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Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (11: Introduction))

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (11: Introduction)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Capability, desperate, evaluation, electorate, expropriation, journalism, marginalised, populist, probation, scenario, violence.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 2

1. Background

During the post-May-2019-to-2024 parliamentary term of the ANC, certain political tendencies may be expected to emerge which would have a profound effect upon South Africa. Some may be described as positive, while others may be characterised as extremely negative with the inclination to produce unrest, anarchy and revolution. Post-May 2019 will not necessarily mean the beginning of a golden age in the South African republic, but neither does it mean that it would be impossible for the ANC to be rehabilitated. The installation of the new regime on 9 May 2019 portends two future periods under the ANC with clear outcomes that may bring dramatic changes in its policies and actions: the 2019-to-2022 period (from May 2019 until the national conference of the ANC in 2020), as well as the 2022-to-2024 period (national conference in 2020 until the next national elections in 2024).

The post-May 2019 period may turn out to be a kind of continuation of the pre-2019 system during which the ANC will again be the ruler with the same failures and misdemeanours of the pre-May-2019 period. But, there is the possibility of an emerging post-May political radicalism, such as land grabbing under the ANC (that may be effected together with the other radical parties like the EFF), which transform South Africa at last into the long-expected autocratic and failed country (which is far worst than a failed state) prophesied by conservative commentators. The period from 2019 to 2022 may be full of political intrigues, chaos and of power struggles between splinter groups of the ANC, further aggravated by radical small parties of the EFF calibre. Included herein would be the ongoing economic and social failures, problems with water and electricity, etc. And if this period does not have the potential to bring enough upheaval, unrest and revolution, there will follow the critical period from 2022 to 2024 during which new factions and political groupings may be formed inside and outside the ANC, which may vary from ultra-radicalism to ultra-conservatism. All of this may play out if the main problems of South Africa, such as comprehensive land reform, are not dealt with during the pre-2022 phase. Both these two periods and timeframes have their own uniqueness and may be intertwined, but, as mentioned, may also be seen as distinct and independent from each other. The denouement of each may steer South Africa into incapacity or success.

The line in South Africa between chaos, stability and order is thin. Justice Malala, a writer and commentator, tries hard to comfort South Africans in some way when he writes:

Politics is toxic everywhere in the world right now. The Democrats in the US are moving to impeach President Donald Trump. The UK is run by a buffoon whose ham-handed actions on Brexit continue to imperil Europe. Across the globe, politics are failing the citizenry. Nigerians do not trust President Muhammadu Buhari or the system he represents. South Africans are not the first people to be failed by politics and politicians and won’t be the last.1: 21

The successful execution of the post-2019 land-reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and implementation by a so-called “good” government, together with a “good” leadership in whom integrity and Solomon’s wisdom are essential characteristics. This means a regime that is not blindly on a path of “reaching the goal at any cost” but to effectively achieving an end-result regarding the matter, which would be a success. This requires a regime honestly serving the interests of all its people by following a well-drawn-up roadmap for an orderly land-reform initiative, and steering it into reality.

The essential question here is thus whether the ANC can be theoretically deemed a candidate or may be shortlisted and thus be considered to have the leadership potential to ensure the successful implementation and completion of the post-2019 plan on land expropriation.

The evaluation guidelines for political parties are:

  1.  Its general policies as well as specific positions on aspects such as respect for law and order, and the fighting of corruption, state capture, delinquent behaviour by its MPs and MPLs, including its top brass, as well as the party’s and its leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put forward in its manifesto for the 2019 election;
  2. Public criticism for the period 1994 to 2019 in newspapers, etc., evaluated and expressed by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the party as a political organisation, its members’ and leaders’ behaviours and actions such as corruption, state capture, as well as the delinquency of MPs and MPLs, the leaders, their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the party’s internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions.

1.1. Introduction

This study is a continuation of the previous article (Article 10, titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2—The DA in perspective (10)”.

The focus of Article 11 is on the ANC as the elected present-day regime. The article is part of a series of articles on the ANC, published under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3 —The ANC in perspective”. It purports to analyse and further discuss the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC to effect land expropriation successfully as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.2. Aims of article 11

The primary intention of the publications on the ANC is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by specifically describing the profile of the ANC on the same basis as was done in Article 9 on the EFF and Article 10 on the DA.

The aim is to evaluate the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of its empowerment as ruler received during the election of 8 May 2019. The focus will be on the party’s leadership to detect poor personal and political integrity. The intention of the researcher is thus to see if the ANC as a political party and the ANC’s MPS and MPLs, its top brass and chief executive, as well as other officials at state enterprises have the ability to successfully execute comprehensive land reform.

1.2.1. The exclusive use of newspaper articles and direct quotations in article 11

It must be noted that the emphasis in information collection for this research was on the use of mostly recent South African newspaper reports, seeing that the information was offered daily in describing (with analyses, comments, investigations and discussions) the prominent political, economic and social events. In totality these reports reflect a very comprehensive and in-depth picture of present-day South Africa’s political, judicial and economic life. On how South Africans trust, read and share news, research published by Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019, together with Isabella Maake and Graphics24, shows that printed newspapers are being used by 40% of the South African population to obtain information and insight. Most of the newspapers used in the research as references, may be described, for instance, in terms of their weekly percentage usage by the total population as follows:

Sunday Times: 25%;
Daily Sun: 21%;
Sowetan: 13%;
The Citizen: 12%;
City Press: 12%;
The Star: 10%.

In addition, local newspapers were also used (21%), while other newspapers (Afrikaans) like Beeld and Rapport (of which the percentage usage is unknown) were also consulted as they are being comprehensively used by the Afrikaans-speakers.2:14

On the extensive use in this research of South African journalistic reporting, it is important to note the following comment in the City Press of 23 June 2019, defining the absolute need for critical journalism to fight crime and political delinquency in South Africa. It reads3:13:

Going deep into the belly of governing circles in countries [African] where the majority of citizens are desperately poor, we discovered how local and international business partners assist presidents, ministers and governing party bureaucrats to convert political power, often via access to natural resources, into personal financial reserves and assets.

And:

Support for African investigative journalists as they continue to expose wrongdoing is once again noted as an important need.

That the country’s journalists are under immense strain, as well as physical and emotional attacks by delinquent politicians without any safeguard such as bodyguards, is reflected by the recent (but failed) action of the South African National Editors’ Forum (Sanef) and five journalists to go to the Equality Court for an interdict to stop a specific political party from intimidating and threatening journalists and inciting violence against them. Munusamy4:18 writes:

And this matter goes beyond the realm of individual safety. Our industry is increasingly on the retreat as political attacks and vilifications intensify. Journalists and editors are already self-censoring to avoid being harangued by politicians and denigrated online. Social media is a toxic space where people can direct violent and misogynistic attacks, either themselves or through troll armies, without consequences.

She continues4:18:

The focus of the attacks is now shifting to the judiciary… Our society cannot claim not to see the warning signs of our democracy under attack. The challenge is whether we respond or watch impassively.

Any public utterance or writing by a civil person, another politician or an author pinpointing alleged wrongdoings by controversial politicians or state officials, are fast being taken to court as instances of slander and libel whereby amounts from R500 000 up to R35-million are being claimed as compensation! It must be noted that most of these public utterances and writings occurred with reference to the alleged state capture under the ANC regime, and are often anchored in the testimonies offered to the judicial commissions such as the Zondo one. In perspective, it seems to be many previously deeply-in-love ANC comrades and other cronies that are calling each other names such as liars, fraudsters, apartheid spies, known enemy agents, charlatans, EFF-sleepers, even “extraordinary k****r”. These “calling out” actions have also been observed between the ANC leaders and churches, as well as other parties’ politicians who try the court seemingly as a “money-spinner”. Most of the lawsuits are plain nonsense, juvenile and sorely reflect the poor quality of our law-makers. Furthermore, these revenge actions are wasting the valuable time of the court, while some seem indeed to generate money for the claimants. Critically observed, most of these civil actions seeking revenge or compensation for so-called libel and slander claims, are also attempts at outright distraction from the spotlight on the guilt of the claimants and threats towards those exposing them, in order to stop their investigations and writing on the culprits’ wrongdoing.5-17

It is clear that most of these cases of libel and slender are purely because the SAPS (South African Police Service) has so far done nothing to investigate the alleged law-breaking and the NPA (National Prosecuting Authority) has not prosecuted, leaving crooks many times over untouchable and free in society to continue their crimes.

This research is not investigative, but purely to use existing newspaper articles that were already published and accepted as correct by the general public and critics, given that the persons named or alleged to have committed crimes or corruption, never objected to the articles’ contents nor did  they take action against the newspaper or its investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts. As a researcher I am very thankful to the mass of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts for their information which formed the backbone of my research project on the ANC. It must further be noted that very little of the enormous reporting on testimonies before the various judicial commissions, like the Zondo one, were used in this research. It was just too much to include into the research. I am considering making it part of a future publication, namely: The phantom of the South African Parliament: the ANC 1994 to 2019.

My publications on the ANC are thus in principle a collation of published information and reflections from this gathered or archived information, on the ANC’s activities. Firstly, the preference for this “reflecting” approach follows from the immense amount of available information, just waiting to be collected and currently underused. Secondly, this published information has already been tested and published according to the criteria of “true news”, or as truth which has not been legally challenged as defamation or falsehoods. The publications quoted in this research were thus operating from within the ethics of good journalism, meaning right, trustworthy and credible, with which editors allowed journalists and authors to publish the information in their newspapers. Many of the cases reported on are still awaiting investigation by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and possible prosecution by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). For this reason the terms “alleged” and “alluded”, as used throughout in newspaper articles, are also used as here. The term alleged is applicable to every case reported here: even in cases were culprits were prosecuted and sentenced, these outcomes are treated as “alleged”, seeing that there can be still appeals to the courts. Directly reflecting the allegations made by political analysts, political commentators and investigative and crime journalists, compelled the large-scale use of quotations. This approach brings the reader directly into the picture of the ANC’s politics, while at the same time giving appropriate acknowledgment to the various authors for their hard work. These quotations tell an intimate story which is frequently lost through indirect references, descriptions and paraphrasing. The guideline of Ngwenya12 on good journalism occupies a central position throughout this research project. He writes12:8:

The reflective call in these tricky, dicey, trying times for journalists is to be independent. Sharpen no knives, grind no axes and dig no graves. If journalism is right, trustworthy and credible the dishonourable will feel the weight of public censure to fall on their sword in a grave they dug for themselves.

The descriptions of this subdivision, titled: 1.2.1.The exclusive use of newspaper articles and direct quotations in articles 11, is also fully applicable to all the articles which are following as part of this project on the ANC. Thus, they will not be repeated.

2. Method

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern politico-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to effect successful land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources have been consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in making an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to achieve successful land reform as from 2019.

The research findings have been presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1 Absence of an Electorate-Parliamentarian-Employment Act and an Electorate-Parliamentarian Ethics Code

The serious question that is prominently being asked by political analysts is: how did South Africa end up in its present mess? Various answers are proffered, varying from it being the end-result of Apartheid, to the end-result of the ANC as a failed revolutionary party. Looking at the utter failure and constant economic decline, failed human uplifting and impoverishment of the mass of the people, the fact is clear that the ANC is the main culprit as a revolutionary that never creates, but takes only from the rich without giving—as the good thief Robin Hood would do—to the poor. Moreover, South Africa’s political setup of pre-1994 and its much-praised but in some ways failed Constitution, offered the ANC the opportunity to successfully establish its revolutionary culture of crookedness, mismanagement, state capture and autocracy, unobstructed over 25 years. Central to this power structure is the incapable ANC elite with their sole intention of self-enrichment and utmost power hunger. But the question remains: how was it possible for the ANC to be able to hijack the mass of poor Blacks’ votes and use the South African Parliament exclusively, from one administration to the other, to benefit them solely? One of the answers lies in the fact that there was the lack of a Basic Conditions Electorate-Parliamentarian-Employment Act [equal to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCOEA)] to describe and enforce a mandate between voters and a regime, obliging the regime to govern a country and its people only with justice and rectitude.18,19

3.2 Chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng’s sincere warning and prayer for good governance

To assess and control an elected party during its term of five years (like the ANC again for the period 2019 to 2024, after it had already been ruling for 25 years since 1994), certain basic guidelines should be in place before the election and inauguration of a government (as an employee in service of the people.) There should be basic guidelines, such as to act all of the time while governing solely in terms of its promises made before the election to the voters (the employer, who takes the government as an employee in service). In South Africa such an act or code is absent. It is thus important to outline it here: firstly, to understand how good governance could have been attained from 1994 until now; and secondly, the absolute present need to promulgate such legislation to get rid of corrupted and failed governments. If such a piece of legislation were in place we would not be shamed by the need of the Chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng, when he swore in ministers and their deputies at the Sefako Makgatho presidential guesthouse in Pretoria recently at the start of South Africa’s sixth Parliament, to give them a clear warning. In this context Hunter18:4 shows how Mogoeng digressed significantly from his traditional swearing-in speech to say to these public figures (mostly from the ANC) that “they should shiver if they even think of misspending public funds in their care, while he also warned elected public representatives to take their oath of office seriously and not to act as if the public owe them something”.

In this context he had undoubtedly referred to the totally failed government of the ANC since 1994. His warning was an attempt by him as a last resort to inculcate good employee habits into the mindsets of law-makers in the new Parliament after so many years of failure. Chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng, specifically pointed to the status of law-makers as plain “public employees” and not, as some seemed to have been thinking and doing since 1994, as high-level mighty “employers” in charge of the voters and the public. Mogoeng said that he wanted to ensure that those who took the oath or affirmation know that18:4: “…power doesn’t belong to you, and the resources that come with that office don’t belong to you. You are a servant of the South African public and this is what you are promising those who have employed you. For you to suddenly begin to treat those who have privileged you with an opportunity to serve – especially at a high level – as if they owe you something and be insensitive, almost, to the dire circumstances they find themselves in [is wrong].”

In the context of Mogoeng Mogoeng’s “preaching”, he further read the so-called Riot Act to the law-makers (who in present-day South Africa seem more and more to be acting as schoolchildren going on a picnic), and emphasised that public officers must realise that people suffer the consequences of bad decisions18:4: “So we never forget, just the thought of giving somebody millions that they ought not to get, that are supposed to help elsewhere, should make you shiver. Just the thought of it should make you shiver.”

But it seems as if there was doubt in the Chief Justice’s heart that his verbal and written warning alone was not going to have an effect on the Ramaphosa cabinet and its officials. This is confirmed by the fact that the honourable justice had also included a prayer to those being sworn in, seemingly hoping in this way to impress his prescribed virtue on the minds of the ANC elite.18

From a practical and judicial viewpoint, as spelt out clearly by the Chief Justice above, the business of government and its proper execution, represents a mandate received by a regime to do certain work for the people in exchange for compensation. This means that the appointed ruler (employee) received his mandate from the voters (employers) in exchange for the pre-election promises, meaning that they will execute these agreed-upon actions and policies—neither more nor less. Looking back to the period 1994 to 2019, very few of the ruling party’s officials—from presidents to their most junior officials—had ever respected the voters or had “shivered” in Mogoeng’s sense when diverting funds to their own pockets. Jacob Zuma and the Parliament under the ANC laughed at both the judiciary and the public. Looking at Cyril Ramaphosa and his cronies, since coming to power in 2017, the alleged Phantom of the Parliament has not changed much of its act.

It is thus important to offer a guideline of what should be in position to assure good government for the sixth Parliament during the period 2019 to 2024.

3.1.2. The unborn Electorate-Parliamentarian Act
3.1.2.1. Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCOEA)

Regarding the ANC‘s many failed promises and wrongdoing, nearly bringing the South African state to a fall (thereby failing in its mandate as na employee), there is only one clear guideline to be used in order to fully understand and describe the ANC’s actions as a failed employee within a legal employee-employer relation, namely the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCOEA). A similar Electorate-Parliamentarian Act to the BCOEA should have be promulgated in 1994 to guide the rights of the employee (ANC-government) in its actions and those of the employer (voters) who want certain and specific work done via Parliament. Central to the BCOEA stands the legal concept of probation that needs to be highlighted and which the ANC regime failed to respect in its job contract via Parliament with the people of South Africa.18,20

To illustrate the need for an Electorate-Parliamentarian Act and the clause of probation for a party as a government and its law-makers as parliamentarians, the BCOEA will be made applicable as a voters-and-government agreement, equal to an employer-and-employee agreement and be discussed theoretically, to illustrate the ANC’s utter failure over 25 years and to show how a failed regime can be stopped dead in its tracks with the correct legislation. The basis will thus be to encapsulate the concept of good governance and the use of probation as a means to end the various ANC regimes’ mischief. This comparative discussion clearly shows what is missing with the present mandate of the government and why the ANC-government (the supposed subordinate employee to the voters) had spun out of control from 1994 to 2019, to engage in unobstructed state capture, failing to activate good services as to education and health, ignoring the Constitution, etc. It will also bear out how the voters were sidelined immediately after every new election of the Parliament, and how the MPs and MPLs became an untouchable force of employees after their election, leaving the employer (voters) powerless until the next election. In reality, it reflects a coup d’état by the law-makers, the moment after they were sworn in.20

Michael Bagraim20, a labour expert, writes excellently in The Star of 12 June 2019 on the matter of a failed employee versus the right of an employer to punish such an employee by requiring him to better himself, as opposed to being able to fire him with immediate effect. His clear writing makes it easy to adapt and compare the rules of the BCOEA to politics. Such a comparision enables one to characterise the ANC regime as a failed employee who should be kicked out and its contract terminated very early in its period of probation. It also makes it possible to obtain insight into the rights that would be awarded to the voters should such a voters’ regime agreement become a legal reality and had to have been thoroughly applied since 1994 to the regime and the law-makers of the South African Parliament. It also shows the specific legal obligations of the regime in terms of which the voters could and should have booked it in order to get rid of the regime when it failed. This would mean terminating the employment contract of the regime (employee), cancelling its stay in Parliament for the full term of five years if such a legal agreement existed.20

Bagraim20 writes that in terms of the BCOEA every employment relationship must have a written letter of appointment or contract of employment. (This agreement goes far further legally than the oath of office that law-makers pledged before the Chief Justice: the oath is essentially a plain promise that may, but does not need, to be respected as was born out by the Zuma regime.) One of the conditions of service is a probationary clause in writing which is prescribed for both the employer and the employee to know and understand that there would be an assessment period before the contract became permanent. Probation is a vehicle to assist an employer to possibly terminate the employment relationship if the employer feels the employment relationship is not a perfect fit or the employee is not performing in accordance with the contract of employment, posits Bagraim.20 In this context it means that if the probationary employee’s work does not meet the standards required by the employer, then the dismissal should be able to seen to be fair. The position of a probationary employee is different from that of a permanent employee and both the procedure and merits of that dismissal will be less onerous on the employer. In this context of the probationary period versus the permanent period, is it important to bear in mind that, besides that the probation clause may differ from employer to employer, the duration of the probation period may also differ in time: it will be longer if the position is one of a senior nature. Prominent in this context are the positions of MPs and MPLs on senior level that warrant a lengthy period of assessment. This reference clearly reflects two aspects relating to the status of a regime as an employee: firstly it needs a lengthy period of assessment stretching fully over the five years as elected representatives to Parliament. Secondly the employment of parliamentarians as employees of the people in terms of this constant assessment is limited to five years in duration which makes the employees’ right to permanent appointment zero (no reappointment of a party as regime without a new election). Implicitly, parliamentarians as representatives are supposed to be “permanently on probation” for their full term.20

The BCOEA has an inscribed clause that a probation period may be extended to erase short-comings and better the employees. In the case of law-makers their probationary period, as said, is supposed to be running for a full five years, excluding any shortening of the probation time. Any legal extension of the five years term is not allowed without another election. It means the re-election of a failed regime and its law-makers can indeed be seen as a willing extension of the probation by the voters, as was done for the ANC over six elections notwithstanding a poor record and performance by the regime.20

The BCOEA requires that the standards set by the employer must be fair and reasonable. The probationary clause provision is also intended to protect the employee who might wish to leave the employer because the position was not as the employee envisaged. Further, the standards set by the employer must be fair and reasonable. In the case of law-makers the writing and execution of these standards are totally handed over to Parliament in governing for the period of five years after the election, during which the law-makers are free to rewrite and set their own standards, totally ignoring the people’s wishes after their election.20

Looking at the fine print of the aim of assessment of the BCOEA, when you see it equal to a law-maker-voter agreement, one sees probation’s function of assessing the new employee (meaning in politics the two entities, namely Parliament and its law-makers) and his capacity for fitting into the organisation (meaning in politics the people’s/voters’ interests) and whether that employee is compatible with fellow employees and the immediate management of the employer. Probation is not only a period granted to the employer to assess the employee, but also to give feedback to the employee in order to ensure better performance and better compatibility which may include training and guidance. Firstly, parliamentarians are expected to be well trained, skilled, seasoned and experienced before they move into Parliament because it was during the pre-election exercise that they were selected and elected by the people for their ability to handle their mandate effectively. Secondly, the only feedback in response to parliamentarians and the ruling party’s performance (good or bad) at present available to the people/voters is to vote for the law-makers and the ruling party or to vote them out in the next election.20

Probation in contracts under the BCOEA is not compulsory. Often appointments are not subjected to probation because both parties are aware of the abilities of the employee. This erasure of the probationary period is presently built-in to the law-makers’ contacts because it is traditionally believed that they are highly qualified and of high integrity before making themselves available to stand for Parliament and thus do not need oversight and monitoring from outside by the voters. The only opportunity to moan about or to reject elected law-makers and a regime is, as mentioned, to not vote for them in the next election.20

The BCOEA further states that an employer must constantly monitor a probationary employee, keeping a record for feedback, keeping minutes of discussions and to see to it that the employee receive the necessary development, support and guidance for improvement. In the voters-versus-law-makers relationship the law-makers obtained the sole right to oversee themselves regarding the development and bettering of their training, experience and behaviour. The present setup regarding public oversight of the regime of the day and law-makers, reflects a process whereby there is very little monitoring of the quality and integrity of law-makers during their period of five years in Parliament, as became evident during the so-called Zupta saga.20

In light of the above, it is clear that Parliament’s management, with specific reference to the party which is also the regime in power, as well as the law-makers elected to Parliament, is totally uncontrolled. The Parliament and the mandated regime become independent powers to do as it and the law-makers “see fit”, leaving the individual citizen stripped of his citizen’s rights. The fact that the ANC received only 28% of the eligible voters’ support in the past election and that only 49% of the total eligible voters participated in the May 2019 election, render the ANC in post-2019 South Africa in practice a non-representative ruler, bordering on self-empowered autocracy. This kind of dangerous ruler-empowerment explains why and how the ANC as a regime has become an irresponsible autocratic ruler since 1994, ignoring the concerns of the majority (51%) of South Africans. Corruption, crookedness, state capture and mismanagement became the normal form of rule. In the end the criminal justice system had to deal with the depths of corruption and misrule, with courts and commissions of enquiry bringing to light the delinquent actions of Parliament and a number of its law-makers.19-21

However, thanks to ANC misrule, the criminal justice system is in itself broken, supporting the crooked law-makers, as was recently well illustrated by various testimonies before the Zondo commission. The ex-head of the KwaZulu-Natal Hawks, Johan Booysen22, testified that there existed a web of alleged corruption in the police, the Hawks and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and pointed out that such corruption culminated in those institutions “being subverted to ensure the shielding of certain individuals from criminal sanction”. A submission of 70 pages by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS,) dealing with the crooked relationship between the national executive and the criminal justice leadership, contains the following sentence22:13:

There can be no doubt that the abuse of executive authority in respect of criminal justice agencies has been central in allowing the current proliferation of corruption.

Gareth Newham, the head of justice and violence prevention at ISS said22:13:

There has to be a much broader political project to uncapture these institutions.

The overwhelming evidence of political and criminal-justice delinquency forced the chair of the Zondo commission, Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, to declare22:13:

If we do not have a proper law enforcement agency then we don’t have a country.

To curb the massive delinquency in the South African Parliament, it urgently needs an Electoral-Parliamentarian Act to be promulgated as a priority before the end of 2020. If the BCOEA had applied to Parliament’s law-makers and the ANC-regime specifically, all would have been fired long ago due to poor performance, incompatibility, poor training and experience, as well as misconduct. Moreover, looking at the way in which they are aggressively handling the land-reform matter by threatening the 30 million poor Blacks (a significant part of the population and in reality the ANC’s employer), the ANC regime is indeed victimising its own employer. Their dismissal would be justified in terms of all the criteria of dismissal.19-21

3.1.3. The  central roles of the ANC’s democratic-centralism and the electoral system in parliamentary abuse
3.1.3.1. The ANC’s democratic-centralism ideology

The ANC’s so-called democratic-centralism plays a prominent role in the failed political outcomes of their five post-1994 administrations and portends similar manifestations to be repeated during their sixth administration under Ramaphosa. This uniqueness of the ANC’s party organisation and its steering of the thinking, planning and actions of every one of its members, from the ordinary to its president, are overlooked by many, even political analysts, commentators and journalists.19-21

This ANC’s democratic-centralism and the established power structure of the ANC as a party, nullifies the claim that a specific ANC member, like its president, is the sole empowered person to act and decide on ANC matters (also making his/her authority as President of South Africa subordinate to the ANC’s power). The implication is thus that the interests of the ANC as a party are determined by its national conferences and must be strictly adhered to and be executed by every member. But this also means that the interests of the country, whether inside or outside Parliament, are subordinate to the interests of the ANC. It does not matter if these ANC interests are crooked deals, state capture, corruption, etc.19-21

The principle of the ANC’s interests first and the subordination of every one of its members to the decisions of its national conferences, is well described and acknowledged by Bishop Hangwai Maumela23 of the Lazarus Maumela Foundation. In his defence of the ANC’s so-called “democracy” and the ANC’s so-called “servicing the needs and right of every citizen”, when he swankily writes in the City Press of 30 June 2019 as follows23:4:“…members of the ANC who are in Parliament have been deployed by the ANC. There’s no member who is superior to another. They pay the same affiliation fee to the ANC. They have been allocated various portfolios – some as ministers, deputy ministers, chief whips and chairpersons of portfolio committees. All of them account to the ANC…”

Mthombothi24 also writes on the corrupt democratic-centralism of the ANC which makes all ANCs subordinate to the interests and decisions of the ANC and absolutely not subordinate to the country’s interests, together with the contaminated intertwining of the country’s direct and indirect appointments of parliamentary law-makers and a Parliament only accountable to itself in the Sunday Times24:15:

The men and women who’ll rock up after the elections to be sworn in as our “public representatives” in parliament play absolutely no role in this campaign. They’re insignificant and invisible. They will get their seats as a reward for loyalty to their party, not for their service to the voters or the community. And it has stench of bribery about it. Which is why all the skelms have made it into their party lists – to buy their silence. Choice, the basis of any democracy, is next to nonexistent. The sum total of what passes foe an election campaign is a smiling face on a poster hanging on every pole throughout the country. It’s almost as if the country has been reduced to a single village or community with the same needs, grievances and aspirations.”

Munusamy25, in this context, writes25:20:

Many people lined up by the main political parties to be our public representatives are an insult to our nation. They would not even be able to run a cake sale without eating the cake themselves- or peddling the backing process to their patronage networks.

If an individual has not come to a firm conclusion about the election, that individual will do more for their country/community by not voting, rather than making a mistake.

The clincher: “Supporting the lesser of two evils is still supporting evil”.

The Zondo commission has made me realise how farcical the political system is when corrupt business people are able to control the state by simply buying off politicians and key officials.

The reason there are so many hopeless people vying to be our public representatives is because the political system is closed off to credible, capable leaders who have the potential to modernise and reimaging our future.

We have to revert to the goals of the Freedom Charter, written in 1955, because nobody can think of fresh solutions to society’s current problems.

SA has many great minds who opt to remain on the sidelines or choose to look after their own financial wellbeing rather than the good of society. So it is difficult to invest in a system that is never going to attract or shape good leaders.

Democratic-centralism makes, as said, all the ANC members (from the Number One to the lowest ranked ones) subordinated to the ANC national conference’s decisions. These decisions are again based on the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist political ideology. The outcomes of these decisions are and must be overseen at all time by the top brass of the ANC, as mandated by its politburo as represented by its Top Six executives and NEC (National Executive Committee) of eighty members. Inside this practice of blanket democratic-centralism by the ANC, there is evidence that it has allowed the development of a strong top brass (its so-called Top Six), but that it has limited to some extent the development of an extreme African-leadership syndrome (until Jacob Zuma arrived in the presidency and became the ANC’s and South Africa’s untouchable paramount chief for a while).24,26

Mthombothi24 writes in this respect regarding the paramount chief of the ANC as being associated with the Nazis and the Fascists as well as South Africa’s tribal system24:15:

Everything is centred on the party leader. He’s the fount of all wisdom. This practice has engendered the sort of behaviour or attitude that’s been prevalent in Africa for so many years, of the leader as all-knowing and omnipotent — the so-called Big Man syndrome, often corrupt and autocratic. The Big Men stay too long in power and when they are done, choose their successor, often a member of the family. Which is what Jacob Zuma almost succeeded in doing.

There is more than enough evidence that all the ANC presidents — from Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, up to Cyril Ramaphosa — had challenged as far as their powers allowed according to the ANC’s principle of democratic-centralism in their pursuit of ambitions to become the paramount chief or the “emperor Julius Caesar”, but were politically destroyed in the end. It was specifically Jacob Zuma, through his open and well-planned corrupted self-empowerment, who had neutralised to a great extent and temporarily the ANC’s democratic-centralism and its exclusive parliamentary functioning and statutory empowerment through the ANC’s politburo (consisting of the ANC’s Top Six and NEC). As a result of Zuma’s internal party coup, it has made Parliament and the executive politics of the country extreme dysfunctional, continuing to this day under Ramaphosa. Moreover, it has created in some way the idea of a true democracy framed in a Constitution of excellence, driven and managed by an effective executive team and Parliament, all under an executive-empowered President who has been totally freed by the ANC’s politburo to do his own will: meaning to take independent decisions and actions and to steer the country as he alone thinks suitable. It seems as if the false belief of the ANC’s absolute “democracy” has become overwhelmingly rooted in most of the media and public’s mindsets too.24,29

The above is only theory as long as the ANC stays in power. The ANC’s own constitution — that became the mandated constitution for the president of the ANC and thus also of the State of South Africa since 1994 — essentially nullifies Sections 84(1) and 85(1) of the South African Constitution. It makes the ANC’s politburo directly and indirectly the “head of state and head of the national executive”, nominating their elected ANC president as South African state president while the secretary-general of the ANC in the background remains the real Number One who might “recall” the state president at any time, as happened to Mbeki. Although such secretarial power did not always exist in the past in the same manner and was not as openly exercised by previous secretaries-general such as Alfred Nzo, Kgalema Motlanthe or Gwede Mantashe, we now have a new contender in the form of Ace Magashule, whose strong hands in the politburo is ever-present in the management of the ANC’s appointed state president. The relationship between Ramaphosa and Magashule may be compared to that between Mandela and Mbeki, immediately after 1994. Nelson Mandela was at best a ceremonial president and his deputy Mbeki teh “unofficial” executive president, while both were subject to direct management by the politburo. The rogue rule is: the ANC comes first and South Africa second. This type of pseudo-democratic political culture has characterised the ANC’s modus operandi in the past and will also in future be part and parcel of the ANC’s radical way of governing, as cemented in its Marxist-Leninist ideology and conditioned by its so-called false “democratic-centralism” (which in reality means autocratic-centralism).26-29

A prominent side-stepping of the law by the post-Mandela ANC leaders and followers, when the ANC brass ran into trouble as during the present crisis of integrity in the ANC — mainly created by its democratic-centralism based on Marxist-Leninist ideology — is just to continue with delinquency, while calling at the same time on the late Mandela for forgiveness and salvation. Meaningless clichés are echoed by the pro-ANCs, absolving them from the bad consequences because they have not ruled the country with integrity. Dugmore30 formulates it thus30:20: “The democratic system in our country, so hard fought for by Mandela and his generation, and which involves all our political parties, is at risk if we do not address these urgent needs.” However, never is the question postulated as to what kind democracy is referred to and why democracy is now suddenly at risk while there was essentially an autocracy in place already back in 1994.

To understand how much subjectivity is present in today’s South African politics and the existence of the misconception of the ANC as “democratic” (including its leaders) with the intention to serve every citizen, it is again important to read Mthombothi’s31 claim that the nationalist-militant’s abandonment of democratic liberties leads to fascism, which may be associated with the EFF (otherwise, he once also referred to the ANC regime since 1994 as fascistic due to its “autocratic-centralism”).

Mthombothi31 writes in this context31:19:

There are as many definitions of fascism as there are experts on the subject, but a few characteristics stand out: intolerance, racism (including anti- Semitism), misogyny, militarism, a predilection for violence, with a cult of charismatic leadership which often demands blind and unquestioned loyalty.

The EFF exhibits almost all these traits in its behaviour. The organisation is obviously not yet in power and it is therefore impossible to know how it would behave if it were to hold the levers of power. But on current evidence, the signs aren’t very good. It is aggressively intolerant towards those who disagree with it both within and outside the party.

Mthombothi31 enlightened us further on fascism in profiling the EFF by quoting Robert Paxton’s31 The Anatomy of Fascism. Mthombothi describes31:19: “…fascism as ‘a form of political behaviour marked by obsessive preoccupation with the community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants…abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion’.”

The above view by Mthombothi31 may be true for the EFF and its leaders, but all of those elements are clearly associated with the politics of the ANC before and after 1994: all the traits and characteristics of fascism are emblematic of the traditional ANC. In addition, every one of its leaders as presidents have displayed those traits so far and not only Jacob Zuma. Its fascism became in some way latent immediately after the ANC took power in 1994 because the New Dispensation had forced them to “behave” until they were ready to fully assume political and economic power, which we have seen emerging since 2017 by openly adopting their “autocratic-centralism”. Land grabbing and the nationalisation of the Reserve and Land Banks, Apartheid victimhood, radicalised BEE and cadre deployment are only a few concrete examples of the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist politics awaiting South Africa from 2019 if it stays in power.31,32

The ANC’s unbreakable pre-1994 radical politics (which is now being well-directed by both Ramaphosa and Magashule, notwithstanding that they are locked in a leadership-ambition struggle inside the greater ANC), which the media seems to regard as something of the past, must be specifically compared to the rather meek advent of the fascists and the Nazis via so-called “good people or labour parties”, only to capture Italy and Germany in the end through autocratic-centralism. The two blueprints are being expertly used in post-2019 South Africa. Mthombothi31:19posits:

But of course fascism as an ideology cannot be wiped of the face of the earth. Only its manifestations can be curbed or conquered. But it continues to emerge in different guises and in different countries. Although fascism is identified as a right-wing ideology, there’s no doubt that the Left has contributed to its origin. Mussolini himself, however, was unconcerned about whether fascism was located on the right or the left of the political spectrum. “We don’t give a damn about these empty terminologies and we despise those who are terrorised by these words”, he said. But just as Mussolini, who founded fascism, is a child of the Left, so is Nazism. The Nazi Party is short for National Socialist German Workers’ Party: its precursor was the German Workers’ Party. The intention was to attract workers from left-wing parties. Nazism is short for National Socialism, which became opposed to – and hostile to – international socialism or any other creed of the Left.

The absolute striving towards self-centredness and empowerment of the ANC over South Africans (Black as well as Whites) is well described by Chilenga-Butao33 when he refers to the ANC national executive committee (NEC) lekgotla at the beginning of June 2019 where there was an effort to revive the democratic-centralist habit of the ANC’s politburo power structure against the onslaught by the “Big Man” Ramaphosa who may alone think, plan and do for the ANC. Referring to the ANC’s democratic-centralist framework, Chilenga-Butao33 pointed out that the ANC policy and resolutions, which are taken during conferences, are applicable to all its members, including the presently serving President of the country, Cyril Ramaphosa, as an ANC member.24,33

On the conflicting statements between Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule, the secretary general of the ANC and seemingly the Number One of the ANC in enforcing the post-May 2019 ANC politics directed by democratic-centralism, for example on the change of the Reserve Bank’s mandate as prescribed by its national conference in December 2017, Chilenga-Butao33:30 writes:

Thus democratic-centralism has dissipated and it has happened because the party is not putting South Africa first. The fact that these contradictory statements emerge shows that there are parts of the ANC that are trying to re-establish a form of democratic centralism by saying what they want to see happening in the country and in so doing, arm-wrestle the president into following suit. If they cannot secure democratic centralism in the party, they are hoping to turn their statements into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

But these party members are also using issues such as the Reserve Bank as small battles in the ongoing war to secure their interests and power in the party and over the country. In this way democratic centralism could be used as a tactic in a much larger scheme.

Chilenga-Butao33:30continues: “…the secretary general’s statement contained the bold declaration that the ANC remains the centre of the country and policymaking” and: “This shows that the ANC comes first, especially if that means leading South Africans down the garden path of false hope”.

This ANC comes first was also confirmed when Ace Magashule contradicted Fikile Mbalula who credited Ramaphosa with the ANC’s election win by saying that the electorate did not vote for an individual like Ramaphosa but solely for the party.34,35

The above remarks by Chilenga-Butao33 and Magashule35 confirm our suspicion that the ANC comes first and the country and its people always second. This also brings the focus on the ANC’s capture of the ownership of Parliament since 1994 with its majority of votes obtained in the national elections which does not necessarily mean that the majority of eligible voters had voted for it. With the ANC’s eighty NECs and ANC Top Six’s placing of the ANC as a party and regime always first, Parliament became once more, after having been voted into government on 8 May 2019, their sole property to do with what they want, including its executive powers. The party’s interests come first with the ANC’s application of its democratic-centralism in the selection of its own MPs and MPLs and these law-makers’ sole responsibility to the ANC’s National Conference policies, even apart from the evil it wreaks via Parliament most of the time. There is no role or empowerment — or even the slightest say — for the country’s voters outside the Parliament where the ANC enjoys a vast majority. Or, in terms of the BCOEA, there is not the slightest trace of a kind of employer-employee contract to curb the ANC’s powers.33,35

Our electoral system — which as mentioned, determines that only a political party via the indirect mandate it received at the ballet box, decides and selects the persons who are going to Parliament to represent the party — fits perfectly into the ANC’s democratic-centralist style of government. This entwining of the faulty electoral system with the autocratic democratic-centralism of the ANC government, led directly to South Africa lapsing into a stupor of criminality, criminality and state capture due to the ANC system of cadre and crony-empowerment being employed, since 1994, but especially from 2009 onwards.24,36

In conclusion on the autocracy of the ANC’s democratic-centralism, it can be postulated with utter safety that it has given the ANC a monopoly on political power for 25 years, but at the same has made the ANC a failed regime and South Africa a failed state with the State President merely a figurehead inside its democratic-centralism, captured and controlled by the ANC’s Politburo.23,34

3.1.3.2. South Africa’s faulty electoral system

In the context of receiving a mandate by a political party (as the ANC has managed continuously since 1994) to rule South Africa, it must be noted that South African voters have been caught in an undemocratic voting system. It is a setup of which the ANC has taken full advantage. Ramaphosa himself seems reluctant to part from it and with good reason, because it enables the ANC through the imbalanced proportional system the power of directly selecting and appointing law-makers, without the voters or constituents having a say in who is to represent them, thereby opening the door of government to all of the ruling party’s crooked candidates. There is no opportunity for the ordinary voting public veto them except by waiting another five years and voting against them at the party level. Thus, the present proportional representation system means that MPs and MPLs are only accountable to party bosses (and are being appointed by party bosses on the party’s list) instead of by the electorate.37-40,42 Notable here is Mthombothi’s39 excellent description39:19: “…our MPs and MPLs are plain party representatives and not public representatives”.

The current system creates a total lack of public accountability by the MPs and MPLs, as evidenced many times over by the ANC’s delinquent MPS, MPLs, ministers and even a past President. This chaos, especially pronounced during the Zuma regime, seems to be a process that is going to continue under Ramaphosa.38-42

A private legal action was started in 2019 to reform the election system and to end the present skewed empowerment of the ANC through the electoral system through a court application of the New Nation Movement (NNM), a KhoiSan organisation, to change the Electoral Act (Act 73 of 1998) to make provision for the direct election of MPs and MPLs by voters. This court application was heard initially on 17 April 2019 by Judge Siraj Desai, but was rejected as not urgent. The appeal by the New Nation Movement, Chantal Revelle and the Mediation Foundation for Peace and Justice to the ConCourt was also unsuccessful. In this case Chantall Revelle of the Mediation Foundation said that at present the country was being ruled by a very small minority. Voters do not even know who are representing them in Parliament. Judge Edwin Cameron of the Concourt said on May 8, 2019 that the application was not urgent. For Cameron it was an important and prominent fact that it could take up to August 2019 to run the election if the court agreed with the applicants’ opinion and that already R36-million had been spent on the organisation of the May 8 election. The ConCourt heard the application on 15 August 2019. It must, to bring greater clarity regarding the case, also be stated that the ConCourt had already decided in terms of the financing of political parties, that every adult citizen had the right to stand as an independent candidate for municipal, provincial and national councils but that the present legislation forbade it.38-46

If legislation is promulgated to reform the Electorate Act it would mean the end of favouring the ANC in its ability to manipulate the voters and to continue its spree of looting by crooked candidates without the ordinary people having a say. Moreover, the indication is that this could bring the ANC down in the next election, if it would not have fallen in its own sword already in its governmental term from 2019 to 2024.38-46

In the context of our faulty electoral system, coming from before 1994, there is no doubt that it is keeping the autocratic ANC directly and indirectly in power. The country’s imbalanced and undemocratic electoral system, rooted in the ANC’s corrupt principle of “party interests first”, can, if not immediately corrected, benefit and advantage the Zuma-Magashule clan after 2024 and damage the Ramaphosa clan’s ascendancy immensely. It can play a primary role in the disorderly implementation of land grabbing and the activation of revolution. Our faulty electoral system of public representatives via Parliament is nothing less than the practice of autocracy inside democracy par excellence. This faulty system, together with the ANC’s revolutionary decision-making via mass opinion, had ensured that Mandela, up to Ramaphosa, and now possibly also Ace Magashule, had obtained the ability to maintain their corrupt political power via the “innocent” ballot box. It must be remembered that the controversial Faith Muthambi, Mosebenzi Zwane and Bathabile Dlamini and so on, prominent ANCs who are still in the post-May 2019 Ramaphosa regime because they have not so far been prosecuted for alleged wrongdoing (notwithstanding testimonies before the Zondo and Mpati commissions against them). They have so far avoided legal repercussions because of a well-planned avoidance scheme by the ANC’s top brass for its tainted officials to escape prosecution. Such corrupt figures are not just the face of the present-day ANC: they are, with Jacob Zuma, David Mabuza and Ace Magashule, the soul of the ANC. Democratic parties would not put the names of many of the tainted ANCs anywhere on a list, besides “wanted”. The listing of alleged crooks by the ANC for the May 2019 election and their reappointment as MPs and MPLs as well as in high-ranking parliamentary positions by the ANC, is an excellent example of how the South African political space, especially Parliament, has become toxic and dominated by the same unrepresentative and elderly politicians within the ANC elite and top brass, giving imbalanced dominance to it as a political party, writes Munusamy. It is also significant that the ruling party has less than one million members while there are as many as 37 million eligible voters outside the ANC members’ circle.23,33,34,38-42,47

Mothombothi’s39 writing is clear on the fact that if the people of South Africa could choose themselves their MPs and MPLs directly — as well as their vice-president and president — the ANC would not return to power after the May 2019 election. He writes39:19:

What would astound a visitor from Mars, for instance, would be to hear that the party responsible for these crimes and misdemeanours is set to be returned to power with a thumping majority. That doesn’t square with what democracy is supposed to be. In any other place, a party with that sort of record, especially one that blatantly steals from its people, would be consigned to the political wilderness, never to be returned in power again. And yet, instead of wearing sackcloth and covering himself in ashes as a mark of repentance, President Cyril Ramaphosa, we are told, is almost as popular as Nelson Mandela was at the top of his powers. Instead of embarking on an apology campaign, he’s already on what looks suspiciously like a lap of honour, certain that he’ll be given a mandate to rebuild what his party has wilfully destroyed.

To illustrate once more the imbalance of the Electoral Act, excluding the individual aspirant MP and MPL from becoming independent law-makers but favouring only a political party that fulfils certain prescribed regulations, we may quote the worrying remark of Judge Desai on his rejection of the initial application on 17 April 2019. Marx reports44:6: “Desai het die aansoek verwerp dat die Kieswet gewysig word om onafhanklike kandidate in te sluit en het gesê Revelle kan by ‘n politieke party aansluit of haar eie stig.”

The above remark can undoubtedly leave the view that Desai as a judge does not take an objective stance in relation to the imbalanced political advantage enjoyed by the present-day government by means of what many see as a defective electoral system out. It was and is still indeed the rejection by Revelle of the ongoing prescribed rule to be a member of a political party and to obtain a seat in Parliament through the proportional system that motivated his court application to Desai. Desai’s opinion and conclusion can in a certain context be seen as a confirmation of the constitutional correctness of the present Electoral Act. It can even be interpreted by some critics of the ANC regime and their abuse of the Electoral Act as supporting the ANC regime and Ramaphosa as president who had opposed the application by Revelle and others.38-46

For many antagonists of the current Electoral Act and the ANC’s parliamentary power, Desai’s remarks46:6: “Revelle kan by ‘n politieke party aansluit of haar eie stig”, revive memories of the old Apartheid ways of the judiciary where there was often a profound irritation with the will of the people, as well as fear by the judiciary that they could overreach by siding with the people against the politicians, risking a rejection of any judgement they did not like. Desai’s remarks could even be seen, rightly or wrongly, as a form of oppression. The individual KhoiSan and Kora citizen, who is at present without a direct say in the law-making of the country because the Electoral Act is not correctly phrased and the Constitution is incorrectly executed, may see the functioning of the electoral system and the insistance by the judiciary in defending the present Act, as political and even human oppression.38-46

Many persons, especially the minorities, who feel victimised and penalised by court verdicts, start to observe the statutory and judicial models of their country as incomplete or as a failure, paralysed by a weak chain of justice. Such outcomes can become engraved on the minds of these “physically and emotionally injured” citizens that their country’s law enforcement agencies are subjective and not fit to safeguard their citizen and group rights. Even pristine, good legal verdicts can sometimes have very bad consequences for the judicial system, essentially because they may seem to lack empathy and an insight independent from the regime’s politics.38-46 The “verdict” by Desai can set off such negative attitudes with his interpretation and order of46:6: “Revelle kan by ‘n politieke party aansluit of haar eie stig”. Revelle’s case — for her undoubtedly a case which should not be a legal failure at all — needs to be tested by the ConCourt as being correct or wrong (as the court is now in the process of doing). In South Africa’s confused politics such cardinal issues cannot be left to a single judge’s sole discretion. If Revelle’s appeal is successful, it will signal the end of a system favouring the ANC’s manipulation of the voters and their corruption spree by crooked candidates without the ordinary people having a say in who gets nominated.38-46 It seems as if the judiciary has forgotten what had happened in the past in South Africa (pre- and post-1994) when the judicial system failed to address issues affecting ordinary citizens. The editorial of the Sunday Times, dated 8 September 2019, appositely describes the ongoing series of failures since 1994, during which almost every state institution was grabbed and steered by the crooks for their sole benefit, casting even a cloud of suspicion over the judicial system’s integrity48:18:

The Zondo commission has become a permanent fixture in our lives – entertaining up to a point, but something of a pointless charade. The National Prosecuting Authority seems especially dormant at a time when we would have expected it to be in overdrive. And through all this, promises, fine words, ringing declarations. But little action.

As the situation now stands, our electoral system is a failure. It allowed a dishonest collection of MPs inside the Parliament and and time and again their crooked party managed to rule Parliament as the outcome of the May 2019 national election confirms. The words of Mthombothi49 must ring daily in eligible voters’ ears — as well as those of Desai — when he posits49:21:

Whichever way one looks at this matter, it is hard not to arrive at one conclusion: our system of government lacks proper and effective accountability. It is past time that our electoral system is reformed so that politicians are answerable directly to voters and not their parties.

It is indeed the duty of the judicial system to see to it that this happens.

3.1.4. The lack of Kantian enlightenment in a chaotic South Africa

To accuse Parliament and the rulers of 1994 to 2019 alone of being “political thieves and rapists of the statutory rights” belonging to individual South Africans is incorrect. Most of the individual South Africans were willing participants in this political orgy by shying away from applicable decision-making during elections, as the past 8 May elections confirm wherein 51% of the eligible voters stayed away from the ballot box. Moreover, they failed to vote out the ANC and enforcing the much-needed Electoral-Parliament Act. Pithouse19 relates this citizen’s passivity to Immanuel Kant’s thinking on the waking up versus the failure of self-thinking in the 1780s when Europe had been equally mesmerised.

It seems to a certain extent that in South Africa the “Kantian enlightenment” of human virtue and political empowerment that the 1994 democracy should have brought to the mass of poor and landless Blacks never emerged. Political immaturity, resulting from the so-called “laziness and cowardice” that prevent people from thinking for themselves and from engaging in constructive deeds under less favourable circumstances, prevailed for six parliamentary elections up to May 2019. It is plunging more and more of the Black supporters of the ANC deeper into anarchy, but more precisely, it is thrusting 72% of the voters outside the ANC-supporting voting population into an equal amount of chaos. This is a negative phenomenon, whereby the emergence of a newly-enfranchised class has very little effect on quality of life or levels op development but is rather exploited to further the interests of a new, revolutionary elite. This has been the case in the 1890s in Europe. The shift in power creates and strengthens the poverty, inequality and joblessness of the masses in favour of a small ruling class and group whose interests become paramount. In contemporary South Africa it manifests as well-nigh irreparable chaos.19 This condition was appositely defined by Kant when he said that the19:27: “…lack of property and the estate of direct labour, of concrete labour, form not so much an estate of civil society as the ground upon which its circles rest and move.”

The South African scenario plays out exactly as the European one did centuries ago in form of delinquent acts by the then European capitalists and their corrupt rule. The ANC elite’s organised effort to dominate the masses of poor people with its hijacking of Parliament as an exclusive ANC kingdom has parallels in bygone European class structures. Pithouse19, more precisely, writes19:27: “In other words, the bourgeois public sphere depends, materially, on the impoverishment of the people that it excludes from participation.” The European Enlightenment and its liberal idea that regards all human beings as fully or equally human, is absent in 2019 in the mindset of the ANC leadership. Pithouse19 indirectly brings Kant’s description into focus here regarding the so-called “right of the ANC to mismanage and misuse the mass of poor Blacks at the voting box and in Parliament” because the ANC alone (which is false) freed the people from Apartheid, when he writes further19:27: “In an essay published in 1793 he [Kant] insisted that property was a qualification for citizenship, and that the “domestic servant, the shop assistant, the labourer…are…unqualified to be citizens”.

To break the ANC’s so-called “anti-Kant politics of curtailment of the poor Blacks” does not seem easy. The ANC and its left-bourgeois mentality has been cemented into Parliament, something which will not be erased overnight. The ANC will not allow it, even if they need to carry out a coup d’état to stay in power. Here in South Africa – where the resistance that had led to the fall of the NP was strongly activated by the trade union movement with their Durban strikes in 1973, the community struggles that mobilised millions of people by the 1980s and their building of democracy from below in their focussed dismantling of White supremacy – that political power was hijacked from them in a deliberate way in 1994 by the already crooked ANC elite returning into the mainstream of politics. Shamelessly the ANC elite sent the true and original 1970s and 1980s fighters for democracy “back to the caves” as Pitman19:27 put it. From 1994 the ANC elite (politburo) started to exercise its dominant power “from above”, continuously via Parliament and the ballot box with false promises. This led to the maintenance of ANC political power through the misuse of its electoral vote, writes Pithouse. For Pithouse19, to reverse the present political contradictions brought about by ANC rule from 1994 to 2019, will require an immense counter-input, similarly to the one between 1973 and 1994 by the masses of Black poor. What is needed firstly, is breaking down the ANC’s power which has silenced the impoverished majority of poor Blacks for 25 years. Secondly, the ANC’s so-called legitimacy via Parliament needs to be erased, together with its many well-established cancerous roots in politics, economics and society. Only this will and can erase the ANC’s present-day misuse of Parliament.19

The lawlessness, corruption and dominance, freely appropriated by the ANC regime via Parliament over 25 years in the absence of an Electoral-Parliament Act, together with the lack of a Parliamentary Ethics Code included in the Act, thus forces three immediate questions upon us:

1) Does the ANC under Cyril Ramaphosa hav the ability to reform and to cleanse itself to serve the people of South Africa, their employer, who has appointed them?

2) May any of the promises in the ANC’s May 2019 manifesto be trusted?

3) Is the ANC able to successfully effect land expropriation with or without compensation between 2019 and 2024?

The 51% voters who stay away from the ballot box in May 2019 and the 28% of voters voting for the ANC in those same elections were willing partners in this political orgy by standing aloof from applicable decision-making during the May 2019 elections. The 72% of voters failed also, by choice, in enforcing or promoting anything like the much-needed Electoral-Parliament Act. Pithouse19 compares this passivity and failure with Immanuel Kant’s thinking on the awakening of self-thinking versus the failure of self-thinking in the 1780s. Pithouse writes19:27:

In 1784, Immanuel Kant argued that enlightenment is the emergence from the immaturity that results from the laziness and cowardice that prevents people from thinking for themselves. He asserted, against forces in the state and church, the imperative to respect ‘the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters’.

Kant’s enlightenment sorely escaped the attention of the mass of 30 million poor Blacks. They are strangers to the concept of freedom and individual self-determination: they are strangers because they are delinquently kept there by the ANC elite’s cunning and devious actions. Looking at the ANC’s continuous strengthening of their grip on power over 25 years, it seems the electorate is going to remain captured for many years to come. Given the absence of political reasoning and constructive public debate by the masses outside Parliament and their blind support for a hard-core ANC regime over six elections, one may have serious misgivings about the future of South African democracy. Voter apathy and blind support for the ANC will ensure the continuation of corrupt politics post-May 2019, together with the shameless misuse of Parliament.19,23

3.1.5. The much-needed “sifting mechanism” for political leaders

Kant’s enlightenment not only escaped the attention of the mass of 30 million poor Blacks, but seemingly also that of educated South Africans. What specicially stands out regarding the more learned section of the population, is their fixation with the Constitution as the only means of law-enforcement as regards political practice in country and how the President is selected and elected. The implications and impact of the Electoral Act on politics are disregarded. This Act and the Constitution of the ANC display a totally undemocratic process in the selection and election of the President, which goes against the grain of liberal democracy. It is not a new trend but a custom and policy that has been followed since 1994. It indeed shows that the Electoral Act must dramatically be revised together with the Constitution to make provision for a much-needed sifting mechanism in the selection and election of executive political leaders, meaning the process. The current politically-laden, undemocratic system in the selection of the President was well-illustrated by the tainted Jacob Zuma’s election in 2009 via the ANC’s national conference system which excluded the say of the majority of South Africa’s voters. The lack of understanding of the indirect, non-voters’ election of the President and the skewed process of his selection as leader, may be seen in the recent opinion by Taylor50 in which he defends the election of the President solely “in terms of our so-called liberal democracy as gestalt by the Constitution”. This postulation of Taylor50 is far from the truth and an utmost misunderstanding and a misleading view of our real politics. [The practice of the election in the selection of law-makers of the Parliament, as well as that of the vice-President and the President, was already fully described in the previous two subsections: ANC’s democratic-centralism ideology (See: 3.1.3.1.) and the South Africa’s faulty electoral system (See 3.1.3.2.) and will only shortly be referred to again].

On his so-called “direct democratic selection and election by the voters of the President in terms of their so-called assumed liberal democracy and Constitution”, Taylor50 writes as follows50:20:

The essence of a democracy is that political power flows from the people (the demos) and the people alone. We and no-one else get to decide who will be our president. Every five years parties give us their lists of candidates, we go to the polls and we elect our representatives on the basis of proportional representation. Any of us can put up our hands to be a representative, to be the president, and the demos will vote on our candidacies; there can be no other criteria, no other sifting mechanism. Anything else isn’t democratic.

The constitution has two primary philosophical functions. The first is that it provides the rules for how the temporary transfer of power from the people to representatives works: in other words elections, the structure of parliament, separation of powers and how, for example, the will of the people is realised in the choosing of a chief justice.

The second function is to place restrictions and obligations on how our representatives operate during their five years tenures. Traditionally, human rights serve as barriers against repressive state action. They are lines in the political sand: the state cannot restrict our speech, it cannot deprive us of life, deny our religious beliefs or force religious beliefs upon us, and it cannot prevent us from organising ourselves in unions, associations and political parties. We can hit the the streets and insult our “leaders”. Moreover, human rights ensure equality in law: that none of us is superior to another.

Looking critically at the last (third) paragraph of Taylor’s50 postulation, it is a pile of unrelated philosophical rhetoric which has nothing to do with obtaining and maintaining good executive political leadership. It must be ignored, together with the philosophical postulations of paragraph two. Only then may we focus on Taylor’s resistance to a sifting mechanism to select and elect the President, which boils down to the notion who sees himself fit for office may stand to be elected as President. Paragraph one contains a contradictory element where he praises the proportional representation system of the present Electoral Act, while he seems to be oblivious to the ANC’s policy of democratic-centralism. In the current setup the ANC’s delegates/representatives of less than 4 000 at its national conference select and elect the ANC leader who at the same time becomes the President of the RSA. Furthermore, it must be noted that the ANC has less than 1 million inscribed members out of a ±57 million population (representing less than a 2% ANC impact) and out of a ±35 million eligible-voters population (representing less than a 3% ANC impact). In the May 2019 elections, only 49% of the total eligible-voters population actually voted. Of this 49% only 28% voted ANC. What Taylor50 further missed, is that in many of the modern liberal democracies, as inscribed in their Constitutions, it is compulsory for all their eligible citizens to register and to vote in elections. This statutory shortcoming in our so-called “excellent” Constitution contributed to the fact that 51% of the eligible voters did not take part in the May elections. This absence of an established liberal democracy is part of the conundrum which has contributed to the ANC having been the sole ruling party since 1994 at the national level. The current President, Cyril Ramaphosa, cannot claim to be elected democratically, neither can the ANC pride themselves on being a democratically elected regime representing the total population.50

South Africa needs a sifting mechanism in the choosing of its executive political leaders on all levels written into the Constitution which states certain clear pre-requirements, for instance a minimum educational qualification and a clean integrity certification. The last-mentioned should include any alleged crimes and misdemeanours under investigation and of course a life-style audit. At the moment the ANC “clearing” rests on its so-called “integrity” committee’s decisions as well as the “approvals” of the Top Six and the NEC of the ANC (the so-called ANC politburo). The lists of candidates to which Taylor refers and where for instance the ANC put up their eligible candidates, were tainted by alleged criminals and even murderers. As many as 22 candidates were alleged to have been tainted and many went back to Parliament, not only to be law-makers, but were promoted into senior parliamentary positions. Jacob Zuma would not have qualified if an official sifting mechanism had been in place when he ousted Thabo Mbeki in 2009 to become President. Likewise, Cyril Ramaphosa would not stay a day on as President after the Public Protector’s finding that he misled Parliament about the R500 000 “gift to his election campaign” from the corrupt company, Bosasa. Central its policy of launching crooks into high-level political executive positions — at least for the ANC as a party and regime — is its “declaration” that “no-one is guilty before having been prosecuted and sentenced by a court of law”. The secretary-general of the ANC, Ace Magashule, via the decisions of the ANC Caucus’s Political Committee, the ANC’s General Council and the ANC’s Integrity Committee, made this standpoint clear in the ANC’s reappointments of tainted ANC-leaders in senior positions in the post-May 2019 government. Integrity only counts for the ANC top brass when they are locked up, an outcome that is not easily reachable when it comes to the ANC’s top leadership in post-1994 South Africa. The ANC’s top brass knows it well and rides the crooked judicial system. How crooked the leadership of the ANC has become but still qualifies today in terms of the proportional representation to be included on its tainted lists of parliamentary candidates, has been the subject of multifarious comments by various political analysts and commentators.50-53

Gumede51 identifies ten untouchable groups that must first be tackled before the rule of law and good politics may be restored. Such groups should be eliminated from the regime’s inner circle and positions of power and influence, which they owe precisely to the ANC’s democratic-centralism and our faulty electoral system that lacks a leadership-sifting mechanism. Here he identifies as the primary untouchable group the ANC’s own corrupt but senior politicians at national, provincial and local level, who flaunt their power and corruptly acquired assets and live ostentatiously on public resources.51

But this ideal outcome propagated by Gumede51 is easier said than done, because the ANC’s democratic-centralism and our faulty official electoral system has been rooted in the ANC’s politics and has been expertly used since 1994. It allows someone such as Ace Magashule to evade the law for his alleged delinquencies. Munusamy writes52:20:

ANC secretary-general ACE Magashule can claim to be a victim of a “fake news media conspiracy” because the National Prosecuting Authority has not been able to formulate a case against him despite myriad illegal activities during his term as Free State premier. The line between wrong and right is indistinct.

Gordhan57, referring to the crooked outcomes between 1994 and 2019 resulting from the ANC regime’s veto of any merit system when it comes to leadership appointments, posits57:19:

The past decade has been characterised by the paralysis of law enforcement agencies to act against corruption, the looting of state coffers, the catastrophic dismantling at the South African Revenue Service (Sars), and rise of a parallel security state targeting political opponents of the state capture project.

Gumede51 similarly comments on the state of lawlessness resulting from ANC cronyism and the lack of any mechanisms to select leaders of integrity by saying51:20:

Allowing political, criminal and business gangsters to remain seemingly untouchable, strutting around arrogantly while ordinary citizens live in fear and poverty gives the sense that SA is out of control, lawless and leaderless.

On 28 June 2019 Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng50 saw fit to allude to the anarchy surrounding so-called “state capture” and its concomitant corruption, as revealed by the Zondo and Mpati Commissions. In a speech to corporate South Africa at the Sunday Times Directors Event in Sandton, he posed the following pertinent questions50:20:

How do we choose leaders? Who qualifies to be a leader? Is there a sifting mechanism of sorts? Isn’t it desirable that, for starters, before you can become a president there are very stringent requirements to be met before you can even begin to run?

It is significant that Mogoeng50 too, is proposing the establishment of some kind of sifting mechanism for political leaders, not only internally by the political parties themselves, but also officially by the state. The power of politicians and rulers to shape the fate of the country is simply too great to leave to mere chance, and requires them to be at least morally “fit for office”. It is clear that South Africa’s so-called “liberal democracy” and its Constitution are not foolproof and is open for exploitation by dishonest politicians.50

Taylor’s50 subsequent reaction to the above questions by Mogoeng50 may be seen as not only inapplicable, but inappropriate. It borders on bad faith when he writes50:20: “What is a problem is that chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng doesn’t like our democracy.” In the same breath he continues his attack by addressing justice Mogoeng directly in an open letter as follows50:20:

Chief justice Mogoeng, you are a functionary of the people, not a paramount leader. Your function is to ensure that political power remains with the demos and that means, at the very least, that we are the “sifting mechanism”. We choose our representatives through the electoral process and they rule at our pleasure. Our vote is the most stringent criterion because, ultimately, political power belongs to us.

Looking critically at Taylor’s50 criticism of Mogoeng, it was exactly because of Mogoeng’s position as functionary of the people that he as a justice had put the questions. Taylor50 uncritically places his faith in the act of voting itself, forgetting that in many totalitarian states voters have for years voted in corrupt dictators, whether coerced or not.

Not anyone of us should have the automatic right to stand for political office: every aspirant candidate needs to be scrutinised for a lack of integrity and education. Without such a pre-selection, democracy is absent and freedom misused. It is important to note that for all statutory professions there are pre-requirements in terms of training and integrity to be able to register and practise for instance as a doctor, an attorney, etc. These registrations are further subject to compulsory renewal yearly as long as the practitioner wants to stay on the roll. Negligence and personal deviances/delinquencies may mean the removal of the professional practitioner’s name from the roll and the end of his ability to practise. In comparison, the careers of philosophers, etc. are not seen as statutory professions and anyone, without the slightest training, may practise it. The status of the self-styled philosopher or the well-learned philosopher does not differ very much from the status of the postdoctoral philosopher. Politicians, especially political leaders, are appointed to high-level positions as law-makers, which make them nothing less than statutory professionals. This makes an official sifting mechanism for politicians urgently needed in a future South African political system. If such a system had been in place since 1994, the Zondo and Mpati Commissions would not have been needed today.50

The above also has a direct bearing on Munusamy’s54 absolute need for lifestyle audits to expose corruption among those whom she called our all-too-easily-tempted-politicians [to which may be added: all-too-easily-elected-politicians]. The argument here is that there are always some politicians who want to live above their means and are therefore amenable to corruption, as well as narcissism, writes Munusamy54. More precisely, there are undoubtedly people directly and indirectly in politics using their positions to access additional sources of income, varying from crooked contracts, bribes, up to donations for election campaigns and the corruption around it, in order to enrich themselves, as well as to ensure their selection to positions of great political power. The best means of applying checks and balances to politicians is through official and rigorous lifestyle audits. It must be comprehensively applied not only to an aspirant politician, but also all of his/her associates such as for instance the companies, trusts and his/her secret donors who are giving to his/her election. The so-called Act on Privacy must not play a role in safeguarding crooked politicians from investigation and the state agency evaluating a candidate must have the right to use all means available, from the SAPS to the NPA and SSA, etc., to gather information in detail. The ANC itself has promised since 2016 to introduce lifestyle audits for ministers, government officials and leaders of public enterprises. Indeed, last year Cyril Ramaphosa pledged that everyone in the government including himself, would undergo them, reports Munusamy54.

Featuring prominently in Munusamy’s54 proposal, is the strict requirement that all MPs and MPLs should also be audited. So far, regarding the ANC’s talking the talk but not walking the walk, nothing has realised. Indeed, as previously said, if these law-makers’ audits had been done since 1994 (when persons with serious criminal records were allowed into Parliament because of their exoneration from doing “evil” as result of “Apartheid’s evil”), South Africa would have been saved the current need for running commissions on state capture and crooked VIPs. It would also have saved Ramaphosa the unnecessary and embarrassing attention of the Public Protector concerning his 2017 Nasrec election campaign. Moreover, it would have set in motion the much-needed evolution of the ANC’s economic policies, cemented as they have been in democratic-centralism which emanates from its pre-1994 years and its communist past. As a result of its iron grip on power in South Africa, 86 members serve in the ANC’s autocratic politburo (representing only 2% of the ANC-members) who have never had a lifestyle audit so far and of whom some are even regarded by the ANC’s Integrity Commission as seriously tainted.54,55

Regarding the findings of the ANC’s own integrity committee, these are often rejected in favour of keeping corrupt politicians in office. Commenting on this tendency, the political commentator Justice Malala writes96:

These leaders of the ANC past and present don’t believe they and a large chunk of the electorate are bound by the laws passed by its parliament and enforced by the organs of state: the police, the prosecutorial services and the judiciary.

It’s not just at national level. It cascades down through the entire ANC. Two weeks ago it was reported that the ANC in Gauteng had rejected its own integrity commission’s recommendations to remove several members, including two who are linked to the VBS Mutual Bank scandal.

The integrity commission in Gauteng, headed by Trevor Fowler, recommended that the mayors of Merafong and the West Rand be fired for their complicity in taking ratepayers’ money and unlawfully, despite clear legal advice, depositing it into VBS. They broke the law and they did so knowingly. Yet the ANC in Gauteng, which for the past 10 years many of us gullible fools have been calling “the enlightened ANC”, chose to defend them. As Mbete said, they see things differently in this ANC. They do not see the rule of law.

The above absence of an official sifting mechanism of politicians before being allowed into executive positions, such as lifestyle audits for the ANC politicians seeking parliamentary positions (besides the utter failure of the party’s integrity commission described by Malala), is deeply rooted in its strong democratic-centralism. Its primary aim and intention is the gobbling up of any challenger or opposition to its well established Marxist-Leninist model of power maximisation and permanent rule. As Feketha56, Munusamy54, Gordhan57 and Padayachee et al.55, already showed in some way, Professor William Gumede58 of the School of Governance at Wits takes further, in depth. Besides the ANC’s adherence to and continuing practice of its rigid pre-1994 revolutionary ideology to maintain undisturbed democratic-centralism, Gumede also points to the use by the ANC’s top leadership of racism and “Black victimhood” to secure their position of political power over the last 25 years. The intertwining of three insidious elements led directly to an ANC-sanctioned culture of state capture, corruption and mismanagement while constant, internalised malfeasance created a culture of unaccountability and irresponsibility. In fact, irresponsibility and unaccountability might be described as an insouciant “lifestyle” in its own right. This in turn makes the implementation of lifestyle audits impossible and the 2016 intention of Ramaphosa to introduce it, tantamount to hypocrisy: On the contrary, it became a topic for the top brass to avoid, because it endangers the established democratic-centralism (autocracy) of the ANC and thus will nullify the top brass’s autocratic rule over the greater party, Parliament and the country. Such autocracy is a revolutionary tradition, habit and custom, which has been internalised in the ANC mindset since its terrorist days. It is a system that Mandela, up to Ramaphosa, brilliantly uses when their power is endangered from within the ANC as well as from outside. The same strategy is applicable to Jacob Zuma, Ace Magashule and David Mabuza fighting at present in the ANC for the autocratic soul of the party.54-58

Gumede58 elaborates further on the functioning of the power structure within the current ANC58:16:

The ANC is guided by democratic centralism, where every member has to obey central decisions and where leaders vet even the lowest-level appointments. These are among the reasons why corruption flourished in a system where everyone must support the party leadership, no matter whether it is wrong, incompetent or corrupt. “Deployment” to government or to the private sector is based on loyalty and struggle “credentials”, rather than ability and competence.

There is the belief that the party laws are above those of the country, even above individual conscience. Many ANC members and supporters would rather follow the party line. They uncritically support party leaders. When corruption is exposed, the party faithful close ranks.

In a centralised party system, a small group can capture the party and wield power over life, careers and public resources.

They made centralised decisions that were accepted as edicts. They appointed loyalists to every level of the party and government. They were uncritically supported by the rank and file, under the rubric of loyalty.

The deputy-general of the SACP, Solly Mapaila, has argued that the use by the ANC’s politburo of democratic-centralism-cum-autocracy to develop a predatory state, has been well hidden inside their pretended implementation of Black economic empowerment over the years. This has led to disadvantage the Black majority while propping up a few politically connected politicians.56

On the intention of the ANC politburo to maintain at all times its policy of democratic centralism, rendering the introduction of an honest lifestyle audit, independent of the ANC’s corrupt party politics, impossible, Gumede58 shows how White racism (citing Apartheid going all the way back to 1652) is seen by the politburo as a danger to Black nationalism. He writes58:18:

Many ANC supporters often still back leaders, issues and politics almost exclusively on the basis of race. US scholar of race Cornel West, in a differing setting, warned about reducing every issue to “racial reasoning”. When an individual is corrupt, all one has to do is to claim racism, and people rally emotionally to that person. Misplaced black solidarity often demands closing ranks behind dubious personalities.

If a white person rightly criticises a corrupt black person, the corrupt person is embraced. Misplaced struggle solidarity has the same effect. If a non-ANC person, or an opposition party member or supporter criticises a corrupt ANC leader, the corrupt ANC leader is protected. If a black person is doing the criticism, he or she is a “puppet” of whites as “white monopoly capital” and “selling out” their race.

This organised racial politics of the ANC in assuring its corruption, etc., but most of all its’ politburo’s absolute autocracy, also streamed since 1994 out of its so-called democratic centralism into the cognition of “black victimhood”, sanctioned further the ANC’s politburo’s right to can do anything wrong because it “services the Black-nation”.

Gumede further enlightens us58:18:

Black victimhood also encourages corruption. It appears that almost every wrong government decision, failure and poor policy made by current leaders is blamed on apartheid, colonialism or conspiracies by the white elite or hostile Western countries.

Black leaders in government and the private sector are increasingly using colonialism, apartheid and Western “imperialism” to cover their incompetence, mismanagement and corruption. Many African leaders and government have cynically promoted the idea of Africans being victims. This easy option numbs creative thinking. It means that leaders and governments can shrink their responsibility to voters. It has also made it difficult to hold leaders and governments accountable for wrongdoing, lack of delivery of delivery and corruption.

The introduction of the much-needed “sifting mechanism” in the selection of ANC political leaders and the doing of a lifestyle audit on them as “preached” by Cyril Ramaphosa in 2016, will and can never be executed in terms of uncontaminated and responsible international evaluation criteria. When looking at the many tainted top ANC members in the present Ramaphosa regime “because they have not yet been found guilty in a court of law”, Ramaphosa’s own inexplicable and seemingly desperate efforts to keep the donors to his 2017 Nasrec leadership campaign secret at all costs via the court provides a prominent example. His use of the permanent, age-old, ingrained trick of “stretched values” in the selection of the ANC’s leaders, makes it clear that the testing of the concepts of goodness, integrity, honesty, responsibility and accountability has never been internalised in ANC political culture and will probably never be internalised in the future. They refuse to face accusations in public to prove their innocence. The abuse of the South African courts for civil cases to silence accusations has become the order of the day for many ANC leaders to ride out accusations and allegations. Prominent here is the court order obtained by the suspended chief financial officer (CFO) of the Sol Plaatje municipality, Lydia Mahloko, who had interdicted the Northern Cape’s local governance executive committee members (MEC) from tabling a damning investigation report which recommends that she be criminally charged for flouting supply-chain management processes during the procurement of a fleet, including the purchase of the mayoral vehicle. The mindset of the ANC politiburo is saturated with autocracy as guided and practised by means of democratic-centralism, racism and Black victimhood. Magashule, Zuma, Mabuza and Ramaphosa’s political activities reflect all the manifestations of these syndromes. If Ramaphosa already has a problem with the Public Protector’s elementary investigation of the donors and the “movement and end-allocation” of their so-called “sincere gift money” for his 2017 Nasrec election, what will his counter-attack look like when she launches a full lifestyle audit on him, starting in 1980, and scrutinising every cent he generated as well as from whom, for which service delivered?54,58,59

3.2. Evaluation guidelines for political parties

3.2.1. Overview

The successful execution of the post-2019 land-reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and implementation by a so-called “good” government, together with a “good” leadership in whom integrity and Solomon’s wisdom are essential characteristics. This means a regime that is not blindly on a path of “reaching the goal at any cost” but to effectively achieving an end-result regarding the matter, which would be a success. This requires a regime honestly serving the interests of all its people by following a well-drawn-up roadmap for an orderly land-reform initiative, and steering it into reality.

The essential question here is thus whether the ANC can be theoretically deemed a candidate or may be shortlisted and thus be considered to have the leadership potential to ensure the successful implementation and completion of the post-2019 plan on land expropriation.

The evaluation guidelines for political parties, as already used in the previous Articles 9 (EFF) and 10 (DA) will precisely be re-used to evaluate the ANC as national, provincial and municipal rulers. These guidelines on the ANC are:

  1. Its general policies as well as specific standpoints on issues such as respect for law and order, as well as the fighting of corruption, state capture, the behavioral delinquency of its MPs and MPLs, as well as its top leaders, in addition to the party’s and its leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as evidenced by its manifesto for the 2019 election;
  2. Public criticism for the period 1994 to 2019 in newspapers, etc., evaluated and reflected by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the party as a political organisation, its members’ and leaders’ behaviours and actions such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behaviour-delinquency of MPs and MPLs, top brass leaders, their views on land     expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the party’s internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinion.
3.2.1.1. The Louw Appraisal Checklist

For the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC, the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018 will again be used.60 The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was again applied to all information collated in the literature review of the party’s manifesto and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees applicable. For guiding the gathering of the information on the ANC, the approach used with the EFF and DA, is again set out as follows for better understanding, namely:

1) The Curriculum Vitae (CV) to obtain insight into the candidates’ qualifications, experience, extraordinary skills, etc; and

2) The letters of the referees, the Attestations, to offer, firstly, further insight into the qualifications, experience, etc. of the candidate; and secondly, at the same time give us confidential insight into the good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate, that are well-masked in, or absent from the CV. This referee-data mostly informs us well regarding the “goodness” or “badness” of a candidate, which can make him in the end a failure or a success in the handling of the responsibilities of the post.

In this research the manifesto and self-description offered by the ANC and its leaders will be seen as their CVs. Hereto the public reporting by journalists and other sources will be seen as the letters of referees/references or attestations. The account or verdict awarded to the ANC as a capable and skilled ruler able to successfully execute land reform, will only be calculated in terms of the Louw Appraisal Checklist60 at the end of the final article in the series (article 20).

3.3. African National Congress

3.3.1. Overview

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF: Part 1) and the Democratic Alliance (DA: Part 2) have already been published in the previous two articles (9 and 10) under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”.

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the African National Congress (ANC: Part 3) will be published next, also under the above general title.

It is an open question if the ANC, “mandated” by the voters as the post-2019 government of South Africa, can truly drive the intended land expropriation as an enterprise with honesty and integrity, to bring it to a successful end? Issues that immediately come to mind are the skills, abilities, integrity and capabilities of the ANC as a regime and as a party, together with the skills, abilities, integrity and capabilities of its elite and leaders. Primary among these is the important question of integrity and whether they might be trusted by voters to exercise their mandate. Integrity is not limited to a single plane: it is comprehensive, including social, economic, personal and political trustworthiness and honesty. Looking at the ANC’s pre-2019 regime record, when comparing it with the prerequisites of Patricia De Lille’s61 list of the seven conditions (which she formulated in her Good Party manifesto for the 8 May elections) which a so-called good government must fulfil too, it clearly fails all of these seven conditions. (Notwithstanding this failure, De Lille joined as minister in Ramaphosa’s cabinet!) The problem here is that the ANC’s election manifesto and its 1994 to 2019 behaviour as a regime did not adhere to the cognitive mindset, the psyche, the culture, customs, traditions and habits or the ability to distinguish between good and bad government. It means that if pre-2019 ANC behaviour is repeated in post-2019 South Africa, good governance will stay an unattainable dream within ANC politics. A successful land expropriation plan thus equally unattainable.61-63

The general ANC manifesto can give us some clue as to what positive or negative elements may be expected from the regime for the period 2019 to 2024.

3.3.2. The general ANC manifesto

Regarding the ANC’s general manifesto for the May 2019 election, launched in January 2019, Derby62, Hunter64 and Kgosana63 point out that it was again saturated with a mass of empty promises of more and better work, better health and education, and contaminated with populism. Missing, however, was prudence. The manifesto further reflects some conflicting views, opinions and mostly, hostile commitments: a Ramaphosa version and a Magashule-Zuma–version, contrasting with each other on issues of cardinal importance such as nationalisation, etc. The coexistence of these two versions and a seemingly growing split in the ANC’s general as well as specific politics (which seems to be purely a leadership struggle rather than a true fight around political principles according to many analysts) are still continuing at the close of this article on 31 October 2019.62-64

Kgosana63 described the ANC’s general manifesto, after an in-depth analysis of it, together with a history of the regime as from 1994, as follows63:17:

The manifest failures of the ANC’s manifesto are all around us: The same bright, shiny, shameless promises are repeated each election, never to be actually met.

More specifically on the ANC’s manifesto, Kgosana writes63:17:

Yes, the ANC has done a lot since 1994. Building infrastructure, electrifying homes, connecting people to clean water, ensuring near universal access to basic education. But these achievements are negated by a bloated and uncaring bureaucratic system, corruption, incompetence and indifference. After the nightmare of the Zuma years, the ANC has to do a lot more than repeat empty promises.

Derby62 takes us closer to the “political darkness” inside the ANC soul, as reflected by its manifesto, when he comments62:2:

In a still-precarious position, there’s simply no room for the ANC — or, I’d add, any party looking to lead after this year’s polls — to veer far off a script that speaks of fiscal prudence. The party has blown the surplus position it had more than a decade ago; it has hired all the public servants it can hire and doled out all the political favours it possibly can. On the last one, we can only hope, right?

It will be interesting see what the manifestos still to come will offer as solutions to what’s now a stale tale of woe. And thereafter we‘ll have to wait for the “Naas Botha” commentary that follows to drum up uncertainty. A state, I am starting to believe, that is inescapable for any functional democracy.

Built into the ANC general manifesto for the May 2019 elections must be read the party’s poor track record coming from 1994, writes the editor of the Sunday Times on 10 February 2019. Specific stands here as reference President Ramaphosa’s Nation Address (Sona) in February 2019. Putting into perspective the many promises of Ramaphosa (which had seemingly become a habit with him still nearly six months after the elections) to improve education, accelerate the economy and return the country to the rule of law, etc., it was clear that neither Ramaphosa as a leader, nor the ANC as a party and regime, have what it takes to deliver from 2019 to 2024 what it has promised. South Africans have heard many promises from the ANC’s executive leaders from the same podium as the one that Ramaphosa used in February 2019. The editor of the Sunday Times in this context writes65:16:

Who can forget Zuma’s first promise in 2009 after his election as state president a few weeks earlier? At the heart of our worst recession, Zuma stood in front of the nation promising to create 500,000 jobs every year. He never delivered, despite repeating this promise of creating jobs every year of his nine years in office.

Ramaphosa’s reign has so far echoed Zuma’s failed actions, however much his clan wants to manipulate the truth in their stand-off with the Magashule-Zuma clan, which has now become a daily cry from the Ramaphosa camp to the public to take these myths and lies for the truth.65

Note what Jacob Zuma himself said in April 2019 around the hypocritical “virtue” of the ANC after 1994 — seemingly “anointed” and innocent as an angel just descended from Heaven — in his ANC May election roadshow promoting the ANC’s general manifesto by describing all the post-1994 wrongs under the ANC (wherein the ANC and its elite was the sole governing party) to be simply the after-effects of Apartheid. Cele66, in this context, reports66:8:

He lauds the party for being honest; admits that there had been some difficulties in fixing the wrongs made by the oppressors, saying that it cannot happen overnight. When you vote for the ANC, you vote for a car that is already en route, you don’t vote for a car whose road worthiness you are unsure of. There is no one who can say that the ANC has not worked for its people.

Zuma is not alone in this cloud of empty promises and dreams. The political figure Cyril Ramaphosa also stands out in his empty pre-election promises and undertakings, writes the labour-relations journalist Terry Bell67. Bell refers to these many promises as outlandishness, which he defines as meaning: looking or sounding bizarre. Specifically on the political, emotional and spoken manifestations, Bell writes67:2:

Extravagant – outlandish – promises are the stock of the political elite as they seek the votes to install them at the parliament trough.

Take the guarantee by President Cyril Ramaphosa that the ANC would build 1 million new houses in Johannesburg‘s Alexandra township within five years.

One million houses? For a population of anything up to 500 000 people living on 800 hectares of land, which, government admits, has the infrastructure to only cater for 70 000 residents? The mind boggles.

And older residents, among them trade unionists who were part of the militant Alex anti-apartheid resistance of the 1980s, have heard it all before.

As recently as 2001, former president Thabo Mbeki announced a R1.6 billion Alexandra renewal project that promised between 50 000 and 66 000 new homes within seven years. What happened to the money and the project is still being investigated.

This outright misleading and false information can already give us an indication of what to expect from 2019 to 2024 from the ANC in most of its endeavours of which addressing land ownership will be the most important. In this context the question is how can any person mislead himself so immensely as to accept his own lies as the truth? Political manipulation and empty promises may be part of the politician’s stock-in-trade, but the ANC has take it to a new level, comparable to some of the more outlandish, to use Bell’s term, promises and predictions made by African dictators such as Idi Amin or Mobutu Sese Seko.

Looking critically at the content of the ANC’s manifesto for the May 2019 election, much of it consisted of the recycling of old ideas, as well as failed outcomes disguised as doubtful successes: it says really nothing of constructing a future and bringing value to the people of South Africa. Looking more broadly at what the text of the manifesto tried to address — such as, for example, the erasing of poverty, inequality, unemployment and the maintenance of a capable state, etc. — these are indeed hackneyed themes during ANC rule from 1994 to 2019. These problems were mostly exacerbated by the ANC itself through its immense mismanagement, such as the theft of state money belonging to the poor by the ANC’s cronies. It was only repackaged for ANC propaganda during the May 2019 elections, not so much as to bring healing, but to present their failures as the results of Apartheid, deflecting from ANC wrongdoing. The political researcher, Thokozani Chilenga-Buta33, also sees the endless repetition of the ANC’s populist themes in the run-up to the May elections, when he writes33:30:

Though these are nice ideas, they are not new. They were punted in the National Development plan (NDP) which was endorsed by Parliament in 2013. At the time the ANC had the full support of Parliament, including opposition parties, to implement the ideals of the NDP.

These problems and failures created by the ANC regime, lacking as always a constructive effort to address and solve them at least in some way, were also reflected by the lekgotla of the ANC’s national executive committee (NEC) at the beginning of June 2019. Chilenga-Butao states33:30:

“That in 2019 the NEC lekgotla is propagating the same old rhetoric — without saying why it thought these ideas had failed to be implemented since 2013 — is a major deception.”

3.3.3. The Ramaphosa manifesto

Ostensibly in an effort to imprint his own powerful status upon the minds of both the ANC and the public, Cyril Ramaphosa also published his own pre-May 2019 manifesto. (This was clearly seen by some analysts, firstly as an attempt to undermine the ANC’s democratic-centralism wherein every member, including the President of the South African state, is subordinate to policy and resolutions taken during its conference, and secondly as a direct effort at that time by Ramaphosa to call attention to his saviour-status in his leadership conflict with Ace Magashule, the secretary general of the ANC).

The best reflection of a self-description (and of a CV) of the present-day ANC’s intentions to shamelessly mislead  the public and dishonestly recruit of voters after 25 years of corruption and failed governance, were the nine paragraphs below containing the ANC’s general political manifesto and its president’s seemingly politically confused mindset.33,72.73

This manifesto, emanating directly from Cyril Ramaphosa’s belief-system and political mindset, does not sound different from that of Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa’s message to South Africans to vote for him and the ANC was published on 17 March 2019 in both the Rapport and the Sunday Times respectively. It reads72:9 and 73:2:

Mede-Suid-Afrikane/ Fellow South Africans

Die toekoms van ons land is in die hande van diegene wat die meeste daarvoor omgee. Jy, die stemgeregtigde/ The future of our country is in the hands of those who care about it the most. You, the Voter.

‘n Hernude gevoel van trots – en ‘n nasie vol verwagtinge – berus op die punt van die pen wat jy op 8 Mei 2019 sal gebruik om jou stem uit te bring/ A renewed sense of pride – and a nation bursting with expectations – sits squarely at the tip of the pen that will be using to make your mark on the 8th of May 2019.

Bring dus jou stem uit vir die party wat met dieselfde passie as jy in hernuwing glo/ So, make your mark for the party that believes in renewal with the same passion that you do.

Die party wat ons nasie se toekoms vooropstel in sy hart en ‘n regering wat ‘n gespesialiseerde teen korrupsie-eenheid gestig het/The party that has our nation’s future foremost in its heart and a government that has put in place a specialised anti-corruption unit.

Die party wat daarop aangedring het om die Zondo-kommissie te stig om staatsopname bloot te lê en te vernietig/ The party that insisted on setting up the Zondo Commission to expose and destroy state capture.

Die party wat die proses gelei het om weereens die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens (SARS) gekry het om volgens wêreldgehalte te funksioneer/The party that has led the process of once again getting SARS working at its world class best.

Die party onder wie se leierskap, ‘n nuwe leierskap van die National Prosecuting Authority, daargestel het/The party under whose leadership, a new leadership of the National Prosecuting Authority has been put in place.

Die party wat die vermoë van die regering herstel het om dienste billik aan almal te verskaf./ The party that is restoring the ability of government to provide services fairly to all

Op 8 Mei 2019, maak ‘n onuitwisbare merk vir die toekoms van vernuwing wat Suid-Afrika verdien/. On the 8th of May 2019, make an indelible mark for the future of renewal that South Africa deserves.

Maak jou merk/ Make your mark.

Stem ANC/ Vote ANC.

Saam Sal Ons Suid-Afrika Laat Groei/ Let’s Grow South Africa Together.

[Signed] Cyril Ramaphosa

President van die ANC/ President of the ANC

3.3.3.1. Analysis of the Ramaphosa manifesto

The above message firstly needs to be analysed before the ANC may be considered as a potential ruler (an employee), mandated by the voters (as the employer within our scheme) effect land expropriation with or without compensation. The above nine paragraphs consist of at least eleven misleading items and untruths: it seems to be clear here that in Ramaphosa’s political mind, as  in that of most of the ANC’s top brass, myths have become truths after their 25 years of unfettered rule and extreme power.72:9

The use of the words “renewed, renewal and restoring” is striking, confirming that the ANC itself has recognised that its political integrity, actions and deliveries from 1994 to 2019 have been sorely lacking, apart from its corruption, negligence and mismanagement.72:9

Referring to a renewed feeling of pride, the “renewed” and “restoring” confirm that the period 1994 to 2019 was undoubtedly a period of constant despair and of loss, experienced by the nation exclusively at the hands of the ANC regime. His specific reference to the renewing of the ANC is an acknowledgement by him of his outright failure, as well as that of his party between 1994 and 2019 to fulfil their mandate of providing good government. Pertinent here is the literature which confirms that the ANC’s mindset and behaviour became totally focussed on internal matters with serious wrongdoing and a culture of delinquency.72:9

Ramaphosa’s reference to the repair of the ANC is again an admission of guilt that the ANC was in 2019 a failed party and a failed regime, overseen by equally failed leaders since 1994: A party that would not be trusted or allowed again as the post-2019 government if a sifting mechanism existed. Ramaphosa’s pleading for the rehabilitation of the ANC above reminds one of the empty words of a confirmed psychopathic criminal, asking for forgiveness for his bad actions to society and to be allowed back amongst them, knowing well he is just going to continue with his serious delinquencies, being conscious that his bad character cannot be changed for the better. To speak like Ramaphosa of his party who had put the nation first/foremost from 1994 to 2019, is an utter lie and a hoax. Firstly, the chaos in our economics, the extreme poverty of 30 million Blacks, criminality and corruption, etc., by the ANC elite and their cronies have long ago erased the concept of nation from most South Africans’ minds. The promise to restore the ability of the government to provide services to the citizens, who are the people (employer) who had appointed them, is nothing else than the acknowledgement that never after Apartheid had there again been any services of average standard offered by the ANC, or when sometimes offered, limited to short periods after 1994 and limited to the ANC’s favourites. Secondly, when Ramaphosa speaks of the concept of a nation, he, for vote-gathering, clearly deviated from his party’s previous classification of Whites as non-Africans and as colonists respectively and thus not part of the ANC’s nation concept.72:9

Ramaphosa’s bragging as to the establishment of a specialised corruption unit must let him feel giddy: Who was the ruler from 1994 to 2019 and who was vice-president under Jacob Zuma when the immense corruption, which Ramaphosa now “promises to erase”, started to develop and to reach a climax: the ANC and Cyril Ramaphosa. The founding of the specialised corruption unit is indeed meant to catch the ANC’s elite (although the prosecuting outcome is far from that). Ramaphosa’s specialised corruption unit failed so far at the closing of this research on 31October 2019 to bring to book a single one of the ANC’s top elite who had been identified by the Zondo or the Mpati commissions. With the establishment of the Zondo commission, notwithstanding the fact that it was conducted under the chair of an excellent justice with high integrity, Ramaphosa knows well that is toothless and a masked instrument to strengthen his position against the Zuma-Magashule clan in the hope of underminging their power in the ANC and within the party’s NEC after 2019. It is about his own power struggle and not improving the lot of the voters or that of the country.72:9

For instance, his so-called renewing of SARS means one thing: SARS (the South African Revenue Service) collapsed solely under ANC rule and is still struggling post-May 2019. Evidence suggests that SARS is miles away from rehabilitation and a positive restart. Also Ramaphosa’s stumbling with the NPA as renewed by the appointment of a new leader who has bettered it, is far from the truth: there is a new leader but so far no real high-ranking culprits identified by the Zondo and Mpati commissions, have been arrested.72:9

A further element in the above, is an effort to rehabilitate the ANC and its elite, after their disastrous rule of 25 years, through Ramaphosa’s plea of “please forgive the ANC top brass their failings”, a hint of despondency in Ramaphosa’s message, without saying it directly, that there had been an immense collapse in the ANC from 2009 onwards. The investigative literature offered by many journalists and political analysts prominently point to Jacob Zuma as the so-called “culprit”. This misleading thinking was also confirmed and promoted by the ANC’s head of elections, Fikile Mbalula74 (a prominent Ramaphosa fan), when he notably said74:4:

We have baggage from an era of a president who was not providing leadership but was associated with all the bad things. Literally everyone influential in the republic never believed in the leadership of former president Zuma,

and74:4:

Zuma affected our image because he was viewed in relation to state capture as the president of the country and the ANC, and that caused damage to the ANC”, as well as: “But now we have a new head of state who is doing good things because it is the new dawn, a strategic era that we are in.

Mbalula, as well as Ramaphosa know well it is not true: both Mbalula and Ramaphosa were prominent ANC leaders during the Zuma administration and did nothing constructive to stop Zuma and his cronies.72,74

In reaction to Mbalula and the Ramaphosa clan’s above political folly, all that can be said is that it seems as if Ramaphosa and the ANC were misleading the public with the Ramaphosa manifesto. Just read what Danny Titus75 writes about the ANC circus of fools and crooks — and possibly indirectly reflecting also on the Ramaphosa manifesto — when he posits75:19:

Die politici skud hul vere reg om straat toe te gaan met hul basuine: “Stem vir my, daai ander ouns is net ‘n klomp robbiese!” Enige erkenning oor korrupsie of hoe om dit op te los? Bloedweinig. Enige verwysings na korrupsie en die impak daarvan op doodgewone mense, die kiesers? Vergeet maar daarvan.

Titus75 refers to “election talk” and suggests that there are lies and subterfuge involved in propping up the ANC’s charade of a “free and democratic South Africa”75:19:

Konstrateer daarmee die vetgesmeerde katte van die politiek en die bedryfslewe, luister na die verkiesingspraatjies en dan sien ons die daaglikse leuens waarin in die vrye en demokratiese Suid-Afrika gelewe word.

It seems, reading the Ramaphosa manifesto (as well as the general ANC manifesto), as if even the President of the ANC and President of South Africa, does not understand the meaning of Titus’s specific pinpointing of the serious consequences of the ANC’s corruption between 1994 and 2019 and how the ANC regime cold-bloodedly crooked the innocent and most vulnerable citizens of South Africa over 25 years of their rule. Titus refers in this context to a United Nations report on the impact of corruption on basic human rights (which undoubtedly includes South African) that shows up the many contradictions in the Ramaphosa manifeste and the general ANC manifesto, as well as the illogical thinking of the ANC top brass on good governance. Titus75 states, regarding the devastating effects of corruption under ANC rule75:19:

Korrupsie is ‘n skending van menseregte, ‘n skending van ons Grondwet. Die reg op voedsel, huivesting, gesondheidsorg, die reg op lewe – dit word daagliks geskend deur munisipalteite, provinsiale en nationale regerings. Nie deur onbevoegdheid nie. Die skending vind daagliks plaas deur korrupsie wat ons land soos dryfsand ingesuig het. “Poorest of the poor; inequality; poverty and unemployment” – dié rympie hoor ons nou al jare. Deur volksverteenwoordigers wat willens en wetens hul kiesers belieg en bedreig.

How much the promises of the election manifestos of Ramaphosa and the ANC on the eve of the 8 May 2019 election were devoid of truth, was at last confirmed by Ramaphosa himself when he responded in June 2019 (after his inauguration as President) on the criticism levelled against his Third Sona and his unrealistic dreams by admitting that neither he nor the ANC regime could fix the country’s problems, mostly created by the ANC themselves, in the next five years, or even in ten or more years. He want so far as to admit that there were no shortcuts or quick fixes to solve the problems he had promised in his election manifesto to fix fast.76

Ramaphosa’s manifesto message is not worth the paper it is printed on: it is built on myths and deception. Contradicting the exclusive guilt of Jacob Zuma since 2009, is all the evidence that the ANC has been a failure from 1994 to this day during which Zuma was only one of a mass of corrupt ANC leaders. It is time that Ramaphosa obtained better insight into his “virtuous ANC”, as well as himself as a so-called beloved, good paramount-chief and as an extraordinary saviour to make post-2019 South Africa a success. Looking at his part in the Zuma regime, up to his present actions in the ANC, it is doubtful if he could ever obtain that insight.72

Ex-President Kgalema Motlanthe77 (who had served as interim president from September 2008 to May 2009 and who had also been secretary general from 1997 to 2007 and the party’s deputy president from 2007 to 2012), warned Ramaphosa in public on his foolish election campaign — specifically his promises, but seemingly without impact before the May elections. Firstly, he tells Ramaphosa that he is not the anointed politico-messiah to save the dying ANC, or to save the post-May 2019 South Africa. What Motlanthe77 apparently tried to say was that the ANC is terminally sick. Until the ANC will be finally deceased, the ANC and its leaders pose great dangers for post-May 2019 South Africa’s democracy, economics and the rights of its people. The ANC stayed an opportunistic revolutionary party to this day. The Ramaphosa manifesto confirms it in an exemplary way.77

3.3.4. The extravagance, outlandishness and bizarreness characteristic of some ANC politicians’ mindsets

The seeming extravagance, outlandishness and bizarreness characteristic of some politicians’ mindsets, which were reflected in the run-up to the May 2019 elections by some of the parties’ manifestos and which spell danger for the South African community post-May 2019, became in some way at last understandable when Siyahleba68 introduces us to the weird world of politics with his description of the origin of the naked ambition of politicians. Siyahleba writes68:2:

Delusion of grandeur is the fixed, false belief that one possesses superior qualities, such as genius, fame, omnipotence or wealth. It is most often a symptom of schizophrenia, but can also be a symptom found in psychotic or bipolar disorders, as well as dementia.

Then Siyahleba68 goes on to describe a certain person in the ANC. But looking critically at the ANC’s elite’s delinquent actions in general, it seems as if Siyahleba’s68 formulation is also applicable to some of the ANC’s other leaders, as evidenced not only by their false promises to the voters, but also by their false behaviour in politics over the period 1994 to 2019.

These bizarre promises in reality extend wider as regards the ANC’s elite. Knowing for instance all too well that their Alexandra Renewal Project was a failure, primarily because of their maladministration as ruling party, intertwined with their corruption and theft of state funds. Moreover, the despair created by the ANC regime, commencing in 2006 as a result of their failed Alexandra Renewal Project, is in the process of being steered into serious and comprehensive civil unrests.69 It signifies an identity struggle inside the soul of the ANC. When evaluated in-depth, the ANC leader’s psyche reflects the confusion of a soul in peril, resulting from decades of changes and exposures to new constructive elements, far away from the old, unstable liberation and revolutionary elements. It seems to fit into Siyahleba’s68 theory of schizophrenia, psychotic or bipolar disorders, and dementia. The ANC top brass display more and more delusions of grandeur and faith in a make-believe world where their false promises become realities, good outcomes that are going to realise, that they are geniuses, and that they are the only anointed persons who can save the country and its people. The so-called “big man syndrome” but then in the form of elect saviours.70

The above shows how the strong or “big” men of the ANC have received the entitlement to rule, unobstructed as “anointed” leaders of the liberation party (“…and in a Zuma way, until Jesus comes back to the earth”, according to his famous dictum), cognitively unaware that they are not political geniuses and did not receive mandates for autocratic rule in terms of the extreme and dangerous mood-swings of their minds. These leaders see themselves as “keepers of the liberation heritage”, which they used first and foremost to ensure their own self-preservation as the party’s elites. The whole approach to stay in power is done by means of false propaganda to members, supporters, voters. They became messiahs whose false words and integrities no-one may dare to doubt, as the many political fallacies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and now apparently Cyril Ramaphosa adhere to in their self-confident belief in their own “good” leadership and their so-called “sincere love” for the population, reflect very well.70

Makhanya71 further unmasked this false liberation ideology offered by the ANC leadership in their political manifestos going as far back as 1994. Hereto the promises from pre-and post-May 2019 of the present ANC leader Ramaphosa are central – namely, as a good leader and still a keeper of the ANC’s liberation heritage, he could make promises in the May elections to voters notwithstanding the failure of the ANC’s liberation after 1994. Regarding the fallacious promises of the ANC and thus also Ramaphosa’s promises as its leader which will and cannot be realised after 8 May 2019, Makhanya informs us71:2:

…those who are drunk on Ramaphoria must wake up from the stupor and recognise that the work that must be done is arduous and that the messiah is someone who watched passively from inside the cockpit as Zuma willingly navigated the ship into stormy waters. The man may be our leader for the next five years but he will not be our saviour [especially not through his promises].

How the ANC’s leadership has projected itself during the May 2019 elections to its supporters and voters as “good” and assured the voters that in the past they have only been doing good and that they are going to do only good in the future for them, as well as being the keepers of the future democracy while at the same time in the ANC backroom contradictory thinking and corrupt actions were going on, is pointed out by Bell regarding the ANC’s silent promulgation of their “Bantustan Bill”. Here, in an effort to keep their rural supporters for at the expense of the poor rural Blacks, the ANC’s Traditional and Khoisan Leadership Bill as well as the Traditional Courts Bill (which were for obvious reasons were not a public part of the ANC’s “election promises” in their manifestos) are on the verge of being signed into law, writes Bell67. On the dangers that these two Bills are holding for the innocent and uniformed voters if they become laws – and thus after the ANC leadership’s glowing promises before 8 May, Bell reports67:2:

“Together, they reinforce the Bantustan Balkanisation of the country and remove from the general rule of law some 17 million people who live in what the apartheid state called ‘tribal homelands’.”

3.3.5. Past, present and future South African scenarios

Looking back critically at the 1994 to 2019 political history of the ANC, there are certain signs of growths, developments and actions which show constancy and which form the basis for being able to offer generalisations on the actions to be expected from the ANC post-May 2019. The outcomes flowing from these generalisations may be positive or negative in the end. But, as history’s Joker often does, he can make the post-May 2019 political scenario suddenly and unexpectedly look totally different from the pre-May 2019 scenario. Such an outcome may disturb South African politics dramatically and drastically. To a certain extent we must note it and make preparations for the future, even for “political joking” or unexpected developments in post-2019 South Africa. In the next subdivision a summary of past, present and future scenarios, offered by political analysts, is presented.

3.3.5.1. Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection’s Indlulamithi Scenarios for 2018 to 2030

Makhanya71 reports on the indicators of the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection’s Indlulamithi Scenarios for 2018 to 2030. These scenarios envisage three primary paths for what Makhanya in summary calls the post-Zuma-South-Africa. He writes71:2:

One was when the inequality grows and resentment spills into unprecedented protests and even a mini revolution.

The other envisaged a prospering ‘nation in step with itself’ where we returned to our core values of a caring and pro-poor constitutional state that could even achieve a 4.5% growth rate.

The third was the ‘floundering false dawn’ scenario, in which the promise of renewal in 2018/2019 becomes a mirage, leading to lost hope, social upheaval and state repression in the new decade.

Makhanya71 continues (and warns) on the above-mentioned third scenario’s outcome as follows71:2:

This scenario imagines that whatever new optimism you might find now turns out to be false optimism and instead what we discover is that the extent of corruption, mismanagement, nepotism and cronyism is deeply embedded at provincial and municipal level, further extending far beyond the echelons of government or the private sector.

Unless we act and stop looking for messiahs, this is the scenario that is scariest. Dashed hopes are ingredients for toxic recipes.

3.3.5.2. Bloomberg Misery Index

In line with the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection’s Indlulamithi Scenarios for 2018 to 2030 are the findings of the Bloomberg Misery Index also with a negative classification of South Africa.78

Focussing on the pre-2019 versus the post-2019 South Africa, according to the Bloomberg Misery Index (calculated as the sum of a country’s inflation and unemployment rates with its forecast as of 11 April 2019), South Africa joined Venezuela, Argentina, Turkey, Greece and Ukraine as the most miserable countries out of 62 countries worldwide. This marker shows that South Africa, with its high (negative) index of 32.4 against Thailand’s low (positive) index of 2.1 and Switzerland’s index of 3.1, displays the presence of intense economic stress and scant progress in taming price-growth and getting people back to work. Moreover, it confirms the chaotic politics of the country, which characterises unstable regimes such as those of Venezuela and Argentina where corruption, nepotism and dishonest are prominent daily phenomena.79

3.3.5.3. International Risk Report of the World Economical Forum (WEF)

The International Risk Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF) identified at its meeting in January 2019 in Davos ten possible negative outcomes (in line with Makhanya’s high political risks for South Africa after May 2019). Theo Venter78, a political analyst of the North West University, defined the following 10 negative attribues of sub-Saharan Africa78:17:

  1.     Werkloosheid;
  2.     Mislukking van nasionale regerings;
  3.     Energie-prysskokke;
  4.     Verval van kritieke infrastruktuur;
  5.     Fiskale krisse;
  6.     Mislukking van finansiële meganismes of instellings;
  7.     Mislukking van streekstrukture of instellings;
  8.     Waterkrisisse;
  9.     Voedselkrisisse; en
  10.     Onbeheerbare inflasie.

Essentially the ANC regime, up to 8 May 2019, had failed to get a clean audit on any one of the above ten markers. Venter shows that the biggest risks for South Africa post-2019, in terms of the International Risk Report, are the following: The failure to maintain the national, provincial and local government structures and the undermining of their functioning by ongoing state capture, nepotism, corruption, politicking, etc., meaning outright poor governance and a lack of political integrity. Confirming Venter’s78 warnings is the fact that only 18 metro (local) authorities, out of 257, received unqualified Treasury audits in 2019. Relevant here are the constant failures of the SAPS/NPA for a decade or more to curb corruption — forget about removing it from society and from the lifestyle of the ANC regime. Hand on hand with these, also goes the failure of the ANC regime’s police force to eliminate crime from daily life.78.80

The above analysis by Venter, done in terms of the findings of the International Risk Report, reflects the extreme social instability and the increasing collapse of critical infrastructure which are absolute needed on a daily basis for especially the poor and landless community to live and survive (such as the provision of water, electricity, roads, basic healthcare, basic education, etc.). There are indications of dissatisfaction turning into a possible physical reaction against the ANC regime. Prominent here is the countrywide evidence of unrest, acute anarchy and at times behaviour bordering on acute revolution. This present social chaos, that seems to grow instead of diminishing, confirms the status of a well-established, chronically dysfunctional regime that may trigger outright revolution.78

For example, confirming Venter’s78 analysis, is the evidence of how chaotic the provincial government of the ANC all over the country has become, failing the people who voted them into government. To cite but one instance: after the May 2019 election, storms tore through KwaZulu-Natal so that many villages in the southern-most part of the province still do not have access to clean water today. In response to this chaos, the DA’s councillor for Ward 2 in the Ugu area described this failure of delivery and maintenance to 175 000 inhabitants by the ANC-associated municipality as follows81:14-15:

We have a water crisis here but we don’t have a shortage of water. There is no drought. Other than this current crisis the production of water is fine. The real problem is a dereliction of maintenance and last-mile reticulation: getting water to people’s houses. This is a threat to our society and the people to blame for it are the Ugu council. It’s a failed entity — you can’t bleed R10-million a month and claim you are a going concern.

Reflecting this kind of in-depth failure under the ANC government oversight and rule, and the immense misuse of tax-payers’ money, is the fact that the Ugu municipality received a qualified audit from the auditor general for 2018-2019 over unauthorised expenditure amounting to R243 billion. For 2017-2018 the auditor gave Ugu a similarly negative rating because of the municipality’s inability to account for property and equipment valued at R4 billion. Harper and Verasamy81, as well as Harper82 consider this disaster as just one example of the many failures of the country’s ANC-ruled municipalities to get water to the people.81,82

Venter78, Harper and Verasamy81 further debunks the ANC’s claims when it comes to municipal government and providing “services to the people”81:14-15:

Government says that about 95% of people in South Africa have “access” to water. But, in the Ugu district, access only means that there is infrastructure. It does not mean that water flows out of taps and brings life. By its own admission, the national water department says that about a third of households don’t have regular clean water. That’s 20 million people.

Noting the fact that out of a total population of 57 million as many as 30 million South Africans are utterly poor, more or less 30 million of them are jobless, and more than 15 million are living solely on monthly social grants, the Ugu district chaos speaks volumes about the path of disaster onto which the 28% of the eligible voters, who thoughtlessly voted for the ANC in the May 2019 elections, had willingly placed themselves from 2019 to 2024, together with the other 72% of non-ANC and passive voters83-86.

3.3.5.4. Bawa reference

Khadija Bawa87, a researcher at the Social Justice Coalition in Khayelitsha, Cape Town points out the failure of effective policing in the country and the lack of policing to ensure the personal safety of the individual citizen. Her critical analysis shows that such conditions are often created by the ANC’s poor and failing management at the national level of essential services such as the South African Police Services, which spiral downwards into local mismanagement, thereby creating chaotic living and housing conditions in informal settlements. She recently stated87:8:

South Africa is one of the most violent countries in the world. That violence, however, is not experienced at the same level across the country. Year in and year out South Africa’s statistics reveal that poor, working-class, urban and semi-urban, and predominantly black police precincts carry the greatest burden of violent crime.

Why is it the case that in historically demarcated, still predominantly white areas police patrols are visible while in historically demarcated coloured and black areas they aren’t?

Bawa87 describes the siege of Coloured and Black living areas by crime further by showing the role of poverty and landlessness which had forced jobless Coloured and Black people to live in these informal crime-ridden settlements. The lay-out of these areas, lacking any national governmental support and infrastructure, further exacerbates the already sub-standard policing in such poor settlements. Again the failure of the pre-20019 ANC regime stands out, extending over a period of 25 years, to supply stable living spaces for these unfortunate poor and landless people and to ensure a permanent income for them as promised before elections. She writes87:8:

Even though the lack of visible policing can be blamed on the police service and local law enforcement, other governmental departments are failing these communities, and the police, by not delivering services. The lack of built environment interventions in areas of high informality, have a direct impact on the safety and security of residents.

3.3.5.5. Harvey reference

The political commentator and analyst, Ebrahim Harvey88, reflects specifically on the context of the present-day badly neglected mass of poor Black people in the country — going as far back as the then young people whose role in the so-called Black student uprising of 1976, together with the Black workers in the trade unions and members of various Black communities country-wide, had, through their anti-Apartheid actions, made a decisive impact on the liberation politics of pre-1994 South African and brought the ANC to power in 1994. However, after 1994 these groups were immediately sidelined by the ANC elite and are still today being excluded by the ANC inner circle from being uplifted in a supposedly bettered South Africa. Harvey writes as follows88:8:

Unfortunately, both these major constituencies of the ANC suffered most from the neoliberal policy regime the ANC adopted after 1994.

Harvey88 further elaborates on this post-1994 failure of the ANC — correctly described as “Black-on-Black discrimination and exploitation” — when he posits88:8:

We can see the negative effects of those policies in many areas of our society, but most notably in the very high unemployment rate among the black youth, the protracted problems in all spheres of education, and the serious lack of infrastructure and social justice in townships where by far most still reside.

A walk through most black townships in the country shows starkly the horrific extent of these problems.

Any study of the reasons why youth face these serious problems point to the effects of neoliberal policies, a related serious lack of funds, the incompetence of ANC members deployed to various sites of education, and an increasing corruption within all levels of government.

On the educational failure of the mass of poor Blacks by the ANC regime, specifically during the pre-2019 period and which is going hand-in-hand with the above suppressing and “crashing” of the development and empowerment of poor Blacks that have been advertised by the ANC regime since 1994, Harvey88 sees the role being played by some of the governing party’s affiliates88:8:

There is no doubt that the South African Democratic Teachers Union, strongly linked to the ANC, has in many respects done the youth at schools a huge disservice. Incompetence, corruption and irresponsibility in its ranks have had a blistering effect on our schools and learners.

Harvey investigates this contaminated political environment further and deeper in his writing when he hints that this failure has the potential to activate in these youths’ minds in the post-2019 politics of South Africa a vicious circle of mass obstruction, unrest, anarchy and passive revolution. The existence of dissatisfied, hostile and aggressive youth makes them potential candidates for recruitment by radical groups in South African politics, such as the EFF.

He refers specifically to th EFF’s hostility to racial minorities and its support for a radical land grab. The EFF seems to regard minorities as so powerless and numerically insignificant that they may be insulted or provoked at will. According to Harvey,

People from these “minorities”, which EFF leader Julius Malema in particular likes to attack in his speeches, are not going to always sit back and allow the EFF to attack and walk over them.88

However, there are radicals in the ANC too who share the Afro-Marxist ideology of the EFF. The same radicalism is openly reflected by the left-wing of the ANC, as evidenced by the Magashule-faction (in which the Zuma clan features prominently). Their use of racialised demographic statistics in inviting confrontation with minorities is similar. The possibility therefore exists that in post-2019 South Africa both the EFF and a faction within the ANC could unleash markedly racial confrontations in various social settings. Harvey writes88:8:

I often feel that this distinct danger is steadily gathering pace in many political and social settings. This country, given an immensely violent history and many unresolved social issues, is deep down a tinder box which can explode in their own hands at any time.

The reaction of the minorities may be much more severe in relation to the ANC as opposed to the EFF, given that the ANC is the sole ruler of the land, notwithstanding that it seems to be a very divided party. A blueprint has been laid since 1994 for anarchy and revolution. Anarchy and revolution are waiting to explode in post-2019 South Africa and this may be laid at the door of the ANC’s corrupted elite politics.88,89

3.3.5.6. Mohale reference

Bonang Mohale90 is the chief executive of Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA). He claims that post-2019 South Africa is politically and economically grinding to a political and economic halt. Positive growth seems to be absent, while transgression has become the rule of the country’s politics. He formulates it thus:

There is no doubt that collectively, we have not succeeded in eradicating the legacy of apartheid and the 350 years of colonialism; the economy is on its knees; young black graduates roam the streets hopelessly; inequality has widened; racism is at an all-time high; public schooling is broken; public schooling is broken; public hospitals fail the poor and vulnerable; crucial infrastructure is in decay; lawlessness is rife.90

The rhetorical question is: Why would the ANC change its delinquent and corrupt habits if has managed to obtain parliamentary majorities six times in a row while getting front-page cover for its succession of financial and other scandals from 1994 until now?

The alleged pervasive corruption of the ANC as a political party and as a regime, including many of its leaders, making them gangsters and serious delinquents, has become a feature of South African life. Closely associated with this is the imminent land grabbing, defined as “land expropriation without compensation”.89,90

3.3.5.7. Andrew reference

Andrew91 draws attention to the ANC’s chronic delinquency and corruption, starting from 1994. Similarly to many other political analysts, Ken Andrew, who also happens to be a seasoned politician, puts it clearly that the ANC’s rot did not start with Zuma: the country become mired in a culture of immense corruption, even post-1994, especially on the level of the ANC’s top leaders, which Zuma merely made bigger. The ANC’s rottenness is clearly identifiable from 1994 when it became the ruling party with its many delinquent actions such as theft, corruption and mismanagement around issues like Sarafina, the arms deal, the improper enrichment of the ANC’s front company, Chancellor House, and the dismantling of the Scorpions long before Zuma’s presidency.

The economy went into decline long before Zuma, directly because of poor policies and failed profile building with foreign countries, etc. Andrew also points out that the Eskom debacle was born before Zuma because the ANC lacked even back then a constructive electricity policy. The implementation of inappropriate affirmative action policies at Eskom by the ANC forced out able technical staff. State capture started officially in 1997 with the ANC National Conference’s decision in favour of the deployment of ANC cadres in all spheres of government and state institutions, including the judiciary. Other ANC actions undermining good governance, identified by Andrew91, are the introduction of bad educational policies such as outcomes-based education, the closing of teachers’ training colleges, the voluntary severance packages given to educationists in the late 1990s and the kowtowing to the South African Teachers Union via Cosatu as a partner in the ANC’s corruption and mismanagement.91

3.3.5.8. The Mthombothi view of an ANC permanently drunk from the alcohol of corruption

Mthombothi92 writes in July 2018 that the “ANC is drunk from the alcohol of corruption”. One outcome of chronic alcoholism is causing extreme mental confusion. In the ANC’s case it has clearly has severed its contact with political, social and personal decency and justice. But the ANC’s habitual corruption has not stopped after 8 May 2019. Mthombothi92 predicts that the ANC’s deviant behaviour, extending back to 1994, is going to spill over to post-2019 South Africa with serious consequences.92

The best evidence for the ANC’s condition as a failure and a drunkard through corruption, crooking and political mismanagement is the testimony in March 2019 on the contemporary ANC psyche by ex-President Kgalema Motlanthe77. For Motlanthe, the present-day political integrity of the ANC is the lowest it has ever been since it took power in 1994 and the leader Ramaphosa is unable to effect rehabilitation.74,77,93,94

Motlanthe77 traces the immense inability of the ANC to act as a competent and qualified ruler of post-May 2019 South Africa, back to its clear record of delinquency which stretches over 25 years of misgoverning and utter corruption. More damning on the ANC’s inability do good at any level of government in future after May 2019 and the immediate need for the ANC to disband in order to end its wrongdoing, Hunter77 conveys Motlanthe’s77 opinion on the chaos in the ANC as follows77:4:

[Motlanthe had said that]…he believed that the ANC could only change if it died in its current form and was reborn as a grassroots movement.

Fikile Mbalula, one of the current politburo members of the ANC and at present a minister in the Ramaphosa cabinet, himself admitted the immense mental and political pathology inside the ANC. On this deep-rooted crookedness in his own ANC, which Mbalula describes as an in-depth cancerous infection which needs an equally in-depth treatment, he said95:4: “… you can’t clean a sore without going deep into it — just dressing the wound won’t help”.

The ANC’s infected sore goes to the bottom. To be honest: it is advanced cancer; it is in its brain, body, stomach, its heart, its psyche, its soul. Many political analysts, together with Mbalula and Motlanthe, have put forward the question if the ANC can be rehabilitated, or if it has the potential to “rescue” itself from its own immense wrongdoing, let alone its promises to rescue South Africa! The evidence suggests there is no hope of rehabilitation for the ANC. The ANC became more than a habitual drunkard guility of serious delinquent behaviour; it became a habitual criminal.74,77,92-95

Note: The evaluation and discussion of this division (3.3 African National Congress) will be continued in article 12 under the subdivision: 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019.

4. Conclusions

It is clear that the current South African political system, continuously run by the ANC regime for 25 years, has been captured by an autocratic ideology in which the party’s Marxist-Leninist leanings maintain and steer its democratic-centralism. The right of the individual voter counts minimally while the ANC politburo has consolidated most available power, making the ANC’s constitution more applicable to governing the country than the South African Constitution.

The pre-May 2019 election promises of the ANC, specifically those of Cyril Ramaphosa, to rectify all South Africa’s ills quickly and completely, more and more seem to be lies and myths. The scenarios, reflecting the immediate present, as well as the future awaiting South Africans, are coming across as very problematic, mostly portending a decline in economics, politics and social cohesion. It seems as if the fallacious belief in the ANC’s absolute “democracy” is overwhelming rooted in most of the media’s and public’s mindsets too.

The Code of Ethical Conduct and Disclosure of Members’ Interests to regulate dishonest conduct by law-makers is insufficient. Prominent is also the faulty Electoral Act, as well as the absence of an Electoral-Parliamentarian Employment Act and an Electoral-Parliamentarian Ethics Code as contributors to the establishment of the ANC as the sole regime over 25 years. These legal short-comings seem to be the primary causes of the ANC’s national election victory in May 2019 during which only 49% of the total eligible voters participated and the winning party received only 28% support of those eligible voters. The ANC’s re-election as ruler for a sixth term of another five years (2019 to 2024) was an immense error. It was tantamount to political fraud in the first class.

In the next (Article 12), titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity)” the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of its empowerment as ruler it received after the election of 8 May 2019, will be further evaluated.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Badness, candidate, crookedness, delinquency, election, evaluation, expropriate, goodness, leadership, political party, responsibility, scenario, wrongdoings,

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 4

1.1. Introduction

This study is a continuation of the previous article (Article 9, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)”. This article (Article 10, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)”], is, as previously mentioned, the second part in the sequence of three articles on the roles of the three main political parties at the moment in the country, namely the EFF, the DA and the ANC. It intends to analyse and further discuss the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the DA to be able to effect land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its CVs and attestations.

1.2. Aims of Articles 9 to 11 (Continued)

The primary aim of this article (Part Two: Article 10) in the sequence of three articles is thus to continue the reflection upon the profile of the DA on the same basis as was done with the previous article (Part One: Article 9). Prominent here is the ability of the DA to be able to take care of the land expropriation matter, should it have been elected on May 8, 2019 into government. At the same time, its ability and integrity is evaluated, in order to see how it is positioned, as an opposition party, to be able to successfully handle the land matter until 2024. This also includes the capability of the DA as a partner of the ruler, the ANC, should such an outcome manifest. Important here is the saying: the test of the pudding is in the eating thereof.

In the context of much manipulation and misleading around the South African land expropriation matter by political parties in terms of how they are going to execute it should they become the ruler, is it important to note that Chomsky1 points out that modern politics is often hampered by the parties’ leadership’s poor personal and political integrity. This unfortunate contaminated political setup of parties in the end blocks the pursuit of their previously agreed on mandate with the voters, who have given them permission to take decisions upon their behalves, as well as the development of the critical role of leaders of integrity and the independent creative actions of the party as a whole. This notion is applicable to the thinking, planning and action of South Africa’s land ownership matter. Central here is the intention of the researcher to unmask a political party as a failure.1

For Chomsky1 it goes much further and deeper: politically mandated people in terms of the Constitution, for instance those who are MPS and MPLs and chief executives at state enterprises, must at all times reflect integrity, goodwill and the intention of order in their thinking, planning and action. He postulates that it is not enough for these political and executive leaders to be able to think “cleanly” and critically, but that ethnic imagination and an immense sense of social responsibility and accountability are characteristics that are imperative for them. Undoubtably the main intention of many delinquent politicians is to exploit the South Africans who are fighting with regard to land ownership. The lack of knowledge and cognitive understanding of many of the ordinary Black and White South Africans on the land matter, is absolutely misused by these delinquent politicians in steering the country’s demanding land ownership issue in such a way that it exclusively benefits the interests of the top brass of their party.1

By the critical evaluation of the CVs and attestations of political parties and their leaders, the mass of political crooks and gangsters are shaken out, leaving the few political knights standing out clearly. Such a shake-out of possible masked crooks and gangsters amongst leaders in the DA is the primary intention of the undertaking of an evaluation and conclusion in this article. It will be in line with the intention of the evaluation and conclusion of the previous article (Article 9) on the EFF.

The single aim in this context of evaluation and conclusion is to accept or to reject the DA as a potential candidate (political party) to be able to successfully effect land reform as part of its political mandate in post-2019 South Africa.

2. Method (Continued)

The research was been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case about the abilities of political parties to successfully effect land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us so as to steer successful land reform from 2019 in South Africa.

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

3. Results and Discussion (Continued)

3.1. Overview

The successful execution of the post-2019 land reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and action of a so-called “good” government. This means a regime that is not blindly on a “path of try and come to” to be able to reach an end result on the matter, notwithstanding whether it is a success or a failure. This requires a regime that honestly serves the interests of all its people by its use of a good road map on an orderly land reform initiative so as to steer it into reality.

The essential question here is thus whether the DA can theoretically be a candidate to be shortlisted due to its potential to assure the successful implementation and completion of the post-2019 plan on land expropriation.

3.1.1. Evaluation guidelines of political parties

The evaluation guidelines of political parties, as were already used in the previous Article 9, will be precisely replicated in order to evaluate the DA as national, provincial and municipal rulers. These guidelines for the DA are:

  1. Its general policies, as well as specific standpoints on aspects such as the respect of law and order, the fighting of corruption and state capture, the behavioural delinquency of its MPs, MPLs and its top brass leaders, as well as the party’s and its leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put in perspective through its manifesto for the 2019-election.
  2. The public critics for the period 1994 to 2019 in newspapers, etc. These include evaluations and reflections by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the party as a political organisation, its members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behavioural delinquency of MPs, MPLs and top brass leaders, and their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the party’s internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions.
3.1.1.1. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018

For the quantitative classification and measurment of the political records of the DA, the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,2 was used again . The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s’ manifesto and to the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees it applicable. For guiding the gathering of the information on the DA, the approach used with the EFF, is again as follows reflected for better understanding, namely:

1) The Curriculum Vitae (CV) in order to obtain insight into the candidates’ qualifications, experiences, extraordinary skills, etc; and

2) The letters of the referees, the attestations, to offer firstly further insight into the qualifications, experiences, etc. of the candidate; and secondly, at the same time, to tell us confidentially about good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate, that were well-masked in or absent from the CV. This referee data mostly informs us of the “goodness” and “badness” of a candidate, which in the end can make him a failure or a success in the execution of the responsibilities of the post.

In this research the manifesto and self-description offered by the DA and its leaders will be seen as their CVs. The public reporting by journalists and other sources will be seen as the letters of referees/reference or attestations.2

3.2. The manifestos, self-descriptions and public references of the three parties (Continued)

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) were already reflected upon in the previous Article 9 (Part 1 of three articles) under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. This article (Article 10: Part 2) will reflected specifically on the Democratic Alliance (DA) under the title of “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. In the next article (Article 11: Part 3) reflection on the African National Congress (ANC) will take place.

3.2.1. The Democratic Alliance
3.2.1.1. Introduction

In his post mortem of the DA’s so-called successes versus its so-called failures in the recent May election, and how the party must be rated in the post-2019 South African politics, the editor of Beeld, Barnard Beukman, on the 17th May 2019 offered an in-depth and critical analysis on the present day DA. This is far removed from those of some of the populist political commentators who ignore long term politics and suffer cognitive clear-sightedness away from the propaganda of the ANC. An in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the dynamic and important role that the DA can play in the mainstream politics of post-2019 is offered by Beukman3 when he writes3”11:

Met net vier LP’s minder – 85 pleks van 89 – en ‘n stemdaling van minder as 2 persentasiepunte, moet die DA beslis voel hy word onbillik behandel deur ontleders wat hom op die daad as die “groot verloorder” van die verkiesing brandmerk.

Hy kan tereg so voel as hy sy uitslag met byvoorbeeld die ANC s’n vergelyk word. Alles in ag geneem, is die DA se verkiesingsuitslag eindelik heel redelik en voel hy oorwegend sekerlik verligting. As sommige meningspeilings reg was – dat hy net ‘n maand voor die verkiesing minder as 20%-steun gehad het – het hy beslis in die pylvak steun teruggekry of onseker kiesers oorreed.

Die groot teleurstelling is eerder met sy vertoning in vergelyking met die wat hy wou en moontlik kon reggekry het en dat hy nie gewys het dat hy minstens die 30%-vlak aanval nie, want ‘n tweede party met meer as 30%-steun sou die eerste tasbare bewys van ‘n komende politieke herskikking gewees het.

3.2.1.1.1. The voter outcome at the ballot box on May 8, 2019 tells much

Beukman’s3 profile on the post-2019 DA firstly forces us to look critically at the facts pinpointing the May elections’ outcome in terms of voter participation. Of particular importance is his reference to a so-called necessary 30% vote count for the DA, to enable it to be a possibly dominant role-player in South Africa. This was seemingly the minimum requirement for it to successfully participate in the country’s ruling in the near future. This needs attention. It again brings us to the playing off of myths and lies versus facts and truths in South African politics and the absolute need of the Solomon wisdom approach to get myths and lies refuted. Thus, before any further evaluation of the DA as a political party with the assumed potential to be able to be the ruler in terms of its CV and attestations can proceed, is it necessary to look at the legitimacy of the May 2019 election in terms of a democratic voter mandate which truly represents the total contingent of legal voters.

Firstly, of paramount importance is the number of voters who gave the parties their support at the ballot box. This consideration is also fully applicable to the ANC, the EFF, as well as the eleven dwarf parties that arrived in Parliament at the end of May 2019 to take their seats.3

Secondly, also of importance is the total number of voters who participated in the election versus the total number of registered voters who stayed away from the ballot box.

Thirdly, and probably the most ignored fact by most of the so-called political wise men on the so-called “true politics” of present day South Africa, is the amount of citizens who qualified to be voters, but refused to register as such for specific reasons.

An analysis of the May voting shows the seats of the 14 parties which made it, as follows4:

  1. ANC: 230
  2. DA: 84
  3. EFF: 44
  4. IFP: 14
  5. FF+: 10
  6. ACDP: 4
  7. NFP: 2
  8. UDM: 2
  9. Good:2
  10. Cope: 2
  11. ATM: 2
  12. AIC: 2
  13. PAC: 1
  14. Aljama: 1

It is also reflected by statistics that there were 35.9 million South Africans who were eligible to register as voters for the May 2019 election, but that only 26 756 649 had formally registered. This means that only 74.5% of those who could register had registered (thus leaving ±9 million outside the voting system). From the 26.7 million formally registered voters, only 17 671 616 actually voted (again leaving ±9.3 million eligible voters further out of the system). This means that the 17.6 million voters active at the ballot box, only represent 49% of the total eligible voters in South Africa, while 51% of potential voters (±18.2 million) did not bring out a vote (consisting of ±9.1 million non-registered voters and ±9.1 million stay-away voters). Although it was the 18.2 million abstaining voters own choice not to vote, this comprehensive passivity places in the first place a question mark on the applicability of the legal status of 14 parties which were selected to Parliament by a “passive no-voting” (which is nothing else than a rejection choice by 51% of the voting population).4-7

What is worrying is that these 14 parties are going to be with South Africans as the so-called “chosen law-makers’, notwithstanding their rejection or at least being ignored by at least 51% of the voters-corp. Furthermore, seeing the overall decline since 2014 of trust in and support for political parties selected into Parliament, the chances are good that this decline is going to continue after 2019, leaving a far higher rejection than the present 51% by the voters. The outcome can with time become an immense resistance to the empowerment of the ruling party, the ANC, up to 2024. This will not only make its reign impossible, but in the process of the rejection of the ANC, the situation can activate immense unrest, anarchy and revolution as a final outcome.4-7

It is not without good reason that Mthombothi8, eleven days after the May election, put his finger directly on the sore of this voting passivity when he wrote8:19: “The outcome of the elections will be debated and analysed for some time to come, but what is clear is that many South Africans were not particularly impressed or satisfied with what was on offer. After 25 years of democracy, many voters are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable.” He continues further8:19: “The menu [parties] on the table is obviously not appetising for the voter. The prevailing conditions are therefore probably ripe for a realignment of political forces or a new political party altogether. We may have reached a typical Gramscian interregnum where “the old is dying and the new cannot be born”. We are at a standstill, and rot tends to set in if there is no movement.”

However, in second place, is the question of Beukman’s3 when he referred to the “ideal of the collection of 30% votes for the DA to make it a party to notice in the South African politics”. Here emerges the next question, namely on the presence of true democracy under which the ANC rules the country at the moment up until 2024.3

Once again on democracy and the constitutional rights of its citizens (and thus eligible voters), Mthombothi8 reflects a warning when he writes8:19: “We may still be cock-a-hoop about our democracy – best constitution in the world and all that! – But the enthusiasm is apparently no longer widely shared. Voter turnout has shown a calamitous decline in recent years, from 88% in 1999 to 65% this year – a drop of more than 20 percentage points in 20 years. Such figures should jolt us out of our complacency. Our democracy is not at all in rude health.”

But, when Mthombothi8 speaks of a “65% voter turnout for the 2019 election”, he failed to say how this percentage was reached. The answer is that it was the 17.6 million voters who had voted out of a possible 26.7 million voters on the voter role. This 65% is a political myth: the fact is that the turnout should be calculated in terms of the 17.6 million voters who had voted versus the 35.9 million South Africans who were eligible to vote. This gives a turnout of only 49% (which is 16% lower than the “official” voting account. This means that South Africans’ democratic interests are politically and statutorily managed by 386 law-makers in Parliament who were sent to it by the minority (49%) of eligible voters. This is not democracy! Mthombothi8 would be jolted himself if he knew that the 65% voter turnout is an complete myth. The hard truth is that it is only 49%. But this truth has another more sinister outcome for the ANC’s so-called democratic empowerment via the May election, and their ability to rule South Africa from 2019 to 2024: the ANC’s 10 026 475 votes at the ballot box (out of a possible 35.9-million) means that it only received approval from 28% of the eligible voters to be the government of the day. For the ANC and its leaders such as Cyril Ramaphosa and his cronies to claim that they have the peoples’ mandate to effect land expropriation without compensation, is a falsity. It is a myth and a great one!4-8

This is not democracy and it is an excellent example of a well-masked illegal reign of South Africa by the ANC.4-8

Taking into perspective the true voter support of the DA and the EFF, in terms of the total eligible voters of 35.9-million, their factorial support is only 10% and 5% respectively.4-8|

It must thus be clear that the ANC is faultily observed as a strong and untouchable political force, which seems to represent (but falsely) 57.5% of the population in terms of its more or less 60% formal voting count. In reality, the ANC is a minority and a hung regime (legally put into Parliament as the ruler by a 28% voters mandate out of a 100% voter population) when we are looking to the indirect suppression of the democratic right of the individual citizens’ passive votes. In this environment, South Africa’s present inauspicious political setup (and thus its political ruling-system based on democracy where the so-called “majority” became the ruler on a minority vote), is excellently described by Labuschagne when he posits9:6: “Suid-Afrika kan in wese, de jure en de facto, as ‘n eenpartystaat bestempel word”.

The abovementioned outcome is a situation that can and must only be accepted firstly as a temporary situation, which can change dramatically overnight when the ±18-million (51% unrepresented) passive voters take a stand at the ballot box or in an alternative way which may be unconstitutional. The DA and the other opposition parties know that this unreal setup provides the possibility that they can at the right time bite away the ANC’s Achilles heel.9

The decline in empowerment of the ANC and its possible phasing out of the mainstream of politics is a reality, even in the mindsets of the ANC’s top brass. It was already before the May election echoed by the Head of the ANC Election, Fikile Mbalula10 when he admitted10:4: “…the ANC is not going to regain all the lost ground overnight, with its image having suffered immensely in the previous decade.”

Mthombothi8 is with good reason worried about the outcome after 2019 of the Mandela-democracy of 1994. The reality is that South Africa is going to be governed from 2019 to 2024 by an illegal autocratic regime with mostly no respect for the voters, while there is also no respect for them by 51% of the voters who did not vote for them. The ANC’s politics are driven and practised exclusively for the ANCs top brass’ interests: it was so in the past and it will be so in the future. The abovementioned reality not only declares the arrogance and political recklessness of the ANC in its practice of delinquent politics since 1994, but also the arrogance and political recklessness of the EFF (See Article 9). The EFF knows very well that they will never, in a true democracy with only their 5% voter mandate, be of importance or receive the attention as a so-called third party in the top rank of parties. In a true democracy their political and personal antics, as well as their extreme irresponsibility and delinquency would not be endured: they would long ago have been put into permanent safe-care.4,6,7,10

Looking from another perspective at the very unstable South African politics – which intensely contaminated its democracy – it must it be clear that things can change – also sometimes very fast – in the post-2019 politics, to end for instance the ANC regime’s formation of new political groupings overnight. Marriam11 quotes the view of the CSIR on the profiles of the various parties’ vote receiving in the past elections and the unknown future around politics. She reports, from another perspective to that of the traditional political analysis11:4:

The CSIR does say things could change before 2021 [local elections]: “It should be kept in mind that the quantitative patterns cannot be counted on to capture all the sentiment behind the votes [2019 elections], it may just provide some warning signs for parties as to what could happen if nothing changes. Many things could change between 2019 and 2021 – there could be changes in the general economics and political climate, but a difference in voter turnout rates could also affect changes in the patterns.

Johnston12, on this fast-changing post-2019 political climate writes12:4-5: “Ten spyte van die oënskynlike stabiliteit van die ANC se oorheersing, vind groot verskuiwings plaaas. Die kieserskorps word baie meer vloeibaar en minder partyvas. Ons he gevind dat meer as 25% van al ons respondent óf van party verander het óf besluit hey om nie te stem nie. Die grootste vloei vloeibaarheid is onder swart kiesers gevind, waar 17.1% van party verander het.” Johnson12, in this context of change, also writes12:4-5: “Daarbenewens is die ANC-stem toenemend broos. Onder alle swart kiesers het slegs een derde gesê hulle sal ANC stem ongeag wie die leier was. 27,3% het gesê hulle sal nooit ANC stem nie terwyl 19,4% gesê het sal ANC stem omdat hulle vetroue in Ramaphosa het, alhoewel daar baie skelms op die ANC-lys is.”

The question, in light of the abovementioned information, is how has the DA in terms of its true voter mandate of only 10% handled its politics in the past, is handling it at present and can be expected to handle it in future in our much quoted “country of milk and honey”. The primary counter-question is: is it similarly irresponsible and arrogant, with the same signs of autocratic and delinquent actions, as the EFF? This question will be evaluated further in this article. [In the next article (Article 11) the same evaluation approach will be followed with regard to the ANC].

3.2.1.2. The DA manifesto of 2019

Reading the DA manifesto, it is clear that it differs from the previous one of the EFF, as it avoids ridiculous promises and “nonsense-speaking”. It is totally focused on concrete action during the pre-2019 years and undertakes in terms of this good record (strongly confirmed by its CV and attestations) to make a constructive input to post-2019 South Africa. Reality is taken into account and examples of good political management on provincial and local levels are offered. Looking at the DA’s track record, it stands head and shoulders above those of the EFF which was previously evaluated.

In terms of the DA manifesto, the leader of the DA, Mmusi Maimane13, in his writings to the public, reflects as follows13:18:

Election 2019 is our chance to effect real change. And when deciding on a new bus, the only thing that matters is a party’s track record.

Thirteen years in Cape Town, 10 years in the Western Cape and two years in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay have given the DA a chance to demonstrate the DA difference, and not just to talk about it. The results – the ones that really matter when it comes to closing the gap between economic insiders and outsiders – speak for themselves. On all the objective indicators, the DA runs the best government in the country.

The DA-run Western Cape leads on every measure of good provincial governance. Over the past year, over half the jobs created in SA were in the Western Cape, thanks to an obsessive focus on attracting investment, growing tourism and supporting a farm sector hard hit by drought.

The Western Cape Government got 83% clean audits in the last Auditor-General Report. Our track record says that we don’t tolerate corruption and mismanagement of public funds.

Maimane continues14:22:

The DA can deliver to the whole country what we have delivered in the Western Cape, which accounted for half of net job creation in the past year (95,000 out of 188,000 jobs, Q3 2017 – Q3 2018) and where broad unemployment (23%) is 14 percentage points lower than the national average (37%).

The DA strives to provide everyone with access to opportunities. For example, the Western Cape has the highest percentage of households living within 30 minutes of a health facility and we retain by far the most children in school between Grades 10 and Matric (64%), whereas no other province retains the abovementioned.

You will find solutions to getting the basics right, such as our action steps to provide schoolchildren with teachers who can actually teach them to read and do arithmetic. The SACMEQ 4 Report showed that the Western Cape achieved 72.7% in advanced reading, compared to 36.1% nationally.

We don’t tolerate corruption. The Western Cape achieved 83% clean audits in the last financial year, well ahead of second placed Gauteng at 52%. The DA-led Coalition in Nelson Mandela Bay Metro took it from the second least to second most trusted city in SA (after Cape Town). In the DA-run Johannesburg, the value of investigations into corrupt tenders under the former ANC administration is R23.6bn.

3.2.1.3. The pre-2019 road-mapping of the DA
3.2.1.3.1. The DA’s original birth-certificate in perspective

The answer to the question as to why the DA did not overtake the ANC in the last election and is still in a gradual process to win votes from the ANC and the other smaller parties, must be seen to be cemented in its many foundations. Professor Pieter Labuschagne9 guides us hereunder to understand why opposition against the ANC reflects a low voter outcome for all those opposing parties since 1994. This can be likened to the previous mighty NP’s only 20.4% in 1994 and the 22.3% and 20% of the DA respectively in 2014 and 2019.9

Firstly, the founding model of the ANC stands out here, namely its anti-Apartheid ideology, through which it initially became an inclusive “catch-up” party for all those pre-1994 suppressed persons and groups who opposed the wrongful politics of the NP (and the Afrikaners/Whites). All types gathered in this potpourri-ANC from before 1994. It varied from hard core communists, socialists, anti-capitalists, anti-White and anti-Afrikaner, pro-Black, pro-African, democrats and anti-democrats, as well as hard-core terrorists, etc. These were persons and groups mostly seeing the ANC as an entrance ticket for their personal gains and to satisfy their ambitions. Most of the ambition and opportunism have stayed on until 2019 in some way within some of these groupings, such as the communists and the unionists.12

In its start-up process, the DA was in the first place an exclusively White-orientated party with a political ideology based on a narrow liberal-democracy, but with roots still entrenched in White-supremacy. The immense hard-line stand of the maintainence of exclusive White capitalism was prominent, and the mass of poor and landless Blacks would never get entrance thereto. For the Blacks, their inequality and poverty (±30 million out of a population of ±60 million) is a direct result of the White supremacy of pre-1994. The DA as a cum Black-cum White political party became from day-one an easy target for the Black revolutionaries in the ANC, who labelled it as anti-Black with the intention to promote and uphold only White interests. This is a process that is ongoing and will only be eroded if the DA becomes overwhelmingly Black in members and in leadership.

3.2.1.3.2. The DA’s policy not to subsidise and enrich the poor

Entrenched in the ANC’s revolutionary ideology of uplifting the people and freeing them from oppression, is its policy of taking from the rich and giving to the poor, which the DA opposes. This characteristic of the ANC is well reflected by its actions such as state capture, the mismanagement of finance and the botched-up 1994 to 2019 land redistribution, the obtaining of “compensations, gratifications and bait” through the misuse of BEE and other instruments under the propaganda of “enriching” the people (Black). Here the ANC’s top brass and their cronies stand out as priority beneficiaries. The ANC’s actions, when compared to those of the DA, are a complete contradiction in terms of the “case of the constant and ongoing illegal compensation” of the so-called “freedom fighters” and those who “suffered under Apartheid”, directly and indirectly in every possible way from the state coffers.

Within this exclusive ideology of uplifting of the ANC, the immense group of poor and landless Black people were kept in embargo by the ANC, without progress or improvement of their circumstances. This setup of continuous, immense poverty and financial dependence of the mass of poor Blacks, fast became a handle for the ANC’s top brass to keep a large contingent of dependent voters, who were daily in need of the ANC’s help, on its list of supporters. This was firstly obtained by keeping these Black voters without training and work opportunities, so as to create not only further poverty and unemployment, but to enlarge this sector constantly, in order to ensure political empowerment via the “ANC’s helping hand of the poor Blacks”.12,13-22

Secondly, this “Black question” was in-depth and broadly propagated by the ANC as a sole White outcome from Apartheid: not only to establish sympathy for them in the minds of the poor, in that the ANC “knew” of their immense, constant needs and was doing as much as possible for them, but at the same time to create ongoing hostility against any White presence in the post-2019 politics. Prominent in this regard was Apartheid’s wrongdoings and the reflection by the ANC of a repeat of such suffering at the hands of Whites in future politics; a process wherein the “White” DA was pertinently positioned as the main culprit. With regard to the needs of the mass of poor Blacks, reflected as the so-called exclusive sufferers of Apartheid, the ANC effectively responded through the state coffers by paying mass contributions to them. These financial contributions are still growing. The ANC, as the ruler and the holder of the state’s purse, entrenched itself within the “greater and higher” tasks of doing good by the hand-out of free awards, grants and other subsidies from the tax-payers’ hard earned money.

This made these “dependent” voters work shy and absolutely dependent on the ANC’s so-called goodness, while the vicious circle of growing poverty and joblessness was aggressively upheld. At the same time a policy of fear was created in this mass of poor and jobless minds that any regime change, such as the coming to power of the DA, would lead to the recall of these comprehensive free awards, grants and subsidies paid from the taxpayers.

The DA’s vague policy on the doubtful existence in future of these awards, grants and subsidies, if they come into power, only strengthened the ANC’s political mesmerising of this mass of poor people with misleading falsehoods. This served as an excellent empowerment vehicle for the ANC to block votes away from the DA. Johnson‘s12 recent research confirms this well, as he found that 40% of the Black respondents indeed believe this rumour of the ANC of the DA as a “danger” to their subsidies.12

The DA and the ANC both know that this unlimited system of subsidising the poor without the simultaneous development of a mass of jobs and good training to replace it, cannot be upheld for much longer into the future. This has so far been ignored by the ANC’s top elite, notwithstanding that the continuation of the scheme will bankrupt the country’s funds and spells out a human disaster in waiting. The outright failure of the DA on the other hand to immediately put an alternative in place to this immense politically opportunistic subsidising scheme, besides saying that they will create jobs in time and offer training, has totally isolated them from the mass of poor people, who constantly and immediately need these subsidies. It does not matter for the poor if the system is wrong or unsustainable – for them it is about immediate survival and voting for the party that upholds and improves this subsidy system.10,12,23-25

3.2.1.3.3. BBBEE and its vehicles of land expropriation

As mentioned above, the ANC’s policy on BBBEE also forced the DA into reverse. This is due to the portrayal of the DA as White capitalists and the safe-guarding of their immediate interests. This obvious hostility to Black upliftment pushed the DA away from the mass of poor and landless Blacks.

It is evident that the DA’s dislike for BBBEE must be changed in some way with regard to its solid rejection policy thereof. What is urgently needed is the implementation of an acceptable change to the DA’s present model of outright rejection, in order to bring about balanced nation-building and to improve the already tense racial relations. It is necessary to create an environment to support a reasonable form of BBBEE. The DA’s clear policy of a racially free society must reflect Black upliftment as a primary principle. BBBEE is unavoidable and was implemented in many countries to benefit the unprivileged and the poor. It was not an extraordinary action in South Africa by the ANC, but so far the DA under its White right-wing blindly rejects it. There must be some confirmation of support of BBBEE as fast as possible by the DA. Maimane’s reference to the DA pushing for the tabling of a private members’ bill on intelligence-related matters and jobs may be the first constructive step, but it is doubtful whether this is enough, and it is far from the BBBEE offered by the ANC.21,26,27

BBBEE is seen by most Whites as extreme discrimination after 25 years of so-called “democracy”, as Bachtis26 writes with justification26:13: “BEE is a racist, exclusionary mechanism designed to destroy any vestiges of whiteness.” BBBEE, in contrast to its primary aims, was undoubtedly applied by the ANC with outmost dishonesty and corruption in order to benefit mostly the ANC top brass, bringing riches to them and their cronies between 1994 and 2019. Billions of rand were also stolen via state capture and other crooked schemes by politicians, government officials and private citizens under the ANC regime, which was in value far more than the total collected by BBBEE for the so-called upliftment of the so-called poor Blacks’ suffering under Apartheid. This confirms that there are many other acceptable ways (besides corruption and dishonesty) to uplift the mass of poor Blacks.

The misuse of BBBEE is furthermore seen by many Whites as pure revenge-taking on Whites for the past.

Other, better ways must be found by the DA to get involved in BBBEE and to directly uplift the poor. Firstly, the present experience by Whites of BBBEE as a punishment to impoverish Whites, especially the White youth, must be counteracted by the DA with reasoned actions. Whites must be allowed to compete freely within the South African business and employment environment, without the direct and indirect “punishment”. As policy, the DA must firstly support an ongoing strictly managed BBBEE system for at most the duration of another term, after which it must be totally erased from the statute books. Secondly, the planned land redistribution scheme, wherein the transferring of state-owned land and buildings, etc., is central, must be a direct replacement for BBBEE inside the DA’s policy of a “helping hand to the Blacks in the post-2019 politics”. Included in this BBBEE scheme must be the free training of Black farmers and the free provision of equipment and produce such as cattle and grain for the mass of incoming Black farmers to make a living on the farms.

3.2.1.3.4. The DA’s policy of land expropriation without compensation

The policy standpoint of the DA was until now to reject the ANC’s land reform of expropriation without compensation. Prominent therein is the the DA’s perception of the ANC’s foundation of confused political radicalism, beset by neo-Marxism, specifically as part of the ANC’s opportunistic elite’s driving of the ANC’s land expropriation policy. In addition, the failed 1994 to 2019 land redistribution programme of the ANC is an indication for the DA of how unplanned, undemocratic and populist land reform can get. This has lead to the passivity of the DA to in any way, either on its own or with the ANC, get involved in constructive land redistribution. The fact that the DA is not shying away from even going to the highest court in South Africa to nullify any ANC legislation on land transformation if needed, does not sit well with the mass of landless Blacks.

The DA believes that there is not a need to tamper with the present Constitution, because the state’s land is available in large amounts, waiting for redistribution directly to the mass of poor and landless people. Indeed, for the DA, this state land is so massive in size and its redistribution potential so overwhelming, that any initiative with private land cannot be addressed successfully before 2025, if not later. The DA notes in this concern that the state at present has a property portfolio of more than 93 000 buildings and more than 1.9 million hectares of land. Just to create an orderly official institution to oversee the handing out and assurance of legal rights of the land and buildings to new private owners, would take up to three to five years to complete by a well managed government. Then there is a further timetable to stretch over another three to five years to establish the infrastructure and award the property to the applicants in waiting, to do training and to supply finance to the mass of incoming farmers. The so-called “White land expropriation”, even with compensation, can only take place after twenty or more years from 2019.10,16,20,28

But, from a critical statutory as well as political and socio-economic point, is it clear that the DA’s land redistribution policy is vague and clearly practised in terms of White interests. It is window dressing and empty rhetoric. It is unavoidable for the DA to get directly involved in the land ownership matter in the post-2019 politics. The DA’s leadership must stop allowing the right-wing of Whites in the DA, who are guided effectively with great political contamination by the so-called Afrikaners/Whites rescuers and saviours, to handle the matter in public and with the government. The DA did shed most of these white hardliners and their sympathisers successfully in the May election – possibly not only at the ballot box, but also on their list of membership. This is now allowing the true DA to come out of the closet with its Black members’ wishes, thinking, planning and action on balancing land redistribution for Blacks.

Firstly, the FF+ must openly be confronted with a public stand by the DA, demonstrating the falsity of the empowerment that the FF+ can help the Whites farmers to hang onto their land. The reality must be delivered to White farmers and the White community that if not enough land is peacefully redistributed fast to the mass of Blacks, land will physically be confiscated from them in a revolution which can happen very soon.29,30 The DA must find a declaration, matching fully and effectively the following declaration by the FF+-leader in Kwazulu-Natal, Duncan Du Bois, which reads30:7: “I think they [FF+] were beneficiaries of people dumping the DA because of the DA’s policy on affirmative action and BEE and also because the FF Plus is very clear on its land policy and the DA is not quite as sharp on that.”

The DA urgently needs a public reference, reading: “The DA is a beneficiary of votes because it is clear on its land policy, with the Freedom Charter declaration as its manifesto on land ownership that all South Africans have the right to own land and that land must be owned racially proportionally before 2024.” 29,30

For Maimane, such a change would be easy and a small step, especially in light of the pronouncement by Johnson12 of him “as a previous ANC supporter who still thinks in terms of the politics of the ANC.” The fact that Maimane, as alluded to by Johnson12, had already estranged the Brown and White Afrikaans speakers, as well as his failure to defend the Afrikaans language and culture rights, forced thousand of angry and dissatisfied Afrikaans and White people out of the DA, makes this step easy if true.12,29,30

3.2.1.3.5. The proof of the DA pudding is not always in the eating

The DA is mostly worried about present day South Africa. It developed, where in charge, styles and approaches, in an effort to fix most of the enormous failures created by the ANC reign. Where the DA was put in to govern, it did not panic and has addressed immense challenges with duty, pride and success.15

The actions of the DA were sometimes deliberately blown up by the press and their political opposition. The ANC propagandists used this to distract attention from their own serious and comprehensive delinquency. In some cases, however, alleged activities of the DA made them no better than the ANC and need the same condemnation.15-20

Seeing that political oversight by the broad public and media is a priority for all public figures and parties, and the fact that it is the criteria on which a mandate to rule has been issued, these accusations need to be highlightened and evaluated. It is important to see if there is proof in the DA pudding after eating it. This will be done hereunder.

3.2.1.3.5.1. The DA’s seemingly ongoing own internal strife

Prominent for instance, but indeed a small matter in the end, was the allegation that Helen Zille of the DA leadership had in 2014 contravened the Constitution and the Ethical Code for Members of the Executive due to an alleged tablet issued to her son who worked as a teacher for the Western Cape Education Department in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. This action against her, brought onto the books by the controversial Public Protector (PP) Busiswe Mkhwebane, in an attempt to prosecute her, failed. (This PP action was nullified by an interdict against the PP in the Johannesburg high court. The PP was also shown to be wrong by the courts in two other cases).15-20

Then there was Helen Zille’s so-called #taxrevolt-plan, which attracted critics from the ANC and some sectors of the public. But, in light of the failed prosecution for theft, corrupt ANC politicians and state officials, racketeers, crooks and tax-avoiders in the ANC, this actually attracted much strong support from law-abiding citizens as an instrument to punish the useless ANC regime.15-20

Furthermore, there was the so-called Patricia De Lille saga wherein the DA was initially accused of racism, etc., because De Lille was allegedly forced out of DA politics by its leadership. This criticism seems to have been contradicted by an independent investigation which alleged that De Lille deliberately misled the Cape Town City Council and triggered a further allegation against her, namely to have interfered with and manipulated city tenders, reports Malatsi31. In nullifying the DA’s and Maimane’s so-called “record of wrongdoing” against De Lille, Malatsi31 writes31:18: “De Lille and her chief lieutenant, Brett Herron, are facing criminal charges for their involvement in these instances of serious maladministration or worse.”

But the De Lille case’s handling by the DA cost them much honour in the eyes of the general voting public and was undoubtedly one of the reasons for the exodus of a strong contingent of votes from the DA to Good. Nyatsumba32 foregrounds the immense negative impact on the DA and the idea of a flawed leadership left by the De Lille case, when he writes that many inside the party in the Western Cape had their daggers drawn at her and wanted her out summarily, ignoring, in his opinion, the right firing process. After a vote of no confidence in the Cape Town City Council failed, the process of her ousting continues, writes Nyatsumba32. He further reflects32:25: “…they continued to manufacture lies about her and to throw mud at her in the hope that some of it would stick. To their chagrin, De Lille emerged victorious each time and they ended up with bloodied noses. And yet, still they continued to lie to the public, right until the elections, that they fired De Lille as a member when, in fact, she had resigned.”

Then there were two other controversial recent cases in the DA household before the May election. Both were fully described in the Sunday Times of the 17th March 2019. From the reports it seems that the DA was in the accused box. In the one a woman member was left off the party’s parliamentary list after accusing a colleague of sexual harassment, while in the other case a senior woman member accused of racism and xenophobia was kept on the list of the DA’s candidates for the sixth Parliament.33

In the first case a DA councillor in Ekurhuleni, a said Thina Bambeni, was alleged to be delisted on the recommendation of the party’s Gauteng leader, John Moodey, after she accused the council’s caucus chair, Shadow Shabangu, of sexual harassment. A provincial disciplinary committee cleared Shabangu due to a lack of evidence and advised the provincial executive to charge Bambeni instead, as reported by Mvumvu and Makinana33. (Note: It is the same said Shabangu who is alleged further on in this reflection to have contravened Section 4 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act because it is alleged that he received a R1 220 000 kickback from the developers of the Springs Mall). In the end Bambeni was removed from the list of candidates, together with Siphesihle Dube (a spokesperson for the MEC of Transport in the Western Cape, due to posting pictures which he took with Patrica De Lille). Dube and Bambeni’s exclusions from the candidate list led to court actions against the DA.33

Regarding the second case within the DA’s inner circle, it was reported by Mvumvu and Makinana33 that Louw Nel, the DA’s parliamentary operations director, had taken legal action against Kohler Barnard after the party bosses allegedly failed to act against her. This is an outcome that follows after Barnard allegedly made racist remarks at a strategy meeting of the DA. It is also alleged that Barnard made offensive statements against Zimbabweans in South Africa (Note: Kohler Barnard was accused of racist behaviour in 2015 and her DA membership terminated in 2015 over a Facebook posting calling for the Apartheid president PW Botha’s “comeback”. Her expulsion was overturned and the DA retained her as an MP on condition that she was not found guilty of a similar offence, according to Mvumvu and Makinana33). It is further reported by Mvumvu and Makinana33 that Louw Nel had been suspended after taking the matter to the Equality Court (because he allegedly did not follow the party’s so-called “procedures” to call Barnard to book). He was however then reinstated.

It seems as though the DA is frequently characterised by unnecessary and doubtful senior level conflicts. Many seem to be unclear about the reasons and motives, while others contend that this is due to much self-empowerment and self-love by individuals inside the party’s structure. The racial factor seems to frequently also to be a culprit. For instance, the exit of the policy head, Gwen Ngwenya, of the DA from the leadership before the May election seems to reflect such a political struggle around the leadership. Professor Kotze22 claimed that the resignation of Ngwenya, who is alleged to have become disillusioned with the DA’s unsteady stance on a pro-Black policy, contributed further to existing uncertainty in the DA as a future political home for Blacks. This is seen as one of the various possible catalysts for Black voters moving from the DA in the past election. There were and are still also sagas around the persons of Helen Zille, Patricia de Lille and Lindiwe Mazibuko – wherein the “Black colour” factor seems not always so very innocent.16,17,19,22,24,31,34

For the DA to qualify as “good” in terms of the referees’ letters of reference, it must undoubtedly settle these kinds of internal leadership issues effectively, without negative roots of doubt. However, it would have been best if they were totally avoided from day-one by the appointment of the correct persons in its leadership. The De Lille saga for instance could have been avoided if sound selection principles were applied and she was never allowed into the DA as a member nor promoted to a leader’s position.16,17,19,22,24,31,34

The writings of the political analyst Muzi Kuzwayo35 in April 2019 on Patricia de Lille’s politics, including her present-day party named Good, and her appointment as an honourable minister in the Ramaphosa regime of post-2019, seems to be a good guideline to follow and to use before making an appointment. Kuzwayo writes35:2: “She first cashed in a few years after she started her party which became defunct and moved over to the DA and became Mayor of Cape Town in return – good deal. Who knows what loot Good will brings her.” Indeed, the loot is there! As a minister in the Ramphosa regime, facing the post-2019 politics, she is receiving a salary of R2.4-million yearly (besides many other allowances such as free flights, subsidised luxury cars, etc.)!35

3.2.1.3.5.2. The DA’s merry men and their alleged hands in the cookie jar

Although it seems that the DA prides itself to not hesitate to call political, economic and social delinquents in the party to book, notwithstanding their seniority or empowerment in the party, it seems that this is not always the true case, as alleged by critics. Looking critically at the DA’s attestations, it seems that although the amount, level and intensity of the delinquencies in the DA are far less than those characterising the ANC, it must be noted on the other hand that when it comes to any wrongdoing and the required appropriate handling thereof, the criteria of punishment must be on an equal level required in public from the ANC to act against its delinquents. The basis cannot and must not be the allowing of any kind of wrongdoing. A single case is as evil as one hundred delinquencies. This, it seems, the DA has missed out on sometimes.15-20

Prominent here are the allegations that the DA lacks fast and decisive actions on the expulsion of delinquents in its executive circle. The so-called Shadow Shabangu case, which echoes seemingly the same failing of the ANC to act against its culprits, is noteable. Shadow Shabangu, the DA’s caucus chair of the Ekurhuleni Council, was before the end of the fifth Parliament accused that he received a R1 220 000 kickback from the developers of the Springs Mall. Immense data was offered in the case.15-20

On the alleged wrongdoing by Shabangu, as specifically spelled out by a report of the Ekurhuleni Council, Mvumvu writes19:4: “The contract required him [Shabangu] to protect the interests of the developer instead of those of the municipality and those of his constituents, which is a direct conflict of interest. Furthermore, it was found that there might be an existence of a corrupt relationship between the developer and Shabangu, under the veil of the so-called facilitation agreement.”

The report alleged that Shabangu’s actions were in contravention of Section 4 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. It has also been alleged that Shabangu received a gift of a hotel payment worth about R1 720 – R2 290 from a friend of the developers of the mall that he did not declare to the council. So far the accused is alleged to still be active in DA party politics, equalling the Ace Magashule and others’ “not guilty till sentenced” stand-off.15-20

The failure of the DA to act decisively and strictly on the allegations against Shabangu undoubtedly made them in the eyes of potential voters in the recent May elections not an acceptable and a good ruler, empowered to be able to take on rumours of corruption in its own circle and respond with criminal prosecution. It seems for the critical voter as though the DA follows the same kind of “stretched” policy as the ANC, notwithstanding their preaching of a so-called “clean character” of the party and its leaders.

It is old news of the DA’s co-operation at three metros with the controversial EFF. It has been alleged that this “DA-EFF-brotherhood” has led thereto that the EFF’s practice of politics has become part of the DA’s thinking, planning and action. This “DA-EFF-brotherhood” is alleged to be driven inside an alleged opportunistic way of functioning and surviving for the DA. It is alleged in a report that the recent support for Moeketsi Mosolo of the EFF, to be an ongoing member of the Tshwane Council, notwithstanding serious allegations, was the outcome of this contaminated DA-EFF-brotherhood. The allegation is that alleged misconduct by Mosolo was ignored by the DA, primarily to bolster and to assure the DA’s empowerment in the council. The perception by the broad public of the good ethics of the DA and their strong showing up of the alleged corruption of the ANC elite, was thereby nullified. On the Mosolo case it is evident that the DA indeed recently wanted him ousted from the council, due to his alleged part in the awarding of a contract valued at R12 billion by the Tshwane Metro Council to the construction group GladAfrica, to manage all the Metro Council’s infrastructure projects. Hereafter, it is alleged, the DA suddenly made a fast turnaround on Mosolo to keep him on the council. The basis for this, it is alluded, was not to offend the EFF because the DA needed the EFF’s support in the council against the ANC at a time when the DA’s empowerment may have been erased. On Mosolo’s alleged wrongdoing, the Auditor-General’s Report alleged that Mosola took unauthorised control as a council member of the appointment of GladAfrica as a service provider, which was is in the first place in conflict with municipal legislation. Secondly, there was the allegation of the presence of corruption via the contract of the City of Tshwane with GladAfrica. As recently as 25 January 2019 the then DA Executive Mayor of Tshwane, Solly Msimanga, alleged that a payment of R317 million to GladAfrica was “irregular” under the management of Mosolo. The existence of a damaging formal report on Mosolo by the firm Bowmans, seemingly reflecting extremely negatively on the R12 billion contract, is alleged to have been ignored by the DA in their continued support of Mosolo in the council.9,36-38

In this context of an allegedly contaminated “DA-EFF-brotherhood”, it has also been alleged that Solly Msimanga, representing the DA as Executive Mayor in Tshwane, was pushed out of the mayoral post by his own DA party, because his efforts to oust Mosolo had angered the EFF and endangered the empowerment environment in the council for the DA with the EFF.9,36-38

The investigative journalist Marrian39 also took the GladAfrica scandal to the door of Solly Msimanga, the DA’s previous mayor, by recently alleging that he is now facing investigation with Moeketsi Mosolo over the multi-billion rand contract which the Auditor General found was awarded irregularly. She further alleged that he had jumped ship at Tshwane City and failed to see through his first mayoral term after he was seemingly “selected” by the DA to be its premier candidate and the face of its campaign to win Gauteng (which did not help the DA much). Marriam39 also alleged that Msimanga faced allegations of nepotism and that his brother had allegedly stolen 100 computers from the City of Tshwane.39

Marrian,39, as well as the political commentator Peter Bruce,40 focused on the actions of the DA’s Johannesburg Mayor, Herman Mashaba. Marrian39 alleged that shortly after he was elected and had formed a government, allegations emerged that a member of his mayoral committee, a said Sharon Peetz, had taken her mother along on an official trip to Spain. Marrian39 reports that this alleged wrongdoing was met with profuse denials by Mashaba and the city council, and that Mashaba even provided evidence that the trip was legal. But he then suddenly fired Peetz some months later after alleged irrefutable evidence of wrongdoing in the case surfaced. Marrian39 also showed the presence of failed service delivery under the mayoral oversight of Mashaba. She alludes that this happened after the city failed to renew a contract with Avis SA for vehicles to collect street rubbish. According to a report by the investigative journalism unit amaBhungane, Marrian reports that the Avis contract was cancelled and the fleet management deal was handed to Afrirent which allegedly in return paid kickbacks to an account belonging to the EFF. Bruce40 further reports that many of Mashaba’s DA causus members insist that he is closer to the EFF than he is to the DA. These members alleged that he allowed the EFF to influence contracts and appointments. This allegation, reading Marrian’s earlier allegations on the Afrirent contract, seem to can make some sense somewhere.39-40

3.2.1.3.5.3. The Marrian test case of the DA as an effective ruler in metros

There are other prominent critics that the DA’s political planning and action on the metro-level reflect widespread lack of constructive and dynamic action and that it does not offer its voters and the inhabitants of the metros where it is in charge, any better services than its opponents, the ANC or the EFF. It seems thus to be a prerequisite to see if the DA pudding has taste.16,17,20

An article by Marrian39 on the 17th May 2019 about the DA reflects it as a party that is unsuccessfully executing its municipal mandate. This requires a frame of reference. A short analysis and description to measure the article’s value in political standing is offered to get some insight as to whether the allegations hold water. The article’s introduction title reads39:32: “The Democratic Alliance’s unsatisfactory performance in the 2019 general elections reflects its poor governance record in the metros it took control of in the 2016 local government election.”

Looking firstly at her reference to the DA’s so-called “unsatisfactory performance in the 2019 elections”, Marrian39 is clearly missing out on all of the primary reasons for the decline of 2% in votes for the DA. Political analysts posit that the 2% decline was clearly a normal and long overdue shedding of the White ultra-conservatives. These drop-outs are now starting to run away because land expropriation is going to be a reality that the DA has to face from 2019 and must constructively handle in reality politics (other than these DA drop-outs’ seemingly new political home, the FF+, which blindly refuses to recognise this reality and promises them false land security). Nullifying Marrian’s 39 postulation is the well-defined and -reasoned opinion of the editor of the Beeld3 offered earlier, which put it clearly that the DA indeed did well in the election with its 20% voter outcome.3,39

Regarding her reference to the DA’s so-called “poor governance record in the metros it took control of in the 2016 local government election”, it is a postulation without roots: the only way to make an analysis of poor performance, is to compare it with the ruling ANC’s outputs in the various municipalities since 2016 (and the EFF which is basically missing in this context). In this context of governance it must be noted that not a single municipality under the DA management failed to obtain a clean audit, while most of the municipalities run by the ANC are contaminated by the lack of clean audits and the presence of constant corruption, fraud and theft, etc.9,16,17,20,39

The chaos in some of these ANC run metros is echoed by the recent arrest of the ANC Durban Mayor Zandile Gumede, chair of the powerful eThekwini region. Together with her, 62 ANC councillors of the eThekwini region stand accused of R208 million tender fraud. (For the record: she has already appeared in court and is out on R50 000 bail).41,42

For Marrian39 to speak vaguely as follows39:32: “…the DA did not live up to its own promise of better and clean governance in the metros it won in 2016. There are ample examples in Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay and Johannesburg of a party out of its depth in governing complex cities”, is plain mischief-making. Marrian39 failed to offer facts besides generalisations, meaning that her evidence is missing to put the DA in the dog box. As it has been offered it is fake news! Firstly, it needs to be noted that the DA only took over these entities three years ago and they had been messed up before by the ANC. The DA’s first tasks were to put remedial actions in place to get them working once again. This was mostly achieved in the three years, as the overall successes in these municipalities confirm.9,16,17,20,39

Marrian39 remarks that the DA had taken over the crown jewels of South Africa’s city scape, namely the big budget Johannesburg, the administrative capital of Pretoria in Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay in coalition deals and informal agreements with the EFF. She simplified the outcomes of these three metro’s complex management, which is prominently reflected by her unconvincing focus on Nelson Mandela Bay, with a specific outcome which she describes in political jargon as39:23: “Three years later, two of the three DA mayors have been removed and the party lost control of Nelson Mandela Bay”. Her “focus” clearly reflects a lack of understanding of the pre-2016 contaminations in all three of the metros which the DA has been trying to rectify since 2016 with the EFF. Secondly, which she knows well, but failed to pinpoint, is the political instability of the EFF as a co-partner and the party’s extreme customs and habits of mischief-making. This mischief-making intention and inclination by the EFF is evident where there is the opportunity for it, where it can scurrilously deviate from normal and orderly politics, even with the other mischief-maker, the ANC, in order to obstruct good governance. The constant change of DA mayors in PE was such an outcome and was not a public rejection of the DA’s mayor.39

To associate the DA’s Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba’s so-called popularity with the decline in DA votes there in the May elections, does not hold water: Marrian39 herself states that the DA’s decline was all over the country, and not only located in Johannesburg; so where does Mashaba really come into the picture, besides his random and subjective selection as a so-called “culprit”? Her postulations39:32: “…that last year bins in Johannesburg’s streets overflowed with rubbish”, and that: “Johannesburg entities, from City Power to Pikitup, degenerated under Mashaba’s watch…”, do not hold any specific evidence of outright and continuous political failure or misdoing by the DA or Mashaba. Marrian, as a salted political analyst, must know this. Her remarks are primarily nothing more than generalised political allegations, failing to bring the DA or Mashaba to book with specific and confirmatory evidence on the specific story of rubbish bins. Furthermore, these claims, if they should be true, are seemingly the extraordinary to the ordinary of every day. Strikes, which are a general phenomenon in all the metros and lead unavoidably to streets overflowing with rubbish, are mostly run by Cosatu and its affiliates, which are alliance members to the ANC regime. Furthermore, the country-wide daily road blocks of burning tyres and unrest, etc., are basically due to the municipalities under the ANC’s management’s constant and ongoing failures for the delivery of services. In the failed service delivery at ANC-run municipalities, the presence of rubbish which overflows the streets is only one problem of many more serious failures to the inhabitants, of which Marrian seems oblivious or prefers not to mention.39

Marrian’s39 overview of the DA’s so-called fight with the then Cape Town mayor Patricia de Lille, seemingly lacks an understanding of the background to the alleged matter, which forced the DA to react with serious steps against her. It seems to be a matter that the DA is still investigating although she has left the party. Her remark39:23: “The electorate clearly turned up their noses at the DA’s antics in the metros over the past three years…”, is an effort by Marrian39 to pinpoint the story behind the so-called “noses-up” of the electorate.. However, it lacks any evidence or political commentator’s depth. In perspective, it seems to be a reflection of a kind of political mischief against the DA. Again, on the “antics” of the DA – as done in all her other reflections on the DA’s so-called many failures in her article – she failed to offer a comparison of the DA’s “bad” antics with the ANC’s “good” antics in all the metros where it is active, knowing that the DA would come first as the best ruler.39

In conclusion, many critics are inclined to say “where there is smoke there is fire”. 39 Viewpoints must be lent an ear. The evidence of poor management and corruption in municipalities all over the country is plentiful: from the smallest village to the biggest metro. What really is needed is that the Cape Town, Johannesburg, eThekwini, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay municipalities must be scrutinised for corruption, theft and nepotism, etc., by commissions such as those of Zondo and Mpati. This will show not only possible wrongdoings by the ANC’s cronies, but also possibly those of the DA’s cronies. Such an outcome may put flesh to Marrian’s39 present vague and unconvincing allegations on the failures of the DA. It will also test the DA’s manifesto for truth and see whether its promises are going to hold water. South Africa needs to see which of the three dominant political parties and their leaders are sufficiently capable and skilled to solve the demanding land redistribution issue. Most of all, we must ascertain which of the three parties’ politics are characterised by poor governance and serious delinquencies.

3.2.1.3.6. The DA’s horse-trading with extreme oppositions as partners

A prominent critic, which could have also played a role in the loss of voters in the 2019 elections, is the opposition of conservative voters (mostly Whites) of the DA’s association with the EFF. Indeed any association with a radical opposition, even the ANC, seems unacceptable for this sector.39,40,43

No-one can escape the hard fact that the DA’s coalition and informal co-operation with the EFF has cost them support. The fiasco in their loss of control of Nelson Mandela Bay and the removal of the DA’s mayors there, has become more than a black mark on the DA’s record of integrity and good governance.39,40,43

This kind of DA-EFF cooperation is seen as nothing more than horse-trading, to use the excellent coining of a phrase by Bruce. It seems for some critics to be extreme opportunism by the DA’s leadership to stay in power and to reap benefits, instead of truly putting the country and its voters’ interests as a priority.39,40,43

At the moment there are a lot of rumours of a repeated coalition with the EFF in the metro councils of Tshwane and Johannesburg. The EFF alleged that such consultations and discussions with the DA are ongoing. But on this outcome, as with the DA’s pre-2019 politics, Maimane43 has thrown cold water by stating43:1-2:

…the DA would co-operate only with parties that shared its values of non-racialism, a capable state, eradication of corruption and a market-based economy that was inclusive of those who were left out.

This discussion on co-operation with the EFF must be based on those principles, and if ultimately parties do not agree on the principles we will not sell those out. We will stand firm and move on from there.

The DA’s pre-2019 association with the EFF and its leaders has, as mentioned, with good reason placed a question mark on the DA’s integrity.34,39,43 Further contamination of the DA’s character by the EFF can make Marrian’s39 remark that39:32: “…the DA did not live up to its own promise of better and clean governance in the metros it won in 2016”, suddenly and irrevocably meaningful. In addition here is Marrian’s request that the DA must do some introspection. It seems to be necessary, not only with regard to its association with the EFF, but also on many of the other so-called “delinquencies” of the DA, of which Marrian39 has spoken many times with a tongue in her cheek.

A fact which cannot be ignored: as a result of its initial construction as a party, the DA has many times been characterised by outright opportunism which has nurtured the party’s unfortunate “EFF-love”. It must be phased out, together with the EFF contamination.27,39,43,44

The DA cannot honestly call itself a unique party: a party free from racism, corruption, state capture, revolutionary politics, etc., as long the EFF is part of its inner circle. The past EFF association has cost the DA as many Black right-wing votes as it did to drive its White right-wing’s departure. Selisho34 quoted the political commentator Leeto Nthoba who said that the DA’s initial loss of voters to the FF+ in the May elections was strongly driven by the DA’s previous association with the EFF. The loss of more Whites from the DA will further be speeded up by a new alliance with the EFF. There is not a single good principle to support the DA to again be involved with the EFF in a future co-operation.34

In this context is it clear that Maimane has started (seemingly for the moment) to cold shoulder the EFF and confirms that the DA’s intention is only that of a positive co-operation with “equal-value” parties to the DA in the post-2019 politics. Maimane reflects further that the DA wants to establish a “caucus of the opposition” with parties that share their values and are identified with the centre of politics. In this context the DA already has a kind of “alliance” with the FF+, the ACDP, the IFP and the UDM, while the EFF is not a member, but is seemingly supported sometimes.27,44-46

However, for the DA to come clean in the post-2019 politics from their previous serious EFF-contamination, remains to be seen. The first prerequisite to be clean is integrity; something that no-one can cheer about in the DA if the EFF is its bed-partner. If the stream goes against Maimane’s cold shouldering of the EFF, the DA is sleeping at the same time with the right-wing FF+ and underwriting the dominant voice of the aggrieved, conservative White and Coloured minorities, while at the same time sleeping with the left-wing EFF and underwriting the voice of the discontented, impatient and even angry Black majority. This is not what is called middle-ground politics: it is political schizophrenia and political psychopathy, two serious psychoses, intertwined in one single party. The end result will be the DA’s ongoing Black-versus-White conflict, but in extreme form. This would also confirm the views of many critics that it lacks a sound political policy in any area of politics. As a party it will fit in nowhere, because it is not positively repositioned. Most of all, it will be without supporters and its rich funders.32,47

For the DA to argue that the previous backing of the DA by the EFF and vice versa has not been without benefit, for instance in Johannesburg, holds no water. There is no fact to contradict the statement that all the inhabitants of Johannesburg would benefit if the ANC alone was the boss, possibly more than the DA-EFF alliance. One thing is clear (and a great concern for a corruption free DA) and that is the enormous benefit for the DA-EFF councillors in pay and their political empowerment. When John Mendelsohn46, a DA councillor, postulates that the DA alliance with the EFF was a “precariously positioned one wich required skilful management by Mashaba” it seems as though both Bruce40 and Marrion,39 seemingly with good reason, frowned on it. The DA would benefit from a little introspection, as Marrian advises.39,40,46

The public have the right to be sceptical on any DA-EFF brotherhood. Mendelsohn’s46 reflection on Bruce’s40 critique on the DA’s actions in the Johannesburg City Council, with specifically the EFF as a prominent empowered partner, read46:18: “The message to Bruce is that the arrangement with the EFF was not entered into simply as a “greedy decision”. It was done for the best of reasons, namely to rid the city of corruption and get some growth going in the local economy.”This has just too much reference to the words “greedy, corruption, best of reasons”, as if coming directly from the Zuma period. It is not convincing. 39,40,46

Postscript: On the 29th May 2019 the Citizen reports that the DA had given the ANC the Chair-position of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa)4 in the Western Cape Provincial Legislature. As motivation for this offering the DA said it was done in the interests of transparency, accountability, cooperative governance and good democratic practice (characteristics the DA constantly accuses the ANC of lacking!). Notwithstanding the DA’s argument that the chair is given traditionally to a member of the strongest opposition party in the government (which the ANC is in the stern Cape), it is in conflict with Maimane’s earlier promises that the DA would stay away from any future cooperation with doubtful partners.49

The advent of post-2019 Malema cooperation with the DA in metros can steer the DA back to its practice of dishonourable horse trading. This does not seem impossible. On the 28th May the Star48 reported that it looks set that the DA is going to do a power-sharing deal again with the EFF in Tshwane and Johannesburg.48

3.2.1.3.8. The DA’s use of the Malloch-Brown model for provincial and municipal political empowerment

There are some serious critics of the opinion that to speak of the DA as a national regime, to in any way be able to govern South Africa after the May election 2019, must be handled with care. The DA, it was felt, just could not brag of doing so, because this experience is totally missing from their CV. There are even critics that believe that on provincial and local level the DA seems to falter. The emergence of various small political groupings and so-called community parties in the Western Cape, the DA’s stronghold, is offered as dissatisfaction with the DA by communities and the inhabitants of regions where the DA is strongly active. Given that these groupings did not make much inroad into the DA’s domain in the Western Cape or Cape Town in the past elections, this contradicts a general indication of poor DA ruling or unpopularity with the broad society of the DA on specific municipal level.22,25,36,50

This outcome erases the critique that the DA does not have the ability or will to be the national ruler in the post-2019 politics. The results of the May election contradict thus firstly the lack of interest of the DA in national politics, and secondly that the DA has neglected the national issue. What most of the critics have missed is that the DA, with very good reason, is focusing its political intentions and role-playing on provincial level to tackle local issues, instead of over-addressing the national issues of South Africa.22,25,36,50

Looking to the arguments and modus operandi of the DA’s leadership since 2014, it becomes clear that there exists cognition inside the party that the first step to be able to move into national government successfully requires the pre-step of a well established provincial level involvement and empowerment by the DA all over the country. Included here is the local level of governmental occupation by the DA in an effort to firstly repair the integrity of municipalities and to again obtain clean audits, and secondly to serve the inhabitants’ needs and demands through this improved system. This will allow them to obtain and establish a foundation to move into provincial and then on into national levels of government. Only after this double stage has successfully been mastered, based on a sound governance foundation, experience and empowerment, can the DA move aggressively into the national sphere from 2024 onward .22,25,36,50

This double stage intention and approach on provincial and local levels of government establishment was evident from the words of Makashule Gana50 of the DA national campaign team for the recent May 2019 election, when he pinpointed that the party was primarily and specifically campaigning on community issues that were close to the ordinary peoples’ daily lives50:15: “We stand more chance of being in government if we pour our hearts into the provinces and grow our votes there.” Prominent here are the constructive efforts of the DA to explain on local level major national issues in such terms that help voters to understand how bad or good decisions taken in the top echelons of government affect their day-to-day lives, write Matiwane and Deklerk25.

How much the quality of the DA’s political structure and know-how are on the standard of international politics, and how intensively they apply the principles of good governance on all levels of their strategy and planning, is especially reflected and confirmed by their insight to go as an opposition in the first place for local and domestic politics. Their aim is mostly, other than some of the ANC top brass like Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, to find an international solution for local problems. No-one can reject the important role of international politics, but if a local policy of management is absent and the basic grievances of the local people on village level are ignored and fail to be addressed – as the ANC mostly did for over 25 years with their minds occupied by national government – international politics not only fails to have an impact, but, where it is applied randomly, brings in most cases only further chaos to an existing local problem. Their exclusive local focus with the use of local approaches, is working positively where the DA is strongly involved in the local level of government. This is not only to repair the local mess at municipalities previously run by the ANC, but at the same time to start to bring about the much needed basic facilities and contacts that are prominently lacking on local level and whereto international solutions mostly are not applicable.

In this context, wherein the DA’s local orientation to politics is correctly focusing on the single aim to altruistically serve the individuals’ needs above personal gains and self-empowerment, an inclination that is at the moment negatively overwhelming the country’s politics on national level, is the supportive narrative of Mark Malloch-Brown51 with regard to the DA’s initiative on local level politics. For the record, Malloch-Brown51 is undoubtedly one of the most qualified internationally recognised persons to understand and evaluate the actions and qualities of political parties and governments worldwide. The insight of Malloch-Brown51, an experienced political correspondent for the Economist, the Vice-President of External Affairs of the World Bank, Head of the United Nations Development Programme, the UN Deputy Secretary-General under Koffi Annan, and later Minister of State at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who worked closely within the Middle East and African political turmoil, is fully echoing the DA’s practise of politics. He can speak of successes and failures and hard lessons to learn from local to national governance, especially on the British environment.51

Malloch-Brown51, writes about Gordon Brown’s hard lesson to learn on the importance of local politics when he became the UK Prime-Minister51:221:

Hit in his early months in office by credit, food and energy crises that were clearly international in origin, he publicly sought international solutions, only to be confronted…with complaints that he was not sensitive enough to people and their problems. Why, the British people asked, was he talking about all these irrelevant international matters?

The dilemma of the modern politician is that the answers are abroad but the votes at home. And so Brown, like Blair before him, had to find a language and narrative of politics that is deeply rooted in the at-home. Among political leaders, neither the natural globalisers nor the nationalists are able to cut themselves free from the strings of domestic politics. That is the forum to which they all remain beholden.

Malloch-Brown51 also writes in this context of the importance of local government about his own experience (and another hard lesson to learn) as a UK minister. He reports51:221: “And local is a tough taskmaster. Coming back to the U.K. as a minister to help Brown drive his internationalist agenda, I was brought down to earth by the weekend’s newspaper headlines that blamed the government for uncollected garbage in London’s streets. It does not get much more local than that.”

How sensitive the DA is in its encircling of good politics and its following every letter of the principles to obtain the best empowerment through addressing the local issue, is clear in their aim to take over city metros as a first step to a later national takeover. Noteworthy here is the DA’s insight to put forward strong leaders of quality in order to lead excellent cities and by doing so, to win the hearts of the local people. Malloch-Brown51, on the empowerment of local government through the installation of persons of integrity in care of these municipalities, writes51:221: “… mayors solve problems that are close to home: violent crime, drugs, public infrastructure. They have to care about schools, social services, police and public investment.”

On the immense empowerment of the local entities and their empowering energy-streaming, not only into the provincial and national levels of a country, but also into the international sphere, because their excellence and know-how can be exported, Malloch-Brown51 writes further51:222: “The world looks good for mayors and other local leaders. The fortunes of cities like Moscow, Cape Town, and Chicago have often been countercyclical to those of their region or country, often due to the leadership of strong mayors.”

The DA’s successful pre-2019 occupation and management of Cape Town (as well as the Western Cape region in which it is anchored) reflects such counter action to erase poor governance and leadership, standing out from the ANC’s failed South African state and its municipalities where they reign.51

In addition, the DA’s political successes, again at the provincial level, especially in the Western Cape in the May election, are a confirmation of their ongoing political manifesto of an orderly taking of power in South Africa, even if it must wait until the 2024 election.22

3.2.1.3.9. The DA as a party of everything for everyone, pre-and post-2019
3.2.1.3.9.1. The DA’s White dilemma

Post-election critics bring various reasons to the door of the DA as to why it did not make a dramatic inroad on the voters. Prominent here is its seeming inability to properly handle the various forces, both positive and negative, active in the DA’s own dynamics. It is often suggested that it tries to be a party of everything for everybody. This is an approach which is seemingly not working anymore. The party’s open kind of politics in which they try to satisfy both the Black interests as well as the White interests seem not to work in 2019 and are not going to work in future. This is damaging to both sides. The basis here is a policy ambiguity, mostly activated by the conservative NP remnants of the White sector of the DA. This opposition, and fear by the doves in the DA of losing White support if they took them on, led to not only a vague but many times an absolute lack of a clearly declared policy on Black empowerment and affirmative action, driving away the middle class and even the lower economic classes of Blacks. On the other hand, there is the suspicion by White DA members of Maimane to have sympathy for dramatic land reform, which echos in many aspects that of the ANC doves. This is a direct reason for a DA internal power struggle. This was also well-reflected by critics as the so-called driving out of Whites as members and supporters in the May elections. This in-house power struggle is immense, although well hidden. It frequently equals the present in-fighting in the ANC on the self-empowerment of individuals. The Black racism within a certain sector of the ANC is in reverse echoed by White racism in the DA.28,32 Nyatsumba writes25:25: “The harder Mmusi Maimane tried to position the DA as a social democratic party that would appeal to black voters, the more conservatives “fought back” against him and his ideals.

Naki, in quoting Professor Dirk Kotze22 of Unisa on this conflicting context and the fight for the soul of the DA, reports22:4: “Blacks wanted reform, but conservative whites opposed liberal policies, which put the DA in a dilemma. Both the constituencies abandoned the party at the polls in favour of the ANC and the FF+.”

This indication is undoubtedly true: as many as 470 396 voters left their DA home and contributed undoubtedly to the FF+ gaining 249 093 votes since the 2014 election. These DA voters who absconded to the ANC also helped the ANC to limit its’ loss to only 1 410 446 votes in the May election.5-8

The post-2019 politics make it clear that the DA has reached its peak of White voters and supporters, but the loss of more or less 249 093 White DA voters to the FF+ was an unavoidable outcome. It was part of the ultra-conservative Whites’ build-up against Black empowerment that could never be solved reasonably inside the DA of the future. Most of these ultra-conservative Whites, a political mix between NPs, ABs and Herstigte-NPs, have opportunistically hung on to the DA for years after losing their own political homes, doing more harm than good to the DA’s political soul.28,52 Mokone, Deklerk and Hunter52, quoting a DA insider on these seemingly politically confused and estranged Whites in the DA, write52:22: “Yes, we have lost support to the Freedom Front Plus, but perhaps it’s about time we lost the right-wing conservatives in the party because we are trying to build a party that represents the interests of all South Africans. Perhaps that will also help us to continue increasing support in black areas, which is what we did in this election.”

3.2.1.3.9.2. A Black ex-ANC as the present leader of the DA

How much these right-wing conservatives have penetrated the soul of the DA with their White racial contamination, was clearly reflected by their efforts to sack Maimane for what they see as his “Black liberation” inside the DA. Other DA right-wingers allude that he is an ex-ANC walking around with the ANC manifesto under his right arm. The intention to oust him at present is very clear. Indeed, it seems that they tried to do this at the DA’s Federal Executive (Fedex) on the 13th May, without success. It seems that they are also gearing up to try to oust him later in June at the DA’s Federal Council’s meeting. (The FC is the DA’s highest decision-making structure between conferences). There are also rumours of a call for an early national congress next year, instead of the scheduled congress of 2021, to muster enough votes to be able to topple Maimane12,52

Mokone, Deklerk and Hunter52 describe these detractors of Maimane to include current and former MPs and MPLs from the DA’s neo-conservative grouping, known in the DA’s circles as the “old guard”, which does not agree with the DA’s “blacking” politics and a more responsible view on true democracy, as opposed to the one catering exclusively to White privilege. A spokesperson on the inside of the DA says52:6: “They are gloating. Even before the results started coming in, there were so many of them that were waiting for Mmusi to fail.”

How focused and poisonous these attacks are on Maimane, especially from the Afrikaner right-wing, is well reflected by Pelser53 when he, without a factual base, writes53:6:

Danksy Maimane se oorhaastige kantkiesery in rassetwiste wat gewissel het van Ashwin Willemse tot Schweizer-Reneke, kry die DA 472 000 stemme minder op 8 Mei, want hoewel sy party se prestasie in regering gerespekteer word, verstaan veral wit kiesers ook wat Maimane wil doen, naamlik om klokslag op sosiale media sy eie onberispelike bona fides wat betref ant-swart rassisme ten toon te stel nog voordat hy al die feite het.”

The double standards of these White right-wingers applied to the correctness and indeed the prescribed duty of Maimane to punish deviant behaviour of party members, especially of the top brass of the DA, knowing it is inappropriate and delinquent – is again reflected by Pelser’s53 public down-playing (seemingly because their political antics fit him) of the seriousness of the deviances of three DA seniors who Maimane (after consultation with his top brass) recently called to book for contravening the party’s media rules and for getting involved in racial politics. Pelser writes53:6:

Die DA-LP Ghaleb Cachalia, seun van die struggle-ikone Amina en Yusuf Cachalia, is weer onder ‘n tipe sensuur geplaas as ‘n ongedissiplineerde kader omdat hy dit gedurf waag het het om die uitgesproke Radio 702–aanbieder Eusebius McKaiser te belg.

Ook Helen Zille, wat as premier die doeltreffendste regering gebou het wat Suid-Afrika in 25 jaar gesien het, en wat nou ‘n gewone DA-lid is, sal na die DA se federale uitvoerende raad verwys word nadat sy op Twitter geskryf het dat daar ook deesdae iets soos “black privileges” is (sy stel dit onder meer gelyk aan grootskeepse geplunder sonder gevolge).

These growing and well-planned attacks on the “Black priest” Maimane as DA leader, are not done alone by single persons or a small group of White right-wing-went-off-DAs, but are also as mentioned done from inside by the mostly White “old guard” of the DA top brass where these attacks are less expected. These attacks are spreading to all the intimate members of Maimane’s team. Important to note is the focus on the DA’s head of elections Jonathan Moakes, and the chief executive Paul Boughey, seemingly also with the intention to oust them for the “alleged” poor performance of the DA in the 2019 elections12,39,53

Moakes did indeed resign recently and referred to the internal fights in the DA, wherein seemingly the detractors of Maimane are central, as: “…’toksiese, abnormal omgewing’ waar ‘interne gevegte, vertrouensbreuk, (en) onenigheid …die norm geword het’,” reports Boonzaaier.54:1

Bringing the fight closer to Maimane and his intimate cronies, Marrian writes39:4: “Knives are said to be out for the young leader, despite him getting ‘a round of applause; as he entered the Fedex meeting on Monday.”

3.2.1.3.9.3. The DA present-day leadership saturation by right-wing Old Guards

The knives of the “old guard” are out for the wrong “emperor” and these detractors of Maimane, similar to those who stabbed Julius Ceasar, learned later that a hefty price needs to be paid in the end.

From a political analysis point of view, it seems more and more that the DA’s drop in share in the national votes from the 22.23% under Helen Zille to 20.77% in 2019, bringing a decrease from 89 to 84 MPs in the National Assembly, was to a great extent directly as a result of the negative impact of these “old guard’” “white-politics” inside the DA, specifically about Maimane’s “Black” presence as its leader. One prominent root of these DA neo-conservatives’ ultra-politics, is their association with the so-called antagonists against land expropriation in any form – and the fighting off of any form of upliftment for the mass of the poor and landless. They are clearly aligned to the so-called and mostly self-styled “Afrikaners/White rescuers and saviours”, such as the FF+, AfriForum, AgriSA, Solidarity and other obstructionists of the unavoidable and much needed land reform plan. The future planning and political model of this “old guard” for the DA does not include the intention to build a party that represents the interests of all South Africans. Prominent here is their exclusive safe-guarding of an imbalanced White land ownership and exclusive White capital at the cost of ±30 million poor and landless Blacks. 21,28,47,52

Critically considered, is it clear that they do not represent the view of most of the ±5 million White South Africans. Moreover, they do not have the majority support of these Whites for their racial politics inside or outside the DA. They can cost the DA a split, but, as said, this split needs to occur as fast as possible under the leadership of Maimane, in order to make the DA a party of the people of South Africa.21,28,47,52

But political analyst Ralph Mathekgo55, quoted by Naki55, contends that the flight of White voters from the DA must also be interpreted from another angle and not outright because they are all against the DA’s so-called activation of a process of “blacking” itself. They were forced out by fear of the EFF’s extreme anti-White and land grabbing policy (and their own selfishness to be rich, empowered and to have unlimited White privilege), and thus ran to the FF+ as their only rescuer in this unfortunate setup. This opinion is confirmed by various other political analysts.21,28,32,47,52,55

Mathekgo55, in line with the above findings, writes55:5: “The EFF helped the Freedom Front Plus to consolidate the white voters. It positioned itself as an opponent of the EFF policies, including the expropriation of land without compensation.”

The exit of the White antagonists (who, as mentioned, did not really belong from day one to the DA’s Black orientated political culture), has undoubtedly on the other hand opened the door in reverse for the influx of the middle and lower classes of Black supporters. This positive and growing process will start to erase the White shortfall in members and the White funding of the party (which also seems to have become a leverage of how these right-wing Whites, especially the White capitalists, have manipulated and captured the DA’s soul for a long time). 21,28,32,47,52,55

To be a party of the future, the DA will need to increase their drive for the collection into the DA of Blacks to make it an overwhelmingly moderate Black party. This is a dramatic move away from the contaminated presence of the (mostly departed) right-wing Whites which have so far blocked any “black-liberalism”. This was done in-house by them, at the cost of the status of Maimane’s leadership, by their internal propaganda to profile him as a poor leader. In this process the media was thoroughly used, especially the Afrikaans media.21,28,32,47,52,55

3.2.1.3.9.4. Good management for change politics

The abovementioned change in politics of the DA from White to Black can bring about enormous winnings for the DA in the next local urban elections of 2021. This political acceptance could be extended to the rural areas wherein the DA so far has been under-performing against the ANC and the EFF. (In the 2019 elections, of the 3.6 million votes which the DA received, 2.9 million came from urban areas, with 152 000 from rural areas, 500 000 from farm areas and 9 000 from mixed areas). This means that the DA has to be progressive in order to improve its position locally.22,56 Marrian56 is correct when she says that the DA’s results in the metros in 2019 show that it will have to work hard to retain control of them in 2021, particularly in the Tshwane and Johannesburg metros which it now governs through unstable coalitions. This includes their sole governing in Cape Town, where their support has dropped from 67% to 56%. However, on the other side, the decrease in votes for the ANC is much more significant, confirming the presence of various negative determinants and not a sole one such as leadership per se.56

With regard to the future politics of the FF+ in the post-2019 politics (which has enlarged its presence in Parliament from 4 to 10 MPs) – it is the party to which the DA shed an assumend ±250 000 voters – there is, besides obstruction together with the various White/Afrikaner rescuers and savers such as Solidarity, AfriForum, the IRR, etc., very little hope. The FF+ is an artificial political setup, still saturated in racism, and as the election outcome reflects, it is not popular with the majority of South Africans who stand strongly against racism. Also for the 250 000 DA members, fleeing the ship to the FF+, the future looks doomed there and they knew very well that the DA is the only party that can bring about ordered and balanced land reform. The failed Pieter Mulder escapade as deputy minister of the FF+ in the Zuma cabinet was an expensive lesson to learn for Whites who tried to channel their politics and interests exclusively through the FF+.5-8

The chance is good that many of these disloyal (and many times displaced) DA supporters, who turned to the FF+ as voters, are going to return to the DA. Kotze22 reflects22:4: “The FF+ support is artificial, caused by DA supporters upset with the way the party was managed at the top.” The question must be asked as to whether the DA wants them back? To argue that the DA is stripped of its White voters/supporters with the departure of the 250 000 right-wing jumpers to the EFF+, is a myth. It must be noted that most of the DA members/supporters are still White and are undoubtedly satisfied. Moreover: the fact is that the Whites (including Afrikaners), especially the youth, have very little sympathy for right-wing Whites and their opportunistic Afrikaner/White saviours and rescuers. The same passivity against the right-wing is present within the 5 million Whites with regard to the political trouble-making of the ±35 000 White farmers and their farms. Although it is impossible to calculate precisely the number of White supporters of the DA, the voting totals of the 2019 statics of the eligible voters (±36 miilion) as well as the total voters (±18 million) at the ballot box out of a total population of ±58 million, can be brought into calculation with the White population of ±5 million. If the eligible White voters are calculated, as many as 3 miilion Whites can support the DA. If the passive vote, as reflected in the 2019 voting, is brought into calculation, as many as 1.5 million Whites can still be supporters of the DA. (The total vote for the DA in 2019 was 3.6 million). This calculation means that the loss of ±250 000 White votes reflects basically a loss of between ±8% and 17% Whites by the DA, which can easily be replaced with Black votes.5-8

It can be expected that many of the Black and Brown voters who jumped ship will return as soon as the ANC restarts its tricks. The politics of the ANC, the SACP and Cosatu, are still bordering on radicalism with regard to race, economics and land reform, etc. This politically radical thinking just does not fit into the mindset of established DAs. 22,63

For South African politics in general, which includes the DA’s future planning, thinking and action, there lurk serious consequences as a result of the right-wing FF+ successes in the May election (a warning also applicable to the EFF’s danger). This holds political dangers, which somewhere in the future, the government of the day may be forced to curb, even by dramatic intervention. On this racial polarisation and risky outcome, Mondi Makhanya,64 the editor of City Press, writes a clear warning64:11: “Pieter Groenewald, VF Plus-leier, het ná die verkiesing in ‘n onderhoud hieroor gekraai. “Mense begin nou besef dat jy toegelaat word om wit te wees, ‘n minderheidsgroep, ‘n Afrikaner, sonder om ‘n rassis te wees.”

On the above response of Groenewald, Makhanya64:11continues:

Deur dit te sê, het hy die terugtrek van ‘n aansienlike deel van die wit bevolking – meestal Afrikaanssprekendes – in ‘n rasse-laer van waar hulle hulself as afsonderlik van hul medeburgers beskou, as lofwaardig beskou.

Die ongelukkige aspek van demokrasie is dat dit elke nou en dan uitslae soos dié bewerkstellig. As demokrasie moet ons dit respekteer.

Suid-Afrikaners moet egter nou reeds die realiteit konfronteer dat ‘n giftige nasionalisme aan die regterkant van ons politieke spektrum herrys. Die goeie ding is dat dit binne die grense van ons grondwetlike bedeling geskied.

Dit kan steeds op demokraties wyse ontman word – mits diegene wat ons republiek lei dit herken en dit met breinkrag eerder as spierkrag beveg.

It is now the duty of the DA to rid itself of the Groenewalds, the racial AfriForums and its associated organisations. There is no place to fire up White resistance and poisonous ultra-White nationalism in the DA. The opportunity is now there for the DA to rid itself of racial domination and contamination. This can be done fast and successfully. For that the DA needs a tough, but balanced Black leader.64

It is clear that Maimane and his intimate cronies are very sure of themselves in the post-2019 DA with their future “blacking”. He is not hesitating to take on the White ultra-conservatives in the party’s top brass. It seems Maimane successfully bottled them together with persons such as Helen Zille and “her regrets of promoted Black leaders in the DA”.43,53,65,66

Maimane43, on this future path of DA politics, said43:1-2: “We have set the direction of the organisation and that is the route we will go”.

His growing success was seen with the recent appointment of his preferred candidate Jacques Julius as deputy chief whip in the place of Mike Waters, who is regarded by Maimane and his cronies as part of the conservatives who obstruct the change of the DA. It shows strong support for Maimane from senior DA MPs. This direct vote within the party’s caucus was undoubtedly the victory Maimane needed to continue fast with his diversity of the racial composition of the DA’s higher echelons. It is also clear that the DA MP Phumzile van Damme is successfully leading a progressive group to dislodge many of Maimane’s detractors.65

Mokone and Deklerk65, quoting DA inside sources, say that Julius not only strengthened Maimane’s empowerment on the DA’s Fedex, but that the support of the senior DA MPs show65:4: “… that there are people in the party who support the vision he’s laid out, who want to continue with the vision of our SA for all.”

This clear and decisive policy finality arriving at last, the previous lack of which cost the DA votes in the recent elections, was concretely demonstrated on the 21st May 2019 when Maimane took on Helen Zille in public (an action long overdue). This clearly reflects his assertion of power in the post-2019 DA politics. He has at last obtained his grip on the party. His undermentioned public speaking shows this clearly.43

Firstly, he recommitted the DA to being the South African party of the centre, with the sole intention to serve every citizen43:1-2: “We will not pander to the right or pander to the left. That is not the space we want to occupy. We are in the centre of politics and we must lay out that stall. Populism and nationalism are on the rise. It doesn’t change the fact that our historical mission to get all South Africans working together is an ideal worth fighting for.”

Secondly, in fighting off the attacks on him as leader, as driven by the ill-disciplined comments of some high profile DA members on Twitter, he initiated disciplinary actions against three prominent DA members, namely Helen Zille and the two DA MPs Galeb Cachalia and Michael Cardo.43,67

Maimane43,67 taking a clear position on the DA”s centre politics and how this will be driven, as well as how he is going to erase the right-wing Whites, has responded as follows43:9 and 67:1-2:

I do not agree with the views that have been put forward by the former premier of the Western Cape.

The discussion about privilege in this country is a function not only of our history which advantaged a particular race over another, but it’s also that in the last number of years in government here, we have failed to create access to opportunities for South Africans and ensure that more can be included in our economy .

White South Africans needed to be “cognisant of the fact that the majority of people who are left out are black South Africans.”

On the conflicting racial matter, also prominent in the DA and which was clearly put into the foreground by the Zille tweets, Maimane67 comments as follows67:9: “Any view that seeks to polarise South Africans on the basis of race is not a view I will support. Our focus must be working together as South Africans, black and white, to recognise those injustices and work to address them.”

3.2.1.3.9.5. The DA is finally at the centre of politics and is laying out its stall

To be honest, the DA was before and still is after the election (as shown by the arrogance of Zille’s tweets), undoubtedly saturated in the belief capture of some right-wing Whites seeing themselves as the sole rescuers of the party (undoubtedly true in terms of funding) when it seems to be in trouble. The pertinent use of Helen Zille and Tony Leon to collect votes, but surely only White votes, was an excellent example of this mistaken perception of these right-wing Whites of their future importance in the DA. The presence of people such as Zille and Leon activated immense Black anger. It was planned belittlement. It was for White empowerment.64,66,68 A DA member of the party’s campaign team reflects68:7: “Why in the dying days were the fossils rolled out? Because they wanted to focus on the white vote. That vote was already gone, it was clear even in by-elections.”

There is a false belief that a Black DA is doomed, which may be true if it is solely entrusted to a future of White voters and putting them first. But the intention is clear to keep only those Whites who are committed to an open society, free from the present DA racial undertones. For Johnson12 to write as follows on this White remedy of the post-2019 DA is pie in the sky12:4-5: “Daar is eise dat die koppe van al die topleiers moet rol en vrese dat, tensy die skip vinnig omgedraai word, verdere verliese in 2021 se munisipale verkiesing die party in die gesig staar.” Firstly, it is doubtful whether people such as Johnston are welcome on the post-2019 DA ship. Secondly, if the Black top leaders of the party are now fired, the White racial DA will in 2019 already face losses and be diminished to the FF+’s status (into which its White right-wing fits very well with their extreme racial ideology).

The immense presence of doubt on the so-called “expert leadership” of Whites in the DA’s top echelons and with good reason the growing rejection of persons (who Malema called the pensioner-politicians) such as Helen Zille, who totally overstayed her welcome in formal DA politics, and her present actions of enormous damage to the DA and to Maimane, is confirmed by her growing anti-DA writings and recent utterances. Specific in this respect were her recent admissions of her seemingly “own fault” as the previous DA leader to “blacken” the DA. Even the DA’s top brass intended to crash her “political profile” to get rid of its White image before the May election (which she named “vernietige Zille-stategie). Zille66, on the 26th May 2019 in the Rapport on these “facts and others”, reflecting back to her so-called ousting in 2017 about her “colonialism-tweets”, writes as follows66:7:

Diegene verantwoordelik vir die DA se verkiesingstrategie (ironies genoeg, die meeste van hulle wit) het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat as hulle my in die openbaar sou verpletter, die DA uitendelik sy beeld as ‘n “wit party” sou verloor. Dit is nie ‘n samesweringsteorie nie. Ek het ‘n dokument wat na die party se federale uitvoerende raad gestuur is, wat dit verduidelik.

Ek is tydelik geskors, en toe dit nog nie werk nie, het hulle my prober aanmoedig om Suid-Afrika te verlaat. Die DA het selfs ‘n skenker gevind om hul strategie te financier. As ek verdwyn, so het hul gereken, sal die party uiteindelik as “getransformeer” beskou word.Toe ek beleef weier om as premier van die Wes-Kaap te bedank en die land te verlaat, is ek verbied uit alle party-aktiwiteite.

With regard to the above – which sounds like pages from the chronicles of the FBI and the KGB! – the DA top brass offers some contradictory facts, such as that they never offered her a job overseas, but that the job offer was made independently by two British universities, and that she was indeed asked to leave the premiership due to the damage done by her view on colonialism and race (as she is doing again). To make her an eminent exile to St Helena, similar to Napoleon, seems to be in her dreams. What is clear is that Zille has her own agenda to do the DA as much harm as possible. She has become her own destroyer in the DA’s politics, as well as the county’s politics. Thankfully for her there is a place and sympathy for a pensioned joker in politics, even world-wide.54

For Maimane the above, namely the possible presence still today of a small but strong empowered group of right-wing mischief-makers in the DA who not only can oust him, but can also send him overseas in the near future or to St Helena! Be aware!

What is clear, Maimane and also the DA’s other leaders learned well from the recent elections, is that a party cannot be unlimited everything for everyone: you can be a party for everyone, but one based on clear moral principles, free from racism and free from the sheltering of politically contaminated opportunists whose foundations rest in pre-1994 racial and self-centred South Africa. A centre party or a social democratic party requires clear borders to the left as well as to the right, far away from the vague bordering on political policy of the present DA. Furthermore, there are signs of stagnation in the DA, as its election results in the May elections reflect. This is due, again as abovementioned, to a certain extent because of the DA’s circling around its middle ground position in politics wherein its’ fine, clear value proposition to voters, after their years of exposure to the ANC’s rude politics, did not always come through correctly or was appreciated.32,45,67

To be a winner in the post-2019 politics, the DA’s ideal composition of members must be proportionally 10 Blacks to 1 White. This ideal is also appropriate for its leadership. In its Constitution the Freedom Charter must be central.

3.2.1.3.9. Pastor Mmusi Maimane: a perspective
3.2.1.3.9.1. The “Poor” leader

There are some very strong critics of the leadership of Mmusi Maimane of the DA. Pivotal here is the allegation of his lack of a so-called “Zille-driving motivation-politics”. Many see him as another failed so-called “Tony Leon with his fight-back-strategy”, without bringing constructive politics to the table, other than constantly showing up Jacob Zuma’s and Cyril Ramaphosa’s failures and their empty promises.36

Descriptions of Maimane as a kind of sub-standard leader, a directionless leader, a powerless leader, a poor leader, etc., became prominent references since 2018 by some journalistic sectors. Included in this “Maimane-bashing”, frequently ignoring the modus operandi of Maimane and the present 2019 politics of the DA, is it important to note that the DA underwent a dramatic metamorphosis since 2014, writes Tabane.77 Maimane undoubtedly inherited a sometimes confused party, one leg in Black politics as well as one leg in White politics. It is still undergoing change today. It is a process wherein White empowerment was shifted to Black empowerment to a certain, but limited, extent. This was a shift that angered many of the White-NP-remnants in the DA, who has moved over to it when the NP passed away. This ongoing change in the DA’s identity brought the much needed activation into its foundation (as well as conflict) of more Black rights. Prominent here was also the erosion of exclusive White capitalism and the activation of inclusive capital, the fighting in some ways of Black inequality, poverty and landlessness of the mass of Blacks, the effort to phase out White supremacy in the party’s structure and policy, etc. This has so far not really been successfully done in terms of a clear one-White-citizen versus one-Black-citizen plan. This outcome is not a result of Maimane’s failure, but of White DA obstructionists and underminers trying to torpedo the party’s unity, potential and growth, and to make Maimane the scapegoat for everything that is wrong in the DA.12,22,36

Maimane, to make the DA a viable and sustainable party, undoubtedly tried in the past and is trying presently to challenge the upholding of White privilege and empowerment inside the DA’s structure, although not always openly and with the aggression so characteristic of persons such as Julius Malema, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma. He is starting to eye the shortcomings of the 1994 Dispensation, which was forced down on all Black South Africans. This intention is aimed at resettling the stagnant situation of the DA, coming from 1994. This gradual, but dramatic activation, Maimane handled and is still handling with grace. But it seems that there is not only outside the DA, but also inside the DA much dislike for his so-called “mild” approach to politics. Inside the DA both its left wing (Blacks) and its right wing (Whites) reflect hostility: the Blacks feel that his efforts to reform the DA are political diminutives while the Whites see his reforms as a threat to their “citizens’ rights” and this is in line with the so-called “discrimination” they have experienced since 1994 under the ANC. This “confused and projected anger” by the DA’s opposing groups seemingly activated their decision not to vote for the DA in the May 2019 election (470 396), but instead voted either for the FF+ (mostly Whites) and the ANC (mostly Blacks).12,24

The fact that the DA was doing to a certain extent better on the provincial level than on the national level has nothing to do with the leadership of Maimane, as some journalists tried to reflect. In declaring this tendency they must first look at the intention of the DA to go firstly for the provincial and municipality levels, before they aim for the national level. The differentiation in votes on national and provincial levels — wherein the DA did less well on the national level than on the provincial level and where the poor national outcome is blamed on Maimane as leader, is far fetched. The truth lies in the fact that two different kind of leaders were standing for the DA and two different political setups present for the DA in the recent elections. Kotze24 puts this misleading by mischief of political commentators to “label” Maimane a poor leader in terms of the post 2019 elections results in perspective when he writes24:11: “DA supporters might have voted for the party at provincial level and for someone else at national level.”

What most of the critics of Maimane ignore in their constant attacks on his “poor” leadership, is their own faulty mindsets, which became contaminated by the ANC top brass’ character and leadership and what is meant by a “poor” and “good” leader. Prominent here is some of the ANC leaders’ alleged involvement with stealing, bribery, corruption, state capture, mismanagement, nepotism, crookery, self-enrichment, hostile and aggressive behaviour against anyone opposing their actions and murder, etc., which have it seems become “accepted” and “correct” characteristics of the present-day leadership politics (the so-called “good” leaders) of South Africa. These are delinquent leaders, many of which would be locked up in other so-called “democracies” and indeed would end their lives before a firing squad in China or North Korea if they committed the same crimes there. The intense moral and political degeneration of the executive leadership of South Africa since 1994 wherein the “bad” instead of the “good” became the criteria, is confirmed by the election as parliamentarians and top brass leaders of the ANC with serious allegations against them to the sixth Parliament. Maimane, in this environment, stands out for his integrity, but at the same time, his extraordinary difference makes him a clear target for vicious attacks.24

3.2.1.3.9.2. The who is who of Mmusi Maimane

Maimane comes from a totally different culture of moral cleanliness, leaving the impression indeed of Maimane as the reluctant politician in the present South African politics. This may be true to a certain extent, but this contaminated political setup undoubtedly also already caused other would-be-politicians of his moral quality and character to shy away, unwilling to get involved in such a political mess which seems incurable. But Pastor Maimane undoubtedly sees a call to provide an example of better quality than the political leadership examples of the ANC which the country’s citizens have been forced to endure since 1994. Undoubtedly, South Africans need him, as they needed the late Sir De Villiers Graaff as leader of the opposition to counter the political evils and actions of the leaders of the NP and the AB from 1948 to 1994. Maimane’s political maturity, vision, leadership, focused strategy and balanced planning for the country’s future, are not only found in his good upbringing and cultural lifestyle, his career as a reverend and years on the pulpit, but are also evident in his advanced studies and training in theology and psychology (he holds masters degrees in both disciplines). Furthermore, his mindset is free from the murderous contamination of the revolutionary setup and the disorder of grabbing and plundering which seems to have become a permanent fixture in many of the ANC’s top brass, especially those coming from pre-1994.12,24

Maimane’s leadership is undoubtedly not characterised by the so-called weakness and shortcomings, as Jason Lloyd24 has tried to reflect in his undermentioned writing on Maimane before the May 2019 election. It seems as though Lloyd has a limited understanding of quality executive leadership (outside that of the EFF and the BLF). He wrote in February 2019 without fact as follows24:35: “The Democratic Alliance (DA) has had a very incompetent and weak leader in Mmusi Maimane.”

In this context Lloyd continues24:35:

The DA is currently rudderless and without any useable ideas or policy to provide answers to the complex post-apartheid political, social and economic challenges.

The latest Ipsos opinion survey indicates that the DA will receive only 14% of votes in the upcoming elections – compared with 22.23% in 2014 – which is possible proof of Maimane’s inadequate leadership.

Maimane has also failed to command authority and respect from mainstream black political parties such as the ANC and the EFF. Worse, he has failed to maintain authority in the DA itself. Against this background, it is probably not difficult or unfair to conclude that this must be at least partly because Maimane is black.

It is very important to look in depth at Lloyd’s myth writing. When studying Lloyds’s article24:35: “The rise and fall of Mmusi Maimane,” it seems to be saturated with political subjectivity wherein White supremacy seems to have a strong founding and driving force. On what the characteristics are of the ideal executive political leader (here seemingly a Black one), there is a total lack of description to use to make comparisons. The only leadership guideline offered by Lloyd seems to be an indirect comparison of Maimane with Ramaphosa and Zuma, who both failed the test of the ideal executive political leader. To contradict Lloyd’s postulation that the DA would only receive 14% of the votes in the May election due to Maimane’s presence as leader, the DA received 20% with Maimane as leader! On the indirect assumtion that Ramaphosa as number one would save the ANC and would bring it a 70% vote outcome in the election, only an ANC outcome of 57.7% arrived! (This outcome that was far worse than that under Jacob Zuma in 2014!) To hint that the DA lost 2% or 470 396 votes in the election under Maimane, he missed that the ANC under their “wonder boy” and messianic leader Ramaphosa, shed three times more votes, namely 1 410 446 votes! So from whence did Lloyd’s condemning classification of Maimane as a poor leader come?1-8,21,56-62

With regard to the reference to the “command of the ANC’s leadership” by Lloyd24 — undoubtedly a hint by Lloyd24 of the presence of a “respected ANC leadership from 1994 to 2019”– which disrespects Maimane, is it important in the first place to point out that such a characteristic of goodness, activating respect to the outside world by the ANC top brass, was absolutely absent from 1994 to 2019. (Forget that he further speaks of a “respected” EFF leadership, as a comparison with that of Maimane. Such respect has not for one day been present in the EFF since its foundation, as was well reflected by the only 10% of voters who supported the EFF at the ballot box). With reference to the so-called absence of “ideas” of Maimane (and the DA) versus the assumed ideas of the ANC and the EFF on ruling, these ideas of the ANC are saturated in political opportunism, anarchy and revolution, while the present-day ideas of the ANC were already present in its terrorist days. Thus: when Lloyd remarked on a lack of credible leaders in the DA, the question is: who is credible in the ANC or the EFF? What are his criteria of credibility? Since 1994 the ruling party’s leaders had only one, including the credibility of Nelson Mandela, as a credible leader, and that was Motlanthe. Ramaphosa is now trying his best, but it seems that since 2017 that success is missing out on him. Where did the chaos in the ANC as a ruler start?: In 1994 with Mandela and the introduction of corruption by a sector of the ANC top brass that forced the late Nelson Mandela to pinpoint it when he was president. Just listen to the witnesses at the Zondo- and Mpati- (and the other) commissions now underway, to see that there are very few of the ANC top brass that are “clean” and who’s respect Maimane longs for. The complex post-1994 political, social and economic problems were created and are today still further created exclusively by the ANC elite, not the DA or Maimane. To measure or compare Maimane’s leadership in terms of the ANC’s or EFF’s sick leaderships is extreme foolishness.16,17,20,24,70,71

The accusation that Maimane “is not respected by the black parties such as the ANC and the EFF” is incorrect or better yet, it is political confusion as to what respect, leadership and politics, per se mean. Firstly, neither the ANC’s or the EFF’s leadership are a criteria of status for Maimane against which to evaluate his leadership, or for the public to evaluate Maimane. Maimane, in absolute contrast to many of the ANC top brass, is free from extra-marital affairs, stealing, state capture, murder or terrorism, etc. The article by Lloyd24 is, as is much of the critique against him, seemingly intended and designed to personally take on Maimane, specifically before the May election. Studying it critically, it seems to be driven and orchestrated by the intention of character assasination, instead of an honest personal and leadership evaluation. Undoubtedly before the election there was a well orchestrated intention to curb the power of Maimane and the DA, for fear of their positive impact on the then upcoming election by way of demoralising possible DA supporters. These kinds of “attacks” are well reflected before the election by the execution of reports such as “Cyril’s appeal prompts DA to lower its poll ambitions”, “ DA poll a setback to coalition ambitions”, “The rise and fall of Mmusi Maimane”, and “Cyril more popular than ANC – poll”. Another political cliché in the Afrikaanspress reads: “Mmusi Maimane is nie juis baie gewild onder DA-lede in Gauteng nie. Tog pryk sy foto op die meeste DA-straatplakkate in die provinsie.” Another one reads “’n netto syfer van [net] 19% [IRR-poll] van DA -lede het boonop aangedui Maimane kom die mas op as opposieleier.” 16,1720,24,69-71,73-75

It seems as though the intention of some of these critical anti-Maimane journalists (especially Whites), with specific advice that Whites must vote for the ANC and Ramaphosa instead of the DA and Maimane, is centred in White self-interest. Some of them are seemingly deeply politically confused (and highly frightened) by their own position in post-2019 South Africa. 16,17,20,24,69-71,73-74

With the criticism of Maimane as leader of the DA, it is clear that most of the fight is specifically because Maimane is Black and that the DA’s continuation must be stopped at all costs. The White Zilles and White Leons must come back to be the boss of the DA. These White supremacists seem to believe that there are still going to be 5 million Whites (more: even 30 million!!) living in South Africa in a century’s time and thus that Whites still have “to be catered for as extraordinary” at present (together with their White capital and traditional rights to drive and steer the DA) at their will. The reality is that the Whites, by their lack of breeding and natural dying out, will be between 10 000 and 30 000 left in a century’s time. Maimane knows this well and is in the process not only of bringing the mass of poor and landless Blacks a better life, but also to assure the Whites a part in the country’s future by his transformation of the ultra-White politics inside the DA to equality politics.16,17,20,24,69-71,73-76

It is true that in the South African voting context the personality of the leader counts sometimes more than his party’s policy and popularity. The intention with the “popular giant Ramaphosa” was to take the “dying” ANC in the election away from the brink of death. But Ramaphosa’s magic did not work, as evidenced by the ANC’s 57.7% in the May election. It must be remembered that Nelson Mandela, far more popular even than the so-called popularity of Ramaphosa, and his ANC party of 1994 could not get beyond 63% of the votes. Ramaphosa failed to make it higher than 57.7%. It is important to note that Ramaphosa’s popularity declined in three month’s time from 73% to only 58% in April 2019, losing 15% in weight. This 58% popularity of Ramaphosa seems to be in line with the 57.7% of votes which the ANC received in the election, making the Ramaphosa factor as an exclusive “election-power” basically zero. It also confirms and emphasises Motlanthe’s view that Ramaphosa is not a political or messianic leader, nor that he can improve an ailing ANC. The blind hero-position constantly awarded to Ramaphosa above Maimane in most of the anti-Maimane rhetoric, as well as the comparison of bad (Maimane) versus good (Ramaphosa), with the view that Ramaphosa is the messianic leader of South Africa, is the evidence that firstly, Ramaphosa is not such a gifted messianic leader, and secondly that his name will be remembered as outstanding in the South African political history. Maimane’s chances are excellent to become a formidable leader in the near future. The phrase: “In South Africa’s voting setup the personality of the leader counts sometimes more than his party’s policy and popularity”, can await Maimane in post-2019.70,77

To describe Maimane as24:35: “…inexperienced in politics, a reluctant political participant who has never really had a well-seasoned political strategy and vision, operating (like most clergymen) from a theological reference frame that has little or no space for other social influences” against the “credible modern technocrat Ramaphosa who is getting rid of the Zuma baggage and building a new ANC”, is nonsense. It reflects not only political “short-sightedness”, but the inability to read future politics. For a political commentator, this is a serious defect in his or her political dynamics. 24,76

In line with the above clichés or allegations of “poor leadership” around Maimane, is it not a surprise when RW Johnson12 also rates him low. But what is a surprise, is his personal attack, perhaps not so extreme as the one reflected by Lloyd. But what needs to be reported, is the religious foundation of the attack. It needs to be reflected, specifically because it can border on the introduction of religious intolerance in South Africa.12,24 Johnston writes12:4-5: “Die feit dat die 38-jarige Maimane jonk en onervare is, ‘n voormalige ANC-ondersteuner wat steeds in ANC-terme dink en ‘n prediker in ‘n fundamentalistiese kerk wat evolusie verwerp, het ook nie gehelp onder die DA se tradisionele liberale Engelse basis nie.” What on earth Maimane’s Christian religious preferences and church-affiliation in a Christian society, as well as a secular state, have to do which his leadership, without reflecting on it with the seeming intention of mischief, is totally unclear. Also the unasked “English contamination” in Maimane’s leadership is neither fish nor flesh. It seems to reflect back to Johnston’s long stay in Britain and the internalising of unfit cognition there which he now applies here. It only brings us back to one clear fact and that is how intensely the “Christian Black” Maimane is under attack, because he accepted the leadership of the till now exclusively pro-White DA.12,24

3.2.1.3.9.3. The good “Graaff characteristics” of Maimane

Maimane has the “Graaff characteristics” to pull the DA and the social democrats into the government of the day. Not so much immediately post-May 2019, but before the 2021 local elections. Maimane, similar to Sir de Villiers Graaff, is also one of the few top politician-gentlemen ever to sit in Parliament. Moreover, other than Graaff who could not bring down the despotic NP in his life, Maimane and his political grouping can be successful in bringing down the ANC.24,78-82

To bring the (poor) leadership of Maimane in line with the DA’s (poor) performance in the past election, as done by many political analysts in the postmortem of the May elections, is absolutely unscientific and nothing but mischief-making speculation. The chair of the DA’s Fedex, Athol Trollip, explains that the reason that the ANC won the election over the DA with 57.5% versus 20%, is the fact that the South Africans will vote ANC come hell or high water. It is seated in the revolutionary background of the ANC. The DA is still a White party for them, hostile to Black interests. The fault is not with the DA, requiring them to soul-search with regard to their performance under Maimane and their future in post-2019 politics, but with these South Africans who support the ANC and who blindly vote for such a corrupt bunch and who are prepared to accept mediocrity and maladministration over and over. Closely aligned herewith is the outdated Apartheid ticket which is still used by the hypocratic ANC who swims together with radicals such as the EFF in a tide of racial nationalism and populism. With regard to the critique that the DA under Maimane did not made inroads for instance in the Eastern Cape with only a 15% voter outcome, it is clear that none of the other parties made an inroad there either. Indeed, the DA increased its votes in Soweto from 5% to 13%. The DA under Maimane is still the second largest party, twice the size of the EFF.28,83

On the foolish efforts and suggestions of the removal of Maimane, various political commentators and analysts, such as Sefara86, Nyuatsamba32, Beukman3,84 and Essop85 are much more direct when guiding us than most political commentators, who are used to sit on two chairs. Their statements are uniform: he must stay on.3,84-86

Firstly, Sefara86 reflects on the loss in votes for the DA in the recent election, by showing that, as many other commentators have already indicated, it was to a great extent indeed a direct outcome after Mainane started to draw the line on greater Black empowerment in the DA that some right-wingers fled to the FF+. There is indeed an incomplete spelling out of strong affirmative action and the land ownership matter in the DA. But Maimane’s activation of a clear policy on land ownership and speaking out as a Black on the DA’s critical affairs was limited by the right-wing in the DA. Their internal mischief in the DA’s racial politics led to the flow of right-wing Whites to the FF+ (±150 000 votes) and not Maimane’s inability as leader. The public missed that the right-wingers assured that Maimane was not fully in charge of the DA’s leadership and the party’s politics, to be able to take much needed significant and sometimes dramatic decisions on Black interests. This was an identity crisis which the DA, as well as Maimane, innocently as the new appointed head, ran into before the May election, costing the DA both Black and White voters.

Secondly, pinpointing this present crisis wherein the DA is still functioning two months after the election, Sefara writes86:26: “And therein lies the DA’s existential question: will the removal of Maimane and his replacement by a white leader help the DA grow beyond 22% in the next polls? Is the loss of conservative white voters to the FF+ a necessary catharsis for the DA to start positioning itself as a genuine alternative – not a party of right-wingers with a black leader at the top?

Sefara86 and Beukman3,84 are fully correct in their opinion that to remove Maimane, without firstly addressing the DA’s policy incoherence, will hurt the DA and can spell its end. It will be a statement of impatience with its first Black leader, as well as the reflection of an unchangeable White party and a party which lacks internal dynamics, either as an opposition or as a ruler, to be able to constructively change South Africa. Maimane, for Sefara86 as for Beukman3,84 and Essop85, must be retained as the party’s top leader with the full power to reposition the party further and where necessary, dramatically. He must be allowed to unrestrictedly sell his vision to the broad public.3,84-86

On Maimane in future politics, Beukman3,84 contends that he is not long in the post and was forced to address the immense growing pains of the last five years. He is not a light-weight and learned a lot and is clearly focused not only on making the DA a better party, but also contributing to a better post-2019 South Africa. Beukman concludes84:11: “Baie meer ervare leiers wêreldwyd het al slegter as hy daarvan afgekom.”

Thombothi87 puts his finger possibly best on Pastor Mmusi Maimane’s leadership dilemma in South African society, where since 1994, bad became gradually intertwined with good to overwhelm it fully in the end, making bad ultimately good. Secondly, bad became the norm. The phasing out of the traditional bi-polar division of good versus bad lead to the evaluation of all behaviour in terms of the grading of bad, worse and worst, with bad the most reflected and acceptable behaviour. On Maimane’s leadership dilemma, he was caught up in this normalised bad culture of the South African politics wherein corruption, theft, murder and specifically land expropriation without compensation, are central and have became the rule of the day. Thombothi writes87:11: “Maybe Mmusi Maimane, in his opposition to expropriation, was judged not to have been sufficiently gung-ho. But Maimane is a pastor. He can’t preach compassion on Sunday and hatred every other day. He also doesn’t seem to have a nasty bone in his body, which appears to be a prerequisite in politics these days. Slaan terug would not sit well in his studio.”

But, it must be emphasised, this dilemma is not unique to Maimane as leader of the DA. It is also part of the dilemma of the DA as a centrist party, which cannot reflect hatred to one of its factions while at the same time bathing another faction in compassion. Not the best and most god-begging prayer can really help Maimane or his DA in this dilemma. Thankfully we have still the Solomon wisdom approach to cognitively handle our immediate crises in the New Dawn South Africa, until goodness is reborn somewhere in the future.

3.2.1.3.10. Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018

The count awarded to the DA and its leadership in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, is 59 (72%) out of a possible maximum of 82. 3,79

Our initial decision to allow the application of the DA onto the list to be considered as a possible candidate to be able to rule South Africa after the 8th May 2019 was correct and appropriate. Its application qualifies to be allowed onto the shortlist of candidates.

5. Conclusions

Looking in retrospect at the DA’s political history, it is clear that millions of South Africans have seen their communities improved under the DA’s good governance. They have also watched the DA take up the fight in Parliament and hold the ANC government to account for every community which has had their rights denied by the ANC government. The people have appreciated the DA’s fight for justice.

The DA and its leaders’ overall evaluation shows that they are still short of 23 (28%) points out of a possible 82 to be the ideal candidate for appointment as the capable ruler to execute land redistribution. Although their CV shows that their qualifications are excellent and comprehensively obtained from top accredited institutions, and their attestations show that they are trustworthy, with immense integrity and that their leader, Mmusi Maimane, has the character and overall potential to run as president of the land, are there shortcomings in their experience due to their youth in politics. Important here is their lack of experience on land reform – and specifically on land expropriation without compensation. Where the issue of the land matter emerges in the DA’s politics, it seems to be determined and driven by White interests, rather than the interests of the poor and landless Blacks. There seems here to be strong signs of a White-stan mentality, very much like the dreadful Bantustans which were run from the Cape Parliament by the National Party and its Afrikaner nationalists.21,57-62,79-91

The critics’ mention of the country having been poorly served on the land ownership matter by the DA and that the party over the past two to three years has frequently stumbled is true. This allowed the ANC a free pass again in the May elections to without obstruction redeliver its past mischief up to 2024. The critics’ view is that the DA’s inclination to oppose the government by any means in some instances stopped progress in the country. The issue of land expropriation, with or without compensation, is an inappropriate fight by the DA. The failure by the DA to write a mandate to serve the citizens of South Africa on just and balanced land ownership within a democratic plan for instance with the ANC as a partner, has lead to the present conflict around land ownership and the possibility of immediate land expropriation that can spell land grabbing and revolution.

The DA must take some advice and criticism to heart: South Africans are looking for a change in a social, economic and political direction, not just public relations branding or window-dressing. In this hopefully new direction, the DA must not mind about its right flank streaming to the confused FF+, which since 1994 has been travelling in circles in the desert, or that its left flank is running to a temporary revitalized ANC, which is trying hard to climb back from its deathbed. There are enough good people at the centre — people who can go nowhere else and who do not want to go anywhere else — to change and to build up the DA.

It is time for the DA to accept that the landownership matter has been exaggerated for a long time by the ±35 000 White farmers (of which only between 5 000 and 7 000 really contribute to the country’s essential daily food supply). The opportunistic group of the rest of the ±30 000 White farmers, with their self-appointed White rescuers and saviours, represent less than 0.1% of the total South African population and less than 1% of the White population. If the mesmerised White sympathisers with the White rescuers and saviours movement are taken into account, the number is far lower than 300 000 of the White population of 5 million, representing at most 6%. It is time for the DA to purify itself from this 300 000 White individuals’ contamination. They must be repositioned to where they belong: outside the DA. The other nearly 5-million Whites also have citizen-interests but are sidelined and ignored outside the 35 000 White farmers’ priority-interests. This priority granted to 35 000 White farmers and there land led also to the ignoring of the interests of nearly 30-million poor and landless Blacks in the post-1994 Democracy. It just can go on this way.4-8

Although the DA was allowed onto the shortlist of candidates, it needs still 28% (a lack of nearly 30%) to reach the maximum points of 100% for the final evaluation of the next national election in 2024. It is up to the DA to improve its experience and know-how, and to reposition its attestations to reach the 100% mark. A clear policy on land redistribution must be formulated. The ability to effect land redistribution with justice and balance needs to be improved by the DA.

In this context the DA must take note of three important facts. First the words of Mthombothi’s8 when he said many South Africans are not particularly impressed or satisfied with the present political parties and that they, after 25 years of democracy, are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable. The second is the fact that 18.2-million potential voters (51% of the total voters’ population) stayed away from the ballot box in the 8th May 2019 elections.4-8 They are waiting and hungry to support and to vote for the correct party. The third, enclosing to the second fact, is that most South Africans are looking sincere for that extraordinary party of goodness, as Mthombothi said8:19: “regardless of race, want the same thing – a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for themselves and their families. They’ll support a party with a unifying message that will make a genuine stab at it. Time may have come for a new party that will inspire fresh hope in a disillusioned electorate.” Why can this party not be the reformed DA?

Maimane can be just too optimistic about the future soul of the DA when he said92:4: “We must occupy the centre. We cannot pursue the left or the right. This election has confirmed more than ever that the centre is where we need to be. We just need to be clearer about who we are and what we are about.” But to be the future ruler it goes far beyond the centre of politics in present-day South Africa. It requires an understanding of existential politics to can make sense of centric politics. It goes thus far beyond left or right politics versus central politics. It is about the life-long permanent fused-in of Black and White conflict-politics, like the issue of land-grabbing and -terrorism coming from 1671. It means far more than just the practice of adapt or die politics to can survive for a party. It can mean the “killing” of a nation’s personality.

In its present form the DA does not exhibit the ability to be able immediately to affect successfully land reform on its own. It has the potential to do it with an experienced and seasoned political partner, within an orderly framework. Otherwise it must change itself immediately to a basically new party; one that can, as a dynamic party, brings at last the peace, security and prosperity for what South Africans are longing for so much

The journey to the 2024 elections for the DA may be easy, but it can also never be reached without an immediate and dramatic turnaround in its politics. Time will tell.

6. References

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa. (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanisation and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan or Khois (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Badness, candidate, crookedness, delinquency, election, evaluation, expropriate, goodness, leadership, political party, responsibility, scenario, wrong-doings,

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 3

1. Background

1.1.   Introduction

It is clear from studying the previous two continuous articles (Articles 7 and 8) that myths and lies played an enormous role in misinforming the mindsets of South Africans on the intended land expropriation and the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution. Prominent in this environment of misinformation are the promises during the May 8, 2019 election of the various political parties contesting the place of the utmost ruler for post-2019. Of great importance here are the promises of the three top political parties which emerged from the election on how they are going to address the land expropriation issue — including how they are going to “solve” the many other demanding political, social and economic issues in post-2019 South Africa. But, as the political history of South Africa, coming from as far back as 1652, tells us over and over, there is a massive difference between promises and deeds, especially good deeds. These deeds are required from the voters in exchange for their mandate to the ruler to “think and do” upon their behalf, and the empty promises of politicians and their parties.1

1.1.1 Lack of understanding of political responsibility by political parties and their leaders

The abovementioned outcome is basically because political parties in present-day South Africa do not understand the immense responsibility around the local-global-plan of governance. Every task entrusted to the executive political leader, his top brass and his party as a government, should be successfully executed by him in terms of the voters’ mandate to be a good leader, as well as for the country to be able to fit into the local-global plan of governance. As a pre-requisite included here is the guarantee to be able to be trusted by the voters to deliver only goodness and goodwill to them in the future. Malloch-Brown2 emphasises that South Africa’s invidious local-global prescriptions for good governance will not go away, and neither will the demand for positive change. It is a hard task to master for a political party cum regime, as it always tests the actions of a regime and the correctness of the state by its society. Even the honourable Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma3 during his presidency had to admit in public that it was far more difficult for him as president and the ANC as a regime to run South Africa, than it was for them to fight for its freedom. He failed to deliver such a mandate as leader of an elected regime, which was forced suddenly to act outside the setup of the revolutionaries’ rhetoric, promises and delinquent actions.2,3

This disconnection of the ANC from the voters, allowing them as a regime to act delinquently outside their election promises and their agreed mandate from the voters to only do good to them, is to a great extent cemented in the present corrupt Electoral Act which fully erased direct responsibility to the voters from MPs and MPLs. In this situation, which the ANC fully optimised and misused only for its top brass’ interest, the response and responsibility of MPs and MPLs were relayed only to the party and its top brass, while the top brass drove their own interests far away from that of the voters’ interests, needs and wishes.4-10

There is at the moment a legal action to change the Act in order to make MPs and MPLs directly responsible to voters. This will be the end of the favouring of the ANC to be able to manipulate the voters and to continue their spree of crooked candidates without a say by the ordinary people. Moreover, the indication is that this can bring the ANC down in the next election, if it has not fallen on its own sword already after the May election.4-10

The extent to which the ANC failed the voters was exclusively as a result of serious wrong-doing due to a lack of direct responsibility to the voters. This was not only confirmed by the public admission thereof before the May 9 Election by its top brass, but also the “begging” at the same time by the ANC’s top brass (including Cyril Ramaphosa) for “forgiveness” of the ANC as a party and its leadership, for its crookedness and delinquency since 1994.11-16

Ramphosa even extended his previous begging for forgiveness to the ANC supporters by his admission again after the election to these many ANC-wrong-doings. Prominent here is his confession, seemingly after immense emotional self-torture, of which Munusamy writes17:20:

Ramaphosa arrived at the election results ceremony [of the May 8 election] last Saturday looking like his dog had died rather than the person who had just rescued his party from having to share power in order to govern. But at the ANC’s victory celebration outside Luthuli House the next day, Ramaphosa conceded that the party had been chastened. He promised that the ANC was no longer an arrogant party and had heard the candid message from the electorate.

With honesty it must be acknowledged that the above kinds of political, social and economic failures of the ANC are inherited from most of the South African regimes coming from 1910. We see it in the failures of the various White political parties’ and party-alliances’ reigns between 1910 and 1948, wherein the Blacks’ interests were not only insignificant but criminally treated, equalling the mass wrong-doings of the post-1994 regime of the ANC. The same delinquency and failure were reflected by the DF Malan regime between 1948 and 1950. This period reflects, as does that of the ANC, that the National Party did not have the slightest idea of good governance, besides political mischief in their creation of the post-1950 Apartheid and its immense evils.1

The South African politics inside the post-1994’s so-called First Democracy has been tough on political aspirants and opportunists at the same time (and thus not only on the ANC in highlighting its faults, as well as its inabilities to not be able to survive in troubled situations). This is reflected by the failed outcomes and disappearance of the many political parties that had enrolled for the recent May election in their fight for a place in Parliament. Mvumvu reports18:1: “A record number of political parties contested the elections, but at the end it was the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that smiled all the way to the bank. Of 48 parties that appeared on the national ballot, only 13 will likely see a return on their investment of R200,000, which the IEC requires to register for elections nationally.”

1.1.2. The madness of 48 political parties and 10 000 candidates in the 8th May 2019 National Election

Firstly, it must be noted that for the May election 48 parties were registered, with more than 10 000 national candidates (2 089 in 2014) and 8 000 provincial candidates (6 562 in 2014). All of the 48 parties and the 10 000 national candidates had more than offered to solve the land debacle: they promised solely to solve it if they were elected as the regime. Of these 48 aspirants, as many as 35 failed the test to obtain a seat in the national elections, while of the 13 left as the so-called “winners”, basically only three can be given attention. The three are the ANC, the DA and the EFF.10  

With regard to the more or less 10 insignificant parties which made it to Parliament, together with the ANC, the DA and the EFF, political commentator Tabane19 gave us a good pre-evaluation already in February 2019 (three months before the May election), based on his “charismatic requirement of the leadership” of a party to be able to survive, when he wrote19:1:

Derhalwe sal die 2019-verkiesing waarskynlik die doodsklok vir Azapo, die PAC en Agang lui omdat hulle nie charismatiese leiers het nie. Maar Mosiuoa Lekota se Cope, wat eintlik op sy sterfbed moet wees weens gebrekkige organisaie, sal waarskynlik bloot weens Lekota se sterk persoonlikheid ‘n setel of twee behou. Good sal ook baat vind by die blote teenwoordigheid van sy leier, De Lille. Haar naam en vorige pos as burgemeester van Kaapstad sal verseker dat Good ‘n klein teenwoordigheid in die Wes-Kaap en dalk Gauteng en Noord-Kaap sal hê.

The political analyst Muzi Kuzwayo20 writes hereto in April 2019 on Paricia de Lille’s politics, up to her present-day party, named Good20:2: “She first cashed in a few years after she started, her party defunct and moving over to the DA and becoming mayor of Cape Town in return – good deal. Who knows what loot Good will bring her.”

Botha21, in January 2019, wrote on the UDM and its charismatic leader Bantu Holomisa. Botha21 reflects that Holomisa played a prominent role in exposing the alleged corruption in the PIC and was indirectly responsible for the exit of its executive, Dan Matjila. Botha’s21 gut feeling in January was that Holomisa would still play a role in Parliament after May. He postulates21:18:

“Holomisa se integriteit maak van hom ‘n blywende figuur. Hou hom dop.”

Holomisa’s and the UDM’s chances were critically analysed before the May election, due to their popularity within the Xhosa-tribe. It was surmised that they were good to win a seat, or mostly two, in Parliament. The pre-May view was that the Minority Front (MF) which was founded by the late Amichand Rajbansi, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IVP), the Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus), the National Freedom Party (NFP) and the ACDP were all insignificant with regard to gaining a prominent number of seats. They are on their deathbeds.21-23

On the FF Plus’s political future as an entity in Black South Africa, Khumalo24 in April 2019 quoted with good reason the opinion of the BLF leader, Andile Mngxitama24:4:

“You should look at their leadership and tell me if there is any diversity. That party only uses a few black stooges to belie the fact that it is still a racist Afrikaans party. Look at the party’s history: leaders from the former Conservative Party, a party that wished to preserve many aspects of apartheid in its DNA, were assimilated into the FF Plus…”

The false image created by the FF+ as a possible future role-player in the country’s politics by its taking of the fifth-most seats in the National Assembly in the May 2019 election, mostly from the DA, was a temporary outcome of the old NPs “rebellion votes”. This group was until now part of the DA supporters, but had become aggravated by “black rule” inside the DA, and decided to vote for the FF+. Hereto is the FF+ for many political strategists nothing more than a false mirage on the horizon for these old NPs as their new rescuer and saviour. The FF+, as is the EFF, extremely racially orientated, making it a post-2019 failure in waiting.24-25

That Andile Mngxitama’s viewpoint on the FF+ may be correct, is confirmed by Buccus’s view. He writes26:26: “

It is true that the crude racial populism of the EFF and the Freedom Front Plus made some gains, but in the overall picture they remain a minority. Mandela’s vision of racial reconciliation clearly still has the support of the majority of South Africans.”

What the boosters and hopefuls of the FF+ forget, or are not familiar with, is that the Whites as a tribe are diminishing yearly at nearly 100 000, and can thus be phased out in a century’s time. Neither the FF+, Solidarity, AfriForum nor AgriSA are true White rescuers and saviours. They can only by their anti-African standpoint (as seen in their actions on the land reform matter), contaminate the Whites’ future in South Africa.1

To shed more light on the many other opportunists who tried in vain to go to Parliament to eat out of its enormous food trough (and also to change silently and unnoticed from tough freedom fighters to freedom eaters) – a scenario which Kuzwayo20:2 aptly described before the May 8 election as an “alphabet soup on the menu in this election” — there are the African Transformation Movement (ATM) with the crowd-puller Mzwanele Manyi on its staff, the joker party the African Content Movement (ACM) of Hlaudi Motsoeneng, and the Economic Emanicipation Forum  (EEF) to outdo the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in radicalism and racism.20,27,28

The final reflection on the May 8 election outcomes confirm Kuzwayo’s20 above reference to the alphabetic failure of a mass with the evidence that 35 parties did not make it further than the ballot box on the voting day.18,29

Munusamy30 also comments about the final end-results of some of the parties when she writes30:26:

“The era of veteran personalities in politics is now waning. The UDM leader Bantu Holomisa, COPE’s Mosiuoa Lekota and the IFP’s Mangosuthu Buthelezi ought to exit the political stage, as the country is clearly seeking fresh talent. Patricia de Lille, however, has proved to be the Meryl Streep of South African politics, able to steal the show in whatever role she appears.”

Okoye31 brings the leader of the African Content Movement (ACM), Hlaudi Motsoeneng, the former SABC Chief Operating Officer, into clear perspective after the May election as a good example of some of the “political leaderships” at our top governmental institutions under the ANC, and of the leaderships of the various political parties which competed in the election (mostly to fail miserably). On Motsoeneng’s so-called “personality as a leader”, Okoye31 reports his alleged words about himself31:6: “He said he refused to hide the fact that he wanted to be president and that leadership was in his blood.” In particular, she quoted his self-praise by using of his own words, namely31:6: “I need to be a person who’s taking decisions. I know how to run South Africa! I have managed a [multimillion-rand] company.” [This of a multimillion-rand company referring to the financially crippled public broadcaster the SABC, which analysts say he helped to run into the ground]. In reaction to Motsoeneng praising himself as the “future president in waiting”, the two political analysts Zamikhaya Maseti and Ralph Mathekga, writes Okoye, labelled him as a31:6:  “political comedy that was not to be taken seriously”, that there was “no legitimate cause to appeal,” and that he “bankrupted the SABC” so it was a bad example to refer to his leadership there.”

But this “labelling” must not be seen as exclusive only to Motsoeneng, but indeed inclusive to most of the leaders of the 48 parties that took part in the election and their self-praise of false excellence31:6:  “I am a person who’s taking decisions, I know how to run South Africa, I have managed a multimillion-rand company, I have leadership in my blood, I want and am going to be the president.”

It is thus with good reason that Ben Trovato32 could write to the leaders, at least, of these manifold failed parties, as follows32:14: “Dear leaders of the 34 parties that never won a seat, it really is a crying shame that you did so poorly. Let me put that another way. I am crying with laughter at your shame. I do apologise”, and: “How can anyone be filled with so much hubris that they misjudge their popularity this badly?”

But Trovato’s32 above comment of “no-good” for the 34 “losers” is even applicable to the 13 “winners” that have made it to Parliament. This includes the ANC and the three nearest winners to the ANC. The question is: Are these 13 winners truly deserving winners with the potential to better South Africans’ poor, even desperate, circumstances, as well as to solve the land-ownership conflict?15,32

The answer is an emphatic NO, when just looking at the top winner’s most recent classification by the imminent ex-president Kgalema Motlanthe12, namely that the ANC is on its deathbed. Motlanthe12 (the Interim President from September 2008 to May 2009 and also Secretary-General of the ANC from 1997 to 2007 and the party’s Deputy President from 2007 to 2012), says that the ANC is now in a far worse shape than it was before the 2017 Nasrec Conference, that elected Cyril Ramaphosa. This view was confirmed by the poor performance of the ANC in the May election.11,12,14,15

This is an opinion echoed by many political analysts.11,14,15 Motlanthe12 comments on the ANC’s  doubtful future, specifically its viability and sustainability, when he says12:4: “The ANC is not in great shape… I think to strengthen the ANC it needs a surgical overhaul from where it is now. It is worse than it was in 2017 [before the Nasrec Conference]”, and: “…that [the] ANC could only change if it died in its current form and was reborn as a grassroots movement”.

1.1.3. The presence of an able political party to successfully steer the land reform initiative

The abovementioned outcome moves me to ask again, as in the Conclusion of the previous Article 8, the prominent question as to whether there is at the moment any capable South African political party, which, either as a sole ruling party or as a partner-party in an alliance, can steer the initiative of land expropriation into the near future with success.

This is a very complex question to answer, but the political analyst Mamokgethi Molopyane33 tries to do so for us, in some way at least, when he writes that the three main political parties, the ANC, the DA and the EFF, were all, after the election, left at a crossroads. In this context the two lower ranking parties, the IFP and the FF+, are ignored: their immediate future in the country’s politics, as significant parties, is zero).24-26,33                                                                                                                                                                          All three of the main parties were unmasked to have immense political weaknesses by the election. Prominent in this regard is their arrogance and their foolishness, as reflected by their thinking that they could in the past and still today solely think on behalf of the population and that this thinking was 100 percent correct. In particular in this chaotic setup is their disconnection from the people whom they assumed supported their ideologies and actions. Pertinent here in their confusion, is the matter of extreme land expropriation without compensation and the negative racial context thereof by land grabbing and nationalising of White assets.33

The above postulation of Molopyane33 is in line with the general postulations of various other political analysts and strategists that were quoted earlier, especially the ANC’s troubled position.11,12,14,15

In reflecting on the three main political parties and their possible failure to fulfil to the standards to be a ruler of quality versus the poor status and condition of their present political constitution, Molopyane33 gives further good insight. He writes as follows33:21: “The coinciding decline of the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), contrasted with the below-expectations growth of the Economic Freedom Fighters EFF), are unsurprising developments with far-reaching, unique consequences for each.”

Molopyane33 pinpoints a stern warning when he writes33:21: “Political parties must adapt or reinvent themselves or they’ll find little or no support from SA’s dynamic populance.”

This undoubtedly puts my question: “…are there able South African political parties who can fast steer the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future?”  into the foreground. This is a question that not the ANC, the DA or the EFF can escape and must answer themselves. Not one of them honestly can or will do so, however. It is up to the political analysts, strategists and commentators to do it on their behalves, however much they like it or not.

In this context of doubt on the future abilities specific to the ANC as the post-2019 ruler, Molopyane posits33:21:

“The ANC’s support is waning. It’s proving to be devoid of freshness, with leaders who have been in politics for so long they may be reluctant to envision change. The party must undergo a makeover of its leaders and change the perceptions they’ve created. If a credible, attractive opposition emerged, its hold on power would fail. Its biggest hurdle is itself.”

On the DA he writes33:21:

“These elections have shown that having a black man in charge doesn’t translate into resonance with black voters. The DA’s crisis may not be as apparent as that of the ANC, but it’s similarly struggling to contemplate change. Worse, it’s riddled with the fear that it might alienate its white supporters.”

With reference to the EFF, Molopyane postulates33:21:

“We tend to forget the enthusiasm and political cult of youth doesn’t offer value for voters. Populism in the age of social media doesn’t mean the same in real life. The election showed that the red party will have to come up with a new approach. Its change in direction must reflect the challenges faced by a society in an ever-changing globalised economy. Although appearing to make the right noises, voters denied the EFF that 15%. Was it a case of dislike, distrust or low turnout?”

This clear warning by Molopyane33 of the possible diminishing from the political scene in the near future by even the three top “winners” of the recent May election, must not be taken lightly and must be read with Louw’s1 opinion that manipulating and under-performing regimes had only the slightest idea of what they were doing and what the outcome of their political self-empowerment would activate in the end for themselves, as well as for the country they ruled. He writes that these sub-standard regimes’ shelf life is limited. This is confirmed by the various European Empire states of the 20th Century, which mostly collapsed due to their wrong-doings after the duration of an average 45 years. Hereto the corrupt and racial-discriminative NP and its nationalist Afrikaners’ self-styled “mini-empire of multi-nations” (or the unofficially managed “NP Union”) only lasted from 1948 to 1961 (13 years), and their “mini-empire for multi-states” (Republic) from 1961 to 1994 (33 years), while the Union of South Africa (exclusively British-orientated under pro-British Whites), lasted from 1910 to 1948 (38 years). This reflects an average of 24 years for the three regimes in office.1,33

On the limiting-build-in to the reigning of political parties in South Africa, especially in terms of Louw’s1 reference to a maximum period of 24 years in office, Mthombothi34 also speaks in the same context when he, in a short post-mortem of the May 8 2019 election, refers to the “possible limited” status of the ANC in the present-day and future politics of the country after a 25 year reign. His overview and insight need full reference. He comprehensively writes34:19:

The outcome of the elections will be debated and analysed for some time to come, but what is clear is that many South Africans were not particularly impressed or satisfied with what was on offer. After 25 years of democracy, many voters are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they’re comfortable.

There is general disillusionment with the political establishment that seems to cut across all age groups. This seems to be mainly related to, or caused by, the government party. In fact the decline in voter turnout, and even the increasing number of people who failed to register to vote, seems to be in line with the steady decrease in ANC support. The ANC reached its apogee in the 2004 elections when it took 69.7% of the vote, and has been declining since. So has overall voter turnout.

There’s no doubt that the ANC is on a downward slope, even a death spiral. It’s on life support. That 57.5% share of the vote it won could be deceptive. Many gave their vote grudgingly. The only thing keeping the party together and alive is power. President Cyril Ramaphosa saved its bacon in these elections. It could have been condemned to the opposition benches. It’s not clear if there is anything that the ANC can do to stem the tide or reverse it. It seems to have overstayed its welcome. Most liberation movements, in Africa especially, do not survive in power for more than 25 years; unless they declare a one-party dictatorship to save their skins, as in Zimbabwe. The ANC is also hobbled by the fact that it is a broad church, and with its alliance partners it becomes truly ungovernable. Such an approach served it well as a liberation movement, but as a government it needs to be specific in its policy direction.

And of course there’s the corruption en grande that has pitted the pro- and anti-Zuma factions against each other. That, one suspects, is going to be the story of the next five years.

Were the ANC to be judged on its performance, which has been abysmal, even hideous in some instances, it would have been consigned to the political wilderness long ago. Our unique history, the race issue and the poverty of opposition have been its saving grace.

SA, given its past, is not always an easy country to govern. But most people, regardless of race, want the same thing – a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for themselves and their families. They’ll support a party with a unifying message that will make a genuine stab at it.

The time may have come for a new party that will inspire fresh hope in a disillusioned electorate.

Practically speaking, the reigning ANC is a dying party; all the fatal signs are there. It seems to have become suddenly suicidal after 25 years in power. It does not matter if the national voters’ turnout for the ANC in the May 2019 election was 70% or 80%, as Mthombothi34 and Louw1 put it. The ANC has lost its appeal with the mass of poor and landless Blacks. The Piet Promise of the NP became the Jacob Promise and the Cyril Promise of the ANC. Promises are not food, they lack trust and are contemptable.1,11,14,34,35

The above unstable setup makes it very hard to reflect precisely on how the ANC is going to handle the land expropriation matter from 2019 to the next election in 2024, and of course, if it is going to complete its term as mandated by the 2019 election. Here time will tell, but for this article the official status quo of the ANC as the regime until 2024 must be accepted and reflected upon. The cut-off date for the cooperation and the collection of information to evaluate and to discuss the land matter and the ANC as a regime’s role in it was chosen as the 31st May 2019.

But, in terms of the political upheaval inside the present-day ANC, it was decided to also focus on the EFF’s and the DA’s political agendas and actions, in case one of them became overnight the new ruler or a partner in an alliance of the governing regime. These two parties seem also to be caught in political upheavals and insecurity, rendering their inputs to the post-2019 politics open to scrunity.11,13,14,34,35  

The land expropriation issue, together with the question of the trustworthiness and the integrity of the three parties, not only to be able to govern the country effectively and properly, but also to  successfully execute a comprehensive and justified balanced land expropriation programme, is prominent here. Some political analysts believe that where the DA successfully resists radical politics, its ultra-conservative land reform policy is a loser for the mass of poor and landless Blacks. They believe that both the EFF and the ANC show revolutionary thinking on the assets of the White population, while the ANC furthermore has shown an absolute lack in integrity and trustworthiness in its 25 years of rule. These views will be evaluated further hereunder.26,30,33,34,36

1.1.4. Aims of Articles 9 to 11

Articles 9 to11 form part of the research project on the matter of land expropriation, which was already introduced to the reader by eight previously published articles.

This article [Article 9, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)”], is the Part 1 (reflecting on the EFF) of three articles on the roles played by the three main political parties in the politics of South Africa. The theoretical point of focus here is their capability to be effective regimes in South Africa, if certain limitations, such as voters’ ignorance and prejudice, etc. on politics and confusion with regard to their right to empowerment, do not play a role. In this article the focus is specifically on the EFF.

In the next two sequential articles (Articles 10 and 11) the focus will be respectively on the DA and the ANC. Article 10 represents: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2- The DA in perspective (10)”. Article 11 represents: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3- The ANC in perspective (11)”.

Although the ANC won the right to be the country’s ruler until 2024 with a national majority of 57.7% for a sixth term, and thus seems to be going to be the sole executor to effect land expropriation in terms of its promises made in its political manifesto (its so-called “political CV”) presented for the May 8, 2019 election on land expropriation (which seemingly can include expropriation without compensation in certain appropriate cases), is it an absolute pre-requisite to also reflect on the two strongest opposition parties’ political manifestos for the May 8, 2019 election regarding their promises and abilities to effect land expropriation successfully. The intention here is to see how these two opposition parties (the EFF and the DA) can theoretically be evaluated as good versus bad regimes, should they have won the ruler’s throne in the May 2019 election. This approach will also give a preview of their potential as good versus bad opposition parties on the land expropriation matter, specifically for the period up to 2024).1,11,14,34,35

Closely aligned to these political manifestos (or “political CVs”) in the description of the three parties’ “political characters, qualifications and experience”, are the public’s arguments, opinions and viewpoints as a further descriptive guide to the three parties’ “political characters and potential”. These public arguments, opinions and viewpoints are best reflected by the reporting by investigative and informative journalists, as well as political analysts, strategists, commentators and critics (the so-called “political letter referees or their attestations”). These mentioned “letters of the referees” are seen by many political scientists as the most (and only) decisive guide to be used for the true description of a political party’s and its leaders’ quality and integrity. They are seen as far more trustworthy than the so-called “trust for the party” brought out by the voters at the ballot-box, or as the election manifestos issued by political parties.

The aim of this article is to evaluate the potential of the EFF in terms of its theoretical capability to be an effective regime.

2. Method

The research was been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case with ownership of South African soil for the period 1652 to 2018. The sources included articles from 2018 to 2019, books for the period 1980 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide and steer us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the EFF as a ruler of South Africa to be able to successfully effect land reform from 2019.

The research findings are presented in a narrative format.

3. Results

3.1. Overview

The successful execution of the post-2019 land reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and action of a so-called “good” government. Such an elected government is not allowed to blindly travel a path of trying to come to reach an end-result, but is obliged to use the existing, well-guided informative guidelines and drivers to steer the land reform aims into reality. These existing informative guidelines and drivers, to steer land reform post-2019, will be reflected upon in the following Subdivision 3.2.

3.2. Existing informative guidelines and drivers to steer land reform post-2019

The land expropriation initiative is not without a foundation. There are prominent informative guidelines and drivers to steer the whole process constructively and in an orderly fashion, far away from the blind “land grabbing from White colonists”, as propagated and promised by some political and racial radicals in their political manifestos. These existing informative guidelines and drivers need to be high-lighted.

3.2.1. The Freedom Charter is an indisputable marker and driver of the post-2019 land reform

The ANC’s Freedom Charter’s land clause, dated 1955 and the ANC’s Tanzania-document on future land ownership, issued in 1969, reflect, although indirectly, on the justified comparability and redistribution of land ownership in terms of the South African race-numbers and legal holding of land ownership, as guided by a democracy, for the rights of the individual South African. The indication is clear that all races can be and must be allowed to be land owners, but equally in terms of the proportional numbers of the various racial groups. The present-day South African numbering of ±83% White land owners versus ±13% Black land owners is an immense imbalance, representing inequality, it and needs rectification. It leaves even the moderates in the ANC no other choice but to activate land expropriation with great urgency immediately.37-42

3.2.2. South Africa’s orderly democracy requires and justifies land expropriation

True democracy allows orderly statutory change by righteous actions in order to rectify injustice of the past or present. The implementation thereof can take time, especially when democracy is new born to a country; especially one which had suffered for centuries under autocracy and fascism. Political, social and economic transformations thus require time and patience. Shortcomings in the 1994-Constitution are coming to the foreground, forcing daring challenges to be faced and solved, as previously mentioned, the addressing of the imbalance between the races on land ownership. The 1994 final settlement on land redistribution is, in terms of the prescription of the country’s democracy, far from a fait accompli and is still in a process of evolution.43-47

3.2.3. Land redistribution within post-2019 Black empowerment is a normal process

Uhuru South Africa, with all its many out-branches, such as land ownership, is an unavoidable and non-debateable process. It is presently driven exclusively because the economic upliftment of Blacks through BBBEE since 1994 was not enough. There are very serious consequences which can follow, if a justified transfer of mass land to the poor and landless Blacks is not activated fast. The present-day land reform initiative is thus not in dispute. The inequality, poverty and landlessness of the mass of non-Whites, living and working for generations as poor farm-labourers in the countryside, demand immediate action.37-42

In theory there is very little difference in the present South African thought-process on land occupation as those reflected and practised by the VOC, the British, the Boers, the Apartheid Government and that of Robert Mugabe. All these institutions were overshadowed by lengthy histories of murder, genocide, injustice, impoverishment and suppression of the previous land owners (who were also mostly land grabbers themselves, coming from an earlier period) who had lost their acquired land to new migrants, intruders and conquerors through multiple atrocities. In light of the above background, it is important to note that the present setup of a mass of South African landless Blacks is basically the same: an immense group of people who have been enormously frustrated mostly since the1994-democracy by the lack of improvement to their lifestyle. Land reform, whether it is a Zimbabwe-style act of violence or a democratic and balanced process without conflict or bloodletting, is, as said, a clearly unavoidable and normal process to balance the land ownership process that will have to happen from after the May 2019 elections.1

The decisions on whether certain elements and parts of the intended land reform programme should be with or without compensation, clearly constitutes a democratic act and is, as said, based on majority consultation and decision of the Parliament, as guided by the population, to benefit the country’s interests. This is an essential democratic principle that the Blacks and Whites endorsed with the 1994 Political Dispensation.38

3.2.4. A post-2019 primary land redistribution plan already in place

Notwithstanding the many draconic statements on the land expropriation process, as likely to be exclusive land grabbing, or that there is not any plan in guiding the post-2019 land expropriation, there are actually clear primary guidelines on how the process is going to be activated and steered. Prominent for selection between truth and myth on the issue of land ownership, is the King Solomon’s wisdom approach, wherein  the final decisions on what is fact and myth and the process on how land expropriation must and will be logically executed, are solely led by compassion, a good moral compass, and logical thinking and action. An in-depth understanding of the present-day suffering of all South Africans, anchored and driven by a leadership of good characteristics, which is freed from racial, religious and political contamination, are pre-requisites. Prominently, as a guideline, is President Cyril Ramaphosa’s repeatedly assurance of South Africans that the process of “land correction” will be done within the present-day laws and the Constitution.48

3.2.4.1. The land expropriation’s primary guidelines

Notwithstanding the initial immense hot headed rhetoric, commissions, committees, much senseless and opportunistic talk and argument, and ongoing threats by radicals, for instance in the Northern Cape ANC, such as the compilation of lists of productive farms to be expropriated immediately before changes to Section 25 are even approved, etc., it seems that other positive outcomes have manifested.

Firstly, it seems that the EFF, which had mainly activated the process on land reform in Parliament, was before the dissolution of the 2019-outgoing Parliament basically absent from attending the Parliamentary Committee on Land reform, which is the primary body doing research, publishing information, and deciding on the outcome of the final process. Only the members of the DA and the ANC attended as many as 50% of the meetings, while the three members of the EFF only attended the first meeting, bringing in a total of only 20% EFF-attendance. Cope, the UDM, the APC, the DSA, the VF+ and the NFP did not attend a single meeting. This passivity and lack of responsibility to the voters, led thereto that the committee failed to deliver a report before the closing of the present Parliament. This means that the issue will have to be run by the new legislature again from June 2019.49

The above undoubtedly reflects a growing detachment and disinterest by the main role-players in the so-called “land grabbing intentions” of parliamentary radicals.49

It seems furthermore that from the ANC side, as specifically reflected in the first hectic Parliament debate on land expropriation without compensation, there developed an observable passivity by the majority of ANC parliamentarians to the whole matter. This passivity is however seen as an opportunistic safeguarding by some ANC parliamentarians: here stands the fact that some of the ANC MPs and MPLs own more than two properties and thus they can, in some way, also be negatively  affected if a radical land policy is implemented. This outcome shifted the whole thinking process and final responsibility on land expropriation of the ANC’s greater inner-circle. This seems to have already put strain on the ANC’s top brass, making it clear to them that extreme land radicalism is not the average member’s wish. On the other side there is a genuine opinion with some ANC parliamentarians that the whole land expropriation process must be toned down in order to balance land reform.49

Based on the “unofficial” opinions and viewpoints of the ANC’s inner-circle – as reflected by some trustworthy “inside rumours”, “unofficial evaluations” and “leaks” by the lesser radicals of the ANC elite – clear primary guidelines seem already to have been compiled by the ANC to guide us. The basis of this post-2019 land redistribution primary plan is shortly described in the following eleven subdivisions:

1) Land reform and redistribution is unavoidable and prescribes an immediate constitutional prescription to be implemented. It needs to be implemented fast, but in well-planned phases, without any disturbance of the racial, political, social and economic stability.49,50  About the many failures on land reform in the past, which need now to be avoided, Nortje maintains that50:9: “Like it or not, SA’s existing land reform policy has not been effective in achieving its goals. In terms of the acquisition of land by the state, there has been partial success, but redistribution and transformation of the agricultural sector have by and large been a failure”.

2) Future land ownership must reflect proportionately the ethnicity and races of South Africa. These same ethnic and racial proportions should reflect in the farming sector, with relation to farmers and labourers. In this context the editor of the Sunday Times on the 10th March 2019 wrote the following under the heading51:18: “Quotas not wrong, those who oppose them are,” with regard to a very well-balanced description of the correct post-2019 South Africa. He put it clearly for himself and the greater Black society, which includes the ANC regime that future land transformation doesn’t seek to replace White with Black, but to ensure all races are included, to ensure that there’s an accurate representation of society. The editor of the Sunday Times further writes51:18: “If there’s something Solidarity needs to understand, it’s that transformation targets are here to stay – and they’re not just about numbers. They form part of a heart-and-minds approach that seeks to address the imbalances of the past”.

This balanced representation on land ownership was indeed, in terms of equality and human rights, a prescribed pre-requisite from 1652 with the arrival of Whites in South Africa. The intended equalisation of land ownership after 2019 must thus not be seen as a “favour” which the Whites are now doing to Blacks through so-called quotas in land ownership, work-placement, sport or education, etc. The centuries long outstanding initiative to erase the imbalance in land ownership in South Africa (read together with the imbalance in wealth and inequality), has led to an immense discrepancy between White land owners and Black land owners, making an immediate large scale equalisation within an orderly political dispensation basically impossible. The editor51 of the Sunday Times is clear on this gradual process of transformation, especially in land ownership, where food production, the need for finance to buy out farms, etc., are central. Transformation is not the central problem here, but the issue is those who (mainly Whites) steadfastly refuse to understand the future of South Africa’s politics after 2019. Prominent for the editor51 of Sunday Times is the main obstruction to phase out the inequality and proportional land ownership which is exclusively vested in White hands.51-54

Obstructive alleged role-players are seen to be Solidarity, AgriSA, AfriForum, the Freedom Front Plus, together with the White exclusive capitalists and the White farmer community. They form a contingent of obstructionists, to which one writer, in his despair on the conflicting and seemingly unchangeable land ownership matter, refers to as “remnants of verkramptes and rooineks resisting change”.51-54

In the context of the ANC’s good intentions on a moderate land reform outcome, Khumalo55 writes specifically of a clear differentiation by the international rating agency Standard and Poor (S&P) between the radical concept of a policy of land expropriation with or without compensation (which has become the antagonists “wildcat”-vehicle of attack on the ANC in pinpointing them as political radicals) versus the ANC’s true intention of the introduction of a conservative policy of land reform. On the S&P opinion of the introduction of a conservative land reform plan by the ANC after 2019, Khumalo posits55:15: “On land expropriation, we think that in as much as the discourse talks about expropriation, we believe it has to do more with land reform. We think the ANC have been conservative in the past. They will remain conservative in the way they manage the land issue.”

3) The land reform plan will be interpreted and implemented as described by the ANC’s Freedom Charter, which reflects a strict implementation of democratic principles on land ownership and rights around land ownership. The intention is clear that the whole land transformation plan must not be radical and will be far from the postulated outcome predicted by the antagonists. It will not be in line, for instance, with the delinquent actions of the White NP between 1970 and 1979 when 240 555 Blacks were removed from so-called “Black spots” located in White land bought by Afrikaner communities prior to the controversial land legislation of 1913. In addition, land expropriation will not again form the type of removal of Blacks as was done with the NP’s social engineering wherein Blacks were removed from so-called “legitimate White land” and relocated to “Bantustans” and other so-called “Black-areas”. In this process more or less 3.5-million people (described by Malan as the “Surplus People”), some 10% of the entire population, were subjected to forced removal.53,56

4) The general prescription that only certain categories of land will be expropriated without compensation refers specifically to abandoned buildings, unutilized land, commercial property held unproductively and purely for speculative purposes owned privately by South Africans and the state, as well as under-utilised property owned by the state, and land farmed by labour tenants with an absentee titleholder (irrespective of race), agricultural land owned by Church groups, and the land owned by closed-down mines. In addition to the abovementioned categories is the free-will handing-over of land by private owners/businesses, etc. to the state for land expropriation.

5) These above categories of land will be expropriated with compensation in terms of realistic and balanced market prices.56

6)  Rural families living under traditional leadership in the former Transkei and rural KwaZulu-Natal will get title to the land upon which they live and work.

7) Land expropriation will be done in various steps or phases, to assure minimum political, personal and racial conflict. The first phase will be of the less conflicting land of the state and the surrendered land from the private sector. The State will in Phase One make a lot of its own land available free of cost to new Black farmers and to other homeless Blacks, as serviced plots with title deeds to build their own homes near their work places in or nearby urban centres.56

8) The reference to “race” in terms of present-day South Africa’s richness, poverty, inequality and landlessness are prominent in the land expropriation initiative. These imbalances, specifically regarding land ownership, will be addressed, but only with justice, empathy and correctness. Prominent here is the declaration by the Deputy President, David Mabuza, in March 2019 in Parliament that it is not the intention of the ANC regime to push out the White farming community and that they must stay to produce food. Clearly there is no intention of revenge for the past on the White owners of land.56

9) The base for land relocation is that every South African citizen has the right to own land in the country, as guided by the Freedom Charter. This ownership needs to reflect in equality the proportions (numbers) of races and ethnicities (guided by the various Black tribal orientations,  as well as so-called other non-White orientations, like Coloured, Indian, etc.), as represented by the present population statistics.1,57.58.59

Statistics reflect the present total population of South Africa as ±57.5-million, represented by the following races numbers: Blacks: ±44.5-million; Coloureds: ±4.8-million; Whites: ±4.5-million; Indian/Asians/Other: ±1.5-million. The various proportional statistical ratios (calculated out of 100) are as follows: Blacks 80; Coloureds 9; Whites 8 and Indian/Asians/Other 3. The primary intention is to bring the present more than 80% of the land in White hands (a group forming only 8% of the total population), gradually down as far as possible in terms of a democratic reform, to only 8%, while the Blacks, Coloureds and Indian/Asians/Other need respectively to own 80%, 9% and 3% of the land.1,57,58,59

The process of majority consultation and decision-making, to be able to activate the intended land reform, is a principle that the NP regime on behalf of the Whites endorsed when they transferred their political power in 1994 to the Black majority and is thus not disputable. The only fault was that this endorsed agreement was not fully and truly activated from 1994.1

A prominent fact here, which is been mostly ignored due to political opportunism and Marxist-revolution orientation by a minority of radicals in the politics, is that the “Blacks” are not one single group to be served by land reform, but are represented by various tribes and further sub-tribes. These tribal and sub-tribal people are mostly established in certain parts of South Africa as majority groups there. (It is only the White tribe, specifically the Afrikaners as a sub-trlbe, that is basically spread over the whole country. The Afrikaners can themselves be divided into at least six sub-groups). Land redistribution will thus, in terms of this tribal-region-orientation be done. This means for instance that the placement of Zulus on traditional Venda land and vice versa can be catastrophic, as were the old “Bantustans” and Apartheid’s other foolishnesses. The First and Second Black Colonisations, with their resulting bloodshed, will be the outcome. The fact that the Zulus before 1994 fought for federalism and the present stand and propaganda of a “physical separation” from the Republic by the King of the Zulus, must serve here as a sharp warning. The growing political demands of traditional leaders’ (especially the kings with their own regimes and traditional empowerment) inside this tribal-regional system, as well as the greater South Africa as a region, also nullifies any argument inside the ANC of one Black Nation, which is to be treated to a simple land reform approach. This so-called Black-unity was a pre-1994 short-term approach to bring Apartheid down, but has now gradually been over-run by tribal nationalism and patriotism, as the EFF’s 10% vote in the May election confirms. Note must also be taken of the claims from the so-called “indigenous Brown people” (KhoiSan, Griqwa, Namakwa) that the land expropriation policy of post-2019 must also favour them fully.1,60,61

The constant declaration and blind acceptance of a “South African democracy” which is exclusively underwritten, driven and promoted by a sole Blackness,  seems to be out of contact with the country’s political, social and cultural realities, as well as Africa’s comprehensive confrontation at the ballot box by the many ethnicities and the tribalism of the Black voters. The so-called “Pure Black nationalists” may be in for a surprise – and a most deadly surprise – in South Africa in the future, due to  the advent of real Black tribal separation and Black tribal nationalism.62 In this regard, Monyae and Matambo write62:19: “They also do not help entrench democracy on a continent where voting along ethnic and tribal lines is common. The most ideal circumstances for democracy’s success in Africa [and South Africa] could be reconciling voters to the ideas rather than identity sensibilities.”

The EFF’s last mentioned outcome on an exclusive Black-nationalism will not easily be blocked if we look to the growth of the EFF after the May election in votes in some of the northern parts of South Africa — a party whose policy is undoubtedly, besides White-bashing, characterised and steered by deadly Black ethnicity and tribalism and the division, including the break-up, of the so-called “pre-1994 Black Nation”. It is important to note that the EFF’s radical cultural and political empowerment has now slowly spread from Limpopo to Mpumalanga and the North West Provinces, making it the official oppositions there.34,63,64

On these delinquent ethnic and tribal manifestations in the EFF, to capture its deprived and political poor and often times under-developed supporters’ planning in the doubtful and devastating elements of ethnicity and tribalism, Trovato writes64:14: “Nice work, though. It doesn’t matter if all three have a combined GDP of R28.50 and a bit of a witchcraft problem.”

Mthombothi34 also pinpoints this deadly foundation after the May election in the EFF, especially its leadership’s immense fault-line when he postulates34:19: “…the EFF’s existence and its survival depend largely on the whims of its leader. It often appears as though it’s a meteor that will rise but ultimately burn itself into oblivion. Also, its propensity for race-bating rules it out as a genuine contender for real power.”

10) The land expropriation is planned to be executed in such a way that it will not harm the economic or political status of the South African State, albeit in the short or long term. Although the implementation of the primary plan will require an enormous financial input by the government, this cost will be balanced in five to ten years’ time, hopefully bringing profits to the country after ten to fifteen years.

11) The first stage of land transfers must be complete before but not later than 2022 (whereby state rural land is been handed to Black farmers and their establishment on these farms ins in place). Included in this time-limit is the transfer of privately-owned abandoned buildings and under-utilised property and land in urban areas (without or with compensation), together with the transfer of the State’s abandoned buildings, under-utilised property and land in urban areas, to the poor and landless Blacks, to be owned by them for accommodation, and upon which to farm and build homes.

3.2.5. A post-2019 secondary land distribution guideline already in place
3.2.5.1. Land grabbing not an issue

There is no intention to grab well-functioning White private property and land without compensation, without clear reasons to benefit the people of the country and the balanced consideration of the loss to the disposed owner. Neither is the intended land transfer scheme going to target even all the so-called more than 80% of the present land of Whites, which radicals are alleging to be “stolen” from Blacks. That would be undemocratic. Neither is the intention the exclusive grabbing of land from one race group while leaving others untouched. The State’s own high-potential land of multiple millions of hectares of agricultural land, which has not been collateralised and is not productive, will, as already said, firstly become part of the intended land expropriation. Land cases under dispute before 2019 will be the prominent focus for settlement. Primarily there is no intention to  travel back in history to punish any so-called “White culprits” for their so-called “alleged stealing of land from Blacks”.48

In this context Nortje confirms50:9: “The good news is that, behind all the noise and political positioning around land reform, the ANC has been consistent in its intentions. The December [2018] policy document does say that expropriation without compensation ‘should be among the key mechanisms available to the government’, but this is followed by an even stronger statement that land reform interventions ‘should focus on government-owned land’ and ‘prioritise the distribution of vacant, unused and underutilised state land’.”

This consistency in the ANC regime’s expropriation plan will not to harm the private White land owner by confiscating his land without compensation, and is further confirmed by Nortje’s pinpointing that only state land will directly be incorporated in the first phase of land redistribution. In co-operation with the redistribution of state land, will also be the buy-out of a new group of White land and the buy-out of White land under dispute. Of the good intention of not to do land grabbing by the ANC regime, notwithstanding the antagonists roaring statements and the political noise of radicals within the ANC itself, and especially within the EFF, there is clear evidence in the February 2019 budget on the buy-out of White land and the immense funds made available to be able to do it.65,66

Hleko, in his analysis of the budget of 2019, writes65:16:

The linkage between the President’s State of the Nation address (Sona) and the Minister of Finance’s Budget speech created a proportionate posture that the government is hard at work making South Africa a better place for all who live in it.

The budget speech planted anew and sowed the seed of renewal. The R3.7 billion set aside to assist emerging farmers seeking to acquire land for farming, is a seed that the government is sowing today to propel emerging farmers to prosper in future.

This allocation will assist the 250 000 emerging farmers, whom the president referred to in his Sona, that are working the land and need support to fully develop their businesses.

The R1.8bn that is allocated for the implementation of 262 priority land reform projects over the next three years will be a shot in the arm for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform to expedite land reform projects.

This further echoes the president’s remark that an accelerated programme of land reform has the potential to expand agricultural output and promote inclusion.

On the 10th April 2019, Ramaphosa himself (who is again the President in the Sixth Parliament), to reign in all the false noises around the land matter, assured White farmers that they did not have to fear land reform48:1:

“I can assure you that the land reform process is something we should never fear. It is to be done in accordance with the rule of law and the Constitution. It is not going to be land grabs where land is grabbed outside of the parameters of the law. We need to look at the practical reality.”

Specific to the Expropriation Amendment Bill, which will be finalised after May 2019 by the new incoming Parliament, Ramaphosa puts it that the Act’s intentions are, as was already well-spelled out in governance and ANC papers, to look at land owned by the state, land owned by state-owned entities, land not used and land sometimes illegally acquired.48:1:

“There is a great future for all farming people, be it workers or farm owners. We need to address the key challenges. We must address some of the sensitive issues – evictions and where the people have no land. We want consensual solutions.”

The secondary good intention of not to land grabb, is further the announcement that the Land Bank will financially support smallholders and leverage partnerships with other financial institutions in their start-up of new incoming Black farmers and to develop existing Black farmers. The main aim here is to disburse R3-billion in the next fiscal year to the farming sector, with more Land Bank financial input later to be facilitated for the farming community.66

3.2.5.2. The 1994 Political Dispensation: a worrying issue which needs urgent comprehensive readdressing

The South African land ownership matter was ignored outright since 1994 and silently shelved in terms of the 1994 Political Dispensation. The 1994 Political Dispensation masked main intention was clear: to exclusively serve the White land owners and farmers, as well as the exclusive capitalists who include Whites as well as Blacks, especially those who misused BBBEE to get rich. South Africa’s economic evolution did not work because it offered nothing to the mass of the poor since 1994. The rise of unrest, acute anarchy and the possibility of a revolution by the mass of poor and landless Blacks, and of course the mass poverty of ±29-million Blacks, served as a wake-up call to a small group of concerned South African politicians, humanists and citizens to take on the matter.48,50

3.2.5.2.1 The neglect and unrepaired situation of ±29-million landless and poor Blacks within the present empowerment of 257 municipalities to be able to do land expropriation

With regard to the abovementioned post-1994 ongoing negligence and unrepaired situation of ±29-million landless and poor Blacks’, Nortje50 can with honesty, with great doubt on the ANC regime’s initial intention to uplift this mass of Blacks, write50:9:

The bad news is that expropriation without compensation will remain a high-stakes political bargaining chip. Indeed, had Ramaphosa‘s hand not been forced at the national elective conference in December 2017, I wonder if our land reform policy would have been re-examined at all. In this case the EFF and factions within the ANC have done South Africans a massive favour by forcing us to scrutinise and improve policy that has massive potential for social redress, job creation and economic development”.

The time-frame left for the ANC to institute and to physically activate a clear, final plan and scheme after 25 years of failure since 1994, is at most two years. Politicians from all of the parties, White land owners and exclusive holders of White capital, must accept it unconditionally. This eye-opening and political life-change includes the DA, the FF Plus, Solidarity, AfriForum and AgriSA.50,60,67

Any delay holds serious consequences, specifically for the ANC as a regime to be able to  bring about justified land reform and in general for South Africa in the form of anarchy, unrest and revolution. This instituting of a final plan comprises the definite establishment of a permanent caretaker deeds statutory body (separate from the present deeds office) which will stand free from political and party influences. It will specifically handle the transfer of land to the state and the registering of the deeds of these properties initially in the name of the State, the compilation of clear legal guidelines for the rights of citizens to receive land, and the pre-as well as post-prescriptions to be able to farm, to take ownership of this land, the describing of a proof period as a candidate-farmer, directing the reselling and estranging of the property after allocation to Black owners. It will need to limit opportunistic profit-taking, state-capture and racketeering, as well as corruption around these allocated properties. The allocation of full ownership, and thus the transfer of title deeds, can be subjected to five years. Although private loans on the properties and lands will be allowed (specifically to be able to make debts for development and the running of the farms), this will be subordinate to the permission of the State as the first loan-holder and thus allocated with the right of the first call to buy-back or to reposess expropriated land when necessary. To control over-debt and the exploitstion of the poor new farmers against loan sharks, the intention is to provide comprehensive loans/other funding via the State to the incoming farmers for up to 20 years. This approach will overcome the many failures of the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution plan, because the State failed many times to supply funding or ancillary agricultural services to the incoming farmers who lacked their own capital. This will also phase out the unrealistic short periods required from the incoming Black farmers to become profitable. (Prominent in this respect, in order to guide stable future ownership of expropriated land, the ANC regime already put the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy in place, which was adopted in 2006, to stop beneficiaries of land reform from selling opportunistic properties which they had acquired. In terms of this ruling, land was leased since 2006 to the majority of beneficiaries while the state retained ownership).50

Another outcome foreseen in the post-2019 empowerment of the incoming Black farmers is that the type of farming production will be steered by the government to assure maximum profit and the needed products for the local, and where possible, for foreign markets. Funding and the training of the new farmers will be steered in terms of the produce on the allocated land.50

It is clear that this Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy adopted in 2006 will be “improved” with new legislation, such as the fundamental restructuring of institutions such as the Land Claims Commission and the Land Claims Court, etc., not only to safeguard those losing their property through land reform, but also to protect those poor Blacks in line to receive land. The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) will also be improved. The rule of law in the process of land reform will be maintained in order to avoid Zimbabwe’s lack of accountability or the Zuma-state-capture. An example thereof is Ngcukaitobi’s68 opinion of the establishment of a land ombudsman or land-rights protector (with the same powers as the present public protector). The state custodianship (temporary) of expropriated land will be spelled out clearly in the post-2019 proposed land redistribution and agrarian reform legislation. In addition, how the process of land transfer will be activated and upheld, will be executed through the creation of various new legislation, such as a Land Acquisition Act as well as a Land Redistribution Act, wherein the suggested land ombudsman or the land-rights protector, is central as the supervisor.68,69

3.2.5.2.2. The present empowerment of 257 municipalities to do land expropriation

The present anomaly in the change to Section 25 of the draft expropriation bill, which can give 257 municipalities the right to expropriate property without compensation, is at the moment under consideration. The seeming intention is to remove their rights and to make the empowerment of land and other property expropriation seated in a single statutory body on national level.69,70

With reference to the concerns of the bill’s empowerment of the local government municipalities, as well as that of the central government bodies, is it important to note that the biggest need for land is in urban areas under municipalities where there is a vast corruption problem. Evidence shows that only 33 municipalities of the total of 257 obtained clean audits in 2018. As such, the municipalities cannot be trusted to implement land expropriation without compensation fairly and to execute administrative justice, as demanded by the constitution.69,70

Furthermore, the clause will address the intended empowerment of the local and central government, wherein the bill gives five examples where nil compensation would be justified and states that expropriation without compensation can be “stretched”, which can allow invalid grabbing of land. In addition, the definition on land (located in municipalities) for speculation (which undoubtedly has financial value for the present owner and is mostly acquired at a cost), is unclearly defined. Lacking a legal description to state clearly what  land for future expansion means — which seems to stand outside the expropriation without compensation clause – is a further point of concern that will be addressed. The concept-definition of what is property in the bill seems to apply also on the confiscation of anything, varying from intellectual property to shares in a company, if it is in the so-called “interests of the public”. This therefore needs a revist, in order to clear confusion and possible capture.69,70

3.2.5.2.3. The mandate of the Land Bank needs immediate attention

To activate land expropriation successfully, the lack of finance to start up and run a farm stands out specifically. Here, in financing the incoming Black farmers, is the commitment of the ANC-regime to change the mandate of the Land Bank so that it is truly development-orientated and financial-friendly to the mass of poor Blacks.68,69 This will be done without “nationalising” it, as some of the antagonists and White capitalists try to argue when the mandate of the Land Bank is put forward as a possible financial vehicle to successfully expropriate land and facilitate the urgent uplifting of 29-million poor and landless Blacks. Own government financial support is just too little to change the present landscape of under-funding of Black farmers. Ngcukaiboti69 writes, on the reason for the present passivity (and isolation) of the Land Bank to be able to support the mass of poor incoming, aspirant Black farmers, as follows69:20-21:

“In 2002, the ANC changed the mandate of the Land Bank  so that, for all practical purposes, it operates like any ordinary commercial bank. In Section 26 of the Land and Agricultural Bank Act, the bank’s mandate is to provide land and agricultural finance ‘against security’. It can be safely assumed that the persons who need Land Bank finance the most have no security.”

3.2.5.2.4. The farming-styles, culture and intentions of new Black and other non-White farmers

The farming-styles, culture and intentions of new Black and other non-White farmers will be prominent in guiding the execution of the land reform programme. In this context,  the candidate-farmers — not as during the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution where pre-training training and constant mentoring were absent – will first be pre-selected on certain characteristics, abilities, skills and interests to assure maximum success as potential candidate-farmers and then pre-trained (as was done in the 1930s with the poor Whites at the Kakamas- and Keimoes-schemes by the government and the DRC). The intention is to extend the Agricultural Colleges training to district-centres countrywide, with the offering of an initial six months as a start-up course for the learner-farmers, while further continuous learning and training will be provided after the establishment of the new farmers for a minimum period of five years. The post-2019 exploitation of agricultural-export potential is a first priority through the small farmers’ setup.1,69

The entire country will be divided into various regions for land transfer, meaning thus concentrated small farms in the more water-rich areas, with the more spread out of larger farms in the dryer regions. Developments beside constant flowing rivers and near established transport and other facilities will form the first phase of the start-up.1

One of the most important oversights in the 1994 to 2019 land redistribution under the 1994 Dispensation were the absence of homesteads, other much needed farm-buildings and infrastructure and equipment to support farming production and activities  by the new farmers. There was frequently outright neglect in this regard from the government’s side even to install any infrastructure and the offer of working equipment at the time of the handing over of farms to the new farmers. Funding to support these enterprises was also lacking most of the time, while constant monitoring, in order to identify shortcomings and failures over time, as well as the development of new needs of the new-farmers-model, were also absent.  These pre-requirements will be put in place before allowing farmers to take up their farmer-appointments.69

Other infrastructure needed is the upfront founding of marketing instruments, such as own markets, the installation of entities for farmer-community-businesses to build and run independent Black farming centres for the selling of the surplus of their produce, as well as the creation of community business-bodies to buy farming equipment and which will deliver services to small farmers to make it possible for them to get their farms working and functioning at affordable costs.69

One of the most hampering elements to land ownership in South Africa has so far been the Western custom and tradition that land can for an unlimited amount of time be owned by a certain person and his immediate family. The ownership of land came under exclusive White capitalism and politics as the untouchable right of the individual (mostly Whites) to be able own land and to do with it as the owner saw fit. Included here is, as said, the untouchable present right of inheritance from generation to generation. The utmost exploitationof this model is well-illustrated by the selective upkeep of the exclusive White ownership (8% of the population) of at least 60% of the South African land. Firstly, in stopping this thinking, it is important to note that land is a national asset and not a personal asset, to be separated from the State and society. Secondly, the occupation of any land, as sealed by a deed of conveyance, is only for the purpose of improving the land and making a living from it – it is always only a solely temporary right issued to the individual of care-taking of the state’s assets. Included hereto stands the effective management of land as a democratic and civil right by the individual who holds the deed of conveyance. This legal setup is solely based on majority consultation and decision-making by the population of South Africa via Parliament, as primarily guided by the country’s Constitution. There is thus in modern-day South Africa a clear pre-requirement emerging on the ongoing legal ownership of land: it is temporary and open to change by the State at any time. This is now what is planned with the process of land expropriation.1

There is already a process in place to re-install the old hereditary tenure with a time-limit, better known as the tenure by long lease, as already activated in Namibia, Zimbabwe and Malawi for the period of 99-years of lease. This was also done at the early Cape. This model of time-limiting of land ownership is by far a better one for the State, as well as the individual citizen. Indeed specific to the South African setup around ownership per se, data shows that very few of the present farms are owned for 99 years or more by the same (White) family. Although data is scarce on the matter, it seems that most (White) owners and their families hang on to land for less than 49 years.1

In terms of the development of a new land culture, South Africa thus also undoubtedly needs a total repositioning of the so-called model of endless-land ownership to the model of tenure by long lease of 49 year-land ownership. Such a model will help to support the intended land expropriation initiative and to dismantle an imbalanced racial and economic-privilege farming community, free from monopolies and the exclusive benefit of certain groups and families.

The intended land expropriation programme to establish the poor and landless Blacks will be far removed from the 1994 to 2019 rigid programme and be easily adaptable to new circumstances as prescribed by the country’s economic, political and civil rights. Much was learned from the 1994 to 2019 failures. Future success lies in the re-examination of the old land reform processes from pre- as well post-1994.50 Nortje posits50:9: “These failures are frustrating but it is encouraging – and indeed correct – that existing land reform policy is being re-examined. Policy by its nature should be a process rather than a prescript. Good policymakers measure the actual and intended outcomes of their policies regularly in order to make adjustments when necessary”.

What is most worrying at the moment is the fact that the Ramaphosa-regime had in the mean time shifted seemingly successfully the land reform matter before the May 8 election from the “urgent” national agenda. This led thereto that to a great extent the debate died down. Notwithstanding the finding of Ramaphosa’s 10-member advisory panel on land reform (appointed in September 2018), which is now to be followed-up and enlightened by the post-May 8 Parliament, the present problematic setup around poverty and landlessness of a mass of Blacks can become extreme, with acute unrest.  Anarchy, moving into a chronic stage, can make revolution a prominent feature later in the 2019-2024 ruling-mandate of the ANC.50

3.2.5. The antagonists are unrealistic and opportunistic to already demand in 2019 a fully-fledged land expropriation plan from the ANC

Too offer a more precise plan as the above theoretical one at this stage, is impossible, seeing that Section 25 is still to be amended. Further consultations by all the lawmakers of the Parliament with the general public, must firstly be held and funding allocated, to be able to start up the project and to turn it from theoretical to practical. Furthermore, the above theoretical plan must and cannot be seen as a final, absolute one. As discussions and outcomes follow during the rest of 2019-2020, changes, adjustments, additions, further descriptions and definitions, etc., can follow. There is no doubt that before any land expropriation will be activated, further land redistribution and agrarian reform legislation will be introduced.50,69

It must be clear that the current agricultural monopolies will have to be dismantled or reigned in, see at present the overpowering of the agricultural sector by the extremely well-established South Africa White agribusinesses and their exclusive White capital. There will be cooperation with the White agribusinesses in the activation of the Black agricultural sector, but away from and outside their White dominance of every sector in agriculture. Land expropriation, its planning and action and its benefits, will be shifted from the few White rich to the mass Black poor. It will be the rule, not the aim. The present exclusive marginalisation of the Black farming communities and Black small-scale farmers will be ended. Ngcukaitobi69 misreads the “un-breakability” of the White empowerment and dominance of the country’s agriculture in the ANC’s planned land expropriation programme when he writes69:20-21: “We can expect that these monopolies will, with the support of the State, multiply their profits, while giving a “helping hand. More of the same. Large agricultural entities, it seems, will be “nudged” to support emerging and small-scale farmers.”

Doubts about the present theoretical plan are unfounded. Firstly, the registration of title deeds of the expropriated land will be handled the same way as the present-day title deeds, although this will preferably be done on a separate register to oversee the land expropriation process. This will be done precisely to avoid corruption, state-capture, etc. and to make the re-registration of land to the new Black farmers easy to control, and to oversee the constant management and execution of the end-part of land expropriation and the success of each of the individual cases.50,69

It must be clear that the transfer and registration of land to the new Black farmers will not be more complicated or strange than that of the starting-up in the 1890s of the Vanwyksvlei Dam’s Agricultural and Farming Settlement of Whites. Here the so-called Crown land (which was also occupied by the Cape Government as “uninhabited land”, but was indeed for a long time the land of the driven-out KhoiSan) was transferred to Whites as private property under certain pre-requirements to work and to inhabit it permanently. The same principal of ownership was repeated after the Second World War when White soldiers of the South African Armed Forces were, after their demobilisation, established as farmers on so-called “free farms”, again on Crown land, in areas such as the districts of Vanwyksvlei and Kenhardt situated in today’s Northern Cape Province.1,71-74

4. Discussion

4.1. A short perspective

From the above is it at this stage clear that there is already in some way a theoretical plan in place on how land expropriation will and can be executed. But here are two clear energies in opposition: it is one thing to theoretically argue a plan, but it is totally something else to implement such a plan in practive with success. South Africa’s political history, since the first day of Jan van Riebeecks’s arrival, is drenched with many political failures. Prominent in this context is the ANC’s somewhat failed post-1994 land reform initiative to establish Black farmers.1,75-80

The essential question is thus who can now after May 8, 2019 be the role-player(s) to assure the successful implementation and completion of the plan on land expropriation.

The May 8, 2019 election’s outcome leaves us with only three significant parties: the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the African Nationalist Congress (ANC). On the third level of significance stands the EFF, in second place the DA and on the first level the ruling ANC. An indication of the potential of the EFF or the DA to be declared a “good” or “bad” ruler, is  the fact that they have never ruled South Africa nationally. of the two the EFF is the most inexperienced one. It has a very limited alliance in municipality management as compared to the DA, and was most of the time less successful and too conflicting to assure an evaluation of outright good. The DA was in the past and is still very successfull after the May election, with regard to governing on provincial level in the Western Cape, as well as with municipal management countrywide.26,30,34,36

4.1.1 Evaluation guidelines of political parties

To evaluate the three parties’ potential as national, provincial and municipal rulers, the following guidelines will be used respectively:

Their general policies as well as specific standpoints on aspects such as the respectof law and order, and the fighting of corruption, state capture, behavioural delinquency of MPs and MPLs, as well as their top brass leaders, the party’s and leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put in perspective through their manifestos for the 2019-election.

The public critique in newspapers, etc., by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the three parties as political organisations, their members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behavioural  delinquency of MPs and MPLs and top brass leaders, their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the parties’ internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions, especially on land expropriation, evaluated and reflected for the period 1994 to 2019.

In this subdivision of the research project the interpretations will be done solely in terms of the interpretation of facts and truths. The information gathered will be evaluated in terms of the Solomon’s wisdom approach and will not be guided by religious and legal/statutory contamination.  The focus of the discussion will be to determine, theoretically in terms of a so-called “clean and constructive political record” of each of the three parties, which of them are the best qualified to effect the land expropriation plan from 2019 and onwards. For this classification and measuring of political records of each party, the under-mentioned Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, will be used.81-84

4.1.1.1. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201881

As an evaluation instrument to quantitatively classify the three political organisations, their members’ and leaders’ behaviour and action, the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, will be used.81 The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, were applied to all information collected in the literature review of the parties’ manifestos and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and will be interpreted as the researcher deems it applicable.81

In light of the political sensitivity of this study, the researcher assured at all times, as prescribed by the Checklist, that the political-historical data were carefully reviewed and coded. Generalisations were not made beyond the capability of the data to support statements. The researcher guarded against his own expectations, misperceptions and the need to find answers that would support his preconceived notions. For the basis of interpretation and evaluation of the data, the Solomon wisdom approach serves throughout as a guideline.81-84

4.1.1.3. The use of election manifestos of political parties as Curriculum Vitae and public reporting on political parties by journalists and other sources such as Letters of Referee/Attestations to determine  the governmental abilities of political parties

When any candidate applies for a responsible post in the top level of an organisation, there are two primary elements to guide the employer in making an appointment or not. These two elements are:

1) The Curriculum Vitae (CV) to obtain insight into the candidate’s qualifications, experiences and extraordinary skills, etc; and

2) The letters of the referees, the attestations, to offer firstly further insight into the qualifications, experiences, etc. of the candidate;  and secondly at the same time to tell us confidentially about good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate that are well-masked by or absent from the CV. This referee data mostly informs us of the “goodness” and “badness” of a candidate, which can make him a failure or a success in the end in the executionof the responsibilities of the post.

In this research the manifestos and self-description offered by the political parties and their leaders will be seen as their CVs. Hereto will the public reporting by journalists and other sources be seen as the letters of referees/reference or attestations.

4.1.1.3.1. Evaluation-criteria for a party and its leadership to be short-listed

In terms of the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, the three parties will be awarded points in terms of an evaluation-criteria of a maximum of 82 points. To qualify for the shortlist as a so-called candidate (party), the candidate (party) must receive 58 points (70%) and higher.81

With specific reference to a retrospective evaluation and description of the political history of political leaders in terms of the Checklist, it is true that information obtained from newspapers, political and historical books, authorised and unauthorised biographies and autobiographies can be seen as subjective, but subjectivity is an inherent part of any text on politics. We cannot escape this reality. Such sources are consulted in terms of the Solomon wisdom approach for this subdivision, with the single aim of building a viewpoint on the party from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is commonly used in modern historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research, as is the case with the quality of the current political leadership of South Africa and the political parties’ functioning with regard to integrity. The information offered in the literature review has not been empirically tested. It relies on the independent opinion of the public as reflected by the independent media and has been accepted by the public as a good reflection of reality.81-84

The research does not offer a comprehensive statistical model to make advanced statistical inferences to be able to test a hypothesis, but the information (data) can be subjected quantitatively to the statistical cycle of research to make it comparable with other research and to evaluate it with hypothesis testing in the end. Advanced statistical inference is outside the intent of the study.81

There has never been such a collection, evaluation and description of information on the actions of the political leaders and regimes of South Africa with the primary focus on their ability to be able to steer land reform for the period 1994 to 2019. Despites the limitations of the various sources, it is a pioneering study that addresses a mostly ignored subject.81-84

4.2. The manifestos, self-descriptions and public references of the three parties

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) will be reflected in this article (Article 9) as Part 1 of three articles under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”. In Part 2 (Article 10) and Part 3 (Article 11) the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the African National Congress (ANC) will respectively be reflected as sequence articles under the main title of “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”.

4.2.1. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)
4.2.1.1. Introduction

In the recent May election, the EFF nearly doubled its political power by winning 44 seats in Parliament (rising from 6% to 10%). One the first utterances by Julius Malema, the Commander-in-Chief of the EFF after obtaining this win, was to clearly spell out that the EFF’s immediate task in the Sixth Parliament would be the completion of the work that could not be done by the Fifth Democratic Parliament and of which the Amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution, to allow for expropriation of land without compensation and the amendment of the SA Reserve Bank Act to discontinue private shareholders in the bank, would be central. In this context of political radicalism, is it old news that the EFF believes that the state should be the custodian of land and that full-out nationalisation without compensation is the way to go.85,86

In this environment a new role is foreseen by some political commentators  for the EFF in the post-2019 politics, directly within the ANC regime to assist the ANC to get the two-thirds majority vote which it needed to enact the ANC’s December 2017 resolution to amend Section 25 to be able to expropriate land without compensation (EWC). There is doubt on the outcome of such an alliance, given that a strong sector (the Ramaphosa-faction) in the ANC does not share the Malema hunger for extreme land expropriation and radical politics. They prefer a watered down window-dressed-version of the status quo on the land matter, writes Hlatshaneni.85:4

Furthermore, it seems that there is still after the May election a kind of “brotherly love” between the EFF and the DA on municipal-level cooperation, which can also put it in a strong position of political empowerment. On the 17th May 2019 the Beeld reports on this possibility after seeming talks between the EFF and the DA. Selebano writes87:1: “Die Tshwane-metroraad in Pretoria kan ‘n EFF-lid as burgemeester kry, terwyl Herman Mashaba [DA] in sy pos as burgemeester van Johannesburg bly.”  Malema himself reports as follows on the matter of a new post-2019 alliance with the DA on municipal-level87:1: “Ons praat reeds met die DA, ons deel die mag in Johannesburg en Tshwane. Kom ons doen dit op ‘n manier wat nie ontwrigtend is nie.”

It is thus of great importance to see how the EFF can play out its role in the post-2019 politics in general and specifically in the solving of the so-called “White-occupation” of Black land. The question is: can the EFF be a significant role-player in the post-2019 politics? To answer this question is it important to study the EFF’s CV and Attestations in-depth and to evaluate its performance on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018.81

4.2.1.2. Overview
4.2.1.2.1. The EFF manifesto

In the EFF’s manifesto under the heading: “The EFF is ready to govern as demonstrated by the detailed blueprint for economic emancipation as set out in its manifesto”, Julius Malema, as in his daily politics, tries to play the card of “African nationalism”.  But the “Malema-African nationalism” is an exclusive new version: one belonging to and driven by the South African post-1994 born Blacks, who are jobless, poor and most of all: landless. Excluded from his group of “African nationalists” are clearly the so-called BEE-marked and other successful Blacks who were born before 1994. Prominent of course are also the Whites in general as the culprits in his radical-Marxism as the sole origin of these Black youth’s poverty, landlessness and unhappiness (and undoubtedly seemingly also Malema’s “own poverty” and unhappiness!). To grasp this absurdity, and by times seemingly confused political mindset, just read the following from his propaganda88:19:

“We are not part of the 1994 elite pact. We are a completely new generation, with new demands. And our demands, unlike those of the 1994 generation, will not be postponed. We refuse to be silenced with so-called reconciliation. We want justice now. We want our land now. We want jobs now. We demand the economy now!

On his so-called “White-problem” philosophy and solution, note the following88:19:

The economy in SA continues today to be under the ownership and control of white minority settlers, whose ownership and control of land, in particular, were gained through settler colonialism and its corollary, the dispossession of the black colonised.

Other sectors of the economy, such as retail chains, industry and the financial sector, are also owned and controlled by the white minority in SA. All the means of economic survival and existence continue to be controlled by the white minority.

Imraan Buccus89, a seasoned researcher and academic, and a well-respected political analyst, after he studied the EFF’s manifesto for the May 2019 election and the party’s practice of politics since its foundation, reflects in-depth in his writing the characteristics of the EFF’s politics if it should had win the election or form a senior partnership in an alliance to be a ruler. Its ruling seems for Buccus to be characterised by the following89:18:

“The manifesto from the EFF is about as ridiculous as it is long. It veers, incoherently, from far right neoliberal economics measures, like export processing zones, to classic far-left politics, like radical land reform. Wildly outlandish promises are made – R1m payments to successful PhD students and orthodontists in every school, for instance – that are impossible to implement in reality.”

In reality the EFF’s election promises, if they are to be implemented in political madness (besides that it is just impossible!), will bring total bankruptcy and steer the country into the same hole as Venezuala and Zimbabwe, writes Buccus89. Moreover: immense poverty, hunger, unrest, violence, to be followed by revolution, will fast be the outcomes. This will end in the mass suppression of the population and dictatorship. Inequality would become out of hand, which, looking critically at the EFF’s politics, seems to be Malema’s main intention and plan. The speaking by the EFF of the creation of a sovereign wealth fund means just another state capture and a looting again of the SAA, Eskom, the PIC and various kinds of VBS Mutual Banks to be robbed again by the EFF-kind of political elite. Buccus89 is very clear when he, on the involvement and trustworthiness per se of the EFF in the management for instance of a sovereign wealth funds, says89:18:

“But, as we all know, the EFF has been closely associated with cross forms of corruption, and is openly defending individuals known to have been at the centre of the state capture project. The EFF simply could not be trusted to run a sovereign wealth fund.”

Bell90, in reference to the EFF’s promises, describes them as absurd, bizarre and outlandish. He writes in this context: “An EFF government, they promised, would provide every informal settlement dweller with a proper house with flushing toilets, and hot and cold running water, within two years.” On the land issue and the EFF, Bell reports90:2:

“Here it is that some of the more  – no pun intended – outlandish comments are made, including an EFF promise to ‘immediately’ give away to ‘the people 50% of all government land’.”

The EFF promises and political, economic, racial and social thinking are plainly bordering on fantasy; they are drowned in populism and cognitive dissonance. The EFFs are more than just crude opportunists; their political madness, as reflected in their promises, will take South Africa not like Jacob Zuma to the brink of a complete collapse: they will immediately bring about a total collapse of the country. The political dysfunctional mindset of its leaders have already been reflected in their weird public behaviour. Their violence and unruly behaviour and dislike of order are well reflected by their violent and disrespectful actions in Parliament, as well as at council meetings where they participated in municipalities. This cognitive chaos inside the EFF leadership is understandable when noting that the EFF hailed Robert Mugabe as a hero. In this utmost political instability of the EFF is it understandable why its MP Zolile Xalisa had no other choice but to leave it for the African Transformation Movement (ATM).The political instability in the EFF also drove out the EFF-MP Thembinkosi Rawula.89,91

4.1.1.2.2. The EFF’s performance after the May 2019 election

To now call the EFF one of the major parties in South Africa due to its so-called third position (ranking) of voters’ representation, which it obtained mostly by our imbalanced indirect Electoral Act, is misleading. Some so-called political analysts became mixed-up between ranking and statistics: the EFF only obtained 10% of the votes in the 2019 elections (and 6% of the votes in the 2014 election), meaning that at most 10% or a 10th of the total votes. Seen from a political analyst’s view, neither did the EFF really successfully master the so-called SWOT characteristic of the “political MBA” to bring them into the league of “good” parties. They misused and exploited the serious conflicting political, social and economic issues of the country which have already put the country into paralysis many times. As a party it fails to offer constructive solutions or ideas, and misuses empty populism to activate aggression and hostility with a 10% sector of the voters as an empowerment vehicle to stay upright. They do not understand basic politics and democracy, neither how to govern even the simplest social organisation. They cannot even can manage the ethics of their own party, as is evident from their support of the looting of the VBS Mutual Bank.85,86,89,92

Their involvement with the DA in municipal affairs shows one thing: destabilisation of good order. Their constant attacks on the ANC seems from the outside a strong and winning outcome for the EFF. But it is far from the truth. Firstly, is it misleading and secondly, there is a good reason for the EFF’s so-called successful attack on the ANC. In this context it must firstly be remembered that their parent-party, the ANC, is in a vegetative state, with a 50% part cemented with the EFF into political-radicalism. This ANC failure had a negative impact over 25 years on the mass of poor and landless Blacks. It is the same deprived group who the EFF also not could enrich and uplift since its founding as a “party of the people”. In addition, it placed them directly into conflict with the authorities and law and order. The creation of unrest, anarchy and revolution seems the ultimate intention of the EFF here.85,86,89,92

Secondly, there is not a single fact in the EFF’s actions to associate it with the positivity which characterised the political ideology of Nelson Mandela. To describe the EFF, as Kanyane92 tried to do, as the new don of South Africa politics, is wishful thinking. The correct reference is: new mischief-monger. Kanyane’s92 insight and thus also his propaganda, are lacking understanding of the principles of basic politics and sound political thinking. There is not a hunger by the mass of South African Blacks for a so-called “liberation”, or revolution in terms of land ownership or races. We saw the improper infusion thereof already in Venezuela and Zimbabwe, as well as the Zuma-regime of state capture under the mantle of “Black-African/African-Black liberation”. Eugene Terreblanche and his AWB tried the same kind of “political joke of mischief” with Afrikaner-liberation, as what Malema and his cronies are now trying to do, just to be rejected at the end. This rejection was not by the Black population, but by the Afrikaner/White population. This happens the same way with the ultra Afrikaner-nationalist leader Hans van Rensburg and his Ossewa-Brandwag (underwriting Nazism and extreme White nationalism) in the White politics of the 1940s. It failed miserably.1,85,86,89,92

4.1.1.2.3. The post-2019 erasing of the EFF’s founding aims and intentions

The May 2019 election shows that radical racial parties such as Andile Mngxitama’s Black First Land First (BLF), the African Content Movement (ACM) led by Hlaudi Motsoeneng and the Social Revolutionary Workers Party (SRWP) of Irvin Jim lost voter support and recognition, writes Mvumvu18. But this loss of voters’ support goes broader, affecting also the two other racial radical parties, namely the EFF and the FF+. Mthombothi93 highlights the dilemma wherein the bitter-ender radical parties such as the EFF, the ACM, the BLF and the ATM had run in the May election due to their expectation that their pushing of the expropriation of land without compensation would reap rich rewards for them (a misconception, which also swayed the ANC to join that bandwagon). It did not work. The racial radical parties of the EFF and the FF+ vote increase in the May 2019, is further misleading. There is no evidence of black voters excitedly flocking to proponents of amending the Constitution with the sole purpose of grabbing other people’s property on which both the EFF and the FF+ build their politics (although that of the FF+ politics is in reverse by their fuelling the Whites with a fear for land grabbing and an outcome which the FF+ has falsely positioned itself to be able to prevent it). This outcome means that there is no role to play in the near future for the EFF. For the EFF (as for that of the ACM, the BLF and the ATM) its primary founding aim and intention to effect exclusive land grabbing from Whites specifically, is firstly nullified. Secondly, its sole purpose of exclusive land grabbing, which held the party on the road and assured its members’ enrolment, is erased.  It is indeed the spelling out in the near future of the end of what a party such as the EFF saw initially as a new, but false beginning in the May elections’ with its gains in Parliamentary seats. The South African grassroots politics of post-2019 is no more established in the racial radicalism that characterised the manifestos of parties such as the EFF, the BKF, the ACM, the SRWP, the ATM and the FF+. The combined might of the South African capitalist class from all racial groups and the respect for democracy by most Blacks, notwithstanding their suffering under Apartheid had nipped in the bud permanently the popularity and empowerment of these racial radicals, leading to the EFF’s, FF+’s and ATM’s insignificant positions in the Sixth Parliament.93,94

A good example (similar to that of the EFF’s winning of votes from short term disgruntled ANC members and voters), is the said sudden “increase” for example of the right-wing Freedom Front Plus (FF+) in the May election. Its rise in votes is also simply the result of disgruntled White DA-voters who respond foolishly to the FF+’s slogan of “Fight Back”, seeing the FF+ as a rescuer of their so-called “eroded White-rights”. It is not a radical, lasting political improved outcome waiting for the disgruntled Whites. It holds the same limitations and a phasing-out in waiting as for the EFF. It is equal to those reflected by radical Afrikaners in the short-lived days of the AWB. Both the “growths” of the EFF and FF+ are the same racial contamination.36

It is important to critically look further at the belief that socialism is favoured by the mass of South Africans; a direction Malema seemingly wants now to steer his EFF into after the voters’ rejection of his exclusive Black-nationalism, land grabbing and nationalising of every citizen’s assets. The absolute failure of the SRWP which was undoubtedly a nasty shock for socialist supporters of the change away from socialism and radicalism in political thinking on grassroot-level is prominent here. This party, initiated by the 370 000-strong National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) and supported by its affiliated federation, the more or less 800 000-strong South African Federation of Trade Unions (Saftu), received only 24 439 votes (meaning a miniscule 0.14% of the total vote).26

This reflects the dilemma of a dark future waiting for the EFF. Its political foundation is precisely that of the doomed BLF, the ACM, the SRWP and the FF+. Botha95 pinpoints that the above outcome of rejection of the land expropriation without compensation and its racial radicalism, was evidence that the populist and socialist opinion about politics, as held until the May election by the labour-unions [but surly also the BLF, the ACM, the SRWP and the EFF], is presently without standing and a myth.95

On the failed racial radical politics coming from the past election around land expropriation and the parties caught up in it, Botha95 refers specifically as an example to the racial radical BHF [whose policy is openly a combination of Marxism and Leninism (an ideology to which the EFF prominently also lends itself) and the implication which had led to the immense financial chaos in Zimbabwe and Venezuela]. Botha95, in a comparison of the EFF with the BHF, writes as follows on the BLF95:10:

Die…Black First Land First (BLF), wie se leier hom gereeld skuldig maak aan onsinnigheid in die algemeen en haatspraak in die besonder en ook sy volgelinge (wat maar dun gesaai is) aanhits tot onwettige optrede, veral oor die besetting van grond.

Dié party het sowat 0.11% van die stemme  ontvang, wat beteken dat sy steun vir ‘n radikale benadering tot nasionalisering van eiendom beperk is tot slegs een persoon uit 1 000 wat gestem het.

Thus in comparing the EFF and its leaders’ racial radicalism with that of the BLF above in how both are driving their politics, there is no real difference, besides the foolish arrogance and self-orientation of the two group’s leaders, thankfully blocking the formation of a foolish alliance. There seems, as for the failed BLF, that the EFF also has a limitation to be able to move into the future, namely as a hindrance, besides its contaminated racial inclinations, its unpredictable and strange leadership. To survive the post-2019 politics, the EFF is now forced to make a drastic change in its politics if it wants to survive until 2024. But, for the EFF to move more racially and economically radical to the left on nationalising the public’s private assets, there is no more space in post-2019 South Africa. To move right and moderately, there is also no place for the EFF: there are already well functioning parties here which will fast gobble up the EFF. Both outcomes are going to leave “Kaiser Julius Malema” walking naked out of Parliament very near in the future. Neither would an alliance with the other radicals such as the BLF, the SRWP and the ACM save the day. As mentioned, these parties are already basically phased out from the post-2019 politics due to their racial, political and economic radicalism, especially on the matter of land. To go to bed with the ATM for Malema’s EFF in a last dying compulsion, will be a fatal coupling for the EFF. It is clear that the ATM, born out of sympathy for Jacob Zuma because of his ousting from the presidency, is just another diminutive party which made it with “luck from somewhere” to Parliament. It is of political insignificance and only costs the taxpayers money by their sitting in Parliament.95

It must be noted that Malema is the EFF and the EFF is Malema. Stripping Malema from his EFF-clothing indeed means the forever departure from politics of Julius Malema, as well as his absurd political ambitions and aspirations. Taking Malema out of the EFF means the outright collapse of the EFF. It will thus take a far more constructive change inside the EFF and its leadership’s mindset to make it and them more acceptable as a party with moderate Blacks and Whites. Malema’s latest political rhetoric-trick after the post-2019 election, as with the many other political jokes, strangeness and obscurities uttered in his politic career, reflects excellenty the EFF’s and Malema’s political confusion and in-depth cementing already into the political wilderness. Prominent is his recent senseless and confused political title-tattle which undoubtedly reflects a serious memory loss on what he extremely racial-radically had said before on Whites and their assets – rhetoric which included serious threats to their property as well as their personal security. His senseless and confused political title-tattle tells us a lot when he said96:7: “We are focusing on all voters generally, not a specific race group. The only issue with white people and our policies is not that they are anti-white. Our policies are anti-white privilege and white people tend to enjoy white privilege at the expense of black people.”

In the face of this false “new good politics”, including a sudden and confusing “White love” as recently declared publically by Malema on behalf of himself and the EFF, Buccus26 guides and warns us on the dark, masked side of the EFF and Malema. Buccus posits26:26: “The EFF is clearly aligned to the mixture of crude nationalism, authoritarianism and gross looting of the state that has characterised the Zuma faction of the ANC.”  Buccus26 takes further this unchangeable racial radicalism politics of the EFF (and that of the FF+ from the White side of racial radicals) in the post -2019 politics when he writes26:26: “It is true that the crude racial populism of the EFF and the Freedom Front Plus made some gains, but in the overall picture they remain a minority. Mandela’s vision of racial reconciliation clearly still has the support of the majority of South Africans.”

For the EFF to move into an alliance with the ANC in an effort to block the EFF’s erasing as an entity from the country’s politics, can only possibly happen if the Zuma-faction overtakes the general ANC. But this outcome also seems also impossible, in terms of the EFF’s radical ideology, for any alliance if the doves of the Ramaphosa-clan obtain the upper hand. Even if the present status of internal conflicting-politics activated by the Zuma faction stays on within the ANC, the May 8 election shows that the ANC in general has successfully forced down for the moment the radicals inside it and had already disowned the Zuma-aligned ACM, the BLF and the ATM as possible future partners. Munusamy30 writes specifically in this context on the EFF’s radicalism and racial-contaminated shortcomings, making it already unacceptable as a possible partner to the ANC. Munusamy postulates30:26: “The EFF could have used its popularity on the ground to partner with the ANC in government. But its politics are underlined by malice and brutish behaviour, making a working relationship with any party unfeasible.

Buccus26, on the outcome of the election results of only a 10% stake instead of 15% and more which has forced down an empowerment cap on the EFF, as well as that of its possible radical partners in the ANC, in terms of their further practising of radical politics, writes26:26: “This outcome means that SA is doing relatively well in avoiding the curse of populism. The populists in the ANC have been seriously weakened by Ramaphosa’s success. They will be further weakened by the now much more credible criminal justice system.”

Indeed, the advent of a post-2019 credible criminal justice system may be the strongest eraser of the leadership of the EFF, together with the basically already invisible political movements such as those of the ACM, the ATM, the BLF, by their calling to book for political delinquency.26

4.1.1.2.4. Alleged inner-circle mischief at the EFF home

When it comes to the measuring of the integrity of a political party and its leadership, it is unavoidable to reflect on the EFF’s inner-circle’s politics and the allegations around it. Important to note in this respect are fresh allegations of financial impropriety against Julius Malema by members of his central command, according to Harper98. In his resignation letter, the previous EFF-MP, Zolile Xalisa, accused Malema of failingto account for R2-million a month collected in levies from councillors, MPLs and MPs. It is also alleged that Malema did not account for about R20-million which the party received from the legislatures every quarter.91,97,98

In this context Harper98 reports that in his public resignation, Xalisa also accused Malema of not accounting for about R1.7-million a month collected in levies specific from the EFF’s 825 councillors. It is alleged that since the 2016 elections, each councillor had paid a levy of almost R2 000 a month. Xalisa said98:10: “You [Malema] never reported about this money in the CCT [central team] and the war council. You refuse to be held accountable nor account for these funds.”

Regarding the levies of the 61 MPs and MPLs, Xalisa reports that just under R7 000 a person a month – which totals R427 000 a month for the 61 members, were collected – and there was no proper accounting done by Malema. All of the abovementioned money was meant to go into a constituency fund for EFF parliamentarians to do their constituency work. Furthermore, Malema is accused by Xalisa of forcing the central command team to themselves pay weekly deployment costs, including car hire, accommodation, party T-shirts and food for supporters.91,98

The other EFF-MP that resigned, Thebinosi Rawula, also accused Malema of alleged financial irregularities.91,97,98

In addition is the fact that Julius Malema has not yet been cleared from prosecution of earlier corruption charges in connection with government tenders in Limpopo. Now that the NPA is renewed and the Zuma-capture thereof it is starting to be cleared, Malema can become a point of focus.97

The madman-looting of the VBS Mutual Bank by many political fools and their cronies is now ready for prosecution. In this context, writes Bruce99, the fraud and pillage at the VBS Mutual Bank and the demonstrable benefit from the looting of it by Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu, which indeed forced their arrest, handcuffing, perp-walking, charging and then releasing on bail before the May 8 election is a clear and easy case for the law-enforcment agencies. Besides this, there is the allegation against the EFF of the receipt of funding from the tobacco underworld that needs the attention of the NPA, SARS and the SAPS, posits Munusamy.100

The arrest of Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu – Bruce’s99 description of “their handcuffing, perp-walking, charging and then releasing on bail before the May 8 election”, which was the moral and politically correct action — was seemingly only to avoid by the ANC’s opportunism not to lose some votes to the EFF for these arrests before the election and/or of a possible partnership between the ANC and EFF after the election. Notwithstanding all this political covering against their earlier arrest, Shamila Batohi and some trustworthy and law-abiding members in the Hawks, the NPA and the SAPS are hopefully waiting patiently for them. Bruce postulates that hopefully their arrests will come during 2019, with the possible outcome of leaving the EFF leaderless already in 2019.99-102

It seems that criminal law has at last arrived at the EFF’s door. It was reported that the EFF MP Marshall Dlamini had appeared on the 15th April 2019 in the magistrate’s court of Cape Town, due to his alleged assault of a police officer in Parliament on the 7th February. It seems that the deputy leader of the EFF, Floyd Shivambu, will also appear in court about his alleged assault of a journalist in March on the Parliament terrain. The 4% rise and glory of the last election can fast make place for the erasing of the EFF and its leaders, if the law is properly executed. The need to take them to court for past wrong–doings is highlighted by various investigative journalists.99-102

4.1.1.2.5. Julius Malema is an acolyte of Peter Mokaba in his underwriting of narrow African nationalism

Julius Malema, the EFF’s top leader, is “an acolyte of Peter Mokaba”, reflects the seasoned political analyst and the political editor of the Sunday Times, Sibongakonke Shoba103, in March 2009. This Malema political inclination is well-illustrated by Shoba103 by clearly showing Malema’s focus of his politics on a narrow “African nationalism”; a political ideology that had already failed to gain ground in the ANC and even the broader South African community. (Narrow White-nationalism was also the reason for the failure of the Afrikaners as a tribe in South Africa and brought down the NP with its racial and discriminative Apartheid; a party which was intimately built around it and its wrong-doings).1,103

Malema and his EFF, writes Shoba103, are a product of Mokaba’s teachings. He had undoubtedly become a believer in and a supporter of the worst form of African nationalism. Shoba writes103:19: “He has hijacked the political space once occupied by the PAC and the Azanian People’s Organisation. Even though Malema may, on occasion, invoke the names of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo, his politics have been inspired by Pan-Africanist rhetoric. His attacks on white people and South Africans of Indian origin show that his idea of African nationalism is extreme, and has an element of right-wing demagoguery.”

What Shoba103 missed out on and also needs to say, is that Malema’s ideology of the “encircling of a greater South African African-nationalism” has been cemented into a well-masked “Venda-African-nationalism” or plain “Venda-tribalism”. It is a deadly, abnormal Black ethnicity and tribalism. This Venda-nationalism-tribalism carries in ordinary South African politics absolutely no empowerment or status and will go nowhere. To underwrite and propagate it would let Malema remain for ever faceless, unknown and powerless in South African politics, and of course, out of Parliament and its feed-trough. The reflection of and presentation thus of a “greater” South African African-nationalism”, is nothing more than masterminded-politics by Malema, purely for opportunistic reasons and his personal gain. (This “Malema-initiative” is to a certain extent a pure mimicing of the Zuma clan’s failed policy through which they  tried to represent “African-Black nationalism” or “Black-African nationalism” away from African-nationalism for their political gain, such as activating and upholding of state capture, land grabbing and the nationalising of White capital, etc.).34,63,64,103

Prominent in Malema’s attacks on so-called “non-Africans” (meaning “non-Black” Africans) are the names of Pravin Gordhan (also a target of Mokaba) and Shamila Batohi. And then there are the Afrikaners/Whites, especially the farm owners and White-capitalists.99,104 Excellent examples here are the many politically and racially delinquent utterances of Malema between 2016 and 2018, such as: “We are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now” and his statement that: “…people of Indian decent tend to mistreat black workers” – both utterances which the South African Human Rights Commission found to be OK!104,105 Then there is Malema’s nonchalant pronouncement of Pravin Gordhan as a “…dog of white monopoly capital who hates Africans”, as well as Shivambu’s authored blog post, accusing as follows: “Gordhan of running a cabal and operating a parallel state”.104,105 These kinds of utterances, if used by a White, undoubtedly would mean a jail sentence plus.

The allegation of the “future that the EFF is seising” and the “freshness and creativeness” that the EFF  allegedly is bringing to the so-called “South African old politics of liberation”- as seen and propagated by Kanyane92 – is going to be very short-lived. The EFF has gained temporarily more votes in the May-election through racism and extreme radical-politics, only because the greater ANC as well as the DA shy away from this kind of political delinquency. But it is going to cost the EFF dearly in post-2019 politics. It must be noted, on the other side, that this political and racial contamination which has beset the EFF will spread into its co-partners if the EFF is successful in misleading either the DA or the ANC into a post-2019 trap of cooperation.103

An exclusive and selective African nationalism (equal to the one which Malema propagates) cost the PAC and Azapo dearly, putting them into permanent regression as groups after 1994, writes Shoba103. The “struggle of Africans” in South Africa, as Malema with great mischief reflects, is not limited to small group of African-Blacks, but includes all the racial groups who are a permanent part of South Africa and thus Africa. It is clear that with regard to the ultra-African nationalism, it is today only Malema and a very small group of remnants of the old revolutionaries that are still stuck with this cognitive idea. The EFF’s propagation and spreading of it spells revolution and genocide that are not part of the thinking of the majority of South Africans. Looking at this delinquent-internalised mindset of Julius Malema, is it undoubtedly with a tongue in his cheek that Shoba fatherly advises Malema103:19: “If Malema is serious about realising his childhood ambition to ascend to the highest office in the land, he will have to change tack.” From experience Shoba103 must know very well that Malema cannot change; neither does he understand the meaning “tack”, or what it means to be responsible after ascending to the highest office.

4.1.1.2.6. Malema and his merry men mostly dressed in Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits

On Julius Malema’s bi-polar presence in the South African politics — and surely an effort to give us insight into the many colours a chameleon can take, even those in the South African politics — De Waal writes106:33:

Thabo Mbeki at the Rand Easter Show! How thrilling. The diminutive former statesman was wheeled out of retirement by the ANC to counter the presence of his former foe, Julius Malema, who now leads the ANC’s external ultra-left wing, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). First, though, a little back ground. It was Malema, then leading the ANC Youth League, who said he would kill for Jacob Zuma, who was then challenging Mbeki for the ANC leadership. Later, in one of those historical ironies one can only relish, Malema himself was booted out of the ANC – by his former patron and glorious leader, Zuma, for comparing him unfavourably with his predecessor, Mbeki!

How we chuckled.

It’s rather odd that, now, with both Mbeki and Zuma out of power, Malema is backing Zuma’s bagman, Tom Moyane, to the hilt, and demonetising Pravin Gordhan, Zuma’s bête noir, for all he’s worth. But that’s a puzzle for another day.

To unlock the above puzzle around the specific Julius Malema political mindset and actions is very easy and does not need another day. We just have to look back to his yesterday and his not so far-back history of politically delinquent actions and how easily he changes from his Dr Jekyll suit to his Mister Hyde suit when the situation opportunistically fits him.

Firstly, witness his delinquent political action excellently reflected when Cosatu, under his leadership in 2002, unleashed chaos in the Johannesburg CBD, leading to loses by pedestrians, vendors and shopkeepers who were mugged and robbed during the rowdy illegal march.107This kind of unleashing of chaos-behaviour in public was alleged again to be caused by his EFF’s involvement at the more recent unrest in the township of Alexandra on land occupation. It was prominently alleged at the last sitting of the Alexandra Inquiry in May 2019 that the EFF was directly involved. At a meeting of the Inquiry, the Alexandra councillor, Teffo Raphadu, said that the EFF perpetrates land invasions in Alexandra in such a delinquent way “that [it] put people’s lives in danger,” according to Okoye.108

Furthermore, it seems, that there is only one approach for Malema109 to obtain land reform (especially the transfer of White “settlers’ so called stolen land” to the landless and poor Blacks, and that is through violence, anarchy and revolution. He declares himself open to the use of violence, anarchy and revolution in the settling of the land matter, ignoring the fact that a mandated black government, the ANC, is reigning and he himself is a MP of the respected South African Parliament and not a non-conforming member of a bush-bar. He is supposed to be a role-model and is expected to promote integrity. The intention to incite unlawful violence, anarchy and revolution in order to overthrow the government of the day is well illustrated by his following writing on the 22 July 2018109:22:

There is simply no way Parliament can retreat on this question any longer. After all these consultations, one thing is clear: to retreat and betray our people on the demand for land expropriation will be to risk a direct revolution, which they will conduct on their own, wherever they are.

On that day, when our people take the land by force, the EFF will join in because the power of the day would have refused to co-ordinate a peaceful, democratic and inclusive process that empowers the previously oppressed to have access to the land.

When further examining his EFF Manifesto presented for the recent election, the same kind of disorder politics is preached by him. The basis is over and over the threatening of the order of society and the instigation of anarchy, constantly and continuously. It reads89:18:

“We are not part of the 1994 elite pact. We are a completely new generation, with new demands. And our demands, unlike those of the 1994 generation, will not be postponed. We refuse to be silenced with so-called reconciliation. We want justice now. We want our land now. We want jobs now. We demand the economy now!”

But there are more than just the Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits that Malema and his cronies from the EFF seem to dress themselves in daily: there are seemingly also their witch-hunter suits that need to be highlighted, because this also, as Teffo Raphadu said of the EFF’s alleged delinquent activities in Alexandra, “puts peoples’ lives in danger.”108,110

At the end of this article the Citizen of the 29th May 2019 reports on the politics of the bizarre that comes from the EFF leader Malema’s alleged death threats towards the Scorpio’s investigative journalist Pauli van Wyk.110 This reaction followed after her report on the 28th May 2019 on how the EFF had apparently benefitted from the looting of the now defunct VBS Mutual Bank, as well as the EFF’s deflection from claims of corruption to a spirited defence of the public protector. Watson110, on these alleged actions of the EFF-cronies, writes110:2: “When the story – titled “Cruising nicely on VBS: EFF’s Parties, Lies and Looted Money” – was released on Monday night, Malema’s response on Twitter was: “We are still cruising nicely, bana ba balei [children of witches] are not happy. Go for kill fighters, hit hard…[sic]”. ▼

Watson110 writes that Van Wyk110 allegedly had noted in her article that the EFF’s fourth birthday bash in Durban in July 2017 was seemingly funded by a part of the money of the illegal R16.1-million Brian Shivambu’s company Sgameka Projects received from VBS that was ultimately channelled to the EFF. Watson also writes that it is alleged by Scorpio that it has so far isolated about R4.13-million in VBS loot paid to the EFF. Watson110 reflects that the article of Van Wyk is currently (29th May 2019) on the Daily Maverick with apparent copies of bank statements around these payments. He writes110:2: “…which, on the face of it, explain the flow of cash in “a scheme designed to mask the origin and ultimate beneficiaries of the funds. VBS money flowed through companies over which Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu have ultimate control”.”

In response to further enquiries to Malema by Van Wyk110 about the leadership of the EFF and its treasurer-general Leigh-Ann Mathys, alleged Watson110 that had Malema said110:2: “I won’t be answering any questions from the moloi [witch]; she can write anything she wants to write. I’ve responded to all her questions before and won’t be doing it going forward. She is extraordinarily personal [sic] and I’m not answerable to a white madam. She can go to the nearest hell.” ▼

Watson110 reports further that, in a seeming effort at deflecting from the VBS Bank matter, the EFF Deputy President Shivambu110 compared Van Wyk to a lizard and Pravin Gordhan to a crocodile110:2: “We really have no time fighting lizards when the crocodiles are the real enemy forces.” This brings us again to the foreground of Van Wyk’s110 earlier note in the Scorpio on the “strange” and for “what unknown” reason, the “spirited defence of the public protector” by the EFF who is herself at the moment under scrutiny by the various political bodies for  her actions.

How far the politically delinquent actions, especially on the contamination of good racial-relations, of persons such as Malema and his intimate cronies in their Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits have tragically already penetrated a sector of the Black society mindsets with their dangerous anti-White culture and radicalism, was well-illustrated by the crowd’s booing of ex-President FW de Klerk (the man who puts Blacks – and thus also Julius Malema and his cronies – in charge of South Africa in 1994) at the recent inauguration of President Cyril Ramaphosa.111  Bachtis111 writes as follows on this indication of the vile racial tensions that exist in the country111:13:

This was a naked display of intolerance of one race group against another. Sickening in the extreme, as white people in this country were given notice that they are abhorred, and regarded as undesirable.

It took the master of ceremonies some time to bring the crowd to order. Sadly, many in that crowd were dignitaries from countries across the African continent, witnessing vitriolic sentiments.

This show of disrespect heralds the new South Africa, a country where white-skinned people, born in this country, are regarded as being of no importance.

The white diaspora will continue, and this country will continue to entrench reverse racism and apartheid.

That the Whites must start to fear for their lives if Malema and his cronies win the empowerment of the country’s politics, is further confirmed by his racially delinquent utterance of:

“We are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now”.103-105

The above words, which echo perfectly Julius Malema’s history of racial rhetoric, have excellently put in the foreground Julius Malema’s and the EFF’s all-over political mischief of agitation and the instigation of disrespect for the individual’s rights, democracy, and political order. This negativity is not only applicable to the Whites, but also to the greater Black population.89,107,108,110,111

Political jokers and clowns bring laughter and can sometimes change for the good, even inside the political circus, but political fools can, masked as jokers and clowns, be very dangerous in the short and long run for the minorities and a country’s stability: remember Idi Amin and Adolf Hitler. Thankfully, the delinquencies and foolishnesses of these political fools’ mostly disable themselves in the end.99-102

Malema and his cronies at the EFF will hopefully soon learn that their outdated and poor fitting Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde suits do not fit into today’s respectable politics. Neither can their witch-hunter suits qualifying them for jokers and clowns. To be dressed in these outfits much longer can cost them dearly.99-102

▲ It is important for Julius Malema with regard to his alleged calling Pauli van Wyk a witch, to take note of the main aims of the Witchcraft Suppression Act No 3 of 1957, namely112:

To prevent any person or a community to identify a specific person (notwithstanding his position or doing, to justify such an identification) to be a “”wizard”” through witch-finding;

To prevent that this identified person (“wizard”) is harmed (threatened, terrorised, victimised or even murdered) in any way by the “witch-finder” or the community;

To prevent a person to call himself a ‘wizard’ by prohibiting such self-naming / declaration as a crime, with the sole aim to safeguard him against harm by his own wrong-doing, to be identified as a ‘wizard’ by the ‘witch-finder’ and the community. [For full text see Section 1(a) to (f) (i) – (iv) of the Act].

This means that Malema’s alleged calling of Ms Pauli Van Wyk a moloi (witch) and the alleged use of the words: bana ba balei [children of witches] are not good. Go for kill fighters, hit hard…[sic]”, can be a serious matter and lead to his criminal prosecution and being sent to jail. It can be as serious as looting the VBS Bank’s money and committing high treason.110,112

4.1.1.2.7. The EFF is a boys’ club of dinky-toy players

The EFF is a boys club of dinky toy players; it does not have political potential, quality or maturity. The majority of democracy-loving South Africans know it well. It is only the politically poorly informed voters and some present-day confused and disillusioned ANC members, together with a pocket of political radicals, that still believe in the EFF’s kindergarten stories and their so-called “saviour and messianic” leaders, the honourable MPs Malema and Shivambu, to bring about their Utopia.12,92,99,100,113-115

The EFF’s Manifesto, propagated by Julius Malema under the heading: “The EFF is ready to govern as demonstrated by the detailed blueprint for economic emancipation as set out in its manifesto”, is not worth the paper on which it has been written. There is an immense difference between a detailed manifesto of plain nonsense and a detailed record of an excellent practice of politics. The last mentioned is a good characteristic which the EFF is totally lacking. Prominent from the reading of the EFF Manifesto is Malema’s instigation of violence, racism, minority-bashing and radical-Marxism and the solving of politics and economics with the typical chaos-revolutionary business model where the ruler does not create new economic growth, prosperity and richness, but only transfers the assets of the one group to the so-called poor and landless people, who, at the end, stay landless and poverty-stricken. At the end of such a chaotic regime, when the economics come to a standstill and poverty and chaos reigns, the ruler collapses and escapes the scene with his loot.33,88,103,114,115

The EFF is, in its juvenile stage of development, already a failed political experience. Hopefully, if the NPA at last starts to do its work, Malema and his immediate cronies will be out of circulation in 2019.88,110,114 The heartbreak which Julius Malema experienced when he mourned the death of his grandmother115:7: “I am broken, finished” may be his same words in the future with his departure and that of his beloved EFF from the country’s politics.

History can be hard and cruel on foolish politicians and their parties. This punishment can be harder for an irresponsible boys club of dinky toy players. Sorely for the EFF, it seems to be one of these historical cases.

4.1.1.2.8. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018

On the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, the EFF is awarded eight points out of a possible 82 points.81

This measure shows that the EFF does not have the ability or a single talent to take on a simple government task or duty; forget the implementation of the nationalising and the grabbing of land. The EFF and its politics is like a dog chasing a car for years and then one day the car stops, giving the dog the opportunity to try to bite the tyres and to take the car captive, but without success, leaving it with the enormous problem of what to do with the stranded car it was chasing for years. The EFF has indeed been stranded between its inciting, foolish and hostile rhetoric and its lack of knowhow to be able to do constructive deeds. And then there is its extremely unpredictable politics, bordering on political insanity. The EFF’s mastery to distract the attention from their own delinquencies and inabilities through the excellent misuse of social media are also thankfully diminishing fast under the onslaught of investigative and constructive journalists. The fact is, and the public is beginning to learn this well, that the EFF and its leaders’ political warts on their hands and faces make them just too visible.12,92,99,100,108,113-116

5. Conclusions

On the decision to vote for the EFF or not in the recent May 2019 election, Munusamy118 gave the voters before the election clear, advice: “…holding our noses to vote for the least-odious party” when she guides118:20: “To make a decision to vote requires that law-abiding, conscientious people ask themselves which political party is least offensive to their own values and principles.” When the “is least offensive” requirement has been applied, it could not be the EFF. Thankfully also, to support Munusamy’s118 guideline, most of the voters have excellent values and principles. They showed it clearly in the election by their isolation of the EFF, together with its cronies, such as the ATM, the ACM and the BLF, from future serious politics. Indeed, the voters put the lid on radical racial politicians. The EFF’s politics, reflected by its contaminated political thinking, planning and action, spell only disaster all over for the county’s well-being.116,118

If people are disgusted by the possible inclusion of some of the 22 listed disgraced ANC top brass as parliamentarians, they must be just as disgusted to see Malema and Shivambu back in Parliament as MPs.92,99,100,113,114,116 But, on the other hand, to be noted on this uncommon phenomenon, people must remember, as Retief119 says, this is Africa. Seemingly this country now has its own style of the practice of politics and the underwriting of political integrity.

All South Africans, especially the Whites, know that serious land reform is absolutely needed; it is an immediate imperative and there is a strong contingent of Whites willing to participate in reasonable land transfer to Blacks. The EFF and its leaders’ incoherent land grabbing policy, together with their cognitive political mal-thinking, spell revolution and can lead to the cost of thousands of innocent lives. Mandela’s sole reason for entrance into the 1994-Dispensation was because too much blood of the Black majority had been spilled. The EFF wants a Rwanda in South Africa. The EFF and the Malema-crowd are on the way, if they get the opportunity, to spill blood again, but this time a mass of Black, Coloured, Indian and White blood.75-80

It is clear that the EFF’s CV is very thin. It lacks the prescribed qualifications and documents as well as the prescribed experience to be a ruler. They played off this meaningless CV very well  in the May election, without anyone really contacting their referees. The Attestations or letters of the referees on the EFF’s and its leaders’ trustworthiness, integrity and qualities – besides one or two subjective, uninformed and unqualified referees — are totally rejecting the EFF as a ruler or partner to a ruler for post-2019 South Africa. The referees of the EFF, in evaluating it as the ideal government to activate, steer and finalise land expropriation, with (or without) compensation, erases them summarily from the list of candidates.

The count awarded to EFF and its leadership in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201881, is a mere 8 (9%) out of a possible maximum of 82 (100%). This means, together with its leadership, an outright failure as a political institution of stature.75-80

Mischief-doing is the only ability of the EFF and its leadership. The present holding of mass land ownership by Whites is basically the only initiative left to the EFF to be able to perpetuate mischief too, basically because it can be contaminated unobstructedly through the EFF’s Parliament privilege racial relations without the taking of responsibility or the calling to book if a fiasco follows. Coetzee120 warns on this post-2019 possibility and the serious consequences for the country by these dinky-toy players’ actions120:14: “Die moedswillige skade wat die Julius Malemas, Magashules and Mlamleli’s met hul opruiery van grondbesetters aanrig, is onberekenbaar.”

The ANC’s own radical racism is strengthening the opportunity for the EFF’s boys club to make some noise, as in the past, in Parliament on the land matter. Coetzee writes120:14: “Naas die korrupsiestryd, gaan die grondkwessie in dié vyfjaar-termyn ‘n brandpunt wees. Die arena waar die wetlike stryd hom grootliks gaan uitspeel, is in die parlement, waar die ad hoc-kommittee vir die wysiging van die Grondwet  se art.25 deurgedryf gaan word.” It is the same Parliament where the EFF had shown in the past its unlimited political gangsters and violence. The land reform matter can, if the EFF is not favoured and supported by the other parliamentarians in doing it in “Malema-style”, change to serious Parliamentary conflict and violence.

The EFF cannot be trusted in any way to be in charge of land expropriation. Moreover, they totally lack the experience to handle such a project.

The applicant status of the EFF, to be considered as an able candidate to be able to rule South Africa after May 8, and thus to  successfully activate land expropriation (with or without compensation), is so low that it and its leadership should not ever be considered and be allowed on the first list of applicants to be a ruler. The application of the EFF must be completely rejected and its application papers should be sent back. It cannot be shortlisted.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa. (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanisation and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.