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South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 1 (18)

Title: South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 1 (18)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Background, discriminative, expropriation, injustice, myth, ownership, redistribution, revenge, troubled, unconstitutional.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 12: 1

1. Background

Do what is right, not what is easy nor what is popular.1

To implement South Africa’s proposed land expropriation (with or without compensation) is not going to be easy. It cannot and must not be a popular political solution. It should represent a righteous and a just outcome to all South Africans.

Is it possible for us to fulfil the above requirements? The prominent question is here, firstly: how did we arrive at this problematic situation, what story is there to tell regarding the present motivation to effect land expropriation in which the Whites and their current land holdings occupy a central position, and what is needed to launch the process of land expropriation?

Ela Gandhi2, a well-known South African activist and granddaughter of Mahatma Gandhi, provides to some extent an answer to these questions and what we need to do to rectify the mess, when she writes in the Sunday Times of the 18th March 20192:21:

I believe that we can only understand what is happening in South Africa if we acknowledge our racist history. Racist education and unbridled racial discrimination were entrenched in the various apartheid laws. Today, although most racist laws are rooted out, racist attitudes, prejudices, misconceptions and judgments remain with us.

We still use racial terms to describe South Africans. Almost all official documents require people to indicate their race. I understand the need for this – we still have a highly unequal society based on race, class and gender, and we need to know these demographics in order to bring about the needed changes. But hopefully there will be a day, sooner rather than later, when we can discard all these tags and be proudly South African.

We still have townships which are predominantly occupied by particular race groups, as was designated historically. Even though there is no law that entrenches these divisions, we are left with the separation legacies of apartheid days.

Schools have had to adjust to having children from different race groups, but racism is still encountered in schools, perhaps because not enough conscious effort has been made to train educators and the communities to think differently, to recognise and root out the racism within us.

Besides dividing South Africans into different race groups, apartheid discrimination impoverished black people by denying them occupational opportunities through job reservation policies and pass laws.

The 1913 Land Act and the Group Areas Act dispossessed many black people of their land and live hood.

We need to acknowledge the injustice and unfairness of apartheid, and we need to engage with the huge economic divide apartheid created between the rich, largely white, and the poor, largely black. A result of no acknowledgment and no sharing is that we have a large majority of people living in wealth and privileged access to resources. Racism is linked to this privilege.

There is a reluctance to rectify the injustices of the past through constructive programmes and voluntary sharing of wealth gained through apartheid privilege. Instead, there is agitation for the protection of individual rights and privileges at the expense of the common.

1.1. Introduction

The land redistribution matter — or land expropriation, as it has been many times announced to the public, in which the sensitive issue of compensation versus non-compensation features prominently — seems to have recently become a central way for the Ramaphosa regime of diverting attention away from its failure to deliver growth-boosting reforms, to curb its elite’s ongoing rent-seeking, their inability to clean up corruption and governance at state-owned enterprises and to do something to the dysfunctional state created by the ANC regime over 25 years. In this context of utter failure, Joffe3 writes3:2:

This was the year of the reality check. We began 2019 with forecasts that economic growth would lift to 1.7% and a state of the nation speech in which President Cyril  promised long-awited reforms to boost the economy and fix ailing state-owned enterprises, especially Eskom. We have ended the year flirting with recession and stage 6 load-shedding – to the “surprise and the shock” of Ramaphosa, whose economic reforms have been delivered excruciatingly slowly, if at all.

The latest GDP figures showed the economy turned negative in the third quarter; a week or more of load-shedding could see that repeated in the fourth quarter; and it’s now possible the full-year 2019 number will be negative — for the first time since 2009. SA had become a 1% economy over the past five years. Now it’s falling even below that; 2019 has driven home just how stuck we are in the low-growth trap and how hard it’s proving to get out of it, despite oft-repeated promises of reform.

The esteem and personal standing of the ANC, the Ramaphosa regime, Cyril Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule with the ordinary man on the street have never been as low as in December 2019. Ramaphosa and the ANC elite know well that they have not been ablot to generate wealth for the poor since 1994 and cannot do it post-2019. Their failed Marxist-Leninist model in economics does not allow for it. They are more and more forced to do something extraordinary to make themselves popular again. Secondly, they must find immediate wealth to get the economy going and to satisfy the poor people’s hunger and other needs to avoid unrest and revolution, and to receive support to be able to stay in power until 2024. Three clear outcomes are easily available for them to regain power and to get money on the table: land grabbing, the nationaliation of the Reserve Bank and looting the public and private pension funds. The easiest to launch and the most popular choice inside the ANC radicals’ RET (radical economic transformation) is land grabbing from Whites.3-9

The year 2020 seems to be the Year of Land Grabbing, especially because Ramaphosa must do something politically extraordinary to outlive the 2020 Mid-year Conference of the ANC. At this stage, inside South Africa’s troubled land ownership, some positive and constructive guidelines are needed to make the unavoidable, threatening land redistribution a reality and a success.

1.2. Aims of article 18

In this article (together with Article 19), the primary aim is to make conclusions, based on the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the matter of land expropriation and to offer a dictum on whether it may be successfully be executed by the ANC regime as the present ruler or by another ruler post-2019.

This is the semi-final article in the series of nineteen articles on the matter of South African landownership. The previous seventeen articles of the series were published in the South African accredited journal Ensovoort [Volume 38 (2018), Number 12:1 to Volume 40 (2019), Number 11:7]. The short-titles of these seventeen published articles (numbered one to 17 in the series) are as follows:

  1. Who are colonists and who are indigenous people? (1);
  2. Perspectives on the background to the land ownership dispute (2);
  3. The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime – Part 1 (3);
  4. The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime – Part 2 (4);
  5. Age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system – Part 1 (5);
  6. Age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system – Part 2 – (6);
  7. Land ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 1 (7);
  8. 8. Land ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 2 (8);
  9. The EFF in perspective (9);
  10. The DA in perspective (10);
  11. The ANC in perspective (11);
  12. The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity);
  13. The ANC in perspective (13: Violence and Crime);
  14. The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability);
  15. The ANC in perspective (15: Opportunism);
  16. The ANC in perspective (16: Outdated ANC);
  17. The ANC in perspective (17: ANC’s troubled leadership).

2. Method

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to successfully execute land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa in order to effect successful land reform from 2019 onwards.

The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. South Africa’s troubled land ownership (1652 – 2019)

3.1.1. Overview (Articles 1 to 17)

The political dispensations of the Cape Colony of 1853 and 1872 and the Union of 1910 offered excellent opportunities to redistribute land and hand a justified part back to Blacks to create an open, just South African society. But White supremacy and its land-grabbing politics made it impossible. The later 1994 dispensation under the ANC failed again. Land redistribution from 2019 onwards will become a natural and unavoidable interference and intervention.

Land grabbing is an age-old custom in South Africa. It was practised by Blacks on Blacks as well as Whites on Blacks for more than three hundred years. It is thus of the utmost importance that this custom is not restarted again in 2019 and that a perfect solution to the present imbalance between White land ownership and Black land ownership is rapidly found, without falling back onto the past’s vicious circle of revenge and counter-revenge to erase the manifold injustices committed before 1994.

South Africa’s political history is far from completion. Also, there is an immense political history what needs to be retraced and to be rewritten, or at least to be corrected. It does not matter if we like it or not: it is a sine qua non.

For the antagonists (anti-land redistributors and mostly Whites), the period 1994 to 2019 under the ANC regime has been a dark period of criminality, state capture, confused violence, thuggery and race-baiting. It has gained a momentum that will not slow as long as the ANC is in power. The antagonists have an unshakable belief that the general public and the parliament itself will reject any change to the Constitution or would not allow land grabbing from Whites. They also believe that the South African courts, including the Constitutional Court, will denounce any illegal and unconstitutional actions by the ANC that could lead to a one-sided policy of land expropriation without full compensation. For the antagonists both Julius Malema and Cyril Ramaphosa are, as land redistributors of White land to the poor and landless Blacks, political bluffs that will soon disappear from the country’s politics.7,10-24

When comparing the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists and the propagandists, some are based on sound foundations while others are emotionally laden and lacking in depth.7,10-24

Hereto is it clear for the propagandists (pro-land redistributors and mostly Blacks) that a mass of contaminating elements and role players, integrated and established during the age-old, unjust and discriminative White political and socio-economic system of South Africa, are obstructing any change to Section 25 of the Consitution that would enable land expropriation without compensation. The propagandists believe that myths and lies are prominent in the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints. They believe the antagonists’ present obstruction of the land expropriation initiative is temporary, unfounded and doomed to failure. The change to Section 25, to effect land expropriation without compensation, is for the propagandists the only path to uplift the mass of Blacks from their inequality, landlessness, poverty and unemployment, and to reverse the immense land grabbing by Whites of non-Whites’ land, starting in 1652. The undoing of the historical trajectory of the age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system of South African society is one of the biggest challenges for the present or any future government. The overwhelming interests of the mass of Black poor and landless people can no longer be ignored. The present exclusive structure of White land ownership and economic empowerment is a recipe for revolution.7,10-24

From a critical vantage point it must be noted that in general the perspective of the antagonists are not representative of the total White or Afrikaner population, but mostly of the contingent of White farm and land owners, White exclusive capitalist business groups with direct and indirect interests in agricultural economics, as well as self-appointed White “saviours and rescuers” that claim to fight unselfishly for the interests of the White farming community and for the Constitution and dispensation of 1994. (The total number of these self-appointed White “saviours and rescuers” is far lower than 300 000 of the White population of 5 milion, representing 6% of the White population).  For the propagandists it is time for the White population to purge itself of this group of 300 000 White individuals’ contamination with fallacies and racism. The other nearly 5 million Whites (outside the antagonists’ and the 35 000 White farmers’ self-interest), also have citizen interests but are side-lined and ignored by the antagonists. The antagonists are a minority group, estimated to represent less than 10% of the White population which, in reality, is another minority group, more or less 8% of the total South African population.7,10-24

For the propagandists the land-ownership matter has been well planned and blown up for a long time by ±35 000 White farmers (of which only between 5 000 and 7 000 farmers really contribute to the country’s essential daily food supply). The opportunistic group of the rest of the ±30 000 of White farmers represents less than 0.1% of the total South African population and less than 1% of the White population. This priority granted to 35 000 White farmers and their land has led to the interests of nearly 30 million poor and landless Blacks in the post-1994 Democracy being ignored. For the propagandists, it just cannot go on in this way.7,10-24

The imbalance in land ownership, together with the inequality in the country between White and Black (as well as between Black and Black) means that redistribution should occur, but it should not be offered as a panacea for poverty or be based on arguments about who is indigenous and who is not. Redistribution of land is a good symbolic act for emotional relief and political catharsis as to Apartheid’s transgressions, but the fact it that it is not going to change the lives of the poor immediately and drastically as falsely claimed by radical politicians. Land expropriation so far has been saturated with corruption and state capture in which the ANC elite has played a central role. It is only one aspect of the political and socioeconomic delinquency of the ANC. The comprehensive dysfunction of the political and socioeconomic system of South Africa since 1994, with its corrupted elements and role players, may activate a poisonous element with the ability to kill the innocent and to bring devastation to South Africa. It can only aggravate the matter further, given the ANC’s present-day politics of corruption, criminality and extreme racism, planned and executed by a strong sector within the ANC elite.7,10-24

The current problems around land redistribution are just too enormous for the current ANC political leadership to solve. When they do attend to the matter, they do it in an explosive and conflict-ridden way, creating more complex problems and crises. Indeed, the fact is that the radicals in the ANC and other political parties do not really know what they want to do with the expropriated land. They do not have a sound plan. There seems to be much revenge about the discriminative politics of the past and land grabbing, making Whites rightfully worried about their assets, as well as their personal future and safety in the country.

Land expropriation with reasonable compensation is a must that needs immediate implementation. But, where applicable, land expropriation without compensation should also be a tool to rearrange the South African scene regarding land ownership. In this the redistribution of state property should take a prominent position as the first stage of activating land expropriation. The mass of poverty, landlessness, indignity and inequality, which had become a lifestyle to nearly 30 million Blacks — people isolated from their social, economic and political rights as South Africans and exposed to immense delinquencies, that are equal to crimes against humanity — contains the potential for country-wide anarchy and revolution; which may ignite from 2020 if not fully addressed. This dangerous situation makes a just land expropriation an absolute priority.7,10-24

Land redistribution is unavoidable. It needs a solution. Whites, mostly the Afrikaners, own most of the land that the Blacks want. The prominent question is how the transfer will take place: Will it be another land grab; or will there be a reasoned, balanced and just land transfer and redistribution? The last option has been absent from all of South African political history, creating doubt if land redistribution by Whites will ever be freely and willingly allowed.

The counts awarded in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018 25, is for the EFF a mere 8 points (9%) out of a possible maximum of 82 points (100%). This means that the EFF is an outright failure as a political institution of stature. It cannot be trusted in any way to be in charge of land expropriation. Moreover, they totally lack the experience to handle such a project.25

The DA was awarded 59 points (72%) out of the maximum 82 points.The DA reflects immense shortcomings in their experience regarding land reform — specifically on land expropriation without compensation. Where the issue of the land matter emerges in the DA’s politics, it seems to be determined and driven by White interests rather than the interests of the poor and landless Blacks. The DA is clearly a slave of exclusive capitalism and its principle of a “stretched democracy”. Since the May 2019 election the DA has shown a movement towards White right-wing politics, making just land redistribution essentially impossible and the party an improper and inappropriate ruler to effect land redistribution.The DA does not show the ability to immediately handle successful land reform.25

The awarding of 23 points (out of 82 points) to the ANC as a regime reflects that it is lacking capabilities and the general integrity as a skilled ruler. Indeed, the ANC failed the basic test to be the ruler of South Africa. Its Marxist-Leninist political ideology as to the economy, landownership and racism is outdated. Evidence is there that the ANC as a regime is going to run into trouble fast to fulfil its May 2019 election promises and to execute its basic duties to the voters. Under the ANC’s 25 years of rule most South Africans lost out on prosperity, while the the living environment of its people has become saturated with violence and crime. Its political leaders’ lifestyles are characterised by a lack of accountability and beset by extreme opportunism. The ANC is incompetent to honestly effect well-planned and balanced land redistribution, with or without compensation. Their intended plan to bring landownership to the mass of poor and landless Blacks will only create further state capture, poverty and anarchy, while a full-scale revolution becomes more and more of a reality.25

Looking at the evaluation of the three main political parties of South Africa in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, all three are absolutely incapable of successfully implementing balanced and justified land redistribution in the next five to ten years. To put in in even stronger terms: none of the three will ever be successful to do land redistribution in any way. The evidence is there that all three will be part of the country’s political history for the next five years.25

This leaves us with the prominent question at this stage: are there South African political parties or a political party that may fast-track the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future? This is very complex question to answer, seeing that popularity at the ballot box does not guarantee that a government of quality and ability comes to power, as the ANC regime of 25 years confirms. Defining the wrongs of our past and present politics and the immediate demand to plan and to fix our future, is the question: can land expropriation (with compensation or without compensation) be executed correctly and with justice after more than three hundred of years of failure?

3.1.2. Immediate and future negative outcomes and dangers
3.1.2.1. Unrest, anarchy and revolution

We already see from Article 13 (Violence and Crime) the extent to which chronic unrest has been established in the country. Looking critically at the uncontrollable murders in the Cape Town Area that necessitated the intervention of the SADF to curb the reign of criminal gangs, together with the burning of trucks on highways and the murder of truck drivers, South Africa has long ago moved from simple riots to chronic anarchy, bringing the country to the threshold of revolution. What is striking, is the hostility and aggressive behaviour of the mass of poor living in the growing shanty towns, also known as “informal settlements”. It initially started due to the lack of service delivery in these settlements, such as the absence of basic health care, education facilities, transport and security infrastructure, and basic accommodation. These shortcomings have been addressed in the past nor are they being tackled at the moment in any way by the ANC regime. The dramatic collapse of the economy since 2016 has led to an immense growth in unemployment, the influx of the poor from the rural areas into the cities, and a resulting lack of basic accommodation. A direct outcome of this migration, absent from the ANC elite’s as well as the broad public’s consciousness, is the significant presence of poverty among half of the South African population and the phenomenon of constant hunger experienced by the mass of poor.  In the past and worldwide, poverty and hunger have caused two opposing outcomes: Firstly, the start of revolution which has brought down regimes, leading to the large-scale killing of certain sectors of the population and radical long-term political changes within countries. Secondly, poverty and hunger in certain countries have brought a total collapse in the poor people’s intention and will to revolt against their tragic circumstances, causing them to lapse even futher and deeper into poverty and enslavement to a ruler’s oppression. We saw this negative enslavement outcome of passivity among the Black population in South Africa since 1652 and especially after 1910 with Apartheid. At the moment we are seeing it again in South Africa under the Black ANC regime, where the enslavement and oppression of the mass of poor Blacks is undoubtedly the highest ever since 1652 and where the mass of Blacks seemingly accept their poverty as their destiny. But actions cause reaction and we should not consider the ongoing unrest and anarchy as a chronic, permanent situation without any further serious outcomes. The truth is far from this, as the chronic ongoing unrest and anarchy in Algeria, Tunisia, Iraqi and Syria, which suddenly changed to deadly revolution, confirms. South Africa’s unrest and anarchy are starting to show the typical characteristics of the forerunners of a comprehensive revolution waiting to be enacted. The land-redistribution matter, together with unemployment, poverty and hunger, may be the imminent stimulant to set off revolution overnight.3-30

The advent of revolution after 2020 is a high possibility that needs to be discussed. It will be dishonest not to warn the public on the negative impact of revolution on their lives. Prominently at risk are the minority of Whites and surely the Black BBEEE-empowered businessmen and politicians such as Ramaphosa and his cronies as possible victims.3-30

Besides the element of revenge in revolution, it must be emphasised that revolution can activate blocked-up development that could not be reached normally inside the traditional political setup. The mass of Blacks (more than 30 million) stand to benefit from any South African revolution. On the virtue of revolution under certain circumstances, Mark Malloch-Brown27, a former UN Deputy Secretary-General and a minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK, in his book The Unfinished Global Revolution27 gives us a guideline when he posits:

Since the book calls for a more comprehensive global democracy where we all have more say over our local, national, and our global affairs, the Arab Spring is evidently a step in the right direction. The Arab Human Development Reports, which I had sponsored at UNDP, pointed out that of the world’s seven regions, the Arab countries had the lowest freedom scores.

The question is: if the Arab Spring was an essential outcome, why can a post-2019 South African revolution not be an essential outcome and a “step in the right direction” either?

The 1994 political dispensation was undoubtedly a revolution, but a passive revolution; one which did not bring an extreme re-balancing of South Africa’s wealth and economics. It was only a false political democracy, meaning much on paper but nothing in practice. It was a continuation of Apartheid, with all its evil. It was a planned revolution by the ANC top brass and the NP-AB top brass to suite their own interests. Features that characterise most active revolutions — actions such as land grabbing without compensation, the prosecution of the Apartheid penetrators for human-rights violations, the activation of inclusive capitalism and job creation — were totally absent. The critical evaluation of the reports of the ANC’s referees (see Articles 12 to 17 of this series), shows that this passive revolution, launched in 1994, was essentially an outright failure. Firstly, it brought more poverty to the mass of Blacks, demolished certain established facilities such as healthcare and education while the landlessness of the poor Blacks stayed unchanged. The second outcome was that a repressive pre-1994 political-economic-social regime was merely replaced with a comprehensively economically repressive post-1994 regime.3-24

The question is: if a radical, active revolution had indeed been implemented in 1994, would it have solved masse Black poverty, joblessness and their lack of landownership as we are experiencing now? The answers are a Yes as well as a No. These opposing two answers must be read in the political histories reflecting revolutions that have played out worldwide over many years. It would be foolish to say that revolution does not work and is an evil. It is not true. The Liberation War of the North American Colonies from Great Britain brought them, besides statutory independence, political, economic and social empowerment that have made the USA the most powerful nation in the world today. The French revolution brought for the lower and middle class, as well as the poor, emancipation from the domination of the rich aristocracy, but on the other hand it has left them to this day with a kind of political immaturity as reflected in their constant unrest which borders on anarchy. The Russian revolution also brought freedom to the poor, the lower and middle class from the domination of the nobility but led directly to the institution of another repressice regime, the Communists, with role players like Stalin up to Putin today. In Africa there were  many active revolutions, with essentially not a single one bringing long-term positive outcomes. Prominent examples in this regard are the Egyptian, Zimbabwean, and Ugandan revolutions.27

Mark Malloch-Brown27, on the phenomenon of positive revolutionary outcomes at certain times and in certain situations, bringing at last human rights to suppressed and discriminated-against people after centuries of suffering, gives good insight when he  writes27:250: “First, that the power of the people, when right is on their side, is always unstoppable.” Prominent stands the fact that the potentials for revolutions are mostly observable, reflecting to the insiders and outsiders that anything in political setups is possible and must be accepted. Mostly is this “incoming revolution” not only ignored, but see as impossible to can and will spring-up. Malloch-Brown27 emphasis that the Arab Spring revolution (to spring up in 2010-2011 in Tunisia and Egypt) was already observable in 2002 (eight years earlier), but ignored and laughed down as the impossible and not to be a serious concern by the authorities and experts. The corrupted leaders go on for nearly a decade to reign in Tunisia and Egypt before the social time bomb, that had been set over many years, had gone off.   But when a certain crisis hits – sometimes a small energy-stimulant is needed to activate it, like the Arab Spring — the surprise is great.27 Malloch-Brown27 writes272:45-246:

The Arab spring began with an auspicious, if tragic, start: the self-immolation of a Tunisian street seller, Mohammed Bouazizi [who could be as well a said Andile Zuzile in South Africa]. On December 18, 2010, he set himself alight because he felt threatened and ignored by corrupt, bullying local police officers [who had, because of their corrupted empowerment coming over years under a corrupted regime, fall into a state of thinking to do what they want and to do this for ever unchallenged].The power of  his protest came from the fact that his desperate frustration was shared by so many others [same as the present-day 30-million ignored impoverished and landless Blacks of South Africa]. His act lit the dry timber of latent anger against a line of corruption and privilege that stretched from the local female police constable, who ignored his complains, to President Ben Ali, his wife and his family. By the time Bouazizi died from his burns on January 4, 2011, the region was catching fire.

The act was auspicious because such apparent futility and weakness brought down an apparently all powerfully political order. And, indeed this David and Goliath theme of weakness confronting strength and prevailing was a steady part of the early months of the Arab spring. Peaceful protestors, drawing courage from the links to each other and the outside world… saw off heavily armed government forces. Yet it took only from December 18, Bouazizi’s burning, to February 11, 2011 for… Ben Ali to be driven from office.

Does the above situation of Mohammed Bouazizi differ from that of the unknown South African Black Andile Zuzile? No, it does not differ an inch. Does the Tunisian political, social and economic disorder under the regime of Ben Ali differ from the disorder under the ANC regime between 1994 and 2019? Again, no, it does not differ an inch. Is the said Andile Zuzile (as was Mohammed Bouazizi seemingly seen at the beginning of his action) the only sufferer and victim of the corrupt 1994 to 2019 regime in South Africa? No, apart from him there are 29, 900, 999 other Black sufferers and victims in South Africa. Are the dissatisfactions and demands of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionaries different from the mass of South African Blacks’ dissatisfactions and demands? No: it was also primarily about the price of bread, demands for jobs, as well as affordable goods and services, etc. And, most of all, a say in politics regarding one’s own affairs. It was not so much about differences in social classes, religions or races. Is the mentioned Andile Zuzile at this stage insignificant for the ANC elite? Yes. It is true that the Marxist-Leninist ANC regime sees Andile Zuzile as an insignificant role player in their political thinking, revealing the ANC elite’s lack of in-depth contact with the masses. In this context Redi Tlhabi30 refers to the book A Tale of Two Cities by Charles Dickens in which he describes the circumstances of the poor and landless people which led to the French Revolution and the followeding reign of terror. She writes, comparing the two delinquent regimes and their leaderships30:20:

Die kloof tussen die wat dié wat lei en dié wat gelei word, word groter en groter.

Dit het in Suid-Afrika gebeur.

Ons kan dalk nie die presiese tydstip aandui toe die kloof gevorm is nie, maar daaglikse uitsprake, besluite en optredes laat ons met geen twyfel nie dat die ANC – die party wat gevorm is deur eerbiedige mans soos John Dube, Pixley ka Isaka Seme en Sol Plaatje – sy vinger van die pols van die nasie gehaal het nie.

Hulle [ANC-topleiers] is besig om mense te “ontdek” en te paradeer wat geraak is deur hul latenskap van onbekwaamheid, korrupsie, swak dienslewering en ja, onbetrokkenheid.

What A Tale of Two Cities30 also tells us is that when the fires of revolution start they are not easily stopped: in France it required a Napoleon Bonaparte, a blood-thirsty dictator, to remove the revolutionaries from politics and to clean up their mess. (This intervention must stand as a warning for revolutionaries such as Zuma, Magashule, Ramaphosa, Mabuza and Malema about a possible destiny awaiting them).

But, cautions Malloch-Brown27, revolution does not always immediately bring success. He writes27:244:

…the notion that the force of street protests that begins a revolution subsequently loses its way in the long, less glamorous, sequel of taking power will not be new. Indeed, in my experience, the completion of the shift from overthrow of the old to a more stable democratic order is on average a ten-year project. Much beyond the ballot box has to change. The old elite’s grip on absolute economic power has to be prized open, a culture of democratic openness and minority rights forged, a civil society given political oxygen to breathe and grow, a justice system people respect and trust established. Nearly always new governments struggle to make these changeas while also battling a legacy of economic failure and pent-up popular demands for job and basic services that they have inherited from their failed predecessors. In Egypt and Tunisia, all these conditions for a long, difficult journey to a “finished” revolution are present. Elsewhere the challenges are more difficult still.

It is significant that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, which started in 2010, are still in 2019  far from over. Moreover, true democratic stability has so far not been reached [in line with Malloch-Brown’s27 estimation that the growth from an old order to a more (hopeful)  stable democratic order is on average a ten-year project. Especially in Egypt, there has been little improvementin the country’s autocratic politics up to 2019. It is also a fact that South Africa’s passive revolution, with its duration stretching over 25 years, is also far from over.27

In South Africa the passive revolution, launched by the 1994 Political Dispensation, did not entail revenge on so-called Apartheid wrongdoers. There were some “emotional confessions” which were drowned in religious dogma offering the cleansing of the political sins of the culprits, mostly the Whites. Then there was the intended prosecution by the NPA of political wrongdoers, also mostly Whites. Again, a failure to fulfil the demands of revenge: jailing, confiscation of assets, the compensation of the Black sufferers under Apartheid. The “1994 revolution” was a soft revolution without real punishment of the obvious culprits: Whites. All that was realised was BBEEE as a punishment of Whites, and cadre deployment as a punishment of anti-ANC Blacks obstructing the ANC elite’s delinquencies.3-24

The most recent revolution in the world, where one autocratic regime was replaced by yet another (more extreme) autocracy, is Iran. Iran’s past political structure had the same kind of basis as that of South Africa and needs some elaboration. One of the prominent outcomes in Iran, as during the French revolution, was revenge on the previous ruling class: the nobles and elite. Not only were they eliminqted from regime structures and their ownership of assets dismantled, but they were also physically killed.

3.1.2.1.1. The 1978 Iranian revolution

To understand what a “real” revolution and a “real” revenge mean, it is needed to look at Iran’s revolution which started in 1978 and is still going on today in the guise of various forms of instability. At the same time it gives it us some criteria to compare post-1994 South Africa under the Marxist-Leninist ANC regime with some of the characteristics of the Iranian post-1978 religious-extremist regime. The post-1978 setup in the end did not bring improvements to the Iranians, not even for the first group of revolutionaries. The well-known international writer and world-traveller, the late Sir VS Naipaul31, gives us a good description of the post-1978 failed Iran in his book, entitled: Beyond Belief: Islamic excursions among the converted peoples.31

In Iran the regime was run from the 1930s by Reza Shah, who was succeeded by his son, the last Shah. Both of the two rulers’ regimes’ were autocratic, repressive and much hated. Especially the last Shah’s SAVAK (secret police) was cruel. The Iranian revolution of 1978 did not come as a surprise — all the characteristics needed for an uprising were there, such as repression, food scarcity, lack of freedom, etc. But the identity of the role players who took power in the end, ignoring the true revolutionaries’ dreams, was indeed a surprise. The main role player, the opportunist and madman Khomeini first arrived on the scene after the revolution’s beginning, heading from there into his precisely planned direction of evil and murder by hijacking the whole exercise with his exclusive religious group. He embarked on the next phase, a religious-cultural revolution, intertwined with a political revolution. This outcome elicited the following response from one of the initial revolutionaries31:183: “We may win the revolution, but culturally we will go back a thousand years”, and31:183: “You will never gain anything following theses religious people. We have known them. We have seen them. These are the people who didn’t let me [female] learn reading and writing.”  On the further outcomes of the revolution Naipaul31, quoting the experience of the mentioned Iranian Ali just after the start of the revolution, reports31:170:

Some people Ali knew, supporters of the revolution, turned against it after the first month. Ali thought he should give it a little more time. But then, about two months after the revolution, when the executions began, he had serious doubts. People who had done nothing were arrested and taken to jail. Many of them disappeared. Then they started charging into people’s houses, confiscating their properties. We had no security for our property our children or our wife.

Naipaul31 further recounts Ali’s experience31:201: “He had his doubts about the drift of the revolution, and soon things began to be bad. There were religious regulations. Women had to wear the chador and the full headdress; music and cultural events were banned. There were restrictions on the press. There was a “cultural revolution,” as it was called; all the universities were closed.” But this was only the beginning, as Ayatollah Khalkhalli in 1979 said31:201: “The mullahs are going to rule now [they still did in 2019]. We are going to have ten thousand years of the Islamic Republic. The Marxists [their initial partners in the revolution] are going to go on with their Lenin. We are going to go on in the way of Khomeini.” Inside Khalkhalli’s malcognition is to be found his own dream of blood, to equal what Stalin did in Russia. Naipaul31, quoting Khalkhalli, writes:31:201 “What he did in Russia we have to do in Iran. We too have to do a lot of killing. A lot.”

Ali’s31 testimony goes further31:173:

There was now, too, a constant harassment from the Revolutionary Guards [still fully governing Iran in 2019], jumping into the garden and looking through the windows to see whether anyone was looking at television or videos, or breaking into the house to search for alcohol or ham or women’s dresses or men’s neckties, all now forbidden things.

And if you were cleanly dressed, they didn’t like it. They would attack you. It was like Pol Pot, but not so extreme. Ten precent. It was a full revolution.

The reins of government went altogether out of the hands of government, out of control. It was anarchy and terror. The reason was Khomeini himself.

In this context Naipaul31 points out that, to make up for his lack of money to supply the mullahs’ immense needs, Khomeini31 said31:173: “Go to your own towns. Find the first man who is rich or the first man who has a factory or a huge farm. And force him to pay.”

On this order by Khomeini to the mullahs in which theft is presented as “honest” and “morally correct”, Ali31 reports31:175:

Khomeini has set a bad example. Every ayatollah now can claim necessity, as Khomeini often did, and break the law. And Iran was still living with his Islamic constitution, which gave him supreme power, and established the principle of leadership and obedience.

On the further consequences of Khomeini’s delinquency, Ali states31:174-175:

The majority [people] wanted to loot. So, he [Khomeini] made disorder in the country and let them loot. He did what they wanted.

When he [Khomeini] said “follow the law, it wasn’t the law of the country. It was his law, the law in his own mind. Before the revolution he said it was un-Islamic to pay taxes to the government. After, he said it was Islamic to pay taxes to the government. He wanted complete chaos. That day in his house I realized this man is not a man of government. He was still a revolutionary. He couldn’t control himself. Until the very last day he was making disorder.

He had an instinctive brain. He was instinctively intelligent, an instinctive, animal intelligence. Because of this he could command the people. He did not have an educational intelligence. He did’nt become emotional. He was very cool.

Looked at from the viewpoint of clinical psychology, it seems as if Khomeini’ s brain function was one of psychopathy. This is borne out by his and his cronies’ undermentioned killing spree.

On the killing spree between 1978 and 1979 (it went on for many years), Naipaul31 writes31:200:

When I went to Theran in August 1979, Ayatollah Khalkhalli, the hanging judge of the revolution, was a star. The Islamic Revolutionary Court [the shah’s old military court] in Shariati Street was sitting almost round the clock, as Ali had said. People were being killed all the time in Evin Prison and trucks were taking away the bodies through the blue gates at night.

There was nothing secretive or abashed about the killings. Some revolutionary official was keeping count, and regularly in the Theran Times there was an update. In the beginning the counting was to show how clement the revolution was; later, when the killing became too much, the counting stopped. In those early days official photographs were taken of people before they were killed and after they were killed — killed and, as it were, filed away, naked on the sliding mortuary slab, in the giant filing cabinet of the morgue. These pictures were on sale in the streets.

Ayatollah Khalkhalli, the ruler of the Islamic Revolutionary Court, was open to the press. He gave many boastful interviews.

Naipaul31 writes further31:188:

Khalkhalli, in an interview [August 1979]  with the Theran Times…said that he “probably” sentenced three to four hundred people to death [in less than one year]. On some nights, he said, the trucks had taken thirty or fourty bodies out of the prison.

Comparing the above description of the Khomeini regime and his cronies’ actions with the letters of the referees on the delinquent actions of the ANC top brass between 1994 and 2019 (see: Articles 11 to 17), and the ANC’s pre-1994 political history, there seem to be immense similarities. Remember: both regimes and their leaders were committed to the revolutionary ethos, of taking without creating, as well as extremism in politics. In both of the two organisations, some of the leaders had blood on their hands,  both constantly broke the law during their rule and engaged in state capture. It gives us a warning what could happen after 2019 if things went wrong for the ANC elite’s grip on power.

3.1.2.1.2. Death mostly for the initial revolutionist

Revolution mostly brings death to the initial revolutionist, however noble his intention was to better his country. The recalcitrant holding on to power and actions of the old class whose regimes are challenged, as well as their tendency to turn to extreme repression to staunch the revolutions and their revolutionaries, are reflected by the counter-actions of Bashar al-Assad in Syria over many years. Most revolutions have gone down fast, unknown many times to the outsider, because suppression of the masses has been efficiently kept out of the public eye. The murdering spree of Bashar Assad’s father in 1982 of up to 20 000 people in Syria on a single occasion, was kept out of the news for long.27

The question is here: was there a pre-1994 revolution by South African Blacks against their suffering? Yes, there was the 1960s Black Revolution which gradually, with the impact of other determinants, spelt the end of Apartheid and the elimination of the NP from political, emotional and cognitive mindsets (although only three decades later). In the 1960s South Africa’s Black Revolution (undoubtedly, in line with the same reasons why present-day unrest and anarchy are kept under wraps, but now possibly on a higher level of dissatisfaction and more broadly experienced), was kept away from the news, as well as the NP’s bloody actions to stamp out this revolution with its immense security force and the elimination of the Black revolutionaries.27,28 The rapid phasing out of the 1960s Black Revolution was directly attributable to the absolute suppression of the Blacks by the security forces of the NP. As Malloch-Brown27 writes27:243: “Yet revolution is not easily sparked in a world where rulers govern with an iron hand. The examples of successful revolution in the Arab world were few and far between.’

South Africa’s 1960s Black Revolution went the same way as that of the many failed revolutions at the time in extreme authoritarian states. But today the ANC is a Black government where a racial guideline for the murder of the Black masses (we hope) is less defined than during the period 1652 to 1994. In addition, the ANC regime is thankfully not armed and trained to the same high level as that of the NP military of the 1960s. For the current South African revolutionaries to be gobbled up by the ANC regime and its incapable securirity forces is impossible. Read herewith the unionisation of the security forces and the presence of Black tribalism in the security forces, any significant bloodletting of Blacks by Blacks in the ANC regime, to avoid a revolution, will not easily be put into action. Neither must it be expected that if a revolution started, it would be quickly and effectively curtailed.26

3.1.2.1.3. Extreme Islamic politics inside a South African revolution

But various African-Black revolutionary efforts since 1960s against the White NP regime and its forces were not the only attempted revolutions. The terrorist expert De Wet Potgieter29 points out that during Apartheid repression a small group of Islamic extremists exploited low-intensity urban warfare in South Africa, after which this Islamic extremism started to flourish with a growing intensity.There was in the Western Cape the Qibla Mass Movement (Qibla), based on Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini doctrine. This group emerged as a militant pro-Shiite one, modelled on the Iranian Revolution, with the objective of implementing and establishing strict Islamic principles in South Africa. [This organisation also went under the names Muslims-Against-Global-Oppression (MAGO) and Muslims-Against-Illegimate-Leaders (MAIL)]. It paved the way for a more violent organisation, writes Potgieter29, which came to the fore in 1996 as the violent organisation People against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad). Qibla was fast labelled as a terrorist organisation by the USA government. It had already started back then to send its members overseas for military training in Libya, later Pakistan, who were deployed in the 1990s to fight in South Libanon with Hezbollah. At the millennium more than 100 Qibla members were arrested for violence-related activities and murder in South Africa. Before that, in 1995, reports Potgieter, the Isamic Unity Convention emerged, representing more than 250 Muslim groups in South Africa. Qibla was the central body within the movement and before 9/11 Qibla had already crossed swords with the USA for its activities in that country.  After the 9/11 attack Qibla sent fighters to Afghanistan. Central to all of this, is a figure such as Achmad Cassiem, a radical Islamic cleric who joined the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) at the age of 15 years and was later sent to Robben Island after having been sentenced for terrorism, attempted murder and the possession of arms and ammunition.29

This build-up in the presence of Muslim revolutionists became clear in 1998 in South Africa with their attack on Planet Hollywood at the popular V&A Waterfront in Cape Town. This was after Pagad had started to target businesses in Cape Town, in response to the US retaliatory attacks in the Middle East after the 9/11 attack.29 Potgieter29 writes on this 1998 radical Muslim attack29:31:

South Africans would never in their wildest dreams have believed that terror would return to the country a mere four years after the newfound freedom of a democratic society under Mandela’s Rainbow Nation. Unfortunately, this false sense of a peaceful transition to a new life of freedom and peace was short-lived with the global terror reaching our shores at the southern tip of Africa.

The above sets out the basic presence of Islamic terrorists in South Africa. Included would be the presence of ISIS in the country, exposing South Africa today to the threat of international terrorism. The country’s liberal foreign policy towards the Middle East and the ANC regime’s anti-American position do not safeguard it from Islamic terrorism. So far, the ANC regime has openly tolerated the existence of Islamic terrorists in South Africa, even it seems blind to the presence of these groups training all over the country, as well as their movements up into Africa. This empathy and passivity of the ANC regime is to a great extent (besides its long-established brotherhood with terrorist regimes of countries in Africa and South America) due to a fear of Islamic counter-actions if they were arrested and prevented from pursuing their terrorism from here to the outside world.29 This fear and passivity of the ANC regime Potgieter29 describes as follows29:33:

The ‘war against terrorism’ is ultimately a chess game in which governments need to be aware that their actions will have consequences, and although counter-measures might be successful in the short term, that might not be the case in the medium to the long term. In other words: states, through their actions, might win a battle (the arrest or elimination of prominent suspects) but ultimately lose the war against terrorism — by driving individuals to extremism and terrorism.

This “unofficial peace agreement” of the ANC regime with the Islamic radicals does not assure a permanent outcome of brotherhood and peace, as well as the absence of attacks on the South Africa state and its system by the Islamic radicals. Especially not for the ultra-extremist Islamic terrorists who have since 1960s clearly wanted an Islamic state with all its principles established here, in contradistinction to the liberal Christian and exclusively capitalist setups that have been dominant since 1652. For the time being, the ANC regime’s sympathy and alliance with terrorism (extending to its pre-1994 years) fits the situation of the radical Islamics well here, while the present low profile and passivity of the radical Islamics within the ANC regime’s political, economic and cultural composition, is  also a temporary characteristic which can change overnight. In the aftermath of the Syrian and Iraq wars, their internal conflicts and political disfunction, the true role and planning of the radical Islamics for the first time emerged with a bloody capture of parts of the two countries. On the other hand, the so-called end of the ISIS caliphate does not spell the end of a theoretical ISIS Caliphate, the ideology of ISIS and the elimination of ISIS jihadists from geopolitics: they are permanent ‘war fixtures” in the world. The fact that many of these jihadists have returned to South Africa and to other Western countries, makes them nothing less as than “soldiers of fortune”. In this case there are many similarities with the “Christian Crusaders” who had fought under the banner of Christianity all over the Middle-East against Islam, and today’s Islamic jihadists. In both cases their self-enrichment and pursuit of power are prominent and their quest for new political, economic and cultural terrority, to which the politically unstable South Africa exposes itself for easy capturing.29

3.1.2.1.4. Political radicalism-in-waiting

It seems in 2019 that South Africans, in terms of the political instability and lawlessness created by the ANC regime and its leadership, are foolishly naive regarding political radicalism (which is often practised in the guise of radical religiousness). The radicalism in the ANC and the EFF is not so innocent as the political term “Black Nationalism” might suggest. Potgieter, in this context, postulates29:35: “Accepting that South African nationals might become involved in transnational terrorism is an unfortunate reality.” It is a fact that our borders have become lawless territories, ruled by marauding gangsters and human traffickers who allow the infiltration of well-trained and experienced jihadists. The issuing of South African identity and passport documents to international jihadists and allowing the stay of international jihadists, fleeing Western forces after the fall of their ISIS state, is an every-day fact. The use of South Africa as the springboard for Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists has become a prominent issue. The passivity of the ANC regime allowed that Al-Qaeda-linked small training camps had not only been established since 2010, but had started to spread all over the country, alleges Potgieter29. These small camps and their trained terrorists are waiting patiently to act when the time is right and the conditions in their favour.

The notion that the terrorists of Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda or Boko Haram will not attack the South African state and its vulnerable political system because the ANC is an ex-terrorist organisation and is sympathic to the terrorists’ ideology, is foolish.  Potgieter29 writes on the Kenyan Hotel attack29:35:

Many will say that such groups have no reason to attack us. They will say that Kenya was attacked because its troops are in Somalia, where Al Shabaab operates. They are wrong.

Terror does not work that way. We are currently cooperating with the Kenyan authorities and a link as tenuous as that is enough to set off an attack on us.

Further, reason and logic are alien to such groups. Their tactics are to scare communities into submission. It does not matter who they attack. They seek  chaos and attention. They want to make a spectacle.

The patient waiting game by djihadists described above, seems to be in line with the more recent insurgency in Southern Africa — which the journalist Simon Allison32 describes as a” faceless insurgency”— that has started in October 2017 against a police station in the town of Mocimboa da Praia, Mozambique, to be followed in June 2018 by an attack in the Cabo Delgado province of northern Mozambique. Such attacks constitute a string of aimless assaults on the security forces and civilians without anyone claiming responsibility for it. In the June attack, 40 people were killed, some with extreme cruelty and at least 400 houses were burnt down, displacing more than 1 000 people. For such a significant conflict, out of the blue, there has been surprisingly little reliable information available, reports Allison.32 Until now, the situation has not changed, leaving the void as to information and understanding intact while the violence intensified in Mozambique. Allison32 reports there are now an average of two to three attacks a week while at least 120 persons have died. On this confusion and lack of knowledge regarding the assailants, Allison32 writes32:20:

Even local journalists can’t talk about it because the culture of intimidation is there. Yeah, it’s confusing. It’s really confusing. Even the government is confused. How can you negotiate with people when you don’t know who they are?

This same initial confusion as to “what is going on” and “who is behind the unrest” had struck the governments of Syrya and Iraq at the start of their wars, before ISIS with its unique ideology, took off its mask. The editor32 of the idependent online newspaper @Verdade in Mozambique, Erik Charas32, said32:20: “I have never come across something like this before. Never, not [even] during the Renamo war. It doesn’t even resemble the other Islamic State movements. This is completely different.”

There is no doubt that the South African djihadists’ début in politics will also take place in a unique way and possibly be associated with radicals in the EFF and the ANC who have already declared, in their intention to effect land grabbing from Whites, their participation in a revolution to come.

3.1.2.1.5. Political dissatisfaction-scoring  

To indicate how the dissatisfaction (during the Black Revolution) of the 1960s of the black masses under the white NP-regime compares with the 2019 dissatisfaction of the black masses under the black-ruled ANC-regime, is not easy, seeing that a kind of Malloch-Brown Arab Human Development Report27 is absent here to reflect scores. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,25 can effectively be used in this instance to award, in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification, a single count of both South African regimes and executive political leadership between: a) 1652 and1994; and b) 1994 to 2019. The central hypothesis is that a low satisfaction rating (50% and lower) with their political rights for the periods: a) 1652 to 1994 and b) 1994 to 2019, respectively for all South African voters (as with the low Arab ratings on the existing freedoms reflect on their “readiness for revolution” by being regarded “as a step in the right direction”), will also reflect how ready South Africans are for “revolution as a step in the right direction.”25,33

For the period 1652 to 1994 on Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction, a score of 42 (51%) out of a possible 82 points, was awarded. This means there was an average dissatisfaction reflected by South Africans in pre-1994 South Africa. Revolutionary activities during that period contradict the opinion that pre-1994 South Africans had a strong tendency towards starting revolution. This low dissatisfaction score possibly also explains why the fomenting of a revolution in the 1960s was easily suppressed by the NP regime.25,33

The count awarded to the ANC and its leadership for the period 1994 to 2019 in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification of satisfaction on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,25 out of a possible maximum of 82, is 23 (26%). This means there is serious dissatisfaction reflected by South Africans in the post-1994 South Africa. The hypothesis is confirmed that the mass of South Africans can see (as did the Arabs low scores on freedom reflect that the “doing of revolution” by them “as a step in the right direction”), post-2019 as the correct time of “revolution as a step in the right direction”.25,33

It is also important to reflect on General Jan Smuts’ words, now a true cliché after more than a century’s use, when he said that South Africa will never give it best but also never give its worst. As with many politicians and their statements, Smuts failed to offer a precise scale to ascertain his notions of “best” and “worst”, and thus the extremes of bad and good can be expected.34 In terms of the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201825 the challenge is to rate what Smuts34 tried to say in 1910 and how in some way a measurement of the concepts of the “best” and “worst” for the period 1910 up to 2019 should be designed in a suitable way. The classification of the information was done in terms of a Black political history, meaning how blacks had experienced their situation historically speaking. Firstly, in terms of the worst versus the best, categorising was done in terms of: 1) political dissatisfaction versus political satisfaction; 2) keenness to start a revolution versus reluctance to start a revolution; and 3) ability to launch a revolution versus inability to start a revolution. Secondly, each of the above categories allocated ten points to quantifying values on the 1 on the scale as absolute low versus the 10 on the scale as absolute high. Thirdly, the period 1910 to 2019 was divided into four time frames: 1910; 1948, 1994 and 2019. All the calculations were done in terms of these particular time frames.25,33

The scores were as follows25,33:

Political dissatisfaction: 1910: 6; 1948: 7; 1994: 9; 2019: 9.
Political satisfaction: 1910: 4; 1948: 3; 1994: 1; 2019: 1.

Keenness to start a revolution: 1910: 5; 1948: 7; 1994: 9; 2019: 9.
Reluctance to start a revolution: 1910: 5; 1948: 3; 1994: 1; 2019: 1.

Ability to launch a revolution: 1910: 3; 1948: 3; 1994: 5; 2019: 9.
Inability to launch a revolution: 1910: 7; 1948: 7; 1994: 5; 2019: 1.

From the above results it is clear that the political dissatisfaction of 1994 and 2019 are similar and has attained the highest level with a score of 9 (In contrast, political satisfaction for 1994 and 2019 attained the lowest count with a score of 1). The rating for keenness to start a revolution for 1994 and 2019 are at the highest level with a score of 9 (In contrast, the reluctance to start a revolution for 1994 and 2019 obtained the lowest level with a score of 1). The ability to launch a revolution in 1994 (possibly as a result of the NP’s strong and able security forces) was only 5 while in 2019 it has obtained a score of 9 (in a context in which blacks have become politically empowered and are actually manning the security forces, free from white dominance). It is obvious from the above outcome that 1994 was the year in which the Apartheid setup was experienced the most negatively since 1910 by blacks ( with a political dissatisfaction count: 9). In 1994, black rule and democracy were still absent. This explosive situation was one of the reasons why the NP regime had faced a strong push to “abdicate” or face a full-scale revolution in 1994. But also, as reflected in 2019, in a general climate in which blacks are supposed to be “free”, a score of 9 regarding political dissatisfaction has been registered. This result highlights the fact that the negative political outlook of blacks in 1994 has not not changed in any way in 2019, except that in 2019 the political scene has become far more volatile and potentially explosive than in 1994. It is confirmed by the ability of the masses of poor and landless people to foment revolution: Here the score of 9, is already four figures higher than 1994’s rating of 5.25,33

3.1.2.1.6. Post-2019 revolution-in-waiting

On the issue of a possible post-2019 revolution heading for South Africa, it is important to emphasize that the political differences between the group of revolutionaries that is able to steer the revolution and unit of the ANC elite who is currently governing the country (coming from pre-1994 and continuing after post-1994), is zero. They are all revolutionaries, born from the same pre-1994 terrorist organisation, the Marxist-Leninist ANC. They are mostly individuals who underwrite the same political ideology, which has been varying from classic to neo-Marxism. So why will they revolt against their own organisation? The answer is found in the existing two ANC liberator identities today: the unscrupulous ANC-elite versus the impoverished masses of black people (30-million plus), which include the ANC-members (less than a million) and the ANC followers (less than 10 million).

The author and political analyst Redi Tlhabi30 referred to the fact that although it has not been possible to identify the date of the above split, when the ANC-elite moved away from the South African people, the gap is enormous and is growing constantly.30 The editor35 of the Mail & Guardian, in an editorial in February 2019 under the heading35:32: “The sad fact is the state is ripe for picking”, pinpointed the date of the divorce exactly however: 1994. He refers to the book of the late Sampie Terreblanche, tittled: Lost in Transformation: South Africa’s Search for a New Future since 1986. Terreblanche,35 argues the editor35, clearly pinpointed that the ANC’s leadership (from Nelson Mandela) bartered away its revolutionary ideals for the pragmatism and acceptance of big business. There was only one intention for this leadership: its own self-enrichment and personal financial empowerment. This was one side and a secret decision by the ANC elite (which includes Cyril Ramaphosa as a writer of the Constitution and supporter of the 1994 Dispensation) with their acceptance of the dishonest 1994 Political Dispensation. In the meantime this leadership, without batting an eyelid, went on to send out and to propagate the false ideology of the pre-1994 ANC, namely that its primary aim and intention is to enrich and uplift the masses of black people caught in the scourge of inequality, poverty and landlessness. This false ideology, which has been repeated for twenty-five years, was and still is signalled to every ordinary ANC supporter. It has now been unmasked, but it was not done by the Zuma-Magashule-Mabuza-Ramaphosa clan of racketeers who are marketing themselves as revolutionaries to save, as they allege, the post-2019 ANC and the country. These four marketeers’ intention is not to save and to restructure the present “sick” ANC, but to worsen the plight of the masses of blacks, their chaotic position in 2019 South Africa to assure a Marxist-Leninist government under a powerful politburo. It is the grassroots of the ANC, especially the dissatisfied black jobless and poor youth, who are now taking on the task of liberation and revolution to advance the masses of black people.35

Reflecting the split in 1994 – and the ANC’s failure already then to rule with honesty and integrity to improve the lives the black masses – between the rich and the poor, which is based on the division between the ANC elite and the ANC’s ordinary members and followers, the editor35 of the Mail & Guardian quotes Terreblanche’s35 words35:32“While the ANC operated on the moral high ground during the anti-apartheid struggle, since 1994 they have slipped into a sleazy underworld where corruption, nepotism and money squandering are the order of the day, so that South Africa could become a neo-colonial satellite of the American-led neoliberal empire. Although the ANC has been the government of South Africa since 1994, we could allege that it is still not ‘ready to govern’.” 

This sustained failure and inability evident within the small circle of the ANC regime, coming from 1994, goes even deeper: it is a function of the ANC’s elite seemingly extraordinary ability to mesmerise the ANC party and its millions of unsuspecting supporters till today with their ideology and promises of liberating the black masses.30,35

The editorial35 of the Mail & Guardian is correct when it postulates that the sad fact is that the South African state is ripe for picking: For many this picking – or more precisely: this revolution-in-waiting – is merely a reappropriation by the masses of poor and landless blacks of the ANC as a party, and possibly also the capturing of the state. Here the notion of being black is a central theme. Helen Zille36 puts it in perspective on the 21st  April 2019 when she says36:9: “We are seeing the resurrection of racial nationalism in our country. It is highly retrogressive and I think it will take South Africa down a cul-de-sac. We will eventually come to realise that but the cost will be high. And I am very sad we are going to have to go down that path, very sad, before we achieve the vision of our Constitution.”

Malloch-Brown’s27 prerequisite for the activating of a revolution — and that such a happening can sometimes be a good event to better people’s tragic setup — fits well into the 2019 dysfunctional South Africa, and the seeming intention by the masses of blacks (ANC-supporters and non-supporters) to take back their so-called country from the mischievous ANC elite.  Tabane37, quoting Azapo president StrikeThokoane’s view, reports on the 21st April 2019, on this disenchantment of supporters with the present-day ANC37:9:

Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) president Strike Thokoane has an interesting analogy for explaining why many black people who supported the ANC for a long time are now turning to other parties 25 years since the dawn of democracy.

“I always liken this to a priest who tries to preach on Christmas Day or New Year eve when people are enjoying themselves at a party. He tries to say, ‘Jesus Christ saves’ but the noise of the entertainment is drowning him out.

But when they get sober, they want to go to the same person and say, ‘By the way, what were you saying about Jesus?”

He [Thokoane] says that, for a long time after 1994, black people were very complacent about democracy, thinking they had “arrived”.

“Our people were told that they have arrived and have nothing to do anymore. Everybody believed what they were told and promised. As a result , they were not even listening to the voice of Azapo. Others listened, but they thought we were rather too extreme and radical.”

The above view and the pleading of Strike Thokoane36, reflect again on Zille’s warning of the resurrection of racial nationalism and the coming of the collapse of the South African state. It goes beyond these issues in 2019 when he says that Azapo stands for the reversing of the betrayal of promises to by the ANC to the people.36,37 Tabane37 writes37:9:

We tell them, “Azapo stands for dignity of black people. Hence it is black consciousness roots. It is not anti white, but it is pro black. We love black people more.

The struggle had been sold. Black people have been sold for money and profit. Land has become fashionable but we have died for land. Our heroes have died for it. Land must be reconquered. So, we must repossess it so that we can redistribute it.

Unlike those who want to expropriate without compensation, we believe that, when you expropriate, you suggest it belongs to someone else and you are taking it by force. Repossession, however, means this belongs to us and we are taking it back.

Land needs to be possessed by black people after it was unlawfully stolen. We must reconquer.”

It must also be noted that there is the extreme radical standpoint of the Black First Land First (BLF) on land by its leader Andile Mngxitama38:4:

“…the BLF, unlike the ANC and the EFF, is serious on its stance on the land issue. The FFPlus knows that if we get into Parliament, we will not drag our feet on the matter. The ANC and the EFF make up more than two thirds of parliament; why do you think they have not amended the Constitution by now? They are in the pockets of these landowners and are protecting their interests.

…should the party be removed from the ballot paper [May 8], “we will be left with no choice but to take up arms and fight for our freedom”.

It is not a surprise, in light of this “revolution” declaration by the BLF,  that Bell39 refers with great reservation to the BLF’s leadership, as follows39:2: “…the self-appointed collective imbongi of North Korea, Andile Mngxitama’s Black First Land (BLF)…”.

It must be highlighted that unrest and chronic anarchy are today inherent to the South African society: The Provinces of the North-West and KwaZulu-Natal reflect this state of affairs extremely well with so-called daily “service-delivery unhappiness” which is characterised by residents burning down state property to40:8: “…announce to government that there is a protest going on…”; that40:8: “…we are going to do worse things”; and40:8: “We’re not benefiting from the advent of democracy. It’s as if we… residents are not South Africans. We are prepared to die to ensure we get basic services”. On the strength of this unrest-cum-anarchy, Lali,40 on the recent extreme violent protest in Khayelitsha in Cape Town (which is only one of a growing mass of violent protests countrywide) and which shows all the signs of a failure by the SAPS to master crime there, writes40:8: “Throughout the morning, the protesters blocked Japhta Masemola Road with burning tyres, various objects and a shipping container. The police tried unsuccessfully to disperse them, but they regrouped and set up more burning barricades, preventing traffic from moving along the normally busy roads.” 

Also, the preparation for unrest countrywide during the past May 2019 election and the ANC government’s decision to place the police and defense forces on readiness, reflect further the chronic presence of unrest-cum-anarchy in South Africa.  Van der Walt,41 quoting the minister of Police, Bheki Cele41, commented on the seriousness of this issue in May 201941:2: “Cele sê hoewel geweld in al nege provinsies moontlik is, hou Noordwes en KwaZulu-Natal die grootste gevaar in. Geweldadige betogings kom al die afgelope jaar gereeld in Noordwes voor, terwyl politieke moorde in KwaZulu-Natal nie ’n vreemde verskynsel is nie.” This unrest-cum-anarchy – representing the growing and broadening collapse of law and order in South Africa – to which Cele36 refers, is also confirmed by the Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba,41 the minister of State security. Van der Walt,41 on the past May election, writes41:2: “…inligting wat deur haar department ingesamel is, dui daarop dat daar ‘bedrywighede’ is wat moontlik ten doel het om die verkiesing in Noordwes en KwaZulu-Natal omver te werp.”

3.1.2.1.7. Political racism’s role in revolution

It must be clear that these are also problems waiting to muddy black versus white race relations, which can be opportunistically be shifted onto a revolutionary project.  It must therefore be acknowledged that a part of the leadership of the ANC seems also to start to reflect racism on the same basis as reflected by the leaders of the EFF, Azania and the BLF. The ANC secretary-general Ace Magashule ponders this in April 2019 when in Philippi in the Western Cape he alleged42:3: “to incite ANC supporters to exercise their vote in a racist way.” Maxon42 reports42:3: “Magashule told residents in Philippi that they must not vote for an umlungu (a white person).” In addition it should be noted that the ANC veterans immediately condemned his racial utterance, seeing it as a sign of irresponsible leadership: a racial and political misstep which demanded the intervention of Ramaphosa to punish Magashule (which unsurprisingly has so far not happened). But this kind of racial outburst from the ANC’s top brass could eventually become more prominent in the wake May 2019, depending on how Ramaphosa squares off against Magashule in a leadership battle.39,42

Maxon42 points out that this “mischievous” political behaviour of Magashule must be read in terms of the outcome of the Nasrec 2017 conference and the power play which has been an outcome of it.  Here his focus is on a contingent of old conservative ANC veterans (respecting the Freedom Charter as a prerequisite for non-racism), still clinging to their traditional Marxist-Leninist politics versus a new brigade of radical cadres (which Bell39 has  described as the “self-appointed collective imbongis of North Korea” and which could become numerous in the ANC if Magashule gets a proper grasp on power). In practice it seems not to be a pure asymmetric leadership feature in the ANC, but more of an outcome of clear groupings around the two big men of the ANC: Ramaphosa versus Magashule. The issue is not so much a political or an ideology renewal or an age-factor, as it is around the grasp on political power in which the Magashule politics is far more radical than the politics prescribed to ANC cadres in terms of the Freedom Charter. Inherent to this is the presence of radicalism which could trigger racially-inspired aggressive behaviour against whites in the advent of of revolution. Maxon42 is correct when he says the ANC’s soul is in peril (which spells danger for the political stability of South Africa after 2019). Yonela Dipko43 notices Magashule’s unflattering description of an umlungu (a white person) as the right of ANC cadres to call out specific white people who are alleged to be against the rights and interests of black persons (which seems in reality to be “ANC blacks”, and not “DA blacks”!). He clearly does not see white-listing by a black Magashule as racism as long as the black Magashule is categorical about a umlungu (white) who is, in his terms, a so-called “racist” particularly as defined by the ANC’s Diko43 and Magashule. At the same time Diko43 fails to describe the “characteristics and activities of the so-called 2019 White Western Cape racist” and falls back onto dangerous political clichés, which suggests taking revenge on and cleansing the opposition, which happens to be white too.39,42,43

Dipko43 reflects firstly on “soft politics”, the so-called “pity plea” by radical and dangerous blacks who, by their own misadventures and shortcomings, do not form part of able and skilled competitors, when he reflects43:3:

Integration is still a one-way street, blacks assimilating to whites. After 400 years, white people can’t pronounce our names, can’t speak our languages, can’t identify with black people’s challenges, such as a lack of spaces. So, black people find themselves having to assimilate. If your name is Tinyiko you must let then call call you “tiny”; you find your black self assimilating to their language, tastes and culture because you are a minority of one, at every board meeting, every restaurant, every school play. It’s disheartening.”

The above plea is obviously one-sided, biased and without serious consideration, while Diko43 also conveniently forgets who has ruled over South Africa since 2019: precisely the old garde and veterans of the ANC which have failed to give persons as Diko4 the required “spaces” and which have introduced English as the only “official” language, making the use of indigenous languages irrelevant. Furthermore, there are of course those who use colonial English first names willingly par excellence, ignoring their ethnic “black names”: the ANC top cadres are littered with such individuals such as Ace Magashule, Nelson Mandela  and Cyril Ramaphosa! It seems so far, from Diko’s43 rhetoric, that the possible presence of a poor self-esteem harboured by some blacks in ANC politics has been ignored, contrary to the public boast and much-touted 2019 “sound black self-esteem”.

But, on the “victim-identity” Diko43 quickly reveals his true intention (and unashamed racism) when he reveals his mindset regarding “hard politics”, as he writes43:3:

The Western Cape is a fiefdom of the abelungu and to contend that, in the name of non-racialism, in fact of a racist government, they must continue to be given governing power is offensive in the extreme, particular to the black majority.

Success here has a white face and it starts in the corridors of the provincial government. While Cape Town is 80% black, the divisional directors of the provincial government alone are 70% white. That then informs everything else, from government policy to the conceptualisation of programmes.

Most experiences are anecdotal, which is why someone such as Premier Helen Zille can deny racism exists in Cape Town. She has no personal encounter with it. Until a black government takes over the Western Cape, sensitivity with racial victimisation will not exist.

Looking carefully at Diko’s43 rhetoric, it seems to be an ANC creed, an organisation posing as a wolf dressed in sheep’s clothing, especially as far as the last election is concerned. This is shown from the words used to describe the Western Cape and Cape Town (both basically the only governmental entities still functioning with qualified audits in the country) as a “racist government”, an “offensive governing power”, and “time that black government takes over Western Cape”, etc. Secondly, the fact that Diko43 is a spokesperson of the ANC in the Western Cape, quite evidently rhymes with Magashule’s anti-abelungu politics, bringing to the foreground the undercurrent of post-2019 racism (and more: racial and political extreminism) prevalent in the ANC: clearly discrimination against blacks, Coloureds and whites who dare to criticise the ANC for its misadvetures and who do not support the ANC’s nefarious politics. Diko’s43 opinions and thinking must be read as the same reflected in Sudan by the previous tyrant Omar al-Bashir specifically against women during his rule of 1998 to 2019.39,42,43

The Guardian44, as quoted by the Sunday Times, reflects44:15: “In the Bashir era, women faced being jailed and were even threatened with physical torture for a variety of offences, such as wearing trousers or behaving in a way that deemed inappropriate.” 

If, so far, no concerns were evident in the minds of many South Africans about their future, especially whites, Coloureds, Indians and non-black ANC cadres, it is now time to start worrying. Diko’s and Magashule’s rhetorics are in line with the racism of the radicals of the EFF, Azano and the PAC. It is political cliches that echo Hitler and the Nazis’ racial policies of highlighting the “differences and evil nature of Jews” in their scapegoating of them as racial, economic, social culprits and saboteurs, and created the foundation for the Nazis to allow the genocide of Jews. In 2019, the insight into the mindsets of the leadership of the ANC, help to differentiate what is really bad and what is really good. It spells danger for the lives of the 15 million voters (out of the 25 million total voting individuals) who did not vote for the ANC and thus for 37 million people (out of a total 57 million population) who do not necessarily support the ANC.39, 42,43

South Africans know well how a madman such as an Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir of Sudan came to power and could stay in power for 30 years with the aid of their brand of extremism, contributing to racial, ethnic and religious discrimination, and murderous rule. For South Africans this should be a timeous warning and an indication what they can expect if the post-2019 politics go wrong and political power falls into the hands of characters like Julius Malema, Ace Magashule, Jacob Zuma and David Mabuza. During Apartheid, where the blacks were the victims, but it is important to note that they were also the victims in Sudan. Things can turn nasty quickly, even for the ANC elite, such as Diko, Magashule, Mabuza and Ramaphosa if they as the top cadres lost their grip on South Africa. On the power grab of Bashir in 1989 by means of a military coup and his corrupt rule up to 2019, the Sunday Times45 of the 14th April 2019 notes as follows45:15:

Labour unions were liquidated and dissenters detained without trial and tortured.

Life got even worse after South Sudan, home to the majority of Christians, seceded in 2011. Churches were bulldozed and burnt. In 2012 Bashir warned non-Muslims: “Nothing will preserve your rights except for Islamic sharia”.

Sudan turned into a playground for Islamic terrorist groups. Its’ harboured Osama bin Laden in the early years of his jihad movement that led to the creation of al-Qaeda, landing Sudan a spot on the US list of countries backing terrorism.

Bashir exploited ethnic and tribal tensions to consolidate power, with bloody ethnically targeted wars in Darfur and other parts of the country earning him an ICC indictment for war crimes and genocide in 2009, and making Sudan’s name synonymous with ethnic cleansing.

Refugees described the horror of racially targeted atrocities. Attackers would shout “Kill the slaves, kill the slaves!” and “We have orders to kill the blacks”. One refugee reported a militia member boasting, “We kill all blacks and even kill cattle when they have black calves.

3.1.2.1.8. Role of the youth in revolution

An aspect missed by political analysts is the possible role that the South African youth can play in a forthcoming revolution. Firstly, it seems that the efforts by the government to register the young voters have failed. Statistics show that the 18 to 19 years olds on the voter lists for 2019 is 47% lower than in 2014, while for the age group 20 to 29 the number declined by 9%. This reflects that only 341 236 of South Africa’s present registered voters are younger than 20 years against 646 313 in 2014 (In 2009 the number was even higher on 669 241). In the age-group 20 to 29 there is at present 5 299 297 voters (against 5 759 297 in 2014). In practice means it that only 1.3% of the registered voters are 20 years and younger, while only 21.1% is 30 years and younger. For formal politics and thus the various political parties mean this a loss of voter support. Firstly, the fact that only 35% of eligible voters participated in the 2014 election shows that the youth’s present apathy not a new kind of phenomenon. What is telling is that as with the 1960s black “revolution” against the Apartheid regime, the growing involvement of the youth in unrests all over the country currently could equally have a huge impact on the status quo. Although the widespread lack of service delivery is often mentioned as the main source of the unrest, unemployment is fast developing into a stronger driver for the widespread riots. Increasingly, it seems to be political indifference that has been playing a role in fomenting the unrest, since many youths are politically well-informed and driven by a political interest with the focus on their personal interests and problems instead of on a political party and the elite’s interests. Many of these non-party youths associated with the “rebellion” politics of the EFF and BLF, take to the streets without necessarily joining these parties as members or as supporters. At most, they see party politics only as a vehicle for self-promotion.38, 46-49

The youth are no longer mesmerised by the ANC’s message of 47:36: “…you should remember what the ANC did for you.” For the present youth the ANC as a party and as a regime have done absolutely nothing and they know it very well. A vote for the ANC by a black youngster simply means47:36: “…to endorse the ANC’s position in power, while its members continue with corruption, the corporatisation of the state and unethical governance.”

They are willing to take on the ANC system, as #RhodesMustFall and the #FeesMustFall movements showed us. They are not shying away from the concept that democratic rule has mostly emerged through bloodshed, but are rather making it a second option.27,46,47

The youth could soon become the real power to drive a revolution, in fact, sooner than most political analysts understand. As in Tunisia and Egypt, their South African revolution could be ignited too, quite suddenly by a small flame. And the various small fires burning already are manifold among the youth: hunger, poverty, abuse, indignity, dominance, discrimination, exploitation, and more.  The advise of Bruce in April 2019 to Ramaphosa in which he repeated Winston Churchill’s famous “blood, toil, sweat and tears” speech in 1938 to the South African youth, is nothing else than a threat on the one side to the youth to toe the line or else, and on the other side a further exploitation of them. These kinds of admonishments by Ramaphosa directed at the youth in the future may just be the single fire to start the revolution. It does not matter if it turns out to be a South Africa Youth Spring, South Africa Youth Winter, South Africa Youth Summer or South Africa Youth Autumn, the revolution is waiting. Where the politicians, especially the black ones of the ANC, celebrate April 27 as their Freedom Day of a 25-year old so-called New South Africa, most of the black youths can’t celebrate along with them. There is good reason for it, and also why they not have registered to vote on May 8 2019 and why they are becoming primed for revolution. They have never tasted Nelson Mandela’s promises of democracy and freedom. Mandela has become a stranger to them, a blurred, bitter memory.27,47,50,51

A prominent example of the sudden explosion of violence by the youth, and that it is looming, ever-present in every-day life, was well-illustrated on the 8th April 2019 in Johannesburg. Here a peaceful march of hundreds of black pupils [all members of the ANC-aligned Congress of South African Students (Cosas) were so disillusioned by the failure of their political parent and mentor, the ANC, to stop violence at schools, that the whole march turned into violence and  looting. Their looting did not stop with the theft of only fruit, but included cellphones and alcohol. The young protesters left a trail of destruction and even injured a shopkeeper. It appears that the Number One of the ANC, Ace Magashule’s speech at Luthuli-house, failed to calm them down. This, it must be noted, can be the future awaiting South Africans exposed to an extreme and unpredictable violent uprising by these youths.52,53

The youth of Cosas’s behaviour must not only be read in the poor example set by their peers in the ANC, but in their powerless situation and deprivation as a result of ignoring their rights in terms of the Constitution, specifically by their own people and group, namely the ANC. It is not a surprise that the secretary of the Young Communist League, Kgabo Moriti54, viewed this with a critical eye, especially the turn of events in South African politics. He says54:12: “We must ask ourselves if we have begun our descent into chaos.”

The seriousness of the misdemeanor by present-day South Africa youths, also caught the attention of the editor53 of The Star forcing him to revisit the past of unrest, anarchy and violence, in order to make sense of our future. He posits53:12:

For a moment it felt like 2002, when Cosas, then led by Jilius Malema , unleashed chaos in the Joburg CBD, leading to loses by pedestrians, vendors and shopkeepers who were mugged and robbed during the rowdy illegal march.

It should not surprise us that high-school children use violence and looting as part of protest. South Africa has an endemic culture of violence and looting in protest. During the days of the Struggle against apartheid, some elements among the protesters used to trash shops and loot during marches.

An editorial50 of the Sunday Times (dated 21 April 2019) tells us the truth and more about the reality that awaits the country50:2:

However, people born in 1994 may not share our joy – mainly because many are unemployed. These 25-year-olds are at the centre of the single biggest challenge SA has faced since 1994: unemployment. According to StatsSA, the youth unemployment rate is higher than any other age group, irrespective of education levels: 52.2% of people aged 15-24, and 35.5%of those aged 25-34, are unemployed – and these figures exclude the young people who have given up looking for work and become a burden on their parents and siblings, or have simply turned to criminal activity.

This brings us back to the sudden start-up of revolutions, especially those of the youth and the single match that usually lights it. For the ANC government to keep up the comprehensive suppression of these outbursts of youth violence, the editor53 of The Star seemingly sees as a solution, the much-needed match to start up revolution, much more serious than the “Malema-2002-uprising” or the 1960s black revolt. He errs when he writes  10th April this year12: “Our government needs to seriously curb this culture, for many a time it undermines the rights to protest and deals a blow to issues that many concerned people protest over.”

He completely misses the point: since 1994, peaceful protests in the first place have brought only false promises given to the black youth from the ANC, as with Ace Magashule’s reassurance to them that55:15: “…their grievances are being given attention”. Secondly, as already indicated, their (and their parents who voted for the ANC) needs, demands and ultimatums are laughed at by the autocratic Marxist ANC-regime, as Magashule’s insincere reaction on the 8th April 2019 in Johannesburg confirms: ongoing empty promises to the youth.

The political analysts like Barney Mthombothi56 — although they despise unrest, riots and violence — understand and respect the drivers of unrest, riots and violence in terms of the mindset of the average South African. They contradict the false insight that South Africa’s psyche is stable after 25 years of “household abuse” by the ANC and that unrest, riots and violence, and thus revolution, is impossible. The “burning of things to show your anger as seemingly the last and only resort” for many are the staple of 2019 politics. The motto that there are no real winners in a strike, riot or revolution, don’t matter for the poor, deprived and rejected persons. Statistics that the South African growth for 2019 is expected only to be 1.3%, with a possible improvement in 2021 to 2%, are not part of their world, because when it was 6% plus, they didn’t benefit from economic growth either.26,50,52,53,56,57

It must be noted that there are other contaminating elements which could play a role in any youth revolution. Firstly, there are the radicals that instrumentalize the unhappiness of the black youths, as we see from the allegations that the ANC youth movement has been behind serious unrest since March-April 2019 in places as Alexandria, Hammanskraal, Orange Grove, Pretoria and Soshanguwe in Gauteng, Khayelitsha, Blackheath, Eersterivier and the Strand in the Western Cape. Here also it seems to be an influx of adult trouble-makers who steer and incite the uprising. This we see too at the April 2019 meeting of Ace Magashule in Parys where the ANC Youth League’s war drums were heard loudly and the ANC seniors sided with the youthful radicals. Julius Malema’s legal and constitutional privilege to declare: “…we will not kill the whites for now” is not so innocent when the planning of anarchy and revolution is the ultimate goal. It must be remembered that Malema publicly said he would take part in a revolution when the situation arises. In addition the war-talk of the BLF is another feature of the political landscape that stands out. Secondly, South Africa is not built on a singular black unity and a singular non-black unity: The black unity is compiled of a very unstable black tribal composition, created by Apartheid, wherein the Zulus and Xhosas are still today regarded as the “superior” tribes. Cyril Ramaphosa and Mtolanthe maybe “Soweto-born”, but they are not of the Zulu- or Xhosa-tribes:  they are from the so-called “Northern tribes”. This “classification” is also applicable to Julius Malema. (note: Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki are Xhosas and Jacob Zuma is a Zulu). Azapo’s creed: “we are pro-black”, is starting to become an insignificant slogan beyond the racial classification and discrimination of the old ethnic reality. Also, the ANC’s erasing of ethnicity and tribalism from its politics is something of the past. When revolution flares up, the tribal reality can steer it to regard the white “tribe” and other “non-black” tribes with equal animosity, but it could well change direction quite quickly to become an extreme black-on-black tribal-driven revolution, like in Rwanda or as during the “First and Second Black Colonisations” of South Africa reflect only too well. The instigators and propagators of revolution can, as during the French Revolution, also unexpectedly become the victims of their fervour.27,34,35,37,38,39,48,52,58-60

Malloch-Brown’s27 notions on the advantages and inevitability of revolution, makes sense. It also makes sense for present-day South Africa.  Most black youth know that under another ANC regime their situation will never improve: Post-2019 could for them become the opportunity to settle and rectify the matter.27

To think that a revolution can and will not ever happen in South Africa is wishful thinking. Above comprehensive and in-depth findings confirm that a post-2019 revolution is not far-fetched. Undoubtedly, the country stands on the brink of a revolution. It is ripe for picking, even overripe. It does not need not another Marikana to start up. And, as in Tunisia and Egypt, when it suddenly comes to an eruption,  will it not only cost the heads of the ANC top brass, but sadly thousands of other people, mostly innocent bystanders, who are unrelated to the 1994 to 2019 ANC’s and the 1948 to 1994 Apartheid regime. And such an outcome can be bloody and unstoppable as in Rwanda.27,35,36,37,39,42,43

3.1.2.1.9. Immense presence of crime, violence, gender-violence and xenophobia in today’s South Africa

When we speak of the presence of unrest and anarchy in the country, is it important to point out that the foundations of it happening have been laid already (See also Article 13). What is important to note in this setup is the absence of a consciousness which is able to differentiate the transgressions of the ordinary citizen (This absence of a consciousness within the ANC elite was already covered in an in-depth study in Articles 11 to 17).

The basically permanent slide of law and order being eroded all over the country — reflected by immense, uncontrollable crime and violence present on the Cape Flats, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and many other places, as well as the presence of extreme highway and railway crime, violence and theft, together with gender- and xenophobic crimes and violence – show how near South Africa is on the path to a collapse into revolution. The basis for doing untold wrongs, as revolution and its murderous deeds often call for, is thus already well-established as a modus operandi with a large contingent of the population.61-73

3.1.2.2. The joker-surprises of history

Louw34 writes that history often brings about unexpected, even strange outcomes. He writes34:239:

The fortunes and misfortunes of nations have in some instances changed even after they had fled or failed, totally contradicting the rules of trustworthy predictions (and even sound thinking!). The impact of extreme world disasters, like earthquakes, pests, new wars, immense famine, new mass migrations, just to mention a few, have in the past had quick and profound impacts on the power of mighty empires or have caused undervalued, small nations’ fate to take a turn for the better.

The possibility remains that the political history of South Africa after 2019 can be one that we never have expected or anticipated, making the issue of land ownership insignificant or at least one eventually resulting in a very successful outcome.  Some determinants which can be roleplayers acting as jokers, need to be enlightened.74-82

3.1.2.2.1. Aids, mass illnesses and pests

The Christian Bible is full of stories of the sudden appearance of known and unknown illnesses and pests that killed off populations in large numbers. The outcomes were often that dynasties, despots and regimes collapsed under the weight of such events. Currently in Africa, Ebola is such a “pest” that, notwithstanding well-organised governmental and healthcare efforts to erase it, seems to have become an unstoppable plague.74,75,80,82

Aids is an illness that has been causing ongoing havoc but it seems it can not be contained, let alone totally erased.  In some countries it has registered a constant increase, notwithstanding healthcare education and medicine to combat it. South Africa unfortunately is caught in a downward Aids spiral. Data shows that in 2002  so much as 4.6 million South Africans were Aids-sufferers. The number 7.97 million was cited in 2019. This represents an increase of 3.37 million in 17 years. The 2019 Aids sufferers form nearly 15% of the country’s total population of 57 million. What is evident is that it is the youth  – who should constitute the base of the future work force and should fuel the growth in GDP, and who must assure the continuation of the nation’s population – has been the most vulnerable in contract the deadly virus.83

Illnesses such as Aids and others can dramatically change – when they become epidemics – a country’s socio-political and economic setup overnight with regard to the numbers of races and the traditional power that these numbers hold in terms of a majority-minority composition assured in a regime.

3.1.2.2.2. Impact of extreme poverty, unemployment and overpopulation

Many economic and political analysts and strategists underscore that there are more or less 30 million poor South Africans (out of a population of 58 million), while more than 17.5 million people, because of their utmost poverty and unemployment, are forced to live as beggars on social grants. This unfortunate poor contingent of people in need of social grants is constantly growing as a result of the growth in unemployment, rising living costs and population growth. The statistics reflect that social grants have grown from 2017 to 2018 by 8%, while the growth in cross tax revenue for the period was only 6%. It can be read from this growing poverty that for 2017/ 2018 there were officially 890 523 job seekers registered, but only 21 076 (2.3%) were placed in jobs or internships. Beyond this registered official jobless rate of 869 447 in 2018, is the mass of jobless people who are not registered. This social-economic chaos has been the result of the country’s high population growth of 1,43 % in 2019, worsening the already high unemployment and poverty.83-88

Growth in official unemployment is confirmed by the data for the first quarter of 2019 at 29% (with some sources putting it near 30%), with the indication that it can further deteriorate. Between 2001 and 2018 the primary sector recorded 484,000 job losses.  The impact of growing poverty, which indicates the presence of hunger for even those with some permanent work too, is pinpointed by Speckman89 when she writes89:3: “…the Pietermaritzburg Economic Justice & Dignity Group’s Household Affordability Index for 2019 showed that a general worker earning the national minimum wage at the 10% exemption level and working full for a 23 days earned  R3,312 per month. Transport and electricity costs accounted for 57% of the wage, leaving R1,425.48 for all other expenses, including food.

The direct impact of poverty, unemployment and overpopulation can bring about a total collapse of the South Africa economy on the one hand, but on the other hand a crisis of starvation and famine. Such outcomes with dire conditions is because of the total degradation that the poor population have to endure for the luxurious lifestyles of the ruler of the day in an effort to survive. An issue as land-ownership quickly becomes a non-starter for these impoverished masses.

3.1.2.2.3. South African climate changes and drought on food production, lifestyle viability and sustainability

The immense impact of climate change, such as extreme temperature fluctuations and droughts can firstly force the issue of land to become a vehicle to create a means of income; and secondly ignite the debate on the use of land to produce food but also question the viability of sustainable lifestyles. Both these issues could eventually lead to famine. The losing battle against hunger can already be read in the negative effect of the countrywide drought. Thus the importance of farm land per se as a means to sustain a living could become obsolete. This could result in waves of people from the rural population taking flight to cities for a living, bringing the need for urban land for homes into the bigger picture.90-96

If recurring droughts are taken into account, especially as a seemingly permanent, natural  phenomenon in South Africa, the arrival of a water scarcity crisis as far as human consumption, agriculture and industrial use is concerned, becomes a given. This can bring about a dramatic change in geopolitics, accompanied by a devastating impact on the already existing mass poverty and unemployment. For an overpopulated country such as South Africa the consequences could be enormous, leaving in its wake an impoverished nation, in which most of the population will be enslaved to the ruler for survival. A water crisis will replace the present political and emotional land-ownership matter and become the population’s foremost concern.90-96

The incoming drought has been confirmed by the SA Weather Service which indicates that the country has experienced drought since 2013 with a continuous uncertainty about when rains will fall. Patrick and Hosken95 write95:11 “This had put the jobs of about a million farm workers at risk, and made the country vulnerable to food and water insecurity, according to agricultural economists and farming associations”; and95:11: “AgriSA said in its 2018/2019 drought report that 31, 000 farming jobs had been lost since January 2018 in the drought hotspots of KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Western Cape, North West, Limpopo and the Northern Cape.”

Patrick and Hosken95 report further95:11: “Water restrictions are in force in some provinces. In the Northern Cape,  water is shut off overnight in its main town, while Eastern Cape premier Oscar Mabuyane this week declared the province a disaster area. Water restrictions are in force in its two metros, Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City.”

The spokesperson of Water Affairs, Sputnik Ratau95, said95:11: “SA is water scarce, so the reality of less than world-average rainfall, rapid urbanisation, climate change, desertification — especially from the west — and rapid population growth cannot be ignored.”

Professor Johan Willemse95, on the effect of the 2019 drought in general on the country, especially on the cost of living which could worsen poverty and hunger, writes:95:11 “We could see a 50% increase in the importing costs of white maize, which will rise from R3,000 per ton to R4,500 per ton. This will cause major meat price increases”.

Also, Patrick and Hosken95, quoting Mervyn Abrahams95 of the Economic Justice and Dignity Group,  report on the rising cost of living as a result of the drought as follows95:11: “…drought was a factor in the cost of the household food basket. It increased by R146.14 (4.8%) from R3,038.50  in October 2018 to R3,184.63 this year.”

Makhosini Mgitywa97, the head of Communication at the Ministry of Human Settlements, Water & Sanitation, writes in the Sunday Times of the 22nd September 201997:26:

The situation is dire and unless we do not do something, as the government and citizens, we will be left with a water shortage situation that will affect  us all, and to an extent never seen before.

SA is among the driest countries in the world but we go on as if we are among the wettest. It’s estimated that in five years’ time we will experience physical water scarcity. Our own department’s projection is that at that time the demand for water will outstrip supply.

Satgar96 writes on the 15th December 2019 in the Sunday Times and Vavi and Lenferna write98 on the 15th September 2019 in the Sunday Times that the climate crisis is already established as fact in the country. It is reflected in the form of sudden flash floods: killing more than 70 people at once and displacing more than 1 500 people, bringing damage at the cost of R1-billion at a time; leaving communities without drinking water or water for agriculture and posing a widespread threat to food security.96,98

Vavi and Lenferna98 reflect98:20:

Studies show that as a result of human-case climate change, SA faces deepening inequality and is already 10%-20% poorer.

Climate change is worsening an already dire situation of deep inequality, poverty and unemployment. The outbreaks of xenophobia violence were the most recent expression of our multifaceted crisis.

The xenophobia attacks are also connected to the climate crisis, because increasing climate impacts are eroding traditional livelihoods and driving people from their homes and increasing migration.

Many wars and revolutions were started because of the need for the three basic resources: water, food and land. Also, on the other hand, it has collapsed wars and revolutions, together with empowering regimes. It has also erased nations from the international scene. Beyond that, the experience of hunger and shortages of water can dramatically change voters to blindly support their failed regime, while thirst and famine could directly lead to revolution.

3.1.2.2.4. Racial assimilation, miscegenation and dissolution

The assimilation and miscegenation of the various races, which started in the Cape in 1652 between whites, blacks, Malays, Indian and Khoi San people, are ongoing today. The 1994 dispensation and the freeing of blacks and Afrikaners from the Apartheid shackles, has  created the impetus for a much deeper assimilation between the South African races while miscegenation seems to be gaining ground. It is possible that full assimilation and miscegenation of races may occur in the next 10 to 20 years. The racial issue around the so-called colour of the land owner could become unimportant because of this miscegenation in which mixed families are created.34

The fact also that the present dominant land owners, namely the whites and specifically the Afrikaners, have been since 1989 in a process of dissolution, could result in them numbering at most 30 000 in a century, and make it unnecessary to pursue land expropriation in the long term, taking farms they own.34,76-78,83,85

3.1.2.2.5. The possible post-2020 democratising of the Electoral Act

For years the South African voters have been caught in an undemocratic voter system which gives the ANC’s party bosses and not the voters the right to select MPs and MPLs through an imbalanced proportional system. This resulted that at present the country is being governed by a very small minority, a powerful ANC clique.47, 99-103

Looting and the appointments of shady figures in municipalities have restarted and is a direct result of this flaw of political accountability demanded from councillors and officials by the electors. Mthombothi104 postulates104:19:

In fact, it’s not even correct to talk about elected officials in our system because we vote for the party, not the individual. This decides which of its members should be elevated to higher office.

The party is given a blank cheque that it uses as it sees fit. That needs to change. Anybody wielding power — from the lowest councillor, to the mayor, to president — should do so by virtue of direct election by the voters.

The private legal action which was started up in 2019 to reform the electoral system and to do away with the present favourable climate for the ANC elite through the election system by means of the court application brought by the New Nation Movement (NNM), a KhoiSan organisation, to change the Electoral Act (Act 73 of 1998) could make provision for the direct election of MPs and MPLs by voters, and if it is at the end successful, it could have a dramatic anti-ANC voter outcome in 2024. So far, the Ramapohosa regime has not shown much support for the change.47,99,101-108

3.1.2.2.6. Lingering impact of nineteen-million passive voters on the 2024-elections

The outcome of the past May 2019 elections highlighted only a participation on national level by 49% of the eligible voters in the elections, of which the ANC only received the votes of  28% of the eligible voters.47,102,109-111

The Institute of Security Studies shows further, comparing the outcomes of the 2014 elections with the 2019 elections, that the ANC is in a permanent downward spiral.  In this free fall must be noted that the ANC has less than a million inscribed members against a total of registered voter population of ±27-million and an eligible voters population of ±37-million.47,99,101-108,112-115

Further statistics show, that as a result of their passivity not to register as voters,  that the 18 to 19 years olds on the voter lists for 2019 is 47% lower than in 2014, while for the age group 20 to 29 the number declined with 9%. Clear dislike and aversion by the youth for the ANC have developed apace since 2014. The youth vote can be devastating for the ANC in 2024.47

The above shows that if a party or a group of integrity can mobilise the 51% of passive voters, the ANC, as well as the DA, can be totally erased in 2024 from the political scene. Mthombothi104, on this immensely positive outcome waiting to be implemented: That is to convince passive voters, writes104:19:

Throughout the turmoil there’s on crucial element that nobody seems even bothered about. The voter is the rock, the foundation on which democracy is built. Yet no-one is talking about him or her. It’s almost as though the voter doesn’t exist or is immaterial to the entire setup. This whole circus therefore brings to the fore the need for electoral reform.

3.1.3. South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)

The analysis and discussion of this article (see headings 3.1.1. to 3.1.2.) will continue in the final article (Article 19) of the series of 19 articles, titled: South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19). The analysis and discussions of Article 19 will be done under the following heading and subheadings:

3.1.3. Advice and suggestions for a post-2019 effective government

3.1.3.1. ANC-DA intertwining
3.1.3.1.1. ANC
3.1.3.1.2. DA
3.1.3.1.3. Perspective on a failed ANC and DA

3.1.3.2. Cutting out the ANC and DA out as future rulers
3.1.3.2.1. The end of political innocence
3.1.3.2.2. Time for political renewal 
3.1.3.2.2.1. The simultaneous practice of autocracy and democracy inside the Constitution
3.1.3.2.2.1.1. The ANC-regime, the judiciary and the possibility of a care-taker administrator
3.1.3.2.3. Time for a new UDF 
3.1.3.2.3.1. Role and position of Whites in a new UDF
3.1.3.2.4. The steps, paths and process of sound future land redistribution 

4. Conclusions

The failed Marxist-Leninist politics of the ANC regime, together with the incompetent leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, has brought South Africa to the brink of disaster. Its economy is in a shambles. A short-term escape route is needed by the Ramaphosa regime. Land grabs are currently the most attractive solution for this ANC regime to deliver some form of capital or money easily to the masses of poor people, as well to give the Ramaphosa elite some credibility again as revolutionaries who are still “freeing” the masses of poor blacks from the shackles of white dominance and from capitalists.

It is clear that not one of the political parties which are active in present-day South Africa, is capable and trustworthy enough to run the country effectively. It is basically impossible for any one of them to deliver on a just and balanced land-redistribution policy.

The troubled land-ownership matter fits well into the many dissatisfactions of the masses of poor and landless people. It holds the potential to motivate them to become involved in immense unrest and anarchy, even revolution, in the immediate future. Furthermore the unbalanced and unjust land-ownership matter in the country is the single best reason available to radicals in the ANC and other political parties, under the cover of revenge on white supremacy and capitalism, to activate a Marxist-Leninist coup. The fact that the ANC is losing its autocratic grip on the country fast and could be ousted in the 2024 elections, makes the probability of a coup a strong possibility in 2020 already.

It is clear that an acceptable solution to the land-ownership matter must be found not later than 2020.

In the final article (Article 19), titled: “South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)”, the land-ownership matter will further be analysed and discussed. An approach and guideline on how the land expropriation process can be activated and steered in an effort to solve the matter, will be offered.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

 

 

Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe a century away? Part 7: 2017 is the time for thinking, planning, and deeds

Gabriel Louw

 

Research Associate, Focus Area: Social Transformation, Faculty of Arts,

Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

 

RESEARCH

 

Corresponding Author:

Prof Dr GP Louw

Focus Area Social Transformation

Faculty of Arts

Potchefstroom Campus

North-West University

South Africa

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

 

Ensovoort volume 37(2017), number 11:3

 

ABSTRACT

 

Keywords

Alliance, apartheid, conflict, discrimination, dissolution, ethnicity, genocide, Herodotus curse, doctrine, minority, miscegenation, monopoly, myth, parent stock, proto-Afrikaner, race, racism, security, self-actualisation, strong-arm tactics, violence.

_____________________________________________________________________________

 

 

  • Background

 

 

“One might argue that there is almost a symbiotic interdependence between Black and White in South Africa, which makes for minority security. On the other hand, the relatively large size of the White majority gives it a substantial capacity for the fomenting dissidence, which could lead a predominantly Black government either to handle it with care so as to avoid provocation; or to use strong-arm tactics to neutralise this potential. Much would depend, of course, on how the process of sharing power had occurred and the extent to which Whites (or a majority of them) felt themselves included in the new government”, writes Welsh1, p.110 in 1988. This political view on the possible future outcomes of a Black regime’s comprehensive attitude and actions against the Whites, including Afrikaners, was not only accurately portrayed by Professor David Welsh, but become a reality 29 years later.1

 

Now, looking back after 23 years of Black rule in South Africa, it is clear that both of the outcomes were realized by the ANC-regime. Although, during the initial period after 1994 when the National Party (NP) led by FW de Klerk stayed on in the government of reconciliation, Afrikaners were treated with care to avoid provocation. But after the NP left the ANC-NP alliance, this intention of the ANC regime started to change gradually into a hostile one. This mild hostility against Whites was initially reflected by BEE, EE, etc., well masked under the pretext of equalizing opportunities between Blacks and Whites and promoting the mass of disadvantaged Blacks. No doubt exists that some sectors inside the Afrikaner population began to show dissidence to Black rule, although this was mostly limited to public protests and legal action, mostly via the various private enterprises which had assigned themselves as “caretakers” of Afrikaner interests.1-16

 

With the Zupta shenanigans and state capture gaining prominence and Jacob Zuma’s efforts to mask his dictatorial, duplicitous regime of self-enrichment, the focus was once again shifted to the Afrikaner. Ignoring the poor Black masses and the civil rights of individual Blacks, Zuma and his ilk diverted the heat to Whites as past and present oppressors of the Blacks. Afrikaners’ self-enrichment through their alleged exploitation of Blacks and the consequent “unlawful possession” of Black capital and land – which had been “stolen” from the rightful Black owners by White colonialists – was the popular refrain. The South African public were reminded of the racial division between Black and White with apartheid, colonialism, Afrikanerism, and the like wedged into the collective consciousness. Zuma and his intimate cadres utilised this momentum to promote Radical Economic Transformation (RET), which focused on nationalizing White capital (banks, property, land, pension funds, etc) and would tip the economic scales in favour of the previously disenfranchised. Disregarding Afrikaners’ civil and political rights in the work environment, crime-fighting, the murder of White farmers, parliamentarian debating, and political decision-making, are further excellent examples of the start-up of strong-arm tactics to neutralize the Whites as a political grouping as well as an indigenous South African population [The more recently emphasis also on Radical Social Transformation (RST) to equal social status between Blacks and Whites is a further example of these tactics].1-16

 

Mthombothi17, p.17writes that the truth behind RET and “White monopoly capital” is that it is just a cloak to cover up Zuma and the Guptas’ nefarious deeds of enduring damage by their cynical exploitation of racism and repeated regurgitation of the apartheid past. The two terms are thus not as innocent as they sound. He writes17, p. 17: “It’s got nothing to do with any desire to help or uplift the black masses, especially not on the part of a family [Guptas] who have shown no love for black people. These words have a sinister motive. They are deliberately designed to pull the wool over our eyes, to set us up against each other, to incite racial hatred. And so we fight among ourselves as they get on with the business of looting the country. We have fallen for it. Their plan is working. They have poisoned the well”. It is excellent example of “divide and rule” used worldwide by sly rulers to stay in power and to distract attention from their own wrongdoing.

 

Clearly the Afrikaner has become, through Zuma, the sole “enemy of the people” again as in the 1960s with the ANC’s policy of revolution and an effective method to distract especially the poor Black classes’ from the truth. This tried-and-tested trick has always been successful at obtaining votes from the poor masses: by frightening them with the return of White apartheid, the repositioning of the “racist” Afrikaners as a political power, and the theft of new-found Black richness.1,3,4,7,11,12,15,16,18-21 This RET policy does not differ from the established corrective economic policies that have been pursued since 1994. Fuelling the fire of Black-White conflict can ultimately – socially and economically – destabilize South Africa. It is in this subjective but overwhelming anti-White hostility that Afrikaners are trying to make the best of their indigenous identity and to live in the new South Africa.17

 

While Welsh1, p. 101postulated in 1988 that “it is perhaps not ‘inevitable’ that in fifty years’ time [2038] White control over South Africa will have disappeared…”, it took the ANC regime only 23 years to reach that goal successfully through the intensifying of well-planned strong-arm tactics. These kinds of tactics by Zuma and his supporters will strongly increase in their efforts to draw the attention away from their growing political wrongdoings as more and more Black dissenters from the middle and higher classes turn their backs on the “Zupta-ANC”.

 

The abovementioned propaganda and political rhetoric is exactly how the ZANU-PF regime of Robert Mugabe “won” Zimbabwe from the Whites. ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe himself recently provided an apt description of the dangerous implications, especially for Afrikaners, of Jacob Zuma’s populist RET policy of grabbing White-monopoly capital and land when he says22, p. 4:

As ‘n revolusionêre beweging agteruitgaan en goedkoop populariteit soek, raak dit avontuurlik en populisties.

 

Zanu-PF was ‘n revolusionêre party, maar om goedkoop steun te kry, het Zanu-PF grond gegryp en uitgedeel en só kosproduksievernietig. Dit was dalk gewild, maar Zimbabwe is nou ‘n voedselinvoerder.

 

Dit is waarheen ons ook neig. Die beweging [ANC] sal nie gered word deur kitsoplossings nie, maar deur diep besinning.

 

Die debat oor radikale transformasie en witmonopoliekapitaal word deur Gupta-gesinde ANC-lede gestook om ‘n voorsprong te kry met die oog op die party se nasionale konferensie in Desember.

 

If the secretary general of the ANC feels obligated to warn against his own party’s failing future political integrity and behaviour (which is already a reality), there can be no doubt of the seriousness of these anti-White tactics and the possibly devastating consequences awaiting Afrikaners. The plight of the Whites in Zimbabwe is well recorded and well published.

 

Although the South African Constitution, the Constitutional Court and other courts of law have thusfar managed to shield the Afrikaner from the ANC’s extreme strong-arm tactics, these bodies might be rendered powerless in the long run if a total ANC-takeover (67%) results in changes to the independence of the courts and the security services. Dramatic action against the Afrikaner could follow, which may even lead to genocide. The present-day cry by ultra-hot-headed ANCs and other radical Blacks for a “second revolution” via RET and RST seems more and more imminent. This revolution’s intention is far from innocent, despite claims by the present-day ANC leadership that its only aim is to obtain “economic” freedom by ending the “first revolution” of 1994 by means of RET and RST to bring “political freedom” to Blacks.1,7,11,12,15,16,20,22,23

 

The aggressive and militant movement known as Black First Land First (BLF), have already started putting their demands in writing and publically vocalising threats and intimidating any opponents of this “second revolution” with their anti-White motto, “to defend black people, the Guptas, from racist, land-thieving white monopoly capitalist scum,” as the journalist Peter Bruce24, p. 20summarised it. This already reflects that the presence of a “…culture of intolerance and bullying and disregard for the basic principles of free speech in our society in the new smash and grab milieu is such that lives are being put at risk”.25, p. 20 This spells disaster for Afrikaners. There is overwhelming evidence of a comprehensive readjustment around Afrikaners and their position as citizens of South Africa, and one cannot help fearing for the worst.1,7,11,12,15,16,20,22,24-26

 

Vilakazi warning of this extreme political, social, economic, and personal upheaval in the future of Afrikaners if they did not take the time to safeguard them against Black revenge and annulment, was already well profiled and spelled out nearly 30 years ago  when he writes 15,p. 40:

 

The essence of revolution is the direct, active intervention of the oppressed masses of society in public affairs, in an effort to speed up and bring about long overdue changes in the fundamental structures of society. These changes are above all in the possession and control of power, first political, and, following on its heels, economic power. Revolution consists of the shifting of this power from the hands of one class to the hands of the hitherto oppressed classes. The issue in any revolution is the possession and control of the power of the State, and possession and control of property; in other words, political power, and economic power.

 

But what Vilakazi also failed15 to say then, but which Gwede Mantashe22 now warns us of, is that any revolution is not a bed of roses: not only for the loser, but also for the winner at the end, spelling total chaos at the end.28 (Remember the vicious cycle of the Herodotus Curse on wrongdoing that history repeats itself and that contravening the rules of justice creates→ injustice hate→ revenge →contra-revenge, with sometimes a fast, sudden, surprising, and deadly counter revenge).22,27,28

 

The present day as well as potential future abuse and crushing of Afrikaners by the ANC regime and other radical Blacks are clearly pinpointed in the above remark of 30 years ago by Vilakazi’s15,p. 40: “…long overdue changes in the fundamental structures of society…”. This was a dire warning of an unavoidable South African indigenous reality of disaster to come in their near future, which the ordinary Afrikaners missed to read on the lips of F W de Klerk when he mesmerized the 1993 referendum and the post-1994 utopian South Africa into their mindsets.14,29,30

 

The basic aim of this article was to inform the Afrikaner of his present and future role as a citizen of the new South Africa. This contemplation should motivate the Afrikaner to do self- introspection. Afrikaners should answer the question: Have we reached self-actualisation and an optimal personal happiness in the new South Africa? Have we left our worries and fears behind so that we can participate in a good life here? If Afrikaners fail to offer a positive answer on the question, then it is time that they reread this article to see how they can address their upcoming Afrikaner dissolution the best, and how they can obtain and assure at present and in future psychological and political wellbeing for themselves. The options are there, but only they alone can make a choice. Remember: at this stage Afrikaner dissolution is a fact, not a myth.

 

The aim of the study is to describe 2017 as the time for thinking, planning, and deeds. The focus is on the various options and routes available for the Afrikaner to plan his immediate future and to delay or to avoid dissolution in a century’s time.

  • This article is the last in a series of seven. The seven articles represent the following research topics: 1) who is the Afrikaner; 2) the historical determinants and role-players in the establishment and maintenance of racial and ethnic discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 3) present and past negative determinants and role-players in the establishment and upkeep of injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 4) the Afrikaner’s failure to understand, accept and intertwine the indigenous realities of South Africa; 5) the vicious cycle of revenge and counter- revenge around apartheid;  6) The preparedness of Afrikaners to deal with the threats and challenges of the new South Africa; 7) 2017 is the time for thinking, planning, and deeds.

 

  • The overarching intention of the entire study is to determine the position of the Afrikaner in the year 2117.

 

 

  • Method

 

 

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the ground up, from evidence as it emerges over the course of the research. This approach is used in modern-day historical research where an established library is lacking, for instance in the case of the topic of the present and future position of the Afrikaner in South Africa. The databases used were EBSCO, Sabinet online as well as articles from 2016 to 2017, books for the period 1944 to 2016, and newspapers covering the period 2012 to 2017. This was done to reflect on the Afrikaner and to place thoughts, views, and opinions on the Afrikaner in perspective.60-62

 

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

 

 

  • Results

 

 

Prominent to the background provided are the questions: Is it justified that Afrikaners at this stage of the New South Africa are still exposed to discriminative behaviours and maltreatment by the ANC regime?; and, What can Afrikaners do to secure a future for themselves and their descendants in or outside of South Africa?

 

In this context it is important to know if the ANC regime understands the concept of indigenousness of the various tribes of South Africa outside a Black-only ethnicity, as well as if they have any knowledge of the prescribed principles and rules to be followed in nation-building? Does the ANC regime really take notice of the Afrikaners’ sincere and willing efforts to become successful members of the new South Africa? There is no doubt that if the ANC regime can answer these three questions positively and practice them accordingly there will be no need for Afrikaners to reconsider their present and future positions in South Africa. So far, all hope seems to be in vain.

 

In the following four subdivisions the ANC’s under standing of and respect for South African peoples’ indigenousness, nation-building, as well as the ordinary Afrikaner’s sincerity and willingness to accept South African indigenous realities and to move on to greater South Africa, will be described.

 

3.1 South African indigenous realities missed by the ANC

 

For some Blacks, especially those in ANC politics, it was just too difficult after 1994 to accept that the White minority had legitimate interests in view of what, historically, had been the ‘illegitimate’ exercise of minority power over “them” as Blacks. This bitterness about their treatment as human beings during apartheid (and during colonialism, in the same breath) and outright rejection of the “illegitimate” NP-regime by the Blacks, has led to today’s hostile actions against Afrikaners. Also, the Afrikaner’s substantial dissidence to Black rule, specifically with the ANC as former revolutionary organization, aggravated the situation. The end result was the ANC regime’s disregard and disrespect of the rights of Afrikaners, despite the safeguarding of minority groups by the Constitution. The ANC regime’s obvious efforts to undo the privileged political and socio-economic position the Afrikaner previously held [and considered guaranteed after 1994 by virtue of the NP and the 1993 referendum agreement] reinforced this view.1,3.4.15.31-35

 

What these Blacks and the ANC have forgotten is that internalized customs, habits, and traditions do not just disappear when a new regime takes over. Rights, privileges, benefits and favours, written or unwritten, official or unofficial, also do not suddenly disappear (the present behaviour of the ANC as an ex-terrorist, ex-revolutionary organization plainly reflects these internalized dispositions). South Africa as a country developed over more than three hundred years of war and peace, good and bad. At the moment the differences between the classes, between Black and White, as well as Black and Black, are just too significant to erase overnight. The same can be said of the chasm between the “haves” and the “have-nots”. Unfortunately, targeting Whites out of racial hatred and jealousy and forcing them out of their homeland and seizing their capital and property will not solve the problem. At the end it is the country and its Black people that suffer the most. After independence, Samora Machel of Mozambique attempted (but failed) to rectify inequalities in one fell swoop by focussing exclusively on Whites as the wringers. Despite Machel’s reputed warning to Mugabe not to repeat this mistake, Mugabe blindly implemented radical racial reform measures by kicking Whites off their farms and out of Zimbabwe, but failed as Machel did and today continues to mutilate the tattered remains of his once-thriving country. The ANC has been trying to do the same in South Africa since 1994, but instead is creating more long-term problems than solving present short-term problems. It is against devastating costs to the country that Mantashe and a few wise ANC stalwarts and veterans are – seemingly in vain – warning the Zupta-led ANC elite.1,22,25,37,38

 

In a “peaceful transfer” from one political regime to another, like that of the NP to the ANC (a peaceful development of revolution which very seldom takes place in history), the peace of such a transfer is  sometimes very short-lived. Basically, because the initial solutions to problems were often insufficient, leaving many of the role-players from both sides unfulfilled and frustrated in terms of compensation or punishment for wrongdoings (as evidenced by the hunger for revenge by victims of apartheid). To steer a regime change peacefully through its growing pains requires extraordinary leadership, characterized by foresight, courage, a sense of morality and conciliation, and the ability to act fast in times of crisis. The ANC leadership after Nelson Mandela lacks all of these. This has led to a misrepresentation in the minds of some Afrikaners that ill discipline, corruption, lethargy, unproductiveness, inefficiency, and incompetence are characteristics of Black culture in general. These traits of the current leadership and the departments under them are the primary motivation behind the commonplace reference to the new South Africa as a “banana republic”.32This is a very sad generalisation as the greater part of most Black societies do not harbour particular ill will towards their fellow South Africans, including Afrikaners. They are merely getting on with life as best they can, and suffer under the same inefficiency and incompetence of the ruling party; they are not governed by hatred or an urge for revenge.13-15, 39-45

 

This “African culture” which has characterized life in post-1994 South Africa is actually a “deviant ANC culture” originating from its origin as a terrorist and revolutionary organization. It is far removed from the true African culture of South Africa and shaped by outdated political thought and the actions of anti-Afrikaner Black politicians and activists with their own agendas (maintained and driven by the MKs of the late 1960s and 1970s). At present, it is aggravated by the Zuptas and their supporters. Many ANC leaders and members are nothing more than spectators, lacking wisdom or insight, who gained front seats to the political game in the post-1994 democratic elections. And then there are the many “takers” who will do anything just to satisfy their personal greed and ambitions. The reality is that these opportunistic people are in charge of the ANC and are steering its policies and actions. Any positivity on the Afrikaner’s side is blindly ignored; the same can be said about their civil rights. It seems that Afrikaners are increasingly falling prey to this system.12,32,33,39,46-52

 

3.2 Requirements for South African Nationhood

 

A lot of the present-day hostility of the ANC-regime is a direct outcome of the political immaturity of the South African Constitution and South Africa’s history as a nation, although the judges of the Constitutional and Appeal Courts act with wisdom, sincerity, and sound legal principles. South Africa as a member of BRICS can learn a lot from India’s colonial past and the successful manner in which this new nation (but old civilisation) is handling its different cultures, peoples, and tribes since obtaining independence in 1947. Whereas India was never a unified political entity, the Proclamation of Queen Victoria in 1853 unified into one country, one nation; when independence came on August 14, 1947, a democracy was created that has remained unified. What makes this achievement so great is that it brought nearly a 1 000 million people (of various cultures, tribes and levels of education, some in extreme poverty, other extreme rich) together as one political entity under conditions of freedom. “Never before in history, and nowhere else in the world today, has one-sixth of the human race existed as a single free nation. This unity of people is more than the combined population of Africa and South America”.53, p. 3

 

This achievement goes much further – all 12 of the great living religions in the world are flourishing in India, 16 major languages written in different alphabets and derived from different roots, while Indians express themselves in 250 dialects. Although English (the language of colonialism) is not included in the major languages listed in the Constitution, it remained the only language for the whole country. Furthermore, English is the only language in which South India is prepared to communicate with North India. British jurisprudence is the matrix of India’s non-personal laws.53, p. 3

 

India’s independence is based on a sound Constitution which is respected by all the role-players. Even in states of the Indian Republic where the Communist Party governs, human rights are fully respected because of the Bill of Rights being firmly ingrained in the Indian Constitution (the substance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations on December 10, 1948, is embodied as Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution). What drives this democracy, freedom, and unity in India, fighting of communal hatred, linguistic fanaticism, terrorism, professional hooliganism, caste, and clan fanaticism, corruption, and creed, is India’s national integration, and integrity. The eminent Indian writer, lawyer and academic, Nani Palkhivala53, defined this totality very well (the ANC leadership and anti-Afrikaner Blacks would do well with a daily dose) when writing53 p. 11:

 

The most crying need of India today is to undergo catharsis, a course of emotional cleansing. We must not allow the moral bedrock of our society to turn to lava.

 

National integration is born in the hearts of the citizens. When it dies there, no army, no government, no constitution, can save it. States of mind precede states. Inter-faith harmony and consciousness of the essential unity of all religions is the very heart of our national integration.

 

The soul of India aspires to integration and assimilation. Down the ages, Indian culture – a tremendous force of power and beauty – has been made richer and deeper as a result of absorbing what is best in outside influences and integrating those various influences to grace and enrich its own identity.

 

Regarding Palkhivala’s reference53, p. 11 to “absorbing what is best in outside influences and then integrating those influences” (which brings us back to the ANC leadership’s distaste and hatred of British colonialism and Afrikanerism and their rejection of good influences as bad simply because it does not fit their revolutionary dogma), he writes specific about the “accidental” impact of British colonialism of 200 years on India as follows53, p. 15:

 

There seems to be a mystical bond which holds us together in real understanding and goodwill. There is something special, in fact providential, in the relationship between Britain and India. The crucial test is this: if the last two hundred years in India’s history were to be relived, how many thinking Indians would prefer to have them without British rule? I venture to say no one, who is not ignorant, or partial, would wish the past to be redrawn effacing all traces of the raj.

 

There was much that was ugly and exploitative in those years. But, on the balance, the good far outweighed the evil. The British took enormous wealth out of India, but they left behind legacies which no money could buy.

 

Where the Indians accepted the British as part of their future life after Indian rule, incorporated the positive of British colonialism and imperialism into their daily lives and created a brotherhood with the British that still exists today, the ANC elite did just the opposite with Afrikaners. Five years into Black rule they started to oust Afrikaners from all terrains of South African life on the basis of their association with “imperial and colonial rule”. Afrikaans as a language came under siege, work limitations followed, political isolation became prominent, White murders intensified and White bashing became a daily rhetoric, while the capture of White capital  now seems to enter its final stage. It must, however, be said that, although India is a young nation (74 years), it is a country with an ancient history (5 000 years). New South Africa is not only a very young nation (23 years), but it lacks a comprehensive history: there are existing White and Afrikaner histories but a true Black history is missing. History and nationhood still come, but notwithstanding this, it is worrying that after 23 years of the existence of the new South Africa, the ANC – driven by greed and revenge – seems to be focussing on national disintegration, fighting its own past, and instigating Black-White conflict and hate, instead of following a course of action to bring about positive growth in nation-building.3,4,8,17,24,32,34,39,47,50,53,54 Palkhivala53 warns well of personal and political mischievousness that destroys nation-building.

 

Palkhivala’s remark that53, p.15: “…no one, who is not ignorant or partial…” points to the ANC’s political and personal immaturity as the reason for their failure, as ruling party, to think strategically and constructively about the country’s future. Or is their thinking so overrun by their negative emotional state after apartheid that it has neutralized all sound cognitive functioning? It took the Afrikaner nearly 400 years to develop from European, Black, Indian, and other indigenous people to the proto-Afrikaner and to the Afrikaner, with the latter still an identity in the process of becoming another. Possible are the present-day peoples of South Africa, including Afrikaners, in a great haste to become true South Africans. To obtain this status, it is necessary for them to live through the present political, social, economical, and personal upheavals for at least another 300 years before the ordinary South Africans can say, as the Indians after 5 000 years of growth: WE ARE A NATION. The ANC as a political party, its tailstock leaders and the hot-headed guild of anti-Afrikaners, are seemingly only a temporary nuisance in this long process of nation-building in which the Afrikaner has unfortunately become an innocent victim.8,14,53,55,56

 

Apartheid, driven by Afrikanerism from 1910, was – like British colonialism in India –ugly and exploitative until 1994. But, on the balance – as with colonialism in India and most African countries – the good of apartheid far outweighed the evil. Afrikaners enriched themselves at the cost of Blacks and degraded them, but they brought and left behind legacies for Black South Africa which no money could buy. As in India with British colonialism, apartheid and British colonialism was needed to bring South Africa and all its populations to its present stage of Black rule. Many Black South Africans reject the legacies of apartheid, although the positive evidence is all over the country and in Black present-day lifestyles.32,53 The arguments against the Europeans/colonists in South Africa, Africa, and worldwide – that they grew rich and powerful by robbing their colonies,– do not hold true because there was not much to take, writes D’Souza57, p. 60 in response to the often heard retort: “The Europeans stole the raw material to build their civilization, they stole rubber from Malaya, and cocoa from West Africa, and tea from India”. D’Souza points out that before British colonialism57, p. 60: “…there were no rubber trees in Malaya, nor cocoa trees in West Africa, nor tea in India. The British brought the rubber tree to Malaya from South America, they brought tea to India from China. And they taught the Africans to grow cocoa, a crop the native people had previously never heard of ”. There was a total lack of infrastructure and to make the countries effective, the British built roads, shipping docks, railway tracks, irrigation systems, government buildings, introduced education and healthcare, and introduced them to new words and new ideas unknown to their ancestral culture, like “liberty”, “sovereignty”, “rights”, etc., concepts that still affect their present-day thoughts and actions.57 “Despite the corrupt and self-serving motives of their practitioners, the institutions of colonialism and slavery proved to be the mechanism that brought millions of non-White people into the orbit of Western freedom”, D’Souza57, p. 60 continues. The doctrine of oppression ignores these facts and goes on to fuel anti-Western resentment around the world and in nations of the West. D’Souza concludes57, p.67: “I think we can now conclude that the doctrine is false, and the animus that is based on it is misplaced”. In fact, the ANC elite have adopted many of the actions condemned as evil habits of Afrikanerism and apartheid. Apartheid and Afrikanerism are, together with Afrikaners, a permanent part of Black history and South African history.32,53

 

Black insecurity about an own identity, masked behind their false bravado and arrogance of “self-made” and “independence” as well as their focused aggression towards Afrikaners, confirms the cemented impact of the positivity of apartheid and Afrikanerism in their psyche. This “inferiority complex” as the result of under-development in a complex and dynamic world easily gets a grip on people. (This also happened to the poorer proto-Afrikaners and later Afrikaners under British colonialism and was strongly reflected in their behaviour in the Union). Blacks reference to themselves as32, p.2: “verbeeldinglose primitiewe barbare”, supported by: “… kolonialiste ‘het ons sommige van die ergste leuens laat glo.’ Deur brute krag, deur ons hulpbronne te plunder en deur ons verstand en liggaam gevange te hou, (is) Afrikane van hul menslikheid en waardigheid ontneem”, are excellent examples of this illusion and underestimation, not only of themselves as full citizens, but also of the roles of Afrikaners in their lives during apartheid. Rationalization and projection are lifestyle-mechanisms often used for the wrong reasons, to relay attention from own much deeper personal-shortcomings, dysfunctions, and needs. Afrikaners are part of the South African nation-building process and have a valuable contribution to make.

 

If the ANC leadership and its members doubt the wise words of Palkhivala53on nation-building and the importance of every piece of history because it is related from an Indian context, they may turn to the writings of South African entrepreneur and White African, Mike Boon39 in The African Way: The power of interactive leadership. Maybe Boon’s simple guidelines on the South African peoples and their leaders will appeal to the palate of the ANC leadership (and change their present failure to succeed as leaders). Boon writes39, p. 15:

 

Africa is a place of many peoples, many tribes, and many beliefs. It is a place of terrible horror and great compassion; one of foolishness and great wisdom. But there is a vision of Africa, based on the nobility, and tragedy of the past. This is a land of strong cultures that survive and grow together with the ever-increasing education of proud people, secure in the knowledge that they are the future mentors of the world. The world is beginning to realize that happiness is a state of being and not something we work towards or buy. It is a vision of harmony, prosperity, and success; of productive, powerful work teams; of true democracy; of cooperation and interdependence; and of trust and pride in humanity and in each other.

 

We are different people with different cultures. We have our own ways, our own languages, customs, philosophies, and beliefs. We have our own history and our own heroes. More importantly, we have our African humanity and our noble cultures. Woe to the world if we all pursue a singular, grey, and boring sameness. Our differences and traditions make us interesting and proud.

 

The ANC regime of today, as the NP-AB (Afrikaner-Broederbond) alliance of the past, is misjudging the South African diversity of cultures and peoples and their stubborn will to survive under immense hardship. It seems that the ANC of today are destined to suffer the same humiliating failure the NP and ordinary nationalist Afrikaners suffered after 46 years of rule (1948 –1994); although it may be after the relatively short time of 25 years in government (1994 – 2019). Both failures were as a result of unwise, racist, authoritarian, and greedy leaderships. Not only did the leaders of both dispensations abuse their positions for their own gains, but they lacked insight into the needs of individual citizens on grassroots level.

 

3.3 The Afrikaner is an identity in becoming another▼

The opportunistic and authorial leaders of the nationalist Afrikaners doctrine into their mindset the belief of themselves as the anointed Afrikaner nation, sent to Africa by God to convert the Blacks and make them better people. A group granted “everlasting supremacy” over Blacks and the right to be “forever the rulers” of South Africa, as established by Verwoerd and his First Republic. Under the sly leadership of the NP and the AB, ordinary Afrikaners were somehow pacified into believing that the political rule of the Afrikaner in South Africa – with its immense military and political might – was infallible. When the unholy alliance between the NP and the AB suddenly collapsed in 1994, ordinary Afrikaners were still too naive to understand that they, with the approval of a newly combined leadership, were going to be gradually sacrificed within ten years: the proverbial lamb to the slaughter on the ANC’s altar of revenge from 2017 and onwards. From the beginning of 1994, ordinary Afrikaners were naive about what to expect in the new South Africa. They were unprepared for the immense political, social, economic, and personal changes awaiting them. They were totally confused about what their positions in the new dispensation were and the appropriate behaviour required in this new environment.8,14,29,41,55,56,58,59

 

It is not a surprise that this confusion and loss of identity suffered by the ordinary Afrikaner after 1994 culminated in total desolation, and in the words of Breytenbach55, p. 83:

Actually I’d ceased being an Afrikaner. My sense of that entity, and even the language, was but nostalgia encapsulated in an irrevocable lost past. Maybe I’d made up that past, coloring it in the glowing tones of innocence, contextualizing its dark and bleeding violence to make it seem part of the woof of being human”, and, ‘“I?” What “I?” The language, if I still used it, had become private and personal. Some words were left, moving like maggots through the dead meat of redundant arguments. But now I am no longer identified in any way. What am I saying? It is already dead. I was talking to dead people. I am talking of a passed away “self”.

 

Thankfully, the Afrikaner is not yet “ceased,” neither is he dead in the new South Africa, but the smell of death is present in his existence and he must know it. What is indeed true, is that the basic issue of an all-over political empowerment of a specific group in South Africa, namely who is going to rule South Africa from now on1, p.108: “‘them’ or ‘us?’” has been successfully phased out of the mindsets of most Afrikaners after 1994. The final acceptance is clear: the Blacks are ruling and that is absolute and final in 2017. What is also clear is that the new rulers are going to apply more and more pressure to impoverish, isolate, and – where possible – nullify the Afrikaner as citizen.

 

It does not matter today whether the55, p. 78: “…Afrikaner is only an identity in becoming another,” or if he is “rightfully still a legitimate member of an independent indigenous South African tribe been stripped of his previous ruler’s status”. The hard fact is that he still exists as a South African reality and the new rulers should mark that he is a human being with legitimate civil rights as a citizen. It is thus of utmost importance for Afrikaners to find solutions to secure their existence to avoid the danger of dissolution in the future. However, there is evidence that Afrikaners have already begun to think outside their doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism and are starting to try out solutions to adapt to their political dilemmas in the new South Africa.

 

▲Cross-references: see Part 5, subdivision 4.2.7 and Part 6, subdivision 4.1.6.

 

3.4 Afrikaner Sincerity and Willingness to Political Change

 

To change political and cultural mindsets to fit into the South African indigenous realities – the cake of customs as the historian J M Roberts14, p. 986describes it – formed sometimes by almost unrecognized assumptions and attitudes over long stretches of time – is no easy feat. But it can be done, as in 1994 when Afrikaners were forced to accept a Black regime and the ANC as ruling party. Although this change was initially seen as a conditional transfer by the outsider, it turned out to be unconditional, leading to today’s serious consequences for the continued existence of Afrikaners in this country. At the time, very few Afrikaners saw the “end … coming”, also because they were never warned of such a possibility by their leaders.

 

Afrikaner leaders showed their sincerity and willingness by releasing Nelson Mandela from jail, and repealing the various apartheid laws in 1991. In 1994, the South African government was technically handed over to an immature, inexperienced, and unprepared ANC regime driven by revolutionary ideas. It already seemed at the time that the same political willingness and sincerity was lacking on the Black side. The ANC and other Black political parties showed an inability to control some of their more radical followers from the beginning and signs of anti-White sentiment were clear from day one of Mandela’s era. These were some of the signs of the stormy path that lay ahead for post-1994 South Africa. It is this stormy path that Afrikaners are now travelling, exposed to the ANC’s deviant politics. Most of Afrikaners still harbour the spirit of sincerity and willingness to make South Africa a better place for themselves as well as the Blacks. All it requires is an equally sincere and willing ANC regime.14

 

  1. Discussion

 

4.1 Possible escape and survival routes for the Afrikaner to survive the next century as an individual, subgroup or tribe

 

Both Boon39 and Palkhivala53illustrated that rigid customs can be changed, although it could take time; also, that South Africa is not a country with “grey people”, but a rainbow nation of many cultures and peoples requiring wise and effective leaders to respect and steer them into the future as a true nation. If Afrikaners could willingly and freely resign their political rule and become subordinate to an ANC government after 46 years of political power, the ANC regime should also show at least the same sincerity towards nation-building. It was under the pretence of democracy for all South Africans, something they argued Afrikaners had failed to institute, that they came into power. If they had stayed true to their political promises and guarantees of 1994, it would have been unnecessary for Afrikaners to seek safeguards and rescue in the new South Africa.

 

Thus far, sadly, the ANC leadership has failed to make a significant positive contribution to better South Africa for its citizens, black or white. There were no reasons or grounds for the ANC to have allowed the hotheads and extremists in its leadership to change the accepted policy of 1994 – to handle Afrikaners with care – to the present-day strong-arm tactics, which seems to have gained momentum in the last two years. The only logical explanation is that the ANC is still locked in its revolution stage of the 1960s, driven by a “cake of customs” which is cemented in outdated and inappropriate assumptions, attitudes, traditions, and beliefs. It seems that they still do not understand, 23 years after demilitarization as freedom fighters, the differences between democratic or authoritarian governing, or how to promote the greater society without discriminating on the basis of race or creed, self-enrichment versus uplifting the poor, and the simple difference between naked hatred from the past versus present-day forgiveness for injustices done. With this the unfortunate status quo, Afrikaners in 2017 are left with no other choice than to prepare themselves for surviving the growing onslaught against them.

 

There are four main options available for the present-day Afrikaner to survive another century as individual, subgroup, or tribe. They are:

 

  • An armed struggle to obtain an independent or autonomous Afrikaner state inside the greater South African region;
  • Extensive migration to Europe and other white-dominated friendly countries;
  • Self-isolation and withdrawal as a tribe in a semi-dependent Afrikaner homeland in the new South Africa;
  • Full social integration and miscegenation with the rest of the South African population.

 

All of these alternatives have been tried and tested, with various outcomes, across the world and throughout history. Of particular interest here are events that occurred in the 1900s, up to the 1950s, in Central, Eastern, and Western Europe as well as in Asia and in the Middle East. These outcomes are well-documented and could guide the Afrikaner in terms of a decision. What must be taken into consideration is that every situation is unique: what could fail in one case could prove successful in another. The Afrikaner’s future lies in this context.14,63

 

4.1.1 An armed struggle to obtain an independent or autonomous Afrikaner state inside the greater South African region

 

The Afrikaner’s history is littered with efforts to obtain independent territories; there was the short-lived earlier Republics of Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet in the Cape Colony, the doomed Natal, Free State, and Transvaal Republics, the failed 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion, the Union of South Africa from 1902 until 1961 and the nationalist Afrikaner Republic of South Africa from 1961 to 1994; all of them came to an end. Those up to the early 1900s were military crushed. South Africa of 1961 to 1994 seems to be the last Afrikaner sovereignty in its history.59,64,65

 

The Afrikaner’s drive to create a mini empire of multinations (Union of South Africa with various provinces), followed by his mini empire of multination-states (South African Republic with various semi-independent Black homelands under a central White homeland), had all failed for various obvious reasons, like the Afrikaner political and financial incompetence after 1990, an underestimation of the ANC’s political and thinking power, and a Black majority as upcoming political role-players, etc.8,68

 

The 1994 political dispensation in South Africa was a reorientation, specifically in terms of redressing the imbalance between Whites and non-Whites that had existed for nearly 350 years, since the official establishment of White rule in the Cape of Good Hope. It is common for such reorientation to be accompanied by severe conflict and loss of lives, as evidenced in various multination states, like Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. Fortunately, South Africa was spared this bloodshed in 1994 due to a sudden and a full collapse of the NP government and their surrender of the leadership without military resistance (or as it is seen today by some as a well-planed bloodless coup d’ état orchestrated by insiders of the nationalist Afrikaners’ leadership). This collapse was swiftly followed by a successful capture of the government in five years by the ANC. The occupation of an initial mini empire of multinations in South Africa between 1910 and 1961, a political system once again changed to a mini empire with multiple states by the NP between 1961 and 1994, shifted into the hands of the ANC without a shot being fired by the Afrikaner tribe to attempt to reclaim leadership of South Africa.63,67

 

This annulment of Afrikaner-power afforded the ANC regime the opportunity to undo a number of decisions implemented by the “Afrikaner executive empire” by dissolving and collapsing the various independent “Bantu-homelands” back into the new South Africa. Through this return to a “mini-empire of multinations” for South Africa, the ANC obtained total military and security power, nipping any possible large-scale revolt by nationalist Afrikaners in the bud. This new ANC state also had a strong inclination to decolonize from day one, with the primary aim of preventing further Afrikaner political aspirations of independence or autonomy.8,15

 

The establishment of a totally independent homeland, like the Jews did in Palestine to create a New Israel, is out in South Africa. The price of this present-day Jewish state was extreme bloodshed, war, and embitterment in the minds of the Arabs. The daily existence and functioning of Israel today still requires massive military overruling and suppressing of the Arabs in the occupied areas, with outcomes of conflict so atrocious it is considered crimes against humanity, and even genocide. Running Israel is an expensive and complicated exercise, and its maintenance is possible only by the backing of Western powers (especially the USA) in money and arms; this is not viable in the Afrikaner context. And then there is the extraordinary Jewish unity and belief system that equally motivates Israelis and Jews; a nation-component that is sorely missing with Afrikaners after 1994.68-71

 

Also, there would be no place for the Afrikaner’s political aspirations (even less for revolt) in an Afrikaner homeland (a nation-state, or even just an ethnic society) inside the ANC and Black majority’s mini-empire of multi-nations of the new South Africa, is. Thus any notion of a future “Afrikaner autonomy” or even of “Afrikaner self-reliance” is wishful thinking and is as nonsensical as offering the modern-day Khoi-San an independent state in the new South Africa. This propaganda is only maintained by a small nationalist-Afrikaner portion of society with very little support from ordinary Afrikaners.63,72

 

Even if the Afrikaner had tried in 1994 to hang on to full political and military power, he would have failed the ruler test: his resources and security for maintaining power were overstretched and the NP was basically bankrupt in 1994: peaceful capitulation was unavoidable. The fact that its population had decreased over the years from more than 4 million to less than 3 million in 2016, emphasizes this dilemma of a declined empowerment. This “cruel” reality has at last been recognized by some of the hard-line nationalist Afrikaners in South Africa, who acknowledged that an own independent state was no longer viable, but that an Afrikaner (ethnic) society inside the new South Africa might still be possible. However, this option is also nothing but a pipe dream.73-79

 

In the end, multi-ethnic mini-empires of multi-nations, together with multi-empires of multi-states that overruled their citizens like the Union government, and later the NP government, had only a shadowy concept of what they were doing and what the outcome of their empowerment or planning would one day be. They mostly collapsed in a short amount of time. Their shelf-life is indeed limited, as confirmed by the various Empire states of the 20th century: the duration of the Bolsheviks’ Social Union lasted from 1922 to 1991 (69 years); Bismarck’s German Reich 1871 to 1918 (47 years); Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich 1938 to 1944 (12 years); Japan’s Colonial Empire 1905 to 1945 (40 years). The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 and is still functioning in 2017, but is only 58 years old. For these five states, the average is 45 years.14,63

 

It is thus not a surprise that the NP and its nationalist Afrikaner style mini-empire of multi-nations (or the unofficial managed “NP Union”) only lasted from 1948 to 1961 (13 years), and its mini-empire for multi-states (Republic) only from 1961 to 1994 (33 years), while the Union of South Africa (exclusively British-oriented) under strong British influence lasted from 1910 to 1948 (38 years). This reflects an average of 24 years for the three regimes.56,58,64

 

The ambition of Afrikaners up to 1994 (with a population of less than 3 million) to rule a majority of Blacks (approximately 40 million) displayed the same flawed thinking as that of 66 million Germans in the 1940s to rule over more than 300 million other Europeans in an area stretching from the Channel Islands to the Caucasus, or 70 million Japanese to rule over 400 million other Asians in Greater East Asia from Manchuria to Mandalay. This kind of rule is and was impossible to maintain indefinitely.63

 

In terms of a military takeover it should also be borne in mind that Afrikaners don’t have a capable defence force at their disposal. The well-oiled army of the 1990s made up of well-trained White soldiers was phased out. The training of new White soldiers had stopped in the 1990s and the 18-year-olds of 1994 are now middle-aged men of 40 years and over. Undoubtedly not the preferred combat troops to win a war!

 

Strive among different groups of Afrikaners since 1902 also makes the possibility of a unified front less. Afrikaners, old and young, are currently grappling with their individual futures to find and map such futures in their thoughts. The Afrikaner’s powerful hyper-Nationalism of 1994 had been replaced by an undefined hypo-Nationalism 20 years later; a nationalism that is still further dwindling.80-83

History also shows that support for hard-core terrorist-oriented Afrikaner and other politically obstructive groups like the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and the Boeremag (BM), is zero amongst present-day Afrikaners. These revolutionary influences faded out in the early 2000s. It also seems as if the Afrikaner has just lost interest in ruling South Africa after centuries of struggling to do so. The lessons Afrikaners have learned about the devastating effects of revolts and uprisings by minorities to themselves clearly stopped any notions of planning organized armed action against the ANC government.68-71They know very well that such action would give the government sound justification to annul them in a racial war without any hope of rescue from Europe or the USA. The treacherous Dingaan and his Hloma Amabutho are still not forgotten by many Afrikaners.59Also, the ANC partners in BRICS will not allow military intervention from the West if such outside assistance were available. The African Union’s support of the ANC in resisting any Afrikaner uprising or outside military support for them would also make any such initiative very unwise indeed.

 

■A well-organized armed struggle is out forever. Even their deep belief (and trust) in the prophet Siener van Rensburg’s vague predictions that the ANC and the Black rulers are going to collapse, putting Afrikaners back in power, is only a small memory of the past in the present-day Afrikaner’s bewildered mindset.84,85

 

Armed responses to secure his survival as a nation, is clearly the last option for the Afrikaner. Other, more constructive, and less risky options must thus be considered.

 

4.1.2 Extensive migration to Europe and other white-dominated friendly countries

 

Since 1994, migration has become a popular option for Afrikaners; apparently to retain their identity, language, freedom, and rights; as much as 1.2 million people have already left, with a further 1.5 thinking or planning to do so the next decade or two. The most popular destinations at present are Australia and New Zealand.73-79

 

Migration is a worldwide manifestation in times of political unrest, racial, and ethnic discrimination as well as economical hardship. Aspects that drove people to migration in the past have been limitated or lack of employment, high criminality, poor governance, and lack of national identity and threats/acts of genocide by the local population. Aggravating circumstances worldwide were that these types of pervasive grievances had grown on a daily basis and had gone unaddressed by the authorities in charge. There was also a constant rise in expectations of a better and a secure lifestyle and living conditions worldwide, especially promoted by the opportunities that globalization had brought since the 1900s.There is also no disloyalty in migration; that is how the ancestors of the Whites and the Blacks of South Africa arrived here. The fact that between 1850 and 1914 nearly 34 million, and between 1901, and 1910 nearly 12 million Europeans emigrated, confirms this as an acceptable and normal process of economical, personal, and social survival.63

 

Most of such worldwide migration was geographical, basically because of economic, social, and ethnic discrimination and not so much a social transplant into a same-nation setup. It happened for instance during the Irish famine, which the English authorities in London totally ignored in an effort to annul the “Irish Problem”. This led to a massive migration to the United States of America. Also, no less than 6 million Germans moved to South America in the 1900s, fleeing from negative political and economical circumstances at home.63

 

This kind of migration also happened in Britain between 1891 and 1900 when no fewer than 726 000 citizens emigrated from the UK, with a 72% of them moving to the foreign USA (geographical migration) in contrast to a mere 28% to other British regions (social/nation-migration).63

 

In the 1900s as many as 5 million Germans emigrated to the American mid-West; at the time, there were already 13 million Germans living beyond the Bismarck-Reich Eastern frontier, a further 9 million Germans in Austria, and another 4 million Germans in Eastern Europe in places like Hungary, Romania, and Russia. There were also substantial numbers of Germans in Poland, Galicia, Bukovina, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Transylvania, and in Russian territory, seeking better life-conditions.63

 

But, these German migrants did not always find a better life and secure German nationhood in Greater Europe. As their economic position improved and they became prosperous, ethnic hostility born from masked economical jealousy led to intense discrimination from nationals in their adopted countries, deportation, and even mass murder of migrant Germans during World War Two (WW2). This was one of Hitler’s reasons for not only occupying some of these countries for the German people, but to wipe out their indigenous populations to make living space.14,63

 

It was not only the Germans who migrated to other countries – fleeing political, economical, racial, or discriminative circumstances in their own homeland – that fell prey to new discrimination and murder in their adopted homelands; it also happened to Blacks in South Africa in the early 1800s and Jews, Greeks, Hungarians, and Turks in the 1900s.63

 

It was especially the Jews who fall prey: of the 10.6 million Jews living in Europe up to Russian territory in the 1930s, 6 million were murdered in their new adopted homelands before 1948. In South Africa, between one and two million people from the tribes that had moved here from Central Africa were murdered by other tribes, like the Zulus and the Matabele, also settlers from Central Africa, between 1810 and 1840.39,63

 

It is evident that migration to a new homeland is not always a guarantee of a better life; in the long term (even in 50 years and more after migration), the outcome can be the tragic opposite. However, for the impoverished and landless Jews moving to the New Israel and the Zulus and Matabele moving to South Africa from Central Africa, migration was worthwhile.39

 

Where could Afrikaners go as a group? This was the same question the Jews were asking themselves in the 1940s in Europe when the tide turned against them. Most of the European and Western countries already had quotas on Jews in place: from South Africa, the UK, all the way to the USA, where other discriminative legislation against them barred them from entering. There was a new Israeli homeland in Palestine, but only for those who could afford the travelling costs. The British authorities further limited the entrance of Jewish settlers so as not to offend the Palestinians.56,63,64

 

For the Afrikaner, as the last White colonist in Africa to be pushed out, it seems that not only political but also economic asylum is urgently needed if the negative politics of the ANC continues.

 

Europe seems a viable choice for the Afrikaner, but for the average Afrikaner the language barriers of Germany, France, etc, could pose severe obstacles. Also, the costs of migrating to and living in Europe are just too steep for the average Afrikaner (initially, poverty also stunted the migration of Jews to Israel). The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, and the UK seem to be the only applicable destinations for a large-scale transplant, but these countries are clearly not financially or politically geared for such a large influx of Afrikaners.67,86,87

 

The present chaos in Europe, created by the massive inflow of Islamic migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, would act as additional deterrent against mass migration of Afrikaners to Europe. Firstly, these countries are already bursting at the seams with the additional demand on existing employment and living space; secondly, the racial and ethnic differences between Europeans and Muslim migrants have already given rise to conflict. This situation leaves very little space for a large influx of Afrikaners to any country in Greater Europe. In light of deteriorating global political scenarios in Greater Europe, the Middle East, and Russia and its surrounding countries, migration northwards could cause more trauma then relief.86,87

 

Although it is a very attractive new homeland, the United States of America (USA) has not been immune to financial, racial, and political upheavals, which renders it far from ideal for a massive migration. Poverty in South Africa is colour-blind, which means that the number of Whites affected by this scourge is also increasing, which automatically bars them from emigrating anywhere, including the US.88-91

 

To put the Afrikaners’ future  for instance in the USA (and in all European countries) in perspective, it must be remembered that pre- as well as post-1994 South Africa was and is still a small power (and its people also) in the international society. The most obvious fact about small powers is that their interests and lots are governed by the policy of the great powers. In the pre-1994 South African governing it was mostly by Europe, Britain and the USA, while in post-1994 the chief-masters are China and Russia. Inside this belittled setup the Afrikaners were in the past and are at present never regard as important by international powers. This includes migration, especially on a large scale.91 In 1965 (more than 50 years ago) Spence writes about the doomed view of the USA of the Afrikaners91, p. 24: “…in the American view ‘the cultural and spiritual interests of a paltry 21/2million whites…or even their vital interests and survival…count for very little. In the pattern of post-war world politics, the truth [is that] the survival and the rights of the small Afrikaner people have no place’”. Today, with still only a population of nearly 2.5 million, but financially and politically in a far more diminished position as in 1965, large scale migration opportunities for the Afrikaners to the USA and a warm welcome there, seems zero. The present US racial developments around the “Federal Statues Must Fall” and so called “New Black-liberation” give a further good indication that the “White”-Afrikaners, still saddled with apartheid, are not welcome. (This zero stand on future mass migration of Afrikaners to Europe seems the same, as the present refugees from “small” countries, like Syria, Iraqi and Libya, to Europe and the USA, confirm it well).

 

The Afrikaner should also remember that a new country poses challenges in terms of lifestyles, customs, habits, and traditions: there will be no Afrikaans at work, and if it is not deliberately spoken at home, the language of the adopted country will become the new home language. Afrikaners who migrated to Argentina and the USA after the Anglo-Boer War were fully assimilated and intermixed with the locals within two generations. They surrendered their Afrikaner identity and today their descendants are Argentineans and Americans, not Afrikaners.59

 

South Africans seem to prefer Australia and New Zealand as peaceful and secure countries to expatriate to. But are these countries really the best calls? It is important to note the Chinese factor of growing imperialism and world domination, especially with their focus on Australia and New Zealand.

 

4.1.2.1 Australia, New Zealand and the Chinese Dragon

 

The ambition of some countries to achieve global empire status is still relevant today as it was before WW2. China’s development as a world power with should not be ignored, especially not with the period after 2030 in mind; China is not only looking to expand its economy, but the living space of its population. The Western World’s present concern over China’s gradual dominance of world trade is missing the point; Chinese citizens are the main export product. By gradually populating politically and economically unstable and vulnerable countries with Chinese people, China is winning the war without firing a single shot. Australia and New Zealand are centrally situated, economically valuable, relatively isolated from Europe and the USA, incapable of defending themselves against a world power like China. From the Chinese perspective, these countries are obvious targets for takeover in the next 20 to 40 years. (Chinas’ annually population growth is equal to the total population of Australia. It’s thus understandable that Australia’s and New Zealand’s inherent potentials in space and richness make them very attractive future destinies of expansion for the over-populated China).63

 

It would be myopic for the Afrikaner to downplay these possibilities in considering a permanent relocation to Australia and New Zealand. In Japan’s Global Policy of the 1940s, aspirations to occupy Australia and New Zealand were clearly articulated. The main aim was to establish a Japanese Empire up to Japanese Asia, with the Yamato Race as nucleus, consisting of 2 million permanent Japanese settlers in Australia and New Zealand.63

 

Regarding China’s possible military entrance to Australia and New Zealand as enclaves for Chinese settlers, the numbers can be phenomenal calculated in terms of the Japanese planning of 1940. Of a total Japanese population of 70 million (in 1940), 2 million Japanese settlers equate to 46 million Chinese settlers in terms of the modern-day Chinese population of 1 600 million. With China’s notorious human rights record, this spells trauma for the democracies of Australia and New Zealand. Who could forget Deng Xiaoping of China or Pol Pot of Cambodia and their murderous gangs who killed thousands upon thousands of other Chinese? Also the cold-blooded annexation of Tibet by China and the diminishing of the indigenous Tibetans in the 1960s is a clear warning for Australia and New Zealand in waiting. Surely these are fates could very well be awaiting Afrikaner migrants in Australia and New Zealand. 63,86,92

 

Above possible negative future outcomes internationally for Afrikaner migrants are well-reflected on by Friedman86, p. 79 when he writes: “The First World War was essentially European [with more than 16 million deaths]. The Second World War was truly global, with the Pacific as well as the Atlantic basin involved. But most important, the war was more intense. No one can be certain of exactly how many died in Europe in World War II, but a reasonable number is 51 million soldiers and civilians, from genocide, bombing, and the normal cost of war. In 1939, Europeans numbered about 550 million, including neutral countries. A staggering 10 percent of all Europeans perished during the six years from 1939 to 1945”. But Friedman86shows the global war-death-outcome for the period 1914 to 1945 was much more devastating, leaving approximately 71 million Europeans dead in general warfare and when  adding the 20 million killed under Stalin, the number rises to 91 million. “Add in the Russian and Spanish civil wars, and sundry other conflicts hardly worth mentioning, such as Turkey’s war with Greece and Armenia, and the number of 100 million is conservative”, states Friedman86, p. 81further. Theoretically did approximately 3 million people died globally per annum in war-related outcomes for the period 1914 to 1945; this is 300 000 more than the total present-day Afrikaner-population. The warfare of the period 1946 up too today, with the seemingly fast incoming Third Wold War III, are going to take not less than 500 million lives and can devastating permanently much more life space, freedom and richness than ever.86, p. 81

 

■Migration seems a very attractive solution for wealthy Afrikaners and the younger generation of Afrikaners away from of their seemingly present financial-, political, racial- and ethnic-problems in South Africa, but there are many unpredictable, unexpected and negative outcomes that can await them in any promising new homeland.  Migration as a choice needs thus a well-thought-through.

 

4.1.3 Self-isolation and withdrawal as a tribe in a semi-dependent Afrikaner homeland in the new South Africa▼

 

The Afrikaner is used to self-isolation, starting in the early days of the European settlers at the Cape of Good Hope, far away from their motherland without family, friends, or the comforts of Europe. This isolated state was exacerbated by negative political and personal treatment by the authorities at the Cape, forcing them to live in the undeveloped and the isolated country-side.58,59,64,93

 

Their later involvement in the Great Trek, founding themselves in the thinly populated Free State and Transvaal further cemented the lifestyle of self-isolation. It was only after the founding of the Union of South Africa and the impoverishment of the Transvaal and Free State burghers (Afrikaners), that they were forced to earn a living away from the farm and amongst other people. The Afrikaner slowly moved into urban areas and became exposed again to the foreign world of his European ancestors. But isolation still exists: the events leading up to and the dawn of apartheid led to many countries, including the Europeans, distancing themselves even today from the South African  great-grandchildren of the original European settlers.56,59,64,93,94

 

The Afrikaner’s longing for an own, exclusive homeland was a constant companion for centuries. The NP government under the FW de Klerk did not see this as practical solution; factors like economic interdependence between the different races, the lack of a suitable region to allocate legally to Afrikaners, and an absence of national unity among Afrikaners were some of the arguments against such a move. Most of these arguments were true. Afrikaners relinquished the notion, also because in 1994 the ANC had made it clear that it objected to any Afrikaner homelands. This set in motion moves to nullify any separate Afrikaner identity, action, or organization even vaguely reminiscent of apartheid or Afrikanerism, including schools, universities, businesses, political organizations, etc.72,95-112

 

There was strong call by Afrikaner nationalists of the 1930s for an independent republic with clear borders and unique Afrikaner character in South Africa, but as a result of infighting between themselves and their short-term political opportunism in terms of obtaining power at the time, the whole effort faded away until 1960. By that time it was too late for such an Afrikaner homeland, especially in view of the economic interdependence of all South Africans and their scattering to all corners of the country.56,58,64

 

This immense failure by nationalist Afrikaner leaders to establish a nationalist Afrikaner republic on their homeland model was because they lacked understanding and acceptance of global changes in thought regarding African and Black Nationalism and Uhuru, as well as the development and protection of human rights by populations and individuals in general. Also, there were insufficient numbers of Afrikaners on the African continent and their geographic isolation from Europe and the USA to support their rights as a White group, disempowered them as a role-player. Afrikaners also underestimated the strength of the ANC in 1994 and put too much faith in a future conciliation between Afrikaners and the ANC. It not only left Afrikaners ill-prepared for the consequences of 1994, but cost them political credibility and respect. This result of poor planning and strategic thinking left them paralyzed, as was the case with the two conquered Boer republics after the Second Anglo-Boer War.67,94

 

Efforts today by Afrikaner leaders to locate Afrikaners within a greater African context by arguing that Afrikaners are also “Africans” and “South Africans”, but with a unique Afrikaner identity, is considered foolish by the Black majority. It is seen as a disregard for the indigenous realities of South Africa. The ANC considers any attempts of Afrikaners to isolate themselves as a parallel government, to polarize the races and call into being a “Boer volkstaat”, as hostile and outside the indigenous unity of a nation18,30,72,113,114

 

The failure of Orania is a good illustration of why an Afrikaner homeland is not a viable solution. This enclave could not attract the massive amount of Afrikaners as expected, neither does it have the infrastructure to make it a viable or sustainable state for 100 000 Afrikaners, let alone 3 million! The same can be said of the other dubious enclaves that had sprung up over time.73,101,107,110,112,115-117

 

A similar kind of separate state in the 1920s for Russian-Jews, the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan in Siberia, failed for a number of reasons, mostly the same associated with the failure of Orania as a true homeland. It serves as a good example as warning of the failure in waiting of an Afrikaner homeland. It must be noted.

 

4.1.3.1 The failed Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan in Siberia

 

The pogroms, the chaos of the Civil War in Russia and the breakup of the Pale, made Russian Jews a thorn in the side of Russia. In the 1920s it became so chronic that a quick solution was needed. For the Russian authorities in Moscow it offered the opportunity to force communism on its Jewish subordinates through its model of nominal autonomy and to deal a blow to Zionism in Russia. On the other hand the Russian authorities believed that a Jewish homeland would attract Jewish capital from the West and at the same time relegate jobless and unskilled Jews of European Russia as farmers in a conventional Soviet cast.118

Both the Ukraine and the Crimea were mooted as Jewish homelands, but the initiatives were dropped as result of resistance by the local people. As a solution, the area of Birobidzhan in the Siberia wilderness along the borders of China was allocated as a Jewish homeland in 1928. It was a derelict land of mosquito-plagued marshes, wild forests, and mud tracks. Government support for establishing the Jewish enclave was minimal; often nothing was prepared for them and implements, livestock, and houses were absent. The area was run on Leninist principles from start and not religious ones, and the first settlers held their prayer meetings in secret. The promises of a rich and waiting land drew only a trickle of Jewish settlers. Religious and integrated Jews distrusted it and it was seen as just another ghetto. From 1928 to 1938 only 43 000 Jews, including outsiders from America, Europe, Argentina, and even Palestine, immigrated. Many of the immigrants were urban artisans with no experience of planting crops or draining soil. More than half of the initial immigrants returned home or moved back into their old occupations in Siberian cities. Notwithstanding all the obstacles in the beginning, the rest of Jews went on to establish the city of Birobidzhan and in 1934 their province became the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan. The income of the area moved from agriculture to industry. Textile factories sprung up, furniture cartels, Jewish newspapers, and schools followed. At this stage the Jewish population had already declined drastically and the Russians were the majority, with the Jews making up only 23%. In the 1936 Stalin purges, which affected the whole Soviet Union, the leaders of Birobidzhan and its committees were also liquidated. Despite the negative events of 1936, the post-war years brought a revival with the arrival of another 10 000 Jews from the Ukraine. This positive turn was dashed by the persecutions in 1948, and the majority of the Jews left the region for good. One by one the Jewish leaders disappeared, accused of obscure conspiracies. All Jewish institutes, schools, theatres and newspapers were closed down.118

 

The only Jews coming in after 1948 were convicted exiles and only Stalin’s death prevented the region from becoming a zone of mass deportation and even mass murder. A tentative synagogue was burned down in 1956 and the region was left without a rabbi permanently. Migration out of the area escalated from there onwards, especially to the USA. In 1990 less than 10 000 Jews were still living in Birobidzhan (representing 6% of the total inhabitants) and Yiddish had disappeared from the streets. Very few true Jews remain today apart from the few who became Russians, while the last poor Jews are being assisted by Israel to move there. Today the businesses are monopolized by the Chinese and Jewish faces are missing from the streets. Even the older street facades show no trace of the early Jewish immigrants. All that remains of the Jewish state of Birobidzhan is a bizarre dream.118

 

The above reflects well what is taking place in the new, integrated South Africa with the Afrikaner population: the loss of their schools, universities, street and city names, jobs, etc. and their out-numbering in traditional (although not by law) Afrikaner areas. Further can RET and RST change dramatically in future the Afrikaners’ position in South Africa for the worst. But these are all realities that are comprehensive in their destroying which the Afrikaner homeland-dreamers must take serious note of –the discrimination and crushing of the Jews took place outside in motherland Russia as well as inside their Russian homeland Birobidzhan. There was no difference at the end, making Birobidzhan as a bizarre dream. It reflects well that to survive as a separate state, even as a subordinate homeland is difficult, even impossible. An Afrikaner homeland in greater South Africa means just another failed Birobidzhan.

 

4.1.3.2 Its time for republic-minded Afrikaners to face the failures of Orania, Kleinfontein and Birobidzhan as true homelands

 

One of the main requirements for the establishment and upkeep of a new state is the availability of motivated young people to develop and to promote it. The young Afrikaners are currently grappling with their own identity in a multi-racial and cultural milieu. At the moment Afrikaners can perhaps only rely on middle age and older people to steer its agendas and interests.83,119 There is today much more cooperation between the urban White youth and urban Black youth than between the urban White youth and the rural White youth. This outcome not only undermines the Afrikaner brotherhood doctrine and volk’s ideology, but also nullifies strong youth support for the exclusive White homeland dream. Today many Afrikaners, in their disorientation and desperation, knowing the Afrikaner homeland idea is something of the past, are instead trying to absorb the “Afrikaanses” (Coloured or Brown Afrikaners and other Afrikaans speakers, including Blacks) as members into their group as part of greater South Africa’s variety of many groups. This kind of overall disintegration of Afrikaners as a tribe and their open acknowledge of this fact, is on the increase.119,120

 

Viewing the aims and intentions of Afrikaner enclaves like Orania and Kleinfontein as the same as that of modern-day Israel is foolished, short-sighted and irresponsible. They are totally different and opposing entities. Israel is supported by world powers like the USA and financially by many rich Jews from all over the world. Also the European/White support element is prominent. There is consensus among the Israelis about their future and being a Jew. The villagers of Orania and Kleinfontein are not like that.

Very few Jews believed initially that they would be better off by establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. In the 1930s about 82 000 Polish Jews immigrated to Palestine. The majority of Jews in Poland and other European countries were initially more interested in what could be achieved in their motherlands. It was only after Hitler, Stalin, the Polish and other European peoples started to murder Jews and the genocide of as many as 6 million Jews followed, mostly Ashkenazim Jews, that the Jews were forced to change their minds in favour of emigration to an independent Israel. However, in the case of the Jews, there was a secure territory awaiting them. 115,116,121-124

 

However, Afrikaners do not have an identified piece of land that they can emigrate to, neither are they welcome to establish such a state inside the new South African territory and under the ANC authority. There is no global support for such an endeavour either. Orania and Kleinfontein are far from secure. In addition to the above, an Afrikaner state would be too small to be a trade partner of Europe and the USA. China and many African countries will be reluctant to trade with the Afrikaners as their sympathies lie with the Blacks and the ANC. As such a state would not form part of South Africa as a financial hub they will struggle to generate income. The infrastructure of South Africa is crucial. Ultimately, such a state would be forced to join South Africa again under Black rule.

 

The overall position of the Afrikaner is also significantly different from the genocide of the Jews in the 1940s and their need to escape from Europe to a homeland. There is no genocide of Afrikaners. The financial and living circumstances of Afrikaners in the new South Africa are still favourable and far better than in the 1830s in the Cape Colony or in the Union after the 1930s, even in the 1960s under Afrikaner rule. Yes, there are immense political problems for Afrikaners as a tribe, but South Africa has not yet declined beyond redemption and can only be described as a partially failed state, although there is some red lights.121-123

 

■H F Verwoerd’s political power play in 1960 to establish again an “Afrikaner/Boer” republic after the two failures of the 1900s and his obtaining then of a strong mandate for this impossible NP dream from the Afrikaner electorate on the “Black-danger” issue, when he said 91, p. 34: “Your choice is more sharply defined than at any previous election, namely between a White republic, with non-white neighbours, and a multi-racial fatherland with, first a multi-racial and, later, a Black government”, is today only a vague memory in the minds of the elderly nationalist Afrikaners. Afrikaner power plays and -visions on future “Boers states” can still be reflected in talks, but the physical establishment again of a “White republic” is only a dream in the illogical mindset of some Afrikaners. This is a South African indigenous reality that all Afrikaners must make peace with.

 

Cross-references: see Part 6, subdivision 4.1.5, as well as subdivision 4.1.1 of this Part.

 

4.1.4 Full social assimilation and racial miscegenation with the other races of South Africa

 

Assimilation and miscegenation between different races and ethnic groups is a global phenomenon. The Afrikaner’s own mixed heredity from early horizontal miscegenation between other races and the White matrilineal family stock, confirms this.

 

Intensive and large-scale assimilation and miscegenation between Afrikaners and Blacks and other races to root out ethnic and racial discrimination in South Africa, is one practical approach to the problem. The questions are:

 

  • Has such assimilation and miscegenation really worked elsewhere in the world? and
  • Can the Afrikaners change their resistance to large-scale assimilation and miscegenation with Black South Africans?

 

The first question is answered by analysing the outcomes on assimilation and miscegenation between different races and ethnic groups in Greater Europe for the period 1900 to 1950 as a guideline for the Afrikaner. Strong focus is on the experiences and treatment of the Jews who were assimilated and married non-Jews in adopted countries.

 

4.1.4.1 Examples of assimilation and miscegenation worldwide▼

 

The Jews, driven from their homeland in Palestine as early as 300 AC, spread over the Greater Europe to countries like Germany, Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Prussia, Russia, Romania, Poland, Estonia, Czechoslovakia and Austria. In 1901, 70% (7.42million) of the world’s total Jewish population of 10.6 million were Ashkenazim in Eastern and Central Europe. Of this 7.42 million Jews, as much as 30% (2.23 million) were living in Russian territory.14,63

 

The process of assimilation of the Jews with the Germans and other nationals was well advanced by the start of the 1900s, leading to the establishment of mixed communities and settlements. In Germany, the various legal obstacles to marriages between Jews and non-Jews were removed in 1875, aligning them with the legislation of Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the USA. It was still illegal in Russia. This assimilation led to miscegenation with the local peoples. In 1876 5% of the Prussian Jews were already married to non-Jews. These marriages rose to 8.5% in the 1890s. In Germany the 7.8% of mixed marriages in 1870s rose to 20.4% in 1914.14,63

 

Racial integration, assimilation and miscegenation of Jews with the citizens of their adopted homelands were thus quite well advanced in Central and Eastern Europe by the 1920s. The rates of intermarriage across ethnic barriers for Jews rose to new heights from 1920. In the late 1920s, nearly one in every three marriages involving a German Jew was to a Gentile, while the rate rose as high as two out of three in some German cities. This trend was more or less similar in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia.63,86

 

This assimilation was so normal in the Jewish community that the Jews did not hesitate to be active in the political landscape of their adopted homelands, especially in the revolutionary politics of the 1900s. Jews like Trotsky and others were part of the various left-wing parties and revolutionary organizations that spearheaded the 1905 revolution in Russia. Their numbers accounted for 11% of the Bolshevik delegates and 23% of the Menshevik delegates at the fifth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party in 1907. Together with other parties attending the Congress, as much as 29% of the delegates were Jews.63

 

This assimilation and miscegenation are also evident from by the acceptance of the Jews into the financial systems of their adopted homelands and the extraordinary economical contribution of the Jewish population to the economies of their homelands. By the 1900s some Jews living under Russian and other rulers had already had great financial success: in 1897 Jews accounted for 73% of all merchants and manufacturers in Poland. In Kiev specifically they accounted for 44% of the city’s merchants and handled more than 66% of the city’s commerce while making up only 13% of the city’s population.63

 

Despite this positive state of affairs, it was precisely in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia, all regions with established mixed settlements, some of the worst ethnic violence and mass murders of Jews (and of other foreigners who had intermixed with the locals) occurred during WW2 in the 1940s.63,86,118

 

In Auschwitz the Nazis killed 1.8 million Jews and the further 4.4 million were murdered at places like Majdanek, Belzec, Chelmno, Sobibor and Treblinka. Assimilation and miscegenation did not save mixed villages and settlements from genocide, sometimes death came by the hands of their own half-brothers and -sisters.14,63,118

 

The German occupation of Poland resulted in the seizing of Jewish property, the closure of their schools, expulsion of Jewish professionals like medical doctors and professors, the closing of Jewish organizations, followed by a well-managed genocide. The result was that of the more than 9 million Jews living in Greater Europe in 1938, only 3 million still remained by the end of 1948.63,86

 

This genocide by the Germans was not limited to the Jews, but was applied to the citizens of Poland during the German occupation – a country where the Germans and the Polish intermixed freely for many years. As many as 6 million people died in Poland under Hitler’s occupation. Here, it was especially the Polish intelligentsia and leadership, like priests, lawyers, businessmen, teachers, doctors, mostly people with strong intermixed relations with the locals who were murdered.14,63

 

In Czechoslovakia, where there was assimilation and miscegenation between Jews, Germans and the Polish in the 1920s, the state capture of Jewish and German property with wide-spread economical reform and land reform by the government (better known as the “selective expropriation and redistribution of German and Jewish property”), as well as the nationalization of their industries and the closing of their schools, followed.63

 

The same processes of racial and ethnic discrimination followed against Ukrainians in Poland, Hungary and Romania, also well-established regions of mixed settlements. Romanian authorities drove German-speaking teachers and lecturers at universities out of the country. Even in Italy did discrimination, especially against German and Jewish organizations, follow.63

 

The Turkish treatment of Armenians also proves that genocide can occur in well-functioning mixed settlements with high rates of intermarriage between races and ethnic groups and mixed descendants. It is often regarded as the first modern genocide, dated 1915-1918, as it led to the extermination of 1.8 million Armenians. (The methods of the Turks were later used in the mass executions of the Jews in the 1930s to 1940s by the Nazis at Auschwitz and other murder camps).14,63,86,125

 

The persecution of Greeks in Turkey in 1923, also in well-functioning mixed settlements with intermarriages between ethnic groups and mixed descendants,  also led to mass murdering and more than 1.2 million Greeks being forced from their ancestral homes.14,63,125

 

The staggering scale of murder of other races, ethnic groups and even dissident Russians by Stalin in his Siberian murder camps – all people who lived in harmony with strong assimilation and miscegenation over long periods – become evident when considering that there were at least 25 million Soviet deaths during WW2. Of these 25 million, only 7.8 million were military deaths, the other 13.7 million deaths were victims of the German occupation. About 7.4 million were executed. The rest was Stalin’s work.14,63,118

 

Although the Germans played the dominant role in the genocide of the Jews, the atrocities during WW2 were not limited to Germany alone, but genocide was committed in many other European countries. It was a general phenomenon, mainly committed by the “superior, developed, intellectually and cultured Caucasian.” Genocide was not led by “a few local ruffians” in these European countries. It was executed on Jews by their neighbours of good standing and personal friends; all people with whom the Jews had lived together within stable mixed settlements. They were often people with the same mixed blood as the Jews.14,63,118

 

As much as roughly half of the male population in certain towns in Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Italy, Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, and France were involved in murdering people based on ethnicity.63,118

 

The above clearly shows that assimilation, even intermixed marriages, is not enough to safeguard a specific racial or an ethnic group’s future in a mixed settlement or in an assumed stable, cultural and educated new homeland against crimes of humanity and genocide. Afrikaner numbers are significantly less that the Jewish numbers before the start up of the genocide, making them much more identifiable and targetable.

 

Genocide is also not always committed by the uneducated and pre-modern human, but also by well-educated people. The Germans’ behaviour towards the Jews (and others) confirms this. Up to 1933 Germany had by far the best universities in the world, more than a quarter of all Nobel prizes awarded in sciences between 1901 and 1940 were awarded to Germans, compared to only 11% to the USA. It had one of most advanced educational system in the world and a political system that brought to power Adolf Hitler primarily by democratic means. Still, they failed the test of humanity.63,86

 

▲Cross-references: see subdivision 4.1.2 of this Part.

 

4.1.4.2 Afrikaners acceptance and willingness to assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks

 

Regarding the second question on the Afrikaner’s resistance to assimilation, it important to mention that assimilation between Whites and Blacks occurred by the 1830s, if not earlier. Some miscegenation surely took place at the Cape between settlers and Black slave women from Madagascar. Assimilation and miscegenation with the Malayans and Coloured People already started in 1652.8,30,41,57,58,59,64,87

Many Afrikaners still think of the differences between the different races as enormous, even though 90% of the country’s population share Christianity. Differences centre on class, customs, habits, traditions. These differences between Afrikaners and Blacks slowly start to diminish. The post-1994 political dispensation very successfully helped to erase it.4,126-129

 

A true hegemony of a United Rainbow Nation for the RSA, how tactfully we are ignoring and side-stepping a discussion of this daring issue is absent. Intensive racial assimilation or miscegenation by the Afrikaner with non-Whites, notwithstanding the Afrikaner’s own “contaminated blood-line” by his non-White parent stock, was just not reachable before 1994 and will not, it seems,  depending on certain positive political outcomes, be obtained easily for many decades to come. Especially the present-day older Afrikaners are not acceptable for it; their indoctrination by the NP, AB and DRC was just too long and too successful to make their mindsets changeable and acceptable. The South African History, starting in 1652, confirms this rigidity.42,86,127-129

 

On the other side is racial discrimination against the Whites by Blacks also prominent in the RSA and is been up-kept and is strength by certain prominent Blacks. Indeed, it is restarted every time before an election or when the ANC-regime fails the test of a responsible and trustworthy government. The end-result is the blocking of better relations between Afrikaners and Blacks.42,86,127-129

 

The present-day financial insecurity which the Afrikaners are experiencing in new South Africa is seen many times exclusively as a direct result of Black aggression and their alleged dislike and hatred for Afrikaners. It is argued that it activates counter-revenge from Afrikaners, resulting in the obstructing since 1994 of their assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks. This is not always a correct observation.  Afrikaners experienced similar, if not more extreme, financial insecurity after the Second Anglo Boer War and during their Anglisation immediatedly after 1910 in the Union. Poverty characterised the Afrikaners existence for a long time in the Union. The Poor White Problem in South Africa: Report by the Carnegie Commission in 1929/30 shows roughly 300 000 (16%) Afrikaners out of a total White South African population of 1.8 million were classified as “very poor”.130These outcomes were totally unrelated to Blacks actions (Indeed, the Black population suffered at that time three to for times more under “very poverty”). Blacks are surely not the primary reason for the financial insecurity of Afrikaner before or after 1994 and thus far not contributed to the Afrikaners reluctance to assimilate and misgenenate with Blacks. This reluctance seems to be must deeper seated in the psyche of the Afrikaners.130

 

The present-day political, social and personal insecurities which the Afrikaners are experiencing in new South Africa is also attributed many times to be the outcome of Black dislike and hatred for Afrikaners which are steered as planned hostile actions against Afrikaners. This alleged behaviour by Blacks, as with the Afrikaners financial insecurity, is argued to activate counter hostility in the mindsets of Afrikaners, leading to  their withdrawing from direct informal Black contact and cooperation. The end-result is argued, is the absence of assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks.  Again, this is not always the full truth. In the past, as with the Afrikaners’ financial suffering, there were many non-Black determinants also as primary role-players contributing to the political, social and personal insecurities of Afrikaners, coming over many years up to 1994, like the internalised disposition of racial discrimination and White supremacy in the mindsets of Afrikaners. On the other side it must be acknowledged that Black hatred and dislike for Afrikaners can play a role in some cases. Hostilities are undoubtedly driven and executed sometimes by ANC political delinquents. But this seemingly racial overture not seated in a general dislike or hatred for Afrikaners: it is a direct outcome of the ANC’s present-day internal power struggles and its slow dismantling as a liberation movement cum political party. This phenomenon of conflict is not new for Afrikaners and is indeed part of their own history. The Afrikaners’ internal politics in the 1930s and 1940s, especially when H F Verwoerd arrived on the scene and contaminated even the internal relations of pro-Nazi Afrikaners, reflected the same extreme instable characteristics inside the leadership of the Afrikaners for as a  certain time before calming down. This 1940s internal hostile energy as reflected by Afrikaners, spilled over not only to the Afrikaners in general, but also unasked to the other ethnic groups (Jews) as well as the Blacks, doing serious harm to racial relations. The Second World War strengthened the nationalist Afrikaners internal conflicts (precisely as conflict and hostility are now manifested inside the ANC by its instability as movement for all Blacks). As with the internal conflicts  now inside the ANC, the Afrikaners  hostile conflicts were not driven by political ideological differences but purely by Afrikaner leaders’ personal ambitions, corruptions and strive for self-empowerment,  turning on each other. This was especially extra-activated in the 1940s by the founding of extreme pro-Nazi Afrikaner groups like the Grey Shirts, the New Order, the Ossewabrandwag (OB) and the Stormjaers (A phenomenon in line with the actions of many in-house groups fighting, even murdering each other, in the present-day ANC). Verwoerd’s conflict with the pro-Nazi groups (notwithstanding his juridical declared status by Judge P A Mullin of the Supreme Court in 1941 as a propagandist for Nazism and thus partner to the same pro-Nazi thinking as the radical Stormjaers and other pro-Nazis groups) even led to two attempts to kidnap him (with the possibility to kill him) in 1941 and 1944 by his radical comrades.130 As said, these in-house Afrikaner conflicts in the 1940s generated hostile energy, comprehensive enough, to negatively effected at that time on a broad base racial relations. The ANC’s present hostile energy towards them is not a new experience for many of the older nationalist Afrikaners, it is much less serious than the Afrikaner press tries to portray it and is temporary..

 

The ANC, after 23 years of reign, shows serious signs of collapsing. This collapse and insecurity are not only presently prominent reflected in their extreme internal political behaviour by in fights around leadership and members, but is to a great extent also responsible for the temporary over spilling of this extraordinary hostile energy to the Afrikaners, making their social assimilation and racial miscegenation with Blacks undoubtedly very difficult. However, after the 2019 General Election, the selecting of new ANC leaders in harmony with each other and possible constructive new Black political directions on government, the situation can normalised, neutralising this hostile energy, as had happened with the Afrikaners in 1940s. To assume thus that the present-day political, social and personal insecurity which the Afrikaners are experiencing in new South Africa is a new experience for them or is a direct Black dislike and hate for Afrikaners and is of a permanent kind, is not always correct. This insecurity is much related to the nationalists Afrikaners loss of their bullying rights of Blacks before 1994.The Black public has very much goodwill towards Afrikaners and most of the hostility against Afrikaners is activated by a small group of extremists inside the ANC who lost very fast their position as soon as the ANC’s internal politics stabilised and common sense triumph. In such a case the opportunity for better relations between the ANC’s elite and the Afrikaners will surely follows. Depending of the 2019 General Election’s outcomes can the general political, personal and financial circumstances of Afrikaners dramatically bettered from 2020 , helping to activate the long overdue social assimilation and racial miscegenation between Blacks and Afrikaners.130

 

■Assimilation as well as miscegenation took place at the Cape between White settlers and Black slave women from Madagascar, Malayans and Coloured People and is ongoing till today, although sometimes on a  reserved level. The 1994 dispensation and the freeing of Blacks and Afrikaners from the apartheid’s shackles gives immense support to much deeper assimilation between the South African races while miscegenation seems also to gain field. With the Afrikaner’s growth in independence from his previous nationalist volks capturing and “pure White blood” ideology, as well as his today’s more willingness to accept South African indigenous realities, it can be expected that his assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks will undoubtedly increase. How much it can be denied by the NP-AB inner circle today, were assimilation and miscegenation not two of the main intentions of their  1994 bloodless coup d’ état ?8,30,4144,,57,58,59,64,87,126-129

In Brazil, the majority of the population was Black and still in slavery at the time of independence (To a certain extent very much in line with the suppression of the apartheid system). As citizens socialized, racial classification diminished fast. Intermarriage was not frowned upon Today the result is a Brazilian population that may well be the most successfully integrated ethnic mix in the world.14,126-129

 

The same path of success as in Brazil can follows in South Africa. It is possible that full assimilation and miscegenation of Afrikaners with Blacks may occur in 100 years or less. But in this assimilation and miscegenation there are many risks for the Afrikaners if the country decays politically and financially. Fast and dramatic changes in ethnic and racial tolerance, as happened with the Jews in Europe in the 1940s, can bring immense suffering to the Afrikaner’s mixed-race descendants, notwithstanding that they are natives of South Africa.

 

  1.  Conclusion

 

For the political scientist interested in the Afrikaner as a human being, especially his thinking and entrenched ideas on apartheid, is it important to look at both their past and present. The eminent historian, JM Roberts, says14, p.xi: “Historical inertia is easily under-rated. This is not just a matter of what we see. Ruins and beefeaters are picturesque, but for the most part less important than much mental and institutional history lost to sight in the welter of day-to-day events”. The aim of the series of seven articles was to offer an overview of that part of Afrikaner history that is hidden from plain sight.

 

This study reveals that many Afrikaners have shown much goodwill and have sincerely attempted to accept Black rule since 1994. These Afrikaners show great willingness to become part of the greater indigenous South Africa, leaving behind racial discrimination. Although most Black citizens have been willing to forgive the Afrikaners for apartheid, the ANC elite clearly intends to implement a policy of discrimination against Afrikaners. This has started to intensify in the last few years, possibly with grave consequences for Afrikaners as citizens.

 

Efforts at reconciliation in 1994 failed all South Africans, reawakening racial conflict with Afrikaners as the focal point. At the moment, Afrikaners being targeted for revenge. Central to this is the Afrikaner’s unforgiveable history: “The past hangs around longer and is more difficult to keep peacefully buried, even by strenuous efforts, than we believe”, warns Roberts14,p.1109 with respect to this hidden danger. Afrikaners are not free from a negative memory of their experiences with Blacks, pre-1994 and post-1994. A re-emerging of a negative Afrikaner-memory spells disaster for Afrikaners as well as Blacks, especially in the activating of revenge and counter-revenge.  

 

The Afrikaner has insufficient knowledge of his own past. The doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism left very little space for the recognition of the many faults in their past. It is time for the Afrikaner to confront the good as well as the bad in their history, not only to understand their past and present behaviour, but also as guideline for the future. Good can come from knowing the bad of the past, but this requires an honest and comprehensive analysis and valuation of history. Only a true and objective evaluation of their history can reveal their identity and place in the future South Africa.8,27,94

 

The “Afrikaner question” is a complex issue that rests on fact as much as on myth, hidden determinants and dark dispositions. Anti-Afrikaners offer many over-simplifications of these determinants and dispositions. It is a “problem” as complex as that of the Jewish Palestinian. No one scholar, historian, sociologist, theologian or politician can give a simple and final summary or solution. Opinions on the Afrikaner matter must be treated with a good measure of scepticism. The ANC elite is tragically relying on spreading misinformation on Afrikaners, while treating them the same as the Palestinians are being treated and the Jews were treated.63,68-71

 

Statistics show that in 30 to 60 years there may only be between 100 000 and one million “pure” Afrikaners left in South Africa and in 2117 possible less than 20 000. The small number of 20 000 will not be the result of genocide or even migration, but of the normal process of natural extinction.

 

Will the descendants of today’s Afrikaners really care about being Afrikaners two to three generations from now? Would they perhaps preferred to be happy Australian-, Chinese-Creole-, half-caste-, hybrid, mulatto-, or simply South African bastards? Are the constant political efforts and fights for rights and existence and the worries and fears about Afrikaners and their future in South Africa really justified and worthwhile? Will the Afrikaners of 2117 know what a “koeksister” or “volkspele” are or will they hear about it for the first time when they read of it in an old article of the year 2017?There seems  to be an overall doubt, meaning  the answer is an undisputed NO. Very few of the Afrikaner’s descendants are going to care about their Afrikaner heredity.

 

Afrikaners must urgently consider how they want to address their present personal and political threats, dangers and challenges under the ANC regime and as citizens of South Africa. Several options are available. Constructive and wise individually thought and action are pertinent. Some Afrikaners will find the selection of an option easy, for other it will be difficult, while some will never decide in their lifetimes. Every Afrikaner’s needs and visions are unique: each individual has to journey into the future. Time is running out. As reflected from this study the year 2017 is the time for thinking, planning, and deeds for Afrikaners, but their actions must be extraordinary and correct. There have been too many mistakes in their past to expect leniency or a chance if they fail again. Palkhivala53, p.129 warns: “In the affairs of nations, as in the affairs of men, there is a providential margin of error; you may take wrong turns at the crossroads, misuse time, take gold for dross and dross for gold, and yet somehow stumble along to your destination. But the margin and period of permissible error need to be carefully watched. You overstep them at your peril”.

 

The human rights author Raoul Martinez131, p.381 emphasises that South African Blacks and Afrikaners must remember that social and personal changes are not: “… something that we get done ‘out there’ simply by changing laws and procedures. Whatever rights are granted whatever procedures are in place, social systems are brought to life by the people who participate in them. The attempt to increase control over our lives and produce outcomes we value is inextricable from the attempt to deepen our understanding and develop our character. Ultimately, this is a moral challenge. We are the timber from which the future will be constructed – the stronger the timber, the more solid the construction.” Martinez131, pp. 381-382brings Blacks and Afrikaners before an easily challenge in this context: “Every human being inevitably suffers hardship, loses loved ones and, some day, passes away. Life is rare, delicate and short. Given all this, why would we not join together to do what we can, for the brief time we have air in our lungs and strength in our bodies, to transform this world into a place of joy and wonder for all those passing through – a place where all can flourish, contribute and create? After all, it is only through the creation of what we deeply value that we find the fullest expression of our freedom. And what could be more valuable than that?”

 

Every Afrikaner should decide on their own an immediate path as an individual. Each must decide on lifestyle changes and strategies, but to postpone a final decision can be fatal. No one else can take this decision. The author of this article can only point out the various options and risks, nothing more.

 

The only consolation for Afrikaners in their present visitation is that if dissolution sweeps away the last Afrikaner, the Herodotus curse on the Afrikaner will also be broken. It will then be time for their conquerors and executors to inherit the curse and to be ravaged. Only time will tell if the ill fate of dissolution awaits the Afrikaner.

 

The year 2017 is the time for options, deeds and more deeds by the Afrikaners about their future. But they must remember that the virtue of deeds lies in completing them (Arabian Proverb).

 

 

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned. Externally peer reviewed.

 

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

 

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Arts, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa.