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Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe a century away? Part 7: 2017 is the time for thinking, planning, and deeds

Gabriel Louw

 

Research Associate, Focus Area: Social Transformation, Faculty of Arts,

Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

 

RESEARCH

 

Corresponding Author:

Prof Dr GP Louw

Focus Area Social Transformation

Faculty of Arts

Potchefstroom Campus

North-West University

South Africa

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

 

Ensovoort volume 37(2017), number 11:3

 

ABSTRACT

 

Keywords

Alliance, apartheid, conflict, discrimination, dissolution, ethnicity, genocide, Herodotus curse, doctrine, minority, miscegenation, monopoly, myth, parent stock, proto-Afrikaner, race, racism, security, self-actualisation, strong-arm tactics, violence.

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  • Background

 

 

“One might argue that there is almost a symbiotic interdependence between Black and White in South Africa, which makes for minority security. On the other hand, the relatively large size of the White majority gives it a substantial capacity for the fomenting dissidence, which could lead a predominantly Black government either to handle it with care so as to avoid provocation; or to use strong-arm tactics to neutralise this potential. Much would depend, of course, on how the process of sharing power had occurred and the extent to which Whites (or a majority of them) felt themselves included in the new government”, writes Welsh1, p.110 in 1988. This political view on the possible future outcomes of a Black regime’s comprehensive attitude and actions against the Whites, including Afrikaners, was not only accurately portrayed by Professor David Welsh, but become a reality 29 years later.1

 

Now, looking back after 23 years of Black rule in South Africa, it is clear that both of the outcomes were realized by the ANC-regime. Although, during the initial period after 1994 when the National Party (NP) led by FW de Klerk stayed on in the government of reconciliation, Afrikaners were treated with care to avoid provocation. But after the NP left the ANC-NP alliance, this intention of the ANC regime started to change gradually into a hostile one. This mild hostility against Whites was initially reflected by BEE, EE, etc., well masked under the pretext of equalizing opportunities between Blacks and Whites and promoting the mass of disadvantaged Blacks. No doubt exists that some sectors inside the Afrikaner population began to show dissidence to Black rule, although this was mostly limited to public protests and legal action, mostly via the various private enterprises which had assigned themselves as “caretakers” of Afrikaner interests.1-16

 

With the Zupta shenanigans and state capture gaining prominence and Jacob Zuma’s efforts to mask his dictatorial, duplicitous regime of self-enrichment, the focus was once again shifted to the Afrikaner. Ignoring the poor Black masses and the civil rights of individual Blacks, Zuma and his ilk diverted the heat to Whites as past and present oppressors of the Blacks. Afrikaners’ self-enrichment through their alleged exploitation of Blacks and the consequent “unlawful possession” of Black capital and land – which had been “stolen” from the rightful Black owners by White colonialists – was the popular refrain. The South African public were reminded of the racial division between Black and White with apartheid, colonialism, Afrikanerism, and the like wedged into the collective consciousness. Zuma and his intimate cadres utilised this momentum to promote Radical Economic Transformation (RET), which focused on nationalizing White capital (banks, property, land, pension funds, etc) and would tip the economic scales in favour of the previously disenfranchised. Disregarding Afrikaners’ civil and political rights in the work environment, crime-fighting, the murder of White farmers, parliamentarian debating, and political decision-making, are further excellent examples of the start-up of strong-arm tactics to neutralize the Whites as a political grouping as well as an indigenous South African population [The more recently emphasis also on Radical Social Transformation (RST) to equal social status between Blacks and Whites is a further example of these tactics].1-16

 

Mthombothi17, p.17writes that the truth behind RET and “White monopoly capital” is that it is just a cloak to cover up Zuma and the Guptas’ nefarious deeds of enduring damage by their cynical exploitation of racism and repeated regurgitation of the apartheid past. The two terms are thus not as innocent as they sound. He writes17, p. 17: “It’s got nothing to do with any desire to help or uplift the black masses, especially not on the part of a family [Guptas] who have shown no love for black people. These words have a sinister motive. They are deliberately designed to pull the wool over our eyes, to set us up against each other, to incite racial hatred. And so we fight among ourselves as they get on with the business of looting the country. We have fallen for it. Their plan is working. They have poisoned the well”. It is excellent example of “divide and rule” used worldwide by sly rulers to stay in power and to distract attention from their own wrongdoing.

 

Clearly the Afrikaner has become, through Zuma, the sole “enemy of the people” again as in the 1960s with the ANC’s policy of revolution and an effective method to distract especially the poor Black classes’ from the truth. This tried-and-tested trick has always been successful at obtaining votes from the poor masses: by frightening them with the return of White apartheid, the repositioning of the “racist” Afrikaners as a political power, and the theft of new-found Black richness.1,3,4,7,11,12,15,16,18-21 This RET policy does not differ from the established corrective economic policies that have been pursued since 1994. Fuelling the fire of Black-White conflict can ultimately – socially and economically – destabilize South Africa. It is in this subjective but overwhelming anti-White hostility that Afrikaners are trying to make the best of their indigenous identity and to live in the new South Africa.17

 

While Welsh1, p. 101postulated in 1988 that “it is perhaps not ‘inevitable’ that in fifty years’ time [2038] White control over South Africa will have disappeared…”, it took the ANC regime only 23 years to reach that goal successfully through the intensifying of well-planned strong-arm tactics. These kinds of tactics by Zuma and his supporters will strongly increase in their efforts to draw the attention away from their growing political wrongdoings as more and more Black dissenters from the middle and higher classes turn their backs on the “Zupta-ANC”.

 

The abovementioned propaganda and political rhetoric is exactly how the ZANU-PF regime of Robert Mugabe “won” Zimbabwe from the Whites. ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe himself recently provided an apt description of the dangerous implications, especially for Afrikaners, of Jacob Zuma’s populist RET policy of grabbing White-monopoly capital and land when he says22, p. 4:

As ‘n revolusionêre beweging agteruitgaan en goedkoop populariteit soek, raak dit avontuurlik en populisties.

 

Zanu-PF was ‘n revolusionêre party, maar om goedkoop steun te kry, het Zanu-PF grond gegryp en uitgedeel en só kosproduksievernietig. Dit was dalk gewild, maar Zimbabwe is nou ‘n voedselinvoerder.

 

Dit is waarheen ons ook neig. Die beweging [ANC] sal nie gered word deur kitsoplossings nie, maar deur diep besinning.

 

Die debat oor radikale transformasie en witmonopoliekapitaal word deur Gupta-gesinde ANC-lede gestook om ‘n voorsprong te kry met die oog op die party se nasionale konferensie in Desember.

 

If the secretary general of the ANC feels obligated to warn against his own party’s failing future political integrity and behaviour (which is already a reality), there can be no doubt of the seriousness of these anti-White tactics and the possibly devastating consequences awaiting Afrikaners. The plight of the Whites in Zimbabwe is well recorded and well published.

 

Although the South African Constitution, the Constitutional Court and other courts of law have thusfar managed to shield the Afrikaner from the ANC’s extreme strong-arm tactics, these bodies might be rendered powerless in the long run if a total ANC-takeover (67%) results in changes to the independence of the courts and the security services. Dramatic action against the Afrikaner could follow, which may even lead to genocide. The present-day cry by ultra-hot-headed ANCs and other radical Blacks for a “second revolution” via RET and RST seems more and more imminent. This revolution’s intention is far from innocent, despite claims by the present-day ANC leadership that its only aim is to obtain “economic” freedom by ending the “first revolution” of 1994 by means of RET and RST to bring “political freedom” to Blacks.1,7,11,12,15,16,20,22,23

 

The aggressive and militant movement known as Black First Land First (BLF), have already started putting their demands in writing and publically vocalising threats and intimidating any opponents of this “second revolution” with their anti-White motto, “to defend black people, the Guptas, from racist, land-thieving white monopoly capitalist scum,” as the journalist Peter Bruce24, p. 20summarised it. This already reflects that the presence of a “…culture of intolerance and bullying and disregard for the basic principles of free speech in our society in the new smash and grab milieu is such that lives are being put at risk”.25, p. 20 This spells disaster for Afrikaners. There is overwhelming evidence of a comprehensive readjustment around Afrikaners and their position as citizens of South Africa, and one cannot help fearing for the worst.1,7,11,12,15,16,20,22,24-26

 

Vilakazi warning of this extreme political, social, economic, and personal upheaval in the future of Afrikaners if they did not take the time to safeguard them against Black revenge and annulment, was already well profiled and spelled out nearly 30 years ago  when he writes 15,p. 40:

 

The essence of revolution is the direct, active intervention of the oppressed masses of society in public affairs, in an effort to speed up and bring about long overdue changes in the fundamental structures of society. These changes are above all in the possession and control of power, first political, and, following on its heels, economic power. Revolution consists of the shifting of this power from the hands of one class to the hands of the hitherto oppressed classes. The issue in any revolution is the possession and control of the power of the State, and possession and control of property; in other words, political power, and economic power.

 

But what Vilakazi also failed15 to say then, but which Gwede Mantashe22 now warns us of, is that any revolution is not a bed of roses: not only for the loser, but also for the winner at the end, spelling total chaos at the end.28 (Remember the vicious cycle of the Herodotus Curse on wrongdoing that history repeats itself and that contravening the rules of justice creates→ injustice hate→ revenge →contra-revenge, with sometimes a fast, sudden, surprising, and deadly counter revenge).22,27,28

 

The present day as well as potential future abuse and crushing of Afrikaners by the ANC regime and other radical Blacks are clearly pinpointed in the above remark of 30 years ago by Vilakazi’s15,p. 40: “…long overdue changes in the fundamental structures of society…”. This was a dire warning of an unavoidable South African indigenous reality of disaster to come in their near future, which the ordinary Afrikaners missed to read on the lips of F W de Klerk when he mesmerized the 1993 referendum and the post-1994 utopian South Africa into their mindsets.14,29,30

 

The basic aim of this article was to inform the Afrikaner of his present and future role as a citizen of the new South Africa. This contemplation should motivate the Afrikaner to do self- introspection. Afrikaners should answer the question: Have we reached self-actualisation and an optimal personal happiness in the new South Africa? Have we left our worries and fears behind so that we can participate in a good life here? If Afrikaners fail to offer a positive answer on the question, then it is time that they reread this article to see how they can address their upcoming Afrikaner dissolution the best, and how they can obtain and assure at present and in future psychological and political wellbeing for themselves. The options are there, but only they alone can make a choice. Remember: at this stage Afrikaner dissolution is a fact, not a myth.

 

The aim of the study is to describe 2017 as the time for thinking, planning, and deeds. The focus is on the various options and routes available for the Afrikaner to plan his immediate future and to delay or to avoid dissolution in a century’s time.

  • This article is the last in a series of seven. The seven articles represent the following research topics: 1) who is the Afrikaner; 2) the historical determinants and role-players in the establishment and maintenance of racial and ethnic discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 3) present and past negative determinants and role-players in the establishment and upkeep of injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 4) the Afrikaner’s failure to understand, accept and intertwine the indigenous realities of South Africa; 5) the vicious cycle of revenge and counter- revenge around apartheid;  6) The preparedness of Afrikaners to deal with the threats and challenges of the new South Africa; 7) 2017 is the time for thinking, planning, and deeds.

 

  • The overarching intention of the entire study is to determine the position of the Afrikaner in the year 2117.

 

 

  • Method

 

 

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the ground up, from evidence as it emerges over the course of the research. This approach is used in modern-day historical research where an established library is lacking, for instance in the case of the topic of the present and future position of the Afrikaner in South Africa. The databases used were EBSCO, Sabinet online as well as articles from 2016 to 2017, books for the period 1944 to 2016, and newspapers covering the period 2012 to 2017. This was done to reflect on the Afrikaner and to place thoughts, views, and opinions on the Afrikaner in perspective.60-62

 

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

 

 

  • Results

 

 

Prominent to the background provided are the questions: Is it justified that Afrikaners at this stage of the New South Africa are still exposed to discriminative behaviours and maltreatment by the ANC regime?; and, What can Afrikaners do to secure a future for themselves and their descendants in or outside of South Africa?

 

In this context it is important to know if the ANC regime understands the concept of indigenousness of the various tribes of South Africa outside a Black-only ethnicity, as well as if they have any knowledge of the prescribed principles and rules to be followed in nation-building? Does the ANC regime really take notice of the Afrikaners’ sincere and willing efforts to become successful members of the new South Africa? There is no doubt that if the ANC regime can answer these three questions positively and practice them accordingly there will be no need for Afrikaners to reconsider their present and future positions in South Africa. So far, all hope seems to be in vain.

 

In the following four subdivisions the ANC’s under standing of and respect for South African peoples’ indigenousness, nation-building, as well as the ordinary Afrikaner’s sincerity and willingness to accept South African indigenous realities and to move on to greater South Africa, will be described.

 

3.1 South African indigenous realities missed by the ANC

 

For some Blacks, especially those in ANC politics, it was just too difficult after 1994 to accept that the White minority had legitimate interests in view of what, historically, had been the ‘illegitimate’ exercise of minority power over “them” as Blacks. This bitterness about their treatment as human beings during apartheid (and during colonialism, in the same breath) and outright rejection of the “illegitimate” NP-regime by the Blacks, has led to today’s hostile actions against Afrikaners. Also, the Afrikaner’s substantial dissidence to Black rule, specifically with the ANC as former revolutionary organization, aggravated the situation. The end result was the ANC regime’s disregard and disrespect of the rights of Afrikaners, despite the safeguarding of minority groups by the Constitution. The ANC regime’s obvious efforts to undo the privileged political and socio-economic position the Afrikaner previously held [and considered guaranteed after 1994 by virtue of the NP and the 1993 referendum agreement] reinforced this view.1,3.4.15.31-35

 

What these Blacks and the ANC have forgotten is that internalized customs, habits, and traditions do not just disappear when a new regime takes over. Rights, privileges, benefits and favours, written or unwritten, official or unofficial, also do not suddenly disappear (the present behaviour of the ANC as an ex-terrorist, ex-revolutionary organization plainly reflects these internalized dispositions). South Africa as a country developed over more than three hundred years of war and peace, good and bad. At the moment the differences between the classes, between Black and White, as well as Black and Black, are just too significant to erase overnight. The same can be said of the chasm between the “haves” and the “have-nots”. Unfortunately, targeting Whites out of racial hatred and jealousy and forcing them out of their homeland and seizing their capital and property will not solve the problem. At the end it is the country and its Black people that suffer the most. After independence, Samora Machel of Mozambique attempted (but failed) to rectify inequalities in one fell swoop by focussing exclusively on Whites as the wringers. Despite Machel’s reputed warning to Mugabe not to repeat this mistake, Mugabe blindly implemented radical racial reform measures by kicking Whites off their farms and out of Zimbabwe, but failed as Machel did and today continues to mutilate the tattered remains of his once-thriving country. The ANC has been trying to do the same in South Africa since 1994, but instead is creating more long-term problems than solving present short-term problems. It is against devastating costs to the country that Mantashe and a few wise ANC stalwarts and veterans are – seemingly in vain – warning the Zupta-led ANC elite.1,22,25,37,38

 

In a “peaceful transfer” from one political regime to another, like that of the NP to the ANC (a peaceful development of revolution which very seldom takes place in history), the peace of such a transfer is  sometimes very short-lived. Basically, because the initial solutions to problems were often insufficient, leaving many of the role-players from both sides unfulfilled and frustrated in terms of compensation or punishment for wrongdoings (as evidenced by the hunger for revenge by victims of apartheid). To steer a regime change peacefully through its growing pains requires extraordinary leadership, characterized by foresight, courage, a sense of morality and conciliation, and the ability to act fast in times of crisis. The ANC leadership after Nelson Mandela lacks all of these. This has led to a misrepresentation in the minds of some Afrikaners that ill discipline, corruption, lethargy, unproductiveness, inefficiency, and incompetence are characteristics of Black culture in general. These traits of the current leadership and the departments under them are the primary motivation behind the commonplace reference to the new South Africa as a “banana republic”.32This is a very sad generalisation as the greater part of most Black societies do not harbour particular ill will towards their fellow South Africans, including Afrikaners. They are merely getting on with life as best they can, and suffer under the same inefficiency and incompetence of the ruling party; they are not governed by hatred or an urge for revenge.13-15, 39-45

 

This “African culture” which has characterized life in post-1994 South Africa is actually a “deviant ANC culture” originating from its origin as a terrorist and revolutionary organization. It is far removed from the true African culture of South Africa and shaped by outdated political thought and the actions of anti-Afrikaner Black politicians and activists with their own agendas (maintained and driven by the MKs of the late 1960s and 1970s). At present, it is aggravated by the Zuptas and their supporters. Many ANC leaders and members are nothing more than spectators, lacking wisdom or insight, who gained front seats to the political game in the post-1994 democratic elections. And then there are the many “takers” who will do anything just to satisfy their personal greed and ambitions. The reality is that these opportunistic people are in charge of the ANC and are steering its policies and actions. Any positivity on the Afrikaner’s side is blindly ignored; the same can be said about their civil rights. It seems that Afrikaners are increasingly falling prey to this system.12,32,33,39,46-52

 

3.2 Requirements for South African Nationhood

 

A lot of the present-day hostility of the ANC-regime is a direct outcome of the political immaturity of the South African Constitution and South Africa’s history as a nation, although the judges of the Constitutional and Appeal Courts act with wisdom, sincerity, and sound legal principles. South Africa as a member of BRICS can learn a lot from India’s colonial past and the successful manner in which this new nation (but old civilisation) is handling its different cultures, peoples, and tribes since obtaining independence in 1947. Whereas India was never a unified political entity, the Proclamation of Queen Victoria in 1853 unified into one country, one nation; when independence came on August 14, 1947, a democracy was created that has remained unified. What makes this achievement so great is that it brought nearly a 1 000 million people (of various cultures, tribes and levels of education, some in extreme poverty, other extreme rich) together as one political entity under conditions of freedom. “Never before in history, and nowhere else in the world today, has one-sixth of the human race existed as a single free nation. This unity of people is more than the combined population of Africa and South America”.53, p. 3

 

This achievement goes much further – all 12 of the great living religions in the world are flourishing in India, 16 major languages written in different alphabets and derived from different roots, while Indians express themselves in 250 dialects. Although English (the language of colonialism) is not included in the major languages listed in the Constitution, it remained the only language for the whole country. Furthermore, English is the only language in which South India is prepared to communicate with North India. British jurisprudence is the matrix of India’s non-personal laws.53, p. 3

 

India’s independence is based on a sound Constitution which is respected by all the role-players. Even in states of the Indian Republic where the Communist Party governs, human rights are fully respected because of the Bill of Rights being firmly ingrained in the Indian Constitution (the substance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations on December 10, 1948, is embodied as Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution). What drives this democracy, freedom, and unity in India, fighting of communal hatred, linguistic fanaticism, terrorism, professional hooliganism, caste, and clan fanaticism, corruption, and creed, is India’s national integration, and integrity. The eminent Indian writer, lawyer and academic, Nani Palkhivala53, defined this totality very well (the ANC leadership and anti-Afrikaner Blacks would do well with a daily dose) when writing53 p. 11:

 

The most crying need of India today is to undergo catharsis, a course of emotional cleansing. We must not allow the moral bedrock of our society to turn to lava.

 

National integration is born in the hearts of the citizens. When it dies there, no army, no government, no constitution, can save it. States of mind precede states. Inter-faith harmony and consciousness of the essential unity of all religions is the very heart of our national integration.

 

The soul of India aspires to integration and assimilation. Down the ages, Indian culture – a tremendous force of power and beauty – has been made richer and deeper as a result of absorbing what is best in outside influences and integrating those various influences to grace and enrich its own identity.

 

Regarding Palkhivala’s reference53, p. 11 to “absorbing what is best in outside influences and then integrating those influences” (which brings us back to the ANC leadership’s distaste and hatred of British colonialism and Afrikanerism and their rejection of good influences as bad simply because it does not fit their revolutionary dogma), he writes specific about the “accidental” impact of British colonialism of 200 years on India as follows53, p. 15:

 

There seems to be a mystical bond which holds us together in real understanding and goodwill. There is something special, in fact providential, in the relationship between Britain and India. The crucial test is this: if the last two hundred years in India’s history were to be relived, how many thinking Indians would prefer to have them without British rule? I venture to say no one, who is not ignorant, or partial, would wish the past to be redrawn effacing all traces of the raj.

 

There was much that was ugly and exploitative in those years. But, on the balance, the good far outweighed the evil. The British took enormous wealth out of India, but they left behind legacies which no money could buy.

 

Where the Indians accepted the British as part of their future life after Indian rule, incorporated the positive of British colonialism and imperialism into their daily lives and created a brotherhood with the British that still exists today, the ANC elite did just the opposite with Afrikaners. Five years into Black rule they started to oust Afrikaners from all terrains of South African life on the basis of their association with “imperial and colonial rule”. Afrikaans as a language came under siege, work limitations followed, political isolation became prominent, White murders intensified and White bashing became a daily rhetoric, while the capture of White capital  now seems to enter its final stage. It must, however, be said that, although India is a young nation (74 years), it is a country with an ancient history (5 000 years). New South Africa is not only a very young nation (23 years), but it lacks a comprehensive history: there are existing White and Afrikaner histories but a true Black history is missing. History and nationhood still come, but notwithstanding this, it is worrying that after 23 years of the existence of the new South Africa, the ANC – driven by greed and revenge – seems to be focussing on national disintegration, fighting its own past, and instigating Black-White conflict and hate, instead of following a course of action to bring about positive growth in nation-building.3,4,8,17,24,32,34,39,47,50,53,54 Palkhivala53 warns well of personal and political mischievousness that destroys nation-building.

 

Palkhivala’s remark that53, p.15: “…no one, who is not ignorant or partial…” points to the ANC’s political and personal immaturity as the reason for their failure, as ruling party, to think strategically and constructively about the country’s future. Or is their thinking so overrun by their negative emotional state after apartheid that it has neutralized all sound cognitive functioning? It took the Afrikaner nearly 400 years to develop from European, Black, Indian, and other indigenous people to the proto-Afrikaner and to the Afrikaner, with the latter still an identity in the process of becoming another. Possible are the present-day peoples of South Africa, including Afrikaners, in a great haste to become true South Africans. To obtain this status, it is necessary for them to live through the present political, social, economical, and personal upheavals for at least another 300 years before the ordinary South Africans can say, as the Indians after 5 000 years of growth: WE ARE A NATION. The ANC as a political party, its tailstock leaders and the hot-headed guild of anti-Afrikaners, are seemingly only a temporary nuisance in this long process of nation-building in which the Afrikaner has unfortunately become an innocent victim.8,14,53,55,56

 

Apartheid, driven by Afrikanerism from 1910, was – like British colonialism in India –ugly and exploitative until 1994. But, on the balance – as with colonialism in India and most African countries – the good of apartheid far outweighed the evil. Afrikaners enriched themselves at the cost of Blacks and degraded them, but they brought and left behind legacies for Black South Africa which no money could buy. As in India with British colonialism, apartheid and British colonialism was needed to bring South Africa and all its populations to its present stage of Black rule. Many Black South Africans reject the legacies of apartheid, although the positive evidence is all over the country and in Black present-day lifestyles.32,53 The arguments against the Europeans/colonists in South Africa, Africa, and worldwide – that they grew rich and powerful by robbing their colonies,– do not hold true because there was not much to take, writes D’Souza57, p. 60 in response to the often heard retort: “The Europeans stole the raw material to build their civilization, they stole rubber from Malaya, and cocoa from West Africa, and tea from India”. D’Souza points out that before British colonialism57, p. 60: “…there were no rubber trees in Malaya, nor cocoa trees in West Africa, nor tea in India. The British brought the rubber tree to Malaya from South America, they brought tea to India from China. And they taught the Africans to grow cocoa, a crop the native people had previously never heard of ”. There was a total lack of infrastructure and to make the countries effective, the British built roads, shipping docks, railway tracks, irrigation systems, government buildings, introduced education and healthcare, and introduced them to new words and new ideas unknown to their ancestral culture, like “liberty”, “sovereignty”, “rights”, etc., concepts that still affect their present-day thoughts and actions.57 “Despite the corrupt and self-serving motives of their practitioners, the institutions of colonialism and slavery proved to be the mechanism that brought millions of non-White people into the orbit of Western freedom”, D’Souza57, p. 60 continues. The doctrine of oppression ignores these facts and goes on to fuel anti-Western resentment around the world and in nations of the West. D’Souza concludes57, p.67: “I think we can now conclude that the doctrine is false, and the animus that is based on it is misplaced”. In fact, the ANC elite have adopted many of the actions condemned as evil habits of Afrikanerism and apartheid. Apartheid and Afrikanerism are, together with Afrikaners, a permanent part of Black history and South African history.32,53

 

Black insecurity about an own identity, masked behind their false bravado and arrogance of “self-made” and “independence” as well as their focused aggression towards Afrikaners, confirms the cemented impact of the positivity of apartheid and Afrikanerism in their psyche. This “inferiority complex” as the result of under-development in a complex and dynamic world easily gets a grip on people. (This also happened to the poorer proto-Afrikaners and later Afrikaners under British colonialism and was strongly reflected in their behaviour in the Union). Blacks reference to themselves as32, p.2: “verbeeldinglose primitiewe barbare”, supported by: “… kolonialiste ‘het ons sommige van die ergste leuens laat glo.’ Deur brute krag, deur ons hulpbronne te plunder en deur ons verstand en liggaam gevange te hou, (is) Afrikane van hul menslikheid en waardigheid ontneem”, are excellent examples of this illusion and underestimation, not only of themselves as full citizens, but also of the roles of Afrikaners in their lives during apartheid. Rationalization and projection are lifestyle-mechanisms often used for the wrong reasons, to relay attention from own much deeper personal-shortcomings, dysfunctions, and needs. Afrikaners are part of the South African nation-building process and have a valuable contribution to make.

 

If the ANC leadership and its members doubt the wise words of Palkhivala53on nation-building and the importance of every piece of history because it is related from an Indian context, they may turn to the writings of South African entrepreneur and White African, Mike Boon39 in The African Way: The power of interactive leadership. Maybe Boon’s simple guidelines on the South African peoples and their leaders will appeal to the palate of the ANC leadership (and change their present failure to succeed as leaders). Boon writes39, p. 15:

 

Africa is a place of many peoples, many tribes, and many beliefs. It is a place of terrible horror and great compassion; one of foolishness and great wisdom. But there is a vision of Africa, based on the nobility, and tragedy of the past. This is a land of strong cultures that survive and grow together with the ever-increasing education of proud people, secure in the knowledge that they are the future mentors of the world. The world is beginning to realize that happiness is a state of being and not something we work towards or buy. It is a vision of harmony, prosperity, and success; of productive, powerful work teams; of true democracy; of cooperation and interdependence; and of trust and pride in humanity and in each other.

 

We are different people with different cultures. We have our own ways, our own languages, customs, philosophies, and beliefs. We have our own history and our own heroes. More importantly, we have our African humanity and our noble cultures. Woe to the world if we all pursue a singular, grey, and boring sameness. Our differences and traditions make us interesting and proud.

 

The ANC regime of today, as the NP-AB (Afrikaner-Broederbond) alliance of the past, is misjudging the South African diversity of cultures and peoples and their stubborn will to survive under immense hardship. It seems that the ANC of today are destined to suffer the same humiliating failure the NP and ordinary nationalist Afrikaners suffered after 46 years of rule (1948 –1994); although it may be after the relatively short time of 25 years in government (1994 – 2019). Both failures were as a result of unwise, racist, authoritarian, and greedy leaderships. Not only did the leaders of both dispensations abuse their positions for their own gains, but they lacked insight into the needs of individual citizens on grassroots level.

 

3.3 The Afrikaner is an identity in becoming another▼

The opportunistic and authorial leaders of the nationalist Afrikaners doctrine into their mindset the belief of themselves as the anointed Afrikaner nation, sent to Africa by God to convert the Blacks and make them better people. A group granted “everlasting supremacy” over Blacks and the right to be “forever the rulers” of South Africa, as established by Verwoerd and his First Republic. Under the sly leadership of the NP and the AB, ordinary Afrikaners were somehow pacified into believing that the political rule of the Afrikaner in South Africa – with its immense military and political might – was infallible. When the unholy alliance between the NP and the AB suddenly collapsed in 1994, ordinary Afrikaners were still too naive to understand that they, with the approval of a newly combined leadership, were going to be gradually sacrificed within ten years: the proverbial lamb to the slaughter on the ANC’s altar of revenge from 2017 and onwards. From the beginning of 1994, ordinary Afrikaners were naive about what to expect in the new South Africa. They were unprepared for the immense political, social, economic, and personal changes awaiting them. They were totally confused about what their positions in the new dispensation were and the appropriate behaviour required in this new environment.8,14,29,41,55,56,58,59

 

It is not a surprise that this confusion and loss of identity suffered by the ordinary Afrikaner after 1994 culminated in total desolation, and in the words of Breytenbach55, p. 83:

Actually I’d ceased being an Afrikaner. My sense of that entity, and even the language, was but nostalgia encapsulated in an irrevocable lost past. Maybe I’d made up that past, coloring it in the glowing tones of innocence, contextualizing its dark and bleeding violence to make it seem part of the woof of being human”, and, ‘“I?” What “I?” The language, if I still used it, had become private and personal. Some words were left, moving like maggots through the dead meat of redundant arguments. But now I am no longer identified in any way. What am I saying? It is already dead. I was talking to dead people. I am talking of a passed away “self”.

 

Thankfully, the Afrikaner is not yet “ceased,” neither is he dead in the new South Africa, but the smell of death is present in his existence and he must know it. What is indeed true, is that the basic issue of an all-over political empowerment of a specific group in South Africa, namely who is going to rule South Africa from now on1, p.108: “‘them’ or ‘us?’” has been successfully phased out of the mindsets of most Afrikaners after 1994. The final acceptance is clear: the Blacks are ruling and that is absolute and final in 2017. What is also clear is that the new rulers are going to apply more and more pressure to impoverish, isolate, and – where possible – nullify the Afrikaner as citizen.

 

It does not matter today whether the55, p. 78: “…Afrikaner is only an identity in becoming another,” or if he is “rightfully still a legitimate member of an independent indigenous South African tribe been stripped of his previous ruler’s status”. The hard fact is that he still exists as a South African reality and the new rulers should mark that he is a human being with legitimate civil rights as a citizen. It is thus of utmost importance for Afrikaners to find solutions to secure their existence to avoid the danger of dissolution in the future. However, there is evidence that Afrikaners have already begun to think outside their doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism and are starting to try out solutions to adapt to their political dilemmas in the new South Africa.

 

▲Cross-references: see Part 5, subdivision 4.2.7 and Part 6, subdivision 4.1.6.

 

3.4 Afrikaner Sincerity and Willingness to Political Change

 

To change political and cultural mindsets to fit into the South African indigenous realities – the cake of customs as the historian J M Roberts14, p. 986describes it – formed sometimes by almost unrecognized assumptions and attitudes over long stretches of time – is no easy feat. But it can be done, as in 1994 when Afrikaners were forced to accept a Black regime and the ANC as ruling party. Although this change was initially seen as a conditional transfer by the outsider, it turned out to be unconditional, leading to today’s serious consequences for the continued existence of Afrikaners in this country. At the time, very few Afrikaners saw the “end … coming”, also because they were never warned of such a possibility by their leaders.

 

Afrikaner leaders showed their sincerity and willingness by releasing Nelson Mandela from jail, and repealing the various apartheid laws in 1991. In 1994, the South African government was technically handed over to an immature, inexperienced, and unprepared ANC regime driven by revolutionary ideas. It already seemed at the time that the same political willingness and sincerity was lacking on the Black side. The ANC and other Black political parties showed an inability to control some of their more radical followers from the beginning and signs of anti-White sentiment were clear from day one of Mandela’s era. These were some of the signs of the stormy path that lay ahead for post-1994 South Africa. It is this stormy path that Afrikaners are now travelling, exposed to the ANC’s deviant politics. Most of Afrikaners still harbour the spirit of sincerity and willingness to make South Africa a better place for themselves as well as the Blacks. All it requires is an equally sincere and willing ANC regime.14

 

  1. Discussion

 

4.1 Possible escape and survival routes for the Afrikaner to survive the next century as an individual, subgroup or tribe

 

Both Boon39 and Palkhivala53illustrated that rigid customs can be changed, although it could take time; also, that South Africa is not a country with “grey people”, but a rainbow nation of many cultures and peoples requiring wise and effective leaders to respect and steer them into the future as a true nation. If Afrikaners could willingly and freely resign their political rule and become subordinate to an ANC government after 46 years of political power, the ANC regime should also show at least the same sincerity towards nation-building. It was under the pretence of democracy for all South Africans, something they argued Afrikaners had failed to institute, that they came into power. If they had stayed true to their political promises and guarantees of 1994, it would have been unnecessary for Afrikaners to seek safeguards and rescue in the new South Africa.

 

Thus far, sadly, the ANC leadership has failed to make a significant positive contribution to better South Africa for its citizens, black or white. There were no reasons or grounds for the ANC to have allowed the hotheads and extremists in its leadership to change the accepted policy of 1994 – to handle Afrikaners with care – to the present-day strong-arm tactics, which seems to have gained momentum in the last two years. The only logical explanation is that the ANC is still locked in its revolution stage of the 1960s, driven by a “cake of customs” which is cemented in outdated and inappropriate assumptions, attitudes, traditions, and beliefs. It seems that they still do not understand, 23 years after demilitarization as freedom fighters, the differences between democratic or authoritarian governing, or how to promote the greater society without discriminating on the basis of race or creed, self-enrichment versus uplifting the poor, and the simple difference between naked hatred from the past versus present-day forgiveness for injustices done. With this the unfortunate status quo, Afrikaners in 2017 are left with no other choice than to prepare themselves for surviving the growing onslaught against them.

 

There are four main options available for the present-day Afrikaner to survive another century as individual, subgroup, or tribe. They are:

 

  • An armed struggle to obtain an independent or autonomous Afrikaner state inside the greater South African region;
  • Extensive migration to Europe and other white-dominated friendly countries;
  • Self-isolation and withdrawal as a tribe in a semi-dependent Afrikaner homeland in the new South Africa;
  • Full social integration and miscegenation with the rest of the South African population.

 

All of these alternatives have been tried and tested, with various outcomes, across the world and throughout history. Of particular interest here are events that occurred in the 1900s, up to the 1950s, in Central, Eastern, and Western Europe as well as in Asia and in the Middle East. These outcomes are well-documented and could guide the Afrikaner in terms of a decision. What must be taken into consideration is that every situation is unique: what could fail in one case could prove successful in another. The Afrikaner’s future lies in this context.14,63

 

4.1.1 An armed struggle to obtain an independent or autonomous Afrikaner state inside the greater South African region

 

The Afrikaner’s history is littered with efforts to obtain independent territories; there was the short-lived earlier Republics of Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet in the Cape Colony, the doomed Natal, Free State, and Transvaal Republics, the failed 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion, the Union of South Africa from 1902 until 1961 and the nationalist Afrikaner Republic of South Africa from 1961 to 1994; all of them came to an end. Those up to the early 1900s were military crushed. South Africa of 1961 to 1994 seems to be the last Afrikaner sovereignty in its history.59,64,65

 

The Afrikaner’s drive to create a mini empire of multinations (Union of South Africa with various provinces), followed by his mini empire of multination-states (South African Republic with various semi-independent Black homelands under a central White homeland), had all failed for various obvious reasons, like the Afrikaner political and financial incompetence after 1990, an underestimation of the ANC’s political and thinking power, and a Black majority as upcoming political role-players, etc.8,68

 

The 1994 political dispensation in South Africa was a reorientation, specifically in terms of redressing the imbalance between Whites and non-Whites that had existed for nearly 350 years, since the official establishment of White rule in the Cape of Good Hope. It is common for such reorientation to be accompanied by severe conflict and loss of lives, as evidenced in various multination states, like Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. Fortunately, South Africa was spared this bloodshed in 1994 due to a sudden and a full collapse of the NP government and their surrender of the leadership without military resistance (or as it is seen today by some as a well-planed bloodless coup d’ état orchestrated by insiders of the nationalist Afrikaners’ leadership). This collapse was swiftly followed by a successful capture of the government in five years by the ANC. The occupation of an initial mini empire of multinations in South Africa between 1910 and 1961, a political system once again changed to a mini empire with multiple states by the NP between 1961 and 1994, shifted into the hands of the ANC without a shot being fired by the Afrikaner tribe to attempt to reclaim leadership of South Africa.63,67

 

This annulment of Afrikaner-power afforded the ANC regime the opportunity to undo a number of decisions implemented by the “Afrikaner executive empire” by dissolving and collapsing the various independent “Bantu-homelands” back into the new South Africa. Through this return to a “mini-empire of multinations” for South Africa, the ANC obtained total military and security power, nipping any possible large-scale revolt by nationalist Afrikaners in the bud. This new ANC state also had a strong inclination to decolonize from day one, with the primary aim of preventing further Afrikaner political aspirations of independence or autonomy.8,15

 

The establishment of a totally independent homeland, like the Jews did in Palestine to create a New Israel, is out in South Africa. The price of this present-day Jewish state was extreme bloodshed, war, and embitterment in the minds of the Arabs. The daily existence and functioning of Israel today still requires massive military overruling and suppressing of the Arabs in the occupied areas, with outcomes of conflict so atrocious it is considered crimes against humanity, and even genocide. Running Israel is an expensive and complicated exercise, and its maintenance is possible only by the backing of Western powers (especially the USA) in money and arms; this is not viable in the Afrikaner context. And then there is the extraordinary Jewish unity and belief system that equally motivates Israelis and Jews; a nation-component that is sorely missing with Afrikaners after 1994.68-71

 

Also, there would be no place for the Afrikaner’s political aspirations (even less for revolt) in an Afrikaner homeland (a nation-state, or even just an ethnic society) inside the ANC and Black majority’s mini-empire of multi-nations of the new South Africa, is. Thus any notion of a future “Afrikaner autonomy” or even of “Afrikaner self-reliance” is wishful thinking and is as nonsensical as offering the modern-day Khoi-San an independent state in the new South Africa. This propaganda is only maintained by a small nationalist-Afrikaner portion of society with very little support from ordinary Afrikaners.63,72

 

Even if the Afrikaner had tried in 1994 to hang on to full political and military power, he would have failed the ruler test: his resources and security for maintaining power were overstretched and the NP was basically bankrupt in 1994: peaceful capitulation was unavoidable. The fact that its population had decreased over the years from more than 4 million to less than 3 million in 2016, emphasizes this dilemma of a declined empowerment. This “cruel” reality has at last been recognized by some of the hard-line nationalist Afrikaners in South Africa, who acknowledged that an own independent state was no longer viable, but that an Afrikaner (ethnic) society inside the new South Africa might still be possible. However, this option is also nothing but a pipe dream.73-79

 

In the end, multi-ethnic mini-empires of multi-nations, together with multi-empires of multi-states that overruled their citizens like the Union government, and later the NP government, had only a shadowy concept of what they were doing and what the outcome of their empowerment or planning would one day be. They mostly collapsed in a short amount of time. Their shelf-life is indeed limited, as confirmed by the various Empire states of the 20th century: the duration of the Bolsheviks’ Social Union lasted from 1922 to 1991 (69 years); Bismarck’s German Reich 1871 to 1918 (47 years); Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich 1938 to 1944 (12 years); Japan’s Colonial Empire 1905 to 1945 (40 years). The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 and is still functioning in 2017, but is only 58 years old. For these five states, the average is 45 years.14,63

 

It is thus not a surprise that the NP and its nationalist Afrikaner style mini-empire of multi-nations (or the unofficial managed “NP Union”) only lasted from 1948 to 1961 (13 years), and its mini-empire for multi-states (Republic) only from 1961 to 1994 (33 years), while the Union of South Africa (exclusively British-oriented) under strong British influence lasted from 1910 to 1948 (38 years). This reflects an average of 24 years for the three regimes.56,58,64

 

The ambition of Afrikaners up to 1994 (with a population of less than 3 million) to rule a majority of Blacks (approximately 40 million) displayed the same flawed thinking as that of 66 million Germans in the 1940s to rule over more than 300 million other Europeans in an area stretching from the Channel Islands to the Caucasus, or 70 million Japanese to rule over 400 million other Asians in Greater East Asia from Manchuria to Mandalay. This kind of rule is and was impossible to maintain indefinitely.63

 

In terms of a military takeover it should also be borne in mind that Afrikaners don’t have a capable defence force at their disposal. The well-oiled army of the 1990s made up of well-trained White soldiers was phased out. The training of new White soldiers had stopped in the 1990s and the 18-year-olds of 1994 are now middle-aged men of 40 years and over. Undoubtedly not the preferred combat troops to win a war!

 

Strive among different groups of Afrikaners since 1902 also makes the possibility of a unified front less. Afrikaners, old and young, are currently grappling with their individual futures to find and map such futures in their thoughts. The Afrikaner’s powerful hyper-Nationalism of 1994 had been replaced by an undefined hypo-Nationalism 20 years later; a nationalism that is still further dwindling.80-83

History also shows that support for hard-core terrorist-oriented Afrikaner and other politically obstructive groups like the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and the Boeremag (BM), is zero amongst present-day Afrikaners. These revolutionary influences faded out in the early 2000s. It also seems as if the Afrikaner has just lost interest in ruling South Africa after centuries of struggling to do so. The lessons Afrikaners have learned about the devastating effects of revolts and uprisings by minorities to themselves clearly stopped any notions of planning organized armed action against the ANC government.68-71They know very well that such action would give the government sound justification to annul them in a racial war without any hope of rescue from Europe or the USA. The treacherous Dingaan and his Hloma Amabutho are still not forgotten by many Afrikaners.59Also, the ANC partners in BRICS will not allow military intervention from the West if such outside assistance were available. The African Union’s support of the ANC in resisting any Afrikaner uprising or outside military support for them would also make any such initiative very unwise indeed.

 

■A well-organized armed struggle is out forever. Even their deep belief (and trust) in the prophet Siener van Rensburg’s vague predictions that the ANC and the Black rulers are going to collapse, putting Afrikaners back in power, is only a small memory of the past in the present-day Afrikaner’s bewildered mindset.84,85

 

Armed responses to secure his survival as a nation, is clearly the last option for the Afrikaner. Other, more constructive, and less risky options must thus be considered.

 

4.1.2 Extensive migration to Europe and other white-dominated friendly countries

 

Since 1994, migration has become a popular option for Afrikaners; apparently to retain their identity, language, freedom, and rights; as much as 1.2 million people have already left, with a further 1.5 thinking or planning to do so the next decade or two. The most popular destinations at present are Australia and New Zealand.73-79

 

Migration is a worldwide manifestation in times of political unrest, racial, and ethnic discrimination as well as economical hardship. Aspects that drove people to migration in the past have been limitated or lack of employment, high criminality, poor governance, and lack of national identity and threats/acts of genocide by the local population. Aggravating circumstances worldwide were that these types of pervasive grievances had grown on a daily basis and had gone unaddressed by the authorities in charge. There was also a constant rise in expectations of a better and a secure lifestyle and living conditions worldwide, especially promoted by the opportunities that globalization had brought since the 1900s.There is also no disloyalty in migration; that is how the ancestors of the Whites and the Blacks of South Africa arrived here. The fact that between 1850 and 1914 nearly 34 million, and between 1901, and 1910 nearly 12 million Europeans emigrated, confirms this as an acceptable and normal process of economical, personal, and social survival.63

 

Most of such worldwide migration was geographical, basically because of economic, social, and ethnic discrimination and not so much a social transplant into a same-nation setup. It happened for instance during the Irish famine, which the English authorities in London totally ignored in an effort to annul the “Irish Problem”. This led to a massive migration to the United States of America. Also, no less than 6 million Germans moved to South America in the 1900s, fleeing from negative political and economical circumstances at home.63

 

This kind of migration also happened in Britain between 1891 and 1900 when no fewer than 726 000 citizens emigrated from the UK, with a 72% of them moving to the foreign USA (geographical migration) in contrast to a mere 28% to other British regions (social/nation-migration).63

 

In the 1900s as many as 5 million Germans emigrated to the American mid-West; at the time, there were already 13 million Germans living beyond the Bismarck-Reich Eastern frontier, a further 9 million Germans in Austria, and another 4 million Germans in Eastern Europe in places like Hungary, Romania, and Russia. There were also substantial numbers of Germans in Poland, Galicia, Bukovina, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Transylvania, and in Russian territory, seeking better life-conditions.63

 

But, these German migrants did not always find a better life and secure German nationhood in Greater Europe. As their economic position improved and they became prosperous, ethnic hostility born from masked economical jealousy led to intense discrimination from nationals in their adopted countries, deportation, and even mass murder of migrant Germans during World War Two (WW2). This was one of Hitler’s reasons for not only occupying some of these countries for the German people, but to wipe out their indigenous populations to make living space.14,63

 

It was not only the Germans who migrated to other countries – fleeing political, economical, racial, or discriminative circumstances in their own homeland – that fell prey to new discrimination and murder in their adopted homelands; it also happened to Blacks in South Africa in the early 1800s and Jews, Greeks, Hungarians, and Turks in the 1900s.63

 

It was especially the Jews who fall prey: of the 10.6 million Jews living in Europe up to Russian territory in the 1930s, 6 million were murdered in their new adopted homelands before 1948. In South Africa, between one and two million people from the tribes that had moved here from Central Africa were murdered by other tribes, like the Zulus and the Matabele, also settlers from Central Africa, between 1810 and 1840.39,63

 

It is evident that migration to a new homeland is not always a guarantee of a better life; in the long term (even in 50 years and more after migration), the outcome can be the tragic opposite. However, for the impoverished and landless Jews moving to the New Israel and the Zulus and Matabele moving to South Africa from Central Africa, migration was worthwhile.39

 

Where could Afrikaners go as a group? This was the same question the Jews were asking themselves in the 1940s in Europe when the tide turned against them. Most of the European and Western countries already had quotas on Jews in place: from South Africa, the UK, all the way to the USA, where other discriminative legislation against them barred them from entering. There was a new Israeli homeland in Palestine, but only for those who could afford the travelling costs. The British authorities further limited the entrance of Jewish settlers so as not to offend the Palestinians.56,63,64

 

For the Afrikaner, as the last White colonist in Africa to be pushed out, it seems that not only political but also economic asylum is urgently needed if the negative politics of the ANC continues.

 

Europe seems a viable choice for the Afrikaner, but for the average Afrikaner the language barriers of Germany, France, etc, could pose severe obstacles. Also, the costs of migrating to and living in Europe are just too steep for the average Afrikaner (initially, poverty also stunted the migration of Jews to Israel). The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, and the UK seem to be the only applicable destinations for a large-scale transplant, but these countries are clearly not financially or politically geared for such a large influx of Afrikaners.67,86,87

 

The present chaos in Europe, created by the massive inflow of Islamic migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, would act as additional deterrent against mass migration of Afrikaners to Europe. Firstly, these countries are already bursting at the seams with the additional demand on existing employment and living space; secondly, the racial and ethnic differences between Europeans and Muslim migrants have already given rise to conflict. This situation leaves very little space for a large influx of Afrikaners to any country in Greater Europe. In light of deteriorating global political scenarios in Greater Europe, the Middle East, and Russia and its surrounding countries, migration northwards could cause more trauma then relief.86,87

 

Although it is a very attractive new homeland, the United States of America (USA) has not been immune to financial, racial, and political upheavals, which renders it far from ideal for a massive migration. Poverty in South Africa is colour-blind, which means that the number of Whites affected by this scourge is also increasing, which automatically bars them from emigrating anywhere, including the US.88-91

 

To put the Afrikaners’ future  for instance in the USA (and in all European countries) in perspective, it must be remembered that pre- as well as post-1994 South Africa was and is still a small power (and its people also) in the international society. The most obvious fact about small powers is that their interests and lots are governed by the policy of the great powers. In the pre-1994 South African governing it was mostly by Europe, Britain and the USA, while in post-1994 the chief-masters are China and Russia. Inside this belittled setup the Afrikaners were in the past and are at present never regard as important by international powers. This includes migration, especially on a large scale.91 In 1965 (more than 50 years ago) Spence writes about the doomed view of the USA of the Afrikaners91, p. 24: “…in the American view ‘the cultural and spiritual interests of a paltry 21/2million whites…or even their vital interests and survival…count for very little. In the pattern of post-war world politics, the truth [is that] the survival and the rights of the small Afrikaner people have no place’”. Today, with still only a population of nearly 2.5 million, but financially and politically in a far more diminished position as in 1965, large scale migration opportunities for the Afrikaners to the USA and a warm welcome there, seems zero. The present US racial developments around the “Federal Statues Must Fall” and so called “New Black-liberation” give a further good indication that the “White”-Afrikaners, still saddled with apartheid, are not welcome. (This zero stand on future mass migration of Afrikaners to Europe seems the same, as the present refugees from “small” countries, like Syria, Iraqi and Libya, to Europe and the USA, confirm it well).

 

The Afrikaner should also remember that a new country poses challenges in terms of lifestyles, customs, habits, and traditions: there will be no Afrikaans at work, and if it is not deliberately spoken at home, the language of the adopted country will become the new home language. Afrikaners who migrated to Argentina and the USA after the Anglo-Boer War were fully assimilated and intermixed with the locals within two generations. They surrendered their Afrikaner identity and today their descendants are Argentineans and Americans, not Afrikaners.59

 

South Africans seem to prefer Australia and New Zealand as peaceful and secure countries to expatriate to. But are these countries really the best calls? It is important to note the Chinese factor of growing imperialism and world domination, especially with their focus on Australia and New Zealand.

 

4.1.2.1 Australia, New Zealand and the Chinese Dragon

 

The ambition of some countries to achieve global empire status is still relevant today as it was before WW2. China’s development as a world power with should not be ignored, especially not with the period after 2030 in mind; China is not only looking to expand its economy, but the living space of its population. The Western World’s present concern over China’s gradual dominance of world trade is missing the point; Chinese citizens are the main export product. By gradually populating politically and economically unstable and vulnerable countries with Chinese people, China is winning the war without firing a single shot. Australia and New Zealand are centrally situated, economically valuable, relatively isolated from Europe and the USA, incapable of defending themselves against a world power like China. From the Chinese perspective, these countries are obvious targets for takeover in the next 20 to 40 years. (Chinas’ annually population growth is equal to the total population of Australia. It’s thus understandable that Australia’s and New Zealand’s inherent potentials in space and richness make them very attractive future destinies of expansion for the over-populated China).63

 

It would be myopic for the Afrikaner to downplay these possibilities in considering a permanent relocation to Australia and New Zealand. In Japan’s Global Policy of the 1940s, aspirations to occupy Australia and New Zealand were clearly articulated. The main aim was to establish a Japanese Empire up to Japanese Asia, with the Yamato Race as nucleus, consisting of 2 million permanent Japanese settlers in Australia and New Zealand.63

 

Regarding China’s possible military entrance to Australia and New Zealand as enclaves for Chinese settlers, the numbers can be phenomenal calculated in terms of the Japanese planning of 1940. Of a total Japanese population of 70 million (in 1940), 2 million Japanese settlers equate to 46 million Chinese settlers in terms of the modern-day Chinese population of 1 600 million. With China’s notorious human rights record, this spells trauma for the democracies of Australia and New Zealand. Who could forget Deng Xiaoping of China or Pol Pot of Cambodia and their murderous gangs who killed thousands upon thousands of other Chinese? Also the cold-blooded annexation of Tibet by China and the diminishing of the indigenous Tibetans in the 1960s is a clear warning for Australia and New Zealand in waiting. Surely these are fates could very well be awaiting Afrikaner migrants in Australia and New Zealand. 63,86,92

 

Above possible negative future outcomes internationally for Afrikaner migrants are well-reflected on by Friedman86, p. 79 when he writes: “The First World War was essentially European [with more than 16 million deaths]. The Second World War was truly global, with the Pacific as well as the Atlantic basin involved. But most important, the war was more intense. No one can be certain of exactly how many died in Europe in World War II, but a reasonable number is 51 million soldiers and civilians, from genocide, bombing, and the normal cost of war. In 1939, Europeans numbered about 550 million, including neutral countries. A staggering 10 percent of all Europeans perished during the six years from 1939 to 1945”. But Friedman86shows the global war-death-outcome for the period 1914 to 1945 was much more devastating, leaving approximately 71 million Europeans dead in general warfare and when  adding the 20 million killed under Stalin, the number rises to 91 million. “Add in the Russian and Spanish civil wars, and sundry other conflicts hardly worth mentioning, such as Turkey’s war with Greece and Armenia, and the number of 100 million is conservative”, states Friedman86, p. 81further. Theoretically did approximately 3 million people died globally per annum in war-related outcomes for the period 1914 to 1945; this is 300 000 more than the total present-day Afrikaner-population. The warfare of the period 1946 up too today, with the seemingly fast incoming Third Wold War III, are going to take not less than 500 million lives and can devastating permanently much more life space, freedom and richness than ever.86, p. 81

 

■Migration seems a very attractive solution for wealthy Afrikaners and the younger generation of Afrikaners away from of their seemingly present financial-, political, racial- and ethnic-problems in South Africa, but there are many unpredictable, unexpected and negative outcomes that can await them in any promising new homeland.  Migration as a choice needs thus a well-thought-through.

 

4.1.3 Self-isolation and withdrawal as a tribe in a semi-dependent Afrikaner homeland in the new South Africa▼

 

The Afrikaner is used to self-isolation, starting in the early days of the European settlers at the Cape of Good Hope, far away from their motherland without family, friends, or the comforts of Europe. This isolated state was exacerbated by negative political and personal treatment by the authorities at the Cape, forcing them to live in the undeveloped and the isolated country-side.58,59,64,93

 

Their later involvement in the Great Trek, founding themselves in the thinly populated Free State and Transvaal further cemented the lifestyle of self-isolation. It was only after the founding of the Union of South Africa and the impoverishment of the Transvaal and Free State burghers (Afrikaners), that they were forced to earn a living away from the farm and amongst other people. The Afrikaner slowly moved into urban areas and became exposed again to the foreign world of his European ancestors. But isolation still exists: the events leading up to and the dawn of apartheid led to many countries, including the Europeans, distancing themselves even today from the South African  great-grandchildren of the original European settlers.56,59,64,93,94

 

The Afrikaner’s longing for an own, exclusive homeland was a constant companion for centuries. The NP government under the FW de Klerk did not see this as practical solution; factors like economic interdependence between the different races, the lack of a suitable region to allocate legally to Afrikaners, and an absence of national unity among Afrikaners were some of the arguments against such a move. Most of these arguments were true. Afrikaners relinquished the notion, also because in 1994 the ANC had made it clear that it objected to any Afrikaner homelands. This set in motion moves to nullify any separate Afrikaner identity, action, or organization even vaguely reminiscent of apartheid or Afrikanerism, including schools, universities, businesses, political organizations, etc.72,95-112

 

There was strong call by Afrikaner nationalists of the 1930s for an independent republic with clear borders and unique Afrikaner character in South Africa, but as a result of infighting between themselves and their short-term political opportunism in terms of obtaining power at the time, the whole effort faded away until 1960. By that time it was too late for such an Afrikaner homeland, especially in view of the economic interdependence of all South Africans and their scattering to all corners of the country.56,58,64

 

This immense failure by nationalist Afrikaner leaders to establish a nationalist Afrikaner republic on their homeland model was because they lacked understanding and acceptance of global changes in thought regarding African and Black Nationalism and Uhuru, as well as the development and protection of human rights by populations and individuals in general. Also, there were insufficient numbers of Afrikaners on the African continent and their geographic isolation from Europe and the USA to support their rights as a White group, disempowered them as a role-player. Afrikaners also underestimated the strength of the ANC in 1994 and put too much faith in a future conciliation between Afrikaners and the ANC. It not only left Afrikaners ill-prepared for the consequences of 1994, but cost them political credibility and respect. This result of poor planning and strategic thinking left them paralyzed, as was the case with the two conquered Boer republics after the Second Anglo-Boer War.67,94

 

Efforts today by Afrikaner leaders to locate Afrikaners within a greater African context by arguing that Afrikaners are also “Africans” and “South Africans”, but with a unique Afrikaner identity, is considered foolish by the Black majority. It is seen as a disregard for the indigenous realities of South Africa. The ANC considers any attempts of Afrikaners to isolate themselves as a parallel government, to polarize the races and call into being a “Boer volkstaat”, as hostile and outside the indigenous unity of a nation18,30,72,113,114

 

The failure of Orania is a good illustration of why an Afrikaner homeland is not a viable solution. This enclave could not attract the massive amount of Afrikaners as expected, neither does it have the infrastructure to make it a viable or sustainable state for 100 000 Afrikaners, let alone 3 million! The same can be said of the other dubious enclaves that had sprung up over time.73,101,107,110,112,115-117

 

A similar kind of separate state in the 1920s for Russian-Jews, the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan in Siberia, failed for a number of reasons, mostly the same associated with the failure of Orania as a true homeland. It serves as a good example as warning of the failure in waiting of an Afrikaner homeland. It must be noted.

 

4.1.3.1 The failed Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan in Siberia

 

The pogroms, the chaos of the Civil War in Russia and the breakup of the Pale, made Russian Jews a thorn in the side of Russia. In the 1920s it became so chronic that a quick solution was needed. For the Russian authorities in Moscow it offered the opportunity to force communism on its Jewish subordinates through its model of nominal autonomy and to deal a blow to Zionism in Russia. On the other hand the Russian authorities believed that a Jewish homeland would attract Jewish capital from the West and at the same time relegate jobless and unskilled Jews of European Russia as farmers in a conventional Soviet cast.118

Both the Ukraine and the Crimea were mooted as Jewish homelands, but the initiatives were dropped as result of resistance by the local people. As a solution, the area of Birobidzhan in the Siberia wilderness along the borders of China was allocated as a Jewish homeland in 1928. It was a derelict land of mosquito-plagued marshes, wild forests, and mud tracks. Government support for establishing the Jewish enclave was minimal; often nothing was prepared for them and implements, livestock, and houses were absent. The area was run on Leninist principles from start and not religious ones, and the first settlers held their prayer meetings in secret. The promises of a rich and waiting land drew only a trickle of Jewish settlers. Religious and integrated Jews distrusted it and it was seen as just another ghetto. From 1928 to 1938 only 43 000 Jews, including outsiders from America, Europe, Argentina, and even Palestine, immigrated. Many of the immigrants were urban artisans with no experience of planting crops or draining soil. More than half of the initial immigrants returned home or moved back into their old occupations in Siberian cities. Notwithstanding all the obstacles in the beginning, the rest of Jews went on to establish the city of Birobidzhan and in 1934 their province became the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan. The income of the area moved from agriculture to industry. Textile factories sprung up, furniture cartels, Jewish newspapers, and schools followed. At this stage the Jewish population had already declined drastically and the Russians were the majority, with the Jews making up only 23%. In the 1936 Stalin purges, which affected the whole Soviet Union, the leaders of Birobidzhan and its committees were also liquidated. Despite the negative events of 1936, the post-war years brought a revival with the arrival of another 10 000 Jews from the Ukraine. This positive turn was dashed by the persecutions in 1948, and the majority of the Jews left the region for good. One by one the Jewish leaders disappeared, accused of obscure conspiracies. All Jewish institutes, schools, theatres and newspapers were closed down.118

 

The only Jews coming in after 1948 were convicted exiles and only Stalin’s death prevented the region from becoming a zone of mass deportation and even mass murder. A tentative synagogue was burned down in 1956 and the region was left without a rabbi permanently. Migration out of the area escalated from there onwards, especially to the USA. In 1990 less than 10 000 Jews were still living in Birobidzhan (representing 6% of the total inhabitants) and Yiddish had disappeared from the streets. Very few true Jews remain today apart from the few who became Russians, while the last poor Jews are being assisted by Israel to move there. Today the businesses are monopolized by the Chinese and Jewish faces are missing from the streets. Even the older street facades show no trace of the early Jewish immigrants. All that remains of the Jewish state of Birobidzhan is a bizarre dream.118

 

The above reflects well what is taking place in the new, integrated South Africa with the Afrikaner population: the loss of their schools, universities, street and city names, jobs, etc. and their out-numbering in traditional (although not by law) Afrikaner areas. Further can RET and RST change dramatically in future the Afrikaners’ position in South Africa for the worst. But these are all realities that are comprehensive in their destroying which the Afrikaner homeland-dreamers must take serious note of –the discrimination and crushing of the Jews took place outside in motherland Russia as well as inside their Russian homeland Birobidzhan. There was no difference at the end, making Birobidzhan as a bizarre dream. It reflects well that to survive as a separate state, even as a subordinate homeland is difficult, even impossible. An Afrikaner homeland in greater South Africa means just another failed Birobidzhan.

 

4.1.3.2 Its time for republic-minded Afrikaners to face the failures of Orania, Kleinfontein and Birobidzhan as true homelands

 

One of the main requirements for the establishment and upkeep of a new state is the availability of motivated young people to develop and to promote it. The young Afrikaners are currently grappling with their own identity in a multi-racial and cultural milieu. At the moment Afrikaners can perhaps only rely on middle age and older people to steer its agendas and interests.83,119 There is today much more cooperation between the urban White youth and urban Black youth than between the urban White youth and the rural White youth. This outcome not only undermines the Afrikaner brotherhood doctrine and volk’s ideology, but also nullifies strong youth support for the exclusive White homeland dream. Today many Afrikaners, in their disorientation and desperation, knowing the Afrikaner homeland idea is something of the past, are instead trying to absorb the “Afrikaanses” (Coloured or Brown Afrikaners and other Afrikaans speakers, including Blacks) as members into their group as part of greater South Africa’s variety of many groups. This kind of overall disintegration of Afrikaners as a tribe and their open acknowledge of this fact, is on the increase.119,120

 

Viewing the aims and intentions of Afrikaner enclaves like Orania and Kleinfontein as the same as that of modern-day Israel is foolished, short-sighted and irresponsible. They are totally different and opposing entities. Israel is supported by world powers like the USA and financially by many rich Jews from all over the world. Also the European/White support element is prominent. There is consensus among the Israelis about their future and being a Jew. The villagers of Orania and Kleinfontein are not like that.

Very few Jews believed initially that they would be better off by establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. In the 1930s about 82 000 Polish Jews immigrated to Palestine. The majority of Jews in Poland and other European countries were initially more interested in what could be achieved in their motherlands. It was only after Hitler, Stalin, the Polish and other European peoples started to murder Jews and the genocide of as many as 6 million Jews followed, mostly Ashkenazim Jews, that the Jews were forced to change their minds in favour of emigration to an independent Israel. However, in the case of the Jews, there was a secure territory awaiting them. 115,116,121-124

 

However, Afrikaners do not have an identified piece of land that they can emigrate to, neither are they welcome to establish such a state inside the new South African territory and under the ANC authority. There is no global support for such an endeavour either. Orania and Kleinfontein are far from secure. In addition to the above, an Afrikaner state would be too small to be a trade partner of Europe and the USA. China and many African countries will be reluctant to trade with the Afrikaners as their sympathies lie with the Blacks and the ANC. As such a state would not form part of South Africa as a financial hub they will struggle to generate income. The infrastructure of South Africa is crucial. Ultimately, such a state would be forced to join South Africa again under Black rule.

 

The overall position of the Afrikaner is also significantly different from the genocide of the Jews in the 1940s and their need to escape from Europe to a homeland. There is no genocide of Afrikaners. The financial and living circumstances of Afrikaners in the new South Africa are still favourable and far better than in the 1830s in the Cape Colony or in the Union after the 1930s, even in the 1960s under Afrikaner rule. Yes, there are immense political problems for Afrikaners as a tribe, but South Africa has not yet declined beyond redemption and can only be described as a partially failed state, although there is some red lights.121-123

 

■H F Verwoerd’s political power play in 1960 to establish again an “Afrikaner/Boer” republic after the two failures of the 1900s and his obtaining then of a strong mandate for this impossible NP dream from the Afrikaner electorate on the “Black-danger” issue, when he said 91, p. 34: “Your choice is more sharply defined than at any previous election, namely between a White republic, with non-white neighbours, and a multi-racial fatherland with, first a multi-racial and, later, a Black government”, is today only a vague memory in the minds of the elderly nationalist Afrikaners. Afrikaner power plays and -visions on future “Boers states” can still be reflected in talks, but the physical establishment again of a “White republic” is only a dream in the illogical mindset of some Afrikaners. This is a South African indigenous reality that all Afrikaners must make peace with.

 

Cross-references: see Part 6, subdivision 4.1.5, as well as subdivision 4.1.1 of this Part.

 

4.1.4 Full social assimilation and racial miscegenation with the other races of South Africa

 

Assimilation and miscegenation between different races and ethnic groups is a global phenomenon. The Afrikaner’s own mixed heredity from early horizontal miscegenation between other races and the White matrilineal family stock, confirms this.

 

Intensive and large-scale assimilation and miscegenation between Afrikaners and Blacks and other races to root out ethnic and racial discrimination in South Africa, is one practical approach to the problem. The questions are:

 

  • Has such assimilation and miscegenation really worked elsewhere in the world? and
  • Can the Afrikaners change their resistance to large-scale assimilation and miscegenation with Black South Africans?

 

The first question is answered by analysing the outcomes on assimilation and miscegenation between different races and ethnic groups in Greater Europe for the period 1900 to 1950 as a guideline for the Afrikaner. Strong focus is on the experiences and treatment of the Jews who were assimilated and married non-Jews in adopted countries.

 

4.1.4.1 Examples of assimilation and miscegenation worldwide▼

 

The Jews, driven from their homeland in Palestine as early as 300 AC, spread over the Greater Europe to countries like Germany, Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Prussia, Russia, Romania, Poland, Estonia, Czechoslovakia and Austria. In 1901, 70% (7.42million) of the world’s total Jewish population of 10.6 million were Ashkenazim in Eastern and Central Europe. Of this 7.42 million Jews, as much as 30% (2.23 million) were living in Russian territory.14,63

 

The process of assimilation of the Jews with the Germans and other nationals was well advanced by the start of the 1900s, leading to the establishment of mixed communities and settlements. In Germany, the various legal obstacles to marriages between Jews and non-Jews were removed in 1875, aligning them with the legislation of Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the USA. It was still illegal in Russia. This assimilation led to miscegenation with the local peoples. In 1876 5% of the Prussian Jews were already married to non-Jews. These marriages rose to 8.5% in the 1890s. In Germany the 7.8% of mixed marriages in 1870s rose to 20.4% in 1914.14,63

 

Racial integration, assimilation and miscegenation of Jews with the citizens of their adopted homelands were thus quite well advanced in Central and Eastern Europe by the 1920s. The rates of intermarriage across ethnic barriers for Jews rose to new heights from 1920. In the late 1920s, nearly one in every three marriages involving a German Jew was to a Gentile, while the rate rose as high as two out of three in some German cities. This trend was more or less similar in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia.63,86

 

This assimilation was so normal in the Jewish community that the Jews did not hesitate to be active in the political landscape of their adopted homelands, especially in the revolutionary politics of the 1900s. Jews like Trotsky and others were part of the various left-wing parties and revolutionary organizations that spearheaded the 1905 revolution in Russia. Their numbers accounted for 11% of the Bolshevik delegates and 23% of the Menshevik delegates at the fifth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party in 1907. Together with other parties attending the Congress, as much as 29% of the delegates were Jews.63

 

This assimilation and miscegenation are also evident from by the acceptance of the Jews into the financial systems of their adopted homelands and the extraordinary economical contribution of the Jewish population to the economies of their homelands. By the 1900s some Jews living under Russian and other rulers had already had great financial success: in 1897 Jews accounted for 73% of all merchants and manufacturers in Poland. In Kiev specifically they accounted for 44% of the city’s merchants and handled more than 66% of the city’s commerce while making up only 13% of the city’s population.63

 

Despite this positive state of affairs, it was precisely in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia, all regions with established mixed settlements, some of the worst ethnic violence and mass murders of Jews (and of other foreigners who had intermixed with the locals) occurred during WW2 in the 1940s.63,86,118

 

In Auschwitz the Nazis killed 1.8 million Jews and the further 4.4 million were murdered at places like Majdanek, Belzec, Chelmno, Sobibor and Treblinka. Assimilation and miscegenation did not save mixed villages and settlements from genocide, sometimes death came by the hands of their own half-brothers and -sisters.14,63,118

 

The German occupation of Poland resulted in the seizing of Jewish property, the closure of their schools, expulsion of Jewish professionals like medical doctors and professors, the closing of Jewish organizations, followed by a well-managed genocide. The result was that of the more than 9 million Jews living in Greater Europe in 1938, only 3 million still remained by the end of 1948.63,86

 

This genocide by the Germans was not limited to the Jews, but was applied to the citizens of Poland during the German occupation – a country where the Germans and the Polish intermixed freely for many years. As many as 6 million people died in Poland under Hitler’s occupation. Here, it was especially the Polish intelligentsia and leadership, like priests, lawyers, businessmen, teachers, doctors, mostly people with strong intermixed relations with the locals who were murdered.14,63

 

In Czechoslovakia, where there was assimilation and miscegenation between Jews, Germans and the Polish in the 1920s, the state capture of Jewish and German property with wide-spread economical reform and land reform by the government (better known as the “selective expropriation and redistribution of German and Jewish property”), as well as the nationalization of their industries and the closing of their schools, followed.63

 

The same processes of racial and ethnic discrimination followed against Ukrainians in Poland, Hungary and Romania, also well-established regions of mixed settlements. Romanian authorities drove German-speaking teachers and lecturers at universities out of the country. Even in Italy did discrimination, especially against German and Jewish organizations, follow.63

 

The Turkish treatment of Armenians also proves that genocide can occur in well-functioning mixed settlements with high rates of intermarriage between races and ethnic groups and mixed descendants. It is often regarded as the first modern genocide, dated 1915-1918, as it led to the extermination of 1.8 million Armenians. (The methods of the Turks were later used in the mass executions of the Jews in the 1930s to 1940s by the Nazis at Auschwitz and other murder camps).14,63,86,125

 

The persecution of Greeks in Turkey in 1923, also in well-functioning mixed settlements with intermarriages between ethnic groups and mixed descendants,  also led to mass murdering and more than 1.2 million Greeks being forced from their ancestral homes.14,63,125

 

The staggering scale of murder of other races, ethnic groups and even dissident Russians by Stalin in his Siberian murder camps – all people who lived in harmony with strong assimilation and miscegenation over long periods – become evident when considering that there were at least 25 million Soviet deaths during WW2. Of these 25 million, only 7.8 million were military deaths, the other 13.7 million deaths were victims of the German occupation. About 7.4 million were executed. The rest was Stalin’s work.14,63,118

 

Although the Germans played the dominant role in the genocide of the Jews, the atrocities during WW2 were not limited to Germany alone, but genocide was committed in many other European countries. It was a general phenomenon, mainly committed by the “superior, developed, intellectually and cultured Caucasian.” Genocide was not led by “a few local ruffians” in these European countries. It was executed on Jews by their neighbours of good standing and personal friends; all people with whom the Jews had lived together within stable mixed settlements. They were often people with the same mixed blood as the Jews.14,63,118

 

As much as roughly half of the male population in certain towns in Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Italy, Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, and France were involved in murdering people based on ethnicity.63,118

 

The above clearly shows that assimilation, even intermixed marriages, is not enough to safeguard a specific racial or an ethnic group’s future in a mixed settlement or in an assumed stable, cultural and educated new homeland against crimes of humanity and genocide. Afrikaner numbers are significantly less that the Jewish numbers before the start up of the genocide, making them much more identifiable and targetable.

 

Genocide is also not always committed by the uneducated and pre-modern human, but also by well-educated people. The Germans’ behaviour towards the Jews (and others) confirms this. Up to 1933 Germany had by far the best universities in the world, more than a quarter of all Nobel prizes awarded in sciences between 1901 and 1940 were awarded to Germans, compared to only 11% to the USA. It had one of most advanced educational system in the world and a political system that brought to power Adolf Hitler primarily by democratic means. Still, they failed the test of humanity.63,86

 

▲Cross-references: see subdivision 4.1.2 of this Part.

 

4.1.4.2 Afrikaners acceptance and willingness to assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks

 

Regarding the second question on the Afrikaner’s resistance to assimilation, it important to mention that assimilation between Whites and Blacks occurred by the 1830s, if not earlier. Some miscegenation surely took place at the Cape between settlers and Black slave women from Madagascar. Assimilation and miscegenation with the Malayans and Coloured People already started in 1652.8,30,41,57,58,59,64,87

Many Afrikaners still think of the differences between the different races as enormous, even though 90% of the country’s population share Christianity. Differences centre on class, customs, habits, traditions. These differences between Afrikaners and Blacks slowly start to diminish. The post-1994 political dispensation very successfully helped to erase it.4,126-129

 

A true hegemony of a United Rainbow Nation for the RSA, how tactfully we are ignoring and side-stepping a discussion of this daring issue is absent. Intensive racial assimilation or miscegenation by the Afrikaner with non-Whites, notwithstanding the Afrikaner’s own “contaminated blood-line” by his non-White parent stock, was just not reachable before 1994 and will not, it seems,  depending on certain positive political outcomes, be obtained easily for many decades to come. Especially the present-day older Afrikaners are not acceptable for it; their indoctrination by the NP, AB and DRC was just too long and too successful to make their mindsets changeable and acceptable. The South African History, starting in 1652, confirms this rigidity.42,86,127-129

 

On the other side is racial discrimination against the Whites by Blacks also prominent in the RSA and is been up-kept and is strength by certain prominent Blacks. Indeed, it is restarted every time before an election or when the ANC-regime fails the test of a responsible and trustworthy government. The end-result is the blocking of better relations between Afrikaners and Blacks.42,86,127-129

 

The present-day financial insecurity which the Afrikaners are experiencing in new South Africa is seen many times exclusively as a direct result of Black aggression and their alleged dislike and hatred for Afrikaners. It is argued that it activates counter-revenge from Afrikaners, resulting in the obstructing since 1994 of their assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks. This is not always a correct observation.  Afrikaners experienced similar, if not more extreme, financial insecurity after the Second Anglo Boer War and during their Anglisation immediatedly after 1910 in the Union. Poverty characterised the Afrikaners existence for a long time in the Union. The Poor White Problem in South Africa: Report by the Carnegie Commission in 1929/30 shows roughly 300 000 (16%) Afrikaners out of a total White South African population of 1.8 million were classified as “very poor”.130These outcomes were totally unrelated to Blacks actions (Indeed, the Black population suffered at that time three to for times more under “very poverty”). Blacks are surely not the primary reason for the financial insecurity of Afrikaner before or after 1994 and thus far not contributed to the Afrikaners reluctance to assimilate and misgenenate with Blacks. This reluctance seems to be must deeper seated in the psyche of the Afrikaners.130

 

The present-day political, social and personal insecurities which the Afrikaners are experiencing in new South Africa is also attributed many times to be the outcome of Black dislike and hatred for Afrikaners which are steered as planned hostile actions against Afrikaners. This alleged behaviour by Blacks, as with the Afrikaners financial insecurity, is argued to activate counter hostility in the mindsets of Afrikaners, leading to  their withdrawing from direct informal Black contact and cooperation. The end-result is argued, is the absence of assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks.  Again, this is not always the full truth. In the past, as with the Afrikaners’ financial suffering, there were many non-Black determinants also as primary role-players contributing to the political, social and personal insecurities of Afrikaners, coming over many years up to 1994, like the internalised disposition of racial discrimination and White supremacy in the mindsets of Afrikaners. On the other side it must be acknowledged that Black hatred and dislike for Afrikaners can play a role in some cases. Hostilities are undoubtedly driven and executed sometimes by ANC political delinquents. But this seemingly racial overture not seated in a general dislike or hatred for Afrikaners: it is a direct outcome of the ANC’s present-day internal power struggles and its slow dismantling as a liberation movement cum political party. This phenomenon of conflict is not new for Afrikaners and is indeed part of their own history. The Afrikaners’ internal politics in the 1930s and 1940s, especially when H F Verwoerd arrived on the scene and contaminated even the internal relations of pro-Nazi Afrikaners, reflected the same extreme instable characteristics inside the leadership of the Afrikaners for as a  certain time before calming down. This 1940s internal hostile energy as reflected by Afrikaners, spilled over not only to the Afrikaners in general, but also unasked to the other ethnic groups (Jews) as well as the Blacks, doing serious harm to racial relations. The Second World War strengthened the nationalist Afrikaners internal conflicts (precisely as conflict and hostility are now manifested inside the ANC by its instability as movement for all Blacks). As with the internal conflicts  now inside the ANC, the Afrikaners  hostile conflicts were not driven by political ideological differences but purely by Afrikaner leaders’ personal ambitions, corruptions and strive for self-empowerment,  turning on each other. This was especially extra-activated in the 1940s by the founding of extreme pro-Nazi Afrikaner groups like the Grey Shirts, the New Order, the Ossewabrandwag (OB) and the Stormjaers (A phenomenon in line with the actions of many in-house groups fighting, even murdering each other, in the present-day ANC). Verwoerd’s conflict with the pro-Nazi groups (notwithstanding his juridical declared status by Judge P A Mullin of the Supreme Court in 1941 as a propagandist for Nazism and thus partner to the same pro-Nazi thinking as the radical Stormjaers and other pro-Nazis groups) even led to two attempts to kidnap him (with the possibility to kill him) in 1941 and 1944 by his radical comrades.130 As said, these in-house Afrikaner conflicts in the 1940s generated hostile energy, comprehensive enough, to negatively effected at that time on a broad base racial relations. The ANC’s present hostile energy towards them is not a new experience for many of the older nationalist Afrikaners, it is much less serious than the Afrikaner press tries to portray it and is temporary..

 

The ANC, after 23 years of reign, shows serious signs of collapsing. This collapse and insecurity are not only presently prominent reflected in their extreme internal political behaviour by in fights around leadership and members, but is to a great extent also responsible for the temporary over spilling of this extraordinary hostile energy to the Afrikaners, making their social assimilation and racial miscegenation with Blacks undoubtedly very difficult. However, after the 2019 General Election, the selecting of new ANC leaders in harmony with each other and possible constructive new Black political directions on government, the situation can normalised, neutralising this hostile energy, as had happened with the Afrikaners in 1940s. To assume thus that the present-day political, social and personal insecurity which the Afrikaners are experiencing in new South Africa is a new experience for them or is a direct Black dislike and hate for Afrikaners and is of a permanent kind, is not always correct. This insecurity is much related to the nationalists Afrikaners loss of their bullying rights of Blacks before 1994.The Black public has very much goodwill towards Afrikaners and most of the hostility against Afrikaners is activated by a small group of extremists inside the ANC who lost very fast their position as soon as the ANC’s internal politics stabilised and common sense triumph. In such a case the opportunity for better relations between the ANC’s elite and the Afrikaners will surely follows. Depending of the 2019 General Election’s outcomes can the general political, personal and financial circumstances of Afrikaners dramatically bettered from 2020 , helping to activate the long overdue social assimilation and racial miscegenation between Blacks and Afrikaners.130

 

■Assimilation as well as miscegenation took place at the Cape between White settlers and Black slave women from Madagascar, Malayans and Coloured People and is ongoing till today, although sometimes on a  reserved level. The 1994 dispensation and the freeing of Blacks and Afrikaners from the apartheid’s shackles gives immense support to much deeper assimilation between the South African races while miscegenation seems also to gain field. With the Afrikaner’s growth in independence from his previous nationalist volks capturing and “pure White blood” ideology, as well as his today’s more willingness to accept South African indigenous realities, it can be expected that his assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks will undoubtedly increase. How much it can be denied by the NP-AB inner circle today, were assimilation and miscegenation not two of the main intentions of their  1994 bloodless coup d’ état ?8,30,4144,,57,58,59,64,87,126-129

In Brazil, the majority of the population was Black and still in slavery at the time of independence (To a certain extent very much in line with the suppression of the apartheid system). As citizens socialized, racial classification diminished fast. Intermarriage was not frowned upon Today the result is a Brazilian population that may well be the most successfully integrated ethnic mix in the world.14,126-129

 

The same path of success as in Brazil can follows in South Africa. It is possible that full assimilation and miscegenation of Afrikaners with Blacks may occur in 100 years or less. But in this assimilation and miscegenation there are many risks for the Afrikaners if the country decays politically and financially. Fast and dramatic changes in ethnic and racial tolerance, as happened with the Jews in Europe in the 1940s, can bring immense suffering to the Afrikaner’s mixed-race descendants, notwithstanding that they are natives of South Africa.

 

  1.  Conclusion

 

For the political scientist interested in the Afrikaner as a human being, especially his thinking and entrenched ideas on apartheid, is it important to look at both their past and present. The eminent historian, JM Roberts, says14, p.xi: “Historical inertia is easily under-rated. This is not just a matter of what we see. Ruins and beefeaters are picturesque, but for the most part less important than much mental and institutional history lost to sight in the welter of day-to-day events”. The aim of the series of seven articles was to offer an overview of that part of Afrikaner history that is hidden from plain sight.

 

This study reveals that many Afrikaners have shown much goodwill and have sincerely attempted to accept Black rule since 1994. These Afrikaners show great willingness to become part of the greater indigenous South Africa, leaving behind racial discrimination. Although most Black citizens have been willing to forgive the Afrikaners for apartheid, the ANC elite clearly intends to implement a policy of discrimination against Afrikaners. This has started to intensify in the last few years, possibly with grave consequences for Afrikaners as citizens.

 

Efforts at reconciliation in 1994 failed all South Africans, reawakening racial conflict with Afrikaners as the focal point. At the moment, Afrikaners being targeted for revenge. Central to this is the Afrikaner’s unforgiveable history: “The past hangs around longer and is more difficult to keep peacefully buried, even by strenuous efforts, than we believe”, warns Roberts14,p.1109 with respect to this hidden danger. Afrikaners are not free from a negative memory of their experiences with Blacks, pre-1994 and post-1994. A re-emerging of a negative Afrikaner-memory spells disaster for Afrikaners as well as Blacks, especially in the activating of revenge and counter-revenge.  

 

The Afrikaner has insufficient knowledge of his own past. The doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism left very little space for the recognition of the many faults in their past. It is time for the Afrikaner to confront the good as well as the bad in their history, not only to understand their past and present behaviour, but also as guideline for the future. Good can come from knowing the bad of the past, but this requires an honest and comprehensive analysis and valuation of history. Only a true and objective evaluation of their history can reveal their identity and place in the future South Africa.8,27,94

 

The “Afrikaner question” is a complex issue that rests on fact as much as on myth, hidden determinants and dark dispositions. Anti-Afrikaners offer many over-simplifications of these determinants and dispositions. It is a “problem” as complex as that of the Jewish Palestinian. No one scholar, historian, sociologist, theologian or politician can give a simple and final summary or solution. Opinions on the Afrikaner matter must be treated with a good measure of scepticism. The ANC elite is tragically relying on spreading misinformation on Afrikaners, while treating them the same as the Palestinians are being treated and the Jews were treated.63,68-71

 

Statistics show that in 30 to 60 years there may only be between 100 000 and one million “pure” Afrikaners left in South Africa and in 2117 possible less than 20 000. The small number of 20 000 will not be the result of genocide or even migration, but of the normal process of natural extinction.

 

Will the descendants of today’s Afrikaners really care about being Afrikaners two to three generations from now? Would they perhaps preferred to be happy Australian-, Chinese-Creole-, half-caste-, hybrid, mulatto-, or simply South African bastards? Are the constant political efforts and fights for rights and existence and the worries and fears about Afrikaners and their future in South Africa really justified and worthwhile? Will the Afrikaners of 2117 know what a “koeksister” or “volkspele” are or will they hear about it for the first time when they read of it in an old article of the year 2017?There seems  to be an overall doubt, meaning  the answer is an undisputed NO. Very few of the Afrikaner’s descendants are going to care about their Afrikaner heredity.

 

Afrikaners must urgently consider how they want to address their present personal and political threats, dangers and challenges under the ANC regime and as citizens of South Africa. Several options are available. Constructive and wise individually thought and action are pertinent. Some Afrikaners will find the selection of an option easy, for other it will be difficult, while some will never decide in their lifetimes. Every Afrikaner’s needs and visions are unique: each individual has to journey into the future. Time is running out. As reflected from this study the year 2017 is the time for thinking, planning, and deeds for Afrikaners, but their actions must be extraordinary and correct. There have been too many mistakes in their past to expect leniency or a chance if they fail again. Palkhivala53, p.129 warns: “In the affairs of nations, as in the affairs of men, there is a providential margin of error; you may take wrong turns at the crossroads, misuse time, take gold for dross and dross for gold, and yet somehow stumble along to your destination. But the margin and period of permissible error need to be carefully watched. You overstep them at your peril”.

 

The human rights author Raoul Martinez131, p.381 emphasises that South African Blacks and Afrikaners must remember that social and personal changes are not: “… something that we get done ‘out there’ simply by changing laws and procedures. Whatever rights are granted whatever procedures are in place, social systems are brought to life by the people who participate in them. The attempt to increase control over our lives and produce outcomes we value is inextricable from the attempt to deepen our understanding and develop our character. Ultimately, this is a moral challenge. We are the timber from which the future will be constructed – the stronger the timber, the more solid the construction.” Martinez131, pp. 381-382brings Blacks and Afrikaners before an easily challenge in this context: “Every human being inevitably suffers hardship, loses loved ones and, some day, passes away. Life is rare, delicate and short. Given all this, why would we not join together to do what we can, for the brief time we have air in our lungs and strength in our bodies, to transform this world into a place of joy and wonder for all those passing through – a place where all can flourish, contribute and create? After all, it is only through the creation of what we deeply value that we find the fullest expression of our freedom. And what could be more valuable than that?”

 

Every Afrikaner should decide on their own an immediate path as an individual. Each must decide on lifestyle changes and strategies, but to postpone a final decision can be fatal. No one else can take this decision. The author of this article can only point out the various options and risks, nothing more.

 

The only consolation for Afrikaners in their present visitation is that if dissolution sweeps away the last Afrikaner, the Herodotus curse on the Afrikaner will also be broken. It will then be time for their conquerors and executors to inherit the curse and to be ravaged. Only time will tell if the ill fate of dissolution awaits the Afrikaner.

 

The year 2017 is the time for options, deeds and more deeds by the Afrikaners about their future. But they must remember that the virtue of deeds lies in completing them (Arabian Proverb).

 

 

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  1.  Kenney H. Verwoerd: Architect of Apartheid. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball; 2016.
  2.   Martinez R. Creating Freedom.London: Canongate; 2016.

 

PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned. Externally peer reviewed.

 

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

 

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Arts, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa.

Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe only a century away? Part 3: Present and past determinants and role players in the establishment and continuation of perceptions of injustice in the mindsets of Afrikaners

Gabriel Louw

 

Research Associate, Focus Area Transformation, Faculty of Arts,

Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

 

                                                                     RESEARCH

 

Corresponding Author:

Prof Dr GP Louw

Focus Area Social Transformation

Faculty of Arts

Potchefstroom Campus

North-West University

South Africa

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

 

Ensovoort volume 37(2017), number 10:1

 

                                                                    ABSTRACT

 

Keywords:

Apartheid, Afrikaanse, Afrikaner, ANC regime, assimilation, Boer, Burgher, Calvinistic, Cape Dutch, civilisation, conflict, discrimination, dissolution, ethnicity, genocide, Herodotus curse, doctrine, internalize, miscegenation, non-White, parent stock, proto-Afrikaner, Protestantism, race, racism, violence, White.

Background

Schlemmer relates the following incident that aptly captures the problem addressed in this article1, p. 7: “At a press conference held in Dakar, Senegal during the July 1987 visit by a number of South Africans to meet the ANC (African National Congress) representatives, a senior ANC member took exception to a remark by a South African academic that ‘apartheid’ had developed over centuries of South African history. Whether this was true or not, the ANC member retorted, one should not let the apartheid government ‘off the hook’ ”.

The Schlemmer1 quotation illustrates two things, namely who the culprits were that created apartheid and the fact that there was a history that resulted in apartheid. First, no-one in South Africa, not even the ‘culprits’ who created apartheid, the Afrikaners, deny that the Whites in South Africa for many years dominated and discriminated against the Blacks: politically, economically, socially and culturally. Apartheid at its height was sustained by a certain class of Afrikaners and the connections they had among them. Its structure was upheld by political, economical, social and cultural institutions and bureaucracies that were controlled and run by Afrikaner men and women from this social class. Even during apartheid, not all Afrikaners dominated and discriminated against Blacks to them same extent, although they were all complicit. Vilakazi explains this poignantly when he says2, p. 43: “Some Afrikaners exercise domination directly and harshly; other exercise it still directly, but more ‘pleasantly’ and ‘kindly’; some exercise it indirectly, but still harshly; while still others exercise it indirectly, with sophistication and even ‘friendship’ for Blacks. All this depends on the class backgrounds of the Whites concerned, and the institutions within which they make their living within the huge edifice of racial domination. The distinctions later give rise to differences in political orientations – to conservatives, liberals, radicals, etc.”

It is clear from the above that apartheid was practice by all “social classes” in the Afrikaner grouping, with the emphasis on the leadership and the ordinary citizens who identified as nationalist Afrikaners as represented by their membership of the National Party (NP), the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) and the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC).3-8

The last part of the 1987 comment of the ANC senior member, as quoted by Schlemmer, namely that1, p. 7: “one should not let the apartheid government ‘off the hook’”, is completely justified. This remark should have added “one should not let the apartheid government, and all the ordinary nationalist Afrikaners and members of the NP-AB-DRC off the hook.” All the various social groups within the larger Afrikaner grouping are guilty of the practice of apartheid, as Vilakatzi2 also argues. They all benefited, either directly or indirectly, and they were all role players in this system, however much some try to hide behind an array of excuses. This collective responsibility is a fact and is accepted by the majority of Afrikaners today. It is within this broad context of collective responsibility that Blacks today tend to label all Afrikaners as participants in apartheid and as the people at whom they direct their revenge for apartheid since 1994 (successfully one might add). This outcome of “collective guilt” shared by all Afrikaners has been used since 1994 to drive the ANC regime’s unspoken policy of revenge on Afrikaners for apartheid specifically and for all the ANC’s own governmental failures in general. This revenge has an immense impact on the way Afrikaners think about the Blacks’ political behaviour, views and intentions. It only serves to strengthen their entrenched feelings about injustices done to them through racial and ethnic discrimination and domination in the past. There are now new added experiences of injustices done to them by the Blacks.1,2,9,10

The dynamic described above re-activates a set of behaviours that was instilled and entrenched in proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners over many years, namely discrimination against Blacks based on colour. [Part 2 of this series discusses how this negative racial behaviour was instilled in Afrikaners and strengthening as “appropriate” and “correct” due to negative examples and experiences]. The immediate question at this stage is: what motivates and drives this sort of behaviour? In this context it seems that the cause of this learned and internalized behaviour is the perception of injustices done to him. This idea can stay passive and can be ignored, but it leads to counter-actions to revenge or defence in the form of various forms and levels of discriminative racial behaviour. The intention of this study is to research and describe the determinants and role players in the establishment and continuation of a perception of injustice in the mindset of the Afrikaner.

The second important point to note in Schlemmer’s1 quote is the reference to the history of Apartheid. Was the South African academic correct to remark at the Dakar meeting of 1987 that “‘apartheid’ had developed over centuries of South African history,” 1, p. 7 or is this a myth without any facts to prove it? In the post-1994 political rhetoric, very little attention is given to this controversy and to the possible negative impact of long-term exposure to undesirable behaviour and experiences on the development of the Afrikaner’s propensity to discriminate. Schlemmer makes the following comment1, p. 8: “Archetypal apartheid was developed to its epitome in the period under Verwoerd. It represented a brutal, massive but almost heroic attempt on the part of the then ethnically solidary National Party of the time to secure a correspondence between nation and territory for whites by imposing an order much more incisive than race segregation,” Such statements have led to a denial of an earlier history. Schlemmer’s1 focuses exclusively on 1960 to 1994. Discussions like this completely ignore the immense negative impact of the history before apartheid on the racist behaviours of the, sometimes unwilling, proto-Afrikaner and later Afrikaner as participants in the system. This point of view is used selectively by some subjective researchers and poorly informed politicians to justify the new South Africa’s over-emphasis on political correctness. It has led to superficial arguments and myths that apartheid is a recent phenomenon created only by nationalist Afrikaners. It also brings to the foreground allegations that the Afrikaners’ racial attitudes are pathological and set, ignoring the effect of external influences on behaviour learning and the reinforcement of problematic behaviour. Research that denies a history that culminated in apartheid fits well with the post-1994 political and emotional rhetoric, especially since any consideration or discussion of history by Black politicians seem to be fixated on the period of Grand Apartheid (1960–1994) for obvious political gain. This “conscious” amnesia is understandable and is also reflected in the “selective” amnesia of Black politicians about their catastrophic and barbarous “Black apartheid” and “Black genocide” between 1810 and 1840 in South Africa.1,2,10,11

The fact is that White racial domination and discrimination against Blacks have a long history, dating from the early Cape Colonists up to the proto-Afrikaners and culminating in the modern-day Afrikaner’s history. Historically, social-cum-racial class differentiation already took shape in 1671 at the Cape Settlement. Whites were favoured and the other races were subjected to discrimination. This differentiation and resulting discrimination continued throughout the centuries, creating a generally unfavourable position for all darker races in the broader society. It started in 1671 and sometimes had the same devastating consequences for non-Whites, if not more, than grand apartheid. However, apartheid can comfortably be criticized in the modern idiom of human rights violations and it is very easily pinpointed as the root of all evil in South Africa. The proto-Afrikaners were and the Afrikaners are still part of this ongoing history of apartheid that started in 1671. A focused study is needed to understand the ordinary Afrikaner’s ideas on race and the reasons why they supported, subscribed to, and practiced apartheid for so many years. Such a study should steer clear of the current political and emotional rhetoric. Such a study will also open the door for insight into and an evaluation of the Afrikaner’s perception that many kinds of injustices have been and are being committed against him (and this leads to their inclination to racial discrimination). 3-8

Although this article does not delve into the history of apartheid, specific and direct historical causes are noted. (The history was already fully described in Part 2 of the series: Historical determinants and role players in the establishment and maintenance of racial discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners. Its subdivision 3.1.1: Negative ethnic and racial influences of the Early Cape authorities, is relevant to this article). From this history it is clear that apartheid has a long historical development in which the proto-Afrikaner, and even to a certain extent also the Afrikaner, were not initially volunteers, but victims themselves. They too were subjected to a bad and inappropriate socio-political system that was forced on them involuntary. The proto-Afrikaner and Afrikaner were not only exposed to bad racial examples that became entrenched in Afrikaners over time, but that they also experienced immensely negative consequences as a direct outcome of infringements perpetrated against them. These negative experiences became entrenched as an obsession with the injustices they suffered. Not only did these ideas lead to racist behaviours, but they also reinforced established racism and behaviours of revenge. Part 2 concludes that Afrikaners hold the specific belief that injustices were not only done to them in the past, but are being done to them today. It is therefore important to know how this perception of injustices took root in the mindset of Afrikaners.3-8, 12

The intention of this article is to study and analyse the present and past negative determinants and role players in the establishment and reinforcement of a perception of injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners.

  • This article is the third in a series of seven. The seven articles represent the following research topics:1) Who is the Afrikaner? 2) Historical determinants and role players in the establishment and maintenance of racial discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 3) Present and past  determinant and role players in the establishment and continuation of perceptions of injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 4) The Afrikaners’ failure to understand, accept and become intertwined in the indigenous realities of South Africa; 5) The vicious cycle of revenge and counter-revenge around apartheid; 6) Preparedness and comprehensiveness of post-1994 rescue actions; 7) 2017 is the year for thinking, planning and action.
  • The overarching aim of the study is to determine the position of the Afrikaner in the year 2117.

Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method aims to build a viewpoint based on evidence as the evidence becomes clearer throughout the research. This approach is used in modern historical research where there is a lack of an established library, as is the case with the topic of the Afrikaner’s current and future position in South Africa. The databases used were EBSCOHost, Sabinet Online. Sources included articles from 2016 to 2017, books for the period 1944 to 2017, and newspapers for the period 2016 to 2017. These sources were used to reflect on the Afrikaners and to put thought trends, views and opinions on the Afrikaners in perspective.13-15

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

  1. Results and discussion

3.1 General perspective

Many Afrikaners argue that their living standard is deteriorating in the new South Africa due to job discrimination and unemployment resulting from Affirmative Action (AA), Employment Equity (EE) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Afrikaners are experiencing more general poverty. There are frequent murders, especially of farmers. This comes in addition to various other social, economical and political discriminations. Political rhetoric, public objections and court cases to protect Afrikaner interests are common. This discriminative Black behaviour has two decisive effects on the Afrikaners’ racial attitudes and inclinations: the reinforcement of established racism and the development of new negative racial attitudes. Fundamental to both these developments is the belief that an injustice is being done to them at present, as was the case in the past. They are experiencing hostile and hurtful behaviour that they believe is undeserved and inappropriate. The perception of injustice is in turn founded on a belief that revenge is an appropriate action.16-24

What is shocking about the post-1994 Afrikaner thought pattern is the lack of insight into the enormous social, economical, political and personal backlash for the Afrikaner in the new South Africa. The anti-Afrikaner attitudes of the ANC regime is nothing else than Black apartheid. It is to be expected when considering history. This reaction by Blacks must be understood in terms of the cruel legacy of White apartheid. Blacks had to endure an extremely negative political environment and lifestyle, not for decades, but for centuries. It was an inhumane setup that Schlemmer1, p. 8describes as a “brutal, massive order much more incisive than race segregation.” The pseudo-peace and the seemingly normal continuation of life immediately after 1994 faded fast with the NP and AB losing power and the increasingly aggressive ANC government. A significant sector of Blacks feels that the dispensation that started in 1994 did not punish the Afrikaners adequately for their mistakes.  Initially the retreating leadership of the NP and AB promised a new and happy South Africa forever. This was an effort to appease the Afrikaners for the moment. Enormous changes awaited the Afrikaners, unbeknownst to them. For many years the NP-AB-DRC leaders concealed the fact that Afrikaners will face an unfriendly environment where they are stripped of their previous White apartheid empowerments and benefits. Some Afrikaners miss the fact that they are now dependent on themselves and on forming small groups. The formal guiding patrons have all disappeared. They are in this “alone” and they are in a hostile environment where they are subjected to “Black Discrimination,” more and more, making any appeal on their rights very difficult. The new and serious injustices against them seem to be gathering momentum.

The Afrikaners at present simply do not have the political power to stand up to the more dominant ANC at any level to ensure their future. The general attitude of the Black society is becoming more hostile. First, the current Afrikaner population of less than 3 million and the negative annual growth of approximately -0.1% from 1960 to 2011 shows that they are indeed a much less influential racial, ethnic and political pressure group than they would admit, especially compared to a Black population of more than 55 million and an approximate annual growth of +1.5% for 2009 to 2014. The decline in the is becoming more rapid, so much so that experts, supported by statistics, predict that the Afrikaners can disappear from the South African scene in 30 to 60 years. The disproportionate racial distribution and accompanying lack of political power largely explain the growing disrespect and discriminatory attitude of the ANC and their followers towards the Afrikaners since 1994. This is an attitude that can intensify in the future, bringing more injustice to the door of the Afrikaners.23,25-29

Second, it would be incorrect to see the attitude and behaviour of the ANC and the Blacks in general towards the Afrikaners as based only on the Afrikaners’ diminished political position as a White minority, which makes them an easy target. It goes much deeper: an age-old hatred has been activated after extreme suffering due to racial discrimination and apartheid. Blacks and other racial groups in South Africa suffered psychologically, politically and economically at the hand of proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners. The negative reactions to and behaviours towards the Afrikaners from the side of the ANC and the other racial groups in South Africa originate from the Herodotus Rules that guide good governance. Afrikaners as rulers blindly and arrogantly ignored these rules in the heyday of apartheid.6,19,30,31

An understanding of these rules will aid in an understanding of today’s “Black Apartheid,” as practiced by the ANC through policies such as AA, EE and BEE [knowing in the USA as Minority Procurement, which in South African implies Majority Procurement or Majority Affirmative Action] and through other racial discriminations against the Afrikaners. It will also provide Afrikaners with some insight into how counter-productive and fatal it is to see these Black discriminative actions against them as justifying counter racial discrimination and actions to balance out the injustices.

Modern Afrikaners only became victims of “Black apartheid” after 1994. They are exposed to experiences that make them feel as if injustices are being committed against them. In actual fact, they got off scot-free after the Black discrimination between 1948 and 1994. However, it is important to note that the proto-Afrikaners from the early 1700s up to 1902 and the Afrikaners from 1902 up to 1948 experienced numerous forms of domination and discrimination against them. This instilled a mentality of being subject to injustice. These current and past experiences of injustices are and were strong determinants in inspiring new and reinforcing old negative racial attitudes amongst Afrikaners, leading to further racial discrimination in the new South Africa.3-8

3.1.1 The Herodotus Rules for good governance and respect

More than 2 500 years ago, the ancient historian Herodotus formulated six rules for good governance. In his view, these rules guarantee a revenge-free country of peace for current and future generations. These six rules provide an excellent explanation of the attitudes of the ANC towards the Afrikaners since 1994.30,31

Herodotus reasoned that any ruler should adhere to six rules to stay in power, to lead a long and happy life as a ruler and to prevent reprisals and retaliation against him and his descendants and followers from aggrieved subordinates or conquered groups and their descendants. The six rules that a ruler should underwrites, practices and respect are31:

  1. Always act with fairness and wisdom towards one’s subjects;
  2. Empower each individual politically, legally, socially, and economically;
  3. Do not favour or put certain individuals or oneself above others;
  4. Act with self-control at all times;
  5. Do not be self-enriching at the expense of one’s subjects, and
  6. Given the power of a ruler, avoid and be free of power mismanagement and emotional and physical exploitation, abuse and misuse of one’s subjects.

In practice, these six rules come down to the following: 1). history repeats itself; and 2). that the contraventions of these rules create hatred that spells tragedy for culprits, even after many centuries had passed.31

The Herodotus Rules acknowledges that the innocent are sometimes punished for the failures and shortcomings of their ancestors (much in line with the Mafia of Sicily’s habit to take revenge on families even after many generations have passed, whether the new generation is guilty or not). A poignant example is the genocide of the Jews in Europe during WW2 because their ancestors were falsely identified as financial and political exploiters by the local citizens of the countries to which they had migrated. In reality, these locals merely failed to be competitive, trained and skilled so that they could be successful in their businesses and professional lives.31,33

The various Afrikaner regimes since 1910, especially those between 1948 and 1994, transgressed all six the Herodotus rules. The current inaccessibility and hostility of the ANC and the Blacks are predictable political, psychological and pathological responses within the framework of the Herodotus philosophy of 1) misrule by the ruler and 2) undeserved punishment for the innocent victim, 3) injustice done to the victim and 4) revenge by the victim for the misruling of the ruler and injustice done.31 The Afrikaner has in the minds of the Blacks been sentenced to long-term political and personal, social and economical “imprisonment” in South Africa for contravening the Herodotus rules, whether the individual Afrikaner is guilty or not. This is the result of the proto-Afrikaner and Afrikaner’s political, socio-economical and inhumane misconduct as a ruler over many years. 31

The Afrikaner should blame themselves and the failed Afrikaner leadership that they elected to act on their behalf for this penalty. The tragedy is that this “sentence” is a logical and expected historically outcome the Afrikaner seems not to understand, to have expected, or to know how to counter. The retaliation according to the Herodotus rules affects all modern Afrikaners and its youth, even though many of them were not part of the practice of apartheid. Many Blacks feel that they may take revenge for apartheid, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the current generation. This, in terms of the Herodotus rules, starts a new cycle where Afrikaners experience their society as unjust, triggering further negative attitudes towards Blacks.3-8

3.2 Current injustices committed against Afrikaners

3.2.1 The long-term punitive intentions of the ANC and the continuation of injustices

The ANC’s revenge clearly entails more than just a short-term punishment of the Afrikaners for apartheid in terms of the Herodotus Rules. It is aimed at the total expulsion, psychologically and physically, of the Afrikaner (although hidden and mostly denied publically) from the country as an ethnic racial group or at totally isolating them from the educational, economic and cultural mainstream. (This is a properly orchestrated exercise and reminds one of the Afrikaner’s own expulsion of Blacks from central South Africa to various Bantu homelands under the Malan/Strydom/Verwoerd regimes. These actions show the negative effect of the Herodotus Rules in justified revenge). 3-8,31

Several factors favour the ANC in its adventure of a long-term punishment for the Afrikaner. These negative factors include the negative population growth of the Afrikaner, the Afrikaner’s fear of residential and farm murders, increasing White poverty and job discrimination, fear of radical economical transformation and White capital and land capture, the closing down of Afrikaner institutions like schools and universities, disrespect for Afrikaans as a national language, political confusion and a loss of sovereignty that is casting many Afrikaners out of the governing system. This ongoing racial and ethnic victimization and discrimination against the Afrikaners, especially as a “colonial” minority group, influence many to eventually leave their birth and/or adopted homeland. This is evident from the fact that nearly 1.2 million (30%) Afrikaners left South Africa in the last 20 years since 1995, while a further 35% (1.35 million) also wish to emigrate in the near future.25-27

The punitive intentions of the ANC regime was and is exacerbated by the fact that most Afrikaners decided to radically oppose the ANC after 1994, openly showing their distrust, hostility and aggression against Black rule and a Black majority government. This negativism was not only exhibited towards the ANC as a political party, but frequently towards the Black majority in general. In retrospect this decision seems to have been a fatal error in terms of planning their future, as was the introduction of apartheid. It seems as if the proto-Afrikaners and the Afrikaners are inclined to saddle the “wrong political horses” over and over. This fatal decision in 1994 terminated all possible sympathy and support for the Afrikaners by the Black majority and any hope of a future intimate partnership with and support of the ANC or one of the other Black political parties. The fear of and reaction against Blacks and Black rule, entrenched in Afrikaners over many centuries, and the actions to counter-act any endangerment of their interests, only strengthened the resolve of the ANC and the Blacks. They are themselves driven by the injustices done to them by the Afrikaners. They want to apply the Rules of Herodotus to the Afrikaners.30,31

The ancient historical work of John Moschos34 (The Spiritual Meadow) and the modern historical works of William Dalrymple30 (A Journey in the Shadow of Byzantium), Ryszard Kapuściński31(Travel with Herodotus) and that of Niall Ferguson33(The World at War), illustrate how these counter-discriminations as revenge for injustices and wrong-doings (and much in line with the current revenges of the ANC on the Afrikaners) take the form of expulsions and deadly annihilations globally from ancient times to modern times.

Good examples of such expulsions and annihilations are those of the Christian Armenians and Suniani in Islamic Turkey and the Christian Greeks in Islamic Egypt between 1900 and today. It is also echoed in the destruction of 210 Armenian monasteries, 700 convents and churches and 1 639 parish churches from 1914 in Eastern Turkey (total: 2 549 buildings). Sixty years later, in 1974, only 449 (18%) of the buildings were still in use by active members. The Suniani tribe in Eastern Turkey decreased from nearly 200 000 in the 1900s, to 70 000 in 1920, 4 000 in 1990 and only 900 in 1998. The expulsion also happened to the Greeks in Egypt. In the 1900s they were 200 000, in 1988 they were 5 000 and in 1998, only 500.30,31

The eradication of the Armenian identity started in Turkey with the replacement of the names of their towns and streets with Turkish names. This was followed by the destruction of Armenian cemeteries, even tombstones, and the conversion of their churches into mosques. The Armenians who did not move house, were forced to adopt Turkish and Islam names for survival.30,31

The Afrikaners have also experienced 1994 similar punitive actions against them. They are losing traditional work opportunities in the civil services, at tertiary institutions and business enterprises. The policies of AA, BEE and EE are intensified almost on a daily basis, while their educational institutions are being “Africanised”. The boundaries of their personal, political, economical and social environments are deliberately transgressed. They are threatened with the capture of capital and land without compensation. There is a growing rhetoric to take arms against Whites who resist the radical transformation, the names of traditional Afrikaner villages, towns and cities have been replaced with Black names. The same is happening with the names of streets and public buildings with Afrikaner names. They are also targeted in terms of criminality in their daily lives.21,22,35,36

The above injustices to Afrikaners are growing, putting them in conflict with the ANC and the Black population more and more. However, their political and military empowerment is zero, making it impossible for them to do anything constructive. These threats (and powerlessness of Afrikaners) create a vicious circle of constant experiences of abuses and maltreatments in many different areas of their lives. Afrikaners experience these actions as injustices. An important development that Afrikaners seem to deny is the reality that the intensity and number of assumed injustices will increase fast from 2017. The other point that Afrikaners seem to miss is that these injustices they are experiencing at the hand of the ANC are equal to the injustices that they measured out indiscriminately to Blacks over many years. This leaves the question if they can claim that these injustices are wrong and whether they are not “justified” revenge in terms of the Herodotus Rules. Is the Afrikaner not just over-sensitive and selfish about upholding their assumed Afrikaner rights and their false belief in their racial supremacy, thing that do not really fit into a modern democracy? 21,22,35,36

Ignoring the possible merits of revenge as a point of discussion, it is clear that these assumed maltreatments by the ANC government and politicians have an immensely negative impact on Afrikaners, specifically on their perception of the integrity and trustworthiness of Blacks as a race and the feeling that it is impossible to live side by side in a civilized manner in South Africa. The direct outcome is that the Afrikaners entrenched ideas of racial discrimination and injustices are strengthened, instead of fading away. The foundation is being laid for new negative racial cognitions and new injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners.10,21,22,35,36

3.2.2 The future dilemmas of the Afrikaner in South Africa in terms of citizenship

In South Africa, apart from the shocking farm murders, extreme radical and massive ethnic and racial aggressions and unrests have thankfully been avoided thus far. If the increasing xenophobic behaviour against foreign fellow-Africans, the recent unrests at Coligny and Lichtenburg against Afrikaners’ property and lives, the increasingly radical speeches of the ANC regime and other Black political leaders and political parties and the open disregard for the Constitution and the judicial authority and system are taken into account, the Afrikaners can expect radical aggression in the near future. The official calls by the ANC and other Black role players for radical economical transformation and the capture of White capital, land and property especially sound warning bells. The consequences can be massive injustices to the Afrikaners in the near future, leading to an escalation in negative racial attitudes and reactive behaviour by the Afrikaners to counter the growing injustices against them. This can even end in physical conflict, an outcome that will spell genocide for the disempowered Afrikaners. What is clear at this stage is that the Afrikaners are certainly not exempt from more emotional and physical aggression in the future, a fact that they must seriously consider.16,18,22,36-41

The growing need for basic resources and the intense competition for it to counter dire poverty among South African Blacks is being ignored by politicians. It is a possible stimulus for conflict with and the maltreatment of the Afrikaners and could result in further negative experiences that they can see as injustices to them. Up to 1994 the Blacks, as competitors of the Afrikaners, were comprehensively nullified on all levels by the rules of the apartheid. The immense poverty of Blacks and their dire life circumstances was psycho-pathologically ignored by the Afrikaner regime. With specific racially discriminative planning, it was even intentionally aggravated. After 1994, the Afrikaners, stripped of their many privileges and economical manipulation, became equal competitors with the impoverish masses of Blacks. In the new South Africa the ANC’s AA, EE and BEE did not at all help the approximately 70% of the total Black population out of their tragic poverty. This situation is making the competition for sources and support systems extraordinary intense, especially when the race factor comes into play. 16,18,22,36-41

The dire state of need in which many Blacks in South Africa still live can possibly lead to further disempowerment of Afrikaners in an effort to eliminate the competition. The continuous poverty of the mass of Black can at the same time lead to physical aggression and genocide of the Afrikaners. This kind of scapegoat behaviour had tragic consequences for the Jews in Europe in the 1930s and the Belgium population in the Congo in the 1960s, basically because of the large-scale poverty of the indigenous people and their inability to escape from it immediately. On the other hand the mob oratories and instigations by German and Belgium Black politicians and leaders respectively to act against Jews and Congolese Whites to rectify alleged injustices of the past through the capture of Jewish and White capital and property undoubtedly drove the impoverished Germans and Africans of Belgium to murder and genocide. A critical perspective shows that the impoverished position of South African Blacks do not differ much from the Germans of the 1930s or the Belgium Blacks of 1960 in the Congo.33,42,43

The current estimated 350 000 to 400 000 poor Whites in South Africa and up to 150 000 Afrikaners struggling for survival (when evaluated in terms of the present value of the South Africa rand and the immense constant increases in the prices of foodstuffs and living costs in 2016, this can even be an underestimation), is of secondary importance in conflict activation. It is no comparison to the masses of non-Whites living below the poverty line. The extreme poverty of non-White groups in South Africa can stimulate direct conflict between Blacks and Whites to such a degree that it can result genocide. In this regard it is estimated (which is an underestimation) that as many as 29 236 632 Blacks (73.0%), 2 175 417 Coloureds (48.1%) and 150 409 (11.8%) Indians live in poverty. The official statistics, which reflects that only 26.6% of the population is unemployed, is misleading when one considers that only 42.8% of the total population is employed in some way and that the youth unemployment is 53.7%, of whom most are Blacks (this means that 57.2% of the total South African population are not in employment and as much as only 46.3% of the youths are employed). To expect that only 6 million middle class Blacks and their new-found wealth would counter future revolt and anarchy is wishful thinking. Any strategist who specializes in political and social conflict, revolution and genocide would confirm that these statics describe a huge time bomb waiting to explode. It is a recipe for human disaster that would overshadow all the current moans of injustice against the Afrikaners.3,4,42,44-48

A prominent question at this stage for the less than 3 million Afrikaners who are struggling at present to get political, social, economical and ethnic recognition and to maintain their unique culture and ways of living, is what will happen 100 years from now in 2117 to a very insignificant minority group of Afrikaners under an authoritarian ANC or other Black regime or an otherwise overwhelming, totally impoverished Black majority in South Africa?

If the expulsions of the Greeks and Suniani from their adopted homelands over 100 years are taken as guidelines, there will only between 10 000 and 20 000 “pure” Afrikaners left in South Africa in 2117, as opposed to an estimated 100 plus million Black people with their own political, economic and cultural attitudes and lifestyles. If the constant population decline among Afrikaners is used as another guideline, the chance is good that there will be between 300 000 and 1 million Afrikaners left in 2047 and fewer than 10 000 “pure” Afrikaners in South Africa in 2117.30,49

Afrikaners should realize that the injustices – true or false, justified or unjustified – done by the ANC government and its Black partners, will increase and become more complex and directed. To revenge or to rectify these injustices through direct military, public or private actions, will be impossible for the declining Afrikaners. The end result can be terrorist actions, a path followed by minority groups worldwide, like in Northern Ireland, Syria and Turkey, sometimes with tragic outcomes.

3.3 Past injustices to the Afrikaner▼

To see the 1994 dispensation and its current negative outcomes as the second “Slagtersnek” in Afrikaner history and as a doomsday in their lives, is wrong. The proto-Afrikaners and the later Afrikaners went through at least two other “Slagternek” incidents before, challenging their future as a population in South Africa. Over many years they have became very familiar with the abuse of power by hostile authorities and what it means to stay upright in such a constant struggle where injustices becomes absolutely overwhelming. They know the enormous psychological and financial efforts and dedication needed to outlive such an ordeal.6, 8-10, 19

Cross-references: see Part 2, subdivision 3.1.3.

3.3.1 Fifty years of British Rule: 1806 to 1854

Although all the stages of the proto-Afrikaner development were characterized by conflicts and constant onslaughts on his existence since 1652, it seems to be the British Rule of 1806 to 1854 that first brought him in open revolt, culminating in the Great Trek to escape many unsolved injustices. One clear fact that stands out here was the British intent to apply British enculturation to the proto-Afrikaners to suppress their political and personal identity. In 1811 there was the “Black Circuit” (Swarte Ommegang), a period during which court cases were opened against 50 farmers and their families based on various allegations of serious crimes, including murder. The allegations were brought by the Hottentotte and other non-Whites. Although the cases were mostly found to be false, the intentions of the British authority and of the missionaries creating these allegations, brought bitterness into the minds of the proto-Afrikaners. The existing racism and ethnocentrism in the Afrikaners were not only strengthened, but broadened to include the British and the other racial groups. The Afrikaners experienced vivid emotions of injustice and transgression. It was also the start of public resistance by small sectors of proto-Afrikaners, like the Frederik Bezuidenhout revolt and conflict, which not only led to death, but also to the hanging of four Boers at Slagtersnek, Graaff-Reinet in 1815.6, 8-10, 19,32,50

This extraordinary abuse of judicial and political power by the British authorities created negative memories that made reconciliation with the British impossible as early as 1815. The British wanted to issue a warning and make an example so that the proto-Afrikaners would behave in the British system, without allowing them to have a say or to make an impact on the political system of the Cape. It created strong fears of injustices in their belief system, especially around their personal identity and safety. It cemented in the mindsets of Afrikaners the growing perception of wide-spread, intense and focused injustices done to them: injustices that they were not empowered to rectify with direct action against the British, but that they rectified indirectly with the Great Trek. The Voortrekkers carried this negative attitude of hate and the perception of injustices directed at the British and the non-Whites, who were directly responsible for their unhappy and unstable lives at the Cape, into Natal, Transvaal, and the Free State. The Slagtersnek incident stands out even today as a the first sign of the later crimes against humanity to be committed in the Second Anglo-Boer War by the British Empire in Transvaal and the Free State against the Boers and their families. These were injustices that brought great division between the Northern and the Southern Afrikaners.6, 8-10, 19,32,50

The many other autocratic and anti-Boer actions of the British authority at the Cape between 1806 and 1836 were aimed at subduing the proto-Afrikaners. They especially wanted to phase out all Dutch influences. They wanted to Anglicized the proto-Afrikaners, starting in 1813 with the civil services, the introduction English into the Afrikaner churches in 1826 by forcing them to accept Scottish Presbyterian ministers, forcing them to accept English-speaking teachers and the establishment of free English Schools in 1822. In 1825, English became the court language, while in 1827 a legal charter was published to replace the Dutch legal system that was in use since 1652 at the Cape. A further act to minimize the Afrikaner cultural and their numbers was the 1820 migration of British Settlers to South Africa.7,10, 19,32

In 1816 the British started with a process to emancipate the slaves, first by formally registering them and then by regulating workdays by 1823. This was followed by the appointment of a Slave Protector and an assistant to oversee that the proto-Afrikaners behaved towards their slaves. In 1836 slavery was ended. The outcome of the emancipation of the slaves financially ruined many farmers, especially those in the country side. The proto-Afrikaners was at this time already split into subgroups like the Grensboers and the Trekboers, showing clear ethno-cultural and racial differences with the more British-orientated and liberal Cape Dutch. For the rural proto-Afrikaners the consequences were immense: not only was the rural proto-Afrikaners financially ruined by the little compensation for their freed slaves by the British, but they were also suddenly a White minority in a region populated by a majority of non-Whites outside their control and equal in status. Their opportunities to prosper in this environment and to establish their identity was blocked. Most of all, their clear differentiation of Christian versus heathen, as well as White versus Coloured, were suddenly shattered. Large numbers of unemployed and landless freed slaves started roaming the country side, make rural areas dangerous. 7,9,10, 19,32

This outcome further complicated the government’s failed attempts at managing the “Black- and Hottentot-questions” and to guarantee the future safety to the proto-Afrikaners on their farms. The proto-Afrikaner’s opinions, personal, political and economical interests, safety and future existence as citizens were also totally ignored. The proto-Afrikaner became a stranger in a new British colony, making the fear of a next Slagtersnek and of their dissolution as a population, acute. Life in the country side became very difficult, making the proto-Afrikaners more desperate by the day. The racial confrontations that highlighted the immense cultural and lifestyle differences between the races also laid the foundation for the Grensboers’ and Trekboers’ perception of deliberate injustices against them. This resulted in apartheid later on. The proto-Afrikaners felt that the injustices against them were mounting, and they had no voice or power as long as they were under British authority.7,9,10,19,32

To uphold their identity, culture, language and freedom in the face of the constant growing hostility and insensitive liberal race policy of the British authority, whose sole intention was to subdue the Afrikaners and the growing “black danger”, the proto-Afrikaners needed an escape route. In the end they were left with only one solution: the Great Trek northwards to vast unpopulated areas without an oppressive British government. In this context it is understandable why the new republics of Natal, Transvaal and Free State were established with three clear characteristics: total self-rule and a total distaste for the British Empire and racial integration. The basis for all these outcomes was the Afrikaners’ perception of enormous injustices done to them; injustices that took the backseat for a while in the republics.6-10,32

3.3.2 British government policy in the Transvaal and Free State between 1902 and 1906

The immediate post-1902 period after the Anglo Boer War brought immense hardships for the Boers of the disbanded Republics of Transvaal and the Free State. Suddenly they were forced to be British citizens inside a domain of the British Empire and thus under the Union Jack and a king, namely Eduard VII. This was precisely what they had fled so eagerly from the Cape Colony in the 1830s, but in the end all in vain.6-10, 32

However, a hell of injustices was still waiting for the Boers in the new British Transvaal and Free State. The worst happened after the reconfiguration of the old republics as British Colonies: the heartless and the intolerant Lord Alfred Milner, who was the instigator of the whole war and the main cause of the Boers’ suffering, downfall and disgrace, became the chief leader in charge of rebuilding the old republics. It was clear from day one that only British interests would be served, especially when considering the repatriation and the compensation for the Boers and his negative public views on the Boers. British mine owners were promoted and supported, while the numbers of the Black workers at Johannesburg mines were accelerated, ignoring the impoverished Boers’ views on race and keeping them from work opportunities. Milner had one main focus and interest, namely the total Anglicization of the Boers and the influx of British immigrants to outnumber the Boers and Afrikaners in South Africa as fast as possible.6-10, 32

Milner’s intent to Anglicize the Afrikaners is evident from his correspondents to the British government on 8 November 1901 where he reflects that there were 368 000 English Whites in South Africa compared to 496 000 Afrikaans Whites. His intention was to boost British numbers to 615 000 against 544 000 Afrikaners in five years to obtain a ratio of three British against two Afrikaners to assure a permanent British majority in South Africa. He wanted to do this through immigration from Britain and the placement of British soldiers and others who had fought in the war into the Civil Service, industries and on farms. The situation for the Boers in Transvaal under Milner became such chaos and so unbearable that JC Smuts referred to the period 1902 to 1906 as “the darkest time in the history of Transvaal, much worse than the bloodshed of the War itself”.6,32

It is undoubtedly true that the Boers and their families of the old Republics of Transvaal and Free State were totally devastated after the war, not only financial but also psychologically. Husbands had to start their lives without their wives, mourning their children lost in the concentration camps. Even General Smuts said himself in 1902 that “South Africa was demolished and that he had seen no light for the future.” It was clear to him that very few Afrikaners still believed in law and justice after their ordeal at the hands of the British. Even the Lord Milner, the brain behind the British war effort, confessed when visiting Western Transvaal after the war that the country had “become a total wreck, a heart-broken sight to see.” The treatment that the Boers received from the British after the war on various terrains only served to strengthen their psychological political dislike for the British Empire and for non-Whites. It was an all-out policy of injustice against them, one that drove the Afrikaners’ racial attitudes in an extreme direction, basically up to 1994. For the Boers this became a direct motivation for more and new kinds of racial discriminations as ways to safeguard their future political and social rights in a hostile South Africa.6-10, 32

The disgraced and demolished Afrikaners were by no means uplifted after 1906. They only overcame this third Slagtersnek because of a unique and dynamic Afrikaner leadership with vision and integrity. These leaders took up the plight of the Afrikaners and steered them back to self-respect by means of psychological and financial upliftment. Prominent leaders were Louis Botha, Koos de la Rey, Barry Hertzog, Christiaan de Wet, Jan Smuts, Christiaan Beyers, Schalk Burger, Abraham Fisher and others. However, the early injustices of 1902 to 1906 remained in the psyche of Afrikaners, driving their racial inclinations, attitudes and behaviour for many years to come, ending in grand apartheid.6,10, 32

3.3.3 The 1994 dispensation of unity

While their second Slagtersnek was avoided by the trek out of the Cape Colony and the founding of independent republics and the Boers of Transvaal and the Free State fought and mastered their third 1902-Slagtersnek guided by a wise Afrikaner leadership, the 1994 dispensation was brought on by a total lack of a sound Afrikaner leadership, a degrading morale and a political process that started in the 1970s and reached a climax in the late1980s. Where they had manifested vision, wise thinking, integrity, planning, and honesty in overcoming successfully their second and third Slagtersneks, most of the nationalist Afrikaners entrusted their political and personal future from the 1950s to 1994 to persons not always worthy of being called Afrikaners or Afrikaner leaders at all; persons totally incapable of leading a tribe through a new Slagtersnek, as the Afrikaner’s history after 1994 confirmed very well. No provision was made to accommodate and to steer the manifold new injustices against Afrikaners, as the present bitterness, insecurity and lack of direction of the Afrikaner’s shows.

The question is: can the Afrikaner again fight off his fourth Slagtersnek, notwithstanding the failed 1994 and present leadership? In this regard it must be noted that world politics, South African politics and human rights have changed dramatically in the last 20 years. Technology, science, lifestyles, habits, beliefs, socio-economics, future-thinking, traditions, group values, family life and demographic limitations have also changed dramatically; not only freeing the individual from group conformity, but also making it less necessary for people to be accommodated in close groups and to be guided by “sacred” leaders to survive in the future. Thankfully, most individual Afrikaners have started to make these changes of modernization; the collapse of the NP, the diminished role of the AB and the vague role of the DRC in the Afrikaner’s life confirms the process of Afrikaners departing from these three dominant, useless and most of all, aimless and racially contaminated groups. This new self-orientation and individuality increases the chances that the individual Afrikaner would be able to fight off his fourth Slagtersnek in new South Africa successfully. However, history tends to repeat not only the good of the past, but also the bad. Traumatic experiences are not easily erased from the human memory. Wrongdoings and injustices are entrenched over many years of suffering, exploitation, abuse and misuse. It is not only the Blacks who can rightly claim that they suffered discrimination and injustices at the hands of the Afrikaners via Afrikaner apartheid, the Afrikaners can also rightly claim that they suffer discrimination and injustices from the side of the Blacks via Black apartheid and in the past at the hand of the Dutch via Dutch colonial apartheid and by the British via British imperial apartheid. The experiences that Afrikaners had over the course of 300 years and the ideas this perpetuated blindly drove apartheid from 1948 to 1994. Racial injustices, etched into the memories of Afrikaners as well as Blacks, will still drive racism for many generations to come in South Africa. Any doubt? There is the Herodotus Rules to back this postulation.

  1. Conclusion

It is clear that the proto-Afrikaner and later the Afrikaner were both exposed to serious life traumas, sometimes experienced over a short and extremely dramatic period, while other times gradually over the long-term. This has caused negative thought patterns to become established in the Afrikaner. For the Afrikaner these traumatic experiences stretched specifically from 1899 to 1902 through the Second Anglo Boer War and to a certain extent also from 1902 to 1948 again under British Imperialism, while for the proto-Afrikaner from 1671 to 1806 under authoritarian Dutch rule and from 1806 to 1902 under authoritarian British rule. It seems, in terms of a negative psychological impact, as if the discrimination in the period 1806 to 1902 is responsible for the most damage to the Afrikaner’s long-term psychological health. It became the breeding-ground for later extreme racial discrimination. The constant, long-term negative experiences of ethnic and racial discrimination and the lack of political power to defend themselves in this imbalanced set-up, clearly created a perception of being the victim of perpetual injustice in the psyche of the Afrikaner. Their reaction to this situation was to find an effective action to counter these daily and growing injustices and for their enemies’ intentions to annihilate them. There was only one way out, and that was to selfishly place themselves first in their daily behaviour, promoting their own interests and rights at all times, ignoring the consequences that such behaviour can have for other persons outside their group; specifically people from other racial groups and non-Afrikaner Whites. The apartheid to which he was exposed by the early Cape authorities was internalized as “good and acceptable” behaviour, but it also became the “correct” direct strategy to obtain and maintain their rights, integrity and most of all their identity. The Afrikaner’s apartheid was born, and the injustices that were done to them became the motivating power and the justification for the pursuit and maintenance of modern-day apartheid. There is no doubt that any injustice done to Afrikaners up to today is still steering their racial attitudes and behaviours.

The historical and political facts of the proto-Afrikaners and later Afrikaners, read together with the historical indicators focusing on the safekeeping of tribes and nations over many centuries, make it clear that the modern Afrikaners is in a crisis: politically, economically, sociologically, personally and psychologically. The powers of hostility against them are immense, overwhelming and overpowering. There is also, it seems, the unbreakable Herodotus curse on them. It seems as if the Afrikaner tribe is heading for dissolution within a century. The primary need at the moment for the Afrikaners, seen specifically from a psychological and political perspective, is to make their dissolution as painless and trauma-free as possible. For such an outcome, specific personal changes and strategies are needed, which are at present outside the Afrikaners frame of reference.

Be that as it may, one can ask if the Afrikaners could not perhaps, as the proto-Afrikaners successfully did three times before, overcome their 1994 Slagtersnek? Why not? Their emancipation from the NP-AB-DRC alliance and their new-found individuality offers them an escape route to overcome this 1994 trauma. This ideal can only be reached if they can lay to rest their obsession with the injustices done and being done to them. They have to clean their collective psyche of contaminated race attitudes and start anew as independent, freed South Africans.

Reaching the above outcome is not so easy and it would need extraordinary cleansing. As Palkhivala cautions51, p. 40: “Unfortunately, enmity and hatred persist among nations even after the root cause has been relegated to the limbo of forgotten past”. Speaking of the Schleswig-Holstein question of the 19th century and the forgotten reasons for the war around it, Lord Palmerston observed, “Only three people had ever understood it. One was dead. The other was in a lunatic asylum. I am the third and I have forgotten it.”

Although it seems best for individual Afrikaners not to know the real future brought on by their past, they may have no other choice in 2017 than to take a peek into the glass ball of hope in a last effort to prevent their obsession with the many injustices done to them to  gobble up their future. Only in this way can Afrikaners hope to postpone their eminent demise as individuals and as a group. But do they, after so many years of exposure to negative political doctrines and the unlearning of independent thinking, still know how to take a peek?

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned. Externally peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Arts, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa.

Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner-tribe only a century away? Part 1: Who is the Afrikaner?

Gabriel Louw

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Arts,
Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

Corresponding Author:
Prof Dr GP Louw
Focus Area Social Transformation
Faculty of Arts
Potchefstroom Campus
North-West University
South Africa
Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Ensovoort volume 37(2017), number 9:1

1. Background

“The world on September 11, 1901, was not a bad place for a healthy white man with a decent education and some money in the bank when the class to which he belonged had enjoyed ‘at a low cost and with the least trouble, conveniences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages’”, writes Niall Ferguson.1, p.3 What was most important, added Ferguson1, p. 4, was that this White man of 1901 saw “this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable”.

This world of 1901 was the oyster of the White man, but for the critical observer, like the economist John Maynard Keynes, it was not without toxic impurities that could devour the White man and the false and superficial utopia over time. Indeed, two cruel and devastating World Wars, various other regional wars, two world-wide financial depressions, internationally ethnic and racial reprisals by the suppressed non-Whites, worldwide radical regime changes and many other calamities ensued from 1901 to 1950. This unexpectedly, unasked and unavoidably changed the White man’s belief in his unshakable “permanent and normal privileged lifestyle,” concludes Ferguson.1, p. 4

For nationalist Afrikaners, especially those living between 1948 and the late 1980s, South Africa was not a bad place to live in either; an oyster of Apartheid-privileged lifestyle that Afrikaners undoubtedly believed was normal and permanent and that could only be improved with time. However, the post-1994 democratic dispensation arrived virtually overnight: unexpected, unasked, unwelcome and unthinkable, and most of all, unavoidable for Afrikaners if they wanted a future existence in South Africa and on the African continent. This socio-economical, political and humanitarian correction of the economical, psychological, political and social wrongs created by the nationalist Afrikaners with their racial discrimination against non-Whites, brought tremendous aberrant and unforeseen negative changes to their good lifestyles, psychological functioning, religious, social-economical and political powers, individual and human rights, even citizen privileges. It also terminated the nationalist Afrikaner’s self-belief with one stroke of the pen. This self-belief was inculcated in Afrikaners since 1652 and it held that the Afrikaners have an “inherited ability” as Europeans to rule forever the indigenous peoples of South Africa.1,2,3

The favourable socio-economical political set-up described above was statutorily erased in 1994 as the political tide turned on the Afrikaner. As the fortune of Ferguson’s (2007) White man of 1901 changed dramatically during the first 50 years of the century, so did the Afrikaner’s fortune change dramatically, but in just 23 years. The Afrikaner is now inextricably linked to the birth pains of political, economical, social and personal modernization in the new South Africa. The Afrikaner brought this on himself during the 1970s without realising the consequences. The future life of the Afrikaner seems to be a totally different one from the one that he and his ancestors experienced or envisioned. When 1994 arrived, the Afrikaner was not only isolated from his fellow South Africans, there was no one left in the world to help him with this fate. 1, 4-10

In light of the above historical overview, the general question is thus prominent: Who is the Afrikaner?
Answering this question has become unavoidable. In 2017 this question needs immediate attention to ensure the Afrikaner’s present-day and future psychological, political, social, financial, emotional and physical well-being.

The lack of an in-depth self-investigation and analysis of who he is has undoubtedly led to a situation where the nationalist Afrikaner and every individual inside the so-called greater Afrikaner grouping carries many unsolved psychological and political traumas and other dispositions with him over many years. This troubles the Afrikaner’s adjustment to the new, greater multi-racial society of South Africa. Many parts of Afrikaner history can possibly be traced back to the Afrikaner’s insufficient knowledge and lack of insight into his history. This includes the political malfunctioning of proto-Afrikaners in the Boer republics after 1902; the transformation of various proto-Afrikaner groups into Afrikaners and later to nationalist Afrikaners and super Afrikaners in the Union and in the Republic of South Africa. The history of the Afrikaner has contributed greatly to the robustness and roughness that Afrikaners display in their daily behaviour and their thinking on racism and ethnicity. It is time for the Afrikaner to confront the good and the bad in their history, but this necessitates an honest and a comprehensive valuation of Afrikaner history and who the Afrikaner is. Only then can the identity of the present-day Afrikaner be understood and the group’s possible future been mapped. Only through such a true and objective re-evaluation of history can the Afrikaner’s real identity and place in the new and future South Africa be revealed; his dark fate as a result of the ill-treatment of non-Whites be made bearable; and the tragic meaning of his possible dissolution become understandable.11-16

Once the Afrikaner knows his own history and who he is, he will much more easily evaluate the role of cognitive thinking and life experiences in the past racial and ethnic domination and discrimination, and he would be able to decide how to handle the present-day environment in an effort to outlive dissolution.

The aim of this article is to research and to reflect on who the Afrikaner is.

The focus is on the Afrikaners’ European heritage, their identification as ‘Afrikaner’, their present-day population numbers, the assumed uniqueness of the Afrikaans language and Afrikaner culture, as well as their position inside the Afrikaanses group and their assumed ‘European blood-purity’.

This article is the first in a series of seven. The seven articles represent the following research topics: 1) Who is the Afrikaner?; 2) Historical determinants and role players in the establishment and maintenance of racial discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 3) Present and past negative determinants and role players in the establishment and upkeep of injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 4) The Afrikaner’s failure to understand, accept and integrate the indigenous realities of South Africa; 5) The vicious cycle of revenge and contra-revenge around apartheid; 6) The preparedness of and comprehensiveness with which Afrikaners deal with the treats and challenges of the new South Africa; 7) 2017 is the time for thinking, planning and action.

The overarching intention of the total study is determine the future position of the Afrikaner in the year 2117.

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern-day historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research, like the Afrikaner’s present-day and future position in South Africa. The databases used were EBSCOHost and Sabinet online, and sources included articles from 2007 to 2017, books for the period 1944 to 2017, government documents covering the period 1955 and newspapers for the period 2016 to 2017. These sources were consulted to reflect on the Afrikaners and to the put thought, views and opinions on the Afrikaners in perspective. 17-19

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

3. Results

3.1 Role of ethnicity and race in discrimination

Most of the social domination and discrimination that has ravaged societies over the centuries was primary activated by ethnicity and race. Ethnicity is the combination of the language, habits, customs, and rituals practiced in the house, the school and the religious life of a person or group. Ethnic differences do not necessary include racial differences. Indeed, one single determinant, like language, is sometimes enough to distinguish two ethnic groups within the same racial group. Such a small difference can start discrimination, violence and even genocide. Race, hereto, is seen as inherited physical characteristics, transmitted from parents to children in their DNA. Racism is a doctrine of innate or biological superiority, which, in its classical form, leads to discrimination that deprives members of victimized groups of equal protection under the laws and of a proper lifestyle. Race per se is one of the most devastating determinants in racial discrimination and genocide worldwide, especially from the middle-1800s to the middle-1900s. Although race and ethnicity are mostly seen and discussed as two separate entities, they are seldom active separately. Usually they form a sole determinant in genocide together, or even in the common discriminations of daily life.1,20-22

In contrast to above outcomes in the thinking and the behaviour of men on race and ethnic differences, the science of modern genetics reveals that human beings are remarkably alike and that all humans belong to one species in terms of DNA. The origin of this one species can be traced back to Africa between 100 000 and 200 000 years ago. This species only started to spread to the new continents as late as 60 000 years ago. Also, it must be noted that the differences used to denote racial identities in South Africa, like for instance an Afrikaner or a Zulu, are superficial. The distinctions were and are still the basis of racial and ethnic discrimination. The darker pigmentation in the melanocytes of peoples whose ancestors lived close to the equator, and the physiognomy which makes eyes narrower and noses shorter at the eastern end of the great Eurasian landmass, as well as hair types, are of secondary importance. Geographical dispersion led to humans forming groups that became physically quite distinct over time, but below the skin, peoples are quite similar. Furthermore, despite outward differences; great distances between groups and mutual incomprehension, these so-called “unique races” of the earth have intermingled.1

Notwithstanding the above biological similarity many people, including the Afrikaner specifically, have thought and acted as if the so-called physically distinctive races were separate species, especially during the 20th century. Specific individuals and groups who are different were classified as somehow ‘subhuman’. 1,21-23

It seems in this context as if humans, notwithstanding our intelligence and cognitive insight, and thus a logical awareness that genetic racial differences may indeed be insignificant; have to a certain extent, been driven by an inherent psych-biological disposition that is designed to attach importance to racial differences . These differences have led to intense discrimination and even the murder of people based on their race and class.1

The inclination to discriminate against other racial groups and against people of the same race simply on cultural, religious and political grounds is not unique to the Afrikaner, even though it is a behaviour that is sometimes be seen by psychologists as a psycho-pathology.3,24-26

Various situations, like the Nazi genocide of the Jews and the ongoing modern-day human tragedies in Israel and Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and less prominent racial and ethnic conflicts in modern-day USA and Europe, illustrate this world-wide inclination. 1,4,27-30

Research shows that most of the Y-chromosomes found in Jewish males are the same as those found in other Middle Eastern men, meaning that notwithstanding their bitter hate and pathological murdering of each other, Israelis and Palestinians are genetically very close. Their inter-racial discrimination orientation is therefore rather based on an ethnic life style: religious differences, socio-economical classes and social behaviours. These differences play the dominant role, rather than pure racial content.1

As another example, it seems as racial and ethnic prejudices (based on physical and cultural differences) are practiced in combination in the USA to create and maintain White-on-Black discrimination. Although an American study shows that between 20% and 25% of the DNA of most African Americans can be traced back to Europe, they are still treated as “European-different” by the so-called White Americans based on the physical differences. In addition, a lower social class and income classification is associated with Blacks in the USA, supporting and strengthening further racial discrimination.1,31,32

This illustrates the fact that visible physical features, like skin colour, hair type and facial features are undoubtedly still powerfully drivers in discrimination, regardless of the actual genetic closeness of the groups in question. Such external features can be much stronger role players than cultural determinants.

When racial and ethnic discrimination functions in combination, the outcome can have serious consequences for the victim. This negative outcome seems to be in line with the Afrikaners’ discriminatory attitude towards people of different colour and class. 33-35

In South Africa, the White Afrikaner discriminated against Blacks and mixed races for centuries by means of ethnic and racial domination of the political, economic, social and cultural spheres. Domination was structured, managed and executed primarily by means of class. Vilakazi36, p.43 aptly describes the machine-like precision with which the Afrikaner elite managed Apartheid discrimination when he writes:

The structure of racial domination is kept up by pillars of political, economic, social and cultural institutions, above all, bureaucracies, controlled and run by men and women from specific social classes. We should also keep in mind the crucial fact that, in our age of elections for State offices, particular parties and politicians find support and favour from, and arise out of, particular social classes; these parties and politicians may therefore champion the causes and pander to the prejudices of particular social classes, no matter what the racial group may be.

In day-to-day, practical terms, Whites, therefore, do not all dominate Blacks alike. Some exercise the domination directly and harshly; others exercise it still indirectly, but more ‘pleasantly’ and ‘kindly’; some exercise it indirectly, but still harshly; while still others exercise it indirectly, with sophistication and even ‘friendship’ for Blacks. All this depends on the class background of the Whites concerned, and the institutions within which they make their living within the huge edifice of racial domination.

In this context, Vilakazi36, p. 44 furthermore writes:

Blacks also do not experience racial domination in exactly similar ways, for there are growing class differentiations within the Black population. For the vast majority, however, domination is still direct, harsh and sharp-edged: this is true for farm workers, peasants and the working classes in industries, cities and White homes.

In addition to the clear class distinction between Whites and non-Whites, the Apartheid regime grouped all Blacks together as one ethnic group to fit the political domination and institutionalised discrimination.

The Afrikaner unfortunately wears the same “stained cloak” of serious racial and ethnic discriminations as the German, Jew, Palestinian, Briton, the American and many other nationalities and races worldwide, guilty or not guilty. This “dark past” of the Afrikaner must therefore be addressed in a study on the future of the Afrikaner as an individual, group or tribe. This includes addressing who he is, how he was formed and where he comes from. This is a historical issue with an immense impact on today’s Afrikaners and their psychological experience of the new South Africa. The issue has thus far deliberately been avoided by the Afrikaner himself. However, avoiding the past out of a sense of shame is unnecessary. The Afrikaner’s history is no more shocking and tragical than that of the Zulu or the Xhosa tribes or the Scots or Ukrainians, and it must be thoroughly understood to understand the present day and future inclinations and intentions of this group of people.

An understanding of the Afrikaners’ history will hopefully shed light on why they practiced racial discrimination to such an extreme and for so long. The unavoidable questions are: Were these discriminatory beliefs driven by a need to keep their assumed pure European bloodline, which makes them “better” than non-Whites, pure at all times? Was it driven by a psycho-pathological mindset on race and White supremacy? Was it shaped by unhappy life experiences during their development that became learned and internalised ideas that drove their thinking and actions? Was it driven by inborn psychopathic inclinations in their psyche, making them selfish and conscienceless so that they put their interests first at the cost of others’ interests and lives?

3.2 The concepts Afrikaner nation, Afrikaans language, Afrikaanses, Afrikaner naming, Afrikaners in numbers, Afrikaner culture and the Afrikaners’ European blood purity

It is of utmost importance to understand the above concepts related to Afrikaner history to determine and to describe the role of race and ethnicity in the discriminatory inclinations of the Afrikaner. The following questions are prominent in this regard:

Do Afrikaners as Whites from the Afrikaner ethnic group and the Blacks in South Africa truly differ so much that these differences could have led to the Afrikaner’s negative attitudes towards other races and to the resulting discrimination?

Are the seemingly unique features of the Afrikaner, like their status as a people, their exclusive Afrikaans language, the name “Afrikaner”, their significance in terms of numbers, the Afrikaner culture and their “pure” White bloodline true reflections of who Afrikaners are?

These features are described and evaluated in the following sub-divisions.

3.2.1 The Afrikaner people

Over the years, a vast body of literature on the proto-Afrikaners and later the nationalist Afrikaners has come to reflect them as members of the exclusive Afrikaner people. This group identity was foregrounded after 1948 with the Malan-Strydom-Verwoerd doctrine of the Afrikaners as a unique European-race that developed over many years in the Cape and who is permanently established in Africa. This idea of the Afrikaner resulted from the political and social domination of civil society by the National Party (NP), the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) and various Dutch Calvinist Protestant churches, especially the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). These forces undoubtedly influenced people to internalise this Afrikaner mindset and lifestyle.3,37-39

For many reasons this trend could not be successfully challenged before the early 1990s. There was great political force behind this mindset. Many dissident Afrikaners, English-speaking Whites and of course all the Blacks endured it in silence. The power behind this indoctrination started to lose steam after 1994 with the constant decline of the Afrikaner numbers and their political disempowerment. The Black majority also embraced the new politically free and democratic environment and started to look at the Afrikaners critically. They regarded the Afrikaner as a group that lacks any direct association with or support from Europe. They are merely a minority group of South Africa. This threw suspicion on the status of the Afrikaner as a people. During the Apartheid regime, most Blacks groups were restricted to certain territories and areas and classified in terms of tribes. In the new South Africa, all the tribes were collected to form the total population of South Africa and a new South African nation. In a certain sense, this diminished the status of the Afrikaner as the South African people to one of many tribes that together constitute a nation. 7,36,40

With reference to the concept Afrikaner nation, the Anglo Boer War veteran and later South African nationalist politician, JBM Hertzog, reflected that the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910 seemingly created a new White nation in the minds of White liberals. This new nation was a South African nation, styled according to the thinking and doctrines of the British Empire. This nation was set to replace ideas of an Afrikaner identity and nation as it existed before 1910. Hertzog rejected any such ideas and nipped them in the bud. He acknowledged only the Afrikaner nation when he stated that the Afrikaner developed in South Africa, complete with the language of Afrikaans, as a new nation that had incorporated Dutch, French and German cultural and biological elements. Hertzog hailed the existence of an Afrikaner nation as early as the 1910s.3

At the same time, Hertzog admitted that to be called a nation, a strong nationalism is needed. This necessitated a comprehensive unity that required more than the existence of a shared religious, own language, culture, shared life values and racial nationalism. According to Hertzog, the Afrikaans people still lacked in this area by the 1910s. Indeed, the Afrikaner nation, later presented as a fact by the South African nationalist Afrikaner prime-ministers DF Malan and JG Strydom, also failed with regard to these requirements. The mono-ethnic NP and their leader Verwoerd’s efforts to establish a territory for Afrikaners and other Whites by means of Apartheid failed the test of time after the decline in the power base of the Afrikaners.37

What was seen at the time and is still constantly propagated today as an Afrikaner nation, was nothing more than and emotional and political rhetoric to motivate a subgroup of nationalist Afrikaners to support the Apartheid ideologies of leaders such as Malan, Strydom and Verwoerd (three persons seen by the opposition of Apartheid as Nazi-orientated). This subgroup stands separate from the total Afrikaner population. Many members of this group of nationalist Afrikaners who belonged to the NP, AB and the DRC (and whom Giliomee41, p. 11describes as NP-Broederbonder-Afrikaners) remains caught in this way of thinking and doing. They stuck to this notion of the Afrikaner nation after the founding of the Verwoerd republic in 1961 and its collapse and they stick to it even today. The NP-AB-DRC-classification of people who upheld the concepts Afrikaner nation and Afrikaner identity, is distinct from the so-called “SAP-Afrikaners”, followers of the Smuts group, with their less comprehensive Afrikaner identification and nation status3,39,41,42 . This conclusion is in line with various other historical and political researchers.7,37,43

Giliomee7 reflects that Afrikaner nationalism has dominated South Africa for so long that it has come to look like a fixed feature in the history. In this context of contradictions, his states that in the 1890s there was no conscious Afrikaner nationalism or movement. In fact, there was no recognisable Afrikaner or Afrikaner nation, no agreement about the term Afrikaner, while the Afrikaans language was a despised “kitchen” or “Hottentot” language. Giliomee7, p. 7 writes:

Contemporary observers in the 1870s and 1880s identified a distinct ethnic segment within the White population of southern Africa. They were people from Dutch, German or French descent, with a considerable sprinkling of Black ancestors who had merged into a group in the course of the eighteenth century. With few exceptions, members married inside the group, belonged to the one of the three Reformed Churches, spoke Dutch or Afrikaans at home, and had a largely shared history”.

It is important to note that the issues around nation status and nationalism are much more complicated and comprehensive than the propagandists of an Afrikaner nation or an Afrikaner identity seem to understand. While the Afrikaners pride themselves in the fact that they originate from age-old nations like the Dutch, Germans and French, it seems that these nations themselves are not that old. Giliomee7 shows in this regard that studies of ethnic movements in Eastern Europe and the Third World indicate that the ethnic and national identity that forms a nation is not natural, but artificial inventions driven by political, economic and social alliances of distinct classes to empower them to face the everyday and long-term challenges of life. As such, many nations are not as old as generally believed and accepted. Sometimes a situation requires a group to have more than a vague idea about the race of groups, their culture and history. They are forced to invent a national identity and to become a political nation for the sake of empowerment. This development path, as with that of many European nations and thus the Afrikaners’ European fore-bearers, repeated itself with the development of the Afrikaner identity and nation concept, although it seems to be less successful than the creations of their fore-bearers.

The Afrikaner only became prominent in South African history as a so-called nation because of their early political and military power and dominance of other groups in the Cape, not because they were by any means sacred. The South African Coloureds show the same dynamics and uniqueness as the Afrikaners, but they were stigmatised and side-lined from the start simply because they are not “pure Europeans” and because they lacked social, economic, political and military power from 1652 onwards to position themselves as a significant racial group. The same is goes for the Griquas. This group formed before permanent settlement at the Cape from contact between Portuguese sailors visiting the Cape and Khoi women. Later, after 1652, this new ethnic group was strengthened by further miscegenation between White colonists at the Cape and Khoi women. Adam Kok (born circa 1710) grouped them together as a people in the 18th century. Initially known as “Basters” (Bastards), their name was changed to Griqua in 1813 under influence of a London missionary because of the stigma surrounding the word “bastard” in Europe. They became, just like the pro-Afrikaners, established as a “nation”, although much fewer in numbers than the Cape Coloureds. They settled on Kok’s farm Klaarwater, later to be known as Griekwastad in the region known as Griekwaland-Wes. The same political, economic and military disempowerment that the Coloureds experienced from early on became their fate. They were side-lined from the social, economic and political mainstream and were denied a prominent role as a “nation” equal to the Afrikaners.41,44,45

Within the ranks of the NP leadership, it was only in 1981 that a minister in a NP cabinet, Dr PGJ Koornhof, showed the courage to admit that the Afrikaners are only one population group among 14 other groups in South Africa.42 This opinion was later supported by president PW Botha in 1986 when he said that the peoples of South Africa form one nation. This served as a clear indication of how the various minority and majority groups inside the borders of the country were encircling Afrikaners, and the Afrikaner was only one of the groups in the country. Although this statement was part of the opportunistic neo-Apartheid (liberal) thinking that entered the mindset of the leadership of the NP during the 1980s, it was a clear admission that there is and has never been an Afrikaner nation.40 Koornhof and Botha’s viewpoints, although a century later, do not differ from what Paul Kruger said in 188346, p. 356: “Evenzo zal ik steeds mijn hartelike ondersteuning schenken aan elke poging ener nauwere verbinding tussen de staten en kolonieën van Zuid-Afrika ter kweking van een Zuid-Afrikaanse natie…”. In Kruger’s view, there was no Afrikaner nation in the 1880s or in view future at the time.

It is doubtful that one could say that the Afrikaner was a true nation in the 1910s or in 2017. The opportunistic and misleading political rhetoric common from the 1940s to the early 1980s, is seldom heard in public or reflected in literature these days.

3.2.2 Afrikaans language

The Afrikaans language has been and is still one of the prominent reasons why Afrikaners aim to maintain exclusively Afrikaans public universities, schools and business entities and to identify villages, townships and cities that date from before 1994 with Afrikaner names. Discrimination against Afrikaans in social life and the formally phasing out of the language at public institutions has led to various court cases and other formal protests. Indeed, its conservation, together with the Afrikaner identity and name, is one of the main reasons why some aspire to an independent Afrikaner state in South Africa. For the majority of Afrikaners, Afrikaans is undoubtedly a personal heirloom, a unique ethno-language, covered in their believed ethnic and racial heretage.47-59

The present official and unofficial attitude of the ANC government towards Afrikaans is most negative, discriminatory and driven by the single intention to demolish Afrikaans as a commonly used public language, basically because it is still seen as the language of the oppressor. These discriminative actions are reflected more and more in the judicial system, at universities and schools and public services of South Africa. This is also seen as a focused and planned effort to diminish the Afrikaners legal, political, economic, personal and civil rights and positions. Afrikaners have reactions to these official and unofficial conducts. The reactions are becoming more and more aggressive and negative towards the government, with fierce court cases, public publications and comments, and various other agitations.60-69

Is this idea that the Afrikaans language belongs solely to the present-day Afrikaners correct?

It is important to study the history of and the development of the language Afrikaans to find an answer to this question.

Afrikaans, currently the third most widely spoken home language in South Africa, evolved from the Dutch vernacular of South Holland. It was initially spoken as a Dutch dialect (with some varieties) by the proto-Afrikaner settlers on the Cape frontier during the eighteenth century. These people were socially and culturally isolated and less educated than the Cape Dutch living in Cape Town and its immediate environment. In this isolation and in the muddle of various races and classes living and working together – Europeans, Hottentots, the Khoi-San, Negro and Indian-Malaysian slaves – and the dialect already different from the original Dutch, it became a way of daily communication between the groups. From there the early reference to it as the “taal” (language), but something of doubtful quality and inferior status. It can with right be said that various racial groups – the French, German, British, Portuguese, the European free burghers, as well as slaves from Southeast Asia like Malaysia, Madagascar and native Africans, Khoikhoi and people of mixed descent – all contributed to this emerging language (initially described as “Kitchen” or “Hottentot” Afrikaans) by adding some of their own vocabulary and cultural practices.7,71-73

From the late 17th century onwards, the Dutch spoken at the Cape started to develop differences from the original Dutch with respect to morphology, pronunciation, accent, and to a certain extent, also in syntax and vocabulary. The language spoken in the Cape start to assimilate influences from the already established new dialect often described with names such as “Cape Dutch”, “African Dutch”, “Kitchen (Kombuis) Dutch”, “Hottentot Dutch” and “Taal” (meaning: language). This proto-Afrikaans only started to develop into a separate language by the 19th century.7,74

Afrikaans initially developed slowly. The first print of proto-Afrikaans only appeared during the early 19th century. Much of the work to develop Afrikaans into a separate language was initially done by the “Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners”.7,39

Pure Dutch remained the official language at the Cape for a long time. This formal use of Dutch continued even after the establishment of the Union of South Africa. In fact, much objection was raised against efforts to legalise Afrikaans as a new language until the 1900s, mostly from Afrikaners themselves. One reason for the official pleas to recognise Afrikaans was the fact that it was already the language used at universities, courts and schools from as early as 1915. It was only in 1925 that Afrikaans was given equal status to Dutch by an act passed by parliament. It became one of the two official languages (with English the second) of the Union of South Africa. As a legal entity, Afrikaans is not yet a century old in 2017. In the new South Africa, Afrikaans has lost its early primary status and is recognised today as one of the eleven official languages and as an African language. Notwithstanding this “African uniqueness” and its remaining independent status as a language, the South African Dutch dialect, known today as Afrikaans, and the Dutch spoken in The Netherlands are still very similar, so much that it is mutually intelligible. This makes it less of an exclusive and independent language than what Afrikaners many times argue.39,48,58,68,74

Second, regarding the initial creators and speakers of Afrikaans at the Cape, there is, as already indicated, no doubt that the early Dutch-speaking White settlers were the main creators of Afrikaans and that they initially guided its development. As also already indicated, other ethnic and racial groups, especially those who were living in the countryside, also contributed to the formation of Afrikaans with vocabulary from their mother tongues. These inputs were limited to contributions to the Dutch dialect. However, newcomers to the colony such as German and French settlers, Cape slaves and non-White groups, usually reverted to the use of Dutch and the later to the various dialects of Dutch and proto-Afrikaans. They used proto-Afrikaans in their communication with their owners, other slaves and non-Whites. In this way, the language was maintained and expanded by the non-Whites as well. Indeed, the inclusive labelling of the “Taal” as “Kombuis” and “Hottentot” Afrikaans aptly illustrates the impact and involvement of household workers (slaves) and other free workers and other indigenous peoples in the forming of the language. It is not the “elite” of the Cape Dutch (Whites) who should be honoured as the sole fathers of Afrikaans. The prefixes “kombuis” and “Hottentot” indicates an early stigma associated with the language because it was widely used by the lower socio-economical classes and lower level working classes (which included mostly non-Whites and slaves) in their mutual communication away from the more complicated Dutch language that was used by the educated Whites at the Cape.39,48,49,75-77

The influence of slaves and non-Whites on Afrikaans was greatly affected by the fact that by 1754 there were only 6 000 Whites in the Cape, but they already far outnumbered by the imported slaves. This means that in comparison with the proto-Afrikaners (Whites), an equal, if not larger proportion of these non-Whites was already speaking “Kombuis” and “Hottentot” Afrikaans by the late-1700s. In 1806, the proto-Afrikaners numbered 26 720 or 36% of the colony’s population, meaning that there were already 74 222 other people (mostly non-Afrikaners or non-Whites) at the Cape, of whom most spoke a kind of proto-Afrikaans or a Dutch dialect. “Kombuis” or “Hottentot” Afrikaans” was most probably forced on workers, but it was nurtured by the non-Whites as their only medium of communication with the proto-Afrikaners.7,39,78

Afrikaans is indeed a multicultural and multiracial language, developed and established to a certain extent by the various races of South Africa, starting in 1652. Ownership of the language rests with all South Africa people. Its survival as an official language is strongly steered and guarded by the so-called Bruin (Brown) Afrikaners or Coloureds. This group is starting to claim more and more ownership of the language and its various dialects. It seems as if they regard the use of Afrikaans as their main communication medium in schools, universities, at work, and in their personal and social lives as absolutely essential and not a matter open for discussion or negotiation for the future. The fact that this group represents more than 3.6 million people and that they are constantly growing in numbers, makes them a factor that the ANC should take into account in its discrimination against Afrikaans. The ANC think of the Brown population as grouped with the Blacks who they freed from oppression, from the Afrikaner. It seems that this group, together with Black Afrikaans speakers (making up a group of more or less 6 million persons in total) will be the rescuers of the language, and not the Afrikaner.41,48,49,75,77,79-81

3.2. Afrikaanses

The term “Afrikaanses” is a new group name that sprouted by the late 2000s. It is used by some nationalist Afrikaners in their efforts to include other racial and ethnic Afrikaans speakers into the Afrikaner-grouping, like the Cape Coloureds, solely to strengthen the Afrikaners’ fading political empowerment and to obtain numbers in an effort to avoid the dissolution awaiting the Afrikaner in a century’s time. Nationalist Afrikaners are now also making an effort to involve other Afrikaans speakers of non-White status to assure the existence of the name Afrikaner, its identity as a group and the conservation of the Afrikaans language in the near future by their offering to “redefine” the name and entity “Afrikaner”. It is a very vague and an undefined offer on the one hand, and a very opportunistic offer on the other. It is too little too late, and totally inappropriate and irrelevant within the political context of modern-day South Africa. “Afrikaanses” have been existing for a long time apart from the Afrikaners and they are not as a group in need of mercy and incorporation to be saved or to be helped as a group. This effort to redefine the name Afrikaner and to make it more comprehensive so that it includes other ethnicities and races, seems to be nothing more than a masked wish to depart from the name “Afrikaner” to get away from the exclusivity of the nationalist Afrikaners who were mostly members and supporters of the NP, AB and DRC. This implies that the proponents of the redefinition of the name “Afrikaner” do not really themselves understand the concept and entity that is the Afrikaner tribe, its position in relation to the other South African tribes and its future in the new South Africa. In 2017, nationalist Afrikaners find themselves in doubt about the Afrikaner’s identity and the Afrikaans language, asking: “whereto from now for us?”. The Afrikaanses, on the other hand, can answer with confidence “we are here and ready for the future”.13,50,59,82

As already indicated, the name “Afrikaanse” is not a new front name or a new front entity or group that has been fabricated to suit the Afrikaner’s frame of reference or to give him an escape route. To the contrary, this group (even tribe) has been in existence from 1652 (as evidenced in their contribution to the development of the Dutch dialect “Kombuis” and “Hottentot” Afrikaans), although mostly as an unspecified background role player up to the late 1990s and the end of Apartheid. They are now, in terms of the present-day political, social and economical empowerment, free and strong enough to move out of the shadow of the nationalist Afrikaners and their Apartheid dominance. Indeed, the Afrikaanses are more than ready to incorporate and to steer the growing number of aimless Afrikaners as individuals, but stripped from their stigmatised past. There is no need for the Afrikaanses to join the Afrikaners, as some nationalist Afrikaners shamelessly try to do. As said, it is just the opposite: the Afrikaanses have become the present-day parents and safe house for the Afrikaners in a future South Africa.48-50,59,77,83

There have been various developing stages after the early Cape Settlement and the later Cape Colony. The identity of the “Afrikaner” grew from “Dutch” to “Cape Dutch” to “proto-Afrikaner” to “Afrikaner”. This Afrikaner identity is now in an end stage. A new entity is now starting to awake, the “Afrikaanse” of today and tomorrow.75,76,83

Who are the Afrikaanses?

All South Africans who speak Afrikaans at home can be defined as “Afrikaanses”. Ethnic features, like religious beliefs and practices, schooling and political orientation and racial features are not role players in inclusion at all. These characteristics take second place. Members are identified by only one thing: they are “Bruin” or Coloured Afrikaanses, Afrikaner Afrikaanses, Black Afrikaanses, etc. There are surely great similarities between some “Afrikaanses”, like adhering to Christianity, but this feature is also contradicted by the inclusion of some Islam “Afrikaanses”. The groups includes different political orientations or membership of different political groupings and it includes members from the Black, White, Coloured and Indian communities and various other mixed races.49,75,80,83-86

The “Afrikaanses” is an open non-racial and non-ethnic social group defined as a group by only a single linguistic factor, Afrikaans as mother tongue. As with all developing cultural groups, uniformity in political, religious and other behaviours can follow in time, but it will surely be free from the comprehensive and extreme Afrikaner dogma, developed and nurtured by the nationalist Afrikaners for over a century and more.

The first foundations for public approval for the classification “Afrikaanses” was laid by the AB in 1998 when this nationalist Afrikaner group tried in vain to grow their dwindling numbers by declaring that all those who show a broad inclination towards the nationalistic Afrikaner values and lifestyle should be accepted as Afrikaners.82

When one looks at the number of non-Afrikaners who qualify as Afrikaanses based on the criterion of using Afrikaans in their daily lives, the numbers are strong. It is important to note in this regard that in 2011, many of the 13.5% of the total South African population who spoke Afrikaans at home were Blacks, Coloureds and Indians and not Whites. The ration of non-Afrikaners to Afrikaanses who speak Afrikaans at home is 60:40. To be more precise, of the approximately 7.5 million South Africans whose mother tongue is Afrikaans, only more or less 2.7 million were White, compared to the 3.6 million Coloureds and 1.2 million other non-White Afrikaans speakers at home. The Coloured population shows a constant growth as the majority Afrikaans speakers. In total is it estimated that 20 million South Africans speak Afrikaans every day in some form during their communication at work or in their social life, a number that completely overshadows the present-day Afrikaners’ input.74,75,80,86-88

There is also evidence that the number of non-Whites whose mother tongue is Afrikaans is increasing: in 2001 they were 5.98 million, compared to 6.9 million in 2011, representing a rise of nearly one million in ten years. The Northern Cape (53.8%) and the Western Cape (49.7%) have the highest percentages of Afrikaans speakers of all the South African provinces. These numbers include a strong non-Whites element, already making regional establishments or enclaves of Afrikaanses possible.74,75,80,86

It is clear that the “Afrikaanses” has become an important non-racial- and non-ethnic cluster that can play a dynamic role in the new South Africa. The group is borderless in terms of culture, ethnicity and race, seasoned and schooled in assimilation and miscegenation over more than three centuries. They have lived both inside and outside the restrictions and stigmas of Apartheid, their unbounded interrelationships offer them the opportunity to eradicate the racial and ethnic discrimination so inherent to the nationalist Afrikaners and which led them to the immense disrespect for Afrikaans as the language of the oppressor. The Afrikaanses, it seems, have the ability to secure a better future citizen’s place for themselves and their descendants in new South Africa. This differs from the insecure Afrikaners. Only one determinant plays a role in their minds, to differentiate them from the rest of the South African population with their adaptable and politics-free Afrikaans language.13,59,89,90

The question left at this stage is: can every Afrikaner become an Afrikaanse? To a certain extent, the Afrikaner’s transformation to new political affiliations from die-hard NP-Broederbonders already started after 1994 after the collapsed of the NP. Many repositioned to the DA and smaller Afrikaner-orientated parties, a small group even joined the ANC. But, for most of these Afrikaners the political focus was on finding a political organisation that they believe can serve their needs as the NP did. The Afrikaanses, on the other hand, stand cultural and politically apart from the interests of the nationalist Afrikaner identity. There are two big obstacles that the nationalist Afrikaner has to overcome to become an “Afrikaanse”. First, he would have change as an individual to a person without the collective baggage of the nationalist Afrikaner culture that he supported for many years and was born into. Secondly, he would have to denounce in all honesty all the racial and ethnic attitudes so inherently part of the nationalist Afrikaner regime before 1994. This change seems to be a small step for a suppressed slave or an individual used to discrimination for his whole life, but a giant and difficult step for a rigid nationalist Afrikaner.

3.2.4 The name of the Afrikaner

The naming and positioning of the “Afrikaner” within the South African society and in the international context as a specific entity followed the same path that his main ancestors, the Dutch, Germans and the French, embarked on centuries ago. Groups identify themselves by fronting a specific identifying name, a clear racial and ethnic orientation and entity, a unique language ability and preference, a well-defined and comprehensive economical system, a geographic region and specific cultural habits, customs and traditions. This includes unique folklore, religious and political beliefs, education and principles. This complex is jealously guarded, and any negative influences or intruders that can endanger its continuation, are fearlessly attacked, either verbally or physically in the form of wars. In addition, its growth and spread other non-related groups and subordinates are scrumptiously promoted and sometimes shamelessly forced to subordinate them and sometimes incorporate them into the group. In South Africa this was done through Apartheid and its strict discriminative laws imposed by the nationalist Afrikaners.21,22,27,36,38,39,42,91

In South Africa the early White political dispensation starting in 1652 and especially the later Afrikaner political dispensation starting in 1902, strictly adhered to the above methods. Here, the name “Afrikaner”, as if truly stretching from 1652, the perceived uniqueness of the language “Afrikaans” as something developed by and belonging solely to the Afrikaner from the beginning, and the exclusiveness of the Afrikaner’s race orientation, labelled as “pure” White, European and Caucasian, became prominent determinants and drivers in the Afrikaner’s racial and ethnic thinking and planning. But did these assumed successes and achievements of the Afrikaner really meet the criteria of fact and truth?3,26,38,39,92

It seems that the name “Afrikaner” is clouded by controversy and contradictions. It is clear that the Whites at the Cape saw themselves as a part of Europe and as citizens of their various European homelands during the early colonial period, even up to the late 1800s, instead of a new race or ethnic population or citizen at the Cape. The fact is that the name “Afrikaner” did not denote a group identity for many years after 1652. The early Cape ancestors of the today’s Afrikaners were simply described as “Christians”, “colonists”, “emigrants”, “inhabitants” or “ingezeetenens”, “free citizens” or “vrijburgers” and “burghers” for a long time. Even the name “Boer” is a late-comer on the scene.26,39,92-94
.
The Cape Colony resident, Hendrik Biebouw’s reference to himself as an “Afrikaander” (“Africander”) in 1707 can not been seen as irrefutable evidence that the “Afrikaner” was already a specific name of an identifiable White group at the Cape. To the contrary, Biebouw’s “Afrikaander” identity or classification seems more applicable to the numerous half-castes, Coloureds and other mixed groups at the Cape at that time. These mixed groups often had the same White and non-White ancestors as today’s Afrikaners, but even at that point they had already begun to develop biologically and culturally away from the Whites as an early branch of the existing Cape Coloured people.95,96

Above finding is in line with that of Giliomee7, p. 8 when he states:

In the eighteenth century the term Africander (Afrikaner) was used primarily for the offspring of slaves born in Africa, usually out of liaisons with ex-slaves, Khoisan or Whites. This usage continued until little more than a century ago [more or less 1890]. An official list of Cape Town prostitutes, taken in 1868, was headed by ‘Africanders’, referring to people of mixed descent. By 1880 the designation Afrikaner was also claimed by some Africans in the Eastern Cape. After a branch of the Afrikaner Bond was established in Cradock an African organisation, the Imbubwe, was formed. Its members claimed that their organisation was the true Afrikaner Bond while the White organisation was merely the Boeren Bond.▼

A community of approximately 100 families, descendants of the freed slaves who accompanied the Voortrekkers to Transvaal in the middle 1800s and settled in 1886 at Onverwacht near the town Cullinan after receiving land from Paul Kruger. They also identify themselves as “Afrikaners” and proudly called themselves “Boer” to this day. They speak Afrikaans as first language and follow Afrikaner traditions, making the exclusive name “Afrikaner” more complex, undefined and multi-racial. This non-White group identification, together with the claims of the Eastern Cape Blacks that they are Afrikaners, foregrounds Biebouw’s remark in 1707 on being an “Afrikaner/Afrikaander/Africander” and that of the Cape prostitutes of mixed descent who called themselves “Afrikaner/Africander” as early as 1890. It was clearly a more non-White than White group in the beginning.97,98

History resulted in three kinds of divisions among the early Dutch-Afrikaner grouping: urban/rural, regional and a class division, each with clear cultural overtones. The urban/rural division was particular salient – those considered the better-educated and more civilised Cape Dutch of the Western Cape or interior towns versus those considered to be ignorant, illiterate and backward Boers living on farms beyond the Western Cape. Regional differences brought a division between the Western Cape Afrikaners and the later Transvaal Boer Afrikaners, especially based on their economical differences. The class differences contained a further difference within the rural Dutch-Afrikaner Boer society with the wealthy land-holding farmers versus the marginalised, poor farmers, many of them bywoners without any land. Many of these poor Dutch-Afrikaners were abused by the rich Boer (Dutch)-Afrikaners and they were not financially and physically supported by the governments of the Boer republics. They were forced out of work on farms where cheaper Black tenants provided the rich Boers with cheaper labour, leading to further unemployment, illiteracy and poverty. During the Anglo Boer War these Boer bywoners formed the bulk of the ‘joiners’ who sided with the British, not only splitting a uniform Afrikaner nation and Afrikaner identity even further, but also delaying the establishment of the culture for many years to come.7

It is therefore clear that by the early 1800s two distinct White groups had developed under the umbrella of the proto-Afrikaner in the Cape Colony, namely the “Cape Dutch” and the “Boers”. These two broad groups in time not only became culturally and economically different from each other, but to a certain extent stood at opposite ends of the continuum of political and socio-religious thinking and doing. The Cape Dutch group, living in and around Cape Town, was generally comprised of a better educated and socially developed society, compared to the Boers who were living in isolation in the country-side with a total lack of educational and cultural facilities. Most of the Cape Dutch (who only adopted and promoted the name “Afrikaner” after the 1900s) of the Cape Colony were pro-British and initially sided with the DRC against the Great Trek of approximate 10 000 Boers [the “Voortrekkers” (First Movers or Pioneers)] who migrated to what became Natal, the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Northern Cape in 1830 to 1840. These cultural and other differences between the Cape Dutch and the Boers and their separate development as two different proto-Afrikaner peoples, are reflected in the Cape Dutch hostility towards the Boers. Some of the Cape Dutch even fought on the side of the British against the Boers. This intimate Cape Dutch-Briton association found expression the many marriages and social and business relations between the Cape Dutch and the British in the early Cape. Many of today’s well-known Afrikaner families supplied the British with food stock for their fighting soldiers in Transvaal and the Free State and were strong British-orientated Cape politicians in line with Cecil John Rhodes’ thinking.3,26,38,39,92,99

The name “Boer” was initially used to refer to the occupation of the “Trek Boers” (travelling farmers) on the Eastern Cape frontier of the Colony around the early 1700s. This group gradually moved northwards to form the “Grens Boers” (border farmers). They later became the vast majority of the “Voortrekkers”. In this way “Boer” became a name for most of the proto-Afrikaners who permanently lived north of the Cape’s eastern border and later north of the Orange River. This group was openly anti-British and anti-colonialist and they had clear ethnic and racial discriminatory tendencies based on their religion. Their lifestyle grew out of their pioneer circumstances and their exposure to a pre-modern environment. These “Boers” were mostly involved in agriculture, living in isolation and lacking basic facilities like schools and career training facilities, hospitals, religious institutions, civil services and the government structures that the Cape Dutch enjoyed and promoted. The Boers’ homes, travelling facilities and amenities seemed to be of a much lower quality and standard as that of the Cape Dutch. Their more rugged lifestyle was necessitated by the undeveloped and rough regions where they farmed. It contrasted their ancestors from Europe and the Cape Dutch in Cape Town and the Cape Colony’s way of living. Eventually this lifestyle spread gradually over the whole eastern border area. This more elementary culture was transferred to the first generation of Boers [now also named “burgers” (burghers)] of the Transvaal and the Free State by the “Voortrekkers”.38,39,82,93,94,100,101

The two groups of proto-Afrikaners, namely the Cape Dutch and the Boers, also differed in their use of the proto-Afrikaans dialect up to the late 1800s all over the Cape. The cultural and socio-economic differences became rooted in the name Boer, and this group started using the name Boer instead of Cape Dutch to identify them as a specific group. These differences later became political and socio-cultural characteristics with the founding of the two anti-British and outright racially discriminative Boer Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The differences that highlighted the Boer and Burgher identification as distinct from Cape Dutch, were further strengthening by the two Anglo Boer Wars that followed. It left many of the Boers hostile and embittered towards the British and the Cape Dutch.39,82,101

The literature preceding the establishment of the Union of South Africa referred to the Transvaal and Free State Afrikaans-speaking citizens as “Boers” and not “Afrikaners.” People like general Smuts, who was initially from the Cape Colony, referred to himself as an “Afrikaner,” but this was at a much later stage during and after the establishment of the Union where new political opportunism played a role. His earlier references to himself, just after the Second Anglo Boer War was to an “old Cape colonialist” (“Kaapkolonialer”) and an old Capetonian (“Kapenaar”), simply meaning a citizen of the Cape Colony.92

It is important to note that three Afrikaner organisations were formed from the 1870s onwards to promote proto-Afrikaans and the Dutch Afrikaners’ interests in terms of an informal nationalism, which undoubtedly included the name “Afrikaner.” The first was the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners, followed by the establishment of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Boere Beschermingsvereniging (BBV) by Jan Hofmeyr in 1878 (representing capitalist farmers and businessmen, the pro-British capitalist Afrikaner nationalism). This was followed by the establishment of the Afrikaner Broederbond in 1879 by the reverend SJ du Toit (for a while it was called the Cape South African Party, but it changed back to Afrikaner Broederbond), representing a radical Afrikaner nationalism away from British domination. These three organisations all aimed to take care of the poor Afrikaans-speaking people’s interests in the Cape.3,7,26

This split into nationalism and a pro-British attitude strengthened a deep Afrikaner class divide and the divide into various opposing and competing sub-groups based on precise economic, social, educational and cultural lines in the Dutch-Afrikaner community. This kind of divide (a negative characteristic of the Afrikaners’ lifestyle and thinking) created conflict in Afrikaner ranks. They split their interests, which interfered with the development of a uniform Afrikaner nationalism. This conflict was further intensified when Hofmeyr captured control of the AB, steering it towards liberal politics and interests, away from the less educated and poor Afrikaners’ immediate politics and interests.7, 102

In the Orange Free State and Transvaal early Afrikaner nationalism was mainly fuelled by the Boer community’s input. It was driven by their hostility and hate of British imperialism and the British aggression against them during the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902). It stood in direct opposition to the pro-British nationalism of the Cape Dutch. A uniformed Afrikaner identity and nationalism was impossible in the Cape in the 1880s and after the outcome of the Anglo Boer War in Transvaal and Orange Free State after 1902. This made unity with the Cape Dutch immediately after 1910 impossible, slowing the development of the Afrikaner as a unified group. This development only continued with the political actions of DF Malan and the NP after 1913 and after 1910 with the intervention of Louis Botha and Jan Smuts to bring about Afrikaner–English reconciliation and reconciliation between the Southern Afrikaners with the Northern Afrikaners. This slowly brought about the unification of subgroups of Afrikaners towards the founding of an Afrikaner entity.7

It took the early Afrikaner architects of Afrikaner nationalism (later hijacked by the NP-AB-DRC Afrikaner nationalists) over a century, starting in 1880s, to establish the term Afrikaner and the Afrikaner “nation”, a dogma based on the “idea of an indigenous people occupying a common territory, having a common language, vigorous culture and proud history, identified by a common name and sharing consciousness of kind”, writes Giliomee.7, p. 13 Central to this is the deliberate transformation of proto-Afrikaans from a “kitchen” or “Hottentot” language to a language in its own right. It ultimately became a modern language with a proper body of literature, spoken by a specific group, namely the Afrikaner.7

Giliomee7, p. 12 writes:

They projected it as White man’s language which set the Afrikaners off from White English-speakers and Brown Afrikaans-speakers. The ethnic project also included the rewriting of history along nationalist lines. Prominent in this were the accounts of Afrikaner heroism and suffering, in particular the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War, and the efforts of the Afrikaners to maintain themselves as a distinct people among ‘savage’ and ‘heathen’ nations. A new nationalist ideology was also constructed. Derived ideas of more abstract nature were grafted upon long-standing beliefs about the need to maintain White supremacy and reject racial intercourse. Prominent among the derived ideas was Calvinism which was strongly propagated by Malan and his followers in the South and the Doppers of Potchefstroom in the North. This Calvinism, or rather neo-Calvinism, argued that God had ordained separate nations, each with a unique destiny, which charged the Afrikaners to maintain themselves in separate cultural, religious and political institutions”.

The main intention, said Giliomee7, was to give meaning to the rather amorphous concept of “Afrikaner,” yet a degree of ambivalence remained around the name for a long time, and it is still there today. The dictionary description of “Afrikander” in the in 1910s was still that it is a person ‘born of White parents in South Africa,” far removed from the political claim of some Cape Dutch as their exclusive name.7

The evidence shows that the name “Afrikaner” was possibly used in a rather non-descriptive way by the middle to late 1800s in the Cape Colony, especially around Cape Town, but not as an exclusive, identifiable and uniform name as it is used by today’s Afrikaners. The name “Afrikaner” to describe a uniform group only took hold after the Second Anglo Boer War when the “Boers” (also commonly identified and referred to as “Transvaal Burgers” or “Transvaal Boers” and “Vrystaat Burgers” or “Vrystaat Boers” respectively) of the two old Republics were left financially devastated and destitute as a result of their War efforts and many were forced to move to the cities for work and a living. In this new and alien environment, they were forced as individuals to adapt to a totally new social and political lifestyle and thinking. This political and economic new dawn, activated by the liberal Cape Dutch and the British authorities governing Southern Africa, affected the mindset of the Burghers of the old Transvaal and Free State. The masked Anglicisation efforts of the authorities promoted the new identity and name “Afrikaner,” which was at the time used to start the political reconciliation between the Cape Colony and the two old Republics. This name was also in line with the blanket name “Southern African” to activate the new South African citizenship created by the Union. In supporting this new “Afrikaner” identity and name, many of the old political leaders of the Transvaal and Free State who joined the new post-1902 South African political dispensation, started to echo more and more Afrikaner nationalism, and from there the use of the name “Afrikaner” for political opportunism.3,26,39,92,95,96,103

In addition, the political climate surrounding the formation of the Union of South Africa did not leave space for the incorporation of the name “Boer” into the new political context and process. This was especially sensitive for the Cape-based Cape Dutch Afrikaners. Leaders promoted the general term “Afrikaner” that was until then mostly associated with the Cape Dutch Afrikaner.3,26,39,82,103-105

It is clear that the name “Afrikaner” to describe the Afrikaners as a specific ethno-cultural group – so frequently used today in public and political literature – slowly emerged all over South Africa only after 1902 with the collapse of the two Boer republics. In 1902 the English author, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, also referred to the Boers who moved eastwards from the Cape Colony in the middle 1800s as “Africanders.” It is unknown if this reference was affected by the new “status” of the Boers after 1902, or if it was a name already in use in the Cape, although not widely in the late 1800s. In retrospect, it seems to have been the new, uniformed and politically promoted name in use from 1902 onwards that influenced Doyle to refer to the trekkers in this way in his writing. It was a referral to these trekkers as early proto-Afrikaners. Even references to the name Afrikaner in public by prominent leaders like General Hertzog after 1902, do not confirmed the existence of an official and uniform group of “Afrikaners” before 1900. People like Hertzog and others offer no confirmation that the name “Afrikaner” was commonly used in the five political and governmental regions of South Africa before 1902 and thus automatically transferred to the Union. It must instead be seen also as a retro-perspective used by Hertzog and other old Boer leaders to describe the new South African scenario. Also, the new common use of the name Afrikaner and the popular descriptions of the history of the Afrikaner nation, offered political power to politicians after 1910 as they could mobilise political support and unity for their own future careers.3,7,26

A good example of this kind of political rhetoric is specifically revealed by Hertzog himself in 1911 when he defined the concepts of “Afrikaner” and “Afrikaner nation” as follows3, p. 301: “In die laaste tyd het mense hulle baie druk gemaak oor die benaming Afrikaner. Hulle het self so ver gegaan om ‘n ander term te soek om daarvoor in die plek te stel. Natuurlik te vergeefs. Dit word gedoen has uitsluitelik omrede van jaloesie. Die Hollandssprekendes was die eerste Afrikaner. Hy kon dit nie help nie. Reeds 150 jaar voor die oordrag van die Kaap aan die Britse Regering was hy hier gehuisves vir goed…Die so geminagtigte Afrikaner het die baanbreker geword van die Suid-Afrikaanse beskawing”.

Hertzog often contradicted himself when speaking about the identification of the Afrikaner. Even by 1921 Hertzog still used names like “Dutch/Afrikaans” versus “English-speaking Afrikaners” and “white and black Afrikander”. Politicians like Hertzog used the more inclusive variant when it suited their political purpose, rather than to be guided by true historical facts. John Vorster also used this kind of political rhetoric in the 1960s with the same short-sighted claim that the NP created the entity Afrikaner and the Afrikaans language.7

As can been seen, most of the political and emotional rhetoric used by Hertzog and later Vorster, failed to offer sound evidence to confirm their claims about the Afrikaner. At most, these terms serve as superficial retro-perspectives on the historical development of the Afrikaner.

Even now after a century, there is some evidence of resistance to the name “Afrikaner” and its broad ethnic and racial classification and stigma. This resistance comes from a small minority of White Boers. Some descendants of the “Boers” in certain geographical parts of South Africa still see themselves as a unique cultural minority that is separate from the larger “Afrikaner”-group, its culture and the name. They do not want to be associated with Afrikaner nationalism. Sub-group and regional names, like “kolonianer” “Boesmanlander”, “Bokveller”, “Bolander”, “Namakwalander”, “Kapenaar”, “Transvaler”, “Vrystater”, “Dopper-Afrikaner” and “Karoo-boer”, etc., are still used by remnants of these minorities to introduce and to identify themselves. In most of these cases, their status as South Africans takes second place, while they ignore the Afrikaner identity. Even the epithets of “joiner”, “hendsopper”, “traitor” and “National Scout” stuck in the minds of certain Afrikaner groups as more important identifications than the broad name “Afrikaner”. The strong “Boer” mentality still, after many years, lingers just below the surface. This is reflected in the use of the term by non-Whites as a name to identify abusive and racially prejudiced Afrikaans-speaking Whites.11,50,75,80,82,87,93,94,100,105-108

The inclination to differentiate between different sub-groups of Afrikaners and to split into factions can gain momentum in the future as the forced and to a certain extent artificial unity of the Afrikaners during the 1900s, starts to disintegrate. The empowerment of the Afrikaanses can disintegrate it further, if not totally over time.3,7,26,39,78,101,109,110

3.2.5 Afrikaners in numbers

Identifying the “true” Afrikaners as a specific group by looking at numbers is a very complex and controversial issue. The traditional classification of Afrikaners as all Whites who speak Afrikaans at home is also controversial and could have led to an over-estimation of their numbers for many years, offering them power as a political pressure group. The inclusion of Coloureds who go through as Whites in statistical research can be a confounding factor. Afrikaners who live outside South Africa permanently but still reflect as South African citizens can also lead to an enormous over-estimation. If the traditional classification is used, the numbers of the Afrikaners have declined dramatically since 1960 compared to the total population of South Africa. In 1960 they made up 10%, compared to only 5.7% of the total population in 2001, reflecting a 0.1% annual decline over 40 years. In 2011, this percentage dropped to 5.2%, reflecting a 0.05% annual decline over 10 years. This placed them below the Coloureds, whose numbers were 4 615 401 in 2011. The total number of Afrikaners living in South Africa in 2001 was estimated at 2 576 184, compared to 2 710 461 in 2011 (an estimated total of between 3.3 to 3.5 million when the Afrikaners living outside the borders are included). It is estimated that between 1994 and 2004, between 1 and 1.5 million Afrikaners left South Africa permanently. This emigration number was conservatively estimated for 2006 to 2011 at 112 046 and for 2011 to 2015 at 95 158.95,96,111-115

It seems that it is specifically the number of Afrikaners in the age group 15 to 34 years that is declining: in 2009 their number was 1 245 000, compared to 1 193 000 in 2014 (a decline of 52 000). For 2009 to 2014, the decline in the number of Afrikaners in the age group 15 to 24 years was 5.2% and for the age group 25 to 34 it was 3%.75,80,87,95,96,111,115

The White segment of the population, of which the Afrikaners formed approximately 58% in 2011, declined with 4.2% between 2009 and 2014, while the Black population increased with 7.3%. The statistics for 2011 to 2016 confirmed the declining trend in the White segment numbers: the age group 0 to 4 years declined from 268 267 to 253 035; the age group 20 to 24 declined from 313 616 to 303 257; the age group 25 to 29 declined from 336 355 to 287 792; the age group 30 to 34 declined from 318 329 to 279 475; and the age group 35 to 39 declined from 342 316 to 278 789. The White segment’s decline in total for the period 2011 to 2016 was from 4 586 838 to 4 516 691 (a decline of 70 147 or -1.5% in five years). 75,80,87,95,96,111,115

What is shocking about the 2017 findings of Statistics South Africa (SSA) is the dramatic aging of the White population over the past 20 years. This is the result of the emigration of younger people, the decline in White births and the fact that people are living longer. Where the ratio of people 16 years and older to children younger than 16 years is 20 above 16 years per 100 children for Blacks, it has become 130 above 16 years per 100 children for Whites. If this trend continues, only a small pocket of Whites will be left in South Africa in years to come. Brand-Jonker 117 estimates the total South African White population at only 3% (compared to the present 8%) in 60 years. Cronje is even more pessimistic and he thinks that the White population can decline to between 1% and 3% in less than 40 years. This negative population profile of Whites is fully applicable to the Afrikaners.109,117,118

The Afrikaner doctrine of the NP-AB-DRC leadership that they have a “chosen role as a nation in Africa by God” and as “the bearers of the European culture in South Africa,” made them blind to the dramatic changes in their status in Africa, “with or without God’s will”. This hard reality has now arrived in 2017.37,119,120

Afrikaners have never taken a hard look at themselves in the mirror. They have a shocking lack of insight into the country’s present and future political and racial environment. They therefore pay no individual attention to their dwindling numbers and diminishing political and military power base, which could be devastating in long run for their existence. This lack of basic insight to read population warnings is illustrated well by Ginsberg121, p. 21 when he writes: “Back in 1989 there was one black child born every 28 seconds, and one white child born every 12 minutes”. Nearly 30 years ago Afrikaners knew what was awaiting them, but they failed to act constructively.

It is clear that it is not only the Afrikaner numbers that are declining, but the broader White segment as well. This implies a decline in political empowerment, not only for the Afrikaners, but for all Whites.75,80,87,95,96,111,115

3.2.6 Afrikaner culture

The Afrikaners’ unique ethno-cultural identity has always been intricately linked to the name “Afrikaner” and their numbers as a tribe. Of the main components of the Afrikaner culture are the Afrikaans language, religion, cultural heritage, education, family life, employment, sports and recreation, and folklore. This unique Afrikaner culture was nurtured and maintained in isolation by means of a system of separate development in which the non-White cultures, especially that of the Blacks, were seen as inferior to that of the Afrikaner. It was even sometimes regarded as non-Christian.37-39,119

This early unique Afrikaner culture and the strict isolation from the rest of South African cultures in an effort to conserve it, circled out to all spheres of South African social life. This resulted in separate sport and recreation activities, residential areas and health, school and training facilities; as well as legal prohibitions on miscegenation. The foundation was Christian nationalism. The basic intention was not only to preserve the Afrikaner identity, but to maintain the fundamentals of Afrikaner culture and to limit it to the Afrikaner-milieu alone. In terms of the doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism, the principle was to promote and to reserve Afrikaner culture at all cost; and to cleanse it from foreign, especially Black cultural influences. Foundational to this doctrine was the belief that the Afrikaner and White civilisations would disappear if it became contaminated by the Black culture. This disappearance of the White and Afrikaner civilisation would automatically result in the disappearance of the Afrikaner as a person.26,37,39,119

Religion was always a strong role player in the Afrikaners’ behaviour and their political thinking and indoctrination, which took the form of a Christian nationalism. Socialism and communism were feared, not because of their implications for the economy, but due to the threat to the Afrikaners’ religion and to their privileges and favoured lifestyles. The Afrikaners’ religious beliefs and traditions were founded on the Protestant practices of the Reformed Church of Holland in the 17th century and were later influenced by English-speaking ministers of the UK. Of all these early role players, it seems that the French Huguenots’ racial-religious influence on the political mindsets of the proto-Afrikaner was immense and has been under-estimated in evaluations of the Afrikaners’ later racism. These French settlers, arriving at the Cape in 1688 at a time when the White population lacked a strong unified political mindset, strongly underwrote the Swiss church reformer John Calvin’s ideas that the church should influence the government and that races should remain pure and separate. This new racial-religious doctrine was quickly incorporated into to Cape’s religious system, which was up until that time influenced by the Goske agreement of 1671. French Calvinism quickly became part of the proto-Afrikaner and the doctrine of the Cape Reformed Church, leading to a unique kind of Calvinistic Protestantism among the proto-Afrikaners and later Afrikaners. By 1985, as many as 92% of Afrikaners were still members of the various Afrikaner Reformed Churches, showing the lasting influence of Calvinist Protestantism on Afrikaners after 300 years.37,38,95,96

The Cape French Huguenots, known for their extreme religious-political views on race, can therefore be regarded as one of the main causes of the later racial discrimination in South Africa. In fact, the Huguenots’ racial attitude was one of the reasons for their persecution and expulsion from France that brought them to the Cape.95,96

The above early blueprint of religious-racial thinking in time led to a specific social-cultural lifestyle among the proto-Afrikaners of the Cape Settlement, Cape Colony and the Boer Republics and later especially the Afrikaners of the Union and the Republic of South Africa. Central to this particular lifestyle and inclination were European, Western and Christian values, standards and life views; community cohesion; a familiar and recognisable environment; a specific way of life; a sense of origin and identity; the psychological satisfaction of an in-group community life; standards of public order, behaviour and respectability; traditions and prescriptions; financial well-being and political-empowerment; and so-called “white culture,” mythical or not. This blueprint became a driver and guideline for their daily doings, decision making, beliefs, customs, traditions and education, even outside the racial and class context. It became so recognisable that literature refers to it as the “unique culture” of the Afrikaners.7,37,38,119

Although this “European Afrikaner culture” of the Afrikaner lacked reference to any European society, Afrikaners believed that they are the bearers of a superior, “African-free” European system that required the imposition of pervasive controls and management of Blacks.37,119

This cultural-religion-political inclination affected all of the Afrikaner’s life to such an extent that major Christian religious holidays like Christmas, Good Friday, Ascension Day were reserved next to political holidays like Founder’s Day, Republic Day, Kruger Day, Day of the Vow. These days became “holy days” that all Afrikaners strictly adhered to and respected. Belonging to one of the Afrikaner Reformed churches was a priority and essential for social mobility. Sunday became a day of rest, reserved for attending church services, with shops, movie theatres and the practice of organised sport being forbidden. This Calvinist Protestantism was intertwined with certain church activities like baptism, catechism and Bible instruction, and specific marriage and burial traditions and customs that reminds one of 17th century Protestant practices.95,96

Afrikaners children were educated within a framework of a strict and punitive Protestant religio-political worldview. Children were required to think, develop and behave within the confines of this conservative mindset. Even a strict clothing protocol was prescribed at Afrikaner schools and churches. In line with their Calvinist Protestantism, children were required to receive a good school training from the age of six to 18 years, and where possible, to attend tertiary institutions.95,96

The Afrikaners’ Calvinist Protestantism rites of passage were inculcated into their folklore, public and personal relationships, family life, dress, traditions, lifestyle rules and prescriptions, sport and recreational activities and employment traditions and styles. Boer music (“Boeremusiek”), folk dance (“Volkspele”), social dancing (“sokkie”) and “Boeresport” (a range of games like tug of war, three-legged races, jukskei and other games) became traditions unique to the Afrikaner.37,95,96

There have been changes to the Afrikaner’s culture, some recent and swift after 1994, while others have been happening gradually over many years. First, there has been a gradual religious mindshift with regard to Black people in the Afrikaner, but it ultimately resulted in immense changes to and the Afrikaner culture, basically obliterating it. This left many deviating from political and moral prescriptions, making them more pragmatic and materialistic. Although the DRC kept Afrikaners from church integration, the Calvinist Protestantism of the proto-Afrikaner was also taught to the Cape slaves and the Cape Coloureds. The various missionary institutes also transferred Christianity to the Blacks. The effect of the early Christianisation efforts on the lifestyles of non-Whites is well illustrated in research. Christianity in time spread to the rest of the South African population, to such an extent that 87.9% of the Blacks and 90% of the total South African population adhere to Christianity today. This outcome was one of the reasons why the doctrine of separate development from the early 1700s onwards (institutionalised as Apartheid in the 20th century) with its belief that the Blacks were non-Christians or heathens in terms of Grand Apartheid, gradually became obsolete. The religious and cultural uniformity among Afrikaners weakened immensely after the fall of Apartheid. The solidarity and group unity on race and the “Black question”, faded. The improvement of religious ties and increased socialisation between Whites and Blacks bettered personal and work relations between some sectors of the Afrikaners and Blacks. Renewed post-1994 socialisation between Whites and Blacks further weakened the stereotypes held among Afrikaners that Blacks are primitive and that there are true racial differences that make Blacks culturally and psychologically inferior as humans and that keeps them from developing according to the standards of Western civilisation.78,119,122-125

The impact of the new South Africa also influenced the religious and cultural context of the present-day Afrikaner, changing it dramatically since 1994. Afrikaners have moved far away from the Huguenot doctrine of their grandfathers and their fathers. This is reflected in a decline in their adherence to Christianity, where as much as 82% Afrikaners belonged to the Dutch Reformed Churches in 1982, this membership has declined to only 1 450 861 out of a 2 576 184 possible Afrikaner members by 2001, representing 56%. In 2013 it was also reported that just more than 30% of Afrikaners still read the Bible at home, while as much as 62% Afrikaners said in 2015 that they no longer attend church on a weekly base.95,96

This “unofficial” split between the “old” and “present-day” doctrines, habits, customs and traditions of the DRC churches is clearly reflected by their members’ public rejection of firmly established church rituals, practices and even management. The position of women as ministers, gays in church life, etc. and various other controversial issues became burning issues, leading to direct confrontation between members and church leaders. Many members have come to reject the pre-1994 doctrines of the NP and AB. The Afrikaners, especially the younger generation, do not hesitate to take the church to court if they feel that the church has failed them and their new liberal religious perspectives. Subjects like atheism, communist Christianity and homosexuality are now openly discussed and even practiced or underwritten by Afrikaners without the pre-1994 fear of being completely rejected by the Afrikaner community. Religious radicalism and blind trust in the right-wing church culture has drastically declined. This new religious thinking among Afrikaners resulted in a large egression from the traditional Afrikaner churches to charismatic churches. These changes have resulted in the DRC threatening to split into two and it is no longer the church of choice among all Afrikaners.52-54,125-139

The only thing Afrikaner churches can still offer their often-conservative members is a White Christianity that is still guarded from a Brown and Black Christianity. Since 2000, many of the Afrikaners, especially the younger generation, have turned away from extreme religious practices and fundamentalism, lessening the dominance of the Calvinist component over their culture, social and political life.101,129,139

The diminishing role of the DRC in public life is indicative of a slow death in progress, as happened with the NP and AB. As with the NP during its dying years, the DRC fails to offer moral leadership to its members on their future in the new South Africa and to modernise its religious system.129,140

Of course the end of Apartheid contributed to the transformation in the Afrikaner’s religious mindset. This change has been supported by changes to the education system since 1994. This includes the exclusion of religious beliefs from schools, phasing out exclusively White public schools and higher education institutions with Afrikaans as medium of instruction. The newly established academic, work-related and social relationships between the younger Whites and Blacks, both generations born outside of the Apartheid contamination of hate and conflict, has hastened this change.58,141,142

Clearly, the sentiment around the traditional Afrikaner church, its powers and influences, has started to crumble fast, freeing the Afrikaner more and more from religious and cultural isolation, making them independent from a formal church association. This outcome, driven by new democratic and free thinking, has also started to shape the Afrikaner’s unique culture. Afrikaners’ personal and social views on education, childrearing, marriage and racism, including Afrikaner nationalism, have undergone a metamorphosis to something that is quite the opposite of the views that characterised the culture of twenty to thirty years ago. The maintenance of old traditions, views, opinions and values have weakened and seems to be in a process of diminishing. Political and social changes and reforms are gruelling processes, sparing not even that which has been regarded as sacred for many centuries. The Afrikaners culture bears evidence of this gruelling process of the last 20 years, steering more and more into an unblemished South African culture.7,37,119

3.2.7 Afrikaners’ White blood purity

A direct and primary co-determinant that activated and drove the Afrikaner to racial domination and discrimination was his fear that open racial societies would promote miscegenation, leading to a contamination of their Caucasian blood by non-White blood. Sexual contact between different races therefore had to be avoided, during Apartheid by means of legal prohibitions. It is the same fear that led the Nazis to the “Jewry question” and the Holocaust as an end result.1,26,39

Added to this, there was the widely accepted and propagated view that the “Afrikaner” is a unique and “pure” White, European and Caucasian race that had its biological and cultural origins in 1652 at the Cape Settlement. This was far from the truth and an incorrect idea. The proof in literature of a more than 6% non-White component in the bloodline of the earlier White Cape settlers in the immediate period after 1652 through miscegenation, was tactfully avoided by researchers and the nationalist Afrikaner himself from 1902 onwards. This denial became even stronger from the 1940s onwards with the development of Afrikaner nationalism.3,7,39

The estimated 6% blood from other races in the Afrikaner’s bloodline is, in fact, far too low. Some research puts it at 7.2%, while other research reflects a 10.7% Indian influence on the Afrikaners’ matrilineal gene pool from Malaysian and other slave women (up to the early 1800s, 80% of the slaves came from India. It was only from 1730 onwards that the import of slaves from Madagascar was intensified).73,143

There is also an erroneous view that this early intermingling was limited to few and certain White families, and that these 6% to 10.7% mixed Afrikaner descendants were pushed from White society to form the new Coloured population at the Cape. This vertical biological development of a closed and outcast group of mixed people, mostly excluded from the White nucleus that formed modern Afrikaners, is surely true as evidenced by the South African Coloureds and other mixed people of today. The politician and former premier of the Cape Province, Peter Marais, describes this “schizophrenic” split between people of the same bloodline well49, p. 7: “Ons (wit en bruin mense) is een volk. Een pa, maar twee ma’s”. The superficiality of this split is confirmed by historical evidence of an immense horizontal biological impact of “Coloured blood” on Afrikaners’ genes, contradicting the 6% to 10.7% of mixed Afrikaner descendants and of an exclusive separate vertical development of the Coloureds as a separate ethnic group.

The sited numbers (6% to 10.7%) selectively masked the true historical fact of a free social and sexual horizontal biological association between the races in the Cape, especially immediately after the introduction of the free burghers in 1657 up to 1671. The fact is, many of the children born to European fathers between 1650 and the late 1600s had slave mothers. Indeed, three out of four children born to slave mothers during 1650 to 1670 had White fathers (meaning that the direct, first line infusion of “non-White blood” into the White parent stock can even as high as 75%). The fact is that between 1657 1671, these early male “Afrikaner” ancestors took Black, Hottentot and Malay women. They were accepted into the White community, either as concubines or wives. They, together with some White women, became the parent stock of the Whites and the Afrikaners. These non-White women’s children, especially the females, were mostly assimilated into society directly and horizontally to make up for the shortage of women, without any discrimination or stigmatisation.7,38,73

This multiracial component that was incorporated into the White bloodline, a fact that is mostly hushed, had a profound effect on the gene pool of the later Afrikaners, seeing that no remarkable effort was made immediately after 1691 to bring more White colonist families or White women. Between 1657 and 1806, the total number of White women who arrived was 454 compared to 1 590 White male colonists. This comes to one female for every four males. In 1688 the White population consisted of 573 persons: 254 men, 88 women and 231 children, in other words one woman for every three men. The above White population (including the contingent of women from other races incorporated into the White family tree) of the late 1600s became the matrilineal Afrikaner parent stock and gene pool. These women who came to the early Cape married early and had large families. There was a high incidence of inter-family marriages as result of the shortage of females. These earlier proto-Afrikaner-families, founded on various racial and ethnic bloodlines, formed the trunk (nucleus) of the Afrikaner family tree that branched out to today’s Afrikaners.39

The 6% to 10.7% influence of other races on the earlier White colonists spread out horizontally since 1652. Within two generations, these genes formed part of all or most of the matrilineal White families at the Cape. This 6% to 10.7% is therefore misleading. The Afrikaner bloodline is far more inclusive of other races, and this intermingling affected most of the Whites at the Cape by 1754, when the census of Cape governor Ryk Tulbagh showed that White free burghers totalled only about 6 000. They were already outnumbered by more than 6 000 slaves (this was already apparent by 1710). Statistically speaking, the infusion of “blood” from other races to the early matrilineal White society at the Cape could results in a 100% “contamination” of the Afrikaner blood of “old” Afrikaner families by bloodlines from other races. This occurred due to repeated intermarriages between proto-Afrikaner families between 1652 and 1806.. This paints a picture that is totally different from the 6% to 10.7% reflected in literature.38,39,73,143

Literature sites the early horizontal European blood infusion to the matrilineal Afrikaner parent stock as 66.67% Dutch, 16.67% French, 14.29% German and 2.37% Scandinavian, Belgian, Scottish and Irish “bloodlines” at the Cape in the late 1600s and the early 1700s. These estimations change a little bit when the period is taken between 1657 and 1867. The numbers change as follows: 35.5% Dutch, 13.9% French, 34.4% German, 2.6% British, 2.8% Other European, 3.6% Unknown and 7.2% non-European. These numbers bluntly and blindly ignore the fact that the French impact of between 13.9% and 16.67% from 1688 constitutes another non-White horizontal blood contamination of the gene pool of the matrilineal Afrikaner parent stock at the Cape. This is due to the earlier Afro-Arab blood contamination of Europeans like the French, Portuguese and Spanish as a result of the early Moorish occupation of Europe and the miscegenation between the Europeans and the Afro-Arabs for many years. This French blood contamination was further transferred to the English through widespread intermarriages between the English and the French after the Battle of Hastings in 1066 and the French reign of England until 1366, to such an extent that 25% of the English forefathers are French. This multiracial bloodline was transferred to the proto-Afrikaners from the 1800s through intermarriages with the British at the Cape. The same is true of the blood contamination of proto-Afrikaners through their intermarriages with Portuguese and Spaniards at the Cape.72,73,91,144,145

The slow growth of the Cape White population since 1754 and the shortage of European newcomers, especially women, to contribute to pureness of their European bloodline, is confirmed by the fact that in 1806 (52 years after the Tulbagh census) the Cape’s White population was still very small, only 26 720. This reflected an average annual growth of only 502 White people. This confirms the branching out (downwards) of the multiracial genetic component through the matrilineal White parent stock due to constant and unavoidable inter-family marriages.95,96,143

This horizontal inter-family bloodline among Afrikaners that goes hand-in-hand with a multiracial component is further confirmed by various family illnesses prevalent in Coloured and Afrikaner families over many years and generations. Huntington’s disease is such an example. The South African mixed-race population contracted this illness from their Dutch and British ancestry, which they share with the Afrikaners. These symptomatic illnesses were undoubtedly further aggravated by the later horizontal intermarriages within Afrikaner families, especially in the late 1800s and early 1900s.73,146,147

By the late 1800’s there were more or less 46 000 Whites at the Cape. They were so interconnected through intermarriage that they were a great interrelated family rather than a new polyglot community. In the later stages of the intermarriage effect, non-White mothers formed a nucleus. Since there was a shortage of women up to the early 1800s, this led to further inter-family marriages between first and second nephews and nieces. In this way, a multiracial bloodline spread horizontally too many, if not most, of the branches of the Afrikaner family tree. This phenomenon was indeed much higher than the conservative and traditionally accepted 6% to 10.7% reflected in the general genealogical literature on the Afrikaner. It is not a case that only 6% to 10.7% of the Afrikaners are from other races; a case can rather be made that more than 6% to 10.7% of the initial gene pool of the Afrikaner is multiracial. This means that far more that 6% to 10.7% of today’s Afrikaners are are not purely White.72,73,144

The shortage of women at the Cape resulted in the mixed or Coloured females from the first miscegenation becoming concubines and wives to male newcomers. It was only by the middle 1800s that the gender ratio of 1:4 females to males improved. This highlights the comprehensive pathway of “blood contamination” that follows when the trunk of a family tree is horizontally penetrated by various bloodlines at an early stage and spreads out downwards over centuries to affect many, if not all, of the descendants. The later “whiteness” of these “contaminated” Whites did not come from the “blood purity” of the Whites at the Cape or their later abstinence from miscegenation with other races. It was simply the direct result of the “whitening” of their mixed race offspring with further miscegenation with Whites until they became indistinguishable from the White settlers themselves. However, genetically they are more or less the same as their mixed nephews and nieces.73,146

The argument that an initially “contaminated” White bloodline has been purified through generations of only procreating within the White gene pool, especially by means of the unofficial and official Apartheid policies that excluded other races from the Afrikaner’s society and family life to prevent mixing, carries little weight. Though racial segregation was practiced from the 1850s to the 1990s, this period of abstinence from racial miscegenation was too short to “purify” a large contingent of Afrikaners of mixed-race blood from their non-White ancestors, dating especially from 1652 to 1670 and immediate thereafter. Indeed, their skins became more white but their gene pool is not white to the same extent. No wonder that this inclusion of “black blood” now inspire proponents of the “Afrikaners-are-Africans”-view to declare the Afrikaner as “Black”.70-72,144,146

The present-day Afrikaner can pride himself in being “purely White” in terms of various definitions used worldwide. However, the term “White person” has since 1924 been defined in the State of Virginia, USA as “such a person has no trace whatsoever of any blood other than Caucasian or one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and no other non-Caucasia blood.” If this definition is used, many Afrikaners would not have passed the pure White test. Using the Nazi annulment definition where a single Jew in the family tree meant that a person was a Jew, the outcome would have been catastrophic. The chances of an Afrikaner to survive a Holocaust would have been zero. In South Africa, the Afrikaner has come to understand the dilemma of his mixed bloodline very well. In some cases, there is a sudden manifestation of a Coloured or Black child from White parents. The “White classification” of 1948 was amended in 1966 so that the child of two White parents were classified as “White”, notwithstanding the contrary physical appearances to be Black or mixed of their offspring.1,148,149

The South African human rights activist, Rhoda Kadalie, herself a descendant from White, Malaysian and Coloured fore-fathers, previously married to a White South African and the mother of children born out of this so called “mixed” marriage, rejected the Afrikaner’s insistence on his White blood purity when she said with pride about her family150, p.11: “Ons is ‘n regte basterfamilie”. This can surely also be said by many Afrikaners with the same pride as Kadalie, if they have courage enough and are honest with themselves about their heritage.

It is important to note that the South African Blacks also carry the genes of various races through their miscegenation with other races in South Africa. South African Black tribes are physically the end product of a racial mingling of the Negros of Africa and the Hamite people. South African Blacks can today be classified into four clear and separate Black groups in terms of language and culture. This is notwithstanding the ANC and the Marxist intentions and efforts to declare all South Africans “grey people” and the Blacks a uniform Black group for the sake of political rights. The four groups are the Nguni group, the Sotho-Tswana group, the Venda group and the Shangana-Tsonga group. These four main Black groups can further be divided into ten Black ethnic groups, each with their own culture, life values, language, and customs and characteristics that are conserved. They also inbred with Whites, Coloureds, Asians as well as other smaller groups like the Khoi-Khoi and Hottentot. This multi-racial inbreeding between Afrikaners, Coloureds and Blacks is still active and ongoing today as reflected by many mixed marriages and the birth of “mixed-race” children.42,50,113,142,150,151

One example of this racial intermingling is the marriage of the Democratic Alliance (DA) leader, Mmusi Maimane, to a White woman.15 This continuation of racial miscegenation that started in 1652 and the resulting new generation of intermixed Blacks and Whites is excellently described by Tambo Dali, a prominent Black South African married to a White South African, when he says142, p. 23: “In my family there are three colours: black, white and my four golden brown children.”

History has the inclination to repeat itself, also regarding natural racial mingling and miscegenation. South Africa is an excellent example where even the Immorality Act of the Apartheid regime could not stop it. Racial intermingling between Blacks and Whites is going to increase in the future, not decrease.

Ultimately, the colour of a person’s skin can contribute very little to the physical classification of a person into a specific South African race group. To call South African Blacks “pure Blacks” is also an error, just as the Afrikaners are not “pure Whites”: South Africans are to a great extent ethnically and racially much more “Creole” than they themselves know or want to know.42,78,113-115

4. Discussion

The view of the Afrikaner as a nation was clearly inapplicable and erroneous. The same can be said about the political and emotionally laden classifications of people as part of the “White nation”, the “Zulu nation”, or the “Xhosa nation”. Today, “nation” refers to the South African nation, including all the races, tribes and peoples inside the borders of the country under one legal definition and classification. The Afrikaners can at most be seen as a South African tribe, more specifically a group among which specific racial features and various cultural similarities are identifiable, based on a predominately mixed European origin.

Arguing that Afrikaans is an old language is wrong. Although it does have roots in the remote past, it is not yet a century old in 2017 as an official language. In addition, to argue that it was exclusively developed by the Afrikaner or that it is a sole Afrikaner possession is also wrong. Afrikaans developed into an independent language from European Dutch as its initial basis. This process was driven by South Africa’s “old” populations, starting in 1652. It was definitely not a language spoken exclusively by the proto-Afrikaners away from the other racial and ethnic groups. To the contrary, it was a mutual language, unsophisticated for a long time, spoken, written and used by the country’s various racial and ethnic groups in their communication with each other. Indeed, one of the first works in written Afrikaans was “Bayaan-ud-djyn”, an Islamic tract written in Arabic script by Abu Bakr in 1845.74,76,83,152-154

There are still various Afrikaans dialects that could be regarded as “Kombuis” Afrikaans. Examples include the varieties spoken in certain parts of the country by the various Afrikaans subgroups, like “Afri-kaaps” of the Cape Flats, “Cape Afrikaans” of Western Cape and the “Orange River Afrikaans” in the Northern-Cape. These dialects can with good reason be seen as public protests against the gold standard of Afrikaans that some academic purists with Afrikaner-nationalist sentiments see as the correct and only Afrikaans, belonging exclusively to the nationalist Afrikaners.73,89,107

This means the Afrikaans language is still in a process of development and it will certainly change considerably as time goes on, especially with the input of the Afrikaanses. The language will not only survive, like the Icelandic and Welsh languages did, it will grow through its use in primary communications between the Afrikaanses as their numbers grow.52-54,67,76,77,152,155-158

It is not wrong to say that Afrikaans also belongs to the “Afrikaanses”, a group that is much more comprehensive in numbers than the Afrikaner grouping, but free from the exclusive contaminated race and ethnicity connection of the Afrikaners. The presence of the Afrikaanses in the South African greater society indeed nullifies the nationalist Afrikaner argument that the Afrikaners are the sole creators or keepers and guardians of the Afrikaans language: there are many more role players. The future of Afrikaans, it seems, is much safer in the hands of the politically uncontaminated “Afrikaanses” than in those of the Afrikaner.7

The name “Afrikaner” in certain circles refers to an exclusive Afrikaner identity that entails political rights and that is regarded as centuries old and endangered by other races and even outsiders from his own White racial group if he allows miscegenation. This identity served as a justification for his discriminatory behaviour against persons from other races. The though construct surrounding this identity was clearly erroneous.

The research shows that the Afrikaners are indeed a very small group in the greater South African population. They are decreasing in number every year, and seeing the controversy around the name “Afrikaner” as an established identity that conserves Afrikaner unity and exclusiveness, the Afrikaner is already en route to dissolution of the group’s coherence as a natural course of events. If the declining numbers (5.2% to 10%) of the Afrikaners from 1960 to 2011 (50 years) are taken as a guideline for future predictions, and the emigration numbers of 1994 to 2017 continue, the Afrikaner as a group would be dissolved by 2117.75,80,87

The belief that the present-day Afrikaner’s Christian religion is unique is also an untruth. The same can be said about the Afrikaner’s culture of today: it has very little in common with the Afrikaner culture of his father and his grandfather. Present Afrikaner culture is much more culturally integrated with the other ethnic groups, like the Coloureds and to some extent even the Blacks. These various cultural changes, some slight while others are significant, are notable in Afrikaner family life, work ethic, the customs and traditions they underwrite and practice, as well as his educational and social preferences. The Afrikaner in general has become an individual, not very different from any other South African.

The idea that the Afrikaner is “lily” white is inaccurate. The strict prohibition of miscegenation between Afrikaners and Blacks because of the Afrikaner’s White blood purity was therefore pointless. The process of intermingling was activated in 1652 and is indeed on-going. The Afrikaner’s discrimination on the basis of “pure blood” reflects a lack of knowledge about his own racial origin. The Afrikaner seems to lack insight and wise reasoning in this regard.

When considering the above information, it is clear that Apartheid was in essence designed by the NP, the AB and the DRC, especially during the period under Verwoerd, in an attempt to secure a correspondence between nation status and territory for Afrikaners. The only principle was refusal to share political power in South Africa. This was done by imposing a political order with creative procrastination and manipulation, much more incisive than just pure racial segregation. It was a period of grand Apartheid with brutal and numerous well thought through legislative, economic, political and administrative policies. It ignored and disregarded the interests and aspirations of the subjugated citizens of South Africa in a blind belief that the Afrikaners, at that stage the most developed of all the South African groups, deserved the lion’s share of all the country’s benefits and rights and that this situation will be permanent. Although there were a number of policy reforms and adaptations by the NP since the late 1970s to uplift Blacks, was it exclusively aimed at keeping the Afrikaner regime in power and to reserve Afrikaner and White rights and benefits.7,37,159

There is no doubt that the masterminds behind Apartheid during the peak of Apartheid were the members of the Afrikaner Broederbond. It consisted of a nucleus of approximately 20 000 nationalist Afrikaners, referred to as the Super Afrikaners. Their powerful cultural, economical, political and military tentacles reached all nationalist Afrikaners, especially the Afrikaners belonging to the NP and the DRC. It form an immense circle and powerful group of approximately three million members, what Giliomee called the NP-Broederbonder-Afrikaners.41, p. 11 Many Afrikaners were not nationalist Afrikaners and experienced discrimination and domination to some extent, like the Blacks. However, they still benefited directly and indirectly from Apartheid and, notwithstanding their distaste for Apartheid, they mostly remained silent on Apartheid’s wrong-doings. Collectively, these side-lined Afrikaners cannot escape responsibility for Apartheid, whatever their arguments and excuses are. They are, with the Super-Afrikaners and nationalist Afrikaners, culprits. Although it is argued that Afrikaners born after 1994 are been freed from this burden they too cannot plead not guilty. They are still benefitting from what their forefathers gained over many years during Apartheid. This outcome makes all of these individuals part of the entity “Afrikaners” to which this article refers.7,36,37,41

5. Conclusion

The aim of this first article in the series of seven was to inform the Afrikaner on who he is and to reflect on the Afrikaner and the Afrikaner’s past roles as citizens of South Africa. The article begs of Afrikaners in-depth introspection. Afrikaners should answer the question whether they had already reached self-actualisation and an optimal personal happiness in the new South Africa. Has the Afrikaner left his worries and fears behind to commit to a good life here, or is he considering other options for happiness in the future.

It is an open question whether the proto-Afrikaner of 1910 on the founding of the Union, would have supported racism, especially the Afrikaner nationalism of the NP-AB-DRC-alliance (Grand Apartheid) from 1948 onwards, had they been thoroughly educated on who they are and where they truly come from. Would the mess the Afrikaners find themselves in today have been their real choice? If Afrikaners knew the facts, would they not perhaps have acted differently? Instead of selecting to obstruct Black voting from 1910 to1948, would they not have had selected not to obstruct one-man-one-vote. Would they not have parted with the “Boer” and “Cape Dutch” identities in 1910 to choose the ANC as his preferred party by the 1960s? Would they not perhaps have become Afrikaanse and Black South Africans because they are Black?3,11,26,92,96,

Was the Afrikaner’s immense psychological fear in 1994 to be rejected as a “traitor”, “joiner” and “hendsopper” (“hand-upper) if he became an ANC supporter or made another radical political change-over stronger than the fear that their culture will dissolve within a century? Are these two fears, now in combination, paralysing today the Afrikaners so that they cannot make sound decisions about their present and future role in the RSA?3,11,26,92,96

Was the cause of Apartheid perhaps the Afrikaner’s dark disposition and inclination to racial and ethnic discrimination? If so, it has resulted in many negative political and life consequences that the Afrikaner must face as they face the personal confusion in the new South Africa.

Two crucial questions emerge from the above:

▼Was the Afrikaner’s racial and ethnic discrimination learned from and embedded as part of their mindset by the bad examples of racist governance and other social, religious, cultural and political institutions and groups into which they were born and grew up? or

▼Do Afrikaners regard their racial behaviours as justified acts of revenge for personal, political, social and economic injustices perpetrated against them by other races and ethnic groups?

Evaluating your own history and wrongdoings of the past is not easy. “We find ourselves living in an indignant world, one intolerant of complexity when viewing our history and eager for simple characterisations of good and bad”, writes the writer Kalim Rajab160, p. 18. He concludes160, p. 18: “…we ultimately need room for greater magnanimity and to allow greater space for graciousness in our understanding of the past”. These words are very much applicable to the Afrikaners when they have to look at themselves: they are caught up in indoctrination that taught that they are a superior race that does only the ethically correct and good, versus the inferior Black subordinates whose doings were infected with unethical and bad behaviour and an inferior disposition. The nationalist Afrikaner regime’s doctrine of Afrikaner supremacy was supported by the idea of a “completeness and perfection” as part of a superior mindset and lifestyle. This started in in 1652 at the Cape of Good Hope. It was internalised by many ordinary Afrikaners: Afrikaners are only good versus Blacks are always bad. Most Afrikaners are too frightened to acknowledge the bad in their past, avoiding consciously and unconsciously their incompleteness, imperfection and failures, which so greatly characterise all humans. This study informed the Afrikaners of their true past, who they are: they are just ordinary humans, indigenous people of the same bloodline as their previous subordinates, characterised by the same incompleteness, imperfections and failures.

The advice of Palkhivala159 is valuable for Afrikaners in their effort to unshackle and cleanse themselves from the dark secrets of their past and to move successfully into the new South Africa with its manifold indigenous realities. He writes159, p. 77: “Every country must learn to live with its past history and to cherish it instead of trying to rewrite it. Chaos would be the only result of trying to undertake ‘correction of history’, or to undo the past, or to seek to remedy past wrongs”. The Afrikaners tried all these wrong venues in the past and failed. They have hopefully at last learned from the past.

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PEER REVIEW
Not commissioned. Externally peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING
The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Arts, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa.