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South Africa’s Troubled Landownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)

Title: South Africa’s Troubled Landownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Good, great, high-level, leadership, outdated, pretender, troubled, taker.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 12: 2

1. Background

Jonathan Tepperman1 writes1:29,220,221:

In real life, even more than in fiction, stories generally follow predictable paths. The good-looking woman gets the guy. The better-funded politician with the thicker head of hair wins the race. The rich get richer, and everyone else gets screwed. Improbable and unexpected victories are exceedingly rare. Yet every once in a while, they do occur… it’s worth considering just what made the happy ending so implausible and, as a consequence, so inspiring.1:29

By emphasizing circumstances, I don’t mean to suggest that fate, not free will and shrewd leadership, proved decisive in any of these episodes. Circumstances played an important role: the extreme conditions cleared away the institutional and political barriers that ordinarily make radical solutions impossible to effect. But governments face serious crises all the time. What separates the best from the rest is how they deal with them.1:221

The details of the crises varied from place to place, of course. While the specifics  varied, however, in all these episodes the extremity of the moment played a similar role, pushing those in charge to set aside ordinary politics and conventional policymaking and to think big — very big.1:220

Tepperman concludes1:25:

Abandoning hope certainly is tempting – especially at a moment when so many things seem to be going wrong with the world.

The problem with despair, however, is that it’s unproductive. And that makes it a dangerous indulgence at times like these.

Fortunately for us. It’s unnecessary. The solution gridlock – is already out there. You just have to know where to look for the answers.

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 18)

Central to the South African landownership matter is a political history in which discrimination against Blacks by various White regimes since 1652 played a dominant role. The post-1994 Political Dispensation in which justice, humanity, equality should play a primary role, failed to bring land and better economics to the mass of poor Blacks. Instead of bettering the country’s economics and Apartheid’s mismanagement, discrimination and corruption, the post-1994 ANC-regime went down the same path in committing corruption, mismanagement, turning White-on-Black discrimination into Black-on-Black discrimination. In particular, its elite creates state capture to favour their intimate cronies. BBEEE and cadre deployment brought wealthto the Blacks, but only to a small group of ANCs, mostly corrupt politicians and those in their intimate circles. The intended redistribution of land to the mass of poor and landless Blacks failed to realise. Inside the present collapse of the economy and the ANC elite’s lack of constructive thinking, planning and doing to bring prosperity to the mass of poor Blacks, there is a retreat into blaming such failure on the past wrongdoing by Whites: The main issue is the the Whites’ land, obtained over centuries, which the radical Black politicians now want. What is lacking in this land redistribution, is a qualified ruler able to manage it, something that the ANC regime is lacking. This unfortunate setup makes land redistribution a second priority, and the appointment of an able, trustworthy and skilled ruler to oversee the process, the first priority. Without such a regime with capability, skills and integrity there will never be successful land redistribution and a second state capture will become unavoidable.

Land grabbing is an age-old custom practised by Blacks on Blacks as well as Whites on Blacks for more than three hundred years in South Africa. It is  a custom that should not be restarted again in 2020. A perfect solution to the present imbalance between White and Black landownership must be found fast, without falling back onto the past’s vicious circle of revenge and counter-revenge to erase the manifold injustices done before 1994.

Our country’s political history is far from completion. We must complete it. The implementation of land redistribution will play a key role in the new part of our political history.

1.2. Aims of article 19 (Continue from Article 18)

The primary aim of this study (Article 19: Part 2) is to continue the analysis and discussion on the matter of land redistribution which is facing South Africans, post-2019.  (See the previous article, titled: South Africa’s Troubled Landownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 1 (18).  The intention  is to bring final conclusions  on how the process can be addressed and to offer a dictum if land redistribution can successfully be executed by the ANC regime as the present ruler or by another ruler post-2019. 

This is the final article in the series of nineteen articles on the matter of South African landownership. The previous eighteen articles in the series were published in the South African accredited journal Ensovoort [Volume 38 (2018), Number 12:1 to Volume 40 (2019), Number 12:10].

2. Method (Continued from Article 18)

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to successfully implement land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa in effecting successful land reform from 2019.

The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion (Continued from Article 18)

3.1. South Africa’s troubled landownership (1652 – 2019)

3.1.1. Introduction

It is true that the 1913 Land Act and the Group Areas Act had dispossessed many black people of their land and livelihood. These injustices and unfairness of Apartheid must be addressed in 2020 to minimise the inequality between White and  Black South Africans. Landownership occupies a central position as a source of serious conflict that is growing. So far there has been immense reluctance from the Whites to address the redistribution of land to the poor and landless Blacks. To effect South Africa’s intended land expropriation (with or without compensation) is not going to be easy. It cannot and must not be a popular political solution. It must bring a righteous and a justified outcome to all South Africans.2

3.1.2. Short  overview of the analysis and discussion of Article 18 (See 3.1.1. to 3.1.2.)

The failed Marxist-Leninist politics of the ANC-regime brought South Africa to the brink of economic and political disaster. Land grabbing is one of the most attractive solutions for the Ramaphosa regime to bring some form of capital and money to the mass of poor people and to restore the ANC regime’s credibility as a revolutionary organisation.

Not one of the political parties in present-day South Africa is capable of effectively running the country, which would include the mandated task of effecting a just and balanced land redistribution.

The troubled landownership is misused by radicals to steer the many dissatisfactions of the mass of poor and landless people into immense unrest and anarchy, even revolution. The unbalanced landownership issue in the country is the single most important reason available to the radicals in the ANC and other political parties to launch a Marxist-Leninist coup. Especially the fact that the ANC can be ousted in the 2024 elections, makes the implementation of a coup a strong possibility in 2020 already. It is thus clear that an acceptable solution to the landownership matter must be found not later than 2020.

3.1.3. Advice and suggestions for a post-2019 effective government

3.1.3.1. ANC-DA intertwining

Political analysts have tried since May 2019 to project what South Africans can be expected in our broader politics from the end of 2019. Suggestions of alliances between parties in an effort to solve the country’s immense problems have been prominent, while the spreading of internal conflicts, to undermine the integrity of political parties even further, have been widely publicised. Regarding alliances, it is argued by some analysts that the ANC’s decisive national majority makes the need for any alliance involving them zero. Other analysts point out the possibility of forming a government of national unity, just like after 1994. They believe such a “coalition” will bring the dissidents in South African politics into the inner circle of the ANC’s politics and promote “nationql unity and consensus” on controversial and conflicting issues such as land expropriation. Political commentators believe that such an outcome will be unacceptable to the hawks in the DA: Although it can be expected that the DA may receive some ministers in the overwhelming ANC cabinet, it will only serve to boost some DA members’  egos and to legitimise the ANC’ s ongoing delinquency (as happened with the FF Plus and Pieter Mulder in the Zuma cabinet). With a partner such as the EFF in a coalition, the ANC’s chaotic pre-1994 politics will prevail.3-6

For the DA elite to be able to cooperate with the ANC elite, they would want to see dramatic changes in the ANC’s politics, which would include abandoning its Marxist rigidity and ceding some of its extreme power. Bruce7 speculates on possible DA prerequisites as follows7:18: “…insisting it would not be the junior partner in any coalition and that it would not, under any circumstances, form coalitions or make ‘arrangements’ with the hated ANC unless the ANC splits and its ‘reformists’ (dove) wing becomes available as a partner”. But such a possible splitting of the ANC is disregarded by Bruce7 as a possibility in the near future when he posits7:18: “That’s (splitting) not going to happen any time soon.”

Other political analysts8 agree with Bruce7 and believe that the present-day ANC, notwithstanding its internal conflicts, will not cede power easily. For these analysts the failure of the ANC after May 2019 to make an alliance with the DA spells the same fate as the NP before its fall into obscurity after splitting up.8

Other analysts predict the formation of a new political party in which an ANC faction would assume a prominent position, but without dominance. The DA is seemingly prepared for any unexpected political happening. All the parties, such as the EFF, DA and ANC, are undoubtedly in some form of consultation as to their long-term politics. Especially for Ramaphosa, such consultation before the ANC’s 2020 mid-year conference, which can determine whether he remains leader, is very important.9

Since 1994 the functioning and structuring of South Africa’s political system in terms of a rigid Black-versus-White division was and is still being questioned by some political analysts. Today this 1994 habit is still seen as being responsible for the compartimentalisation of the two main groups (although the many smaller diverse groups, emanating from pre-1994, are still there): the conservatives and the radicals: the doves and the hawks. Indeed, some analysts foresee a kind of a present as well as a future ANC-DA intertwining. Labuschagne10 posits as follows10:6: “Op nasionale vlak verskil die DA en die ANC se beleid op sommige gebiede net in graad, byvoorbeeld oor grondhervorming. Dié verskille kan deur onderhandelinge en kompromie baie na aan mekaar gebring word.” Labuschagne10 elaborates further when he writes10:6:

Die aksentuering van waardes in die gematigde middelgrond van die politieke spektrum is die enigste werkbare oplossing vir die toekoms. Indien die gematigde partye in Suid-Afrika en die duiwe in die ANC bymekaar kan kom, kan so ‘n gematigde magsblok ontstaan.

In die ideologiese en politieke spektrum is die gematigde groep (duiwe) in die ANC baie nader aan die DA-beleid as die radikale EFF se beleid.

Die ANC-valke is ideologies nader aan die EFF en die groep kan ná ’n skeuring naas dié party links op die politieke spektrum sy plek inneem.

Die ANC-duiwe sal dan na die sentrum van die politieke spectrum kan beweeg om saam met die DA en ander gematigdes ’n sterk gematigde party te kan vorm wat sterk op maatskaplike demokrasie gegrond is.

Die antwoord en hoop vir Suid-Afrika is die hersamestelling van die politieke spektrum en die vorming van ‘n sterk gematide sentrumparty wat die magsbalans in die land beheer.

In Suid-Afrika is die onlogiese preapartheidskonfigurasie van politieke partye [en rasse] nie volhoiubaar nie. Die ANC se verskillende opponerende groepe, saamgebing deur belange en nie waardes nie, is onrealisties en nie in belang van demokrasie en die land nie.

The above so-called “similarity” between the Cyril Ramaphosa clan  and the DA has enjoyed much emphasis since the middle of 2019 in the so-called “battle” between Cyril Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule. But, as pointed out in the previous Article 17, there is a lot of misunderstanding by political analysts on the so-called “Ramaphosa-Magashule battle” and the so-called “fight” for the soul of the Marxist-Leninist ANC: it is a soul which both Ramaphosa and Magashule respect and propagate and do not want to hurt. The same holds for the “killing” of the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist ideology. Neither Ramaphosa nor Magashule disagrees with it: without a Marxist-Leninist ANC is there no place for Ramaphosa in present South African politics. The Ramaphosa-Magashule battle is  purely a short-term leadership battle in which the ambitions, blown-up egos and revenge of the two leaders occupy centre stage. Munusamy11 states appositely11:20: “It is well known that the resistance is not even driven by ideology or principle, but rather by vested interests.” The infighting is not influencing the ANC’s corrupt and radical politics in any way to “better” the ANC and thus to make the ANC acceptable for the DA as an alliance partner.11

Herman Mashaba12, the previous mayor of Johannesburg  writes in the Sunday Times of the 27th Oct. 2019 that he believes that after 25 years South Africans are faced with great inequality, more crime and an education system that has failed the country’s young people, which is a direct result of the monopoly on power enjoyed by the ANC. To combat these negative outcomes, together with the ANC’s state capture, corruption and the plundering of state resources,  Mashaba12 believes there is only one solution, namely that a coalition government is the best way forward for South Africa. For him is It simply  a case of overseeing by the so-called “regime parties ”of the actions of the other “regime parties” in the governance process. He writes12:23: “It is through this lens that the members of the multiparty government evaluated proposals, and ultimately built consensus. I view this to be one of the greatest advantages of coalition government. When no single party has a monopoly on ideas, proposals can be evaluated on their merits and their impact on residents.”

For Mashaba12 there is no deviation by parties in terms of their ideologies and politics. Critically evaluated, the contaminated, crooked values and behaviour of parties left unaddressed and the parties’ identity untouched in a coalition will essentially ripen further, leading to more wrongdoing. In reality it is only a planned and calculated effort by the elite of each party to obtain still a bigger part of the pie (as evidenced by the ANC elite’s immense corruption still continuing today). Mashaba’s12 misunderstanding and misrepresentation of such coalitions is well confirmed by the perverse outcomes of the ANC-SACP-Cosatu Alliance and the various failures of the DA-ANC-EFF Alliance. The exclusive party-only coalitions have not worked since 1994 and they opportunistically serve only the various coalition parties’ and their cronies’ own interests, while the residents’ and citizens’ interests are left out in the cold because they lack their own direct representative (non-political) bodies in the government.12

What Mashaba12 propagates is just a repeat of the wrong politics chosen in 1994 by the citizens of South Africa. It will just be the support again of the wrong party and most of all the wrong leaders, all saturated in opportunism and self-enrichment and -empowerment. Politicians such as Mashaba’s foolish statements and opinions must be read in terms of Gumede’s13 analysis13:20: “Some ANC and government leaders appear to think that just issuing a public statement will miraculously translate into the successful implementation of it. Policies are often based on aspirations, wishful thinking and ideology rather than on grinding reality, evidence and reason.

De Groot14 reflects on these kinds of malcognitive outcomes by quoting the philosopher Daniel Denett14:20: “Those who fear the facts will forever try to discredit the fact-finder.”  

The tragic outcome of these kinds of politics in South Africa under the ANC elite is well described (and at the same time warned against) by Gumede15 when he states15:18:

Many poor, marginalised and desperate black South Africans regularly support leaders and parties  whose policies and behaviour on the face of it run counter to their own interests, only worsening their poverty and marginalisation.

Sadly, the pattern is repeated across post-colonial Africa. This is one of the reasons Africa  has remained overwhelming poor. Nothing will change unless ordinary citizens stop supporting leaders and parties that undermine their own interests.

A dramatic new approach to ruling themselves via self-empowerment is needed not only by the mass of poor Blacks, but by every South African not able to identify with the corrupt political parties.  In addition, it is needed to abandon the positioning of Black versus White and vice versa in the choosing of good leaders, in an improved political system eschewing exclusively Black and White political parties.

To team up the ANC and DA either in an alliance or to form a new party composed of DA and ANC dissendents, is an outright impossibility when taking into account their dissimilar political ideologies, aims, kinds of membership and political histories. In this context of an absolute impossibility to amalgamate in future again only existing political entities in a form of governance in South Africa, we need to shortly reflect on the political entities, the ANC and the DA, in terms of their origins, functioning and aims.

 3.1.3.1.1. The ANC

What firstly stands out, is the founding model of the ANC and its anti-Apartheid ideology, being an inclusive “catch-all” party for all those pre-1994 persons and groups suppressed by the NP (and the Afrikaners/Whites). All types gathered in it:  from hard-core communists, socialists, anti-capitalists, anti-White and anti-Afrikaner, pro-Black, pro-African, democrats and anti-democrats, etc. It was a true hodge-podge of political “bastards” who had seen the ANC as an entrance ticket for their personal gain and to satisfy their ambitions. Its Marxist-Leninist ideology has been part of its foundation and is central to the practice of ANC politics and a presrequisite to become a member.  The absolute rule of the party by its politburo, which is guided by the resolutions of its national conferences and which is implemented via the ANC’s president into policy, forms the core of its politics.3-6,16,17 

Secondly, another prominent feature of the ANC’s revolutionary mindset, as evidenced by its state capture and the mismanagement of country’s finances and the botched 1994 land-redistribution programme, is the obtention of “compensations, gratifications and bait” through the misuse of BEE and other instruments like cadre deployment, thereby exclusively enriching the ANC’s top brass and their cronies. Such policies and attitudes have led to the constant and illegal “compensation” from the state coffers — master-minded by corruption, theft and bribery — justified as normal actions to benefit the so-called “freedom fighters” and those who had “suffered under Apartheid”. State capture and the exclusive chanelling of funds to the ANC elite has become a handle to keep a certain kind of voter on the ANC’s supporters list by maintaining them in poverty and unemployment on the one hand and to distribute free allowances and rewards to them, making these voters work-shy and absolutely dependent on the ANC’s so-called largesse on the other hand. The ANC was born from a revolutionary mother and revolutionary father who both never accepted democracy, political stability, parental responsibility and the development of their children. These negative internalised values are still being maintained by the Ramaphosa regime today.3-6,16,17

This ANC mafia has created an in-depth integration of the economics and politics of the party at the local, provincial and national levels of government, the state system as well as the public system. To break this power structure will not be easy.18,19

Thabo Mokone20, on the above growing gangsterism in the official bodies of the country in which the ANC wields power, writes on 8 December 2019 in the Sunday Times as follows20:20:

Auditor-general Kimi Makwetu this week presented a frightening report, confirming that our downward spiral is gaining momentum and that the public auditing profession has become a danger zone.

Makwetu detailed how high-ranking and highly paid government officials, among them CFOs and municipal managers, brazenly offered bribes or threatened to hijack and kidnap his auditors. Those officials don’t want committed and ethnical auditors to expose the theft and misuse of public money.

In November, a newspaper cutting of a report on a councillor’s murder was left in th offices that the auditors were using. The auditors were looking into a R21m Nelson Mandela Bay municipal drain-cleaning tender with which the dead councillor just happened to have been involved.

It was clearly a threat: the auditors needed to watch their backs. Since that tender was awarded in 2018, reports indicated that 18 people, including politicians and officials, had been murdered in the municipality as a result of squabbles over proceeds from such manipulated tenders.

If you still refuse to believe that SA has officially become a gangster state, Makwetu provided proof of it this week [December 2019].

Mthombothi16, in this context of crooked municipalities under the rule of the ANC elite, also enlightens us on the present return of the looters under Ramaphosa when he writes16:19:

We were convinced that a decade of carefree plunder and looting was behind us and the way was now clear to rediscover our route to the promised land. But a rip-roaring love affair that takes off like a rocket often ends in a crash.

Things have now come to a sticky pass. The national mood has plummeted. This week especially has been brutal [December 2019].

But it is the utter chaos in the big metros that has left people incandescent. Council chambers have been turned into circus. We are the laughing stock of the world. Our politics has long descended into a farce, but we seem to take it in our stride

The ANC’s return to power in Johannesburg this week has filled its residents with distress and trepidation. Their previous stint was marked by eye-popping corruption and incompetence. One has to confess there was nothing to choose between the parties. They’re all part of a bad bunch. But on would have expected the ANC to at least have put forward the least corrupt of its members as candidate for mayor.

Instead, the ANC put forward Geoff Makhubo, a man who apparently comes to the job dragging a caravan of scandals.

Such an appointment is a betrayal of everything that Ramaphosa has been telling us of his administration, and indeed the ANC under his leadership, would be about. Makhubo’s election is confirmation, if any was still required, that talk of a reborn ANC under Ramaphosa is hot air, is that the new dawn is a slogan dreamt up to impress a public hungry for a clean government.

The dancing on the ANC benches must have felt like a stake in the heart to all who want to see a society free of corruption. The looters are back and they won’t let you forget that.

Gumede21 writes that the ANC regime has since 1994 squandered almost the equivalent of the post-war financial aid that the US, in the form of the Marshall Plan and other programmes, gave countries in Europe and Asia to rebuild their economies. In value this misuse represents a staggering R2 trillion that went into outright public corruption. Emphasising the ANC elite’s essential financial fraud in dealing with the public’s money, he states21:22:

Since 1994, close to R1-trillion has been transferred in BEE deals that went to a handful of politically connected politicians, trade unionists and public servants. First, very few of the recipients are entrepreneurs – they were political capitalists.

Not surprisingly very few have added value by creating new industries, opening new economic sectors or developing new technologies. Instead, they have crowded out genuine black entrepreneurs and killed the development of a mass entrepreneurial spirit in black society, because all you need to secure a BEE deal or tender is the right political connections.

On the ANC leadership who have masterminded the defrauding of the state, Gumede21 writes21:22: “We have to honestly face the fact that a predominantly black post-apartheid government has done this. Coming to grips with this painful reality will mean a change in mindset about economic development”; and21:22:

Currently, the top ranks of the party appear to be bereft of leadership quality, ideas and imagination. The ANC seems to have deliberately elected or appointed the least capable members it can find to senior positions. The small dominant group that controls the ANC and government is just too insular, out of ideas and lacking in imagination to get us out of this crisis.

Mthombothi21 continues21:22:

We need to accept that the ANC will never get us out of this mess. It is the author of our predicament, not its solution. Corruption has become part of its makeup. It courses through its veins. To expect the party to fight corruption is akin to demanding that an incorrigible alcoholic give up booze.

Financially, South Africa has gone down the drain under the ANC’s 25 years of rule. The country’s existing debt of 50.6% of GDP in 2017 has worsened to 61% in 2019, with another increase in debt to 71% of the GDP in 2022, which makes it easily understandable why all the rating agencies, besides Moody’s, have long ago relegated our ability to repay our debt to the “junk” level.22,23  Bernstein24 reports that the Treasury recently estimated that the country’s debt will rise to 74% of GDP in 2023 and will keep rising thereafter to hit 80% by 2027.

Bruce22 elaborates further on this state debt, quoting Tito Mboweni, writing22:18: “This year, the national debt exceeded R3-trillion. It is expected to rise to R4.5-trillion in the next three years. To stabilise debt, government will target a primary balance by 2022/23 …we will need to find additional measures in excess of R150bn over the next three years, or about R50bn a year. How will we do this?”

 Bruce22 adds a further comment regarding our mounting debt, as follows22:18:

A senior Investec economist, Nazmeera Moola, has brilliantly grasped what the government cannot – that our finances are literally out of control, and putting off difficult decisions until “the outer years” is Treasury talk for a three-year policy holiday not going to happen.

Moola tracks how our 10-year sovereign bond yields (the margin required to attract buyers) have grown against emerging market peers. Pre-2015 we were paying about 1.5% more than, say, Mexico or Vietnam, to raise money on the markets. Today we’re paying 3.25%. More than double. It means that since December 2015 the extra interests on our debt has risen by R26.6bn. Over the whole life of the debt it will cost an extra R228bn.

In the context of governance, the ANC is a failed political party and has lacked sound leadership since its founding. Under Cyril Ramaphosa, it has become a confused and terminally ill party, lacking the ability to govern South Africa even on a daily basis. On the present immense chaos and pathology in the greater ANC, Crouse25 writes25:20: “Instead, by its unquestioned, corrupt primary system and the national party system, the ANC’s base has been skewered. We childhood lovers of the ANC are nailed like a million worms to a party plank that is at once reformist and recidivist, realistic and revanchist, promising and nihilism incarnate. It is maddening.”

Mkokeli26 writes with honesty that Ramaphosa does not have the ability, power and circumstances — as the one-man-band Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India is successfully doing — to hold things together in South Africa, amid growing chaos.

The successful re-election of the ANC in 2019 essentially means maintaining the corrupt networks created by some members of the ANC elite and their cronies under Zuma, which represent a future lifeline and financial empire for those corrupt members of the ANC elite. Kotze18 posits18:4:

Die tweede rede is dat die netwerke wat in die Zuma-era gevestig is, sover moontlik beskerm moet word. Dit sluit ook privaat sakebelange in. Met Zuma uit die Uniegebou is dt moeilik om nuwe netweke te vestig, maar dit  is steeds moontlik om bestaande s te prober beskerm.

Die toekoms van baie ondernemings en die lewenstyl van baie mense is hiervan afhanklik.

The failure of the ANC regime is well summed up by the editor27 of the Mail & Guardian when he states27:32:

While the ANC operated on the moral high ground during the anti-apartheid struggle, since 1994 they have slipped into a sleazy underworld where corruption, nepotism and money squandering are the order of the day, so that South Africa could become a neo-colonial satellite of the American-led neoliberal empire. Although the ANC has been the government of South Africa since 1994, we could allege that it is still not ‘ready to govern’.

Mthombothi28 concurs when he characterises the present-day ANC as follows28:21:

The fact is the ANC remains the criminal syndicate that found succour and prospered under Jacob Zuma. It is the party of the likes of Magashule, Bongani Bongo and so on, and Ramaphosa doesn’t seem to have even disturbed the furniture. Anybody getting into bed with the cabal cannot escape the stench.

It is to be doubted if the ANC and Ramaphosa would stay in power longer than May/June 2020. The ANC regime’s only hope to survive till 2024 as ruling party, is how successfully the ANC elite can “borrow” from the PIC to provide short-term finance for the country’s collapsing economy. Of course, as a regime it can undertake land redistribution in 2020 but, notwithstanding what the ANC elite do or the outside help they receive, the process is doomed to be a failure if the ANC stays in power until 2024. It will turn into a second round of so-called “state capture”. Poverty and inequality will rise sky-high and the end result spells the rise of revolution.

3.1.3.1.2. The DA

The DA was initially formed as an exclusively White political party, with a political ideology based on a narrow liberalism and exclusive capitalism. Today, it appears to be still hanging on to White supremacy and White interests, as the recent revamping of its leadership confirms. It seems to be at present an inbred verson of the old NP and the Freedom Front, making it a kind of a neo-AWB. It totally failed to handle land redistribution. More than that: it does not seem to have any intention to address the matter in the near future. It cannot be incorporated in any way in a government of unity to solve the land issue.3-6

Some of the DA’s liberal traditions are just too confrontational for the ANC and together with its racism exclude it from being invited as a partner in ruling South Africa. Lloyd4 in this context writes4:35: “It is not surprising because liberalism has become problematic in South African history, because it is based on colour-blindness, which is not in line with our colonial and apartheid realities.” 

It will be foolish to try to reconcile the so-called ANC doves with the DA liberals, as Labuschagne10 postulates10:6 “…wandelgang-diplomasie en ‘n gematigde middelpuntsoekende strategie sou die ANC-duiwe nader aan die DA kon posioneer en sodoende geleidelike middelgrond tussen die partye kon bou” .

Neither would any courting by the DA leadership of Ramaphosa and his clan bring virtue to the country on the land matter. The DA’s testing of the political waters before the May election was foolish when it said5:4:

Ours is not to fight Cyril, ours is to fight for South Africans. Cyril must do what he needs to do, we must do what we have to do to save SA. We are prioritising the voters we are not prioritising fighting Cyril …We are more concerned about South Africans. Ours is not to fight Cyril Ramaphosa or to sound better than him.

Maimane’s good intention of “blackening” the DA failed. When he said in October 2016 that the DA would diversify its leadership4:35: “… so that all party structures from branch to national level should set targets for the recruitment and development of exceptional black candidates for public office…”; and4:35: “If you don’t see that I am black, you are not seeing me”, became empty words for the present-day White DA elite. On the outcome Lloyd4 writes4:35: “This has split the DA into two groups — the one black (social democrats) and the other white (liberals/”liberal core”) — who are engaged in a fierce battle for the soul of the party.” This splitting, whereby the racial Whites remain in charge of the DA, is now in December 2019 greater than ever in the DA. This Whiteness makes any alliance with the ANC impossible. Indeed, the rise of the so-called “Zillenators” spells the end of the DA as a significant political party in post-2020 South Africa.4,29-33

Indeed, the rise of the “Zillenators” and an exnclusive, racially reversed DA under its old guard, confirms the DA’s dream of White supremacy and “to think for the Blacks”.34-37

Putting the DA chaos in perspective, Buccuss38 on the 3rd November 2019 In the Sunday Times writes38:22:

In the recent weeks, large volumes of ink have been split on analysis of the collapse of the DA into a minor ethnic party. In the wake of the party’s capture by the zealots at the Institute of Race Relations, and the return of Helen Zille, very few commentators have sympathy for the party, though some have argued that its collapse is bad for democracy.

But the collapse of the DA’s credibility means that the party is unlikely to be able to play a positive role again.

For years the DA sat on a racial powder keg without an explosion but, sure enough, the explosion eventually came.

Mthombothi39 offers some analysis39:21:

Ultimately, Maimane was the author of his own downfall. He was meticulous in choosing his assassins. Tony Leon and Ryan Coetzee are not disinterested or impartial observers on matters to do with the DA. The party as it stands is their handiwork., their baby.

The DA under Helen Zille, John Steenhuisen, Tony Leon and Ryan Coetzee is at the end of its political life. Indeed, the party was already dying under Maimane, notwithstanding his immense input to grow it and his efforts to keep it standing.28,35,37-47

3.1.3.1.3. Perspective on a failed ANC and DA

The basis of the failures of the ANC and the DA lies in their pre-1994 histories. Johann Rossouw48 writes48:7: “Die rede hiervoor is dat die meeste politieke partye nog ontstaan het in die stryd teen die Britse kolonialisme en apartheid. Dink mooi daaroor: Nie een nuwe politieke party wat werklik ‘n nuwe toekomsvisie vir alle Suid-Afrikaners verteenwoordig, is al ná 1994 suksesvol gestig en bedryf nie.” 

This characterisation is not only applicable to the “late” NP and the present-day ANC, but also to the DA which is rooted in the old South African Party of Jan Smuts. All these initial aims and intentions of our dominant political parties, which also include their pathology, have never been discarded and new visions adopted, but been maintained in modern South Africa to bring only evil.49

Mthombothi28 has not only summarised well the present-day pathology of the ANC but also the failed integrity of the DA (and the EFF) when he posits28:21:

But none of the other parties seems capable of coming to our rescue. The DA’s inability to attract black voters  will remain its Achilles heel, making its attainment of power almost a bridge too far. The EFF’s stock-in-trade is sowing racial hatred, and its leaders would be wearing overalls of a different colour had the criminal justice system been half-awake.  The other parties are nothing more than spaza shops serving no purpose except as sources of regular income for their leaders and their cronies.

Buccus50 gives his perspective on the ANC, DA and EFF and also draws a very negative conclusion as follows50:22:

But here in SA we have no political party in parliament that stands for a viable, progressive alternative.  The kleptocrats in the EFF and the ANC offer nothing but a vision of horror. The neoliberals in the ANC and the DA offer their own version of a vision of horror, in the form of an economy that condemns millions to poverty.

Buccus’s38 conclusion is final and is stated with integrity38:22: “It is plain that there is no party in our parliament that has a credible vision for SA.”

On splitting the ANC and DA to bring forward a successful viable and sustainable new party (or parties), the doubt is great. For Mthombothi28 to say to Maimane to ignore the doomsayers and to launch a new party, is irresponsible. The South African political parties’ histories show that the splitting of established parties — notwithstanding that so-called “saviour-leaders” lead them — has seldom been done with success. Mthomboth28, on the possible intention of Maimane to found a new party or to form an alliance with the ANC, writes28:21:

There are already voices warning against this idea. Look at what happened to COPE, Agang, the UDM and so on, they say. I guess the death or stillbirth of infants should be deployed as an argument against procreation. The better option apparently is for the likes of Maimane to join forces with President Cyril Ramaphosa in the noble struggle to avert national disaster.

People who think this are whistling in the wind. Ramaphosa has been a great disappointment, no two ways about it. In fact, this argument echoes the appeals we heard before the elections for people to hold their noses and vote for the ANC to strengthen Ramaphosa’s hand. The ANC was duly returned to power with the usual thumping majority, and the hyenas are laughing at our naiveté. Mosebenzi Zwane, Faith Muthambi, Bathabile Dlamini, the entire rotten gang, are back in harness under the tutelage of the venal Ace Magashule. It is business as usual. And Ramaphosa remains his wimpish self.

Any alliance between a Maimane faction of old DAs and a Ramaphosa faction of old ANCs will be born in outright political sin — it represents opportunism par excellence; an inclination that will gobble up each faction fast.51-53

Essentially, both of the main parties are in the process of dying — they cannot bring any success to a post-2019 South Africa: especially not around the land matter.3-6,54

3.1.3.2. Disregarding the ANC and DA out as future rulers
3.1.3.2.1. The end of political innocence

Firstly, it must be recognised, as the editor55 of the Sunday Times emphasises, that the glue which held this country and its people together in the immediate years after 1994, is gone. Secondly, the dream of building a non-racist, non-sexist and prosperous South Africa is also something of the past. The editor55 of the Sunday Times on the 28th April 2019 writes55:18:

The unity we showed the world during that brief post-1994 honeymoon is now fracturing. We are slowly being divided along racial lines. Today, as we reflect on these first 25 years of freedom, we need to find a new common goal that all South Africans can rally around.

Looking critically at the political mess of 2019 in South Africa (emphasised by the fact that 19-million or 51% of the eligible voters cold-shouldered politics by not participating in the May 2019 elections)  and its failed political parties saturated by their masked agendas and their contaminated mindsets, Mthombothi28 rightfully writes28:21:

So, despite the plethora of parties, many people are still without a political home. Ideology doesn’t seem to be an issue either. The country is simply crying out for decisive leadership, to get things done. There’s therefore space for either another political party or for some political realignment. The more the merrier.

The above words of the editor55 of the Sunday Times are visionary. He is formulating a totally new vision and guideline on governing South Africa from 2019: a clear, precise racial and ethnic model, inside a kind of a short-term form of democratic but inclusive government, to serve at last effectively the interests of all South Africans. The false and misleading nature of so-called non-racial and non-ethnic politics of the racial Marxist-Leninist ANC is something of the past: it did not work pre- or post-1994 and will not work in the near future.55

Indeed, a totally new political venture is required, entirely excluding the ANC and the DA as the exclusive ruler or rulers of the day. They are fallen angels.7,17,25,26,56

The 1994 Dispensation failed for many obvious reasons, in which the enormous corruption, fraud and theft by the ANC elite, together with the immense rape of the Constitution, stand out, making justified land redistribution a total failure too. Basically, in this confusion there are only three conclusions to be drawen: 1) the faulty belief that democracy is the only good and correct form of government;  2) the ignoring of South Africa’s racial and ethnic diversity as a pre-requisite for effective and justified government; and 3) the reality that the post-1994 BBEEE-policy and cadre deployment, to serve the pre-1994 discriminated-against Blacks, failed because the ANC elite delinquently captured and mismanaged it for their self-enrichment and –empowerment (and because of the outright practice of autocracy masked as democracy).

To expect that the Ramaphosa regime is going to do good in the future is lunacy. Ramaphosa and his regime are the same Marxist-Leninist group formed a century ago to disorganise the greater South African society to exclusively benefit its politburo. The same Cyril Ramaphosa was vice-president to Jacob Zuma during the post-1994 ANC regime’s ongoing state capture, while he was also  the driver behind cadre deployment which is state capture in its purest form. It is correct to describe the present ANC Lite as a crypto-party dictatorship which is intentionally enforcing a false and failed Western democracy and economy (the so-called “dirty” democracy), while a favoured political-economic system for the Marxist-Leninist ANC leaders and its politburo is kept in place.  The ANC’s intention in the past was and is still today to destroy political stability, as well as the rights and assets of the individual. They are more than a wolf in sheep’s clothing. In contemporary South Africa we are saddled with a corrupt ANC regime that can never be rehabilitated and a racial DA, extremely mismanaged by exclusively White capitalists, that are impossible to heal.

3.1.3.2.2. Time for political renewal

A clear, new broad political impact is needed for the positive renewing of our politics to successfully enact land redistribution. The direct intervention and interference through the use of a policy of comprehensive government directed by the nation, must be the priority. This broad national intervention must be of a duration of between five and ten years. Such a way of government in which the traditionally dominant role of political parties is minimalised, will undoubtedly be labelled by the main parties such as the ANC, DA and the EFF as autocracy because it will tend to phase them out of politics and expose their present politically delinquent activities.This political renewal will bring: 1) a totally new political style of government which is statutorily free from the contaminations and ideologies of the present-day politically delinquent parties and their corrupt leaders, their members and cronies; and 2) a precise racial/ethnic statutory prescription defining proporsional representation of the national body, enabling unhindered effective government and the implementation of balanced and responsible land re-allocation.

Buccus57, in forcing this urge for political and government renewal to the foreground, as well as the institution of an applicable governance body (referring specifically to the old UDF) to do it,  writes on the 22nd  September 2019 in the Sunday Times57:25:

Today, SA is in another kind of crisis. There is mass unemployment, rapid economic decline, a systematic collapse into lawlessness, and anti-democraric forces that are actively working to undermine democratic norms. There is also a global crisis with right-wing authoritarianism flourishing and a profound and urgent climate crisis.

In this situation we require inspired, visionary and decisive leadership. However, our president is largely absent from thje national debate. When Cyril Ramaphosa does speak, he equivocates, gives us insane clichés or fudges the urgent issues. He seems to suffer from a more or less complete inability to deal with the urgent issues confronting us. He is not even willing to acknowledge the seriousness of the crisis that we face, let alone offer us a credible path out of the crisis.

But whatever the reason for Ramaphosa’s inability to lead, we are in the midst of an escalating social, economic and political crisis and he is not able to give leadership. Many of the forces competing to fill the gap are extremely dangerous. These range from the alliance between the pro-Zuma faction of the ANC and the EFF, to the smaller and at times openly violent formations organising attacks on truck drivers  and migrants, and shaking down construction projects.

Increasingly, many in the middle class are abandoning democratic values and demanding dangerously authoritarian responses to the crisis such as the declaration of a state of emergency or the return of the death penalty. This is a very worrying development. If a charismatic authoritarian figure emerged, promising a law and order crackdown and a clean up of corruption, many in the middle  class would, as has happened in India, Brazil and the US, succumb to the authoritarian temptation.

This means that we have to accept that we cannot rely on elected authority to lead us out of the crisis. This does not mean that all is lost. There is another alternative. That alternative is that leadership will have to come from within the society itself.

This is not an entirely new situation. In the 1980s black leadership was largely in exile, in prison, underground or living with extreme harassment. The formation of the United Democratic Front in 1983 enabled ordinary people to participate in leadership from below, and  the UDF was able to give very significant leadership to society.

The UDF was, broadly speaking, a democratic force that was anti-racist and pro-working class. It wasn’t perfect. Its willingness to dissolve itself after the unbanning of the ANC was a major strategic error. But as imperfect as the UDF was, it organised and mobilised millions of people behind a broadly democratic and progressive vision of society.

It is clear that a renewal of the South African model, replacing the corrupt political parties that beset the voters’ mindsets with ideologies of White or Black supremacy, exclusively White capitalism, Stalininist communism, etc., is immediately needed and indeed possible to activate.

3.1.3.2.2.1. Many similarities between the UDF and the Pact of Mexican political parties

The questions are: 1) can the UDF work again in the 2020 politics of South Africa? and; 2) have such a kind of broad community organisation, inclusive of various political parties and many other non-party associates, worked worldwide so far? Although such outcomes failed to realise in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan at this stage, the outcomes brought by the Pact governance in Rwanda and Mexico have been very positive. Mexico, where the country’s political, social and economic heartbeat was exactly in the same extremely “ill-health” condition as in present-day South Africa — slowed down by crime, corruption, mismanagement, incapable leaders, state capturers etc. — an enormous rehabilitation was launched by a kind of UDF to run the politics there for a while and to do a clean-up of at least the economy. Although Mexico is today still contaminated by the evils of the past, such as the presence of crime and cartels, a major improvement in many areas of governance has been noted. It may be important to refer shortly to the success of  Mexico’s “UDF” (or as they call it there: Pact) to bring governance directly to the citizens by limiting the wrongdoing of the corrupted political parties.1

The initial approach by the  Mexican leader Peńa Nieto was not to focus on law enforment or the ongoing security problems of Mexico (notwithstanding immense bloodshed by crime cartels in especially drug-dealing), but to go for uplifting the economy. The outright failure of the government in ignoring the action and practice of “open” crime by the criminal cartels — these crime cartels alone are estimated to have killed one hundred thousand people since 2007) — led to widespread protest from 2014 by the ordinary public. To this Nieto reacted constructively by bringing in some measures to fight crime and to take on the immense powerful cartels. Jonathan Tepperman1, the managing editor of Foreign Affairs, writes in his book: The Fix,  on Nieto’s various constructive interventions and interferences in Mexican politics, as follows1:195:

[Nieto] moved to reform the nation’s police by dissolving local forces and assimilating them into new, state wide agencies; created a nationwide emergency hotline; promised greater transparency in government contracting; and set up special economic zones in Guerrero and other impoverished states. He also introduced constitutional amendments to allow the federal government to take over municipalities infiltrated by organized crime. And in 2015 he oversaw the establishment of a new National Anticorruption System that, among other things, created an independent prosecutor dedicated to fighting corruption and that requires public officials to declare their assets and potential conflicts of interests.

Another very important further step by Nieto to drive and to oversee the above remedial actions, was to gather the various opposition parties into a movement of unity, called the Pact on the 2nd December 2012, to work together and to manage the country constructively. The Pact stayed active until the 20th August 2014. Today, as said, Mexico is still far from an example of good governance, honesty, or even crime-free. Indeed, there are critics that derided Nieto’s measures as too little and too late, while there is scepticism as to the Nieto family’s own integrity because of their alleged involvement in corruption and murder. But at least there there are strong signs of integrity coming from Mexico’s government. It cured in some way the country’s political paralysis and helped to get It to function properly. Furthermore, and though the Pact may be finished, the reforms it had activated as a specifically empowered group in which the parties’ influence was limited, are still making a profound impact on Mexico’s governance and civil life today.1

Tepperman1 continues1:196: “And so for the inevitable question: Can other countries really replicate Mexico’s cure for political paralysis?” 

It is prominent that certain conditions helped Nieto, for instance that all three parties recognised their part in the country’s political mess and thus that they needed to change. This setup indeed forced them in the first place to form the Pact. What made the Pact work was the fact that its leaders shared an unusual ability to recognise reality, face it directly and deal with it in the most responsible fashion, reports Tepperman.1:196

Mexico’s political system is not unique in most ways, writes Tepperman1:196-197: “All this suggests that a good many currently deadlocked nations could indeed follow Mexico’s model — one that involved quiet negotiation, painful compromise, political leaders willing to take risks and keep their word, and above all a recognition that zero-sum politics accomplishes nothing.” 

A South African Pact or a New UDF can be realised, but what is clear is that the ANC elite’s dominant and destabilising Marxist-Leninist ideology will never recognise and accept their part in the country’s political mess. They do not want to change because the chaos of present-day politics is planned and steered by the ANC elite. Any  Pact is out for them because it will mean the end of their power and rule.1

Thankfully the ANC’s political obstruction (together with the other political parties’ rigid ideologies such as the DA’s “White supremacy”)  rules them out from participating in the Pact and the New UDF. To make things work, the leadership of the New UDF must only select leaders who share the unusual ability to recognise reality, face it directly and deal with it in the most responsible fashion. Prominent priorities for the new UDF’s leaders should be to serve society and the interests of individuals.1

3.1.3.2.2.2. The simultaneous practice of autocracy and democracy inside the South African Constitution
3.1.3.2.2.2.1. Failed South African post-1994 democracy

It is clear that the principle of democracy, as embedded in the Constitution, has not worked post-1994 when a Marxist-Leninist party — the ANC took over control of the state. Indeed, all five of the ANC’s previous administrations were in essence a tidal wave of malfeasance, dishonesty and state capture. Notwithstanding these misdeeds, the ANC was re-elected in May 2019 as the ruler for the sixth administration. This confirms that democracy does not always work to the benefit the total population. This is also evidenced by Africa’s and the world’s many “takers” and failed regimes, as that of Zimbabwe. Although democracy worldwide is still the most sought-after system with 53% of the total number of countries currently qualifying as democracies globally, it has to be noted that since 1994 so much as 75 countries worldwide have moved in the direction of authoritarianism (undoubtedly sometimes for good reasons, at least in the short-term). In 2017 alone 24 countries became autocracies. Hereto are there were in 2019 only 24 countries showing positive aspects in terms of democratisation. Although despots and takers are often central in such autocracies, it also often seems as if the innocent aims and intentions of democracy are inapplicable in the upliftment of the poor or to develop a country in a proper way. South Africa, where the revolutionary ANC misused democracy to exploit the poor, is such an example. It seems as if South Africa would be far better-off if it was initially gradually steered through autocratic economics and politics into a democratic system.21,58

The question is what must be done to assure successful land redistribution in South Africa post-2019 without disregarding the principles of democracy?

Firstly, our election system must be democratised by radically changing the present Electoral Act, to make it possible for voters to vote directly on national, provincial and local levels for their favoured candidates (independent from their mostly contaminated party-affiliations) in each of the constituencies. Lifestyle audits as a pre-selection requirement should be the first hurdle to cross for those wishing to be elected to Parliament or appointment to the civil service.

Secondly, associated with the above, there must thus be done away with the exclusive party-orientated system through the statutory implementation of a broad national government representing all the individual voters, together with political and economic role-players as the unions, etc.

Thirdly, the creation of “clean” local, provincial and national governments in which not one single member serving at any specific time as a so-called “people-representative” in the present local, provincial and national administrations (or had served in the past) are allowed to do so again. This clean-up can be done by way of a mutual agreement by the role-players involved in the rehabilitation of the parliament and the various  state organs, but the best will be if it is done statutorily by an amendment to the Constitution. Although this démarche undoubtedly will not totally free the new government and its organs from existing corrupt state capture networks and crooks, but this necessary intervention will launch the process of rehabilitation of the South African political landscape and civil service to assure that at least a 70% contingent of clean, trustworthy politicians and civil servants are appointed in future.

The above changes are not part of an autocratic intrusion and is in line with the traditional retirement conditions of persons who for instance have reached the retirement age of 60 or 65 years, or the retrenchment of staff under the retirement age, as traditionally practiced by democratic governments to decrease their employees. Such an intervention will not endanger the Constitution or the rights of the ordinary, good citizen: it will in the long run assure the establishment of true democracy within five to ten years and the kick out the present-day corrupt politicians. The substantial presence of questionable individuals serving as politicians and civil servants was well-illustrated by the various judicial commissions such as the Zondo and Mpati. What is further clear, is that these corrupt politicians and officials identified by means of the investigations led by the commissions mentioned, have all already taken more than their legitimate share in compensation. Also most of them were appointed to highly paid positions for which they really did not qualify. This was made possible by the country’s undemocratic electoral system — others were appointed by the ANC elite’s cadre deployment and BEE model, thus making them unworthy of their positions.

If above short-term statutory rehabilitation of the Parliament is not followed, the ANC elite will introduce a Stalinist regime quite soon to rule outside the Constitution while lording over the country indefinitely, with land grabs without compensation, taking assets from white property owners, making the policy of nationalisation an absolute way of governance. And of course, land grabs will quickly move to a Second State capture.21,58

3.1.3.2.2.2.2. ANC elite’s fascist leadership

In this rehabilitation the incoming of the New UDF and its replacement of the exclusive political party system by a comprehensive national, provincial and municipal  representative governance model, will become a central development. This approach to stabilise and to repair our failed governance system will undoubtedly be labelled as autocracy and even as despotism and fascism by the so-called neo-liberals and neo-Stalinists (which includes the ANC, DA and EFF).  But is above rehabilitation really autocracy? Here the seasoned South African political philosopher, Professor Tristan Taylor59 of the University of Stellenbosch, warns and guides us here clearly into what it would really mean. He writes59:24: “Liberals and the left are making a terrible mistake when they use fascist as a political insult in this way [by for instance calling the democrat Donald Trump the new Benito Mussolini]. They are blinding themselves to the true nature of fascism, which is something far worse than authoritarianism and ethnic nationalism”; and59:24: “Along with a fair dose of irrationalism and mysticism, fascism revolves around two key concepts: the body national and the leadership principle.” 

Taylor continues59:24: “In other words, the fascist leader is the embodiment of the nation. The fascist leader’s will is be above written law, is always correct and demand obedience.”  

Looking critically at the above guideline issued by Taylor59, the ANC, in terms of the empowerment of its elite and leaders, represent precisely fascism: just revisit the blind empowerment of the ANC regime with Mandela at the helm, and which was eventually transferred to Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, to end with rule of the so-called ANC saviour, namely Cyril Ramaphosa. The UDF’s rise minimized the power grab of the ANC leadership while the individual citizen and voter’s interests and rights were the only focus. This represents democracy in the extreme. Indeed, the whole process proposed taking over control of Parliament, its MPs and MPLs and cleaning up the civil service, ridding it of crooks by the suggested new UDF and its governance plan, which is democracy par excellence.59

3.1.3.2.2.2.3. State president’s unqualified powers to misuse the Constitution

To what extent fascism became embedded in the ANC from 1994 onwards as well as in our democracy and openly degraded by it daily, was recently revealed by the previous head of Asset Forfeiture Unit, advocate Willie Hofmeyr60, when he said South Africa is at risk of state capture again unless the president’s sweeping powers are cut. Hunter60, in the Sunday Times of the 1st December reports that Hofmeyr60 sees this errant presidential rule as such a serious matter that he, in an affidavit to the Zondo-commission, recommended that the Constitution be changed. Hofmeyr60 states that at present  Ramaphosa (as with Mandela up to Zuma60:8: “…has unqualified powers to appoint anybody in all positions in the criminal justice system.”

Hofmeyr60 notes60:8: “These powers are what led to the capture of the criminal justice system, including the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA)…”  It means that at present the heads of the SAPS, the Hawks, the NPA and the four deputy directors of public prosecutions and provincial directors of public prosecutions, as well as judges are appointed by the president, serving as it were, at his pleasure.60

What is obvious, confirming the lack of any democratic rule followed by the ANC leadership from 1994 onwards and them rather veering off into fascism in the extreme as suggested by in Hofmeyr’s affidavit, is, that already under former president Thabo Mbeki the justice system was abused by the clique in the executive. This means that political skullduggery at the top, on the level of the ANC’s leadership, was not some exclusive process started up by Jacob Zuma, but much earlier in the ANC regime by its corrupt elite. Hofmeyr specifically reflects on this matter60:8: “I don’t think people must underestimate the damage Mbeki was doing to law enforcement at that time.”

Contradicting further any trace of the presence of a true democracy during the ANC regime’s 25 years of rule [a fact which was basically already erased as by the evidenced in Ramaphosa’s overseeing of cadre deployment (equalling state capture) as vice-president and his absolute passivity as vice-president not to intervene and interfere in Jacob Zuma’s state capture], Hofmeyr60 believes the Constitution in its present form ha been disarmed to block bad appointments (by the President) which had in the past, for example by Mbeki and Zuma, led to the decay of the criminal justice system. (The former deputy chief justice Dikgang Moseneke said also in 2014 that too much power rests with the  presidency).60

Hofmeyr60 further erases the notion of our Constitution as one which exclusively promotes democracy and upholds clean governance, when he posits60:8:

The thesis I put forward essentially is that individuals don’t capture states, political parties capture states.

To capture a state, you have to capture a political party first and this is what happened here.

…’[the] ANC and corruption go hand’ because of how big a part money plays in party politics.

It’s not right to blame Zuma for all of it. It wasn’t just his people who were stealing. Both sides of the divide were stealing.

I think democracies tend to be built on patronage. Politicians have to deliver something for their constituencies.

The above remarks reflect again not only the ANC’s constant and ongoing failure to respect democracy, the Constitution or the rights of the individual citizen, but also the contaminating role which the present Electoral Act plays in freeing the ANC from their responsibility to the voters as democracy requires and prescribes. It is clear that the South African Constitution has many loopholes, making the presence of an intertwining of autocracy and democracy possible. There is a lifestyle audit missing for each politician on national, provincial and municipal level. There is no place for “freewheeling” candidate election funding and the Ramaphosa debacle of interdicts to maintain the anonymity of his funders and the money his election as leader of the ANC and State President attracted in 2017. Again, our electoral system’s fault to allow the appointment of a State President because a person was elected by only 179 winning votes, brought out by more or less 4 000 ANC delegates at the ANC’s National Conference, is a case in point. Furthermore, our so-called “democracy” and our much-praised “good Constitution” is a mockery, since the fact is that only 28% of the 37 million eligible voters voted in the May 2019 elections for the ANC. The fact that 51% eligible voters stayed away from the voting booth, is undoubtedly not an example of democracy.60

The best guide as to why past and  present-day politicians must be banned from official politics in future, is, as already said, solely based on the immense political corruption in which many of them have been directly implicated. Many of these individuals cannot be rehabilitated, as most religious sinners’ failed rehabilitations confirm. To make a clear difference between the so-called “good politician” and the “so-called bad politician”, is impossible. Politicians in South Africa at least, are mostly all in Parliament for opportunistic reasons, even though they try to hide it.  Secondly, all the politicians, either as members of the ruling ANC or the opposition, had the opportunity to make South Africa a better place for the ordinary citizen during their well-paid terms in Parliament. But South Africa is in chaos after 25 years: each politician thus failed in his/her task and duty.

3.1.3.2.2.2.4. The Bible’s guideline applicable on political sinners

To guide us clearly on the right to expel past and present politicians from further engagement in official politics, the Bible’s description of the treatment of sinners is enlightening, including on their sins and the frequent inability of these sinners to reform themselves truly and permanently. Looking carefully at the concepts of “ religious sins” and “political sins”, there is no difference between the wrongdoing and the failure of the two kinds of sinners to follow the path of integrity, honesty and trustworthiness.

Dr RJK Law61, in his book: Apostasy from the Gospel, gives us a clear guideline how to separate the politician crooks – as  the early Christian leaders did with religious crooks – from the future South African good politics. The many tainted ANCs on their May 2019 election lists, who found at the end the road successfully back to Parliament after the May 2019 elections, are par excellent examples of the immense amount of the ANC’s political sinners safely “staying-on” in the ANC’s own created political heaven.

Law writes61:91:

The early church was careful whom they admitted into fellowship. Every Christian who sinned was only readmitted into fellowship by open repentance.

But where notorious and scandalous sins, such as murder, adultery or idolatry, were committed, no readmission into the fellowship of the church was allowed. This was especially so when a Christian committed idolatry through fear of being martyred for his faith.

The Church of Rome, however, was considered to be very remiss and lax in its discipline. Tertullian accuses Zephyrinus, Bishop of Rome, of admitting adulterers to repentance and readmission into the fellowship of the church.

Novatus and Novatianus opposed this laxity by going to the opposite extreme. They denied all hope of pardon and return to church membership to any person who sinned after baptism. But their followers, horrified at such extreme discipline, left all persons, upon their repentance, to God’s mercy, refusing to readmit only those who had committed notorious and scandalous.

As for Novatus, Novatianus and Tertullian, who were not allowed back into the Christian church as members or as fellow congregants because they had committed notorious and scandalous acts such as murder, adultery and idolatry, there should be no place either in Parliament for politicians who committed any “politically notorious and scandalous acts”, or the political equivalent of “murder, adultery and idolatry”. Many of the ANC’s politicians, notwithstanding their eagerness to repent for their political sins (and sometimes doing so unashamedly), reflect a pattern of their ongoing and constant nefarious activities as a firmly established behavioural patron. The ANC elite (especially their MPs, MPLs and senior  state officials) have been implicated in outright state-capture, BEE and cadre-deployment, and harming millions of people directly in doing so. These are but a few examples of their shocking “politically notorious and scandalous acts” and of “political murder, adultery and idolatry” they committed. As for the religious sinners, there should be for the past and present MP and MPL sinners no longer a comfortable seat in Parliament. If the Church had no mercy on religious deviants, why should Parliament have mercy on political crooks?

Any failure to replace the present-day corrupt, autocratic and despotic ANC governance and to stop its intended land grab by the above-suggested statutory intervention and interference, could activate the crash of the economy, famine and the awaiting deadly revolution, as Gumede58 warns58:18: “Unless land reform is done in ways that will leverage the potential of agriculture to lift growth, secure food security and boost development, it will crash the economy; and58:18: “Unless land reform is done honestly, transparently and accountably, it will be ensnared in the sort of corruption, rent-seeking and populism that have befallen BEE. 

3.1.3.3. The ANC-regime’s possible awaiting judiciary and constitutional crisis

When a person becomes bankrupt, insane or mentally disabled, they lose their ability to function as independent citizens, and can no longer make decisions on their own. The first step in this process is to bring the case of such an individual before a court in order to strip them of their privileges since they have become incapable of handling their own affairs. Sometimes this kind of process is done specifically to keep the person from himself of herself, but often also to safe-guard society against an unpredictable, exploitative of a dangerous individual.  A care-taker or curator is appointed specifically by the court, giving the appointee a mandate to act on behalf of the disabled person as long as the court finds it appropriate – especially in the case of persons regarded as non compos mentis or a doli in capax individual. When such an individual commits crime, he/she can be declared insane and not answerable for their deeds. These wrongdoings can vary from murder, theft, corruption, rape, state capture, organised crime, violence, gender-violence as well as xenophobia, etc.

On the other hand, if such a person doing crime, is found to be sane and capable by the court and held responsible and accountable, he/she can be prosecuted by a criminal court and sentenced to a certain punishment.

Although it can be argued that a regime is not a person, and as such cannot be held responsible for its deeds, it is misleading. A regime is run by a certain team, consisting of certain members, who are until they reach the of their lives, responsible for their own as well as the team’s wrongdoings. This fact is confirmed by the prosecution of various Nazi individuals for war-crimes after WW2, specifically for their actions on behalf of the Hitler regime. It is in this context that Mthombothi’s description of the ANC elite’s nefarious acts against all South Africans as well as the country – committed as an ANC’ executive team, as individual members and as part of the same unit from 1994, under Nelson Mandela — should be profiled and analysed – in terms of the concepts non compos mentis, doli incapax and the penalties which common criminals should face. Mthombothi62 describes the ANC elite’s bad regime outcomes in the Sunday Times of the 15th December 2019 as  follows62:21:

Rampant crime is a consequence of the incompetence of the state. The basic responsibility of the state, its raison d’être, is the security or protection of its citizens. The state has all the legal power, including instruments of violence, to carry out such a mandate. But the South African state has continuously failed its people.

One cannot remember a time in this country when crime was either at a manageable level or was not the biggest concern for its people. It is a more pressing issue than, say, unemployment, which is very high. Those leaving the country rarely cite the lack of jobs or greener pastures as reasons. Violent crime is by far the biggest reason for those emigrating.

It’s no exaggeration to say SA has become a major crime scene. The government is failing its people. But for some reason it doesn’t seem to get sufficiently blamed for its numerous failures, be it the faltering economy, lack of jobs or rampant crime rate. Like all governments, it laps up any semblance of success, but would run a mile from its disasters. And the public, whether it’s the result of years of living under an unaccountable  and oppressive government or just sheer ignorance, does not readily lay the blame at the door of the state. Instead, people are often too willing to acknowledge or be thankful for small gestures.

Mthombothi63 further reflects63:25:

The government’s fault is one of omission, not commission. It had no control over what’s happening in the country.

Ramaphosa’s government is in no position to give any undertaking to anybody, not even to its own citizens, that such maddening violence won’t happen again. It has become a mere spectator to the drama unfolding in the country. It has lost control of the country. The country is on autopilot. The government can’t even protect its own citizens, who are hunted like animals even in their own homes.

The country is literally burning while Cyril and his ANC comrades are busy gazing at their own navels.

It is clear from the above that some members of the ANC elite have become implicated in criminal behaviour and in this context they have often exhibited personal characteristics  similar to that of the common criminal. Furthermore, the ANC elite in their way of governing — specifically regarding their personal traits and certain acts — are mostly associated with the mindsets of people who are non compos mentis and doli incapax. It is clear that the ANC elite’s thinking, planning and activities have become confused and frequently seemingly influenced by hallucinations and illusions, and a glaring lack of awareness. The ANC elite seems indeed, in terms of the test of sanity, often not answerable for their behaviour to the public as required from them as the ruler of the day. Some of the ANC elite, after we analysed their lifestyle audits, seemingly should be already in jails or asylums. The ANC regime’s continuation as the post-2019 ruler needs the attention of the court in order to see if it compos mentis. It seems, looking at the weirdness of the ANC regime over 25 years, that such a request should be processed as soon as possible demanding that the courts be involved to appoint a care-taker to support an interim executive body to rule on behalve of the ANC. Another approach is that the court should be asked to remove the ANC regime and forced a new election.64

Above suggestion is not without good reason and the necessary supporting facts. Referring back to the recent court conclusion that the ANC regime failed to manage land redistribution properly as prescribed by the law and the Constitution, forcing the court to appoint a master (caretaker) to see to it that justice be done, the South African courts were thus directly placed to position to be able to decide if the ANC elite is in fact compos mentis to rule or whether it is indeed non compos mentis and doli incapax to properly think, plan and act on behalf of itself or the public and voters.64

The court’s intervention64 on the land matter shows firstly that the ANC regime could not be trusted in the past to manage land redistribution in a proper way and will never be capable of managing any form of balanced and justified land redistribution in the future. Secondly, the court findings64:30 reflected on the behaviour of who can be regarded as non compos mentis within the ANC elite64;30: a lack of accountability and responsibility, the clear, deliberately ignoring the constitutional rights of citizens and for the  empowerment of the judicial institutions, the displaying of an ‘obstinate misapprehension of its statutory duties’, ‘unresponsiveness’, ‘a refusal to account to those dependent on its co-operation’ and a ‘patent incapacity or inability to get the jobs done’ in terms of what the statute and the Constitution require.64 An individual, who is constantly transgressing and going beyond the boundaries of what is acceptable with these kinds of above delinquent and deviating characteristics and behaviours, should in his or her private life surely attract the attention of  law-enforcement authorities and the courts about a conclusion on his/her state of mind, but in South Africa such people are deemed fit to be rulers.

The court’s findings and conclusions, as reflected by Fish-Hodgson64 confirm the right of the court to monitor any regime’s activities when it deviates, either compos mentis or non compos mentis, from its mandate. It confirms the court’s right to intervene and to interfere when a regime has totally collapsed and failed. On the initial finding of the ANC regime’s failure to do its duty around land redistribution, as prescribed by the Constitution, the court’s finding on the land matter becomes a future legal directive that means intervention and interference in the governance of the ANC elite because their behaviour reflects signs of being non compos mentis or could in fact be classed as doli incapax. On the court’s ruling (and its future legal impact) Fish-Hodgson64 reflects that it64:30: “… leaves the Cabinet with nowhere to hide and no so-called “sell out” constitutional property clause to hide behind”; and18:30: “…the court warns that, despite its sensitivity towards the need for the department to have a free hand at performing its constitutional mandate without undue interference, systematic failure to perform may justify, and require, muscular intervention by a court. This is of relevance far beyond the facts of this case and the land issue more generally”. Fish-Hodgson64 writes further on the ruling set by the court in this context:64:30: “The court warned that, because the separation of powers does not ‘imply a rigid or static conception of strictly demarcated functional roles’ and ‘the mythical spell must be broken’ to ensure the protection of Mwelase and his co-applicants’ constitutional rights’, court control of the remedial process’ may be warranted”.

Regarding the argument of the state that reads64:30: “The department told the court that the appointment of a special master, under the auspices of the judiciary, would amount to a usurpation of the powers of the executive in violation of the separation of powers”, but the court nullified this argument of the department’s judicial independence and only being responsible to the ConCourt for its actions, quite quickly and precisely by narrowly following the legal issue by concluding64:30: “…the court noted that none of those cases it had decided ‘quite match the sustained, large-scale systematic dysfunctionality and obduracy that is evidenced here’.” Fish-Hodgson64 points out that the court64:30: “…describing the situation as a ‘colossal crisis’, the court is warning the government that it must endeavour to ensure that, as the Constitution requires, its obligations are performed diligently and without delay. Failing which, and irrespective of the success of the mooted constitutional amendments of the property clause, courts may begin to act to the embarrassment of a government whose legitimacy is questioned within and outside of its own political ranks”.

The fact that the court had inscribed in its findings and conclusion that the executive must perform its constitutional obligations and accept at all time accountability and responsibility, means that other litigants can64:30: “…ask for such supervisory remedial action in the face of [its] systematic failures” from the ANC-regime.

The misadventurous and incompetent ANC regime’s actions, and by times their behaviour of being non compos mentis, can be brought directly before a court because of its failure or refusal to be accountable to those dependent on its co-operation – in essence, the electorate that voted for it on national, provincial and local levels. The time is right to launch such an intervention. It seems that the only enterprise able to undertake such an enormous task on behalf of the voters and citizens of South Africa to bring down the ANC regime in 2020 is a New UDF.64-7

3.1.3.4. Time for a new UDF

The launch of a second UDF as a kind of political party is needed for such a process of political “cleansing”. The economy and governance be addressed with the help of the business sector and the public since the post-1994 rule by die ANC has been a disaster. Professor William Gumede21 at Wits guides us21:22: “There has to be co-governance between the state, business and civil society.” On the economic side (which means the same for the political) Gumede writes: “We will have to plan an evidence-based, realistic and pragmatic national economic turnaround plan”.

Gumede21, on the future of such a UDF-kind of governance, posits21:22:

Whatever development funds are mobilised, and whatever projects are initiated, should be run not by the government or party alone but in tandem with independent business, entrepreneurs and civil society.

Every skill, resource and talent available in the country must be marshalled in a national reconstruction effort. The country cannot afford to marginalise people based on skin colour, ethnicity or ANC affiliation.

Where possible, money lost through corruption should be seized from the guilty.

Corruption should be made a crime against the people. Many lives have been lost because a crooked tender means a hospital had no medicine. Millions continue to live in squalor because the national social housing programme has long ground to a halt.

BEE in its current form should be scrapped, and businesses should divert “BEE” money away from political capitalists and into infrastructure, housing and education.”

Imraan Buccus50, a senior associate-researcher at Asri and  research-fellow at UKZN, takes Gumede’s21 suggestion of a drastic, comprehensive turnaround plan for post-2019 South Africa further by pinpointing the lack of insight, understanding and willingness in general by political leaders in South Africa to think anew and thus to successfully address such socio-political matters. He writes50:22:

We do have some very smart people working on alternatives  to neoliberalism in NGOs and universities, but, unlike in the UK, the US and Brazil, there is no political instrument through which our progressive experts can contribute to real change.

Ideas, especially when they represent the interests of the majority against those of the elite, don’t change anything on their own. This is especially so when, as in  SA, there is an overwhelming commitment to now discredited neoliberal ideas among the commentators.

Ideas that have not been taken seriously in most of the world since the financial crisis of 2008 continue to flourish among elites in SA. Commentator after commentator tells us that to advance, we must break the unions, privatise, and commit to fiscal austerity.

These policies have failed everywhere they have been tried and, in a number of countries, led by voters to embrace dangerous forms of right-wing populism.

Public discussion in SA urgently needs to catch up with current developments and to stop pretending that the world has not changed since 2008. But the extraordinary backwardness of our national conversation isn’t just a matter of provincialism, although there is plenty of that. It is also a result of the fact that where we do have progressive intellectuals up to date with current evidence about economics and policy they are not connected to social movements, trade unions or a progressive political party.

Enlightening further Gumede’s21 vision of a UDF kind of governance for post-2019, Buccus50 clearly points out that the trade unions are in fact part of our present and future politics – and implicated in the direct decision-making thereof – present in broad society, steering the voters and the various political parties fighting for power. This present union power informed Gumede’s notions, that namely it is essential to rehabilitate the country by the involvement of the private sector with governance. It is not only needed in future South African politics, but specifically the urgency to cooperate with the unions as an essential partner, is obvious. Indeed, the immense power of Cosatu forced the ANC not only to cooperate as a partner, but also to toe the line in its behaviour, following Cosatu’s prescriptions. To remove the unions from the South African political scene is more difficult than to remove the ANC from it. On the history and dynamics of the unions in our politics, and their immense power today to be a prime role-player within a kind of UDF regime to rehabilitate the post-2019 economy and politics of the South African state, Buccus50 reflects as follows50:22:

In the 1980s SA was often seen as being at the cutting edge of progressive politics. The UDF and Cosatu worked closely together and drew in hundreds of progressive intellectuals. Of course, all that was lost when the ANC was unbanned, popular struggles demobilised and political debate crushed by the dead hand of the Stalinism of the SACP.

But we do have the largest urban social movement in the world, in the form of Abahlali base Mjondolo, large industrial trade unions like Numsa and other located in Safru that are now independent of the ruling party, and some very good intellectuals in NGOs and universities.

Building a progressive alternative to kleptocracy and neoliberalism requires these three forces – social movements, trade unions and intellectuals – to be united behind a democratic political instrument that can build grassroots support, effectively engage in the battle of ideas and, ultimately, contest for power.

Professor Johann Rossouw48, in line with Buccus’ and Mthombothi’s arguing, also takes up the absolute need for the launch of a new UDF to reform South Africa. He, on the chaos in present-day South Africa under the ANC elite and their regime, writes48:7: “Suid-Afrikaners was laas in die 1980’s so onseker soos nou. Ons redding was toe die burgerlike samelewing wat die politici gelei het om nuwe bondgenootskappe ter wille van die toekoms te smee. En dis presies wat nou moet gebeur.”

Rossouw48 identifies doing away with political parties as the drivers, doers and planners on behalf of the interests of South Africans. He is pertinently clear on the path that the post-2019  politics could play in rehabilitating South Africa. He writes48:775:

Die antwoord lê in die bou van ’n nuwe bondgenootskap buite die party politiek om. Dis ou nuus dat die werklike besluite in SA nie in die parlement geneem word nie. Voorts is die meeste opposiepartye in amper ‘n vrotter toestand as die ANC.

Ons fokus moet dus nie op politieke partye wees nie, maar op burgerlike vennote wat kan saamspan. Aan die hand van ‘n uitstekende ontleding wat Moeletsi Mbeki van die SA maatskaplike struktuur gedoen het, is die volgende groeperinge vandag uitgesluit uit die ANC-geleide bedeling: die sakesektor, die beroepslui, die intelligentsia en, les bes, die arm onderklas van nagenoeg 60% Suid-Afrikaners [a standpoint which is echoed fully by Buccus].

Rossouw48, on this civil government in waiting to rescue the country, writes further48:7: “Daarom, as ons werklik ‘n nuwe bondgenootskap en selfs ‘n nuwe party wil sien, behoort ons deur een enkele ideal gelei te word. Al wat skynbaar vandag in die pad van so ‘n nuwe bondgenootskap staan, is nie ‘n tekort aan bronne, planne of welwillendheid nie, maar eenvoudig die diet van wanhoop waarvan ons leef omdat ons aandag op die mislikte regering en die mislukkende opposisie gerig is.”

Looking critically at the Chief Justice Mogoeng’s under-mentioned utterances, it seems that he, although not saying it directly, also speaks of a kind of UDF approach to solve our present problems. Rooi,75 in this context, refers to his speech of 23 November 2019 as follows75:2:

Hy het bygevoeg ‘n doelbewuste program moet gevolg word om diens-billikheid te bereik, selfs tot op die hoogste vlakke van indiensneming.

Wat ook al die burgerlike samelewing, die arbeid -en private sektor en die regering doen, moet die befhoeftes van armes in ag neem, waaronder hongersnood, siektes en ongeletterdheid.

Mogoeng het gesê enigeen met ‘n funksionele gewete moet sy of haar verantwoordelikheid ontdek soos in die grondwet vervat.

“ As jy in ‘n posisie is wat goed betaal en jy leef gemaklik, en nie omgee vir mense in Diepsloot (‘n township in Johannesburg) nie, is jy ‘n verraaier.”

The implementation of a UDF kind of regime is not easy. Buccus57 in this context sets it out thus57:25:

Achieving organisation and mobilisation on this scale requires real commitment at the level of grassroots community politics. It requires endless meetings, endless discussions and endless work. It is a world apart from the narcissism of “online activism” in which self-promotion usually trumps any commitment to real grassroots work. It is also a world apart from most forms of NGO politics, which are often deeply elitist and generally carried out without any sort of popular mandate or constituency.

On the goodness and honest motivation of persons driving the UDF, Buccus57 posits57:25: “ Most activists don’t want to be activists. They would prefer to spend their time with their families, or developing themselves in interesting ways. There is drudgery in real activism. This is why the bulk of the generation that built the UDF retired from activism when the ANC came to power.”

Kaizer Nyatsumba76, the CEO of the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa warns that South Africa is dangerously on the brink of a precipice, but lacks leadership from the ANC elite, which he describes as either somnambulant or deeply in slumberland, besides being arrogant too. On this lack in leadership of the ANC regime and the need by non-politicians to take the task to reform the country, he, as the other propagandists of a new UDF, posits76:19:

That impose a huge obligation on all South Africans of goodwill, but especially those with any influence in whatever space they find themselves, to make their voices volubly heard. Now that we know the promised “new dawn” has so far proved to be a mirage, civil society and organised business in particular have an inordinate duty to hold this government as accountable between elections as they did the Jacob Zuma administration, and to remind our political mandarins that they are no more than mere servants of our people, who are the real bosses in elections.

To listen further to the rhetoric of  persons such as Mosepe Matlala77, the president of the National African Farmers Union of SA (Nafu SA) and the agricultural economist Mandivamba Rukuni77 of the University of Zimbabwe, namely that to seize white land will “revive the South African economy”, is to keep the company of fools.  Firstly, Rukuni’s77 use of Japan’s land grab from the Japanese landlords after WW2 and giving it to Japanese small farmers to increase production and introduce more players into the market, shows his lack of understanding of how the Japanese system operates and Japan’s good work ethics, integrity and honesty which are in general lacking in Africa.77,78

On Rukuni’s77 memory loss about the fact that Mugabe’s land grab led to today’s famine in Zimbabwe, Gumede58 guides us58:18: “The independence movement governments of Algeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe that pursued populist land reform without compensation plunged their countries into mass starvation, crashed their currencies and caused mass foreign and local investor, human  capital and policy flight, with consequences they have been unable to reverse for decades.”

Secondly, Rukuni’s77 shocking lack of insight and know-how regarding the aspects of strategy planning, project-management and business planning in the complex South African agricultural economy, together with the complexity of the South African landownership matter – echoes that of the dangerous radical thinking and planning of likes of the elites  of the ANC and the EFF. It is evident when he says77:8: “You redistribute land in order to create, by my estimation, 500 000 to 700 000 new farmers. These  people… create a new market. Then you will not have the 17 million people on social grants because the people will get land and become farmers, and gain access to markets through public procurement. You convert social grants to real economic participation.”

Thankfully, the peaceful stand on land redistribution by Chief Justice Mogoeng75 erases the one-dimensional views of Rukuni77, Matlala77 and other radicals when he on the 23rd November 2019, in his Nelson Mandela memorial lecture speech proposes a peaceful and satisfactory outcome of the South African land matter, away from land grabs or nationalising of the assets of whites75:2: “Almal moet saamwerk om te verseker dat die grondvraagstuk en alle ander uitstaande vraagstukke op ‘n manier opgelos word wat tot versoening bydra”.

Gumede58 writes that the Ramaphosa regime must make a mature and pragmatist public stance on land reform and differentiate itself from the opportunistic populists within and outside the ANC who call for land expropriation without compensation. What persons such as Rukuni77 and Matlala77 missed out in their limited knowledge of the South African land matter, is that it is an immensely complicated issue. It is not a one-day solution as some foolish revolutionaries believe without a proper grasp on the matter. On the immense input required to reform the South African agricultural setup before there can be thought of any land redistribution, Gumede58 guides us in-depth58:18:

SA will need to foster a manufacturing sector out of agriculture, focusing on new agricultural products, agricultural processing and beneficiation.

Land reform is a complicated co-ordination and management of market perceptions; it therefore needs a competent public sector to manage it.

The agricultural and rural development government institutions, SOEs and lending institutions must be cleaned up, made more efficient and less corrupt.

Educational, research and technology institutions in the agricultural value chain will also have to be cleaned up, better resourced  aligned to agriculture industrialisation. White individual farmers and agricultural companies will have to be more proactive. They can mentor, partner with and share markets with black farmers.

Private financial institutions should also give easier, cheaper financing and advice to black farmers — and of course to white farmers.

Land redistribution should be done by a sound-minded new UDF and not be done by the corrupted clique as in the ANC-EFF circus. A wise approach and plan is needed. On the absolute need to activate an UDF once again, to manage an orderly and peaceful land redistribution, Buccus57 writes57:25: “But now that we confront a new and severe national crisis, and the ANC is no longer able to give leadership to a progressive vision, there has to be a return to the activist trenches. There is no credible alternative.”

3.1.3.4.1. Role and position of Whites in a new UDF

Clouding the cooperation between black and white to form a comprehensive civil organisation, such as the old UDF, to rule South Africa constructively in the place of the corrupted ANC and its elite, a sector in the ANC and EFF are under the misapprehension that whites are not part of the future of South Africa and as such cannot form part of such a civil organisation. This delusion is totally nullified by Gumede79 when he writes79:20:

Increasingly — and alarmingly — many people have a very narrow perception of who or what is African in SA. They base this on one type of pigmentation, ethnicity of forebearers or level of suffering.

This leads to the misguided phenomenon that some people are perceived as not African or black enough. For many South Africans this leads to unnecessary trauma, with people questioning their sense of identity and belonging.

An African identity in South Africa context is therefore more diverse than in most other African countries – and that is the overwhelming character and strength of Africanness in the South African context. It is the basis of the country’s national identity, its mirror to itself and its face to the world.

However, South African identities are not “gated communities” with fixed borders; they overlap meaningfully, beyond the occasional shared word or value. Our modern South Africanness, therefore, cannot but be a layered, plural and inclusive one, based on acceptance of our interconnected differences.

Being born into a particular “community’ should be only one aspect of Africanness or South Africanness. An African and South African identity would be adding parts of all communities to those one was born into, discarding aspects that impinge on the human rights of others.

The whites — as the blacks, the various civil organisations, the unions and the intelligentsia —  are all rightfully members of a new UDF. Whites, as well as blacks, must start to think outside the box on how to construct a better South Africa and to manage an orderly land redistribution with compensation, instead of land grabs without compensation. This means that as much for whites, blacks should not be following their delinquent  leaders blindly and naïvely just because they are of the same race.58,80,81

Perhaps it is important to emphasise that, although South Africans are often partitioned on the basis of their skin colour while some are scapegoated on the landownership issue as culprits, their bloodlines are frequently less certain. Especially the so-called whites who are viewed as settlers, foreigners or colonists by the ANC and EFF’s radicals. One of the ground-breaking peacemakers (a so-called white) who spent decades mediating SA’s bloody conflicts and who pioneered the successful talks between the Nats and the ANC pre-1994, the late Professor Ampie Muller82, was such a mixed-race individual, both black and white. His obituary of the 29th September 2019 in the Sunday Times reads:82:17

Muller, whose uncle was former South African state president Nico Diederichs, was delighted to discover through DNA testing that he had 5% Nigerian ancestry and was descended in part from Cape slaves.

He said this confirmed his belief that Afrikaners were naturally and historically part of the country’s greater racial mix, and should embrace rather than reject that.

White South Africans have undoubtedly a precise and a legitimate place in the new UDF.

3.1.3.4.2. The steps, paths and process of sound future land redistribution

On the correct process of land redistribution Gumede58 states the steps and path to be followed clearly and precisely (which is fully underwritten and supported by the author in this series on land reform) as follows58:18:

Pragmatic land reform should have multiple strategic pillars. The ANC government must ring-fence commercial agriculture to keep the country food self-sufficient and retain current agriculture jobs, high-grade farming skills and export income.

Commercially viable farms in white hands should not be touched. Redistribution must be pragmatic. Legitimate  farm employees who are active in agriculture could be given shareholder options, profit-sharing and of course be treated with dignity.

Communal land must be immediately transferred to individual households. Communal land, vested under control of traditional leaders, chiefs and kings rather than individual owners, is one of the biggest obstacles to development, industrialisation and economic growth in SA.

In SA and in most African countries, traditional leaders run communal land as if they own it, using it for patronage purpses and to punish those critical of them by depriving them of communal land rights.

State land, whether under the control of SOEs, municipalities or provinces, should be made available to black farmers already active in farming – not given to political farmers.

Undoubtedly the present-day landownership issue is saturated with the wrongs of the past, but to manage land redistribution in terms of the populists’ and radicals’ revenge-seeking modus, will crash the economy. The first stage of land redistribution, without compensation, must be the transfer of communal and state land. The second stage, focussing on the land which belongs to the church, must be the transfer of land accompanied by reasonable compensation. The third stage, namely the transfer of the land of whites, must be activated only with reasonable compensation if there is still land needed after the full completion of stages one and two. The present policy of the ANC that the land redistribution process must be done outright in terms of a race-proportional approach, must be strictly adhered to. The following statistical ratios (calculated out of 100 persons) are applicable: Blacks: 80; Coloureds: 9; Whites: 8 and Indian/Asians/Other: 3. The primary intention must be maintained to bring the present more than 80% of the land in white hands (a group forming only 8% of the total population) gradually down in terms of above race-proportional guideline.83-88

It must be noted that the “blacks” are not one single group to be served by the intended land reform. This is a reality that the ANC elite has so far successfully kept out of sight and discussions.  The proportional rights on land by the individuals of the various African tribes and sub-tribes must be statutorily described and be recognised. It is unavoidable and an immediate must to address. These black tribal and sub-tribal people have for centuries mostly been living in certain parts of South Africa as majority groups in those areas. This means for instance, that in terms of land allocation through the program of expropriation, the placement of Zulus on traditional Venda land and vice versa could be catastrophic; as were the old “Bantustans” and Apartheid’s other foolishness on who owned which land.  The ratio of 80% of the land to be owned by blacks in general can for instance mean at the end that a ratio of only 8% land for the Zulus, 7% land for the Venda’s, etc. This can bring a totally new dimension to landownership, greed and power grabs, which on its own can lead to the upstart of black ethnic conflicts and struggles (which can usurp the frequently excessive racial attention on white landownership). The impact on the system of African traditional chiefs, leaders and tribal structures could become a hurdle in traditional tribal areas with great swathes of tribal communal land, but Gumede83 clearly defined the setup’s solution83:22: “The system of African traditional chiefs, leaders and structures should be abolished, or if retained, reformed to be in line with constitutional democracy. Harmful African traditions, cultures and customs must be scrapped. Control of communal land must be taken away from traditional leaders and given to individual households.”

Also, there must be taken note of the statutory claims of the so-called “indigenous brown people” (KhoiSan, Griqwa, Namakwa). The allocation of land, obtained through any form of land expropriation from whites, must also favour them proportionally to the fullest extent (See above: Indian/Asians/Other: 3).83-88

4. Conclusions and Dictum

Comprehensive land redistribution is an immediate must. But it needs vision, statesmanship, and a balanced and  responsible implementation.

South Africa’s main political parties fail the test to be legitimate rulers. Not one of the politicians tasked with it is capable to execute a balanced and justified land redistribution programme.

The ANC as the present-day ruler failed to execute one single project without involving corruption, as its elite’s state capture confirms. Its implemented land redistribution programme was not only saturated by nepotistic ANC elites through cadre deployment and BBEEE, but is par excellence an example of its inability to execute the simplest land redistribution project to uplift the poor and landless blacks. The ANC seems not to know or understand its own “law-bible” and the contents of an act it had itself promulgated in 1996 to effectively manage land redistribution without the need to change Section 25 of the Constitution. The intention to change Section 25 is nothing else than to restart state capture on a grand scale and the intention of the Marxist-Leninist ANC to over-regulate politics in order to stay in power and bring benefits to the exclusive ANC clique.69

The ANC-regime is seemingly hellbent on pushing through land redistribution without a structured plan and a much-needed infrastructure. Political opportunism by the dying, but extremist Marxist-Leninist orientated ANC elite to obtain votes from the masses of poor and landless blacks in order to stay in power after 2024, remains the central theme here. If the ANC regime is going to force through land redistribution, the outcome will be a colossal failure and chaos. The chance of igniting a revolution in the process is huge, wherein racial and ethnic conflicts stand central. Rwanda Two is not impossible. It seems that even the Chief Justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng75, has his doubts and is hesitatant when it comes the alleged, good outcome of the land matter, as Rooi75, on Mogoeng’s recent  speech at the Nelson Mandela memorial lecture, reflects75:2: “Hy het ook sy geloof uitgespreek dat die grondvraagstuk op ‘n vreedsame  wyse opgelos kan word en selfs tot versoening kan bydra.” There is only hope expressed by Mogoeng, and no decisive assurance that the process of a peaceful land redistribution process is a fact or is going to be a fact.

Also, the unfortunate quote by Mogoeng75 sadly revisiting much of Apartheid and its evils, such as the mass landownership to which whites were allegedly entitled, does not lend much support to the many struggling and South Africans of goodwill in their efforts to create a new South African Nation. His remarks, as quoted by Rooi75 — especially coming from the influencial Chief Justice – is saturated by political ill-will and an incitement to create trouble:2 “Hoewel die verlede nie vir alles wat fout is in Suid-Afrika geblameer kan word nie, is ‘die meeste van die probleme wat Suid-Afrika ervaar egter ‘n direkte gevolg van kolonialisme en apartheid’.”

South Africa is in immense trouble, not only its economy, but its racial and ethnic relations and brotherhood. As said previously, revolution and civil wars remain possibilities as long as the ANC elite and their regime are in power.

South Africa, as never before in its history coming from 1652, is in great trouble. We need the wisdom of King Solomon. Our salvation is the procedure of proving the doli incapax state of ANC regime in the political sphere: we need a New UDF as the ruler before the end of 2020.

Here the words of Tepperman1 are very supportive for us1:29: “Improbable and unexpected victories are exceedingly rare. Yet every once in a while, they do occur… it’s worth considering just what made the happy ending so implausible and, as a consequence, so inspiring.”

Tepperman1 reflects also that Mexico’s story of rehabilitation and improvement holds for us an immediate and important directive:97Hope”.  Quoting a Mexican leader, Pardinas, Tepperman1 writes1:197: “If you had asked ordinary Mexicans, or even the people who negotiated the Pact, whether, [a few] years ago, they would have thought something like this could happen here, they would have said no. We went through fifteen years of frustration. But our lesson is that the impossible can happen. It happened. Sometimes you really can find water in the middle of the desert.”

The New UDF is more than hope; it could become a reality. It could happen. It is a must to save South Africa from the brink of disaster and to eventually bring democracy and prosperity to the masses of poor and landless blacks. The New UDF is the only organisation that can successfully bring about a peaceful land redistribution process.

You reap what you sow.

Since 1652 South Africans have sowed distilled and reaped chaos. Since the 1994 democracy we have sowed, distilled and reaped chaos and despair. But there is hope: with the right person at the helm, sowing good corn, this confused and devastated country can be saved to live its golden days at last. The landownership matter is central to guarantee such golden days.  

It’s now the duty and obligation of the country’s 37-million eligible voters to appoint the right helmsman.

5.  References

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  38. Buccus I. A doubly discredited opposition and a paralysed ruling party leave SA vulnerable to a social explosion. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Nov. 3; p. 22.
  39. Mthombothi B. White and black parties facing off in parliament would be a sad sunset for Cyril’s new dawn. Sunday Times. 2019 Nov. 3; p.21.
  40. Boonzaaier D. Die gif in die DA. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 4.
  41. Bruce P. The writing is on the wall for the DA. Sunday Times. (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 24.
  42. Cachalia G. The DA has an opportunity to recalibrate and concentrate on policy. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Nov. 3; p. 22.
  43. De Groot S. Spare a thought for poor old ‘liberal’ caught up in the DA crisis. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Oct. 27; p. 24.
  44. Leon T. Veterans of long haul are not rattled by death notices. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Oct. 27; p. 24.
  45. Makinana A. ‘Not a classical liberal’. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Dec. 1; p. 14.
  46. Mokone T, Deklerk A. Leon’s secret Mmusi mission. Sunday Times. 2019 Oct. 6; pp.1,4.
  47. Steenhuisen J. ‘Dead’ DA not only alive and well, but ready to do some kicking. Sunday Times. 2019 Nov. 1; p. 5.
  48. Rossouw J. Hier’s die revolusie wat SA kort. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 7.
  49. Louw GP. The Crisis of the Afrikaners. Beau Bassin, Mauritius; Lap Lambert Academic Publishing; 2018.
  50. Buccus I. The left in SA is being left behind in the reinvigorated battle of ideas. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Dec. 1; p. 22.
  51. Boonzaaier D. Wit kiesers straf die DA nog ‘n keer. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 8
  52. Mokgobu A. Vote for party federal chair looms. The Citizen (News). 2019 Oct. 17; p.  6.
  53. Naki E. DA infighting is ‘not about race’. The Citizen (News). 2019 Oct. 17; p. 6.
  54. Pelser W. Stryd in DA is morsig – met lang messe uit. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 6.
  55. Celebrate freedom, yes, but more important, rediscover our lost unity. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 April 28; p. 18.
  56. Phakathi B. DA vows to challenge land reform. Business Day (National). 2019 Feb. 14; p. 3.
  57. Buccus I. Leadership vacuum calls for a return to UDF-style activist trenches. Sunday Times. 2019 Sept. 22; p. 25.
  58. Gumede W. Protect land reform from the problems that beset BEE. Sunday Times. 2019 June 12; p. 18.
  59. Taylor T. Fascism, the barbarous undercurrent of our time, finds the ground ripe for a re-emergence. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Oct. 27; p. 24.
  60. Hunter Q.  Hofmeyr warns of ‘state capture’ risk if powers are not curbed. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Dec. 1; p. 8.
  61. Law RJK. Apostasy from the Gospel. Edinburgh; RJK Law; 2003.
  62. Mthombothi B. Politicians should spare us the photo-op sympathy shows and admit guilt for rampant violent crime. Sunday Times. 2019. Dec. 15; p. 21
  63. Mthombothi B. Instead of grovelling to foreign heads of state our government should apologise to us. Sunday Times. 2019 Sept. 22; p. 25.
  64. Fish-Hodgson T. State’s failures to impede land reform. Mail & Guardian (Comment & Analysis). 2019 Aug.30 to Sept. 5; p. 30.
  65. Basson A, Du Toit P. Enemy of the People. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball; 2017.
  66. Mthombothi B. It’s hard to see the wisdom of the chief justice inserting himself so blatantly in the political terrain. Sunday Times. 2019 Oct. 6; p. 19.
  67. Myburgh P. Gangster State. Cape Town: Penguin; 2019.
  68. Pauw J. President’s Keepers. Cape Town: Tafelberg; 2017
  69. Villa-Vicencio C. The Church in South Africa. In: Fisher A, Albeldas M. A Question of Survival. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball; 1987.
  70. Nail the farm-flippers. Mail & Guardian. 2019 May 24 to 30
  71. Friedman H. Corruption plaques land reform. Mail & Guardian. (News). 2019 June 7 to 13; p. 9.
  72. Pithouse R. ANC factions rely on silence from the poor. Mail & Guardian, 2019 June 14 to 20; p. 27.
  73. Mthombothi B. Clean up all you like, Cyril, but without consequences the litter will be back. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March 10; p. 19.
  74. Tabane JJ. Crack down on the crooks in private and public sectors. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Feb. 3; p. 20.
  75. Rooi J. ‘Dis apartheid,’ sê Mogoeng. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Nov. 24; p. 2.
  76. Nyatsumba K. The arrogance and disdain of our leaders is our greatest challenge. Sunday Times. 2019 Sept. 15; p. 19.
  77. Dlamini P. Seizing land will “revive economy”. Sowetan (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 8.
  78. 78.Ndlovo R. Grim harvest for white farmers. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Dec. 2; p. 3.
  79. Gumede W. Our African identity is complex and unique. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Oct. 6; p. 20.
  80. Yako Y. Why people worship demigods who don’t serve them? Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 June 20; p. 13.
  81. Runji N. Cyril has to show nation what the legacy of his years in office will be. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 June 20; p. 13.
  82. Ampie Muller: Afrikaner academic who pioneered talks between Nats, ANC (1930-2019). Sunday Times (Obituaries). 2019 Sept. 29; p.17.
  83. Gumede W. Traditional chiefs an anachronism in democratic era. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Dec. 15; p. 22.
  84. Demographics of South Africa. [Cited 2019 Apr. 10]. Available from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_South_Africa/
  85. South Africa’s white population is still shrinking. [Cited 2019 Apr. 10]. Available from https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/206219/south-africas-white-population-is-still-shrinking/
  86. Africa’s white population shrinks even further in 2017. [Cited 2019 Apr. 10]. Available from https://https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/189135/south-africas-white-population-shrinks-even-further-in-2017/
  87. Boonzaaier D. Gee grond aan bruin mense – Peter Marais. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 6.
  88. Rooi J. Buthelezi kyk terug: ‘SA kon so anders wees’. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 12.

PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

 

South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 1 (18)

Title: South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 1 (18)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Background, discriminative, expropriation, injustice, myth, ownership, redistribution, revenge, troubled, unconstitutional.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 12: 1

1. Background

Do what is right, not what is easy nor what is popular.1

To implement South Africa’s proposed land expropriation (with or without compensation) is not going to be easy. It cannot and must not be a popular political solution. It should represent a righteous and a just outcome to all South Africans.

Is it possible for us to fulfil the above requirements? The prominent question is here, firstly: how did we arrive at this problematic situation, what story is there to tell regarding the present motivation to effect land expropriation in which the Whites and their current land holdings occupy a central position, and what is needed to launch the process of land expropriation?

Ela Gandhi2, a well-known South African activist and granddaughter of Mahatma Gandhi, provides to some extent an answer to these questions and what we need to do to rectify the mess, when she writes in the Sunday Times of the 18th March 20192:21:

I believe that we can only understand what is happening in South Africa if we acknowledge our racist history. Racist education and unbridled racial discrimination were entrenched in the various apartheid laws. Today, although most racist laws are rooted out, racist attitudes, prejudices, misconceptions and judgments remain with us.

We still use racial terms to describe South Africans. Almost all official documents require people to indicate their race. I understand the need for this – we still have a highly unequal society based on race, class and gender, and we need to know these demographics in order to bring about the needed changes. But hopefully there will be a day, sooner rather than later, when we can discard all these tags and be proudly South African.

We still have townships which are predominantly occupied by particular race groups, as was designated historically. Even though there is no law that entrenches these divisions, we are left with the separation legacies of apartheid days.

Schools have had to adjust to having children from different race groups, but racism is still encountered in schools, perhaps because not enough conscious effort has been made to train educators and the communities to think differently, to recognise and root out the racism within us.

Besides dividing South Africans into different race groups, apartheid discrimination impoverished black people by denying them occupational opportunities through job reservation policies and pass laws.

The 1913 Land Act and the Group Areas Act dispossessed many black people of their land and live hood.

We need to acknowledge the injustice and unfairness of apartheid, and we need to engage with the huge economic divide apartheid created between the rich, largely white, and the poor, largely black. A result of no acknowledgment and no sharing is that we have a large majority of people living in wealth and privileged access to resources. Racism is linked to this privilege.

There is a reluctance to rectify the injustices of the past through constructive programmes and voluntary sharing of wealth gained through apartheid privilege. Instead, there is agitation for the protection of individual rights and privileges at the expense of the common.

1.1. Introduction

The land redistribution matter — or land expropriation, as it has been many times announced to the public, in which the sensitive issue of compensation versus non-compensation features prominently — seems to have recently become a central way for the Ramaphosa regime of diverting attention away from its failure to deliver growth-boosting reforms, to curb its elite’s ongoing rent-seeking, their inability to clean up corruption and governance at state-owned enterprises and to do something to the dysfunctional state created by the ANC regime over 25 years. In this context of utter failure, Joffe3 writes3:2:

This was the year of the reality check. We began 2019 with forecasts that economic growth would lift to 1.7% and a state of the nation speech in which President Cyril  promised long-awited reforms to boost the economy and fix ailing state-owned enterprises, especially Eskom. We have ended the year flirting with recession and stage 6 load-shedding – to the “surprise and the shock” of Ramaphosa, whose economic reforms have been delivered excruciatingly slowly, if at all.

The latest GDP figures showed the economy turned negative in the third quarter; a week or more of load-shedding could see that repeated in the fourth quarter; and it’s now possible the full-year 2019 number will be negative — for the first time since 2009. SA had become a 1% economy over the past five years. Now it’s falling even below that; 2019 has driven home just how stuck we are in the low-growth trap and how hard it’s proving to get out of it, despite oft-repeated promises of reform.

The esteem and personal standing of the ANC, the Ramaphosa regime, Cyril Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule with the ordinary man on the street have never been as low as in December 2019. Ramaphosa and the ANC elite know well that they have not been ablot to generate wealth for the poor since 1994 and cannot do it post-2019. Their failed Marxist-Leninist model in economics does not allow for it. They are more and more forced to do something extraordinary to make themselves popular again. Secondly, they must find immediate wealth to get the economy going and to satisfy the poor people’s hunger and other needs to avoid unrest and revolution, and to receive support to be able to stay in power until 2024. Three clear outcomes are easily available for them to regain power and to get money on the table: land grabbing, the nationaliation of the Reserve Bank and looting the public and private pension funds. The easiest to launch and the most popular choice inside the ANC radicals’ RET (radical economic transformation) is land grabbing from Whites.3-9

The year 2020 seems to be the Year of Land Grabbing, especially because Ramaphosa must do something politically extraordinary to outlive the 2020 Mid-year Conference of the ANC. At this stage, inside South Africa’s troubled land ownership, some positive and constructive guidelines are needed to make the unavoidable, threatening land redistribution a reality and a success.

1.2. Aims of article 18

In this article (together with Article 19), the primary aim is to make conclusions, based on the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the matter of land expropriation and to offer a dictum on whether it may be successfully be executed by the ANC regime as the present ruler or by another ruler post-2019.

This is the semi-final article in the series of nineteen articles on the matter of South African landownership. The previous seventeen articles of the series were published in the South African accredited journal Ensovoort [Volume 38 (2018), Number 12:1 to Volume 40 (2019), Number 11:7]. The short-titles of these seventeen published articles (numbered one to 17 in the series) are as follows:

  1. Who are colonists and who are indigenous people? (1);
  2. Perspectives on the background to the land ownership dispute (2);
  3. The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime – Part 1 (3);
  4. The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime – Part 2 (4);
  5. Age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system – Part 1 (5);
  6. Age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system – Part 2 – (6);
  7. Land ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 1 (7);
  8. 8. Land ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 2 (8);
  9. The EFF in perspective (9);
  10. The DA in perspective (10);
  11. The ANC in perspective (11);
  12. The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity);
  13. The ANC in perspective (13: Violence and Crime);
  14. The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability);
  15. The ANC in perspective (15: Opportunism);
  16. The ANC in perspective (16: Outdated ANC);
  17. The ANC in perspective (17: ANC’s troubled leadership).

2. Method

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to successfully execute land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa in order to effect successful land reform from 2019 onwards.

The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. South Africa’s troubled land ownership (1652 – 2019)

3.1.1. Overview (Articles 1 to 17)

The political dispensations of the Cape Colony of 1853 and 1872 and the Union of 1910 offered excellent opportunities to redistribute land and hand a justified part back to Blacks to create an open, just South African society. But White supremacy and its land-grabbing politics made it impossible. The later 1994 dispensation under the ANC failed again. Land redistribution from 2019 onwards will become a natural and unavoidable interference and intervention.

Land grabbing is an age-old custom in South Africa. It was practised by Blacks on Blacks as well as Whites on Blacks for more than three hundred years. It is thus of the utmost importance that this custom is not restarted again in 2019 and that a perfect solution to the present imbalance between White land ownership and Black land ownership is rapidly found, without falling back onto the past’s vicious circle of revenge and counter-revenge to erase the manifold injustices committed before 1994.

South Africa’s political history is far from completion. Also, there is an immense political history what needs to be retraced and to be rewritten, or at least to be corrected. It does not matter if we like it or not: it is a sine qua non.

For the antagonists (anti-land redistributors and mostly Whites), the period 1994 to 2019 under the ANC regime has been a dark period of criminality, state capture, confused violence, thuggery and race-baiting. It has gained a momentum that will not slow as long as the ANC is in power. The antagonists have an unshakable belief that the general public and the parliament itself will reject any change to the Constitution or would not allow land grabbing from Whites. They also believe that the South African courts, including the Constitutional Court, will denounce any illegal and unconstitutional actions by the ANC that could lead to a one-sided policy of land expropriation without full compensation. For the antagonists both Julius Malema and Cyril Ramaphosa are, as land redistributors of White land to the poor and landless Blacks, political bluffs that will soon disappear from the country’s politics.7,10-24

When comparing the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists and the propagandists, some are based on sound foundations while others are emotionally laden and lacking in depth.7,10-24

Hereto is it clear for the propagandists (pro-land redistributors and mostly Blacks) that a mass of contaminating elements and role players, integrated and established during the age-old, unjust and discriminative White political and socio-economic system of South Africa, are obstructing any change to Section 25 of the Consitution that would enable land expropriation without compensation. The propagandists believe that myths and lies are prominent in the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints. They believe the antagonists’ present obstruction of the land expropriation initiative is temporary, unfounded and doomed to failure. The change to Section 25, to effect land expropriation without compensation, is for the propagandists the only path to uplift the mass of Blacks from their inequality, landlessness, poverty and unemployment, and to reverse the immense land grabbing by Whites of non-Whites’ land, starting in 1652. The undoing of the historical trajectory of the age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system of South African society is one of the biggest challenges for the present or any future government. The overwhelming interests of the mass of Black poor and landless people can no longer be ignored. The present exclusive structure of White land ownership and economic empowerment is a recipe for revolution.7,10-24

From a critical vantage point it must be noted that in general the perspective of the antagonists are not representative of the total White or Afrikaner population, but mostly of the contingent of White farm and land owners, White exclusive capitalist business groups with direct and indirect interests in agricultural economics, as well as self-appointed White “saviours and rescuers” that claim to fight unselfishly for the interests of the White farming community and for the Constitution and dispensation of 1994. (The total number of these self-appointed White “saviours and rescuers” is far lower than 300 000 of the White population of 5 milion, representing 6% of the White population).  For the propagandists it is time for the White population to purge itself of this group of 300 000 White individuals’ contamination with fallacies and racism. The other nearly 5 million Whites (outside the antagonists’ and the 35 000 White farmers’ self-interest), also have citizen interests but are side-lined and ignored by the antagonists. The antagonists are a minority group, estimated to represent less than 10% of the White population which, in reality, is another minority group, more or less 8% of the total South African population.7,10-24

For the propagandists the land-ownership matter has been well planned and blown up for a long time by ±35 000 White farmers (of which only between 5 000 and 7 000 farmers really contribute to the country’s essential daily food supply). The opportunistic group of the rest of the ±30 000 of White farmers represents less than 0.1% of the total South African population and less than 1% of the White population. This priority granted to 35 000 White farmers and their land has led to the interests of nearly 30 million poor and landless Blacks in the post-1994 Democracy being ignored. For the propagandists, it just cannot go on in this way.7,10-24

The imbalance in land ownership, together with the inequality in the country between White and Black (as well as between Black and Black) means that redistribution should occur, but it should not be offered as a panacea for poverty or be based on arguments about who is indigenous and who is not. Redistribution of land is a good symbolic act for emotional relief and political catharsis as to Apartheid’s transgressions, but the fact it that it is not going to change the lives of the poor immediately and drastically as falsely claimed by radical politicians. Land expropriation so far has been saturated with corruption and state capture in which the ANC elite has played a central role. It is only one aspect of the political and socioeconomic delinquency of the ANC. The comprehensive dysfunction of the political and socioeconomic system of South Africa since 1994, with its corrupted elements and role players, may activate a poisonous element with the ability to kill the innocent and to bring devastation to South Africa. It can only aggravate the matter further, given the ANC’s present-day politics of corruption, criminality and extreme racism, planned and executed by a strong sector within the ANC elite.7,10-24

The current problems around land redistribution are just too enormous for the current ANC political leadership to solve. When they do attend to the matter, they do it in an explosive and conflict-ridden way, creating more complex problems and crises. Indeed, the fact is that the radicals in the ANC and other political parties do not really know what they want to do with the expropriated land. They do not have a sound plan. There seems to be much revenge about the discriminative politics of the past and land grabbing, making Whites rightfully worried about their assets, as well as their personal future and safety in the country.

Land expropriation with reasonable compensation is a must that needs immediate implementation. But, where applicable, land expropriation without compensation should also be a tool to rearrange the South African scene regarding land ownership. In this the redistribution of state property should take a prominent position as the first stage of activating land expropriation. The mass of poverty, landlessness, indignity and inequality, which had become a lifestyle to nearly 30 million Blacks — people isolated from their social, economic and political rights as South Africans and exposed to immense delinquencies, that are equal to crimes against humanity — contains the potential for country-wide anarchy and revolution; which may ignite from 2020 if not fully addressed. This dangerous situation makes a just land expropriation an absolute priority.7,10-24

Land redistribution is unavoidable. It needs a solution. Whites, mostly the Afrikaners, own most of the land that the Blacks want. The prominent question is how the transfer will take place: Will it be another land grab; or will there be a reasoned, balanced and just land transfer and redistribution? The last option has been absent from all of South African political history, creating doubt if land redistribution by Whites will ever be freely and willingly allowed.

The counts awarded in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018 25, is for the EFF a mere 8 points (9%) out of a possible maximum of 82 points (100%). This means that the EFF is an outright failure as a political institution of stature. It cannot be trusted in any way to be in charge of land expropriation. Moreover, they totally lack the experience to handle such a project.25

The DA was awarded 59 points (72%) out of the maximum 82 points.The DA reflects immense shortcomings in their experience regarding land reform — specifically on land expropriation without compensation. Where the issue of the land matter emerges in the DA’s politics, it seems to be determined and driven by White interests rather than the interests of the poor and landless Blacks. The DA is clearly a slave of exclusive capitalism and its principle of a “stretched democracy”. Since the May 2019 election the DA has shown a movement towards White right-wing politics, making just land redistribution essentially impossible and the party an improper and inappropriate ruler to effect land redistribution.The DA does not show the ability to immediately handle successful land reform.25

The awarding of 23 points (out of 82 points) to the ANC as a regime reflects that it is lacking capabilities and the general integrity as a skilled ruler. Indeed, the ANC failed the basic test to be the ruler of South Africa. Its Marxist-Leninist political ideology as to the economy, landownership and racism is outdated. Evidence is there that the ANC as a regime is going to run into trouble fast to fulfil its May 2019 election promises and to execute its basic duties to the voters. Under the ANC’s 25 years of rule most South Africans lost out on prosperity, while the the living environment of its people has become saturated with violence and crime. Its political leaders’ lifestyles are characterised by a lack of accountability and beset by extreme opportunism. The ANC is incompetent to honestly effect well-planned and balanced land redistribution, with or without compensation. Their intended plan to bring landownership to the mass of poor and landless Blacks will only create further state capture, poverty and anarchy, while a full-scale revolution becomes more and more of a reality.25

Looking at the evaluation of the three main political parties of South Africa in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, all three are absolutely incapable of successfully implementing balanced and justified land redistribution in the next five to ten years. To put in in even stronger terms: none of the three will ever be successful to do land redistribution in any way. The evidence is there that all three will be part of the country’s political history for the next five years.25

This leaves us with the prominent question at this stage: are there South African political parties or a political party that may fast-track the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future? This is very complex question to answer, seeing that popularity at the ballot box does not guarantee that a government of quality and ability comes to power, as the ANC regime of 25 years confirms. Defining the wrongs of our past and present politics and the immediate demand to plan and to fix our future, is the question: can land expropriation (with compensation or without compensation) be executed correctly and with justice after more than three hundred of years of failure?

3.1.2. Immediate and future negative outcomes and dangers
3.1.2.1. Unrest, anarchy and revolution

We already see from Article 13 (Violence and Crime) the extent to which chronic unrest has been established in the country. Looking critically at the uncontrollable murders in the Cape Town Area that necessitated the intervention of the SADF to curb the reign of criminal gangs, together with the burning of trucks on highways and the murder of truck drivers, South Africa has long ago moved from simple riots to chronic anarchy, bringing the country to the threshold of revolution. What is striking, is the hostility and aggressive behaviour of the mass of poor living in the growing shanty towns, also known as “informal settlements”. It initially started due to the lack of service delivery in these settlements, such as the absence of basic health care, education facilities, transport and security infrastructure, and basic accommodation. These shortcomings have been addressed in the past nor are they being tackled at the moment in any way by the ANC regime. The dramatic collapse of the economy since 2016 has led to an immense growth in unemployment, the influx of the poor from the rural areas into the cities, and a resulting lack of basic accommodation. A direct outcome of this migration, absent from the ANC elite’s as well as the broad public’s consciousness, is the significant presence of poverty among half of the South African population and the phenomenon of constant hunger experienced by the mass of poor.  In the past and worldwide, poverty and hunger have caused two opposing outcomes: Firstly, the start of revolution which has brought down regimes, leading to the large-scale killing of certain sectors of the population and radical long-term political changes within countries. Secondly, poverty and hunger in certain countries have brought a total collapse in the poor people’s intention and will to revolt against their tragic circumstances, causing them to lapse even futher and deeper into poverty and enslavement to a ruler’s oppression. We saw this negative enslavement outcome of passivity among the Black population in South Africa since 1652 and especially after 1910 with Apartheid. At the moment we are seeing it again in South Africa under the Black ANC regime, where the enslavement and oppression of the mass of poor Blacks is undoubtedly the highest ever since 1652 and where the mass of Blacks seemingly accept their poverty as their destiny. But actions cause reaction and we should not consider the ongoing unrest and anarchy as a chronic, permanent situation without any further serious outcomes. The truth is far from this, as the chronic ongoing unrest and anarchy in Algeria, Tunisia, Iraqi and Syria, which suddenly changed to deadly revolution, confirms. South Africa’s unrest and anarchy are starting to show the typical characteristics of the forerunners of a comprehensive revolution waiting to be enacted. The land-redistribution matter, together with unemployment, poverty and hunger, may be the imminent stimulant to set off revolution overnight.3-30

The advent of revolution after 2020 is a high possibility that needs to be discussed. It will be dishonest not to warn the public on the negative impact of revolution on their lives. Prominently at risk are the minority of Whites and surely the Black BBEEE-empowered businessmen and politicians such as Ramaphosa and his cronies as possible victims.3-30

Besides the element of revenge in revolution, it must be emphasised that revolution can activate blocked-up development that could not be reached normally inside the traditional political setup. The mass of Blacks (more than 30 million) stand to benefit from any South African revolution. On the virtue of revolution under certain circumstances, Mark Malloch-Brown27, a former UN Deputy Secretary-General and a minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK, in his book The Unfinished Global Revolution27 gives us a guideline when he posits:

Since the book calls for a more comprehensive global democracy where we all have more say over our local, national, and our global affairs, the Arab Spring is evidently a step in the right direction. The Arab Human Development Reports, which I had sponsored at UNDP, pointed out that of the world’s seven regions, the Arab countries had the lowest freedom scores.

The question is: if the Arab Spring was an essential outcome, why can a post-2019 South African revolution not be an essential outcome and a “step in the right direction” either?

The 1994 political dispensation was undoubtedly a revolution, but a passive revolution; one which did not bring an extreme re-balancing of South Africa’s wealth and economics. It was only a false political democracy, meaning much on paper but nothing in practice. It was a continuation of Apartheid, with all its evil. It was a planned revolution by the ANC top brass and the NP-AB top brass to suite their own interests. Features that characterise most active revolutions — actions such as land grabbing without compensation, the prosecution of the Apartheid penetrators for human-rights violations, the activation of inclusive capitalism and job creation — were totally absent. The critical evaluation of the reports of the ANC’s referees (see Articles 12 to 17 of this series), shows that this passive revolution, launched in 1994, was essentially an outright failure. Firstly, it brought more poverty to the mass of Blacks, demolished certain established facilities such as healthcare and education while the landlessness of the poor Blacks stayed unchanged. The second outcome was that a repressive pre-1994 political-economic-social regime was merely replaced with a comprehensively economically repressive post-1994 regime.3-24

The question is: if a radical, active revolution had indeed been implemented in 1994, would it have solved masse Black poverty, joblessness and their lack of landownership as we are experiencing now? The answers are a Yes as well as a No. These opposing two answers must be read in the political histories reflecting revolutions that have played out worldwide over many years. It would be foolish to say that revolution does not work and is an evil. It is not true. The Liberation War of the North American Colonies from Great Britain brought them, besides statutory independence, political, economic and social empowerment that have made the USA the most powerful nation in the world today. The French revolution brought for the lower and middle class, as well as the poor, emancipation from the domination of the rich aristocracy, but on the other hand it has left them to this day with a kind of political immaturity as reflected in their constant unrest which borders on anarchy. The Russian revolution also brought freedom to the poor, the lower and middle class from the domination of the nobility but led directly to the institution of another repressice regime, the Communists, with role players like Stalin up to Putin today. In Africa there were  many active revolutions, with essentially not a single one bringing long-term positive outcomes. Prominent examples in this regard are the Egyptian, Zimbabwean, and Ugandan revolutions.27

Mark Malloch-Brown27, on the phenomenon of positive revolutionary outcomes at certain times and in certain situations, bringing at last human rights to suppressed and discriminated-against people after centuries of suffering, gives good insight when he  writes27:250: “First, that the power of the people, when right is on their side, is always unstoppable.” Prominent stands the fact that the potentials for revolutions are mostly observable, reflecting to the insiders and outsiders that anything in political setups is possible and must be accepted. Mostly is this “incoming revolution” not only ignored, but see as impossible to can and will spring-up. Malloch-Brown27 emphasis that the Arab Spring revolution (to spring up in 2010-2011 in Tunisia and Egypt) was already observable in 2002 (eight years earlier), but ignored and laughed down as the impossible and not to be a serious concern by the authorities and experts. The corrupted leaders go on for nearly a decade to reign in Tunisia and Egypt before the social time bomb, that had been set over many years, had gone off.   But when a certain crisis hits – sometimes a small energy-stimulant is needed to activate it, like the Arab Spring — the surprise is great.27 Malloch-Brown27 writes272:45-246:

The Arab spring began with an auspicious, if tragic, start: the self-immolation of a Tunisian street seller, Mohammed Bouazizi [who could be as well a said Andile Zuzile in South Africa]. On December 18, 2010, he set himself alight because he felt threatened and ignored by corrupt, bullying local police officers [who had, because of their corrupted empowerment coming over years under a corrupted regime, fall into a state of thinking to do what they want and to do this for ever unchallenged].The power of  his protest came from the fact that his desperate frustration was shared by so many others [same as the present-day 30-million ignored impoverished and landless Blacks of South Africa]. His act lit the dry timber of latent anger against a line of corruption and privilege that stretched from the local female police constable, who ignored his complains, to President Ben Ali, his wife and his family. By the time Bouazizi died from his burns on January 4, 2011, the region was catching fire.

The act was auspicious because such apparent futility and weakness brought down an apparently all powerfully political order. And, indeed this David and Goliath theme of weakness confronting strength and prevailing was a steady part of the early months of the Arab spring. Peaceful protestors, drawing courage from the links to each other and the outside world… saw off heavily armed government forces. Yet it took only from December 18, Bouazizi’s burning, to February 11, 2011 for… Ben Ali to be driven from office.

Does the above situation of Mohammed Bouazizi differ from that of the unknown South African Black Andile Zuzile? No, it does not differ an inch. Does the Tunisian political, social and economic disorder under the regime of Ben Ali differ from the disorder under the ANC regime between 1994 and 2019? Again, no, it does not differ an inch. Is the said Andile Zuzile (as was Mohammed Bouazizi seemingly seen at the beginning of his action) the only sufferer and victim of the corrupt 1994 to 2019 regime in South Africa? No, apart from him there are 29, 900, 999 other Black sufferers and victims in South Africa. Are the dissatisfactions and demands of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionaries different from the mass of South African Blacks’ dissatisfactions and demands? No: it was also primarily about the price of bread, demands for jobs, as well as affordable goods and services, etc. And, most of all, a say in politics regarding one’s own affairs. It was not so much about differences in social classes, religions or races. Is the mentioned Andile Zuzile at this stage insignificant for the ANC elite? Yes. It is true that the Marxist-Leninist ANC regime sees Andile Zuzile as an insignificant role player in their political thinking, revealing the ANC elite’s lack of in-depth contact with the masses. In this context Redi Tlhabi30 refers to the book A Tale of Two Cities by Charles Dickens in which he describes the circumstances of the poor and landless people which led to the French Revolution and the followeding reign of terror. She writes, comparing the two delinquent regimes and their leaderships30:20:

Die kloof tussen die wat dié wat lei en dié wat gelei word, word groter en groter.

Dit het in Suid-Afrika gebeur.

Ons kan dalk nie die presiese tydstip aandui toe die kloof gevorm is nie, maar daaglikse uitsprake, besluite en optredes laat ons met geen twyfel nie dat die ANC – die party wat gevorm is deur eerbiedige mans soos John Dube, Pixley ka Isaka Seme en Sol Plaatje – sy vinger van die pols van die nasie gehaal het nie.

Hulle [ANC-topleiers] is besig om mense te “ontdek” en te paradeer wat geraak is deur hul latenskap van onbekwaamheid, korrupsie, swak dienslewering en ja, onbetrokkenheid.

What A Tale of Two Cities30 also tells us is that when the fires of revolution start they are not easily stopped: in France it required a Napoleon Bonaparte, a blood-thirsty dictator, to remove the revolutionaries from politics and to clean up their mess. (This intervention must stand as a warning for revolutionaries such as Zuma, Magashule, Ramaphosa, Mabuza and Malema about a possible destiny awaiting them).

But, cautions Malloch-Brown27, revolution does not always immediately bring success. He writes27:244:

…the notion that the force of street protests that begins a revolution subsequently loses its way in the long, less glamorous, sequel of taking power will not be new. Indeed, in my experience, the completion of the shift from overthrow of the old to a more stable democratic order is on average a ten-year project. Much beyond the ballot box has to change. The old elite’s grip on absolute economic power has to be prized open, a culture of democratic openness and minority rights forged, a civil society given political oxygen to breathe and grow, a justice system people respect and trust established. Nearly always new governments struggle to make these changeas while also battling a legacy of economic failure and pent-up popular demands for job and basic services that they have inherited from their failed predecessors. In Egypt and Tunisia, all these conditions for a long, difficult journey to a “finished” revolution are present. Elsewhere the challenges are more difficult still.

It is significant that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, which started in 2010, are still in 2019  far from over. Moreover, true democratic stability has so far not been reached [in line with Malloch-Brown’s27 estimation that the growth from an old order to a more (hopeful)  stable democratic order is on average a ten-year project. Especially in Egypt, there has been little improvementin the country’s autocratic politics up to 2019. It is also a fact that South Africa’s passive revolution, with its duration stretching over 25 years, is also far from over.27

In South Africa the passive revolution, launched by the 1994 Political Dispensation, did not entail revenge on so-called Apartheid wrongdoers. There were some “emotional confessions” which were drowned in religious dogma offering the cleansing of the political sins of the culprits, mostly the Whites. Then there was the intended prosecution by the NPA of political wrongdoers, also mostly Whites. Again, a failure to fulfil the demands of revenge: jailing, confiscation of assets, the compensation of the Black sufferers under Apartheid. The “1994 revolution” was a soft revolution without real punishment of the obvious culprits: Whites. All that was realised was BBEEE as a punishment of Whites, and cadre deployment as a punishment of anti-ANC Blacks obstructing the ANC elite’s delinquencies.3-24

The most recent revolution in the world, where one autocratic regime was replaced by yet another (more extreme) autocracy, is Iran. Iran’s past political structure had the same kind of basis as that of South Africa and needs some elaboration. One of the prominent outcomes in Iran, as during the French revolution, was revenge on the previous ruling class: the nobles and elite. Not only were they eliminqted from regime structures and their ownership of assets dismantled, but they were also physically killed.

3.1.2.1.1. The 1978 Iranian revolution

To understand what a “real” revolution and a “real” revenge mean, it is needed to look at Iran’s revolution which started in 1978 and is still going on today in the guise of various forms of instability. At the same time it gives it us some criteria to compare post-1994 South Africa under the Marxist-Leninist ANC regime with some of the characteristics of the Iranian post-1978 religious-extremist regime. The post-1978 setup in the end did not bring improvements to the Iranians, not even for the first group of revolutionaries. The well-known international writer and world-traveller, the late Sir VS Naipaul31, gives us a good description of the post-1978 failed Iran in his book, entitled: Beyond Belief: Islamic excursions among the converted peoples.31

In Iran the regime was run from the 1930s by Reza Shah, who was succeeded by his son, the last Shah. Both of the two rulers’ regimes’ were autocratic, repressive and much hated. Especially the last Shah’s SAVAK (secret police) was cruel. The Iranian revolution of 1978 did not come as a surprise — all the characteristics needed for an uprising were there, such as repression, food scarcity, lack of freedom, etc. But the identity of the role players who took power in the end, ignoring the true revolutionaries’ dreams, was indeed a surprise. The main role player, the opportunist and madman Khomeini first arrived on the scene after the revolution’s beginning, heading from there into his precisely planned direction of evil and murder by hijacking the whole exercise with his exclusive religious group. He embarked on the next phase, a religious-cultural revolution, intertwined with a political revolution. This outcome elicited the following response from one of the initial revolutionaries31:183: “We may win the revolution, but culturally we will go back a thousand years”, and31:183: “You will never gain anything following theses religious people. We have known them. We have seen them. These are the people who didn’t let me [female] learn reading and writing.”  On the further outcomes of the revolution Naipaul31, quoting the experience of the mentioned Iranian Ali just after the start of the revolution, reports31:170:

Some people Ali knew, supporters of the revolution, turned against it after the first month. Ali thought he should give it a little more time. But then, about two months after the revolution, when the executions began, he had serious doubts. People who had done nothing were arrested and taken to jail. Many of them disappeared. Then they started charging into people’s houses, confiscating their properties. We had no security for our property our children or our wife.

Naipaul31 further recounts Ali’s experience31:201: “He had his doubts about the drift of the revolution, and soon things began to be bad. There were religious regulations. Women had to wear the chador and the full headdress; music and cultural events were banned. There were restrictions on the press. There was a “cultural revolution,” as it was called; all the universities were closed.” But this was only the beginning, as Ayatollah Khalkhalli in 1979 said31:201: “The mullahs are going to rule now [they still did in 2019]. We are going to have ten thousand years of the Islamic Republic. The Marxists [their initial partners in the revolution] are going to go on with their Lenin. We are going to go on in the way of Khomeini.” Inside Khalkhalli’s malcognition is to be found his own dream of blood, to equal what Stalin did in Russia. Naipaul31, quoting Khalkhalli, writes:31:201 “What he did in Russia we have to do in Iran. We too have to do a lot of killing. A lot.”

Ali’s31 testimony goes further31:173:

There was now, too, a constant harassment from the Revolutionary Guards [still fully governing Iran in 2019], jumping into the garden and looking through the windows to see whether anyone was looking at television or videos, or breaking into the house to search for alcohol or ham or women’s dresses or men’s neckties, all now forbidden things.

And if you were cleanly dressed, they didn’t like it. They would attack you. It was like Pol Pot, but not so extreme. Ten precent. It was a full revolution.

The reins of government went altogether out of the hands of government, out of control. It was anarchy and terror. The reason was Khomeini himself.

In this context Naipaul31 points out that, to make up for his lack of money to supply the mullahs’ immense needs, Khomeini31 said31:173: “Go to your own towns. Find the first man who is rich or the first man who has a factory or a huge farm. And force him to pay.”

On this order by Khomeini to the mullahs in which theft is presented as “honest” and “morally correct”, Ali31 reports31:175:

Khomeini has set a bad example. Every ayatollah now can claim necessity, as Khomeini often did, and break the law. And Iran was still living with his Islamic constitution, which gave him supreme power, and established the principle of leadership and obedience.

On the further consequences of Khomeini’s delinquency, Ali states31:174-175:

The majority [people] wanted to loot. So, he [Khomeini] made disorder in the country and let them loot. He did what they wanted.

When he [Khomeini] said “follow the law, it wasn’t the law of the country. It was his law, the law in his own mind. Before the revolution he said it was un-Islamic to pay taxes to the government. After, he said it was Islamic to pay taxes to the government. He wanted complete chaos. That day in his house I realized this man is not a man of government. He was still a revolutionary. He couldn’t control himself. Until the very last day he was making disorder.

He had an instinctive brain. He was instinctively intelligent, an instinctive, animal intelligence. Because of this he could command the people. He did not have an educational intelligence. He did’nt become emotional. He was very cool.

Looked at from the viewpoint of clinical psychology, it seems as if Khomeini’ s brain function was one of psychopathy. This is borne out by his and his cronies’ undermentioned killing spree.

On the killing spree between 1978 and 1979 (it went on for many years), Naipaul31 writes31:200:

When I went to Theran in August 1979, Ayatollah Khalkhalli, the hanging judge of the revolution, was a star. The Islamic Revolutionary Court [the shah’s old military court] in Shariati Street was sitting almost round the clock, as Ali had said. People were being killed all the time in Evin Prison and trucks were taking away the bodies through the blue gates at night.

There was nothing secretive or abashed about the killings. Some revolutionary official was keeping count, and regularly in the Theran Times there was an update. In the beginning the counting was to show how clement the revolution was; later, when the killing became too much, the counting stopped. In those early days official photographs were taken of people before they were killed and after they were killed — killed and, as it were, filed away, naked on the sliding mortuary slab, in the giant filing cabinet of the morgue. These pictures were on sale in the streets.

Ayatollah Khalkhalli, the ruler of the Islamic Revolutionary Court, was open to the press. He gave many boastful interviews.

Naipaul31 writes further31:188:

Khalkhalli, in an interview [August 1979]  with the Theran Times…said that he “probably” sentenced three to four hundred people to death [in less than one year]. On some nights, he said, the trucks had taken thirty or fourty bodies out of the prison.

Comparing the above description of the Khomeini regime and his cronies’ actions with the letters of the referees on the delinquent actions of the ANC top brass between 1994 and 2019 (see: Articles 11 to 17), and the ANC’s pre-1994 political history, there seem to be immense similarities. Remember: both regimes and their leaders were committed to the revolutionary ethos, of taking without creating, as well as extremism in politics. In both of the two organisations, some of the leaders had blood on their hands,  both constantly broke the law during their rule and engaged in state capture. It gives us a warning what could happen after 2019 if things went wrong for the ANC elite’s grip on power.

3.1.2.1.2. Death mostly for the initial revolutionist

Revolution mostly brings death to the initial revolutionist, however noble his intention was to better his country. The recalcitrant holding on to power and actions of the old class whose regimes are challenged, as well as their tendency to turn to extreme repression to staunch the revolutions and their revolutionaries, are reflected by the counter-actions of Bashar al-Assad in Syria over many years. Most revolutions have gone down fast, unknown many times to the outsider, because suppression of the masses has been efficiently kept out of the public eye. The murdering spree of Bashar Assad’s father in 1982 of up to 20 000 people in Syria on a single occasion, was kept out of the news for long.27

The question is here: was there a pre-1994 revolution by South African Blacks against their suffering? Yes, there was the 1960s Black Revolution which gradually, with the impact of other determinants, spelt the end of Apartheid and the elimination of the NP from political, emotional and cognitive mindsets (although only three decades later). In the 1960s South Africa’s Black Revolution (undoubtedly, in line with the same reasons why present-day unrest and anarchy are kept under wraps, but now possibly on a higher level of dissatisfaction and more broadly experienced), was kept away from the news, as well as the NP’s bloody actions to stamp out this revolution with its immense security force and the elimination of the Black revolutionaries.27,28 The rapid phasing out of the 1960s Black Revolution was directly attributable to the absolute suppression of the Blacks by the security forces of the NP. As Malloch-Brown27 writes27:243: “Yet revolution is not easily sparked in a world where rulers govern with an iron hand. The examples of successful revolution in the Arab world were few and far between.’

South Africa’s 1960s Black Revolution went the same way as that of the many failed revolutions at the time in extreme authoritarian states. But today the ANC is a Black government where a racial guideline for the murder of the Black masses (we hope) is less defined than during the period 1652 to 1994. In addition, the ANC regime is thankfully not armed and trained to the same high level as that of the NP military of the 1960s. For the current South African revolutionaries to be gobbled up by the ANC regime and its incapable securirity forces is impossible. Read herewith the unionisation of the security forces and the presence of Black tribalism in the security forces, any significant bloodletting of Blacks by Blacks in the ANC regime, to avoid a revolution, will not easily be put into action. Neither must it be expected that if a revolution started, it would be quickly and effectively curtailed.26

3.1.2.1.3. Extreme Islamic politics inside a South African revolution

But various African-Black revolutionary efforts since 1960s against the White NP regime and its forces were not the only attempted revolutions. The terrorist expert De Wet Potgieter29 points out that during Apartheid repression a small group of Islamic extremists exploited low-intensity urban warfare in South Africa, after which this Islamic extremism started to flourish with a growing intensity.There was in the Western Cape the Qibla Mass Movement (Qibla), based on Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini doctrine. This group emerged as a militant pro-Shiite one, modelled on the Iranian Revolution, with the objective of implementing and establishing strict Islamic principles in South Africa. [This organisation also went under the names Muslims-Against-Global-Oppression (MAGO) and Muslims-Against-Illegimate-Leaders (MAIL)]. It paved the way for a more violent organisation, writes Potgieter29, which came to the fore in 1996 as the violent organisation People against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad). Qibla was fast labelled as a terrorist organisation by the USA government. It had already started back then to send its members overseas for military training in Libya, later Pakistan, who were deployed in the 1990s to fight in South Libanon with Hezbollah. At the millennium more than 100 Qibla members were arrested for violence-related activities and murder in South Africa. Before that, in 1995, reports Potgieter, the Isamic Unity Convention emerged, representing more than 250 Muslim groups in South Africa. Qibla was the central body within the movement and before 9/11 Qibla had already crossed swords with the USA for its activities in that country.  After the 9/11 attack Qibla sent fighters to Afghanistan. Central to all of this, is a figure such as Achmad Cassiem, a radical Islamic cleric who joined the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) at the age of 15 years and was later sent to Robben Island after having been sentenced for terrorism, attempted murder and the possession of arms and ammunition.29

This build-up in the presence of Muslim revolutionists became clear in 1998 in South Africa with their attack on Planet Hollywood at the popular V&A Waterfront in Cape Town. This was after Pagad had started to target businesses in Cape Town, in response to the US retaliatory attacks in the Middle East after the 9/11 attack.29 Potgieter29 writes on this 1998 radical Muslim attack29:31:

South Africans would never in their wildest dreams have believed that terror would return to the country a mere four years after the newfound freedom of a democratic society under Mandela’s Rainbow Nation. Unfortunately, this false sense of a peaceful transition to a new life of freedom and peace was short-lived with the global terror reaching our shores at the southern tip of Africa.

The above sets out the basic presence of Islamic terrorists in South Africa. Included would be the presence of ISIS in the country, exposing South Africa today to the threat of international terrorism. The country’s liberal foreign policy towards the Middle East and the ANC regime’s anti-American position do not safeguard it from Islamic terrorism. So far, the ANC regime has openly tolerated the existence of Islamic terrorists in South Africa, even it seems blind to the presence of these groups training all over the country, as well as their movements up into Africa. This empathy and passivity of the ANC regime is to a great extent (besides its long-established brotherhood with terrorist regimes of countries in Africa and South America) due to a fear of Islamic counter-actions if they were arrested and prevented from pursuing their terrorism from here to the outside world.29 This fear and passivity of the ANC regime Potgieter29 describes as follows29:33:

The ‘war against terrorism’ is ultimately a chess game in which governments need to be aware that their actions will have consequences, and although counter-measures might be successful in the short term, that might not be the case in the medium to the long term. In other words: states, through their actions, might win a battle (the arrest or elimination of prominent suspects) but ultimately lose the war against terrorism — by driving individuals to extremism and terrorism.

This “unofficial peace agreement” of the ANC regime with the Islamic radicals does not assure a permanent outcome of brotherhood and peace, as well as the absence of attacks on the South Africa state and its system by the Islamic radicals. Especially not for the ultra-extremist Islamic terrorists who have since 1960s clearly wanted an Islamic state with all its principles established here, in contradistinction to the liberal Christian and exclusively capitalist setups that have been dominant since 1652. For the time being, the ANC regime’s sympathy and alliance with terrorism (extending to its pre-1994 years) fits the situation of the radical Islamics well here, while the present low profile and passivity of the radical Islamics within the ANC regime’s political, economic and cultural composition, is  also a temporary characteristic which can change overnight. In the aftermath of the Syrian and Iraq wars, their internal conflicts and political disfunction, the true role and planning of the radical Islamics for the first time emerged with a bloody capture of parts of the two countries. On the other hand, the so-called end of the ISIS caliphate does not spell the end of a theoretical ISIS Caliphate, the ideology of ISIS and the elimination of ISIS jihadists from geopolitics: they are permanent ‘war fixtures” in the world. The fact that many of these jihadists have returned to South Africa and to other Western countries, makes them nothing less as than “soldiers of fortune”. In this case there are many similarities with the “Christian Crusaders” who had fought under the banner of Christianity all over the Middle-East against Islam, and today’s Islamic jihadists. In both cases their self-enrichment and pursuit of power are prominent and their quest for new political, economic and cultural terrority, to which the politically unstable South Africa exposes itself for easy capturing.29

3.1.2.1.4. Political radicalism-in-waiting

It seems in 2019 that South Africans, in terms of the political instability and lawlessness created by the ANC regime and its leadership, are foolishly naive regarding political radicalism (which is often practised in the guise of radical religiousness). The radicalism in the ANC and the EFF is not so innocent as the political term “Black Nationalism” might suggest. Potgieter, in this context, postulates29:35: “Accepting that South African nationals might become involved in transnational terrorism is an unfortunate reality.” It is a fact that our borders have become lawless territories, ruled by marauding gangsters and human traffickers who allow the infiltration of well-trained and experienced jihadists. The issuing of South African identity and passport documents to international jihadists and allowing the stay of international jihadists, fleeing Western forces after the fall of their ISIS state, is an every-day fact. The use of South Africa as the springboard for Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists has become a prominent issue. The passivity of the ANC regime allowed that Al-Qaeda-linked small training camps had not only been established since 2010, but had started to spread all over the country, alleges Potgieter29. These small camps and their trained terrorists are waiting patiently to act when the time is right and the conditions in their favour.

The notion that the terrorists of Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda or Boko Haram will not attack the South African state and its vulnerable political system because the ANC is an ex-terrorist organisation and is sympathic to the terrorists’ ideology, is foolish.  Potgieter29 writes on the Kenyan Hotel attack29:35:

Many will say that such groups have no reason to attack us. They will say that Kenya was attacked because its troops are in Somalia, where Al Shabaab operates. They are wrong.

Terror does not work that way. We are currently cooperating with the Kenyan authorities and a link as tenuous as that is enough to set off an attack on us.

Further, reason and logic are alien to such groups. Their tactics are to scare communities into submission. It does not matter who they attack. They seek  chaos and attention. They want to make a spectacle.

The patient waiting game by djihadists described above, seems to be in line with the more recent insurgency in Southern Africa — which the journalist Simon Allison32 describes as a” faceless insurgency”— that has started in October 2017 against a police station in the town of Mocimboa da Praia, Mozambique, to be followed in June 2018 by an attack in the Cabo Delgado province of northern Mozambique. Such attacks constitute a string of aimless assaults on the security forces and civilians without anyone claiming responsibility for it. In the June attack, 40 people were killed, some with extreme cruelty and at least 400 houses were burnt down, displacing more than 1 000 people. For such a significant conflict, out of the blue, there has been surprisingly little reliable information available, reports Allison.32 Until now, the situation has not changed, leaving the void as to information and understanding intact while the violence intensified in Mozambique. Allison32 reports there are now an average of two to three attacks a week while at least 120 persons have died. On this confusion and lack of knowledge regarding the assailants, Allison32 writes32:20:

Even local journalists can’t talk about it because the culture of intimidation is there. Yeah, it’s confusing. It’s really confusing. Even the government is confused. How can you negotiate with people when you don’t know who they are?

This same initial confusion as to “what is going on” and “who is behind the unrest” had struck the governments of Syrya and Iraq at the start of their wars, before ISIS with its unique ideology, took off its mask. The editor32 of the idependent online newspaper @Verdade in Mozambique, Erik Charas32, said32:20: “I have never come across something like this before. Never, not [even] during the Renamo war. It doesn’t even resemble the other Islamic State movements. This is completely different.”

There is no doubt that the South African djihadists’ début in politics will also take place in a unique way and possibly be associated with radicals in the EFF and the ANC who have already declared, in their intention to effect land grabbing from Whites, their participation in a revolution to come.

3.1.2.1.5. Political dissatisfaction-scoring  

To indicate how the dissatisfaction (during the Black Revolution) of the 1960s of the black masses under the white NP-regime compares with the 2019 dissatisfaction of the black masses under the black-ruled ANC-regime, is not easy, seeing that a kind of Malloch-Brown Arab Human Development Report27 is absent here to reflect scores. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,25 can effectively be used in this instance to award, in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification, a single count of both South African regimes and executive political leadership between: a) 1652 and1994; and b) 1994 to 2019. The central hypothesis is that a low satisfaction rating (50% and lower) with their political rights for the periods: a) 1652 to 1994 and b) 1994 to 2019, respectively for all South African voters (as with the low Arab ratings on the existing freedoms reflect on their “readiness for revolution” by being regarded “as a step in the right direction”), will also reflect how ready South Africans are for “revolution as a step in the right direction.”25,33

For the period 1652 to 1994 on Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction, a score of 42 (51%) out of a possible 82 points, was awarded. This means there was an average dissatisfaction reflected by South Africans in pre-1994 South Africa. Revolutionary activities during that period contradict the opinion that pre-1994 South Africans had a strong tendency towards starting revolution. This low dissatisfaction score possibly also explains why the fomenting of a revolution in the 1960s was easily suppressed by the NP regime.25,33

The count awarded to the ANC and its leadership for the period 1994 to 2019 in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification of satisfaction on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,25 out of a possible maximum of 82, is 23 (26%). This means there is serious dissatisfaction reflected by South Africans in the post-1994 South Africa. The hypothesis is confirmed that the mass of South Africans can see (as did the Arabs low scores on freedom reflect that the “doing of revolution” by them “as a step in the right direction”), post-2019 as the correct time of “revolution as a step in the right direction”.25,33

It is also important to reflect on General Jan Smuts’ words, now a true cliché after more than a century’s use, when he said that South Africa will never give it best but also never give its worst. As with many politicians and their statements, Smuts failed to offer a precise scale to ascertain his notions of “best” and “worst”, and thus the extremes of bad and good can be expected.34 In terms of the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 201825 the challenge is to rate what Smuts34 tried to say in 1910 and how in some way a measurement of the concepts of the “best” and “worst” for the period 1910 up to 2019 should be designed in a suitable way. The classification of the information was done in terms of a Black political history, meaning how blacks had experienced their situation historically speaking. Firstly, in terms of the worst versus the best, categorising was done in terms of: 1) political dissatisfaction versus political satisfaction; 2) keenness to start a revolution versus reluctance to start a revolution; and 3) ability to launch a revolution versus inability to start a revolution. Secondly, each of the above categories allocated ten points to quantifying values on the 1 on the scale as absolute low versus the 10 on the scale as absolute high. Thirdly, the period 1910 to 2019 was divided into four time frames: 1910; 1948, 1994 and 2019. All the calculations were done in terms of these particular time frames.25,33

The scores were as follows25,33:

Political dissatisfaction: 1910: 6; 1948: 7; 1994: 9; 2019: 9.
Political satisfaction: 1910: 4; 1948: 3; 1994: 1; 2019: 1.

Keenness to start a revolution: 1910: 5; 1948: 7; 1994: 9; 2019: 9.
Reluctance to start a revolution: 1910: 5; 1948: 3; 1994: 1; 2019: 1.

Ability to launch a revolution: 1910: 3; 1948: 3; 1994: 5; 2019: 9.
Inability to launch a revolution: 1910: 7; 1948: 7; 1994: 5; 2019: 1.

From the above results it is clear that the political dissatisfaction of 1994 and 2019 are similar and has attained the highest level with a score of 9 (In contrast, political satisfaction for 1994 and 2019 attained the lowest count with a score of 1). The rating for keenness to start a revolution for 1994 and 2019 are at the highest level with a score of 9 (In contrast, the reluctance to start a revolution for 1994 and 2019 obtained the lowest level with a score of 1). The ability to launch a revolution in 1994 (possibly as a result of the NP’s strong and able security forces) was only 5 while in 2019 it has obtained a score of 9 (in a context in which blacks have become politically empowered and are actually manning the security forces, free from white dominance). It is obvious from the above outcome that 1994 was the year in which the Apartheid setup was experienced the most negatively since 1910 by blacks ( with a political dissatisfaction count: 9). In 1994, black rule and democracy were still absent. This explosive situation was one of the reasons why the NP regime had faced a strong push to “abdicate” or face a full-scale revolution in 1994. But also, as reflected in 2019, in a general climate in which blacks are supposed to be “free”, a score of 9 regarding political dissatisfaction has been registered. This result highlights the fact that the negative political outlook of blacks in 1994 has not not changed in any way in 2019, except that in 2019 the political scene has become far more volatile and potentially explosive than in 1994. It is confirmed by the ability of the masses of poor and landless people to foment revolution: Here the score of 9, is already four figures higher than 1994’s rating of 5.25,33

3.1.2.1.6. Post-2019 revolution-in-waiting

On the issue of a possible post-2019 revolution heading for South Africa, it is important to emphasize that the political differences between the group of revolutionaries that is able to steer the revolution and unit of the ANC elite who is currently governing the country (coming from pre-1994 and continuing after post-1994), is zero. They are all revolutionaries, born from the same pre-1994 terrorist organisation, the Marxist-Leninist ANC. They are mostly individuals who underwrite the same political ideology, which has been varying from classic to neo-Marxism. So why will they revolt against their own organisation? The answer is found in the existing two ANC liberator identities today: the unscrupulous ANC-elite versus the impoverished masses of black people (30-million plus), which include the ANC-members (less than a million) and the ANC followers (less than 10 million).

The author and political analyst Redi Tlhabi30 referred to the fact that although it has not been possible to identify the date of the above split, when the ANC-elite moved away from the South African people, the gap is enormous and is growing constantly.30 The editor35 of the Mail & Guardian, in an editorial in February 2019 under the heading35:32: “The sad fact is the state is ripe for picking”, pinpointed the date of the divorce exactly however: 1994. He refers to the book of the late Sampie Terreblanche, tittled: Lost in Transformation: South Africa’s Search for a New Future since 1986. Terreblanche,35 argues the editor35, clearly pinpointed that the ANC’s leadership (from Nelson Mandela) bartered away its revolutionary ideals for the pragmatism and acceptance of big business. There was only one intention for this leadership: its own self-enrichment and personal financial empowerment. This was one side and a secret decision by the ANC elite (which includes Cyril Ramaphosa as a writer of the Constitution and supporter of the 1994 Dispensation) with their acceptance of the dishonest 1994 Political Dispensation. In the meantime this leadership, without batting an eyelid, went on to send out and to propagate the false ideology of the pre-1994 ANC, namely that its primary aim and intention is to enrich and uplift the masses of black people caught in the scourge of inequality, poverty and landlessness. This false ideology, which has been repeated for twenty-five years, was and still is signalled to every ordinary ANC supporter. It has now been unmasked, but it was not done by the Zuma-Magashule-Mabuza-Ramaphosa clan of racketeers who are marketing themselves as revolutionaries to save, as they allege, the post-2019 ANC and the country. These four marketeers’ intention is not to save and to restructure the present “sick” ANC, but to worsen the plight of the masses of blacks, their chaotic position in 2019 South Africa to assure a Marxist-Leninist government under a powerful politburo. It is the grassroots of the ANC, especially the dissatisfied black jobless and poor youth, who are now taking on the task of liberation and revolution to advance the masses of black people.35

Reflecting the split in 1994 – and the ANC’s failure already then to rule with honesty and integrity to improve the lives the black masses – between the rich and the poor, which is based on the division between the ANC elite and the ANC’s ordinary members and followers, the editor35 of the Mail & Guardian quotes Terreblanche’s35 words35:32“While the ANC operated on the moral high ground during the anti-apartheid struggle, since 1994 they have slipped into a sleazy underworld where corruption, nepotism and money squandering are the order of the day, so that South Africa could become a neo-colonial satellite of the American-led neoliberal empire. Although the ANC has been the government of South Africa since 1994, we could allege that it is still not ‘ready to govern’.” 

This sustained failure and inability evident within the small circle of the ANC regime, coming from 1994, goes even deeper: it is a function of the ANC’s elite seemingly extraordinary ability to mesmerise the ANC party and its millions of unsuspecting supporters till today with their ideology and promises of liberating the black masses.30,35

The editorial35 of the Mail & Guardian is correct when it postulates that the sad fact is that the South African state is ripe for picking: For many this picking – or more precisely: this revolution-in-waiting – is merely a reappropriation by the masses of poor and landless blacks of the ANC as a party, and possibly also the capturing of the state. Here the notion of being black is a central theme. Helen Zille36 puts it in perspective on the 21st  April 2019 when she says36:9: “We are seeing the resurrection of racial nationalism in our country. It is highly retrogressive and I think it will take South Africa down a cul-de-sac. We will eventually come to realise that but the cost will be high. And I am very sad we are going to have to go down that path, very sad, before we achieve the vision of our Constitution.”

Malloch-Brown’s27 prerequisite for the activating of a revolution — and that such a happening can sometimes be a good event to better people’s tragic setup — fits well into the 2019 dysfunctional South Africa, and the seeming intention by the masses of blacks (ANC-supporters and non-supporters) to take back their so-called country from the mischievous ANC elite.  Tabane37, quoting Azapo president StrikeThokoane’s view, reports on the 21st April 2019, on this disenchantment of supporters with the present-day ANC37:9:

Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) president Strike Thokoane has an interesting analogy for explaining why many black people who supported the ANC for a long time are now turning to other parties 25 years since the dawn of democracy.

“I always liken this to a priest who tries to preach on Christmas Day or New Year eve when people are enjoying themselves at a party. He tries to say, ‘Jesus Christ saves’ but the noise of the entertainment is drowning him out.

But when they get sober, they want to go to the same person and say, ‘By the way, what were you saying about Jesus?”

He [Thokoane] says that, for a long time after 1994, black people were very complacent about democracy, thinking they had “arrived”.

“Our people were told that they have arrived and have nothing to do anymore. Everybody believed what they were told and promised. As a result , they were not even listening to the voice of Azapo. Others listened, but they thought we were rather too extreme and radical.”

The above view and the pleading of Strike Thokoane36, reflect again on Zille’s warning of the resurrection of racial nationalism and the coming of the collapse of the South African state. It goes beyond these issues in 2019 when he says that Azapo stands for the reversing of the betrayal of promises to by the ANC to the people.36,37 Tabane37 writes37:9:

We tell them, “Azapo stands for dignity of black people. Hence it is black consciousness roots. It is not anti white, but it is pro black. We love black people more.

The struggle had been sold. Black people have been sold for money and profit. Land has become fashionable but we have died for land. Our heroes have died for it. Land must be reconquered. So, we must repossess it so that we can redistribute it.

Unlike those who want to expropriate without compensation, we believe that, when you expropriate, you suggest it belongs to someone else and you are taking it by force. Repossession, however, means this belongs to us and we are taking it back.

Land needs to be possessed by black people after it was unlawfully stolen. We must reconquer.”

It must also be noted that there is the extreme radical standpoint of the Black First Land First (BLF) on land by its leader Andile Mngxitama38:4:

“…the BLF, unlike the ANC and the EFF, is serious on its stance on the land issue. The FFPlus knows that if we get into Parliament, we will not drag our feet on the matter. The ANC and the EFF make up more than two thirds of parliament; why do you think they have not amended the Constitution by now? They are in the pockets of these landowners and are protecting their interests.

…should the party be removed from the ballot paper [May 8], “we will be left with no choice but to take up arms and fight for our freedom”.

It is not a surprise, in light of this “revolution” declaration by the BLF,  that Bell39 refers with great reservation to the BLF’s leadership, as follows39:2: “…the self-appointed collective imbongi of North Korea, Andile Mngxitama’s Black First Land (BLF)…”.

It must be highlighted that unrest and chronic anarchy are today inherent to the South African society: The Provinces of the North-West and KwaZulu-Natal reflect this state of affairs extremely well with so-called daily “service-delivery unhappiness” which is characterised by residents burning down state property to40:8: “…announce to government that there is a protest going on…”; that40:8: “…we are going to do worse things”; and40:8: “We’re not benefiting from the advent of democracy. It’s as if we… residents are not South Africans. We are prepared to die to ensure we get basic services”. On the strength of this unrest-cum-anarchy, Lali,40 on the recent extreme violent protest in Khayelitsha in Cape Town (which is only one of a growing mass of violent protests countrywide) and which shows all the signs of a failure by the SAPS to master crime there, writes40:8: “Throughout the morning, the protesters blocked Japhta Masemola Road with burning tyres, various objects and a shipping container. The police tried unsuccessfully to disperse them, but they regrouped and set up more burning barricades, preventing traffic from moving along the normally busy roads.” 

Also, the preparation for unrest countrywide during the past May 2019 election and the ANC government’s decision to place the police and defense forces on readiness, reflect further the chronic presence of unrest-cum-anarchy in South Africa.  Van der Walt,41 quoting the minister of Police, Bheki Cele41, commented on the seriousness of this issue in May 201941:2: “Cele sê hoewel geweld in al nege provinsies moontlik is, hou Noordwes en KwaZulu-Natal die grootste gevaar in. Geweldadige betogings kom al die afgelope jaar gereeld in Noordwes voor, terwyl politieke moorde in KwaZulu-Natal nie ’n vreemde verskynsel is nie.” This unrest-cum-anarchy – representing the growing and broadening collapse of law and order in South Africa – to which Cele36 refers, is also confirmed by the Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba,41 the minister of State security. Van der Walt,41 on the past May election, writes41:2: “…inligting wat deur haar department ingesamel is, dui daarop dat daar ‘bedrywighede’ is wat moontlik ten doel het om die verkiesing in Noordwes en KwaZulu-Natal omver te werp.”

3.1.2.1.7. Political racism’s role in revolution

It must be clear that these are also problems waiting to muddy black versus white race relations, which can be opportunistically be shifted onto a revolutionary project.  It must therefore be acknowledged that a part of the leadership of the ANC seems also to start to reflect racism on the same basis as reflected by the leaders of the EFF, Azania and the BLF. The ANC secretary-general Ace Magashule ponders this in April 2019 when in Philippi in the Western Cape he alleged42:3: “to incite ANC supporters to exercise their vote in a racist way.” Maxon42 reports42:3: “Magashule told residents in Philippi that they must not vote for an umlungu (a white person).” In addition it should be noted that the ANC veterans immediately condemned his racial utterance, seeing it as a sign of irresponsible leadership: a racial and political misstep which demanded the intervention of Ramaphosa to punish Magashule (which unsurprisingly has so far not happened). But this kind of racial outburst from the ANC’s top brass could eventually become more prominent in the wake May 2019, depending on how Ramaphosa squares off against Magashule in a leadership battle.39,42

Maxon42 points out that this “mischievous” political behaviour of Magashule must be read in terms of the outcome of the Nasrec 2017 conference and the power play which has been an outcome of it.  Here his focus is on a contingent of old conservative ANC veterans (respecting the Freedom Charter as a prerequisite for non-racism), still clinging to their traditional Marxist-Leninist politics versus a new brigade of radical cadres (which Bell39 has  described as the “self-appointed collective imbongis of North Korea” and which could become numerous in the ANC if Magashule gets a proper grasp on power). In practice it seems not to be a pure asymmetric leadership feature in the ANC, but more of an outcome of clear groupings around the two big men of the ANC: Ramaphosa versus Magashule. The issue is not so much a political or an ideology renewal or an age-factor, as it is around the grasp on political power in which the Magashule politics is far more radical than the politics prescribed to ANC cadres in terms of the Freedom Charter. Inherent to this is the presence of radicalism which could trigger racially-inspired aggressive behaviour against whites in the advent of of revolution. Maxon42 is correct when he says the ANC’s soul is in peril (which spells danger for the political stability of South Africa after 2019). Yonela Dipko43 notices Magashule’s unflattering description of an umlungu (a white person) as the right of ANC cadres to call out specific white people who are alleged to be against the rights and interests of black persons (which seems in reality to be “ANC blacks”, and not “DA blacks”!). He clearly does not see white-listing by a black Magashule as racism as long as the black Magashule is categorical about a umlungu (white) who is, in his terms, a so-called “racist” particularly as defined by the ANC’s Diko43 and Magashule. At the same time Diko43 fails to describe the “characteristics and activities of the so-called 2019 White Western Cape racist” and falls back onto dangerous political clichés, which suggests taking revenge on and cleansing the opposition, which happens to be white too.39,42,43

Dipko43 reflects firstly on “soft politics”, the so-called “pity plea” by radical and dangerous blacks who, by their own misadventures and shortcomings, do not form part of able and skilled competitors, when he reflects43:3:

Integration is still a one-way street, blacks assimilating to whites. After 400 years, white people can’t pronounce our names, can’t speak our languages, can’t identify with black people’s challenges, such as a lack of spaces. So, black people find themselves having to assimilate. If your name is Tinyiko you must let then call call you “tiny”; you find your black self assimilating to their language, tastes and culture because you are a minority of one, at every board meeting, every restaurant, every school play. It’s disheartening.”

The above plea is obviously one-sided, biased and without serious consideration, while Diko43 also conveniently forgets who has ruled over South Africa since 2019: precisely the old garde and veterans of the ANC which have failed to give persons as Diko4 the required “spaces” and which have introduced English as the only “official” language, making the use of indigenous languages irrelevant. Furthermore, there are of course those who use colonial English first names willingly par excellence, ignoring their ethnic “black names”: the ANC top cadres are littered with such individuals such as Ace Magashule, Nelson Mandela  and Cyril Ramaphosa! It seems so far, from Diko’s43 rhetoric, that the possible presence of a poor self-esteem harboured by some blacks in ANC politics has been ignored, contrary to the public boast and much-touted 2019 “sound black self-esteem”.

But, on the “victim-identity” Diko43 quickly reveals his true intention (and unashamed racism) when he reveals his mindset regarding “hard politics”, as he writes43:3:

The Western Cape is a fiefdom of the abelungu and to contend that, in the name of non-racialism, in fact of a racist government, they must continue to be given governing power is offensive in the extreme, particular to the black majority.

Success here has a white face and it starts in the corridors of the provincial government. While Cape Town is 80% black, the divisional directors of the provincial government alone are 70% white. That then informs everything else, from government policy to the conceptualisation of programmes.

Most experiences are anecdotal, which is why someone such as Premier Helen Zille can deny racism exists in Cape Town. She has no personal encounter with it. Until a black government takes over the Western Cape, sensitivity with racial victimisation will not exist.

Looking carefully at Diko’s43 rhetoric, it seems to be an ANC creed, an organisation posing as a wolf dressed in sheep’s clothing, especially as far as the last election is concerned. This is shown from the words used to describe the Western Cape and Cape Town (both basically the only governmental entities still functioning with qualified audits in the country) as a “racist government”, an “offensive governing power”, and “time that black government takes over Western Cape”, etc. Secondly, the fact that Diko43 is a spokesperson of the ANC in the Western Cape, quite evidently rhymes with Magashule’s anti-abelungu politics, bringing to the foreground the undercurrent of post-2019 racism (and more: racial and political extreminism) prevalent in the ANC: clearly discrimination against blacks, Coloureds and whites who dare to criticise the ANC for its misadvetures and who do not support the ANC’s nefarious politics. Diko’s43 opinions and thinking must be read as the same reflected in Sudan by the previous tyrant Omar al-Bashir specifically against women during his rule of 1998 to 2019.39,42,43

The Guardian44, as quoted by the Sunday Times, reflects44:15: “In the Bashir era, women faced being jailed and were even threatened with physical torture for a variety of offences, such as wearing trousers or behaving in a way that deemed inappropriate.” 

If, so far, no concerns were evident in the minds of many South Africans about their future, especially whites, Coloureds, Indians and non-black ANC cadres, it is now time to start worrying. Diko’s and Magashule’s rhetorics are in line with the racism of the radicals of the EFF, Azano and the PAC. It is political cliches that echo Hitler and the Nazis’ racial policies of highlighting the “differences and evil nature of Jews” in their scapegoating of them as racial, economic, social culprits and saboteurs, and created the foundation for the Nazis to allow the genocide of Jews. In 2019, the insight into the mindsets of the leadership of the ANC, help to differentiate what is really bad and what is really good. It spells danger for the lives of the 15 million voters (out of the 25 million total voting individuals) who did not vote for the ANC and thus for 37 million people (out of a total 57 million population) who do not necessarily support the ANC.39, 42,43

South Africans know well how a madman such as an Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir of Sudan came to power and could stay in power for 30 years with the aid of their brand of extremism, contributing to racial, ethnic and religious discrimination, and murderous rule. For South Africans this should be a timeous warning and an indication what they can expect if the post-2019 politics go wrong and political power falls into the hands of characters like Julius Malema, Ace Magashule, Jacob Zuma and David Mabuza. During Apartheid, where the blacks were the victims, but it is important to note that they were also the victims in Sudan. Things can turn nasty quickly, even for the ANC elite, such as Diko, Magashule, Mabuza and Ramaphosa if they as the top cadres lost their grip on South Africa. On the power grab of Bashir in 1989 by means of a military coup and his corrupt rule up to 2019, the Sunday Times45 of the 14th April 2019 notes as follows45:15:

Labour unions were liquidated and dissenters detained without trial and tortured.

Life got even worse after South Sudan, home to the majority of Christians, seceded in 2011. Churches were bulldozed and burnt. In 2012 Bashir warned non-Muslims: “Nothing will preserve your rights except for Islamic sharia”.

Sudan turned into a playground for Islamic terrorist groups. Its’ harboured Osama bin Laden in the early years of his jihad movement that led to the creation of al-Qaeda, landing Sudan a spot on the US list of countries backing terrorism.

Bashir exploited ethnic and tribal tensions to consolidate power, with bloody ethnically targeted wars in Darfur and other parts of the country earning him an ICC indictment for war crimes and genocide in 2009, and making Sudan’s name synonymous with ethnic cleansing.

Refugees described the horror of racially targeted atrocities. Attackers would shout “Kill the slaves, kill the slaves!” and “We have orders to kill the blacks”. One refugee reported a militia member boasting, “We kill all blacks and even kill cattle when they have black calves.

3.1.2.1.8. Role of the youth in revolution

An aspect missed by political analysts is the possible role that the South African youth can play in a forthcoming revolution. Firstly, it seems that the efforts by the government to register the young voters have failed. Statistics show that the 18 to 19 years olds on the voter lists for 2019 is 47% lower than in 2014, while for the age group 20 to 29 the number declined by 9%. This reflects that only 341 236 of South Africa’s present registered voters are younger than 20 years against 646 313 in 2014 (In 2009 the number was even higher on 669 241). In the age-group 20 to 29 there is at present 5 299 297 voters (against 5 759 297 in 2014). In practice means it that only 1.3% of the registered voters are 20 years and younger, while only 21.1% is 30 years and younger. For formal politics and thus the various political parties mean this a loss of voter support. Firstly, the fact that only 35% of eligible voters participated in the 2014 election shows that the youth’s present apathy not a new kind of phenomenon. What is telling is that as with the 1960s black “revolution” against the Apartheid regime, the growing involvement of the youth in unrests all over the country currently could equally have a huge impact on the status quo. Although the widespread lack of service delivery is often mentioned as the main source of the unrest, unemployment is fast developing into a stronger driver for the widespread riots. Increasingly, it seems to be political indifference that has been playing a role in fomenting the unrest, since many youths are politically well-informed and driven by a political interest with the focus on their personal interests and problems instead of on a political party and the elite’s interests. Many of these non-party youths associated with the “rebellion” politics of the EFF and BLF, take to the streets without necessarily joining these parties as members or as supporters. At most, they see party politics only as a vehicle for self-promotion.38, 46-49

The youth are no longer mesmerised by the ANC’s message of 47:36: “…you should remember what the ANC did for you.” For the present youth the ANC as a party and as a regime have done absolutely nothing and they know it very well. A vote for the ANC by a black youngster simply means47:36: “…to endorse the ANC’s position in power, while its members continue with corruption, the corporatisation of the state and unethical governance.”

They are willing to take on the ANC system, as #RhodesMustFall and the #FeesMustFall movements showed us. They are not shying away from the concept that democratic rule has mostly emerged through bloodshed, but are rather making it a second option.27,46,47

The youth could soon become the real power to drive a revolution, in fact, sooner than most political analysts understand. As in Tunisia and Egypt, their South African revolution could be ignited too, quite suddenly by a small flame. And the various small fires burning already are manifold among the youth: hunger, poverty, abuse, indignity, dominance, discrimination, exploitation, and more.  The advise of Bruce in April 2019 to Ramaphosa in which he repeated Winston Churchill’s famous “blood, toil, sweat and tears” speech in 1938 to the South African youth, is nothing else than a threat on the one side to the youth to toe the line or else, and on the other side a further exploitation of them. These kinds of admonishments by Ramaphosa directed at the youth in the future may just be the single fire to start the revolution. It does not matter if it turns out to be a South Africa Youth Spring, South Africa Youth Winter, South Africa Youth Summer or South Africa Youth Autumn, the revolution is waiting. Where the politicians, especially the black ones of the ANC, celebrate April 27 as their Freedom Day of a 25-year old so-called New South Africa, most of the black youths can’t celebrate along with them. There is good reason for it, and also why they not have registered to vote on May 8 2019 and why they are becoming primed for revolution. They have never tasted Nelson Mandela’s promises of democracy and freedom. Mandela has become a stranger to them, a blurred, bitter memory.27,47,50,51

A prominent example of the sudden explosion of violence by the youth, and that it is looming, ever-present in every-day life, was well-illustrated on the 8th April 2019 in Johannesburg. Here a peaceful march of hundreds of black pupils [all members of the ANC-aligned Congress of South African Students (Cosas) were so disillusioned by the failure of their political parent and mentor, the ANC, to stop violence at schools, that the whole march turned into violence and  looting. Their looting did not stop with the theft of only fruit, but included cellphones and alcohol. The young protesters left a trail of destruction and even injured a shopkeeper. It appears that the Number One of the ANC, Ace Magashule’s speech at Luthuli-house, failed to calm them down. This, it must be noted, can be the future awaiting South Africans exposed to an extreme and unpredictable violent uprising by these youths.52,53

The youth of Cosas’s behaviour must not only be read in the poor example set by their peers in the ANC, but in their powerless situation and deprivation as a result of ignoring their rights in terms of the Constitution, specifically by their own people and group, namely the ANC. It is not a surprise that the secretary of the Young Communist League, Kgabo Moriti54, viewed this with a critical eye, especially the turn of events in South African politics. He says54:12: “We must ask ourselves if we have begun our descent into chaos.”

The seriousness of the misdemeanor by present-day South Africa youths, also caught the attention of the editor53 of The Star forcing him to revisit the past of unrest, anarchy and violence, in order to make sense of our future. He posits53:12:

For a moment it felt like 2002, when Cosas, then led by Jilius Malema , unleashed chaos in the Joburg CBD, leading to loses by pedestrians, vendors and shopkeepers who were mugged and robbed during the rowdy illegal march.

It should not surprise us that high-school children use violence and looting as part of protest. South Africa has an endemic culture of violence and looting in protest. During the days of the Struggle against apartheid, some elements among the protesters used to trash shops and loot during marches.

An editorial50 of the Sunday Times (dated 21 April 2019) tells us the truth and more about the reality that awaits the country50:2:

However, people born in 1994 may not share our joy – mainly because many are unemployed. These 25-year-olds are at the centre of the single biggest challenge SA has faced since 1994: unemployment. According to StatsSA, the youth unemployment rate is higher than any other age group, irrespective of education levels: 52.2% of people aged 15-24, and 35.5%of those aged 25-34, are unemployed – and these figures exclude the young people who have given up looking for work and become a burden on their parents and siblings, or have simply turned to criminal activity.

This brings us back to the sudden start-up of revolutions, especially those of the youth and the single match that usually lights it. For the ANC government to keep up the comprehensive suppression of these outbursts of youth violence, the editor53 of The Star seemingly sees as a solution, the much-needed match to start up revolution, much more serious than the “Malema-2002-uprising” or the 1960s black revolt. He errs when he writes  10th April this year12: “Our government needs to seriously curb this culture, for many a time it undermines the rights to protest and deals a blow to issues that many concerned people protest over.”

He completely misses the point: since 1994, peaceful protests in the first place have brought only false promises given to the black youth from the ANC, as with Ace Magashule’s reassurance to them that55:15: “…their grievances are being given attention”. Secondly, as already indicated, their (and their parents who voted for the ANC) needs, demands and ultimatums are laughed at by the autocratic Marxist ANC-regime, as Magashule’s insincere reaction on the 8th April 2019 in Johannesburg confirms: ongoing empty promises to the youth.

The political analysts like Barney Mthombothi56 — although they despise unrest, riots and violence — understand and respect the drivers of unrest, riots and violence in terms of the mindset of the average South African. They contradict the false insight that South Africa’s psyche is stable after 25 years of “household abuse” by the ANC and that unrest, riots and violence, and thus revolution, is impossible. The “burning of things to show your anger as seemingly the last and only resort” for many are the staple of 2019 politics. The motto that there are no real winners in a strike, riot or revolution, don’t matter for the poor, deprived and rejected persons. Statistics that the South African growth for 2019 is expected only to be 1.3%, with a possible improvement in 2021 to 2%, are not part of their world, because when it was 6% plus, they didn’t benefit from economic growth either.26,50,52,53,56,57

It must be noted that there are other contaminating elements which could play a role in any youth revolution. Firstly, there are the radicals that instrumentalize the unhappiness of the black youths, as we see from the allegations that the ANC youth movement has been behind serious unrest since March-April 2019 in places as Alexandria, Hammanskraal, Orange Grove, Pretoria and Soshanguwe in Gauteng, Khayelitsha, Blackheath, Eersterivier and the Strand in the Western Cape. Here also it seems to be an influx of adult trouble-makers who steer and incite the uprising. This we see too at the April 2019 meeting of Ace Magashule in Parys where the ANC Youth League’s war drums were heard loudly and the ANC seniors sided with the youthful radicals. Julius Malema’s legal and constitutional privilege to declare: “…we will not kill the whites for now” is not so innocent when the planning of anarchy and revolution is the ultimate goal. It must be remembered that Malema publicly said he would take part in a revolution when the situation arises. In addition the war-talk of the BLF is another feature of the political landscape that stands out. Secondly, South Africa is not built on a singular black unity and a singular non-black unity: The black unity is compiled of a very unstable black tribal composition, created by Apartheid, wherein the Zulus and Xhosas are still today regarded as the “superior” tribes. Cyril Ramaphosa and Mtolanthe maybe “Soweto-born”, but they are not of the Zulu- or Xhosa-tribes:  they are from the so-called “Northern tribes”. This “classification” is also applicable to Julius Malema. (note: Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki are Xhosas and Jacob Zuma is a Zulu). Azapo’s creed: “we are pro-black”, is starting to become an insignificant slogan beyond the racial classification and discrimination of the old ethnic reality. Also, the ANC’s erasing of ethnicity and tribalism from its politics is something of the past. When revolution flares up, the tribal reality can steer it to regard the white “tribe” and other “non-black” tribes with equal animosity, but it could well change direction quite quickly to become an extreme black-on-black tribal-driven revolution, like in Rwanda or as during the “First and Second Black Colonisations” of South Africa reflect only too well. The instigators and propagators of revolution can, as during the French Revolution, also unexpectedly become the victims of their fervour.27,34,35,37,38,39,48,52,58-60

Malloch-Brown’s27 notions on the advantages and inevitability of revolution, makes sense. It also makes sense for present-day South Africa.  Most black youth know that under another ANC regime their situation will never improve: Post-2019 could for them become the opportunity to settle and rectify the matter.27

To think that a revolution can and will not ever happen in South Africa is wishful thinking. Above comprehensive and in-depth findings confirm that a post-2019 revolution is not far-fetched. Undoubtedly, the country stands on the brink of a revolution. It is ripe for picking, even overripe. It does not need not another Marikana to start up. And, as in Tunisia and Egypt, when it suddenly comes to an eruption,  will it not only cost the heads of the ANC top brass, but sadly thousands of other people, mostly innocent bystanders, who are unrelated to the 1994 to 2019 ANC’s and the 1948 to 1994 Apartheid regime. And such an outcome can be bloody and unstoppable as in Rwanda.27,35,36,37,39,42,43

3.1.2.1.9. Immense presence of crime, violence, gender-violence and xenophobia in today’s South Africa

When we speak of the presence of unrest and anarchy in the country, is it important to point out that the foundations of it happening have been laid already (See also Article 13). What is important to note in this setup is the absence of a consciousness which is able to differentiate the transgressions of the ordinary citizen (This absence of a consciousness within the ANC elite was already covered in an in-depth study in Articles 11 to 17).

The basically permanent slide of law and order being eroded all over the country — reflected by immense, uncontrollable crime and violence present on the Cape Flats, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and many other places, as well as the presence of extreme highway and railway crime, violence and theft, together with gender- and xenophobic crimes and violence – show how near South Africa is on the path to a collapse into revolution. The basis for doing untold wrongs, as revolution and its murderous deeds often call for, is thus already well-established as a modus operandi with a large contingent of the population.61-73

3.1.2.2. The joker-surprises of history

Louw34 writes that history often brings about unexpected, even strange outcomes. He writes34:239:

The fortunes and misfortunes of nations have in some instances changed even after they had fled or failed, totally contradicting the rules of trustworthy predictions (and even sound thinking!). The impact of extreme world disasters, like earthquakes, pests, new wars, immense famine, new mass migrations, just to mention a few, have in the past had quick and profound impacts on the power of mighty empires or have caused undervalued, small nations’ fate to take a turn for the better.

The possibility remains that the political history of South Africa after 2019 can be one that we never have expected or anticipated, making the issue of land ownership insignificant or at least one eventually resulting in a very successful outcome.  Some determinants which can be roleplayers acting as jokers, need to be enlightened.74-82

3.1.2.2.1. Aids, mass illnesses and pests

The Christian Bible is full of stories of the sudden appearance of known and unknown illnesses and pests that killed off populations in large numbers. The outcomes were often that dynasties, despots and regimes collapsed under the weight of such events. Currently in Africa, Ebola is such a “pest” that, notwithstanding well-organised governmental and healthcare efforts to erase it, seems to have become an unstoppable plague.74,75,80,82

Aids is an illness that has been causing ongoing havoc but it seems it can not be contained, let alone totally erased.  In some countries it has registered a constant increase, notwithstanding healthcare education and medicine to combat it. South Africa unfortunately is caught in a downward Aids spiral. Data shows that in 2002  so much as 4.6 million South Africans were Aids-sufferers. The number 7.97 million was cited in 2019. This represents an increase of 3.37 million in 17 years. The 2019 Aids sufferers form nearly 15% of the country’s total population of 57 million. What is evident is that it is the youth  – who should constitute the base of the future work force and should fuel the growth in GDP, and who must assure the continuation of the nation’s population – has been the most vulnerable in contract the deadly virus.83

Illnesses such as Aids and others can dramatically change – when they become epidemics – a country’s socio-political and economic setup overnight with regard to the numbers of races and the traditional power that these numbers hold in terms of a majority-minority composition assured in a regime.

3.1.2.2.2. Impact of extreme poverty, unemployment and overpopulation

Many economic and political analysts and strategists underscore that there are more or less 30 million poor South Africans (out of a population of 58 million), while more than 17.5 million people, because of their utmost poverty and unemployment, are forced to live as beggars on social grants. This unfortunate poor contingent of people in need of social grants is constantly growing as a result of the growth in unemployment, rising living costs and population growth. The statistics reflect that social grants have grown from 2017 to 2018 by 8%, while the growth in cross tax revenue for the period was only 6%. It can be read from this growing poverty that for 2017/ 2018 there were officially 890 523 job seekers registered, but only 21 076 (2.3%) were placed in jobs or internships. Beyond this registered official jobless rate of 869 447 in 2018, is the mass of jobless people who are not registered. This social-economic chaos has been the result of the country’s high population growth of 1,43 % in 2019, worsening the already high unemployment and poverty.83-88

Growth in official unemployment is confirmed by the data for the first quarter of 2019 at 29% (with some sources putting it near 30%), with the indication that it can further deteriorate. Between 2001 and 2018 the primary sector recorded 484,000 job losses.  The impact of growing poverty, which indicates the presence of hunger for even those with some permanent work too, is pinpointed by Speckman89 when she writes89:3: “…the Pietermaritzburg Economic Justice & Dignity Group’s Household Affordability Index for 2019 showed that a general worker earning the national minimum wage at the 10% exemption level and working full for a 23 days earned  R3,312 per month. Transport and electricity costs accounted for 57% of the wage, leaving R1,425.48 for all other expenses, including food.

The direct impact of poverty, unemployment and overpopulation can bring about a total collapse of the South Africa economy on the one hand, but on the other hand a crisis of starvation and famine. Such outcomes with dire conditions is because of the total degradation that the poor population have to endure for the luxurious lifestyles of the ruler of the day in an effort to survive. An issue as land-ownership quickly becomes a non-starter for these impoverished masses.

3.1.2.2.3. South African climate changes and drought on food production, lifestyle viability and sustainability

The immense impact of climate change, such as extreme temperature fluctuations and droughts can firstly force the issue of land to become a vehicle to create a means of income; and secondly ignite the debate on the use of land to produce food but also question the viability of sustainable lifestyles. Both these issues could eventually lead to famine. The losing battle against hunger can already be read in the negative effect of the countrywide drought. Thus the importance of farm land per se as a means to sustain a living could become obsolete. This could result in waves of people from the rural population taking flight to cities for a living, bringing the need for urban land for homes into the bigger picture.90-96

If recurring droughts are taken into account, especially as a seemingly permanent, natural  phenomenon in South Africa, the arrival of a water scarcity crisis as far as human consumption, agriculture and industrial use is concerned, becomes a given. This can bring about a dramatic change in geopolitics, accompanied by a devastating impact on the already existing mass poverty and unemployment. For an overpopulated country such as South Africa the consequences could be enormous, leaving in its wake an impoverished nation, in which most of the population will be enslaved to the ruler for survival. A water crisis will replace the present political and emotional land-ownership matter and become the population’s foremost concern.90-96

The incoming drought has been confirmed by the SA Weather Service which indicates that the country has experienced drought since 2013 with a continuous uncertainty about when rains will fall. Patrick and Hosken95 write95:11 “This had put the jobs of about a million farm workers at risk, and made the country vulnerable to food and water insecurity, according to agricultural economists and farming associations”; and95:11: “AgriSA said in its 2018/2019 drought report that 31, 000 farming jobs had been lost since January 2018 in the drought hotspots of KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Western Cape, North West, Limpopo and the Northern Cape.”

Patrick and Hosken95 report further95:11: “Water restrictions are in force in some provinces. In the Northern Cape,  water is shut off overnight in its main town, while Eastern Cape premier Oscar Mabuyane this week declared the province a disaster area. Water restrictions are in force in its two metros, Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City.”

The spokesperson of Water Affairs, Sputnik Ratau95, said95:11: “SA is water scarce, so the reality of less than world-average rainfall, rapid urbanisation, climate change, desertification — especially from the west — and rapid population growth cannot be ignored.”

Professor Johan Willemse95, on the effect of the 2019 drought in general on the country, especially on the cost of living which could worsen poverty and hunger, writes:95:11 “We could see a 50% increase in the importing costs of white maize, which will rise from R3,000 per ton to R4,500 per ton. This will cause major meat price increases”.

Also, Patrick and Hosken95, quoting Mervyn Abrahams95 of the Economic Justice and Dignity Group,  report on the rising cost of living as a result of the drought as follows95:11: “…drought was a factor in the cost of the household food basket. It increased by R146.14 (4.8%) from R3,038.50  in October 2018 to R3,184.63 this year.”

Makhosini Mgitywa97, the head of Communication at the Ministry of Human Settlements, Water & Sanitation, writes in the Sunday Times of the 22nd September 201997:26:

The situation is dire and unless we do not do something, as the government and citizens, we will be left with a water shortage situation that will affect  us all, and to an extent never seen before.

SA is among the driest countries in the world but we go on as if we are among the wettest. It’s estimated that in five years’ time we will experience physical water scarcity. Our own department’s projection is that at that time the demand for water will outstrip supply.

Satgar96 writes on the 15th December 2019 in the Sunday Times and Vavi and Lenferna write98 on the 15th September 2019 in the Sunday Times that the climate crisis is already established as fact in the country. It is reflected in the form of sudden flash floods: killing more than 70 people at once and displacing more than 1 500 people, bringing damage at the cost of R1-billion at a time; leaving communities without drinking water or water for agriculture and posing a widespread threat to food security.96,98

Vavi and Lenferna98 reflect98:20:

Studies show that as a result of human-case climate change, SA faces deepening inequality and is already 10%-20% poorer.

Climate change is worsening an already dire situation of deep inequality, poverty and unemployment. The outbreaks of xenophobia violence were the most recent expression of our multifaceted crisis.

The xenophobia attacks are also connected to the climate crisis, because increasing climate impacts are eroding traditional livelihoods and driving people from their homes and increasing migration.

Many wars and revolutions were started because of the need for the three basic resources: water, food and land. Also, on the other hand, it has collapsed wars and revolutions, together with empowering regimes. It has also erased nations from the international scene. Beyond that, the experience of hunger and shortages of water can dramatically change voters to blindly support their failed regime, while thirst and famine could directly lead to revolution.

3.1.2.2.4. Racial assimilation, miscegenation and dissolution

The assimilation and miscegenation of the various races, which started in the Cape in 1652 between whites, blacks, Malays, Indian and Khoi San people, are ongoing today. The 1994 dispensation and the freeing of blacks and Afrikaners from the Apartheid shackles, has  created the impetus for a much deeper assimilation between the South African races while miscegenation seems to be gaining ground. It is possible that full assimilation and miscegenation of races may occur in the next 10 to 20 years. The racial issue around the so-called colour of the land owner could become unimportant because of this miscegenation in which mixed families are created.34

The fact also that the present dominant land owners, namely the whites and specifically the Afrikaners, have been since 1989 in a process of dissolution, could result in them numbering at most 30 000 in a century, and make it unnecessary to pursue land expropriation in the long term, taking farms they own.34,76-78,83,85

3.1.2.2.5. The possible post-2020 democratising of the Electoral Act

For years the South African voters have been caught in an undemocratic voter system which gives the ANC’s party bosses and not the voters the right to select MPs and MPLs through an imbalanced proportional system. This resulted that at present the country is being governed by a very small minority, a powerful ANC clique.47, 99-103

Looting and the appointments of shady figures in municipalities have restarted and is a direct result of this flaw of political accountability demanded from councillors and officials by the electors. Mthombothi104 postulates104:19:

In fact, it’s not even correct to talk about elected officials in our system because we vote for the party, not the individual. This decides which of its members should be elevated to higher office.

The party is given a blank cheque that it uses as it sees fit. That needs to change. Anybody wielding power — from the lowest councillor, to the mayor, to president — should do so by virtue of direct election by the voters.

The private legal action which was started up in 2019 to reform the electoral system and to do away with the present favourable climate for the ANC elite through the election system by means of the court application brought by the New Nation Movement (NNM), a KhoiSan organisation, to change the Electoral Act (Act 73 of 1998) could make provision for the direct election of MPs and MPLs by voters, and if it is at the end successful, it could have a dramatic anti-ANC voter outcome in 2024. So far, the Ramapohosa regime has not shown much support for the change.47,99,101-108

3.1.2.2.6. Lingering impact of nineteen-million passive voters on the 2024-elections

The outcome of the past May 2019 elections highlighted only a participation on national level by 49% of the eligible voters in the elections, of which the ANC only received the votes of  28% of the eligible voters.47,102,109-111

The Institute of Security Studies shows further, comparing the outcomes of the 2014 elections with the 2019 elections, that the ANC is in a permanent downward spiral.  In this free fall must be noted that the ANC has less than a million inscribed members against a total of registered voter population of ±27-million and an eligible voters population of ±37-million.47,99,101-108,112-115

Further statistics show, that as a result of their passivity not to register as voters,  that the 18 to 19 years olds on the voter lists for 2019 is 47% lower than in 2014, while for the age group 20 to 29 the number declined with 9%. Clear dislike and aversion by the youth for the ANC have developed apace since 2014. The youth vote can be devastating for the ANC in 2024.47

The above shows that if a party or a group of integrity can mobilise the 51% of passive voters, the ANC, as well as the DA, can be totally erased in 2024 from the political scene. Mthombothi104, on this immensely positive outcome waiting to be implemented: That is to convince passive voters, writes104:19:

Throughout the turmoil there’s on crucial element that nobody seems even bothered about. The voter is the rock, the foundation on which democracy is built. Yet no-one is talking about him or her. It’s almost as though the voter doesn’t exist or is immaterial to the entire setup. This whole circus therefore brings to the fore the need for electoral reform.

3.1.3. South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)

The analysis and discussion of this article (see headings 3.1.1. to 3.1.2.) will continue in the final article (Article 19) of the series of 19 articles, titled: South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19). The analysis and discussions of Article 19 will be done under the following heading and subheadings:

3.1.3. Advice and suggestions for a post-2019 effective government

3.1.3.1. ANC-DA intertwining
3.1.3.1.1. ANC
3.1.3.1.2. DA
3.1.3.1.3. Perspective on a failed ANC and DA

3.1.3.2. Cutting out the ANC and DA out as future rulers
3.1.3.2.1. The end of political innocence
3.1.3.2.2. Time for political renewal 
3.1.3.2.2.1. The simultaneous practice of autocracy and democracy inside the Constitution
3.1.3.2.2.1.1. The ANC-regime, the judiciary and the possibility of a care-taker administrator
3.1.3.2.3. Time for a new UDF 
3.1.3.2.3.1. Role and position of Whites in a new UDF
3.1.3.2.4. The steps, paths and process of sound future land redistribution 

4. Conclusions

The failed Marxist-Leninist politics of the ANC regime, together with the incompetent leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, has brought South Africa to the brink of disaster. Its economy is in a shambles. A short-term escape route is needed by the Ramaphosa regime. Land grabs are currently the most attractive solution for this ANC regime to deliver some form of capital or money easily to the masses of poor people, as well to give the Ramaphosa elite some credibility again as revolutionaries who are still “freeing” the masses of poor blacks from the shackles of white dominance and from capitalists.

It is clear that not one of the political parties which are active in present-day South Africa, is capable and trustworthy enough to run the country effectively. It is basically impossible for any one of them to deliver on a just and balanced land-redistribution policy.

The troubled land-ownership matter fits well into the many dissatisfactions of the masses of poor and landless people. It holds the potential to motivate them to become involved in immense unrest and anarchy, even revolution, in the immediate future. Furthermore the unbalanced and unjust land-ownership matter in the country is the single best reason available to radicals in the ANC and other political parties, under the cover of revenge on white supremacy and capitalism, to activate a Marxist-Leninist coup. The fact that the ANC is losing its autocratic grip on the country fast and could be ousted in the 2024 elections, makes the probability of a coup a strong possibility in 2020 already.

It is clear that an acceptable solution to the land-ownership matter must be found not later than 2020.

In the final article (Article 19), titled: “South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)”, the land-ownership matter will further be analysed and discussed. An approach and guideline on how the land expropriation process can be activated and steered in an effort to solve the matter, will be offered.

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

 

 

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (17: ANC’s troubled leadership)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (17: ANC’s troubled leadership)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Good, great, high-level, leadership, outdated, pretender, troubled, taker.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 7

1. Background

In 2001, Prof Jim Collins1 and a group of academics, known as the Good-To-Great Research Team, published their findings on the eleven companies that made the list of so-called great American companies, in terms of strict and rigid selection prescriptions. This outcome follows a study of the records of 1435 well established and successful so-called good American companies that all appeared on the Fortune 500 list for at least 15 years. These studies show that leadership was the critical feature that distinguished ‘great companies’ from ‘good companies’: The type of leadership associated with transforming a good company into a great one, was their Level 5 leadership, or the highest level leaders. Collins reports:1:20,21,30,35

Compared to high-level leaders with big personalities who made head-lines and become celebrities, the good-to-great leaders seem to have come from Mars. Self-effacing, quiet, reserved, even shy – these leaders are a paradoxical blend of personal humility and professional will. They are more like a Lincoln and than Patton and Caesar. We expected that good-to-great leaders would begin by setting a new vision and strategy. We found instead that they first got the right people on the bus, the wrong people off the bus, and the right people in the right seats – and then figured out where to drive the bus.

Level 5 leaders channel their ego needs away from themselves and into the larger goal of building a great company. It’s not that the Level 5 leaders have no ego or self-interest. Indeed, they are incredibly ambitious – but their ambition is first and foremost for the institution, not themselves.

It is very important to grasp that Level 5 leadership is not just about humility and modesty. It is equally about ferocious resolve, an almost stoic determination to do whatever needs to done to make the company great.

Level 5 leaders look out the window to apportion credit to factors outside themselves when things go well (and if they cannot find a specific person or event to give credit to, they credit good luck). At the same time, they look in the mirror to apportion responsibility, never blaming bad luck when things go poorly.

On the question if a lower level leader can develop to become Level 51, Collins’s answer is clear [which could also guide politicians in South Africa]1:36:

My hypothesis is that there are two categories of people: those who do not have the seed of Level 5 and those who do. The first category consists of people who could never in a million years bring themselves to subjugate their egoistic needs to the greater ambition of building something larger and more lasting than them selves. For these people, work will always be first and foremost about what they get – fame, fortune, adulation, power, whatever – not what they build, create, and contribute.

Considering the slow death of the ANC party, as argued by my previous Article 16 (Outdated ANC) in which I discuss the direct impact of devastating group factions and leader infighting inside the regime and the party, it is clear that the ANC has lacked Level 5 leaders since 1994. First and foremost, the ANC’s leaders are working exclusively towards what they can get – fame, fortune, adulation, power, assets, and not what they can build, create, and contribute to the greater ANC and the people of South Africa.1

The above description by Collins1 is consistent with Thabo Mbeki’s2 warning in October 2017, during his OR Tambo memorial speech. Already then, Mbeki said that the ANC, as a political entity, is coming to an end. Their end is ascribed to the capturing of its’ elite by criminal and political thugs. To better understand the malfunctioning of the present-day ANC under the leadership of criminals, it is important to reconsider Mbeki’s2 message of October 2017 when he said2:23:

In his 1941 presidential address to that year’s ANC national conference, Dr [Alfred Bitini] Xuma said: “To Congress we must be loyal and true. For Congress, we must forget any personal or sectional interests or gain. We must put the cause and the interests of the people begore any expediency…To be true leaders, we must put the interests and welfare of our people above our own”.

Much later, in a December 1955 letter to the ANC, published in January 1956, Dr Xuma said: “Leadership means service for and not domination over others. True and genuine leaders serve the cause of the people and do not expect the cause to serve them or become a source of profit and honour for them”.

Earlier, I said that the ANC now faces the third threat of destruction since its foundation almost 106 years ago. This time that threat emanates from acts of commission originating from within the ANC itself.

As we all know, the ANC gained access to state power from 1994 onwards. It was inevitable that this would happen because of the place which the ANC occupied in the hearts and minds of the majority of our people as their true representative.

However, the challenge which arose with this access to stage power was and is that it could be abused, was and is being abused for purposes of self-enrichment. This means that the ANC contains within its ranks people who are absolutely contemptuous of the most fundamental values of the ANC, at whose centre is a commitment selflessly to serve the people.

These are people who only see the ANC as a stepladder to enable them to access state power for the express purpose of using that access for self-enrichment.

By definition these are people who are card-carrying members of the ANC but who have completely repudiated the value system which inspired Oliver Tambo throughout his life.

Part of the national tragedy in this regard is that the ANC recognised the emergence of this immensely negative phenomenon quite early after 1994.

The fact of the matter is that during the last two decades the ANC has failed to do the two things which Nelson Mandela mentioned in 1997 – to purge itself of the mercenaries who had joined its ranks and to make it difficult for such elements to join the movement.

This means that the historic value system of the ANC has become so corrupted that its replacement, that is unprincipled access to political power and the related corrupt self-enrichment, has in fact become the norm within the organisation.

Necessarily and logically, the qualitative change I have mentioned — arising from the failure to defeat the process of the increase in the numbers of those remained in the ranks of the ANC for selfish and corrupt reasons as described by Nelson Mandela – would in the end also affect the composition and quality of the very leadership of the movement.

I have sought to suggest that the negative situation currently affecting and characterising the ANC will, unless it is addressed correctly and immediately, sooner rather than later result in the destruction of the ANC.

The presence of the so-called Takers inside the ANC and their immense empowerment are prominent in Mbeki’s2 speech, such as the Arms Deal and other instances of the excessive state capture that transferred R1-trillion to the pockets of prominent ANC elite and their intimate cronies (which echoes Collins’s1 description of the defected characters of some leaders). Mike Boon3, in his book “The African Way”, has been skeptical of the ANC as long ago as 1996; he shows the derailing of morality of the ANC’s leaders and their values, principles and intentions, as well as their cognitive tilt towards corruption and criminality. Boon3 writes3:104: “Mature leadership dictates that we routinely and constantly attempt to employ people who are more capable than us or who, at the very least, have the potential to be. If this does not happen, the organization will, over the years, gradually slip into mediocrity and disappear”. Evidence of this negative outcome is the ANC’s incapable and crooked opportunistic leaders that have, since 1994, destroyed the soul of the ANC to promote their own corrupt interest.

The persons that Boon3 identifies as the “Takers” are well-positioned today in the ANC elite. Boon3 reflects3:48,50,51:

But there is a dark and utterly destructive cloud to the Third [developing] World: a massive movement of individuals turning their backs on their traditions and discipline and, in so doing, the closeness of community and ubuntu. They replace it, not with the best of the First [developed] World, but often with the very worst. They are self-serving and care nothing for the community other than what it can deliver to them personally. They seek to take, not to give or share. Many of these people have managed to educate themselves very well. They know how to manipulate Westerners and how to use, to their own ends, their once-upon-a-time tribe. They are part of the Third World but they also exist in the First World. We shall call this group the “Takers”. Takers have neither integrity nor discipline. They serve the dollar-god of power and will do anything for it.

Why have there been so many one-party states and coup after coup? The reason is that, in the past, many African leaders been totally and unapologetically self-serving. Yet the First World does not view Africa as different from itself for fear of discrimination. It is fundamentally different  because Third World Africa, which is largely led by Takers, has no discipline. It is not governed according to the same ethics and values as either the First World or the tribal worlds, and therefor does not respond to them.

It is the blatant rape of these fragile societies by fellow Africans that makes the issue more repugnant. The Third World Takers are far more insidious and warped than the colonists ever were, yet this is exactly the behaviour and attitude for which colonial settlers were criticized and expelled. The Takers obviously learnt their appalling, self-serving lessons well!

The corruption of the politics of the ANC needs to be understood and reflected on. The activities and functioning of the four top leaders of the ANC will be reflected on in the next subdivision: 3.3.1: ANC’s troubled leadership.

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 16)

Article 17 is a continuation of the previous article 16, titled: “Critical in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (16: Outdated ANC)”. This article is in sequence with articles 11 to 16, which were already published on the ANC. The intention is also to analyse and discuss further the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity the ANC and its ability to execute land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.2. Aims of article 17 (Continued from Article 16)

The primary intention of this project on the ANC is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by specifically describing the profile of the ANC on the same basis as was done by Article 9 on the EFF and Article 10 on the DA.

In this article, the primary aim is to determine how the ANC leadership and organisation, as well as the ruling of the ANC regime as the mandated ruler of South Africa, has been affected by the corrupted ideas of some of the ANC elite.

2. Method (Continued from Article 16)

This research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence, as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often no established body of research, as is the case with a discussion on the abilities of political parties to successfully employ land reformation from 2019 onward. The sources include articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that may guide one in making an evaluation of the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to successfully employ land-reform from 2019.

The research findings have been presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

In this article, the public referees of the African National Congress will further be reflected, evaluated and described in the division that follows, 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019. The focus is to reflect on the leadership and organisation of the ANC. 

3.2. Louw Appraisal Checklist

The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,4 will be used once more, for the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC. The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s’ manifesto and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees it applicable.

3.3. The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 16)
3.3.1. ANC’s troubled leadership
3.3.1.1. Post-2017 ANC top leaders

To make a conclusive decision on the integrity and quality of the contemporary leadership of the ANC is very difficult, as extremes manifest; in terms of the media’s profiling of some leaders as anointed, whilst others are labelled as crooks without an objective division. The lack of prosecution of a large portion of the ANC elite who were implicated by the various judicial commissions tells a story of a culture of criminality. These alleged culprits’ aggressive denial of all these testimonies against them, with the sole intent to besmirch the ANC leadership, makes it very problematic to profile its top leaders in terms of morality and virtue, etc.7-16

Perhaps an appropriate anecdote is the well-known American mobster, Vincent Teresa10, and the ease with which he describes another mobster in terms of virtuous acts versus evil acts. He writes on mobster habits, dressing, opportunism, thinking10:292:

If you’re on a plane sitting next to a mob guy, you’ll probably never know. Nine times out of ten, when a mob guy is travelling alone, he’ll sleep or just lay there with eyes closed, because he don’t want to bother with anybody. If he should happen to talk with you, he’ll talk about everything but the mob. He’ll say he’s in the food produce business. Unless he’s a clown, he’ll dress very conservatively, dark clothes, white shirt, hair well trimmed, like a businessman out of Wall Street except maybe his features might be a little tougher looking. His nails will be nice and manicured and polished.

The one way you can tell a mob guy is that his clothes will always match. His shoes will always match his socks, and his socks will always match his suit, and his tie and hat will always match the outfit he’s got on. In fact, the overcoat will probably be made from the same material the suit is made of. They dress very, very well. It’s not that they’re flashy; it’s just that everything they’re wearing is money.

There are a couple of mob peculiarities I’ve still got myself. Number One is big tipping. And Number Two is that you always want the best of everything. Like I always wanted the best seats in the house…

The NPA’s treatment of former state security minister Bongani Bongo can possibly brings us closer to a general understanding of the ANC’s leadership’s quality and integrity. Began on the 21st November 2019, the information around Bongo’s criminal prosecution may allow a deeper look into the life of a corrupt politician, or a Teresa-esque profile of a criminal. Notwithstanding the NPA’s action to prosecute Bongo, it must be clear that many of the corrupt ANC leaders, coming from 1994 and still very active in the ANC elite, will never sit in a cell or will even be suspected by the Hawks and the NPA. In contrast, they may only climb into higher positions inside the ANC.

The alleged Bongo-leadership fiasco can aid us in profiling leaders of the ANC in the future. Admittedly, though, the insight into a reliable criminal profile of the corrupt ANC elite is minimal; insofar that is it only an accusation against Bongo and not a conviction. The writing of the editor12 of the Sunday Times on the 24th November gives us at least some hope of the possibility to profile bad ANC leaders versus good ANC leaders somewhere in the future. The following information on the Bongo case must be noted in the context of the current chaos around the ANC leadership12:20:

When former state security minister Bongani Bongo stood in the dock on Thursday morning, his worst nightmare had come true. Two years after advocate Ntuthuzelo Vanara laid a charge of attempted bribery against him, Bongo was finally brought before court to answer to the allegation as that he tried to influence the outcome of the parliamentary probe into alleged corruption at Eskom. He was in Cuba when police summoned him, apparently receiving treatment for suspected poisoning. He was made to sit in a cell like a criminal suspect that he is.

Bongo and the rest of the corrupt elements in the radical economic transformation faction of the ANC have gotten away with so much that they never imagined the long arm of the law will ever reach them. It’s been a long, frustrating wait for those who want to see the law takes it course. Individuals with dark clouds of corruption over their heads continue to occupy positions of influence in the ANC and the government.

The lack of a trustworthy profile of the quality and integrity of the overall ANC elite forces this article to limit the evaluation and description of its top four leaders. In the next subdivision, the leaderships of Ace Magashule, David Mabuza, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa discussed respectively.

3.3.1.1.1. Ace (ES) Magashule

Inside the current struggle for leadership in the ANC, it is important to note Ace Magashule’s unkind public comments on President Cyril Ramaphosa. These comments reflect a well-masked intention to erase Ramaphosa from the future of ANC politics, if the radical ANC members obtain the upper-hand in the greater ANC between 2019 and 2024 (in Article 16, under the subdivisions 3.3.1.3: Post-2019 ANC faction-infights and 3.3.1.4: ANC leadership-infights, the activities of Magashule in contemporary ANC politics are described and discussed in-depth, specifically those against Ramaphosa).5-11 This subdivision will therefore only shortly discuss Magashule as a top ANC leader.

Ideologically, it seems as if Magashule’s leadership is hindered by the unbroken principle within the ANC that the ANC is bigger than the country and certainly bigger than the individual. Cyril Ramaphosa, therefore, is less important to  Magashule than the ANC at large. Leon5 writes on an unexpected insight here5:18: “…the direct and dangerous consequence of the Soviet idea that the ruling party is the vanguard of the people and its direct acts are cleansed by its immutable understanding of the needs of the masses”, is and was always part of Magashule’s promotion of the ANC’s aims. This is confirmed by his emphasis that the 2017 resolutions by the ANC’s national conference on land redistribution without compensation, and the nationalising of the Reserve Bank, are priorities that must be executed in 2019/2020.

The true socioeconomic and political dogma that inform Ace Magashule and the ANC’s politburo beliefs, actions and practices, seems to have never entered the greater part of the public consciousness, nor the ideologies of many political analysts and commentators. The ANC’s politics were and have always been dangerous for exclusive capitalism and Western ideas of democracy. Discussing Magashule’s ideas also clearly invalidates the belief held by most of the South African democrats and the white exclusive capitalists; that the current ANC-regime is well-functioning and well-disposed towards them. Promoting the standing of white people was never Magashule’s intention and will not be his as long he is in the ANC. Magashule’s main intention is to unabashedly continue the radical Freedom Charter’s nationalisation of land, mines and banks (an intention which was temporarily curbed by Nelson Mandela in order to begin the 1994 dispensation but is now ripe for Magashule to restart).6-11

If the ANC is successful in renewing their political power under Ace Magashule after 2024, serious problems await the public and private sector, the economy and specifically white people. The editor9 of the Sunday Times writes a warning on the 28th of July 20199:18: “…one gets the impression that while Ramaphosa and his ministers clean up the state and do their best to deliver a better life for all who live in SA, others in the ANC will not have any of it”.

In this context, the editor9 of the Sunday Times called Magashule and his delinquent cronies at Luthuli-house (captured by outdated soviet-communism) an “unelected cabal”. He writes9:18:

And at Luthuli House, a swelling band of malcontents, led by ANC secretary-general Ace Magashule, with little better to do than place booby traps in Ramaphosa’s path, seems happy to lay the groundwork for a dramatic reversal of the clean-up gains by removing him at the party’s national general council meeting next year.

All of which one wondering why we bother with democracy, elections, and even a constitution, when you have quasi-comical figures like Carl Niehaus and cronies running the political show in the background.

Unelected and accountable to no-one they would name in public, this band of malcontents  erodes the small but steady gains that Ramaphosa may be making.

Magashule’s presence as a dominant leader in the ANC’s politburo after 2020 will potentially mean great problems for South African law and order.

3.3.1.1.2.  David (DD) Mabuza

There are many other general initiatives that aim to isolate the leadership of Ramaphosa from the main stream of the ANC’s voters and supporters.10-16 David Mabuza has become a prominent example of a member that has begun to gain power as a third force inside the ANC. In this context, Marrian17 writes17:3: “To further complicate matters, Mabuza and ANC treasurer Paul Mashatile are being whispered about as a ‘third’ faction’ in the ANC, but the pair have thus far been adept at keeping in line with Ramaphosa’s vision.”

Mkokeli18 points out Mabuza as the “cat” in contemporary ANC politics, and with good reason: Mabuza is a dangerous political figure with a track record alleged to rival even Jacob Zuma’s criminal history. To Mkokeli18, Mabuza is in the same league as Ace Magashule and Supra Mahumapelo, specifically as they share the same brutal style of leadership and politics that quashes dissidence and is feared by opponents in and outside of the ANC. These three figures were the foundation on which Jacob Zuma had first begun to build his empire. Zuma won their loyalty by aiding them in their days as premiers of various Provinces to create their own corrupted network of political power, the so-called Premier League.18

Mabuza is, after Ace Magashule and Cyril Ramaphosa, the most powerful politician in the country. In reality, he is symptomatic of the greater malaise afflicting our politics. More precisely, he is an antithesis of the “New Dawn” associated with Ramaphosa. Political analysts indicate that it is not only Ace Magashule who can become the ANC’s candidate, post May 8 2019. Mabuza must not be under-estimated in Ramaphosa’s future downfall or in the further breakdown of the ANC from 2020 on.7,18,19

Mabuza’s political power play is difficult to approach, well-planned and has the potential to be devastating to the future positions of Magashule and Zuma. Ntyintyane20 warned readers about the impact of Mabuza in the future. In May 2019, he writes20:6:

The Cat lives on. Once again David Mabuza is trying to dictate the terms of Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidency. He claims to have made him the president of the ANC.

It is not the first time The Cat has become the narrative. At the last ANC elective conference, Mabuza outwitted Sun Tzu himself – that is, former president Jacob Zuma’s camp. The same Zuma who toyed with Thabo Mbeki as if he was Lionel Messi.

You underestimate Mabuza at your peril. In Mpumalanga he made Mathews Phosa irrelevant and outdated.

Mabuza is undoubtedly waiting to take the presidency of South Africa. It must be noted that all the ANC state presidents were first deputy presidents of the ANC. This makes making Mabuza, as much as Magashule, the ANC crown-prince for the presidential inheritance in the post-May 2019 ANC regime.7,18

Although Mabuza denies any alliance with either the Ramaphosa or the Magashule factions, he is described as undoubtedly having ties to the Magashule faction for opportunistic reasons.7,18,19

Not only does Mabuza shows a kind of “Zupta-radicalism”, but his political preferences seems to be more or less the same as Magashule’s and Zuma’s: to disassociate from the rule of law and order, and to nullify the ANC’s top leaders’ criminality thus far in order to support the corrupt ANC’s unity and empowerment at the cost of the ordinary South African.7,18,19

On the 28th April 2019, the editor7 of Rapport reflects on Mabuza’s specific corrupt political affiliations with Zuma when it reports7:1: “Hy het te velde getrek teen die kommissie van ondersoek wat pres. Cyril Ramphosa aangewys het om ondersoek in te stel na staatskaping en die misbruik van staatsinstellings soos die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens en die nasionale vervolgingsgesag.”

Mabuza, other than Magashule and Zuma, does not openly attack Ramaphosa. Mabuza has been silent during the “Ramaphoria” of the last 19 months, or the public lauding of Ramaphosa. His silence has left him out of the immediate conflict inside the greater ANC and the country, with Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule being vocal in public. Mabuza, according to Mkokeli18, has only chosen the Ramaphosa-camp in order to avoid outright disorder in the ANC, leading up to 2024. This theory implies that his ties are temporary, before turning against Ramaphosa in time for the elections. In this estimation, Mabuza might see Ramaphosa as only a figurehead, running out of political power. Mkokeli, reflect on Mabuza’s temporary affiliation with Ramaphosa18:19“Mabuza wanted someone who could give the ANC a longer shelf life so that at the right time, he will be able to claim his inheritance.” 

At times, Mabuza openly differs from Ramaphosa, which seems to be a challenge and irreconcilable with his supposed loyalty. Mabuza’s public comments are often rife with disrespect, such as when replying to Finance Minister Tito Mboweni’s opinions on serious issues such as the privatisation of SOEs, when he says22:2: “I don’t really take the minister of finance seriously when he makes comments”. Comments such as these seem to be political attacks. Furthermore, that Mabuza was not reprimanded by Ramaphosa, is telling. Some political analysts speculate that Ramaphosa is totally “gridlocked” by his fear for the slow growth of Mabuza’s support and his faction.21,22

As the ANC’s political landscape develops in the year 2020, Mabuza’s true intention may become clear and bring about a political re-positioning of the Magashule-Zuma camp and the so-called “rogues” of the ANC’s top members.18

3.3.1.1.3. Jacob Zuma

Upon reading contemporary political opinions in the media, one clear message emerges; that Jacob Zuma must be erased from the political sphere of South Africa entirely. His actions are often described as amoral, even evil. Dreyer23 writes23:1: “Zuma operated in this twilight zone of lies, danger and double lives. Psychologists have observed that agents can become subtly detached or separated from other people, even when they resume normal lives. Zuma’s appearance at the Zondo commission this week revealed the degree to which the murky sphere of espionage and counter-espionage has engulfed his world.”

Munusamy24 emphasises this presence of serious psychopathology in Zuma’s court, when she writes24:20: “…lunatics will continue to dictate the discourse and sabotage our country”.

On the 21st July 2019, the editor25 of Beeld writes that Zuma25:2: “…is ‘n ANC-karikatuur want sy gedrag is ‘n karikatuuragtige oordrywing van gedrag wat ook elders in die party goed gevestig is”.

The words of the former secretary-general of the ANC, Cheryl Carolus26, can possibly become dangerous to her political standing and safety in the future, after she labelled Zuma as follows26:4: “Zuma will do or say anything to protect himself. The man is an immoral, amoral, spineless thug.”

Contrary to the public removal of Zuma from the formal ANC politics, some evidence indicates that Zuma aims to not only recover political power behind the screens, but he that he also aims to regain the party loyalty that he lost to Ramaphosa and his cronies. Zuma seems to remain a treat to the fragile power of the current leaders of the ANC.26

Many political commentators argue that Jacob Zuma’s ousting from the formal ANC politics, after December 2017, means that his power was lost and that he is a figure of the ANC’s past. Evidence show that Zuma’s popularity has remained and even seems to be growing.25-35

The mounting tensions between the so-called “factions” of Zuma and Ramaphosa seem to manifest more and more often. The aim, it seems, is for Jacob Zuma’s loyal followers and cronies to nullify all of Ramaphosa’s political power no later than the end of 2020. Zuma’s large group of intimate and trusted cronies are people with unusual skills that have been following Zuma since the pre-May 2017 period, and are also still active and supporting him discreetly.36

Munusamy36 reflects on the Zuma loyalists’ heavy, problematic impact on contemporary South African politics. Munusamy writes36:20:

Former president Jacob Zuma also needed unusual skills set around him. He required ministers, key officials in the state, political allies and body men who were blindly faithful, who would readily implement the instructions of the Guptas, and who would defend him to the hilt even when he violated the constitution.

Evidence being reeled out at the Zondo commission shows how the state was “repurposed” and institutions paralysed so that Zuma’s various benefactors could plunder at will.

There is no doubt that many ANC MPs and MPLs that are aligned to the Zuma, Magashule and Mabuza factions, who have become entangled in corruption allegations, are now back in the Parliament. These same members, whose conduct show a shocking lack of integrity are also contributing to provincial legislatures for the sixth administration, as well. These tainted law-makers are clearly not invested in Ramaphosa’s success or in good politics.37-41

Besides the fact that Zuma was the previous secretary-general of the ANC (as was Ramaphosa), he was also the chief of the ANC’s external and internal security and intelligence, and head of Mbokodo, the intelligence centre of the ANC. With these credentials, Zuma is well-known to be highly informed on some of the contemporary ANC political leaders. Especially the information on these ANC member’s corrupt political associations with the Apartheid regime is highly valuable, as these members could have been paid blood money in exchange for ANC secrets. Zuma has allegedly already used this information to create suspicions around his opponents in the ANC, like ANC stalwarts and former ministers Ngoako Raatlhodi, Siphiwe Nyanda and Derek Hanekom. Furthermore, Zuma allegedly has a list of spies that he is threatening to release at a strategic time. Ramaphosa may also be targeted, as Lekota was, in Parliament. Ramaphosites may face the choas of Zuma exposing more so-called “secrets” in the next five to six months, regarding the alleged traitors in the ANC. At this stage, Zuma can afford to wreak havoc in ANC with his information; it may gain him immense political power and give him a chance to, against all odds, reclaim his position as the ANC’s top leader.23,25,26,30,32,34,35,42-46

For many political analysts, the so-called “Zuma-cobra” has been hibernating since 2017 and is now beginning to lift its head to strike. It is public knowledge that Zuma intends to derail not only the Ramaphosa regime and Ramaphosa as a leader, but also the country as a whole, with the aim of committing another immense state capture.17,37-40 

Many political analysts underestimate Jacob Zuma’s current political power, and thereby the ability to pose a threat to President Cyril Ramaphosa and to radically reform the South African political landscape before 2024. Although Zuma has lost his political power to call official press conferences at this stage, this does not means he is isolated from his contingency of loyal followers. Even after being publicly rejected from politics for the last nineteen months, new forms of media allow for direct attacks of the “Ramphosa ANC”. His effective use of Twitter since November 2018 confirms this; his handle, @PresJGZuma, and his widely read tweets might seem unimportant to some, but not to his cronies and his seemingly growing “crowd” of followers. This heightens the contrast between Ramaphosa’s unstable position and the Zuma-Magashule camp, inside the 2019 to 2024 South African and the greater ANC politics.48

Firstly, employing Twitter as a communication method has helped Zuma to overcome his initial isolation by the Ramaphosa faction. Secondly, Twitter offers him the opportunity to test his shifting popularity with the “Nation”. His first tweet in January 2018 was shared 10 000 times and was favourited 29 000 times. His total tweets thus far have amassed more than 222 000 followers in 15 months. Of the 64 tweets Zuma posted, he has an average of 1 720 re-tweets and 6 567 favourites. If Twitter can be read as indicative of follow interest, Ramaphosa’s twitter activity does not compare well with Zuma’s. Ramaphosa, who joined Twitter in January 2015, has 450 000 followers over 38 months, until March 2019. These statistics reflect an average of only 11 841 followers per month for Ramaphosa against Zuma’s average of 14 800 followers per month. Taking into account Zuma’s immense political and social isolation, thoroughly implemented by the Ramaphosa clan, his twitter support seems to indicate that he is still a strong contender for the top leadership position of the greater ANC in post-2019 South Africa.40,48-52 

 

The fact that Zuma has 2 958 followers per month more than Ramaphosa, confirms that Zuma is still very popular with the ordinary public; if not more so than Ramaphosa. This “measure of popularity” was a very important indicator for Jacob Zuma and his cronies when they returned to politics after May 2019. Zuma is aware of his popularity and the accompanying Zuma populism, as he reflects in his first interview48:8: “Hello, everyone. I have decided to move the times – to join this important area of conversation. Because I hear that many people are talking about me and many other calling themselves Zuma in many ways.

A prominent example of Zuma’s clear tweets on important political issues, as opposed to Ramaphosa’s vague and indecisive political policy, was his clear political stand in January 2019. In a two-part video on land expropriation (a topic that he had rarely addressed in his nine years as president), Zuma lays out his ideas. The videos intended to influence the large group of poor and landless black people to develop the belief that Zuma is “their only saviour and a president of integrity”, and that he will follow through on the land that was promised, taken from white people after May 2019. Coetzee48, after analysing Zuma’s speech in the video, discusses the radical political intentions of Zuma and how different this approach is from Ramaphosa’s insecure politics. Coetzee48 writes48:8: “With a view seemingly more aligned to the nationalisation policies of the Economics Freedom Fighters, Zuma referred to ‘developed European countries’ where, he said, property is nationalised by the state and leased to the people.”

Zuma is still very active on Twitter. The recent attack on Zuma by Shoba130, where he writes on the phenomenon of Zuma’s presence in the media growing parallel to his ever-diminishing status in the ANC, seems to be incorrect. Zuma has not faced any consequences as serious as the alleged sacking of the eThekwini and Msunduzi mayors Zandile Gumede and Themba Njilo, or the difficulties of the Sihle Zikalala-led ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, for example. It is likely that Zuma will send out more cryptic Twitter posts and gain more attention around political developments that harm Ramaphosa’s reputation. In addition to Zuma overshadowing Ramaphosa on Twitter, Zuma’s following also seems to be very positive towards him. This may also indicate that Ramaphosa will be unprepared in 2020, during the ANC’s meeting that “looks back from 2019 to 2020”. Political commentators argue that it will likely be problematic for Ramaphosa if he is re-elected as the ANC’s president from 2022 to 2024, without taking note of Zuma’s influence. Some of the signs of this danger is the way in which the so-called combined Zuma-Magashule faction has easily neutralised the Ramaphosa faction in the Western Cape,  since August 2019. The Zuma-Magashule faction has also been standing strong since May 2019, in the general ANC structures. With Zuma’s appointment of pro-Zuma-Magashule favourites in the Parliament and various parliamentary and provincial committees, it would seem as if Ramaphosa has taken a back seat in politics, whilst Zuma is in control.53,54

South Africans must be mindful of the intentions (as well as immense political power) of Jacob Zuma and his cronies’ future plans. Their singular strategy is to demolish Ramaphosa. In this context, it must be remembered that Jacob Zuma never does anything without a careful plan, or free from corruption, making the unstable and failed politics of pre-2019 a blue-print for post-2019 South Africa, especially if the Magashule-Zuma clan take over the Ramaphosa-regime.48,55,56

It is utmost correct to say that the combined Zuma-Magashule faction is preparing to take on Ramaphosa and to scheme him out of the presidency. The use of the politburo is the most obvious choice. The editor45 of the Sunday Times may be right when he writes on Jacob Zuma’s approach for the post-2019 politics, on the 23rd July 201945:18:

While he leads the theatrics from the front, it is those working in the shadows, behind the scenes, who we should most be worried about. Zuma and his fan club in the ANC never accepted defeat. When their candidate, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma lost at Nasrec, they grudgingly conceded. But those in the know say instead of demobilising and rallying behind the newly elected leadership, they have regrouped in dark corners and are mapping a cunning way to recapture the ANC and, by extension, the state.

The political analyst Eric Naki’s57 detailed description of the “yet to be reborn” Jacob Zuma needs to be reflected on to understand his present day strength and seemingly “anointed” political “rebirth”, that has the potential to make Cyril Ramphosa’s presidency more and more unstable.  Naki57 quotes Xolani Dube57, on the seemingly anointed political survivor Jacob Zuma and his political plans for post-2019 South Africa57:6:

The man creates not only a crisis but a catastrophe for the ANC and the entire country. But he manages to swim out of the net because he is no fool.”

The man is a chess game player, he is able to fool everybody who believes he is a fool. He is not a fool but is very smart.

Even the bruising legal wrangles between Public Protector Busiswe Mkhwebane and President Cyril Ramaphosa and his Public Minister Pravin Gordhan is seen as an extension of the infighting.

“Ramaphosites” like ANC chairperson Gwede Mantashe and SA Communist Party (SACP) deputy general secretary Solly Mapaila accused Mkhwebane of involving herself in ANC matters.

The SACP and civil society groups like the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation see a political agenda in Mkhwebane’s actions and as part of the Zuma group fightback.

Zuma created a catastrophe not only for the ANC but for SA. He is a man of the stage and on every stage that he stood, he has new supporters, he is a man who can incarnate himself.

Jacob Zuma has never strayed from Marxist-Leninist socialism. He grew up and developed in it; it remains his sole motivator. Indeed, the editor52 of Beeld describes Zuma’s behaviour, the ANC and Ramaphosa, and unintentionally acknowledges the rigid existence of democratic centralism and Marxist-Leninist socialism in the radical politics of Zuma and the ANC (which Ramaphosa also follows), over the last decades. This is prominent when he writes52:2: “Zuma se verdediging van se kaderontplooïngskomitee voor Zondo…het gewys dat Zuma bloot ANC-dogma korrek verwoord. Want ook die sogenaamde hervormingsgesindes in die party – insluitende pres. Cyril Ramaphosa self – onderskryf steeds die ANC se beleid dat lojale kaders in sleutelposte ontplooi moet word.”

For Zuma, the ANC cannot change: its ideology of yesteryear informs it today. Without its Marxist-Leninist ideology, there is no ANC, no Jacob Zuma and, most of all, no Cyril Ramaphosa. More so, without its corrupted and autocratic politburo (and its corrupted cadre-deployment committee) alone in charge of the Marxist-Leninist ANC and the country, is there no place for Zuma (and Ramaphosa) in the contemporary politics of South Africa. It is in this context that Zuma’s may turn the ANC away from Ramaphosa by smearing him as anti-Marxist-leninist.33,44

Many ANC MPs and MPLs are still aligned to Jacob Zuma, making him a strong partner in the Magashule and Mabuza factions. Ramaphosa can expect vicious attacks on all levels in 2020.37-41

3.3.1.1.4. Cyril Ramaphosa

Cyril Ramaphosa stand central in the current political climate of South Africa, as the state president and “Number One” of the ANC. The question remains if these positions of Ramaphosa are stable.

More so than Magashule, Mabuza and Zuma, an in-depth evaluation and discussion on Cyril Ramaphosa as the president of the ANC and of the South African State will be undertaken.

3.3.1.1.4.1. Introduction

The biggest mistake Cyril Ramaphosa, as president of the ANC, has made after his election in December 2017 (and which is rooted in his installment as President of South Africa), was not to do a comprehensive analysis of the preceded process and outcomes of his election. Taking the obstructions and resistance that Ramaphosa currently experiences into account, Ramaphosa is hindered not only as president of the country, but also as the president (leader) of the ANC. Majoko58 writes on this error58:12:

The biggest mistake that President Cyril Ramaphosa’s faction made on winning the ANC’s presidential campaign in December 2017 was to underestimate the size and viciousness of an already evident fightback campaign from those who benefitted from state capture.

But being astute to win a party election is no guarantee for long-term survival. And that is what is coming back to bite Ramaphosa now, the temporary friends that assured his ascendency to the highest office are not there backing him right now against the current fightback

The five questions that Ramaphosa should have asked himself before his inauguration as state president in 2019 are59-64:

1) Would his winning as the president of the ANC and South Africa had realised if the alleged R500-millions of donations were absent in his campaign, seeing that he won with a small majority of votes (179) out of the total of ±4 000 votes of the ANC representatives at the 2017 Nasrec-Conference, which leaves him a very insignificant and disempowered leader-figure in the greater ANC;

2) Was it not voting-buying with the deliberate separation of his so-called “voter-supporters” on his costs at hotels as well as his paying of their other costs?;

3) Is the ANC’s autocratic and despotic way of selection not only the president of the ANC but also that of the State by only ±4 000 (±2%) representatives out of a more and less 1-million ANC-members and a total of ±37-million eligible voters, not the direct reason for the ongoing failure of the post-May 2019 South African state under the ANC as a regime and the sole reason of the present bitterly conflict in the ANC?;

4) Would the election of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as presidents of the ANC and the State in 2017 not resulted in a much-better post-May 2019 ANC and South Africa;

5) Were the intrigues and plotting behind the doors in the steering of the votes for Ramaphosa and the fine foot-work by Cat Mabuza via his cronies to support Ramaphosa at the end of the voting, not responsible that the wrong leader for the ANC emerged after the 18th December 2019?

There is strong doubt that Ramaphosa, as a Marxist-Leninist, will honestly answer to any of these questions; it would not be in line with his politburo policy wherein he and his comrades at the top of the ANC have the exclusive power on behalf of the entire population [which implies a departure from democracy]. Basically, five honest answers by Ramaphosa could mean his downfall.

In short: Ramaphosa‘s CR 17 election campaign and his election in December 2017 were both controversial, making his present leadership of the ANC, as well as his presidency of South Africa, also controversial. Indeed, it seems as if the present disapproval by many ANC members and black people can be seen as similar to the conflicting views around HF Verwoerd, John Vorster and PW Botha.

To be frank, Ramaphosa’s popularity with the white population is also declining considerably. This is because they first mistook his political ideology as being positive towards Western democracy and capitalism. Instead he, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma, are all experienced Marxist-Leninists. For many political analysts and commentators to “beg” Ramaphosa in public and ask him to “to rid the ANC of Magashule in order to establish Ramaphosa politics”, is misguided, therefore. He cannot do it; if he removes Magashule, he endangers his own role as the main player in contemporary politics. Importantly, there does not seem to be a will to reform the party. Ramaphosa is not invested in finding a new political or economic order to make the country democratic and exclusively capitalistic. Neither is it Ramaphosa’s intention to bring inclusive capitalism into the ordinary public sphere; instead he is pitted against the hidden intentions of the ANC’s politburo in their strive to obtain and to keep riches and power exclusively for themselves. The Ramaphosa versus Magashule conflict stems from the desire for leadership in the ANC, and not a Marxist-Leninist ideological conflict. The conflict is also a personal one; they both strive for self-empowerment and are extremely ambitious, and certainly motivated and driven by their excessive, inflated egos. What both missed, however, is that the ANC is a horse that does not like an inexperienced and overweight rider on its back: both Ramaphosa and Magashule are such “riders” and both can fall off in the near future.65

The personal conflict over Ramaphosa or Magashule leadership is supported by various groups, factions and clans. Their support stem mostly from opportunistic reasons, such as seeing which one of the two shall become chief (and therefore their “ally”) of the ANC. Inside the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the ANC, all kinds of foul play are present. The ever-present Marxist-Leninist idea remains: ANC principles are greater than Ramaphosa and Magashule, Zuma or Mabuza as personal figures. It seems that all of the individuals in the ANC, including the leaders, knows this well and respects it.

3.3.1.1.4.2. Anointed ANC and a messianic Ramaphosa as saviour of South Africa

The cliché in the media is that18:19 “Ramaphosa has a magic wand that will fix the moribund ANC and sort out all our problems, from economics to racial tension”, and has become central in the propaganda of the ANC’s populists when advocating for their so-called economic restructuring of post-2019 South Africa under Ramaphosa.18

Indeed, the persona of Cyril Ramaphosa is seen by many economic and political commentators, as well as a great part of the public, to be the saviour of the ANC that will drive the ANC into good governance. He is perceived as someone who is going to save South Africa, and sometimes discussed with strong religious undertones. This opinion is supported by many political analysts.13,18,59-64,66,67

Tabane68 refers to the so-called “Ramaphosa the saviour”, as follows68:1:

… the exceptional CR – the Ramaphosa that exists in the imagination of many. He’s the man who will clean up corruption, ensure that former president Jacob Zuma and his cronies are sent to jail, defeat secretary-general Ace Magashule, get Public Protector Busiswe Mkhwebane removed from office and yes, create millions of jobs for the millions of unemployed South Africans.

CR feels like someone who has just landed from Mars and is about to wave his magic wand and free us all from our collective misery, which includes the threefold challenge of poverty, unemployment and inequality.

The ANC’s corrupted elite has optimised the Ramaphosa leadership and regime to their benefit. For Mthombothi69, Ramaphosa became a handy tool for the contemporary greater ANC (and for Zuma’s future plans). In this context, Mthombothi reflects69:19: “The ANC had found its messiah in Ramaphosa, the magician who’nt play tricks with the electorate. He’d wave the magic wand. ‘I wanna lend a hand/send me,’ Ramaphosa crooned”.

The confusion and choas behind the scenes of government can be seen in the inner circle of the ANC’s decision-making. This is especially clear in the ANC’s “Roadmap” document which was deliberately  leak to the public. In their efforts to do some damage control and reinstitute some flattering beliefs in their traditional voters, the ANC is clearly desperate after the elections in May 2019. Jacob Zuma’s criminal acts are understood as a decisive part of the ANC’s bad past (meaning the period pre-January 2018), which was stopped by the 1st January 2018’s so-called “unstoppable messianic” return of Cyril Ramaphosa and an “anointed, ameliorated ANC”. Once again, the ANC elite and their propagandists offer a narrative of a dramatic victory to the public, intended to show that the South African voters are still pro-ANC, based on Ramaphosa’s so-called popularity (57% votes for the ANC in the May elections). Some political analysts associated his so-called popularity in the election with the popularity of Nelson Mandela (who could never exceed more than 63% of the votes for the ANC, at any time during the various elections). Fikile Mbalula of the ANC equates the idea that the “ANC is still a strong brand” to the idea that “Hitler’s Nazi-party today is still a strong brand”, in the face of the ANC’s ongoing decline in support at the ballot box (from 62%: 2014 to 57%: 2019). Regarding Ramaphosa’s so-called “immense popularity” that may rescue the ANC, it must be noted that this image is constructed by his publicly propagated performance, and supported by the CR17 campaign that has allegedly cost R500 million. Pushing this image of Ramaphosa as the “Nation’s darling” has started to fail, as his lack of organisational and governing abilities become clear, and he fails to make a success of the future of South Africa.21,44

Seepe and Heller56 bring Cyril Ramaphosa’s public persona, as the only saviour of a nation, into the context of a country that oscillates between hope and hopelessness. This paints a picture of a nation in psychosis, where there is a cognitive inability to differentiate between reality and fiction, evil and virtue, and dishonesty and honesty. They write56:5: “This national psychosis is at the heart of the propagandist portrait of President Cyril Ramaphosa as the salve and salvation of South Africa. For his part, Ramaphosa has enthusiastically embraced this world of make-believe. He is as much complicit as he is an inevitable victim of this malady. But like all myths, the messianic Ramaphosa portrait is beginning to melt”.

Seepe and Heller56 continue56:5: “For those invested in the Ramaphosa presidency, the truth may just be too ghastly to contemplate. Truth is the supreme disruptor of both faith and fallacy, and right now, the truth is blowing the whistle on the make-believe of The New Dawn”. It seems that the pro-Ramaphosites and white capitalists are not going to allow negative views of Ramaphosa to infect and thus to create cognitive dissonance around the “Ramaphosa the saviour” idea, despite his many failures. On the other side, however, there is a growing portion of the public imagination that is seeing “Ramaphosa the saviour” as a myth and realising that his departure from politics will not mean the collapse of the country. As Seepe and Heller write55:5 “The sun will rise tomorrow, as surely as it did today”.

Tabane68 writes that it somehow remains unclear how South Africans arrived at the idea of “Ramaphosa the saviour”. A possibility is that a false hope – the contamination of the public mind by false expectations – forces people into believing that Ramaphosa will improve their living standards and ordinary lives. Indeed, it can be argued that the public are negatively affected by the Zuma regime and where it left off. Another possible origin of the myth may be because many people were left uninspired and confused by the phantom leadership of Ramaphosa; especially the people inside the ANC leadership and around the president, from David Mabuza to the younger ANC MPs, including the leaders of the DA and EFF.18,68 Clearly, the Ramaphosa-mania is a myth which was propagated to build support for the ANC in the May elections.

These initial projections of the “extraordinary qualities” of “Ramaphosa the leader” have overreached and this means that there is no energy left at the end of the Ramaphosa-mania, with no strategy to win at the ballot box. Neither is Ramaphosa himself enough to energise voters for the post-2019 campaign of the ANC. Ramaphosa’s “extraordinary qualities” as a leader is artificial and insignificant on every level.21,50

The various cognitive states or emotional conditions that suddenly manifested in 2017, like Ramaphoria and Ramaphomania, and the identity of “Ramaphosa the anointed saviour”,  has lost its colloquial use and seems rather dated. Instead, Ramaphosa’s identity seems to be better described by “Ramaphosa the phantom”. It seems to indicate the possibility of Ramaphosa soon disappearing from the public imagination of many South Africans.59,60

Furthermore, the so-called 57% winning vote for the ANC in the May elections have been frowned upon by some financial institutions and many political commentators and analysts. For these skeptics, the spirit of triumph contradicts the hard fact that only 49% of the eligible voters voted in the May elections, and that the ANC only received a 28% vote selection by the total contingent of eligible voters. These numbers nullify the well-published glorification of Ramaphosa that assumes that the ANC’s 57% is because of his leadership.13,18,59-64,66,67

The political analyst Mcebisi Ndletyana agrees that Ramaphosa’s “popularity” and saviour-status, that was unduly awarded to him by the media and some political analysts, clearly did not function to win more votes for the ANC. The narrative inside the party, however, is that 57% of votes for the ANC in the May elections was predicted to be only 40% of votes if Ramaphosa was not the leader. This means that Ramaphosa’s faction and supporters claim an alleged 17% gain under Ramaphosa’s leadership. The research, however, does not substantiate their narrative.50,70

In this context of the supposed high levels of voter energy behind Ramaphosa and the presence of Ramaphosa’s so-called saviour-profile, one might overlook the fact that the traditional ANC members do not vote for the ANC’s top leader but instead they vote to maintain the ANC’s democratic centralism. Furthermore, the media and several political analysts have completely ignored the entry of the elderly and respected Thabo Mbeki into the election, as well as the numerous propaganda campaigns of Ace Magashule, David Mabuza and Mrs Dlamini-Zuma that claim their role in the election-manifesto of the ANC that brought the 57% voter win. When comparing the provincial votes with the national votes for the ANC, the national voters outcome (assumed and used by many political analysts to be reflective and representative of the leader’s personality and popularity in his party and the country) were 643 194 national votes more than the provincial votes for the ANC. Bringing this difference in calculation with the 10 026 475 votes the ANC received on national level, the so-called positive impact of leadership is ±7%. When divided through the six main propagandists/leaders’ contribution to ANC-manifesto (Ramaphosa, Magashule, Zuma, Mabusa, Mbeki, ANC), this 7% impact is an average of 1.1% per leader. These numbers makes the so-called Ramaphosa-saviour contribution to the 57% win of the ANC less than 2% and therefore insignificant. Ramaphosa’s minimal impact is further confirmed by Ramaphosa’s fluctuating performance leading up to November 2019. Whilst his image and persona sets high standards, no evidence suggest that Ramaphosa can live up to these expectations.13,18,40,49,50,67,71-76

3.3.1.1.4.3. Ramaphosa’s enslaving to Marxist-Leninist socialism

Ramaphosa is often portrayed as the virtuous ANC politician who fell victim to the dictators in the ANC. As part of this narrative, it is speculated that Ramaphosa was forced to address or partake in issues such as land grabbing, by the two “communist dictators”, Zuma and Magashule. In this view of the ANC’s schizophrenic politics, Ramaphosa’s leadership is affected and undone by radicals and revolutionaries in the ANC. Du Plessis77 agrees with this narrative when he writes77:6: “Bepaald moet hy [Ramaphosa] die twee gifbekers wat die Jacob Zuma-faksie hom in die doodsnikke van die Nasrec-konferensie in die hand gestop het [om grond te onteien met of sonder vergoeding], so drink dat hy nie daarvan sterf nie”. There is evidence to the contrary, however. Ramaphosa is an established ANC member, and has participated in the ANC since the days of the Freedom Charter. The Freedom Charter has always clearly indicated that land grabbing is a priority of the ANC. The reissuing of the resolution at Nasrec in 2017 was expected by the ANC at large, including Ramaphosa. If Ramaphosa was opposed to land grabbing, he had the option to withdraw from the race for leadership, instead of playing the victim.

To deny that Ramaphosa supports Marxist-Leninist socialism is dangerous and it is equally problematic to subjectively profile Ramaphosa as a Western caricature. FW de Klerk arguably made the same mistake in the 1990s as Du Plessis now77, when De Klerk, in his “political innocence” and impetuosity, understood the ANC and its corps of leaders without their DNA of true traditional democratic centralism and Marxist-Leninist socialism. Instead, he believed them to be exclusively “good” political partners. De Klerk (and his NP) were quickly faced with the reality of their decision.25,78,79

Ramaphosa’s politics are rooted in the greater ANC’s venerable foundation of Marxist-Leninist socialism. This is a phenomenon that Du Plessis80, other than many political commentators, successfully identifies when he writes80:6: “Ramaphosa se ANC het in 2019 nog nie sy sentrale ideologie – rassenasionalisme en verknogtheid aan ras – dieselfde doodsteek gegee as wat die NP in die 1980’s met die Verwoerdiaanse apartheid gedoen het nie”, and80:6: “Die ANC sal dit nie maklik doen nie. Want al wat dan oorbly, nes in die 80’s, is naakte vasklou aan mag. Die ANC weet  baie goed regimes wat inbeweeg in daardie dimensie – mag ter wille van mag alleen – val, vroeër eerder as later.”

This recognition that Ramaphosa and the ANC member’s concerns are saturated with selfishness, opportunism and the corrupt Marxist-Leninist ideology of self-enrichment, nullifies the misleading argument by the Ramaphosa propagandists that he is a democrat and “virtuous” politician (these same propagandists blindly argue for Ramaphosa’s “anointed” virtue and his successful politics). His current entanglement with the corrupted politics and actions of Zuma’s cronies and their so-called “rot” is clear by the fact Ramaphosa has allowed them into his cabinet and his inner-circle. Ramaphosa supporters argue that this is only because he has been forced accept criminals in his cabinet for the sake of keeping the ANC intact. This line of reasoning is dangerous, naive and misleading; it is politically illogical. Another argument by Ramaphosa’s supporters, in their ardent Ramaphoria, is that Ramaphosa could not speak out against state capture when he was Zuma’s deputy as Zuma would fire him. This argument is erased by the fact that Ramaphosa participates in Marxist-Leninist politics. Instead, he did not react against Zuma and his cronies, or speak out against state capture, because his Marxist-Leninist ideology prioritises the group above all. Secondly, if this argument of his compliance with state capture is true, it confirms that Ramaphosa was disrespectful to his oath as vice president to serve the people of South Africa fully at all times, with honestly and integrity, and to obey its Constitution. Furthermore, that he was unaware, as vice-president, of the Zuptas’ state capture, is unlikely. If he was truly unaware of the corrupt situation, he was a poor observer of politics and an ineffective player in the ANC’s inner-politics. His attention to these matters is required as an executive political leader. It is more likely that he is in compliance with Zuma’s state capture. This profile makes him incapable to be an effective president for South Africa. Moreover, if he was aware of the presence of state capture, but feared to act against Zuma, it indicates blatant self-interest above duty and a political fear that is highly inappropriate for a vice president. A role with responsibility to the people of South Africa should not be allowed to be dictated by fear, and this keeps Ramaphosa from making the right decisions, both officially and unofficially.69,81,82

To many critics, the failure of Ramaphosa to attack Zuma openly since the start of his campaign, and in his appointment as vice president, indicates a much deeper foundation of brotherhood of the ANC’s leadership. This brotherhood is prescribed and forced upon members by the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist politics. The argument made by the pro-Ramphosa supporters – that Ramaphosa will act decisively and dramatically and kill the Zuma rot from 2019 to 2024 – is highly unlikely. An executive political leader of integrity – someone who acts with honesty and is trustworthy – never sits idly whilst his organisation falls deeper into corruption, or allows himself to be extorted by the demands of criminals.81,82

Evidence that Ramaphosa is deeply influenced by Marxist-Leninism and RET, can be found in his active practice of cadre-deployment. Cadre-deployment can be argued to be the primary cause of state capture since 1994. Ramaphosa, when he was vice president to President Zuma, was also the chair of the ANC’s cadre-deployment committee. The primary role of Ramaphosa in the ANC’s cadre-deployment committee, seen in terms of political contamination the country’s stature, was so excessive that he was recently asked to explain the matter before the Zondo-commission.79

Cadre-deployment, as evidenced by the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist political thinking, plans and actions, makes Ramaphosa part of the “brotherhood of communists” with Magashule and Zuma. Rooi writes79:8:

Vier jaar lank, terwyl hy tussen Mei 2014 en Februarie 2018 adjunkpresident was van die land, was Ramaphosa die voorsitter van dié omstrede ontplooiingskomitee. In dié jare is talle bedendenklike figure met ANC-bande in sleutelposte in die staatsdiens en by geruïneerded staatsbeheerde ondernemings aangestel.

Die kaderontplooiingskomitee bestaan nog steeds – die huidige voorsitter is adj.pres. David Mabuza, Jessie Duarte, die ANC se adjunk-sekretaris-generaal, is die koördineerder.

Die rol van die ANC se kaderontplooiingskomitee in staatskaping het in November voor die Zondo-kommissie ter sprake gekom toe Barbara Hogan, voormalige minister van openbare ondernemings, gesê het dat ‘n “handvol mense aangewys deur die ANC se nasionale uitvoerende komitee (NUK) [geskool op ‘n Marxisties-Leninisties politburo] – eenvoudig besluit wie is die voorkeurkandidaat” vir ‘n pos.

Ramaphosa’s support of the ANC’s outdated, 107-year old, communist value system is well reflected by his tainted cabinet and even his tainted chairpersons of the parliamentary portfolio committees. He is only a temporary and powerless role player in the greater ANC and their political narrative, especially its politburo’s intentions and rigid guidelines, as prescribed by its democratic centralism and Marxist-Leninist ideology.68

Tabane writes on the implications of an ANC president68:1:

When we expect him to fire Magashule, we are taking the ANC for granted and substituting our wishes for Ramaphosa’s agenda. And when we overlook his mistakes because we want him to emerge and be strengthened, we are kicking the can further down the road, postponing the solving of problems that are already there.

My fear is that those who portray him as the answer to all of South Africa’s problems – and spend time attacking his perceived enemies – will soon suffer an about-turn and turn against CR because he would have failed to meet their (unrealistic) expectations.

While hope has to spring eternal, investing such high hopes in one individual is unrealistic. Now that he is president of the country, of course we should expect only the highest standards from him, but we voted for an ANC president. It is the choice the majority made.

Ramaphosa’s so-called “conflict with the Magashule-Zuma clan” – increasingly breaking down his “saviour role” as the President of the South African nation – is not because they differ on the ANC’s contemporary politics and ideologies, but because of Ramaphosa’s personal conflict with Magashule (and Zuma, as well as any other opposing leader in the ANC) to hold the political power in the greater ANC68:1: “It is a well-masked leadership and personal revenge-fight coming from 1996 when Ramaphosa was side-lined in the ANC’s greater politics.” Ramaphosa’s belief in and his support of Marxist-Leninist socialism remains undisturbed by this conflict.

Tabane68 pertinently guides his readers through the rationale behind this personal conflict between Ramaphosa and Magashule-Zuma, and argues that it is outside of the ANC’s organisation and its ideology. In this small conflict, Ramaphosa is only a temporary figure and insignificant in the greater ANC psyche. She writes68:1: “The cold, hard fact is: Ramaphosa is the president of the country because of the ANC. To try to define him outside of the party with our imposed values is a mistake. He will always act within the value system and milieu of this 107-year old organisation”.

It is important to note, however, that Ramaphosa’s contradictory reactions to remarks (made by people such as Ace Magashule) on the nationalising of the Reserve Bank, sit well inside the ANC’s history of gradually and secretly nationalising important entities and land grabbing. The ANC’s greater ideological detraction breaks down the idea of Ramaphosa as the saviour of white land ownership and exclusive capitalism, against the Magashule faction as the criminal Marxist-Leninist threat that engages in land grabbing. The pretense of the “Ramaphosa-Magashule conflict” gives Magashule the opportunity to successfully and carefully construct a well-masked plan to gain power. The slow implementation of land reform by the ANC, from 1994 to 2017 (23 years), was fundamentally caused by the political environment and circumstances that limited the implementation of radical ANC politics. Since 2017, however, the circumstances seems to have been stimulating the aggressive, radical politics of nationalising and land grabbing. Both Ramaphosa and Magashule stand as central figures and as active supporters, role-players and partners in this sudden, aggressive behaviour. Both are familiar with the brand of the ANC, and support the activation and implementation of the 107 year old radical and revoltionary politics of the ANC.68,83,84

Understanding the aforementioned political strategy of the ANC, the editor85 of the Sunday Times, writes on the 5th 2019 how the current ANC party under Ramaphosa is problematic. He points out the fake leadership conflict, wherein Ramaphosa is reflected as the “virtuous” (capitalist/democratic) leader that will reform the ANC’s criminal culture. South Africa at large may be grappling with Western politics and democracy, but not ANC’s politics; the ANC is finally busy establishing communism in South Africa. The editor85 of the Sunday Times writes85:18:

The party has a new leader, President Cyril Ramaphosa, who has presented himself as a new broom that will sweep clean all the rot. So far, he has said all the right things, for which he has been endorsed even by the global community.

But as former president Kgalema Motlanthe said, Ramaphosa is no messiah. The rot in his party is so entrenched that it will require a massive purge, which could lead to its total collapse.

Ramaphosa’s clean-up campaign is facing strong resistance from within, with those accused of corruption working hard to weaken him. Until he firms up his grip on the party, he remains handicapped.

Makhanya83 also writes on the brotherhood of Ramaphosa and Magashule, as well as their relationship to the radical and revolutionary ANC. Ramaphosa, therefore, has no intention to establish a post-2019 democracy and unlimited exclusive capitalism, as Makhanya83 argues83:2: “Ramaphosa tinkered here and there, and thought we would all be bamboozled into the believing he had made a radical reduction [of the bad]. What actually happened was that he lost the battle to reform the state and rid it of the excesses of the Zuma era. The employment agency ethos remained largely undisturbed and little will happen in the next five years to change that. It showed that the Zuma zombies are alive and still very much in charge, Renewal is a myth”.

The ANC’s final establishment of communism in South Africa is executed through its trusted model of economic chaos. For Makhanya83 to declare that democratic renewal is a myth, is correct. Moveover, Marxist-Leninist renewal is a fact. There will likely be a reform of the South African state, but instead of positive reform, the ANC will keep radicalising. This means the ANC may bring a Marxist-Leninist reform if it rules post 2019.83,84

It must be taken into account that, historically, communists thrived on chaos; if it is not already present in a state, they create and cultivate chaos. A few instances of this encouragement of chaos has manifested the South African state since the ANC took power in 1994. Chaos is the norm of governing for the communists and the ANC elite. The present South African economy, having collapsed, is just one stage in establishing a vicious cycle of communism. In this context of a communist state, with its chaotic economy and human rights abuses, Scott86 reflects on the ANC’s affect on South Africa86:13: “The more one looks at the ANC, the more one can come to no other conclusion than that the only purpose it has is to complete the destruction of the country it claims to love. Everything it touches is destroyed.”

The overall chaos, and especially its impact on the economy, is confirmed by the fact that more African countries became less democratic since the 1990s. These countries are characterised by more autocratic political systems, wherein the communist model often starts to develop. This problematic type of political governance, together with unlimited population growth, contributed to the rapid growth of poverty in Africa. These factors led to number of impoverished people in Africa rising from 278 million to 416 million from 1990 to 2015. The means that 55% of the world’s poor is currently living in Africa. The World Bank estimates that the percentage of impoverished people in Africa is going to grow exponentially, and that in 2030, as much as 90% of the world’s poor will live in Africa. Since 1994, as many as 75 countries worldwide have moved in the direction of autocracy, while in 2017, 24 countries became autocracies. In 2019, there were only 24 countries that showed positive consequences of democratisation, while only 53% out of all the countries in the world still qualify as democracies. Looking towards South Africa, 25 years under the chaotic reign of the Marxist-Leninist ANC has seen an immense growth in poverty; 60% of the population are impoverished, seemingly in line with the political chaos that characterise most African countries. If the ANC continues to hold power after 2024, the 30 million impoverished people in South Africa (out of a 57 million population) is estimated to grow to 52 million in 2030.86-88

3.3.1.1.4.4. Alleged intertwining of junior-Ramaphosa with senior-Zuma

Notwithstanding the reflection of two main opposing and hostile groups inside the greater ANC, namely the Ramaphosa clan versus the Zuma-Magashule clan, the main question is if there is really a difference in thinking and political ideology between senior Zuma and the junior Ramaphosa in terms of South African politics. The land reform issue has been a bonding factor for the comrades. Comparing the thinking and activities of some of the cadres represented in Ramaposa’s inner-circle with that of the cardres of the Zuma-Magashule faction, there are strong similarities signalling some form of connection. Munusamy89 reflects clearly on this anomaly in Ramaphosa’s apparent inertia since December 2017 in taking on the Zuma-Magashule cronies suspected of various transgressions. The lack of any action taken before the prosecution started against Zuma and his cronies, as well as the subsequent appointment of dubious Zuma cronies in high level positions in the Ramaphosa regime since May 2019, reflects some sort of bond between the two rather than two hostile, opposing factions. Munusamy89 reflects on this “political intransparency” evident in the actions and reactions of Cyril Ramaphosa, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma when she pertinently warns that the public has often overlooked the ANC’s “dark politics”. Shrouded in this darkness is often the strange and extreme relationship between Ramaphosa, Magashule and Zuma. She writes89:20:

Zondo should not be the only one concerned with safeguards to prevent the state from being captured by corrupt business interests again.

If President Cyril Ramaphosa is serious about building an efficient state that repels corruption, he needs to ensure that the people in his core team share his perspective and commitment.

The disgraced people and deadwood he retained in cabinet to keep the peace in the ANC need to be put out to pasture”.

Tabane90 also mentions this possible bond rather than a prevailing animosity between Ramaphosa and Zuma to the foreground with his reflection on the ease with which the Constitutional Assembly had fired McBride in March 2019 to prevent him to rattle further on the SAPS’s wrongdoings and his revelations about the greater ANC’s immense political transgressions inside the law-enforcement agencies. This was reflected for Tabane90 in how easily the Magashule-Zuma faction eventually got rid McBride, booting him out of the SAPS without Ramaphosa as much as lifting his presidential finger to stop this obvious political move by the greater ANC’s leadership. Tabane90, on this apparent tap-dancing routine of the junior Ramaphosa to the tune of his senior Zuma, posed exactly this question90:20: “Is Ramaphosa in on this…?”

More evidence of the alleged cosy actual relationship between Ramaphosa and Zuma is also the fact that Ramaphosa has so far not been able to or hesitant to step out of the leader’s grim shadow. Ramaphosa — or so the antagonists scrutinising the ANC’s politics and governance believe — has undoubtedly helped the ANC elite since his days as vice-president to dodge the bullet directed at their failed past and corrupt schemes. His political thrust was in the past and still is today to advance a doctrine in which black voters are repeatedly convinced of the “existence of white supremacy” while the whites must take the blame for being “the sole culprits of blacks poverty”. This puts Ramaphosa on par with the radical political outlook of Jacob Zuma as well as Julius Malema. Here, Ramaphosa’s willingness to allow of many of the ANC corrupt elite to continue, untouched in their old Zuma ways in post-May 2019 South Africa, is underscored. Mthombothi69 brings this reality in focus when he writes69”19: “All the looting, the corruption, the sheer greed and debauchery over which it had presided, the poverty it failed to address as its leaders feasted on the gravy train, the criminals who are running amok…”, is just continuing under Ramaphosa.

The present Ramaphosa regime has been characterised by the antagonists as similar to the past Zuma regime, namely a regime: “…that has done everything but govern”. The basis for this kind of remark is, as said, Ramaphosa’s subordinate position in relation to Zuma, which dates from before 1994 as being inextricably intertwined with the Zuma political culture and the Zuma guidelines on governance.69,81

In terms of the above reasoning, it is for certain political analysts not a case of President Cyril Ramaphosa who cannot step out of ex-President Zuma’s grim shadow: for them is it that Ramaphosa does not want to step out from there. Ramaphosa and Zuma have had too much of a cosy relationship regarding their revolutionary outlook to be able to break-up their close association. Zuma’s extraordinary reaction of denying the Zondo commission’s testimonies against him, is evidence of his political-cognitive incompetence and impaired response. But, for the political insider, knowing the ANC’s psyche, it seems to be part of an established ANC political pathological culture. Ramaphosa is seemingly also blinded by the same ANC political pathological culture with makes him beliefs he is not implicated in any political corruption and is purely cast by his enemies as a scapegoat. The constant allegations against him of having been an Apartheid spy, a Bosasa beneficiary, a Zuma mate, a BBBEE opportunist or part of a crime network while serving as vice-president in the nine years of Zuma regime’s misadventures, do not seem to concern him. The reference by Ramaphosa of Zuma’s reign as “nine wasted years” is seen by his critics as nothing more than opportunistic political window-dressing only for the sake of the greater ANC. In reality, it  it is nothing else but “nine wasted years under the Zuma-Ramaphosa-duumvirate”.69,81

This kind of duumvirate inside a party’s leadership, with its parasitic roots smothering the nation’s heart, will not be terminated that easily. The ANC and its various leaders, have fallen prey to it. The principle is that if the one leader falls, the other leader also falls. The one needs the other, even if their well-hidden intentions and their rhetoric may seem to contradict each other in terms of political viewpoints. Moreover, these leaders need the ANC and the ANC needs them.69.81

Ramaphosa is for most true democrats and capitalists a Zuma remint — a political leader as dangerous and unpredictable as his mentor, the senior ANC Jacob Zuma. Mthombothi91 tells us the story behind this political danger, present in the pursuits of both Ramaphosa and his predecessor Jacob Zuma, as well as his fellow comrades Ace Magashule and David Mabuza, when he writes91:21:

But we have a political leadership which, because of years spent in Eastern Bloc countries, has inculcated an outmoded Soviet-style undemocratic culture, if not hostility to every idea of an open society. They mouth catchphrases such as “national democratic revolution”, which ordinary people hardly understand or relate to. Out in the hustings, they refer to each other as comrade, but they are honourable members in parliament. There’s a tug of war between ideology and praxis.

Such people therefore cannot always be relied upon to protect the values enunciated in our constitution, especially when the chips are down.

The total encirclement of some of the ANC’s top leaders by political delinquency had shaped them into a lifelong political gang. It is not without a specific reason that Munusamy81 suggests the greater ANC leadership’s moral collapse and their failure to deal with reality. Their unity is upheld by the conspiratorial and nefarious behaviour of the leaders, in their like-minded planning and mal intended way of approaching issues. On the functioning of Zuma’s political mindset (an enquiry that can also be extended to many of the political mindsets present in the top structure of ANC) she posits81:20: “Or is Zuma so detached from his moral compass that he does not know that secretly receiving money from crooked business people while serving as the president of the republic amounts to crime and a breach of office?” In this context, in exposing Zuma’s seemingly mental and political confusion, it is reflected quite succinctly by his own admission when he says: “I do not fear exiting political office. However, I have only asked my party to articulate my transgressions and the reason for its immediate instruction that I vacate office.”

Both Ramaphosa and Zuma seem for some of their serious critics to be equally implicated in misguided moral and political endeavours; they need each other and they both need the corrupt ANC as a motherboard to continue to function.69,81,82 Bruce92 of all the political analysts, is possibly the closest in his apt description of how far the Ramaphosa-Zuma intertwinement has progressed already when he postulates92:16: “It is an apocalyptic scenario when taken to its logical extreme, but it’s also the double life Ramaphosa must lead. Only one of his shoes is his own. Ramaphosa will dance like this for as long as he leads the ANC. The only positive is that the longer he dances, the more discredit the old order becomes. That can’t all be bad.”

But there lurks a danger for Ramaphosa in his close embrace of certain comrades in the ANC to promote its interests. It could cost Ramaphosa his job as that of a subordinate pawn to the opportunistic and ambitious Jacob Zuma, Ace Magashule and David Mabuza. These three are unquestionably the ultimate representatives of the greater ANC: they are, as said, the soul of the ANC, with Ramaphosa the most willing enabler. A Zuma-Magashule-Ramaphosa embrace could render Ramaphosa politically impotent, lacking as Jacob Zuma does, political insight, good decision-making skills and sound principles. It could result in him being totally incapable of leading the country’s reform initiative. This intertwining can make result in a milder version of the programme of land expropriation falling apart. The land expropriation initiative does not augur well for another round of Zuma involved in capture of the first order.69,81,82,89

3.3.1.1.4.5. Ramaphosa the failed leader

The fact that Ramaphosa is a so-called classical communist (or, as Mthombothi describes his adherence to the ideology as being “comrades practising an outmoded Soviet-style undemocratic culture”) and is working with Magashule, Zuma and Mabuza in the realisation the ANC’s aims, does not safeguard him from opposition inside the ANC, leadership battles, serious criticism or eventually from being ousted from the party. His controversial victory of the ANC’s leadership contest in 2017 created many enemies, like Magashule and Zuma and their respective devoted groups. Furthermore, there are the ill-intended ambitions of Magashule, Mabuza and Zuma who all aspire to be the ANC’s leader. There are immense benefits and privileges that come with this position. It seems that especially Ramaphosa’s ongoing failure to activate the 2017 national conference resolutions has been is making him vulnerable to internal attacks in the greater ANC and could mean a possible ousting.91

3.3.1.1.4.5.1. Ramaphosa in the backseat and in reverse-gear

Ramaphosa, notwithstanding his so-called political importance and his lofty title as State President, has been running in reverse-gear from May 2019. His regime has so far totally failed to address the problems of South Africa. His failure has been to implement some of the main resolutions of the 2017 Nasrec conference, like the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank and land grab policies aimed only at white constituents. The ongoing stuggling economy on his watch could soon deliver the final prick to the inflated political balloon, triggering his sudden downfall and speedy exit from the South African political scene.17,21,50,93-98

Evidence of his devalued position as the leader of the ANC is Ramaphosa’s poor grasp on power at Luthuli-house. Magashule and his faction are already advancing their own political views freely inside the greater ANC from Luthuli-house, in order to make up for Ramaphosa’s under-performance and inefficiency. They have taken control of the long-term command of the ANC at the headquarters of the party by the awarding the ex-ministers Malusi Gigaba and Nomvula Mokonyane with high-profile jobs, respectively as part of the ANC’s policy-making team and as head of organisation. The same empowerment of the Magashule-Zuma faction leading the party from Luthuli-house, is observable in the Parliament where they successfully appointed so-called anti-Ramphosa figures as chairs of various committees (Parliament committee chairs wield enormous legislative and oversight powers, controlling how parliamentary committees conduct oversight over ministers and senior government officials).55,99-101

The strength of the Magashule-Zuma group in all the ANC’s structures, especially in Parliament, is well-illustrated by the editor102 of the Beeld when he writes on the 22nd June 2019102:16:

Lojale trawante van oud-pres. Jacob Zuma wat ook nou by beweerde staatskaping betrek word, sal vir die volgende vyf jaar hoofde van strategiese parlementêre portefeulje-komitees wees.

Ace Magashule, sekretaris-generaal van die ANC, het Woensdag aangekondig dat Supra Mahumapelo, Faith Muthambi, Tina Joemat-Petterson, Mosebenzi Zwane and adv. Bongani Bongo die hoofde van portefeulje-komitees soos toerisme, begrotingstoewysings en vervoer sal wees.

Magashule het die aanstellings geregverdig deur te sê dat nie een van hulle nog in ‘n hof skuldig bevind is nie.

It is also clear that Luthuli-house’s corrupt relations with the security services are a cause for concern since it is used to isolate Ramaphosa more and more from the ANC’s active politics. The state security minister, Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba55, acknowledged that because of Zuma’s association with SSA, it has not been friendly towards Ramaphosa. Letsatsi-Duba55 recently said55:1-2: “Right now some politicians are happy with the status quo. Those intelligence officials serve them. There is no way they are going to say ‘we are not going to allow them to interface with us or interact with us’ because it benefits them anyways. Some [ANC] politicians used intelligence officers ‘for political reasons’ and ignored the law because it served their interests”.

Also, Hunter100 confirms this isolation of Ramaphosa via Luthuli-house, when Hunter100 writes100:2:

President Cyril Ramaphosa is facing a rebellion by senior spooks in the State Security Agency who are threatening to topple him over his plans to restructure the intelligence services.

This was confirmed by state security minister Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba in an interview with the Sunday Times.

Letsatsi-Duba said she feared that high-ranking officials were rebelling at Ramaphosa’s proposed overhaul of the agency following years of ‘lawlessness’”.

‘This is not an ordinary resistance, it has a bigger agenda which is to make the status qui remain, so people can do as they wish”.

The Mufamadi-report55, published in March 2019, reports as follows further on Ramaphosa’s growing threatening position in the intimate ANC- politics by the security environment55:1-2:

Spies loyal to Jacob Zuma ran an illegal and co-ordinated intelligence campaign and spent millions on dirty tricks in a failed bid to stop Cyril Ramaposa becoming president of the ANC [and South Africa], a shock new report on the state Security Agency (SSA) has revealed. The report exposes illegal activities in the service of Zuma, including:

Physically stopping CR17 supporters from distributing regalia;

Spying on civil society organisations that were critical of Zuma; and

Fake news in the form of a media campaign for the 2016 local government polls.

The Mufamadi report points out that the threat that spooks could “hit Ramaphosa” because of his intention to cleanse the state security agency from crooks and criminals who are obstructing law and order, as well as delinquent agents who endanger the lives of the innocent citizens. Hunter100 paints a bleak picture when he reports100:2: “Top intelligence operatives, speaking on condition of anonymity, have threatened to hit back. If Ramaphosa continued ‘agitating’ them, some of our guys will get involved and he will see it at the NGC”.

Also, the editor103 of the Sunday Times commented on the focused intention to undermine Ramaphosa, and writes on the 9TH June 2019 as follows103:18: “The Mufamadi report into the State Security Agency came to the shocking, if obvious, conclusion that there had been ‘serious politicisation…of the intelligence community over the past decade or more, based on factions in the ruling party’. This, it said, had resulted in ‘an almost complete disregard for the constitution, policy, legislation and other prescripts’, and turned the intelligence community into ‘a private resource to serve the political and personal interests of particular individuals.”

Two other negative factors are furthermore facing Ramaphosa inside the inner-circle of the ANC operating from Luthuli-house. One is the hostile positioning of the ANC stalwart Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (including her cronies) against Ramaphosa.55,104

Secondly, there are the Public Protector’s constant actions against Ramaphosa; allegedly   continuing unabated because she is a kind of “agent” or “supporter” of Jacob Zuma. The allegation is moreover that she has been receiving illegal and co-ordinated information from so-called intelligence operatives, or Zuma spies, in her campaign against Ramaphosa and his cronies.103,105 Solly Mapaila105 of the SACP in this context warned her not to be105:6 “…pursuing comrades on the basis of information that she is allegedly been fed by rogue intelligence units.” On these pro-Zuma elements alleged influencing of the Public Protector’s office, Mapaila is quoted on the 27th June 2019 in the Sowetan as follows by Goba105:6: “They feed this office with rogue intelligence and information. If that information is not utilised, you see it coming through opposition parties…which are supplied information by these roué intelligence units.”

It is clear that Ramaphosa has been hampered in some of his decision-making tasks and executive actions by his opponents in the greater ANC, that he is not the assumed strongman who can turn around the ANC’s politics in 2019 and neither will he be able to deliver pots of gold to South Africans. He appears unable to cleanse the ANC from his opponents and its alleged crooks. Ramaphosa may perhaps and does sometimes speak up in public about his enemies in the greater ANC and his ability and intention ”to demolish” them.  The writing of the editor9 of the Sunday Times on the 28th July 2019 is a well-illustrated example: it as follows9:18 “President Cyril Ramaphosa’s dramatic challenge to fellow leaders who oppose him, to remove him if they dare…”. But it is false bravado, with very little assertiveness and action. It is a misunderstanding to see Ramaphosa as the untouchable, empowered Messiah who will save the ANC and South Africa from Magashule and his faction:  Emperor Ramaphosa is naked.9      

Ramaphosa has been moved to the backseat, while under the ANC’s politburo’s rules Magashule is now driving the ANC bus exclusively. It is thus with good reason that the media postulates that Ramaphosa is heading for a difficult time in office.106

The intention by Ramaphosa’s opponents in the ANC to oust him must not be seen as an immediate action of retaliation in 2019. His opponents lie low and will only strike when they discern that Ramaphosa is at his most vulnerable.25,26,32,35

Although the appointment of Ramaphosa as President of the ANC will continue up to the national conference in 2022, the rumour is that there will be an effort to oust him in 2020 at the ANC’s National General Council (NGC). Hunter writes100:2: “There are suspicions that some Zuma backers plan to table a motion of no confidence in Ramaphosa at the gathering. A source close to Ramaphosa said his allies had been warned that some intelligence officials were ready to help ‘make life difficult’ for him”.

Matiwane142 reports also that the KwaZulu-Natal chair of the ANC Sihle Zikalala and his provincial executive recently quelled a brewing revolt against President Ramaphosa with great effort. Matiwane142 writes142:4: “The attempt comes amid talk of a plan to call for the president’s removal at the ANC’s next national general council (NGC), scheduled for next year”. He further writes142:4: “Zikalal confirmed raising the matter [ousting of Ramaphosa] at the PEC meeting, saying it was public knowledge that there were people discussing Ramaphosa’s possible dismissal”. Although Zikala said that the directive of the NGC is solely a process whereby the ANC takes stock of what had emerged in terms of successful implementations of the resolutions of the 2017 conference at Nasrec, and not a specific process to select leaders, the NGC-empowerment indeed offers the opportunity to intervene where the leadership failed because of bad intentions or ignoring these resolutions, making the selection of new leaders an immediate urgency.13,19,94-96,107

It is believed that there is going to be a full attack on Ramaphosa at the national conference in 2022. It is emphasised by political analysts that if the present leadership in-fighting and faction conflict in the ANC is not soon forced to deliver a clear outcome and in which one of the role-players is all but erased from the ANC politics, the outcome can be a constant, and ongoing fight for survival between Ramaphosa and Magashule and their factions leading up to 2022 or even 2024. The absence of a clear unified support fo a leadership to steer the greater ANC’s interests constructively, can make the ANC’s policies very confusing and conflicting, and disarms the ANC as the effective ruler of the country.13,19,107

About the Zuma/Magashule clan’s unwavering patience to wait before launching a full-scale attack in order to lay claim to the post-2019 to 2024 ANC-regime, Harper39 writes with specific reference and clarity39:31: “And, warm curled up as a fat cat waiting for an opportunity to eat the small, bewildered mouse, is of course Jacob Zuma and his list of crooks to take over the post May 2019 ANC and South Africa.” It is thus with good reason, undoubtedly after some glimpse into the ANC’s political future and the functioning of its revolutionary leadership, that Harper39 postulated39:31: “…Ace’s smug look is understandable, if the theory that his [the Magashule/Zuma] faction in the ANC is planning to call a vote of no confidence against Ramaphosa within the party and Parliament to cut short his term – and the clean-up of the state – is true.”

For the editor108 of the Sunday Times Ramaphosa is challenged daily for his leadership position in the ANC and as state president.

Labuschagne also doubts Ramaphosa’s ability to assure good governance post-2019. Labuschagne states that the ANC’s political setup is chaotic and can mean that Ramaphosa’s so-called plans to save the country could be ship-wrecked. This can directly end any improvement in the ANC itself; and neither will it advance Ramaphosa’s already precarious position.13,18,66,67,109

Hugo Pienaar66 of the Bureau for Economic Research also posits that the victory of the ANC during the May 2019 elections does not necessarily mean a totally free hand for Ramaphosa to get the country’s engine working again and resolving its problems. There are just too many complicated elements inside the battered soul of the present-day ANC, which are misread by economists and the media, and have the potential to block any positive input.66

Criticism of Ramaphosa is his under-performance as vice-President before 2017, his present-day powerlessness as ANC-leader, being encircled by hostile cadres from the Magashule-Zuma faction and the growing chaotic state of the South African economy in which he played a prominent role for a long time as Number Two in the country. Pertinent also are his inabilities as a leader to launch dynamic actions to prosecute the Zupta-clan and to cleanse the ANC of crooks on all levels since December 2017. The so-called “Ramaphosa vote”  is seen as of little impact after the 8th May 2019 elections, and neither is it going to bring gains for the ANC in the future. He is short-circuited by the Magasgule-Zuma clan, making him, solely a figurehead in the ANC. A possible return to the Zuma era after 2019, is therefore quite feasilble.18,19,67,111

The above finding echoes Motlanthe’s and Mthombothi’s pre-May’s opinions that Ramaphosa is not the anointed messiah to save the post-May 2019 ANC, neither can he bring about any improvement to South Africa. It seems South Africa is far worse off in November 2019 than it had been in December 2017 with the departure of Jacob Zuma as president. This outcome alone, political analysts believe, tells a story of a new kind of political mishap that is about to unfold.59,60,67,76,108

Msimang112 writes that during Ramaphosa’s presidency are there few objective reasons to be optimistic or hopeful about South Africa’s future, although it does not mean at this stage that South Africa is a failed state or that our democracy has ended in tragedy. The fact that Ramaphosa’s failure so far has brought uncertainty as to whether he will be capable post-2019 of addressing corruption, poverty and inequality; outcomes which in turn have forced South Africans into a life of constant uncertainty. The intention of nation-building after 2000 is no longer a priority while the mechanisms that had been established during Apartheid to resolve social conflicts, were discarded or were hijacked by quasi-governmental associated bodies. This state of affairs resulted in the impunity of and abuse by the ANC and its leaders. Political analysts sense that it was in this ill-fated socio-economic and political setup that Ramaphosa had been able to cast himself as a new broom that arrived to sweep away the unwanted debris. His assumed position of “excellence, goodness and ability” was subjectively strengthened because he served as vice-president for the second half of Zuma’s term as president, painted by the media as the good leader versus Zuma the bad one.112

Ramaphosa’s silence on the chaos in the SOEs confirms his immense fear of antagonising the unions (especially his tripartite partners Cosatu and the SACP). If he dares to act against them, as is required by a true statesman, and launches the reform of Eskom, the SABB and SAA assuring their profitably by firing their masses of over-appointed and over-paid staff to lessen the taxpayer’s burden, he could revive the economy. In the meantime, however, he has been continuing his backroom dealings, and by doing so he has been putting the credit rating of the country at risk113-116.

The view of political analysts is that for the likes of Ace Magashule, David Mabuza and Jacob Zuma, Ramaphosa is nothing else but a round peg inside the ANC square hole, making him unfit to deliver constructive results in the doomed ANC, not to mention the wider South Africa. Msimang112 continues in this context on Ramaphosa112:1-2: “His history in the last two decades – alongside that of his comrades – indicates that, at best, he will be able to promote incremental improvements to the economy. But where it matters the most, he will lack the courage and authority to rein in the worst impulses of a party that rewards the arrogant, the cruel and the callous. Ramaphosa and those who have accompanied him to power lack moral authority.” 

Also, Mthombothi117 agrees with Msimang112 on the failure of Ramaphosa as the much lauded saviour, when he specifically reflects on Ramaphosa’s foolish Third Sona:117:21

Ramaphosa says he has heard the frustration of South Africans and his administration will focus on addressing these.

However, his speech showed there is still disconnect and failure to approve the level of restlessness in the country.

This was a political moment that required a defining address to the nation.

But our nation remains adrift, and clearly nobody, including our president, knows how to get us on course.

Notwithstanding the growing opposition against him, Ramaphosa, as a well-seasoned politician knows his present-day dilemma is demanding and dangerous, but he also knows how to profit from it. Contrary to the dying NP under FW de Klerk, which had little breath left in the 1990s, the ANC is still one phase away from terminal death, giving Ramaphosa enough time to establish his grasp on the greater ANC and enhance his standing in the presidency and South African politics. This short but safe time-frame also offers him the scope to plan his final revenge on the ANC’s leaders and the ANC as a party, similar to how De Klerk directed his revenge on the NP’s leaders and their party.59,80

The post-May 2019 ANC political landscape that Ramaphosa is facing require from him a dangerous journey, full of potholes, that can either make him the winner or the loser counting his final days in the presidency. Mirrian writes17:3:

It is going to be a long, hard slog. The key question he faces is how long will he continue to play the negotiator against his political opponents?

Eventually, doing so will culminate in paralysis – it is at this point that he will have to set his instincts for consensus and negotiation aside and make hard decisions, which could lead to the fraught political environment coming to a head.

Ramaphosa is a master at escaping political responsibilities and blame. His use of political dummies to do his dirty work and to hang the “culprit-identity” around their necks is obvious. He has been using for instance Minister Tito Mboweni to make fearless stands in public in order to do his dirty work, without allowing the Zuma-Magashule clan to get a grip on him, notably. Mthombothi21 writes21:21:

Instead of Ramaphosa dipping his own toe in the water, Mboweni can do so for him. A few months ago he wondered aloud why the government thought it wise to run an airline, the troublesome SAA, Ramaphosa didn’t make any attempt to correct him. Mboweni has used strong language against the ANC decision to nationalise the Reserve Bank. In his presentation this week, he took a swipe at the Road Accident Fund, and was forceful about the drastic measures that need to be taken at Eskom.

There are many other kinds of Mboweni-like saviours helping to bolster Ramaphosa’s image and grasp on the levers of power. Mboweni’s various controversial and fundamental public opinions, which are seen as outright unspeakable and untouchable issues for the ANC’s radicals (and for Ramaphosa if he wishes to stay on as leader). Examples are for instance the cutting back of the rising public sector payroll (saving R30 billion for instance by the shedding of 30 000 civil servants in the 55- to 59-year age group) and the stopping the bailing out of the many ineffective and ailing SOEs. Mboweni’s furthermore announced to the public that the ANC regime was borrowing R1.2 billion a day while it pays out R1 billion a day in interest on the country’s debts (leaving a surplus of only R0.2 billion for “grocery-spending”), was certainly not sweet music to the ears of some of the corrupt ANC top brass living off their state capture loot.21,118,119

Then is there Mboweni’s so-called insensitive intention to squeeze more tax money from the already over-taxed citizens, varying from “sin-taxes” to “emergency-taxes”, to the bailout of the “hungry dog” Eskom to the tune of yet another R59 billion. Mboweni’s Special Appropriation Bill to take more money from the unfortunate taxpayers for the ANC’s ongoing failures – while at the same time, the dear leader Ramaphosa silently hides in the background, so as not to appear as politically contaminated through the “tax-punishment” meted out to his voters.113-115

The writings of the editor113 of The Citizen on the 25th July 2019 reflects the political manoeuvring of Ramaphosa via Mboweni113:12:

It is clear that the ANC government, through Mboweni, is still unwilling to bite the bullet and privatise Eskom, which might – although there are no guarantees – help set it on its financial feet. And that is because, whoever takes over Eskom and tries to run it as a going concern business will have to retrench thousands of employees. And that does not sit well with the ANC’s union partners.

3.3.1.1.4.5.2. Ramaphosa and his third Sona’s wonderland-dreams

President Cyril Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address (Sona) on the 20th June 2019 reflects his complete lack of an in-depth understanding of the country’s present-day comprehensive social, financial, political and statutory problems. Firstly, the fact that these problems were mostly created by the ANC during their rule of 25 years is seemingly missed by Ramaphosa. Secondly, it reflects a glaring lack of insight by Ramaphosa on the know-how to address these problems constructively.120:21

Ramaphosa’s third Sona on the 20th June 2019 was a Walt Disneyland fantasy flight. More precisely: a collection of Alice in Wonderland’s daydreams. It was also just a continuation of the Wonderland dreams that were announced by Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma and offered to the masses of poverty-stricken blacks as another African Uhuru to come; denoting the coming of more chaos and hunger in post-1994 South.121,122

Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address or Sona (often mocked by opposition voters as Same old nothing address) illustrates this political confusion and naivety of Ramaphosa quite well. It gives us a clear view of the chaos of the post-2019 politics that is currently awaiting us under Ramaphosa. Saunderson-Meyer120 writes120:12:

Like psychological troubled patients decoding ambiguous inkblots, we earnest tried to discern in the president’s vaguely sketched air castles and careful non-specifics our national gestalt.

Unfortunately, CR’s dream skirts big, existential issues. Forget about addressing an increasingly divided nation tearing itself apart, what most fires the imagination of the president is a bullet train that will traverse the country. To be precise, from Musina to Cape Town, via Pretoria and Buffalo City.

Oh, and please Father Christmas, a new “smart city…founded on the technologies of the fourth industrial revolution.”

Crime will be halved within a decade. International tourism will be double by 2030. Eskom will be rescued. The Reserve Bank will remain independent. Very soon, every child “will be able to read for meaning”. Our economy will grow faster than our population.

Less ambitiously, the government will cut data costs and build digital hubs for innovating youngsters. It will also build fresh produces marketplaces for their old-fashioned parents.

On Ramaphosa’s foolish dream in his third Sona that 2 million jobs will be created before 2029, Julius Malema of the EFF offered a cold shower when he said123:2: “Daar is 9 miljoen werkloses. Dit beteken 7 miljoen mense gaan steeds werkloos wees.”

His Third Sona confirms that sound planning of short and long term economic policy are outside Ramaphosa’s political competence, his planning and activities. Myths, short-sightedness, ignorance and lack of political responsibility seem to be present in abundance in Ramaphosa’s political register.120-132

Much praise was showered on Ramaphosa for his so-called excellent Third Shona, while it clearly lacked real solutions. Ramaphosa stood central in the reigning the chaos.125,134-138

Ramaphosa’s precarious position highlights Calland’s cliché134:8:  “Ramaphosa’s in control”, as empty words. For some political analysts to react to Ramaphosa’s many and increasing rhetorical flourishes in public speeches, such as the Third Sona, by saying that: “Ramaphosa knows what must be done”, “Ramaphosa is [a] brilliant economist”, “On Thursday night, though, Ramaphosa re-exerted his leadership over both the party and state…”, or “Ramaphosa’s in control”, reflect the outright foolish thinking, misleading and false postulations.

His Third Sona revealed that Ramaphosa remains unconcerned and disconnected from the problems of the country as the editor139 of The Citizen on the 20th June 2019 reflects139:10: “He should be in crisis mode. The country is in crisis. Things are getting worse, fast. Our finances are getting worse, look at the tax receipts. The liabilities of Eskom are in the hundreds of billions of rand. We need a crisis response.”

The immense problem of black poverty is has been shoved to the backburner. Ramaphosa is instead wallowing in his extravagant wealth and revolutionary education as part of the exclusive ANC elite. This mindset is underscored in an excellent manner by Pelser121 when he describes Ramaphosa’s personal appearance in Parliament while he had presented his foolish future dreams of South Africa in his Third Sona, as follows121:6: “Ramaphosa, geklee in sy pragtige House of Monatic-pak, vra ons moet plaaslike produkte koop terwyl die nuwe minimum loon die koste van plaaslike vervaardigers opstoot en goedkoop tekstielinvoer uit Xi se China klerefabrieke van Soutrivier tot Newcastle laat sluit”.

Can anyone disagree with Pelser121 when he concludes on the foolish dreams of Ramaphosa’s Third Sona, noting121:6: “Oppossie-LP’s het hardop vir hom gelag. Dit was tragies om te aanskou”.

The hard and tragic fact is that Ramaphosa’s third Sona confirmed that he as the president is not in command of his presidency, nor of the greater ANC, the SACP, Cosatu or the Magashule-Zuma clan. He has not been in the past and will not be in the future the ANC’s Commander One. Overall, the greater ANC is a lost case as a regime. Indeed, visible in many of his speeches, are the hands of the Magashule puppetmaster, together with that of the greater ANC politburo, pulling the strings on what is going to be done and what is not going to be done between 2019 and 2024 by Ramaphosa (and how and when the Magashule clan and the politburo will be giving permission or not to him to do whatever they want to have done).134-140

The editor130 of City Press reflects very succinctly on the 23rd June 2019 on Ramaphosa’s Third Sona speech as follows130:2: “This Sona ended up being one of his poorest speeches since December 2017. It was the worst possible start to his formal term as elected president of the republic.”

Bauer137 describe the “best” outstanding and extraordinary talent exhibited by Ramaphosa as his ability to avoid complex political problems by his masterly, well-manipulating of facts and the use of myths. Bauer137 offers in this context a useful insight when he says137:5: “There was a hell of a lot of rhetoric in his speech and we’ve all heard the same words being said about employment rates and committing to growth.”

Also, the editor85 of the Saturday Citizen on the 22nd   of June 2019 elucidates Ramaphosa’s  third Sona and the instability of the post-2019 South African state awaiting us, when he said85:12: “It’s true his address left more questions than answers. Over the next few years, he will have nowhere to hide when trying to fulfil these lofty plans.”

Ramaphosa, as President, again as he did as vice-President, refuses to face political realities. The consequences are immense.85

3.3.1.1.4.5.3. Zindzi Mandela-Hlongwane’s doings: a small fry for Ramaphosa but a big racial issue

South Africa is heading for a cliff of unstoppable troubles, especially around the unaddressed remnants of Apartheid, the present and future position of whites in the South African state, the present-day uncritical adherence to the ANC’s revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology deeply rooted in the ANC governance, the ANC’s  failed economic policy of land grab, void of economic stimulii and the ANC elite’s inclination to exclusively enrich themselves. Central in such matters too are the intrinsic value that white landowners hold and their full-status as citizens.

The many conflicting outcomes since December 2017 as evidenced daily is that the ANC is moving into the category of a failed and political bankrupt regime, led by a paramount chief who does not know how to handle even the smallest incident of racial conflict without allowing it to take root out in court cases and the continuous detonation of devastating black-on-white and vice versa political bombs. We see this in the present-day intolerance as reflected by Tweeters on social media who have unnecessarily been inflaming racial tensions. The presence of certain senior radical elements in the ANC (while elected and public salaried executives should know better) who are directly responsible of starting trouble by race-baiting while at the same time these elements within the ANC top brass are sheltered behind the law with enough money to ponder the legal ramifications of crimen injuria, human rights violations,  etc., have charged the racial atmosphere. Some whites have begun to retaliate in tweets because they fear what they perceive as the intention to grab their assets or as direct threats to their persons. Of the wise King Solomon Ramaphosa, using well-reasoned cognitive solutions instead of the massively unrealistic dreams, speeches and judicial solutions he proposes to bring concrete and lasting racial harmony — there is sadly no sign on the horizon of any constructive trouble-shooting or simple damage-control. The absolute silence by Ramaphosa on these racial matters could in the near future be one of the reasons for him to wave the presidency farewell.141-144

Here the recent activities of the daughter of the late Nelson Mandela, Ambassador Zindzi Mandela’s (Mandela-Hlongwane) relating to her tweets on the issue of whites landownership and their future position in the country, are causes for concern. The deafening silence of her top boss, Cyril Ramaphosa, on her specifically delinquent political and racial behaviour, inappropriate for a high-level diplomat, rings out.  It is not a case of whether or not she is entitled to act controversially as if she is speaking her mind as an individual, but that she, as a functioning ambassador, is undoubtedly not entitled to this kind of undiplomatic behaviour in public. The fact is that there were no serious consequences for her. Indeed, she was allowed to stay on in her diplomatic appointment. This is an outcome that had reflected very negatively on Ramaphosa. His inaction in addressing the issue and directly and immediately responding with a public and formal acceptable solution, was significant. The seriousness around Ambassador Mandela’s undiplomatic behaviour was of such a consequential and racial importance that ex-President Thabo Mbeki, in the absence of Ramaphosa’s constructive intervention as Number One, felt obliged to advise the Ramaphosa government that Ms Mandela should be recalled. What is again remarkable here is that Ramaphosa side-stepped any projection of him being pro- or anti-Mandela-Hlongwane, forcing his minister Dr Pandor to take the public rap in reprimanding the culprit.143-146

Zindzi Mandela-Hlongwane’s remarks may be a small matter for Cyril Ramaphosa, but the worsening racial issue is certainly not insignificant in the greater South Africa outside of the ANC regime’s dubious politics and delinquent activities. Especially the fact that comprehensive and extreme land expropriation without compensation of white-owned property is now seemingly a strong policy direction to be activated in the near future. This negative advance of the Mandela-Ramaphosa setup needs to be fully examined as an excellent example of Ramaphosa’s failure as the President of South Africa.143-146

Mandela’s expressions of racism as an individual and a senior state official was left without punishment by Ramaphosa, but this is in conflict with the recent cases where the alleged racism of four whites had officially led to their prosecution and sentencing, forcing them to either pay hefty fines or go to prison. The Mandela tweets, seen by opposition black and white politicians as well as whites in civil society as highly inappropriate for a diplomat and as a public attack on all whites in general in South Africa, read as follows146:2: “Dear Apartheid Apologists, your time is over. You will not rule again. We do not fear you. Finally # The Land Is Ours.”

How serious the Mandela tweets are, underscored by Makhanya.146 He writes as follows146:2: “The thing about Mandela’s tweets is that they were raw in their racism. Racism, not radicalism”.

Mkhwanazi,142 on the first official reaction by the ANC regime to the public critics on the Mandela tweets, points out a clear ANC intention of a further fire-up of the already explosive racial situation. He writes as follows142:7: “The ANC spokesperson Pule Mabe entered the fray and said this week Mandela was entitled to express her views”.

The Beeld reports that she also said in another tweet that141:4: “…wit Suid-Afrikaners is gronddiewe en apartheidsapologete wat nes ongenooide gaste ‘weier om te loop’.”

Ritchie,147 on the series of Mandela’s various ongoing tweets, describes the contents as follows: “…calling white South Africans land thieves and cowards to c#nts and a#seholes in almost as many tweets.”

The above kind of writing only contributes to the broad anti-white mood already pervasive to which Mandela seemingly also contributed with the misuse of her ambassador’s position and tweets under the ANC’s political protection and parliamentary privilege and mandate. It creates nothing less than planned racial conflict in a political setup in which Cyril Ramaphosa’s intervention and guidance as the wise state man, is absent.141,142,147-151

Ramaphosa’s passivity and uninvolved behaviour (as reflected in his usual way of political interactions) in above racism, becomes understandable in terms of the ANC’s growing extreme racism152,153 Jessie Duarte,153 the adjunct-secretary of the ANC said on the 21st of November 2019 that the ANC is attached to tribal- and racial-orientated politics. Boonzaaier153 reports in the Rapport of the 24th November 2019153:6:

In haar toespraak vir die jaarlikse Albertina Sisulu-gedenklesing in Soweto het Duarte gesê die ANC marginaliseer lede wat nie swart afrikane is nie. “Ons het amper stamgebonde geword in die manier waarop ons onsself voorhou”.

Ons is rassisties in die ANC, want ons marginaliseer mense  nie swart Afrikane is nie; ons hou hulle ten alle koste uit die ANC. (En) sit een of twee kwotas daar om te kan sê Jessie verteenwoordig ons.

Ons kan nie aanvaar dat nierasssigheid een van die kernwaardes van die ANC is nie. Ons wild it nie aanvaar nie, selfs al hou ons aan om mites daaroor te skep.

How intense this racism of the ANC is, is confirmed when even people of colour are discriminated against because they are not perceived to be “black enough”. Boonzaaier153 describes Duarte’s153 response in this context as follows153:6:

Sy het bygevoeg dat party ANC-lede volhou met die retoriek dat bruin mense baat gevind het by apartheid.

Volgens Duarte vra ANC-lede gereeld wie bruin mense kwansuis gedurende apartheid gemaginaliseer het. Hulle sê dat bruin mense niks nodig het van die demokratiese staat nie.

Sy het ook verwys na ANC-WhatsApp-groepe waar daar rassistiese terme gebruik word as daar verwys word na bruin en Indiërmense.

***[Thankfully many South African studies show that the outright majority of blacks does not feel hatred towards whites over Apartheid and the harm doen to them, as well as that the May 2019 elections had showed that there is no place for future black racial-radicalism and the future incitement of racial animosity (a radicalism unfortunately still cemented in  a small part of the ANC, the PAC, the ATM, the EFF, etc.)]141,142,147-151

3.3.1.1.4.6. Ramaphosa’s need to come clean as State President

In viewing Ramaphosa’s career critically, as a so-called “freedom-fighter, revolutionary, businessman, politician and State President, there are just too many loose ends and secrecies around all his activities from his pre-1994 days up to his post-1994 days. Three prominent issues need to be addressed urgently by Ramaphosa if he wants to continue his political career:

  1. His CR17 campaign’s funding and his in-fighting with the Public Protector;
  2. How he obtained his fortune;
  3. Lekota’s allegation of him as an Apartheid’s spy.
3.3.1.1.4.6.1. The case Cyril Ramaphosa versus Busisiwe Mkhwebane in the CR17 funding campaign

The CR 17 funding campaign and the ongoing legal battle between President Cyril Ramaphosa and the Public Protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane, undoubtedly reflect some strange behavioural discrepancies by Ramaphosa. This behavioural manifestation is in conflict with the lifestyle of any politician, let alone that of a president of a country. The proceedings launched against Number One, with the Public Protector’s interest in the R500 000 which was donated by the firm Bosasa to Ramaphosa’s December 2017 CR17 campaign, is a central issue. The whole campaign ended up with alleged donations of between R300 million and R500 million, although it can be as much as R1 000-million.59,60,154-156

On the alleged wrongdoings of Ramaphosa that have been a concern to Mkhwebane, is firstly the alleged R500 000 Bosasa money for Ramaphosa’s campaign and the Public Protector’s opinion that Ramaphosa had violated the Constitution and the executive’s Code of Ethics. Wa Afrika and Rampedi write157:1-2:

Mkhwebane added that Ramaphosa may have been involved in money-laundering since Watson‘s donation had been made through several intermediaries.

The public protector’s findings indicate that the donation was transferred from Watson’s personal account into the account of Miotto Trading, a company owned by Margaret Longworth, a sister of Bosasa’s former auditor Peet Venter, and then into the CR17 Attorney Trust Account managed by Edelstein, Faber and Grobler (EFG) Attorneys.

Mkhawebane says Ramaphosa may have breached the executive code of ethics by exposing himself to any situation involving the risk of a conflict between his official responsibilities and private interests and he acted in a way inconsistent with his position.

It does not matter whether the donation to the CR 17 is R500 000 or R500 million, because in the end allegations around Ramaphosa’s campaign financing hold the same negative implications for him, which Wa Africa and Rampedi157 highlight as157:1-2: …“exposing himself to any situation involving the risk of a conflict between his official responsibilities and private interests and he acted in a way inconsistent with his position”. Ramaphosa and his spokesperson Khusela Diko have since constantly been trying to sidestep the thorny issue. His eventual appointment to a public position, namely that of President of South Africa is underlined by the fact that he is being paid by the state, meaning by the taxpayers. The argument by Ramahosa that the Bosasa money, the R500 000157:1-2: “…was not for any benefit received by myself in my official capacity, nor was it in order to influence me in my duties, but to support an internal party election”, missed the fact that this donation may have helped him to win the national December 2017 ANC election. On the opinion and possible misconception of Ramaphosa157:1-2: “…of no direct befitting him through the R500 000”, the Public Protector found on the contrary157:1-2: “…that the campaign pledges were some form of direct financial sponsorship and therefore has benefits of a material nature for Ramaphosa.”

The donations of hundreds of millions of rand allegedly handed to him by outsiders to the CR17 campaign are undoubtedly a setup which (must) concern the Public Protector for various reasons, varying from the possibility of undue political influence to issues that can endanger the state’s security. Naki154 writes154:4: “Mathekga highlighted that his [Ramaphosa] campaign was run by outsiders. But the fact that he received a R390-million donation was indicative of his influence outside the party,” and154:4: “To me it remains a mystery because we know so little about it.”

The justified questions asked by all citizens were: Who were these donors or where do the donors come from? What are or were the relations between these donors and Ramaphosa? Were taxes declared?

Cele, Masuabi and Rooi158 write in the Rapport of 21st July 2019 on the alleged R440 miilion for Ramaphosa’s controversial election campaign158:1-2:

Pres. Cyril Ramaphosa weier om te aanvaar dat daar iets onbehoorliks was aan die R440 miljoen wat weldoeners geskenk het aan sy veldtog om ANC-president te word.

Sy het bevind daar is “meriete” in bewerings dat Ramaphosa ‘n reeks trustrekeninge en komplekse finasiële transaksies gebruik het om die oorsprong van miljoene rande se skenkings aan sy veldtog weg te steek.

Baie van die skenkersgeld is in die trustrekening van die regsfirma Edelstein, Faber en Grobler (wat sy in die verslag as die “EFG2-rekening” identifiseer) betaal vanwaar dit blykbaar na verskeie ander entiteie, insluitende die Ria Tenda Trust, Linked Environmental Services en die Cyril Ramaphosa Stigting, gevloei het.

Luidens die verslag is R191.5 miljoen tussen 6 Desember 2017 en I Januarie 2018 in die EFG2-trustrekening betaal terwyl R190 miljoen uitbetaal is aan ander entiteite.

Ander entiteite waardeur CR17-geld gevloei het sluit in:

  • R388.5 miljoen wat tussen 1Januarie 2017 en 20 Februarie 2019 in die Ria Tenda-trustrekening inbetaal is. R388.5 miljoen is uitbetaal.

  • R441.2 miljoen wat tussen 15 Desmber 2016 en 13 Februarie 2019 gedeponeer is in die FNB-rekening  van Linked Environmental Services. R444.1 miljoen is uitbetaal.

  • R336 000 wat tussen 20 Julie 2017 en 26 Maart 2018 van Linked Environmental Services aan die Cyril Ramaphosa-stigting betaal is.

Cele, Masuabi and Rooi158 write further158:1-2:

Uit die verslag blyk dit dat een enkele skenker R121.1 miljoen aan Ramaphosa se vedtog geskenk het. Die skenker word nie geídentifiseer nie. Hierdie geld is blykbaar in drie paaiemente betaal: R30 miljoen  op 9 Maart 2017, nege maande voor die ANC se verkiesingskonferensie by Nasrec, en twee verdere bedrae van R39.6 miljoeon en R51.5 miljoen, albei op 29 September 2017.

Ramaphosa self het R37.2 miljoen van sy eie geld in sy veldtog gestoot. Hiervan was R31 miljoen as lening [wat terugbetaal aan hom moes word] en R6 miljoen is geskenk [wat dus die enigste koste inset aan sy kant was].

Cele, Masuabi and Rooi158 report on the view of Mkhwebane as follows158:1-2: “Mkhwebane skryf dat in die lig van die groot bedrae geld wat betrokke sy ‘voorlopig die siening toegedaan is dat so ‘n scenario, as mens versigtig daarna kyk…die risiko skep van ‘n tipiese staatskaping deur diegene wat die geld aan die veldtog geskenk het’”; en dat158:1-2: “…’n  skenking van R500 000 van Gavin Watson en die ander skenkings van R440 miljoen  aan die sogenaamde CR17 –veldtog om hom tot die ANC-president verkies te kry, op geldwassery kan neerkom.”

Hunter and Munusamy159 report that the investigations followed [after Mkhwebane issued a subpoena to gain access to three bank accounts (among them Standard Bank and Absa, reflecting as the Cyril Ramaphosa Foundation, a company linked to Ramaphosa and the CR17 and linked to Ramaphosa’s campaign) because some members of Ramaphosa’s team declined to give details of the donors], as Mkhwebane analysed the inter-account transfers between January 2017 and February 2019. This analysis, report Hunter and Munusamy159 on the 23rd June 2019, led to the Public Protector’s suspicions159:1-2: “… that the president had used the accounts to launder money. She wants him to respond to her suspicions”. 

Hunter and Munusamy159 report furthermore that Ramaphosa’s long-time friend, one James Motlatsi, alleged that it was he who had asked Gavin Watson [of Bosasa] for money (supposedly R500 000) and that Ramaphosa did not know about the donations. On the various other donations to which Mkhwebane made enquiries, Motlatsi said159:1-2: “… Mkhwebane asked him who the other donors were: ‘I said no, we have taken a decision that each and every donor will remain confidential’.” On the broad aim and final destination of the money raised for the Ramaphosa-campaign, a member of the Ramaphosa- team said159:1-2: “Not all this money was fundraised for the campaign. Some of it is money for the foundation”, while another team-member said about the transfer of the funds which were moved between accounts that159:1-2: “…movement of money was ‘purely for logistical purposes’.” 

Wyngaard156 reports on the alleged R300 million to R500 million (Molatsi said that the amount of R400 million is incorrect but failed to give the correct amount) in donations for the CR17,  that Molatsi and the CR17 managers said156:21: “…dat die geld’ wetlik’ aangewend is vir verblyf, toelaes (‘stipends’) en bemarkingsmateriaal.”

Wyngaard156 elaborates on a clear guideline on how the “correct”  spending of the alleged R300 million to R500 million should have been done when he writes156:21:

Bemarkingsmateriaal’ sou seker T-hempde kon insluit, altyd ‘n gewilde item, of spesiale plakkate ter ondersteun van die kandidaat. Maar waarom sou ‘n kandidaat verblyf aan afgevaardigdes moet verskaf wanneer dit deur die organisaie self gedek word?

Wel, die verblyf wat die ANC aanbied, is dalk nie van die beste nie, dus skuif jy jou ondersteuners na “beter” verblyf – sonder dat hulle die rekening hoef te betaal.

En waarvoor sou die kandidaat se veldtog “toelaes” aan afgevaardigdes moet betaal? Die ANC dek immers self vervoer, etes én akkommodasie.

Of is hierdie toelae in werklikheid maar die “vergoeding” vir afgevaardigdes se lojaliteit, wat oornag kan verander na gelang van wat die belonging is en ten spyte van die “kandidaatmandaat” wat ‘n tak aan die afgevaardigdes gegee het.

Die WhatsApp-boodskappe wat ek gedurende die Nasrec-konferensie van ingeligtes ontvang het, het in die dae en ure vóórdat vir ‘n nuwe leierskap gestem is, vertel van aanbiedinge om afgevaardigdes se skuld af te betaal of beloftes van duisende rande om die familie oor Kersgety te bederf.

De Lange60 writes, specifically on the use of the campaign money to influence delegates, as follows60:13: “Die geld is gebruik om [Ramaphosagesindes] afgevaardigdes na die konferensie te vervoer en hulle te huisves in hotels waar hulle nie deur die teenkanting [skynbaar die Nkosazana Dlamini- Zuma kamp] beïnvloed of geïntimideer kon word nie.”

***[It is mentioned by Butler59 and De Lange60 that the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma camp spent far more than R500 million in their fight for the presidency of the ANC: Butler59 places the total costs of the ANC’s National Conference of December 2017 on R2 billion, making the donations for the two camps more or less R1 000 million. The sum of this R2 billion and the more than R500 million spent by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma camp, seems so far not to have attracted the attention of the Public Protector for “possible money-laundering”. This leaves the impression that the Public Protector can be subjective in her focus on the CR17, making the allegation that she is seemingly a “Zuma-appointed, -orientated -and –driven” agent in her so-called “attacks” on Ramaphosa, very convincing].59,60,160-162

Wyngaard156 emphasises that the156:21: “…’koop’ van stemme op ANC-leierskapkonferensies lê aan die kern van pres. Cyril Ramaphosa se huidige probleme met die openbare beskermer”. Wyngaard156 states clearly that there is surely no evidence that the two candidates were aware of above kinds of “candidate-promotions”, but quoted the unpublished book of Dr Oscar van Heerden156 about the “problematic outcomes” of the Nasrec 2017 ANC election156:21: “Geen eerbaarheid meer onder ANC-leiers nie en enigiets is aanvaarbaar – solank as wat jy wen”.

The indication by Wyngaard156 that the Ramaphosa-team was far less organised and experienced in political manipulation than the one of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, made him a less probable winner, seems appropriate. On the end-result of the Nasrec-election, Wyngaard writes156:21: “Stemme op die ANC-konferensies kom immers teen ‘n prys. En dit was so hittette of Dlamini-Zuma het hom [Ramaphosa] by die stembus verslaan – ‘n skrale 179 afgevaardigdes het hom gehelp om die knoop deur te hak. Nou met die OB se ondersoek na hom kan met reg gevra word: Wat het dit hom gekos?

The editor163 of The Star, on the corrupt buying of votes by candidates at the Nasrec 2017, responds163:8: “The leaking on social media of bank statements, showing payments from an account linked to the CR17 campaign showed, in black and white, what many had for a long time suspected: those wishing to stand for the ANC’s top job need more than just slogans and songs – they need deep pockets”.

***[The imbalanced outcome of the Nasrec election reflects that Ramaphosa’s simultaneous occupying of the chairs of the president of the ANC and that of the President of South Africa which was the result of an insignificant voter mandate brought about by merely ±2 090 votes for Ramaphosa against ±1 910 votes for Dlamini-Zuma. (This majority of Ramaphosa represents only 4.5% of the 4 000 delegate-group, which in turn represent ±1-million ANC-members)]156,164.

The above alleged “buying of the leadership” in 2017 by Ramaphosa is openly condemned by Ace Magashule,164 when he posits164:12:

Every leader of the ANC has been very critical about us using money because leaders are identified. Leaders are elected. Leaders emerge out of struggle.

We have always condemned these foreign tendencies within the ANC. Those tendencies are foreign and we will condemn them forever because there are clear conference resolutions and decisions and we must all adhere to those resolutions.

Magashule164 continues164:12:

We have not changed our character. We won’t behave like a pure electoral party that goes to the electorate during elections – we have principles.

If you understand the ANC, you will never move away from ANC objectives and principles, culture and traditions.

If you want to move away from it you must go to conference and change. Persuade people to take certain resolutions. The highest decision-making body is the national conference, and the national conference has never changed the character of the ANC.

***[It seems that there is at the moment an effort to quash covert party funding after the controversial Ramaphosa CR17 campaign by a draft Bill, the Promotion of Access to Information Act, to include provisions to get information on the funding of political parties.  The Bill, if passed, will compel parties to keep detailed records of the identity of donors and the amounts paid by the donor if it is above R100 000.The Bill stipulates that records should be kept (for a minimum of five years and should be made public quarterly) of money lent to political parties, sponsorships, expenses and its assets. Regarding the R100 000 limit Cosatu already demanded that all donations be declared because this threshold again could be a loophole for unscrupulous politicians to continue to accept bribes as so-called gifts. The intention is to align the Act with the Political Party Funding Act (promulgated in January 2019, 14 months after the ANC’s Nasrec election of 2017). This Act compels parties to declare to the Electoral Commission of South Africa donors who give in excess of R100 000, while it states that parties may not accept donations that are suspected or known to be proceeds of crime].165,166

Many stories and allegations have emerged around the alleged R500 millions of donations to the CR17. One story is that not all this money was fundraised for the campaign. De Lange162 reports that the CR-17 fund was not emptied or closed down after the election, as the CR17 management alleged. So-called donors’ money was apparently being used still after the Nasrec 2017 election for other purposes, such as salaries unrelated to the 2017 Nasrec election and for the party’s affairs, as well as Ramaphosa’s own personal activities. It is alleged that the salaries of certain ANC cadres at Luthuli-house – persons out of ANC jobs and who had formed part of the nucleus of Ramaphosa’s present list of loyalists and supporters at the time – were seemingly paid. Specifically, alleged De Lange162, Zizi Kodwa is alleged to be such a person. De Lange162 reports that Kodwa stayed on at Luthuli-house after the election at the cost of Ramaphosa to exclusively promote Ramaphosa’s interests there and in the greater ANC. De Lange162 writes further162:2: “Sy salaris is uit die CR-17-bankrekening betaal. Die CR-17-geld is ook gebruik om Fikile Mbalula se salaris te betaal. Dit word egter nie regstreeks so weerspieël in die gelekte state nie omdat dit meesal ingesluit is in ander items.”

The CR17 seems to have snared more politicians than Fikile Mbalula (now paid by the taxpayers as Transport Minister) and Zizi Kodwa (also, now paid by the taxpayers as State Security Deputy Minister) in its payment network. It is alleged by Mavuso and Ndaba167 in The Star of 19th August 2019 that the EFF-MP Tebogo Mokwele’s family also benefited from a payment and that former EFF-MP Nkagisang Mokgosi equally received finance from the CR17 when she ran into difficulties.167 On the strange “donations” to the two EFFs, Mokgosi  and Mokwele, Mavuso,168 quoting the political analyst Thabani Khumalo, writes168:7: “…the relationship that led to the soft financial bailout was not holy. Where there is a donation, there are always conditions attached”.

The above allegations together with other damning information stand out in the #CR17leaks, #RamaphosaLeaks and the #CR17BankStatements. These leaks, related to the persons named to have received or contributed funds to the presidential campaign and linked to bank statements of the CR17 campaign, were sealed from public knowledge by the North Gauteng High Court deputy judge president, Aubrey Ledwaba, at the beginning of August 2019 on a specific request by Ramaphosa.162,168,169

Other payments alleged by Mavuso168 is that a prominent KwaZulu-Natal-based black-owned firm, the said Ngweya and Zwane Attorneys, had also received R1.5-million from the CR17 campaign168.

On the so-called “excessive” amount of money paid to the CR17 and the alleged “streaming out” of such money during and after the Nasrec 2017-election, Wa Africa, Rampedi and Ngoepe write170:1: “President Cyril Ramaphosa’s supporters have accused the CR17 campaign managers, especially Small Business Development Minister Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, of having used them to enrich themselves from the R1 billion raised for his ANC leadership campaign in 2017”. It is alleged170:1: “…that Ntshavheni, who was the campaign co-ordinator in Limpopo, gave local ANC leaders only R1 500 of the R6 000 allocated per branch to sway members in Ramaphosa’s favour during the branch general meeting held before the Nasrec conference”. It is also alleged by Wa Africa, Rampedi and Ngoepe that Ntshavheni170:1“…claimed CR17 had no funds because it was a ‘religious’ campaign aimed at stopping state capture”. In this context of alleged pay-outs from the CR17 Wa Africa, Rampedi and Ngoepe170 write170:1: “The Sunday Independent learnt this week that Ntshavheni allegedly used a portion of the more than R5 million she received from the CR17 campaign funds to buy a luxury vehicle and build a mansion in Thohoyando for her mother”. They also alleged that Ntshavheni built another mansion for her alleged lover, Risimati Hlongwane, a CR regional coordinator in Vhembe.170

Maughan,169 on the other alleged beneficiaries from the CR17, reports further169:5: “The Sunday Independent reported that the beneficiaries of the campaign funds included ANC leader Enoch Godongwana, Ramaphosa’s adviser Marion Sparg, small business development minister Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, deputy minister in the presidency Thembi Siweya, former Free State economic development MEC Mxolisi Dukwana, former DA politician Grant Pascoe, Cosatu and Western ANC, among others”. 

Also, various other reports deal with the alleged funders.169,171 Regarding these alleged funders and their payments, Maughan169 reports169:5: “The records named some of the funders as billionaire Nicky Opperheimer (R10m), former Absa CEO Maria Ramos (R1m), Pick and Pick owner Raymond Ackerman who also contributed R1m. It also mentioned Absa Nation Building as one of the donors that contributed R10.5m”.  Friedman171 reports the name of John Copelyn of Hosken Consolidated Investments with the amount of R2 million.

The presidential spokesperson Khusela Diko172 admits that there were more than 120 donors. She, in her and Ramaphosa’s fightback on the publishing of the names of the donors, states:172:4 “Part of the conditions of them donating to the campaign was that they should not expect any benefit to arise from their contribution. It was for that reason that the campaign, to the greatest extent, attempted to keep that information from the president”.

The above statements of Diko172 reflect many contradictions. Firstly, is it unclear why Ramaphosa would want to keep these donors unknown in the light of his “clean”-governance undertaking in his election promises. The fact that he was one of the most eager supporters of the Political Party Funding Act of 2019 (promulgated post-January 2019), is now completely contradicted by his acknowledgement of his own secret political life, pre-January 2019. Secondly, any undertaking by a donor “not to expect benefits in exchange for their money” is not worth the paper on which the undertaking was signed: it seems some of the more than 120 donors were seasoned businessmen who are very active in White capitalism, while some seem not to be new-comers to associations with the ANC and to have had some previous dealings with and alleged benefits from the ANC regime.172-174

Two further contradictions here are prominent. Firstly, Ramaphosa maintains he knew very little about the donations made to his CR17 campaign (a standpoint reaffirmed by his spokesperson Diko), but then a batch of leaked e-mails arrived via the Public Protector’s report on Ramaphosa’s response to Parliament about the R500 000 Bosasa donation which suggested that he could indeed have known who the donors of the CR17 campaign were. These e-mails he successfully stopped from being released to the public by a court interdict because it was alleged that they, together with the financial records of his campaign, had been illegally obtained. Ramaphosa’s argument was not so much that it was untrue or fake news, which would mean that there could be more than just smoke, and a case that needs to be investigated by the NPA. What is important is that financial records and e-mails were indeed leaked, creating the possibility that serious mischief could be masked by the interdict.172-174

The above outcomes leave us with the question why Ramaphosa had interdicted genuine e-mails regarding his funding if he underwrites clean governance and has nothing to hide and is willing to take responsibility if there had been wrongdoing. On the integrity of the e-mails Dlamini172 states172:4: “News24 reported that the emails were shared among Ramaphosa’s political rivals and on Twitter and were apparently verified and found to be accurate”, while Rooi175 too states that175:2: “News24 het die e-posse …geverifisieer en bevind dit is eg”.

Based on reports from New24’s website, Dlamini172 as well as Rooi175 further state that the Public Enterprises minister Pravin Gordhan allegedly was central in raising funds for Ramaphosa. Dlamini172 writes172;4: “It further said the president was consulted by the managers of the campaign about plans to approach several donors, including a Greek shipping tycoon with links to the arms deal”. Prominent stands out the question why this Greek tycoon (alleged to have a local political connection, linked to a well-known “Afrikaner political figure” outside the ANC), and a person who should thus be seen by the CR17 managers to be part of state capture under the ANC regime coming from 1994 (and to can continue after 2017), was considered as a qualified donor. The editor108 of the Sowetan,172,175 S’thembiso Msomi, states:

Considering that Ramaphosa came into power promising clean governance and a break with the capturing of the state by business interests that South Africa experienced under his predecessor Jacob Zuma, it was worrying to see him keeping quiet over the weekend.

In addition, Rooi175 draws attention to another contradiction with seems to nullify Ramaphosa’s plea of a lack of knowledge on the intrigues surrounding the activities of the CR17. He writes175:2: “Daar is ook ‘n e-pos waarin Ramaphosa self opdrag gee dat R20 miljoen van een rekening na ‘n ander oorgeplaas word.”

Secondly, there seem to be many other contradictions to read in the responses of Diko172 on behalf of Ramaphosa when she vaguely reacted to the leaked e-mails172:4: “…the President could not comment on the substance of the emails or their veracity”. But in the same breath she said that Ramaphosa was perturbed by the narrative being built around these e-mails, which could be seen as an acknowledgment that the e-mails are all true, when she states172:4:

South Africans perhaps have a legitimate right to want to know who funded the campaign. But there was no obligation on the part of the president or the campaign to release that particular information.

There is no regulation that requires that information to be made public and a lot of those donors would have donated because it was also going to be confidential”. 

Answering her statement that there is “no regulation forcing Ramaphosa to make the e-mails public”, is it important to state that there are now postJanuary 2019 regulations in terms of the Political Party Funding Act of 2019 in place which could have forced Ramaphosa to make public his donors who gave money above R100 000 should the donations have taken place post-January 2019.172 What is important in all of Ramaphosa’s acts, is his paying lip service to good governance. The promulgation of the Political Party Funding Act of 2019 was promoted and endorsed by Ramaphosa, making the question now prominent: Should it not be politically correct for Ramaphosa as the Number One — after the nine Zuma years of deception and crooking — to freely oblige to the guideline of publishing all the names of the beneficiaries from and donors to his CR17 campaign and possible other funding-sources?172

Msomi,174 reflecting back on the names of the many donors and the e-mails allegedly  “blackening” them enough to justify a court interdict for Ramaphosa, thrusting the president in the centre of the web of lies and myths versus facts and truths concerning his involvement in the CR17 when he174, in line with Dlamini’s172 conclusion, writes on the 6th August 2019174:1:

News24 at the weekend reported on a number of leaked e-mails, some between Ramaphosa and his CR17 campaign managers, showing that the then deputy president had more than just a cursory interest in the drive to attract donors for his bid to become ANC president, and therefore president of the country.

Previously he had claimed that the CR17 kept a deliberate wall between him and their fundraising efforts and he did not even know who the donors were.

But the e-mails, which appear to have been partly relied upon by Mkhwebane in her findings that Ramaphosa misled parliament about the donations, suggest otherwise.

Although it can be argued that the CR17 money was not state money and thus outside the  authority of the Public Protector, it must be noted that Ramaphosa was still Vice President of the country at the 2017 Nasrec election and stood under the rules of the Executive Code as a civil servant. Also, the fact that the Nasrec election made him the State President with state pay and benefits, changes the private setup around the CR17 to a public one.  The Public Protector is indeed obliged by this outcome to investigate it and to refer it to the Hawks156 if there is an indication of possible money laundering.

The argument that Cyril Ramaphosa did not benefit from the CR17 money and that he is under no obligation by Parliament to declare the money or the donors’ names, seems not to hold water at all times. Ramaphosa’s obtention of an interdict to seal off from the public eye the many names of the donors of the money and his actions, reactions and counter-actions against Mkhwebane on the CR17’s activities are starting to look very suspicious. The question is prominent and contstant in the minds of many political analysts: what does Ramaphosa try to hide with all his opposing actions against the Public Protector’s findings or her indications of possible problems to be address by her.158,161,176-182 

Even Ramaphosa’s own supporters in the ANC’s NEC doubt his intentions and said the alleged amounts of R300 million (which can in reality be between R500 million and R1 000 million) of donations were overkill by Ramaphosa. About the so-called “humble” need to keep the donors’ names secret by Ramaphosa through an interdict, Cele, Masuabi and Rooi158 write158:1-2: “Dit kan korporatiewe Suid-Afrika met rooi gesigte laat.” This position of secrecy invokes once more the question primary question: why did these “good” but wealthy donors (undoubtedly with business and others interests mostly within the White-capitalist circles)  joine the Ramaphosa group? Was it not again a planned state capture and why should the public stay uninformed about the private donors’ actions and motives, hiding possible long-term political and economic effects still awaiting us? Ramaphosa’s successful interdict against the Public Protector, forbidding the publishing of the names of the donors to the CR 17, is of great concern: it spells out already the possibility of future state capture, as well as the possibility for Ramaphosa’s donors – with his guarantee by the court of their anonymity – to hold the country to ransom. It is obvious that Ramaphosa’s “good position” as state president at the end of the South African rainbow was ensured for him by the secret donors through their private financial and political intentions and activities.158,161

The fact that Ramaphosa is involved in an increasingly hostile battle with the Public Protector, while the Ramaphosa faction undoubtedly successfully smeared her in the media as the sole troublemaker against the “good Ramaphosa” and his regime, is a worrying phenomenon. It seems there can be an organised effort to undermine law and order.183-190 How intense Ramaphosa is fighting back against the Public Protector on any “suspicious” activities against him or by her doubting of his politics, is confirmed by the fact of  that he has appointed two of the top South African lawyers to take her on.183,184 On the 11th August 2019184 in his analysis of the situation, Hunter writes184:4: “President Cyril Ramaphosa has enlisted two top legal minds in what is expected to be an explosive legal fight against public protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane this week”.

About Ramaphosa’s role-playing as a so-called victim of the Public Protector in her alleged constant investigations against him, it must be noted that until June 2019 there had been only one. That his case should have been investigated, given all the questions around the CR17 funding, was justified, at least on a prima facie level. On her output of cases investigated (and wherein Ramaphosa did not play a role), inmiddle-June 2019 Mkhwebane herself gave us some inside information of her 20 months in office and the massive amount of cases so far investigated by her. This output by her clearly contradicts the public media’s allegation that she is primarily focussed on Ramaphosa or Gordhan, when she states191:2: “In die 12 maande tot 31 Maart 2019 het ek 14 000 sake ondersoek. Slegs twee het verband gehou met min. Gordhan, terwyl een met die president verband gehou het.”

Support is little for her in the media and politics, as Sokutu reflects192:12: “The opposition, from the Democratic Alliance (DA) to the ruling ANC – except for the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – have intensified the campaign to push for her firing.”

A well-organised antiBusisiwe Mkhwebane movement has emerged, reflecting focussed efforts to remove the present Public Protector from her post. Ramaphosa, his clan and supporters, parliamentarians, as well as officially and pro-Black organisations such as the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation, Freedom Under Law, the Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse, Cosatu and the SACP, have all called for Mkhwebane’s resignation or firing.183-193

There is no doubt that a Public Protector’s task and person are always endangered when he/she dares to try to implicate powerful individuals in their various kinds of wrongdoing, hardly making the case of Busiswe Mkhwebane a unique one. There are well-orchestrated efforts to oust the present Public Protector as soon as possible and at all costs for spurious reasons, such as her alleged “enabling of state capture” and of being an “alleged failure”. There are even the outrageous allegations that she is apparently mentally ubalanced, suffering from “paranoia” which would explain why she is daring to take on high-status figures, such as the two media heroes and darlings, Gordhan and Ramaphosa. Some want to take her to court for alleged perjury, while other persons cry out to remove her as an advocate from the roll.183-193

The attacks on her seem at times to be well-planned and focussed, extremely rude and undoubtedly mostly without evidence. Many are calculated to cast suspicion where evidence is lacking.183-193 Calland194 writes194:23: 

She [Mkhwebane] is not in fact exercising her powers without fear or favour, but in service of certain factional and other vested interests;

and194:23:

In the corridors of power, the most often stated rumour is that Mkhwebane  is being ‘handled by The Farm’ – a faction in the base of the intelligence services. Mkhwebane once worked there, but that does not mean she is a spook. However, there has to be an explanation for her conduct.

She is subjectively described as a “one-woman show which has to go”; postulations that fail to reflect any evidence against her besides betraying subjective and unrelated arguments which fit well into the pro-Ramaphosa faction’s mindset. Much of the criticism is characterised by the same personal rejection of her as of Jacob Zuma.183-193

Calland’s194 tirade that Mkhwebane’s dismissal by a two-thirds majority will be blocked in Parliament, constructs a narrative of the alleged sheltering of the Public Protector by crooks in the Parliament when he writes194:23:

The scoundrels on the list [ANC election list] will fight hard to stop a move against Mkhwebane. They have common cause with her; there are common interests in halting the reforms that may lead to their own investigation, prosecution and imprisonment.

Micheal193 writes193:13:

This woman has been an abject failure from the day she took office and everything she has touched has turned into a disaster. The only thing she is concerned about is to be a bulwark and a safeguard for Zuma’s cronies and this is the reason she was put there in the first place. It is fairly obvious now that she is incapable and cannot do the job that she was appointed to do…She should be fired from her job…

Sokutu192 writes192:12:

Looking at the string of her bungles – the latest the disputed finding on the SA Reserve Bank and Absa [as well as the latest court findings on Gordhan and on the Gupta-linked Estina dairy farm project] for which she has been slapped by the Constitutional Court with a huge personal cost order for “being untruthful” – the embattled Mkhwebane finds herself besieged by sharks baying for her blood.

Essop191 reports her own experience of the attack on her191:2: “Sy het gesê sy is in die sowat 20 maande in die amp onder meer ‘n “spioen” en “Zuptoid” of “Zupta-beskermer” genoem, ‘n minister het haar “onbevoeg” genoem, ‘n direkteur-generaal het haar vir ‘n “idiot “uitgekryt en joernaliste het haar ‘n “moroon” genoem. Mkhwebane het ook ontken dat sy betrokke is by die ANC se faksiegevegte.”

There seems to be an outright attack on Mkhwebane’s abilities and integrity as reflected by Munusamy’s195 writing of the 4th August 2019 which reads195:13-14:

Busisiwe Mkhwebane has been savaged by the highest court in the land. She has been branded a liar who is also incompetent, devious irresponsible, sloppy and opaque.

Marrian196 warns on the 14th June 2019, on the alleged capturing by Jacob Zuma and his cronies of the present office of the public protector – specifically the person Busisiwe Mkhwebane, and that political honesty, wisdom and sense must prevail as to her actions and person – when she writes as follows196:2:

At the end of this battle, the office of the public protector has to remain intact and if removing Mkhwebane ensures that this is done, so be it. But it is critical that this is done fairly and within the ambit of the law.

That Ramaphosa is going to pay a price in the future inside the greater ANC but mostly with the voters for his Ledwaba interdict, no-one can doubt. Mavuso and Ndaba167 refer to the viewpoint of the Durban-based independent political analyst Thabani Khumalo who said that the CR17 funds revelations were deeply damaging to the reputation of Ramaphosa167:2: “…as a man who came to power to clean the image of the country after lurching from one scandal to another in the past nine years”.

Khumalo167 is very straight on Ramaphosa’s insecure position since June 2019, triggered by the CR17 controversy and his own political clowning around it from June,  when he says167:2: “…there was little that Ramaphosa could do to cleanse his image, saying people would now start recalling that he was part of the previous leadership [as vice-President and righthand and supporter of Jacob Zuma] that was being questioned.”

Msomi174 writes that notwithstanding some South Africans having been sceptical on Ramaphosa’s New Dawn to come, they believed that he at least would bring and run a clean administration174:13:

At the very least, we expected Ramaphosa would not be allergic to truth, no matter how uncomfortable or embarrassing it might be. He is certainly no Zuma, but his handling of the donations saga so far has left a bitter taste in the mouth.

The editor176 of the Citizen is quite lucid, reminding us of legal objectivity and reality. This also forms the basis of the Public Protector’s approach to Ramaphosa, even if it might sink him in the end. Regarding the present-day fight between Ramaphosa and the Public Protector, the editor176 of The Citizen guides us well on the 23rd July 2019 when he writes176:12:

However, the fact remains that, whatever the dust stirred up by this judgement and by Mkhwebane’s report on Ramaphosa the president has serious questions to answer.

And whether we like her or not, Mkhwebane was asking them.

The fact that many people believe Ramaphosa is some sort of political saviour should not blind them to the fact that he does not appear squeaky clean himself.

People must, at all costs, avoid believing that the end justifies the means.

The former public prosecutor, Lawrence Mushwana197, warns us of an internalised unreality which can sometimes relegate objectivity and honesty into second place in the minds of all the parties involved in the cases investigated by the public prosecutor’s office, saying in June 2019197:9: “…stakes are high in the office of the public prosecutor with all interested parties trying to stake a claim.” It is about the power to rule via the Public Protector’s office by delinquent politicians: Here the actions of the Ramaphosa clan to stay in power are very prominent.  This so-called “claim staking” can be for less noble reasons as Makhanya187,197 warns on the role-playing of the dangerous populists in ANC politics as well as those in the economic world which have since 1994 dominated politics.178,197

About the distracting and organised attack on the Public Protector, discerning at least some suggestions of impropriety in the “smoke” suggesting some fire in the activities of the pro-Ramaphosa faction, Wyngaard156, supported by many other journalists, states156:21: “Maar die koor van kritiek teen Mkhwebane en die gereelde luide bevraagtekening van haar kundigheid, kan maak dat ‘n mens nalaat om te vra: Het Ramaphosa dalk tog iets om weg te steek?

Brian Sokutu192 is very correct when he says192:12: “Cyril needs to come clean”: it does not mean a week by week cleansing through affidavits and court interdicts to silence critics, but a permanent cleansing by himself of his past if he dares to stay on in the presidency.

What is obvious in this context are the increasing signs of Ramaphosa’s duplicity and evasions as a president to save his skin. He started his down-fall by misleading the Parliament himself with his slipperiness and ambiguity around the R500 000 of Bosasa money for his CR17 as an alleged payment to his son Andile for “consultation work”.156

The country is now in what many say is a crisis. The constant fights and interdicts around the position of Ramaphosa’s presidency doesn’t smell good186:4: “…worse news follow bad news”. It is time that Ramaphosa’s acts are taken to the courts to see if he is capable and skilled enough for the presidency. It is the duty of the court to intervene and to interfere when it seems that political leaders, regimes and law-makers fail their mandates of integrity, honesty and good governance.

Mkhwebane’s alleged transgressions against Ramaphosa are even deemed to be driven by her jealousy, especially because it is alleged that she does not receive as much attention as the previous Public Protector had received. Such allegations seem to be based on her lack of also being seen as a “national hero” and “saviour of the nation” as Madonsela was eulogised because she “captured” the bad Zuma and his cronies! Munusamy195 reflects this cognitive disposition well when she postulates195:13-14:

Mkhwebane’s deep resentment of Madonsela would become obvious. It seemed to go beyond the fact that Madosela took the role of the ‘Makhadzi’ with her, robbing Mkhwebane of the public adoration she felt entitled to.

The previous position and role of Madonsela as an alleged hero in ANC politics needs to be analysed. It will be done in the section immediately following here.

3.3.1.1.4.6.1.1. The strange role of Thuli Madonsela in Jacob Zuma’s state-capture adventure

The deputy general secretary of the SACP, Solly Mapaila198, in his testimony before the Zondo-commission on state capture which lifted the lid on the process that set the stage for state capture, made the surprising allegation of the role of previous Public Protector Thuli Madonsela in this process. Madonsela became a kind of “national heroine” for her so-called “role of saviour of the nation” from Zuma and his cronies’ state capture. Copious was the praise for her alleged role in the “fall of Zuma” with her report on Nkandla and state capture. In the evidence before the Zondo Commission by Solly Mapaila and Robert McBride, Madonsela was suddenly and unexpectedly clothed in another role, that of a crony and understudy to Jacob Zuma, in helping to prepare him for the presidency. It is alleged that Zuma finally helped her to become the country’s all-powerful public protector.198

Their testimony suggests the alleged formation of an elite group, called the engine room, which was gathered and apparently led by Zuma himself to advise him on the running of his regime from 2009 onwards. This training and advisory activity took place quite apart from the tripartite-alliance’s team, which was, on the face of it, supposed to guide and prepare Zuma officially. Mapaila198 said that this engine room, later also described as the kitchen cabinet, gave extensive advice to Zuma about the structure and policy direction of his government ahead of the 2009 period, totally disregarding the official ANC alliance team’s advice and guidelines.198

Munusamy198 also states that in submissions to Zondo, as was argued by Mapaila and the former Ipid chief Robert McBride, the members of the engine room group were very close to Zuma’s planning and decision-making: far closer and with more power than the ANC’s alliance (transitional) team. The evidence held that many of these members of the kitchen cabinet were later appointed by Zuma to key positions within the state.  The engine room (kitchen cabinet) members had included persons such as the filmmaker Duma Ndlovu, Thuli Madonsela, Independent Electoral Commissioner chairperson Glen Mashinini, the former national police commissioner Riah Phiyega, the former minister Nkosinathi Nhleko, while the former Sars commissioner Tom Moyane also attended the meetings.198

On the other hand, members of the alliance or transitional (official) team, that was established by the ANC, SACP and Cosatu to do the restructuring of the government and to determine its programme based on the outcome of the ANC’s 2007 Polokwane national conference, were sidelined by Zuma and his “kitchen cabinet”, Munusamy claimed198.[The members of this team consisted of the top six members of the ANC, as well as the secretary general of the SACP Blade Nzimande and the secretary general of Cosatu, Zwelinzima Vavi. The secretariat of the alliance team was headed by Collins Chabane (who later joined Zuma’s cabinet), with members Mapaila, Ayanda Dlodlo, Neil Coleman and Clifford Motsepe]198.

Mapaila198 said that when the transitional team was established Zuma had already activated his kitchen cabinet in secret without informing the alliance leadership. What was shocking for the alliance team was that when Zuma announced his cabinet, some of the kitchen cabinet’s proposals were implemented in conflict with the advice of the alliance team. It was clear that the alliance team had been short-circuited by Zuma and that the kitchen cabinet determined the policy directions of the future Zuma presidency. Prominent conflicting decisions taken by Zuma, in line with the kitchen cabinet’s advice and against the advice of the alliance team, were that the National Planning Commission and the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation became two separate ministries.198

Munusamy198 reports that there is no suggestion that the kitchen cabinet has been linked to corrupt activities. But certain outcomes of the decision-making of the kitchen cabinet and its members’ later appointments around Zuma’s interests are very suspicious. Firstly, a prominent outcome of the direction taken by Zuma with the appointment of his “own”, unofficial advisory team was a first sign that he was quite prepared to outsource the ANC’s mandate on ruling the country and to ignore the resolutions of the national conference. This is also a significant characteristic of his later state-capture enterprise via his appointed cronies and the involvement of strangers, such as the Guptas, opening the state’s coffers to them. Secondly, it is both significant and very suspicious that most of the so-called “members of his kitchen cabinet” were appointed later by Jacob Zuma in high-ranking positions. The following appointments followed from the kitchen cabinet: Nhleko, a previous provincial-prisons boss, was appointed minister of police; Moyane became the Sars commissioner; Mashinini was first appointed as an adviser to Zuma and then chair of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); Phiyga was first appointed chair of the presidential state-owned enterprises review committee, before becoming police commissioner; Vincent Magwenya was appointed presidential spokesperson; Bonsile Makhene became legal adviser to Zuma; Yekani Monde Gadini (husband of Makhene) was a State Security Agency agent, redeployed to Sars; while Madonsela became the public protector.198

Thirdly, all these positions were politically very powerful. These posts provided for excellent opportunities for the abuse and manipulations of the political, economic and statutory system as part of steering state capture. (The appointees Moyane and Phiyga’s problematic behaviours are today well-known).198

In reaction to the above developments and outcomes, Mapaila198 said before his appearance before the Zondo Commission198:5: “When we go to the commission we will illustrate our point of view that this is how capture happened even before [Zuma] became president. Policymaking shifted from the ANC to an unknown secret system.” Here, in the launching of state capture from within an unknown secret system, seems to stand out in some way for Mapaila the corrupting role of Zuma’s kitchen cabinet.198

Madonsela’s alleged association with and appointment by Jacob Zuma in the 2009s versus her current elevated and prestigious figure, and a person known since 2017 as a so-called national saviour and somewhat of an idol, as well as a so-called “prominent” fighter against the “bad” Zuma and his “evil” state capture, is controversial. If these allegations are true, it spells trouble in some way. There are enough conspiracy bloodhounds to start sniffing her tracks in the life and politics of the ANC and that of Zuma, not only after 2009, but also before 2009. The question, somehow, is what went wrong between her and Uncle Jacob? What cooled down her initial loyalty to and friendship with Zuma? What awful interpersonal incident had caused her to nearly put him in jail as well as attempt to take away his much beloved Nklanda from him. There are also her strange acquaintances with Moyane and Phiyga in their days of the kitchen cabinet and after the appointments of the three to state positions. It requires some answers.198

Two questions will stay undoubtedly unanswered: did Zuma’s kitchen cabinet teach him his political delinquency or did some of these “cabinet members” learn crookedness from him? Or was the whole group, including Zuma, from day one a bunch of delinquents? It seems as if Mkhwebane’s biggest problem at the moment is that she was not appointed by Ramaphosa as a favoured follower and that she was not  part of Ramphosa’s own “kitchen cabinet”. But her biggest sin, it seems, is that she dared to take on the “good, anointed saviour of the Nation”, Cyril Ramaphosa, while Madonsela took on the public’s much-hated “prime evil”, Jaco Zuma! The line between wrong and right is thin in the cesspit of South African politics, following on from 1994.

3.3.1.1.4.6.2. Where does Ramaphosa’s wealth come from?

The standpoint of President Cyril Ramaphosa that he wants to cleanse South African politics from corruption obliges him also as a politician to undergo a lifestyle audit. This seems to be an idea he supported strongly in the past in Parliament.81,200,201

At the moment it appears that he has not so far undergone a lifestyle audit, making it very difficult to determine how he had obtained his assets for the two periods, pre-1994 and post-1994. From media reports Ramaphosa seems to be a very rich man.  For the mass of poor people his financial success, power and wealth are things to adore. It undoubtedly brings him hero status amid the Black population. But, without an official parliamentary lifestyle audit, we are left in the dark, without an idea of the size of his assets and how and when he established it: was it pre-1994 or post-1994, etc.? The research of Phapano Phasha202, published on the 8th January 2019, seems to give us some insight as to how Ramaphosa had obtained at least some of his wealth. To get a better insight into Ramaphosa the businessman and politician, his story is reflected below to provide the reader with an in-depth understanding of the so-called “unique Ramaphosa lifestyle”.202

The report of the political analyst, commentator and spokesperson for the Progressive Professionals Forum (PPF), Phapano Phasha202, is of the opinion that Ramaphosa’s wealth could possibly have originated from support he had received from the PIC (Public Investment Commissioner).89,202

Note: The PIC is at the moment under scrutiny by the Zondo and Mpati commissions for possible state capture and other corruption by certain members of the ANC elite and their cronies. The alleged corruption unmasked by the inquiry is now starting to probe deeper and deeper into the integrity of the ANC elite, or lack thereof, stretching as far back as 1996. Indeed, it is suggested by forensic experts that the terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry into the PIC must be extended to investigate some of the ANC-elite members in depth.202-207

Phapano Phasha202 did a thorough study of the historical, economic and political occurrences from 1996 to 2005 at the PIC and its beneficiaries. Her comprehensive analysis of the data is very significant and needs to be noted here.  In this research Phasha202 states having identified the presence of Cyril Ramaphosa as an alleged beneficiary.202

The use of Phapano Phasha’s202 article is to provide further insight into the present and future role of Cyril Ramaphosa in the politics of post-2019 South Africa. It also makes the remark of the columnist of the Tiso Blackstar Group’s, Tom Eaton208, more understandable when reflecting on the South African Political Theatre and his investigation of the ANC leaders under the title: A-Z of Droscars – from Agrizzi to Zondo, he writes207:8: “Few political actors have gone so far with so little…”

The seasoned political analyst and commentator Phapano Phasha’s202 article is of great importance, not only because it gives insight into the political heartbeat of the ANC, but especially because it can serve as a guideline how to do constructive thinking and planning in future regarding the land reform matter. In this context a full quotation is necessary. She writes202:

Between 1996 and 2005 Trevor Manual, in his capacity as Finance Minister, was the sole trustee and custodian of the Government Employee Pension Fund (GEPF) which at the time of inception had assets close to R200 billion. As a sole trustee of GEPF, Mr Trevor Manual did not report or account to anyone but himself. To this end there was no board or governance and therefore Mr Manual had the sole discretion of how employees’ pension funds would be invested.

However, in 2002 a tender for actuarial services was advertised and eventually awarded to Alexander Forbes by Trevor Manual in his capacity as the sole trustee of GEPF, which was now worth over R250 billion. Alexander Forbes then proceeded to sell 30% of its shares to an empowerment group that was called Millennium Consolidated Investments (MCI) which was incorporated in 2001, being a year before the invitation to tender came out. This company belonged to the current President of the African National Congress (ANC) and South Africa (SA), Cyril Ramaphosa.

Before ‘buying’ 30% of the Alexander Forbes shares and thus getting first-hand access to the funds of the GEPF, President Ramaphosa was just another Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) proxy from the governing party who subsequently managed to buy more than 27 companies post 2003 which turned him into an instant billionaire. To strengthen the argument, according to a 2006 article by the Mail & Guardian titled ‘Anatomy of Fast Money’, the sudden wealth which was concentrated amongst a few new colonial elites, like President Ramaphosa, was not due to hard work but to connections to the ANC, patronage and friends in government which in turn led to some of the following acquisitions by President Ramaphosa:

  • April 2003: 16% of Alexander Forbes, now worth R1,1-billion.

  • July 2003: 14,4% of Bidvest, worth R706-million.

  • July 2004: 1,2% of Standard Bank, worth R1,1-billion.

  • August 2004: 42% of Mondi Shanduka Newsprint and 40% of Mondi Packaging, worth about R980 million.

  • November 2005: 11,74% of Assore, worth R394-million

  • November 2005: 1,5% in Liberty Life, worth R299-million.

  • May 2006: 25% of Downing, Reynard and Associates (unlisted)

  • July 2006: 40% of Kangra Coal…Source (Mail & Guardian)

It is quite obvious to any student of geopolitics that the rise and rise of President Ramaphosa was sparked by his acquiring the shares at Alexander Forbes. This brings me to the rationale on why President Ramaphosa must extend the terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry into the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), which is the asset-management company that invests funds on behalf of the GEPF.

It will be an injustice if the current terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry into the PIC [Public Investment Corporation] are left as they are because for more than a decade Trevor Manual was God presiding over billions in hard-earned savings of government employees whilst President Ramaphosa became Deputy God. Hence to only focus on the investment decisions taken by the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the PIC, Dan Matjila, is quite frankly opportunistic and self-serving. South Africans have every right to know which companies and individuals benefitted during the tenures at the GEPF of Trevor Manual and President Ramaphosa, especially since there was no board or governance in place at that time.

Another factor is the conflict of interest regarding both President Ramaphosa and Mr Trevor Manual which necessitates an investigation to unpack if President Ramaphosa directly used his position as a shareholder at GEPF to get a capital injection into his own companies; the same applies to Trevor Manual, which also falls under the ambit of state capture. This, by the way, is no different to the conflict of interest associated with Nhlanhla Nene who opted to resign as the Minister of Finance.

The investment decisions by both Trevor Manual and President Ramaphosa, each in their capacity as custodian of the GEPF, must also extend to the likes of Zanele Mbeki, Tokyo Sexwale, Saki Macozoma, Frank Chikane, Jay Naidoo, Kelso Gordian, Cheryl Carolus et cetera. To this end the Commission of Inquiry must assess whether they received, or legitimately received, any capital injection through the GEPF. Moreover, the conduct of the likes of Johan Rupert, Christopher Wiese, Johannes Mouton, Stephen Koseff and Markus Jooste, who used the funds of the GEPF through their asset-management companies which sub-contract with the PIC, to inject capital into their own businesses, must be inquired into.

It is therefore not surprising that the post-1994 Afrikaners, especially the Stellenbosch and Paarl gang, have become richer than they were during apartheid. It is precisely because Trevor Manual and President Ramaphosa literally handed them the pension funds of black employees without any competition from black-owned asset management companies.

The PIC, which now controls trillions of pension-fund money, has literally become a piggy bank for the private sector and politically connected elite who don’t have to work hard to earn their wealth – but simply abuse and misuse money that belongs to workers, many of whom are living from hand to mouth. Unfortunately, unions like the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), including the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA), have never been vocal on this slave-trade transaction because they are part and parcel of the same private sector which has perfected monopolizing public funds to feed the private sector. This is what Dr Okechukwu C Iheduru defined as labour capitalism in a paper titled ‘Organised Labour, Globalisation and Economic Reform: union investment companies in South Africa’.

In essence, state capture and exchange of capital between the blue-eyed boys, the Broederbond and the new colonial elite, was very systematic and structural. What is quite obvious is that this gang has been very sophisticated whilst using all sorts of treacherous and deceitful means to gain proximity to government coffers in order to empower itself and its family whilst simultaneously taxing the working class and poor who literally sustain their wealth.

uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) prisoner Soko Ndukwana defined this grouping as “looters of the Nation and Gangster Capitalists” who today have become the paragon of truth and business experts in a country which is rated as the most unequal in the world. This is precisely because state resources have been misused and abused by those using their struggle credentials to benefit a few whilst the majority, who keep them in power and who are yet to see the rays of liberation, are burdened by squalor and degradation. This is sheer state capture which has taken centuries to perfect and in its collapse, we must never allow it to use Dan Matjila as collateral damage…

Conclusion: The above is not about dishonesty or fraud. Neither does it represent an allegation of that nature, but with commissions such as Zondo and Mpati running and Ramaphosa at a loss to explain his and his son’s involvement with Bosasa and the CR17, together with his plea of “complete innocence” as vice president of Jacob Zuma and his many intimate cronies’ wrongdoing, an in-depth investigation into his assets, as from pre-1994, is urgently needed. It is not a recommendation, but a must. Official lifestyle audits, going back to the 1990s, are needed on Ramaphosa and Manuel (but the chances are good that they, as Ramaphosa and Manuel did recently with their various interdicts when the air gets hot, will summarily stop any investigation against them).

If the above allegations of Phapano Phasha202 are true, the questions are: Firstly, who did Manual consult for a good and independent consideration in his awarding of the BBBEE deal to Ramaphosa? Secondly, on what merits and grounds did Ramaphosa obtained the deal(s)? Why did Ramaphosa, as a co-ANC cadre and friend of Manuel, obtain such a deal? Why did Ramaphosa not declare it when he accepted the presidency? In this context, there are clear ethical obligations for Ramaphosa as the present chief executive of the Republic of South Africa, other than just an ordinary businessman, that he should immediately fulfil. These ethics clearly prescribe why he could not take on the presidency of South Africa if the BBBEE deal enabling him to obtain his wealth via the PIC, as alleged by Phasha,202 is true. To disregard such ethics, would place him in the same camp as Jacob Zuma. He cannot stay on as president.

It is doubted if Phasha’s202 allegations will easily reach the ears of the Zondo or the Mapti commissions. There is just too much ANC obstruction. The impact of Phasha’s202 reporting in the social media was limited to her article on Google (through the social media the EFF reach 5.8 million people, the ANC 4.9 million people and the DA 4.6 million people). Phasha’s202 allegations seem to be serious, but it is doubted that in the event of a court case she will be in a favourable  position to tell Ramaphosa and Manuel (as Malema did with ease in reaction to Manuel’s threat of a court case against him) that they “can go to hell” and “I am not afraid of you.”202,209

Weighing alleged self-enrichment via BBBEE versus the immense poverty of the mass of Blacks outside BBBEE opportunities (it does not matter if the BBBEE deal had been done entire honestly through the PIC) casts a cloud over Ramaphosa’s head.

If Phapano Phasha’s202 article on Ramaphosa’s use of the PIC has some merit, he must come clean on the PIC allegations in the first place. Secondly, he should fully declare his financial setup: his assets, other belongings and trusts, etc., starting before 1994. The origins of Ramaphosa’s wealth must be fully revealed. As president of South Africa it is his responsibility and duty to do it. At this stage he is a witness, not a perpetrator.  He is surely not one of the many persons who avoided the various judicial commissions on state capture. Munusamy210 writes210:28: “When former finance minister Nhlanhla Nene returned to the witness stand this week, Zondo asked him why so few former and current cabinet members and senior officials were coming forward to testify, Nene responded that other people might not be dictated by their conscience and could also be worried about the ‘price to pay’.” Indeed, these culprits should be worried, reports Munusamy210:28: “In Nene’s case, the price to pay was very high.” Cyril Ramaphosa must know it beforehand. He avoids without clear reason the Zondo and Mpati Commissions, as well as the public at large.210, 211

3.3.1.1.4.6.3. Role of the Lekota-Zuma-Ramaphosa triumvirate in the Apartheid regime’s spies

Since the December 2017 election of Ramaphosa as the ANC’s leader, there have been rumours about the Ramaphosa group’s alleged spying association with the Apartheid regime. The leaking of information by previous intelligence agents of the NP that the lists of the names of ANC members that had worked under-cover for them were erased created suspicion. Prominent present-day members of the ANC elite could indeed be spies and therefore at risk.

That there were indeed many ANC traitors working with the NP regime as agents and who as ANC VIPs may now fear being unmasked, was confirmed by the bragging of John Vorster23:1-2: “…that the majority of ANC exiles were spies”.

Moalusi212 also refers in this context to the possibly of “plentiful” ANC top leaders that may have been “spies” and the ANC’s punitive actions in the past against some of them, by specifically citing Jacob Dlamini’s book Askari. On Nelson Mandela’s own view on the possibility of “plentiful” ANC top leaders that may have indeed been “spies”, Moalusi writes212:14: “Nelson Mandela did say if the issue of spies is to be an obsessive point of discussion, then almost everyone in the ANC will be called a spy. Something the apartheid regime wanted to achieve, ultimately.”

Prominent among these wanton rumours is Jacob Zuma’s list of “ANC-spies”. It is alleged  by Dr Nel Marais30, a risk analyst who had worked from 1980 to 2000 in the South African national Intelligence structures (National Intelligence, SA Secret Service, Military Information and the SAPS Security Police), that there does not exist a single list of the names of Apartheid agents anymore. The belief is that this makes Zuma’s task of identifying these culprits with concrete evidence, based on the real Apartheid records very difficult. Marais reports that although the National Intelligence destroyed all its records in 1990, the NP regime’s various secret services never worked together and that the records of agents were probably limited to access by certain personnel inside those governmental agencies only. There is thus no indication that all the governmental records were destroyed and thus no assurance for ANC-NP collaborators not to be exposed in the near future.23,30,43-45,213

The main question is why it was so important for the NP regime to erase these ANC culprits’ names from being identified later?23,30,43-45,213

Rumours of a so-called secret list of ANC-NP collaborators started to circulate before Ramaphosa’s appointment as executive political leader of South Africa. This list, alleged to be in the possession of Zuma alone, was referred to as a kind of extorting method by  Zuma’s cronies to get Ramaphosa’s people in the ANC NEC to tone down their their anti-Zuma behaviour and campaign. This initiative seems directed at isolating Ramaphosa from the mainstream of the ANC’s voters and supporters. Political analysts see this very wanton allegation as undoubtedly well-planned and inserted into the public mind to sow suspicion so that Ramaphosa may be taken down. Featuring prominently among these rumours is the resurfacing of allegations about Ramaphosa’s relationship and favoured position with the NP regime during Apartheid. This observation was tabled in Parliament by Mr Patrick Lekota recently.25,26,32,35,213

Zuma’s political company know all too well Ramaphosa’s weaknesses and mistakes, originating from pre-1994, and how these may be used to undermine him before the election of 2024. The spying allegations may be one focus.25,26,32,35,213

Although Ramaphosa rejected Lekota’s allegation in Parliament, his defence was not very strong and indeed vague; creating the impression that he tried to further defuse confrontation with Lekota and to get the issue out of the public eye. There has so far also not been any outright rejection by Ramaphosa of the so-called “Zuma list” which is alleged to reflect indirectly on him and his clan.213

There are allegations that the SSA is still delinquent with a footing in the Zuma clan. The Mufamadi report is counted as evidence. The Zuma clan’s political, social and economic power is underestimated: it is still strong enough to topple Ramaphosa even as early as 2020.55,104

There is a clear coordinated fight-back by the pro-Ramaphosa camp to divert the attention from identifying alleged spies in their ranks by propagating that Jacob Zuma was himself in the 1980s an alleged  NP spy, without offering the evidence to back it up. The fact that the ANC veterans strongly rally to Zuma’s side in the growing Ramaphosa-Zuma war for the soul of the ANC and are standing on the side of Zuma in his spying allegations against some prominent ANC members, spells the possibility of spies being unmasked in the near future.25,26,28,30,33,34

The MK veterans, as well as Zuma, have publicly fingered Nyanda and Ramatlhodi as alleged spies. Kgosana32 writes, on the response of the leader of Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans Association (MKMVA), Kebby Maphatsoe, as follows32:4:

Maphatsoe said the veterans are not surprised that former ministers Ngoako Raatlhodi and Siphiwe Nyanda have been outed by Zuma as alleged apartheid agents. It now makes sense why the integration of former MK combatants into the new South African National Defence Force, which Nyanda had overseen, disadvantaged many of those who had fought for liberation.

“We are beginning to connect the dots to say under his leadership of the army, during integration, that is why MK members even now are retiring poor.”

Ramatlhodi30 remarked on the allegations of Zuma against him and Nyanda when he said30:8: “Hy [Zuma] wil die grafte heropen en dis nie wat ek wil doen nie”, but this may hide more than the eye can see. For alleged ANC members to escape their past as so-called “reform revolutionaries” there is no place in Zuma’s politics. Indeed, Zuma’s future strategy on Apartheid agents may be life-threatening for some ANC VIPs. Zuma and Lekota’s positions as head of the ANC external and internal security and intelligence undoubtedly provide them with information about many present-day ANC political leaders’ past political activities and the persons who had paid them blood money in exchange for ANC secrets. To write off Zuma or Lekota in favour of Ramaphosa and his neo-ANCs can be a grave error.25,26,30,34,35,46

Many Ramaphosa supporters can be sure that in the next twelve months more so-called “secrets” will be exposed in some way on the alleged traitors in the ANC by Zuma and his group. At this stage Zuma can afford to lift the lid of the story of treason in the ANC: it can make him in the end the winner against all doubts. He can bounce back as the top leader, as Winston Churchill successfully did in WW2.25,26,30,34,35,42,46

It is of the utmost importance that Cyril Ramaphosa address the allegation of Patrick Lekota regarding him as an alleged spy constructively with facts, and not again with libel cases and interdicts to staunch doubts about him.

3.3.1.1.4.6.4. Cyril Ramaphosa in perspective

From the above controversies that reflect on Ramaphosa’s actions, it is clear that the public, even his intimate comrades, know very little about Ramaphosa the person. His plan, similarly to his behaviour, are unpredictable. This spells serious trouble if he stays on in the presidency. In the context of Ramaphosa, the vague political-leader, De Lange60 writes as follows60:13:

Sestien jaar lank – van 1996, toe hy klaar was met die skryf van die Grondwet, tot 2012, toe hy uit die bloute adjunkpresident van die ANC geword het – het Cyril Ramaphosa ‘n baie private loopbaan en lewe in die sakewêreld gelei. Selfs in die vier jaar wat hy adjunkpresident was, het hy ‘n masker gedra wat bra min oor hom verklap het” en: “Die president is byvoorbeeld nie goed met fyner detail nie – dit laat hy aan ander oor; dit vat ook lank voordat hy ‘n besluit neem; niemand weet wat hy dink nie…”

Msimang214 is of the opinion that the positioning, power- and image-building of Ramaphosa go deeper. It seems to be well-anchored in the dark politics of the ANC. Msimang posits214:1-2:

Before that, he was already the embodiment of the grotesque. The rapid and enormous rise in his wealth was largely a result of his position as a lead mediator for the ANC during the negotiations for democracy, where he won the trust of the white businesspeople who controlled the economy in 1994 and continue to do so today.

His role in the events that led to the 2012 Marikana mineworkers’ massacre showed him to be callously out of touch with the interests of workers, and predictable and cruelly supportive of the interests of the mining company on whose board he sat.

 

3.3.1.1.4.6.5.  Results of the Louw Appraisal Checklist on the ability of the ANC to be a government

The activities of the regime and leadership of the ANC have been spread over seven articles. The contents of the seven articles are as follows:

The mark awarded to the ANC and its leadership for the period 1994 to 2019 in terms of the bad-versus-good classification of satisfaction on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,4 was 23 (26%) out of a possible maximum of 82.

4. Conclusions

4.1. Specific conclusions: Article 17 (ANC’s troubled leadership)

Since 1994, the ANC as a regime and leadership has gradually decayed into looters, serving the dollar-god of power and will do anything for it. These looters are opportunists who only see the ANC and its power since 1994 as a stepladder to enable them to access state power for the express purpose of self-enrichment. They are crooked card-carrying members of the ANC; persons whose inclinations and activities in the ANC are always first and foremost about what they get – fame, fortune, adulation, power, whatever – not what they build, create, and contribute.  Their principles, integrity and discipline, together with their cognitions are dominated by utter corruption and criminality. They blatantly rape the fragile societies of their fellow Africans. Corruption has become the norm within the value system of the current ANC. This lack of ethical norms, together with its lack of good leadership, in which the employment of capable people is missing, has led thereto that the ANC as an organization over the years has gradually slipped into mediocrity and is now disappearing.1-3

It just does not seem possible for Ramaphosa to reform the ANC or to better South Africa.  He lacks the ability to control the ANC’s politburo. He has so far not a single time shown a strategy to heal the deep fractures in the ANC, to eliminate corruption, to better and to reform governance and to restart the economy. He is not an anointed leader, nor the saviour of South Africans. The ANC cannot be reformed or be revitalised; it is “beyond redemption”.215

Reflecting specifically on the present Number One of South Africa, President Cyril Matamel Ramaphosa, he is as he was in 1994, still wearing a mask and as unpredictable as David Mabuza, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma. To say that Ramaphosa is a democratic and non-racial politician or that his politics are outside the Marxist-Leninist ANC box, represents the height of deception. He is an enrolled and loyal member of Mother ANC, from day-one until today. His present and future position as an executive political leader is absolutely dependent on it. He rigidly supports the ANC’s Marxist socialism and his only aim is to promote the ANC.80

It is clear that Whites and many non-Black Africans can expect  extreme situations to develop in South Africa under an ANC regime run by Ramaphosa, especially around their capitalist, land-ownership and civil rights. The ANC’s outdated and failed Soviet-communist politics has started to occupy future South African politics in full. The phantom of Robert Magube seems to be moving southwards. It was with good reason that Ramaphosa recently praised him at his funeral: those politicians in the Presentlife must always keep good relations with those in the Afterlife.

The ANC’s troubled leadership cannot be healed72:3: “…it is drunk from the alcohol of corruption”.

4.2. General conclusions: Articles 11 to 17

The awarding of 23 points (out of 82 points) to the ANC as a regime reflects that it lacks the capabilities and integrity as a candidate to be considered a skilled ruler. Indeed, the ANC may be seen as a failed candidate. The pre-May 2019 decision to allow the application of the ANC onto the shortlist to be considered as a possible candidate that may rule South Africa after the 8th May 2019, was a blatant mistake, theoretically speaking. Moreover, it was incorrect and inappropriate to mandate the ANC as a regime for the period 2019, particularly on the strength of 28% votes of the total eligible voters. Secondly, its poor political history as a regime and its crooked leadership, as reflected over 25 years, disqualifies it from being shortlisted as a candidate. It failed the basic test to be ruler of South Africa.

The general evaluation of the ANC and its leaders’ abilities, skills, competence and integrity show that they are as many as 59 points or 74% short of being the ideal candidate to be considered for the appointment as the top candidate for the position of post-May 2019 ruler, able to execute land redistribution. The sub-standard count of 26% also reflects that the ANC over 25 years (five regimes) failed to better themselves. The ANC is a false pretender to the throne. Its political ideology on the economy, land ownership and racism is outdated. Evidence is there that the ANC as a regime is going to run into trouble fast if it wants to fulfil its May 2019 election promises and execute its basic duties to the voters. Under the ANC’s 25 years of rule most South Africans lost out on prosperity, while the lives of its people became saturated with violence and crime. Its political leaders’ lifestyles are characterised by a lack of accountability and extreme opportunism. The ANC is incompetent to do well-planned and balanced land redistribution, with or without compensation. Their intended plan to bring land ownership to the mass of poor and landless Blacks will only create further poverty and anarchy, while a full-scale revolution becomes more and more of a reality.4,72,216

In the next and final Article (18), entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (18: Conclusions and a Dictum)”, the process and the politics that may bring successful land redistribution will be further evaluated and discussed.

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  79. Rooi J. ‘Cyril moet self kom sê oor kaders se ontplooiing. Rapport (News). 2019 July 21; p. 8.
  80. Du Plessis T. Dis tyd vir ‘n skuif soos FW s’n in 1990. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 July 14; p. 6.
  81. Munusamy R. When the law comes knocking for Zuma, he will try to take everything down with him. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Feb. 3; p. 20.
  82. Mthombothi B. If the people, and not parties, chose representatives, the ANC rot would never be returned to power. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March 24; p. 19.
  83. Makhanya M. Return of the Zuma zombies. City Press (Voices), 2019 June 23; p. 2.
  84. Monyooe L. Will the new team deliver? City Press. 2019 June 23; p. 5.
  85. Time to choose direction for a country that is undeniable at a crossroads. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 May 5; p. 18.
  86. Scott C. ANC obviously out to destroy SA. The Citizen (Letters). 2019 Aug. 28; p. 13.
  87. Armoede al hoe meer ‘n Afrika-verskynsel. Rapport (Sake). 2019 Nov. 24; p. 2.
  88. Jones C. Democracy still rules – for now. Mail & Guardian. 2019 June 21 to 27; p. 30.
  89. Munusamy R. Ramaphosa should beware SA’s Michael Cohens toadies who put up a firewall between Zuma and accountability. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March 3; p. 20.
  90. Tabane OJJ. Watchdog sacked while cops carry on conniving. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March 3; p. 20.
  91. Mthombothi B. As Trump drags the US down, he emboldens those in other countries who are hostile to an open society. Sunday Times. 2019 Nov. 24; p. 21.
  92. Bruce P. Uncomfortable shoes for Cyril to fill – and just one is his. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Jan. 20; p. 16.
  93. Mthombothi B.  Ramaphosa is in a position of strength, but his failure to act emboldens Magashule’s malcontents. Sunday Times. 2019 April 19; p. 10.
  94. Matiwane Z. KZN faction plots to remove president. Sunday Times (News). 2019 June 16; p. 4.
  95. SA betaal prys vir eenheid in die ANC. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 June 9; p. 2.
  96. De Lange J. Bank: Geveg in ANC verskerp. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 June 9; p. 2.
  97. Khumalo K. Rand plunges on ANC’s SARB dual-speak. Business (Influence). 2019 June 9; p. 18.
  98. RET nothing more than a slogan. Politics (Influence). 2019June 9; p. 18
  99. Cele S, Stone S. ANC opens up new battlefront. Sunday Times. 2019 June 23; pp. 1-2.
  100. Hunter Q. ‘Lawless’ spies threaten Cyril’s state clean up. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March 10; p. 2.
  101. Hunter Q, Matiwane Z, Mvumvu Z. Ace in a hole. Sunday Times 2018 Sept. 18; pp. 1-2.
  102. Ou gesigte. Beeld. 2019 June 22; p.16.
  103. Big Brother’s sinister reach needs to be restricted. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 9; p. 18.
  104. Use Special Tribunal as a tool to disinfect SA. The Star (Opinion). 2019 Feb. 26; p. 8.
  105. Goba N. Mapaila blasts public protector. Sowetan (News). 2019 June 27; p. 6.
  106. Makinana A, Hunter Q and Mokone T. Cyril foils Ace partly “coup”. Sunday Times. 2019 June 16; pp. 1-2.
  107. Stone S, Modjadji N. Cyril-vyande kap terug. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 April 14; p.1.
  108. Time to choose direction for a country that is undeniable at a crossroads. Sunday Times (Oinion). 2019 May 5; p. 18.
  109. Labuschagne P. Só kan ANC onttroon word. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 April 2; p. 6.
  110. Wie presies is dit wat baat by ‘n Cyril-stem? Rapport (Nuus). 2019 April 28; p. 2.
  111. Munusamy R. How Ace got his way on nominations. Sunday Times (News). 2019 June 23; p. 4.
  112. Msimang S. On hope and the death of nostalgia. Mail & Guardian (Comments).2019 June 28 to July 4; pp. 1-2.
  113. Tito shakes fist at SA taxpayers. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 25; p. 12.
  114. Don’t blame citizens for SA mess. The Citizen (Letters). 2019 July 29; p.13.
  115. Eskom bailout ups SA credit risk. Citizen (Business). 2019 July 25; p. 3.
  116. Speckman A. S&P ratings move ratchets up pressure on government. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Nov. 24; p. 10.
  117. Mthombothi B. ANC shows the middle finger in allowing Magashule room where he doesn’t belong. Sunday Times. 2019 June 23; p. 21.
  118. Joffe H. Mboweni’s joviality hides the grim truth. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Feb. 24; p. 2.
  119. De Lange J. Mboweni: ‘Besnoei salarisse, nie ander besteding’. Rapport (Sake). 2019 Aug. 25; p. 1.
  120. Saunderson-Meyer. W. Decoding Sona’s inkblots. Saturday Citizen (Opinion). 2019 June 22; p.12.
  121. Same Old Nothing Address. Saturday Citizen (Opinion). 2019 June 22; p.13.
  122. Joffe H. Sona, yet so far: straight talk but wobbly walk. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 June 23; p. 9.
  123. Narrain A. ‘Soos kondome weggegooi’. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 June 22; p. 2.
  124. Alberts T. Jonges moet met oplossings kom. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 June 16; p. 4.
  125. Seery B. A pain in the royal butt. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 29; p. 12.
  126. Derby R. Prudence, not populism, must rule in manifesto season. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Jan. 20; p. 2.
  127. Kgosana C. The manifest failures of the ANC’s manifesto are all around us. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Jan. 20; p. 17.
  128. Gqubule D. How many jobless people will it take? Business Day (Opinion). 2019 May 28; p. 7.
  129. Makgetla N. Jobs malaise due much more than bad governance. Business Day (Opinion). 2019 May 28; p. 7.
  130. Time to dream before the real hard work starts. Saturday Citizen (Letters)). 2019 June 22; p.13.
  131. Van der Walt S. Sien ‘superstad’ as ‘n simbool. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 June 22; p. 5.
  132. Willemse. R. Jeug moeg vir fiksie oor werkskepping. Beeld (By). 2019 June 22; p. 2.
  133. Mkhwanazi S. Who’s going to stop the gaps? Saturday Star. 2019 June 22; p 7.
  134. Calland R. Ramaphosa’s in control. Saturday Star (Opinion). 2019 June 22; p. 8.
  135. Mashele P. Ramaphosa is blocking progress through his dour appointments. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 July 29; p. 13.
  136. President who dared to dream. Saturday Star (Comments). 2019 June 22; p. 8.
  137. Hlatshaneni S. Cyril sees SA in Business terms. Saturday Citizen. 2019 June 22; p. 5.
  138. Hlatshaneni S. President knows what must be done. Saturday Citizen. 2019 June 22; p. 5.
  139. A nation in crisis needs a remedy. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 June 20; p. 10.
  140. Munusamy R. No leadership to undo damaging anti-SA sentiment. Sowetan (Analysis). 2019 Sept. 11; p. 11.
  141. Van der Walt S. ‘Tree op soos ‘n diplomat!” Beeld (Nuus). 2019 June 22; p. 4.
  142. Mkhwanazi S. Pandor reprimands Zindzi Mandela over tweets. Saturday Star. 2019 June 22; p. 7.
  143. The end of Zindzi’s term may have driven tirade. City Press (News). 2019 June 23; p. 2.
  144. De Lange J. Zindzi Mandela se termyn straks nie hernu. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 June 23; p. 2.
  145. De Lange J. Pandora aan Zindi: Jy het perk ever oorskry. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 June 23; p. 3.
  146. Halt descent to hateful society. City Press. 2019 June 30; p. 21.
  147. Ritchie K. Pandor has the onerous task of damage control. Saturday Star. 2019 June 22; p. 8.
  148. Madonsela T. Confronting the past City Press. 2019 June 30; p. 3.
  149. For whom the bell told in SA politics. Saturday Star (Opinion). 2019 July 13; p. 8.
  150. Naki E. Koloane on thin ice? Saturday Citizen. 2019 July 13; p. 5.
  151. Sodi T. Why we are angry. City Press. 2019 June 30; p. 3.
  152. Om vir almal se regte op te kom, śo bou ‘n mens. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Nov. 24; p. 2.
  153. Boonzaaier D. Duarte sê ANC is rassisties. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Nov. 24; p. 6.
  154. Naki E. Breakaway party on CR17 agenda? The Citizen (News). 2019 July 25; p. 4.
  155. Don’t believe end justifies the means. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 23; p.12.
  156. Wyngaard H. Om moeilikheid te koop.  Beeld (Middelblad). 2019 July 4; p. 21.
  157. Wa Afrika M, Rampedi P. Ramaphosa ‘misled’ Parliament. Sunday Independent. 2019 June 9; pp. 1-2.
  158. Cele S, Masuabi Q and Rooi J. ‘Niks fout’ met R440 m. Rapport. 2019 July 2019; pp.1-2.
  159. Hunter Q, Munusamy R. Cyril’s R400m time bomb. Sunday Times. 2019 June 23; p. 2.
  160. Saloojee F. Protector must probe all parties’ donations. The Citizen (Letters). 2019 Aug. 22; p. 13.
  161. Naki E. Ramaphosa in hot seat. The Citizen (News). 2019 Aug. 22; p. 7.
  162. De Lange J. CR17-geld vir salarisse gebruik. Rapport (News). 2019 Aug. 12; p. 2.
  163. Casualties of PP’s CR17 stray bullet. The Star (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 21; p. 8.
  164. Shoba S. Money a problem in the ANC – ACE. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 12.
  165. Marrian N. Bill aims to quash covert party funding. Mail & Guardian (News). 2019 Aug. 30 to Sept. 5; p. 6.
  166. Naki E. ‘Declare party funding’. The Citizen (News). 2019 Oct. 2; p. 5.
  167. Mavuso S, Ndaba B. CR17 snares more politicians. The Star (Metro). 2019 Aug. 19; p. 2.
  168. Mavuso S. Law firm denies it got CR17 R1.5m. The Star (Nation). 2019 Aug. 21; p. 7.
  169. Maughan K. Ledwaba seals Cyril’s bank records. Sowetan (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 5.
  170. Wa Africa M, Rampedi P, Ngoepe K. More CR17 campaign skeletons. The Star. 2019 Aug. 19; p. 1.
  171. Friedman D. Daily Maverick did not get paid to punt Ramaphosa – editor. The Citizen (News). 2019 Aug; p. 13.
  172. Dlamini P. Ramaphosa maintains he was in the dark until…Sowetan (News). 2019 Aug. 6; p. 4.
  173. Madisa K. Ramaphosa not ready to disclose his donors. Sowetan (News). 2019 Aug. 13; p. 4.
  174. Msomdi A. Ramaphosa must come clean if his New Dawn is to be a reality. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 6; p. 13.
  175. Rooi J. E-posse weerlê Cyril se Cr17-storie. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Aug. 4; p. 2.
  176. Rooi J. Die ANC sal nooit verander, beloof Ace in Parys. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 April 28; p. 2.
  177. Jika T. Mkhwebane has done it again. Mail & Guardian (News). 2019 June 14 to 20; p. 3.
  178. Makhanya M. Populists on your stoep. City Press (Voices). 2019 June 9; p. 2.
  179. Hlatshaneni S. ‘Cough up for the poor’. The Citizen (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 3.
  180. Friedman D. ‘Her head must roll’. The Citizen (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 3.
  181. Busi poster not us – ANC. The Citizen (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 3.
  182. Stone S, Cele S. Cyril gears up for war. City Press. 2019 June 30; pp. 1-2.
  183. Majoko S. Busi not in political office. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 13; p.12.
  184. Hunter Q. Top lawyers take on protector. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Aug. 11; p. 4.
  185. Kgosana C. ‘I shouldn’t have to pay’. Sunday Times. 2019 Aug. 4; pp. 1,4.
  186. Enslin-Payne S. Worse news follow bad, and don’t look to business or state. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Aug. 4; p. 2.
  187. 1Versluis JM. OB bedrywig op Twitter. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Aug. 4; 2.
  188. Ongeag wat, OB is op ’n kontrak. Rapport (Nuus) 2019 Aug. 4; p. 2.
  189. Kgosana C; Played with a straight bat. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March 24; p. 12
  190. Political leadership matters. City Press (Voices). 2019 June 30; p. 2..
  191. Essop P. OB swyg oor verslag. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 June 10; p. 2.
  192. Sokutu B. Cyril needs to come clean. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 25; p. 12.
  193. Micheal J. Protector a disaster from day one. The Citizen (Letters). 2019 July 25; p. 13.
  194. Calland R. Getting rid of Mkhwebane won’t be easy. Mail & Guardian. 2019 July 26 to August 1; p. 23.
  195. Munusamy R. The protection racket. Sunday Times (Insight). 2019 Aug. 4; pp. 13-14.
  196. Marrian N. Office of the public protector must not be captured. Mail & Guardian. 2019 June 14 to 20; p. 30.
  197. Mkhwanazi S. Former public protector calls for cool heads in the office. Sunday Independent (Nation). 2019 June 9; p. 9.
  198. Munusamy R. Madonsela ‘helped to prep Zuma for top job’. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March 24; p. 5.
  199. Nelana B. The white economic class undermines the Madiba legacy that protects it. Sunday Times (Opinion) 2019 Feb. 3; p. 20.
  200. Mthombothi B. One year on, it’s high time Ramaphosa stepped out of Zuma’s grim shadow. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Feb. 3; p. 19.
  201. Tabane JJ. Crack down on the crooks in private and public sectors. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 February 3; p. 20.
  202. Phasha P. Why the terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry into PIC must be extended to investigate Ramaphosa and Manual. /https:// blackopinion.co.za/2019/01/08/ terms-reference-commission-inquiry-pic-must-extended-investigate-bramaphosa-manuel/#/
  203. Speckman A. How to ruin an SOE: take a politician on board”. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 March 10; p. 9.
  204. Paton C. PIC directors told recoup Ayo billions.  Business Day. 2019 Feb. 26; pp.1-2.
  205. Thompson W. Gungubele questions way PIC dealt with allegations. Business Day. 2019 Feb. 26; p. 2.
  206. Maughan K. Siu to seek Ramaphosa nod to probe Bosasa claims. Business Day. 2019 Feb. 26; p. 2.
  207. Wood E. ‘Ayo-transaksie het al die reëls oortree’. Beeld (Sake). 2019 Feb. 26; p. 11.
  208. Eaton T. A-Z of Droscars – from Agrizzi to Zondo. Business Day 2019 February 26; p. 8/
  209. Boonzaaier D. Manuel vra hof: Keer EFF om laster te versprei. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 April 21; p. 8.
  210. Munusamy R. Zondo inquiry is more harrowing for witnesses than the perpetrators, who are living comfortably abroad or will be back as MPs. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March 17; p. 28.
  211. Qobo M. Does Ramaphosa have the gumption to bring the ANC out of its turpitude? Sunday Times. 2019 March 10; p. 19.
  212. Moalusi R. Don’t hold your breath for Zuma resumption. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 19; p. 14.
  213. Pather R. Impimpi accusations are ‘reckless’. Mail &Guardian. 2019 February 22 to 28; p. 9.
  214. Msimang S. On hope and the death of nostalgia. Mail & Guardian (Comments). 2019 June 28 to July 4; pp.1-2.
  215. Bruce P. It’s all about saving the country, stupid. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March, 17; p.16.
  216. Mabena S, Mokgoba A. ‘Land issue is stalled.’ The Citizen (News). 2019 July 25; p. 6.

 

PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.