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Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Badness, candidate, crookedness, delinquency, election, evaluation, expropriate, goodness, leadership, political party, responsibility, scenario, wrongdoings,

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 4

1.1. Introduction

This study is a continuation of the previous article (Article 9, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)”. This article (Article 10, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)”], is, as previously mentioned, the second part in the sequence of three articles on the roles of the three main political parties at the moment in the country, namely the EFF, the DA and the ANC. It intends to analyse and further discuss the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the DA to be able to effect land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its CVs and attestations.

1.2. Aims of Articles 9 to 11 (Continued)

The primary aim of this article (Part Two: Article 10) in the sequence of three articles is thus to continue the reflection upon the profile of the DA on the same basis as was done with the previous article (Part One: Article 9). Prominent here is the ability of the DA to be able to take care of the land expropriation matter, should it have been elected on May 8, 2019 into government. At the same time, its ability and integrity is evaluated, in order to see how it is positioned, as an opposition party, to be able to successfully handle the land matter until 2024. This also includes the capability of the DA as a partner of the ruler, the ANC, should such an outcome manifest. Important here is the saying: the test of the pudding is in the eating thereof.

In the context of much manipulation and misleading around the South African land expropriation matter by political parties in terms of how they are going to execute it should they become the ruler, is it important to note that Chomsky1 points out that modern politics is often hampered by the parties’ leadership’s poor personal and political integrity. This unfortunate contaminated political setup of parties in the end blocks the pursuit of their previously agreed on mandate with the voters, who have given them permission to take decisions upon their behalves, as well as the development of the critical role of leaders of integrity and the independent creative actions of the party as a whole. This notion is applicable to the thinking, planning and action of South Africa’s land ownership matter. Central here is the intention of the researcher to unmask a political party as a failure.1

For Chomsky1 it goes much further and deeper: politically mandated people in terms of the Constitution, for instance those who are MPS and MPLs and chief executives at state enterprises, must at all times reflect integrity, goodwill and the intention of order in their thinking, planning and action. He postulates that it is not enough for these political and executive leaders to be able to think “cleanly” and critically, but that ethnic imagination and an immense sense of social responsibility and accountability are characteristics that are imperative for them. Undoubtably the main intention of many delinquent politicians is to exploit the South Africans who are fighting with regard to land ownership. The lack of knowledge and cognitive understanding of many of the ordinary Black and White South Africans on the land matter, is absolutely misused by these delinquent politicians in steering the country’s demanding land ownership issue in such a way that it exclusively benefits the interests of the top brass of their party.1

By the critical evaluation of the CVs and attestations of political parties and their leaders, the mass of political crooks and gangsters are shaken out, leaving the few political knights standing out clearly. Such a shake-out of possible masked crooks and gangsters amongst leaders in the DA is the primary intention of the undertaking of an evaluation and conclusion in this article. It will be in line with the intention of the evaluation and conclusion of the previous article (Article 9) on the EFF.

The single aim in this context of evaluation and conclusion is to accept or to reject the DA as a potential candidate (political party) to be able to successfully effect land reform as part of its political mandate in post-2019 South Africa.

2. Method (Continued)

The research was been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case about the abilities of political parties to successfully effect land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us so as to steer successful land reform from 2019 in South Africa.

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

3. Results and Discussion (Continued)

3.1. Overview

The successful execution of the post-2019 land reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and action of a so-called “good” government. This means a regime that is not blindly on a “path of try and come to” to be able to reach an end result on the matter, notwithstanding whether it is a success or a failure. This requires a regime that honestly serves the interests of all its people by its use of a good road map on an orderly land reform initiative so as to steer it into reality.

The essential question here is thus whether the DA can theoretically be a candidate to be shortlisted due to its potential to assure the successful implementation and completion of the post-2019 plan on land expropriation.

3.1.1. Evaluation guidelines of political parties

The evaluation guidelines of political parties, as were already used in the previous Article 9, will be precisely replicated in order to evaluate the DA as national, provincial and municipal rulers. These guidelines for the DA are:

  1. Its general policies, as well as specific standpoints on aspects such as the respect of law and order, the fighting of corruption and state capture, the behavioural delinquency of its MPs, MPLs and its top brass leaders, as well as the party’s and its leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put in perspective through its manifesto for the 2019-election.
  2. The public critics for the period 1994 to 2019 in newspapers, etc. These include evaluations and reflections by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the party as a political organisation, its members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behavioural delinquency of MPs, MPLs and top brass leaders, and their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the party’s internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018

For the quantitative classification and measurment of the political records of the DA, the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,2 was used again . The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s’ manifesto and to the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees it applicable. For guiding the gathering of the information on the DA, the approach used with the EFF, is again as follows reflected for better understanding, namely:

1) The Curriculum Vitae (CV) in order to obtain insight into the candidates’ qualifications, experiences, extraordinary skills, etc; and

2) The letters of the referees, the attestations, to offer firstly further insight into the qualifications, experiences, etc. of the candidate; and secondly, at the same time, to tell us confidentially about good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate, that were well-masked in or absent from the CV. This referee data mostly informs us of the “goodness” and “badness” of a candidate, which in the end can make him a failure or a success in the execution of the responsibilities of the post.

In this research the manifesto and self-description offered by the DA and its leaders will be seen as their CVs. The public reporting by journalists and other sources will be seen as the letters of referees/reference or attestations.2

3.2. The manifestos, self-descriptions and public references of the three parties (Continued)

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) were already reflected upon in the previous Article 9 (Part 1 of three articles) under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. This article (Article 10: Part 2) will reflected specifically on the Democratic Alliance (DA) under the title of “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. In the next article (Article 11: Part 3) reflection on the African National Congress (ANC) will take place.

3.2.1. The Democratic Alliance Introduction

In his post mortem of the DA’s so-called successes versus its so-called failures in the recent May election, and how the party must be rated in the post-2019 South African politics, the editor of Beeld, Barnard Beukman, on the 17th May 2019 offered an in-depth and critical analysis on the present day DA. This is far removed from those of some of the populist political commentators who ignore long term politics and suffer cognitive clear-sightedness away from the propaganda of the ANC. An in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the dynamic and important role that the DA can play in the mainstream politics of post-2019 is offered by Beukman3 when he writes3”11:

Met net vier LP’s minder – 85 pleks van 89 – en ‘n stemdaling van minder as 2 persentasiepunte, moet die DA beslis voel hy word onbillik behandel deur ontleders wat hom op die daad as die “groot verloorder” van die verkiesing brandmerk.

Hy kan tereg so voel as hy sy uitslag met byvoorbeeld die ANC s’n vergelyk word. Alles in ag geneem, is die DA se verkiesingsuitslag eindelik heel redelik en voel hy oorwegend sekerlik verligting. As sommige meningspeilings reg was – dat hy net ‘n maand voor die verkiesing minder as 20%-steun gehad het – het hy beslis in die pylvak steun teruggekry of onseker kiesers oorreed.

Die groot teleurstelling is eerder met sy vertoning in vergelyking met die wat hy wou en moontlik kon reggekry het en dat hy nie gewys het dat hy minstens die 30%-vlak aanval nie, want ‘n tweede party met meer as 30%-steun sou die eerste tasbare bewys van ‘n komende politieke herskikking gewees het. The voter outcome at the ballot box on May 8, 2019 tells much

Beukman’s3 profile on the post-2019 DA firstly forces us to look critically at the facts pinpointing the May elections’ outcome in terms of voter participation. Of particular importance is his reference to a so-called necessary 30% vote count for the DA, to enable it to be a possibly dominant role-player in South Africa. This was seemingly the minimum requirement for it to successfully participate in the country’s ruling in the near future. This needs attention. It again brings us to the playing off of myths and lies versus facts and truths in South African politics and the absolute need of the Solomon wisdom approach to get myths and lies refuted. Thus, before any further evaluation of the DA as a political party with the assumed potential to be able to be the ruler in terms of its CV and attestations can proceed, is it necessary to look at the legitimacy of the May 2019 election in terms of a democratic voter mandate which truly represents the total contingent of legal voters.

Firstly, of paramount importance is the number of voters who gave the parties their support at the ballot box. This consideration is also fully applicable to the ANC, the EFF, as well as the eleven dwarf parties that arrived in Parliament at the end of May 2019 to take their seats.3

Secondly, also of importance is the total number of voters who participated in the election versus the total number of registered voters who stayed away from the ballot box.

Thirdly, and probably the most ignored fact by most of the so-called political wise men on the so-called “true politics” of present day South Africa, is the amount of citizens who qualified to be voters, but refused to register as such for specific reasons.

An analysis of the May voting shows the seats of the 14 parties which made it, as follows4:

  1. ANC: 230
  2. DA: 84
  3. EFF: 44
  4. IFP: 14
  5. FF+: 10
  6. ACDP: 4
  7. NFP: 2
  8. UDM: 2
  9. Good:2
  10. Cope: 2
  11. ATM: 2
  12. AIC: 2
  13. PAC: 1
  14. Aljama: 1

It is also reflected by statistics that there were 35.9 million South Africans who were eligible to register as voters for the May 2019 election, but that only 26 756 649 had formally registered. This means that only 74.5% of those who could register had registered (thus leaving ±9 million outside the voting system). From the 26.7 million formally registered voters, only 17 671 616 actually voted (again leaving ±9.3 million eligible voters further out of the system). This means that the 17.6 million voters active at the ballot box, only represent 49% of the total eligible voters in South Africa, while 51% of potential voters (±18.2 million) did not bring out a vote (consisting of ±9.1 million non-registered voters and ±9.1 million stay-away voters). Although it was the 18.2 million abstaining voters own choice not to vote, this comprehensive passivity places in the first place a question mark on the applicability of the legal status of 14 parties which were selected to Parliament by a “passive no-voting” (which is nothing else than a rejection choice by 51% of the voting population).4-7

What is worrying is that these 14 parties are going to be with South Africans as the so-called “chosen law-makers’, notwithstanding their rejection or at least being ignored by at least 51% of the voters-corp. Furthermore, seeing the overall decline since 2014 of trust in and support for political parties selected into Parliament, the chances are good that this decline is going to continue after 2019, leaving a far higher rejection than the present 51% by the voters. The outcome can with time become an immense resistance to the empowerment of the ruling party, the ANC, up to 2024. This will not only make its reign impossible, but in the process of the rejection of the ANC, the situation can activate immense unrest, anarchy and revolution as a final outcome.4-7

It is not without good reason that Mthombothi8, eleven days after the May election, put his finger directly on the sore of this voting passivity when he wrote8:19: “The outcome of the elections will be debated and analysed for some time to come, but what is clear is that many South Africans were not particularly impressed or satisfied with what was on offer. After 25 years of democracy, many voters are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable.” He continues further8:19: “The menu [parties] on the table is obviously not appetising for the voter. The prevailing conditions are therefore probably ripe for a realignment of political forces or a new political party altogether. We may have reached a typical Gramscian interregnum where “the old is dying and the new cannot be born”. We are at a standstill, and rot tends to set in if there is no movement.”

However, in second place, is the question of Beukman’s3 when he referred to the “ideal of the collection of 30% votes for the DA to make it a party to notice in the South African politics”. Here emerges the next question, namely on the presence of true democracy under which the ANC rules the country at the moment up until 2024.3

Once again on democracy and the constitutional rights of its citizens (and thus eligible voters), Mthombothi8 reflects a warning when he writes8:19: “We may still be cock-a-hoop about our democracy – best constitution in the world and all that! – But the enthusiasm is apparently no longer widely shared. Voter turnout has shown a calamitous decline in recent years, from 88% in 1999 to 65% this year – a drop of more than 20 percentage points in 20 years. Such figures should jolt us out of our complacency. Our democracy is not at all in rude health.”

But, when Mthombothi8 speaks of a “65% voter turnout for the 2019 election”, he failed to say how this percentage was reached. The answer is that it was the 17.6 million voters who had voted out of a possible 26.7 million voters on the voter role. This 65% is a political myth: the fact is that the turnout should be calculated in terms of the 17.6 million voters who had voted versus the 35.9 million South Africans who were eligible to vote. This gives a turnout of only 49% (which is 16% lower than the “official” voting account. This means that South Africans’ democratic interests are politically and statutorily managed by 386 law-makers in Parliament who were sent to it by the minority (49%) of eligible voters. This is not democracy! Mthombothi8 would be jolted himself if he knew that the 65% voter turnout is an complete myth. The hard truth is that it is only 49%. But this truth has another more sinister outcome for the ANC’s so-called democratic empowerment via the May election, and their ability to rule South Africa from 2019 to 2024: the ANC’s 10 026 475 votes at the ballot box (out of a possible 35.9-million) means that it only received approval from 28% of the eligible voters to be the government of the day. For the ANC and its leaders such as Cyril Ramaphosa and his cronies to claim that they have the peoples’ mandate to effect land expropriation without compensation, is a falsity. It is a myth and a great one!4-8

This is not democracy and it is an excellent example of a well-masked illegal reign of South Africa by the ANC.4-8

Taking into perspective the true voter support of the DA and the EFF, in terms of the total eligible voters of 35.9-million, their factorial support is only 10% and 5% respectively.4-8|

It must thus be clear that the ANC is faultily observed as a strong and untouchable political force, which seems to represent (but falsely) 57.5% of the population in terms of its more or less 60% formal voting count. In reality, the ANC is a minority and a hung regime (legally put into Parliament as the ruler by a 28% voters mandate out of a 100% voter population) when we are looking to the indirect suppression of the democratic right of the individual citizens’ passive votes. In this environment, South Africa’s present inauspicious political setup (and thus its political ruling-system based on democracy where the so-called “majority” became the ruler on a minority vote), is excellently described by Labuschagne when he posits9:6: “Suid-Afrika kan in wese, de jure en de facto, as ‘n eenpartystaat bestempel word”.

The abovementioned outcome is a situation that can and must only be accepted firstly as a temporary situation, which can change dramatically overnight when the ±18-million (51% unrepresented) passive voters take a stand at the ballot box or in an alternative way which may be unconstitutional. The DA and the other opposition parties know that this unreal setup provides the possibility that they can at the right time bite away the ANC’s Achilles heel.9

The decline in empowerment of the ANC and its possible phasing out of the mainstream of politics is a reality, even in the mindsets of the ANC’s top brass. It was already before the May election echoed by the Head of the ANC Election, Fikile Mbalula10 when he admitted10:4: “…the ANC is not going to regain all the lost ground overnight, with its image having suffered immensely in the previous decade.”

Mthombothi8 is with good reason worried about the outcome after 2019 of the Mandela-democracy of 1994. The reality is that South Africa is going to be governed from 2019 to 2024 by an illegal autocratic regime with mostly no respect for the voters, while there is also no respect for them by 51% of the voters who did not vote for them. The ANC’s politics are driven and practised exclusively for the ANCs top brass’ interests: it was so in the past and it will be so in the future. The abovementioned reality not only declares the arrogance and political recklessness of the ANC in its practice of delinquent politics since 1994, but also the arrogance and political recklessness of the EFF (See Article 9). The EFF knows very well that they will never, in a true democracy with only their 5% voter mandate, be of importance or receive the attention as a so-called third party in the top rank of parties. In a true democracy their political and personal antics, as well as their extreme irresponsibility and delinquency would not be endured: they would long ago have been put into permanent safe-care.4,6,7,10

Looking from another perspective at the very unstable South African politics – which intensely contaminated its democracy – it must it be clear that things can change – also sometimes very fast – in the post-2019 politics, to end for instance the ANC regime’s formation of new political groupings overnight. Marriam11 quotes the view of the CSIR on the profiles of the various parties’ vote receiving in the past elections and the unknown future around politics. She reports, from another perspective to that of the traditional political analysis11:4:

The CSIR does say things could change before 2021 [local elections]: “It should be kept in mind that the quantitative patterns cannot be counted on to capture all the sentiment behind the votes [2019 elections], it may just provide some warning signs for parties as to what could happen if nothing changes. Many things could change between 2019 and 2021 – there could be changes in the general economics and political climate, but a difference in voter turnout rates could also affect changes in the patterns.

Johnston12, on this fast-changing post-2019 political climate writes12:4-5: “Ten spyte van die oënskynlike stabiliteit van die ANC se oorheersing, vind groot verskuiwings plaaas. Die kieserskorps word baie meer vloeibaar en minder partyvas. Ons he gevind dat meer as 25% van al ons respondent óf van party verander het óf besluit hey om nie te stem nie. Die grootste vloei vloeibaarheid is onder swart kiesers gevind, waar 17.1% van party verander het.” Johnson12, in this context of change, also writes12:4-5: “Daarbenewens is die ANC-stem toenemend broos. Onder alle swart kiesers het slegs een derde gesê hulle sal ANC stem ongeag wie die leier was. 27,3% het gesê hulle sal nooit ANC stem nie terwyl 19,4% gesê het sal ANC stem omdat hulle vetroue in Ramaphosa het, alhoewel daar baie skelms op die ANC-lys is.”

The question, in light of the abovementioned information, is how has the DA in terms of its true voter mandate of only 10% handled its politics in the past, is handling it at present and can be expected to handle it in future in our much quoted “country of milk and honey”. The primary counter-question is: is it similarly irresponsible and arrogant, with the same signs of autocratic and delinquent actions, as the EFF? This question will be evaluated further in this article. [In the next article (Article 11) the same evaluation approach will be followed with regard to the ANC]. The DA manifesto of 2019

Reading the DA manifesto, it is clear that it differs from the previous one of the EFF, as it avoids ridiculous promises and “nonsense-speaking”. It is totally focused on concrete action during the pre-2019 years and undertakes in terms of this good record (strongly confirmed by its CV and attestations) to make a constructive input to post-2019 South Africa. Reality is taken into account and examples of good political management on provincial and local levels are offered. Looking at the DA’s track record, it stands head and shoulders above those of the EFF which was previously evaluated.

In terms of the DA manifesto, the leader of the DA, Mmusi Maimane13, in his writings to the public, reflects as follows13:18:

Election 2019 is our chance to effect real change. And when deciding on a new bus, the only thing that matters is a party’s track record.

Thirteen years in Cape Town, 10 years in the Western Cape and two years in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay have given the DA a chance to demonstrate the DA difference, and not just to talk about it. The results – the ones that really matter when it comes to closing the gap between economic insiders and outsiders – speak for themselves. On all the objective indicators, the DA runs the best government in the country.

The DA-run Western Cape leads on every measure of good provincial governance. Over the past year, over half the jobs created in SA were in the Western Cape, thanks to an obsessive focus on attracting investment, growing tourism and supporting a farm sector hard hit by drought.

The Western Cape Government got 83% clean audits in the last Auditor-General Report. Our track record says that we don’t tolerate corruption and mismanagement of public funds.

Maimane continues14:22:

The DA can deliver to the whole country what we have delivered in the Western Cape, which accounted for half of net job creation in the past year (95,000 out of 188,000 jobs, Q3 2017 – Q3 2018) and where broad unemployment (23%) is 14 percentage points lower than the national average (37%).

The DA strives to provide everyone with access to opportunities. For example, the Western Cape has the highest percentage of households living within 30 minutes of a health facility and we retain by far the most children in school between Grades 10 and Matric (64%), whereas no other province retains the abovementioned.

You will find solutions to getting the basics right, such as our action steps to provide schoolchildren with teachers who can actually teach them to read and do arithmetic. The SACMEQ 4 Report showed that the Western Cape achieved 72.7% in advanced reading, compared to 36.1% nationally.

We don’t tolerate corruption. The Western Cape achieved 83% clean audits in the last financial year, well ahead of second placed Gauteng at 52%. The DA-led Coalition in Nelson Mandela Bay Metro took it from the second least to second most trusted city in SA (after Cape Town). In the DA-run Johannesburg, the value of investigations into corrupt tenders under the former ANC administration is R23.6bn. The pre-2019 road-mapping of the DA The DA’s original birth-certificate in perspective

The answer to the question as to why the DA did not overtake the ANC in the last election and is still in a gradual process to win votes from the ANC and the other smaller parties, must be seen to be cemented in its many foundations. Professor Pieter Labuschagne9 guides us hereunder to understand why opposition against the ANC reflects a low voter outcome for all those opposing parties since 1994. This can be likened to the previous mighty NP’s only 20.4% in 1994 and the 22.3% and 20% of the DA respectively in 2014 and 2019.9

Firstly, the founding model of the ANC stands out here, namely its anti-Apartheid ideology, through which it initially became an inclusive “catch-up” party for all those pre-1994 suppressed persons and groups who opposed the wrongful politics of the NP (and the Afrikaners/Whites). All types gathered in this potpourri-ANC from before 1994. It varied from hard core communists, socialists, anti-capitalists, anti-White and anti-Afrikaner, pro-Black, pro-African, democrats and anti-democrats, as well as hard-core terrorists, etc. These were persons and groups mostly seeing the ANC as an entrance ticket for their personal gains and to satisfy their ambitions. Most of the ambition and opportunism have stayed on until 2019 in some way within some of these groupings, such as the communists and the unionists.12

In its start-up process, the DA was in the first place an exclusively White-orientated party with a political ideology based on a narrow liberal-democracy, but with roots still entrenched in White-supremacy. The immense hard-line stand of the maintainence of exclusive White capitalism was prominent, and the mass of poor and landless Blacks would never get entrance thereto. For the Blacks, their inequality and poverty (±30 million out of a population of ±60 million) is a direct result of the White supremacy of pre-1994. The DA as a cum Black-cum White political party became from day-one an easy target for the Black revolutionaries in the ANC, who labelled it as anti-Black with the intention to promote and uphold only White interests. This is a process that is ongoing and will only be eroded if the DA becomes overwhelmingly Black in members and in leadership. The DA’s policy not to subsidise and enrich the poor

Entrenched in the ANC’s revolutionary ideology of uplifting the people and freeing them from oppression, is its policy of taking from the rich and giving to the poor, which the DA opposes. This characteristic of the ANC is well reflected by its actions such as state capture, the mismanagement of finance and the botched-up 1994 to 2019 land redistribution, the obtaining of “compensations, gratifications and bait” through the misuse of BEE and other instruments under the propaganda of “enriching” the people (Black). Here the ANC’s top brass and their cronies stand out as priority beneficiaries. The ANC’s actions, when compared to those of the DA, are a complete contradiction in terms of the “case of the constant and ongoing illegal compensation” of the so-called “freedom fighters” and those who “suffered under Apartheid”, directly and indirectly in every possible way from the state coffers.

Within this exclusive ideology of uplifting of the ANC, the immense group of poor and landless Black people were kept in embargo by the ANC, without progress or improvement of their circumstances. This setup of continuous, immense poverty and financial dependence of the mass of poor Blacks, fast became a handle for the ANC’s top brass to keep a large contingent of dependent voters, who were daily in need of the ANC’s help, on its list of supporters. This was firstly obtained by keeping these Black voters without training and work opportunities, so as to create not only further poverty and unemployment, but to enlarge this sector constantly, in order to ensure political empowerment via the “ANC’s helping hand of the poor Blacks”.12,13-22

Secondly, this “Black question” was in-depth and broadly propagated by the ANC as a sole White outcome from Apartheid: not only to establish sympathy for them in the minds of the poor, in that the ANC “knew” of their immense, constant needs and was doing as much as possible for them, but at the same time to create ongoing hostility against any White presence in the post-2019 politics. Prominent in this regard was Apartheid’s wrongdoings and the reflection by the ANC of a repeat of such suffering at the hands of Whites in future politics; a process wherein the “White” DA was pertinently positioned as the main culprit. With regard to the needs of the mass of poor Blacks, reflected as the so-called exclusive sufferers of Apartheid, the ANC effectively responded through the state coffers by paying mass contributions to them. These financial contributions are still growing. The ANC, as the ruler and the holder of the state’s purse, entrenched itself within the “greater and higher” tasks of doing good by the hand-out of free awards, grants and other subsidies from the tax-payers’ hard earned money.

This made these “dependent” voters work shy and absolutely dependent on the ANC’s so-called goodness, while the vicious circle of growing poverty and joblessness was aggressively upheld. At the same time a policy of fear was created in this mass of poor and jobless minds that any regime change, such as the coming to power of the DA, would lead to the recall of these comprehensive free awards, grants and subsidies paid from the taxpayers.

The DA’s vague policy on the doubtful existence in future of these awards, grants and subsidies, if they come into power, only strengthened the ANC’s political mesmerising of this mass of poor people with misleading falsehoods. This served as an excellent empowerment vehicle for the ANC to block votes away from the DA. Johnson‘s12 recent research confirms this well, as he found that 40% of the Black respondents indeed believe this rumour of the ANC of the DA as a “danger” to their subsidies.12

The DA and the ANC both know that this unlimited system of subsidising the poor without the simultaneous development of a mass of jobs and good training to replace it, cannot be upheld for much longer into the future. This has so far been ignored by the ANC’s top elite, notwithstanding that the continuation of the scheme will bankrupt the country’s funds and spells out a human disaster in waiting. The outright failure of the DA on the other hand to immediately put an alternative in place to this immense politically opportunistic subsidising scheme, besides saying that they will create jobs in time and offer training, has totally isolated them from the mass of poor people, who constantly and immediately need these subsidies. It does not matter for the poor if the system is wrong or unsustainable – for them it is about immediate survival and voting for the party that upholds and improves this subsidy system.10,12,23-25 BBBEE and its vehicles of land expropriation

As mentioned above, the ANC’s policy on BBBEE also forced the DA into reverse. This is due to the portrayal of the DA as White capitalists and the safe-guarding of their immediate interests. This obvious hostility to Black upliftment pushed the DA away from the mass of poor and landless Blacks.

It is evident that the DA’s dislike for BBBEE must be changed in some way with regard to its solid rejection policy thereof. What is urgently needed is the implementation of an acceptable change to the DA’s present model of outright rejection, in order to bring about balanced nation-building and to improve the already tense racial relations. It is necessary to create an environment to support a reasonable form of BBBEE. The DA’s clear policy of a racially free society must reflect Black upliftment as a primary principle. BBBEE is unavoidable and was implemented in many countries to benefit the unprivileged and the poor. It was not an extraordinary action in South Africa by the ANC, but so far the DA under its White right-wing blindly rejects it. There must be some confirmation of support of BBBEE as fast as possible by the DA. Maimane’s reference to the DA pushing for the tabling of a private members’ bill on intelligence-related matters and jobs may be the first constructive step, but it is doubtful whether this is enough, and it is far from the BBBEE offered by the ANC.21,26,27

BBBEE is seen by most Whites as extreme discrimination after 25 years of so-called “democracy”, as Bachtis26 writes with justification26:13: “BEE is a racist, exclusionary mechanism designed to destroy any vestiges of whiteness.” BBBEE, in contrast to its primary aims, was undoubtedly applied by the ANC with outmost dishonesty and corruption in order to benefit mostly the ANC top brass, bringing riches to them and their cronies between 1994 and 2019. Billions of rand were also stolen via state capture and other crooked schemes by politicians, government officials and private citizens under the ANC regime, which was in value far more than the total collected by BBBEE for the so-called upliftment of the so-called poor Blacks’ suffering under Apartheid. This confirms that there are many other acceptable ways (besides corruption and dishonesty) to uplift the mass of poor Blacks.

The misuse of BBBEE is furthermore seen by many Whites as pure revenge-taking on Whites for the past.

Other, better ways must be found by the DA to get involved in BBBEE and to directly uplift the poor. Firstly, the present experience by Whites of BBBEE as a punishment to impoverish Whites, especially the White youth, must be counteracted by the DA with reasoned actions. Whites must be allowed to compete freely within the South African business and employment environment, without the direct and indirect “punishment”. As policy, the DA must firstly support an ongoing strictly managed BBBEE system for at most the duration of another term, after which it must be totally erased from the statute books. Secondly, the planned land redistribution scheme, wherein the transferring of state-owned land and buildings, etc., is central, must be a direct replacement for BBBEE inside the DA’s policy of a “helping hand to the Blacks in the post-2019 politics”. Included in this BBBEE scheme must be the free training of Black farmers and the free provision of equipment and produce such as cattle and grain for the mass of incoming Black farmers to make a living on the farms. The DA’s policy of land expropriation without compensation

The policy standpoint of the DA was until now to reject the ANC’s land reform of expropriation without compensation. Prominent therein is the the DA’s perception of the ANC’s foundation of confused political radicalism, beset by neo-Marxism, specifically as part of the ANC’s opportunistic elite’s driving of the ANC’s land expropriation policy. In addition, the failed 1994 to 2019 land redistribution programme of the ANC is an indication for the DA of how unplanned, undemocratic and populist land reform can get. This has lead to the passivity of the DA to in any way, either on its own or with the ANC, get involved in constructive land redistribution. The fact that the DA is not shying away from even going to the highest court in South Africa to nullify any ANC legislation on land transformation if needed, does not sit well with the mass of landless Blacks.

The DA believes that there is not a need to tamper with the present Constitution, because the state’s land is available in large amounts, waiting for redistribution directly to the mass of poor and landless people. Indeed, for the DA, this state land is so massive in size and its redistribution potential so overwhelming, that any initiative with private land cannot be addressed successfully before 2025, if not later. The DA notes in this concern that the state at present has a property portfolio of more than 93 000 buildings and more than 1.9 million hectares of land. Just to create an orderly official institution to oversee the handing out and assurance of legal rights of the land and buildings to new private owners, would take up to three to five years to complete by a well managed government. Then there is a further timetable to stretch over another three to five years to establish the infrastructure and award the property to the applicants in waiting, to do training and to supply finance to the mass of incoming farmers. The so-called “White land expropriation”, even with compensation, can only take place after twenty or more years from 2019.10,16,20,28

But, from a critical statutory as well as political and socio-economic point, is it clear that the DA’s land redistribution policy is vague and clearly practised in terms of White interests. It is window dressing and empty rhetoric. It is unavoidable for the DA to get directly involved in the land ownership matter in the post-2019 politics. The DA’s leadership must stop allowing the right-wing of Whites in the DA, who are guided effectively with great political contamination by the so-called Afrikaners/Whites rescuers and saviours, to handle the matter in public and with the government. The DA did shed most of these white hardliners and their sympathisers successfully in the May election – possibly not only at the ballot box, but also on their list of membership. This is now allowing the true DA to come out of the closet with its Black members’ wishes, thinking, planning and action on balancing land redistribution for Blacks.

Firstly, the FF+ must openly be confronted with a public stand by the DA, demonstrating the falsity of the empowerment that the FF+ can help the Whites farmers to hang onto their land. The reality must be delivered to White farmers and the White community that if not enough land is peacefully redistributed fast to the mass of Blacks, land will physically be confiscated from them in a revolution which can happen very soon.29,30 The DA must find a declaration, matching fully and effectively the following declaration by the FF+-leader in Kwazulu-Natal, Duncan Du Bois, which reads30:7: “I think they [FF+] were beneficiaries of people dumping the DA because of the DA’s policy on affirmative action and BEE and also because the FF Plus is very clear on its land policy and the DA is not quite as sharp on that.”

The DA urgently needs a public reference, reading: “The DA is a beneficiary of votes because it is clear on its land policy, with the Freedom Charter declaration as its manifesto on land ownership that all South Africans have the right to own land and that land must be owned racially proportionally before 2024.” 29,30

For Maimane, such a change would be easy and a small step, especially in light of the pronouncement by Johnson12 of him “as a previous ANC supporter who still thinks in terms of the politics of the ANC.” The fact that Maimane, as alluded to by Johnson12, had already estranged the Brown and White Afrikaans speakers, as well as his failure to defend the Afrikaans language and culture rights, forced thousand of angry and dissatisfied Afrikaans and White people out of the DA, makes this step easy if true.12,29,30 The proof of the DA pudding is not always in the eating

The DA is mostly worried about present day South Africa. It developed, where in charge, styles and approaches, in an effort to fix most of the enormous failures created by the ANC reign. Where the DA was put in to govern, it did not panic and has addressed immense challenges with duty, pride and success.15

The actions of the DA were sometimes deliberately blown up by the press and their political opposition. The ANC propagandists used this to distract attention from their own serious and comprehensive delinquency. In some cases, however, alleged activities of the DA made them no better than the ANC and need the same condemnation.15-20

Seeing that political oversight by the broad public and media is a priority for all public figures and parties, and the fact that it is the criteria on which a mandate to rule has been issued, these accusations need to be highlightened and evaluated. It is important to see if there is proof in the DA pudding after eating it. This will be done hereunder. The DA’s seemingly ongoing own internal strife

Prominent for instance, but indeed a small matter in the end, was the allegation that Helen Zille of the DA leadership had in 2014 contravened the Constitution and the Ethical Code for Members of the Executive due to an alleged tablet issued to her son who worked as a teacher for the Western Cape Education Department in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. This action against her, brought onto the books by the controversial Public Protector (PP) Busiswe Mkhwebane, in an attempt to prosecute her, failed. (This PP action was nullified by an interdict against the PP in the Johannesburg high court. The PP was also shown to be wrong by the courts in two other cases).15-20

Then there was Helen Zille’s so-called #taxrevolt-plan, which attracted critics from the ANC and some sectors of the public. But, in light of the failed prosecution for theft, corrupt ANC politicians and state officials, racketeers, crooks and tax-avoiders in the ANC, this actually attracted much strong support from law-abiding citizens as an instrument to punish the useless ANC regime.15-20

Furthermore, there was the so-called Patricia De Lille saga wherein the DA was initially accused of racism, etc., because De Lille was allegedly forced out of DA politics by its leadership. This criticism seems to have been contradicted by an independent investigation which alleged that De Lille deliberately misled the Cape Town City Council and triggered a further allegation against her, namely to have interfered with and manipulated city tenders, reports Malatsi31. In nullifying the DA’s and Maimane’s so-called “record of wrongdoing” against De Lille, Malatsi31 writes31:18: “De Lille and her chief lieutenant, Brett Herron, are facing criminal charges for their involvement in these instances of serious maladministration or worse.”

But the De Lille case’s handling by the DA cost them much honour in the eyes of the general voting public and was undoubtedly one of the reasons for the exodus of a strong contingent of votes from the DA to Good. Nyatsumba32 foregrounds the immense negative impact on the DA and the idea of a flawed leadership left by the De Lille case, when he writes that many inside the party in the Western Cape had their daggers drawn at her and wanted her out summarily, ignoring, in his opinion, the right firing process. After a vote of no confidence in the Cape Town City Council failed, the process of her ousting continues, writes Nyatsumba32. He further reflects32:25: “…they continued to manufacture lies about her and to throw mud at her in the hope that some of it would stick. To their chagrin, De Lille emerged victorious each time and they ended up with bloodied noses. And yet, still they continued to lie to the public, right until the elections, that they fired De Lille as a member when, in fact, she had resigned.”

Then there were two other controversial recent cases in the DA household before the May election. Both were fully described in the Sunday Times of the 17th March 2019. From the reports it seems that the DA was in the accused box. In the one a woman member was left off the party’s parliamentary list after accusing a colleague of sexual harassment, while in the other case a senior woman member accused of racism and xenophobia was kept on the list of the DA’s candidates for the sixth Parliament.33

In the first case a DA councillor in Ekurhuleni, a said Thina Bambeni, was alleged to be delisted on the recommendation of the party’s Gauteng leader, John Moodey, after she accused the council’s caucus chair, Shadow Shabangu, of sexual harassment. A provincial disciplinary committee cleared Shabangu due to a lack of evidence and advised the provincial executive to charge Bambeni instead, as reported by Mvumvu and Makinana33. (Note: It is the same said Shabangu who is alleged further on in this reflection to have contravened Section 4 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act because it is alleged that he received a R1 220 000 kickback from the developers of the Springs Mall). In the end Bambeni was removed from the list of candidates, together with Siphesihle Dube (a spokesperson for the MEC of Transport in the Western Cape, due to posting pictures which he took with Patrica De Lille). Dube and Bambeni’s exclusions from the candidate list led to court actions against the DA.33

Regarding the second case within the DA’s inner circle, it was reported by Mvumvu and Makinana33 that Louw Nel, the DA’s parliamentary operations director, had taken legal action against Kohler Barnard after the party bosses allegedly failed to act against her. This is an outcome that follows after Barnard allegedly made racist remarks at a strategy meeting of the DA. It is also alleged that Barnard made offensive statements against Zimbabweans in South Africa (Note: Kohler Barnard was accused of racist behaviour in 2015 and her DA membership terminated in 2015 over a Facebook posting calling for the Apartheid president PW Botha’s “comeback”. Her expulsion was overturned and the DA retained her as an MP on condition that she was not found guilty of a similar offence, according to Mvumvu and Makinana33). It is further reported by Mvumvu and Makinana33 that Louw Nel had been suspended after taking the matter to the Equality Court (because he allegedly did not follow the party’s so-called “procedures” to call Barnard to book). He was however then reinstated.

It seems as though the DA is frequently characterised by unnecessary and doubtful senior level conflicts. Many seem to be unclear about the reasons and motives, while others contend that this is due to much self-empowerment and self-love by individuals inside the party’s structure. The racial factor seems to frequently also to be a culprit. For instance, the exit of the policy head, Gwen Ngwenya, of the DA from the leadership before the May election seems to reflect such a political struggle around the leadership. Professor Kotze22 claimed that the resignation of Ngwenya, who is alleged to have become disillusioned with the DA’s unsteady stance on a pro-Black policy, contributed further to existing uncertainty in the DA as a future political home for Blacks. This is seen as one of the various possible catalysts for Black voters moving from the DA in the past election. There were and are still also sagas around the persons of Helen Zille, Patricia de Lille and Lindiwe Mazibuko – wherein the “Black colour” factor seems not always so very innocent.16,17,19,22,24,31,34

For the DA to qualify as “good” in terms of the referees’ letters of reference, it must undoubtedly settle these kinds of internal leadership issues effectively, without negative roots of doubt. However, it would have been best if they were totally avoided from day-one by the appointment of the correct persons in its leadership. The De Lille saga for instance could have been avoided if sound selection principles were applied and she was never allowed into the DA as a member nor promoted to a leader’s position.16,17,19,22,24,31,34

The writings of the political analyst Muzi Kuzwayo35 in April 2019 on Patricia de Lille’s politics, including her present-day party named Good, and her appointment as an honourable minister in the Ramaphosa regime of post-2019, seems to be a good guideline to follow and to use before making an appointment. Kuzwayo writes35:2: “She first cashed in a few years after she started her party which became defunct and moved over to the DA and became Mayor of Cape Town in return – good deal. Who knows what loot Good will brings her.” Indeed, the loot is there! As a minister in the Ramphosa regime, facing the post-2019 politics, she is receiving a salary of R2.4-million yearly (besides many other allowances such as free flights, subsidised luxury cars, etc.)!35 The DA’s merry men and their alleged hands in the cookie jar

Although it seems that the DA prides itself to not hesitate to call political, economic and social delinquents in the party to book, notwithstanding their seniority or empowerment in the party, it seems that this is not always the true case, as alleged by critics. Looking critically at the DA’s attestations, it seems that although the amount, level and intensity of the delinquencies in the DA are far less than those characterising the ANC, it must be noted on the other hand that when it comes to any wrongdoing and the required appropriate handling thereof, the criteria of punishment must be on an equal level required in public from the ANC to act against its delinquents. The basis cannot and must not be the allowing of any kind of wrongdoing. A single case is as evil as one hundred delinquencies. This, it seems, the DA has missed out on sometimes.15-20

Prominent here are the allegations that the DA lacks fast and decisive actions on the expulsion of delinquents in its executive circle. The so-called Shadow Shabangu case, which echoes seemingly the same failing of the ANC to act against its culprits, is noteable. Shadow Shabangu, the DA’s caucus chair of the Ekurhuleni Council, was before the end of the fifth Parliament accused that he received a R1 220 000 kickback from the developers of the Springs Mall. Immense data was offered in the case.15-20

On the alleged wrongdoing by Shabangu, as specifically spelled out by a report of the Ekurhuleni Council, Mvumvu writes19:4: “The contract required him [Shabangu] to protect the interests of the developer instead of those of the municipality and those of his constituents, which is a direct conflict of interest. Furthermore, it was found that there might be an existence of a corrupt relationship between the developer and Shabangu, under the veil of the so-called facilitation agreement.”

The report alleged that Shabangu’s actions were in contravention of Section 4 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. It has also been alleged that Shabangu received a gift of a hotel payment worth about R1 720 – R2 290 from a friend of the developers of the mall that he did not declare to the council. So far the accused is alleged to still be active in DA party politics, equalling the Ace Magashule and others’ “not guilty till sentenced” stand-off.15-20

The failure of the DA to act decisively and strictly on the allegations against Shabangu undoubtedly made them in the eyes of potential voters in the recent May elections not an acceptable and a good ruler, empowered to be able to take on rumours of corruption in its own circle and respond with criminal prosecution. It seems for the critical voter as though the DA follows the same kind of “stretched” policy as the ANC, notwithstanding their preaching of a so-called “clean character” of the party and its leaders.

It is old news of the DA’s co-operation at three metros with the controversial EFF. It has been alleged that this “DA-EFF-brotherhood” has led thereto that the EFF’s practice of politics has become part of the DA’s thinking, planning and action. This “DA-EFF-brotherhood” is alleged to be driven inside an alleged opportunistic way of functioning and surviving for the DA. It is alleged in a report that the recent support for Moeketsi Mosolo of the EFF, to be an ongoing member of the Tshwane Council, notwithstanding serious allegations, was the outcome of this contaminated DA-EFF-brotherhood. The allegation is that alleged misconduct by Mosolo was ignored by the DA, primarily to bolster and to assure the DA’s empowerment in the council. The perception by the broad public of the good ethics of the DA and their strong showing up of the alleged corruption of the ANC elite, was thereby nullified. On the Mosolo case it is evident that the DA indeed recently wanted him ousted from the council, due to his alleged part in the awarding of a contract valued at R12 billion by the Tshwane Metro Council to the construction group GladAfrica, to manage all the Metro Council’s infrastructure projects. Hereafter, it is alleged, the DA suddenly made a fast turnaround on Mosolo to keep him on the council. The basis for this, it is alluded, was not to offend the EFF because the DA needed the EFF’s support in the council against the ANC at a time when the DA’s empowerment may have been erased. On Mosolo’s alleged wrongdoing, the Auditor-General’s Report alleged that Mosola took unauthorised control as a council member of the appointment of GladAfrica as a service provider, which was is in the first place in conflict with municipal legislation. Secondly, there was the allegation of the presence of corruption via the contract of the City of Tshwane with GladAfrica. As recently as 25 January 2019 the then DA Executive Mayor of Tshwane, Solly Msimanga, alleged that a payment of R317 million to GladAfrica was “irregular” under the management of Mosolo. The existence of a damaging formal report on Mosolo by the firm Bowmans, seemingly reflecting extremely negatively on the R12 billion contract, is alleged to have been ignored by the DA in their continued support of Mosolo in the council.9,36-38

In this context of an allegedly contaminated “DA-EFF-brotherhood”, it has also been alleged that Solly Msimanga, representing the DA as Executive Mayor in Tshwane, was pushed out of the mayoral post by his own DA party, because his efforts to oust Mosolo had angered the EFF and endangered the empowerment environment in the council for the DA with the EFF.9,36-38

The investigative journalist Marrian39 also took the GladAfrica scandal to the door of Solly Msimanga, the DA’s previous mayor, by recently alleging that he is now facing investigation with Moeketsi Mosolo over the multi-billion rand contract which the Auditor General found was awarded irregularly. She further alleged that he had jumped ship at Tshwane City and failed to see through his first mayoral term after he was seemingly “selected” by the DA to be its premier candidate and the face of its campaign to win Gauteng (which did not help the DA much). Marriam39 also alleged that Msimanga faced allegations of nepotism and that his brother had allegedly stolen 100 computers from the City of Tshwane.39

Marrian,39, as well as the political commentator Peter Bruce,40 focused on the actions of the DA’s Johannesburg Mayor, Herman Mashaba. Marrian39 alleged that shortly after he was elected and had formed a government, allegations emerged that a member of his mayoral committee, a said Sharon Peetz, had taken her mother along on an official trip to Spain. Marrian39 reports that this alleged wrongdoing was met with profuse denials by Mashaba and the city council, and that Mashaba even provided evidence that the trip was legal. But he then suddenly fired Peetz some months later after alleged irrefutable evidence of wrongdoing in the case surfaced. Marrian39 also showed the presence of failed service delivery under the mayoral oversight of Mashaba. She alludes that this happened after the city failed to renew a contract with Avis SA for vehicles to collect street rubbish. According to a report by the investigative journalism unit amaBhungane, Marrian reports that the Avis contract was cancelled and the fleet management deal was handed to Afrirent which allegedly in return paid kickbacks to an account belonging to the EFF. Bruce40 further reports that many of Mashaba’s DA causus members insist that he is closer to the EFF than he is to the DA. These members alleged that he allowed the EFF to influence contracts and appointments. This allegation, reading Marrian’s earlier allegations on the Afrirent contract, seem to can make some sense somewhere.39-40 The Marrian test case of the DA as an effective ruler in metros

There are other prominent critics that the DA’s political planning and action on the metro-level reflect widespread lack of constructive and dynamic action and that it does not offer its voters and the inhabitants of the metros where it is in charge, any better services than its opponents, the ANC or the EFF. It seems thus to be a prerequisite to see if the DA pudding has taste.16,17,20

An article by Marrian39 on the 17th May 2019 about the DA reflects it as a party that is unsuccessfully executing its municipal mandate. This requires a frame of reference. A short analysis and description to measure the article’s value in political standing is offered to get some insight as to whether the allegations hold water. The article’s introduction title reads39:32: “The Democratic Alliance’s unsatisfactory performance in the 2019 general elections reflects its poor governance record in the metros it took control of in the 2016 local government election.”

Looking firstly at her reference to the DA’s so-called “unsatisfactory performance in the 2019 elections”, Marrian39 is clearly missing out on all of the primary reasons for the decline of 2% in votes for the DA. Political analysts posit that the 2% decline was clearly a normal and long overdue shedding of the White ultra-conservatives. These drop-outs are now starting to run away because land expropriation is going to be a reality that the DA has to face from 2019 and must constructively handle in reality politics (other than these DA drop-outs’ seemingly new political home, the FF+, which blindly refuses to recognise this reality and promises them false land security). Nullifying Marrian’s 39 postulation is the well-defined and -reasoned opinion of the editor of the Beeld3 offered earlier, which put it clearly that the DA indeed did well in the election with its 20% voter outcome.3,39

Regarding her reference to the DA’s so-called “poor governance record in the metros it took control of in the 2016 local government election”, it is a postulation without roots: the only way to make an analysis of poor performance, is to compare it with the ruling ANC’s outputs in the various municipalities since 2016 (and the EFF which is basically missing in this context). In this context of governance it must be noted that not a single municipality under the DA management failed to obtain a clean audit, while most of the municipalities run by the ANC are contaminated by the lack of clean audits and the presence of constant corruption, fraud and theft, etc.9,16,17,20,39

The chaos in some of these ANC run metros is echoed by the recent arrest of the ANC Durban Mayor Zandile Gumede, chair of the powerful eThekwini region. Together with her, 62 ANC councillors of the eThekwini region stand accused of R208 million tender fraud. (For the record: she has already appeared in court and is out on R50 000 bail).41,42

For Marrian39 to speak vaguely as follows39:32: “…the DA did not live up to its own promise of better and clean governance in the metros it won in 2016. There are ample examples in Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay and Johannesburg of a party out of its depth in governing complex cities”, is plain mischief-making. Marrian39 failed to offer facts besides generalisations, meaning that her evidence is missing to put the DA in the dog box. As it has been offered it is fake news! Firstly, it needs to be noted that the DA only took over these entities three years ago and they had been messed up before by the ANC. The DA’s first tasks were to put remedial actions in place to get them working once again. This was mostly achieved in the three years, as the overall successes in these municipalities confirm.9,16,17,20,39

Marrian39 remarks that the DA had taken over the crown jewels of South Africa’s city scape, namely the big budget Johannesburg, the administrative capital of Pretoria in Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay in coalition deals and informal agreements with the EFF. She simplified the outcomes of these three metro’s complex management, which is prominently reflected by her unconvincing focus on Nelson Mandela Bay, with a specific outcome which she describes in political jargon as39:23: “Three years later, two of the three DA mayors have been removed and the party lost control of Nelson Mandela Bay”. Her “focus” clearly reflects a lack of understanding of the pre-2016 contaminations in all three of the metros which the DA has been trying to rectify since 2016 with the EFF. Secondly, which she knows well, but failed to pinpoint, is the political instability of the EFF as a co-partner and the party’s extreme customs and habits of mischief-making. This mischief-making intention and inclination by the EFF is evident where there is the opportunity for it, where it can scurrilously deviate from normal and orderly politics, even with the other mischief-maker, the ANC, in order to obstruct good governance. The constant change of DA mayors in PE was such an outcome and was not a public rejection of the DA’s mayor.39

To associate the DA’s Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba’s so-called popularity with the decline in DA votes there in the May elections, does not hold water: Marrian39 herself states that the DA’s decline was all over the country, and not only located in Johannesburg; so where does Mashaba really come into the picture, besides his random and subjective selection as a so-called “culprit”? Her postulations39:32: “…that last year bins in Johannesburg’s streets overflowed with rubbish”, and that: “Johannesburg entities, from City Power to Pikitup, degenerated under Mashaba’s watch…”, do not hold any specific evidence of outright and continuous political failure or misdoing by the DA or Mashaba. Marrian, as a salted political analyst, must know this. Her remarks are primarily nothing more than generalised political allegations, failing to bring the DA or Mashaba to book with specific and confirmatory evidence on the specific story of rubbish bins. Furthermore, these claims, if they should be true, are seemingly the extraordinary to the ordinary of every day. Strikes, which are a general phenomenon in all the metros and lead unavoidably to streets overflowing with rubbish, are mostly run by Cosatu and its affiliates, which are alliance members to the ANC regime. Furthermore, the country-wide daily road blocks of burning tyres and unrest, etc., are basically due to the municipalities under the ANC’s management’s constant and ongoing failures for the delivery of services. In the failed service delivery at ANC-run municipalities, the presence of rubbish which overflows the streets is only one problem of many more serious failures to the inhabitants, of which Marrian seems oblivious or prefers not to mention.39

Marrian’s39 overview of the DA’s so-called fight with the then Cape Town mayor Patricia de Lille, seemingly lacks an understanding of the background to the alleged matter, which forced the DA to react with serious steps against her. It seems to be a matter that the DA is still investigating although she has left the party. Her remark39:23: “The electorate clearly turned up their noses at the DA’s antics in the metros over the past three years…”, is an effort by Marrian39 to pinpoint the story behind the so-called “noses-up” of the electorate.. However, it lacks any evidence or political commentator’s depth. In perspective, it seems to be a reflection of a kind of political mischief against the DA. Again, on the “antics” of the DA – as done in all her other reflections on the DA’s so-called many failures in her article – she failed to offer a comparison of the DA’s “bad” antics with the ANC’s “good” antics in all the metros where it is active, knowing that the DA would come first as the best ruler.39

In conclusion, many critics are inclined to say “where there is smoke there is fire”. 39 Viewpoints must be lent an ear. The evidence of poor management and corruption in municipalities all over the country is plentiful: from the smallest village to the biggest metro. What really is needed is that the Cape Town, Johannesburg, eThekwini, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay municipalities must be scrutinised for corruption, theft and nepotism, etc., by commissions such as those of Zondo and Mpati. This will show not only possible wrongdoings by the ANC’s cronies, but also possibly those of the DA’s cronies. Such an outcome may put flesh to Marrian’s39 present vague and unconvincing allegations on the failures of the DA. It will also test the DA’s manifesto for truth and see whether its promises are going to hold water. South Africa needs to see which of the three dominant political parties and their leaders are sufficiently capable and skilled to solve the demanding land redistribution issue. Most of all, we must ascertain which of the three parties’ politics are characterised by poor governance and serious delinquencies. The DA’s horse-trading with extreme oppositions as partners

A prominent critic, which could have also played a role in the loss of voters in the 2019 elections, is the opposition of conservative voters (mostly Whites) of the DA’s association with the EFF. Indeed any association with a radical opposition, even the ANC, seems unacceptable for this sector.39,40,43

No-one can escape the hard fact that the DA’s coalition and informal co-operation with the EFF has cost them support. The fiasco in their loss of control of Nelson Mandela Bay and the removal of the DA’s mayors there, has become more than a black mark on the DA’s record of integrity and good governance.39,40,43

This kind of DA-EFF cooperation is seen as nothing more than horse-trading, to use the excellent coining of a phrase by Bruce. It seems for some critics to be extreme opportunism by the DA’s leadership to stay in power and to reap benefits, instead of truly putting the country and its voters’ interests as a priority.39,40,43

At the moment there are a lot of rumours of a repeated coalition with the EFF in the metro councils of Tshwane and Johannesburg. The EFF alleged that such consultations and discussions with the DA are ongoing. But on this outcome, as with the DA’s pre-2019 politics, Maimane43 has thrown cold water by stating43:1-2:

…the DA would co-operate only with parties that shared its values of non-racialism, a capable state, eradication of corruption and a market-based economy that was inclusive of those who were left out.

This discussion on co-operation with the EFF must be based on those principles, and if ultimately parties do not agree on the principles we will not sell those out. We will stand firm and move on from there.

The DA’s pre-2019 association with the EFF and its leaders has, as mentioned, with good reason placed a question mark on the DA’s integrity.34,39,43 Further contamination of the DA’s character by the EFF can make Marrian’s39 remark that39:32: “…the DA did not live up to its own promise of better and clean governance in the metros it won in 2016”, suddenly and irrevocably meaningful. In addition here is Marrian’s request that the DA must do some introspection. It seems to be necessary, not only with regard to its association with the EFF, but also on many of the other so-called “delinquencies” of the DA, of which Marrian39 has spoken many times with a tongue in her cheek.

A fact which cannot be ignored: as a result of its initial construction as a party, the DA has many times been characterised by outright opportunism which has nurtured the party’s unfortunate “EFF-love”. It must be phased out, together with the EFF contamination.27,39,43,44

The DA cannot honestly call itself a unique party: a party free from racism, corruption, state capture, revolutionary politics, etc., as long the EFF is part of its inner circle. The past EFF association has cost the DA as many Black right-wing votes as it did to drive its White right-wing’s departure. Selisho34 quoted the political commentator Leeto Nthoba who said that the DA’s initial loss of voters to the FF+ in the May elections was strongly driven by the DA’s previous association with the EFF. The loss of more Whites from the DA will further be speeded up by a new alliance with the EFF. There is not a single good principle to support the DA to again be involved with the EFF in a future co-operation.34

In this context is it clear that Maimane has started (seemingly for the moment) to cold shoulder the EFF and confirms that the DA’s intention is only that of a positive co-operation with “equal-value” parties to the DA in the post-2019 politics. Maimane reflects further that the DA wants to establish a “caucus of the opposition” with parties that share their values and are identified with the centre of politics. In this context the DA already has a kind of “alliance” with the FF+, the ACDP, the IFP and the UDM, while the EFF is not a member, but is seemingly supported sometimes.27,44-46

However, for the DA to come clean in the post-2019 politics from their previous serious EFF-contamination, remains to be seen. The first prerequisite to be clean is integrity; something that no-one can cheer about in the DA if the EFF is its bed-partner. If the stream goes against Maimane’s cold shouldering of the EFF, the DA is sleeping at the same time with the right-wing FF+ and underwriting the dominant voice of the aggrieved, conservative White and Coloured minorities, while at the same time sleeping with the left-wing EFF and underwriting the voice of the discontented, impatient and even angry Black majority. This is not what is called middle-ground politics: it is political schizophrenia and political psychopathy, two serious psychoses, intertwined in one single party. The end result will be the DA’s ongoing Black-versus-White conflict, but in extreme form. This would also confirm the views of many critics that it lacks a sound political policy in any area of politics. As a party it will fit in nowhere, because it is not positively repositioned. Most of all, it will be without supporters and its rich funders.32,47

For the DA to argue that the previous backing of the DA by the EFF and vice versa has not been without benefit, for instance in Johannesburg, holds no water. There is no fact to contradict the statement that all the inhabitants of Johannesburg would benefit if the ANC alone was the boss, possibly more than the DA-EFF alliance. One thing is clear (and a great concern for a corruption free DA) and that is the enormous benefit for the DA-EFF councillors in pay and their political empowerment. When John Mendelsohn46, a DA councillor, postulates that the DA alliance with the EFF was a “precariously positioned one wich required skilful management by Mashaba” it seems as though both Bruce40 and Marrion,39 seemingly with good reason, frowned on it. The DA would benefit from a little introspection, as Marrian advises.39,40,46

The public have the right to be sceptical on any DA-EFF brotherhood. Mendelsohn’s46 reflection on Bruce’s40 critique on the DA’s actions in the Johannesburg City Council, with specifically the EFF as a prominent empowered partner, read46:18: “The message to Bruce is that the arrangement with the EFF was not entered into simply as a “greedy decision”. It was done for the best of reasons, namely to rid the city of corruption and get some growth going in the local economy.”This has just too much reference to the words “greedy, corruption, best of reasons”, as if coming directly from the Zuma period. It is not convincing. 39,40,46

Postscript: On the 29th May 2019 the Citizen reports that the DA had given the ANC the Chair-position of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa)4 in the Western Cape Provincial Legislature. As motivation for this offering the DA said it was done in the interests of transparency, accountability, cooperative governance and good democratic practice (characteristics the DA constantly accuses the ANC of lacking!). Notwithstanding the DA’s argument that the chair is given traditionally to a member of the strongest opposition party in the government (which the ANC is in the stern Cape), it is in conflict with Maimane’s earlier promises that the DA would stay away from any future cooperation with doubtful partners.49

The advent of post-2019 Malema cooperation with the DA in metros can steer the DA back to its practice of dishonourable horse trading. This does not seem impossible. On the 28th May the Star48 reported that it looks set that the DA is going to do a power-sharing deal again with the EFF in Tshwane and Johannesburg.48 The DA’s use of the Malloch-Brown model for provincial and municipal political empowerment

There are some serious critics of the opinion that to speak of the DA as a national regime, to in any way be able to govern South Africa after the May election 2019, must be handled with care. The DA, it was felt, just could not brag of doing so, because this experience is totally missing from their CV. There are even critics that believe that on provincial and local level the DA seems to falter. The emergence of various small political groupings and so-called community parties in the Western Cape, the DA’s stronghold, is offered as dissatisfaction with the DA by communities and the inhabitants of regions where the DA is strongly active. Given that these groupings did not make much inroad into the DA’s domain in the Western Cape or Cape Town in the past elections, this contradicts a general indication of poor DA ruling or unpopularity with the broad society of the DA on specific municipal level.22,25,36,50

This outcome erases the critique that the DA does not have the ability or will to be the national ruler in the post-2019 politics. The results of the May election contradict thus firstly the lack of interest of the DA in national politics, and secondly that the DA has neglected the national issue. What most of the critics have missed is that the DA, with very good reason, is focusing its political intentions and role-playing on provincial level to tackle local issues, instead of over-addressing the national issues of South Africa.22,25,36,50

Looking to the arguments and modus operandi of the DA’s leadership since 2014, it becomes clear that there exists cognition inside the party that the first step to be able to move into national government successfully requires the pre-step of a well established provincial level involvement and empowerment by the DA all over the country. Included here is the local level of governmental occupation by the DA in an effort to firstly repair the integrity of municipalities and to again obtain clean audits, and secondly to serve the inhabitants’ needs and demands through this improved system. This will allow them to obtain and establish a foundation to move into provincial and then on into national levels of government. Only after this double stage has successfully been mastered, based on a sound governance foundation, experience and empowerment, can the DA move aggressively into the national sphere from 2024 onward .22,25,36,50

This double stage intention and approach on provincial and local levels of government establishment was evident from the words of Makashule Gana50 of the DA national campaign team for the recent May 2019 election, when he pinpointed that the party was primarily and specifically campaigning on community issues that were close to the ordinary peoples’ daily lives50:15: “We stand more chance of being in government if we pour our hearts into the provinces and grow our votes there.” Prominent here are the constructive efforts of the DA to explain on local level major national issues in such terms that help voters to understand how bad or good decisions taken in the top echelons of government affect their day-to-day lives, write Matiwane and Deklerk25.

How much the quality of the DA’s political structure and know-how are on the standard of international politics, and how intensively they apply the principles of good governance on all levels of their strategy and planning, is especially reflected and confirmed by their insight to go as an opposition in the first place for local and domestic politics. Their aim is mostly, other than some of the ANC top brass like Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, to find an international solution for local problems. No-one can reject the important role of international politics, but if a local policy of management is absent and the basic grievances of the local people on village level are ignored and fail to be addressed – as the ANC mostly did for over 25 years with their minds occupied by national government – international politics not only fails to have an impact, but, where it is applied randomly, brings in most cases only further chaos to an existing local problem. Their exclusive local focus with the use of local approaches, is working positively where the DA is strongly involved in the local level of government. This is not only to repair the local mess at municipalities previously run by the ANC, but at the same time to start to bring about the much needed basic facilities and contacts that are prominently lacking on local level and whereto international solutions mostly are not applicable.

In this context, wherein the DA’s local orientation to politics is correctly focusing on the single aim to altruistically serve the individuals’ needs above personal gains and self-empowerment, an inclination that is at the moment negatively overwhelming the country’s politics on national level, is the supportive narrative of Mark Malloch-Brown51 with regard to the DA’s initiative on local level politics. For the record, Malloch-Brown51 is undoubtedly one of the most qualified internationally recognised persons to understand and evaluate the actions and qualities of political parties and governments worldwide. The insight of Malloch-Brown51, an experienced political correspondent for the Economist, the Vice-President of External Affairs of the World Bank, Head of the United Nations Development Programme, the UN Deputy Secretary-General under Koffi Annan, and later Minister of State at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who worked closely within the Middle East and African political turmoil, is fully echoing the DA’s practise of politics. He can speak of successes and failures and hard lessons to learn from local to national governance, especially on the British environment.51

Malloch-Brown51, writes about Gordon Brown’s hard lesson to learn on the importance of local politics when he became the UK Prime-Minister51:221:

Hit in his early months in office by credit, food and energy crises that were clearly international in origin, he publicly sought international solutions, only to be confronted…with complaints that he was not sensitive enough to people and their problems. Why, the British people asked, was he talking about all these irrelevant international matters?

The dilemma of the modern politician is that the answers are abroad but the votes at home. And so Brown, like Blair before him, had to find a language and narrative of politics that is deeply rooted in the at-home. Among political leaders, neither the natural globalisers nor the nationalists are able to cut themselves free from the strings of domestic politics. That is the forum to which they all remain beholden.

Malloch-Brown51 also writes in this context of the importance of local government about his own experience (and another hard lesson to learn) as a UK minister. He reports51:221: “And local is a tough taskmaster. Coming back to the U.K. as a minister to help Brown drive his internationalist agenda, I was brought down to earth by the weekend’s newspaper headlines that blamed the government for uncollected garbage in London’s streets. It does not get much more local than that.”

How sensitive the DA is in its encircling of good politics and its following every letter of the principles to obtain the best empowerment through addressing the local issue, is clear in their aim to take over city metros as a first step to a later national takeover. Noteworthy here is the DA’s insight to put forward strong leaders of quality in order to lead excellent cities and by doing so, to win the hearts of the local people. Malloch-Brown51, on the empowerment of local government through the installation of persons of integrity in care of these municipalities, writes51:221: “… mayors solve problems that are close to home: violent crime, drugs, public infrastructure. They have to care about schools, social services, police and public investment.”

On the immense empowerment of the local entities and their empowering energy-streaming, not only into the provincial and national levels of a country, but also into the international sphere, because their excellence and know-how can be exported, Malloch-Brown51 writes further51:222: “The world looks good for mayors and other local leaders. The fortunes of cities like Moscow, Cape Town, and Chicago have often been countercyclical to those of their region or country, often due to the leadership of strong mayors.”

The DA’s successful pre-2019 occupation and management of Cape Town (as well as the Western Cape region in which it is anchored) reflects such counter action to erase poor governance and leadership, standing out from the ANC’s failed South African state and its municipalities where they reign.51

In addition, the DA’s political successes, again at the provincial level, especially in the Western Cape in the May election, are a confirmation of their ongoing political manifesto of an orderly taking of power in South Africa, even if it must wait until the 2024 election.22 The DA as a party of everything for everyone, pre-and post-2019 The DA’s White dilemma

Post-election critics bring various reasons to the door of the DA as to why it did not make a dramatic inroad on the voters. Prominent here is its seeming inability to properly handle the various forces, both positive and negative, active in the DA’s own dynamics. It is often suggested that it tries to be a party of everything for everybody. This is an approach which is seemingly not working anymore. The party’s open kind of politics in which they try to satisfy both the Black interests as well as the White interests seem not to work in 2019 and are not going to work in future. This is damaging to both sides. The basis here is a policy ambiguity, mostly activated by the conservative NP remnants of the White sector of the DA. This opposition, and fear by the doves in the DA of losing White support if they took them on, led to not only a vague but many times an absolute lack of a clearly declared policy on Black empowerment and affirmative action, driving away the middle class and even the lower economic classes of Blacks. On the other hand, there is the suspicion by White DA members of Maimane to have sympathy for dramatic land reform, which echos in many aspects that of the ANC doves. This is a direct reason for a DA internal power struggle. This was also well-reflected by critics as the so-called driving out of Whites as members and supporters in the May elections. This in-house power struggle is immense, although well hidden. It frequently equals the present in-fighting in the ANC on the self-empowerment of individuals. The Black racism within a certain sector of the ANC is in reverse echoed by White racism in the DA.28,32 Nyatsumba writes25:25: “The harder Mmusi Maimane tried to position the DA as a social democratic party that would appeal to black voters, the more conservatives “fought back” against him and his ideals.

Naki, in quoting Professor Dirk Kotze22 of Unisa on this conflicting context and the fight for the soul of the DA, reports22:4: “Blacks wanted reform, but conservative whites opposed liberal policies, which put the DA in a dilemma. Both the constituencies abandoned the party at the polls in favour of the ANC and the FF+.”

This indication is undoubtedly true: as many as 470 396 voters left their DA home and contributed undoubtedly to the FF+ gaining 249 093 votes since the 2014 election. These DA voters who absconded to the ANC also helped the ANC to limit its’ loss to only 1 410 446 votes in the May election.5-8

The post-2019 politics make it clear that the DA has reached its peak of White voters and supporters, but the loss of more or less 249 093 White DA voters to the FF+ was an unavoidable outcome. It was part of the ultra-conservative Whites’ build-up against Black empowerment that could never be solved reasonably inside the DA of the future. Most of these ultra-conservative Whites, a political mix between NPs, ABs and Herstigte-NPs, have opportunistically hung on to the DA for years after losing their own political homes, doing more harm than good to the DA’s political soul.28,52 Mokone, Deklerk and Hunter52, quoting a DA insider on these seemingly politically confused and estranged Whites in the DA, write52:22: “Yes, we have lost support to the Freedom Front Plus, but perhaps it’s about time we lost the right-wing conservatives in the party because we are trying to build a party that represents the interests of all South Africans. Perhaps that will also help us to continue increasing support in black areas, which is what we did in this election.” A Black ex-ANC as the present leader of the DA

How much these right-wing conservatives have penetrated the soul of the DA with their White racial contamination, was clearly reflected by their efforts to sack Maimane for what they see as his “Black liberation” inside the DA. Other DA right-wingers allude that he is an ex-ANC walking around with the ANC manifesto under his right arm. The intention to oust him at present is very clear. Indeed, it seems that they tried to do this at the DA’s Federal Executive (Fedex) on the 13th May, without success. It seems that they are also gearing up to try to oust him later in June at the DA’s Federal Council’s meeting. (The FC is the DA’s highest decision-making structure between conferences). There are also rumours of a call for an early national congress next year, instead of the scheduled congress of 2021, to muster enough votes to be able to topple Maimane12,52

Mokone, Deklerk and Hunter52 describe these detractors of Maimane to include current and former MPs and MPLs from the DA’s neo-conservative grouping, known in the DA’s circles as the “old guard”, which does not agree with the DA’s “blacking” politics and a more responsible view on true democracy, as opposed to the one catering exclusively to White privilege. A spokesperson on the inside of the DA says52:6: “They are gloating. Even before the results started coming in, there were so many of them that were waiting for Mmusi to fail.”

How focused and poisonous these attacks are on Maimane, especially from the Afrikaner right-wing, is well reflected by Pelser53 when he, without a factual base, writes53:6:

Danksy Maimane se oorhaastige kantkiesery in rassetwiste wat gewissel het van Ashwin Willemse tot Schweizer-Reneke, kry die DA 472 000 stemme minder op 8 Mei, want hoewel sy party se prestasie in regering gerespekteer word, verstaan veral wit kiesers ook wat Maimane wil doen, naamlik om klokslag op sosiale media sy eie onberispelike bona fides wat betref ant-swart rassisme ten toon te stel nog voordat hy al die feite het.”

The double standards of these White right-wingers applied to the correctness and indeed the prescribed duty of Maimane to punish deviant behaviour of party members, especially of the top brass of the DA, knowing it is inappropriate and delinquent – is again reflected by Pelser’s53 public down-playing (seemingly because their political antics fit him) of the seriousness of the deviances of three DA seniors who Maimane (after consultation with his top brass) recently called to book for contravening the party’s media rules and for getting involved in racial politics. Pelser writes53:6:

Die DA-LP Ghaleb Cachalia, seun van die struggle-ikone Amina en Yusuf Cachalia, is weer onder ‘n tipe sensuur geplaas as ‘n ongedissiplineerde kader omdat hy dit gedurf waag het het om die uitgesproke Radio 702–aanbieder Eusebius McKaiser te belg.

Ook Helen Zille, wat as premier die doeltreffendste regering gebou het wat Suid-Afrika in 25 jaar gesien het, en wat nou ‘n gewone DA-lid is, sal na die DA se federale uitvoerende raad verwys word nadat sy op Twitter geskryf het dat daar ook deesdae iets soos “black privileges” is (sy stel dit onder meer gelyk aan grootskeepse geplunder sonder gevolge).

These growing and well-planned attacks on the “Black priest” Maimane as DA leader, are not done alone by single persons or a small group of White right-wing-went-off-DAs, but are also as mentioned done from inside by the mostly White “old guard” of the DA top brass where these attacks are less expected. These attacks are spreading to all the intimate members of Maimane’s team. Important to note is the focus on the DA’s head of elections Jonathan Moakes, and the chief executive Paul Boughey, seemingly also with the intention to oust them for the “alleged” poor performance of the DA in the 2019 elections12,39,53

Moakes did indeed resign recently and referred to the internal fights in the DA, wherein seemingly the detractors of Maimane are central, as: “…’toksiese, abnormal omgewing’ waar ‘interne gevegte, vertrouensbreuk, (en) onenigheid …die norm geword het’,” reports Boonzaaier.54:1

Bringing the fight closer to Maimane and his intimate cronies, Marrian writes39:4: “Knives are said to be out for the young leader, despite him getting ‘a round of applause; as he entered the Fedex meeting on Monday.” The DA present-day leadership saturation by right-wing Old Guards

The knives of the “old guard” are out for the wrong “emperor” and these detractors of Maimane, similar to those who stabbed Julius Ceasar, learned later that a hefty price needs to be paid in the end.

From a political analysis point of view, it seems more and more that the DA’s drop in share in the national votes from the 22.23% under Helen Zille to 20.77% in 2019, bringing a decrease from 89 to 84 MPs in the National Assembly, was to a great extent directly as a result of the negative impact of these “old guard’” “white-politics” inside the DA, specifically about Maimane’s “Black” presence as its leader. One prominent root of these DA neo-conservatives’ ultra-politics, is their association with the so-called antagonists against land expropriation in any form – and the fighting off of any form of upliftment for the mass of the poor and landless. They are clearly aligned to the so-called and mostly self-styled “Afrikaners/White rescuers and saviours”, such as the FF+, AfriForum, AgriSA, Solidarity and other obstructionists of the unavoidable and much needed land reform plan. The future planning and political model of this “old guard” for the DA does not include the intention to build a party that represents the interests of all South Africans. Prominent here is their exclusive safe-guarding of an imbalanced White land ownership and exclusive White capital at the cost of ±30 million poor and landless Blacks. 21,28,47,52

Critically considered, is it clear that they do not represent the view of most of the ±5 million White South Africans. Moreover, they do not have the majority support of these Whites for their racial politics inside or outside the DA. They can cost the DA a split, but, as said, this split needs to occur as fast as possible under the leadership of Maimane, in order to make the DA a party of the people of South Africa.21,28,47,52

But political analyst Ralph Mathekgo55, quoted by Naki55, contends that the flight of White voters from the DA must also be interpreted from another angle and not outright because they are all against the DA’s so-called activation of a process of “blacking” itself. They were forced out by fear of the EFF’s extreme anti-White and land grabbing policy (and their own selfishness to be rich, empowered and to have unlimited White privilege), and thus ran to the FF+ as their only rescuer in this unfortunate setup. This opinion is confirmed by various other political analysts.21,28,32,47,52,55

Mathekgo55, in line with the above findings, writes55:5: “The EFF helped the Freedom Front Plus to consolidate the white voters. It positioned itself as an opponent of the EFF policies, including the expropriation of land without compensation.”

The exit of the White antagonists (who, as mentioned, did not really belong from day one to the DA’s Black orientated political culture), has undoubtedly on the other hand opened the door in reverse for the influx of the middle and lower classes of Black supporters. This positive and growing process will start to erase the White shortfall in members and the White funding of the party (which also seems to have become a leverage of how these right-wing Whites, especially the White capitalists, have manipulated and captured the DA’s soul for a long time). 21,28,32,47,52,55

To be a party of the future, the DA will need to increase their drive for the collection into the DA of Blacks to make it an overwhelmingly moderate Black party. This is a dramatic move away from the contaminated presence of the (mostly departed) right-wing Whites which have so far blocked any “black-liberalism”. This was done in-house by them, at the cost of the status of Maimane’s leadership, by their internal propaganda to profile him as a poor leader. In this process the media was thoroughly used, especially the Afrikaans media.21,28,32,47,52,55 Good management for change politics

The abovementioned change in politics of the DA from White to Black can bring about enormous winnings for the DA in the next local urban elections of 2021. This political acceptance could be extended to the rural areas wherein the DA so far has been under-performing against the ANC and the EFF. (In the 2019 elections, of the 3.6 million votes which the DA received, 2.9 million came from urban areas, with 152 000 from rural areas, 500 000 from farm areas and 9 000 from mixed areas). This means that the DA has to be progressive in order to improve its position locally.22,56 Marrian56 is correct when she says that the DA’s results in the metros in 2019 show that it will have to work hard to retain control of them in 2021, particularly in the Tshwane and Johannesburg metros which it now governs through unstable coalitions. This includes their sole governing in Cape Town, where their support has dropped from 67% to 56%. However, on the other side, the decrease in votes for the ANC is much more significant, confirming the presence of various negative determinants and not a sole one such as leadership per se.56

With regard to the future politics of the FF+ in the post-2019 politics (which has enlarged its presence in Parliament from 4 to 10 MPs) – it is the party to which the DA shed an assumend ±250 000 voters – there is, besides obstruction together with the various White/Afrikaner rescuers and savers such as Solidarity, AfriForum, the IRR, etc., very little hope. The FF+ is an artificial political setup, still saturated in racism, and as the election outcome reflects, it is not popular with the majority of South Africans who stand strongly against racism. Also for the 250 000 DA members, fleeing the ship to the FF+, the future looks doomed there and they knew very well that the DA is the only party that can bring about ordered and balanced land reform. The failed Pieter Mulder escapade as deputy minister of the FF+ in the Zuma cabinet was an expensive lesson to learn for Whites who tried to channel their politics and interests exclusively through the FF+.5-8

The chance is good that many of these disloyal (and many times displaced) DA supporters, who turned to the FF+ as voters, are going to return to the DA. Kotze22 reflects22:4: “The FF+ support is artificial, caused by DA supporters upset with the way the party was managed at the top.” The question must be asked as to whether the DA wants them back? To argue that the DA is stripped of its White voters/supporters with the departure of the 250 000 right-wing jumpers to the EFF+, is a myth. It must be noted that most of the DA members/supporters are still White and are undoubtedly satisfied. Moreover: the fact is that the Whites (including Afrikaners), especially the youth, have very little sympathy for right-wing Whites and their opportunistic Afrikaner/White saviours and rescuers. The same passivity against the right-wing is present within the 5 million Whites with regard to the political trouble-making of the ±35 000 White farmers and their farms. Although it is impossible to calculate precisely the number of White supporters of the DA, the voting totals of the 2019 statics of the eligible voters (±36 miilion) as well as the total voters (±18 million) at the ballot box out of a total population of ±58 million, can be brought into calculation with the White population of ±5 million. If the eligible White voters are calculated, as many as 3 miilion Whites can support the DA. If the passive vote, as reflected in the 2019 voting, is brought into calculation, as many as 1.5 million Whites can still be supporters of the DA. (The total vote for the DA in 2019 was 3.6 million). This calculation means that the loss of ±250 000 White votes reflects basically a loss of between ±8% and 17% Whites by the DA, which can easily be replaced with Black votes.5-8

It can be expected that many of the Black and Brown voters who jumped ship will return as soon as the ANC restarts its tricks. The politics of the ANC, the SACP and Cosatu, are still bordering on radicalism with regard to race, economics and land reform, etc. This politically radical thinking just does not fit into the mindset of established DAs. 22,63

For South African politics in general, which includes the DA’s future planning, thinking and action, there lurk serious consequences as a result of the right-wing FF+ successes in the May election (a warning also applicable to the EFF’s danger). This holds political dangers, which somewhere in the future, the government of the day may be forced to curb, even by dramatic intervention. On this racial polarisation and risky outcome, Mondi Makhanya,64 the editor of City Press, writes a clear warning64:11: “Pieter Groenewald, VF Plus-leier, het ná die verkiesing in ‘n onderhoud hieroor gekraai. “Mense begin nou besef dat jy toegelaat word om wit te wees, ‘n minderheidsgroep, ‘n Afrikaner, sonder om ‘n rassis te wees.”

On the above response of Groenewald, Makhanya64:11continues:

Deur dit te sê, het hy die terugtrek van ‘n aansienlike deel van die wit bevolking – meestal Afrikaanssprekendes – in ‘n rasse-laer van waar hulle hulself as afsonderlik van hul medeburgers beskou, as lofwaardig beskou.

Die ongelukkige aspek van demokrasie is dat dit elke nou en dan uitslae soos dié bewerkstellig. As demokrasie moet ons dit respekteer.

Suid-Afrikaners moet egter nou reeds die realiteit konfronteer dat ‘n giftige nasionalisme aan die regterkant van ons politieke spektrum herrys. Die goeie ding is dat dit binne die grense van ons grondwetlike bedeling geskied.

Dit kan steeds op demokraties wyse ontman word – mits diegene wat ons republiek lei dit herken en dit met breinkrag eerder as spierkrag beveg.

It is now the duty of the DA to rid itself of the Groenewalds, the racial AfriForums and its associated organisations. There is no place to fire up White resistance and poisonous ultra-White nationalism in the DA. The opportunity is now there for the DA to rid itself of racial domination and contamination. This can be done fast and successfully. For that the DA needs a tough, but balanced Black leader.64

It is clear that Maimane and his intimate cronies are very sure of themselves in the post-2019 DA with their future “blacking”. He is not hesitating to take on the White ultra-conservatives in the party’s top brass. It seems Maimane successfully bottled them together with persons such as Helen Zille and “her regrets of promoted Black leaders in the DA”.43,53,65,66

Maimane43, on this future path of DA politics, said43:1-2: “We have set the direction of the organisation and that is the route we will go”.

His growing success was seen with the recent appointment of his preferred candidate Jacques Julius as deputy chief whip in the place of Mike Waters, who is regarded by Maimane and his cronies as part of the conservatives who obstruct the change of the DA. It shows strong support for Maimane from senior DA MPs. This direct vote within the party’s caucus was undoubtedly the victory Maimane needed to continue fast with his diversity of the racial composition of the DA’s higher echelons. It is also clear that the DA MP Phumzile van Damme is successfully leading a progressive group to dislodge many of Maimane’s detractors.65

Mokone and Deklerk65, quoting DA inside sources, say that Julius not only strengthened Maimane’s empowerment on the DA’s Fedex, but that the support of the senior DA MPs show65:4: “… that there are people in the party who support the vision he’s laid out, who want to continue with the vision of our SA for all.”

This clear and decisive policy finality arriving at last, the previous lack of which cost the DA votes in the recent elections, was concretely demonstrated on the 21st May 2019 when Maimane took on Helen Zille in public (an action long overdue). This clearly reflects his assertion of power in the post-2019 DA politics. He has at last obtained his grip on the party. His undermentioned public speaking shows this clearly.43

Firstly, he recommitted the DA to being the South African party of the centre, with the sole intention to serve every citizen43:1-2: “We will not pander to the right or pander to the left. That is not the space we want to occupy. We are in the centre of politics and we must lay out that stall. Populism and nationalism are on the rise. It doesn’t change the fact that our historical mission to get all South Africans working together is an ideal worth fighting for.”

Secondly, in fighting off the attacks on him as leader, as driven by the ill-disciplined comments of some high profile DA members on Twitter, he initiated disciplinary actions against three prominent DA members, namely Helen Zille and the two DA MPs Galeb Cachalia and Michael Cardo.43,67

Maimane43,67 taking a clear position on the DA”s centre politics and how this will be driven, as well as how he is going to erase the right-wing Whites, has responded as follows43:9 and 67:1-2:

I do not agree with the views that have been put forward by the former premier of the Western Cape.

The discussion about privilege in this country is a function not only of our history which advantaged a particular race over another, but it’s also that in the last number of years in government here, we have failed to create access to opportunities for South Africans and ensure that more can be included in our economy .

White South Africans needed to be “cognisant of the fact that the majority of people who are left out are black South Africans.”

On the conflicting racial matter, also prominent in the DA and which was clearly put into the foreground by the Zille tweets, Maimane67 comments as follows67:9: “Any view that seeks to polarise South Africans on the basis of race is not a view I will support. Our focus must be working together as South Africans, black and white, to recognise those injustices and work to address them.” The DA is finally at the centre of politics and is laying out its stall

To be honest, the DA was before and still is after the election (as shown by the arrogance of Zille’s tweets), undoubtedly saturated in the belief capture of some right-wing Whites seeing themselves as the sole rescuers of the party (undoubtedly true in terms of funding) when it seems to be in trouble. The pertinent use of Helen Zille and Tony Leon to collect votes, but surely only White votes, was an excellent example of this mistaken perception of these right-wing Whites of their future importance in the DA. The presence of people such as Zille and Leon activated immense Black anger. It was planned belittlement. It was for White empowerment.64,66,68 A DA member of the party’s campaign team reflects68:7: “Why in the dying days were the fossils rolled out? Because they wanted to focus on the white vote. That vote was already gone, it was clear even in by-elections.”

There is a false belief that a Black DA is doomed, which may be true if it is solely entrusted to a future of White voters and putting them first. But the intention is clear to keep only those Whites who are committed to an open society, free from the present DA racial undertones. For Johnson12 to write as follows on this White remedy of the post-2019 DA is pie in the sky12:4-5: “Daar is eise dat die koppe van al die topleiers moet rol en vrese dat, tensy die skip vinnig omgedraai word, verdere verliese in 2021 se munisipale verkiesing die party in die gesig staar.” Firstly, it is doubtful whether people such as Johnston are welcome on the post-2019 DA ship. Secondly, if the Black top leaders of the party are now fired, the White racial DA will in 2019 already face losses and be diminished to the FF+’s status (into which its White right-wing fits very well with their extreme racial ideology).

The immense presence of doubt on the so-called “expert leadership” of Whites in the DA’s top echelons and with good reason the growing rejection of persons (who Malema called the pensioner-politicians) such as Helen Zille, who totally overstayed her welcome in formal DA politics, and her present actions of enormous damage to the DA and to Maimane, is confirmed by her growing anti-DA writings and recent utterances. Specific in this respect were her recent admissions of her seemingly “own fault” as the previous DA leader to “blacken” the DA. Even the DA’s top brass intended to crash her “political profile” to get rid of its White image before the May election (which she named “vernietige Zille-stategie). Zille66, on the 26th May 2019 in the Rapport on these “facts and others”, reflecting back to her so-called ousting in 2017 about her “colonialism-tweets”, writes as follows66:7:

Diegene verantwoordelik vir die DA se verkiesingstrategie (ironies genoeg, die meeste van hulle wit) het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat as hulle my in die openbaar sou verpletter, die DA uitendelik sy beeld as ‘n “wit party” sou verloor. Dit is nie ‘n samesweringsteorie nie. Ek het ‘n dokument wat na die party se federale uitvoerende raad gestuur is, wat dit verduidelik.

Ek is tydelik geskors, en toe dit nog nie werk nie, het hulle my prober aanmoedig om Suid-Afrika te verlaat. Die DA het selfs ‘n skenker gevind om hul strategie te financier. As ek verdwyn, so het hul gereken, sal die party uiteindelik as “getransformeer” beskou word.Toe ek beleef weier om as premier van die Wes-Kaap te bedank en die land te verlaat, is ek verbied uit alle party-aktiwiteite.

With regard to the above – which sounds like pages from the chronicles of the FBI and the KGB! – the DA top brass offers some contradictory facts, such as that they never offered her a job overseas, but that the job offer was made independently by two British universities, and that she was indeed asked to leave the premiership due to the damage done by her view on colonialism and race (as she is doing again). To make her an eminent exile to St Helena, similar to Napoleon, seems to be in her dreams. What is clear is that Zille has her own agenda to do the DA as much harm as possible. She has become her own destroyer in the DA’s politics, as well as the county’s politics. Thankfully for her there is a place and sympathy for a pensioned joker in politics, even world-wide.54

For Maimane the above, namely the possible presence still today of a small but strong empowered group of right-wing mischief-makers in the DA who not only can oust him, but can also send him overseas in the near future or to St Helena! Be aware!

What is clear, Maimane and also the DA’s other leaders learned well from the recent elections, is that a party cannot be unlimited everything for everyone: you can be a party for everyone, but one based on clear moral principles, free from racism and free from the sheltering of politically contaminated opportunists whose foundations rest in pre-1994 racial and self-centred South Africa. A centre party or a social democratic party requires clear borders to the left as well as to the right, far away from the vague bordering on political policy of the present DA. Furthermore, there are signs of stagnation in the DA, as its election results in the May elections reflect. This is due, again as abovementioned, to a certain extent because of the DA’s circling around its middle ground position in politics wherein its’ fine, clear value proposition to voters, after their years of exposure to the ANC’s rude politics, did not always come through correctly or was appreciated.32,45,67

To be a winner in the post-2019 politics, the DA’s ideal composition of members must be proportionally 10 Blacks to 1 White. This ideal is also appropriate for its leadership. In its Constitution the Freedom Charter must be central. Pastor Mmusi Maimane: a perspective The “Poor” leader

There are some very strong critics of the leadership of Mmusi Maimane of the DA. Pivotal here is the allegation of his lack of a so-called “Zille-driving motivation-politics”. Many see him as another failed so-called “Tony Leon with his fight-back-strategy”, without bringing constructive politics to the table, other than constantly showing up Jacob Zuma’s and Cyril Ramaphosa’s failures and their empty promises.36

Descriptions of Maimane as a kind of sub-standard leader, a directionless leader, a powerless leader, a poor leader, etc., became prominent references since 2018 by some journalistic sectors. Included in this “Maimane-bashing”, frequently ignoring the modus operandi of Maimane and the present 2019 politics of the DA, is it important to note that the DA underwent a dramatic metamorphosis since 2014, writes Tabane.77 Maimane undoubtedly inherited a sometimes confused party, one leg in Black politics as well as one leg in White politics. It is still undergoing change today. It is a process wherein White empowerment was shifted to Black empowerment to a certain, but limited, extent. This was a shift that angered many of the White-NP-remnants in the DA, who has moved over to it when the NP passed away. This ongoing change in the DA’s identity brought the much needed activation into its foundation (as well as conflict) of more Black rights. Prominent here was also the erosion of exclusive White capitalism and the activation of inclusive capital, the fighting in some ways of Black inequality, poverty and landlessness of the mass of Blacks, the effort to phase out White supremacy in the party’s structure and policy, etc. This has so far not really been successfully done in terms of a clear one-White-citizen versus one-Black-citizen plan. This outcome is not a result of Maimane’s failure, but of White DA obstructionists and underminers trying to torpedo the party’s unity, potential and growth, and to make Maimane the scapegoat for everything that is wrong in the DA.12,22,36

Maimane, to make the DA a viable and sustainable party, undoubtedly tried in the past and is trying presently to challenge the upholding of White privilege and empowerment inside the DA’s structure, although not always openly and with the aggression so characteristic of persons such as Julius Malema, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma. He is starting to eye the shortcomings of the 1994 Dispensation, which was forced down on all Black South Africans. This intention is aimed at resettling the stagnant situation of the DA, coming from 1994. This gradual, but dramatic activation, Maimane handled and is still handling with grace. But it seems that there is not only outside the DA, but also inside the DA much dislike for his so-called “mild” approach to politics. Inside the DA both its left wing (Blacks) and its right wing (Whites) reflect hostility: the Blacks feel that his efforts to reform the DA are political diminutives while the Whites see his reforms as a threat to their “citizens’ rights” and this is in line with the so-called “discrimination” they have experienced since 1994 under the ANC. This “confused and projected anger” by the DA’s opposing groups seemingly activated their decision not to vote for the DA in the May 2019 election (470 396), but instead voted either for the FF+ (mostly Whites) and the ANC (mostly Blacks).12,24

The fact that the DA was doing to a certain extent better on the provincial level than on the national level has nothing to do with the leadership of Maimane, as some journalists tried to reflect. In declaring this tendency they must first look at the intention of the DA to go firstly for the provincial and municipality levels, before they aim for the national level. The differentiation in votes on national and provincial levels — wherein the DA did less well on the national level than on the provincial level and where the poor national outcome is blamed on Maimane as leader, is far fetched. The truth lies in the fact that two different kind of leaders were standing for the DA and two different political setups present for the DA in the recent elections. Kotze24 puts this misleading by mischief of political commentators to “label” Maimane a poor leader in terms of the post 2019 elections results in perspective when he writes24:11: “DA supporters might have voted for the party at provincial level and for someone else at national level.”

What most of the critics of Maimane ignore in their constant attacks on his “poor” leadership, is their own faulty mindsets, which became contaminated by the ANC top brass’ character and leadership and what is meant by a “poor” and “good” leader. Prominent here is some of the ANC leaders’ alleged involvement with stealing, bribery, corruption, state capture, mismanagement, nepotism, crookery, self-enrichment, hostile and aggressive behaviour against anyone opposing their actions and murder, etc., which have it seems become “accepted” and “correct” characteristics of the present-day leadership politics (the so-called “good” leaders) of South Africa. These are delinquent leaders, many of which would be locked up in other so-called “democracies” and indeed would end their lives before a firing squad in China or North Korea if they committed the same crimes there. The intense moral and political degeneration of the executive leadership of South Africa since 1994 wherein the “bad” instead of the “good” became the criteria, is confirmed by the election as parliamentarians and top brass leaders of the ANC with serious allegations against them to the sixth Parliament. Maimane, in this environment, stands out for his integrity, but at the same time, his extraordinary difference makes him a clear target for vicious attacks.24 The who is who of Mmusi Maimane

Maimane comes from a totally different culture of moral cleanliness, leaving the impression indeed of Maimane as the reluctant politician in the present South African politics. This may be true to a certain extent, but this contaminated political setup undoubtedly also already caused other would-be-politicians of his moral quality and character to shy away, unwilling to get involved in such a political mess which seems incurable. But Pastor Maimane undoubtedly sees a call to provide an example of better quality than the political leadership examples of the ANC which the country’s citizens have been forced to endure since 1994. Undoubtedly, South Africans need him, as they needed the late Sir De Villiers Graaff as leader of the opposition to counter the political evils and actions of the leaders of the NP and the AB from 1948 to 1994. Maimane’s political maturity, vision, leadership, focused strategy and balanced planning for the country’s future, are not only found in his good upbringing and cultural lifestyle, his career as a reverend and years on the pulpit, but are also evident in his advanced studies and training in theology and psychology (he holds masters degrees in both disciplines). Furthermore, his mindset is free from the murderous contamination of the revolutionary setup and the disorder of grabbing and plundering which seems to have become a permanent fixture in many of the ANC’s top brass, especially those coming from pre-1994.12,24

Maimane’s leadership is undoubtedly not characterised by the so-called weakness and shortcomings, as Jason Lloyd24 has tried to reflect in his undermentioned writing on Maimane before the May 2019 election. It seems as though Lloyd has a limited understanding of quality executive leadership (outside that of the EFF and the BLF). He wrote in February 2019 without fact as follows24:35: “The Democratic Alliance (DA) has had a very incompetent and weak leader in Mmusi Maimane.”

In this context Lloyd continues24:35:

The DA is currently rudderless and without any useable ideas or policy to provide answers to the complex post-apartheid political, social and economic challenges.

The latest Ipsos opinion survey indicates that the DA will receive only 14% of votes in the upcoming elections – compared with 22.23% in 2014 – which is possible proof of Maimane’s inadequate leadership.

Maimane has also failed to command authority and respect from mainstream black political parties such as the ANC and the EFF. Worse, he has failed to maintain authority in the DA itself. Against this background, it is probably not difficult or unfair to conclude that this must be at least partly because Maimane is black.

It is very important to look in depth at Lloyd’s myth writing. When studying Lloyds’s article24:35: “The rise and fall of Mmusi Maimane,” it seems to be saturated with political subjectivity wherein White supremacy seems to have a strong founding and driving force. On what the characteristics are of the ideal executive political leader (here seemingly a Black one), there is a total lack of description to use to make comparisons. The only leadership guideline offered by Lloyd seems to be an indirect comparison of Maimane with Ramaphosa and Zuma, who both failed the test of the ideal executive political leader. To contradict Lloyd’s postulation that the DA would only receive 14% of the votes in the May election due to Maimane’s presence as leader, the DA received 20% with Maimane as leader! On the indirect assumtion that Ramaphosa as number one would save the ANC and would bring it a 70% vote outcome in the election, only an ANC outcome of 57.7% arrived! (This outcome that was far worse than that under Jacob Zuma in 2014!) To hint that the DA lost 2% or 470 396 votes in the election under Maimane, he missed that the ANC under their “wonder boy” and messianic leader Ramaphosa, shed three times more votes, namely 1 410 446 votes! So from whence did Lloyd’s condemning classification of Maimane as a poor leader come?1-8,21,56-62

With regard to the reference to the “command of the ANC’s leadership” by Lloyd24 — undoubtedly a hint by Lloyd24 of the presence of a “respected ANC leadership from 1994 to 2019”– which disrespects Maimane, is it important in the first place to point out that such a characteristic of goodness, activating respect to the outside world by the ANC top brass, was absolutely absent from 1994 to 2019. (Forget that he further speaks of a “respected” EFF leadership, as a comparison with that of Maimane. Such respect has not for one day been present in the EFF since its foundation, as was well reflected by the only 10% of voters who supported the EFF at the ballot box). With reference to the so-called absence of “ideas” of Maimane (and the DA) versus the assumed ideas of the ANC and the EFF on ruling, these ideas of the ANC are saturated in political opportunism, anarchy and revolution, while the present-day ideas of the ANC were already present in its terrorist days. Thus: when Lloyd remarked on a lack of credible leaders in the DA, the question is: who is credible in the ANC or the EFF? What are his criteria of credibility? Since 1994 the ruling party’s leaders had only one, including the credibility of Nelson Mandela, as a credible leader, and that was Motlanthe. Ramaphosa is now trying his best, but it seems that since 2017 that success is missing out on him. Where did the chaos in the ANC as a ruler start?: In 1994 with Mandela and the introduction of corruption by a sector of the ANC top brass that forced the late Nelson Mandela to pinpoint it when he was president. Just listen to the witnesses at the Zondo- and Mpati- (and the other) commissions now underway, to see that there are very few of the ANC top brass that are “clean” and who’s respect Maimane longs for. The complex post-1994 political, social and economic problems were created and are today still further created exclusively by the ANC elite, not the DA or Maimane. To measure or compare Maimane’s leadership in terms of the ANC’s or EFF’s sick leaderships is extreme foolishness.16,17,20,24,70,71

The accusation that Maimane “is not respected by the black parties such as the ANC and the EFF” is incorrect or better yet, it is political confusion as to what respect, leadership and politics, per se mean. Firstly, neither the ANC’s or the EFF’s leadership are a criteria of status for Maimane against which to evaluate his leadership, or for the public to evaluate Maimane. Maimane, in absolute contrast to many of the ANC top brass, is free from extra-marital affairs, stealing, state capture, murder or terrorism, etc. The article by Lloyd24 is, as is much of the critique against him, seemingly intended and designed to personally take on Maimane, specifically before the May election. Studying it critically, it seems to be driven and orchestrated by the intention of character assasination, instead of an honest personal and leadership evaluation. Undoubtedly before the election there was a well orchestrated intention to curb the power of Maimane and the DA, for fear of their positive impact on the then upcoming election by way of demoralising possible DA supporters. These kinds of “attacks” are well reflected before the election by the execution of reports such as “Cyril’s appeal prompts DA to lower its poll ambitions”, “ DA poll a setback to coalition ambitions”, “The rise and fall of Mmusi Maimane”, and “Cyril more popular than ANC – poll”. Another political cliché in the Afrikaanspress reads: “Mmusi Maimane is nie juis baie gewild onder DA-lede in Gauteng nie. Tog pryk sy foto op die meeste DA-straatplakkate in die provinsie.” Another one reads “’n netto syfer van [net] 19% [IRR-poll] van DA -lede het boonop aangedui Maimane kom die mas op as opposieleier.” 16,1720,24,69-71,73-75

It seems as though the intention of some of these critical anti-Maimane journalists (especially Whites), with specific advice that Whites must vote for the ANC and Ramaphosa instead of the DA and Maimane, is centred in White self-interest. Some of them are seemingly deeply politically confused (and highly frightened) by their own position in post-2019 South Africa. 16,17,20,24,69-71,73-74

With the criticism of Maimane as leader of the DA, it is clear that most of the fight is specifically because Maimane is Black and that the DA’s continuation must be stopped at all costs. The White Zilles and White Leons must come back to be the boss of the DA. These White supremacists seem to believe that there are still going to be 5 million Whites (more: even 30 million!!) living in South Africa in a century’s time and thus that Whites still have “to be catered for as extraordinary” at present (together with their White capital and traditional rights to drive and steer the DA) at their will. The reality is that the Whites, by their lack of breeding and natural dying out, will be between 10 000 and 30 000 left in a century’s time. Maimane knows this well and is in the process not only of bringing the mass of poor and landless Blacks a better life, but also to assure the Whites a part in the country’s future by his transformation of the ultra-White politics inside the DA to equality politics.16,17,20,24,69-71,73-76

It is true that in the South African voting context the personality of the leader counts sometimes more than his party’s policy and popularity. The intention with the “popular giant Ramaphosa” was to take the “dying” ANC in the election away from the brink of death. But Ramaphosa’s magic did not work, as evidenced by the ANC’s 57.7% in the May election. It must be remembered that Nelson Mandela, far more popular even than the so-called popularity of Ramaphosa, and his ANC party of 1994 could not get beyond 63% of the votes. Ramaphosa failed to make it higher than 57.7%. It is important to note that Ramaphosa’s popularity declined in three month’s time from 73% to only 58% in April 2019, losing 15% in weight. This 58% popularity of Ramaphosa seems to be in line with the 57.7% of votes which the ANC received in the election, making the Ramaphosa factor as an exclusive “election-power” basically zero. It also confirms and emphasises Motlanthe’s view that Ramaphosa is not a political or messianic leader, nor that he can improve an ailing ANC. The blind hero-position constantly awarded to Ramaphosa above Maimane in most of the anti-Maimane rhetoric, as well as the comparison of bad (Maimane) versus good (Ramaphosa), with the view that Ramaphosa is the messianic leader of South Africa, is the evidence that firstly, Ramaphosa is not such a gifted messianic leader, and secondly that his name will be remembered as outstanding in the South African political history. Maimane’s chances are excellent to become a formidable leader in the near future. The phrase: “In South Africa’s voting setup the personality of the leader counts sometimes more than his party’s policy and popularity”, can await Maimane in post-2019.70,77

To describe Maimane as24:35: “…inexperienced in politics, a reluctant political participant who has never really had a well-seasoned political strategy and vision, operating (like most clergymen) from a theological reference frame that has little or no space for other social influences” against the “credible modern technocrat Ramaphosa who is getting rid of the Zuma baggage and building a new ANC”, is nonsense. It reflects not only political “short-sightedness”, but the inability to read future politics. For a political commentator, this is a serious defect in his or her political dynamics. 24,76

In line with the above clichés or allegations of “poor leadership” around Maimane, is it not a surprise when RW Johnson12 also rates him low. But what is a surprise, is his personal attack, perhaps not so extreme as the one reflected by Lloyd. But what needs to be reported, is the religious foundation of the attack. It needs to be reflected, specifically because it can border on the introduction of religious intolerance in South Africa.12,24 Johnston writes12:4-5: “Die feit dat die 38-jarige Maimane jonk en onervare is, ‘n voormalige ANC-ondersteuner wat steeds in ANC-terme dink en ‘n prediker in ‘n fundamentalistiese kerk wat evolusie verwerp, het ook nie gehelp onder die DA se tradisionele liberale Engelse basis nie.” What on earth Maimane’s Christian religious preferences and church-affiliation in a Christian society, as well as a secular state, have to do which his leadership, without reflecting on it with the seeming intention of mischief, is totally unclear. Also the unasked “English contamination” in Maimane’s leadership is neither fish nor flesh. It seems to reflect back to Johnston’s long stay in Britain and the internalising of unfit cognition there which he now applies here. It only brings us back to one clear fact and that is how intensely the “Christian Black” Maimane is under attack, because he accepted the leadership of the till now exclusively pro-White DA.12,24 The good “Graaff characteristics” of Maimane

Maimane has the “Graaff characteristics” to pull the DA and the social democrats into the government of the day. Not so much immediately post-May 2019, but before the 2021 local elections. Maimane, similar to Sir de Villiers Graaff, is also one of the few top politician-gentlemen ever to sit in Parliament. Moreover, other than Graaff who could not bring down the despotic NP in his life, Maimane and his political grouping can be successful in bringing down the ANC.24,78-82

To bring the (poor) leadership of Maimane in line with the DA’s (poor) performance in the past election, as done by many political analysts in the postmortem of the May elections, is absolutely unscientific and nothing but mischief-making speculation. The chair of the DA’s Fedex, Athol Trollip, explains that the reason that the ANC won the election over the DA with 57.5% versus 20%, is the fact that the South Africans will vote ANC come hell or high water. It is seated in the revolutionary background of the ANC. The DA is still a White party for them, hostile to Black interests. The fault is not with the DA, requiring them to soul-search with regard to their performance under Maimane and their future in post-2019 politics, but with these South Africans who support the ANC and who blindly vote for such a corrupt bunch and who are prepared to accept mediocrity and maladministration over and over. Closely aligned herewith is the outdated Apartheid ticket which is still used by the hypocratic ANC who swims together with radicals such as the EFF in a tide of racial nationalism and populism. With regard to the critique that the DA under Maimane did not made inroads for instance in the Eastern Cape with only a 15% voter outcome, it is clear that none of the other parties made an inroad there either. Indeed, the DA increased its votes in Soweto from 5% to 13%. The DA under Maimane is still the second largest party, twice the size of the EFF.28,83

On the foolish efforts and suggestions of the removal of Maimane, various political commentators and analysts, such as Sefara86, Nyuatsamba32, Beukman3,84 and Essop85 are much more direct when guiding us than most political commentators, who are used to sit on two chairs. Their statements are uniform: he must stay on.3,84-86

Firstly, Sefara86 reflects on the loss in votes for the DA in the recent election, by showing that, as many other commentators have already indicated, it was to a great extent indeed a direct outcome after Mainane started to draw the line on greater Black empowerment in the DA that some right-wingers fled to the FF+. There is indeed an incomplete spelling out of strong affirmative action and the land ownership matter in the DA. But Maimane’s activation of a clear policy on land ownership and speaking out as a Black on the DA’s critical affairs was limited by the right-wing in the DA. Their internal mischief in the DA’s racial politics led to the flow of right-wing Whites to the FF+ (±150 000 votes) and not Maimane’s inability as leader. The public missed that the right-wingers assured that Maimane was not fully in charge of the DA’s leadership and the party’s politics, to be able to take much needed significant and sometimes dramatic decisions on Black interests. This was an identity crisis which the DA, as well as Maimane, innocently as the new appointed head, ran into before the May election, costing the DA both Black and White voters.

Secondly, pinpointing this present crisis wherein the DA is still functioning two months after the election, Sefara writes86:26: “And therein lies the DA’s existential question: will the removal of Maimane and his replacement by a white leader help the DA grow beyond 22% in the next polls? Is the loss of conservative white voters to the FF+ a necessary catharsis for the DA to start positioning itself as a genuine alternative – not a party of right-wingers with a black leader at the top?

Sefara86 and Beukman3,84 are fully correct in their opinion that to remove Maimane, without firstly addressing the DA’s policy incoherence, will hurt the DA and can spell its end. It will be a statement of impatience with its first Black leader, as well as the reflection of an unchangeable White party and a party which lacks internal dynamics, either as an opposition or as a ruler, to be able to constructively change South Africa. Maimane, for Sefara86 as for Beukman3,84 and Essop85, must be retained as the party’s top leader with the full power to reposition the party further and where necessary, dramatically. He must be allowed to unrestrictedly sell his vision to the broad public.3,84-86

On Maimane in future politics, Beukman3,84 contends that he is not long in the post and was forced to address the immense growing pains of the last five years. He is not a light-weight and learned a lot and is clearly focused not only on making the DA a better party, but also contributing to a better post-2019 South Africa. Beukman concludes84:11: “Baie meer ervare leiers wêreldwyd het al slegter as hy daarvan afgekom.”

Thombothi87 puts his finger possibly best on Pastor Mmusi Maimane’s leadership dilemma in South African society, where since 1994, bad became gradually intertwined with good to overwhelm it fully in the end, making bad ultimately good. Secondly, bad became the norm. The phasing out of the traditional bi-polar division of good versus bad lead to the evaluation of all behaviour in terms of the grading of bad, worse and worst, with bad the most reflected and acceptable behaviour. On Maimane’s leadership dilemma, he was caught up in this normalised bad culture of the South African politics wherein corruption, theft, murder and specifically land expropriation without compensation, are central and have became the rule of the day. Thombothi writes87:11: “Maybe Mmusi Maimane, in his opposition to expropriation, was judged not to have been sufficiently gung-ho. But Maimane is a pastor. He can’t preach compassion on Sunday and hatred every other day. He also doesn’t seem to have a nasty bone in his body, which appears to be a prerequisite in politics these days. Slaan terug would not sit well in his studio.”

But, it must be emphasised, this dilemma is not unique to Maimane as leader of the DA. It is also part of the dilemma of the DA as a centrist party, which cannot reflect hatred to one of its factions while at the same time bathing another faction in compassion. Not the best and most god-begging prayer can really help Maimane or his DA in this dilemma. Thankfully we have still the Solomon wisdom approach to cognitively handle our immediate crises in the New Dawn South Africa, until goodness is reborn somewhere in the future. Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018

The count awarded to the DA and its leadership in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, is 59 (72%) out of a possible maximum of 82. 3,79

Our initial decision to allow the application of the DA onto the list to be considered as a possible candidate to be able to rule South Africa after the 8th May 2019 was correct and appropriate. Its application qualifies to be allowed onto the shortlist of candidates.

5. Conclusions

Looking in retrospect at the DA’s political history, it is clear that millions of South Africans have seen their communities improved under the DA’s good governance. They have also watched the DA take up the fight in Parliament and hold the ANC government to account for every community which has had their rights denied by the ANC government. The people have appreciated the DA’s fight for justice.

The DA and its leaders’ overall evaluation shows that they are still short of 23 (28%) points out of a possible 82 to be the ideal candidate for appointment as the capable ruler to execute land redistribution. Although their CV shows that their qualifications are excellent and comprehensively obtained from top accredited institutions, and their attestations show that they are trustworthy, with immense integrity and that their leader, Mmusi Maimane, has the character and overall potential to run as president of the land, are there shortcomings in their experience due to their youth in politics. Important here is their lack of experience on land reform – and specifically on land expropriation without compensation. Where the issue of the land matter emerges in the DA’s politics, it seems to be determined and driven by White interests, rather than the interests of the poor and landless Blacks. There seems here to be strong signs of a White-stan mentality, very much like the dreadful Bantustans which were run from the Cape Parliament by the National Party and its Afrikaner nationalists.21,57-62,79-91

The critics’ mention of the country having been poorly served on the land ownership matter by the DA and that the party over the past two to three years has frequently stumbled is true. This allowed the ANC a free pass again in the May elections to without obstruction redeliver its past mischief up to 2024. The critics’ view is that the DA’s inclination to oppose the government by any means in some instances stopped progress in the country. The issue of land expropriation, with or without compensation, is an inappropriate fight by the DA. The failure by the DA to write a mandate to serve the citizens of South Africa on just and balanced land ownership within a democratic plan for instance with the ANC as a partner, has lead to the present conflict around land ownership and the possibility of immediate land expropriation that can spell land grabbing and revolution.

The DA must take some advice and criticism to heart: South Africans are looking for a change in a social, economic and political direction, not just public relations branding or window-dressing. In this hopefully new direction, the DA must not mind about its right flank streaming to the confused FF+, which since 1994 has been travelling in circles in the desert, or that its left flank is running to a temporary revitalized ANC, which is trying hard to climb back from its deathbed. There are enough good people at the centre — people who can go nowhere else and who do not want to go anywhere else — to change and to build up the DA.

It is time for the DA to accept that the landownership matter has been exaggerated for a long time by the ±35 000 White farmers (of which only between 5 000 and 7 000 really contribute to the country’s essential daily food supply). The opportunistic group of the rest of the ±30 000 White farmers, with their self-appointed White rescuers and saviours, represent less than 0.1% of the total South African population and less than 1% of the White population. If the mesmerised White sympathisers with the White rescuers and saviours movement are taken into account, the number is far lower than 300 000 of the White population of 5 million, representing at most 6%. It is time for the DA to purify itself from this 300 000 White individuals’ contamination. They must be repositioned to where they belong: outside the DA. The other nearly 5-million Whites also have citizen-interests but are sidelined and ignored outside the 35 000 White farmers’ priority-interests. This priority granted to 35 000 White farmers and there land led also to the ignoring of the interests of nearly 30-million poor and landless Blacks in the post-1994 Democracy. It just can go on this way.4-8

Although the DA was allowed onto the shortlist of candidates, it needs still 28% (a lack of nearly 30%) to reach the maximum points of 100% for the final evaluation of the next national election in 2024. It is up to the DA to improve its experience and know-how, and to reposition its attestations to reach the 100% mark. A clear policy on land redistribution must be formulated. The ability to effect land redistribution with justice and balance needs to be improved by the DA.

In this context the DA must take note of three important facts. First the words of Mthombothi’s8 when he said many South Africans are not particularly impressed or satisfied with the present political parties and that they, after 25 years of democracy, are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable. The second is the fact that 18.2-million potential voters (51% of the total voters’ population) stayed away from the ballot box in the 8th May 2019 elections.4-8 They are waiting and hungry to support and to vote for the correct party. The third, enclosing to the second fact, is that most South Africans are looking sincere for that extraordinary party of goodness, as Mthombothi said8:19: “regardless of race, want the same thing – a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for themselves and their families. They’ll support a party with a unifying message that will make a genuine stab at it. Time may have come for a new party that will inspire fresh hope in a disillusioned electorate.” Why can this party not be the reformed DA?

Maimane can be just too optimistic about the future soul of the DA when he said92:4: “We must occupy the centre. We cannot pursue the left or the right. This election has confirmed more than ever that the centre is where we need to be. We just need to be clearer about who we are and what we are about.” But to be the future ruler it goes far beyond the centre of politics in present-day South Africa. It requires an understanding of existential politics to can make sense of centric politics. It goes thus far beyond left or right politics versus central politics. It is about the life-long permanent fused-in of Black and White conflict-politics, like the issue of land-grabbing and -terrorism coming from 1671. It means far more than just the practice of adapt or die politics to can survive for a party. It can mean the “killing” of a nation’s personality.

In its present form the DA does not exhibit the ability to be able immediately to affect successfully land reform on its own. It has the potential to do it with an experienced and seasoned political partner, within an orderly framework. Otherwise it must change itself immediately to a basically new party; one that can, as a dynamic party, brings at last the peace, security and prosperity for what South Africans are longing for so much

The journey to the 2024 elections for the DA may be easy, but it can also never be reached without an immediate and dramatic turnaround in its politics. Time will tell.

6. References

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  74. Ed-EFF as koalisievennoot skrik minderheidskiesers af – peilong. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 10.
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Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.


The author declares that he has no competing interest.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.


Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa. (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanisation and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan or Khois (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Badness, candidate, crookedness, delinquency, election, evaluation, expropriate, goodness, leadership, political party, responsibility, scenario, wrong-doings,

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 3

1. Background

1.1.   Introduction

It is clear from studying the previous two continuous articles (Articles 7 and 8) that myths and lies played an enormous role in misinforming the mindsets of South Africans on the intended land expropriation and the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution. Prominent in this environment of misinformation are the promises during the May 8, 2019 election of the various political parties contesting the place of the utmost ruler for post-2019. Of great importance here are the promises of the three top political parties which emerged from the election on how they are going to address the land expropriation issue — including how they are going to “solve” the many other demanding political, social and economic issues in post-2019 South Africa. But, as the political history of South Africa, coming from as far back as 1652, tells us over and over, there is a massive difference between promises and deeds, especially good deeds. These deeds are required from the voters in exchange for their mandate to the ruler to “think and do” upon their behalf, and the empty promises of politicians and their parties.1

1.1.1 Lack of understanding of political responsibility by political parties and their leaders

The abovementioned outcome is basically because political parties in present-day South Africa do not understand the immense responsibility around the local-global-plan of governance. Every task entrusted to the executive political leader, his top brass and his party as a government, should be successfully executed by him in terms of the voters’ mandate to be a good leader, as well as for the country to be able to fit into the local-global plan of governance. As a pre-requisite included here is the guarantee to be able to be trusted by the voters to deliver only goodness and goodwill to them in the future. Malloch-Brown2 emphasises that South Africa’s invidious local-global prescriptions for good governance will not go away, and neither will the demand for positive change. It is a hard task to master for a political party cum regime, as it always tests the actions of a regime and the correctness of the state by its society. Even the honourable Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma3 during his presidency had to admit in public that it was far more difficult for him as president and the ANC as a regime to run South Africa, than it was for them to fight for its freedom. He failed to deliver such a mandate as leader of an elected regime, which was forced suddenly to act outside the setup of the revolutionaries’ rhetoric, promises and delinquent actions.2,3

This disconnection of the ANC from the voters, allowing them as a regime to act delinquently outside their election promises and their agreed mandate from the voters to only do good to them, is to a great extent cemented in the present corrupt Electoral Act which fully erased direct responsibility to the voters from MPs and MPLs. In this situation, which the ANC fully optimised and misused only for its top brass’ interest, the response and responsibility of MPs and MPLs were relayed only to the party and its top brass, while the top brass drove their own interests far away from that of the voters’ interests, needs and wishes.4-10

There is at the moment a legal action to change the Act in order to make MPs and MPLs directly responsible to voters. This will be the end of the favouring of the ANC to be able to manipulate the voters and to continue their spree of crooked candidates without a say by the ordinary people. Moreover, the indication is that this can bring the ANC down in the next election, if it has not fallen on its own sword already after the May election.4-10

The extent to which the ANC failed the voters was exclusively as a result of serious wrong-doing due to a lack of direct responsibility to the voters. This was not only confirmed by the public admission thereof before the May 9 Election by its top brass, but also the “begging” at the same time by the ANC’s top brass (including Cyril Ramaphosa) for “forgiveness” of the ANC as a party and its leadership, for its crookedness and delinquency since 1994.11-16

Ramphosa even extended his previous begging for forgiveness to the ANC supporters by his admission again after the election to these many ANC-wrong-doings. Prominent here is his confession, seemingly after immense emotional self-torture, of which Munusamy writes17:20:

Ramaphosa arrived at the election results ceremony [of the May 8 election] last Saturday looking like his dog had died rather than the person who had just rescued his party from having to share power in order to govern. But at the ANC’s victory celebration outside Luthuli House the next day, Ramaphosa conceded that the party had been chastened. He promised that the ANC was no longer an arrogant party and had heard the candid message from the electorate.

With honesty it must be acknowledged that the above kinds of political, social and economic failures of the ANC are inherited from most of the South African regimes coming from 1910. We see it in the failures of the various White political parties’ and party-alliances’ reigns between 1910 and 1948, wherein the Blacks’ interests were not only insignificant but criminally treated, equalling the mass wrong-doings of the post-1994 regime of the ANC. The same delinquency and failure were reflected by the DF Malan regime between 1948 and 1950. This period reflects, as does that of the ANC, that the National Party did not have the slightest idea of good governance, besides political mischief in their creation of the post-1950 Apartheid and its immense evils.1

The South African politics inside the post-1994’s so-called First Democracy has been tough on political aspirants and opportunists at the same time (and thus not only on the ANC in highlighting its faults, as well as its inabilities to not be able to survive in troubled situations). This is reflected by the failed outcomes and disappearance of the many political parties that had enrolled for the recent May election in their fight for a place in Parliament. Mvumvu reports18:1: “A record number of political parties contested the elections, but at the end it was the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that smiled all the way to the bank. Of 48 parties that appeared on the national ballot, only 13 will likely see a return on their investment of R200,000, which the IEC requires to register for elections nationally.”

1.1.2. The madness of 48 political parties and 10 000 candidates in the 8th May 2019 National Election

Firstly, it must be noted that for the May election 48 parties were registered, with more than 10 000 national candidates (2 089 in 2014) and 8 000 provincial candidates (6 562 in 2014). All of the 48 parties and the 10 000 national candidates had more than offered to solve the land debacle: they promised solely to solve it if they were elected as the regime. Of these 48 aspirants, as many as 35 failed the test to obtain a seat in the national elections, while of the 13 left as the so-called “winners”, basically only three can be given attention. The three are the ANC, the DA and the EFF.10  

With regard to the more or less 10 insignificant parties which made it to Parliament, together with the ANC, the DA and the EFF, political commentator Tabane19 gave us a good pre-evaluation already in February 2019 (three months before the May election), based on his “charismatic requirement of the leadership” of a party to be able to survive, when he wrote19:1:

Derhalwe sal die 2019-verkiesing waarskynlik die doodsklok vir Azapo, die PAC en Agang lui omdat hulle nie charismatiese leiers het nie. Maar Mosiuoa Lekota se Cope, wat eintlik op sy sterfbed moet wees weens gebrekkige organisaie, sal waarskynlik bloot weens Lekota se sterk persoonlikheid ‘n setel of twee behou. Good sal ook baat vind by die blote teenwoordigheid van sy leier, De Lille. Haar naam en vorige pos as burgemeester van Kaapstad sal verseker dat Good ‘n klein teenwoordigheid in die Wes-Kaap en dalk Gauteng en Noord-Kaap sal hê.

The political analyst Muzi Kuzwayo20 writes hereto in April 2019 on Paricia de Lille’s politics, up to her present-day party, named Good20:2: “She first cashed in a few years after she started, her party defunct and moving over to the DA and becoming mayor of Cape Town in return – good deal. Who knows what loot Good will bring her.”

Botha21, in January 2019, wrote on the UDM and its charismatic leader Bantu Holomisa. Botha21 reflects that Holomisa played a prominent role in exposing the alleged corruption in the PIC and was indirectly responsible for the exit of its executive, Dan Matjila. Botha’s21 gut feeling in January was that Holomisa would still play a role in Parliament after May. He postulates21:18:

“Holomisa se integriteit maak van hom ‘n blywende figuur. Hou hom dop.”

Holomisa’s and the UDM’s chances were critically analysed before the May election, due to their popularity within the Xhosa-tribe. It was surmised that they were good to win a seat, or mostly two, in Parliament. The pre-May view was that the Minority Front (MF) which was founded by the late Amichand Rajbansi, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IVP), the Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus), the National Freedom Party (NFP) and the ACDP were all insignificant with regard to gaining a prominent number of seats. They are on their deathbeds.21-23

On the FF Plus’s political future as an entity in Black South Africa, Khumalo24 in April 2019 quoted with good reason the opinion of the BLF leader, Andile Mngxitama24:4:

“You should look at their leadership and tell me if there is any diversity. That party only uses a few black stooges to belie the fact that it is still a racist Afrikaans party. Look at the party’s history: leaders from the former Conservative Party, a party that wished to preserve many aspects of apartheid in its DNA, were assimilated into the FF Plus…”

The false image created by the FF+ as a possible future role-player in the country’s politics by its taking of the fifth-most seats in the National Assembly in the May 2019 election, mostly from the DA, was a temporary outcome of the old NPs “rebellion votes”. This group was until now part of the DA supporters, but had become aggravated by “black rule” inside the DA, and decided to vote for the FF+. Hereto is the FF+ for many political strategists nothing more than a false mirage on the horizon for these old NPs as their new rescuer and saviour. The FF+, as is the EFF, extremely racially orientated, making it a post-2019 failure in waiting.24-25

That Andile Mngxitama’s viewpoint on the FF+ may be correct, is confirmed by Buccus’s view. He writes26:26: “

It is true that the crude racial populism of the EFF and the Freedom Front Plus made some gains, but in the overall picture they remain a minority. Mandela’s vision of racial reconciliation clearly still has the support of the majority of South Africans.”

What the boosters and hopefuls of the FF+ forget, or are not familiar with, is that the Whites as a tribe are diminishing yearly at nearly 100 000, and can thus be phased out in a century’s time. Neither the FF+, Solidarity, AfriForum nor AgriSA are true White rescuers and saviours. They can only by their anti-African standpoint (as seen in their actions on the land reform matter), contaminate the Whites’ future in South Africa.1

To shed more light on the many other opportunists who tried in vain to go to Parliament to eat out of its enormous food trough (and also to change silently and unnoticed from tough freedom fighters to freedom eaters) – a scenario which Kuzwayo20:2 aptly described before the May 8 election as an “alphabet soup on the menu in this election” — there are the African Transformation Movement (ATM) with the crowd-puller Mzwanele Manyi on its staff, the joker party the African Content Movement (ACM) of Hlaudi Motsoeneng, and the Economic Emanicipation Forum  (EEF) to outdo the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in radicalism and racism.20,27,28

The final reflection on the May 8 election outcomes confirm Kuzwayo’s20 above reference to the alphabetic failure of a mass with the evidence that 35 parties did not make it further than the ballot box on the voting day.18,29

Munusamy30 also comments about the final end-results of some of the parties when she writes30:26:

“The era of veteran personalities in politics is now waning. The UDM leader Bantu Holomisa, COPE’s Mosiuoa Lekota and the IFP’s Mangosuthu Buthelezi ought to exit the political stage, as the country is clearly seeking fresh talent. Patricia de Lille, however, has proved to be the Meryl Streep of South African politics, able to steal the show in whatever role she appears.”

Okoye31 brings the leader of the African Content Movement (ACM), Hlaudi Motsoeneng, the former SABC Chief Operating Officer, into clear perspective after the May election as a good example of some of the “political leaderships” at our top governmental institutions under the ANC, and of the leaderships of the various political parties which competed in the election (mostly to fail miserably). On Motsoeneng’s so-called “personality as a leader”, Okoye31 reports his alleged words about himself31:6: “He said he refused to hide the fact that he wanted to be president and that leadership was in his blood.” In particular, she quoted his self-praise by using of his own words, namely31:6: “I need to be a person who’s taking decisions. I know how to run South Africa! I have managed a [multimillion-rand] company.” [This of a multimillion-rand company referring to the financially crippled public broadcaster the SABC, which analysts say he helped to run into the ground]. In reaction to Motsoeneng praising himself as the “future president in waiting”, the two political analysts Zamikhaya Maseti and Ralph Mathekga, writes Okoye, labelled him as a31:6:  “political comedy that was not to be taken seriously”, that there was “no legitimate cause to appeal,” and that he “bankrupted the SABC” so it was a bad example to refer to his leadership there.”

But this “labelling” must not be seen as exclusive only to Motsoeneng, but indeed inclusive to most of the leaders of the 48 parties that took part in the election and their self-praise of false excellence31:6:  “I am a person who’s taking decisions, I know how to run South Africa, I have managed a multimillion-rand company, I have leadership in my blood, I want and am going to be the president.”

It is thus with good reason that Ben Trovato32 could write to the leaders, at least, of these manifold failed parties, as follows32:14: “Dear leaders of the 34 parties that never won a seat, it really is a crying shame that you did so poorly. Let me put that another way. I am crying with laughter at your shame. I do apologise”, and: “How can anyone be filled with so much hubris that they misjudge their popularity this badly?”

But Trovato’s32 above comment of “no-good” for the 34 “losers” is even applicable to the 13 “winners” that have made it to Parliament. This includes the ANC and the three nearest winners to the ANC. The question is: Are these 13 winners truly deserving winners with the potential to better South Africans’ poor, even desperate, circumstances, as well as to solve the land-ownership conflict?15,32

The answer is an emphatic NO, when just looking at the top winner’s most recent classification by the imminent ex-president Kgalema Motlanthe12, namely that the ANC is on its deathbed. Motlanthe12 (the Interim President from September 2008 to May 2009 and also Secretary-General of the ANC from 1997 to 2007 and the party’s Deputy President from 2007 to 2012), says that the ANC is now in a far worse shape than it was before the 2017 Nasrec Conference, that elected Cyril Ramaphosa. This view was confirmed by the poor performance of the ANC in the May election.11,12,14,15

This is an opinion echoed by many political analysts.11,14,15 Motlanthe12 comments on the ANC’s  doubtful future, specifically its viability and sustainability, when he says12:4: “The ANC is not in great shape… I think to strengthen the ANC it needs a surgical overhaul from where it is now. It is worse than it was in 2017 [before the Nasrec Conference]”, and: “…that [the] ANC could only change if it died in its current form and was reborn as a grassroots movement”.

1.1.3. The presence of an able political party to successfully steer the land reform initiative

The abovementioned outcome moves me to ask again, as in the Conclusion of the previous Article 8, the prominent question as to whether there is at the moment any capable South African political party, which, either as a sole ruling party or as a partner-party in an alliance, can steer the initiative of land expropriation into the near future with success.

This is a very complex question to answer, but the political analyst Mamokgethi Molopyane33 tries to do so for us, in some way at least, when he writes that the three main political parties, the ANC, the DA and the EFF, were all, after the election, left at a crossroads. In this context the two lower ranking parties, the IFP and the FF+, are ignored: their immediate future in the country’s politics, as significant parties, is zero).24-26,33                                                                                                                                                                          All three of the main parties were unmasked to have immense political weaknesses by the election. Prominent in this regard is their arrogance and their foolishness, as reflected by their thinking that they could in the past and still today solely think on behalf of the population and that this thinking was 100 percent correct. In particular in this chaotic setup is their disconnection from the people whom they assumed supported their ideologies and actions. Pertinent here in their confusion, is the matter of extreme land expropriation without compensation and the negative racial context thereof by land grabbing and nationalising of White assets.33

The above postulation of Molopyane33 is in line with the general postulations of various other political analysts and strategists that were quoted earlier, especially the ANC’s troubled position.11,12,14,15

In reflecting on the three main political parties and their possible failure to fulfil to the standards to be a ruler of quality versus the poor status and condition of their present political constitution, Molopyane33 gives further good insight. He writes as follows33:21: “The coinciding decline of the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), contrasted with the below-expectations growth of the Economic Freedom Fighters EFF), are unsurprising developments with far-reaching, unique consequences for each.”

Molopyane33 pinpoints a stern warning when he writes33:21: “Political parties must adapt or reinvent themselves or they’ll find little or no support from SA’s dynamic populance.”

This undoubtedly puts my question: “…are there able South African political parties who can fast steer the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future?”  into the foreground. This is a question that not the ANC, the DA or the EFF can escape and must answer themselves. Not one of them honestly can or will do so, however. It is up to the political analysts, strategists and commentators to do it on their behalves, however much they like it or not.

In this context of doubt on the future abilities specific to the ANC as the post-2019 ruler, Molopyane posits33:21:

“The ANC’s support is waning. It’s proving to be devoid of freshness, with leaders who have been in politics for so long they may be reluctant to envision change. The party must undergo a makeover of its leaders and change the perceptions they’ve created. If a credible, attractive opposition emerged, its hold on power would fail. Its biggest hurdle is itself.”

On the DA he writes33:21:

“These elections have shown that having a black man in charge doesn’t translate into resonance with black voters. The DA’s crisis may not be as apparent as that of the ANC, but it’s similarly struggling to contemplate change. Worse, it’s riddled with the fear that it might alienate its white supporters.”

With reference to the EFF, Molopyane postulates33:21:

“We tend to forget the enthusiasm and political cult of youth doesn’t offer value for voters. Populism in the age of social media doesn’t mean the same in real life. The election showed that the red party will have to come up with a new approach. Its change in direction must reflect the challenges faced by a society in an ever-changing globalised economy. Although appearing to make the right noises, voters denied the EFF that 15%. Was it a case of dislike, distrust or low turnout?”

This clear warning by Molopyane33 of the possible diminishing from the political scene in the near future by even the three top “winners” of the recent May election, must not be taken lightly and must be read with Louw’s1 opinion that manipulating and under-performing regimes had only the slightest idea of what they were doing and what the outcome of their political self-empowerment would activate in the end for themselves, as well as for the country they ruled. He writes that these sub-standard regimes’ shelf life is limited. This is confirmed by the various European Empire states of the 20th Century, which mostly collapsed due to their wrong-doings after the duration of an average 45 years. Hereto the corrupt and racial-discriminative NP and its nationalist Afrikaners’ self-styled “mini-empire of multi-nations” (or the unofficially managed “NP Union”) only lasted from 1948 to 1961 (13 years), and their “mini-empire for multi-states” (Republic) from 1961 to 1994 (33 years), while the Union of South Africa (exclusively British-orientated under pro-British Whites), lasted from 1910 to 1948 (38 years). This reflects an average of 24 years for the three regimes in office.1,33

On the limiting-build-in to the reigning of political parties in South Africa, especially in terms of Louw’s1 reference to a maximum period of 24 years in office, Mthombothi34 also speaks in the same context when he, in a short post-mortem of the May 8 2019 election, refers to the “possible limited” status of the ANC in the present-day and future politics of the country after a 25 year reign. His overview and insight need full reference. He comprehensively writes34:19:

The outcome of the elections will be debated and analysed for some time to come, but what is clear is that many South Africans were not particularly impressed or satisfied with what was on offer. After 25 years of democracy, many voters are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable.

There is general disillusionment with the political establishment that seems to cut across all age groups. This seems to be mainly related to, or caused by, the government party. In fact the decline in voter turnout, and even the increasing number of people who failed to register to vote, seems to be in line with the steady decrease in ANC support. The ANC reached its apogee in the 2004 elections when it took 69.7% of the vote, and has been declining since. So has overall voter turnout.

There’s no doubt that the ANC is on a downward slope, even a death spiral. It’s on life support. That 57.5% share of the vote it won could be deceptive. Many gave their vote grudgingly. The only thing keeping the party together and alive is power. President Cyril Ramaphosa saved its bacon in these elections. It could have been condemned to the opposition benches. It’s not clear if there is anything that the ANC can do to stem the tide or reverse it. It seems to have overstayed its welcome. Most liberation movements, in Africa especially, do not survive in power for more than 25 years; unless they declare a one-party dictatorship to save their skins, as in Zimbabwe. The ANC is also hobbled by the fact that it is a broad church, and with its alliance partners it becomes truly ungovernable. Such an approach served it well as a liberation movement, but as a government it needs to be specific in its policy direction.

And of course there’s the corruption en grande that has pitted the pro- and anti-Zuma factions against each other. That, one suspects, is going to be the story of the next five years.

Were the ANC to be judged on its performance, which has been abysmal, even hideous in some instances, it would have been consigned to the political wilderness long ago. Our unique history, the race issue and the poverty of opposition have been its saving grace.

SA, given its past, is not always an easy country to govern. But most people, regardless of race, want the same thing – a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for themselves and their families. They’ll support a party with a unifying message that will make a genuine stab at it.

The time may have come for a new party that will inspire fresh hope in a disillusioned electorate.

Practically speaking, the reigning ANC is a dying party; all the fatal signs are there. It seems to have become suddenly suicidal after 25 years in power. It does not matter if the national voters’ turnout for the ANC in the May 2019 election was 70% or 80%, as Mthombothi34 and Louw1 put it. The ANC has lost its appeal with the mass of poor and landless Blacks. The Piet Promise of the NP became the Jacob Promise and the Cyril Promise of the ANC. Promises are not food, they lack trust and are contemptable.1,11,14,34,35

The above unstable setup makes it very hard to reflect precisely on how the ANC is going to handle the land expropriation matter from 2019 to the next election in 2024, and of course, if it is going to complete its term as mandated by the 2019 election. Here time will tell, but for this article the official status quo of the ANC as the regime until 2024 must be accepted and reflected upon. The cut-off date for the cooperation and the collection of information to evaluate and to discuss the land matter and the ANC as a regime’s role in it was chosen as the 31st May 2019.

But, in terms of the political upheaval inside the present-day ANC, it was decided to also focus on the EFF’s and the DA’s political agendas and actions, in case one of them became overnight the new ruler or a partner in an alliance of the governing regime. These two parties seem also to be caught in political upheavals and insecurity, rendering their inputs to the post-2019 politics open to scrunity.11,13,14,34,35  

The land expropriation issue, together with the question of the trustworthiness and the integrity of the three parties, not only to be able to govern the country effectively and properly, but also to  successfully execute a comprehensive and justified balanced land expropriation programme, is prominent here. Some political analysts believe that where the DA successfully resists radical politics, its ultra-conservative land reform policy is a loser for the mass of poor and landless Blacks. They believe that both the EFF and the ANC show revolutionary thinking on the assets of the White population, while the ANC furthermore has shown an absolute lack in integrity and trustworthiness in its 25 years of rule. These views will be evaluated further hereunder.26,30,33,34,36

1.1.4. Aims of Articles 9 to 11

Articles 9 to11 form part of the research project on the matter of land expropriation, which was already introduced to the reader by eight previously published articles.

This article [Article 9, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)”], is the Part 1 (reflecting on the EFF) of three articles on the roles played by the three main political parties in the politics of South Africa. The theoretical point of focus here is their capability to be effective regimes in South Africa, if certain limitations, such as voters’ ignorance and prejudice, etc. on politics and confusion with regard to their right to empowerment, do not play a role. In this article the focus is specifically on the EFF.

In the next two sequential articles (Articles 10 and 11) the focus will be respectively on the DA and the ANC. Article 10 represents: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2- The DA in perspective (10)”. Article 11 represents: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3- The ANC in perspective (11)”.

Although the ANC won the right to be the country’s ruler until 2024 with a national majority of 57.7% for a sixth term, and thus seems to be going to be the sole executor to effect land expropriation in terms of its promises made in its political manifesto (its so-called “political CV”) presented for the May 8, 2019 election on land expropriation (which seemingly can include expropriation without compensation in certain appropriate cases), is it an absolute pre-requisite to also reflect on the two strongest opposition parties’ political manifestos for the May 8, 2019 election regarding their promises and abilities to effect land expropriation successfully. The intention here is to see how these two opposition parties (the EFF and the DA) can theoretically be evaluated as good versus bad regimes, should they have won the ruler’s throne in the May 2019 election. This approach will also give a preview of their potential as good versus bad opposition parties on the land expropriation matter, specifically for the period up to 2024).1,11,14,34,35

Closely aligned to these political manifestos (or “political CVs”) in the description of the three parties’ “political characters, qualifications and experience”, are the public’s arguments, opinions and viewpoints as a further descriptive guide to the three parties’ “political characters and potential”. These public arguments, opinions and viewpoints are best reflected by the reporting by investigative and informative journalists, as well as political analysts, strategists, commentators and critics (the so-called “political letter referees or their attestations”). These mentioned “letters of the referees” are seen by many political scientists as the most (and only) decisive guide to be used for the true description of a political party’s and its leaders’ quality and integrity. They are seen as far more trustworthy than the so-called “trust for the party” brought out by the voters at the ballot-box, or as the election manifestos issued by political parties.

The aim of this article is to evaluate the potential of the EFF in terms of its theoretical capability to be an effective regime.

2. Method

The research was been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case with ownership of South African soil for the period 1652 to 2018. The sources included articles from 2018 to 2019, books for the period 1980 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide and steer us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the EFF as a ruler of South Africa to be able to successfully effect land reform from 2019.

The research findings are presented in a narrative format.

3. Results

3.1. Overview

The successful execution of the post-2019 land reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and action of a so-called “good” government. Such an elected government is not allowed to blindly travel a path of trying to come to reach an end-result, but is obliged to use the existing, well-guided informative guidelines and drivers to steer the land reform aims into reality. These existing informative guidelines and drivers, to steer land reform post-2019, will be reflected upon in the following Subdivision 3.2.

3.2. Existing informative guidelines and drivers to steer land reform post-2019

The land expropriation initiative is not without a foundation. There are prominent informative guidelines and drivers to steer the whole process constructively and in an orderly fashion, far away from the blind “land grabbing from White colonists”, as propagated and promised by some political and racial radicals in their political manifestos. These existing informative guidelines and drivers need to be high-lighted.

3.2.1. The Freedom Charter is an indisputable marker and driver of the post-2019 land reform

The ANC’s Freedom Charter’s land clause, dated 1955 and the ANC’s Tanzania-document on future land ownership, issued in 1969, reflect, although indirectly, on the justified comparability and redistribution of land ownership in terms of the South African race-numbers and legal holding of land ownership, as guided by a democracy, for the rights of the individual South African. The indication is clear that all races can be and must be allowed to be land owners, but equally in terms of the proportional numbers of the various racial groups. The present-day South African numbering of ±83% White land owners versus ±13% Black land owners is an immense imbalance, representing inequality, it and needs rectification. It leaves even the moderates in the ANC no other choice but to activate land expropriation with great urgency immediately.37-42

3.2.2. South Africa’s orderly democracy requires and justifies land expropriation

True democracy allows orderly statutory change by righteous actions in order to rectify injustice of the past or present. The implementation thereof can take time, especially when democracy is new born to a country; especially one which had suffered for centuries under autocracy and fascism. Political, social and economic transformations thus require time and patience. Shortcomings in the 1994-Constitution are coming to the foreground, forcing daring challenges to be faced and solved, as previously mentioned, the addressing of the imbalance between the races on land ownership. The 1994 final settlement on land redistribution is, in terms of the prescription of the country’s democracy, far from a fait accompli and is still in a process of evolution.43-47

3.2.3. Land redistribution within post-2019 Black empowerment is a normal process

Uhuru South Africa, with all its many out-branches, such as land ownership, is an unavoidable and non-debateable process. It is presently driven exclusively because the economic upliftment of Blacks through BBBEE since 1994 was not enough. There are very serious consequences which can follow, if a justified transfer of mass land to the poor and landless Blacks is not activated fast. The present-day land reform initiative is thus not in dispute. The inequality, poverty and landlessness of the mass of non-Whites, living and working for generations as poor farm-labourers in the countryside, demand immediate action.37-42

In theory there is very little difference in the present South African thought-process on land occupation as those reflected and practised by the VOC, the British, the Boers, the Apartheid Government and that of Robert Mugabe. All these institutions were overshadowed by lengthy histories of murder, genocide, injustice, impoverishment and suppression of the previous land owners (who were also mostly land grabbers themselves, coming from an earlier period) who had lost their acquired land to new migrants, intruders and conquerors through multiple atrocities. In light of the above background, it is important to note that the present setup of a mass of South African landless Blacks is basically the same: an immense group of people who have been enormously frustrated mostly since the1994-democracy by the lack of improvement to their lifestyle. Land reform, whether it is a Zimbabwe-style act of violence or a democratic and balanced process without conflict or bloodletting, is, as said, a clearly unavoidable and normal process to balance the land ownership process that will have to happen from after the May 2019 elections.1

The decisions on whether certain elements and parts of the intended land reform programme should be with or without compensation, clearly constitutes a democratic act and is, as said, based on majority consultation and decision of the Parliament, as guided by the population, to benefit the country’s interests. This is an essential democratic principle that the Blacks and Whites endorsed with the 1994 Political Dispensation.38

3.2.4. A post-2019 primary land redistribution plan already in place

Notwithstanding the many draconic statements on the land expropriation process, as likely to be exclusive land grabbing, or that there is not any plan in guiding the post-2019 land expropriation, there are actually clear primary guidelines on how the process is going to be activated and steered. Prominent for selection between truth and myth on the issue of land ownership, is the King Solomon’s wisdom approach, wherein  the final decisions on what is fact and myth and the process on how land expropriation must and will be logically executed, are solely led by compassion, a good moral compass, and logical thinking and action. An in-depth understanding of the present-day suffering of all South Africans, anchored and driven by a leadership of good characteristics, which is freed from racial, religious and political contamination, are pre-requisites. Prominently, as a guideline, is President Cyril Ramaphosa’s repeatedly assurance of South Africans that the process of “land correction” will be done within the present-day laws and the Constitution.48 The land expropriation’s primary guidelines

Notwithstanding the initial immense hot headed rhetoric, commissions, committees, much senseless and opportunistic talk and argument, and ongoing threats by radicals, for instance in the Northern Cape ANC, such as the compilation of lists of productive farms to be expropriated immediately before changes to Section 25 are even approved, etc., it seems that other positive outcomes have manifested.

Firstly, it seems that the EFF, which had mainly activated the process on land reform in Parliament, was before the dissolution of the 2019-outgoing Parliament basically absent from attending the Parliamentary Committee on Land reform, which is the primary body doing research, publishing information, and deciding on the outcome of the final process. Only the members of the DA and the ANC attended as many as 50% of the meetings, while the three members of the EFF only attended the first meeting, bringing in a total of only 20% EFF-attendance. Cope, the UDM, the APC, the DSA, the VF+ and the NFP did not attend a single meeting. This passivity and lack of responsibility to the voters, led thereto that the committee failed to deliver a report before the closing of the present Parliament. This means that the issue will have to be run by the new legislature again from June 2019.49

The above undoubtedly reflects a growing detachment and disinterest by the main role-players in the so-called “land grabbing intentions” of parliamentary radicals.49

It seems furthermore that from the ANC side, as specifically reflected in the first hectic Parliament debate on land expropriation without compensation, there developed an observable passivity by the majority of ANC parliamentarians to the whole matter. This passivity is however seen as an opportunistic safeguarding by some ANC parliamentarians: here stands the fact that some of the ANC MPs and MPLs own more than two properties and thus they can, in some way, also be negatively  affected if a radical land policy is implemented. This outcome shifted the whole thinking process and final responsibility on land expropriation of the ANC’s greater inner-circle. This seems to have already put strain on the ANC’s top brass, making it clear to them that extreme land radicalism is not the average member’s wish. On the other side there is a genuine opinion with some ANC parliamentarians that the whole land expropriation process must be toned down in order to balance land reform.49

Based on the “unofficial” opinions and viewpoints of the ANC’s inner-circle – as reflected by some trustworthy “inside rumours”, “unofficial evaluations” and “leaks” by the lesser radicals of the ANC elite – clear primary guidelines seem already to have been compiled by the ANC to guide us. The basis of this post-2019 land redistribution primary plan is shortly described in the following eleven subdivisions:

1) Land reform and redistribution is unavoidable and prescribes an immediate constitutional prescription to be implemented. It needs to be implemented fast, but in well-planned phases, without any disturbance of the racial, political, social and economic stability.49,50  About the many failures on land reform in the past, which need now to be avoided, Nortje maintains that50:9: “Like it or not, SA’s existing land reform policy has not been effective in achieving its goals. In terms of the acquisition of land by the state, there has been partial success, but redistribution and transformation of the agricultural sector have by and large been a failure”.

2) Future land ownership must reflect proportionately the ethnicity and races of South Africa. These same ethnic and racial proportions should reflect in the farming sector, with relation to farmers and labourers. In this context the editor of the Sunday Times on the 10th March 2019 wrote the following under the heading51:18: “Quotas not wrong, those who oppose them are,” with regard to a very well-balanced description of the correct post-2019 South Africa. He put it clearly for himself and the greater Black society, which includes the ANC regime that future land transformation doesn’t seek to replace White with Black, but to ensure all races are included, to ensure that there’s an accurate representation of society. The editor of the Sunday Times further writes51:18: “If there’s something Solidarity needs to understand, it’s that transformation targets are here to stay – and they’re not just about numbers. They form part of a heart-and-minds approach that seeks to address the imbalances of the past”.

This balanced representation on land ownership was indeed, in terms of equality and human rights, a prescribed pre-requisite from 1652 with the arrival of Whites in South Africa. The intended equalisation of land ownership after 2019 must thus not be seen as a “favour” which the Whites are now doing to Blacks through so-called quotas in land ownership, work-placement, sport or education, etc. The centuries long outstanding initiative to erase the imbalance in land ownership in South Africa (read together with the imbalance in wealth and inequality), has led to an immense discrepancy between White land owners and Black land owners, making an immediate large scale equalisation within an orderly political dispensation basically impossible. The editor51 of the Sunday Times is clear on this gradual process of transformation, especially in land ownership, where food production, the need for finance to buy out farms, etc., are central. Transformation is not the central problem here, but the issue is those who (mainly Whites) steadfastly refuse to understand the future of South Africa’s politics after 2019. Prominent for the editor51 of Sunday Times is the main obstruction to phase out the inequality and proportional land ownership which is exclusively vested in White hands.51-54

Obstructive alleged role-players are seen to be Solidarity, AgriSA, AfriForum, the Freedom Front Plus, together with the White exclusive capitalists and the White farmer community. They form a contingent of obstructionists, to which one writer, in his despair on the conflicting and seemingly unchangeable land ownership matter, refers to as “remnants of verkramptes and rooineks resisting change”.51-54

In the context of the ANC’s good intentions on a moderate land reform outcome, Khumalo55 writes specifically of a clear differentiation by the international rating agency Standard and Poor (S&P) between the radical concept of a policy of land expropriation with or without compensation (which has become the antagonists “wildcat”-vehicle of attack on the ANC in pinpointing them as political radicals) versus the ANC’s true intention of the introduction of a conservative policy of land reform. On the S&P opinion of the introduction of a conservative land reform plan by the ANC after 2019, Khumalo posits55:15: “On land expropriation, we think that in as much as the discourse talks about expropriation, we believe it has to do more with land reform. We think the ANC have been conservative in the past. They will remain conservative in the way they manage the land issue.”

3) The land reform plan will be interpreted and implemented as described by the ANC’s Freedom Charter, which reflects a strict implementation of democratic principles on land ownership and rights around land ownership. The intention is clear that the whole land transformation plan must not be radical and will be far from the postulated outcome predicted by the antagonists. It will not be in line, for instance, with the delinquent actions of the White NP between 1970 and 1979 when 240 555 Blacks were removed from so-called “Black spots” located in White land bought by Afrikaner communities prior to the controversial land legislation of 1913. In addition, land expropriation will not again form the type of removal of Blacks as was done with the NP’s social engineering wherein Blacks were removed from so-called “legitimate White land” and relocated to “Bantustans” and other so-called “Black-areas”. In this process more or less 3.5-million people (described by Malan as the “Surplus People”), some 10% of the entire population, were subjected to forced removal.53,56

4) The general prescription that only certain categories of land will be expropriated without compensation refers specifically to abandoned buildings, unutilized land, commercial property held unproductively and purely for speculative purposes owned privately by South Africans and the state, as well as under-utilised property owned by the state, and land farmed by labour tenants with an absentee titleholder (irrespective of race), agricultural land owned by Church groups, and the land owned by closed-down mines. In addition to the abovementioned categories is the free-will handing-over of land by private owners/businesses, etc. to the state for land expropriation.

5) These above categories of land will be expropriated with compensation in terms of realistic and balanced market prices.56

6)  Rural families living under traditional leadership in the former Transkei and rural KwaZulu-Natal will get title to the land upon which they live and work.

7) Land expropriation will be done in various steps or phases, to assure minimum political, personal and racial conflict. The first phase will be of the less conflicting land of the state and the surrendered land from the private sector. The State will in Phase One make a lot of its own land available free of cost to new Black farmers and to other homeless Blacks, as serviced plots with title deeds to build their own homes near their work places in or nearby urban centres.56

8) The reference to “race” in terms of present-day South Africa’s richness, poverty, inequality and landlessness are prominent in the land expropriation initiative. These imbalances, specifically regarding land ownership, will be addressed, but only with justice, empathy and correctness. Prominent here is the declaration by the Deputy President, David Mabuza, in March 2019 in Parliament that it is not the intention of the ANC regime to push out the White farming community and that they must stay to produce food. Clearly there is no intention of revenge for the past on the White owners of land.56

9) The base for land relocation is that every South African citizen has the right to own land in the country, as guided by the Freedom Charter. This ownership needs to reflect in equality the proportions (numbers) of races and ethnicities (guided by the various Black tribal orientations,  as well as so-called other non-White orientations, like Coloured, Indian, etc.), as represented by the present population statistics.1,57.58.59

Statistics reflect the present total population of South Africa as ±57.5-million, represented by the following races numbers: Blacks: ±44.5-million; Coloureds: ±4.8-million; Whites: ±4.5-million; Indian/Asians/Other: ±1.5-million. The various proportional statistical ratios (calculated out of 100) are as follows: Blacks 80; Coloureds 9; Whites 8 and Indian/Asians/Other 3. The primary intention is to bring the present more than 80% of the land in White hands (a group forming only 8% of the total population), gradually down as far as possible in terms of a democratic reform, to only 8%, while the Blacks, Coloureds and Indian/Asians/Other need respectively to own 80%, 9% and 3% of the land.1,57,58,59

The process of majority consultation and decision-making, to be able to activate the intended land reform, is a principle that the NP regime on behalf of the Whites endorsed when they transferred their political power in 1994 to the Black majority and is thus not disputable. The only fault was that this endorsed agreement was not fully and truly activated from 1994.1

A prominent fact here, which is been mostly ignored due to political opportunism and Marxist-revolution orientation by a minority of radicals in the politics, is that the “Blacks” are not one single group to be served by land reform, but are represented by various tribes and further sub-tribes. These tribal and sub-tribal people are mostly established in certain parts of South Africa as majority groups there. (It is only the White tribe, specifically the Afrikaners as a sub-trlbe, that is basically spread over the whole country. The Afrikaners can themselves be divided into at least six sub-groups). Land redistribution will thus, in terms of this tribal-region-orientation be done. This means for instance that the placement of Zulus on traditional Venda land and vice versa can be catastrophic, as were the old “Bantustans” and Apartheid’s other foolishnesses. The First and Second Black Colonisations, with their resulting bloodshed, will be the outcome. The fact that the Zulus before 1994 fought for federalism and the present stand and propaganda of a “physical separation” from the Republic by the King of the Zulus, must serve here as a sharp warning. The growing political demands of traditional leaders’ (especially the kings with their own regimes and traditional empowerment) inside this tribal-regional system, as well as the greater South Africa as a region, also nullifies any argument inside the ANC of one Black Nation, which is to be treated to a simple land reform approach. This so-called Black-unity was a pre-1994 short-term approach to bring Apartheid down, but has now gradually been over-run by tribal nationalism and patriotism, as the EFF’s 10% vote in the May election confirms. Note must also be taken of the claims from the so-called “indigenous Brown people” (KhoiSan, Griqwa, Namakwa) that the land expropriation policy of post-2019 must also favour them fully.1,60,61

The constant declaration and blind acceptance of a “South African democracy” which is exclusively underwritten, driven and promoted by a sole Blackness,  seems to be out of contact with the country’s political, social and cultural realities, as well as Africa’s comprehensive confrontation at the ballot box by the many ethnicities and the tribalism of the Black voters. The so-called “Pure Black nationalists” may be in for a surprise – and a most deadly surprise – in South Africa in the future, due to  the advent of real Black tribal separation and Black tribal nationalism.62 In this regard, Monyae and Matambo write62:19: “They also do not help entrench democracy on a continent where voting along ethnic and tribal lines is common. The most ideal circumstances for democracy’s success in Africa [and South Africa] could be reconciling voters to the ideas rather than identity sensibilities.”

The EFF’s last mentioned outcome on an exclusive Black-nationalism will not easily be blocked if we look to the growth of the EFF after the May election in votes in some of the northern parts of South Africa — a party whose policy is undoubtedly, besides White-bashing, characterised and steered by deadly Black ethnicity and tribalism and the division, including the break-up, of the so-called “pre-1994 Black Nation”. It is important to note that the EFF’s radical cultural and political empowerment has now slowly spread from Limpopo to Mpumalanga and the North West Provinces, making it the official oppositions there.34,63,64

On these delinquent ethnic and tribal manifestations in the EFF, to capture its deprived and political poor and often times under-developed supporters’ planning in the doubtful and devastating elements of ethnicity and tribalism, Trovato writes64:14: “Nice work, though. It doesn’t matter if all three have a combined GDP of R28.50 and a bit of a witchcraft problem.”

Mthombothi34 also pinpoints this deadly foundation after the May election in the EFF, especially its leadership’s immense fault-line when he postulates34:19: “…the EFF’s existence and its survival depend largely on the whims of its leader. It often appears as though it’s a meteor that will rise but ultimately burn itself into oblivion. Also, its propensity for race-bating rules it out as a genuine contender for real power.”

10) The land expropriation is planned to be executed in such a way that it will not harm the economic or political status of the South African State, albeit in the short or long term. Although the implementation of the primary plan will require an enormous financial input by the government, this cost will be balanced in five to ten years’ time, hopefully bringing profits to the country after ten to fifteen years.

11) The first stage of land transfers must be complete before but not later than 2022 (whereby state rural land is been handed to Black farmers and their establishment on these farms ins in place). Included in this time-limit is the transfer of privately-owned abandoned buildings and under-utilised property and land in urban areas (without or with compensation), together with the transfer of the State’s abandoned buildings, under-utilised property and land in urban areas, to the poor and landless Blacks, to be owned by them for accommodation, and upon which to farm and build homes.

3.2.5. A post-2019 secondary land distribution guideline already in place Land grabbing not an issue

There is no intention to grab well-functioning White private property and land without compensation, without clear reasons to benefit the people of the country and the balanced consideration of the loss to the disposed owner. Neither is the intended land transfer scheme going to target even all the so-called more than 80% of the present land of Whites, which radicals are alleging to be “stolen” from Blacks. That would be undemocratic. Neither is the intention the exclusive grabbing of land from one race group while leaving others untouched. The State’s own high-potential land of multiple millions of hectares of agricultural land, which has not been collateralised and is not productive, will, as already said, firstly become part of the intended land expropriation. Land cases under dispute before 2019 will be the prominent focus for settlement. Primarily there is no intention to  travel back in history to punish any so-called “White culprits” for their so-called “alleged stealing of land from Blacks”.48

In this context Nortje confirms50:9: “The good news is that, behind all the noise and political positioning around land reform, the ANC has been consistent in its intentions. The December [2018] policy document does say that expropriation without compensation ‘should be among the key mechanisms available to the government’, but this is followed by an even stronger statement that land reform interventions ‘should focus on government-owned land’ and ‘prioritise the distribution of vacant, unused and underutilised state land’.”

This consistency in the ANC regime’s expropriation plan will not to harm the private White land owner by confiscating his land without compensation, and is further confirmed by Nortje’s pinpointing that only state land will directly be incorporated in the first phase of land redistribution. In co-operation with the redistribution of state land, will also be the buy-out of a new group of White land and the buy-out of White land under dispute. Of the good intention of not to do land grabbing by the ANC regime, notwithstanding the antagonists roaring statements and the political noise of radicals within the ANC itself, and especially within the EFF, there is clear evidence in the February 2019 budget on the buy-out of White land and the immense funds made available to be able to do it.65,66

Hleko, in his analysis of the budget of 2019, writes65:16:

The linkage between the President’s State of the Nation address (Sona) and the Minister of Finance’s Budget speech created a proportionate posture that the government is hard at work making South Africa a better place for all who live in it.

The budget speech planted anew and sowed the seed of renewal. The R3.7 billion set aside to assist emerging farmers seeking to acquire land for farming, is a seed that the government is sowing today to propel emerging farmers to prosper in future.

This allocation will assist the 250 000 emerging farmers, whom the president referred to in his Sona, that are working the land and need support to fully develop their businesses.

The R1.8bn that is allocated for the implementation of 262 priority land reform projects over the next three years will be a shot in the arm for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform to expedite land reform projects.

This further echoes the president’s remark that an accelerated programme of land reform has the potential to expand agricultural output and promote inclusion.

On the 10th April 2019, Ramaphosa himself (who is again the President in the Sixth Parliament), to reign in all the false noises around the land matter, assured White farmers that they did not have to fear land reform48:1:

“I can assure you that the land reform process is something we should never fear. It is to be done in accordance with the rule of law and the Constitution. It is not going to be land grabs where land is grabbed outside of the parameters of the law. We need to look at the practical reality.”

Specific to the Expropriation Amendment Bill, which will be finalised after May 2019 by the new incoming Parliament, Ramaphosa puts it that the Act’s intentions are, as was already well-spelled out in governance and ANC papers, to look at land owned by the state, land owned by state-owned entities, land not used and land sometimes illegally acquired.48:1:

“There is a great future for all farming people, be it workers or farm owners. We need to address the key challenges. We must address some of the sensitive issues – evictions and where the people have no land. We want consensual solutions.”

The secondary good intention of not to land grabb, is further the announcement that the Land Bank will financially support smallholders and leverage partnerships with other financial institutions in their start-up of new incoming Black farmers and to develop existing Black farmers. The main aim here is to disburse R3-billion in the next fiscal year to the farming sector, with more Land Bank financial input later to be facilitated for the farming community.66 The 1994 Political Dispensation: a worrying issue which needs urgent comprehensive readdressing

The South African land ownership matter was ignored outright since 1994 and silently shelved in terms of the 1994 Political Dispensation. The 1994 Political Dispensation masked main intention was clear: to exclusively serve the White land owners and farmers, as well as the exclusive capitalists who include Whites as well as Blacks, especially those who misused BBBEE to get rich. South Africa’s economic evolution did not work because it offered nothing to the mass of the poor since 1994. The rise of unrest, acute anarchy and the possibility of a revolution by the mass of poor and landless Blacks, and of course the mass poverty of ±29-million Blacks, served as a wake-up call to a small group of concerned South African politicians, humanists and citizens to take on the matter.48,50 The neglect and unrepaired situation of ±29-million landless and poor Blacks within the present empowerment of 257 municipalities to be able to do land expropriation

With regard to the abovementioned post-1994 ongoing negligence and unrepaired situation of ±29-million landless and poor Blacks’, Nortje50 can with honesty, with great doubt on the ANC regime’s initial intention to uplift this mass of Blacks, write50:9:

The bad news is that expropriation without compensation will remain a high-stakes political bargaining chip. Indeed, had Ramaphosa‘s hand not been forced at the national elective conference in December 2017, I wonder if our land reform policy would have been re-examined at all. In this case the EFF and factions within the ANC have done South Africans a massive favour by forcing us to scrutinise and improve policy that has massive potential for social redress, job creation and economic development”.

The time-frame left for the ANC to institute and to physically activate a clear, final plan and scheme after 25 years of failure since 1994, is at most two years. Politicians from all of the parties, White land owners and exclusive holders of White capital, must accept it unconditionally. This eye-opening and political life-change includes the DA, the FF Plus, Solidarity, AfriForum and AgriSA.50,60,67

Any delay holds serious consequences, specifically for the ANC as a regime to be able to  bring about justified land reform and in general for South Africa in the form of anarchy, unrest and revolution. This instituting of a final plan comprises the definite establishment of a permanent caretaker deeds statutory body (separate from the present deeds office) which will stand free from political and party influences. It will specifically handle the transfer of land to the state and the registering of the deeds of these properties initially in the name of the State, the compilation of clear legal guidelines for the rights of citizens to receive land, and the pre-as well as post-prescriptions to be able to farm, to take ownership of this land, the describing of a proof period as a candidate-farmer, directing the reselling and estranging of the property after allocation to Black owners. It will need to limit opportunistic profit-taking, state-capture and racketeering, as well as corruption around these allocated properties. The allocation of full ownership, and thus the transfer of title deeds, can be subjected to five years. Although private loans on the properties and lands will be allowed (specifically to be able to make debts for development and the running of the farms), this will be subordinate to the permission of the State as the first loan-holder and thus allocated with the right of the first call to buy-back or to reposess expropriated land when necessary. To control over-debt and the exploitstion of the poor new farmers against loan sharks, the intention is to provide comprehensive loans/other funding via the State to the incoming farmers for up to 20 years. This approach will overcome the many failures of the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution plan, because the State failed many times to supply funding or ancillary agricultural services to the incoming farmers who lacked their own capital. This will also phase out the unrealistic short periods required from the incoming Black farmers to become profitable. (Prominent in this respect, in order to guide stable future ownership of expropriated land, the ANC regime already put the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy in place, which was adopted in 2006, to stop beneficiaries of land reform from selling opportunistic properties which they had acquired. In terms of this ruling, land was leased since 2006 to the majority of beneficiaries while the state retained ownership).50

Another outcome foreseen in the post-2019 empowerment of the incoming Black farmers is that the type of farming production will be steered by the government to assure maximum profit and the needed products for the local, and where possible, for foreign markets. Funding and the training of the new farmers will be steered in terms of the produce on the allocated land.50

It is clear that this Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy adopted in 2006 will be “improved” with new legislation, such as the fundamental restructuring of institutions such as the Land Claims Commission and the Land Claims Court, etc., not only to safeguard those losing their property through land reform, but also to protect those poor Blacks in line to receive land. The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) will also be improved. The rule of law in the process of land reform will be maintained in order to avoid Zimbabwe’s lack of accountability or the Zuma-state-capture. An example thereof is Ngcukaitobi’s68 opinion of the establishment of a land ombudsman or land-rights protector (with the same powers as the present public protector). The state custodianship (temporary) of expropriated land will be spelled out clearly in the post-2019 proposed land redistribution and agrarian reform legislation. In addition, how the process of land transfer will be activated and upheld, will be executed through the creation of various new legislation, such as a Land Acquisition Act as well as a Land Redistribution Act, wherein the suggested land ombudsman or the land-rights protector, is central as the supervisor.68,69 The present empowerment of 257 municipalities to do land expropriation

The present anomaly in the change to Section 25 of the draft expropriation bill, which can give 257 municipalities the right to expropriate property without compensation, is at the moment under consideration. The seeming intention is to remove their rights and to make the empowerment of land and other property expropriation seated in a single statutory body on national level.69,70

With reference to the concerns of the bill’s empowerment of the local government municipalities, as well as that of the central government bodies, is it important to note that the biggest need for land is in urban areas under municipalities where there is a vast corruption problem. Evidence shows that only 33 municipalities of the total of 257 obtained clean audits in 2018. As such, the municipalities cannot be trusted to implement land expropriation without compensation fairly and to execute administrative justice, as demanded by the constitution.69,70

Furthermore, the clause will address the intended empowerment of the local and central government, wherein the bill gives five examples where nil compensation would be justified and states that expropriation without compensation can be “stretched”, which can allow invalid grabbing of land. In addition, the definition on land (located in municipalities) for speculation (which undoubtedly has financial value for the present owner and is mostly acquired at a cost), is unclearly defined. Lacking a legal description to state clearly what  land for future expansion means — which seems to stand outside the expropriation without compensation clause – is a further point of concern that will be addressed. The concept-definition of what is property in the bill seems to apply also on the confiscation of anything, varying from intellectual property to shares in a company, if it is in the so-called “interests of the public”. This therefore needs a revist, in order to clear confusion and possible capture.69,70 The mandate of the Land Bank needs immediate attention

To activate land expropriation successfully, the lack of finance to start up and run a farm stands out specifically. Here, in financing the incoming Black farmers, is the commitment of the ANC-regime to change the mandate of the Land Bank so that it is truly development-orientated and financial-friendly to the mass of poor Blacks.68,69 This will be done without “nationalising” it, as some of the antagonists and White capitalists try to argue when the mandate of the Land Bank is put forward as a possible financial vehicle to successfully expropriate land and facilitate the urgent uplifting of 29-million poor and landless Blacks. Own government financial support is just too little to change the present landscape of under-funding of Black farmers. Ngcukaiboti69 writes, on the reason for the present passivity (and isolation) of the Land Bank to be able to support the mass of poor incoming, aspirant Black farmers, as follows69:20-21:

“In 2002, the ANC changed the mandate of the Land Bank  so that, for all practical purposes, it operates like any ordinary commercial bank. In Section 26 of the Land and Agricultural Bank Act, the bank’s mandate is to provide land and agricultural finance ‘against security’. It can be safely assumed that the persons who need Land Bank finance the most have no security.” The farming-styles, culture and intentions of new Black and other non-White farmers

The farming-styles, culture and intentions of new Black and other non-White farmers will be prominent in guiding the execution of the land reform programme. In this context,  the candidate-farmers — not as during the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution where pre-training training and constant mentoring were absent – will first be pre-selected on certain characteristics, abilities, skills and interests to assure maximum success as potential candidate-farmers and then pre-trained (as was done in the 1930s with the poor Whites at the Kakamas- and Keimoes-schemes by the government and the DRC). The intention is to extend the Agricultural Colleges training to district-centres countrywide, with the offering of an initial six months as a start-up course for the learner-farmers, while further continuous learning and training will be provided after the establishment of the new farmers for a minimum period of five years. The post-2019 exploitation of agricultural-export potential is a first priority through the small farmers’ setup.1,69

The entire country will be divided into various regions for land transfer, meaning thus concentrated small farms in the more water-rich areas, with the more spread out of larger farms in the dryer regions. Developments beside constant flowing rivers and near established transport and other facilities will form the first phase of the start-up.1

One of the most important oversights in the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution under the 1994 Dispensation were the absence of homesteads, other much needed farm-buildings and infrastructure and equipment to support farming production and activities  by the new farmers. There was frequently outright neglect in this regard from the government’s side even to install any infrastructure and the offer of working equipment at the time of the handing over of farms to the new farmers. Funding to support these enterprises was also lacking most of the time, while constant monitoring, in order to identify shortcomings and failures over time, as well as the development of new needs of the new-farmers-model, were also absent.  These pre-requirements will be put in place before allowing farmers to take up their farmer-appointments.69

Other infrastructure needed is the upfront founding of marketing instruments, such as own markets, the installation of entities for farmer-community-businesses to build and run independent Black farming centres for the selling of the surplus of their produce, as well as the creation of community business-bodies to buy farming equipment and which will deliver services to small farmers to make it possible for them to get their farms working and functioning at affordable costs.69

One of the most hampering elements to land ownership in South Africa has so far been the Western custom and tradition that land can for an unlimited amount of time be owned by a certain person and his immediate family. The ownership of land came under exclusive White capitalism and politics as the untouchable right of the individual (mostly Whites) to be able own land and to do with it as the owner saw fit. Included here is, as said, the untouchable present right of inheritance from generation to generation. The utmost exploitationof this model is well-illustrated by the selective upkeep of the exclusive White ownership (8% of the population) of at least 60% of the South African land. Firstly, in stopping this thinking, it is important to note that land is a national asset and not a personal asset, to be separated from the State and society. Secondly, the occupation of any land, as sealed by a deed of conveyance, is only for the purpose of improving the land and making a living from it – it is always only a solely temporary right issued to the individual of care-taking of the state’s assets. Included hereto stands the effective management of land as a democratic and civil right by the individual who holds the deed of conveyance. This legal setup is solely based on majority consultation and decision-making by the population of South Africa via Parliament, as primarily guided by the country’s Constitution. There is thus in modern-day South Africa a clear pre-requirement emerging on the ongoing legal ownership of land: it is temporary and open to change by the State at any time. This is now what is planned with the process of land expropriation.1

There is already a process in place to re-install the old hereditary tenure with a time-limit, better known as the tenure by long lease, as already activated in Namibia, Zimbabwe and Malawi for the period of 99-years of lease. This was also done at the early Cape. This model of time-limiting of land ownership is by far a better one for the State, as well as the individual citizen. Indeed specific to the South African setup around ownership per se, data shows that very few of the present farms are owned for 99 years or more by the same (White) family. Although data is scarce on the matter, it seems that most (White) owners and their families hang on to land for less than 49 years.1

In terms of the development of a new land culture, South Africa thus also undoubtedly needs a total repositioning of the so-called model of endless-land ownership to the model of tenure by long lease of 49 year-land ownership. Such a model will help to support the intended land expropriation initiative and to dismantle an imbalanced racial and economic-privilege farming community, free from monopolies and the exclusive benefit of certain groups and families.

The intended land expropriation programme to establish the poor and landless Blacks will be far removed from the 1994 to 2019 rigid programme and be easily adaptable to new circumstances as prescribed by the country’s economic, political and civil rights. Much was learned from the 1994 to 2019 failures. Future success lies in the re-examination of the old land reform processes from pre- as well post-1994.50 Nortje posits50:9: “These failures are frustrating but it is encouraging – and indeed correct – that existing land reform policy is being re-examined. Policy by its nature should be a process rather than a prescript. Good policymakers measure the actual and intended outcomes of their policies regularly in order to make adjustments when necessary”.

What is most worrying at the moment is the fact that the Ramaphosa-regime had in the mean time shifted seemingly successfully the land reform matter before the May 8 election from the “urgent” national agenda. This led thereto that to a great extent the debate died down. Notwithstanding the finding of Ramaphosa’s 10-member advisory panel on land reform (appointed in September 2018), which is now to be followed-up and enlightened by the post-May 8 Parliament, the present problematic setup around poverty and landlessness of a mass of Blacks can become extreme, with acute unrest.  Anarchy, moving into a chronic stage, can make revolution a prominent feature later in the 2019-2024 ruling-mandate of the ANC.50

3.2.5. The antagonists are unrealistic and opportunistic to already demand in 2019 a fully-fledged land expropriation plan from the ANC

Too offer a more precise plan as the above theoretical one at this stage, is impossible, seeing that Section 25 is still to be amended. Further consultations by all the lawmakers of the Parliament with the general public, must firstly be held and funding allocated, to be able to start up the project and to turn it from theoretical to practical. Furthermore, the above theoretical plan must and cannot be seen as a final, absolute one. As discussions and outcomes follow during the rest of 2019-2020, changes, adjustments, additions, further descriptions and definitions, etc., can follow. There is no doubt that before any land expropriation will be activated, further land redistribution and agrarian reform legislation will be introduced.50,69

It must be clear that the current agricultural monopolies will have to be dismantled or reigned in, see at present the overpowering of the agricultural sector by the extremely well-established South Africa White agribusinesses and their exclusive White capital. There will be cooperation with the White agribusinesses in the activation of the Black agricultural sector, but away from and outside their White dominance of every sector in agriculture. Land expropriation, its planning and action and its benefits, will be shifted from the few White rich to the mass Black poor. It will be the rule, not the aim. The present exclusive marginalisation of the Black farming communities and Black small-scale farmers will be ended. Ngcukaitobi69 misreads the “un-breakability” of the White empowerment and dominance of the country’s agriculture in the ANC’s planned land expropriation programme when he writes69:20-21: “We can expect that these monopolies will, with the support of the State, multiply their profits, while giving a “helping hand. More of the same. Large agricultural entities, it seems, will be “nudged” to support emerging and small-scale farmers.”

Doubts about the present theoretical plan are unfounded. Firstly, the registration of title deeds of the expropriated land will be handled the same way as the present-day title deeds, although this will preferably be done on a separate register to oversee the land expropriation process. This will be done precisely to avoid corruption, state-capture, etc. and to make the re-registration of land to the new Black farmers easy to control, and to oversee the constant management and execution of the end-part of land expropriation and the success of each of the individual cases.50,69

It must be clear that the transfer and registration of land to the new Black farmers will not be more complicated or strange than that of the starting-up in the 1890s of the Vanwyksvlei Dam’s Agricultural and Farming Settlement of Whites. Here the so-called Crown land (which was also occupied by the Cape Government as “uninhabited land”, but was indeed for a long time the land of the driven-out KhoiSan) was transferred to Whites as private property under certain pre-requirements to work and to inhabit it permanently. The same principal of ownership was repeated after the Second World War when White soldiers of the South African Armed Forces were, after their demobilisation, established as farmers on so-called “free farms”, again on Crown land, in areas such as the districts of Vanwyksvlei and Kenhardt situated in today’s Northern Cape Province.1,71-74

4. Discussion

4.1. A short perspective

From the above is it at this stage clear that there is already in some way a theoretical plan in place on how land expropriation will and can be executed. But here are two clear energies in opposition: it is one thing to theoretically argue a plan, but it is totally something else to implement such a plan in practive with success. South Africa’s political history, since the first day of Jan van Riebeecks’s arrival, is drenched with many political failures. Prominent in this context is the ANC’s somewhat failed post-1994 land reform initiative to establish Black farmers.1,75-80

The essential question is thus who can now after May 8, 2019 be the role-player(s) to assure the successful implementation and completion of the plan on land expropriation.

The May 8, 2019 election’s outcome leaves us with only three significant parties: the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the African Nationalist Congress (ANC). On the third level of significance stands the EFF, in second place the DA and on the first level the ruling ANC. An indication of the potential of the EFF or the DA to be declared a “good” or “bad” ruler, is  the fact that they have never ruled South Africa nationally. of the two the EFF is the most inexperienced one. It has a very limited alliance in municipality management as compared to the DA, and was most of the time less successful and too conflicting to assure an evaluation of outright good. The DA was in the past and is still very successfull after the May election, with regard to governing on provincial level in the Western Cape, as well as with municipal management countrywide.26,30,34,36

4.1.1 Evaluation guidelines of political parties

To evaluate the three parties’ potential as national, provincial and municipal rulers, the following guidelines will be used respectively:

Their general policies as well as specific standpoints on aspects such as the respectof law and order, and the fighting of corruption, state capture, behavioural delinquency of MPs and MPLs, as well as their top brass leaders, the party’s and leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put in perspective through their manifestos for the 2019-election.

The public critique in newspapers, etc., by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the three parties as political organisations, their members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behavioural  delinquency of MPs and MPLs and top brass leaders, their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the parties’ internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions, especially on land expropriation, evaluated and reflected for the period 1994 to 2019.

In this subdivision of the research project the interpretations will be done solely in terms of the interpretation of facts and truths. The information gathered will be evaluated in terms of the Solomon’s wisdom approach and will not be guided by religious and legal/statutory contamination.  The focus of the discussion will be to determine, theoretically in terms of a so-called “clean and constructive political record” of each of the three parties, which of them are the best qualified to effect the land expropriation plan from 2019 and onwards. For this classification and measuring of political records of each party, the under-mentioned Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, will be used.81-84 The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201881

As an evaluation instrument to quantitatively classify the three political organisations, their members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action, the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, will be used.81 The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, were applied to all information collected in the literature review of the parties’ manifestos and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and will be interpreted as the researcher deems it applicable.81

In light of the political sensitivity of this study, the researcher assured at all times, as prescribed by the Checklist, that the political-historical data were carefully reviewed and coded. Generalisations were not made beyond the capability of the data to support statements. The researcher guarded against his own expectations, misperceptions and the need to find answers that would support his preconceived notions. For the basis of interpretation and evaluation of the data, the Solomon wisdom approach serves throughout as a guideline.81-84 The use of election manifestos of political parties as Curriculum Vitae and public reporting on political parties by journalists and other sources such as Letters of Referee/Attestations to determine  the governmental abilities of political parties

When any candidate applies for a responsible post in the top level of an organisation, there are two primary elements to guide the employer in making an appointment or not. These two elements are:

1) The Curriculum Vitae (CV) to obtain insight into the candidate’s qualifications, experiences and extraordinary skills, etc; and

2) The letters of the referees, the attestations, to offer firstly further insight into the qualifications, experiences, etc. of the candidate;  and secondly at the same time to tell us confidentially about good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate that are well-masked by or absent from the CV. This referee data mostly informs us of the “goodness” and “badness” of a candidate, which can make him a failure or a success in the end in the executionof the responsibilities of the post.

In this research the manifestos and self-description offered by the political parties and their leaders will be seen as their CVs. Hereto will the public reporting by journalists and other sources be seen as the letters of referees/reference or attestations. Evaluation-criteria for a party and its leadership to be short-listed

In terms of the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, the three parties will be awarded points in terms of an evaluation-criteria of a maximum of 82 points. To qualify for the shortlist as a so-called candidate (party), the candidate (party) must receive 58 points (70%) and higher.81

With specific reference to a retrospective evaluation and description of the political history of political leaders in terms of the Checklist, it is true that information obtained from newspapers, political and historical books, authorised and unauthorised biographies and autobiographies can be seen as subjective, but subjectivity is an inherent part of any text on politics. We cannot escape this reality. Such sources are consulted in terms of the Solomon wisdom approach for this subdivision, with the single aim of building a viewpoint on the party from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is commonly used in modern historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research, as is the case with the quality of the current political leadership of South Africa and the political parties’ functioning with regard to integrity. The information offered in the literature review has not been empirically tested. It relies on the independent opinion of the public as reflected by the independent media and has been accepted by the public as a good reflection of reality.81-84

The research does not offer a comprehensive statistical model to make advanced statistical inferences to be able to test a hypothesis, but the information (data) can be subjected quantitatively to the statistical cycle of research to make it comparable with other research and to evaluate it with hypothesis testing in the end. Advanced statistical inference is outside the intent of the study.81

There has never been such a collection, evaluation and description of information on the actions of the political leaders and regimes of South Africa with the primary focus on their ability to be able to steer land reform for the period 1994 to 2019. Despites the limitations of the various sources, it is a pioneering study that addresses a mostly ignored subject.81-84

4.2. The manifestos, self-descriptions and public references of the three parties

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) will be reflected in this article (Article 9) as Part 1 of three articles under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. In Part 2 (Article 10) and Part 3 (Article 11) the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the African National Congress (ANC) will respectively be reflected as sequence articles under the main title of “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”.

4.2.1. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) Introduction

In the recent May election, the EFF nearly doubled its political power by winning 44 seats in Parliament (rising from 6% to 10%). One the first utterances by Julius Malema, the Commander-in-Chief of the EFF after obtaining this win, was to clearly spell out that the EFF’s immediate task in the Sixth Parliament would be the completion of the work that could not be done by the Fifth Democratic Parliament and of which the Amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution, to allow for expropriation of land without compensation and the amendment of the SA Reserve Bank Act to discontinue private shareholders in the bank, would be central. In this context of political radicalism, is it old news that the EFF believes that the state should be the custodian of land and that full-out nationalisation without compensation is the way to go.85,86

In this environment a new role is foreseen by some political commentators  for the EFF in the post-2019 politics, directly within the ANC regime to assist the ANC to get the two-thirds majority vote which it needed to enact the ANC’s December 2017 resolution to amend Section 25 to be able to expropriate land without compensation (EWC). There is doubt on the outcome of such an alliance, given that a strong sector (the Ramaphosa-faction) in the ANC does not share the Malema hunger for extreme land expropriation and radical politics. They prefer a watered down window-dressed-version of the status quo on the land matter, writes Hlatshaneni.85:4

Furthermore, it seems that there is still after the May election a kind of “brotherly love” between the EFF and the DA on municipal-level cooperation, which can also put it in a strong position of political empowerment. On the 17th May 2019 the Beeld reports on this possibility after seeming talks between the EFF and the DA. Selebano writes87:1: “Die Tshwane-metroraad in Pretoria kan ‘n EFF-lid as burgemeester kry, terwyl Herman Mashaba [DA] in sy pos as burgemeester van Johannesburg bly.”  Malema himself reports as follows on the matter of a new post-2019 alliance with the DA on municipal-level87:1: “Ons praat reeds met die DA, ons deel die mag in Johannesburg en Tshwane. Kom ons doen dit op ‘n manier wat nie ontwrigtend is nie.”

It is thus of great importance to see how the EFF can play out its role in the post-2019 politics in general and specifically in the solving of the so-called “White-occupation” of Black land. The question is: can the EFF be a significant role-player in the post-2019 politics? To answer this question is it important to study the EFF’s CV and Attestations in-depth and to evaluate its performance on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018.81 Overview The EFF manifesto

In the EFF’s manifesto under the heading: “The EFF is ready to govern as demonstrated by the detailed blueprint for economic emancipation as set out in its manifesto”, Julius Malema, as in his daily politics, tries to play the card of “African nationalism”.  But the “Malema-African nationalism” is an exclusive new version: one belonging to and driven by the South African post-1994 born Blacks, who are jobless, poor and most of all: landless. Excluded from his group of “African nationalists” are clearly the so-called BEE-marked and other successful Blacks who were born before 1994. Prominent of course are also the Whites in general as the culprits in his radical-Marxism as the sole origin of these Black youth’s poverty, landlessness and unhappiness (and undoubtedly seemingly also Malema’s “own poverty” and unhappiness!). To grasp this absurdity, and by times seemingly confused political mindset, just read the following from his propaganda88:19:

“We are not part of the 1994 elite pact. We are a completely new generation, with new demands. And our demands, unlike those of the 1994 generation, will not be postponed. We refuse to be silenced with so-called reconciliation. We want justice now. We want our land now. We want jobs now. We demand the economy now!

On his so-called “White-problem” philosophy and solution, note the following88:19:

The economy in SA continues today to be under the ownership and control of white minority settlers, whose ownership and control of land, in particular, were gained through settler colonialism and its corollary, the dispossession of the black colonised.

Other sectors of the economy, such as retail chains, industry and the financial sector, are also owned and controlled by the white minority in SA. All the means of economic survival and existence continue to be controlled by the white minority.

Imraan Buccus89, a seasoned researcher and academic, and a well-respected political analyst, after he studied the EFF’s manifesto for the May 2019 election and the party’s practice of politics since its foundation, reflects in-depth in his writing the characteristics of the EFF’s politics if it should had win the election or form a senior partnership in an alliance to be a ruler. Its ruling seems for Buccus to be characterised by the following89:18:

“The manifesto from the EFF is about as ridiculous as it is long. It veers, incoherently, from far right neoliberal economics measures, like export processing zones, to classic far-left politics, like radical land reform. Wildly outlandish promises are made – R1m payments to successful PhD students and orthodontists in every school, for instance – that are impossible to implement in reality.”

In reality the EFF’s election promises, if they are to be implemented in political madness (besides that it is just impossible!), will bring total bankruptcy and steer the country into the same hole as Venezuala and Zimbabwe, writes Buccus89. Moreover: immense poverty, hunger, unrest, violence, to be followed by revolution, will fast be the outcomes. This will end in the mass suppression of the population and dictatorship. Inequality would become out of hand, which, looking critically at the EFF’s politics, seems to be Malema’s main intention and plan. The speaking by the EFF of the creation of a sovereign wealth fund means just another state capture and a looting again of the SAA, Eskom, the PIC and various kinds of VBS Mutual Banks to be robbed again by the EFF-kind of political elite. Buccus89 is very clear when he, on the involvement and trustworthiness per se of the EFF in the management for instance of a sovereign wealth funds, says89:18:

“But, as we all know, the EFF has been closely associated with cross forms of corruption, and is openly defending individuals known to have been at the centre of the state capture project. The EFF simply could not be trusted to run a sovereign wealth fund.”

Bell90, in reference to the EFF’s promises, describes them as absurd, bizarre and outlandish. He writes in this context: “An EFF government, they promised, would provide every informal settlement dweller with a proper house with flushing toilets, and hot and cold running water, within two years.” On the land issue and the EFF, Bell reports90:2:

“Here it is that some of the more  – no pun intended – outlandish comments are made, including an EFF promise to ‘immediately’ give away to ‘the people 50% of all government land’.”

The EFF promises and political, economic, racial and social thinking are plainly bordering on fantasy; they are drowned in populism and cognitive dissonance. The EFFs are more than just crude opportunists; their political madness, as reflected in their promises, will take South Africa not like Jacob Zuma to the brink of a complete collapse: they will immediately bring about a total collapse of the country. The political dysfunctional mindset of its leaders have already been reflected in their weird public behaviour. Their violence and unruly behaviour and dislike of order are well reflected by their violent and disrespectful actions in Parliament, as well as at council meetings where they participated in municipalities. This cognitive chaos inside the EFF leadership is understandable when noting that the EFF hailed Robert Mugabe as a hero. In this utmost political instability of the EFF is it understandable why its MP Zolile Xalisa had no other choice but to leave it for the African Transformation Movement (ATM).The political instability in the EFF also drove out the EFF-MP Thembinkosi Rawula.89,91 The EFF’s performance after the May 2019 election

To now call the EFF one of the major parties in South Africa due to its so-called third position (ranking) of voters’ representation, which it obtained mostly by our imbalanced indirect Electoral Act, is misleading. Some so-called political analysts became mixed-up between ranking and statistics: the EFF only obtained 10% of the votes in the 2019 elections (and 6% of the votes in the 2014 election), meaning that at most 10% or a 10th of the total votes. Seen from a political analyst’s view, neither did the EFF really successfully master the so-called SWOT characteristic of the “political MBA” to bring them into the league of “good” parties. They misused and exploited the serious conflicting political, social and economic issues of the country which have already put the country into paralysis many times. As a party it fails to offer constructive solutions or ideas, and misuses empty populism to activate aggression and hostility with a 10% sector of the voters as an empowerment vehicle to stay upright. They do not understand basic politics and democracy, neither how to govern even the simplest social organisation. They cannot even can manage the ethics of their own party, as is evident from their support of the looting of the VBS Mutual Bank.85,86,89,92

Their involvement with the DA in municipal affairs shows one thing: destabilisation of good order. Their constant attacks on the ANC seems from the outside a strong and winning outcome for the EFF. But it is far from the truth. Firstly, is it misleading and secondly, there is a good reason for the EFF’s so-called successful attack on the ANC. In this context it must firstly be remembered that their parent-party, the ANC, is in a vegetative state, with a 50% part cemented with the EFF into political-radicalism. This ANC failure had a negative impact over 25 years on the mass of poor and landless Blacks. It is the same deprived group who the EFF also not could enrich and uplift since its founding as a “party of the people”. In addition, it placed them directly into conflict with the authorities and law and order. The creation of unrest, anarchy and revolution seems the ultimate intention of the EFF here.85,86,89,92

Secondly, there is not a single fact in the EFF’s actions to associate it with the positivity which characterised the political ideology of Nelson Mandela. To describe the EFF, as Kanyane92 tried to do, as the new don of South Africa politics, is wishful thinking. The correct reference is: new mischief-monger. Kanyane’s92 insight and thus also his propaganda, are lacking understanding of the principles of basic politics and sound political thinking. There is not a hunger by the mass of South African Blacks for a so-called “liberation”, or revolution in terms of land ownership or races. We saw the improper infusion thereof already in Venezuela and Zimbabwe, as well as the Zuma-regime of state capture under the mantle of “Black-African/African-Black liberation”. Eugene Terreblanche and his AWB tried the same kind of “political joke of mischief” with Afrikaner-liberation, as what Malema and his cronies are now trying to do, just to be rejected at the end. This rejection was not by the Black population, but by the Afrikaner/White population. This happens the same way with the ultra Afrikaner-nationalist leader Hans van Rensburg and his Ossewa-Brandwag (underwriting Nazism and extreme White nationalism) in the White politics of the 1940s. It failed miserably.1,85,86,89,92 The post-2019 erasing of the EFF’s founding aims and intentions

The May 2019 election shows that radical racial parties such as Andile Mngxitama’s Black First Land First (BLF), the African Content Movement (ACM) led by Hlaudi Motsoeneng and the Social Revolutionary Workers Party (SRWP) of Irvin Jim lost voter support and recognition, writes Mvumvu18. But this loss of voters’ support goes broader, affecting also the two other racial radical parties, namely the EFF and the FF+. Mthombothi93 highlights the dilemma wherein the bitter-ender radical parties such as the EFF, the ACM, the BLF and the ATM had run in the May election due to their expectation that their pushing of the expropriation of land without compensation would reap rich rewards for them (a misconception, which also swayed the ANC to join that bandwagon). It did not work. The racial radical parties of the EFF and the FF+ vote increase in the May 2019, is further misleading. There is no evidence of black voters excitedly flocking to proponents of amending the Constitution with the sole purpose of grabbing other people’s property on which both the EFF and the FF+ build their politics (although that of the FF+ politics is in reverse by their fuelling the Whites with a fear for land grabbing and an outcome which the FF+ has falsely positioned itself to be able to prevent it). This outcome means that there is no role to play in the near future for the EFF. For the EFF (as for that of the ACM, the BLF and the ATM) its primary founding aim and intention to effect exclusive land grabbing from Whites specifically, is firstly nullified. Secondly, its sole purpose of exclusive land grabbing, which held the party on the road and assured its members’ enrolment, is erased.  It is indeed the spelling out in the near future of the end of what a party such as the EFF saw initially as a new, but false beginning in the May elections’ with its gains in Parliamentary seats. The South African grassroots politics of post-2019 is no more established in the racial radicalism that characterised the manifestos of parties such as the EFF, the BKF, the ACM, the SRWP, the ATM and the FF+. The combined might of the South African capitalist class from all racial groups and the respect for democracy by most Blacks, notwithstanding their suffering under Apartheid had nipped in the bud permanently the popularity and empowerment of these racial radicals, leading to the EFF’s, FF+’s and ATM’s insignificant positions in the Sixth Parliament.93,94

A good example (similar to that of the EFF’s winning of votes from short term disgruntled ANC members and voters), is the said sudden “increase” for example of the right-wing Freedom Front Plus (FF+) in the May election. Its rise in votes is also simply the result of disgruntled White DA-voters who respond foolishly to the FF+’s slogan of “Fight Back”, seeing the FF+ as a rescuer of their so-called “eroded White-rights”. It is not a radical, lasting political improved outcome waiting for the disgruntled Whites. It holds the same limitations and a phasing-out in waiting as for the EFF. It is equal to those reflected by radical Afrikaners in the short-lived days of the AWB. Both the “growths” of the EFF and FF+ are the same racial contamination.36

It is important to critically look further at the belief that socialism is favoured by the mass of South Africans; a direction Malema seemingly wants now to steer his EFF into after the voters’ rejection of his exclusive Black-nationalism, land grabbing and nationalising of every citizen’s assets. The absolute failure of the SRWP which was undoubtedly a nasty shock for socialist supporters of the change away from socialism and radicalism in political thinking on grassroot-level is prominent here. This party, initiated by the 370 000-strong National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) and supported by its affiliated federation, the more or less 800 000-strong South African Federation of Trade Unions (Saftu), received only 24 439 votes (meaning a miniscule 0.14% of the total vote).26

This reflects the dilemma of a dark future waiting for the EFF. Its political foundation is precisely that of the doomed BLF, the ACM, the SRWP and the FF+. Botha95 pinpoints that the above outcome of rejection of the land expropriation without compensation and its racial radicalism, was evidence that the populist and socialist opinion about politics, as held until the May election by the labour-unions [but surly also the BLF, the ACM, the SRWP and the EFF], is presently without standing and a myth.95

On the failed racial radical politics coming from the past election around land expropriation and the parties caught up in it, Botha95 refers specifically as an example to the racial radical BHF [whose policy is openly a combination of Marxism and Leninism (an ideology to which the EFF prominently also lends itself) and the implication which had led to the immense financial chaos in Zimbabwe and Venezuela]. Botha95, in a comparison of the EFF with the BHF, writes as follows on the BLF95:10:

Die…Black First Land First (BLF), wie se leier hom gereeld skuldig maak aan onsinnigheid in die algemeen en haatspraak in die besonder en ook sy volgelinge (wat maar dun gesaai is) aanhits tot onwettige optrede, veral oor die besetting van grond.

Dié party het sowat 0.11% van die stemme  ontvang, wat beteken dat sy steun vir ‘n radikale benadering tot nasionalisering van eiendom beperk is tot slegs een persoon uit 1 000 wat gestem het.

Thus in comparing the EFF and its leaders’ racial radicalism with that of the BLF above in how both are driving their politics, there is no real difference, besides the foolish arrogance and self-orientation of the two group’s leaders, thankfully blocking the formation of a foolish alliance. There seems, as for the failed BLF, that the EFF also has a limitation to be able to move into the future, namely as a hindrance, besides its contaminated racial inclinations, its unpredictable and strange leadership. To survive the post-2019 politics, the EFF is now forced to make a drastic change in its politics if it wants to survive until 2024. But, for the EFF to move more racially and economically radical to the left on nationalising the public’s private assets, there is no more space in post-2019 South Africa. To move right and moderately, there is also no place for the EFF: there are already well functioning parties here which will fast gobble up the EFF. Both outcomes are going to leave “Kaiser Julius Malema” walking naked out of Parliament very near in the future. Neither would an alliance with the other radicals such as the BLF, the SRWP and the ACM save the day. As mentioned, these parties are already basically phased out from the post-2019 politics due to their racial, political and economic radicalism, especially on the matter of land. To go to bed with the ATM for Malema’s EFF in a last dying compulsion, will be a fatal coupling for the EFF. It is clear that the ATM, born out of sympathy for Jacob Zuma because of his ousting from the presidency, is just another diminutive party which made it with “luck from somewhere” to Parliament. It is of political insignificance and only costs the taxpayers money by their sitting in Parliament.95

It must be noted that Malema is the EFF and the EFF is Malema. Stripping Malema from his EFF-clothing indeed means the forever departure from politics of Julius Malema, as well as his absurd political ambitions and aspirations. Taking Malema out of the EFF means the outright collapse of the EFF. It will thus take a far more constructive change inside the EFF and its leadership’s mindset to make it and them more acceptable as a party with moderate Blacks and Whites. Malema’s latest political rhetoric-trick after the post-2019 election, as with the many other political jokes, strangeness and obscurities uttered in his politic career, reflects excellenty the EFF’s and Malema’s political confusion and in-depth cementing already into the political wilderness. Prominent is his recent senseless and confused political title-tattle which undoubtedly reflects a serious memory loss on what he extremely racial-radically had said before on Whites and their assets – rhetoric which included serious threats to their property as well as their personal security. His senseless and confused political title-tattle tells us a lot when he said96:7: “We are focusing on all voters generally, not a specific race group. The only issue with white people and our policies is not that they are anti-white. Our policies are anti-white privilege and white people tend to enjoy white privilege at the expense of black people.”

In the face of this false “new good politics”, including a sudden and confusing “White love” as recently declared publically by Malema on behalf of himself and the EFF, Buccus26 guides and warns us on the dark, masked side of the EFF and Malema. Buccus posits26:26: “The EFF is clearly aligned to the mixture of crude nationalism, authoritarianism and gross looting of the state that has characterised the Zuma faction of the ANC.”  Buccus26 takes further this unchangeable racial radicalism politics of the EFF (and that of the FF+ from the White side of racial radicals) in the post -2019 politics when he writes26:26: “It is true that the crude racial populism of the EFF and the Freedom Front Plus made some gains, but in the overall picture they remain a minority. Mandela’s vision of racial reconciliation clearly still has the support of the majority of South Africans.”

For the EFF to move into an alliance with the ANC in an effort to block the EFF’s erasing as an entity from the country’s politics, can only possibly happen if the Zuma-faction overtakes the general ANC. But this outcome also seems also impossible, in terms of the EFF’s radical ideology, for any alliance if the doves of the Ramaphosa-clan obtain the upper hand. Even if the present status of internal conflicting-politics activated by the Zuma faction stays on within the ANC, the May 8 election shows that the ANC in general has successfully forced down for the moment the radicals inside it and had already disowned the Zuma-aligned ACM, the BLF and the ATM as possible future partners. Munusamy30 writes specifically in this context on the EFF’s radicalism and racial-contaminated shortcomings, making it already unacceptable as a possible partner to the ANC. Munusamy postulates30:26: “The EFF could have used its popularity on the ground to partner with the ANC in government. But its politics are underlined by malice and brutish behaviour, making a working relationship with any party unfeasible.

Buccus26, on the outcome of the election results of only a 10% stake instead of 15% and more which has forced down an empowerment cap on the EFF, as well as that of its possible radical partners in the ANC, in terms of their further practising of radical politics, writes26:26: “This outcome means that SA is doing relatively well in avoiding the curse of populism. The populists in the ANC have been seriously weakened by Ramaphosa’s success. They will be further weakened by the now much more credible criminal justice system.”

Indeed, the advent of a post-2019 credible criminal justice system may be the strongest eraser of the leadership of the EFF, together with the basically already invisible political movements such as those of the ACM, the ATM, the BLF, by their calling to book for political delinquency.26 Alleged inner-circle mischief at the EFF home

When it comes to the measuring of the integrity of a political party and its leadership, it is unavoidable to reflect on the EFF’s inner-circle’s politics and the allegations around it. Important to note in this respect are fresh allegations of financial impropriety against Julius Malema by members of his central command, according to Harper98. In his resignation letter, the previous EFF-MP, Zolile Xalisa, accused Malema of failingto account for R2-million a month collected in levies from councillors, MPLs and MPs. It is also alleged that Malema did not account for about R20-million which the party received from the legislatures every quarter.91,97,98

In this context Harper98 reports that in his public resignation, Xalisa also accused Malema of not accounting for about R1.7-million a month collected in levies specific from the EFF’s 825 councillors. It is alleged that since the 2016 elections, each councillor had paid a levy of almost R2 000 a month. Xalisa said98:10: “You [Malema] never reported about this money in the CCT [central team] and the war council. You refuse to be held accountable nor account for these funds.”

Regarding the levies of the 61 MPs and MPLs, Xalisa reports that just under R7 000 a person a month – which totals R427 000 a month for the 61 members, were collected – and there was no proper accounting done by Malema. All of the abovementioned money was meant to go into a constituency fund for EFF parliamentarians to do their constituency work. Furthermore, Malema is accused by Xalisa of forcing the central command team to themselves pay weekly deployment costs, including car hire, accommodation, party T-shirts and food for supporters.91,98

The other EFF-MP that resigned, Thebinosi Rawula, also accused Malema of alleged financial irregularities.91,97,98

In addition is the fact that Julius Malema has not yet been cleared from prosecution of earlier corruption charges in connection with government tenders in Limpopo. Now that the NPA is renewed and the Zuma-capture thereof it is starting to be cleared, Malema can become a point of focus.97

The madman-looting of the VBS Mutual Bank by many political fools and their cronies is now ready for prosecution. In this context, writes Bruce99, the fraud and pillage at the VBS Mutual Bank and the demonstrable benefit from the looting of it by Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu, which indeed forced their arrest, handcuffing, perp-walking, charging and then releasing on bail before the May 8 election is a clear and easy case for the law-enforcment agencies. Besides this, there is the allegation against the EFF of the receipt of funding from the tobacco underworld that needs the attention of the NPA, SARS and the SAPS, posits Munusamy.100

The arrest of Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu – Bruce’s99 description of “their handcuffing, perp-walking, charging and then releasing on bail before the May 8 election”, which was the moral and politically correct action — was seemingly only to avoid by the ANC’s opportunism not to lose some votes to the EFF for these arrests before the election and/or of a possible partnership between the ANC and EFF after the election. Notwithstanding all this political covering against their earlier arrest, Shamila Batohi and some trustworthy and law-abiding members in the Hawks, the NPA and the SAPS are hopefully waiting patiently for them. Bruce postulates that hopefully their arrests will come during 2019, with the possible outcome of leaving the EFF leaderless already in 2019.99-102

It seems that criminal law has at last arrived at the EFF’s door. It was reported that the EFF MP Marshall Dlamini had appeared on the 15th April 2019 in the magistrate’s court of Cape Town, due to his alleged assault of a police officer in Parliament on the 7th February. It seems that the deputy leader of the EFF, Floyd Shivambu, will also appear in court about his alleged assault of a journalist in March on the Parliament terrain. The 4% rise and glory of the last election can fast make place for the erasing of the EFF and its leaders, if the law is properly executed. The need to take them to court for past wrong–doings is highlighted by various investigative journalists.99-102 Julius Malema is an acolyte of Peter Mokaba in his underwriting of narrow African nationalism

Julius Malema, the EFF’s top leader, is “an acolyte of Peter Mokaba”, reflects the seasoned political analyst and the political editor of the Sunday Times, Sibongakonke Shoba103, in March 2009. This Malema political inclination is well-illustrated by Shoba103 by clearly showing Malema’s focus of his politics on a narrow “African nationalism”; a political ideology that had already failed to gain ground in the ANC and even the broader South African community. (Narrow White-nationalism was also the reason for the failure of the Afrikaners as a tribe in South Africa and brought down the NP with its racial and discriminative Apartheid; a party which was intimately built around it and its wrong-doings).1,103

Malema and his EFF, writes Shoba103, are a product of Mokaba’s teachings. He had undoubtedly become a believer in and a supporter of the worst form of African nationalism. Shoba writes103:19: “He has hijacked the political space once occupied by the PAC and the Azanian People’s Organisation. Even though Malema may, on occasion, invoke the names of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo, his politics have been inspired by Pan-Africanist rhetoric. His attacks on white people and South Africans of Indian origin show that his idea of African nationalism is extreme, and has an element of right-wing demagoguery.”

What Shoba103 missed out on and also needs to say, is that Malema’s ideology of the “encircling of a greater South African African-nationalism” has been cemented into a well-masked “Venda-African-nationalism” or plain “Venda-tribalism”. It is a deadly, abnormal Black ethnicity and tribalism. This Venda-nationalism-tribalism carries in ordinary South African politics absolutely no empowerment or status and will go nowhere. To underwrite and propagate it would let Malema remain for ever faceless, unknown and powerless in South African politics, and of course, out of Parliament and its feed-trough. The reflection of and presentation thus of a “greater” South African African-nationalism”, is nothing more than masterminded-politics by Malema, purely for opportunistic reasons and his personal gain. (This “Malema-initiative” is to a certain extent a pure mimicing of the Zuma clan’s failed policy through which they  tried to represent “African-Black nationalism” or “Black-African nationalism” away from African-nationalism for their political gain, such as activating and upholding of state capture, land grabbing and the nationalising of White capital, etc.).34,63,64,103

Prominent in Malema’s attacks on so-called “non-Africans” (meaning “non-Black” Africans) are the names of Pravin Gordhan (also a target of Mokaba) and Shamila Batohi. And then there are the Afrikaners/Whites, especially the farm owners and White-capitalists.99,104 Excellent examples here are the many politically and racially delinquent utterances of Malema between 2016 and 2018, such as: “We are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now” and his statement that: “…people of Indian decent tend to mistreat black workers” – both utterances which the South African Human Rights Commission found to be OK!104,105 Then there is Malema’s nonchalant pronouncement of Pravin Gordhan as a “…dog of white monopoly capital who hates Africans”, as well as Shivambu’s authored blog post, accusing as follows: “Gordhan of running a cabal and operating a parallel state”.104,105 These kinds of utterances, if used by a White, undoubtedly would mean a jail sentence plus.

The allegation of the “future that the EFF is seising” and the “freshness and creativeness” that the EFF  allegedly is bringing to the so-called “South African old politics of liberation”- as seen and propagated by Kanyane92 – is going to be very short-lived. The EFF has gained temporarily more votes in the May-election through racism and extreme radical-politics, only because the greater ANC as well as the DA shy away from this kind of political delinquency. But it is going to cost the EFF dearly in post-2019 politics. It must be noted, on the other side, that this political and racial contamination which has beset the EFF will spread into its co-partners if the EFF is successful in misleading either the DA or the ANC into a post-2019 trap of cooperation.103

An exclusive and selective African nationalism (equal to the one which Malema propagates) cost the PAC and Azapo dearly, putting them into permanent regression as groups after 1994, writes Shoba103. The “struggle of Africans” in South Africa, as Malema with great mischief reflects, is not limited to small group of African-Blacks, but includes all the racial groups who are a permanent part of South Africa and thus Africa. It is clear that with regard to the ultra-African nationalism, it is today only Malema and a very small group of remnants of the old revolutionaries that are still stuck with this cognitive idea. The EFF’s propagation and spreading of it spells revolution and genocide that are not part of the thinking of the majority of South Africans. Looking at this delinquent-internalised mindset of Julius Malema, is it undoubtedly with a tongue in his cheek that Shoba fatherly advises Malema103:19: “If Malema is serious about realising his childhood ambition to ascend to the highest office in the land, he will have to change tack.” From experience Shoba103 must know very well that Malema cannot change; neither does he understand the meaning “tack”, or what it means to be responsible after ascending to the highest office. Malema and his merry men mostly dressed in Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits

On Julius Malema’s bi-polar presence in the South African politics — and surely an effort to give us insight into the many colours a chameleon can take, even those in the South African politics — De Waal writes106:33:

Thabo Mbeki at the Rand Easter Show! How thrilling. The diminutive former statesman was wheeled out of retirement by the ANC to counter the presence of his former foe, Julius Malema, who now leads the ANC’s external ultra-left wing, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). First, though, a little back ground. It was Malema, then leading the ANC Youth League, who said he would kill for Jacob Zuma, who was then challenging Mbeki for the ANC leadership. Later, in one of those historical ironies one can only relish, Malema himself was booted out of the ANC – by his former patron and glorious leader, Zuma, for comparing him unfavourably with his predecessor, Mbeki!

How we chuckled.

It’s rather odd that, now, with both Mbeki and Zuma out of power, Malema is backing Zuma’s bagman, Tom Moyane, to the hilt, and demonetising Pravin Gordhan, Zuma’s bête noir, for all he’s worth. But that’s a puzzle for another day.

To unlock the above puzzle around the specific Julius Malema political mindset and actions is very easy and does not need another day. We just have to look back to his yesterday and his not so far-back history of politically delinquent actions and how easily he changes from his Dr Jekyll suit to his Mister Hyde suit when the situation opportunistically fits him.

Firstly, witness his delinquent political action excellently reflected when Cosatu, under his leadership in 2002, unleashed chaos in the Johannesburg CBD, leading to loses by pedestrians, vendors and shopkeepers who were mugged and robbed during the rowdy illegal march.107This kind of unleashing of chaos-behaviour in public was alleged again to be caused by his EFF’s involvement at the more recent unrest in the township of Alexandra on land occupation. It was prominently alleged at the last sitting of the Alexandra Inquiry in May 2019 that the EFF was directly involved. At a meeting of the Inquiry, the Alexandra councillor, Teffo Raphadu, said that the EFF perpetrates land invasions in Alexandra in such a delinquent way “that [it] put people’s lives in danger,” according to Okoye.108

Furthermore, it seems, that there is only one approach for Malema109 to obtain land reform (especially the transfer of White “settlers’ so called stolen land” to the landless and poor Blacks, and that is through violence, anarchy and revolution. He declares himself open to the use of violence, anarchy and revolution in the settling of the land matter, ignoring the fact that a mandated black government, the ANC, is reigning and he himself is a MP of the respected South African Parliament and not a non-conforming member of a bush-bar. He is supposed to be a role-model and is expected to promote integrity. The intention to incite unlawful violence, anarchy and revolution in order to overthrow the government of the day is well illustrated by his following writing on the 22 July 2018109:22:

There is simply no way Parliament can retreat on this question any longer. After all these consultations, one thing is clear: to retreat and betray our people on the demand for land expropriation will be to risk a direct revolution, which they will conduct on their own, wherever they are.

On that day, when our people take the land by force, the EFF will join in because the power of the day would have refused to co-ordinate a peaceful, democratic and inclusive process that empowers the previously oppressed to have access to the land.

When further examining his EFF Manifesto presented for the recent election, the same kind of disorder politics is preached by him. The basis is over and over the threatening of the order of society and the instigation of anarchy, constantly and continuously. It reads89:18:

“We are not part of the 1994 elite pact. We are a completely new generation, with new demands. And our demands, unlike those of the 1994 generation, will not be postponed. We refuse to be silenced with so-called reconciliation. We want justice now. We want our land now. We want jobs now. We demand the economy now!”

But there are more than just the Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits that Malema and his cronies from the EFF seem to dress themselves in daily: there are seemingly also their witch-hunter suits that need to be highlighted, because this also, as Teffo Raphadu said of the EFF’s alleged delinquent activities in Alexandra, “puts peoples’ lives in danger.”108,110

At the end of this article the Citizen of the 29th May 2019 reports on the politics of the bizarre that comes from the EFF leader Malema’s alleged death threats towards the Scorpio’s investigative journalist Pauli van Wyk.110 This reaction followed after her report on the 28th May 2019 on how the EFF had apparently benefitted from the looting of the now defunct VBS Mutual Bank, as well as the EFF’s deflection from claims of corruption to a spirited defence of the public protector. Watson110, on these alleged actions of the EFF-cronies, writes110:2: “When the story – titled “Cruising nicely on VBS: EFF’s Parties, Lies and Looted Money” – was released on Monday night, Malema’s response on Twitter was: “We are still cruising nicely, bana ba balei [children of witches] are not happy. Go for kill fighters, hit hard…[sic]”. ▼

Watson110 writes that Van Wyk110 allegedly had noted in her article that the EFF’s fourth birthday bash in Durban in July 2017 was seemingly funded by a part of the money of the illegal R16.1-million Brian Shivambu’s company Sgameka Projects received from VBS that was ultimately channelled to the EFF. Watson also writes that it is alleged by Scorpio that it has so far isolated about R4.13-million in VBS loot paid to the EFF. Watson110 reflects that the article of Van Wyk is currently (29th May 2019) on the Daily Maverick with apparent copies of bank statements around these payments. He writes110:2: “…which, on the face of it, explain the flow of cash in “a scheme designed to mask the origin and ultimate beneficiaries of the funds. VBS money flowed through companies over which Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu have ultimate control”.”

In response to further enquiries to Malema by Van Wyk110 about the leadership of the EFF and its treasurer-general Leigh-Ann Mathys, alleged Watson110 that had Malema said110:2: “I won’t be answering any questions from the moloi [witch]; she can write anything she wants to write. I’ve responded to all her questions before and won’t be doing it going forward. She is extraordinarily personal [sic] and I’m not answerable to a white madam. She can go to the nearest hell.” ▼

Watson110 reports further that, in a seeming effort at deflecting from the VBS Bank matter, the EFF Deputy President Shivambu110 compared Van Wyk to a lizard and Pravin Gordhan to a crocodile110:2: “We really have no time fighting lizards when the crocodiles are the real enemy forces.” This brings us again to the foreground of Van Wyk’s110 earlier note in the Scorpio on the “strange” and for “what unknown” reason, the “spirited defence of the public protector” by the EFF who is herself at the moment under scrutiny by the various political bodies for  her actions.

How far the politically delinquent actions, especially on the contamination of good racial-relations, of persons such as Malema and his intimate cronies in their Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits have tragically already penetrated a sector of the Black society mindsets with their dangerous anti-White culture and radicalism, was well-illustrated by the crowd’s booing of ex-President FW de Klerk (the man who puts Blacks – and thus also Julius Malema and his cronies – in charge of South Africa in 1994) at the recent inauguration of President Cyril Ramaphosa.111  Bachtis111 writes as follows on this indication of the vile racial tensions that exist in the country111:13:

This was a naked display of intolerance of one race group against another. Sickening in the extreme, as white people in this country were given notice that they are abhorred, and regarded as undesirable.

It took the master of ceremonies some time to bring the crowd to order. Sadly, many in that crowd were dignitaries from countries across the African continent, witnessing vitriolic sentiments.

This show of disrespect heralds the new South Africa, a country where white-skinned people, born in this country, are regarded as being of no importance.

The white diaspora will continue, and this country will continue to entrench reverse racism and apartheid.

That the Whites must start to fear for their lives if Malema and his cronies win the empowerment of the country’s politics, is further confirmed by his racially delinquent utterance of:

“We are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now”.103-105

The above words, which echo perfectly Julius Malema’s history of racial rhetoric, have excellently put in the foreground Julius Malema’s and the EFF’s all-over political mischief of agitation and the instigation of disrespect for the individual’s rights, democracy, and political order. This negativity is not only applicable to the Whites, but also to the greater Black population.89,107,108,110,111

Political jokers and clowns bring laughter and can sometimes change for the good, even inside the political circus, but political fools can, masked as jokers and clowns, be very dangerous in the short and long run for the minorities and a country’s stability: remember Idi Amin and Adolf Hitler. Thankfully, the delinquencies and foolishnesses of these political fools’ mostly disable themselves in the end.99-102

Malema and his cronies at the EFF will hopefully soon learn that their outdated and poor fitting Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits do not fit into today’s respectable politics. Neither can their witch-hunter suits qualifying them for jokers and clowns. To be dressed in these outfits much longer can cost them dearly.99-102

▲ It is important for Julius Malema with regard to his alleged calling Pauli van Wyk a witch, to take note of the main aims of the Witchcraft Suppression Act No 3 of 1957, namely112:

To prevent any person or a community to identify a specific person (notwithstanding his position or doing, to justify such an identification) to be a “”wizard”” through witch-finding;

To prevent that this identified person (“wizard”) is harmed (threatened, terrorised, victimised or even murdered) in any way by the “witch-finder” or the community;

To prevent a person to call himself a ‘wizard’ by prohibiting such self-naming / declaration as a crime, with the sole aim to safeguard him against harm by his own wrong-doing, to be identified as a ‘wizard’ by the ‘witch-finder’ and the community. [For full text see Section 1(a) to (f) (i) – (iv) of the Act].

This means that Malema’s alleged calling of Ms Pauli Van Wyk a moloi (witch) and the alleged use of the words: bana ba balei [children of witches] are not good. Go for kill fighters, hit hard…[sic]”, can be a serious matter and lead to his criminal prosecution and being sent to jail. It can be as serious as looting the VBS Bank’s money and committing high treason.110,112 The EFF is a boys’ club of dinky-toy players

The EFF is a boys club of dinky toy players; it does not have political potential, quality or maturity. The majority of democracy-loving South Africans know it well. It is only the politically poorly informed voters and some present-day confused and disillusioned ANC members, together with a pocket of political radicals, that still believe in the EFF’s kindergarten stories and their so-called “saviour and messianic” leaders, the honourable MPs Malema and Shivambu, to bring about their Utopia.12,92,99,100,113-115

The EFF’s Manifesto, propagated by Julius Malema under the heading: “The EFF is ready to govern as demonstrated by the detailed blueprint for economic emancipation as set out in its manifesto”, is not worth the paper on which it has been written. There is an immense difference between a detailed manifesto of plain nonsense and a detailed record of an excellent practice of politics. The last mentioned is a good characteristic which the EFF is totally lacking. Prominent from the reading of the EFF Manifesto is Malema’s instigation of violence, racism, minority-bashing and radical-Marxism and the solving of politics and economics with the typical chaos-revolutionary business model where the ruler does not create new economic growth, prosperity and richness, but only transfers the assets of the one group to the so-called poor and landless people, who, at the end, stay landless and poverty-stricken. At the end of such a chaotic regime, when the economics come to a standstill and poverty and chaos reigns, the ruler collapses and escapes the scene with his loot.33,88,103,114,115

The EFF is, in its juvenile stage of development, already a failed political experience. Hopefully, if the NPA at last starts to do its work, Malema and his immediate cronies will be out of circulation in 2019.88,110,114 The heartbreak which Julius Malema experienced when he mourned the death of his grandmother115:7: “I am broken, finished” may be his same words in the future with his departure and that of his beloved EFF from the country’s politics.

History can be hard and cruel on foolish politicians and their parties. This punishment can be harder for an irresponsible boys club of dinky toy players. Sorely for the EFF, it seems to be one of these historical cases. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018

On the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, the EFF is awarded eight points out of a possible 82 points.81

This measure shows that the EFF does not have the ability or a single talent to take on a simple government task or duty; forget the implementation of the nationalising and the grabbing of land. The EFF and its politics is like a dog chasing a car for years and then one day the car stops, giving the dog the opportunity to try to bite the tyres and to take the car captive, but without success, leaving it with the enormous problem of what to do with the stranded car it was chasing for years. The EFF has indeed been stranded between its inciting, foolish and hostile rhetoric and its lack of knowhow to be able to do constructive deeds. And then there is its extremely unpredictable politics, bordering on political insanity. The EFF’s mastery to distract the attention from their own delinquencies and inabilities through the excellent misuse of social media are also thankfully diminishing fast under the onslaught of investigative and constructive journalists. The fact is, and the public is beginning to learn this well, that the EFF and its leaders’ political warts on their hands and faces make them just too visible.12,92,99,100,108,113-116

5. Conclusions

On the decision to vote for the EFF or not in the recent May 2019 election, Munusamy118 gave the voters before the election clear, advice: “…holding our noses to vote for the least-odious party” when she guides118:20: “To make a decision to vote requires that law-abiding, conscientious people ask themselves which political party is least offensive to their own values and principles.” When the “is least offensive” requirement has been applied, it could not be the EFF. Thankfully also, to support Munusamy’s118 guideline, most of the voters have excellent values and principles. They showed it clearly in the election by their isolation of the EFF, together with its cronies, such as the ATM, the ACM and the BLF, from future serious politics. Indeed, the voters put the lid on radical racial politicians. The EFF’s politics, reflected by its contaminated political thinking, planning and action, spell only disaster all over for the county’s well-being.116,118

If people are disgusted by the possible inclusion of some of the 22 listed disgraced ANC top brass as parliamentarians, they must be just as disgusted to see Malema and Shivambu back in Parliament as MPs.92,99,100,113,114,116 But, on the other hand, to be noted on this uncommon phenomenon, people must remember, as Retief119 says, this is Africa. Seemingly this country now has its own style of the practice of politics and the underwriting of political integrity.

All South Africans, especially the Whites, know that serious land reform is absolutely needed; it is an immediate imperative and there is a strong contingent of Whites willing to participate in reasonable land transfer to Blacks. The EFF and its leaders’ incoherent land grabbing policy, together with their cognitive political mal-thinking, spell revolution and can lead to the cost of thousands of innocent lives. Mandela’s sole reason for entrance into the 1994-Dispensation was because too much blood of the Black majority had been spilled. The EFF wants a Rwanda in South Africa. The EFF and the Malema-crowd are on the way, if they get the opportunity, to spill blood again, but this time a mass of Black, Coloured, Indian and White blood.75-80

It is clear that the EFF’s CV is very thin. It lacks the prescribed qualifications and documents as well as the prescribed experience to be a ruler. They played off this meaningless CV very well  in the May election, without anyone really contacting their referees. The Attestations or letters of the referees on the EFF’s and its leaders’ trustworthiness, integrity and qualities – besides one or two subjective, uninformed and unqualified referees — are totally rejecting the EFF as a ruler or partner to a ruler for post-2019 South Africa. The referees of the EFF, in evaluating it as the ideal government to activate, steer and finalise land expropriation, with (or without) compensation, erases them summarily from the list of candidates.

The count awarded to EFF and its leadership in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201881, is a mere 8 (9%) out of a possible maximum of 82 (100%). This means, together with its leadership, an outright failure as a political institution of stature.75-80

Mischief-doing is the only ability of the EFF and its leadership. The present holding of mass land ownership by Whites is basically the only initiative left to the EFF to be able to perpetuate mischief too, basically because it can be contaminated unobstructedly through the EFF’s Parliament privilege racial relations without the taking of responsibility or the calling to book if a fiasco follows. Coetzee120 warns on this post-2019 possibility and the serious consequences for the country by these dinky-toy players’ actions120:14: “Die moedswillige skade wat die Julius Malemas, Magashules and Mlamleli’s met hul opruiery van grondbesetters aanrig, is onberekenbaar.”

The ANC’s own radical racism is strengthening the opportunity for the EFF’s boys club to make some noise, as in the past, in Parliament on the land matter. Coetzee writes120:14: “Naas die korrupsiestryd, gaan die grondkwessie in dié vyfjaar-termyn ‘n brandpunt wees. Die arena waar die wetlike stryd hom grootliks gaan uitspeel, is in die parlement, waar die ad hoc-kommittee vir die wysiging van die Grondwet  se art.25 deurgedryf gaan word.” It is the same Parliament where the EFF had shown in the past its unlimited political gangsters and violence. The land reform matter can, if the EFF is not favoured and supported by the other parliamentarians in doing it in “Malema-style”, change to serious Parliamentary conflict and violence.

The EFF cannot be trusted in any way to be in charge of land expropriation. Moreover, they totally lack the experience to handle such a project.

The applicant status of the EFF, to be considered as an able candidate to be able to rule South Africa after May 8, and thus to  successfully activate land expropriation (with or without compensation), is so low that it and its leadership should not ever be considered and be allowed on the first list of applicants to be a ruler. The application of the EFF must be completely rejected and its application papers should be sent back. It cannot be shortlisted.

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Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.


The author declares that he has no competing interest.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.


Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa. (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanisation and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652 to 2018. Part 2: The entities in government and society that executive political leaders used to aid their political behaviour

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: appraisal, characteristic, constitution, dynamics, guarantee, hypocrisy, integrity, leadership, liberator, mindset, organization, platform, regime.

Ensovoort, volume 38 (2018), number 6:2

1. Background

1.1 Introduction

In any moment of decision, the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing. (Theodore Roosevelt).1: !88

Sound decision-making is one of the primary duties that executive political leaders must fulfil every day. It is an essential requirement before one could become a good executive political leader and to stay on in a leadership position. How diligently executive political leaders keep all the promises they made to their voters during their election campaigns and the degree to which they successfully do the things prescribed by their letters of appointment, are two very different issues in modern politics. Sound decision-making as a characteristic of good leadership and good governance by executive political leaders have become problematic, even in the best democracies. It was with good reason that the late president Roosevelt made the above clear distinction between good and bad decision-making. Research confirms that executive political leaders seldom do “the best thing to do” in decision-making today. Good decision-making has become a rarity. Voters have become used to massive wrongs and corrupt decision-making, often bringing nations to the verge of disaster and the rest of the world to despair. Bad decision-making goes deeper than mere error; it often testifies of immoral behaviour on the side some executive political leaders, primarily to benefit themselves at the cost of society.1-7

Roosevelt’s1 foresight about leaders who do wrongful things or who do nothing at all goes much deeper: it points to a constant growing stream of failed and bad executive political leaders in modern politics. Hard evidence shows that many of the promises that leaders present to their voters remain “true deeds in words.” Political leaders promise voters a wonderful future where they will do only good things, and they shout these promises loudly from public platforms during their election campaigns, but these promises die away as remnants of political fraud that historians can later research. These leaders, often highly talented persons, seem to deviate from the path of serving the voters and the public deliberately and selfishly. Roosevelt classifies “the wrong thing” and “nothing” as negative decisions that one would associate with bad executive political leaders and their regimes. However, the growing group of immoral politicians would often view these negative acts as positive. They see their poor leadership behaviour as equal to doing the right thing in Roosevelt’s eyes. Such leaders enter the political domain because it gives them the opportunity to do as they please.1-7

Politics, especially in democracies, has become a haven for crooks and political hooligans, basically because open systems of rule and over-seeing the country’s interests, are meant only for executive political leaders of high integrity. In South Africa, the President, as the top executive political leader, is awarded immense power. The Constitution and the Chapter 9 institutions are open to easy manipulation by him and his cronies if they are crooks. Many other public and private institutions are also vulnerable. 2,4,8-12

There has been frequent reference to possible state and private capture by executive political leaders in South Africa in the recent past, although the practice dates back to 1652. It seems to be a subject that needs an appraisal.

The aim of this article is to determine and describe the entities in government and society that executive political leaders used to aid their political behaviour.

Entities for the purposes of this article refer to the establish bodies and systems that function alongside government and within the greater society to develop, manage and steer a government’s abilities and potentials. Such entities see to it that the specific and the general obligations, duties, instructions and legal principles embedded in these entities can function without obstruction at all times. These entities can be physical or abstract in function and legal recognition, depending on their place, need and function in society and within the government set-up. In this research these entities include: the Constitution and Parliament, democracy, population composition, and media houses.

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research, as is the case with the established entities that executive political leaders use as the basis of their political behaviour. The sources include articles from 2017, books from the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2018. These sources were consulted to determine and to describe the established entities in society and government that executive political leaders use as the basis of their political behaviour and to put thoughts, views and opinions on the South African political leadership in perspective.13-15

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1 Introduction

This article primarily focuses on the established entities within the South African society and government that executive political leaders rely on or abuse in their actions, be it good or bad actions. Some of these entities may at times to a certain extent act as determinants in the development and functioning of executive political leaders, but in general their role as determinants is very limited. They are, as said, mostly used as means that executive political leaders with established ideas use to influence the thinking, planning and behaviours of other persons, especially their followers.

The various factors that influence the development of executive determinants and that can play a role in shaping the behaviours of executive political leaders, are discussed in depth in the next article (Part 3).

The discussion in this article addresses the following subdivisions:

  • 3.2 The inherent characteristics of stupidity, self-promotion, opportunism and flawed thinking of executive political leaders as drivers of their political behaviour.
  • 3.3 The use of the latent receptiveness of the South African Constitution and Parliament for criminal and political abuse by executive political leaders.
  • 3.4 The latent receptiveness of democracy for criminal and political abuse by executive political leaders.
  • 3.5 The use of South Africa’s majority, minority, homogeneous and heterogeneous populations by executive political leaders.
  • 3.6 The odd good executive political leader versus the organized hostility of the media houses.
  • 3.7 Flawed thinking and social dysfunction as dynamics in the immoral behaviours of executive political leaders.

3.2 The inherent characteristics of stupidity, self-promotion, opportunism, flawed thinking and social dysfunction of executive political leaders as drivers of their political behaviour

3.2.1 The Palkhivala description of obstinance16

The fact that political leaders from all races and ethnic groups, educated and uneducated, from richer or poorer backgrounds and at all levels of politics show immoral behaviour brings to mind the work of Professor Nani Palkhivala16, a seasoned and world-renowned Indian academic, lawyer, diplomat, politician, philosopher and writer. He sees this as a complex problem. Our political leaders are supposed to be learned and wise men, morally above reproach, but often this is not the case, so that they contaminate society, often destroying the lives of innocent individuals.

Palkhivala16 regards the use of the entities that are available in a democracy as central to this dynamic where political leaders strive to gain political power and personal riches. Sometimes they desire power and riches only for themselves, at other times a small group of allies would benefit. Palkhivala16 attempts to understand why immoral political leaders so readily abuse these entities to reach their wicked goals. He regards this abuse as something that is steered by a variety of negative traits, thought processes and dispositions that he sees as integral parts of the kind of leader that emerges in our modern society. These traits include stupidity, self-promotion, opportunism and flawed thinking. This range of negative traits serve as “energies” or “drivers” for these leaders’ thinking, planning and decision-making, especially as it relates to the abuse of the platforms of society or the government for their sole selfish interests. Palkhivala16 classifies this odd behaviour among political leaders under a very descriptive name: wooden-headedness.

The selective immoral political behaviour of executive political leaders that renders them failed leaders, leaves Palkhivala with a question of why.16:297 Why do they do this? Why do political leaders blindly ignore the simple advice of Theodore Roosevelt?1 These questions compelled Palkhivala16 to look for clear reasons why executive political leaders and their regimes fail to be “good”. In his search for an answer to his “why”, he found that the failure of executive political leaders is a universal phenomenon, also reflected by well-known world leaders and the regimes of world powers. He writes16:297:

A study of history, regardless of the period or the type of government in authority, makes one wonder why man makes a poorer show of government than almost any other human activity. In the field of governmental activity, wisdom – which may be defined as judgment acting on experience, common sense, available knowledge, and a keen appreciation of probability – is amazingly absent. Why do men in high office so often act contrary to the way that reason points and enlightened public interest enjoins? Why does intelligent mental process seem to be so often paralyzed?

Palkhivala16 points out that this phenomenon, sometimes totally self-destructive, repeats over and over in the world’s history. Somehow leaders do not learn from the mistakes of others or their own errors. They are impervious of the negative outcomes of their “bad” behaviour, not only for other people, but also for themselves.

Palkhivala further interrogates this matter as follows16:297:

Why did successive ministries of George III – that “bundle of imbecility” as Dr. Johnson called them collectively – insist on coercing rather than conciliating the thirteen Colonies which, as a result, broke away and declared themselves as a republic, destined to be the most powerful in the world – the United States of America? Why did Napoleon invade Russia and Hitler repeat the same mistake? Why did the Kaiser’s government resume unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 despite the clear warning that this would result in the entry of the United States into the war? Why did Chiang Kai-shek refuse to heed any voice of reform or alarm until he woke up to find that his country had been irretrievably lost to him?

When it comes to the immense negative impact of wooden-headedness on executive political leaders’ governmental behaviour, Palkhivala writes16: 296-297:

Wooden-headedness is a characteristic feature of governments. Wooden-headedness assesses a situation in terms of preconceived fixed notions while ignoring or rejecting any contra indications. In short, it is the obstinate refusal to learn from experience. These fixed notions bring in the most cases the focus on the selective aims or interests of the executive political leader and his intimate group inside the nation, not on the aims or interests of all the groups inside the nation, cancelling thus the overarching mandate which goes with a good executive political leader and his regime. It serves as a short-cut for the political leader – and possibly his intimate group also – to ignore willingly and intently the interests and human rights of the total nation, as well the risks involved by his under-par and malfunctioning leader’s behaviour for the total nation.

Although the description “wooden-headedness” creates the impression that the behaviour includes only stupidity, Palkhivala16 gives a detailed description of what he means with this mindset among executive political leaders. He focuses on flawed thinking, planning and behaviour in such a leader’s political behaviour. Palkhivala16 reflects further on the wooden-headed leader’s self-centeredness and disrespect for the rights of others. This description brings the possibility of psychopathic thinking as a trait in the mindset of executive political leaders to the foreground.

It is an error to think that only authoritarian states and their leaders, like Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler, boast leaders who act foolishly without any grounding in reality or a view to the future, and with a total disregard for the consequences of their acts. Democratically elected leaders and the governments of established democracies act with the same political foolishness and oppressiveness. Examples include the British Empire in its early days in relation to its American and other colonies, White Apartheid South Africa in relation to Blacks, the Americans in relation to Saddam Hussein of Iraq, etcetera.1,6,7,9

Barbara Tuchman16: 29 takes the discussion on the paucity of good leadership further by saying that governments act unwisely because short-sighted politicians are driving and managing it. She argues that the politicians’ arrogance prevents them from admitting error (and if they are in an act of foolishness, they just won’t turn back in fear of losing face). Their immense thirst for political power makes them unstoppable within their role as mandated executive leaders. They lack self-confidence and magnanimity, which leads to inappropriate acts of grandeur in an effort to demonstrate self-capability. They seek to create an image as formidable executive political leaders through inappropriate behaviour (which can be immoral). Ultimately immoral acts overshadow many leaders’ initial intentions to lead effectively in terms of good executive actions. According to Tuchman’s16 postulation, it is just impossible for certain persons to function normally as responsible and good executive political leaders, bringing various forms of possible psychological pathology to the foreground. This opinion of Tuchman16 strongly supports Palkhivala’s16 view that executive political leaders’ immoral behaviour may be rooted in psychopathology.

In line with the views of Palkhivala16 and Tuchman16 on the failure of executive political leaders to act properly within the democratic set-up, Martinez6 postulates6:88-89:

Pyramid structures concentrate power in the hands of those who sit atop them. This power is always open to abuse. It enables the ideas and the priorities of a small number to be imposed on the lives of millions – ideas and priorities that have a strong tendency to include wide-ranging privileges for those doing the imposing.

3.2.2 The Boon description of takers9

Boon9, working specifically on profiles of South African executive political leaders and in line with Palkhivala’s16 so-called wooden-headedness, sketches an extremely troubling picture of the existing conditions that make good executive political leadership an impossibility. He identifies the traits of being unapologetic, ill-disciplined, self-serving, self-enriching, opportunistic and an immense lack of feeling and empathy, as central to the characters of immoral executive political leaders. For Boon9, as for Palkhivala16 and Tuchman16, these negative traits form the dynamics or energies driving the executive political leaders’ immoral. He describes this kind of immoral political leaders as “takers.” Their political behaviour focuses on milking the members of their political party, their society and the government, thus taking. The impact of these politico-pathological mindsets, as reflected in flawed thinking and immoral behaviour, undermines democracy in all its facets.9

Boon’s9 view on the present state of South African leadership is that the country is being run more and more by the takers. It is clear that not even a specific racial or cultural group as a unity is benefitting from the present South African political system, but only an exclusive group (gang) of crooks under the executive political leaderships of takers. The executive political behaviour and thus the reign of the country is based on the flawed thinking and social dysfunction of these leaders. This dark view of crooks running the present-day South African politics and society, all driven by immorality and crookery, is supported by various other studies.17-25

Boon9 writes with concern9:51:

Why have there been so many one-party states and coup after coup? The reason is that, in the past, many African leaders have been totally unapologetically self-serving. Yet the First World does not view Africa as different from itself for fear of discrimination. It is fundamentally different because the Third World Africa, which is led largely by Takers, has no discipline. It is not governed according the same ethics and values as either the First World or the tribal world, and therefore does not respond to them.

About the so-called takers, Boon9 writes9:48:

But there is a dark and utterly destructive cloud to the Third World: a massive movement of individuals turning their backs on their traditions and discipline and, in doing so, the closeness of community and ubuntu. They replace it, not with the best of the First World, but often with the very worst. They are self-serving and care nothing for the community other than what it can deliver to them personally. They seek to take, not to give or share. Many of these people have managed to educate themselves very well. They know how to manipulate Westerners and how to use, to their own ends, their once-upon-a-time tribe. They are part of the Third World but they also exist in the First World. We shall call this group the “Takers”. Takers have nothing integrity nor discipline. They serve the dollar-god of power and will do anything for it. Unfortunately, the tribal way has become confused with Takers…

But the takers seldom act on their own, often they have well-masked Western accomplices. These powerful accomplices not only steer the takings that the executive political leaders take, they also offer military and financial support for these corrupt political leaders so that they can execute, unobstructed and with ease, their immoral reign, driven by their delinquent mindsets. These leaders penetrate politics through their masterly use of the established platforms like the parliament, etc. This ganging-up of delinquent minds was well illustrated by the crimes against humanity perpetrated against the Iraqi people under the executive political leadership of Saddam Hussein and his Western accomplices.9,26 Chomsky says of those pre-war times during the Bush administration26:107: “If Iraqis ever see Saddam Hussein in the dock, they want his former American allies shackled beside him”.

Political wrongdoings of whatever kind, seem to be perpetrated mostly by established criminal-minded persons who find the political and social environment’s rewards of power and riches very attractive and satisfying, and very easy to obtain. Executive political leaders are sometimes driven by extreme stupidity and psychopathology as Palkhivala16 and Tuchman16 suggest (in some cases making their behaviour non compos mentis), but as Boon9 clearly indicates with the takers, their political delinquency also reflects strongly the presence of well-planned and sound thinking. Boon’s9 and other studies3,8,26,27 reflect that these leaders are masters at identifying and selecting vulnerable established platforms from which to launch their foul play. They can overrun and capture South Africa’s public and private institutions, as evidenced in the last eight years.3,8,9,26,27

3.3 The use of the latent receptiveness of the South African Constitution and Parliament for planned criminal and political abuse and immorality by executive political leaders

The South African Constitution and the Parliament as established institutions offer immense opportunity for mismanagement and abuse. Both have a latent receptiveness in their foundations that crooked political leaders can with ease abuse as a gateway to the state coffers and to law making to enrich and to empower themselves. The Constitution and the Parliament are excellent platforms to use for state capture. This has been well illustrated since the ANC’s political elites came to power in 1994. A well-positioned and powerful immoral executive political leader can, by using his learned knowledge and experiences of statutory institutions and by implementing his corrupt thinking into the system, introduce fraud, corruption, theft and a general culture of crookery into the frameworks of the South African Constitution and the Parliament. Such a nest of crookery is very difficult to touch with the efforts of the general public and even the law-makers of the opposition in Parliament. This culture circles around a band of crooks that prey on established platforms like the Constitution and the Parliament. They plan these actions well and they aim to enrich themselves with intent. The evidence is strong that executive political leaders with immoral political thinking, planning and actions and seasoned in political delinquency, are central role players in these political wrongdoings.8,17,20,22,24,25, 27,28

Corrupt executive political leaders are in reality nothing other than members of well-oiled mafia networks that have infiltrated the socio-economic and political systems of countries worldwide. They are impossible to erase, as the Italian state’s endless fights with their mafia confirms. South Africa’s fruitless fight against its own large number of takers and the Zupta mafia, especially since 1994, equals this situation. These wrongdoers never learn from the consequences (they do not want to) and never ever stop; as soon as one political crook or despot is eliminated from the political system, the next one stands ready to take over and to better the well-oiled machine of corruption.4,8,22,28-34

It seems that there is an “inheritance of taking” in place for the next generation, ensuring the endless continuation of takers in the political system. This is evident from the continuation of a subculture of corruption in the greater South African society and the opportunities for easy profit-taking by corrupt politicians in government institutions where statutory rules are missing or have degenerated. The negative impact of political takers on a country’s people, its justice and political systems, can be immense. It can indeed lead to a dual governmental system where the Constitution and the Parliament become subordinate to the taker regime, as has happened over the last eight years in South Africa with Luthuli house becoming the government of the day. However, this is not the full story: South Africa had become, up until Zuma’s ousting, a tripartite governmental system, with Zuma and his cronies at the top in charge of the various Chapter 9 institutions and the Constitution, the so-called Zupta regime. The second leg of was Luthuli house and the ANC followers who believe foolishly that they are in charge. The third leg was the castrated Parliament and its “frozen” law makers.4,8,22,28-34

The remnants of the Zupta regime and the political leaders who formed part of this unholy union will not depart quickly, notwithstanding the fact that Jacob Zuma has been kicked out. It will take long to reinstate a regime of good governance accompanied by good executive political leaders in South Africa, if ever. Buccaneering politicians have taken rooted in the platforms of the Constitution and Parliament, they cannot be removed simply with the ousting of a president. The loot is too great to abandon without a few more tricks. The delinquent executive politicians have an arsenal of powers still at their disposal to terminate any “attack” on their power. It must be noted that the temporary acting president, Cyril Ramaphosa, fully approves of the empowerment of the Luthuli-house parliament as the top decision maker on all South African affairs. The takers are back in the South African political system, using its institutions for their own gain and in line with their flawed thinking. The most notable of takers did not leave with Zuma. Citizens should still fear them as they are devastating the coffers of the country by means of the Constitution and Parliament.17,25,35-37 Note Mthombothi’s remark21:25: “The rogues and the scoundrels are not only having a great time; they’re in charge.”

The capture of the Constitution and the Parliament has deeper rotten roots. The Zupta regime captured the political heart of the ANC as a party and corrupted it. The ANC’s monopoly in South African politics provides criminal politicians with easy access (and knowledge of how and where they can abuse the system) to the Constitution and the Parliament. Tshabalala38, with good reason, warns38:13: “Beware, the snake might be dead but those who share its secrets can still bite.”

It seems as if South African politics attracts more crooked-minded persons than persons of good character. This happens for a reason: the latent receptiveness of the South African Constitution and Parliament makes them easy platforms from which executive political leaders can easily launch their criminal campaigns. Two facts are clear: our politics makes corruption easy and crime pays with money and power. Nelson Mandela warned early in his term that many crooks had become politicians of the ANC-regime after 1994.39 This sincere warning was undoubtedly in vain. Widespread corruption under the auspices of the ANC is running the county down and has started gobbling up Mandela’s beloved ANC. The investigative journalist Gumede18 focuses on the most prominent culprit guilty of this delinquency when he writes18:13: “Zuma has single-handedly reconfigured South Africa’s post-apartheid politics. His actions have reduced the ANC’s political dominance, intellectual hegemony and leadership of the country broadly, and in black society in particular.” The editor of the Sunday Times is also very clear on this issue in his editorial column!0: 20: “This space is not big enough to accommodate the long list of transgressions President Jacob Zuma has committed since he first occupied the high office.” What he fails to say is that Zuma is only one of many executive political leaders with long lists of transgressions since 1994 and that many are waiting in the wings to indulge in the feast of South Africa’s assets.

3.4 The latent receptiveness of democracy for criminal and political abuse by executive political leaders

The abuse of political power, as reflected above, often lies in an abuse of democracy by the crooked-minded politician. Democracy, just like the Constitution and Parliament, lends itself to abuse. In South Africa it has aided many immoral politicians in their efforts towards self-enrichment, self-empowerment and state capture. It is an easy vehicle for majority groups and political parties that have been infiltrated by corrupt leaders. South Africa has been an excellent example of this mechanism from 1652.8,17,22,27,29-31,36,40-42

Democracy does not give the people control of the country, although many voters think so. Democracy, as a dynamic, energizing political process, only means that the people have the opportunity to accept or reject a candidate. However, what a candidate promises before the election and what he does after he has been elected, are two very different things. Chomsky writes about the arrogance of politicians who ignore the voters (and true democracy) after they have been elected26:82-83: “The political leadership will pat them on the head and say, ‘I’m for you, vote for me’. The people involved will have to understand that maybe they’ll do something for you, that only if you maintain substantial pressure can you get elected leadership to do things – but they’re not going to do it on their own, with very rare exceptions.” This is evident from the political dynamics in what is actually a sound democracy. The post-1994 democracy of South Africa as an institution has fallen victim to false political leaders, making it a false democracy. The reason for this is its latent receptiveness for criminal and political abuse by executive political leaders.8,17,22,27,29-31,36,40-42

Chomsky26 elaborates on false politicians cum failed executive political leaders. He describes them as persons who have been contaminated by arrogance and malign intentions. These leaders, empowered by their high-ranking positions inside the country’s executive political hierarchy, prey on the defenceless and vulnerable public and other statutory institutions when the country’s political and social systems collapse. The dynamics of immorality has penetrated and contaminated the system and the psyche of these executive political leaders long ago. They are untouchable and an unavoidable enemy. Chomsky reflects on the manner in which such leaders force their immense political power on the system26: 14:

It does not matter whether these leaders are elected or appointed, or hold their office through blood or advantage of wealth or even as the result of some level of educational attainment useful to a ruling elite.

Coggan writes as follows on the negative dynamics brought about corrupt leaders40:2:

The cynicism of voters in the developed world is, in part, the result of a series of scandals that have shown politicians willing to cheat on both their expenses and their spouses, and to break the solemn promises they made to voters before their election. Many people also have the feeling that, in practice, there is little difference between the main parties; that, however citizens vote, policies will not change.

It is with good reason that Coggan40 expresses great concern about the abuse of democracy by politicians when he concludes40:ix:

All this inspired me to look back at the early debates about democracy, and I found that the issues that concern us today also worried Plato, Aristotle and the American founding fathers. In turn, that made me worry that democracy might be more fragile than most people assume.

The new German ambassador to South Africa and a man seasoned in the dynamics of South African politics since 2007, Martin Schäfer43, points out the fragile state of present-day democracies worldwide, including the South African democracy. When asked to comment on the present South Africa on the 4th of February 2018, he said with great concern43:12: “Ten years ago, we would not have had any doubts about the stability of democracies and the rule of law in the West but beyond. We cannot be so sure any more.”

Professor Deon Rossouw44, CEO of The Ethics Institute, looks at the negative impact of delinquent thinking, planning and behaviour on our democracy and state capture from another angle when he writes44:18:

More than at any other time since the dawn of new South Africa, people are agreeing that there is a clear and urgent need for ethical leadership in the country. The cost of getting us to this level of awareness has been painfully high — it took corruption on a grand scale in the public and private sectors being exposed…

Holomisa45, also very negative about the capture of the country’s democracy for abuse by the crooked leader, elaborates as follows on the situation45:18: “An attitude of animosity has captured South Africa. A culture of mistrust, contempt and one-upmanship. A culture of destruction.

These comments bare evidence of how immoral executive political leaders have captured the democracy. They have changed it into a failed democracy. Democracy made it possible for them to capture the state.

The rule of a country and its people is driven by two intertwined energies, namely money and politics. He who has the money rules the politics and he who has the politics rules the money. Chomsky writes about this link that the26:55: “… concentration of wealth leads almost reflexively to concentration of political power, which in turn translates into legislation, naturally in the interests of those implementing it: and that accelerates what has been a vicious cycle leading to, as I said, bitterness, anger, frustration and a very atomized society.”

More than a hundred years ago the political financier Mark Hanna was asked what he regarded as important in politics. He answered26:82: “The first is money, the second one is money and I’ve forgotten what the third one is.” Is it different today? Chomsky says26:82: “Today it’s much more extreme. So yes, concentrated wealth will, of course, try to use its wealth and power to take over the political system as much as possible, and to run it and do what it wants, etc.” This dualistic empowerment is the reason why crooked person are attracted to politics.

Individual writers as Coggan40, Schäfer43, Rossouw44, Holomisa45 and Chomsky26 are not alone in their concerns about the many political crooks who have captured modern democracies and who are holding the citizens of these democracies at ransom. Other researchers are also vocal about the prominent role of corrupt political leaders and the creation of a culture of crookery. South Africans, Black and White, have since 1652 up to today been ruled by a range of surreptitious democratic rulers and their democracies. They leave few good memories.8,9,27-29,31,33,36,39,46,47-51

Boon9 possibly gives the best explanation of what democracy rule means and what mob rule means. This offers a very good guideline to evaluate the South Africa’s governance and political systems to get an idea of the degree to which it has been infiltrated by mob politicians over the years. In this indication Boon9 first describes a mob as a group of people who, in their selfish effort to reach their corrupt goals, use strategies devoid of any true democratic principles or traditions. These political mobsters are absolutely intolerant. They quickly eradicate all order, the presence of minorities and the rights and dignity of their opposition. Their coercive actions are often characterized by destruction, threats and killings and other similar brutalities. All their power is focused on the establishment of their reign. This mob does not respect the majority as the ruling entity, and any member of the majority who opposes them simply becomes part of the minority and is treated as such. Dissidents are forced to change their mindsets to accept the mob’s consensus on decisions or they pay greatly for their beliefs. Boon9 describes democracy as a statutory entity that seeks to understand minorities and to tolerate minorities. In a democracy the majority makes decisions in cooperation with the minority to obtain consensus, collectiveness and inclusiveness in decision making. It assures dignity, care and compassion for the minority and their opposition. Of the mob in practice, Boon writes9:75:

Without adequate focus on principles and positive values, democracy can easily be hijacked and become a mob. The mob then continues to call itself democratic as ‘the majority has decided’ on a course of action. But when the values of the group no longer underpin dignified, positive, democratic norms and aspirations, it is no longer a democracy; it is an unruly, negative and destructive mob. Russia, under Stalin, is an excellent example of such an abrogation and hijacking – complete shift from socialism to dictatorship and autocracy – and the ultimate result of mob rule.

But is Russia the only culprit when it comes to dictatorship and autocracy? What about South Africa under DF Malan? He changed the country from a “half-democracy” to a dictatorship and autocracy that supported the Afrikaner Nationalists in their practice of Apartheid. What about the ANC’s continuation of their pre-1994 unruly, negative, intolerant and destructive behaviour as a liberation movement to establish and maintain a dictatorship and autocracy in post-1994 South Africa?

When people are offered democracy, they welcome all the democratic rights that traditionally accompany democracy like a free press, competing political parties, an independent judiciary, etc. However, in today’s new socio-economical, personal and political environment, citizens expect far more from their executive political leaders in the form of better labour rights and a bigger share in the national gross domestic product (GDP). Of course they also want a sympathetic ear that would listen to their complaints and leaders who would do something about.8,18,22,27,29-31,36,40-42

In reference to above situation, Chomsky26 points out that the governments of many democracies have recently scored their lowest approval in history, while the ratings of the accompanying institutions are not much higher. He clearly reflects the dissatisfaction with false democracies lead by false leaders26:54:

The population is angry, frustrated, bitter – and for good reasons. For the past generation, policies have been initiated that have led to an extremely sharp concentration of wealth in a tiny sector of the population. In fact, the wealth distribution is very heavily weighted by, literally, the top tenth of one percent of the population, a fraction so small that they’re not even picked up on the census. You have to do statistical analysis to detect them.

Does the above sound strange for South Africa? Consider that the country had White radical economic transformation (WRET) from 1948 to 1994 and from 1994 ongoing Black radical economic transformation (BRET), where 10 per cent of the population steals at the cost of 90 per cent of the population simply by masterly use of democracy.

Failure to meet the usual demands and the many new needs and demands of modern voters creates doubt about the right and mandate of a “good” executive political leader to be in charge of the government and of the democracy. Many promising leaders lose standing with citizens as they have a new frame of reference with stricter criteria for leadership. In South Africa the response of citizens was effectively repressed by the country’s leaders since 1652. Prominent here is the use of suppressive legislation and the informal and formal management of disinformation. South Africans have become used to efforts to create false impressions of the noble intentions and characters of our political icons and saints.8,18,22,27,29-31,36,40-42

The failures of democracy are often a direct result of the public assuming that leaders are noble and able. However, the incompetent leaders who assume executive political leadership for selfish reasons know from the beginning that they would never be able to satisfy the demands and needs of the people. The immediate benefits overshadow the interests of their voters. Such persons are false leaders in a false democracy, and they gradually destroy any hope of ever establishing true democracy in societies. These leaders have skewed thinking and are focused on self-enrichment long before their voyage into politics. The current South African politics is at the mercy of this kind of leader.8,18,22,27,29-31,36,40-42

When one considers South Africa’s political history, it is clear that since 1652 false executive political leaders and regimes dubbed in crookery and delivering incompetence services had successfully captured the platform of democracy and had abused this platform. These leaders often acted contrary to true democracy; harming human decency, love for mankind, equality, and psychological and emotional normality. The political histories and biographies of some of these politicians reveal their poor judgement and their failure as persons and leaders in real life.8,9,20,27,30,31,33,39,52-54

Reckless political decisions and undemocratic behaviour has resulted in conflict from the side of with voting rights and the voiceless masses in the past. The great injustice that was Apartheid unfortunately shed a very negative light on those who come from a certain minority group, even if some do have the potential to be good executive political leaders that would benefit the greater society. Racism, discrimination and domination by any ruling group are unforgiveable, and it seems in South Africa unforgettable too. It leads to long-term estrangement and hostility between the conflicting groups. These conflicts are at the basis of the ANC’s outright rejection of the NP leaders Malan, Strydom, Verwoerd, Vorster, Botha and De Klerk as good executive political leaders, contrary to how they are seen in the eyes of the most Afrikaners and certain international sectors. The leadership of these persons also motivated the ANC’s decision to fight the Afrikaners and the NP with terrorism to overthrow their regime. The injustices of Apartheid is now engrained as permanent cultural and racial hatred in the mindsets of the most South Africans, undoubtedly a direct outcome of the flawed thinking of the false leaders of the NP as part of the two false White democracies (Union of South Africa and the Verwoerdian Republic). Unconditional, or even conditional acceptance of Malan, Strydom, Verwoerd, Vorster, Botha and De Klerk by Blacks was not and is not possible. These political leaders intentionally abused the platform of democracy for political gains. (However much hostility and aggression there is towards the present-day ANC-regime, their transgressions are in all honesty not an inch worse than the political regimes before 1994).8,9,20,27,30,31,33,39,52-54

We must take note of the phenomenon of a false democracy with false executive political leaders if we want to take care of our future in the new South Africa. South Africa becoming a sound democracy with a genuine democrat in charge after the recent Ramaphosa election is something that must first be seen to be believed. South Africans heard the same promises with Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma before.29 Gumede18 seems a little bit over-optimistic when he speaks about the “post-Zuma South Africa” and a bettered system to keep out false leaders and better safeguards to protect the South African democracy from becoming false again. His hope is a good guideline in our search for good executive political leaders and a good regime of governance. He writes18:13: “It is now very likely that the actions, decisions and behaviour of future leaders and governments will be scrutinized much more deeply by citizens, civil society, the media and democratic institutes.”

What Gumede18 must remember is that although Parliament gives the final vote on the president’s election, the ANC is still the majority party in Parliament. Their candidate for the state presidency is selected by only 5 000 ANC members before he arrives in Parliament for approval. Their integrity, as we see from the loyalty to and support of a corrupted Zuma as president for a very long time, is questionable. Does 5 000 ANC voters who choose on behalf of 56 million South Africans speak of true democracy?55

Ginsberg4 takes the criticism on this false democracy that South Africans created themselves a step further with his comments on our chaotic present Parliament representation4:98:

Unfortunately our new electoral system of proportional representation allows many MP’s to ride into Parliament on the backs of one or two party stalwarts. Under the previous constituency-based system these candidates would be compelled to go out and campaign in the field – in their constituency, where they would be forced to address the concerns of their fellow citizens. To make matters worse, since no Members of Parliament are currently directly elected, there are vast areas of South Africa that have no real voice or real representation in the national legislature, as the majority of members hail from a few large cities. At present many of our MP’s are among the most out-of-touch and unaccountable politicians South Africa has ever elected.

South Africa’s problems with good executive political leadership and good governance are to a great extent self-created in the form of its vulnerable state structures and a lack of legislation to put a process in place to keep out crooked politicians and to assure that South African voters experience true democracy under a true representative executive political leader of good standing. Over the years no efforts have been made to put a lock on the door of the platform democracy to keep out corrupt politicians. To the contrary, it seems as if the door was opened wide in 2012. So far no improvement has been evident under Ramaphosa – indeed, the chances of further misuse of the Constitution, Parliament and democracy further for political gain and the emergence of stronger and more corrupt executive political leaders until the 2019 general elections are very high. Every day there is more evidence for this suspicion.

The current South Africa, as before 1994, is a false democracy, created in the first place by the people themselves. We, the voters, ourselves opened the door for false political leaders to get entrance into the highest office of the country. We are wrong to blame Jacob Zuma for his tricks: it was we, the moaning South Africans, who created the opportunity for him to become president. We did the same with the incoming leader.25,36,37,42,55-57 The dynamics of corrupt politics that date from the days of Jan van Riebeeck seem to be too entrenched to be stopped.

We, the voters, have become uninvolved and passive spectators of the South African political failure that is our own doing. Boon9 uses the word spectator to describe South Africa’s passive “onlookers” who fail to better their negative position, a situation that needs their intervention. This label fits our passive South African onlookers who fail to take a stand against political crooks. The problem that Boon9 describes dates from South Africa’s earliest times. It is not a new phenomenon that came with the ANC regime. Indeed, the Afrikaner Nationalists were overwhelmed and manipulated from 1948 by their executive political leaders. They were also spectators from a distance. Boon9 allows us to look into a mirror. He writes9:99:

Spectators make up the greatest sector of humanity. These people are observers and critics, and they are only positive when the side is winning. They have a high concern for self and are very critical of change agents. Although negatively critical, they will very seldom do anything to change the circumstances they dislike. They simple prefer to get more vocal and more negative in their criticism of ‘appalling leadership’ when things do not work out to their satisfaction. Circumstances rarely work out to the satisfaction of spectators, so their primary characteristics are negativity and selfishness. I’m sure everyone has heard someone say: “They should do something about it. This is a disaster”.

Spectators never expose themselves and avoid the concomitant vulnerability at all costs. It is as if they instinctively know that by becoming vulnerable, they will be challenged and forced to become accountable for their own actions, views, utterances and behaviour. Spectators are characterized as negative, selfish and highly critical; they never expose themselves, refuse to accept accountability and are often devious.

If the Afrikaner Nationalist executive political leaders could steer their followers to spectator-obedience in 1948, is it possible for the Afrikaners to change in 2018? If the Afrikaners failed to challenge their despotic leaders since 1948, how can we expect the ANC followers to take on its autocratic leaders since 1994? Wishful thinking! For many years we had given corrupt leaders the freedom to do what they want. The miserable state of our politics in 2018 confirms this.

South African politics in a sense mirrors the ironies of the replacement of the weak and corrupt King Sihanouk by the bloody revolution of extremist Communists in Cambodia. Malloch-Brown reflects5:80: “A weak king had been replaced by Communist butchers because the country lacked a democratic stage on which any other ending might have been played out.” Basically both the failed pre-1994 and post-1994 democracies of South Africa do not offer a political choice to its people that they can exercise to make a success of their lives. South Africa was and is a failed state, whichever way we look at it.

3.5 The use of South Africa’s majority and minority populations by executive political leaders for political gain

Executive political leaders have always and are still using the population of South Africa as a tool to make their immoral actions possible. It is also used by some delinquent executive political leaders as a platform to steer their dogmas, doctrines and ideologies and to penetrate and misuse the formal political system for their own gain. The structure of South African society developed slowly from 1652, and today this complex and layered society is used by politicians with ulterior motives. Since the early times of the British authorities at the Cape society was used as a very useful platform to steer new political dogmas, doctrines and ideologies. In 1910, with the founding of the Union of South Africa, political dogmas, doctrines and ideologies around a White minority against a Black majority, White and Black homogeneousness versus a South African heterogeneousness, were used as a gateway by the Whites to isolate Blacks for eighty-four years from any formal say in the government of the day. This skewed political thinking on the side of the White executive political leaders led them to capture society on many occasions since 1910. Apartheid and its racism, which are still dashing the hopes that South Africa would become a true Nation, are sad reflections of this.33,45,58-69

The next subdivisions provide an in-depth discussion of past and present misuse of the South African society as an easy gateway. The discussion focuses on how bad executive political leaders smuggled their ideas into South African politics to serve their own interests.

3.5.1 Majority versus minority populations

It is important to note that in most heterogeneous nations, the majority, empowered by an integrated democratic system, is allowed to rule over the minority groups through its executive political leaders as part of a model empowers all groups. Communist and despotic countries always portray their regimes as democratic, but in practice the majority has unlimited power over the minorities. The contrary can also happen, as was the case during Apartheid in South Africa. A minority ruled a majority as a result of White power that dates from 1652 at the Cape.6,7,40

Usually, the most disliked minority groups receive the worst treatment. This is usually a result of the disempowerment of minority groups, further strengthened by earlier conflicts between the two groups. Apartheid, practiced by the minority group of Afrikaners and the rulers until 1994, now out of government and political disempowered, is the direct reason for the discrimination against Afrikaners by the now ruling Black majority. The current treatment that Whites receive under the Black majority government is very different from the treatment that the other two minorities (seen as “Black” enough), the Coloureds and the Indians, receive. This is a good example of a majority versus minority rule where the “democratic” rights obtained by the Blacks as the majority after 1994, are abused to serve the political aims of the rulers.6,8,27,33,39,40,48 It is a typical mobster case according to Boon’s classification9. Revenge for the past is prominent.33 These outcomes are because the established platforms of majority and minority groups offer delinquent executive political leaders unlimited opportunities to take revenge and to give expression to their autocracy in the governmental, societal and political systems.

History shows that the majority’s “democratic” decision-making are not necessarily always the best option. The negative rule of the democratic majority on many terrains in South Africa after 1994, confirms this. A minority ruler is not better, basically because it is not democratically selected and thus not politically representative of every citizen. However, in some cases there could be good characteristics that can make a minority government better with the delivery of certain services and an appropriate ruler of the majority. The NP in South Africa from 1948 to 1994 was successful on certain economic, social and political terrains. However, they also abused their rule for the domination of Blacks. This tragic outcome is more or less similar to what is presently unfolding in South Africa, only in a reversed edition.17,18,27,29,30,31,33,70

In most cases the concept “minority” is racially, ethnically, educationally, religiously and culturally applicable, and thus enormously emotionally laden. This often freezes rational thinking on both sides of the majority-minority duality. The majority think they can rule a country as a whole better because they are backed by majority opinions, views, traditions, customs and beliefs in decision-making. The minority/minorities experience these opinions, views, traditions, customs and beliefs in decision-making on their behalf as false, vicious and outright revenge. As said, these hostilities are mostly based on race, religion or culture and they are often senseless attempts to correct historical wrongdoings. In South Africa these attitudes do not stem from the general population so much, but from executive political leaders on behalf of their people. These self-appointed political leaders’ decisions on behalf of the population are not based on the true sentiments of the voters. Most Blacks of South Africa do not hold grudges against Whites and have outgrown Apartheid. The true drivers behind these resentments are the executive political leaders and they keep hatred alive of their own interests. When leaders break through on these various population platforms, they gain power and riches, and also enormous support from the group (s) they pretend to “help”, giving them more energy to continue with their behaviour. 6,17,18,27,29,30,31,33,40,70

Delinquent executive political leaders often have a history of trauma and they lack insight into right and wrong because of social and mental dysfunction and underdeveloped superegos. They abuse issues like race, ethnicity, poverty, democracy and problematic minorities in their exclusive planning of their delinquent actions to benefit only themselves. The basis of their success is the upfront establishment of a strong group of corrupt cronies in power, as is the case with the untouchable sector inside the ANC in South Africa.6,8,17,18,27,29-31,33,40,49,51,54,70,71,73

On the legal dilemma (and tragic finality) of minorities in society, Coggan reports40:27:

The rights of those minorities are dependent on the goodwill of the majority, unless they are protected in law. Even then, the dilemma is not solved. Either the majority has the right to abolish or dilute such laws (in which case the minority’s rights are theoretically under threat and democracy is undermined) or they do not have the right (in which case the system is not fully democratic).

The above outcome of the infringement of minority groups’ political and human rights, even threatening their future existence as citizens in their homeland, is a direct consequence of the NP’s racist regime, which was overseen by ultra-strong executive political leaders and their cronies from 1948 to 1994 (including the Afrikaner Broederbond and the Dutch Reformed Church). This was an excellent example of a minority regime that governed falsely under the mantle of a so-called democracy (a false democracy upheld by the White military and other security forces and an oppressive constitution). The early conflict is now reversed, and we see more and more in post-1994 South Africa that the Constitution is frequently ignored the concept of democracy is stretched. This is particularly evident from the treatment Afrikaners receive from the majority ANC’s liberation-driven executive political leaders. There is a constant and continuous abuse of democracy, Parliament, etc. to penetrate the political systems, and to rule the masses without obstruction or limits.4,8,17,27,29-31,33,35,39,73

This vicious circle of political disorderliness present within the ANC was already spotted by Nelson Mandela’s official biographer, Anthony Sampson, in the middle-1990s. Sampson writes39:518:

By the end of Mandela’s first year as President, the honeymoon had ended. White South Africans were complaining bitterly about the crime wave, the falling rand, corruption scandals, upheavals in hospitals and schools. Liberals were disillusioned that a black government was ignoring their advice; other whites never thought it would work anyway.

The ANC’s executive political leaders (in this case Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, Mandela’s so-called “care-taker president”) quickly came to view the White minority as of little importance, and this included their rights as citizens. This is reflected in the following quotation by Sampson on behalf of Mandela39:518: “White South Africa had been a uniquely privileged society under previous regimes, protected both from Black competition and from the world marketplace, and found it hard to adjust to an open democracy”.

The Afrikaners, as a minority group, were betrayed by their executive political leader FW de Klerk, who was gobbled up by the ANC elite. For the Black liberator Mandela and his followers it was a case of finished and goodbye: you deserve it and that is it. The ANC leadership’s tendency to discriminate against the Afrikaners as a White quickly degenerated more under Mbeki and Zuma. It now seems as if the incoming executive political leader of the ANC and acting president, Ramaphosa, is starting to make the same noises as Zuma.17,21,27,29,30,32,33,35,54,74-78

3.5.2 Homogeneous versus heterogeneous populations

Boon1 emphasizes that discriminatory and suppressive behaviour elicits immediate reaction from minorities, sometimes with deadly consequences. When a group’s immediate future is threatened, they fall back on community and homogeneity. The endangerment of a person’s cultural identity – language, religion, beliefs, custom, opinions, traditions and race – brings homogeneity and heterogeneity to the foreground. These two concepts are far more comprehensive in meaning than simple majorities and minorities and immoral political leaders use and abuse them. It must be noted that these four concepts often function in an intertwined manner, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively.4,9,33,39,46-49,52-54,58,61,63-66,79,80

Homogeneity plays an important role when a minority group’s cultural identity is endangered by a homogeneous majority group that governs a country and that is guided by immoral leaders. The reactions that are elicited from such discrimination can be very specific and devastating. On the other hand homogeneity can play a very destructive role under the leadership of crooked politicians. The governing group’s members are mobilized through false ideas about the opposing groups. At the centre of such delinquent executive political leaders’ thinking lies the abuse of homogeneity for their own gain.4,9,33,39,46-49,52-54,58,61,63-66,79,80

People’s sense of belonging to a homogenous group is sometimes unexpectedly revived in times of danger. The insecurity that danger brings is amplified if they are a minority group. Boon writes in this regard9: 62-63:

If a community comes under threat, there is an immediate psychological shift back to the tribe. This happened among many communities in the period immediately prior to South Africa’s first democratic elections: the AWB, the Zulus, the English and the Jews. A quick check was casually done, just to establish where the community/tribe was, so that they could be contacted if the need arose; a check to get the tribe’s perspective on the treat. The same thing occurred in business.

The realities of the African environment do not allow us to deny tribalism, although some people do. Hopefully, truly free and enlightened people do not choose to revert to tribe whether they like it or not.

Prominent is here the “phenomenon of return” of passive members to their tribe or group as a safe-haven like as in the distant past. They want to be lead out of danger. The point of focus here is that they fall in behind the (old) executive political leaders of their tribe. We saw this outcome after 1902 to 1908 with the Boers in the two Boer republics (then turned into British colonies): gathering themselves around their old Transvaal and Free State burgher groupings and behind their old Transvaal and Free State executive political leaders like Smuts, Botha, Hertzog, De Wet and other. Executive political leaders then have to act as the guardians of the minority and homogeneous group (in the Boers’ case, the Transvaal and Free State Burghers) against the majority’s executive political leadership’s power (the British Government, the British South African Colonial Authority and the liberal Cape Dutch of the Cape Province). The leaders have to face and fight off the threats to the minority.4,9,33,39,46-49,52-54,58,61,63-66,79,80

But, as Boon9 says, as soon as a group experiences threats and is marginalized on the grounds of their features and characteristics, they start forming new groups. They revert back to tribal or group support, as Boon9 illustrates. Often these unanchored and bewildered minorities fall prey to unethical political leaders and they submit to them as a last hope to survive or to gain back their previous better positions. The AWB and its executive leadership after 1994, and the ANC- and the PAC-leaderships before 1994, as well as the NP in 1948, are excellent examples of organizations that became attractive safe-havens for factions of the population. In some cases these executive political leaders – like that of the NP after 1948 and the ANC after 1990 – become more than just guiders as result of the dire need and mass numbers of their new followers. They receive a mandate to think, to plan and to act on behalf of their confused followers, notwithstanding their own internal rotten political characteristics and behaviour. The executive political leadership characteristics that have become embedded in the leadership of the NP and the ANC started as corrupted bonds to steer and to guide their new generation of executive political leaders. This creates a vicious circle of more bad executive political leadership. 8,27,33,39

Louw33 comments on the contaminating potential of executive political leaders when he describes how Afrikaners surrendered their independent thought to their leaders33:218-219:

Afrikaner status, Afrikaans as an exclusive own Afrikaner language, Afrikaner radical economic transformation, Afrikaner state capture, the racial purity of the Afrikaner, race separation, the limitation of Black politics, Afrikaner social and economical empowerment, Afrikaner nation identification, Afrikaner group identity above individuality, etc., became the dominant propaganda of the Malan era.

For the Afrikaners, especially the bruised and vulnerable Northern Afrikaners still battling with their psychological scars after the Second Anglo Boer War, this Afrikaner messiah [DF Malan] and his message were like manna from heaven. Extreme apartheid was born, driven daily by a growing authoritarian Afrikaner leadership who gradually broke down individual thinking, planning and decision-making of the ordinary Afrikaner in exchange for the establishment of an exclusive Whiteman’s utopia. The ordinary Afrikaners’ dependence on their NP-AB-DRC leaders to meet all their needs as citizens in time became internalized in most of the post-1910 Afrikaners and the following three generations up to 1994. It not only led to grand apartheid to manage the ever-growing and ever-present “Black danger”, but also contributed to the rigid and ruthless reinforcement of apartheid for nearly five decades to follow.

The “goodness” or “badness” of political leaders is often linked to the racial or ethnic tension that accompanies the person’s reign. Such tensions re-awaken people’s sense of belonging to either the majority or the minority group. It also rekindles feelings of revenge. Conflicts that had been over rise again (think for example of the Great Trek and how these ideas were rekindled during the First and Second Anglo Boer Wars). Past conflicts and ideas are rekindled however inapplicable they may be, because followers want to go back to what worked in the past. This happened in 1948 with the Afrikaner Nationalists. They were guided by outdated and dangerous ideas. The immoral ideas that led to the changes in 1948 date from 1908. The founding fathers of Afrikanerism elicited strong feelings of resentment directed at English-speaking White South Africans, dissident Afrikaners and Black South Africans. Outdated racist ideas with their foundation in the Cape of the 1700s were invigorated by Afrikaner Nationalist executive political leaders (persons like DF Malan, HF Verwoerd and BJ Vorster, with a smack of religion and/or Nazism into their political mindsets) and became engrained in the mindsets of many very naïve Afrikaners. They used these ideas and emotional appeals to gain power. 4,9,33,39,46-49,52-54,58,61,63-66,79,80

Racism was formally introduced in South Africa by Whites in 1652. Racism is still very much alive in present-day South Africa, now kept alive also by Blacks. All of these centres on majority versus minority and homogeneity versus heterogeneity, and all the entities are at the disposal of leaders who want to profit from this. Leaders use the problems between groups to gain political ground. South Africa has always been a mixture of races and it will remain one, which means that there will always be racial and ethnic minorities. The people of the country should wisely and calmly oust delinquent executive political leaders and prevent them from using the countries institutions as a gateway for abuse.

Boon9 writes as follows about the racial dynamics in South Africa9: 63:

There is no point in denying that ethnicity exists. It simply does, whether one likes it or not. It is in the context in which the tribe is seen that is important. If it is a support group or away of life, there is no problem. But when ethnicity is used to fan hatred of other groups, evil is being done.

Some of the post-1994 leaders are power hungry and corrupt, and they were transferred from the liberation movement directly to the government. Many have become untouchable icons. This obscures the efforts to executed pure government: the overwhelming number of delinquent political leaders who abuse the different platforms will be difficult to eliminate from politics.39

3.5.3 Critical perspective on the role of divisions such as majority, minority, homogeneity and heterogeneity in political manipulation

It seems as if democracies and their executive political leaders function best where the population is homogeneous, either by birth or by the gradually incorporation of different races, ethnicities and cultures into a “mixed” new, homogeneous nation, as has happened in the USA to a great extent over a period of 400 years. Although the American Dream of a homogeneous American people seemed to work for a long time, this unity is now slowly starting to crumble, bringing minorities and racism and ethnicity to the foreground. In the USA many of the minorities are moving slowly into a non-White heterogeneous majority. Although we refer to the UK, France and Germany as homogeneous nations, their homogeneity is also under attack due to a growing mixture in their citizenry. A part of this comes from the colonial ventures of these countries. The influx of migrants from the Middle East into Europe is eroding homogeneity in Europe. This new trend of migration is eliciting strong negative and racist feelings among the European population, especially with reference to the religious militancy of the incoming groups, while the impoverished and destitute migrants are left in the cold by most of the executive political leaders of Europe. This is leading to immense conflict between the newcomers and the permanent inhabitants, creating strong hatred, especially against the few struggling executive political leaders fighting in some way for the human rights of migrants and their incorporation into Europe. The negative classification of these pro-migrant executive political leaders in terms of an ultra-right classification, as failed leaders because of their sympathy for the migrants is totally unacceptable in terms of the strict principles prescribed for a regime of good governance. Unfortunately, these good executive political leaders who openly under-write, propagate and promote human rights, are mostly forced out of active politics as bad executive political leaders. The migrants and their problems are ignored, and in many cases the migrants are labelled as criminals, troublemakers and terrorists. The leaders who are “tough” on migrants can be sure of a political future. One should remember that the present migrant crisis is a direct outcome of Europe and the USA’s unasked interference in the Middle East for their own interests, like oil and minerals.2,3,6,26

The problem described above is a clear reflection of the complexity of categories such as homogeneous, heterogeneous, majority and minority and the fine balance there should be. These categories of populations can either co-exist, or be pitched against each other. A country can have a homogeneous population that functions excellently, like Switzerland. On the other hand a country can consist of various minorities, lacking a dominant majority that clearly stand out as the ruling group. In such cases co-existence depends on the racial, ethnic, cultural, economic and social characteristics and interests of the inhabitants, making it a well-functioning country. When one takes a look at the old Union of South Africa, the Northern Boers (Transvaal), Southern Boers (Free State), Cape Dutch (Western Cape) and the Karoo Boers (Northern Cape) functioned well in their Afrikaner racist enclave and their political system of Black suppression. Yet the Union failed as a political entity, because the majority of the South African population, the Black South Africans, were excluded from the government and proper citizenship until 1994.2,9,33,39,49,81,82

Another example is where a country has a heterogeneous population and is governed by more than one majority. This can sometimes make the governing of a country very difficult if consensus is lacking. Belgium, ruled together by its two majorities, the French and the Flemish (both White, but differing in language and religion, as well as certain cultural habits, customs, traditions and beliefs, etc.), is an example of such a 50:50 government system and its problems. The fourth outcome is where there is a heterogeneous population, consisting of various heterogeneous minorities (various Black tribes, like Xhosas, Zulus, Venda’s, etc., each with their own different languages, certain cultural habits, customs, traditions and beliefs), but belonging to the same branch of the ethnic family tree (Black). They then form a homogeneous political majority, like the Blacks in South Africa on whose behalf the ANC is governing today.2,9,33,39,49,81,82

The various successes described above do not always reflect the true situation of the everyday reality of governmental management. It is basically impossible to obtain an overwhelming homogeneous majority population inside a country’s borders. Even Switzerland is experiencing more and more dissidence of small pockets of minorities who, notwithstanding their Swiss nationality, are culturally rooted in neighbouring countries. What keeps the Swiss people together is Switzerland’s extraordinary democracy and the direct say that every citizen has in the affairs of the country. There are no long-term successes among the countries with small homogeneous minorities that govern autocratically (like the Afrikaner groups of the Union and Republic of South Africa tried to do), basically because the autocratic homogeneous minority model ignores a homogeneous majority (in this case the Blacks) in the political system and the minority is ultimately conquered by the majority. The Afrikaners are currently in a process of dissolution because of its minority status.2,9,33,39,49,81,82

Classifications like heterogeneity/homogeneity and majorities/minorities are complex. Very few executive political leaders understand it and know how to master and manage it effectively. It seems to be the crooked executive political leaders who are willingly to engage with it, but only because it suits them. They do not really consider needs or risks in the long run. They have in mind rule and self-enrichment, and they learn to use such concepts to their benefit.2,9,33,39,49,81,82

In present-day South Africa it is important for any capable government to take note of Malloch-Brown’s5 warning that they do not understand the immense responsibility around concepts such as homogeneity, heterogeneity, majority and minority inside the global plan of governance. Every task entrusted to the executive political leader should be successfully executed for him to be a good leader and for the country to fit into the global plan of governance. The comparison of the ANC regime’s democracy in South Africa with the democracies of their BRICS partners can bring negative surprises in the next five years, as well as new challenges will have to face within the global context of governing. Malloch-Brown5:253 emphasizes that South Africa’s invidious global comparison will not go away, and neither will the demand for change: obtaining a place in the global society is a hard task to master as it always tests the actions of a regime and the state of that society. For South Africa to compete globally there should be sound governance. This is difficult to attain and maintain. Even the honourable Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma83, the previous president, had to admit in public that it was far more difficult for him to run South Africa than it was for him to fight for its freedom. The outcomes of his presidency confirm this.

Apartheid South Africa was, in terms of the use of homogeneity, heterogeneity, majority and minority as political vehicles, possibly one of the best successes ever in modern times with its creation of various homogeneous minority (racial) states, so-called independent homelands or nation-states (negatively labelled Bantustans). Each state had to accommodate one homogeneous group. The sub-group of Afrikaners who sought an independent homogeneous homeland (a revival of the Boer republics) is also such an example, but the lack of a region to occupy led to its failure and in the end also to the NP’s policy of “separate development.” The ultimate failure of the Afrikaners’ own homeland was a direct result of the Afrikaner Nationalists’ executive political leaders’ selfish and politically blind policy to allocate more than 80 per cent of South Africa to the Whites as a homeland, keeping the best areas for themselves. The short-lived policy of the Apartheid homelands mirrored the 1908 efforts to institute, in the place of the Union, a loose federation of separate South African states, based on homogeneous and minority populations (Tswana’s, Venda’s, etc.). This would surely have healed or prevented many of today’s political and racial pains that come with the majority-minority conflict. In a federation there is minimal opportunity for an immoral executive leader opportunity to play off various heterogeneous and majority groups against each other. It would also have limited the chances of such leaders penetrating the formal political system for their own interests.2,9,33,39,49,54,61,64,80-82

The ANC, when taking over government in 1994, did not focus as a political party cum liberation movement on any tribal interests and preferences, because such a policy would have directly endangered their political power base. For them there was only one way to go: a mini-empire of multi-nations. Inside this mini-empire of multi-nations the chances were plentiful to reduce some groups to powerless minorities. The independent power of tribes and minorities would have limited their ability to manipulate the various peoples of South Africa, forcing the executive leaders of the ANC (even before the 1994-dispensation) to start to dismantle the project of independent homelands (a mini-empire of multi-nation states) as fast as possible. Prominent ANC figures who actively led this dismantling from 1994 onwards included Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. In this case the ANC’s outdated ideology of liberation drowned out the political wisdom to steer the country into the global community. Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma’s dismantling of the homelands went deeper: it represented the dismantling of minority rights in South Africa. It also confirms their inability to be good executive political leaders to serve every citizen independently, irrespective of his religion, politics, culture and colour in the post-1994 South Africa.2,9,33,39,49,54,61,64,80-82

The 1994 promise of the ANC to make South Africa a democratic state of national unity after 300 years of Apartheid did not realize. They show the same tragic short-sightedness as the Afrikaners. The grey policy of the ANC, ignoring the issue of race and numbers in politics, initially gave the ANC a free hand to abuse homogeneity, heterogeneity, majority and minority without any resistance. By falling back on majority as a point of departure they captured the formal government system to benefit corrupted leaders. This is still the case.2,9,33,39,49,54,61,64,80-82

South Africa is burdened today by not only a Black-White differentiation, but also Black tribal differentiations (well hidden from the public), which is growing (with the Zulus and Xhosas as the two majority Black tribes), as well as a growing population of Coloureds and Indians. As a state it is struggling more and more to keep its various minorities happy inside the ANC’s “homogeneous” state where the Black ANC members, as the voting majority, governs the country. So far the ANC’s executive leaders could keep the true nature of the problem of minorities away from the party, but the cracks are starting to appear.33

The histories of the USA, UK, France and Germany confirm that, even if states are overwhelmingly homogeneous, total majority vested in total homogeneity, as the ANC tried to establish in South Africa with its grey nation, is a impossibility. This is aptly formulated by Coggan40:29:

Problems certainly arise when there is a minority within a state who would like to live in their own, or another, state; or when the majority population of a state treat a minority as second-class citizens (as African Americans were treated by many of the state’s legal structure until the 1960s).

As a significant minority group the Afrikaners are diminishing in numbers as a result of their own actions; it is possible that they will disappear within a century’s time. This means that their daily pleas in the ears of ANC’s mean nothing to the party. However, there will always be remnants of this group making ongoing demands, even if there are only ten Afrikaners in a population of 100 million. Even as only a few spectators in the crowd they can be rowdy sometimes!33

The creation and maintenance of the “perfect homogeneous” state is a fable and cannot be attained. It must be admitted that meeting every individual citizens’ needs and demands is a impossibility in any regime. Plato and Socrates warned us long ago about this myth. South Africa, as a modern state, is therefore not extraordinary in failing to bring political satisfaction to every one of its citizens, but the ANC’s executive political leaders failed outright as they promised shamelessly since 1994 that they would meet the needs and demands of every Black citizen.33,40,83

To argue that South Africans are free of class, group and tribal differences, functioning perfectly as citizens in a homogeneous majority state, as was done recently by the Member of Parliament and the President of the United Democratic Movement, Bantu Holomisa45, are the empty words of just another misinformed politician45:18:

We, the people, must take back the promise of 1994. We are not Zulu or Venda, men or women. We are not Catholic or Zionist, Indian or coloured. We are not gay or straight, clever or stupid. For if we are, we are lost. We are South Africans. Period. Rise not to this reality and we are lost indeed.

Holomisa45 is wrong and his understanding of homogeneity is lacking when it comes to the intimate cultures of groups. South Africa is heterogeneous, scattered with minorities and deeply troubled by its different peoples’ various needs and demands. With the abolishment of Apartheid and the diminishing of the Afrikaners as a political danger to Black supremacy, inter-ethnic conflicts, specifically between the Black tribes, are gaining momentum. The liberation dogma of the ANC of promoting non-tribalism and non-heterogeneity, is crumbling. Minorities and homogeneous groupings are alive in New South Africa. However, the concepts of majority-minority and homogeneity-heterogeneity seem to be less open to abuse. A younger generation of Afrikaners is replacing the political fossils of the late NP with the dynamic, young executive business cum political leaders of various Afrikaner bodies, while the anti-ANC Blacks are looking to the executive political leaders of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Front (EFF) for leadership. The perception of the goodness of the executive political leaders of the ANC that captured the imagination of the majority Blacks in 1994 has given way to a reality check.33

Louw33 writes as follows of manipulation by means of the concepts discussed above33: 279:

The Afrikaner’s drive to create a mini-empire of multi-nations (Union of South Africa with various provinces), followed by his mini-empire of multi-nation states (South African Republic with various semi-independent Black homelands under a central White homeland), all failed for various reasons, like the Afrikaner’s political and financial incompetence after 1990, an underestimation of the ANC’s political and thinking power, and a Black majority as upcoming political role players, etc.

Some of the factors above are affecting the ANC too, but the only ones not to see this is the ANC themselves.

Louw33 argues that these regimes that manipulated minorities and majorities had only the slightest idea of what they were doing and what the outcome of their political self-empowerment would. He writes33: 281:

They mostly collapsed in a short amount of time. Their shelf-life is indeed limited, as confirmed by the various Empire states of the 20th century: the duration of the Bolsheviks’ Social Union lasted from 1922 to 1991 (69 years); Bismarck’s German Reich 1871 to 1918 (47 years); Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich 1938 to 1944 (12 years); Japan’s Colonial Empire 1905 to 1945 (40 years). The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 and is still functioning in 2017, but is only 58 years old. For these five states, the average is 45 years.

It is thus not a surprise that the NP and its nationalist Afrikaner style mini-empire of multi-nations (or the unofficial managed “NP Union”) only lasted from 1948 to 1961 (13 years), and its mini-empire for multi-states (Republic) only from 1961 to 1994 (33 years), while the Union of South Africa (exclusively British-orientated) under strong British influence lasted from 1910 to 1948 (38 years). This reflects an average of 24 years for the three regimes.

History tends to repeat itself: the main role players in these failed states are those political leaders whom Palkhivala16 describes as suffering from wooden-headedness, people driven by selfishness and self-enrichment. The above references to the World’s political histories and that of South Africa should serve as a warning to the ANC.33 Their misuse of homogeneity, heterogeneity, majority and minority by their political leaders for their own gain can start to fail them.

3.6 The odd good executive political leader versus the hostility of the media houses

There are undoubtedly executive political leaders of high quality in the South African society, Black, Coloured, Indian and White. Very few of them reach the top positions as Level 5 executive leaders or are even recognized as leaders of stature.84 They are often unseen as they are blocked out by corrupt leaders. There are also various other role players with the intention to keep good leaders from moving up in the hierarchy of the country’s leadership.

3.6.1 The odd good executive political leader

Political leaders of good, even great world status – persons highly qualified, skilled, able and blessed with extraordinary intelligence and wisdom – have in the past been selected and appointed as top executive politicians in South Africa.84 But the troubled South African political system and the people of the country’s immense ethnic, racial, social, cultural and economic dissimilarities and internal conflict kept these executive political leaders from implementing and permanently planting their good values and virtues in the country. A sound leadership foundation and a sound form of governance are crucial. It would help with the selection and training of new executive political leaders and would serve as a guideline for how to govern correctly and ethically. The time that some of the extraordinary persons spent in office – persons like JC Smuts and JBM Hertzog – were just too short to cultivate a culture of good leadership and a regime of good governance. Their positive contribution was quickly overshadowed by the Afrikaner Nationalists’ racially driven executive leaders DF Malan, JG Strydom and HF Verwoerd (persons from the same racial and cultural group as Smuts and Hertzog, but who held totally different ideas). There was little difference between the regimes of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma (and now also Ramaphosa). There is no evidence of good executive political leaders in the ANC, making their contributions to the establishment of a culture of good leadership minimal.9,27,39,46,47,52,58,60,79,82,86

When considering the Collins-Freiberg-Ginsberg models4,84,86, the Barber-Bremer models1,2 and other guidelines by researchers3,5 on good-to-great/gutsy business enterprises, government systems and leaders, principles that are also applicable to good-to-great political parties, governments and leaders, it seems that most governments and leaders do not meet the strict requirements to be classified a Level 5 executive political leader (Collins model)84. Indeed, executive leaders of extraordinary talent and quality have been supplanted by popular larger-than-life celebrity politicians and their intimate advisers. This is also the case in South Africa. South Africa has never held its leaders to these high standards. Such standards would assure that only humble, colour-blind, emotionally stable visionaries and nation builders free from crookery and dishonesty would be selected to these important positions. The political emancipation of 1994, often driven by the self-conceit of some of the new executive political leaders of doubtful character inside the ANC, which itself was contaminated over many years by its liberation foundation, further contributed to the political failure of South Africa. The party has allowed delinquent leaders to misuse every one of the platforms that were intended to assure good reigning of the country.9,27,39,46,47,52,58,60,79,82,86

It is not even necessary to test the post-1994 leaders against the standards set by legislation to see their rottenness. One can simply look at the company they keep. Mthombothi30 wisely comments30:25:

If you want to know a man and judge his character, look no further than his company. But if he walks in the company of rogues, criminals and hooligans, that man is probably a scoundrel.

This is why it should not be difficult to find out what kind of a man President Jacob Zuma is – just look closely at who he counts among his closest friends. You will see that though our president is not known for unwavering loyalty to his friends, he certainly feels comfortable in their in their circle of corruption.

In the selecting of an executive political leader the “primary principle must be that only people who are respected, knowledgeable, capable and enlightened will lead. Rank should not be something that is imposed – it should be earned”, writes Boon.9: 104

In the selection of leaders three powers are present: the “ordinary strength or power” (in African language: amandla) with its opposite of “negative energy to destroy power” (umbango), and the “strength that comes from many people” (ibandla). With his indigenous South African approach and reflection on leadership, Boon9 very successfully reveals the presence of the odd good executive political leader versus the abundance of bad executive political leaders in the country’s politics in general and in particular in the leadership of the present-day ANC. On the modus operandi of the scoundrels when they overpower the political system and push out the odd good executive political leader, Boon9: 91 writes:

In an umhlangano [interactive forum], maximum positive criticism and creative energy is generated. In the umbango, one finds individuals who negatively criticize to achieve their own ends – perhaps even to dethrone the leader. In an umhlangano, criticism is made to strengthen the leader and one another. There is a very fine line between the two concepts. South Africa, in particular, because of recent history, tends to have difficulty differentiating between the two. In the umbango, one argues for position. In the umhlangano, one argues to build and strengthen what is being created.

One of the ways in which the umbango gains strength is to nullify positive arguments, refuse to participate and to intimidate anyone whose thrust is towards openness and togetherness. This is achieved by creating subversive dissension and fear, by isolating the leaders of the positive thrust and attempting to discredit them. An effort is made to position the leaders as the enemies of the people.

In the past, one would often hear the word impimpi. Roughly translated, this means ‘sellout’. It was and sometimes still is used to stop people from participation openly with one another, and, more particularly, with management. In this way, one shifts from an umhlangano to an umbango. Forcing the openness of all procedures and discussions works directly against the umbango. Openness works against politicking and the formation of camps. In an open environment, the umbango will die.

As part of his “African perspective” on effective and good leadership for South Africa, Boon9 brings two other perspectives to the foreground, both deeply intertwined with executive political leaderships, namely 1) our present-day Western governmental system and its applicability on future South Africa’s government; and 2) our present messy system of leadership. Here he makes us think again (and provides insight into the ANC’s confusion about effective and good executive leadership and a regime of good governance since 1994), when he says9: 64:

One of the dangers of a rapidly developing Africa is that we lose sight of balance. In pursuit of being First World, of displaying the success of our progress away from the tribe, we can easily lose ourselves in intellectualization.

We are Africans! We are not Americans or Europeans. We are Africans. And yet, in a state of sad and sometimes aggressive ignorance, many black people have lost touch with their African roots. In many instances, they are more ‘Western’ and more ‘intellectual’ than apparently Western whites. Because of this, they are even more lost, for now it is they who intellectualize everything. They are desperately clinging to intellectualism so that they can find themselves. In reality, they are taking future generations down the same road that the West has discovered is the way to lose one’s humanity. This is reflected in the great drives in search of self, humanity, emotion, community and success.

Looking critically at Boon’s9 view, the question arises: is the present South African executive leadership of the ANC not in an African grip, while they have to function in the Western system left by the NP’s reign? Is this “African” context not directly responsible for the present mess of our executive political leadership? Think here of Zuma’s behaviours in personal and public life as reflected at his home and public meetings, even in parliamentary sittings. Specific in relation to Boon’s9 above description: Can Zuma in terms of his leadership qualities and characteristics, intellectualize anything?

On a more sober and clear note, Boon9 concludes by commenting on the need to kick out political “clingfishes” like Zuma who are trying to make the presidency a heritage for a bloodline of crooks and who are intent on erasing the odd executive political leader for ever from our politics:9: 104

Mature leadership dictates that we routinely and constantly attempt to employ people who are more capable than us or who, at the very least, have the potential to be. If this does not happen, the organization will, over the years, gradually slip into mediocrity and disappear. The culture of employing less capable people is perpetuated by people we employ, who in turn employ people who are less capable than them, and so on. To reverse this takes enormous confidence.

The writers Boon9, Collins84, Freibergs85, Ginsberg4 and Mthombothi30 stress that good executive leaders promote and assure the growth and development if an organization, as well as the growth of new, bettered executive leaders to take the organization into the future. The growth of a new generation of executive leaders must thus be based on amandla. The umbango of the crooked executive leaders should be fought. 9 Boon writes9: 104:

By employing people who are ‘better’ than us, we become driven. By surrounding oneself with ever-better people and by stimulating their personal growth, one empowers the organization, giving it life, passion and fortitude. They push us, challenge us, and force us to learn, grow and lead in ever-improving ways. Should we reach a level at which we can no longer progress, and those following us can, we must accept that it is right for them to overtake us. We do, after all, think highly of them and respect them, because that is why we brought them into the organization!

These kinds of leaders are undoubtedly not on the lookout for gateways to penetrate our social and political systems for their own gain.

Can this also be said of the present-day dynamics of the ANC’s executive leadership? Undoubtedly not. Our present-day leaders have become caught in their abuse of the various platforms, entities and institutions that are meant to be noble instruments with which the executive political leader may rule.

The odd good executive political leader is an endanger species: the scoundrels, criminals, hooligans, rogues and crooks who have positioned themselves well in the present-day executive political leadership of the country, are just too powerful.

3.6.2 The hostility of the media houses

It must be remembered that satisfying the needs and demands of an entire nation, especially one as complex as that of South Africa, is difficult for any executive political leader, however extraordinary politician he might be. Often very sincere politicians are portrayed very negatively. The South African media’s various branches are central to this phenomenon. They use umbango and impimpi to disempower the odd good executive political leaders if they do not view him as meeting their requirements. Prominent role players are the press, the radio and the television. Chomsky writes as follows about this blind subjectivity of the media houses26:83: “There is nothing wrong with giving tentative support to a particular candidate as long as that person is doing what you want.” An excellent example is the constant variety of personal and leadership attacks on Donald Trump by American and world media associated with liberal thinking and media sympathetic to the Democratic Party of America. Built into this organized media hostility against Trump is the fake news and misinformation about him. What applies to Trump also applies to the political leaders of other countries, including South Africa.9,39,40,79

What is unique to South Africa is the capture of the media by the majority in their organized effort to manipulate information on political leaders. This is not only reflected in Black-versus-White politics, but is also very prominent within the ruling ANC leadership in their efforts to discredit their own good executive political leaders. They rather promote scoundrels, criminals, hooligans, rogues and crooks as executive political leadership. The recent efforts from within the ANC’s inner circles to isolate and discredit Cyril Ramaphosa by spreading false information to get him reject from the ANC’s lists of presidential candidates, is a good example. It is difficult to believe, but often these media manipulations and false information to the voters and the general public, works effectively, with serious long-term negative consequences for the good leader.29,30,86,87

Coogan40 writes the following on this negative state of affairs40:3:

The disillusionment of voters is fed by the way that politicians are portrayed in the media. Long gone is the age of deference in which journalists addressed political leaders as ‘sir’ and reported their words with reverence. When our leaders are not mocked on comedy shows, they are denounced as traitors or crooks on talk shows.

As if the press and TV are not enough, the Internet is a haven for conspiracy theorists and trolls, who can use the anonymity of the Web to spew abuse without comeback. Sometimes it seems as if it is no longer possible for reasonable people to disagree reasonably; unpopular views on the part of a politician are often automatically taken as a sign of corrupt motives or moral turpitude.

Martinez6 emphasizes that impartiality is unattainable in the media world: it is impossible to present information objectively, neutrally or impartially. Certain ideas, perspectives and facts are side-lined by the subjective agendas (and often with very bad intentions) of editors, executives in charge and the media owners (and crooked politicians who often have corrupt relationships with the media). The media and have much to gain and their actions must be aggressive and direct: “Methods now are by propaganda, consumerism, stirring up ethnic hatred, all kinds of ways.”26:83 In the middle of this muddle the good executive political leader is basically naked, depending on some loyalty and support of certain less biased media houses. Even for a very popular politician (notwithstanding always good), the process of obtaining the goodwill of the media houses for various opportunistic reasons can quickly turn wrong. The politician can be turned into a public political failure by misinformation on the radio, television and in newspapers aimed at the uninformed public.6,40

On information manipulation, Martinez writes6:177:

The power of voters is dependent on what they know. Information is the oxygen of democracy: its health depends on the quality of the ideas and facts circulating through society. If voters can be systematically misled, they can be systematically manipulated.

If a politician wants to have any hope for success in politics, the first step is to gain the favour of the mass media. Martinez6 writes that to establish a candidate’s suitability for entrance into a political career, his “political status” must be evaluated first as one of “acceptability,” after which these6:327: “…findings have to traverse the political battleground of the corporate-owned mass media before they can permeate the public consciousness”. For the good executive political leader to make it just to the corporately owned mass media’s entrance door for evaluation and consideration is basically a near impossible task. Getting a thumbs-up from them when evaluated according to their requirements for successful politics is another story.

Good executive political leaders are plentiful, depending on the group to whom they belong and thus the group who had put them in power as executives (majority, preferable homogeneously driven). Those leaders coming from the majority (empowered) are in general evaluated more positively than those from the minority (disempowered) group. Individuals and groups active outside the dominant majority or homogeneous group’s affiliation – opposition leaders who are mostly seen as representing the political, economically, racially and social losers (minorities) of the population – are mostly portrayed by subjective media houses as bad leaders whose political influences and impact must be erased. In South Africa, internal Black conflicts (the executive political leaders of one tribe against another tribe’s executive political leaders), as well as resistance from the other minorities, like the Afrikaners, can, with well-steered contaminated media influencing, cause serious ethnic and racial unrest and even revolution. This kind of planned influence can quickly overturn the present ANC regime, in the process taking down their executive political leaders. A totally new group of executive political leaders, thus far unknown in the country, can be created, notwithstanding the fact that they are not at present part of the ANC majority.4,7,17,29,33,39

It is clear that the organized media is being used extensively as a specific platform in the making as well as the unmaking of executive political leaders in South Africa, depending how successfully a leader or his group can use the media to attract the public’s attention. The outcome of discrediting the truly good political leader is prominent in this process.

3.7 Psychopathology in the behaviour of executive political leaders

Many studies postulate that cold-blooded executive political leaders, for example Adolf Hitler, reflect psychopathology, especially the psychopathic personality. These leaders do not care about the interests and lives others in the least. What they preach in public as politicians and what they plan and do in private as politicians are opposites. Africa has had its share of murderous autocrats and despots who disregarded the foundations of the democracies they took over (either by selection or force). Usually the lives of their country’s people are of zero importance.2,4,3,9,39,84

However, there is also evidence that psychopathology is not necessarily generally present in executive political leaders who make them guilty of serious offences, like terrorism, against their enemy. The study of Martinez6 confirms the lack of an overwhelming presence of psychopathology in terrorists’ mindsets.

Powell7 confirms this when he writes7: 18:

There are indeed psychopaths in the ranks of terrorist groups, but Louise Richardson says ‘terrorists, by and large, are not insane at all. Their primary shared characteristic is their normalcy, in so far as we understand them. Psychological studies of terrorism are virtually unanimous on this point’.

Powell7 quotes Richardson7:18 to support his view:

‘…terrorists are neither crazy nor amoral but rather are rationally seeking to achieve a set of objectives’. It is true to say they have their own rationality: something is driving them to take up arms and they want undoubtedly something to achieve.10

Remember, Menachem Begin, the leader of the terrorist group Irgun Zvai Leumi in Israel that was very active in the large scale murdering of Arabs in the 1930s to 1940s, was a hard-core terrorist who had learned his terrorist tactics from IRA campaign of 1919–1921 and the campaigns of the Russian anarchists. The original IRA studied the terrorist tactics of the Boers used in their guerrilla fighting (equal to terrorism) against the British between 1898 and 1902. Each one of these groups had their own reasons; often they were persons who took up arms because they had something to achieve, as did the terrorist ANC’s executive political leaders in their struggle for Black freedom or the executive leaders of the Voortrekker Boers in their terrorism against the Blacks when occupying the Transvaal and Free State regions. These various persons and groups were certainly not all crazy.7

Another argument is that all these people are atheists, an attribute that would supposedly make them cold-blooded as people. Nelson Mandela was specifically labelled an atheist. Although it is true that many of the ANC’s executive political leaders seem to be atheists (a characteristic which certainly does not make them insensitive to other people’s well-being or make them ‘bad’ persons per se), there is also overwhelming evidence that many of ANC’s executive leaders who were indeed terrorists were Christian believers. Belief in God, especially Christianity, is not a guarantee that such believing politicians will not get engage in terrorism: the Irish Christian terrorists and the Christian NP leadership’s involvement in the killing of their opponents confirms that religion per se is not a restraint. In fact, some studies confirm the presence of extreme religiousness as a specific characteristic of some terrorists.6,7,33,39

Louw33 is of the opinion that the Afrikaner problem of Apartheid is too complex to simplify it as some kind of psychopathology. Many other unrelated negative external determinants are also involved. A comprehensive study is needed to understand the racism of the Afrikaners. He emphasizes on the other hand that psychological and emotional problems can form the basis of serious social, even criminal, behaviour. Indeed, a psychopathic foundation makes the individual insensitive, exploitative and cold-blooded towards other persons, but the presence of clinically significant psychopathy is rare in the greater society. Louw33 reflects that studies on the behaviour of people from ancient times until the present show that the mass behaviour of the greater society can reflect behaviour bordering on psychopathic. He writes33:87-88:

The stories from the Old Testament of the Holy Bible describing in-depth the Jews outright and totally murdering of innocent non-Jews communities that hey conquered in their entrance into Israel from Egypt, instigated, and instructed mostly by their religious leaders in the name of the “God of the Jewry.” The Nazis leadership’s successfully mesmerizing of the Germans to commit the genocide of Jews as well as other non-Germans confirms this internalizing of doctrine further. Basic to these behaviours stand mass discrimination; In the Jewish and the German cases more ethnic orientated against people of the same race as the Afrikaners’ discrimination against people of another race. To be coerced into such mal-behaviour requires a tendency and latent disposition in the mindset of the culprits to be acceptable for these doctrines of misbehave and to commit it. To argue subjective that these culprits also as nations were permanent evil or psychologically genetically malfunctioning, is wrong, and inapplicable. Other activating and contaminating powers are also involved to activate and up-keep mal-behaviour in the mindsets of ordinary people and nations as a whole.

About the presence of on possible psychopathology in the Afrikaner mindset, Louw writes33: 80:

On the other side bad behaviour cannot originate in the individual’s mind without his own reasoning and permission, understanding, acceptance, and a willingness to participate in it. This indicates the presence of a latent cognition in his mindset, waiting and ready to be activated by external stimuli, ending in various forms of abnormal behaviour. It seems as if the Jews and Germans (and the Afrikaners in their Apartheid dogma) fell prey to this faulty cognition.

On the extent to which negative external influences can contribute to dangerous behaviour among the Afrikaners, Louw33:89 postulates:

In this regard it must be noted that the majority of ordinary nationalist Afrikaners a mandate to their leaders through the ballot box to act on their behalf and on their own discretion to drive and manage apartheid, knowing well that this included the cold-blooded murder of political opponents and dissidents. They never tried through elections to make a turn-around, and this makes them party to these crimes and brings their cognitive judgement and thus general mental health under suspicion.

Louw33 comments on the abuses by Afrikaner leaders by stating that they should have learned from the mistakes of other nations, such as the Nazis. Louw reports33: 88-89:

It is clear that a manifold of negative external influences, examples, circumstances, and environments, events over a short period or coming over centuries, can be used by cunning, manipulative leaders with flawed thinking as drivers to establish deviant doctrines and ideologies in the mindsets of large groups and to activate and internalize bad behaviour like the practice of discrimination. In the case of the Jews as well as the Germans, these external causes were seemingly manifold, causing common people to accept leaders who “lead and defend on their behalf their rights, property, cultural and religious lifestyles and nationhood”…

When he writes specifically about the Afrikaners’ behaviour during Apartheid Louw says33: 89:

In the case of the creation and practice of the Afrikaner’s Apartheid there seems, as with the Jews and the Germans, to be clear and specific historical causes that over centuries led to the internalizing of discrimination against non-Whites. The Afrikaners came to view it as correct, acceptable, and normal. This internalizing dimension does not acquit the Afrikaners as individuals or as a group from their flawed thinking in their racial discrimination…

Looking critically at possible psychopathology among the Afrikaners in their practice of Apartheid, it seems that there are strong signs of it. It is impossible to make a diagnosis on a general observation without formally testing all Afrikaners for psychiatric or psychological pathology. Looking on the severity of the practice of Apartheid’s atrocities, and the fact that the most Afrikaners ignored the signs of murder, also confirms the presence of psychopathology among the general Afrikaner people. The best conclusion that can be made under the present circumstances is that of Louw33: 89: In light of their public acceptance and formal acceptance of Apartheid at the ballot box, knowing very well the serious transgression going with it, the judgement and thus general mental health, of Afrikaners is under suspicion.

It must be accepted that the psychopathology of the Afrikaner was manipulated by the psychopathic leaders. Here psychopathology refers to the mindset of thousands of Afrikaner supporters of Apartheid and the mindsets of their executive leaders.33

4. Conclusions

The soap opera of politics and governments will never be eliminated. This is a cause for celebration – human judgement in all its fallibility will ultimately reign supreme. However much we know and however much power we wield there will always be the unexpected development to throw us of course. For those with power, hubris is always a risk. Pride comes before a fall, in government above all (Barber2:288-289).

Barber2 continues to say that the pride of executive political leaders drives a variety of negative characteristics such as self-promotion and self-service, recklessness, ruthlessness, opportunism, delinquency and crookery, cold-bloodedness, racism, lack of integrity, manipulation murderousness, flawed thinking and social malfunctioning.2,9 Boon9 describes the South African politicians excellently with his two classes: takers and mobsters. These are the true identities of most of the South African politicians, but instead of seeing this, we honour them with bronze statues; the naming of buildings, townships and airports; specific years of national remembrance; honorary doctorates, half-knighthoods and knighthoods; and even, it seems, as saints and semi-gods.2,9,33,88

This research shows they are driven by four main aims and intentions in life: self-enrichment, ownership of immense and unlimited political power, cold-blooded rule and if needed, extinguishing the lives of other humans and a life of unlimited crookery and delinquency. It interesting to look at the attempted assassination and successful assassinations of politicians in South Africa: from 2000 to 2016 more than 1 000 attempted assassinations were reported. It seems that from 1994 for certain ideological political reasons the focus shifted from killing to mafia-style violence against opponents, bring down the murder count. Although many of these attempts are purely economically and gang driven, some were political. There have been a number of successful assassinations of politicians, especially in Kwazulu-Natal. These assassinations of politicians are not a post-1994 trend, but as the TRC reflected, a phenomenon that was also part of the NP regime’s political “solutions”. This is further confirmation of the extent to which crooks had infiltrated the South African politics and their focus on remaining in power. It can be expected that political assassination up to the 2019 general election can become much more focused on prominent executive political leaders of the ANC.89-92 Remembers that many of the new leaders who were elected in 2018 are not Xhosas or Zulus. Again, take note of Tshabalala’s warning38:13: “Beware, the snake might be dead but those who share its secrets can still bite”.

Looking to our political history it seems to be the Whites, especially the Afrikaners’ executive political leaders, who were at the forefront of transgressions in South Africa. This is with specific reason that Smith writes93:18: “No man did more to create the environment in which thousands of anti-apartheid activists were detained and tortured by the security forces than Balthazar Johannes Vorster – know as BJ or John Vorster”. These unbelievable wrongdoings are not limited to Grand Apartheid (1948-1994), but stretch back over three hundred years of our history. The former PAC-leader, Motsoko Pheko94, is more than justified when he refers to role of specifically Whites (Afrikaners) in the colonization and land expropriation of South Africa (and Africa), saying94:10: “…though colonists called it the spreading of ‘Western Christian civilisation’, it was in fact, colonial terrorism”, and: “This was a crime against humanity. It was theft.” Indeed, the TRC failed to settle the “bad accounts” left by the NP-AB-DRC-alliance leaders, especially their failure to send the “accounts” to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for collecting.

But the Blacks — from the ANC to the PAC (and the PAC’s Motsoko Pheko, who is now crying “White terrorism” and “White crime against humanity”) — are equally guilty of Black terrorism and Black crimes against humanity.33,94 Here I am not referring to the ANC and PAC’s terrorism between the 1940s and 1990s (one can almost pardon this due to the oppression that the Blacks suffered and their fight to obtain equality in South Africa up to 1994), but is goes as far back as Shaka and Mzilikazi, and then of course, their post-1994 modern failed executive leaders, starting from Nelson Mandela up to Jacob Zuma.2,33 They and the Afrikaner leaders are birds of the same feather and were the main reason that debts to pay could not be sent to the ICC.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) closed it eyes to the actions of the Whites and the pre-1994 Black actions via the ANC. Instead it keeps itself busy with the atrocities of various Northern African delinquent political leaders whose political atrocities were not that much different from the Afrikaner Nationalist executive political leaders or the political atrocities of the ANC’s leadership. At the same time it seems as if the ICC turns a blind eye to the West’s killings and atrocities, especially in the Middle East. The ICC’s view on South Africa’s pre-1994 transgressions on both sides is seemingly in line with the convenient “illegal but legitimate” view on the Serbian killings by the Western forces. The judgment of the International Independent Commission of Inquiry (IICI) reads: “It was illegal because it did not receive approval from the UN Security Council…but it was legitimate because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and there was no other way to stop the killings and atrocities in Kosovo.”3:122 This verdict and interpretation are stretching international law in an extreme form and is deplorable. South Africans, Black and White, got away with the same kinds of acts as their Western (White) counterparts by the ICC. South Africans have not improved since 1994, in fact, their thinking has deteriorated.

What is so surprising is that both Blacks and Whites suffered oppression and their turned around and oppressed in response. It is a good example of Herodotus’ revenge-counter-revenge theory.95 We are repeating the vicious circle of wooden-headedness. The post-1994 ANC executive political leaders, as were the White and Afrikaner executive political leaders up to 1994, are also takers and political mobsters.9,16,33,94,95

Ultimately the failed Afrikaner executive political leaders learned the hard way, and Barber2 offers a sincere warning applicable to the Blacks2: 288-289: “For those with power, hubris is always a risk. Pride comes before a fall, in government above all.” The chances are good that they will also learn that hubris is always a risk.

Many leaders have come and gone in the South Africa political history. Some left no footprint whatsoever; others were remembered for a while before they became ghosts of the past. Some became icons, also to disappear into the archives of history as numbered files. The pictures of more recent ones are still colourful and are shown around; the pictures of older ones yellowed with time, cracked and the faces indistinct. Some are still loved, at least in some way; others are despised and bitterly hated. Some called it a day and resigned freely from their posts; others were recalled; some passed away peacefully; others died violently. If we would be offered the opportunity to speak to our dead leaders in the afterlife, why would we, even if we could? In life they failed South Africa as executive political leaders; what can they now teach us besides mistakes, mistakes…and wooden-headedness? When it comes to the few living ex-leaders, we have stopped talking to them long ago; we don’t want to hear more lies and wooden-headedness from the living dead.

There is no point in denying that ethnicity and racism exist, writes Boon9:63: “It simply does, whether one likes it or not. But it needs not to be negative. It can be the most inclusive, colourful, wonderful and positive thing”. But when ethnicity and racism are being used to fan hatred of other groups, evil is being done. This evil is exactly what the Afrikaner Nationalist executive political leaders did with the “Black danger” from 1948 to 1994 to attract the votes of the common Whites. Since 1994 the ANC has started fanning ethnic and racial hatred of Whites. The ANC’s executive political leaders captured the platform “White danger” for their own gain. It seems that they learned a lot about wrongdoing from their White twin brother.

South Africa’s political dividers and disrupters must learn there is much wisdom, empowerment and blessing in the Swahili proverb: Unity is strength, division is weakness. Such a positive political concept can only come with a re-evaluation of good-versus-bad executive political leaderships and good-versus-bad regimes of governance. Trouble-making executive political leaders must learn that their time as political masters of manipulation and opportunism, takers and political mobsters are over in the South African politics.

The behaviours of South Africa’s executive political leaders are inexplicable and border on the insane. The remnants of the ideological wars between the Whites and the Blacks will be with us for a long time to come. We still see the remnants of Willem Adriaan van der Stel, Paul Kruger, DF Malan and HF Verwoerd’s actions in the thinking, planning and actions of many present-day Afrikaners. The same can be said about the negative remnants left by the executive political leaders Shaka, Mzilikazi, Nelson Mandela and Jacob Zuma. Their actions affect the thinking, planning and actions of some of the present-day Black executive political leaders ruling South Africa.4,9,27,33,54,58,60,61,63-68,95

It is no wonder that Engelbrecht23,97 after he reviewed Ronnie Kasrils’s97 book on Jacob Zuma, says23:12-13: “Kasril’s book reveals a serpent’s nest that confirms one’s suspicions that most politicians – everywhere, not just in South Africa – are cunning and dangerous snakes.” [Own translation].

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  82. Roberts JM. The Penquin History of the World. London: Penquin; 1995.
  83. Zuma JG. Running a country is more difficult than to fight for freedom. Sunday Times. 2017 Oct. 29; p. 23.
  84. Collins J. Good to Great. London: Random House; 2001.
  85. Freiberg K, Freiberg J. Guts! Companies that blow the doors off business-as-usual. London: Doubleday; 2004.
  86. Hartley R. ‘Ramaphosa, the Man who would be King’. Cape Town; Jonathan Ball; 2017.
  87. Zulu P. ‘Sex scandal’ more a misdirected missile than a bombshell disclosure. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2017 Sept. 24; p. 22.
  88. Matshiqi A. Both sides of Zuma divide risk bringing the edifice down. Sunday Times. 2017 Aug. 20; p. 21.
  89. Hitman hostel shows up crisis in justice system. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2017 July 23; p. 24.
  90. Nine bullets to silence a talkative insider. Sunday Times (Insight). 2017 July 23; p. 20.
  91. Shaw M. Hitman for Hire. Exposing South Africa’s Underworld. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball; 2017.
  92. Shaw M. Execution to order. Sunday Times (Insight). 2017 July 23; p. 20.
  93. Smith T. Timol inquest breakthrough is an important step in exorcising ghost of BJ Vorster. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2017 Oct. 15; p.18.
  94. Khumalo A. Land debate the first of many we need to save SA. Sunday Times (Business). 2018 Mar. 11; p .10.
  95. Kapuściński R. Travels with Herodotus. London: Penguin; 2007.
  96. Rantete J. The African National Congress and the Negotiated Settlement in South Africa. Pretoria: Van Schaik; 1998.
  97. Kasrils R. A simple Man. Kasrils and the Zuma Enigma. Pretoria: Jacana; 2018.


Not commissioned; Externally peer-reviewed.


The author declares that he has no competing interest.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652-2018. Part 1: Leadership characteristics in perspective

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: appraisal, characteristic, constitution, executive governance, guarantee, hypocrisy, integrity, leadership, liberator, mindset, organization, regime.

Ensovoort, volume 38(2018), number 6:1

  1. Background

1.1 Introduction

The concept leader is prominent in the South African literature when reflecting on the country’s past and present executive political leaders. In this context the term executive political leaders refers specifically to governors at the Cape Refreshment Station, of the Cape Colony and the other colonies, prime ministers of the Union of South Africa and presidents of the Republic of South Africa.

Leaders are usually identified by descriptive adjectives like great, famous, traditional, strong, interactive, powerfully, true and mature. The user’s primary aim with these adjectives is to reflect and describe the quality of the person and the reign of these leaders South Africa. Some descriptions, overviews and opinions on the executive political leaders are contain classifications such as good, poor, under-par and failed leaders, depending mostly on the political and racial orientation of writers. This descriptions, overviews and opinions are also applicable on regimes.1-4

A critical analysis of South African literature reflects that these descriptions are not only very subjective, but also vague. It fails to define and to describe in depth who and what an executive political leader is and the characteristics and behaviour unique to each individual leader. This failure to offer complete descriptions is also reflected in considerations of the various regimes of South Africa, from the rule of the Dutch and British, to the South African Party (SAP) and the National Party (NP) in the period of the Union and the NP and the African National Congress (ANC) in the management of the Republic.3,5-9

This article, Part 1: Leadership characteristics in perspective, is the first in a series of five articles in this project (Project One) to evaluate and describe the performance profiles of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa (previously the Cape Colony) for the period 1652 to 1795.

The articles that make up the rest of this series are:

  • Part 2: The entities in government and society that executive political leaders use to aid their political behaviour;
  • Part 3: Factors that influence the development of executive political leaders;
  • Part 4: A basic checklist for the appraisal of executive political leaders and regimes;
  • Part 5: Performance profiles of executive political leaders and regimes for the period 1652 to 1795.

This project will be followed by a second project (Project Two) with another series of five articles on the performance profiles of executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa, covering the remaining period of 1796 to 2018. In this case the focus will be on the performance profiles of executive political leaders and regimes in five timeframes: 1796 to 1872 (Part 6), 1873 to 1909 (Part 7), 1910 to 1948 (Part 8), 1949 to 1994 (Part 9) and 1995 to 2018 (Part 10).

The aim of this article is to put the characteristics of executive political leaders of South Africa in perspective.

  1. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research, like on the topic of the quality of the current political leadership of South Africa. The sources used include articles from 2017 to 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2018. These sources were consulted to put the characteristics of executive political leaders into perspective.10-12

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

  1. Results

3.1 Current general public opinions and views on the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa

Political commentators give us various opinions and views on the South African executive political leaders, sometimes in a very one-sided manner from a subjective corner. This is especially true of commentators from among the Afrikaners, who feel like derelicts in the post-1994 political environment and see such writing as an opportunity to litigate. Historians try to base their views and opinions on historical facts, but in many cases the history of Apartheid contaminates the work of historians with feelings of guilt that subtract from their objectivity.

Some comments are cited below to provide a bit of perspective on South African executive political leaders and their regimes. These passages reflect how some South Africans in general, and Afrikaners specifically, see these leaders.

Elmer Bredenkamp recently wrote13:10:

Paul Kruger plunged the Boers into a war with the powerful British Empire with tragic consequences, and then fled overseas. Genl. Jan Smuts’s obsession with the British king plunged his people into further poverty. John Vorster and PW Botha started a war outside our borders in Angola, which held no danger for South Africa, and tried to solve the country’s internal problems with violence. FW de Klerk was the weakest of them all. He negotiated a good handshake for himself and plunged the Afrikaner into a no man’s land with inhumane racist legislation. Not one of these leaders had been elected democratically, but rather by a small group of self-serving, greedy souls of a political party [Own translation].

Above opinion to a certain extent seems to be subjective and right wing orientated. It criticizes Afrikaner leaders for seemingly failing in the long run to be effective, good political leaders who govern and steer South Africa and for cold-bloodedly betraying the Afrikaner cause. This view is a good representation of a so-called minority view on South African politics within the country’s heterogeneous population that is governed by a majority group13.

Other literature1,2,6-8,14,15 on South African executive political leaders and regimes, covering the period 1652 to 2018, also reflects certain deviant behaviours of the executive political leaders and their regimes, very much in line with the opinion of Bredenkamp.13

From critical literature it seems as if the Black successors of the White political leaders of South Africa after 1994 have not been doing much better than Kruger, Smuts, Vorster, Botha and De Klerk. The idea that the political leadership of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki showed infallible integrity and were free from self-conceit, self-enrichment and opportunism is a falsity. This is evident from the literature available on their respective rules. It is argued that the criminality that so undermines good executive political leadership was already awakened in 1994 by the incoming political leaders of the new regime, run by the elite of the African National Congress (ANC), long before the controversial Jacob Zuma arrived on the scene as the ultimate delinquent political leader.16,17

The South African academic and political analyst, Dr Piet Croucamp, writes18:8:

“The first cracks in the ‘morality of liberation’ were revealed under former pres. Nelson Mandela when ‘the face of all that could go wrong’, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, showed poor judgement that resulted in corruption” [Own translation].

The role of Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, in the Arm’s Deal Scandal and his selective “Alzheimer memory and ongoing amnesia” about his direct involvement in the matter is still a criminal controversy today, indicating his overall failure as an executive political leader with integrity. His immense overall shortcomings as a political leader directly led to his recall as the president of South Africa by his own party in September 2008.2,17-19,20

Croucamp18 describes the corrupt and substandard political leadership of the most recent president of South Africa, the “most honourable” Mr Zuma, who egoistically reign the country through the Zupta-gang and the ANC’s Luthuli house parliament, as follows18:8:

Many South Africans, probably most citizens of this country, regard pres. Jacob Zuma with some contempt, even hate. He is undermining, criminal and without conscience in his understanding of the democratic process. Without changing the Constitution, he changed, broke and manipulated the political rules of the game in the country until most South Africans lost their trust in the sustainability of the 1994 compromise [Own translation].

Boon1:25, in the context of good versus bad executive political leaders and regimes, written about the deviant behaviour of Black executive political leaders from 1810 to 1840. He focuses on the murderous conquest and rule of some tribes over other Black tribes, specifically Shaka, king of the Mthetwa and Zulu tribes, during the early 1800s to the middle 1800s. The land and human rights of other established and independent Black tribes were ignored by aggressive executive political Black leaders (who Boon1 calls “great,” seemingly sanctioning their histories of outright murder as good to present them in the literature as the “fathers of the Black nations”). These were all Black leaders who brought excruciating hardship and blooshed to hundreds of thousands of Blacks in South Africa. Boon1 writes about the Zulu leader Shaka’s rigid, uncompromising and selfish behaviour (very much in line with the rigid, uncompromising and selfish behaviour of Afrikaner leaders Kruger, Smuts, Botha and De Klerk towards Blacks during Apartheid as portrayed by Bredenkamp13), as follows 1:26:

Soon Shaka had decimated his northern neighbours, the Ndwandwe, and his Zulu armies were the undisputed power in a region extending from the Tugels River in the South, to the Pongola in the north, and the Buffalo in the west. His expansionist policies had a further devastating effect on the region. In the south, all the way to the Umtata River, people gradually lost everything to the Zulus – their cattle, their ability to raise crops (which were constantly taken by foraging Zulu armies), their young women and, eventually their dignity. Henry Francis Fynn, who travelled through the area at that time, wrote of emaciated and desperate people, who were dirty, terrified and, in some instances, turning to cannibalism as their means of survival. Thus began a period of migration of people who fled from Shaka and tyranny, as he raided and terrorized the tribes bordering Zululand.

Ginsberg21 elaborates further on the actions and qualities of executive political leaders and their governments at the Cape during the 17th century. He first refers to the Dutch and then to the British governors who came after 1806 with their autocratic powers. Especially prominent was the British establishment’s enforcement of autocratic imperial rules at the Cape Colony in the 1800s. He writes as follows on the impact of these foreign rules and management on the mostly Dutch-orientated inhabitants21:98:

Remember the days of Simon van der Stel, the 17th-century governor of the Cape: when the Dutch settlers grew dissatisfied with him, he was recalled to Holland. Unfortunately, the 1830s saw trekboers (Boer farmers) resorting to every conceivable means of expressing their grievances, but with no power to affect government policies they ultimately took the radical step of entering the interior of an unknown continent [Great Trek].

Linking the above with the current situation, it seems as if the new South African president, Cyril Ramaphosa, is already starting to play to the masses. The investigative political journalist Barney Mthombothi writes in short22:21:

But could it be that Ramaphosa is also struggling with a transition of his own — from obsequious underling to the headstrong honcho plotting the political demise of his former boss? How can one be a servant one day and a master the next? Or play both roles interchangeably, which Ramaphosa seems to be doing.

The above descriptions, however emotionally coloured “they may be”, are penetrating the political mindsets of many South Africans and require an answer. This discourse shows the urgent need for an appraisal and an evaluation of the quality of the South African executive political leaders and their regimes from 1652 up to today. They should be evaluated in terms of a broad set of criteria of good versus bad executive political leadership and their unique characteristics.

3.2 The effect of South Africa’s hate speech legislation on criticism aimed at incompetent executive political leaders and their practices

In politics there are no holy cows: not Gandhi, Churchill, Verwoerd or Mandela can escape critical appraisals and evaluations. Criticism is the democratic right of the individual. In practice, the contrary has occurred many times. Leaders use false propaganda and cover-ups, like the ANC’s parliamentarians did with their misinformative media statement in November 2017 when Zuma was unmasked in public for his immense constitutional and other wrongdoings, especially his disregard for parliament. Munusamy writes9:26:

The African National Congress lauds President Jacob Zuma for his continuing and undeterred commitment to account to the people of South Africa by regularly appearing before parliament to answer questions on a number of the most pressing issues facing South Africa today.” This false reflection comes after Zuma repeatedly made a mockery of parliament and the ANC caucus with his absence from parliament. When attending, he acted the fool to divert attention away from his wrongdoings.9,17

The above illustrates that during any critical unmasking of prominent political leaders and regimes, there are always efforts to subdue such critism, either by law, abuse of the media and even physical attacks. It has become difficult to evaluate executive political leaders critically, notwithstanding the fact of their corruption, fraud and theft, especially when they are still alive and acting. South Africa’s foolish but effective gagging hate speech legislation sees to this. This obstacle to criticism makes for crooked and ineffective leaders who clearly fail to reach as much a level 1 as leaders when judged according to the Collins-Freiberg-Ginsberg classification.21-24

Many succeed in escaping the unmasking of their wrongdoings. The superficial sugar coating of the post-1994 South African executive political leaders as good persons and as good leaders, is well-reflected by their biographers. They only write of excellence, affected by an icon-saint syndrome where no one dares to challenge or to critize. The fact that the hate speech legislation became intertwined with the informal post-1994 policy of political correctness and some formal pieces of security legislation effectively gags historians and political commentators. This is all to clear from the present threat of criminal and civil legal actions against the political writer Jacques Pauw17 after the appearance of his book The President’s Keepers. The book reveals just too much about Jacob Zuma and the ANC as a political party. Historians and commentators are not welcome to evaluate, appraise and describe South Africa’s executive political leaders in depth and critically.

The country’s politico-historical sources have to be tapped for information. Critical appraisals and descriptions of every South African politician, regime and leader are crucial. No former or current political leaders should ever be protected from unmasking and revelation of the truth.1,-8,16,17,25-52

At the moment it seems the leaders who came into parliament with the change to the ANC regime are above reproach. What is more, it has become fashionable to subject the pre-1994 executive political leaders, both White and Black, to ruthless scrutiny. This scrutiny has turned into a one-sided political attack on races that stand on the margins under Black rule. Misleading public statements about the Whites’ status as settlers and colonialists abound (notwithstanding the fact that the Black ethnic groups of South Africa are settlers themselves…but no whisper about this). Strong and justified responses to the attacks by these executive political leaders of the ANC (including attacks on the characters of former leaders) are often silenced by the ANC with a call on hate speech legislation and prosecution. In the meantime they offer doubtful and untrustworthy arguments and excuses to escape attacks on their wrongdoings and incompetences.2,53-68

Research cannot and must not be blocked or captured as has been the case lately when the reprehensible actions of Jacob Zuma were highlighted in the media. The South African nation needs to know the truth. Every member of the ANC elite took part in this silencing of the media when they wanted to report on the failed executive political leadership. The new president of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, was the vice-president and a senior ANC member under Zuma and a willing party to the constant cover-up and the silencing of critics of the ANC. It is time that these ANC leaders are called to book, notwithstanding their various tactics and lies to escape justice.15,17-19, 69-73

Publishing on failed executive political leaders and their regimes in South Africa is not only a right, but indeed a must. It does not matter if it is Jan van Riebeeck, the Afrikaner icons Malan and Verwoerd, the Xhosa icon Mandela or the Zulu Pimpernel Zuma (Here, simple tribal references like Xhosa, Zulu, etc., can result in legal action against critical writers). The democratic right to criticism forms the foundation of this research, covering the executive political leaders and regimes from 1652 to 2018.

Palkhivala74 is clear on the right to freedom of speech and to expression of opinions in terms of a country’s constitution. Citizens have the right to take on any executive political leader or regime that was in office previously or is in office at present. If a country proudly claims a foundation of democracy as South Africa has been doing since 1994, citizens have the right to focus on evaluations and criticism of political leaders and regimes’ contributions in general, be they positive or negative, or on every citizen’s political and civil rights and their well-being in a country (ironically the most suppressive communist states also claim to have these foundations). Palkhivala states74:296-297:

The right to dissent is at the heart of every democracy. This right becomes the duty of every knowledgeable and right-minded citizen, when government acts in a manner detrimental to civil liberties or otherwise against the public interests. The right to dissent is conferred by the Constitution: the duty to dissent is dictated by the realization that in a democracy citizens have to practice obedience to the unenforceable.

Palkhivala74 reacts to the assumed “mandate of unlimited power” of executive political leaders (and their regimes) in charge of the populations who elected them by citing the legal opinion of Justice Frankfurter, who puts it clearly that in a democracy the highest office is not that of the Number One executive (president or prime minister), but that of being a citizen. It is something for which the citizen himself always and constantly must strive and fight for74:297:

Democracy is always a beckoning goal, not a safe harbour. For freedom is an unremitting endeavour, never a final achievement.”

Only with the constant public exposure of rotten executive political leaders and their regimes can democracy be upheld and renewed. Of cause executive political leaders of good standing can be kept upright in this way as well.16,17,25,75

3.3 Lack of literature reflecting the true nature of South African executive political leaders and their political regimes

South Africa lacks in-depth literature that offers descriptions of the quality of the performances of its executive political leadership, specifically with reference to leadership as practiced by its various executive political leaders and their regimes from 1652 to 2018. Only limited references to the behavioural and political practices of the executive political leaders and their regimes are available.

The multiple biographies, articles and books on South African executive political leaders, as well as various autobiographies by these leaders themselves, offer sparse information and descriptions on the precise nature of their leadership, their contributions, or any measure of their quality. Most of research on South African leadership offers many postulations, opinions, viewpoints and “facts”, data that are mostly subjectively influenced by parties, self-conceit and intentions to promote political agendas.It often leads to the personal glorification of substandard and corrupted political leaders and their governments. Literature is used to detract from the failures of these leaders. Even with failed political leadership, some of these political leaders have become icons, even with worldwide status, with very few criticisms lodged against them to point out criminality, psychological pathology and other deviant behaviours associated with them or their regimes. Never ever do researchers dare to ask questions such as: Did leaders so and so serve every citizen of South Africa equally every day before, during and after their reign with the same love and dedication, honesty, justice, objectivity, and benefit? Were they free from racial and cultural biases and did they have the guts to take on immoral socio-political systems and delinquent political leaders without regard for the consequences this may have for their political careers? Moreover, did the many forms of resistance that leaders claim to have shown, the anti’s, keep political leaders on the right tract and their souls pure? Was this resistance really part of these leaders’ personal and political lifestyles – anti-Apartheid, anti-poverty, anti-joblessness, anti-uneducation, anti-corruption, anti-nepotism, anti-racial hate, anti-stealing, anti-lying, anti-religious domination, anti-cultural domination, anti-tribalism, anti-self-enrichment, anti-self-empowerment? 1-4,6-7,16,17,25-37

Can the top South African politicians say with pride and sincerity that Mahatma Gandhi’s goodness is part of their psyche? Not one of the many autobiographies and biographies available offers a convincing answer to the simple “anti-questions” listed above. The many wrongs done by political leaders are kept silent in many of these beautiful accounts that praise them as politicians. The truth is baked into sweet pies of lies by politicians and their autobiographers.

Hard-core facts that can unmask world figures, icons and heroes are just left out. Not even the brilliant authorized biography of Nelson Mandela (undoubtedly one of the best biographies ever to be published on a South African statesman), notwithstanding its honesty and a strong under build of objectivity, really stripped the icon naked. When there is sensitivity about the past, there is always more than the eyes can see, especially when famous politicians are involved. The hypocrisy of the British on political leaders like Begin, Kenyatta, Makarios and Mandela is a reminder of the hard reality of the crooked mindsets of politicians that has spread into the heart of democracy and respectability (and most importantly, objective research).

Daphne Caruana Galizia76, the leading Maltese investigative journalist and fearless critic of corruption who was murdered by means a car bomb in October 2017, was absolutely correct when she on the day of her death said76:23: “There are crooks everywhere you look now.

The above lack of well-grounded critical evaluations on South African executive politicians in general means that this matter should ideally be addressed in a comprehensive study and not within the limited scope of a series of articles. Nevertheless, this series of articles serves to make a start to this endeavour.

3.4 Confusing and subjective descriptions of the good executive political leader

The various declarations, definitions, opinions and views on who and what an executive political leader is and should be, are very complicated, confusing, and indeed controversial. Who or what an executive political leader is for the one writer or government depends on whose side the leader is on: the same person may be a terrorist and a murderer in the eyes of one government, but a hero and a godsend to others. There are also frequent and extreme changes in the valuation of leaders. This is accompanied by radical changes in the values of writers and governments. They change their opinions and views of certain crooked leaders, erasing overnight their memory of the chequered past of the murderer or terrorist, awarding them the status of a saint. Powell77 illustrates excellently how a person can be a terrorist one moment, hunted by many governments, and then the next moment morph into a distinguished executive political leader of world calibre, most welcome in respectable countries. Powell77:1 writes:

The British government called Menachen Begin a terrorist and tried to kill him, they described Jomo Kenyatta as a terrorist and imprisoned him, and they labeled Archbishop Makarios a terrorist and exiled him to the Seychelles – and yet later welcomed all three to London as distinguished leaders of other countries.

Nelson Mandela himself publically admitted2:9: “I was called a terrorist yesterday, but when I came out of jail, many people embraced me, including my enemies.”

The question is thus what specific leadership and personal characteristics make a person a good executive political leader. What leadership and personal characteristics fail the “official” test of goodness? The same can be asked about what kind of behaviour must be reflected to elevate a person’s poor leader status to one of good standing. Prominent in this regard is for example the extreme changes in the status and the descriptions of the political leaders Begin, Kenyatta and Makarios by the British in their reclassification of these leaders as good executive political leaders and the British establishment’s accommodating acceptance of these leaders as good persons.2,77

It must be noted that Begin was seen and honoured as a good leader and a good person by the Jews and his Irgun-group in Israel long before the British changed their opinion of him (in this context murder and terrorism are simply dismissed). The same applies to Kenyatta in Kenia with the Mau-Mau and Makarios with the Maltese Cypriots. The extreme differences in the good-versus-bad classification between various populations and nations confirms the complexity and conflicts that subjective, emotional and cognitive dispositions bring to the appraisals and classifications of political leaders as either good or bad. Of cause, many other factors are at play in the change of mindset decribed above. For instance, the direct and long-term economic, political and diplomatic interests of the UK play a role, since the new political winners in regional and world politics, like Begin, Kenyatta, and Makarios, can play an important long-term role. This can be used opportunistically by showing approval, nullifying and conveniently forgetting the cruel past.2,77

The sudden changes described above are not extraordinary. The British showed same re-evaluation and reclassification of a bad political leader as a good political leader in July 1996 with towards President Nelson Mandela of the Republic of South Africa. In this context Anthony Sampson2, Mandela’s authorized biographer, writes2:xxiii:

In the past, many of the politicians in the audience had regarded him as their enemy, who should never be permitted to lead his country. Many Conservative Members of Parliament had condemned him as a terrorist: the former Prime Minister Lady Thatcher, who is sitting near the front, had said nine years before that anyone who thought the African National Congress was ever going to form the government of South Africa was ‘living in cloud-cuckoo land’. Now cloud-cuckoo land arrived in Westminster Hall.

The above was written when Mandela was honoured in July 1996 as a visiting head of state in Westminster Hall, London, the ancient heart of the House of Parliament, in a ceremony that happens only once or twice in a lifetime. It must also be mentioned that this British mood swing with regard to Mandela already started in March 1995 with the British Queen awarding him the Order of Merit, the most coveted British honour, during her state visit to South Africa.2

Degrading British names used in the press, like St Mandela, quickly changed to Mister and President Mandela. Hypocrisy becomes a normal personal characteristic in the political mind when blurring self-enrichment and political empowerment seemingly overtakes sound thinking and argumentation on good versus bad leadership.2

Such hypocrisy is not unique to the English when it comes to classifying and reclassifying political leaders. In South Africa Nelson Mandela was, in terms of Black thinking, unjustly jailed for political reasons for a long time, receiving a prison number as name, stripped of all human dignity. The NP in turn labelled him with names such as a revolutionary, guerrilla leader, prisoner, violent terrorist and the Black Pimpernel under the executive political leaderships of his biggest political opponents, BJ Vorster, PW Botha and FW de Klerk, and their cronies Pik Botha, Kobie Coetsee and Louis le Grange. Then, suddenly, these arch-enemies officially changed and reclassified his status (and their mindsets also?). They came to call him a statesman and the President of South Africa, the chief executive political leader.2

There can also be a dramatic reclassification when a good executive political leader comes to be viewed as a bad executive political leader, as has been confirmed by the Robert Gabriel Mugabe case of Zimbabwe. This reclassification was again executed by the British, seemingly as part of their local comic: Britain rules the waves versus Britain waves the rules. Mugabe, a well-educated man holding seven degrees, including one from the University of London, initially became notorious for his political group’s atrocies against the Whites in Zimbabwe during the Smith-regime. These murderous inclinations were further extended to Whites after he took power in 1980. However, his murderous inclinations are best reflected by his Fifth Brigade’s massacre of an estimated 20 000 Zimbabweans in the 1980s, mostly from the Ndebele tribe. He ruled Zimbabwe from the 1980s as a despot, ignoring human rights and lives, including that of Zimbabweans. Notwithstanding this murderous record and thus outright failure as an executive leader in terms of world standards and surely also in the eyes of the World Court for Humanity, his indiscretions only increasingly from 1980 to 1994, the British Queen, her Excellence Elizabeth, knighted him in 1994 for his “role in the development of Zimbabwe-UK relations.”78:15 The reference “relations” already indicates British opportunistic intentions and not good leadership based purely on good personal standards and integrity on the side of the UK.78

The question here is clear: How did the British measured the initial goodness of Mugabe as an executive political leader to give him a knighthood in 1994 when his personal and political behaviour at that time had been out of line with the behavior of a good statesman for a long time already? It is only after continued murderous deeds against Whites and Blacks and many other multiple criminal wrongdoings (and an immense rise in hostility towards the British state), that the Queen stripped him of his knighthood in 2008. It took a full fourteen years after his hypocritical mark-up to good on the good-versus-bad classification (enough to meet to the requirements of knighthood), that he was downgraded on the scale to bad, where he indeed belonged from the beginning. The true meaning of hypocrisy and the blurring of sound thinking on the quality of leaders becomes evident from the fact that Mugabe was also shortlisted for the Nobel peace prize in 1981 after his election victory to become Zimbabwe’s first democratically elected president in 1980.78

When considering above negative reflection on Mugabe as a failed executive political leader (ousted as a dictator in Zimbabwe at last, but only in 2018), it is interesting to see that the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the so-called leading countries south of the Congo River and South Africa’s neighbours of good standing, harbours more and more despots and other failed executive political leaders. This includes Mugabe, Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Jacob Zuma (ousted in 2018), as well as the failing executive political leaders of Tanzania, Angola and Zambia. Notwithstanding the negative political actions of these leaders, as presidents they continue to represent independent nations as their heads. They enjoy good status as leaders internationally. Their oppression and the genocides of their own people are not strictly measured and tested on the good-versus-bad classification (or even discussed) anywhere in the Western world because it is not in the West’s interest.79

3.5 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s reflection on poor political leadership and regimes

The 1996 hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)2,45 revealed horrific stories as both perpetrators and victims of Apartheid described cold-blooded details of torture and assassinations. The two main culprits: the ANC and its executive political leaders with their own dark history of political crimes, many times against their own people; and the NP-regime’s atrocities against Blacks as well as White dissidents, argued by their executive political leaders to be committed without their “official permission” by the South African armed and security forces. Notwithstanding this laughable disclaimer, the then active political leaders of the NP, De Klerk, Pik Botha, PW Botha and Magnus Malan stood central to these cold-blooded torture and assassinations. Malan went scot-free after a botched court case, while De Klerk remained evasive and even denied involvement till the end, notwithstanding an “avalanche of evidence”, as Archbishop Tutu2:74 calls it.

Pik Botha’s acknowledgement of guilt with regard to the NP regime’s atrocities goes as far as admitting that all NP cabinet ministers “suspected these killings and torturing”, while PW Botha refused blindly to appear before the TRC to be questioned.2 However, there has been no sign of a proper appraisal and classification of the actions of the NP executive leaders as good or bad.2,45

Mandela’s own response to the prominent NP leaders’ failures as executive political leaders was that De Klerk “allowed the slaughter of innocent people because they are black”.2:474 He had no doubt that De Klerk had to be involved as the top executive political leader of the country. Still, notwithstanding the evidence, the TRC never officially condemned De Klerk and his cronies as failed executive political leaders.2,45

Mandela’s most condemning public statement on the matter of De Klerk as a failed executive political leader was undoubtedly his comment when he was asked whether De Klerk is a “political criminal.” He replied2:474: “Almost everybody in [the NP] government is a political criminal.” This pinpointed for the first time the NP’s failed executive leaderships – justified or not, true or false. Mandela classification extends to De Klerk’s intimate cronies. Mandela, now officially a statesman, one made by De Klerk himself, was forced to step in to denounce De Klerk when the TRC failed to officially admit the failures of the leadership of the Afrikaner regimes from 1910, especially the racist NP-regime from 1948 that also harboured De Klerk.2

Mandela opinion on the quality of South African political leadership cited above raises a very important question that can guide our thinking on and definition of executive political leadership: Is there any integrity left in a person when he or she becomes a successful politician? Formulated differently: Do politics contaminate the mindsets and harm the integrity of people with good and bad attributes so that they end up embracing only their bad attributes? Looking at Apartheid and the ANC’s terrorism in the Struggle years, integrity seems not to be a strong attribute among politicians, and many politicians seem to be besotted by crookery.1-8,16,17,21

On the part of the ANC2, besides their TRC confessions regarding their own bad executive political leadership during the Struggle years, Mandela himself condemned the bad executive political leaderships reflected by ANC politicians after 1994, when, the ANC became2:571: “…lenient towards corrupt Ministers, and too slow to condemn and root out bribery and abuses of power, particularly in the provincial governments, which Mandela admitted were the Achilles heel of democratic governance.” In February 1999 he publically took the leadership to task about failed executive political leadership inside the ANC (something the NP leaders under FW de Klerk failed to do, even today)2:571:

Among the new cadres in various levels of governance you find individuals who are corrupt – if not more – those they found in government. When a leader in a provincially legislature siphons off resources meant to fund service by legislators to the people: when employees of a government institution, set up to help empower those who were excluded by apartheid, defraud it for own enrichment, then we must admit that we are a sick society.

Mandela, as well as De Klerk (and of course all their intimate cronies, at all times playing the ball of hypocrisy with great eagerness), could learn a lot on clean executive politics and how to behave correctly when you are trusted and allowed into the position of an executive political leader of a country. They should in the early days of their political careers have read and studied intensively the old writings of some of the world’s politically wise men, such as those of the Indian trade unionist and politician, Sardar Patel. On the 10th of October 1949 in the Indian Constituent Assembly he said74:263-264:

Have you read history? Or, is it that you do not care for recent history after you have begun to make history? If you do that, then I tell you we have a dark future. Learn to stand upon your pledged word…Can you go behind these things? Have morals no place in the new Parliament? Is that how we are going to begin our new freedom? Do not take a lathi and say, Who is to give you a guarantee? We are a Supreme Parliament. Have you supremacy for this kind of thing? To go behind your word? If you do that, that supremacy will go down in a few days.

Patel74 here sets out a simple consideration of good and bad leadership that a person must think through before embarking on a political career. This consideration is seldom done, simply because politicians are seldom honest and pure in integrity. They hate the truth about their well-masked bad qualities as political leaders. PW Botha and FW de Klerk revealed this at the TRC and Mandela was forced to unmask their bad qualities on their behalve.2,74

What Mandela2 said in February 1999 and Patel74 in October 1949, although indirectly, is that political environments corrupt some people and the intricacies of politics do not hold respect for anyone or anything. For crook-minded politicians politics is heaven on earth, because Mandela and Patel’s pre-selection guidelines for executive political leaders are just seen as after-thoughts and not guidelines to be followed by executive leaders in their politic career choices or their groups’ in-house committees on the selection of good leaders. Any pre-appraisal or guidelines make the selection of good leaders and the rejection of bad leaders possible. This threatens the dubious leader’s future and is therefore disregarded.

  1. Discussion

The above intimate overview of the quality of South African executive political leaders and regimes from the1600s, but especially from the 1950s up to today, on the one hand confirms how bad personal characteristics and qualities have become part of the personalities and behaviour of political leaders. On the other hand it shows how such leaders carry their crooked personal characteristics and qualities into their executive leadership positions, contaminating not only their political regime, but the whole society.

Four prominent questions arise from the above discussion:

  • How can good political leaders be identified and described when there is no well-formulated definition of a good leader?
  • What criteria are there in place to select only good persons as executive political leaders?
  • Are there cultural differences between Blacks and Whites and between the various Black tribes regarding the characteristics each group feels are needed in a good executive political leader in South Africa and/or for the tribe as a leader?
  • Are these differences, if they exist, not similar to the pro-Begin Jews of Israel’s hypocritical view of good versus the anti-Begin     British’s hypocritical view of bad?

This project will try to deal with each of these questions as the research progresses.

4.1 The role of opportunism and self-interest in the good-versus-bad classification of leadership and regime

It is important to focus the attention on the immense political and personal subjectivities that can go with these four questions. It was already demonstrated how the English made a turn a round on the status of political leaders, basically for selfish and opportunistic reasons. There were also, as with the English, very clear selfish and opportunistic reasons for the NP’s turn-around on Nelson Mandela2. The NP elite knew very well in the late 1980s that the South African economy was in shatters and that maintaining Apartheid through war would bring immense loss in human live, especially for the Blacks, which the outside world would not allow to go unpunished.2,46

The common members of the Afrikaner–nationalist groups, abused for nearly five decades by their opportunistic and radical executive political leaders, also became tired of political turmoil and war. They started to reject and to denounce their role as racists and the oppressors of Black South Africans, making the collapse of Afrikaner supremacy and rule by the executive political leaders of the NP-AB-DRC-Alliance, unavoidable. The only person who could get the executive political leaders of the NP-AB-DRC-Alliance out of their growing political mess, was the Black Pimpernel Mandela, the most prominent, but unseen ANC leader. While it is true that he was acclaimed throughout the world as the great liberator, the new Moses or Mesiah, he was an unofficial South African political leader without a tangible power and lacking a convincing liberation army to overrun the NP.2,26,45-46

His leadership benefited from the fact that his prison ordeal transformed him not only into an excellent reflective and influential political leader with vision and finesse, but also into a classical Black hero. This overshadows his many other leadership shortcomings as Sampson eloquently shows in his biography2. In prison, he, the Black hero, became the only saviour and saver of the struggling Blacks in the country under the autocratic Apartheid regime. For the executive political leaders of the NP-AB-DRC-Alliance, he was indeed also the saviour of their personal, political and financial interests in the 1990s in a future South Africa: the ultimate person that must be incorporated into a kind of NP-ANC-alliance. The NP-elite had to adapt to majority rule, not out of goodwill towards the Blacks or Mandela, but to safeguard their own interests and to save their skins. They did this by changing their minds about Mandela.2,46,75

The examples of Begin, Kenyatta, Markarios and Mandela are in line with the findings of South African literature in that the classification of many of the South African executive political leaders who had failed the test as good leaders resulted solely from the personal views (framework of references) of certain journals, writers, regimes and politicians (which are been seen as subjective and false by the opposition supporting the failed leader). Supporters of such disgraced, criminal leaders (as Mandela was classified by the Afrikaner nationalist executive leaders for a long time), oppose any condemning views and opinions that attack the good status of their leaders. For the pro-Mandela supportive groups, their views and opinions on Mandela represent only the truth (which can also be subjective, as guided by their opposing framework of reference). These conflicting classifications found in South African literature with regard to good versus bad executive political leaders, are applicable to both White and Black political leaders, as well as on the various NP as well as ANC executive political leaders.2,77 (These possible kinds of outcomes will be appraised and evaluated in various articles, starting from Part 5 covering the period 1652 to 1795).

This trend in the literature basically nullifies these contradicting literatures. The consideration of South African political leaders depends on the specific time, political regime, race, voter empowerment and sentiment. The total disdain for DF Malan and HF Verwoerd on the side of Blacks in the post-1994 South Africa after they had been glorified as heroes by Afrikaner nationalists during Grand Apartheid, are excellent examples.2,77

The above outcome raises four more questions:

  • Is there really such a thing as a bad political leader or regime in politics?
  • Can an objective definition of a good executive political leader or regime ever be formulated?
  • Does the sheer complexity of a study that aims to compile and describe the good characteristics of a good executive political leader and  his good regime make such a project impossible?
  • More specifically, is it scientifically possible to offer a trustworthy appraisal and evaluation of the executive political leaders and regimes of a country in terms of a “good-versus-bad” classification?

The above questions are tested in articles starting from Part 5.

4.2 Confusing decisions on the moral standing of executive political leaders and regimes

Some political scientists, politicians and lawmakers (usually established in political power and not open to the competition of strong opponents in an unstable environment) propose that persons with criminal backgrounds (like terrorist and freedom-fighting activities), should not be allowed into political positions in any way. This changes an inclusive entrance to politics and possible executive political leadership to an exclusive, strict political entrance, totally cutting out ‘criminals’ from politics in the hopes of ensuring a better class of candidates for politics. The trend of political leaders committing criminal acts (notwithstanding their “clean” record before entering politics) once in public office, defies this requirement of “no criminal record.” Some of the “crime-clean” NP politicians when measured according to this criterion became criminally driven politicians once in office, as their Apartheid atrocities confirm, while many of the “terrorist” ANC politicians, involved in serious atrocities during the struggle and thus “criminals” from the beginning of the ANC regime in 1994, did not get involved in crime while in parliament. It must be emphasized that the lack of distinction between right and wrong by high level politicians and governmental executives in decision-making and behaviour is not limited to the NP and ANC leaders, but a worldwide phenomenon, whether these officials were elected or not.2,80-86

The confusing opinions of regimes and world leaders on whether a person or political leader is good or bad is not only illustrated by the examples of Begin, Kenyatta, Markarios and Mandela, but also by American president George Bush’s lack to distinguish between good and bad realities, and ultimately between good and bad politics.87 In this case the decision-making bordered on dangerous hallucinations and delusions. Bush was blinded by quasi-political-religious infections. It is reported that Bush proclaimed87:108: “God told him to strike at al Qaida,” which he then did, and then “again that God instructed him to strike at Saddam,” which he again did. It is also reported that he said he87:108: “received the command of the Lord of Hosts, the War God, to fight the problems of the Middle East.” Besides the fact that financial, political and military opportunism can drive the leaders of regimes to appraise and to evaluate a foreign executive political leader subjectively and faultily, is it clear that the subjective (faulty) religious foundations of empowered political leaders can also blur their views on any other executive political leader (driving them to act against them in cold blood, as happened with Saddam Hussein). Such religious evaluations can be untrustworthy and can activate dangerous politics. This is confirmed by various other researches.77,87 Powell77 warns in this context that religiously inspired persons are less susceptible to rational thinking. He quotes a former Israeli minister, Dan Meridor, as saying77: 346: “When you get God into discussions, God never compromises.”

When the top executive political leaders, like those of the USA, classify the executive political leaders of countries in conflict with the USA in terms of an exclusive religious evaluation, the classification undoubtedly becomes superficial, false and dangerous. Remember above saying: “God never compromises [for others’ politics and rights]”. Indeed, the devil can be “present and very active” within the mindset of the eager and judgemental executive political leader himself.77,87

It seems as if politics make the corrupt more corrupt and the virtuous less virtuous. Although this statement can be seen as a sweeping statement, there seems to be some truth in it when looking critically at the histories of South African executive politicians and regimes from 1652 to 2018. What is very clear is that these negative outcomes bedevil the formulation of an acceptable definition of good executive political leaders. It also gives some insight into why there has so far not been a comprehensive evaluation or appraisal in South Africa on the political leaders for the period 1652 to 2018. It seems just too complex and too impenetrable to undertake.2,80-86

4.3 The effect of democracy on our idea of good executive political leaders and regimes

Regarding the issue of good political leadership, it is clear from South African and international literature, that political leaders who fail to deliver on their promises or leaders who deviate from democratic politics in their management of countries, attract much attention (but voters fail to force them to rectify their failures). Political leaders and regimes try to make real improvements, often succeeding in bettering the lives of their voters, seldom receive praise.86

Barber86 emphasizes that the process of delivery – and thus the practice of good leadership at all time – is important to politics since a politician’s future is threatened if he fails repeatedly to deliver on promises. Matthew d’ Ancona argues that86:xiii:

…successful political leadership is becoming increasingly challenging as leaders face ‘higher expectations of government, raised standards of accountability and media scrutiny more intense and unrelenting than at any time in history’.

Political leaders of both talent and genuine goodwill, of which there are many more around the world than public commentary would have you believe, find themselves struggling to deliver their promises.

Clearly good executive political leaders have to adhere to ever-rising standards. Good leaders still fail to fulfil their tasks in the public’s eyes as good executive political leaders (whatever fails means in this context).

4.4 Accountability, responsibility and ethics as unique characteristics of good executive political leaders and regimes

Some researchers have tried to take the good-versus-bad classification further, at least in some way, by identifying certain characteristics unique to good leaders. Many researchers 2,17,80-87 highlight the failure by executive political leaders to act accountably and responsibly and with regard to ethics principles. These failures are mostly direct outcomes of crooked doings or the result of shortcomings in the abilities and skills of political leaders.2,17,80-87

Chomsky writes87:14:

Chomsky knows full well the limits of leaders and their advisors, the arrogance, posturing, and malign intentions he finds in their words. It does not matter whether these leaders are elected or appointed, or hold their office through blood or advantage of wealth or even as the result of some level of educational attainment useful to a ruling elite. He is aware that oligarchs do not rule as trustees for others, but for themselves. They have in mind the destruction of democracy if it ever proves to be more than a rhetorical fig leaf, when it means the redistribution of economics and political power along the ideological lines of Adam Smith and Tom Paine, or when it means the renunciation of imperialism. There is a direct line between the antidemocratic elites and the establishment of secret organizations such as the CIA, which know and do things that a democracy would not begin to understand or countenance – until democracy is deadened through propaganda.

Regarding the reference of Chomsky87 to the negative impact of secret organizations on politics and the upkeep of democracies worldwide, the politics of South Africa was and is not free from secret organizations and their hidden bedevilling activities on the country’s political functioning. The wrongdoings of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond (AB), a crooked and intimate associate of the NP during Apartheid, is well known. ANC is comparable with a faction of its elites (specifically the exiles and the veterans who maintain their liberation dogmas, doctrine and ideology) belonging to the secret MK organization, still going strong today as a destructive liberation organization in the South African politics. It is not very different from the AB, which promoted undemocratic political acts during the heydays of Apartheid. And, of course, there is also the ghost of the PAC’s PQCQ.16,17,25,26,75,82

Chomsky87 states that the politics of many countries were in the past and are at present still driven by “old Wild West politics”, justice and business, its cowboys and crooks, its crooked town councils and crooked sheriffs, all working together to run and to oversee the whole crooked business. Corruption, theft, mismanagement, injustice and killing as correct values, customs and traditions, have successfully replaced the concepts decency and of law and order in the intimate executive political leadership’s functioning. There is not a single rule of integrity in this kind of politics – most politicians are driven by their own interests, with the interests of the voters only a vague idea and memory. In this political environment it does not matter who the sheriff is, as long as he has a silver star pinned to his chest. Who pinned it on for him, is also of little importance.16,17,87,88

South Africa’s own politics did not escape this Wild West, its crooked town councils and its crooked sheriffs with their silver badges. Our political history tells us this story over and over – of crooked regimes, crooked governors, crooked prime ministers and crooked presidents — and still we vote into power these crooked sheriffs and crooked town councils. In this context the question becomes prominent: Can South Africa’s various governments, governors, prime ministers and presidents with the many allegations brought against them be seen in general as good executive political leaders and good regimes of governance? This is one of the questions that this research project of nine articles will try to answer.16,17,88

In South Africa, poor executive political leaders and poor regimes of governance have a long history, going back to the honourable Jan van Riebeeck in 1652. It gained momentum from 1948 with the Apartheid regime of the NP. The post-1994 period shows a further rise in the lack of accountabilility and responsibility by the executive political leaders, a phenomenon that Chomsky87 warns us is plentiful worldwide and which Mandela2 also pinpointed in the ANC leadership since 1994. The following warning is clear85:20:

Accountability is a cornerstone of our constitution, which is replete with mechanisms to ensure that public officials, both elected and employed in the public service and in state entities deliver on what they are paid to do. The ease with which public officials pass through the wringer, to emerge apparently unscratched at the other end, is unsettling.

4.5 The failure of the Constitution to enforce good executive leadership principles

The failure of the Constitution80-83,85 to set down measures for the strict implementation of its rules for good executive leadership is a direct result of the fact that the South African Constitution is only designed for a honest statesman as the executive political leader at the helm: a person immune to corruption, nepotism, fraud inside his own government and the public service and to onslaughts from outside by the private sector. The mass executive juridical and political power vested in the president leaves him free to abuse it if he lacks accountability, integrity, ethics and basic honesty, all of which are essential for a good executive political leader and the upkeep of a good regime of governance. Crooked invaders from the public service and the private sector can quickly create political and economical havoc and a constitutional crisis if the President is a failed executive political leader and a crook himself. Africa has become known for such bad executive political leaders. It was not without the deepest concern about the calibre of executive political leader in charge of South Africa that the EFF MP Mbuyiseni Ndlozi referred to Zuma as the “constitutional delinquent.” He endangered the Constitution, and this concern is still valid with application to Ramaphosa. There are many other constitutional delinquents in the ANC planning to become the executive political leaders of South Africa in the future.1,2,16,17,21,89

The current envisaged change to the Constitution to allow land-grabbing as part of the ANC’s policy of radical economical transformation (RET) and radical social transformation (RST), offer these constitutional delinquents of the ANC the opportunity to encircle and to close down Western democracy, accountability, responsibility, integrity, ethics and honesty, all essentials for a good executive political leader who oversees a regime of good governance. But, to be honest, this constitutional delinquency such as that in the ANC’s inner circle is not new in South African politics. It is exactly what DF Malan and his constitutional delinquents did in 1948 within Western democracy to the Constitution of the then Union of South Africa. The Grand Apartheid of the Afrikaner nationalists took constitutional delinquency to its utmost limits.89,90

Mthombothi83 writes about the above dangerous flaw in the South African Constitution, giving executive political leaders some scope to act with bad intentions and to promote their own interests83:21:

Some of the Chapter 9 institutions have proved useless in curbing the powers of the executive. We need to craft a system that makes power directly accountable to the people. Structures that are themselves removed or distant from the masses cannot be expected to ameliorate overweening power.

Ranjeni Munusamy9, a South African political-investigative journalist, writes about the concourse of a crooked President who is fully and solely in charge of the Constitution, with the failed Chapter 9 Institutions, also under his strong hand9:26:

…Zuma repeatedly made a mockery of parliament and the ANC caucus, most notably in the Nklanda saga.

Zuma has become accustomed to fobbing off serious allegations against him as if he is a private citizen and nobody is entitled to know his business.

He has also mastered how to cheat accountability mechanisms.

As a result, he has managed to escape culpability for bending the rule of law, violating the constitution, instructing state officials to give contracts to his friends, making cabinet appointments on instruction from his benefactors, receiving payments from business people and gangsters, and paralyzing the security agencies to prevent prosecution.

… the president also owes millions to the South African Revenue Service, which he has no intention of paying thanks to one of his keepers…

4.6 The contaminating effect of the public-private sector intertwining on the quality of executive political leaders and regimes

To understand the contaminated effects of bad accountability, bad responsibility and bad ethics active in the present South African leadership environment, it must be noted that the South Africa private sector and public sector had become totally intertwined over time. To divorce the South African private services from the public sector when it comes to political management and business systems is impossible: What is happening in the one can not be separated from the other’s practices of corruption, poor governance and accountability. Our immense state capture is an outcome of this public-private sector’s “bastard birth” in 1994. This entanglement, which is leading to poor outcomes on many terrains of society, also spread deep into the two sectors’ executive leaderships.69,91-94

It is clear that South Africa is in trouble, and indeed in very deep trouble, due to its lack of good executive leaders and good governance. Corrupted accountability, ethics, responsibility and governance seem to sprout from a well-placed cocoon of political and business crooks; active simultaneously in the private and public sectors, functioning as a well-intertwined web of deceit.69,91-94

It must be noted that there are still many executive political and business leaders of good standing. Magda Wierzycka, CEO of the Sygnia Group, is of the opinion that, proportionally, only a small group of bad executive business and bad executive political leaders have captured and contaminated South Africa. She put this group on 20 000 well-positioned corrupted transgressors against a population of 56 million South Africans outside this culture.95

4.7 The executive political leader as the central guiding figure in good governance

The concept leader (in this study more specifically the executive political leader, meaning the top executives of the country) is central to this study. As previously said, many references are found in the literature to the words leaders and leadership, but most definitions provide no guidance. For this study is it important to give a short overview on the important role of good leaders and good leadership in the political and business sectors, and why the researcher sees a politico-historical appraisal or evaluation of the contributions of South Africa’s executive political leaders as a necessity.

One of the best studies that shows the importance of good executive leaders and leadership in extraordinary successfully American enterprises, is that of Jim Collins,23 titled Good to Great. Why Some Companies Make the Leap…and Others Don’t, which was published in 2001.

The Collins-study23 focused on 1 435 American companies, classified as “good” companies in 1985. Collins and his team observed these companies from 1996 to 2000 with reference to a schedule of 15 years of performance (1985-2000). When considering these fifteen years only, only eleven companies (0.7%) could be classified as great. The crucial question for Collins23 was: What did the eleven good-to-great companies share in common that distinguished them from the other 1 424 comparatively good companies. Certain findings emerged; one outstanding was the presence of extraordinary executive leaders in these eleven companies, who he named Level 5: Executive Leaders or good-to-great leaders. This kind of leader was absent from the other 1 424 companies, notwithstanding their status as good and their business successes.23

Some of the characteristics unique to this Level 5 leader are the following: they built enduring greatness through a paradoxical blend of personal humility and professional will; they are fanatically driven, infected with an incurable need to produce results; they make productive contributions through talent, knowledge, skills, and good work habits; they contribute individual capabilities to the achievement of the group’s objectives and work effectively with others in a group setting; they organize people and resources towards the effective and efficient pursuit of pre-determined objectives; they catalyze commitment to and vigorous pursuit of a clear and compelling vision; and they stimulate higher performance standards.23

What is of direct importance to this research project is the fact that the intent with Collins’23 study was initially not on the quality (good or great) of leaders per se, but solely on the business profiles and functioning of the eleven good-to-great businesses itself that set them apart from among 1 435 companies. The prominence and importance of executive business leaders emerged only as it became clear that they were the main drivers to turn the eleven good enterprises to great enterprises in a period of 15 years and to uphold this good-to-great status. What Collins23 also identified, was that his findings were not limited to the private business sector, but applicable to every sector of the society, including the various segments of the public sector.

Read about Collins’23 initially negative attitude about the role of executive leaders in the success of business enterprises and organizations as compared to his Rubicon-acceptance of good executive leadership based on sound empirical findings, as an absolute necessity in good management. It does not matter if it is in business or politics. His full text, describing his Rubicon, is quoted to give an in-depth understanding of the aims and intentions with this series of articles and the need for this study on executive political leaders. The title of the study: Leadership characteristics in perspective, says it all. Collins writes23:21-22:

We were not looking for Level 5 leadership or anything like it. In fact, I gave the research team explicit instructions to downplay the role of top executives so that we could avoid the simplistic “credit the leader” or “blame the leader” thinking common today.

To use an analogy, the “Leadership is the answer to everything” perspective is the modern equivalent of the “God is the answer to everything” perspective that held back our scientific understanding of the physical world in the Dark Ages. In the 1500s, people ascribed all events they didn’t understand to God. Why did the crops fail? God did it. Why did we have an earthquake? God did it. What holds the planets in place? God. But with the Enlightenment, we began the search for more scientific understanding – physics, chemistry, biology, and so forth. Not that we became atheists, but we gained deeper understanding about how the universe ticks.

Similarly, every time we attribute everything to “Leadership”, we’re no different from the people in the 1500s. We’re simply admitting our ignorance. Not that we should become leadership atheists (leadership does matter), but every time we throw our hands up in frustration – reverting back to “Well, the answer must be Leadership!”—we prevent ourselves from gaining deeper, more scientific understanding about what makes great companies tick.

So, early in the project, I kept insisting, “Ignore the executives”. But the research team kept pushing back, “No! There is something consistently unusual about them. We can’t ignore them”. And I’d respond, “But the comparison companies also had leaders, even some great leaders. So, what’s different?” Back and forth the debate raged.

Finally – as should always be the case – the data won.

The good-to-great executives were all cut from the same cloth. It didn’t matter whether the company was consumer or industrial, in crisis or steady state, offered services or products. It didn’t matter when the transition took place or how big the company. All the good-to-great companies had Level 5 leadership at the time of the transition. Furthermore, the absence of Level 5 leadership showed up as a consistent pattern in the comparison companies. Given that Level 5 leadership cuts against the grain of conventional wisdom, especially the belief that we need larger-than-life saviors with big personalities to transform companies, it is important to note that Level 5 is an empirical finding, not an ideological one.

The good executive leader is a fact, a reality, a must for a society that wants to be successful. He is the modern-day Messiah of a company, a institute, a regime, a country – he can get it through troubled times and steer it to Utopias, because he has integrity, accountability, responsibility, personal ethics, vision, sound thinking, balanced emotions, honesty and is against self-enrichment and self-promotion. For him the group and its interests come first. South Africa’s good executive political leader and regime must have the same qualities as those reflected by the Collins research23, if not at a higher level. They must be able to steer the country and its people towards success.

How do South Africa’s executive political leaders and regimes fit into this picture? This question is explored in article 5 (Part 5) of this project for the period 1652 to 1795 (The inention is to explore on a later date also the period 1796 to 2018 in Project Two).

  1. Conclusion

Anthony Ginsberg21 in his book South Africa’s Future emphasizes that South African voters must at all times judge the performance of their elected politicians and executive political leaders and hold them highly accountable if they fail their tasks and duties. Ginsberg writes21:20:

Members of our present and future governments should not be treated as untouchables, no matter how courageous their leaders may have been or how many years they may have struggled to achieve leadership positions. By voting them into power we have sufficiently rewarded them for their years of struggle and sacrifice. The longer we wait to demand results and answers to the harsh realities our country faces, the deeper the hole will become which we have dug ourselves into.

It is our role as the electorate to ask tough questions and to demand answers of the people we put in power. They are our servant, not the other way around.

We are the shareholders of government – the current management team is only temporary, and can be replaced by a new team with new ideas every five years if need be.

Boon1 and Ginsberg’s21 statements, together with five other studies, form the appraisal base of this series of five articles of project one. The project is focused on positioning the executive political leaders of South Africa and their regimes for the period 1652 to 1795 on a continuum of good and bad. The intention of this series is much broader and more in-depth than the intentions of Boon1 and Ginsberg,21 who put only the current South African executive political leaders in perspective. The primary aim of Project One (with the focus on the period 1652 to 1795) is to create a basis for a second project that will evaluate and describe the performances of South African executive leaders from 1795 to 2018, with President Cyril Ramaphosa being the focus end-point in a classification of good performances versus bad performances. The two projects explore how accountable, responsible and ethical executive political leaders were in the past or are at present. The intention is to offer a descriptive overview and conclusion on the contributions of executive political leaders and regimes to the well-being of every South African and South Africa’s politics overall. The outcome of this overview and the conclusions must be seen as an effort to know our past so that we can understand our present and can appraise our future. In line with the guidelines of Boon1 and Ginsberg,21 the overall appraisals of political wrongdoings and praise for executive political leaders and their regimes of governance where they did well, are organized according to six timeframes (Parts 5 to 10) in the period 1652 to 2018.

This first project (Project One: including Parts 1 to 5) offers an appraisal of the leaders and regimes of the period 1652 to 1795 (with the evaluation of the profiles of the leaders and regimes in Part 5).

What we need is a dramatic change in the thinking on South Africa’s political problems, especially those that have became entrenched in most South Africans. South Africa can take an important lesson from Jonathan Powell77, a well-known international mediator between governments and terrorist organizations, when he reflects:77:366-367:

…there is no such thing as an insoluble conflict, however bloody, difficult or ancient.

Believing that a solution is inevitable is nearly as dangerous as believing a conflict is insoluble. If people sit around waiting for a conflict to be ‘ripe’, or for the forces of history to solve it for them, then it won’t be resolved.

What we need are more political leaders prepared to take the necessary risks…

The solution to South Africa’s political problems is no more complex than the solutions to the problems Powell77 addressed. In as sense our executive political leaders are part of the insoluble conflicts themselves; they are the instigators and zealots of the ongoing racial, social, economical and political conflicts. The leadership must change before any other changes can occur. The question is who will bring about the change, their former partners in crime? Thankfully history shows that there are always insiders in a defective system who are willing to change and who would work to change their partners and their organization to steer them away from wrongdoing. It is a difficult task, but often very successfully. Powell’s77 positive opinion that even the most serious political problem can be solved, gives us hope that the problem of South Africa’s ineffective executive political leaders can also be solved. However, as Powell77 warns, we can not sit around waiting for it to solve itself. It is ancient, but not bloody at the moment.2,16,17,21,25,74,77 This study can make a positive contribution in this regard.

The South African politico-historical literature has thus far failed to ask the following basic questions about the country’s various executive political leaders:

  • Did the said executive political leader serve every South African citizen’s interests every day before, during and after their political reign with love and dedication, honesty, justice, objectivity, and free from racism and cultural bias?
  • Did the particular leader have the guts to take on the country’s socio-political system, not fearing the consequences this would have for their political careers?

A further question that arises from the above questions is:

  • Did the executive political leaders under discussion pertinently distance themselves from any racial, ethnic and cultural discrimination, domination and siding, and did they belong to groups that reflected any ethnic, racist and violent political behaviour, be it justified or unjustified?

In South Africa the same leader would be hailed a hero in some politico-historical sources and a villain in others. This has become a point of controversy. These conflicting and controversial views and opinions do not serve the South African history and its political culture well. These views do not help to steer the development, the establishment and the upkeep of a culture of good executive political leadership and good governance.

It is time that the above daring questions be answered, however simple they seem. We cannot shy away from it anymore: He who asks is a fool for five minutes, but he who does not ask remains a fool forever (Chinese Proverb).

Hopefully, articles two to five (Parts 2 to 5) will shed some light on the above questions. The research will perhaps also help politico-historical researchers let go of their fear of looking like fools for asking the right questions.


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Not commissioned; Externally peer-reviewed.


The author declares that he has no competing interest.


The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.