compensation (not necessarily at market prices) farms for land reform in terms of Art 42(e) and that there have been 23 such cases since 2007.

An attorney, Bertus van der Merwe, an expert on land expropriation, also indicates that there has thus far not been a single successful case of direct land expropriation by the government without some form of compensation. Maite Nkoane-Mashabane seemingly wants to create a legal precedent that favours the state in case of future cases of land expropriation without compensation, thereby overcoming the need to change Section 25(2)(b). Evidence suggests that the state in most instances pay semi-full /semi-half compensation (± 60% of market price), meaning that it would be difficult to force a pay-out above 60% in court.48,125,127 This testing of how compensation must be calculated indicates the failure of the ANC regime, because they did not use the courts as a final decision-maker and guide on the compensation process from the start. They instead followed a political process. If the court of law was used it would have resulted in a clear guideline on the correct calculation of compensation, preventing the current conflicting principles of willing seller-willing buyer.

In defence of their initial legal passivity, now replaced by an active process in court to force down expropriation in terms of the state’s pricing guideline, the ANC government argues that the market prices in time caused the buying process to slowed down because the prices were driven up unrealistically and artificially.34,48,125,129,130 Umraw128:4 reports that the expropriation of the 139 listed farms is expected to be carried out before the end of December 2018. An ANC NEC member, Ronald Lamola, revealed the truth that the ANC at its lekgotla in December 2017 adopted a plan to speed up land expropriation, including the alleged 139 farms selected for expropriation, because the ANC wanted to test the principles of the Constitution. Lamola reports128:4:

We said we will take a multipronged approach to land. We don’t know when the process for amendment will be finalized.

And it’s not a given that when we put the amendment to parliament, we will get a two thirds majority vote. We will continue to expropriate land this way, and the parliamentary process for a constitutional amendment for expropriation without compensation will run parallel.

Kodwa125:2 pointed out that even if this test run with the 139 farms is successful, the ANC would still seek an amendment of the Constitution to help them avoid future legal conflict in the process of land expropriation without compensation. Weighted compensation is only a short-term solution. Full-scale land grabbing is still the goal.125 Umraw128:4 reports that according to insider information on the ANC legotka, ANC members of the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) conceded that as the Constitution presently stands, “the state was already able to expropriate land without compensation if it wished”, but did not do so because of certain blocks in the country’s political set-up. The political power of the ANC has now reached the point where there is more radical thinking on the economic and social empowerment of the Black population. In this context, the members of the CRLR felt that the matter must be addressed by means of direct land grabbing. Affected landowners could be referred to the courts, from there the ANC’s eagerness to take test cases to court.128
Umraw128 writes128:4:

Party [ANC] insiders who attended the two-day lekgotla of the party’s national executive committee (NEC) this week, the ANC’s highest decision-making body between conferences, gave details of the legislative plans and the expropriation “guinea pig” scheme.

In addition to pushing for an amendment to section 25 of the constitution to allow for expropriation without compensation, the ANC’s plans include: Drafting a land records bill aimed at documented all landowners, both formal and informal, and ensuring security of tenure; Drafting a redistribution bill that would provide a framework for the deciding who gets priority access to land once the reform programme rolls out; and Amending the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act to recognize those who have lived on the property for three years or more as the de facto owners who cannot be dispossessed without consent.

Party members at the lekgotla are said to have wanted the process of passing and implementing the Expropriation Bill expedited. Once Section 25 of the constitution has been amended, the bill can be changed to allow for expropriation without compensation, effectively doing away with the willing buyer–willing seller principle.

Hunter131:4 says that the ministry of rural development had received specific instructions from its minister to pursue the matter right up to the Constitutional Court as test cases. The intention is not to relent if the White farmers take the department to court to object to the valuer-general’s valuation, but to obtain a pronunciation and guideline from the Constitutional Court on what Section 25 of the Constitution really means. The ANC wants the farmers to go to court. Although the head of the ministry of rural development, Mashile Mokono131, said that131:4: “…the department had set aside funds for the farms’ paying and if there were no disagreement, the department would have gone ahead and bought them”, he did a sudden turn-about on pay-outs when he said131:4:

The department believes the current provisions of the constitution may allow for farms to be expropriated with the value of the farm set at zero rands.

When land is evaluated, we take different things into consideration. If we consider the fact that maybe that land was given to the farmer by the apartheid government, then that farmer got soft loans, and when there was drought, he further got more…so the valuation might be that the farmer doesn’t get anything. Zero.

Mokono131:4 also posits that the government does not expect the present parliamentary process to amend the constitution to be concluded by the end of this administration, making a Constitutional Court order on the matter of crucial importance to the ANC. Hunter131:4 reports further that a member of the ANC’s executive said that it’s likely that once the Constitutional Court proclaims on any of the 139 cases, Section 25 may not need to be overhauled, because the Constitution is then functioning correctly in terms of the ANC’s concept of justice. This is in line with what Ramaphosa said to the Zulu King in July 2018, namely that the land targeted for expropriation is limited to the land of mostly White South Africans.68 On the 21st September 2018, Ramaphosa132:1 in an interview with Business Times elaborated further on his previous utterances. Derby132 reports132:1:

He and his party have backed changes to the constitution in order to ensure that land expropriation without compensation takes place to speed up transformation with regard to landownership.

Derby further reflects132:1:

Ramaphosa said the state would target land from state-owned enterprises and private sector businesses that have large tracts of unused land — such as forestry giants Sappi and Mondi.

The packaging and paper manufacturer Mondi Group and the pulp and paper company Sappi already accepted the unavoidable realities of landownership and publicly indicated they are not interested in owning land in future, but instead wants permission to use state or communal land to produce wood-products. Although the research of the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agricultural Studies (PLAAS) shows that as much as 40% of the large plantations are subject to land claims. They look at these claims in terms of their business models. Their priority is future access to wood resources instead of land ownership, making the transfer of land to communities less complicated and demanding.132,133 Above statements by various ANC elites on land reform and the contradictions, the ANC’s biggest problem is that it does not have a lucid policy on land134:4. They have only a series of decisions taken at various meetings sold as empowerment to the radical elements in the voter corps.

Munusamy writes134:4:

The land question could turn out to be SA’s Brexit if the ANC continues to chase votes without a coherent policy position and game plan.

Tabane135 postulates as follows135:4:

The elevation of the land question to a central election issue has made the ANC act in a desperate fashion, exposing policy schizophrenia,

and:

This must be one of the most disorganized policy approaches to befall the ruling party since 1994.

Professor Ben Cousins136:1 of the Department of Science and the Technology and National Research Foundation and a chair in Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies at the University of Western Cape, warns about the lack of a policy on land. He agrees that land redistribution is a core issue that must be addressed136:1:

We’ve got to change the racial ownership of land, but as a long-term project.

4.2.1.1. Does the ANC have a clear redistribution plan?

Cousins136, Haffajee138 and Derby137 emphasizes that a properly described official redistribution programme is crucial. The ANC simply lacks expertise.136-138 Cousins136 reflects as follows136:1:

We’ve got a massive problem with the restitution programme, which is now massively dysfunctional. We’ve got to fix those problems and resolve the restitution claims, possibly through lots of cash pay-outs. We’ve got to resolve the issue of the insecure land rights of people in informal settlements, in backyards shacks, in cities, communal areas and on farms. We need that tenure-reform component.

A new Land Records Act, which records, registers and secures people’s land rights, whether these are private title deeds or whether they are given tenure rights – a proper way of securing those rights against arbitrary eviction – is a third key element of a proper land reform programme.

The “cash payouts” Cousins136 refers to has become a problem. It seems to have dried up, forcing the ANC to take desperate measures. Another troubling idea is the prominent remark by Ronald Lamola128 that the ANC considered at the December 2017 lekgotla to introduce a land tax or a kind of levy on land for so-called absent landowners as a way to force the full use of land or to open up such land to the poor and landless. To add to the confusion, Enoch Godongwana125, chair of the ANC’s sub-committee of economic transformation, said the ANC had no intention to expropriate productive land without compensation distanced the ANC from the EFF125:2:

We strive to different kinds of landownership, including private land, state-land, communal land, etc.

What he omits is what percentage of land ownership the ANC would allow. If the models of Zimbabwe, Zambia or Mozambique are anything to go by, the percentage of White ownership will be very low, mostly limited to tenure by means of long lease.125 When considering the current situation where the ANC is in a hurry to push through land expropriation without compensation and Ramaphosa is attempting to clinch his position as president of the ANC of the country, chances are good that the ANC will strike a deal with the EFF and other radical parties in parliament before the 2019 election to withdraw the Expropriation Bill and to amend it to make explicit those categories of land (as a first step) likely to be expropriated without compensation and the conditions in which this may happen.138 Haffajee138:2 describes these properties as follows: “…possible abandoned buildings, unused land, unproductive commercial property held for speculative purposes, underutilized state property, and land farmed by labour tenants with an absentee titleholder”.

The earmarked properties clearly also include those farms with disputed prices and the so-called “soft Apartheid farms” (described by Mashile Mokono131:4 as farms obtain by nationalist Afrikaners because Apartheid favoured them).138 Derby137 is concerned about the consequences of land expropriation without compensation. He asks137: 2: “Just how will the state handle indebted land, even if a farmer is not compensated? Would there be compensation to the banks, and if not, just where it does it leave a bank like Absa, one of the largest lenders to the agricultural sector?”

This is just one risk of an untidy resolution to what is a structural fault line in the South African economy – access to land. If banks are susceptible and face a real prospect of some of their loans being wiped off their books, a crisis will follow. How will they be able to provide loans to new Black farmers?

This is admittedly alarmist, as there is much uncertainty about exactly what and how the changes to the Constitution will unfold. What will it mean for private property and house prices? There are just so many different objectives to the land debate. Apart from historical redress, there’s the promotion of land ownership of rural land. This calls into question the role of our traditional leaders such as the Zulu king. In these areas, just how we deal with the question of land tenure for women will be a minefield to navigate.

Plaintiffs have two prominent misconceptions about the ANC and its land reform. In contrast with the Westernized, capitalistic and democratic thinking of landowners, the ANC leaders have a revolutionary mindset based on the theory of chaos. Secondly, is the belief of some plaintiffs that the statutory change to the Constitution will stop with the change to Section 25. However, Section 25 seems to be only the first step of a low-level change to the Constitution to fit the ANC’s present needs, paving the way for more comprehensive and complicated changes to follow.42 To understand the ability of the ANC leadership to manipulate the facts is reflected in the ease with which they side-stepped the matter after President Donald Trump tweeted that he has instructed his minister of Foreign Affairs, Mike Pompeo, to investigated the ANC’s land grabbing and the murder of White farmers. After the ANC-leadership took Pompeo’s chargé ď affaires at the American Embassy in Pretoria under their hand about the “arrogant” Trump-tweet, Pompeo only wants from the ANC-regime “to explain its land reform policy better”. The report of journalist Llewellyn Prince139 on how easily Pomeo’s enquiry with the South African minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Lindiwe Sisulu, was laid to rest, is striking139:2:

South Africa must explain its land transforming policy better.

This was in New York the message of Mike Pompeo, the American minister of Foreign Affairs to Lindiwe Sisulu, the minister International Relations and Cooperation.

Sisulu yesterday, on her monthly information session, said to journalists Pompeo had said to her he and the American government understands what South Africa likes to reach, but that there are people which do not understand it. “After we called in the American Embassy’s chargé ď affaires after the tweet (of pres. Donald Trump), the American department issued a balanced elucidation”.

She [Sisulu] said the government will use every opportunity to explain.

The chances are good that the ANC will introduce comprehensive changes to the Constitution to implement RET from 2019 if the ANC stays in power after the 2019 election. They indeed do have a clear and guiding redistribution plan in place.

4.2.1.2. The legal foundation of the process of land expropriation with or without compensation

For a change to the Constitution, a two-thirds majority is needed in parliament and an approval from six of the nine provinces, while the ordinary Bill on Expropriation that is serving before parliament at the moment only needs an approval vote of 50% by the parliament.125,138,140 Two sections of the Constitution will have to be amended — 25 and 31. Section 25 is applicable to the property clause that allows for expropriation, and 31 is the limitations clause that outlines when rights, to, for example, property, can be limited.125,138,139 The ANC at moment has 62% of the seats and the EFF 6% of the seats of parliament, meaning an alliance can give 68%.125,138,140

Advocate Paul Hoffman of Accountability Now postulates that although a two-thirds parliamentarian majority is needed to Section 25 (Article 25) of the Constitution, it ultimately depends on a 75% parliamentarian majority vote as guided by Article 74(1) of the Constitution.125,138,140 To change the Constitution the amendment must be approved and accepted by the National Assembly, after which the concept amendment must also be considered and accepted by the National Council for Provinces.23 Laws aimed at streamlining the expropriation process without constitutional changes are the Employment Equity Act, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act and Codes, the Skills Development Act, the Levies Act and the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act. These legislations are supported by for instance the National Development Plan and the Black Industrialist Programme. Land expropriation in terms of democratic principles and African empowerment, is clearly described by Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, while the redistribution of agricultural land is further partially covered in the Agri BEE codes. This begs the question of why the sudden intended changes to the Constitution for land redistribution are needed?82

It is becoming more and more clear that the ANC is also setting their sights on various other traditional financial, legal and statutory institutions. The intention is undoubtedly to increase the ANC’s power over these traditional financial, legal and statutory institutions. Not even the South African courts will necessarily escape trespassing and disempowerment in the near future.

One direct outcome of the expropriation initiative is the abuse of the various legal vehicles to manipulate the prices of land. Plaintiffs criticise the calculation of the value of land when sold in terms of Art 42(e) of the Act on Property Valuation. They argue that the valuation-general uses an illegal formula to do the calculation for compensation, which should be based on six criteria, namely the 1) present market value of the property, 2) improvements, 3) present use and income-generation component, 4) the way the property was acquired, 5) the amount of financial state support the owner received over the years, and 6) the primary aim of the expropriation, like land-transformation, etc. The plaintiffs indicate that the open market value and the valuation of the valuation-general often differ as much as 50% and more, making the forced sale of the property a loss to the affected owner. Ms. Annelize Crosby48 of AgriSA puts it at more or less 60%, while Dr. Theo de Jager110, chair of the World Agricultural Organisation, puts it on an average of 40%. The valuation-general sometimes contracts private valuation groups to estimate the value of farms to ratify this low evaluation as the final expropriation offer.

The plaintiffs see this whole process with all its cancerous roots as nothing less than land expropriation without compensation.48,110,127,128-130 De Jager110: 4-5 says in this regard that the fact that the Land Claim Commission has been offering only 60% of the market value since September 2007 means that some farmers could not pay their outstanding bonds to banks when expropriation took place. This is nothing other than land expropriation without compensation for the White farmer.110 The banks in most cases get back the full amount of their bonds, which is seldom above 60% of the market value of farms. This assures that the banking sector’s involvement and their lending to farmers is not affected negatively in anyway. It means that farmers carry the financial losses alone as individual (White) citizens, while the shareholders/investors in banks are not affected. Bankruptcy is unavoidable for the White farmers who land in this situation. De Jager110: 4-5 reports that when the first pay-out of only 60% occurred, the banks lowered land bonds and informed farmers with bonds that they would still be responsible for shortfalls when land is expropriated by the government at 60% of the market value.

Another way in which the ANC is trying to limit White land ownership is with the concept legislation on the regulation of landownership issued in March 2017. It will probably be put to Parliament for approval in March 2021. This legislation suggests that land ownership be limited to 12 000 hectares, but that the ceiling of 12 000 hectares must not be absolute. The final size will depend on various factors, such as the location of the farm (for instance semi-dessert which needs large areas to make a living versus wetter areas where intensive farming is practiced on a small area), the quality of the land, the availability of water, distance from markets, capital requirements for farming and the number of the people already living and working on the farm. Gwede Mantashe (previously the secretary-general of the ANC and now minister of mineral resources) tried on 15 August 2018 to side-step the legal process with a further demand that the change to Section 25 should include limiting White land ownership to 12 000 hectares. However, in reality only 0.22% of farms are affected. The idea is that the land above the limit must be confiscated without compensation. This hostile behaviour on the one hand shows the lack of knowledge on the part of the ANC and on the other the growing hostility towards White landowners31,34.48,141-143.

This legislation will give the government the power to limit the right to own 12 000 hectares even further in some instances, depending on climate and the quality of the soil, etc.34 Another limitation on land ownership was suggested by Zuma in 2015, namely foreign landownership.34 Official statements on land expropriation is ever more conflicting, inciting the poor and landless to grab land. They have been waiting in the background, eagerly anticipating their promised free land. Munusamy144 expresses the popular expectations well144:22:

Following the ANC’s decision to amend the constitution to allow for land expropriation, there are all manner of expectations: Some people think title deeds for land will be handed out like free chilli sauce with a takeaway meal…

Since the Whites have been labelled the transgressors of the past, the question is if Whites will be allowed any land ownership whatsoever.142 The current fight against land grabbing will not turn around the ANC in the long run, only the voters can bring change. Arguments like that of Opperheimer124 ultimately only offer emotional support. Opperheimer writes124:18:

Almost all victims of land dispossession have been compensated. Home ownership matches racial demographics. Barring a few opportunistic politicians, almost no one view land reform as a burning issue. The transfer of functioning farms to ill-equipped beneficiaries has been a spectacular failure. Expropriate without compensation has been tried in communist regimes, where it has harvested riches for a few and devastation for everyone else.

We have an internationally lauded constitution premised on freedom, dignity, and equality. We have never altered our Bill of Rights and the evidence shows that there is no reason to do so now.

You can’t remove property rights and have a flourishing economy. Foreign investors won’t risk having their land confiscated when they can pick any number of other nations that will protect their investments.

4.3. The future of White farmers in South Africa

However much Whites are protesting, land reform is a reality. Those who do not fight it, but react with wisdom and calmness are often regarded as traitors when they consult with the authorities..31,97,98,101,102,112,125 This category of land owners sees the land issue as a valid concern that should have been addressed already, while many farmers still yearn for their apartheid rights.31,97,98,101,102,112,125,145 Those farmers who have adjusted are aggrieved by the rigid thinking of White farmers in general. They see the current efforts of the leaders of many of the pro-farmer groups like AfriForum, Solidarity and the FFP Plus as opportunistic and more focused on conflict than constructive discourse that could improve the relationship between the White farmers and ANC radicals. Van Rensburg145: 10 focuses our attention on this conflict with a comparison between the 1994 Constitution and the useless agreement the British Premier Neville Chamberlain made with Adolf Hitler in an effort to avoid the Second World War. He writes145:10:

After his return from Munich he cast around a note with the message: “I believe this is peace in our time”. Within a year Europe was plunged into war.

The 1994 Constitution has many short-comings. It is not absolute and will not protect White rights forever.110,145 Theo de Jager110: 4-5, chair of the World Agricultural Association, warns that Whites will not escape dramatic changes. They are naïve to think the Constitution will guard them. The ANC is losing power, and as in Zimbabwe where the Mugabe regime latched onto the rhetoric of punishing Whites for the past when they started losing power, the ANC wants to disempower Whites to regain power. De Jager110 shows that Section 25 of the Constitution does not guarantee market-related compensation for expropriation at all. What is more, the Land Claims Commission also has the power to decide on the specific value of farms under expropriation as is evident from the many pending disputes between farmers and the government. Only 10% of farms have been transferred up to 2018. De Jager110 makes it clear that the conflict with respect to land is not only the fault of the ANC government. He writes110: 4-5:

Our farmers have known for more than two decades that landownership and land transformation can become political dynamite. We saw what happened in Zimbabwe, but learned very little from it. The ANC asked in 2008 for suggestions for a land reform plan and we did not suggest one. Even the partnership model of the National Development Plan was shot down aggressively until the expropriation-without-compensation-scenario brought the established agricultural organisations to other insights.

To reject every new land reform plan as unconstitutional, ANC-friendly or as interference in the free market (as if it was not interference in the free market that plunged us in the present landownership dilemma), creates the impression that we speak left but is running right. History is going to judge us harshly for our inability to devise a workable plan [Own translation].

De Jager110 is clear and robust on the only choice available110: 4-5:

It is this or losing everything. It is not business as usual. We can certainly not sit down and believe that the problem will disappear [Own translation].

The White farmers should urgently change their attitude of obstruction, conflict and hostility and start to cooperate with ANC regime. They stand to be the only losers.110,146 The research of Pieter Steyn146, a South Africa journalist who recently toured Zimbabwe to do comprehensive interviews with Black and White farmers, officials and politicians, takes De Jager’s110 urgent warning of “adapt or die” even further. He reflects on the absolute right to land ownership and compares it with the situation of the Zimbabwean farmers. Steyn writes146: 12:

You do not need to own land to farm successfully and profitably. This fact is seldom acknowledged in the angry talks on land which are heard today in South Africa, this sentiment is seldom raised [Own translation].

For Steyn146 it is clear that Zimbabwean Black and White commercial farmers have started to think differently about land ownership and farming as a lifestyle and as a source of income. In Zimbabwe, as in Zambia and Mozambique, land is now more often owned by the state and rented out in terms of tenures of long lease (99 years) to farmers. A White Zimbabwean farmer, Ken Drummond146: 12, reflects that South Africans — from the farmers to the government — must look carefully at the events in countries like Kenya and Zambia. They had bloody revolutions about land, while in Zimbabwe White farmers lost their lives. He regards hanging on to land as foolish, and many of the White farmers in Zimbabwe who selfishly and rigidly clung to their land in the Mugabe period, lost it in the end.146 Basil Nyabadza146: 12, chair of the Agricultural and Rural Development Council of Zimbabwe and a high profile member of Zanu-PF, confirms that the only solution in Zimbabwe for all the parties involved was to transfer land ownership to the state. White farmers re-entered the agricultural sector by renting land for 99 years. For him is it important that South Africans look at all the unnecessary mistakes made in Zimbabwe since the 1960s. He emphasizes that it resulted in food shortages, murder and plundering, racism, and the South African situation has the potential to turn out the same. Drummond’s146: 12 advice to South African White farmers, in line with what De Jager110: 4-5 is advising, is to begin constructive talks with the ANC regime and to work towards something creative, even if it means selling farms under expropriation at lower than the market prices. One possibility is expecting of all persons who want to farm to be licensed as a farmer.146 The direct advice of Scott Masala146, a businessman and cattle farmer of Bulawayo, to White South African farmers is that they should take a look at the real amount of land they need to be productive and profitable146: 12:

If you own 30 000 hectares but uses only 1 000 hectares or only need 1 000 hectares to be productive, give away the rest [Own translation].

Drummond146: 12 agrees whole-heartedly and says that if a constructive thinking process was followed from day one in Zimbabwe, the end result would have been different.146 Both Masala146 and Drummond146 see the use of the courts as needless and ineffective in the end. It only delays the process. Masala146 and Drummond146 point out that this route has never worked and will not work here.

It is important for the business and farming sectors to get involved in the land transformation issue and that they must not allow themselves to be steered by politics. These sectors are currently passive, and this has led to the process being taken over by politicians.146,147 The various self-appointed bodies should also be replaced by a single body that represents all farmers at all levels, Black and White. For instance, the threats of Agri SA to use its influence with Business South Africa (BUSA) and the International Business Chamber and its interaction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other entities that lend money to the South African government, to fight expropriation, can have more disadvantages than benefits.31

The Afrikaner farming community is also playing a diminishing role in South Africa. Their current resistance to even a balanced land expropriation process is leading to unreasonable farm prices. Some of the organizations that speak for them are actually hindering the success of land reform and the cause the banking sector to be reluctant to support options such as a 99-year tenure system. Resistance is largely also why early reasonable efforts in Zimbabwe failed.42,130,146-149 The farmers who have embraced the process supports the viewpoint of the Zimbabwean farmers based on their lessons, namely that the ANC’s idea to look for farms/land that are not in full use and to redistribute these farms.

Barack Obama pointed to the greed to “own more than you need or you can utilize” in his recent Nelson Mandela annual lecture on 17 July 2018 in Johannesburg. White South African landowners must make a change from exclusive capital and move towards inclusive capital ownership. If the process of land expropriation is supported by the White farmers, it could be a moderated process.146 Although some of these White farmers feel that White farmers are ultimately unwelcome, they feel that cooperation could go far in ameliorating the current conflicts.146,149

4.4. Who will rule South Africa after 2019?

The change of Section 25(2)(b) and the implementation of land expropriation with or without compensation greatly depend on the outcome of the 2019 election. If the ANC or an ANC-EFF alliance wins more than 67% of the votes, radical land reform will be a given. A cursory look at the numbers of the three main parties could perhaps shed light on the current situation.

The ANC is currently popular with a certain segment of the population. The fact that it equalling the EFF in terms of radical ideas on land reform means that the EFF is losing ground. Present estimates reflect a rise in the popularity of the ANC attributable to the land debate from 50% to 60%. Despite this, there are several indications that this will not hold.19,57,112,152.153-155

Firstly, the parliamentary hearings revealed that only about 34.2% of the population really supports radical land reform. This means that the new-found radicalism of the ANC may not translate into votes. A recent Victoria Research report shows that the greatest worries of South Africans (Black and White) are unemployment (47%), drugs (23%), crime (20%) and corruption (18%). The ANC has failed to address any of these. The issue of land reached only 6%. What is more, this 6% represents an average. Only 4% of Blacks have an issue with land, while 11% of Whites express concern. Racism featured in only 7% of the answers, so the race care may not work either. Black groups indicated a 16% dislike for Black illegal immigrants, indicating that this is more of an issue.19,57,112,152-157

Since Ramaphosa has come into power, the ANC has attracted fewer votes in 33 out of 47 by-elections. Further is the Ramamania fast making place for Ramaconfusion, -depression and -failure. A large segment of the Black middle class prefers the DA as the favoured party. This is very important, seeing that the growing Black middle class makes up 40% of the labour force, 30% to 35% of the employment revenue generated and nearly 10% of the country’s wealth.19,57,112,152-157

Another blow to the ANC is the ever widening gap between the party and the SACP and Cosatu since the 54th ANC conference in October 2017. Ramaphosa could thus far not heal the rift. His election as president of the ANC came with the exclusion of the SACP’s senior leaders and Cosatu’s top unionists from the ANC’s 80-member national executive committee (NEC). The SACP has also recently started to criticize Zuma and the ANC openly.158,159

A further factor that can deter voters is the continued corruption.160,161 Onkgopotse Tabane161, a well-known journalist, the author of Let’s Talk Frankly and the host of Power Perspective on Power 987, writes161: 14:

The NEC’s continuation of a culture of a missing backbone will turn off voters in big numbers, as they will be convinced that the Ramaphosa-led ANC is still being remotely controlled by Zuma, who is a wrecking ball across the economy. This is the singular threat to the ANC’s electoral fortunes…

The ANC itself is aware of its decline as the favoured party. This is evident from the Boksburg document that was compiled by the ANC during their April 2018 Boksburg conference. The following quotation dated the 13 May 2018, comes from the April 2018 conference. It reads162:4:

If we want to make a significant impact on voter mood we need to use the next 15 months to demonstrate political will, concrete actions, and the capacity to deal with these issues.

This includes concrete and drastic action (not just statements) against corruption, especially among our leaders, and [to] strengthen the capacity of the state to investigate and prosecute offenders.

We also have to provide clear action and proof that we are prioritising job creation and economic development and our efforts are bearing fruit.

The election of 2019 is a threat to the ANC. They are already doing fancy political footwork to stay in power. The internal document of April 2018 after the Boksburg conference reflects a sombre mood within. They have real concerns about losing Gauteng, North West, Free State, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. The ANC’s own admission in this document that they “have squandered the goodwill they enjoyed from voters for the past 24 years” and that they intend “to rectify their bad actions immediately in the less than 15 months before the election” is telling. Land redistribution is a desperate attempt to show goodwill towards the voters. Ramaphosa is vulnerable at the moment, and as already indicated, his decision-making could be affected by the up-coming election.91,112,124,163,164 The ANC is trying everything to stay in power. Consider the rhetoric of Zizi Kodwa45, the ANC’s head of the presidency at Luthuli house, in his address to the nation, dated 26h August 201845: 22:

As we celebrate the centenary of Nelson Mandela and Albertina Sisulu, we must rededicate ourselves to the ANC’s founding values.

We are under no illusion that the path we have yet to traverse as a Nation towards the realisation of a truly emancipated society free of corruption and all forms of discrimination is a long one. This [Zondo] commission presents us with an opportunity not only to learn from our mistakes, but to also build resilient institutions that can withstand scrutiny and enjoy the confidence of all South Africans.

Ranjeni Munusamy165 brings some much-needed rationality to the table165: 22:

Next year, the ANC will swamp us with election campaign messages about how it will serve our interests. It will beg us to return it to power. Judging by how it failed our nation and let down those who showed courage under fire, why should we believe it?

Munusamy165 shows that there is tremendous distrust in the integrity of the ANC. Poor service delivery, unemployment and the immense dishonesty within the ANC elite have turned the tide against them. The ANC’s intended land grabbing is the final straw for the Black middle class.165 The ANC’s promises have become unconvincing. They fact that the ANC is asking China for help also sends off a red light.166,167 Bruce indicates80:20:

Left to the ANC alone, there is no prospect of any of this getting better. The party simply doesn’t have the will to manage our vast social and mechanical complexity on the ground.

Land expropriation can cost the ANC its rule. Bruce80 describes this possibility poignantly:80: 20
Rich or poor, you will probably, in your heart, have already decided these people [ANC] can’t help you. The land issue will take years to resolve, if it ever is.

I’m not scared, just disappointed. My house isn’t going to be expropriated. Neither would my farm be, if I had one. Even if it wanted to the ANC simply doesn’t have the ability to make land reform happen. It should hand the entire process over to AgriSA, tell it to find x-million hectares and partner with and take responsibility for the new farmers it puts on the land.

That’s easy. The hard part is recasting our politics into something that represents the structure of the economy instead of merely the race of people in it. That will take decades but, mercifully, it’ll end in the demise of the ANC – which, right now, seems to me to be a dream worth work shopping.

Tabane’s12 short “obituary” of the ANC reflects a party that has failed the Black people: a phenomenon he calls the death of Black humanity, where the12:18: “…disappearance of norms and values, leading to dysfunctional families, unstable communities and a society whose sense of outrage have become an optional extra, while the concept of ubuntu has all but disappeared”.

The ANC’s mismanagement of the economy and failure to address service delivery, work, healthcare and education, spells disaster for the party. Tabane12 sees the ANC as the cause of a new Black opposition and the loss of unity. Munusamy11 emphasizes that the world, including ANC supporters, are now aware that the country was run by a shadow state for ten years and that its crooked leadership has not been taken to book. She writes11: 18:

The ANC is instead plotting against itself, ready to place the country in peril again in another reckless battle for power. It is alarming how much ANC leaders distrust one another and how their primary motivation is self-preservation rather than the national interest.

One of the biggest blemishes on the ANC is the Marikana massacre six years ago. The government has yet to take responsibility. Tabane calls it the lowest point in the new South Africa, white-washed by the Farlam commission. The question is, can Blacks lives be entrusted to the ANC regime after 2019?144,168,169 Ramaphosa’s failure to get everyone linked to the Zuma-Gupta scandal out of his cabinet has caused concern. It leaves us thinking that the AND elite is just too untrustworthy, unpredictable and self-centred to be the government of the day.170-172 Eric Naki writes160: 3:

…Ramaphosa, then deputy president, was informed by a major shareholder at VSB early last year that money was being stolen. He allegedly promised to do something about the matter but did nothing.

The political analyst Professor Lesia Teffo takes it to the door of the man who is now supposed to run South Africa with integrity. He writes160: 3:

Ramaphosa kept mum because he was looking after his own interests.

The ANC’s support dropped to an estimated 52% after Ramaphosa’s land expropriation programme was announced.12,75,111,173-176 The present indication is that the ANC will not be able to turn around the distrust before the election. Some analysts project 60%, others as low as 50% (2004: 69.69%, 2009: 65.9%; 2014: 62.1%). The Ipsos poll shows 60%, while the DA’s research reflects less than 50%. The ANC’s own poll by its Luthuli house research team came to 48%.156,157,177

However, the DA cannot take this as a victory yet. The party still has a “Whitish image”. They are not able to attract any of the populistic votes as they do not embrace radical land reform. The DA is also accused of not being open to new ideas, but in practice this criticism is insignificant compared to the emptiness of the ANC and EFF. Another criticism is that their policies are of reminiscent of a party struggling with the dual ambitions of being a national and a regional power. However, this is equally true for the ANC and especially the EFF, which is mainly established in the Venda region and lacks a basic presence in Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal.177-183 There also seems to be a negative political culture in the DA. The editor of the Sunday Times wrote as follows in this regard on 12 August 2018:184: 16

The DA is desperate, and worried. The possibility of losing support in next year’s election is real. A recent poll by Ipsos’ predicts that the DA, which received 22% in 2014, could lose as much as 9%. The research says the infighting in the Western Cape could even lead to the DA losing its grip on the province. This would be disastrous, and the DA knows this. Losing the Western Cape, the only province it governs, would render the DA irrelevant.

Initially the thought was that the DA may lose votes to the ANC once Cyril Ramaphose takes over, but this seems doubtful given his plans of radical land reform. The electoral analyst Dawie Scholtz points out that the DA has managed to strengthen their position in the 12 by-elections held since Ramaphosa became president.150,185-187 Some of the most well-known political commentators and journalists are very positive about the DA’s chances in the coming election, pointing out that the DA’s politics is relevant for concerned voters whose politics are based on democracy and capitalism and a Western orientation. These analysts project a possible increased voter turn-out, placing the DA in a stronger position. The findings of the Victory Research project shows that the support of Black voters for the DA has grown between 6% and 10%. This strong Black contingent of followers was evident at the official launch of the DA’s 2019 election campaign at Mary Fitzgerald Square in Newtown, Johannesburg on 22 September 2018. The DA also shows no traces of the scandals that have marked the ANC and EFF.157 Their honesty about South Africa’s immense challenges and their clear guidelines that steer clear from empty promises has made them an attractive party. Their opposition to the growing racial nationalism (Black) not only attracts White votes, but also middle and upper class Black votes. It is worthwhile to quote the words of the DA-leader, Mmusi Maimane188. He writes188: 22:

There is no doubt we lost our way as a country. The SA of today bears no resemblance to the country we envisaged for ourselves at the start of our democracy in 1994. Corruption and mismanagement have become endemic to the government, and the result is a country that lags behind its peers on just every measure you can image. Our country still has deep divisions of colour, of gender and religion. But the biggest division in our society is between those on the inside – people with jobs, good education and access to opportunity – and the millions still locked out of our economy.

The Victory Research estimates 23% for the DA in the 2019 election. The steady path of the DA shows that it has a qualified leadership with integrity. They party has grown steadily since 1994.157,189

The EFF in turn is a radical political party, openly and unapologetically hateful of Whites. Land grabbing is central to their policy. They call for the nationalisation of property. Most researchers agree that the party is propelled by extremism, but that they have limited impact. This is not surprising given the general citizenry’s lack of interest in land reform and their deep-seated worry about factors such as unemployment and crime. Even their racist rhetoric does not seem to attract the crowds.19,57,112,152-157 The political scandals in which the party has been involved has also detracted from their support. There is the alleged transfer of R16.1 million to Brian Shivambu, the organizer of the EFF recruiting parties on campuses, and a brother of Floyd Shivambu, deputy-leader of the EFF. It is alleged that R10-million ended up in Floyd Shivambu’s pockets, while only R1.3 million was paid into the EFF’s bank account. It is also alleged that Floyd Shivambu acted as a facilitator of PIC deals and receiving large payments for his time.170,190-192 In reaction to Malema’s denial of the allegations, Munusamy192 reflects:192: 22

Strangely, even when the EFF has been implicated in corruption, its leaders still have the space and ability to manipulate public opinion.

The EFF went on the offensive, attacking people in the National Treasury, commentators and journalists for suggesting these allegations should be investigated and that Shivambu should subject himself to a lifestyle audit.

Malema claimed that these calls emanated from a ‘mob’ of racists and paid ‘Stratcom’ agents.

Malema tweeted this week that his members should remain vigilant and focused as ‘the enemy is attacking’.

Because of the dearth of leadership, many people will take his cue and chase after whomever he defines as the enemy. Even though the EFF’ hypocrisy is exposed, Malema will continue to dictate the national agenda for as long as nobody else does.

Munusamy continues:194: 18

“If it is not invective from the EFF’s leaders that journalists and commentators have to endure, it is the online onslaught from the party’s supporters, including race baiting and death threats”.

Bruce shows that things can go wrong for the EFF in the run-up to the election. He writes:195:16

“By the time we go to the polls, the SARS inquiry will be done and Moyane gone. There’ll be a new head at the National Prosecuting Authority. Arrests will have been made and charges laid”.

The SAPD is also looking around to make arrests, as Bruce193 confirms:193: 20

“If Julius cannot get the EFF out of the corner it is in and goes into the 2019 election visibly damaged, those wavering white voters might relax and stick with the DA”.

In middle October the EFF, after a good run in student council elections on minor campuses, was thumped by the ANC at Wits in Johannesburg.195 Victory Research estimates an outcome of 13%, doubling the votes the party got in its first attempt in 2014 (6.34%). Victory Research also indicates that 25% of ANC voters are interested in voting for the EFF in 2019).19,57,112,153-157

Despite this, it seems the party’s inputs will remain dependent on alliances and focused on controversies. The broader population is just not comfortable with the EFF’s ideology of land grabbing and political instability. Derby178:2 shows that even though some proclaim the EFF as the “centre of a new politics”, the party’s roots represent the thinking and interests of a faction of the ANC, while its economic policies are outdated and framed by those of the ANC, the SACP and the PAC. This limits their growth.178,185 Bruce185 estimates that they will struggle to get 10% of the votes next year.

4.4.1. Overview: South African politics 2018–2019

Despite all the polls and projections, a completely different picture may appear. If the DA gets between 35% and 40%, a different political model can emerge from the present one where the ANC targets the Whites as a racial group thrives on corruption, theft, state capture and a foolish and outdated economic and political communist orientation. A new anti-radicalism can also mean the end of the EFF, as happened with the PAC and the AWB.

An alliance between the EFF and the ANC is unlikely. The EFF has virtually no policy. Their main aim is to disturb the ANC. Their alliance with the DA proved unsuccessful due to their unruliness. The ANC and EFF together could have changed the Constitution already since they share their radical views on land reform, yet the EFF elected to partner with the DA. They promptly proceeded to stab the DA in the back by ousting Athol Trollip as the mayor of Nelson Mandela Bay. This means that sudden game-changing alliances seem unlikely.111,150,151

It is a political-historical fact in South Africa that voters rarely change their national government, writes Leon.150:22 The NP won 11 consecutive general elections, and since 1994 the ANC has won five general elections successfully.12,150,179,186,196 However, surprise is a political-historical fact. Not even the strongest regimes last forever.150:22 The Indian Congress Party, the Israeli Labour Party and the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party are excellent examples of such diminishing regimes, although it took between thirty to seventy years to play out.150 Louw42 is supportive of Leon’s150 finding and shows that multi-ethnic mini-empires of multi-nations mostly collapse in a short amount of time. Louw42 writes that their shelf-life is indeed limited, as confirmed by the various empire states of the 20th century: the duration of the Bolsheviks’ Social Union lasted from 1922 to 1991 (69 years); Bismarck’s German Reich 1871 to 1918 (47 years); Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich 1938 to 1944 (12 years); Japan’s Colonial Empire 1905 to 1945 (40 years). The average duration for reigning were 42 years.42 In a South African context, the NP and its nationalist Afrikaner style mini-empire of multi-nations (or the unofficial managed “NP Union”) only lasted from 1948 to 1961 (13 years), and its mini-empire for multi-states (Republic) only from 1961 to 1994 (33 years), while the Union of South Africa under strong British influence lasted from 1910 to 1948 (38 years). This reflects an average of 24 years for the three regimes. In terms of the average of 24 years, the ANC will reach the end of its shelf-life at the end of this year.42 If all the above is true it means the ANC would not have the power to change the Constitution.

5. Conclusions

South Africans don’t know each other across the racial divide, despite the fact that there are more similarities than differences between the various South African groups.24,41,86 Since 1994 the Whites have been reminded of the sins of apartheid in every single speech, and the recent developments on land has brought them to the point where they doubt they will ever be treated equally.2,7,42

South Africa has one of the highest rates of unemployment in the world and has one of the most unequal societies. Although the roots of these scourges go back to 1671, it is also true that very little has changed since 1994. The improvement will not come from taking from Whites to give to Blacks. What will happen to the poor when nothing is left but very inefficient state machinery? Inequality can only be erased by large-scale permanent employment, affordable housing, better training and education, and the establishment of a stable political environment. We are far from that given the current climate.1-7,14,15

The recent writings of the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, Thabo Makgoba,198 summarize very honestly the South African issue of land expropriation without compensation. This article aimed to join the discussion by showing the complexity of the matter. The current political environment is marked by old myths, misconceptions of our own history, and fear to address crucial issues.198 As Magoba198 highlights, going back into history means going back to the time before the 1600s when Black tribes colonised the KhoiSan and the KhoiKhoi. Viewing the Blacks as indigenous people deprived of their land is inaccurate. However, the beginning of apartheid stretches back to 1671 at the Cape. It was a slow process of social engineering to benefit Whites.198

Redistributing land without compensation will not solve this. It can only aggravate the matter, as Makgoba198 shows. Although the inequality in the country means that redistribution should occur, it should not be offered as a panacea for poverty or be based on arguments about who is indigenous and who is not.

The fact is that redistribution is a symbolic act for emotional relief; it is not going to change the lives of the poor. Makgoba198 highlights the fact that the radicals in the ANC don’t really know what they want to do with the expropriated land. There is no sound plan. It’s all about revenge and Whites can rightfully be worried about it.

The relationship between Blacks and Whites is in reality much better than what the radicals in the ANC and EFF want to make it. Threats of war are far-fetched,42,84,157,189 but enormous economic distress is not, and this could be the fuel that ignites racial hate. Venezuela has seen more than three million of its people flee the country as they grow desperate for basic food and medicines.42,199 We must solve these problems constructively, now.199 Archbishop Makgoba’s argument on the land issue is a fitting conclusion to this discussion:198:21

Although I don’t want to turn the current fight over land reform into a free-for-all, we cannot afford to ignore the seizure of land before the current cut-off date of 1913. Expropriation going back to colonial times has sentenced many generations to utter poverty and shame. Laws and practices were maintained by force of arms, leading to a system of landownership and economic development disproportionately based on race.

However, we must recognize that going back to the colonial era raises difficult questions. What happens to white families who have long since sold the land originally seized by their forebears and invested the proceeds? And what about those who bought land for the first time more recently, using big loans from banks? If the banks lose their money, what damage does that do to the economy?

What about the land given in the 19th century to those of our ancestors who helped the colonizers defeat other groups of African people? Who adjudicates those disputes?

While our history gives us no choice but to redistribute land, I am not happy with the way politicians are playing on people’s hunger for redress and their yearning for better lives. In people’s minds, the unjust distribution of land has become a proxy for economic disadvantage, and “expropriation without compensation” is being sold as an instant solution to all our problems, from failed land reform to unemployment. Expropriation does not automatically improve the lives of our people.

I have not heard anyone spell out an overarching vision which takes all the complex practical and emotional factors into account. Nor have I heard a satisfactory answer to the fundamental question: expropriation to do what?

What South Africa needs is a wise man. At the moment the ANC leadership is paralysed. Mthombothi writes:171: 21

They don’t know where to start. And so they tarry or push them aside, hoping they will go away.

The current problems are just too enormous for the current political leadership to solve. When they do attend to the matter, they do it on an explosive and conflict-ridden way, creating more complex problems and crises.171 Mthombothi171: 21 points out that the “normal human reaction when disaster strikes, is to cower”, instead of being ardent, challenged, opportunistic and motivated. South Africa needs a Winston Churchill, who said:171: 21

“Never let a good crisis go to waste”.

We need an executive leader who also knows it’s a time to be bold, to act decisively and think out of the box. It seems that we do not have such a leader at present, neither Black, nor Coloured, Indian or White.200-204

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; Externally peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.