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Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (13: Violence and Crime)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (13: Violence and Crime)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Analyst, confidence, desperate, expropriation, journalist, perspective, political party, traumatised, violence.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 4

1. Background

In 1973 the American ex-Mafia boss Vincent Teresa1 revealed in his book: “My Life in the Mafia”, how the Mafia ruthlessly ‘whack out’ their enemies; how film stars and singers are snared by the mob; how the mob infiltrates big business; how the mob steals countless millions of dollars and makes millions of dollars through almost every conceivable crime; how to fix a horse race or corrupt a cop; how to be a top money-maker; how the mobsters live, and what their fatal weaknesses are; and how it is to live in hiding under constant armed guard with a half-million dollar price on your head from the mob for whistle-blowing by an ex-gangster. Citing the dangers and excesses of organised crime , from their numbers to their actions, etc., to serve as a warning that the same can happen anywhere else in the “good” outside world, is far too late for crime-stricken South Africa. Teresa states:1:295-296

Crime families can vary in size. In New York, Gambino had maybe a thousand made men; in our family in New England we had a hundred and fifty. Between New Jersey and New York you might have two thousand five hundred people. In the whole country [USA], there is probably six thousand five hundred. But these are just the made men, remember. There are another two hundred to three hundred thousand mob guys working for the made guys. Nothing gives the mob a bigger laugh than when some expert says the mob is nothing to worry about because there are only six thousand members. Hell, behind those six thousand you’ve got a whole army, not counting all the people who aren’t Italian but who work with the mob.

These Sicilian Mafiosi will run into a wall, put their head in a bucket of acid for you if they’re told to, not because they’re hungry but because they’re disciplined. They’ve been brought up from birth over there to show respect and honour, and that’s what these punks over here don’t have. Once they’re told to get someone, that person hasn’t a chance. They’ll get him if they have to bust into his house in the middle of the night, shoot him, bite him, eat him, suck the blood out of his throat. They’ll get him because they were told to do it.

The above scenario does not seem strange to South Africans living in informal settlements, neglected suburbs and other areas out of the ordinary public’s eyes, or those reading the daily newspapers or listening to the news on radio or following the many television broadcasts of the Zondo commission. Here, we have the same mafia behaviour and inclinations which have become ingrained in the actions of some of the ANC’s top leaders in committing serious crimes, varying from state capture, election manipulation, to murder. We see various kinds of uncontrolled crime, present all over the country, especially from 1994 with the advent of the so-called “first democracy” in South Africa. What differs between the USA and the SA crime scenes, making the situation here much worse than in the USA, is that the American prosecution authorities act constructively and are locking up crooks constantly. However, as the Zondo commission under the guidance of an excellent judge revealed, the many culprits that seem mostly to be part of the ANC’s inner circle are able to get away with their crimes and corruption as the prosecution authorities demonstrate an outright failure to bring these perpetrators to book.

The example of Teresa’s whistle-blowing in the USA presented us with an excellent outcome: 27 top-ranking Mafiosi were jailed in America, while many more had been indicted or charged. Teresa himself was jailed for twenty years for his criminal activities before being paroled. Here in South Africa whistle-blowers are harassed, taken to court for libel and slander by the crooks who committed crimes and who are still walking free under the ANC’s safety-net, while other whistle-blowers are being murdered. The ANC’s policy’s is that if you are not found guilty before a court and have not be sentenced for an alleged crime, you are free to serve in the ANC’s highest positions. That policy includes awaiting the outcome of an appeal so you are considered not guilty until the court comes to a final verdict and thus that you may stay on untouched and comfortable in your position as lawmaker. The ANC list of 22 tainted candidates for the May 2019 elections and the positioning of some of these tainted ANCs later to senior posts in Parliament, confirm this policy very well. Jacob Zuma has been staying out of jail now for years, based on appeal on appeal against his alleged crimes in the arms deal, while the ANC’s top structure was also let off and walking free by the now disgraced Sereti commission.2-5

In this article the presence of crime — especially violence, gangsterism and related phenomena — and how it has infiltrated society and even the statutory institutions under the mandate of the ANC, will be reflected, evaluated and described.

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 12)

Article 13 is a continuation of the previous article (Article 12, titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity)”. This article, with the focus on violence and crime, is in sequence with articles 11 (Introduction) and 12 (Prosperity) already published on the ANC. The intention is also to analyse and to discuss further the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC to effect land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.2. Aims of article 13 (Continued from Article 12)

The primary intention of this project on the ANC) is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by specifically describing the profile of the ANC on the same basis as was done with Article 9 on the EFF and Article 10 on the DA.

Once more, we aim to evaluate the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of the mandate as ruler it received during the election of 8 May 2019.

2. Method (Continued from Article 12)

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to engage in successful land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources have been consulted to assess and to describe the facts that must guide us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to effect successful land reform from 2019 onwards.

The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

The manifestos, self-descriptions and public referees of the ANC were already reflected, evaluated and described in Article 11 (Introduction). The public referees of the African National Congress will further be reflected, evaluated and described in the under-mentioned division 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019.

3.2. Louw Appraisal Checklist

The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,6 will again be used for the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC. The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good classification, were again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s’ manifesto and  the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts, and interpreted as the researcher sees fit.6

3.3 The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 12)

3.3.1. South African violence and related crimes

One of the criteria of a failed state is the inability of a regime to guarantee and assure prosperity. Another one of the criteria for a good regime is to guarantee the presence and maintenance of law and order for its people, and thus to assure a peaceful society free from any crime, especially violence.

Undoubtedly South Africa has become a crime-ridden country, especially over the last two decades. Crime, in its broadest form, is totally out of control. It is practised on the highest levels by some members of our so-called political elite. The various judicial commissions, prominently the Zondo commission, bring this reality under our attention daily where it is alleged that certain top ANCs and their cronies stole millions of rand from the state, where murder in the form of assassinations to silence whistle-blowers is a common phenomenon, and where there is an almost complete lack of an effective prosecution system to punish criminals and murders.

South Africa is today a country of crooks without a single cowboy and a sheriff. If there is any doubt about the present-day South Africa being a gangster state and thus a failed constitutional state, just read the books of Adriaan Basson2, Pieter du Toit2, Pieter Myburgh5 and Jacques Pauw7. Through the mass penetration of crime in their daily dealings some of the political elite have become the South African Mafiosi, counting today nearly as many as Teresa’s1 thousands of Mafiosi in America. Unlike in America, the Mafiosi here are only partly friends with the politicians: many a time they are the politicians themselves. With such an official example it must thus not be a surprise that the practise of crime by some factions of society has become a common lifestyle.1,2,5,7

Crime takes various forms, from common theft, stealing, embezzlement, up to the most extreme form that should be punishable by hanging: Violence. Violence is central today in South Africa as the creator of poverty, political instability, inequality, as well as social, emotional and psychological traumas and despondency. It also tells us why prosperity is absent here. It plays a signifcant role in our country’s service-delivery unrest and the unstoppable chronic anarchy. The immense presence of violence in South African is well indicated by Bawa8 when he writes8:17: “South Africa is one of the most violent countries in the world”. But this violence is not experienced or observed at the same level by all the citizens; meaning that the middle and higher socio-economic groups, living and working in the better-off areas with good security systems, are mostly spared the extreme experience of daily rape, murder, robbery, etc. Predominantly, most sufferers of violence are the poor Blacks living in temporary shelters in isolated areas and informal settlements engulfed by crime and violence, far away from the security of the SAPS safety-net. But today the intensity of crime is spreading also to more developed areas and the poorer suburbs.8-10

Furthermore, it is clear that the statistics on violence and crime are understated, making the violence experienced by the poor far more comprehensive and in-depth than the general public realises. Their living conditions reflect not prosperity but utter adversity and hardship. What makes this crime condition so devastating, as well as a political pressure cooker waiting to explode, is the hard fact that nearly 30 million South Africans are poor, lacking sufficient housing accommodation, healthcare, basic education, work, and most of all not knowing when they or their children are going to be robbed, assaulted or murdered. Visible policing is mostly absent in those poor areas that are sheltering people marred by devastating life conditions that they can neither control nor are responsible for. These unfortunate people have been the forgotten, faceless ones for many years. They are people who are sometimes not only the ones to be robbed, assaulted and murdered, but who have in time become themselves robbers, attackers and murderers to survive in their dark, criminalised world. Some have an uncle, a nephew or brother as a parliamentarian but these have unfortunately forgotten them and their own homeland-past long ago because most politicians become with time blind and deaf to the outside world:  they live their lives ensconced in luxury and abundance.8-10

South Africa’s crime and violence, also as a barometer of the ANC regime as a failed government, will in the various next subdivisions be comprehensively described and be evaluated.

3.3.1.1. Western Cape

Even a cursory glance at South African media, persuades one that gangsterism and other crime-related activities such as the drug trade, theft, unrest, serious violence like assault, rape and murder, have taken over the Cape Flats of the Western Cape. It is not a sudden phenomenon, but a gradual development that has been gaining momentum over the last decade or two. It clearly betrays the ANC national government’s failure to maintain primary governmental structures. Prominent among these failures, must be counted the progressive downward spiral as to the quality of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and its ability to ensure daily crime prevention. It portends a very negative future for especially the poor living in the informal settlements as well as the lower-level socio-economic suburbs. The main sufferers and victims are Blacks, including the Coloureds. The immense long-term criminality in the Cape Flats is well reflected by the entrenched establishment of well-armed gangs, such as the Destruction Boys, which have become “armies” in their their own right. Organised, as well as common crime, associated with a very high murder rate, forced the ANC-regime to order the return of the South African National Defence Force (SADF) to the Cape Flats in July 2019. During the so-called Operation Prosper, the SADF was supposed to render assistance to the failed SAPS in areas identified as crime-ridden hotspots on the Cape Flats. (The “Cape Flats” is the collective name for a poverty-stricken, gang-infested area of more or less 25km between east and west, stretching from Bellville in the north, Blue Downs in the east, Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain in the south to Gugulethu. It totals 11 townships, including the places Lavender Hill, Bishop Lavis, the Steenberg district, Manenberg, Delft, Marcus Garvey, Elsiesrevier, Nyanga, Khayelitsha, Mfuleni, Philippi and Kraaifontein.9,11-17

But what is often overlooked, is that crimes such as gansterism and violence are permanent features of a society in peril and caught in social and economic instability, which is a direct result of South Africa’s poor governance over many years. The almost pathological conditions in the West Cape has seemingly been unknown to the ANC leadership since 1994. It is a situation of which the roots have so far never been addressed by government besides treating the symptoms so as to get the “fever down without healing the illness”. Four years ago the same kind of experiment in intervention was execited when the SADF was used in Operation Fiela, in cooperation with the SAPS, the South African Revenue Service (SARS), Home Affairs and a plethora of other state departments to raid, search and arrest anyone who did not have a reasonable explanation for anything in his/her possession. The immense criminality already established, and basically left untreated from 2014 to 2015, apart from ordinary law enforcement in 3 205 operations, is reflected by the official data in December 2015 when Operation Fiela began to be wrapped up. The data reflect: 41 000 arrests, the recovery of 737 vehicles, confiscation of 375 firearms and 10 homemade firearms. In 2018 Fiela Two was launched again, but seemingly without success. The present hopeless failure by the ANC regime to combat the immense criminality in the Western Cape and the need to activate the emerging use of the SADF, has forced the Police minister Bheki Cele to describe it as a “national effort to combat gangsterism in South Africa”. (This description applies one hundred present to the country’s gangsterism in general, but also specifically to its Parliament, its SAPS and many state enterprises where corruption is seemingly well entrenched).9,11-13,15-18

It seems that the SADF interventions since 2014, as well as the SAPS’s constant presence in the problematic Cape Flats since 1994, have never brought successes; the present ongoing criminal situation in the Western Cape confirms it. Although Fiela One did not bring much bloodshed on the side of the criminals, experts warn that the “Cape Criminality” is a deep-seated phenomenon that has developed over many years. It must be seen in terms of the active unrest and anarchy which have spread all over the country since 1994.  From a security perspective, it seems already to have moved into chronic anarchy, a phenomenon which the ANC regime either does not understand or ignores outright because they do not have the skills and ability to address it. This opinion is strengthened by the ANC’s poor fighting of criminality since 1994 and encouragement to engage in serious crime that the greater society may draw, given the bad example set by the ANC’s own law-makers, some of whom some were jailed for serious offences. Many other ANC law-makers and politicians are serious offenders too, but find themselves still outside jail because they have so far not been prosecuted by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).17,19

The fact that the ANC never took the Cape Flats crime issue seriously, is becoming more and more evident because it is a regime that still lives inside its old culture of lawlessness and disorder, coming from its pre-1994 days as a terrorist-revolutionary organisation. Ritchie19 aptly named it “real-politik at play”. Ritchie19 and Fokazi29 mention that, in light of the ANC’s neglect of the Cape Flats crime issue and their failure to do an in-depth analysis of the causes and to implement prevention and healing, the warning signs are there that Cape Town risks becoming the world’s most dangerous city.19,20

Hyman21 postulates that in reality Cape Town is already the world’s most dangerous city when he aligned its statistics with the world’s — until recently — most dangerous city: Caracas in Venezuela. The same author21 mentions that according to the Cape’s Citizen Council for Public Safety and Criminal Justice, which compiled a listing from official global statistics, Caracas was in 2017 the world’s murder capital with 3 387 murders. Hereto Cape Town’s death-by-murder rate rose from the 15th place in 2017 to the 11th place (with a growth of 15%) in 2018. Now, in 2019, if the body count is maintained in Cape Town with 3 900, Caracas is left far behind. Looking at the analysis of murders per 100 000 people, the rate for Cape Town of approximately 97.3 per 100 000 so far for the first four months of 2019, would propel it into the fourth place for 2018 on the global list where all the top cities in the top 10 are situated in Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil which are all at the centre of the international drug trade, reports Hyman21. A short analysis for 2019 for Cape Town by Hyman21 shows that the murders in the first four months of 2019 were 10.66 per day, while the number of murders between the three days of June 1 and June 3 were 62. The percentage rise in admissions of murdered victims to the Salt River mortuary so far this year has been 46%, while the projected murders for 2019 is 3 893 if the rate of killings continues.21

Other statistics are there to confirm Hyman’s21 labelling of Cape Town as the “World’s most dangerous city”. In May 2019 there were 331 murders in the Western Cape; in the month of June 2019 there were 448 murders in Cape Town (against the 344 murders of June 2018); in the first week of June 2019, 14 people were shot dead within 24 hours in Delft; on 5 July 2019 six women were shot and killed in the Marcus Garvey areas of Philippi in Cape Town, while on 6 July 2019 five men were also killed in the same area. On the weekend of 5 to 7 July 2019, 55 people were murdered in the greater Cape Town area. This year (over the last six months), 2 000 people have been killed so far in gang-related incidents in the Cape. Between January and June 2019 (six months) more than 44 people were killed in Bonteheuwel. The 2018/2019 SAPS report shows that in Nyanga, 289 people were murdered, followed by Delft with 247 murders and Khayelitsha with 221 murders.14,18-24

What the Cape Flats saga further reflects is the killing of persons under 30 years of age mainly, prompting Pinnock15 to call it “a war against young people”. What has been overlooked by the ANC’s bigwigs since their taking political power in 1994, is that most of the youth in the Cape Flats (as in most of the other socio-economically disturbed South African areas) grew up without supportive families, with poor education and no formal employment prospects (there are more or less 350 000 young people under 25 years outside education in the Cape). Many are adolescents who are victims of complex historical conditions, not of their own making, which are mixed into an inflammatory setup wherein Apartheid’s relocations, present-day migration and high levels of alcohol and drug abuse, play a prominent role.15

Looking at the monthly crime statistics, one finds that almost 1 300 murder victims arrived at the Cape Town mortuaries between January and April 2019, while between 1 November 2018 and 30 April 2019 (six months) a total of 1 875 people were murdered in the greater Western Cape. According to figures from Professor Lorna Martin20, head of forensic pathology in the Western Cape, by the end of April 2019 the city’s mortuaries in Tygerberg and Salt River handled 1 280 murder victims, with more than 50% having been shot. Martin20 states to Fokazi20 of the Sowetan that the region’s mortuaries (which can already not cope with the inflow of bodies — in such a way that bodies have to be stored in refrigerator shipping containers) are further overstretched by the storage of more incoming murdered bodies.14,19,20

Martin20, on the undercapacity of the mortuaries, responds as follows20:6: “Even though this is new [the R281-million Observatory mortuary] and we are moving in, it’s already not big enough. With the increase [in the amount of murders] that we’ve had lately, I don’t think we will cope.”

The names of Delft’s so-called “townships” (consisting in total of 500 000 residents), varying from “Blikkiesdorp”, “Tin-Can Town”, the “Hague” (the so-called “Bishopscourt” of Delft) to “Symphony Way” (where most of the evicted people find a “home”), reflect well the criminal and social disorder there. When Hyman25 writes as follows of “Symphony Way”, his description is fully applicable to all of the many “camps” around Cape Town where the city’s outcasts are forced to live and hope not to get murdered25:6:

It’s a place of constant waiting. An internment camp that represents the worst of apartheid’s legacy and the failure of the new governments to deal with it.

Pastor Ray McCauley26, president of the Rhema Family Churches and co-chair of the National Religious Leaders Council, put the situation as follows26:6: “Residents say enough is enough”. He said that 308 people were killed in June 2019 at the Cape of which 139 were shot and 118 stabbed.

In this regard, the editor18 of the Sowetan writes on the nonchalant attitude and lack of concern of South Africans as to what has happened concerning the number of murders at the Cape Flats over the last six months (with 1 875 murders) and the presence of immense crime and violence all over South Africa18:12:

That is a huge number of deaths in just six months but there was no outrage in SA, we carried on with our lives as if nothing had happened. This is the kind of news that would have made headlines every day in other countries until police were seen to be doing something to ensure the safety of innocent citizens.

The essentially permanent breakdown of law and order in the so-called “Cape Flats”, which Ritchie19 describes appositely as “a war zone run by crooks and murderers”, is primarily because the ANC regime failed to bring prosperity to the inhabitants in the form of good training, work opportunities and a safe environment. Instead, they have left the area on its own to struggle on haphazardly. This is a situation which Ritchie19 summarises as follows19:8: “What is happening in Cape Town, what has been allowed to develop on the forgotten and dumped communities of the Cape Flats, has to be a crime against humanity.” How much the ANC failed in the Cape Flats to bring prosperity to the citizens and how the present setup was allowed to deteriorate as a result of the ANC’s poor policing and law-enforcement, as well as corruption in the SAPS, is described by Watson17 as follows17:4: “Gangsters there are unafraid of fighting back as evidenced by the shooting of six police anti-gang unit members in June [2019].”

3.2.1.2. Violence is countrywide

But we must not be fooled to think that the Cape Flats represents an extraordinary, singular “bad” situation and place. Countrywide, crime has been created and maintained by the ANC regime’s poor governance since 1994. Just listen to Cyril Ramaphosa’s own confession in his speech during the state of the nation debate in June 2019 when he mentioned that the anti-gang unit was transferred to national control by police minister Bheki Cele because “hooliganism (gangsterism) is spreading across the country”.

McCauley26 describes the chaos of the constant murder-spree in South Africa at present well when he writes26:6:

The Western Cape is not the only province suffering from the violence. Throughout the country we are hearing of horrific stories where people are hijacked or robbed at gunpoint and their possessions taken.

According to the SAPS, there were 20 336 murders in South Africa, between April 2017 and March 2018, showing a 7% increase from the previous year.

This puts the country’s murder rate at close 36 people murdered per 100 000 of the population – with Cele [Minister of Police Bheki Cele] noting that 57 people are being murdered each day.

Crime in all its forms are indeed present and very active in the country, reflecting a country spinning out of control under the ANC regime. During its reign it has failed to improve the country’s infrastructure, economy and law and order, besides responding time after time by only implementing short-term crime interventions. The overview of Makhetha23 and Marupeng23 of an overwhelmingly crime-beset South Africa, based on the SAPS report for 2018/2019, is very informative, but shocking. They pinpointed Gauteng as a specific point of concern and write that the area of Ivory Park outside Tembisa remains one of the most dangerous areas in South Africa to live in: it recorded the highest number of house robberies with 373 (an increase of 52). The second was the Honeydew area (consisting of Northriding, Strydom Park and Randpark Ridge) with 329 house robberies (a decrease of 31), while Orange Farm (south of Johannesburg) reflects the highest number of rapes, 226. This statistic makes it the most dangerous area for women in the country. Regarding the number of murders committed, Johannesburg Central and its immediate surroundings areas remained the top murdering spot: 123 murders for 2019 against the 93 of 2018 (an increase of 30). In the second spot for high-murder areas are respectively Hillbrow and Jeppe with 111 cases each.23,24

The violent-crime behaviour and other disorders in the northern areas of Port Elizabeth which include Bethelsdorp, have been many years in the making. It has been, like most other crime-infected areas in the country, left essentially unattended by the ANC regime since 1994. In 2018, there was an SAPS intervention, but it was withdrawn later. On the prevalence of the uncontrolled murdering and other serious violent crimes in this area, Sain27 reports that with the SAPS intervention some results were obtained for a short while. Since May 2019 it has started to escalate again, leaving so far this year already 117 people murdered.27 This chaos, or lack of law and order, is well described by Sain27 when he writes27:8: “Impeccable sources say that in the last five months the Gelvandale Mortuary has recorded more than 100 gunshot wound related deaths.” The situation is now so serious that the inhabitants of the northern areas of Port Elizabeth have also started to plead for SADF intervention to safeguard them in some way.27

The presence of serious violent crimes countrywide is also reflected by the murder statistics showing the highest number of murders recorded at the top-30 police stations: Western Cape occupied 10 spots, Gauteng had eight spots and KwaZulu-Natal six spots.24

The 2018/2019 SAPS data28 reveal the following crime statistics countrywide: 21 022 murders (686 more than 2018 or a 3.4% increase), sexual offences increased by 4.6% (2 312 cases, bringing them to a total of 52 420), attempted murder increased by 4.1% (747cases) with 18 980 cases for 2019, common robbery increased by 2% to 51 765 reported cases and farm murders declined from 62 in 2018 to 47 in 2019.28

The latest SAPS statistics (2018/2019) reflects a rise in the reporting of crimes against women from 172 961 to 177 620, with a decline of 5.4% in the murders of women: 2 930 to 2 771. Regarding the reporting of crimes against children, the crimes decline from 43 842 to 43 540.  In this regard, 1 014 children were murdered, reflecting an increase from 985. The rate of sexual offences against women decreased by 0.4% to 36 597. There was an increase in sexual offences against children: 3.8%, to reflect 24 387 children affected. In total, general sexual offences has increased by 4.6 % to reach 52 420 offences (2 312 more). Sexual offences have reduced by over 10 000 cases since the 2009/2010 reporting year. On official rape-reporting stats, Gareth Newham30, head of the Justice and Violence Prevention programme at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), said that on average only one out of nine rape cases is reported, while in some communities it can be as low as one out of 22. Only between 4% and 8% of all rape reporting leads to sentencing).29-31

These SAPS statistics reports that children, affected by their daily lived environment of crime,  themselves joined the stream of murderers: out of 21 022 murders as many as 736 people were killed by children (Eastern Cape : 231, Western Cape: 170), while many of the children killed were victims of other children. In the same way, 4 196 common assaults were committed by  children.24,30,32

The ubiquitous presence of uncontrolled violent crime, intertwined with the constant growth of broad criminality in South Africa, is also evidenced by the call on 19 July 2019 by the DA for more specialised anti-gang units in the Gauteng Province. the presence of uncontrolled gang violence in the province was revealed in the research report of GIATOC, namely Ending the Cycles of Violence, which was focussed on the two areas, Westbury and Eldorado Park. John Moodley33 of the DA emphasised that the ANC regime’s general failure to ensure good law and order via the SAPS in Gauteng, engendered the same kind of chaos through gang violence as in the Cape Flats and had led directly to the undermining of job creation, schooling, youth and community development, further exacerbating the incidence of violent crimes.33

Violent crimes and the breakdown of law and order countrywide, including property crime, are doing one main thing: limiting the growth of prosperity. Until now, it does not seem to be a negative phenomenon for the ANC regime.

A specific category of violent crime which is growing countrywide is kidnapping. The Gauteng annual provincial crime statistics revealed that 125 cases of kidnapping were reported in Kempton Park, reflecting a 14.7% increase (making it the kidnapping capital of South Africa) for the period 2018/2019. In total there were 530 cases of kidnapping in Gauteng, with Free State 511, Eastern Cape 468 and Western Cape 458. Statistics revealed that the predominant motives for kidnappings were for robbery, rape or sexual assault, hijacking, domestic violence and for ransom.30,34

The 2018/2019 statistics show that another category of violent crime that reflects an increase is robbery. Robbery with aggravating circumstances has increased by 1.2% to 140 032 cases (meaning 1 668 more) countrywide. (In this category is included hijackings, cash-in-transit robberies and robberies at commercial and residential properties). Common robbery increased by 2% to 51 765 cases and arson by 5.5% to 4 083 cases (with an increase of 214). There were 113 089 cases of malicious damage to property, reflecting an increase of 1.4% (1 597 cases). In total the contact crimes with a violent element, as listed above, increased by 2.6%.30,34

Gareth Newham30, who made the shocking revelation about the 2018/2019 SAPS report, said that these statistics were almost six months out of date (closing on March 31, 2019) and did not reflect the current spate of high-profile violent crimes reported since 1 April in the media. This means the picture on all kinds of crimes, included violence, can be much worse.30

3.3.1.2.1. Highway violence

Another confirmation that the ANC regime’s maintenance of law and order collapsed, is the overtaking of violent gangsterism of the country’s roads and highways.35,36 On 9 June 2019 Hosken and Singh35 wrote in the Sunday Times35:2: “Motorists have been warned to stay off the N3 between Johannesburg and Durban after dark”.

Why this warning? Because the deadly attacks on foreign truck drivers, which started more than a year ago, are surging.

Hosken and Singh35 report that according to the Police 74 trucks were burnt and damaged, with 50 vehicles torched on the highway since April 2018. In the past year 213 truck drivers were killed of whom 12 were foreigners. The financial loss of cargo and trucks amounts to R1.2-billion. Towhat extent the government failed to protect not only the life of citizens, but the economy, is well described by the CEO of the Road Freight Association (RFA), Gavin Kelly35, when he says35:2: “If the government doesn’t act swiftly against this anarchy, which has increased over the past seven months, with 40 trucks torched in three weeks, RFA will consider taking action, including stopping deliveries across the country.”

How extensive these N2, N3, N7 and other road anarchies have become (in some way equal in seriousness to the chronic anarchy and lawlessness on the Cape Flats), is the control by gangs of the roads by blocking them for up to a day without any intervention by the security services. The ANC regime is utterly silent on the matter.35,37 Hosken and Singh35 report on these various occasions when gangsters took over the roads, as follows35:2:

Between Sunday and Tuesday [beginning of June 2019], gangs searching for foreign truck drivers besieged towns across KwaZulu-Natal  and Mpumalanga , pulling vehicles off the roads in Ermelo, Piet Retief, Newcastle, Amsterdam and Bethal. Foreign drivers were forced to surrender their cargo and vehicles.

An Ermelo truck-stop owner, who asked not to be named as he feared further attacks, said 500 trucks had been ‘held hostage’ at the stopover by the All Truck Drivers Association (ATDA).

Slabbert36 and others37 listed the other roads under attack and described as dangerous, besides the N3, as the R59, R550, R101, N1, N2 and N7.36,37

The permitted anarchic blockade of trucks on the highways without formal police intervention and interference is reflected by the fact that one of the blockades at Van Reenen Pass lasted undisturbed for 24 hours. This result has led with good reason to speculation and allegations of a conspiracy between the truck-blockers and the ANC regime and its law-enforcement institutions. The spread of anarchy as alleged to be perpetrated by the ATDA and other so-called anti-foreign-truck-drivers groups, with very little response to these events by the ANC regime still propagating its illusory policy of South African Prosperity, is further confirmed by Hestony’s managing director, Etuan van der Westhuizen35, who reported six trucks burnt at the beginning of June 2019 in Johannesburg and Cato Manor. Trucking company owner Barend Groenewald was in ICU at the Worcester Mediclinic after his truck was set alight in Touws River in the Western Cape in May 2019. More informative on this road anarchy is the testimony of Claudia Carvalho35, the owner of Hawkeye Trucker Association (HTA) which safeguards trucks on roads with armed escorts. Carvalho35 called it the “Wild West” and said35:2: “…it was ‘complete madness’ on the N3. ‘The situation, which began to develop a year ago, was largely ignored and is now totally out of control’.

Advocate Pria Hassan38, spokesperson of the Positive Freight Solutions Forum, who took a strong stand against the ongoing truck violence, was forced to take safety measures to guard her and her family after serious threats. She reports38:1:

Ons lewe nou elke dag in vrees. Dit is ‘n nuwe soort wetteloosheid wat kan oorspoel na ander bedrywe as die regering nie dringend en daadwerklik ingryp om dit te voorkom nie.

But this truck anarchy is at present going on, intensified and is spreading out westwards from the Cape to attacks on the N7 near Piketberg, Moorreesburg and Piekenierskloofpas, while an attack was recently reported on the N2 near the Strand too. The Cape provincial spokesperson Kenny Africa37 said on the ongoing and intensified truck anarchy which the ANC regime clearly failed to curb37:9: “This can’t keep happening. It’s bad at the moment”. A response or statement of action by the ANC regime’s Transport minister Fikile Mbalula still outstanding.37

Looking at the passive reaction of the ANC-regime on the road anarchy so far, which puts union interests first above those of the country (as enforced by the unions’ seat in the tripartite government alliance), it seems that the ANC regime wants to solve the matter solely as a workplace issue (wherein the appointment of foreign drivers, amounting to only 15% of the total drivers occupies a central position), rather than taking criminal steps against the perpetrators for robbery and murder. The rule of law seems to be placed second to the importance of ongoing anarchy, racism and ethnicity, taking at face value the words of the Police-ministerial spokesperson, Reneliwe Sereo35, when he says35:2: “A workplace joint inspection task team, which is coordinated by the labour department and which consists of various government departments including the police, has been established.”

The extent of anarchy on the roads against specifically foreign truck drivers (motivated by xenophobia, but which the ANC regime sees as criminality, free from racism or ethnicity), and the SAPS’s passivity in intervening, is well illustrated by Du Plessis38 when he writes38:1: “Die polisie het in die verlede magteloos toegekyk terwyl vragmotors beskadig word.”

Again, featuring prominently, is the lack of any official announcement of danger to the general public and anarchy lurking, or the assurance that drastic law enforcement and pertinent policing will be introduced, or the offering of NPA results in the arrest and punishment of the culprits concerned. There is no sign of the constructive cleansing of the criminals from the country’s roads. What is clear, however, is a regime not in control of the country; a regime which is allowing the murderers of  213 truck drivers and the crooks who burnt 74 trucks and did damages to the amount to R1.2-billion, to get off the hook, in the same as the perpetrators of state captue did not get punished and got away with their stolen billions of rand. Further confirming this open tolerance of anarchy, racism, ethnicity, xenophobia and murder by the ANC regime without punishing the criminals, and thus a further reaffirmation that South Africa has an impotent regime in Parliament, unable to safeguard its citizens’ rights and safety, is the arrogant and challenging utterance by the head of ATDA, Sipho Zungu35, when he allegedly said to Hosken and Singh35:2:

We have no problem with foreign trucks coming to SA, rather with foreigners driving for South African companies. South African drivers and their families are starving. Children cannot be sent to school. South Africans are losing jobs to foreigners, who don’t only take our jobs but also our rights to protect jobs.

Slabbert36 points out the “political empowerment” and hostility of ATDA, as reflected by their demand that in future only ATDA members should be appointed as drivers and that foreigners should be fired and that truck owners must pay R350 per month to ATDA for each of its members employed. Slabbert36 writes on the masked threat to companies which dare to “disobey” the ATDA’s demands and extortion36:8: “Maatskappye wat nie hieraan voldoen nie, word gedreig met weerwraak en dat hul voertuie aan die brand gesteek sal word.”

The endangering of the drivers’ lives went so far that a truck company was forced to obtain a court order on 31 May 2019 in the High Court of KwaZulu-Natal which forbade the ATDA to attack or threaten its members. But as the recent attacks at the beginning of September 2019 confirm, the violence is continuing, more intense than ever and spreading all over the country.36,37

The above kind of remarks against the truck drivers and their employers by unions reflect racism, ethnicity, xenophobia and the sanctioning of the murder against foreigners, as well as wreaking massive damage on trucking firms. They are remarks which should be brought under the attention of the Council for Human Rights, as well as the SAPS and the NPA for drastic action.  The passivity of the ANC regime can rightfully be seen as in some way allowing or even supporting such crimes.39

Secondly, in addition, we find the remark of the secretary general of the National Truck Drivers Federation, Siphesihle Muthwa35, to Hosken and Singh35 when he said35:2: “…the issue would go away if ‘employers did the right thing’.” This is undoubtedly an open threat to the lives and property of truck owners which again needs the attention of the SAPS and the NPA to enforce the law.35

The anarchy in the long-distance trucking industry has another aspect, confirming again the lack of a stable government to ensure law and order. This entails robbing trucks of their valuable loads, as well as open theft from trucks on our roads. Slabbert36 reports36:8: “…op die N2-hoofweg tussen Oos-Londen en Kokstad waar vragmotors weens die kronkelende en heuwelagtige paaie so stadig as soos 30km/h ry, spring misdadigers op die vragmotors, sny die seile wat die vrag bedek oop en gooi die vrag af; 36:8: “… in Beaufort-Wes gebeur dit [stropery] sommer by die verkeersligte”; en36:8: “Belhamels gooi rotse van brûe op voertuie om hul tot stilstand te dwing sodat hulle die vrag kan steel”.

The utter failure of the ANC to instill law and order on the roads and the comprehensiveness and seriousness of the problem which is simply being ignored by the ANC leaders is described by Ehlers40 as follows40:10: “The shocking statistics regarding trucks and cargoes burnt within the past 12 months should long ago have been addressed as a national problem bordering on civil war.”

Looking at the chaos and anarchy in the trucking industry created by crooks and murderers, it must be clear for Ehlers40 that we do not have a national government to combat the country’s massive crime, especially violence. We have again been captured by a new kind of “Zuptas of the road”.

3.3.1.2.2. Railway anarchy and violence

The above road anarchy and violence are echoed by the similar railway anarchy and violence. South Africa has suffered many arson attacks on the rail system over many years. It specifically started in the Western Cape and has spread gradually to become a countrywide phenomenon. It  cost the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa) and Transnet  close to a billion rand, with 1 496 rail carriages destroyed. Virtually not a single arrest for the 2017/2018 financial year of the was made by the SAPS.41,42

Pijoos43 refers to the chaotic conditions pertaining to the country’s railway system, on which millions of the poor are dependent for their daily travel to work, schools, shops, hospitals, etc., as43:9: “Stranded commuters, lengthy delays, stolen railway tracks, deadly train crashes and burning coaches — this the state of the country’s railway system”.

Including in this failure is the railway infrastructure, which is itself broken. Besides arson, there is immense vandalism of railway property. A recent cellphone video showed the George Goch station in Johannesburg being stripped of copper cables, windows, doors and even the roof covering within two days during a strike of railway policement. It seems, as with all the other schemes of the ANC regime that have collapsed, that it does not have a long-term solution. On the whole, it does not seem as if the ANC regime cares about the deterioration of South Africa’s railway infrastructure. When it becomes a headache, the ANC-regime, through sporadic, insignificant efforts, addresses the chaos it created by means of a superficial short-term approach, treating the “symptoms without the underlying causes”. For instance, in an effort to “handle” the violence and arson on their trains, Prasa’s short-term solution was the launching of the so-called “railway enforcement unit” whereby about 100 officers were deployed to ensure the safety of trains in the Cape Town area. The input was insignificant and nothing else than political window-dressing: it was only a trickle to rescue the railways.43

How serious the situation is for Prasa (Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa), seen from an economic viewpoint, is reflected by its 2017-2018 annual report. Pijoos43, after studying the report, warns on 10 July 2019 that the long-distance passenger train service of Prasa was declining to lower than acceptable levels. Pijoos43 reflects on the Prasa-report as follows43:9:

Passengers have dropped from 2.8-million in 2009-2010 to 465,647 [19%] in 2017-2018, while trains run have dropped from 6,604 to 1,770 [30%]. Both trains run and passenger patronage have dropped drastically at a rate indicative of a service that has totally collapsed.

3.3.1.3. Extraordinary violent crimes

More recently two further forms of violent crime have broken out country-wide, namely 1) violence against women and children (gender violence); and 2) violent crime against foreigners (xenophobia). Because of the comprehensive attention offered by the media, the public and especially the Ramaphosa regime to it and the outright political opportunism around the two forms of violence, they need to be evaluated and discussed in depth. These two issues are indeed part of the greater crime culture, or better: the crime mentality of many South Africans. To understand it, will help us to understand better the already discussed violence in the Western Cape as well as the epidemic of violent crime in the whole country.

3.3.1.3.1. Gender violence

Regarding another recent tragic phenomenon connected to crime, is the alleged appalling and often brutal way men treat women and children in South Africa. This is being seen in some way as having triggered a nationwide uprising to combat the evil, and described by some in the media as one of the most tumultuous and emotional episodes in our country’s history, the editor44 of the Sunday Times wrote recently. Indeed, the seemingly sudden rise in gender-violent crimes invoked promises of punishment of the male culprits by the ANC’s top leadership, even a presidential promise which reads44:3:

I will propose to cabinet that all crimes against women and children should attract harsher minimum sentences. We agree with the women of the country that the state should oppose bail and parole for perpetrators of rape and murder against women and children.

The minister of justice, Ronald Lamola45, continued where Ramaphosa stopped by saying that the cabinet would consider requests for a referendum on the issue, while the president of the ANC Women’s League, Bathabile Dlamini45, asked for a law to forbid bail for persons accused of violence against women.45

Supporting these “ANC royals” in their “revenge seeking and taking” is the opinion and standpoint of the “Zulu royal”, King Goodwill Zwelithini46 whor recently during Umkhosi weLembe (Shaka Day), addressing hundreds of his subjects, said46:24:

…maybe it would be better if once a man was found to have rape, he should be handed to ‘men like us’ to cut off his manhood. This would end this thing(rape), this should be done in a way that would show the world that the Zulu nation does not tolerate this shame.

Palesa Lebitse47 also brings the present shocking state of rape and gender-based violence to our attention by pointing out that the chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng recently reflected on the complexity of  rape and gender-based violence by showing that we are not confronted here with a sudden pathological surge of evil-doing men, but a deep-rooted problem which has been a long time coming. For Lebitse47, the so-called “phenomenon” of gender-based violence in 2019 is due to the long-term neglect and the “untouchability” of the problem by the various authorities within the ANC government, specifically the Department of Women, the SAPS and the NPA.47,48

To argue, as do Ramaphosa44 and Lamola45 and others inside the ANC circle, that present legislation on gender violence is insufficient, reflect a lack of knowledge by them of the country’s battery of laws on this issue. Indeed, effective legislation exists to tackle and solve the problems.  What is missing is an effective government to govern and which is able to effectively use  the existing laws to address and solve the matters. We will hear for a long time in future horrifying stories of the maltreatment of women and children — as we are constantly hearing the ongoing shocking testimonies before the Zondo and other commissions on state corruption — but both approaches to the offering of “confessions” will bring nothing constructive in the end. Results such as prosecutions will stay absent. Regarding gender-based violence, short-term rhetoric by the ANC’s leaders are being heard daily, exclusively for the opportunistic gains of the ANC and support for the ANC’s calculated diverting of attention away from their regime’s corruption and dishonesty since 1994.31,49-51

The minister of Justice and Correctional Services, Ronald Lamola52, is treading water when he reflects on the recent prominence of gender violence by saying it52:2: “…remains a sore point and requires all of us to do our bit to curb this scourge”, and that52:2: “…establishing more sexual offences courts remained an important step in ‘their quest to eradicate gender-based violence and femicide’.” In this context he further states52:2: “…an additional 15 courts rooms were adapted in line with the sexual offences model and this brought the total number of courtrooms adapted to 90. We are planning a further 11 courtrooms in the current financial year”.

What Lamola52 did not say loudly was that these courts have gathered dust since there establishment, because they are under-used, primarily because the promulgated laws to curb these kinds of crimes are not effectively used and the NPA lacks capable staff while the SAPS fails the people in combatting crime. This makes all the loud talk of Lamola, together with that of Ramaphosa on their supposed fight against gender violence, just hot air, once more.39,53,54

How much Ramaphosa and his ministers are confused and uninformed about the established and appropriate legislation already in place to fight and punish all kinds of crimes against women and children — but also seemingly taken up emotionally by the present protests and apparently orientated to use the situation opportunistically — is evidenced by Versluis31. She writes31:6:

Die minimum vonnisse is reeds jare lank lewenslank vir moord met voorbedagte rade, verkragting wat met roof of aanranding gepaardgaan, ‘n verkragting van ‘n kind, groepverkragting of meer as een verkragting. Vir die meeste ander seksmisdade, roof met verswarende omstandighede, asook moord sonder voorbedagte rade is die minimum vonnis 15 jaar vir ‘n eerste oortreding.

A further contradiction in Ramaphosa and his ministers’ opportunistic power-play that the present crimes against women and children are abnormally high and increasing all over the country, is the evidence that although the total cases in 2019 stand at 52 420 sexual offences, the peak before 2019 was higher and the 2019 number represents a reduction of over 10 000 cases since 2010. The latest SAPS statistics (2018/2019) reflects a decline of 5.4% in the murders on women: 2 930 to 2 771, the crimes against children declined from 43 842 to 43 540 and sexual offences against women decreased by 0.4% to 36 597.29,31,55

In regard to Ramaphosa’s hypocrisy to “commit” the ANC regime to rectify the maltreatment of children that suddenly “emerged” in 2019, it is important to emphasise (on paper at least), that South African legislation already protects and cares for the country’s children through the Children Act which was promulgated by the ANC regime itself in 2005.56 Pearl Boshomane Tsotetsi56, a freelance writer, states that the Act demands that parents ensure their children are financially supported and taken care of, but it is clear for her that the socio-economics under the present regime nullifies the fulfilment of this parental duty, primarily because of the parents’ growing poverty, leaving them destitute and unable to afford the necessities of life for their children. She writes56:20:

…the problem is that ours isn’t a country that encourages poor parents to be self-sufficient, and in turn to effectively take care of their offspring. With such a high rate of unemployable people and the economy in the gutter, how are parents meant to financially support their children when they can’t even support themselves?

On the ANC regime’s failed economics, which are creating only poverty and unemployment for the country’s citizens, Tsotesti56 points out firstly that the R430-a-month social grant for a child is totally insufficient. Secondly, she shows the frightening numbers of the poor who are suffering of hunger, indicating that among pregnant woman aged 12 to 50 as much as 16.3% lived in households where children or adults suffered from hunger because there was not enough food, and that 35% were living in households that ran out of money to buy food for five or more days a month. In this context, there is the bleakness of poverty that makes it difficult for people to better themselves or to ever escape poverty. A permanent culture of poverty and despair plays a role in causing poor mental health and depression, which could have explained why a mother recently killed her four children with rat poison. It is clear that, notwithstanding how much the country, especially the leadership of the ANC-regime were “shocked” by the gender violence in 2019, there is a lack of focus by the media and the public on the specific role of the failed government in these kinds of tragedies around children, primarily because of its outright lack of financial support and provision of a mental help service for struggling mothers. At the moment, as with the “maltreatment of women issue”, the ANC regime of Ramaphosa is fleeing from its direct responsibility to children by their efforts to cast it as a non-political issue, while in reality they stand accused of the tragedies which their failed politics have caused in 2019.56 Tsotesti56 points to the ANC regime’s failure (and their present political opportunism)  when she writes56:20: “Lack of resources, lack of effective politicking and a lack of social workers (while thousands of social work graduates are unemployed) mean single mothers are left to fend for themselves in untenable situations that are not of their own making.

The poverty of women is strongly related to gender violence, especially those women who are single mothers and must care for children on their own. Busi Mavuso57, CEO of Business Leadership SA, points to the presence in the country of an all-over gender inequality which she believes contributes to engendering the suppression of the female and triggering gender violence. Mavuso said that there was a growing crisis in the social construction of the South African society: South African women who are permanently employed earn 22.7% less than men, and the country’s mothers, wives and daughters face a future where their work will be less remunerated than that of their male counterparts. There has been an entrenched lack of equality under the ANC regime since 1994 (for which they now cry foul as part of the mistreatment of women), placing the female in the traditional men’s world, together with female inequality inserted as part of a wider process whereby certain social and racial groups are neglected or discriminated against, the perpetuation of which the ANC regime makes itself guilty. Mavuso writes57:26:

The lack of equality in our own private rooms in a climate of low growth and confidence levels played itself out in a rising tide of femicide, which our country’s statistical agency calls the intentional killing of females because they are females.

The problems of patriarchy, some of whose norms and standards are inherited from our colonial past and some of which come from our different cultural influences, need to be addressed. All of us – the government, business and civil society – need to find common purpose on just how we start to deal with a system that goes against equality.

Professor William Gumede58 of the School of Governance, Wits University, offers Mavuso57 a clear picture of the many wrongs of cultural influences, inherent to the country’s patriarchy which is directly responsible for gender violence. For Gumede58 these aberrations must go first before the ANC regime may dare to speak further of a “sudden” rise in 2019 of gender violence and the “urgent need” for legislation to combat it. He writes58:26:

Patriarchy, which informs most South African cultural, social and religious traditions, is at the root of violence against women.  To end this scourge, any cultural belief, custom or practice that encourages inequality between men and women must be made illegal; all traditions and social practices must be democratised.

Gumede58 enumerates the following cultural beliefs, customs and practices, which have all been supported and maintained by the ANC regime since 1994, notwithstanding the party’s condemnation of gender violence, that should be abolished, erased and nullified58:26:

  • Customary law that made women defer to men and preclude them from inheriting property or becoming traditional leaders;
  • Initiation schools encourage patriarchy, aggressive masculinity and a violent response rejection;
  • Patriarchal traditions such as lobola;
  • The reed-dance ceremonies that objectivise women;
  • Religious practices which undermine the rights of women;
  • Improper school curriculum.

The editor59 of the Sunday Times also shoved the role of established cultural beliefs, customs and practices in triggering gender violence into the lime-light by pointing out our two-tier legal system which is forcing discrimination on the poor and rural Black women with little access to justice. Pertinent here is the ANC regime’s direct contribution to the abuse of the women in society over many years as “good”, which has now been re-established by the Traditional Courts Bill. This Bill was passed at the end of the fifth Parliament, supported by the majority of MPs during which the assenting votes by the ANC MPs including ANC women MPs, were prominent. These MPs also specifically voted to remove a crucial so-called “opt out” clause which would allow rural women to opt out of matters before the traditional courts in order to seek justice in statutory courts. There is further evidence that some women, appearing before traditional courts presided over by male traditional leaders, are sometimes not allowed to attend the proceedings simply because they are women. In other cases where they are allowed to attend, they are not allowed to speak, while the testimonies offered by women were belittled. The Bill, making Ramaphosa’s presidential promises that the ANC regime was going to fight the abuse of women simple hypocrisy, was passed despite a legal guideline that it was unconstitutional. It is now before the National Council of Provinces. [Note: Traditional courts are empowered to adjudicate matters including theft, malicious damage to property, burglary, crimen injuria and other matters in which women frequently experience forms of discrimination such as in a customary-law marriage, guardianship of children and inheritance matters].59

The criminologist, Professor Christian Bezuidenhout31 reflects on the chaos of the present social system in South Africa which the ANC now wants to solve bye means of a quick and easy solution in the form of new laws and new kinds of judicial punishments, notwithstanding the fact that the problem has been created and nurtured over 25 years of rule by the ANC itself.  He postulates31:6:

Dit spruit uit ’n komplekse wisselwerking tussen omgewingsfaktore en die genetiese material van die individu [geslagsgeweld is ‘n ekspressiewe misdaad met ‘n sterk emosionele motivering].

Die probleem in Suid-Afrika is dat kinders in ‘n groot deel van die samelewing konstant aan geweld blootgestel word.

In sommige gemeenskappe word geweld beskou as die medium tot sukses.

Dié tipe misdade is die moeilikste om af te skrik. Dit gebeur ook gewoonlik in die privaatheid van die huis.

Meer polisie of swaarder strawwe gaan nie help nie.

The opportunism of the Ramaphosa regime to misuse the issue of the current gender violence to score political points is proven over and over by supporting evidence. The extreme opportunism of the Department of Women — established as the sole, exclusive government vehicle to better and to safeguard the rights of women and children — is increasingly coming under the spotlight. The question strongly arises as to why the department has not executed on its mandate since its creation, already turning Ramaphosa’s recent presidential promise into reality? It can rightly be asked further which constructive legislation on the rights of women and children has it propagated and promulgated, and what evidence there is to reflect that it is engaged in a comprehensive team effort with the NPA and the SAPS to improve the life circumstances of women and children? Why has there been such a “sudden and immense” rise in crimes related to women and children over the last two years if the department had been doing its utmost to curtail such violence and violations of women’s and children’s rights?60,61

Most importantly, why has the Department of Women not taken the SAPS to the ConCourt on neglect of duty when women accused the SAPS that rape victims had to face uncaring cops who fobbed them off with callous remarks when the wanted to lay charges? Fokazi48 writes in a very focussed manner on these accusations against the SAPS, reflecting the description of the head of the Western Cape’s Thuthuzela Care Centre regarding some of the phrases women often hear when they try to report rape to police48:4:

  • Go home, don’t bathe or wash your underwear for the next few days, and come back on Monday.
  • He only used his finger to penetrate you, it’s no big deal.
  • This case is weak, do you really want to put yourself through this?

It is thus of great importance to consider the actions of the Department of Women to make an evaluation of the ANC regime’s intentions and actions since 1994 around women and child welfare and care. This can also give us an indication if Ramaphosa’s presidential promise on rectifying the affairs of women and children may be taken seriously, in the same vein as all of his political promises made in the May-2019 election and his many other post-May 2019 promises on job creation, an end to crime and invigorated economic growth. As a guideline for evaluating ANC policies on the importance of women and children, as represented by the Department of Women’s actions, one may consult Katharine Child’s61:4 recent article in the Sunday Times of the 8 September 2019, very descriptively entitles: “Plenty of pricey talk, no action”.

Child61 depicts a failed and incapable ANC Department of Women under the leadership of its ministers Bathabile Dlamini and Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, including many highly-paid officials, who were supposed to implement their official duty directive, which reads61:4: “…the custodian of the promotion and advancement of gender quality and the empowerment of women”. Child61 makes it very understandable why the publicly expressed outrage at the high rate of murder and rape of women takes place without the truth behind this chaos. Clichés by the department’s present minister, Mate Nkoana-Mashabane, have dealt with the “ideal man-woman relationship in South Africa”, and she has also said that61:4: “We [women] cannot continue to live lives that are constantly under siege and where we are not all enjoying the fruits of our constitutional democracy. Enough is enough, we need justice”. This is hypocrisy of the highest order. It is at the same time an excellent example of how the ANC’s leadership, specifically that of the Ramaphosa regime, directs the people’s attention away from the real culprits that have abandoned women and children since 1994 with their corrupt governance: the ANC leadership itself.61

It is by no means an exaggeration to say that the Department of Women has constantly failed to address gender-based violence. It has indeed itself acknowledged that it never meets its prescribed targets but “only held dialogues with women” with useless travelling around the country and the world to promote these so-called departmental dialogues to “better” the position of women and children. There were no constructive and concrete outcomes confirmed by the Department of Women in its annual performance indicator which requires true “interventions to enhance prevention and elimination of violence against women and children”. It is amid this chaos (mostly unknown to the public) that Ramaphosa is now shamelessly trying to capitalise on the gender-based violence issue with his sudden so-called “judicial intervention and interference in the acts of criminal men”, while he stays silent on his government’s failed Department of Women.60-62

Child61 gives an in-depth description of the Department of Women’s lack of fulfilling its annual performance indicator. She states that when the Parliamentary oversight committee listened to the Department of Women’s annual performance plan in July 2019, its members were unimpressed. Indeed, in a statement afterwards the committee said61:4: “…it could not understand the issues the department is working on as there is no visible community outreach and it did not see tangible achievements”, writes Child61. The parliamentary researcher Kashiefa Abrahams,61 after studying the most recent report of the Department of Women, describes the official explanations by the leadership of the Department about its “national dialogues” held, which allegedly were set up to discuss gender violence, as “incoherent”.61

To give insight into the failed performance of the Department of Women — confirming also the failed performance of the ANC-regime starting from 1994 and telling us in some way again of the immense state capture between 2008 and 2017 — it is of great value to read Child’s61 summary of the Department’s recent annual report.61 Child61:4 writes that of the department’s R244m budget in 2017/2018 about R80m was allocated to the Commission for Gender Equality, lacking a declaration for how and why the R80 million was used. Of the rest, the lion’s share — R72.4m — went to salaries for the 101 staff members. In addition to these salaries, R13m was spent on travel and subsistence, R11.5m on “property managers” and R6.3m on consultants [with R1.2m last year on consultants to investigate the distribution of free “sanitary dignity products”. This last-mentioned  project has after two years still not been finalised].61

Child61 also mentions that the report stated that staff members went on four official overseas trips (without reporting how many staff went on the trips) which the Department recorded as “achievement”! Of the R13m spent on travel, R4m was for overseas travel to destinations such as New York to attend the UN Commission on the Status of Women conference in 2017. Further there were a three-day meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Swaziland and a five-day AU meeting in Ethiopia. There was again a SADC meeting in Ethiopia to prepare for the next UN Commission on the Status of Women conference in New York in 2018. Moreover, under the category “achievements” listed in the report was attendance at a “moral regeneration movement” meeting in Kimberley in 2017, a Women’s Day celebration on 9 August last year in Kimberley, an interdenominational meeting on gender-based violence in Upington, a “cancer-awareness-raising imbizo”, the launch of the 16 days of activism campaign and a men’s meeting in Port Elizabeth. It also became clear that of the 101 staff 47 were in senior positions, with annual salaries averaging R1 million each. This “salary capture” prompted the IFP MP, Liezl van der Merwe61, to call the Department of Women in Parliament an “employment agency”, asking questions about the need for consultants [with a R6.3m budget] when most of its staff had seemingly high training as reflected by their high salaries.61

Another issue pointing to the failure of the Department of Women under Mate Nkoana-Mashabane to govern properly on behalf of the ANC cabinet the affairs of women and children, is the nonperformance by other ultra-motivated women’s rights fighters, such as  Dlamini, Goodwill Zwelithini, Cele, and other top executives of the ANC regime in addressing crimes against LGBTQ+ people. This passivity of specific politicians undoubtedly led thereto that in the first place there are blind spots in South African data on the crimes against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer community, wrote Hlatshaneni63 recently. This makes SAPS data unreliable and sub-standard while the pending legislation on hate crimes initiated by the ANC regime is blocking data collection on LGBTQ+ crimes. There is not any official effort to calculate the true presence of gender-based violence by trying to establish the incidence of unreported gender violence. Lisa Vetten63, a gender activist and researcher reports that the last official report on the rate of unreported cases of gender-based violence was released 22 years ago.  But from the statistics (starting in 2009), emanating from nongovernmental organisations and their investigations of LGBTQ+ crimes, the presence of these crimes is high (profiled as unreported or unrecorded cases). It has shown a strong upwards trajectory from 2011, writes Vetten63. For a person who has declared him on the side of the victims of gender violence, Ramaphosa has shown ignorance of these LGBTQ+ crimes which may be seen as a selective escape from a kind of gender-based crime which is politically, socially, culturally and religiously controversial, as well as pertaining to a specific lifestyle not accepted by the greater society of patriarchy.57,58,63

The LGBTQ+ crimes are, as a part of gender violence and thus of the same importance, by and large totally ignored by the ANC regime. Ramaphosa’s silence here seems significant. Letsike63, director of Access Chapter 22, writes that LGBTQ+ crimes have occurred in South Africa for decades, forming an important element of gender-based violence, but are completely ignored by the ANC as not having any importance.  There are some shocking cases of SAPS discrimination when it comes such gender cases shocking, especially because it has been tolerated by the ANC regime during its failed crime-prevention programme to eliminate xenophobia and gender violence since 1994. Letsike63 reflects on the discriminatory behaviour of the SAPS against the LGBTQ+ gender group as follows63:2:

We have actually seen research that showed that 88% of crimes against the LGBTQ+ community go unreported or unrecorded.

One of the reasons for this is when investigating officers do not look at hate or bias as possible motive if the person’s gender identity or sexual orientation is known.

Letsiko63 elaborates further63:2:

Another reason the stories of hate crimes against this community went untold was that the criminal justice system still harboured bias against complainants from the LGBTQ+ community.

We still have a very high level of secondary victimisation where police themselves will victim-blame or intimidate a person for instance, and ask “are you a boy or a girl?” These are the things that discourage victims from reporting these cases”.

Lebitsi47 places the ANC’s outright failure over years to safeguard persons through its judicial arms, the SAPS and the NPA, against gender violence, prominently in focus. His analysis again confirms Ramaphosa and his regime’s opportunism in their misuse of the so-called “2019 gender violence”. Lebitsi writes47:13:

And in interrogating issues around cases involving sexual abuse and gender-based violence, I pondered about the National Prosecuting Authority and its role in ensuring that it too interrogates these issues.

I ended up asking myself: where is the national director of public prosecutions, Shamila Batohi, given the gravity of sexual abuse? But I remembered that Batohi has not even uttered a single word about the calamity of sexual abuse.

I did however remember how a friend of mine once told me about a joke at the NPA about certain rape cases: “at the tavern, to the tavern, from the tavern – no prosecution”.

The bottom line is that the way the NPA treats cases may be a major contributor to this national crisis and may also perpetuating rape myths that plague our society.

Giving us another glimpse into previous official promises by the ANC regime which were made to women and children, similar to the one of Ramaphosa, to “wipe out gender violence by the law” which never went further than mere utterances, is that of the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa) a year ago. In June 2018 the newly appointed chairperson of Prasa, Khanyisile Kweyama64, promised to set aside women-and-children-only train carriages on Cape Town‘s Metrorail when she said64:7: “In Women’s month, we will assign terms of reference on how we are going to proceed to implement it”.

A month later in 2018 she apparently made the same commitment to the civil society group #UniteBehind, namely to personally oversee the implementation of the new carriages by August 2018. When #UniteBehind sent a letter with  updates to her in August, it received no response. Further enquiries at Prasa tell another story as to the initial promise of Kweyama: the excuse was that there were other more important issues than the women-and children-only train carriages. Prasa further states that there was a shortage of usable train carriages as well as a lack of security guards available to guard the women and children. So far, until September 2019, requests for updates from #UniteBehind were ignored by Prasa. The official Prasa promise stays just a promise, ignoring the safety of women and children on the Cape Town Metrorail, a negative situation which has now been continuing for years under the ANC regime.44,64

It seems as if the Department of Women is untouchable when it comes to being called to account inside the ANC regime which is characterised by ongoing poor performances and failure. This untouchability is well revealed by Child61,62 when she recounts that when she asked the Department to answer certain questions regarding its 2017/2018 annual report and actions, its spokesperson, Shalen Gajadhar’s only reaction was to send copies of seven speeches made by the Department’s staff! 61,62

It is important to consider, in terms of Ramaphosa’s promise to introduce “extreme laws” to punish men treating women “badly”, that he seemingly lacks an in-depth understanding that South Africa is not only a violent country for women, but also for men. Ramaphosa’s “women’s promise” fails as such to imply an improvement of our failed criminal justice system to serve both gender victims of violence, meaning also men. Moreover: Ramaphosa should have said that South Africa was a violent land for women and men, but he ignored the matter as his regime has been turning a blind eye since 1994 to the violent Western Cape. Lisa Vetten66 of Wits University states in this context that police murder statistics showed that a man was 5.6 times more likely to be murdered than a woman in South Africa. This avoidance in addressing violence against men again highlights the political opportunism of Ramaphosa with his “suddenly selecting and addressing” of the so-called “women’s issue”. He knows well that the chances at this moment of bringing lasting and comprehensive changes to the maltreatment of woman and children are zero. It is a tragic situation which has developed strongly after 1994 under the ANC regime. Evidence shows that the ANC regime can do nothing constructive to the matter. Promises like that of Ramaphosa are all that the ANC can offer South Africans.61,62,65,66 It is a standard part of the ANC’s well-known political practice, what Melody Emmett65;15 referred to as the phenomenon of “lies, lies and more lies” and Child describes as61:4: “Plenty of pricey talk, no action”.

Real evidence contradicts the apparent stereotyping by the ANC leadership of all men as beasts — the “exclusively male transgressors of gender violence” (excluding of course the ANC leadership!) who suddenly arrived in 2019 in South Africa. This profiling of all men as psychopathic characters reflects thankfully only one clear meaning after it was stripped of its emotional and political posturing: an utterly sick political opportunism in the mindset of the ANC.52,67 The author Azille Coetzee’s67 argues that all men are undoubtedly not bad and have not suddenly become perpetrators of gender violence. For her, there is a gender-violence problem, but it is a chronic problem, extending back in the post and in which the behaviour of the ANC and its members also stand accused.52,67

Finally, the question is why the so-called “appalling and often brutal way men treat women in South Africa” was only suddenly recognised in 2019, positioned, and undertaken to be addressed by the ANC regime’s leadership after 25 years of their failed governance. Never in the ANC’s previous elections promises was the matter brought up or recommendations made to rectify it. It is clear that the ANC’s 25 years of poor rule has discredited it on all the levels associated with good governance and excellent leadership. It is forcing Ramaphosa to misuse any emotional and political issue that distracts the attention from the ANC’s delinquent rule and which can easily be used to put him in the lime-light again as the so-called “good” leader after his presidency had started to falter from June 2019. Opportunism seems to be strongly present in the ANC regime nowadays60:4: “…sincerely striving to better the lives of women and children”.

The current one-sided, exclusive over-emphasis of the maltreating of women and children  by the pro-Ramaphosa media and the ANC itself, stands totally in contrast with their ignoring of gang and taxi violence where the gangsters and the taxi bosses and drivers are apparently above the law and the lot of the innocent, suffering people around them deemed insignificant. The ANC fails in this context to issue a similarly public “Ramaphosa empathy” at the individual level to citizens who have been flagrantly abused by public officials by successive ANC regimes. Gumede49 sees a syndrome of “little empathy of Ramaphosa for the mass of victims gripped and suffering in the observable political disorder of the country”. This obvious passivity, observable in the crisis on crimes committed against women, is similar to the passivity that the government shows on crime in general committed against the individual citizen, as well as the passivity recently showed during the crimes perpetrated against foreigners.68-71

The opportunistic effort by the ANC regime and Ramaphosa to reverse the ANC’s present political turmoil by misusing the maltreatment of women and children is wrong. Notwithstanding the tragedy around the abuse of women, children and foreigners, it is a secondary matter when viewed against the total criminal mess the country finds itself in. The main reason for these criminal outcomes is the crooked ANC which created and nurtured these crimes over the past 25 years. To eliminate these crimes, it is also needed to eliminate the ANC as a regime because it fails to practise law enforcement within the existing legal framework, besides their own political and legal transgressions, as well as their lack of taking responsibility for their extensive delinquencies. Pelser45 is very much here correct in emphasising the right of the innocent citizens (including the mass of innocent men) to defend their civil rights, when he writes45:6:

As ons gaan toelaat dat die demone van eiereg, wraaksug en growwe veralgemenings oor mans of buitelanders uit hul hokke kom, om van die soeke na nuwe sondebokke nie te praat nie, gaan ons problem as nasie vererger. Wetstoepassing is die sekerste manier vorentoe.

Hierdie regering gee die barbare in die samelewing al so lank vrypas om te steel en te verkrag en te moor, soms met opset en soms uit blote onbevoegdheid, dat niemand meer die staat se waarborge glo dat reg en orde weer afgedwing kan word nie.

Gumede72 brings a reality to the crimes against women, a matter which the ANC regime has carefully tried to sweep under the carpet for a long time in their frenzied political opportunism, when he writes72:22:

What appears to be a sudden alarming rise in violence against women is in fact the continuation of a rape culture that has been with us since the apartheid dispensation, but which has not been spoken about loudly before, the victims shamed or feared into silence or a stubborn denial of the enormity of the crisis.

What is new, though, is that the spells of silence about the extent of SA’s rape culture – rape, sexual harassment and violence – has finally been broken, and the scourge is now discussed in social, family and public spaces.

This culture has been normalised within social institutions, communities and families.

Even in the military camps of the ANC and PAC, rape culture was pervasive but cloaked in silence. And it also existed within the associated anti-apartheid civil society organisations, including the trade unions and student and youth movements.

It is important for the ANC leadership to own up to the sexual violence that happened within the liberation movement during the struggle against apartheid. Such a move would be an important act of acknowledgment to victims but may also help to bring about a culture change in our present time.

The tragedy was that, for the victims at that time, to accuse liberation leaders of sexual violence was seen as a “betrayal” of the liberation movement, undermining the cause of the struggle and strengthening the hand of the apartheid forces.

Because rape culture is so pervasive, an integrated strategy will be needed to tackle it, focusing on changing the cultural, social and political acceptance of what is “normal”.

3.3.1.3.2. Xenophobic violence

The outbreak of xenophobia is a matter that the ANC regime clearly tries hard to play down as general crime committed by some members of communities in their revenge taken on particular foreigners for their alleged criminal acts, either on their own or as part of local South African crime syndicates as well as foreigner syndicates against so-called “innocent” local South Africans. Another element is that those local South Africans, who are involved in vengeful attacks on foreigners, have been described by the ANC regime specifically as criminals who are attacking small groups of foreigners (on the same basis as if they were attacking  other South Africans) only for opportunistic and self-enriching reasons. The ANC regime does not discern any sign or intention of xenophobia in these attacks: as said, the same kind of attack by the local criminals is directed against other South Africans, as seemingly evidenced by the Western Cape violence. Ramaphosa too, has carefully avoided both the term and the subject of xenophobia in his responses to foreign governments. A case in point was his recent public statement to Nigeria’s envoy, Ahmed Rufal Abubakar, in an effort to calm down the recent conflict between Nigeria and South Africa around the attacks on the lives and property of Nigerians, that these attacks are not xenophobia, but solely the delinquent actions of local criminals against criminal Nigerians for their specific transgressions. Central to the South African-Nigerian conflict was the death of eight South Africans who had allegedly been killed by criminal Nigerians and thus sparked the reaction against  Nigerians which came to be known as xenophobia, worldwide . On the incidence of criminality as a characteristic of a certain group of Nigerians — isolating them as crooks but not as “foreigners”— it is reported that Ramaphosa, stating that South Africans were innocent of any discrimination against any Nigerians or harbouring any xenophobia against them, put forward “justified” actions by the locals to rid the country of crime and criminals (which seems in this case to be sometimes, accidentally, Nigerians!). On the existence of such foreign criminals in South Africa, igniting the recent violence, Ramaphosa even called on Nigeria to assist him with the deportation of some of its citizens who were committing crimes in South Africa and were in the country illegally.68-71

In response to Nigeria’s demand that South Africa compensates the losses of Nigerians here in the unrest (which the Nigerian government sees as xenophobia), South Africa took a hard line of not being guilty of any xenophobia or committing crime against any Nigerians and stated that it would only assist and compensate damaged Nigerian businesses here that where legitimately registered in the country and had their affairs in order with the South African Revenue Service, writes Hunter70. But Hunter70 reports that this “foreign-policy profile” projected on the ethnic unrest involving Nigerians in South Africa, differs from the ANC regime’s local “self-confession” on xenophobia. Hunter70, on the seeming arrogance and deception of Ramphosa in his double-talk with Abubakaro, writes70:1,7: “This was despite Ramaphosa’s acknowledgement of the existence of xenophobia in SA in his address to the nation on Tuesday evening [5th September] in which he condemned the violence and looting”.

That there is no doubt in most of the ANC’s leaders’ minds that xenophobia is real, is well confirmed by their orchestrated effort to lie about it to diplomats. Munusamy writes54:11:

The government has been flat-footed in countering the anti-SA sentiments. SA diplomats have been instructed to keep the line that the violence is as a result of criminality, not xenophobia.

Including in this denial of the presence of xenophobia was the violence against foreigners even relayed to so-called49:8: “conspiracy theories, claiming dark outside forces were ‘organising’ the xenophobic violence”, writes Gumede49. On the lack of an in-depth understanding of the true nature of xenophobia in the country by the ANC and thus to address it correctly, Gumede49 guides us well49:20: “Throughout all these crises, the ANC and government leadership appears to have been out of their depth, many not grasping the severity of the crisis the country is facing.4

It seems as if two ministers in the Ramaphosa regime accepted the reality of xenophobia, without saying it publicly or attributing it to the ANC’s failure to rule correctly and effectively. In avoiding the truth about the ANC’s direct role in the manifestation of xenophobia — as many members of the ANC’s elite mostly do when they are at the receiving end — they play the “blame game”. Other than Ramaphosa who confusingly blamed tribalism and nationalism as a possible reason, the Higher Education Minister Blade Nzimande blamed capitalism, while the International Relations Minister Naledi Pandor attributed it to Apartheid.71

An interesting contradiction arising from the alleged xenophobia phenomenon and Ramaphosa’s view that Nigerians were responsible for committing crime against locals, is that it militates against the ANC’s traditional denial of tribalism and ethnicity in favour of the class struggle and other Marxist concepts of sociology and history. In their statements on the attacks against Nigerians and other foreigners, both Ramaphosa and Magashule therefore acknowledged the existence of ethnicity, a phenomenon which is anathema to the ANC’s revolutionary ideology (besides racism against the Whites as European “colonists” and hence the ANC’s intention to grab their land without compensation).70,71

Saunderson-Meyer71 points out that not only does Ace Magashule reaffirm that xenophobia is based on ethnicity but that the presence of xenophobia is also based on racism (and in September 2019 puts on record the ANC’s most recent official standpoint on Whites). Saunderson-Meyer71 refers to Magashule’s racial and anti-White stand (which can be seen undoubtedly as the open instigation of racial violence), as follows71:12: “Last week Magashule had expressed regret that the violence was being directed at ‘people who have the same skin colour as us’, rather than those many others with a whitish colour’…[who] have never been attacked, because they are also so-called foreigners”. Pelser45 reports on this alleged White racism by Magashule as follows45:6: ““Ace Magashule, sekretaris-generaal  van die ANC, maan swart Suid-Afrikaners om hul woede nie uit te haal op swart mense nie — hulle moet liewer wit mense teiken”.

Also Munusamy50 shows that Julius Malema, the leader of the EFF, tried to refocus the violence against White people rather than foreign nationalists. Referring to this, Pelser45, quoting Malema, writes45:6: “‘Ons woede is op die verkeerde mense gerig. Soos ons almal, verkoop ons Afrika-broers en susters hul arbeid teen ‘n lae prys om te oorleef. Die eienaars van ons welvaart is witmonopoliekapitaal; hul weier om dit met ons te deel’.”

On Ramaphosa’s reaction on the involvement of Nigerians in the latest so-called “crimes” in South Africa and the specific background to it, Hunter45, aligning Ramaphosa’s acknowledgement of tribalism with that of crimes as xenophobia and thus indeed that xenophobia springs from tribalism.  Hunter reports as follows45:1,7: “The president reasserted his publicly held view that rising nationalism globally is affecting the rise of tribalism on the continent”.

In this context Saunderson-Meyer71, on the official standpoint of the ANC on tribalism and thus also indirectly xenophobia, states71:12: “…tribalism is not acknowledged to be the cause of anything, implying as it would, ethnic cleavages within the Black South African society” and71:12: “…xenophobia, the x-word, has joined the k-word as unutterable in SA”.

Magashule, in line with Ramaphosa’s confusion on seemingly what the violence, tribalism and the xenophobia definitions mean, also opened the can further when he referred to some of the violence in which foreigners were involved recently as “tribal battles,” which expressly means ethnicity and xenophobia. These ANC references to tribalism, positioned suddenly by Ramaphosa and Magashule, also brought to the foreground the extreme presence of South African violent crimes in certain communities, such as gangsterism in many so-called exclusively “Coloured” Western Cape areas in South Africa. (As already discussed, the SADF was forced to intervene on the Cape Flats in a crime-prevention role because the SAPS utterly failed to do their job.)  It seems then that some issues are indeed “tribal-orientated” for the ANC’s top managers and thus the reason why the ANC-regime since 1994 has taken such a passive stance on this “Coloured problem” and had left it in the cold.70

Saunderson-Meyer71, on the supposed ANC revolutionaries’ traditional blindness to xenophobia and tribalism, further writes71:12:

While Ace should expect a chiding from the ANC’s political commissars for the little slip, xenophobia and tribal denialism is prevalent among black nationalists. It is simply inconceivable to admit that there is, indeed, a deep-seated antipathy among many black South Africans to their black ‘brothers and sisters’, both here and abroad.

Saunderson-Meyer71 reports that Ace Magashule’s explanation of his rejection of xenophobia, goes this way71:12: “What I know …is that our presidents, the presidents of Africa [Nigeria, Zambia and Rwanda] are talking, and they have analysed this correctly. It is not acts of xenophobia, it’s acts of criminality”.

The editor73 of the Sowetan, in an article dated 13 September 2019, reflects on how the blackjacks in the 1960s, harassing Africans found in urban areas without so-called “dompasses” by going from door to door to pull-out those considered to be “too Black and too different to belong to the other Blacks”. He states that on Wednesday, September 11 2019, in the supposed free South Africa, Blacks again knocked on doors73:14: “Open the door, we want to see your ID. The k-word of the apartheid-era is replaced by an equally derogatory k-word that they reserve for foreigners. …the reality is that there are a significant number of our citizens who are — and are engaging in acts of violence against those they deem foreign”.

If the above editorial description, read together with the descriptions by various local Blacks on the reason why they are burning trucks and killing truck drivers, are not true examples of the presence of extreme xenophobia, what kind of example do we need to offer which would convince the ANC leaders of it?35,36,73

Secondly, contradicting Ramaphosa and his cronies’ standpoint in their overseas rhetoric that xenophobia is purely criminal violence, is the prominent presence of foreigners (legal and illegal) in South Africa as so-called “culprits” in the reasons for the deaths of 11 persons in Gauteng.74,75 Hosken74 refers in this context to the “culprit” foreigners as to be exclusively people who many Blacks classed as persons74:2: “…endangering Black South Africans’ work opportunities, and to be people peddling drugs and committing crimes”.

The reporting of Hosken and Germaner75 of the mobilising in August 2019 of Black communities by the Sisonke People’s Forum, which had spurred locals into action against so-called “delinquent foreigners”, is very informative. Hosken and Germaner75 quoted the Forum chairman Zwelie Ndabe who allegedly said75:2:

Since 2016 our pleas to government have been ignored. We are tired of our kids dying from drugs sold by foreigners, South African business employing foreigners, and of foreigners hijacking buildings for human trafficking and prostitution. That’s why we mobilised. We didn’t expect people to be this angry, and the violence disturbs us. But we won’t stop mobilising.

In 2008 the nationwide so-called xenophobic attacks had claimed the lives of 56, to be followed by regular flare-ups of similar incidents. The deaths of foreigners over the period, from 1994 up to 2019, withing the category of “xenophobia (which is disavowed by the ANC regime), reflect that the ANC regime has no strategy and possibly no intention to stop foreign ethnic hate. This apathy about others’ lives must be read together with the delinquent acst of the police force under the ANC regime in the 2012 Marikana massacre which led to the death of 34 Black miners — which lacks any response seven years later of  a single police officer having been prosecuted or that the recommendations of the Farlam commission have been implemented. The presence of hatred for foreigners, from speaking, intentions and actions, hold serious consequences for the more or less 4 million foreigners living in South African.44,75

But the growing anti-foreigner sentiment (seen by many White South Africans as a masked anti-foreign sentiment of them also as so-called “colonists”), is for political analysts a possible sign that the historical Black tribal infighting (and Black genocide) of the 1800s between the Xhosa, the Zulu, the Tswana, etc., might be restarted as the tribal right to land and resources in the increasingly collapsing economy, as well as the dissolution of the South African state (and nation), become a reality.75

On foreigners, specifically so-called “bad persons, thieves”, etc., it is important to reflect the official ANC and ANC associates’ negative characterisation of foreigners, to see how in-depth xenophobia has become rooted in the psyche of South Africans. Here the KwaZulu-Natal House of Traditional Leaders represents a worrying phenomenon regarding ethnicity and foreigners, much in line with Ndabe’s view above. The remarks of the House’s chairperson, Inkosi Phathisizwe Chiliza76, are a classic case of xenophobe when he responds76:5:

Many foreigners did not respect SA traditions. When you get to those levels, they will tell you they are taking our jobs, the problem is they are here in big numbers and they don’t respect our traditions, and that is what needs to be fixed.

Even ANC ministers of the Ramaphosa cabinet were fast to capitalise on the “not fitting” into South Africa of Black foreign nationals (while at the same time involuntarily revealing their own ethnic mindset and inclination to xenophobia). Pelser reports45:6: “Thulas Nxesi, minister van arbeid en werkskepping, sê xenofobiese geweld is als die ‘elitistiese vryemarkstelsel” se skuld, wat buitelanders toelaat om hul arbeid teen minder as die minimum loon te verkoop”,  en45:6: “Ook David Makhura , premier van Gauteng, reik na populisme toe hy sê buitelanders moet verbied word om ‘sekere tipe sakeondernemings’ in townships te bedryf”.

But this false and ethnic categorisation of foreigners as “crooks” did not stop with Nxesi and Makhura’s negativity. The Gauteng ANC’s community safety MEC, Faith Mazibuko77, ventured77:16: “…we can’t govern with criminals, especially foreign nationals who want to turn our country into a lawless banana republic”.

In this context of “separating” Black foreigners from the Black South African society because “they take our people’s jobs and opportunities” — and thus seemingly: “they were killed in the past, are killed at present and can be killed in future”  for “understandable” reasons — Tony Leon77 points out that the ANC regime’s present ministerial viewpoint and guidance may be of the same dangerous ethnic hostility as that of Zwelie Ndabe and Inkosi Phathisizwe77, when he writes77:16: “According to the minister of justice, Ronald Lamola, the government is ‘developing legislation that will bar foreign nationals from operating in certain sectors of the economy’.”

This view of Lamola makes Ramaphosa’s agreement with the Nigerian government of a guaranteed balanced and good treatment of foreigners (Nigerians) in the future null and void. At the same time it is an early warning of the possible advent of the extreme ethnic politics of Robert Mugabe that led to the death of more than 20 000 Black Zimbabweans because they did not fit into his exclusively “Black Zimbabwe”. More than this: it spells out an ethnocentric South African Black-BEE policy which excludes certain other Black persons.78,79,80-82

There seems to be an encircling as well as an intertwining of the definitions xenophobia, crime, violence, which describe in some way the recent so-called “spree” of xenophobia (remember: in terms of the ANC regime’s view there exists the alleged exploitation by Black foreigners of Black South Africans), Hosken83 gives an excellent overview of the whole process as general criminality, based on South Africans’ internalised, ongoing and actively delinquent acts. It is for him a process wherein the presence of foreigners is only used as an excuse or as a distraction from the real reasons: exclusively looting from the easiest and most defenceless group of people, namely foreigners by some South Africans whose own lives have been degraded in only 25 years into a general life of crime under an equally disorderly and crime-orientated regime. Hosken83 in this context sums up the situation well when he writes83:2:

Looters, armed with guns and self-made weapons, stormed through a 2km stretch of Jules Street burning cars, torching buildings, ransacking businesses and terrorising people on Sunday night and throughout the week. In Alexandra, Crosby, Slove Park, Coronationville, KwaThema and Katlehong, looters turned on foreign-owned shops.

For Henry Mathe, who lives in Crosby’s povertry-stricken Slovo Park informal settlement, the looting was justified. “They killed two of us. It was only right that we went to the Somali and Pakistan shops and took what was theirs.

We just wanted them out. We were not burning or stealing their stuff. They were just told to get out because Solve Park does not need foreigners here. We waited until the cops were gone. We took groceries, cold drinks and Red Bulls. We took revenge, not because we were hungry. They provoked us by killing our people”.

Mathe claims that Isaac Sebeka, a South African who was killed in Coronationville, was shot when he was caught looting.

Hosken83 also describes the reaction of the medical doctor Samir Saha83, a Bangladeshi national who has been living in South Africa for 24 years, of which the last 10 was in Johannesburg. He lost all his assets in the recent “foreigner bashing” and had to flee for his life. Saha’s story contradicts totally Ndabe’s perceptions of the delinquent acts of so-called foreigners as always being wrongdoers against local Blacks or to be job-stealers, when he says83:2:

I have never experienced anything like this before. I am a doctor. I don’t run a spaza or a barber shop and even if I did, how would me running such shops rob South Africans of jobs? Saying I steal South Africans’ jobs is madness. In fact it is the opposite. I employ two South Africans, one as a secretary and the other as my medical assistant.

The above various outcomes show that the execution of violence (undoubtedly driven by internalised aggression and hostility in their mindsets, as well as by the immense poverty of some Black South Africans), which had become focussed on foreigners, is now affecting not only the individual innocent foreigner, but also any innocent South African businessman who dares to employ a single foreigner. This tragic outcome is well confirmed by the already mentioned, recent attacks on South African companies’ transport trucks (which led directly to the murder of various foreign drivers) on our highways and other routes which employ foreigners.

Misago75, quoting the senior researcher Jean-Pierre of the Wits Centre for Migration, says South Africa is becoming a pariah state. Hosken and Germaner75 bring into focus the ANC’s failed crime-prevention capability as a regime and allowing uncontrolled crime to develop and to get internalised in a great part of the society’s mindset as a “normal” condition. Secondly, Hosken and Germaner75 show just how dysfunctional the ANC regime is, including the ANC’s ambivalent thinking on the foreigner issue and the regime’s failed intention and capacity to eliminate violence and crime or at least to handle it from day to day. Misago states75:2: “The situation is complicated by the lack of governance and the delayed reaction to violence. Despite repeated warnings of violence, police were seemingly slow to respond”.

In this context of failed police oversight and a descent by the ANC regime into disorder, crime and violence, the potential that the so-called xenophobia may be transformed into anarchy and even as part of the start of a people’s revolution, Misago75 reflects further75:2: “What happens when those attacks shift to universities, medical institutions and international agencies employing migrants? 

Dr Franz Fanon84, a psychiatrist, who also turned political analyst, confronted us for the first time with one of the main reasons for unrest, crime, violence and xenophobia captured in the mindsets and actions of the poor and side-lined people of the slums, the informal settlements and lower socio-economical townships and parts of towns and cities: the utterly cold-blooded abuse and extremely opportunistic exploitation of the poor, mostly by their own race’s leaders (elite). The end result is violent reactions to all of those that seem to be better off than they the poor or who are assumed to be the cause for their chaotic lives. Fanon84 based his experience on the liberation of Algeria from France, specifically on the immediate outer and inner circle around the origin of violence as xenophobia. He shows that it is an international phenomenon which reflects extreme nationalism, driven by political opportunists without caring for the poor or the minority — essentially for anyone besides themselves. Violence against the foreigner is tacitly encouraged by the elite of the ruling party whose only interest is self-enrichment and political power to keep up their human exploitation. He precisely brought for us the story of South Africa’s economic, political and social failure under the extreme, Marxist-Leninist ANC. Moreover, Fanon84 tells us that our country is on the brink of collapse and why: Because of the ANC elite’s exploitation of Black politics by an exclusive but useless Black African nationalism for 25 years.84

This preaching of nationalism by the ANC’s elite was heard clearly around the xenophobia matter wherein the poor Black people’s violent behaviour against the vulnerable foreigners was justified, albeit in a masked manner. The South African mass of poor, absolutely unhappy and dissatisfied with their chaotic lifestyle, cannot take on their oppressor: the ANC’s elite. Here, as happens worldwide where the masses are exploited by their own people, they turn almost immediately their dissent into direct revenge, focussed on the easiest and most available target without fear for mass counter-revenge. Foreigners, migrants and other poor people stand out as targets because they are extremely vulnerable as a result of their isolation from their fatherland, poor political empowerment and a lack of recognition as a local. Only after the process of the elimination of the migrants is completed, will the poor masses turn with much effort to their real exploiters and oppressors. However, it will mostly be too late because of the immense power build-up by the regime to squash any revolt besides allowing chronic unrest and violence by the poor on the poor, and xenophobia. Buccus84, quoting Fanon84, writes as follows84:19:

Xenophobic violence, often tacitly encouraged by elite figures, has become an omnipresent reality.

Because the national elite “is preoccupied with filling its pocket as rapidly as possible…the country sinks all the more deeply into stagnation”. But, as “the people stagnate deplorably in unbearable poverty, slowly they awaken to the unutterable treason of their leaders”.

Fanon’s84 enlightening view of xenophobia as primarily a people’s unrest against the regime and not really the foreigner (which firstly must be read also in the presence of the immense violent crime in the Western Cape and other parts of the country, and secondly as a sign of a revolution from within) is supported in some way by seasoned local political analysts.

Fred Khumalo85, a seasoned journalist and political analyst writes in this context that inside the so-called xenophobia-violence-crime crisis there is far more negative energy to be read: the simple fact is that the country is teetering on the brink of an abyss because of the wrongdoing and failure of the ANC regime as result of its elite’s self-orientation. Removing the so-called (Black) foreigners will not solve the violence. Buccus84 too, points out that the xenophobic violence is the primary reaction of the mass caught up in poverty, which was solely a process activated by the ANC elite’s capturing of the country, its resources and richness for their self-enrichment and -empowerment and upheld through various manipulations. These manipulations include unleashing a false Black-African nationalism and fictitious anti-colonialism, and then, as the government of the ANC elite started to lose their power over the masses, slowly moving into a process of anti-democracy and the capturing and management of the political, social and economic empowerment of the mass of poor. At the end of this process, the poor will become conscious of their betrayal by their opportunistic revolutionary leaders, commencing in 1994 as the “fathers” of the Black nation. Unrest, crime, violence and pertinent xenophobia are the middle-stage behaviour of the poor masses.84,85

3.3.1.4. ANC as a failed regime inside a constitutional state

Many writings75,83-85 are loud and clear that there is such a thing as xenophobia in South Africa and that it can be practised because of some Black South Africans’ hostility against and hatred of foreign nationals. They also tell us that there are crimes as the ubiquitous violence in the country is channelled into xenophobia because of the internalisation over years of criminality in the psyche of some South Africans. The foreigner falls prey because of he/she has poor defence and is thus vulnerable. These writings tell us also that crimes such as xenophobic violence and other violent behaviour are often committed out of jealousy, for self-enrichment and the inability of poor, undeveloped locals to compete with other people who are seemingly successful or are favoured in some way by the socio-economic and political system. Moreover: the writings tell us that most of these crimes are focussed on other citizens as a way of compensation in not being able to directly engage in crimes such as violence, theft, murder, etc., against the ruler of the country who is basically solely responsible for the poor people’s chaotic lives. The present mixing of xenophobia-crime-violence is very much similar to the crime and violence reflected by the Black masses who had risen against Apartheid and its unjust racial, economic, social and personal discrimination which had denied Blacks their citizenship in the country of their birth and which had reduced them to beggars.75,83-85 Today, postulates Khumalo85, the masses are rising again because our current crooked rulers — many of whom were inside the Struggle of the 1970s and 1980s with the now suppressed and poor Blacks — have lost contact with their own past as well as who the masses of poor and landless Blacks really are. These rulers have become drunk on corruption, insensitivity and self-enrichment.75,83-85

At the root of the current social chaos is a failed political system wherein most of the people are not developed, but are left to plan for their own for survival inside a collapsed socio-economic and political system where there is no law and order and where the criminal has become untouchable by the society and the prosecution institutions. We see it well in the Western Cape’s uncontrolled crimes like extreme violence and murder, and the ANC regime’s inability as well as unwillingness to address it since 1994.

The poor are today venting their anger on each other and those less fortunate than themselves, including the foreigners. Xenophobia, like all violence, exists but is mostly part of organised crime and power plays which the mass poor by times cannot control, nor understand. Their way and method of venting their anger were largely acquired and internalised in the 1970s as the only solution to get attention: the burning of buildings, homes and the destruction of essential structures. They mostly got attention and their way from the previously White rulers. These actions are repeated today, although sometimes in other manifestations.85

On the current social conditions, Khumalo85 comments on the unobserved, ignored and neglected grievances of the mass poor and their present hostile reactions to it, in the following way85:15:

People have come to realise that if you want to have a conversation with the authorities, you burn something down.

What has been happening in pockets here and there seems like a replay from the 1980s. Except that the rulers are no longer arrogant white Afrikaners. They are black like the masses who are rising. Which makes it even more palpable.

The masses can’t help but wonder: how can these people, our own people, act like the oppressors of yore, if not even worse?

The warnings in commentaries66,75 of more evil to can come through “national” violence with its origin in poverty and inequality — issues which the ANC have so far left unattended in their 25 years of rule, and which have in reality nothing to do with “genuine” xenophobia and ethnicity — is further brought into the lime-light by Runji66 in emphasising the immense presence of inequality and poverty. The primary reason for this negative outcome is the fight for primary resources such as water, food, accommodation (which has led over ages to many wars in the world). Firstly, there is the prominent fear by the present economic middle class who are living in areas bordering on poor townships and informal settlements (and who themselves have moved up over the past 25 years from the poor lower economic class), to be dragged down again by any socio-economic instability and new competitors. Competition may lead thereto that they lose their assets, privileges and benefits. In this setup, it is true that the competitors from the present lower economic classes are gunning especially for the middle class’s privileges and benefits, while the middle class is doing anything to stop movements endangering their benefits. The outcome is immense hostility and violence. On the other side one finds the ambitions and often successes by the poor lower economic class (people who are mostly unwillingly “locked up” by their unfortunate conditions in poor townships and informal settlements that are thoroughly affected by mostly established “national” violence), leading to a class restructuring inside the poor townships and informal settlements themselves, which in itself causes a constant strife and even fighting for resources, rights, privileges and benefits there. Instead of growth and improvement, because of the lack of government intervention, the direct outcome is mostly the creation of more inequality, greater competition and hostility between the competing groupings in the poor lower class, which turn into daily behaviour tending to do harm to anyone seen as a competitor, regardless of being a local or a foreigner.66,75

The conflict between local poor Blacks from the shanty towns and informal settlements with the better-off middle class of the suburbs, with inequality the pivot, is at present more than a looming phenomenon. Evidence confirms that this hostility has already transformed into open clashes, for instance the clashes in July 2019 between the better-off middle-class homeowners and the neighbouring lower-class shack dwellers in Ennersdale, Lawley and Lenasia, Gauteng, during which four persons were wounded86. Wicks86 described it as an “all-out war brewing”. It is clearly an issue triggered by the financial inequality of the mass of poor, lower-class Blacks making it impossible for them to own land, and this group objecting violently to the rights, privileges and wealth of the middle class.  This outcome is a clear result of the ANC regime’s empty promises to eliminate inequality since 1994 and to better every citizen’s lifestyle. Wicks writes86:5:

The clashes are the latest chapter in SA’s heated land problems. They come after Alexandra township was effectively shut down in June due to similar issues, with residents facing off against “invaders”. Unabated illegal building had seen structures erected on pavements and in people’s gardens.

An established home-owner of Ennersdale, guarding his property, describes the violent conditions (which have also nurtured the so-called xenophobia for some time) very appositely when he says86:5:

I carry this [knobkerrie] when I patrol. I have to because the fight is coming here. The way these people [illegal shack dwellers] are doing things is uncalled-for, but they are doing it because our government has failed.

In this context Gilad Isaacs86 of the National Minimum Wage Research Initiative at Wits University says the problem is the state’s housing policy86:5: “Forceful occupation is no-one’s first choice, and we have to ask why there is vacant land owned by the provincial government in the first place.”

Runji66 comments on the country’s immense social inequality and the enormous insecurity present in the middle class — “cancerous metastasis” — which have been left untreated for 25 years by the present-day government and is boiling and exploding in various crimes, as for instance violence, xenophobia, etc. She writes66:13:

SA is not a nation at peace with itself. And that peace has been difficult to forge because the rights to life, dignity and liberty that are enshrined in the constitution have failed to find practical expression in the daily experience of millions across the country.

The reality is that many of those who have benefited from the opportunities of social mobility in the last 25 years, who form part of the new middle class, are precarious.

Their economic position hinges on them retaining their employment. As such they are a few pay checks away from falling of that prized middle class rung of the ladder.

They don’t only carry themselves and their picture-perfect families but they provide the remittances which many other relatives rely on to survive — the so-called black tax.

Misago75 traces all these different forms of serious crimes such as violence and specifically the so-called xenophobic attacks, to three origins (which are fully in line with the origins of the deadly violence in the Western Cape). He writes75:2: “Government must act before it’s too late. Government must target the root causes, which are unemployment and poverty”.

Specifically on the  presence of unemployment and poverty, which often serve as primary stimulants in doing violence and attacking other people’s lifestyles and possessions, and which unfortunately also engulf foreigners living in these areas, making them falsely troubled xenophobic areas, Pheto87 gives us in-depth insight when she argues that the unrest-troubled Alexandra has among the highest unemployment rates in the Gauteng province with between 4 979 and 8 758 jobless people per square kilometre.

Misago’s75 view of the incompetent ANC regime’s failed role in putting an end to the violence is supported by Alan Mukoki88, the CEO of the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Sacci).  He prominently blames88:7: “…a lawless environment in which people feel they can do what they like with impunity. The government needs to show that it is serious about law and order”.

Barron88 conveys Mukoki’s88 counter-description of the so-called exclusively “South African xenophobia” when he writes that Mukoki88 is of the opinion that the vast majority of South Africans are not xenophobic and that a few hundred people, engaging in racial and ethnic delinquencies, undoubtedly do not represent 60 million good people. The opinion of Mukoki88 is clearly that it is misleading and dangerous to label the present-day violent outbreaks as xenophobia, but that it is rooted in the results of a failed ANC regime. Barron88 reflects Mukoki’s88 words as follows88:7:

We cannot afford to politicise crime, to say that when people are committing crime they’re xenophobic. Deal with it as crime. When people steal goods and burn property it is crime. Xenophobia is used as a cover to commit crime.

For trust and confidence in SA to be restored, the government needs to demonstrate that it has the capacity and the will to take decisive action to contain violent outbreaks “before they get completely out of control”.

To have any hope of restoring the trust that is vital to investment, business people need a very clear plan from government about what it intends to do to deal with this issue in a way that is decisive.

The best answer to so-called xenophobia…is the “enforcement of existing laws, proper policies, proper leadership, proper values, proper service delivery”.

Ron Derby89 is looking from another angle at the unwelcome current hostility and violence aimed at foreigners (as well as South Africans on South Africans which forms the overwhelming violence in the country) by also putting the ANC regime, together with the various pre-1994 White regimes, in the accused box regarding such violence. Most of the violence now associated with the bad behaviour of foreigners, represents for him the negative outcomes of poor Black townships, the joblessness and poverty there, as well as the isolation from the greater economy of these people, whereby poor, destitute foreigners (fleeing sometimes much more chaos at home) are also forced to survive in an unfavourable living environment. Notwithstanding that these foreigners are forced to survive under equally poor local conditions (sometimes worse) as the local poor Blacks in the making of a living, their adaptable, practical styles of surviving (like doing various forms of trade) are often seen as faults by the locals, even as exploitation of the locals. Many of the politicians and policy-makers inside present South African politics show ignorance of the deeper drivers of violence, crime and thus the so-called xenophobia to which they have personally contributed through their poor governance.89 Derby writes89:9:

We’ve been exposed to some terrible economic planning [which led surely to poor townships, contaminated by joblessness and poverty], and it goes back to land legislation passed more than a century ago and apartheid laws a few decades later, and through the unintended consequences of the many plans for SA post 1994.

Amid this, we have a flood of migrants trying to make a living without the support of our government or their own.

Those of them who are merchants have priced their goods at levels so low that the Shoprites won’t try to match them, operating on margins so narrow that few average South African families would try to survive on them.

In this frustrating low-growth economic environment, immigrants are the easiest targets to blame for everything, from taking jobs to violence and crime.

At the centre of the ongoing violent outburst, Dr Kenosi Mosalakae90 reminds us, is the ANC’s inbred culture of revolutionary politics, wherein the obstruction of order is central and wherein every one of the present-day ANC top leaders had participated en masse in making the pre-1994 functioning systems ungovernable. This has led to an immense outlet of delinquent energy which is still steering the ANC clan on a daily basis in most of their actions. Mosalakae states90:14: “We are where we are because we have never forgotten to ‘render the country ungovernable’, we continue to do so whenever we have a grievance”.

The above established revolutionary culture of the ANC, inbred in its post-1980s members and constantly internalised in its post-1994 generation’s mindsets, has led thereto that lawlessness has almost become the norm, writes Mthombothi91. According to him91:25:

No demonstration or protest seems complete without a spate of violence or looting. There’s a bonfire somewhere every day of the week with the people protesting about one thing or the other. It started with unions trashing towns and cities during labour strikes. The government looked the other way because they were its allies. The students burnt books and buildings, including libraries, and were hailed as latter-day revolutionaries.

Looking critically at the various ANC regimes’ unwillingness and inability to stop and to eliminate prominent mass murdering since 1994, for instance in the Western Cape, and their lack of concern for the murders there (with a massive upswing the last five years or so), it seems wishful thinking to believe that the present Ramaphosa regime is going to do anything constructive to the present crime spree of violence;  it does not matter if it is called xenophobia or plain criminality. The deaths of fewer than 20 people in the context of so-called xenophobia in Gauteng this year are just too insignificant for the ANC mindset: the thousands of deaths by murder on the Cape Flats were seemingly not a real issue, until three months ago, so why really about a few more, newer murders?66,88,89

The ANC since 1994 has been “flying blind” when it came to assuring good governance, basically because its leadership is contaminated with the crooked mentality of revolutionary politics. Ramaphosa’s present actions to “make up” for instance to Nigeria about its citizens’ poor treatment here, will again be limited to the doing of talking but lacking the walking as the surge of conflict between foreign nationals and the SAPS in Cape Town at the end of October 2019 confirms. Criminality has overwhelmed the ANC’s top leadership, as the state capture and their many tainted members in the Parliament reflect. As leaders they are unable to be rehabilitated: they are blind to social disorder, especially inequality in wealth, social and personal status, such as that of the poor caught in the chaos of informal settlements and townships. Here the immense chaos is not limited to one specific informal settlement and township, but extend to the many around the country. The question may be asked with good reason if the ANC regime understands what is really going on in the townships where the poor are mostly forcefully channelled into an unstable and conflicting society. Comparing these problematic informal settlements and townships’ residents’ behaviour with that of residents in middle-class residenatial areas who are mostly stable and happy, the inequalities in wealth and class status reveal a stark picture which is a recipe for violence.66,68,69

Runji66 gives us an insight into the indecisiveness of the Ramaphosa regime when it comes to doing something constructive to mitigate inequality and to defuse violence. Runji postulates66:13:

Research shows that unequal societies tend to be the most violent. Therefore, what will Ramaphosa do to get SA closer to be a nation at peace with itself. He should apply his mind and provide definitive responses to these questions.

The first 100 days of a leader in office is the sole guide to give an indication of what the legacy of his five years in office will be. Looking at the comprehensive criticism of what has gone wrong in these 100 days, the indicator classes Ramaphosa as a failed leader.66,88,89

An intimate view of the life of most of the many people in the informal settlements and neglected townships are given by three testimonies. In the first of the testimonies, under the title: “Top dogs need to feel pain of poor”, the author93 writes93:13:

Millions of my compatriots live in squalid and unsanitary conditions, without electricity, running water and toilets.

So the time has come for a united front made up of the President Cyril Ramaphosa, Mmusi Maimane …and Julius Malema to hold court with the poorest of the poor and feel the pain, the suffering, the hunger pangs, the joblessness.

But, most of all, to feel what it is like to rise from your slumber, and use a “long drop” for relief – 200m away from your shack.

It will be tough to leave their luxurious surroundings, but such a night will re-programme their moral compass.

The second author94 writes94:18:

In this morass, Ramaphsa and his mavens think it is possible for society to gravitate towards a social compact. When people are living with raw sewage flowing down their streets, digging in rubbish bins for food and getting arrested in a police dragnet because they ‘smell Ethiopian’, it is quite difficult to embrace fanciful ideas of nationhood.

The third author95, under the title: “President Ramaphosa is living in dream land”, concludes as follows95:13:

A new day and another addition from the wish list of Cyril Ramaphosa who made a request which turned out to be similar to his “I have a dream of future cities on the clouds and bullet trains”.

Now the president encourages the public “to use public transport to foster social cohesion”.

Has he ever tried to take a ride on public transport? Oh yes, he did once and a 20 minutes ride took him three hours as there was a breakdown and he was fuming.

Has he taken the Metrobus service that only operates between strikes or taken a ride on one of the overloaded killing machines called minibus taxis? Of course not.

It seems he still didn’t learn a lesson and so he dreams and pontificates.

Has he considered as well the crime and thieving and killings on some of the modes of our transport? Definitely not.

That’s why it’s a bit rich coming from him.

Which planet do he and the rest of the clowns in his government come from when they endanger everyone’s lives with their blue light convoys which are screaming through our roads, but encourage everyone else to take public transport?

The fact that the ANC regime over 25 years failed to understand, to respect and to rectify the poor people’s circumstances, is the basis of not only of gangsterism and murder, but also xenophobia. Inequality in its broadest context, notwithstanding the consequences, must first be addressed as it was required to be addressed correctly over the last 25 years. The EFF MP Yoliswa Yako96, reflecting her own negative experience — varying from hope and excitement in 1994 to disappointment and despair in 2019 on the failed 1994 democracy and the comprehensive negative outcomes — tells us of the ongoing, devastating inequality and its many injustices which are gobbling up the South African nation, when she writes96:13:

I was a jovial 11-year-old in 1994. I have fond memories of how my mother proudly spoke of new hope, that everyone would own decent houses and how their children would go to any school of their choice.

She said working conditions would be incredibly better and opportunities would be afforded to all, in particular the previously disadvantage, without racial prejudice.

But all this excitement quickly turned into disdain as I watched my mother continue to toil like before. She continued to work as hard while our lives remained the same. Not much chanced and I grew up and I realised that this new democracy did not deliver on all its promises.

The ANC top leaders in the persons of Cyril Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule are too engaged in their own fighting over power within the present South African regime, making them disconnected with reality and in constant flight from taking responsibility for the massive wrongdoing perpetrated by the ANC since 1994 in the country. Munusamy54 illustrated this well by pointing out the failure of the two to meet the press together in person at Luthuli House (the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg) on 10 September to brief them on the current state of affairs in the country regarding unrest, gangsterism and undoubtedly the economy. The fact is that the two would have had to face a barrage of deep-cutting questions from journalists that would probably not only have exposed their failed leadership, but their lack of response to the multiple crises on their watch. On the present so-called xenophobia, gender and other kinds of violence, Munusamy54 writes that Magashule timidly  took the lead above Ramaphosa alone at the meeting, but  side-stepped his responsibility to the nation (and that of Ramaphosa and the ANC) as the ANC’s secretary general, by simply issuing a statement calling on government’s justice, peace and security cluster54:11: “…to establish the immediate causes of the violence and to identify those involved in fuelling it”. This statement, as expected, was of course never respected.

Of the immense gangsters’ threat to South Africa’s political setup, together with other forms of organised crime, the Deputy State Security Minister, Zizi Kodwa97, said recently that it indeed poses a danger to the legitimacy and stability of the South African state, reported The Citizen97 on 19 July 2019. The acting director general of state security of the ANC regime, Loyiso Jafta97, concurred, saying that there were already signs of erosion of the state by entrenched gangsterism [referring to additional crime, outside the crimes of state capture]. The Citizen of 19 July 2019 reports that Jafta97 stated97:6:

The truth is, and we have already seen elements of this, it does displace the formal structures of the state and once it happens, those who are benefitting, like getting healthcare, education, etc, will have a diminished view of the state, but those who are standing outside of it will also see a very, very weak state and therefore the legitimacy and the integrity of the state will severely subtracted from.

But further to that, if you allow it to mature then it starts corrupting law enforcement authorities, it starts corrupting the judiciary, it start s corrupting the legislature and before you know it, you have a complete narcoleptic state and once that happens it is very, very difficult to reverse the effects of that.

The presence of gangsterism, corruption, theft, state capture, murder and immense wrongdoing inside the South African state go deeper than only the endangering of the legitimacy and the stability of the South African state: it represents a symbol of how the political leadership in the country is wholly ineffectual and disconnected from reality, writes Munusamy54.  This results in a bad economy and a totally insecure citizenship ready to riot, with serious consequences already on view. Munusamy posits54:11: “The state of the economy creates the sense that life in our country is a constant fight for survival and that we are at war with each other”. 

Supporting Munusamy’s54 postulation, Dr Saths Cooper54, president of the International Union for Psychological Science and previously a prominent Anti-Apartheid activist, states that the country’s people are54:11: …“living in a state of psychic emergency and the presence of a sense of ‘deep insecurity’ stemming from the demise of law and order”. Referring to the flaming-up of violence in the middle of July to 16 September period of 2019, especially gender and xenophobic violence, he states54:11:

I don’t think the leadership [ANC] fully appreciates where we are right now. The past two weeks have been the worst psychological moment the country has experienced post-democracy. It is really a new low.

People are living with conditions of imminent emergency, crisis and fear. It is an all-pervasive fear. People are afraid to go out and common spaces are deemed to be unsafe.

Munusamy54, quoting Cooper’s standpoint, writes that for Cooper54 the underlying problem is deep public distrust of officials, either elected or appointed. In this context, she writes54:11:

People have lost confidence in those in positions of authority and we do not have the calibre of leadership to rally the nation; and: : “It is unclear what it would take for government and the ANC to realise that SA is at war with itself and the rest of the continent. While the ANC is hoping that a government that is ‘in touch’ and ‘responsive’ conjures itself out of thin air, people continue to lose confidence and feel under siege.

The economist Thabi Leoka54 is of the opinion that the present chaos in the country, especially the devastating violence, can be laid before the door of the government’s inaction to govern appropriately and effectively. She writes54:11: “The violence is how the poor is responding to the failure of leadership. That is the essence of what is happening”. Leoka54 describes this failed ANC leadership as follows54:11: “The lack of leadership appears almost as if this [the xenophobic attacks] is encouraged by SA’s politicians”.

On the failed ANC regime and the empty utterances and promises of its leader Cyril Ramaphosa who has a bag full of goodies for every South African post-2019, Munusamy50 postulates50:20:

Still, his [Ramaphosa] words and those of other party leaders failed to provide solace and direction. We are beyond the point of promises to fix the bureaucracy.

In a week of turmoil and despair, it was apparent more than ever that our country is surely in need of leadership and change but that it could not come from the president.

Ramaphosa does not seem to have the mettle to lead the way in a time of deep crisis. He does not have a team around him that can read the room, and is therefore constantly on the back foot and fighting fires. The government has no money and does not implement the measures he announces.

On the high level of crime in present-day South Africa there is much warning in the words of Gareth Newham55 of ISS regarding the presence of an incurable crime culture when he writes55:3: “South Africa’s high level of violence is rooted in its violent past and continues across generations”.

Indeed, South Africa seems to be lawless, leaderless and spiralling into the Armageddon of a failed state, notwithstanding that Ramaphosa is president and the ANC in government. The hungers of violence and crime are insatiable; they are busy gobbling up South Africa.

4. Conclusions

There are no signs that the pre-May 2019 election promises of Cyril Ramaphosa and his ANC regime have so far in any way been realised. The many ills of South Africa have still not been healed and there are even more ills. The economy is still in a dire state, while the ANC’s politics is indecisive. The country can indeed be described as being in a state of disparity and despondency. The presence of the Chávez-Madura-elite is also palpable here and the feeling of another Venezuela in the making, may be true.

Our law-enforcement institutions are in disrepair; they just do not have the ability and keenness to combat violence and crime.

Crime, as well as prominent violence in various forms, is well anchored in the South African culture. It is not new, but a phenomenon traceable to pre-1994. The 1994 New Dispensation, with its assumed and preached democracy, peace and justice for everyone, was supposed to erase it, but the internalised revolutionary mentality to destroy within the ANC seems to have aggravated the situation, creating more violence and crime.

The present-day South Africa as a failed constitutional state, masterly captured inside a culture of extreme violence and crime by the Marxist-Leninist ANC, is well summed up by Saunderson-Meyer41 when he writes41:12:

There is virtually not an international comparator that SA has not sagged against. There is not a moral or ethical standard that we have not betrayed. The country is literally grinding to a halt.

In full support of Saunderson-Meyer’s41 opinion Scott98:13 states:

The more one looks at the ANC, the more one can come to no other conclusion than that the only purpose it has is to complete the destruction of the country it claims to love. Everything it touches is destroyed.

South Africa is, as Myburgh claims in his book, a gangster state.5

Within the ganster state, there flickers the vague red light of a planned political-military coup in the making. The fact that the ANC has been ruling undemocratically with only 28% of the eligible voters on its side, reflecting that it is losing power and may lose the next national election, makes its agenda very dangerous. Political unrest, anarchy, but especially revolution, may be seen as the ideal opportunity for the Magashule-Mabuza-Zuma clan to interfere and intervene, and thus to grab the daily government under the pretext of restoring political order and the ANC’s policy of Marxism-Leninism.99-102

To terminate violence and crime, more is asked than just the reform of the ANC as a regime. It would need a total obliteration of the ANC from the country’s politics. To hang on to the ANC as a regime and to try to reform the party will only aggravate further our already uncontrolled violence and crime: Its Marxist-Leninist intentions will put the country on fire. The warning of Majoko103 is clear and precise103:12:  

Political expediency is bad for the overall health of the republic. No matter how badly one wants to deal with a festering wound, amputation of the whole appendage because it’s quicker only creates a bigger long-term problem.

Post-2019 spells chaos for South Africans if the ANC stays in power. Justice Edwin Cameron104 gives the ordinary citizen a warning when he says104:12: “Tough times lie ahead for those who are committed to democracy, governance under law and to social justice for all people in our country — not the enrichment of the inside elite.”

In the next (Article 14), entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability)”, the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of its mandate as ruler it received from the 8 May 2019 election, will be further evaluated.

5. References

  1. Teresa V, Renner TC. My Life in the Mafia. Hart-Davis and MacGibbon, London. 1973.
  2. Basson A, Du Toit P. Enemy of the People. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball; 2017.
  3. Davis D, Mutemwa-Tumbo D. Guns, lies, politics: seeking a judicial inquiry into arms deal’s whitewash commission. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 16; p. 20.
  4. Gibson E. Wapens: ‘Ons kán geld terugkry’. Rapport (Nuus).  2019 Aug. 25; p. 8.
  5. Myburgh P. Gangster State. Cape Town: Penguin; 2019.
  6. Louw, GP. 2018. Ensovoort, 38 (2018): 7(2): 1-36:An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652 to 2018. Part 4: A basic checklist for the appraisal of executive political leaders and regimes.
  7. Pauw J. President’s Keepers. Cape Town: Tafelberg; 2017.
  8. Bawa K. The Star (Opinion). 2019 June 11; p. 8.
  9. Police is failing, but there is a way to destroy Cape Town’s gangs’ recourse. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 30; p. 16.
  10. Bruce D. Focus on violent crime welcome but likely to lead to fiddling of figures. Sunday Times. 2019 June 30; p. 17.
  11. Jansen J, Du Toit E. ‘Julle sal ons wel sien op Vlakte’. Rapport (Nuus), 2019 July 14; p. 4.
  12. National effort to combat gangs. Sunday Times (News/Crime). 2019 July 14; p. 6.
  13. Nombembe P, Hyman A. The killing field. Sunday Times (News/Crime). 2019 July 14; p. 6.
  14. Nombembe P, Hyman A. Living and dying in Tin-Can Town. Sunday Times (News). 2019 June 16; p. 6.
  15. Pinnock D. Young people in the crosshairs as army moves into Cape townships. Sunday Times. 2019 July 28; p. 19.
  16. Vlakte se bloed aan regering se hande. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 July 14; p. 2.
  17. Watson A. SANDF is off to Cape Flats. Saturday Citizen (News). 2019July 13; p. 4.
  18. Lockdown a little too late for deceased. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 July 9; p. 12.
  19. Ritchie K. Bloodbath on Cape Flats should make us worried. Saturday Star (Opinion). 2019 July 13; p. 8.
  20. Fokazi S. Cape Town mortuaries not coping with intake. Sowetan (News). 2019 July 10; p. 6.
  21. Hyman A. “World’s most dangerous city’. Sunday Times. 2019 June 30; pp. 1, 4.
  22. Makora M. More cops to beef up safety. Daily Sun. 2019 September 12; p. 8.
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  24. Makhetha T. Hundreds of murders committed by kids. Sowetan (News). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 3.
  25. Hyman A. Like a prison camp for a city’s outcasts. Sunday Times (News). 2019 June 16; p. 6.
  26. McCauley R. Decisive action is essential. The Star. 2019 July 16; p. 6.
  27. Sain R. Body bags mount after Port Elizabeth’s fatal gunshot attacks. The Citizen (News). 2019 June 14; p. 8.
  28. Curb lawlessness or pay the price. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 12.
  29. Marupeng P. Femicide sentences not a deterrent. Sowetan (News). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 2.
  30. Okoye CJ. Crime focus must shift. The Citizen (Crime stats). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 3.
  31. Versluis JM. “Totale kopskuif’ moet kom. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 6.
  32. Two places where our police can start to improve right now. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 15; p. 18.
  33. Special anti-gang police units needed, says DA. The Citizen (News). 2019 July 29; p. 4.
  34. Makhetha T. Kempton Park kidnappings capital. Sowetan (News). 2019 Sept. 13; p.2.
  35. Hosken G, Singh O. Motorist warned of N3 terror zone. Sunday Times (News Arson). 2019 June 9; p. 2.
  36. Slabbert A. Aanvalle op lorries eis 200 lewens. R1,2 mjd in 1jaar. Rapport (Nuus), 2019 June 9; p.8.
  37. Trucks bombed, set alight. Sowetan (News). 2019 Sept. 11; p. 9.
  38. Du Plessis C. “Die geweld kan uitbrei, ander raak’. Beeld. 2019 June 10; p. 1.
  39. Marupeng P. Plans afoot to tackle violence in SA. Sowetan (News). 2019 Sept. 11; p. 7.
  40. Ehlers W. State apathy at truck violence inexcusable. Sunday Independent (Opinion). 2019 June 9; p. 10.
  41. 41. Saunderson-Meyer W. Optimism shrivels on vine. Saturday Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 13; p. 12.
  42. Smit S. Prasa leaves guards in the cold. Mail & Guardian (News). 2019 June 28 to July 4; p. 15.
  43. Pijoos I. Train services really off the rails. Sowetan (News). 2019 July 10; p. 9.
  44. Let’s not waste another chance to save SA. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 3.
  45. Pelser W. Ja, barbare is los, maar wraak sal ons nie red. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 6.
  46. Hans B. Castration would end the problem of rape, says King Zwelithini. The Star (Nation). 2019 Sept. 26; p. 24.
  47. Lebitse P. Mogoeng spot on about giving rape and gender-based violence special attention. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 13; p. 13.
  48. Fokazi S. After rape, victims still have to face uncaring cops. Sunday Times (News) 2019 Sept. 15; p. 4.
  49. Gumede W. Cyril must learn: a little empathy goes a long way. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 20.
  50. Munusamy R. Our abnormal society can change through rebellion or in a planned way, but no messiah can save us. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept 8; p. 20.
  51. Jansen J. Die gruwels teen vroue duur voort. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 6.
  52. Zulu M. Justice minister vows to go after transgressors. The Citizen (News). 2019 Oct. 17; p. 2.
  53. Nakedi Z. It’s time to take action against violence in SA. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 11; p. 12.
  54. Munusamy R. No leadership to undo damaging anti-SA sentiment. Sowetan (Analysis). 2019 Sept. 11; p. 11.
  55. Okoye CJ. Latest figures are based on pure speculation, says expert. The Citizen (Crime Stats). 2019 Sept.13; p. 3.
  56. Tsotesti PB. Tragedy amid neglect our mothers have to endure. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 29; p. 20.
  57. Mavuso B. Business cannot ignore the pleas of women who fears to walk down the street or in office corridors. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 26.
  58. Gumede W. Lobola, reed dance has to go as we root out patriarchy. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 26.
  59. Let us not forget the rights of poor and rural women with little access to justice. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 4; p. 18.
  60. Presidential promise. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 4.
  61. Child K. Plenty of pricey talk, no action. 2019 Sept. 8; p. 4.
  62. Child K. A violent land – for Women and men. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 4.
  63. Hlatshaneni S. Data collection ‘subpar’. The Citizen (Crime Stats). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 2.
  64. Wayland D, Gontsana MA. Women-only carriages derailed. Saturday Citizen (News). 2019 Sept. 21; p. 7.
  65. Emmett M. Lies, lies and more lies. Sunday Times (Lifestyle). 2019 Sept. 29; p. 15.
  66. Runji N. Cyril has to show nation what the legacy of his years in office will be. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 June 20; p. 13.
  67. Coetzee A. Waarom ek huiwer om alle mans ‘vuilgoed’ te noem. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Sept 22; pp. 4-5.
  68. Makhetha T. Police call for calm in Soweto after looting. Sowetan (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 2.
  69. Njilo N. Foreign nationalist close up shops and leave area. Sowetan (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 2.
  70. Hunter Q. SA pushes back against xenophobia fury. Sunday Times, 2019 Sept. 8; pp. 1,7.
  71. Saunderson-Meyer W. Don’t uses that dirty x-word. Saturday Citizen (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 14; p. 12.
  72. Gumede W. ANC leaders need to own up to past sexual violence. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Oct. 20; p. 22.
  73. Action now, not debate on attacks. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 12; p. 14.
  74. Hosken G. Gauteng’s death toll rises to 11. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 2.
  75. Hosken G, Germaner S. Warnings of xenophobic attacks ignored. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept 8; p. 2.
  76. SA’s apology ‘not a solution’. The Citizen (News). 2019 Oct. 3; p. 5.
  77. Raids and ugly rhetoric the wrong way to go. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 11; p. 16.
  78. Comrade Bob to some…how SA leaders saw Mugabe. Sunday Times (Insight). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 2.
  79. From democrat to despot. Sunday Times (Insight). 2019 Sept. 8; pp.1-2.
  80. Leon T. Rap on the knuckles for the new nationalists. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 29; p. 20.
  81. Rooi J. Afrika eer Mugabe as held. Rapport (Sport). 2019 Sept 8; p. 9.
  82. Rooi J “Mugabe se dood verander niks” – Zim-uitgewekenes. Rapport (Sport). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 9.
  83. Hosken G. Provocation or sheer madness? Two sides of the tragedy. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 2.
  84. Buccus I. Ace and the gang are precisely the people Fanon warned us about. Sunday Times. 2019 Aug.4; p. 19.
  85. Khumalo F. Foreigners not the real target of fires of fury. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 15.
  86. Wicks J. Suburbs on edge as shanty towns grow. Sunday Times (News). 2019 July 28; p. 5.
  87. Pheto B. Down jobless street. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Aug. 11; p. 6.
  88. Barron C. ‘Flying blind’ as lawlessness rules. Sunday Times (Business) 2019 Sept 8; p. 7.
  89. Derby R. Violence sprouts from broken plans. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 9.
  90. Mosalakae K. SA drifting from Biko, Sobukwe’s ideals. Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 14.
  91. Mthomboti B. Instead of groveling to foreign heads of state our government should apologise to us. Sunday Times. 2019 Sept. 22; p. 25.
  92. Mokgobu A. Bread theft ‘sparks looting’. The Citizen (News). 2019 Aug. 16; p. 5.
  93. Bachtis P. Top dogs need to feel pain of poor. The Citizen (Letters). 2019 Aug. 16; p.13.
  94. Munusamy R. A bare-knuckle fight rather than fanciful philosophies is what we need now to secure the future of our country. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 18; p. 18.
  95. Michel J. President Ramaphosa is living in dream land. Saturday Citizen (Letters). 2019 Oct. 12; p. 13.
  96. Yako Y. Why people worship demigods who don’t serve them? Sowetan (Opinion). 2019 June 20; p. 13.
  97. Gangsters’ threat to state. The Citizen (News). 2019 July 19; p. 6.
  98. Scott C. ANC obviously out to destroy SA. The Citizen (Letters). 2019 Aug. 28; p. 13.
  99. Mirrian N. List scandal will haunt Ramaphosa. Mail & Guardian. 2019 March 15-21; p. 4.
  100. De Lange J. JZ-kamp kaap ANC se kieslys. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 7.
  101. Gloves off in ANC turmoil. Business Times (Opinion). 2019 February 26; p. 8.
  102. Harper P. ANC applies the Ronaldo principle Mail & Guardian. 2019 March 15 -21; p, 31.
  103. Majoko S. Time for some introspection. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 July 23; p. 12.
  104. Sokutu B. Cameron’s parting shot. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 22; p. 12.

 

PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names

 

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Analyst, confidence, desperate, expropriation, journalist, perspective, political party, traumatised, violence.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 3

1. Background

Many poor, marginalised and desperate black South Africans  regularly support leaders and parties whose policies and behaviour on the face of it run counter to their own interests, only worsening their poverty  and marginalisation.

Supporting populist leaders has been shown in many African countries, such as Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, to have caused more suffering for the poor because populist rhetoric, corrupt behaviour and inappropriate policies crash economies and lead to mass starvation, societal breakdown and violence.

In SA, a case in point is of course the desperate voters who elected leaders such as former president Jacob Zuma; they voted to continue their own poverty and underdevelopment.

The irony is, black poverty increases partly because of the actions of populist leaders, be they in the ANC or EFF, and because much of the support for such leaders comes from the poor, wider poverty means more votes for the populists, even though they act against the interests of their own supporters.1:18

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 11)

Article 12 is a continuation of the previous article (Article 11, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (11: Introduction)”. The research forms part of a project consisting of 10 articles, offered in sequence which started with article 11 on the ANC. The intention of is to analyse and discuss further the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC effect land expropriation successfully as reflected by its CVs and Attestations, starting with article 11 and to be continued in this article (12) and the next article.

1.2. Aims of article 12 (Continued from Article 11)

The primary intention of this project (Part 3 on the ANC) is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by specifically describing the profile of the ANC on the same basis as was done with the previous two articles (Part One: Article 9 on the EFF and Part Two: Article 10 on the DA).

Our primary aim here is to evaluate the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of the empowerment as ruler it received from the 8 May 2019 election. The focus will be on the party’s leadership to detect poor personal and political integrity.

2. Method (Continued from Article 11)

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to do successful land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources have been consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to effect successful land reform from 2019.

The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Overview

The manifestos, self-descriptions and public referees of the ANC have already been partly reflected, evaluated and described in the previous article (Article 11), entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (11: Introduction).”

The public referees of the African National Congress will be reflected, evaluated and described in the under-mentioned division 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019.

3.2. The Louw Appraisal Checklist

The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, will again be used for the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC.2 The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s manifesto and  the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees applicable.2

3.3. The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 11)

3.3.1. South African prosperity

The concept prosperity, either in general or specifically, must and can only be read  within the context of the utmost political, economical and social stability. This approach to analysis and to describe prosperity is applicable to the country as a whole, as well as partial terms as to sub-regions, districts and provinces.

Prosperity does have clear markers in governance, such as the specific presence of good to excellent economics, education, law-abidingness, healthcare, governance, employment, financial sufficiency and independence, safe living and working environments, quality housing and service delivery, equal rights before the law, sufficient and safe public transport, an effective and working police force, an effective and working prosecuting and judicial system, a trustworthy and effective government, law-makers and state officials, equality in wealth and opportunities, the spreading of wealth to and the uplifting of the poor, the presence and promotion of a system of stable family life, etc. These markers, identifying good to excellent actions of a government, bring a clear differentiation between prosperity (goodness) and adversity the (badness). To evaluate and decide on a government’s political integrity, its accountability and responsibility to the voters and the citizens — and thus to evaluate and to decide on the basis of the Louw Appraisal Checklist if it can successfully implement land reform — requires an in-depth analysis of the regime’s daily workings; preferably to be studied over a period of ten years and more. In the case of the ANC, we have a comprehensive archive at our disposal, produced by a large contingent of able and skilled political analysts, political commentators, and investigative and crime journalists, published over 25 years and more.2

Reading the ANC’s and Ramaphosa’s May 2019 election manifestos, it may leave the impression in the average reader’s mind that South Africa is a prosperous state and that a predictable prosperity awaits us all in post-2019 South Africa. But, reading on the other hand the reflections of some critical political analysts and commentators, the contrary seems to be true. Prominent among their criticism is a picture that reflects an ANC characterised by poor integrity, lacking the intention to do “good” to all the people and to bring prosperity in all areas to South Africans, notwithstanding President Cyril Ramaphosa’s sincere promises and undertakings since 2017. Barney Mthombothi3, one of the most experienced senior political analysts in South Africa, sees the party rather than the man when he posits3:19: “We know what kind of animal or monster it is, even with Ramaphosa at the helm.”

On the supposed prosperity of present-day and future South Africa, Saunderson-Meyer quotes an anonymous Canadian journalist4:12:

A Canadian journalist friend used post-1994 to say that South Africans were the most absurdly optimistic people that she had ever met. That optimism is shrivelling, turning sour on the vine.

This negative opinion is supported by other political analysts. The post-2019 ANC, as the pre-2019 one, has become also for them an animal, a monster, an uncontrollable beast, which is going to gobble up the country, including even Ramaphosa, before the end of 2024. South Africa’s so-called post-2019 prosperity-in-waiting is a hoax to them.4-7

In light of the above negative reflection on present-day prosperity in South Africa under the ANC regime it is needed to look comprehensively at those businesses still successfully functioning, the status of the economy, the presence of crime, the state of law and order, the workings of government, in general and specifically, under the iron hand of ANC control, etc. This will be done in the following subsections.

3.3.1.1. Business, finance and economic perspective

Conflicting opinions by the business community on the ANC’s practice and management of the economy, as well as the status of the country’s finances, have been seen since the May 2019 election.

For instance, the international ratings agency Standard & Poor (S&P) believes that the win of the ANC and Ramaphosa in the May 2019 election has ensured growth and that it can be expected that a doubling of growth to 1,6% can follow already before the end of 2019. S&P is of the opinion that the Ramaphosa administration will continue with policy “reforms” and that the country is better off post-May with the so-called “reform-minded united majority ANC-party” than what rule by any of the other 47 parties which competed in the elections, could bring. The Bureau for Economic Research at the University of Stellenbosch underwrites in some way S&P’s view and also believes that the ANC will go on with reform.  Hereto Moody’s is more neutral and allows the ANC space to prove themselves during the rest of 2019.8

But the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is far more pessimistic and, other than for instance S&P, points out the ANC’s broad unclear political policy constantly brings uncertainty. The IMF has cut the country’s growth for 2019 from 1,4% to 1,2 % and classified the ANC as a “less stable” regime.8

On the growth prospects of South Africa, Moody’s Investors Service said in the June 2019 Global Macro Outlook report that South Africa’s economy could experience a technical recession in 2019, while Capital Economics cut the growth forecast for 2019 to 0,5%. Nedbank was likely to reduce its growth forecasts for 2019 from 07% to 0.6% or even 0.5%, writes Brown9:3. George Glynos10 of ETM Analytics reports that the long-term decline in the performance of the South African economy is stretching as far back as 10 years and that the contraction of the economy would likely mean that tax revenue would remain under pressure, while the budget deficit would expand from 4,5% to 5% of GDP.9,10  Mpiyakhe Dhlamini10:4 emphasises that in 2018 the South African economy grew only 0,8% (with the last growth of more than 3% in 2011).

One of the best indicators of a crawling economy and a lack of prosperity is the level and numbers of liquidations. Anderson11 states that the total number of liquidations recorded in the country skyrocketed: it went up by more than half in April 2019. Anderson11 shows that liquidations rose by 53,1%, following year-on-year declines of 12,6%, and 9,6% in February and March 2019 respectively. In this respect, the National Credit Bureau reported for the fourth quarter of 2018 a decline (as a percentage of the total number of credit-active consumers of good standing) of 1,9% quarter-on-quarter and 1% year-on-year, while the number of consumers with impaired records rose to 10,16-million during the quarter. Investec is expecting a GDP growth of about 1% in 2019 and 2% in 2020.11

In terms of the use debt (and getting into it) South Africans are indeed debt-enslaved. The October 2019 statistics of the National Credit Regulator (NCR) show South Africans are over-indebted, writes Ngalonkula.13:19 During the the first quarter (Q1) of 2019, new credits increased by more than 5% to over R134 billion in Q2. One million applications were received for more credit (with nearly 60% turned down). There are 25 million active credit consumers with 10,23 million (40%) behind with their payments. The account-average per customer is 3,5, with the impairment of at least one. There are 80 milion debt accounts in South Africa, with 21 million in arrears by three months or more. Of these customers 12,7% have adverse listings against their names, while 5,1% have judgments and administration orders against them, reports Ngoako Mabeba13 of NCR. Ngalonulu13 mentions that a 2019 financial-reality survey by Debt Safe indicated that 67% of the 1 020 participants were indebted due to the tough economic climate, preventing them from buying basic necessities, 38% were indebted due to education and school expenses for themselves, their children and other relatives, while 29% were indebted due to unforeseen circumstances.

The Ramaphosa-regime is clearly out of touch with ever-growing numbers of poor people in South Africa, currently at 30 million, because of the tough economic conditions which prevent them from buying basic necessities, as well as people saturated with debt which they cannot escape or pay back. It spells a warning that a greater and more devastating “New Marikana violence” awaits us soon. The editor of The Citizen14, commenting specifically on the present-day mass of indebted miners who are constantly sinking deeper into financial chaos with their families as a result of the ANC regime’s permanent, ongoing economic failures, writes14:23:

SA’s mining sector has been particularly hard hit.

Two-thirds of the industry’s 450 000 workers have had unsecured loans and spend an average of 48% of their wages paying off debt.

In 2012, miners’ extreme indebtedness was seen as a root cause for violent labour unrest that culminated in the massacre of 34 strikers at Marikana.

To understand the immense ill-distribution of life chances and the absolute lack of sufficient resources in our cities, suburbs, informal settlements, neglected townships and shanty towns (which have seemingly been missing since 1994 from the observation of the ANC elite), it is important to understand the “normal” lifestyles of many of the unfortunates there.  The comprehensive research and in-depth personal experience of Dr. Chris Jones16 of the Unity for Moral Leadership of the University of Stellenbosch, who lived and worked for a certain time in the neglected township of Lavender Hill on the Cape Flats area, offers an excellent lifestyle audit and description of the conditions there; conditions which require enormous long-term socio- economic, educational and personal uplifting and constructive spending (instead of a waste of money on the  4IR there which will make no impact or serve an immediate goal). This audit, with the specific focus on how the issues of chaos, poverty, extreme crime and social disorder — stretching over a very long period and that are still continuing — shows why the extraordinary remedies planned by the Ramaphosa regime there (as 4IR) are unaffordable, unavailable, inapplicable, unviable and unsustainable. Jones’s observations are worthwhile to quote because they tell us how the basis of revolutions has been laid many times. More than that: they convey to us the possibility of a coming revolution.15-17

Jones16, reflecting on these tragic conditions which involve thousands and thousands of people who cannot easily be socio-economically and emotionally rehabilitated in their lifetimes, writes16:8-9:

Ek het onder meer vir so 90 minute per dag by Farikhaan in sy hout-en-sink-aanmekaar getimmerde winkeltjie deurgebring. Mense kon staan daar met enkele (koper-) muntstukke in die hand. Hulle koop byvoorbeeld R1 se suiker, R2 se koffie, een aartappel, een ui, of een stukkie Weetbix. Hierdie blokkie Weetbix word gedeel tussen twee mense, gemeng met water, omdat hulle nie melk kan bekostig nie.

Ek het gesien hoe mense net vel en been in Lavender Hill rondloop, nie net van honger nie, maar ook van al die pyn wat hulle saamdra. Afgetakel in liggaam en gees. Oë dof van ellende. Vasgevang in ‘n afgryselike, benouende, stik-donker put van ellende en magteloosheid met sy seepgladde wande van armoede, werkloosheid en uitsigloosheid. Hoe gaan hierdie mense hulself ooit hieruit ophef? Hoe “maak” kinders dit wat hier grootword?

The lack of social stability and prosperity can be traced back to the presence of many negative elements in the South African economy and society, such as joblessness, population growth, poverty, poor education standards, unstable family life, gangsterism, crime, etc. The fact that the childhood of South Africa’s youth is described as “not easy” — conditions stretching back decades — must ring a bell of concern when politicians speak of South African prosperity in 2019. Saba18 writes in the Mail & Guardian of 7 June 2019 using the data of STATS SA 2018 [as compiled by the M&G Datadesk from STATS SA 2019 (using the 2018 Figures)] on the “no easy Childhood of SA’s youth” wherein the Black child stands out as the main sufferer. This research shows, profiling the state of family life for the total Republic in terms of the country’s averages, that for the category of “who children are living with”, only 33,8% children are living with both parents,  3,3% living with a father alone, 43,1% living with a mother alone and as many as 19,8% living without a parent. In the Eastern Cape the absence of both parents in the home is as high as 33,1%. It is only in the Western Cape and Gauteng that the presence of both parents is high, namely respectively 53,7% and 48,9%. Many of these instabilities are the outcomes of single-parent births, but many result from the need for the parents to generate an income far away from home as the Eastern Cape statistics reflect.18

Looking specifically at the economics around childcare in South Africa as one of the barometers of prosperity in the country, the writing of Absolom19, based on the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign’s finding, shows that 14 million people go to bed hungry daily, with 53% (29 million) of the nation’s inhabitants experiencing food insecurity, the absence of prosperity. Based specifically on reports published at the end of 2018, more than six million of South Africa’s children regularly go hungry. Shining a further light ont the chaos around the economics of childcare, is a report by the Pietermaritzburg Agency for Community Social Action which states that already in 2017 it cost R578,45 a month to feed a child aged between three and nine years a nutritionally complete diet. Although the government supports some children of unemployed parents by providing a support grant of R380 a month per child, this money is far too little to make up the R578,45 minimum needed. Moreover, not every unemployed parent qualifies for the grant and some of these grants are only temporary.19

Besides this collapse of stable family life due to the poor finances of the country, there is also the threatening implosion of state-run businesses such as Eskom,  as well as those of the private business sector and their ordinary customers. Many economists and analysts note that there is a lack of sincerity by the ANC regime to fix anything, especially the corrupted state-owned enterprises  (which already cost the taxpayers billions of rand and, notwithstanding this, are mostly on the brink of going bankrupt). Prominent in this regard, is the failure of the ANC regime to deliver basic, essential services to the poor.9, 20-26

At least one economic outcome of such disorderly governance, caused solely by the ANC regime in charge of the country, is the contraction of 13,2% in the first quarter of 2019 in agriculture, which has historically bolstered GDP growth. The South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s business confidence index for May 2019 reflected a slump across most major sectors, while for the same month the Absa-sponsored purchasing managers’ Index (PMI) fell to 45,4 index points (1,8 points down from April 2019). The IHS Markit PMI also shows that the private sector across the economy has slipped back into contraction territory, reports Speckman25:5. He further states that fixed investment, which already declined in the first quarter of 2019, is expected to show muted growth and that in most other sectors there was a “complete and utter” lack of confidence in the economy; essentially because the ANC regime apparently does not understand the principles of a sound economy and does not know what to do to create a stable economy.25

In line with the evidence of an all-over slump in business confidence, Dhlamini10:4 states that between 2008 and 2016 (eight years) the country’s position on the Fraser Institute World-index for Economic Freedom dropped from 82 to 110 (down 28 places; meaning a decline in total of 26% or 3% per annum), reflecting the curtailed economic policy of the ANC, which is more and more rooted in its Marxist-Leninist principles and further strongly and negatively driven by the radical trade unions.10

Tony Leon27:20 writes on 28 July 2019 on the failure of the Ramaphosa regime’s economic policy and vision. Instead of facing the immense economic, social and political crisis, Ramaphosa himself has acted aimlessly and without drive. This is essentially because he has been forced into a small corner, permanently subject to the ANC politburo’s overseeing of his actions in terms of the ANC’s democratic-centralism, and of course, being forced to support the ANC’s unity on broad politics, including economics. Leon states that at the end of July 2019 the IMF forecast a dismal growth rate of 0,7%, two thirds lower than the rosy Treasury forecast. Every indication is there that within five years our current unsustainable debt levels will reach stratospheric heights of around 70% in relation to our anaemic GDP. Notwithstanding the economic decline, no fundamentals of policy will be reviewed in the future by the ANC, such as reforming or dropping BEE. On the contrary, it will be intensified, ostensibly permanently, until the ANC’s music ends.27

3.3.1.2. Stagnant job market and growing unemployment

In line with a troubled economy, there is evidence that the job-market is moving further into a phase of devastating job cuts, as the June 2019 cuts at the major corporations confirm. For instance, the following lay-offs will take place (with the number of employees in brackets): sugar producer Tongaat-Hulett (5 000), miner Sibanye-Stillwater (3 450), pay-TV producer MultiChoice  (2194), miner Impala Platinum (1 500), bankers Standard Bank (1 200) and Absa (827), diamond miner Alexkor (238) and construction company Group Five (3 000).28,29

Many economic and political analysts and strategists are seemingly ignoring that the ANC has created chaos in the life styles and standards of the overwhelming part of the South African population, with the result that there are more than 30 million poor citizens (out of a population of 58 million), while more than 17,5-million people, because of their extreme poverty and unemployment, are forced to live as beggars on social grants. When comparing the 2018 total tax revenue of R1 216 464 000 with the social grants paid out for that year at R155 264 000, social grants represent a burden of 12% on gross income. (Then there are also further grants indirectly paid to provincial governments which are not included here). Moreover, this unfortunate and poor contingent of people in need of social grants is constantly growing as a result of the growth in unemployment, rise in living costs and population increase. The statistics reflect that social grants have grown from 2017 to 2018 by 8%, while the growth in gross tax revenue for the period was only 6%.31

The utter failure over 25 years to create jobs by the ANC regime and which directly causes joblessness and extreme poverty, has negatively impacted other outcomes, such as gangsterism, robberies, unrest, public violence, anarchy and other crimes. Another barometer in this context to identify prosperity or despondency is to look at the official statistics: for 2017 to 2018 there were officially 890 523 job seekers registered, but only 21 076 (2,3%) were placed in jobs or internships. This leaves nearly 100% of the applicants still in the cold. Excluded from those still registered jobless of 869 447 in 2018, are the mass of jobless people who are not registered and who have lost hope to ever obtain any kind of work, forget a decent permanent job.32

This failure of the ANC at job creation must be to some extent be attributed to its populist streak, which Makhanya33:2 says forces the ANC to “set unachievable targets and give false hope to the people”. On the other, dark side such outrageous promises may represent a planned, delinquent misleading of the voters, like for instance the regime’s promise in June 2019 to “reduce unemployment from 27.6% to 14% in the next five years”, notwithstanding an economy that is expected to grow an average of 1,3% in 2019, 1,8% in 2020 and to reach at most 2,4% in 2023. Reality is seemingly simple absent from some of the ANC elite’s minds. On the other hand, it seems as if some of the ANC leaders are just not able to deliver on their rosy forecasts, simply because they are incapable, irresponsible and lacking in accountability.33

Professor Hardus van Zyl28 of the University of Pretoria agrees on the failure of the ANC’s economic policy and that the country under the ANC-regime is reaching the end of the road, financially as well as socially. The present-day chaotic job market undoubtedly reflects an excellent example, not only as to the absence of prosperity, but also political instability. He writes on 28 June 201928:23: “The country’s job market is horrible. I am concerned about youth employment; that, for me is really going to nail us.” In this context of ongoing and growing chaos, he seriously warns: “The time to talk is over. If we do not start being reactive now, we are going to have a crisis of incredible proportions in the next two to three years — we are going to see socioeconomic chaos.”

The reality is that there are not enough jobs on all levels for the ordinary citizens outside cadre deployment and BEE intervention, because the economy planned and created by the ANC is in crisis. Van Zyl28 is adamant that the failed economics of the ANC is a direct result of the ANC’s own chaotic job planning and their dogmatic, uncreative politics. He is especially concerned about the fact that the country’s youth counts for almost 66% of the total number of unemployed people. Here, in establishing a cause for the ANC’s economic failure, he points out that the ANC regime28:23: …“is bloated and cannot create jobs”.

The ANC’s “intended” efforts to better South Africa for all its people — mostly built on empty promises — never realised in the past. This was well reflected by Ramaphosa’s failed Work Conference in 2018.  Raymond Willemse31, head of Beeld’s metro projects, refers to the ANC politicians’ many promises “of work to come in the future”, but at the same time “acknowledged themselves their absolute failure to create it in the past”. A jobs plan for the the youth (who represent 55,2% of the latest jobless statistics) to alleviate their growing poverty, is absent. Nor is there any strategy for those 9,4 million South Africans who are unemployed (against 16,3 million in work) out of 38,4 million people of working age between 15 and 64 who  in some way qualify to be employed but aren’t.31,34,35

Ramaphosa’s foolish dream in his Third Sona to save South Africa with a comprehensive effort of mass job creation, especially seen against his inability to bring prosperity to the youth, is well illustrated when he pathetically said on 16 June 2019, on Youth Day31:3: “Moenie hoop verloor nie en moenie dat die die son oor jul drome sak nie”. The fantasies of Ramaphosa and his twisted economic and political views are nothing else than a lot of “Ramaphosa pies in the sky”. The Black youth know it well after 25 years of ANC rule. They know just too well the ANC’s leadership’s “talking without the walking”.31

Referring to the tragedy of youth joblessness within a so-called “South African prosperity” – a prosperity which in real life is confined to those with exclusive capitalistic bonds to the regime and the legitimated favouring of fewer than 10 million South Africans living in a “totally other South Africa” than the one inhabited by more than 30 million poor Blacks, Willemse writes31:3:

…as ‘n mens die SSA [Statistiek Suid-Afrika] se syfers sien oor die groot persentasie jong mense wat ophou werk soek het, die skool verlaat het en nie juis enige planne het om verder te gaan studeur nie, is dit duidelik talle jong mense het reeds hoop verloor en ophou droom. Vir hulle het die son van geleenthede reeds gesak.

Dié realiteit kan waargeneem word in gemeenskappe waar jong mense sonder geleenthede op straat rondrentel. Werkloosheid bring voortdurend maatskaplike en sosiale probleme mee wat nie gaan help om misdaadsyfers te verlaag nie.

Dit is ook ‘n klad op Suid-Afrika se naam wanneer graduandi by verkeersligte met ‘n plakkaat en curriculum vitae in die hand staan op soek na werk.

It is thus understandable why as many as 6 million eligible voters under the age of thirty (forming part of a total of 9,8 million eligible registered voters) did not register for the May 2019 elections. It also explains why there are another 9,1 million registered voters who did not make an effort to vote. The answer is obvious: They have written off the ANC as a legitimate regime; one which is lacking the integrity to ever bring prosperity to greater South Africa.31

3.3.1.3. Fourth Industrial Revolution

Reflecting further on the need for job creation and the unemployment problem as to both youth and adults, it is important to note how the ANC regime tries to distract the attention from their failure to offer constructive solutions and actions on these two matters. It needs to be reflected on, because of the danger which these two populations pose for the country’s stability and greater economy.

It is significant how much the Ramaphosa regime’s leadership, specifically President Cyril Ramaphosa and his Vice President David Mabuza, are misusing unrelated phenomena and situations to cover up the ANC’s failures. One very contradictory strategem they have found is to blame unemployment on the advent of digital technology which is decimating traditional jobs; at the same time, however, they hold forth that the use of information technology and the internet will solve the unemployment problem as part of the “fourth industrial revolution”.28

Outstanding here is their earlier suggestion that the advent and the growth of digital technology is one of the reasons for joblessness. Their arguments are extremely opportunistic and holds no ground. Facts show that digital technology is not involved in the kind of work that most of the jobless people are doing or will be doing in the future. Neither did digital technology force the employed worker into unemployment. Most of the unemployed persons’ training and education simply do not make them part of the various technological job categories. It seems a false argument by Ramaphosa and Mabuza, well-used by them, to escape from the realities of joblessness and their incapacity as leaders to solve the matter. Professor Hardus van Zyl28, specifically on joblessness, said that the ANC-regime allowed two problems to develop: firstly28:23: “…a structural problem of unemployment where ‘we have a huge skills gab, underpinned by, on average, low productivity, which makes the country vulnerable to high unemployment”. A second problem is cyclical unemployment which is caused by an “economy that is not growing”, indicating the truth: South Africa’s economy is in chaos. Ben Scully of Wits agrees on the fallacious scape-goating of digital technology as one of the so-called “creators” of joblessness, making up the “Ramaphosa-Magashule-theory” which regards digital technology as one of the reasons for the present South African joblessness and contributing to the possible growth of joblessness in the near future.  Reflecting on these false arguments, pointing to the real reason for the growth in unemployment, he states28:23: “…it’s a popular sort of idea that a company can use as an explanation when business might not be doing well because of the economy.”

We have already commented that making digital technology a scapegoat as being the cause of the present South African joblessness, Ramaphosa — as happened with many of his other hot-air political statements and opinions — later contradicts his initial suggestion on digital technology.  Most recently, Ramahosa has propagated that digital technology is going to be the “cleaner” of the country’s unemployment problem and as such must be supported and be promoted by government, notwithstanding evidence that the unemployment problem will not be solved and that most of the jobless people will not benefit from the exercise. He insists that 4IR is a vehicle to bring prosperity to all South Africans. The false, ongoing rhetoric regarding 4IR’s benefits is so intense that it seems to have replaced the ANC’s Radical Economical Transformation (RET) as part of its radical political rhetoric. For the objective analyst, the propagating of 4IR is nothing but an opportunistic ruse par excellence to distract the public’s attention from the real issues around extreme poverty, namely poor education, inequality and the lack of opportunities. Moreover: these specific negative determinants are going to block the transfer of 4IR to the mass of poor people. Critically viewed, it is folly to present 4IR, which is part of the “Silicon Valley model”, as a reality that will occur in South Africa. The argument that the establishment of advanced innovation and technology are going to solve our unemployment or other socio-economic and political problems, represents arrogance in the extreme.15,28,36,37

The ANC’s “Silicon Valley plan” is inapplicable to present-day chaotic South Africa and tantamount to wishful thinking37:25: the country’s lack of good basic and high school education and training, together with a failing economy in which unemployment is central, makes it a delusional plan, writes Molopyane. 4IR should not be a current priority. What should be priorities are economic development, foreign investment, job creation, improved education and training. The lower level of the potential labour force must first be developed and empowered by basic skills and work opportunities before the advanced 4IR may be introduced. Within the current conditions, 4IR is going to benefit a very small, already well-educated, trained and economically stable group37.  Ramaphosa’s remark37:25 ,“The digital revolution is an opportunity to build an entrepreneurial state, where government’s own appetite for risk and innovation inspires large-scale entrepreneurship and unlocks economical potential”, is fake news par excellence and tends to mislead the public for political gain.

No-one doubts that 4IR is going to have an impact, but, as said, only on a small group of already advantaged socio-economic and political beneficiaries, leaving the mass of poor still in the doldrums. 4IR spells more poverty and inequality for the mass of poor Blacks.36-39

Rossouw17 shows that the sound existence of sustainable industrialisation (and thus 4IR) depends on the presence of two primary elements. Firstly, it needs the maintenance and further development of basic technology (the so-called “family-lines of rising development”). The start here is the creation of a much-needed basic technology foundation, to be improved and to be extended in complexity during the immediate next phase, followed by another phase of improvement and complexity17:7: “Jy kan nie digitale netwerke en tegnologieë suksesvol instel en bedryf sonder die voorafgaande tegnologie van elektrisitet nie”. Secondly, ongoing or sustainable industrialisation needs constantly rising levels of literacy and numeracy. 4IR requires the education of new generations to understand and use old and new technologies through a functioning teaching system, together with the maintenance of the existing levels of industrialisation. These two prescriptions are missing in present-day South Africa, simply because of the  ANC regime’s failure over 25 years to bring development to poor South Africans. In this context, Rossouw posits17:7:

Ongelukkig is nie een van laasgenoemde twee vandag in Suid-Afrika teenwoordig nie. Onder ‘n regering wat gefikseer is op verbruik pleks van vervaardiging is verskillende nywerheidsorganisaies aan ‘n orgie van plundering en aftakeling onderwerp. Eskom is die uitstaande voorbeeld onder vele meer.

Kortom, dit wat van industrialisering en die beheersing van simboliese stelsels in die land teenwoordig was, is die afgelope 20 jaar en meer stelselmatig afgetakel. Dieselfde mense wat die voorwaardes vir deelnae aan volgehoue industrialisering vernietig het en steeds vernietig, kom bak nou mooi broodjies oor hoe die land moet deelneem aan die “vierde nywerheidsomwenteling”.

Nullifying Ramaphosa’s views and propaganda (the transfer of so-called “facts” back to myths) on the advent and/or existence of 4IR, Roussouw writes17:7:

By nadere beskouing is die ‘vierde nywerheidsrevolusie’ eintlik niks anders nie as bloot nog ‘n fase in die industrialisering van die bewussyn (robotte, kunsmatige intelligensie) en gepaardgaande simboliese stelsels (die kodes onderliggend aan nano- en biotegnologie).

On how the foolish and misleading concept of “4IR” established itself overnight in the mindsets and speeches of many South African university managers and politicians — including ostensibly Ramaphosa — and has became extremely misused and propagated by certain spokespersons and leaders, Rossouw explains17:7:

Eenvoudig: Pres. Cyril Ramaphosa, wat die laaste jare gereeld Davos toe is om die krummels van die tafel van die neokoloniale meesters van die wêreld te eet, het sy meester, [Klaus Martin] Schwab, se papegaai geword [*Schwab, ‘n ingenieur en ekonoom, is die stigter van die Wêreld Ekonomiese Forum (WEF) en lid van die Bilderberg-groep (BG). Die WEF en die BG is hoogs omstrede en het ‘n groot aandeel aan die ekologiese krisis, ekonomiese ongelykheid en die huidige wêreldwye politieke onstabiliteit].

Nog voordat jy “Kophou” kon sê, het die term soos ‘n veldbrand versprei en net nog ‘n leë bestuurscliché geword. Dat politici wat die guns van die neokoloniale meesters soek hulle napraat, verras niemand nie, maar mens verwag meer van universiteitsbesture.

Aangesien Suid-Afrika se eie industriële organisasies en die bemeestering van simboliese stelsels die afgelope 20 jaar stelselmatig vernietig is, sal dit gek wees om hierdie tegnologieë nie met die grootste omsigtigheid te benader nie as ons ons nie bloot verder wil laat koloniseer om ons na die beeld van sinistere korporasies te misvorm nie.

The widespread presence of poverty and inequality in our current society is blocking and stifling any hope to create a comprehensive, inclusive digital economy. Angelo Fick36, the director of research at the Auwal Socio-economic Research Institute,  writes that technology is not necessarily the panacea it is made out to be36:21: “it is indeed de-skilling the under-skilled”. In this context he states that South Africans are suffering from skills deficits that are much more fundamental than the ones they are being urged to address ahead of the 4IR.36

Various authors write that histories of earlier industrial revolutions show that their outcomes were not associated with the interests of the working or under-classes, but were associated with the advancement of capitalism through the so-called “big class of technology”. This means that the 4IR’s outcomes will be the same for present-day South Africa: more poverty, more inequality, more ethnicity and racism, and more exploitation. The mass of the poor Blacks will be outsiders to the benefits of the 4IR and will be the victims because the new setup will exacerbate the existing social, economic and political inequalities, problems and conflicts. It will only, as the ANC’s cadre-employment and selective BEE-employment did, provide prosperity once more to the ANC elites (and possibly a state capture contract). The promotion and welcoming of the 4IR is again one of Ramaphosa’s distractions from the real problems responsible for the country’s backwardness, created and upheld by the ANC regime in many areas, such as education, job opportunities, etc.15,17,36,38

Both of the ANC regime’s two postulations, namely firstly that digital technology has led to people losing their jobs and thus that it creates unemployment, and secondly that 4IR is going to be a job creator and that it will remove the unemployment problem, are outright false.

South Africa’s jobless problem requires logical thinking, planning and doing. It needs the understanding of realities, and of course the acceptance of it. The basic fact, which Ramaphosa and his leadership missed, is that in order to accommodate at least 700 000 young people entering the job market on all levels every year, the country needs an annual growth rate of at least 10%. (In this respect the ANC regime could only manage a current growth rate of 1,5% for 2019, with at most 2,1% forecast for 2021!) Then, apart from this much-needed 10% growth for the more or less 700 000 youths coming onto the job market annually, there are the many other youths and adults already outside jobs because of the economic crisis.  These statistics, together with the mass of jobless, untrained and hungry people, confirm over and over the shameful failure of the ANC regime’s economic and population policies, nullifying the introduction of advanced programmes for digital technology and the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) as a solution for the mostly under-skilled and undertrained poor. It will only, as the ANC’s cadre employment and selective BEE employment did, create prosperity for ANC insiders who constitute a small, selective group within the broader population. The promotion of 4IR by Ramaphosa, as a solution for unemployment, is again one of Ramaphosa’s distractions from the real problems regarding the country’s backwardness in many areas, such as education, work opportunities, poverty, etc., that were created by the failed ANC regime.15,17,36,38

3.3.1.4. Empty state coffers

Our state-owned enterprises’ financial health is in tatters (which is very much in line with the ANC’s general politics and their empty state coffers). There are the continuously failing Eskom, SAA, SABC, etc., as examples. How empty the ANC regime’s purse is, was well reflected in June 2019 by Denel’s announcement that it would not be paying full salaries at the end of the month. Although Pravin Gordan announced after this that a “lender” was found to pay Denel’s salaries, it the chaos within the South African economy and within a government whose day-to-day rule is characterised by constant borrowing.40

The extent to which the South African state under Ramaphosa is approaching financial bankruptcy and an empty treasury, is well illustrated by the recent jobs bloodbath wherein small business owners had to close shop, primarily because the state owes them a staggering R7,1 billion in unpaid invoices. (The amount was R0,6-billion on the national level and R 6,5 billion on the provincial level). The negative situation (and its serious consequences) was summed up by Statistics SA’s indication that unemployment in the labour force (private sector) had increased from 27,6% in the first quarter to 29% in the second quarter of 2019. This shocking figure was revealed by a Ramaphosa minister, the Small Business Development minister, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, in a written reply to Parliament. In this context, it was revealed that invoices of private providers for services rendered should be settled by the state within 30 days. Despite this official rule, the average age of outstanding official debt is several months. This has had serious consequences for the private firms and their employees, a situation which seemingly left the Ramaphosa regime unconcerned. Makinana and Umraw41 report on this chaos, created directly by the government, and its effects on employees and employers as well as their families and communities. They write41:4:

Small business owners who deal with the government have sad stories to tell about the unwillingness to pay them on time. An Eastern Cape based civil engineering firm owner said she had been sent from pillar to post for almost a year over outstanding invoices. ‘We are unable to pay our staff. There are outstanding salaries in our company for about six months. As a result, we are down to two staff members from 11’.

Ramaphosa too, in his parliamentary reply to his Third Sona, confirmed in some way the lack of money in the state coffers and the failure of the economy to generate cash under the present ANC regime. In an effort to escape the growing financial and economic fiasco — further showing up the ANC regime’s lack of business skills to restart the country’s collapsing economy by means of proper planning and management — Ramaphosa has gone on a second investment drive in 2019/2020 after his 2018 $100 billion investment drive was not a roaring success. Marrian40 describes Ramaphosa and Gordhan’s desperate borrowing spree to meet the state’s daily needs, like salaries (and thus to avoid more job cuts), as40:27: “…an illustration of the short-termism and lack of planning afflicting government.

As already shown in the above analysis, general economical stability and normality are lacking in South Africa. For big companies and capitalists, it does not meet the criteria of “prosperity”. It seems as if it is only the pro-Ramaphosa media and the ANC’s top brass who still “believe” in their own myth. Indeed, as already said, South Africa is on the brink of collapse. The unstable and deteriorating economic situation is contradicting the vestiges of South African prosperity. Our failed prosperity is debunked by the independent economist Thalbi Leoka.40 For Leoka40 the primarily reason for this chaos is apparently situated in the mindset of the ANC’s top elite at Luthuli House (which forms an important part of the ANC’s politburo). Luthuli House and the ANC’s politburo lack an understanding of the seriousness of the country’s economic situation: essentially they do not understand that there is such a thing as “good democratic capitalism” outside of the crooked socialism of their Marxist-Leninist convictions. In short: they fail to make a distinction between good and bad economic planning. As Leoka puts it40:4: “…the GDP figures indicate an economy in crisis, while the ANC seemingly speaks of prosperity”.

The CEO of Nedbank, Mike Brown42, also said in August 2019 that Ramaphosa and his regime are at a critical juncture and the country requires urgent action not to crash into an IMF bailout. In his outline of a failed economy, Brown also focussed on the ANC’s internal self-centred leadership struggle, leaving the affairs of the regime in tatters. On a question from the journalist Chris Barron42 if Brown42 believes Ramaphosa is capable of taking politically unpopular decisions which rectifying the business programme requires, Brown42, very tactfully responded42:6:

I’m not qualified to comment on the president’s ability to do these things. But we are left with no option other than to take these difficult decisions.

Immediate remedies to save South Africa’s twisted economy by means of South African private initiatives so as to rescue the country from a Venezuelan or Zimbabwean scenario, are being looked on skeptically for good reason. Any initiative where the ANC-regime is in a way involved to bring correction is doubted. The chaos, created over 25 years of ruling, is putting even an IMF-intervention and –interference, to can bring economical-correction, in doubt. The state-coffer is going to be for a long time on its emptiest ever.

In this context of private saviours coming in to “remodel” South Africa to regain economic and financial integrity, it is important to reflect on a public-private growth initiative project, announced in June 2019, ready for takeoff. The recent statement by the initiative that the first phase of 43 projects has been activated, as part of the so-called Public-private Growth Initiative, and which aims to inject R840 billion into the economy and create 155 000 jobs over the next five years, seems to be wishful thinking at this stage within the current South African politico-economic context. So far it only reveals a theoretical approach. It seems again to be part of the talking without walking politics of South Africa that has had the country  in its grip since 1994. The immense political failure over 25 years by the ANC and South Africa, has caused the international community to cool in its enthusiasm, other than in 1994 when they were eager to assist the ANC and South Africa after apartheid’s wrongdoing.  It seems foreign investors are leaving the ANC and South Africa on their own to see what next catastrophe will follow. Reflectin the difficulty to get foreign entities involved in present South Africa, the World Bank Index is a good place to start: where the country used to rank at number 32 out of 190 economies in those early days of ANC rule, it has now slipped to position number 82 (50 places, or nearly 30%, down).

De Lange43:4 states that the South African economy now may now be compared with the level where the country was in the 1980s when it had a large amount of debt.  South Africa under the ANC, writes Strydom46:3, is a shrinking economic entity in Africa and its growth prospects are much worse than the Reserve Bank’s forecast of expansion in GDP for this year (reflecting a paltry 0,6% against 2018’s equally insignificant 0,8%). In terms of its economic status in the world, South Africa has dropped from the 25th position in 1994 to more or less 35th position in 2018 (10 places down in 24 years). When comparing our economy with those of Poland, Israel, Ireland, Nigeria and Turkey, it has been left behind. Its ability to generate growth of more than 4% a year as was done from 2000 till 2007, is gone. Poor service delivery and constant unrest issues have broken the back of the country’s economy, making South Africa after 25 years of ANC economics “…no longer Africa’s largest economy, but hopefully only Africa’s most advanced economy”. Nothing more is present.17,43-46

3.3.1.5. Third State of the Nation Address (Sona)

An excellent example of the vacillation between political reality and unreality in the mind of Ramaphosa regarding present-day politics and economics was reflected by his State of the Nation Address (Sona). It was published in the public press on 23 June 2019 by Ramaphosa47 after he had delivered it on 20 June 2019. This reporting brings into perspective Cyril Ramaphosa the political talker-but-not-walker. It is based solely on the rhetoric of “we”, “us” and “our” in doing the walking, while there is a lack of “me” (Ramaphosa) to constructively drive the process until success is obtained. To understand the fantasy of the ANC politico-economics, and why the country is moving into collapse, the “Ramaphosa Sona” must be looked at. It reads as follows47:8:

As South Africa enters the next 25 years of democracy, let us proclaim a bold and ambitious goal, a unifying purpose, to which we dedicate all our resources and energies.

Let us agree as a nation and as a people united in our aspirations, that within the next 10 years we will have the South Africa we want.

  • No person in South Africa will go hungry
  • Our economy will grow at a much faster rate than our population
  • Two million more young people will be in employment
  • Every 10-year-old will be able to read for meaning
  • Violent crime will be halved

Let us make these commitments now, to ourselves and to each other, knowing that they will stretch our resources and capabilities, but understanding that if we achieve these 5 goals, we will have fundamentally transformed our society.

We set these ambitious goals not despite the severe difficulties of the present, but because of them.

We set these goals so that the decisions we take now are bolder and we act with great urgency.

Working together, there is nothing we cannot be, nothing we cannot do, and nothing we cannot achieve.

The ungrounded utterances — which frightens every wise investor, local or international — are very much in line with the foolish political utterances of the late President Hugo Chavez and the present President Nicolás Manduro of the failed Venezuela.

Political and investment analysts feel that Ramaphosa must be woken up from his Sona dreams when it comes to the practice of real economics and politics. It is plain foolish and nonsensical to speak and dream in the “last days of the South African economy” in the following manner47:8:

… the new city in the mist, high-speed trains to can travel the country from south to north and west to east, new employment for 2-million youths in a decade, tracking civil claims arising from investigation by the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) of the state capturers, the doubling of the tourists to 21 million in ten years’ time.

The same awakening must be take place regarding his continuing empty promises, coming after the May 2019 elections, offering unrealistic economic growth as well as his fantastical halving of the crime rate!47-50

The editor49 of the Sunday Times reports on 23 June 2019 on this foolish mind-capturing of Ramaphosa, as follows49:20:

The problem, Mr President, is that South Africans are not living in 2030; they are living in the present. Their reality is one of extremely low employment, slow service delivery and dimmed economic prospects. A majority of our children go to schools that do not have the basics – no libraries, and with duplicated buildings. Some schools do not even have proper toilets or running water. Our public health system is in tatters; patients wait in long queues and are often treated by rude and uncaring staff. Crime levels are high. People do not feel safe outside their homes, or even inside them.

We are running out of patience, fast. How long must we wait for violent criminals to face justice? How long must we wait for proper roads to be built, for schools and hospitals to be fixed, for leadership that inspires economic growth so that we can start attracting investments and create jobs?

The editor48 of Rapport writes on the 23 June 201948:2:

‘n Mens moet groot droom, sê ons graag vir ons kinders. Maar die land se kiesers is nie kinders nie. Dis jammer dat ‘n president wat in sy kort tyd aan die stuur reeds só baie reggekry het die kluts in een toespraak so kan kwytraak.

Note that the Afrikaans phrase, “die kluts kwytraak”, means “losing one’s marbles”, which is quite a harsh judgment on Ramaphosa’s character and abilities.

Others have been equally scathing on Ramaphosa, the so-called “unique thinker and planner and great doer as statesman”, who has grabbed the minds of many South Africans since December 2017 because they believed he could bring salvation on his own. De Lange51 brings to us another, but strange dimension regarding the above extreme and visionary “dreaming” of Ramaphosa. He51 states it was not original, but a rehash of a much more comprehensive presentation made earlier by Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma at the ANC’s lekgotla in June at Irene.  More informatively, De Lange writes51:2:

Dlamini-Zuma het nie net gesê ons moet droom oor sneltreine nie, maar ook oor ‘n trein wat ‘binne twee uur’ die 2 000km van die Kaap na Musina kan aflê – wat ‘n snelheid van ‘n hele 1 000 km/h sal vereis [terwyl die wêreld se vinnigste trein in Sjanghai, China tans net 430 km/h haal]’.

The above leaves us with the worrying question: does Ramaphosa have any plan or vision of his own to better the stricken South Africa? This is a very important question after reading Heystek’s20 analysis of the negative Ramaphosa impact on the economy20:3:

Dis opmerklik dat die rand nou die afgelope 17 maande, sedert die verkiesing van pres. Cyril Ramaphosa as ANC-leier in Desember 2017 met bykans 33% teen die Amerikaanse dollar gedaal het. Dít tydens ‘n tydperk wat as ‘Ramaforie’ beskryf word.

3.3.1.6. Failed modern-day 1948 Marshall plan

Helen Zille52 considers the failure of the ANC regime’s economics since 1994, by comparing and contrasting it with the successful outcome of the 1948 Marshall Plan of the USA to rebuild 18 European countries’ economies after the devastating World War II. This financial assistance was $12 billion (more or less $100 billion or R1 507 billion in today’s money). The reasons for the success of the Marshall Plan were drivers that are outright missing in the ANC’s so-called South African economic reform. In this context Zille posits52:7:

Omdat dit goed deurdink en doeltreffend geïmplementeer is om lewensvatbare en volhoubare Europese ekonomieë te bou, eerder as om afhanklikheid te bevorder. En die institutionele meganismes (wat van nuts af herstel of herbou is) het ‘n verantwoordbare uitbetaling van fondsgeld verseker, wat enige moontlikheid verhoed dat ‘n klein invloedryke elite met politieke bande verryk word. Kan ons dieselfde doen? Ongelukkig het die resep ons tot dusver ontwyk.

On the financial input by countries outside Africa to the later “African Marshall Plan”, Zille52 writes on 9 June 201952:7:

Die jongste syfers wat ek kon opspoor, toon dat die top-tien lande wat amptelik ontwikkelingshulp aan Afrikalande verskaf in 2016 $50 miljard aan hulle oorbetaal het. Oor drie jaar gemeet (dieselfde tydperk as die Marshallplan) sal dit $150 miljard, die ekwivalent van een en ‘n half keer die Marshallplan, beloop.

In teenstelling met die Marshallplan is hulp en skuldverligting aan Afrika ‘n volgehoue en herhalende patron – nie ‘n eenmalige oordrag nie. Die totale hoeveelheid ontwikkelingshulp aan Afrika oor die afgelope drie dekades sou baie gekompliseerde Marshallplanne beloop.

On the failed economics of the ANC inside the “South African Marshall Plan”, Zille52 describes a shocking picture. She states52:7:

Sedert 1994 het ons $54 miljard van 21 lidlande van die Organisaie van Ekonomiese Samewerking en Ontwikkeling ontvang – meer as dubbeld die bedrag [$26 miljard in vandag se geld] wat die Marshallplan aan Brittanje (die grootste enkele begunstigde) gegee het en amper vyf keer meer as wat Wes-Duitsland [$11 miljard in vandag se geld] gekry het.

Per capita bereken, is die bedrag wat Suid-Afrika ontvang het selfs meer vrygewig in vergelyking met die Europese lande.

A prominent question is: why are there today at least 9,9 million jobless people against the 3,7 of 1994? This leads Zille52 to ask further52:7:

En hoe is dit moontlik dat ongelykheid binne ons swart bevolking nou net so groot is as tussen die rykste wit mense en die armste swart mense? Hoekom het al hierdie miljarde ons nie gehelp om ‘n inklusiewe ekonomie te bou nie, beleggings te lok en volhoubare groei te verseker nie?

The answer to our failed “South African Marshall plan”, coming since 1994, is quite clear toe Zille52:7:

Ons ken die antwoord: Beleidsonsekerheid, ‘n onbevoegde gekaapte staat, die amperse ineenstorting van ons strafregtelike regstelsel, ‘n swak openbare onderwysstelsel en die omvang van korrupsie en misdaad. Hierdie faktore, in kombinasie, vernietig die beleggingsvetroue wat nodig is vir volgehoue ekonomiese groei.

Matthys53 offers further insight into the issue of inequality referred to by  Zille above, particularly between members of the Black population. He reflects on our position in terms of the Gini coefficient and points out that South Africa is one of the world’s five most unequal countries. Moreover, South Africa is the number one most unequal country in the world with a coefficient of 63,4%! The other four most unequal countries are: Namibia (61,3%), Haiti (60,8%), Botswana (60.5%) and Suriname (57, 6%). This so-called “country association” of South Africa relative to the four under-developed countries referred to, clearly tells the story of how far gone our economic and social constitutions are at present [The Gini coefficient, the most commonly used measure of inequality, measures the statistical dispersion of the income or wealth distribution of a nation’s residents. A Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality against a coefficient of one or 100% which expresses maximum inequality].53

3.3.1.7. South Africa’s failed 2012 to 2018 targets

The latest figures by the World Bank, Statistics SA, Trading Economics and CEIC,54 reflecting how South Africa is meeting its targets set for the period 2012 to 2030, show that the outcomes for the period 2012 to 2018 failed to reach any one of the set targets. The following summary shows it well54:4:

  1. Economic growth: 2012 – 2030 (4%) > 2012 – 2018 (1.5%)
  2. National savings rate: 2012 -2030 (25% of GDP) > 2012 – 2018 (14% in December 2018)
  3. Gini coefficient: 2012 – 2013 (0.6) > 2012 – 2018 (0.63 in 2014)
  4. Average income per person per year: R120 000 > 2012 -2018 (R88 000 in 2017)
  5. People with jobs: 2012 – 2030 (24-million) > 2012 – 2018 (16.3-million first quarter 2019)
  6. Unemployment: 2012 -2030 (6%) < 2012 – 2018 (27.6% first quarter 2019)
  7. Percentage of adults with jobs: 2012 -2030  (61%) > 2012 -2018 (42.6% first quarter 2018)
  8. Labour participation rate: 2012 – 2030 (65%) > 2012 -2018 (58.8% first quarter 2019).

Looking more closely at our missed targets for 2012 to 2018, it is clear that the ANC regime overlooked — or more correctly just blindly ignored — two of the primary factors creating poverty and unemployment: an oversized population, and the uncontrolled constant growth of the South African population.

It seems as if the ANC regime paid scant attention to the hard fact that the country’s population (the Black majority) had grown from 38,78 million in 1994 to 58,78 million in 2019 (representing a 50% growth or 20 million people). This indicatates that the country’s population is growing at 1,43% per annum against the world average of 1,08% per annum (or 850 000 more people per annum in South Africa). This population growth of 1,43% is more than double our present economic growth of ,.6% on a yearly basis.55,56 Saunderson-Meyer56 in this context reports56:12:

While the national fertility rate had dropped from 3,23 in 1996, to 2,67 in 2011 — above the replacement rate of 2.1 — it was particularly high among black Africans at 2,82 and coloureds at 2,57, while below replacement among Indians and whites (1,85 and 1,7).

The immediate implication of an oversized population is the overuse of our resources, high unemployment, a diminishing personal income and more people to feed in a shrinking economy. The end result is that South Africans have been getting poorer since 2014, as statistics show. Looking at our present annual population growth, it is estimated that the economy must grow by 6% yearly to successfully allow the more than 1 million new job-seekers into the labour market, as well as to erase in some way the already existing jobless numbers (note once more: our GDP growth is 0,6% at present). Part of these new-comers to the South African economy, directly and indirectly, is a strong contingent of children under the age of 15 years who lack proper nutrition. (These children are in addition to the fact that nearly 40% of the 58,78 million of population and six out of 10 in the age category under 35 are jobless). Undoubtedly this situation is fast overwhelming the government’s ability to meet the food needs of many children through social grants. Notwithstanding this growing crisis, the ANC regime has not tackled for the last five years any of adverse elements causing economic decline. The current promise of the ANC regime, that for instance the 29% unemployment will be halved in the next five years, is exactly the same unrealistic promise that the ANC made  in 2009 to fully eliminate informal settlements before 2014. The primary fact is that the GDP growth (and available state finance) has been trending downwards for years, while the country’s fertility rate shows a continuation above the average of what is considered the replacement rate.55,56

The ANC’s failed population-planning policy and practice is creating more and more chaos in the lifestyles and living standards of the overwhelming part of the South African population. The direct result is that there are more than 30 million poor citizens (out of a population of 58 million) while more than 17,5 million people, because of their extreme poverty, are forced to live as beggars on social grants. When comparing the 2018 total tax revenue of R1 216 464 000 with the social grants paid out for that year at R155 264 000, social grants stand out as a burden of 12% on the gross income. It must be noted that this unfortunate poor contingent in need of social grants is constantly growing: it grew from 2017 to 2018 by 8% while the growth in gross tax revenue for the period was only 6%.30,31

Smit55:11, in a short summary on the natural growth from 2004 to 2019 (births minus deaths), reports as follows:

2004: 409 2610;
2007: 509 974;
2010: 629 622;
2014: 639 791;
2019: 629 726.

He55 states categorically, based on the 2019 report of Statistics SA, that the population-growth tempo of South Africa increased from ±1% in 2002/2003 to 1,43% in 2019. This growth is strengthened by the decline in infantile deaths, the surge in immigrants from especially African countries, etc., making it clear that the growth is still to increase after 2019.55,56 The Whites, as Saunderson-Meyer56 points out, reached already in 1989 the replacement-border balance, with at the moment minus 0,4% growth (below the equilibrium level, meaning they are in the process of dying out.55,56

It is important to note that the ANC’s radical statutory policy, with its enforced BEE empowerment and other forms of affirmative action, etc., exclusively favouring a part of the Black population, prescribing that the demography of 80,7% Blacks, 8% Coloureds, 7,7% Whites and 2,1% Asians must be reflected in social life and in the workplace , has done enormous damage to the economy as well as race relations.55 The foolishness and irresponsibility around the use of racial quotas by politicians to rule South Africa because “they are our people” — notwithstanding that these quotas may bring famine, uncontrollable revolution and possibly death in the end — is well summed up by Smit when he writes55:11: “Die EFF-leier, Julius Malema, moedig swart vroue aan om meer kinders te hê ‘vir die revolusie’.” The ANC regime’s failure to decrease the above-average growth of the Black population since 1994 must be read in the same negative context as Malema’s utterances.

The prominent imbalance in numbers between South Africa’s racial groups referred to, read together with the various racial groups’ economic empowerment, spells conflict for the future and can be a driving factor for assets and land grabbing from Whites without compensation, as happened in Zimbabwe. There is also the hostility between Black and White, caused by the racial wealth-gap, which is growing because of the introduction of anti-white racism into politics by some political radicals in the ANC and the EFF. The often-ignored demography of South Africa may determine the fate of its various ethnic and racial groups in a future South Africa, either for the best or for the worst, writes Smit.55:11

One way to address the present poverty and joblessness (and undoubtedly the hunger of children), and thus to move the country upwards into at least a “low-level prosperity”, Saunderson-Meyer56 suggests in August 2019 that the ANC-regime become realistic, outside its futile politics, on the reproduction rate of its people. He writes56:12:

Government needs to do everything it can to grow the economy and slow population growth, even though the latter is likely to be a radically flammable issue.

What Saunderson-Meyer56 seemingly suggests to the ANC regime is: don’t use baby-making as a political weapon to empower you with votes. In the end you take the food out of the poor’s mouths after they foolishly voted for you and your false promises. It is already costing you dearly at the moment and is going to cost you dearly in the future. The only other alternative to our over-population, in relation to our chaotic economics, is a constant annual GDP growth of five times the present rate, which is just impossible to obtain in the ANC’s parliamentary term from 2019 to 2024.55,56

3.3.1.8. South African a clone of Venezuela

Looking at the apparent start of South Africa’s death dance (dodedans), is is important to note the death dance of Venezuela, which is now, in slow-motion, coming to an end in comprehensive chaos in that country. What is most worrying, is the fact that some of the ANC elite, like the convicted Tony Yengeni and the previous minister of state-security Bongani Bongo, failed to notice the Venezuelas death dance after they went there in March 2019 on a so-called “fact-finding mission”, supposedly to inform and assure South Africans of the “benificence” of Chávez-Madura-type regimes. Yengeni and Bongo, in describing their visit afterwards, said they had adored Venezuela for its “all-over excellence”.57 John Endres57 of the IRR describes the two’s responses as follows57:4-5:

Volgens hulle (Yengeni en Bongo) het hulle hulle ‘n wonderlike tyd by ‘n straatkarnaval gehad, ‘n opelug-musiekfees bygewoon en op die strand gelê.

Moving away from Ramaphosa’s dreams and now seemingly also Yengeni and Bongo’s dreams, the evidence coming out of Venezuela tells another, much darker story. According to observers,  between January and June 2019, one million of its population fled Venezuela, making that a total of 4 million people (out of a population of 36 million) that are living outside the country to escape hunger and political instability. The base of this poverty is a direct outcome of Nicolás Maduro’s failed socialist economics, his nationalisation of private assets and land grabbing from the rich, as well as his printing of worthless money after he grabbed the country’s Reserve Bank, the useless spending of state money (obtained through the selling of oil) in terms of the Maduro regime’s socialist policies on senseless housing projects, feeding schemes, education and health programmes, while state money was further misused to support extremely radical movements and parties outside Venezuela.

Evidence shows further that more than 50% of children in five of the seven Venezuelan states, under the age of five, suffer from malnutrition and that the average citizen has lost 10 kilograms in weight. Venezuela is the only country in the world experiencing hyperinflation (in 2018 it was 80 000%, rising to 165 000% in 2019), while the country’s GDP sank by more or less 50%. The Chávez-Madura elite internally undermined the Venezuelans’ political and civil rights. The extreme corruption and state capture by the Chávez-Madura elite (in full swing since 1999) further drained the state’s coffers. The fall in the price of oil in 2013, from $97 to $35 per barrel, and the rise of mass poverty, led to the nationalisation of private assets, and an economy policy which sent the prices of all products, especially food, sky-high, with unemployment rocketing.57 This confirms the well-known principle of revolutionary governments: to grab from others but never to create oneself. Endres,57 in an effort to bring some understanding to South Africans of a “similar” Venezuelan-style South Africa that might be coming, writes very comprehensively and in-depth on 23 June 2019 on the Venezuelan death dance as follows57:4-5:

…voorbeelde wys dat byna al Venezuela se ekonomiese probleme tuisgemaak was: sosialistiese idees soos onteiening, nasionalisering, prysbeheer en statsinmenging in die ekonomie. Die dalende olieprys ($100 per vat in 2012 tot $35 in 2013) het net die situasie vererger.

Maduro en sy ondersteuners pak graag die skuld vir sy problem op die VSA en sanksies, maar die feit is dat sanksies hoogs gefokus is – op die binnekring van die regime en die staatsoliemaatskappy, PDVSA.

Die waarheid is dat dit ‘n rampspoedige ekonomiese beleid is wat die ineenstorting van dié land veroorsaak het. Suid-Afrika behoort dié les ter harte te neem.

That South Africa is in a crisis, an immense one, has so far been kept successfully away from the public’s eyes by the pro-Ramaphosa media and of course Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidential rhetoric, echoing the political style of the telling stories as does Nicolás Maduro. Also the use of the word prosperity has become something of a “hate-speech utterance”. But prosperity, crisis and despondency are tripartite partners. They need to be brought into the present-day context of our economy.

Khumalo23, in a broader context, relates the present lack of true prosperity directly to the existence of a comprehensive crisis created by the ANC, as was done by the regimes of Chávez and Madura in Venezuela, which has spread its tentacles since 1994 out to all levels of the South African people. Khumalo writes23:2:

For far too long we have been in denial about the nature of the crisis. The cosmetic changes implemented — a job summit, adding the word “employment” to the ministry of labour — have done little to address the structural issues underpinning our stagnant economy. In the deliberation phase, the nation at large needs to acknowledge that the prevailing paradigms under which such contraventions have been contained — primarily the tense alliance between business, labour and the state — are no longer fit for purpose.

The future cruel socio-economics and politics awaiting South Africa, possibly in the short time of three years, as stated euphemistically by Khumalo23 above, can be read in the political analyst and investigative journalist, Qaanitah Hunter’s50 in-depth article: “Searching for the real Venezuela”, published in the Sunday Times on 1 September 2019 after her visit to the country. Parts of her informative writing and observations are reflected underneath. She writes50:11:

I travelled to Venezuela on a whim last month, prompted by curiosity to see what has been touted by ANC and the EFF as a blueprint for what SA could become.

In SA, the Venezuelan model has been romanticised and vilified in equal measure.

…when I landed at Simón Bolivar International Airport, with its exposed vents and dour concrete, the words of Bonani Bongo ringing in my head. Bongo, an ANC MP, led the party’s fact-finding delegation to Venezuela, and returned with a statement that the country’s problems were caused by “Western imperialism”.

It was important to me not to be swayed by any argument for or against the socialist regime, to fairly observe the reality of life for ordinary people, and to avoid politics althogether,

On my first day in Caracas I understood the appeal. The model of socialism espoused by President  Nicolás Maduro is enormously seductive to someone from a country with a wealth gap such as ours.

On paper at least, there is universal equality, free electricity, housing, water. Health care and education, plus a box of free groceries per household each month. There is also a national minimum wage.

But as one drives out of the capital in the direction of real life in the country, the paper crumbles.

The free electricity comes from derelict generation infrastructure and the country’s grid hangs by a thread. Power outrages last between three and 10 hours. When the free electricity is out, so is the free water. Locals are disparaging about the free education, and some corrupt officials now sell the state-supplied groceries, that should be free, at a premium price — which those on the minimum wage cannot afford. The free health facilities have barely any medicines.

With nothing to sell, many stores were simply shut. Others had two aisles stocked with whatever items – from toilet paper to maize –they had managed to import.

Large department stores, however, were full of Turkish-made snacks and Chinese-made clothes. Shoppers told me that the situation was far better than it had been all year – at one store a 2l bottle of Coke cost $8 (R121) — but still the shelves were bare.

We stopped at a well-stocked convenience store just outside Caracas where more than half the items cost more than the national minimum wage.

A box of digestive biscuits cost the equivalent of about R45 – which is the weekly wage. This was probably why two armed soldiers stood guard over the “luxury” items, which in Venezuela are Coke and ice-cream.

Hearing analysts speak on international news channels about the hyperinflation (80, 000% in 2018) is something entirely different to actually seeing how a sliced bread and fresh milk are luxuries most Venezuelans could not dream of buying.

Butter, for example, is such a prized commodity that one can only physically handle it once one has paid for it. The caps on each bottle of fruit juice are fitted with a lock that can be opened only once the item has been bought.

The national conversation is dominated by how great things used to be, and how bad they now are. People I met asked if they could travel back with me to SA. Warned about crime, they said they would manage it — and they were only half joking.

For those Venezuelans who can afford to buy basic foodstuffs, chances are they will not have the physical cash to do so.

Because the country cannot afford to print its own banknotes, they are now a commodity on their own. In the cities, coffee shops accept bitcoin and other crypto currencies as payment, while informal traders rely on mobile money apps because cash is increasingly scarce.

Also, the social dream is now being eroded by corruption, which is evident almost everywhere.

There e-tolls don’t work — the toll booths are abandoned because nobody has the money to pay. The roads, however, are hardy worth paying for. Instead of potholes they have pot craters.

But the roads traverse a magnificent country, which just over a decade ago was the richest in Latin America, thanks to its massive oil reserves. Now it appears to be on the brink of ruin, thanks to bad politics.

In 2016, ANC policy guru Joel Netshitenzhe, when reflecting on state capture in SA  and comparing it with Latin America, said opportunists simply seize openings created by bad governments.

After 10 days in Venezuela, I now better understand the appeal for the ANC and the EFF. The state has a firm grip on all facets of its people’s lives – from where they live and what they eat to how much they earn.

Venezuela’s socialist model requires a utopia to work. We adopt it at our peril.

I said above that the Venezuela model might only reach us in three years; I was over-optimistic. Looking at the 30 million of our population trapped in poverty — nearly 20 million living on social grants, more than 10 million official jobless, 7,8 million South Africans caught in a debt trap of R225 billion of loans without collateral, our huge and ongoing crime wave, corruption and state capture, and most of all, our enormous inequality, making it well-nigh impossible for the mass of unemployed and poor in the shanty towns and other informal settlements, to merely buy their daily bread, get basic education and basic healthcare and survive — Venezuela is already inside our psyche, our children, our homes and our futures. Is it wrong to replace in Hunter’s article the name Venezuela with South Africa, Caracas with Cape Town and Johannesburg, President Nicolás Maduro with President Cyril Ramaphosa, and socialism with Marxist-Leninist radicalism, to make Hunter’s article applicable to describing present-day South Africa?50,58

3.3.1.9. Zimbabwe in perspective

If Endres’s57 warning of a possible “Venezuelan South Africa” is not enough, it is also important to note the editorial in the City Press of 23rd June 2019, describing the present economic chaos in Zimbabwe. A country devastated economically by the actions of a madman in the mold of Nicolás Maduro, the despotic Robert Mugabe, who was recently given a hero’s tribute by both Thabo Mkbeki and Cyril Ramaphosa at his funeral in September 2019. This tribute reminds us of the many hero’s tributes to the despotic and failed Hugo Chávez of Venezuela at his funeral in 2013.50,57

Speaking volums on the present chaotic Zimbabwean finances and the ongoing seizure of the country by means of corruption, theft, mismanaging and human-rights violations since Uhuru (which includes land and other assets grabbed from Whites), is the current Zimbabwean president’s confession in June 2019 when he said59:3: “I’ve been in government for 38 years as minister and I can’t remember when you ever had a budget surplus”.

Notwithstanding the financial and political mess create by the Mugabe-Mnangagwa regimes themselves, created over decades, the Mnangagwa-regime still shamelessly harbours the opportunistic hope to obtain financing in 2019/2020 from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They even hope for a Eurobond offering to service their state debt and to restart their struggling economy. But, it must be noted that most of these moneys intended to be borrowed is not going for the development of a post-2019 Zimbabwe, but mostly for bridge financing to clear about $1,2-billion (R17,2-billion) of arrears to the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the European Investment Bank. In addition, the Mnangagwa regime is still thinking up plans to restructure debt owed to bilateral creditors! All this money that the Mnangagwa regime wants to borrow must again be paid back, while the country in the meantime should be running, forget about development!59

How little insight and understanding the current Mnangagwa regime have of applicable and sound state economics and proper financial, social and political management of their country, is well reflected by the Mnangagwa regime’s minister of finance, Mthuli Ncube59. His ignorance for instance of the seriousness of IMF finance, especially IMF debt responsibility,  the political, social and economic empowerment of citizens applicable to IMF loans, the strict IMF debt/funding programme which entails the monitoring of government economic progress, etc., are cast to the winds when he says59:3: “Why not? We can only ask, they can only say no. But if we can get funding from the IMF, that would be fantastic. Just additional support on our balance-of-payments position”.  [Sounds very much in line with the economic thinking of the ANC-regime!]

If South Africans are worrying of a Venezuela to come to its shores, it must worrying far more of a Zimbabwe in waiting, especially the Whites: the land and asset grabbing in Zimbabwe under mad Mugabe is a blueprint for land and asset grabbing here. Radical Economical Transformation (RET) is still a temptation for some insanely radical politicians here.

3.3.1.10. Ramaphosa’s economic saviour-partners

It is would be a mistake to ascribe the Ramaphoria which grabbed South Africans after December 2017 — and which was maintained for some time by Cyril Ramaphosa’s promised New Dawn to bring a mass of Christmas goodies — to the person of Ramaphosa as the saviour of South Africa alone. Two other saviours are central to Ramaphosa’s political power and his ability so far to survive the infighting within the greater ANC: Tito Mboweni and Pravin Gordhan. Without his partners’ upport and controversial manoeuvring around the finances and economics of the country, Ramaphosa would have been unseated long ago. Their actions and roles in the present-day politics of the ANC, especially in the demanding in-fights around the Marxist-Leninist economic policy of the ANC, must shortly be commented on.99,20-26

Tito Mboweni

It is important to note the role of Tito Mboweni in our catastrophic economy; a person who is seen and lionised, together with Pravin Gordhan, by the pro-Ramaphosa media and a sector of the White capitalists, as the economic saviour of South Africa. What is at stake is Tito Mboweni and the National Treasury’s so-called “dramatic” proposal of privatisation with their discussion paper entitled: “Economic transformation, inclusive growth and competitiveness: Towards an economic strategy for SA” which is presented by the pro-Ramaphosa faction as a new guideline on future economic development, starting privatisation of state assets and the introduction of private capital into our state-run enterprises. The Mboweni plan is presented as a drastic changer of our future economics. The reality, like most of the ANC’s misleading plans and schemes, reveals a continuation of the Marxist-Leninist economic model wherein the rights of the members of the radical trade unions occupy a central position. The document is nothing else than an effort to revive the failed economic idea of Thabo Mbeki in the 2000s, which had fizzled out at the time because it lacked constructive plans to steer the economy into growth. The Plan was strongly criticised by an important sector of the business community as incapable of creating economic reform, on the hand. On the other hand, the Plan was criticised by Cosatu and the SACP for its lack of kick-starting the economy by means a radical, revolutionary approach. Essentially the Mboweni plan may be described as “an incoherent, ill-thought out and ultimately chaotic intervention”, should it be implemented. Speckman refers to its poor business and political intentions as another “jaws drop” of the Ramaphosa regime.60

Gumede65 describes the “intentions” of the so-ccalled “Mboweni plan” as inappropriate “grand economic experiments”. It is clear that the ANC regime, with this Plan, is again avoiding “real politics”, such as the scrapping of BEE, the stopping of support for dictators in Africa, the blind partnering with China, as well as effecting constructive interventions in curtailing corruption, etc. Instead the plan clings to strategies focussing on so-called “politically easier issues” and thus maintenance the status quo of the ANC’s already failed political and economic policies within its Marxist-Leninist politics. Central to the Plan is keeping the peace with the political radicals, Cosatu and the SACP that are threatening to bring the ANC regime down if the ANC had to introduce any structural capitalism. In practice the plan is a window-dressing exercise in the hope of attracting especially foreign investors and to keep Moody’s and other ratings agencies from demolishing the international economic status of the country. The Plan will  make no difference to our economy, besides temporarily freeing the ANC government from the immense pressure to immediately reform its economic policy by the political opposition, the ordinary public and the greater business community to.61-66

The above outcome in the ANC’s economics is exactly what Khumalo23:2 called “cosmetic changes implemented”. Political opportunism and a misled public, well anchored in a plan that does not address the structural failures underpinning our stagnant economy.23

The foolish element in the Mboweni plan, initiated by the Ramaphosa regime, is further pointed out by Duma Gqubule60, director at the Centre for Economic Development and Transformation, when he said that the even if the privatisation of Eskom realised, it was not going to immediately wipe out its R450 billion debt which is currently smothering the economy, while the whole process of privatising Eskom is not a “one-day clean-up”. It can stretch up to 15 years of direct/indirect involvement of the state at a very high cost. Neither is the Plan’s broader intention to create a total of 142 000 jobs in three years (basically unattainable within the present GDP growth of 0,8% a year). Secondly, the whole Plan’s contribution to job creation is nullified because the demands from the job market is too high in the light of the fact that every year the number of job-seekers are growing by 700 000, leaving in three years a labour force of 2 million looking for work (versus the theoretical growth of a total of 142 000 jobs).  Elsewhere Ted Blom60, an energy analyst, has showed that the Plan is marred by some serious errors and assumptions.

Gqubule60 comments on the confusion created by the Mboweni plan and its so-called “correction” of the economy, bringing us back to political reality when he writes60:4:

But to be frank, I don’t think it’s going to happen. What I heard is that nobody has heard about this report. He [Mboweni] dropped it out of the blue like a record, like a new release. Like Beyoncé.

This is a free marketer’s wet dream. It’s just unbelievable. This is definitely the National Development Plan repackaged in a new bottle.

Pravin Gordhan

On the other economic saviour of the Ramaphosa regime, namely Pravin Gordhan, it is important to note how GDP contracted by 3,2% under his oversight. It confirms how much the country’s economy is already in decline, notwithstanding Ramahosa’s stimulation package in September 2019 of R50 billion and the decade of other comprehensive stimulatory spending by the ANC regime since 2008. But it also reflects back on the much-praised “extraordinary” abilities of the Ramaphosa regime’s cabinet. In this context Mpiyakhe Dhlamini10 lays this economic decline over a decade at the door of Pravin Gordhan. Dhlamini10 points out that under Gordhan’s economic stewardship, bankruptcies, liquidations and joblessness are escalating, while exports have shrunk by 26,4% and fixed capital formation declined by 4,5%. On the ongoing chaos within the economy, predominant under the ANC regime of Jacob Zuma and now repeated under the Ramaphosa regime, Dhlamini writes10:4:

Suid-Afrika ly op die oomblik onder die gevolge van vrot regeringsbesluite. Suid-Afrika het nog nie herstel van die resessie van 2009 nie.

Dhlamini10 considers the instability around South Africa’s current economic failures, that may be traced back to 2009, and blames the Ramaphosa regime’s present inner circle when he writes10:4:

Gordhan, toe minister van finansies, het ons toe geneem op ‘n pad wat daartoe gelei het dat regeringskuld toegeneem het van 22.6% van die BBP tot die huidige 55.6%. Pleks daarvan om die ekonomie te beskerm teen die ‘nege vermorste jare’ het die plunder en ekonomiese stagnasie onder dié minister se neus gebeur, en10:4: Nou asof dit nie erg genoeg is nie, is daar steeds geen tekens van hervormings nie. Die regering bly verbind tot beleid soos onteiening sonder vergoeding in ‘n omgewing waar private beleggings reeds daal.

Zille further high-lights the role of Gordhan in the country’s chaotic economics and ascribes the reason for the absence of prosperity in today’s South Africa to the unavoidable devastation of our economy in future because the ANC’s various disciples will maintain their Marxist-Leninist ideology under its politburo throughout Ramaphosa’s term in office. Zille67 hits the nail on the head when she writes67:7:

Tog het een van ons slimste politici, Pravin Gordhan, die man wat (saam met Ramaphosa) geskilder word as die een wat die land moet red van die magte van duisternis, so onlangs soos verlede week nog sy verbintenis tot die ondersteuning, konsolidering tot die ondersteuning en selfs die uitbreiding van staats beheerde ondernemings bevestig – om in die proses die “tweede fase van radikale sosio-ekonomiese transformasie” te bevorder.

Dit is ‘n duidelike onderskrywing van die doelwitte van die NDR [Nasionale Demokratiese Revolusie].

Solank as wat mense glo dat ons die toekoms van Suid-Afrika sal verseker indien die “goeie ouens” (soos Ramaphosa en Gordhan) die stryd om die siel van die ANC wen , so lank sal ons ‘n land bly wat langsaam misluk.

Die “goeie ouens” is ongetwyfeld minder korrup as die res. Maar dit maak nie die ANC se beleidsraamwerk voordelig of implementeerdbaar nie.

3.3.1.11. ANC’s infighting

The infighting in the greater ANC and between the regime’s leaders, especially their many hostile and contradictory messages, including their open opposition to each other, is seen by many economists as one of the main reasons why the economy has gone into a tail-spin since pre-June 2019. The infighting may have contributed to the GDP’s contraction, by 3,2%. This contraction was the biggest decline in 10 years and is raising the fear of a recession, already in 2019. The political and economic confusion characterising the regime’s policy declarations and executions seem to be created by Luthuli House’s various factions, as well by the leadership of the various ministries within the Ramaphosa regime. This governmental tumult we see, as with the recent announcement of the Mboweni plan, jeopardises the decision-making privileges and independent functioning of the different governmental ministries and sectors. Internally, on a high level, it is seen and experienced as the open sabotage of other governmental institutions’ aims, intentions and planning.9,20-26,63,66

The conflict within the ANC’s top leadership about which faction is to steer the regime and who is the paramount leader (a struggle in which Ramaphosa and Magashule are the central figures) is counterproductive. It is hobbling the South African economy and is also seriously obstructing the proper functioning of the government of the day with often deliberately different and contradictory policies and declarations. From a general point of view, the ordinary citizen discerns an outright lack of sincerity inside the ANC elite when it comes to fixing the impaired and malfunctioning state-owned enterprises or efforts to get the country and its economy functioning.9,20-26

Possibly the economist Iraj Abedian25 tries to tell us something when he states25:5:

SA seems to have moved from policy paralysis to policy sabotage. This is the surest way to push the economy into a prolonged recession. The country has to have one centre of policy-making. A governing party can’t contradict its own government.

How far down the road the ANC as an assumed 100% party and a 100% regime is in October 2019, is well summarised by Malala68, in his perspective on the present-day ANC and its leadership, when he writes68:21: “I believe Ramaphosa and his team have a 55% chance of succeeding and turning the country’s fortunes around”. On the chronic illness of infighting in the greater ANC, but specifically between Ramaphosa and Magashule for the paramount-chief post, Malala responds68:21:

It’s the areas of politics and economics that seem to have led to total despondency. As the leaders continue to tear at each others’ throats for power and pull in different directions on economic policy, many have wondered who, in fact, is driving this thing called SA. Is it Ramaphosa or is it the dreaded Ace Magashule of the Free State? Ramaphosa has seemed eager to please his comrades, allowing Magashule to pronounce naively on everything from quantitative easing [nationalising] (a subject he knows nothing about) to who should be running the country (a subject he knows nothing about).

Ramaphosa has let the insults and acts of insubordination slide. That has consequences: everyone is left wondering who, exactly, is driving this thing. Their confidence dwindles when they realise that it is not: “Safe Pair of Hands” Ramaphosa, but “What’s My Cut” Magashule.

The extent of damage to the economy by an unorganised and poorly unified party, is leading to an image of South Africa in the eyes of the public and of the world with a stigma attached, that of a country characterised by poor political and economic integrity. More precisely, it is pictured as a country with a seemingly disturbed political mindset, clouded by confusion and disorientation: a regime not always accountable for his actions.25,63,66

Khumalo23, like Abedian25, describes the dysfunctional and unconstructive ANC leadership as “engaged in a chaotic civil war”. Their internecine struggles have undoubtedly caused the ANC regime’s failure to come to terms with its own political traumas and crises, and thus its inability to put the party on the road with a map again to bring prosperity for South Africans. The party’s paralysis is an outcome of the present unstoppable infighting around the leadership and power between Ramaphosa and Magashule. The two are caught inside the party’s democratic-centralism and its Marxist-Leninist ideology (a political setup that many people seemingly either do not understand or is unfamiliar with). Khumalo23 reflects in some way on the role of this ANC substrate as follows23:2:

SA has found itself plunged into a chaotic civil war involving economics, statistics and politics. But rather than adopting a line of march aimed at assuring citizens that there is indeed an understanding of the issues, the government plunged itself into a civil war reminiscent of the ANC’s factional battles of 2017 when secretary-general Ace Magashule said an ANC lekgotla had resolved to nationalise the Reserve Bank, amend its mandate and initiate steps towards exploring quantitative easing.

For Cyril Ramaphosa, the problem is that he derives his political legitimacy from the ANC itself, so its resolutions – however impractical they may turn out to be – are regarded as key performance indicators by the party. Unilaterally disowning them is not on the cards for him.

This dilemma has led to a paralysis where his voice been absent from the discourse. The vacuum was filled by market speculation, incoherent press releases and contradictory tweets.

Derby22 pertinently describes, in terms of a retrospective analysis, the present politico-economic mess of the country under the ANC regime as an old, ongoing strife to preserve Marxist-Leninist politics as a22:8: “circus run by their political class in search of the enigma of radical economic transformation”. But in this case it means precisely the ugly face of Marxist-Leninist politics: the execution of radicalism in all the spheres of socio-economic, political and personal life, which is of course beginning to manifest itself more and more clearly in the ANC’s thinking, planning and actions since December 2017.22

In this respect, the editor21 of the Sunday Times, on their foolish destruction of prosperity by the ANC top brass, describes them more elegantly as21:18: “…financially ignorant power-players”.

The above “financial ignorance” referred to by the editor21 of the Sunday Times is undoubtedly the behaviour, mostly exemplified by irrational plans and actions,  by the different ANC top leaders in their various self-centred economic power-plays, lacking knowledge of what is going on at grassroots level, meaning how the ordinary South African perceives and thinks of the ANC’s leadership. Prominent is here, in response the growing unrest of the Black masses, the recent  confession by Magashule of his own ignorance — and that of Ramaphosa and his regime — of what is going on at grassroot levels, when he says24:11: “These latest events underline the need for a government that is in touch with the people and responsive to their needs”. 

The immense failures of the ANC so far to serve  the people and their inability to make specific or general constructive corrections, seems to be catching up with the ANC after their 25 years of delinquent government of the people. Some of the ANC elite seems be grasping the reality, at last. There is no doubt that the revolutionary ANC, since its enthronement by the National Party (NP) and the international world as the sole ruler of South Africa, has never, similarly to the politburos of communist and delinquently socialist regimes in the Soviet Union, Cuba, Venezuela, etc., been really in touch with the mass of poor, landless Blacks. The ANC and its elite have been glorified since 1994 by the mass of poor Blacks South Africans as their saviours, primarily because they “were of us” and were against Apartheid, but not for what they truly did for the poor.  It is with honesty that the editor of the Sunday Times, together with Munusamy24, De Lange43 and Strydom46, can describe the ANC regime as a so-called “less successfull government”. The so-called “good” government of which Magashule above is speaking and dreaming of, can surely not be the ANC’s Ramaphosa regime!21,22,24,43,46

The hanky-panky in the present-day ANC is part of an ongoing, paralysing internecine conflict to crown a skilled Marxist-Leninist next year at the ANC’s national general council as paramount chief. Until then the country’s economy, as in the past 25 years, does not really count.

3.3.1.12. The IMF and Nationalisation

Notwithstanding the many indicators bearing out poor economics and politics, some financial analysts argue that an IMF bailout for South Africa is not needed or wise at this stage. For them, excluding the country from a place in the IMF basket is based on the recruiting of foreign investors, growing exports and the fact that South Africa’s balance of payments risk is safeguarded by its effective management of its balance of payments risk, which is buttressed by its $41 billion in foreign-currency reserves held by the South African Reserve Bank (which is equivalent to 5,8 months’ import coverage).19,69-74

It is important to remember that the ANC under Ramaphosa is desperate for money: preferably easy money without a risk of repayment if their “business” ventures go wrong (which has usually happened in the ANC regime’s history).  In this risk-taking to lend money to the ANC regime it is important to remember that an estimated R1 trillion from South African banks is already exposed to South African state entities and the public sector.72,75-81

The constant threat of the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank and other public and private assets, together with the country’s immensely growing debt and failed SOEs such as Eskom, SAA, SABC, DENEL, stagnant manufacturing and production, collapsing municipalities, a downturn in the world economy and an aversion by the West of the ANC’s politics, are increasingly undermining broad support here. Our constantly worsening governance, etc., can change the situation overnight for the worse. The loud drumming by a strong sector in the ANC who are hanging on to its Marxist-Leninist ideology as the only and primary economic solution for a future South Africa, together with the even louder revolutionary politics of the ANC tripartite alliance’s two partners, the SACP and Cosatu, has already shifted the country into an unreliable political state with an even more unreliable economico-political model.  The country’s post-1994 economics looks more and more gloomy, leaving a very, very small window open to escape International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance, however much the pro-ANC and Ramaphosa prophets try to predict that such intervention would never occur.19,69-74

On the potential ending of the ANC’s much-heard “political music” (although the pro-Ramaphosas ignore the stuporous sounds and preach daily that South Africa is in a “perfect economic condition” and thus does not need IMF or any other intervention in the near future), Leon27 quotes Pieter du Toit27 who mentioned that Johann Rupert had said that South Africa would soon be knocking at the door of the IMF for a bailout, most likely within a year. (About the decline of the country, it is interesting to mention that Rupert recently said that all his children had already left the country because of its instability).  Efforts to discredit Rupert by some of the pro-Ramaphosa elements in the media about his warning, did not work. What it indeed confirms, is how strongly the pro-Ramaphosa clan has penetrated the media (as most communists, masked as “good” or as so-called “democratic socialists”, have done over the years) in their propaganda to falsely tell South Africans that their country’s dying economy is healthy. Indeed, it seems as if some of these pro-Ramphosas successfully mesmerised themselves to believe their own lies.27,42,74,82,83

To state that South Africa is far from IMF intervention and does not need it, is seen more and more as  part of the Ramamaphosa camp’s use of populism to obscure the reality. All the signs are there that the ANC regime will be forced within a year or three, if the economy continues to worsen, to knock on the doors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for structural-adjustment programmes. Although some economists believe the IMF can bring intense socio-economic constraints for the citizens, other economists see such an intervention as a saving grace which should happen as soon as possible. All that can keep the IMF away is how easily the Ramaphosa clan can loot the private and public pension funds.72,84

The Reserve Bank governor, Lesetja Kganyago72, described in August 2019 the intervention impact of the IMF well when he said72:3: “The IMF is so terrible. They give the patient such terrible medication that the patient dies. Only if the patient ate the vegetables, they wouldn’t need to take the medication”.

The ANC, as a revolutionary regime, does clearly not want to eat the IMF vegetables nor drink the terrible IMF medicine. They are looking for soft, easy money targets to defraud the owners. As soft targets — as a new form of state and private capture — the private and public pensions are ideal (to cure their failed SOEs and other financial disasters) instead of going for a strict IMF intervention and the IMF’s constructive control of the Ramaphosa regime’s socio-economics. (It must be noted that the assets of public pension funds in South Africa amount to about R4,2 trillion with 40% of that belonging to the GEPF. In total there is more or less R6 trillion controlled by private and public assets managers).71,75,77-81

The real plan already being prepared by the Ramaphosa regime is to expropriate in some way the R6 trillion of pensions, as was recently clearly indicated by Enoch Godongwa72, the head of the ANC’s economic transformation subcommittee, when he said the asset management industry (which includes pension funds, insurers and other investors) is sitting on R6-trillion and72:3: “…should lend some of this to the state”. What the word “lend” means in the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist politics is only one thing: grabbing without compensation. This delinquent intention of the ANC is  making even the radical Cosatu worried about its own members’ pensions. It was with good reason that Cosatu reacted as follows72:3: “What we want to see is assurance that the money is going to be used for its intended purposes and not corruption, and there will be guaranteed returns”. For the critical political analyst it is a clear case of money never to be paid back as has happened with the millions and millions of rand stolen during the state capture by the ANC elite and their intimate cronies.

Kgosana and Speckman72, alert us to the reality of the ANC’s immediate intention to “overpower” the R6-trillion in the very near future, when they write72:3:

The ANC’s economic policy guru [Godongwa] has reiterated the party’s desire for the government to raid private and public pension funds to raise money to rescue ailing state-owned enterprises  (SOEs) and meet its obligations.

Quoting further Godongwa72, they write72:3:

Why would you go to the IMF and the World Bank and go and raise money when we have sufficient savings in the economy which you can borrow, probably far cheaper, and probably with little exchange rate risk?

Bruce61, in his sometimes practical and simple approaches to serious matters related to the ANC-regime’s delinquent activities and unpredictability, steers us to the “large black hole” of debt that is (hopefully) worrying the ANC regime daily and which makes the prospect of gobbling up both private and public pension funds all the more appealing when he compares interest on state debt to monthly payments on a car61:14:

Every day, officials at the National Treasury have to find around R1bn to repay the interest on our national debt. If it ever happened one day that they couldn’t manage, then we would be, as a country, what you and I would be if we missed a car payment. Buggered.

So while Treasury boffins are busy making sure policemen, teachers and nurses get paid every month by the broken government departments they work for, it’d  be pretty normal for them to wonder why this all has to be so difficult.

De Lange77:4 reports that prescriptions on asset allocation usually come in when something is not working in the economy of a country: in South Africa it is essentially the failed economic policy of the ANC which is causing chaos and therefore the main reason for a further misuse of the tax-payers’ money by imposing prescribed assets (to stave off IMF intervention for a while). The looting of the prescribed assets is unlikely to boost the economy in the long term. But one thing is clear: after the pensions are gobbled up in three years’ time, what other money will be left as cash heist for the Ramaphosa regime to balance its daily budget? Nothing will be left by an Eskom, an SABC and an SAA far down in a large black hole. Can this be prosperity?

Andrew Canter72, the CIO of Future Growth Asset Management, points out that there is only one solution for the ANC regime’s failed economical management since 1994 (a system which pension grabbing and nationalisation cannot solve)72:3:

“There is no magic bullet with prescription, there is no magic bullet with the IMF, there is no magic bullet from anywhere except to run the government better”.

3.3.1.13. Bad Donald Trump and bad USA

The foolishness of Ramaphosa’s Third Sona not only echoed his lack know-how when it comes to constructive political thinking, planning and action to bring economic and political solutions to a country still mired in the “bad” ANC’s politics of the past, but also demonstrated his many shortcomings as a supposed executive leader. This is well borne out by the controversial policy on international relations he has adopted and practices blindly. One issue that stands out is his inability to solve xenophobia inside the country as well as outside our borders. As in many African countries marred by a revolutionary government, he terminated any prospects to create prosperity for present-day South Africa.

His approach to our relations with the USA can only be described as a major mistake, exemplified by his gratuitous criticism levelled against Donald Trump and his Administration for their stance and handling of the USA-China-Huawei matter.24,85-88

This curious international political stumbling by Ramaphosa persuaded Douglas Gibson85, the veteran politician, to write85:6:

Has President Cyril Ramaphosa been studying at the Zindzi Mandela School of Diplomacy?

His recent gratuitous insults to the US and his sucking up to China makes no sense against the background of his overriding aim of the New Dawn: focusing on the economy, attracting foreign direct investment, fostering growth and thus creating jobs for our unemployed millions.

Ramaphosa seems to display gross ignorance of diplomacy, given that he twice confusedly made statements at a world forum that: 1) “…the US is jealous that a Chinese company called Huawei has outstripped it when it comes to 5G technology” (G20 Summit), and: 2) “… the US has been unable to imagine a better future which goes beyond 4-plus-1G (referring to 5G connectivity) at the 4IR-conference. Besides his ostensible lack of an understanding of possible communication manipulation and espionage by China via Huawei, he does not take into account the profound and hidden struggle for hegemony as the USA and China compete for power. He missed out on the benefits of being good friends with both.85-90

However much some pro-Ramaphosa economists try to minimise the impact of such statements with counter-arguments, e.g. that the AGOA agreement has been by untouched by Ramaphosa’s negative rhetoric, the future outcomes of Ramaphosa’s verbal attacks on the USA will only be learnt in time. Other arguments in support of Ramaphosa’s clumsy rhetoric have been advanced, such as88:1: “China’s economy is forecast to surpass the USA in size and that the Chinese are probably more committed in terms of investing in South Africa than the USA”, but are unrelated to the matter. Those are purely political and opportunistic postulations as to a situation far away in the future. The Chinese, on the contrary, have already shown caution regarding South Africa’s unstable politics. In addition, China is an astute investor in Africa, making sure that its own interests in obtaining raw materials are placed first, so that many African countries have already become disillusioned with apparent Chinese largesse when it comes to investments.85-88

Gibson and other political commentators show precisely how Ramaphosa (undoubtedly noticed too by his loyal and pro-Chinese economists in the media and in politics) is committing a major error in selecting the correct country as a future partner to improve our economy (and is making a fool of himself in the Western countries’ eyes). The fact that must basically only count in the making and the upkeep of international relationships, is the trade amount between countries. Data show out that the total RSA-USA-trade for 2018 was as much as $18,9 billion, while between January and October 2018 South Africa had a favourable trade surplus of around R7,9 billion with the USA. This means we sold more to them than they did to us. During the same period South Africa had a hugely unfavourable trade deficit of R96,85-billion with China, meaning we bought far more from China than that they bought from us. Regarding investments in South Africa, the fact is that American investmens in South Africa total R129 billion as against China’s R89,9-billion.86-89

Ramaphosa’s rash attack on the USA forced Gibson85 to put forward the question85:6: “Is there a benefit, other than the ideological satisfaction of poking Trump in the eye?” Thankfully the seasoned politician Gibson, in enlightening us on Ramaphosa’s behaviour, supplies us with a good answer85:6: “But then, there is scarcely a dictator in the world for whom the government does not have a warm feeling and scarcely a democratic Western country that the ANC really like.” The ANC regime’s intimate association with BRICS confirms Gibson’s statement.85

The editor91 of the Sunday Times of 7 June 2019, seemingly also perplexed about Ramaphosa’s rhetoric, asks91:16:

One wonders about the game Ramaphosa is playing, given that the US remains a significant trading partner with SA. Also curious is the extent to which Ramaphosa seemed to be at odds with his own trade & industry minister, Ebrahim Patel  who seems to have adopted a more cautious and even-handed approach in juggling SA’s relations with the worlds two economic superpowers.

Thankfully it seems as if Ramaphosa’s Minister Patel has some political tact and diplomacy, and most of all economic knowhow and political intelligence, when he said that South Africa needed every partner in the world in order to deal with our many economic ills like joblessness.91 Also Ramaphosa’s special envoy to attract foreign investments, Phumzile Langeni87, shows excellent economic skills in circumlocuting Ramaphosa’s mumble when he said that South Africa was continuing to court the USA aggressively.

What Ramaphosa further overlooked in his attack on Donald Trump and the USA, are the benefits that the current African Growth and Opportunity Act (ACOA) of the USA, bring to South Africa. It is indeed a lifeline for South Africa. Any negative political signals to the USA could and would trigger negative actions, which could be devastating for many of our sectors that are benefitting under AGOA. It can bring serious socio-economical consequences. Although AGOA expires in 2025, it does not mean that the Trump-administration, in its growing protectionist stance and isolation of hostile countries, cannot act immediately against hard-line culprits. It must be noted that SA’s exports in industry and agricultural produce to the US have increased threefold since the implementation of AGOA in 2000. It seems to have passed Ramaphosa by that South Africa’s wine-exporting industry, which is totally intertwined with our tourist industry, has enjoyed the largest export growth to the USA under AGOA. Last year AGOA is estimated to have directly contributed up to R32,7 billion of our GDP and that as many as 310 000 jobs of mostly unskilled and semi-skilled workers are dependent of it. The 2018 biennial report on the AGOA implementation shows that the treaty is in our favour, such as the export of transportation equipment to the US which rose from $76 miillion (R1,12-billion at today’s rate)  in 2001 to $1,3-billion in 2017 while it added more than 30 000 jobs here.

Regarding China, Wandile Sihloho, head of agribusiness research at the Agricultural Business Camber of SA, said that South Africa was indeed a small player in Chinese agricultural exports. Our exports, standing at R9,5-billion, was only a 0,5% share of the value of Chinese agricultural imports in 2018. Chances are also slim that our agricultural exports would be increased to China in the near future. In the absence of AGOA or any other agreement, South Africa’s exports would face reciprocal tariffs in the USA as laid down by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the form of Most Favoured Nation tariffs, warned Professor Nhlanhla Mbatha of Unisa’s Graduate School of Business Leadership.86-88,91

It must thus be noted, with specific reference to Ramaphosa’s attacks on the USA’s policies, both in his personal and public capacity as state president, that AGOA’s benefits and outcomes depend almost entirely on decisions of the USA and that it could be quickly reviewed following on his anti-American rhetoric. Indeed, there has recently been a review of the USA’s African development programme after questions were raised on hostile countries active inside it. The following sub-Saharan African countries do not currently benefit from AGOA: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea (graduated from GSP), Eritrea, Mauritania, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Although Ramaphosa’s term as President may be short-lived, the loss of AGOA’s benefits to South Africa before 2025 could be devastating, as many of the ANC regime’s other foolish actions since 1994 had brought devastating outcomes.86,91

Although it is speculated that the egregious anti-American rhetoric by Ramaphosa will not affect the AGOA agreement and that the September 2019 so-called “draft plan between South Africa and the US to develop Ramaphosa’s so-called vision” will assure fruits in terms of AGOA and the US’s new Prosper Africa initiative, only time will show. The statement, as formulated by South Africa and the US after they held their tenth annual bilateral forum (ABF) in September, ran as follows92:6: “Both sides agreed to continue to nurture the relationship.” Such a terse statement is far from a declaration of sincere brotherhood and trust and an agreement of sole cooperation without making the Chinese a third bed-fellow for the ANC in this already “unhappy” relationship.92 Neither does there seem to be any sense in the pro-Ramaphosas’ argument that China was more important than the USA to South Africa because “China’s economy is forecast to surpass the USA in size and that the Chinese are probably more committed in terms of investing in South Africa than the USA”. This Ramaphosa assessment lacks soundness and can come at a price for South Africa.88

The short-sightedness of the Ramaphosa regime flows from its lack of sound business principles. But it goes deeper: It reflects an insidious brotherhood with China and revolutionary countries which has poisoned its economic thinking. Moreover, increasingly present in the ANC regime’s mindset is a hostile anti-Western stance. Its lack of influence within countries that form part of the Western sphere of influence is already reflected by the Ramaphosa regime’s less than successful effort in 2018 to secure $100 million of investments without strict conditions for South Africa in the Middle East, in countries such as Abu Dhabi, the United Emirates, etc., that are all pro-Western and pro-American.44

The billionaire Johann Rupert44, quoted by Pieter du Toit44, author of the book entitled “The Stellenbosch Mafia: Inside the Billionaire’s Club”, has some incisive opinions on the stubborn folly and revolutionary thinking of the ANC’s top brass, stretching back 107 years, which had not only led to their failed $100-million call for “good” investments in 2018, but reflects a financial-investment failure continuing to this day. Rupert states44:4-5:

Wat die Suid-Afrikaners nie verstaan het op hul beleggingstoer na die Golf nie, is dat Ramaphosa se regering sal sukkel om vriende te maak met die VAE en Saoedi-Arabië as hulle voortgaan om die VSA, Brittanje en Israel swart te smeer.

Sonder die VSA se beskerming is die VAE niks nie. Hulle weet dit. So werk hulle saam met Saoedi-Arabië, Israel en die VSA teen Iran.

En nou kom ons, hoed in die hand, om geld by hulle te vra, terwyl ons die VSA en Brittanje soos vuilgoed behandel?

The Chinese, on the contrary, already show signs of reaching saturation point with South Africa’s unstable politics, labour unrest and violent protests. As alluded to above, China is usually the winner when it comes to its investments in Africa, and not the African states where those investments take place.

Ramaphosa continues to side with the BRICS countries (as Jacob Zuma did), which may in the end cost the country dearly. Ramaphosa’s actions start to reveal how the ANC’s concept of constitutional democracy reminds one more and more of the one superficially adhered to by leaders of Soviet Russia and Communist China. Since 1994 in South Africa, it has also been the “party” that is the “state” and which rules through a manipulated and watered-down electoral system and an even autocratic democratic-centralism. Power is concentrated in its politburo from where the secretary general and president of the ANC as two members of the Top Six and the eighty members of the ANC NEC determine the policy and implementation of the state affairs outside Parliament. The main reason for the country’s currently failing economy and a make-believe instead of a real prosperity is directly rooted in a quasi-democratic system that has been corrupted from within.93

3.3.1.14. Bettering the ANC-regime

For the “government to be run better” by the ANC regime seems to be a political analyst’s dream, but a nightmare for a bank manager at risk of losing other people’s good money as “loans” to the ANC in an attempt to better it. Schuitema94 sees the chaotic economics to be seated in so-called “takers” by specifically naming South Africans as a “nation of takers” — an internalised cognitive tradition which is not easily erased from a nation’s mindset. The misused and under-used status of our people — of which the Apartheid regime and even more prominently the ANC have been guilty — led to poorly developed people, wealth disparities and structural imbalances, together with an economy that could easily become the host for a parasitical political elite inside a revolutionary regime which presented itself as the saviours of the suppressed Blacks of pre-1994. Inside the post-1994 pseudo-democracy, with its misleading, opportunistic political aims and intentions, self-gain has overtaken the minds of the elite as well as the poor. This debased cognition is growing, turning into looting and avarice that are negatively impacting economic management, as well as causing social and personal misbehaviour. Such entrenched negative elements cannot easily be rooted out, in an effort to improve the economy. The fact is that these entrenched elements are permanent parts of the ANC’s established Marxist-Leninist ideology, which is maintained and implemented daily by means of the ANC’s democratic-centralism that does not allow the individual to deviate from his prescribed path and ideology, and which makes a rehabilitation of the South African economy nearly impossible, as long as the ANC remains in power.94

Helen Zille67 too, after studying the political system and economics of the ANC, postulates that the reason why  true prosperity has not been reached since 1994 in South Africa and why there can never be such prosperity in the future if the ANC stays in power, is be found in the ANC’s democratic-centralism and Marxist-Leninist political ideology, together with its dogma of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which it inherited from its close association with the South African Communist Party (SACP). Sustaining this ANC political inclination is its pyramidal or hierarchical power structurue with the ANC’s politburo (based on its Marxist-Leninist-ideology) exclusively in charge (on top). The politburo, consisting of the autocratic and despotic Top Six, the eighty NEC members and the secretary general, is the only executive body that may set policies and take decisions in terms of the resolutions taken at the party’s national conferences (attended by more or less 4 000 delegates from all the ANC branches countrywide). This politburo controls and manages the ANC party and every member, and by extension the ANC regime and the South African state.67

South Africa’ economic problems are a product of the ANC politburo’s power structure and its obedience to Marxism-Leninism. Focussing on the supposed prosperity and the false future economic growth as propagated to innocent and uninformed South Africans by the ANC’s top brass (politburo) during their daily promises of rehabilitating the South African state post-May 2019, it must be noted that its Marxist-Leninist politics never means allocating prosperity to the individual citizen but only to its politburo and thus the ANC elite. The Marxist-Leninist ANC started state capture in 1994 under Nelson Mandela and it was refined by the Jacob Zuma regime. It is still current practice by the Ramaphosa regime and Ramaphosa’s economic gurus such as Gordhan, notwithstanding their so-called “political virtue” and sweet-sounding “democratisation speeches”.67

That the Ramaphosa regime is still subscribing today to the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist politics is well illustrated by the ongoing appointment of incomptetent ANC cadres and tainted ANC top cronies in executive positions as required and prescribed by its politburo, clearly not with the intention to heal the economy or to deliver prosperity or to bring clean government. The ANC’s Marxist-Leninist foundation will never allow its political system to be changed or to be improved. It did not change under Mbeki or Zuma and will not change under Ramaphosa the Good. His many commissions on state capture, his fingering of Jacob Zuma as a kind of political and economic culprit or his cornering of the public protector as the perpetrator of improper “prosecutions” of him and Gordhan, represent short-term window dressings to keep the Marxist-Leninist ANC on track to rule South Africa. The ANC leaders, deeply marinated in revolutionary politics, know all too well that an ANC without a Marxist-Leninist foundation would be dead and so would their own political careers.

Inside the Marxist-Leninist tradition of the ANC (as showed by the history of the Soviet Union, Maoist China, Cuba, etc.) we find the primary concept: he who controls the economy controls the politics; and he who controls the politics controls the economy. Mandela knew it, Mbeki knew it, Zuma knew it, Ramaphosa knows it, Magashule knows it, Mabuza knows it and Gordhan knows it. All Marxist-Leninist disciples know it. Intertwined “political economies” as Marxists fondly call them, are the ideal for nation-states presided over by autocrats and despotic emperors. The ANC has nearly perfected this ideal, their dream.67

Zille67 presents an excellent analysis of how successfully the ANC’s leaders since 1994 have masterfully upheld a public image of democracy, while at the same time nurturing Marxism-Leninism in order to unleash at any time a full national-democratic revolution on the country. Undoubtedly our presently failing economy and governance are a direct outcome of the ANC’s planned national-democratic revolution, making any constructive bettering of our economy at this stage far-fetched. Zille writes67:7:

Al die ondersoeke en kommissies sal uiteindelik ‘n mors van tyd en geld wees as hulle nie die fundamentele ontwerpfout, wat aan die kern van al ons problem lé, uitwys nie: die NDR.

Dit is egter omwaarskynlik dat dit ooit sal gebeur en daarom sal ons aanhou om langsamerhand te misluk.

Te veel Suid-Afrikaners is verblind deur die oortuiging dat die goeie ouens die wa deur die drif kan sleep — gegrond op ‘n beleidsraamwerk wat dit onmoontlik maak. Dit is soos om te glo dat ‘n bevoegde vlieërnier ‘n Boeing 737 Max in vryval kan red. Selfs die wêreld se beste vlieëniers kan nie ‘n vliegtuig met ‘n fundamentele ontwerpfout in die lug hou nie.

Two indicators, or rather truths, are clearly related to Zille’s67 opinion above. Firstly, South Africa experienced from day-one with Mandela’s presidency the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist politics which would activate at the right time its national-democratic revolution such as the grabbing of land and the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank, etc. The radicalism of the Freedom Charter was watered down tacitly for politically opportunistic reasons by Nelson Mandela in 1994. Certain pre-steps were first needed, creating a slow, well-disguised descent into autocracy and a systematic sabotage of the economy and the administration of the country, to prepare the political terrain. Secondly, the process to activate the ANC’s national Marxist-Leninist revolution came out of the closet in December 2017 with the arrival of the ambition-driven Ramaphosa and Magashule, as well as their ANC’s instruction to finally implement the radicalism of the Freedom Charter.4,95-97

The ANC’s Marxist-Leninist organisational structure, derived from Soviet Russia and Communist China’s politico- economic system, persuaded the political-veteran Douglas Gibson93 to refer to the existing South African system as a crypto-party dictatorship intentionally set up to make a Western-style democracy and economy fail, while the favoured politico-economic system of the Marxist-Leninist ANC leaders is kept in place.93

Jones95 evaluated the prosperity of a country from a similar viewpoint as Zille (and thus the possibility to improve its economy when adversely affected) in terms of the driving of the economy by a democratic party under a community leadership versus a crypto-party dictatorship. To be able to do this, is it firstly important to compare true democracies which mostly reflect real prosperity and sound economic policies, with semi-autocracies to full autocracies which seldom show prosperity — or as in present-day Venezuela — hold up “pretended” prosperity as a front. Secondly, included in this analysis, one should look at the political alliances of a country with other countries as a clear barometer to confirm prosperity versus economic chaos. As a measurement instrument Jones uses an evaluation guideline on democracies versus autocracies in 2019, and South Africa’s position in it. Although Jones writes that democracy worldwide still rules, his evaluation bears out that since 1994 as many as 75 countries worldwide have moved in the direction of autocratisation. In 2017 alone, 24 countries became autocracies. In comparision, there are only 24 countries in 2019 showing positive tendencies toward democratisation, while 53% of the world’s total countries still qualify as democracies.95

South Africa’s association with BRICS shows how we are slipping away from democracy (notwithstanding how much we try to praise our so-called “good” Constitution and democracy) and our decline into utter poverty and a lack of prosperity. Jones’s95 article refers to research by two Swedish political scientists who currently see a decline in democracy world-wide:

In their fascinating new academic study, two Swedish political scientists, Anna Lührmann and Staffan Lindberg, point out that we are in the sixth chapter of the world’s democratic history. A third wave of democratic decline has hit us — the largest to date.

Among the many countries that have autocratised (in other words, slipped away from democracy) over the past two to three decades are India, Russia and Venezuela. Brazil could also be included.

Because of South Africa’s association with BRICS and countries that seem to form part of increasing autocratisation, we should take it as a serious warning of our imminent decline to the extreme junk status of a Venezuela or a Zimbabwe. Not only are the outward signs of prosperity in South Africa chimeral, but we might be on a precipice of losing even those vestiges of prosperity we still have. Jones95 quotes Anna Lührmann and Staffan Lindberg who sound the following warning95:30:

About a third of all autocratisation episodes … started during a democratic dispensation. Almost all of the latter … led to the country turning into an autocracy. This should give us a great pause in the spectre of the current third wave of autocratisation. Very few episodes of autocratisation starting in democracies have ever been stopped before countries become autocracies.

The innocent voter is mostly misled by the so-called “credibility of elections, the independence of courts and the freedom enjoyed by the opposition parties”, but there is much more to the issue that is not noted correctly. The loss of political and economical freedom take mostly time and is well-planned by the autocrat. Jones informs us95:30:

This shift away from democracy to autocracy is sometimes hidden because it does not necessarily take place overnight as, for example, with a coup. Nowadays, countries are gradually moving in this direction — often in a way that appears to be democratic.

Jones’s95 description of autocracy, strongly in line with Zille’s67 view of a Marxist-Leninist ANC at present ruling South Africa, is confirmed by our imperfect electoral system and our law-makers’ elections that bear similarities to the election process in many autocracies. (Recall again that the ANC regime of today was chosen in May 2019 as ruler by only 28% of the eligible voters, with 51% of eligible voters withholding their votes). South Africa is undoubtedly not one of the 24 so-called true democracies and it seems that the country has moved since 1994, together with as many as 75 countries worldwide, in the direction of autocracy.

Noting the growing autocracy in South Africa, driven by Marxist-Leninist politics, and pointed out by Zille67, Gibson85,93 and Jones95, it is clear why the country’s economy is running into serious trouble after 25 years. On the other hand, it is also evident that this economic approach is favoured and consonant with ANC power because it fits into its political planning for a future South Africa. Bettering, done in terms of Western capitalist principles, may therefore be ruled out.

In light of the above, Munusamy98 and Taylor99 are correct in writing that there are no easy paths to rebuilding or bettering our broken state and to change divisive attitudes in our society. Indeed, those ANC delinquents who are fighting attempts to clean up the corrupted state and set it aright, are all people attempting to escape prosecution and to keep their ill-gotten gains within the protection offered by the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist political model. These political crooks know how to attack the pillars of good and true democracy. To better our economy would need more than “cultured” democracy, it needs an equally robust defence in order to rescue South Africa from its current morass. Munusamy puts it clearly98:18:

“There is no such thing as an idealistic revolution [or an idealistic bettered economy]. Real change takes strong leadership and a bare-knuckle fight [for a clean regime]”.

Taylor99 writes on the absolute requirement to effect constructive changes to the economy, like the implementation of austerity (which also includes changes to the personal, political and social lifestyle of every citizen and most of all the ANC elite), all of which form part of a reality that the ANC desperately avoids. Within the current politico-economic chaos, the ANC has no plan or intention to change, essentially because the regime’s elite does not want to put the nation’s interests before theirs. Political reality is manipulated by the government through personal attacks and baseless declarations, reflecting firstly that lies became the truth for them, and secondly that they cannot and will not do anything constructive to the economy that would contradict their Marxist-Leninist ideology. There is no silver bullet that can re-establish the country’s economy besides a new, better government.

Perhaps because of Scandinavian financial and logistical support for ANC during its terrorist phase prior to 1994, it seems to look at the “Scandinavian model” of marrying capitalism and socialism, otherwise known as “social economics”. The journalist and researcher Ivo Vegter83 very successfully unmasks the ANC politburo’s rejection of exclusive capitalism in favour of so-called inclusive capitalism (or more correctly: their communistic socialism which never ever worked in the long term, as evidenced by Zimbabwe, Venezuela, the old Soviet Union, Cambodia, etc.). Vegter points out that the so-called “social economics” of Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland) are far away from the ANC’s ideas. Scandinavian democratic socialism is just not in the ANC’s fabric. However much it tries, it just does not have the integrity to better itself in any way to be in the class of the Scandinavian countries.

Vegter83, referring to the findings of the Fraser Institute World-index for Economic Freedom, shows that the Scandinavian countries are at the top of the list of the world’s free countries because of their sound judicial and financial systems, protected property rights, balanced immigration and international trade policies, etc. (In comparison, on the Fraser Institute World-index, South Africa under the ANC dropped from 82nd place in 2008 to 110th place in 2016, confirming our impaired Marxist-Leninist economics).10,83

The “ideal” ANC socialist state (the model of the Scandinavian countries of which Ramaphosa undoubtedly dreamed many times in his Third Shona) is a sociopolitical model which the revolutionary and selfish ANC-regime never can or will master. Vegter points out in terms of the Fraser Institute’s report and guideline what it takes to top the list as the Scandinavian countries do, reporting as follows83:4-5:

Die verslag wys dat nasies in die boonste kwartiel van ekonomiese vryheid ‘n gemiddelde bruto binnelandse produk (BBP) per capita het wat ses keer groter is as dié van lande in die onderste kwart.  Die gemiddelde inkomste van die armste 10% van die bevolking in die vryste lande is sewe keer hoër as in die onvry lande s’n, en selfs hoër as die gemiddelde per capita-inkomste van die lande wat die minste ekonomiese vryheid het.

In die boonste kwart ervaar slegs 1,8% van die bevolking armoede, teenoor 27,2%  in die onderste kwart. In die vry lande sterf minder babas en leef mense langer. Politieke en burgerlike vryhede is meer in die ekonomiese vry lande as in die onvry lande. Geslagsgelykheid is groter. Mense is gelukkiger.

The question is thus: why is South Africa under the ANC not at the top of the list, most of its people poor, a government hijacked in so-called “state capture” and is the country waiting for its bankruptcy to be declared? Vegter gives us a clear, precise answer: Because these so-called socialist Scandinavian countries used their wealth constructively and with integrity to create and to establish comprehensive, healthy welfare-states that are functioning politically effectively and correctly.8

Dr. Frans Cronjé100, the head of the Institute of Racial Relations (IRR) attributes the significantly lower evaluation of South Africa by the Fraser Institute to the effects of one clear cause: the utterly bad leadership of the ANC that cannot by any means be improved. The Fraser Institute‘s ranking is simply confirming what we know already: the ANC’s appalling leadership, the evidence of its failed communist-style socialism, revolutionary, radical and delinquent thinking, planning and actions, as well as the dishonest inclination to self-enrichment by the ANC’s elite must lead to eventual economic decline. This entrenched delinquent mentality of the ANC  was again confirmed by the absolute praises sung by both Thabo Mbeki and Cyril Ramaphosa regarding the mass murderer, thief, and despot Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe at his funeral. They lionised him as a so-called good man, a man of integrity, a man who knew how to reign and a man who had benefited his people; notwithstanding undisputed evidence which contradicts and rejects such a view.83,100 The Fraser Institute knows the ANC regime and its post-1994 reign of South Africa just too well when it negatively evaluated it with the number 110 position on its list. As Cronjé muses100:6:

Dit is sekerlik nou vir selfs die grootmoedigste en redelikste waarnemers duidelik dat die ANC ‘n inherent bose organisaie is en dat dit die plig van alle ordentlike Suid-Afrikaners is om alles in hul vermoë te doen om hom van sy mag te ontneem.

Cronjé’s reference to the ANC as a so-called “inherently evil organisation”, redirects us to the many public and media requests that the ANC’s elite should improve the economy through better rule. But in this context the most basic question has so far not a single time been asked: is there a single soul in the ANC’s present leadership to better the ANC itself, let alone to better the economy of the country? If we are look at the failed presidential histories of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, the answer is no. Taking note of Cyril Ramaphosa’s indecisive presidential term so far, the popular narrative seems to be68:21: “…that the president is ineffective, isolated, out of touch and overwhelmed by the fightback in his party”. Taking into account the conclusion of Malala68 that reads68:21: “…Ramaphosa and his team have a 55% chance of suceeding and turning the country’s fortunes around”, it would be foolish to believe that the ANC can better itself, or the country. The ANC’s saviour, who should have a 100% rating, has only obtained more or less 50%. It means the last man standing, went down. There is no leadership in the present-day ANC to do good for itself or the nation. Above all, the reconstruction of the country should be a first demand and priority. Present arguments that it should be a requirement for the ANC regime to better the economy, because of its large parliamentary majority, are not persuasive72. The ANC is leaderless; its politics is too contaminated to let it loose in a future democracy. On the other hand, at this stage to oust the ANC from Parliament by a motion of no confidence or a coup is not feasible. But something must be done as soon as possible to create  a clean government to improve the country’s economy and the people’s quality of life, without a disturbance of the political and societal peace. For Professor William Gumede1 of Wits one of the best ways to install an effective and clean government which can guarantee prosperity, is to educate our voters with knowledge of their civil interests and rights and the mass empowerment they enjoy through their votes: meaning thus to vote the best lawmakers into Parliament and the best party to be the ruler.

Gumede1, on a “better government” that could improve the country’s economy and drag it out of its present despondency, indicates in some way how the mass of Black voters should change their behaviour in electing a government that would act in their interest, and not in the interest of the corrupt elite. What Gumede should have said to us is that the ANC is “irreparable”, a “misfit” as a political party and never intended to bring prosperity to the mass of poor anyway. There is no sense in trying to better it. All the pages and pages written on possibilities to “rehabilitate” the ANC, is inappropriate and inapplicable. There is only one solution to the matter: the voters must themselves reject the ANC at the ballot box. Only after that and under a new regime with integrity, can the process of bettering South Africa be started. Gumede writes1:18:

For the cycle of black poverty to end, poor blacks must stop voting for instance for independence movements and leaders just because of their past opposition to colonialism and apartheid or their current “radical” rhetoric, regardless of their record in government.

People will also have to stop supporting leaders purely because they are loudly against the hated “others”.

In the long term, quality mass education, societal opposition to false beliefs and better quality leaders and political parties are crucial.

Poor blacks should support black leaders because of their competence, behaviour and values. Within black communities, more imagination, maturity and forward-looking approaches are needed to tackle the enduring impact of the trauma of colonialism and apartheid, at both the individual and the societal level.

4. Conclusions

I flew into SA in the second week of spring. This time the new season did not herald hope and renewal. It was the spring of despondency. The country was plummeted into the foulest mood I had experienced among my fellow countrymen in decades. The crime statistics were horrendous. Economic indicators showed we are a country in crisis. The currency was plumbing new depths. — Justice Malala, Sunday Times, 20 October 2019

Studying prosperity in present-day South Africa, the mood reflected does not differ in any way from the one Malala met in September 2019 when he had arrived from the USA and had described it as despondency. All the indicators put forward in this article around the concept prosperity, varying from the availability of jobs, unemployment, business trust, political harmony, leadership, willingness to change, governmental international relations and alliances, etc., showed that South Africa was not going to get more prosperous. On the contrary, there are signs that current South African politics is mired in an autocratic political system whereby the ANC’s previously hidden Marxist-Leninist politics, is starting to steer its policies. The country’s economy has been subject to the ANC’s delinquent intentions as far back as in the days of Nelson Mandela. Here, as in Venzuela, the state is starting to have a firm grip on all facets of our people’s lives — from where we live and what we eat, to how much we earn. We are more in trouble than we think.

There are no signs that the pre-May 2019 election promises of Cyril Ramaphosa and his ANC regime have in any way rectified the ills of South Africa so far. The economy is still negatively impacted, while the ANC’s politics is indecisive. The country can indeed be described as being in a state of disarray, or better, as Malala described it, despondency. The presence of a Chávez-Madura-elite is here too, and the feeling of a Venezuela in the making, might be real.

In the forthcoming Article 13, entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective”(13)”, the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of the mandate as ruler it received in the 8 May 2019 election, will be further evaluated.

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  38. Taylor T. If we don’t become the masters of our future, we’ll doomed to the salt mines of 2060. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Oct. 13; p. 20.
  39. Sokuto B. Technology holds key to Africa growth. The Citizen (News). 2019 Oct. 17; p. 4.
  40. Marrian N. President snaps out of dream. Mail & Guardian. 2019 June 28 to July 4; p. 27.
  41. Makinana A, Umraw A. Spike in job losses blamed on state. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Aug.25; p. 4.
  42. Barron C. ‘Act or SA will fall over fiscal cliff’. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Aug. 11; p. 6.
  43. De Lange R. Public-Private Growth initiative projects set for takeoff. City Press. 2019 June 30; p. 4.
  44. Du Toit P. ‘Wat SA regering nie kan begryp’. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 July 2; pp. 4-5.
  45. Peyper L. Steeds g’n plan vir Eskom-ontknoping. Rapport (Sake). 2019 Aug.25; p. 1.
  46. Strydom TJ. Look at our incredible shrinking country. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 July 28; p. 3.
  47. Ramaphosa C. Be part of building the South Africa we want. SundayTimes (News). 2019 June 23; p. 8.
  48. Ons wil droom van vis-en-tjips vir almal. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 June 23; p. 2.
  49. Time for dreaming is over, Mr President. There’s work to be done. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 23; p. 20.
  50. Hunter Q. Searching for the real Venezuela. Sunday Times (Insight). 2019 Sept. 1; p.11.
  51. De Lange J. NDZ het 1ste oor trein gedroom. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 June 23; p. 2.
  52. Zille H. Bepaal liefs self eie lot. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 June 9; p.7.
  53. Matthys D. China’s cash will boost Namibia’s economy City Press (Business). 2019 June 9; p. 4.
  54. NDP: Is South Africa meeting its targets? City Press. 2019 June 30; p. 4.
  55. Smit F. As babas ‘n land knak. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 11.
  56. Saunderson-Meyer W. Weaponised baby-making. Saturday Citizen. (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 10; p. 12.
  57. Endres J. ‘n Land se dodedans. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 June 23; pp. 4-5.
  58. Millions caught in SA’s debt trap. The Citizen (Business). 2019 Sept. 13; p. 23.
  59. Mnangagwa wants new currency, IMF loan. City Press. 2019 June; p. 3.
  60. Speckman A. Jaws drop at Tito’s privatisation plan. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Sept. 1; p. 4.
  61. Bruce P. Dare to bypass the Left and be waylaid by hypocrisy. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 1; p. 14.
  62. Davies K. Light at the end of Eskom tunnel? Mail & Guardian. 2019 Aug. 30 to Sept. 5; p. 3.
  63. De Lange J. Twis dreig oor Tito se plan. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 2.
  64. Joffe H, Speckman A. Economic panel to start work. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Sept 9; p. 1.
  65. Gumede W. This is no time for grand economic experiments. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 1; p. 16.
  66. Time to decide on Tito’s plan – and all those other plans. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Sept. 1; p. 14.
  67. Zille H. Suid-Afrika se ontwerpfout. Rapport (Weekliks) 2019 July 14; p. 7.
  68. Malala J. Don’t despair, Ramaphosa still represents hope. Sunday Time. 2019 Oct. 20; p. 21.
  69. Joffe H. Reserve Bank can do little about without structural reform. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Oct. 6; p. 2.
  70. Milapityana S. Is Nedlac the ideal forum to forge a new agenda for growth? Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Oct. 6; p. 20.
  71. Rakele R, January Y, Mukansi R. IMF bailout not wise – or needed. Mail & Guardian. (Business). 2019 Aug. 30 to Sept. 5; p.26.
  72. Kgosana C, Speckman A. ‘Divert pensions to stave off IMF. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Aug. 18; p. 3.
  73. Speckman A. ‘Good governance means better GDP’. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Oct. 6; p. 3.
  74. Speckman A. Alarmist, but bailout might be a remedy. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Aug. 18; p. 9.
  75. Peyper L. Staat het plan vir pensioene. Rapport (Sake). 2019 June 16; p. 1.
  76. Barron C. Peril looms for state pension fund. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Aug. 25; p. 7.
  77. De Lange R. Prescribed assets requirement may well hit pension savings. City Press. 2019 June 30; p. 4.
  78. Dis tyd vir besluite wat goed is vir more. Rapport (News). 2019 Aug. 25; p.2.
  79. Ka Nkosi S. When ignorance turns into a disruptor of policy modernisation. Business Report (Focus). 2019 June 12; p. 16.
  80. Kgosana C. Pension-grab plan ‘unjust and wrong’. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Sept. 8; p. 5.
  81. Slabbert A. Pensioen: Cosatu sien ook rooi ligte. Rapport (News). 2019 Aug. 25; p. 4.
  82. Joffe H. Global indices and ratings agencies have got our number. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Oct. 13; p. 2.
  83. Vegter I. Verlief op ‘n gek idée. Rapport (Debat). 2019 Sept. 22; pp. 4-5.
  84. Joffe H. SA economy enters last chance saloon. Sunday Times (Business). 2019 Oct. 13; p. 4.
  85. Gibson D. Be friends with most countries. The Star (Comments). 2019 July 9; p. 6.
  86. Mbatha NC. AGOA benefits of critical value for SA. The Star (Opinion). 2019 June 12; p. 8.
  87. Speckman A. SA juggles China, US interests in trade battle. Sunday Times (Business Times). 2019 July 7; p. 6.
  88. Speckman A. Cyril pans US, winks at China. Sunday Times (Business Times). 2019 July 7; p. 1.
  89. Eybers J. Trump en Huawei: ‘SA kan erg skade ly’. Rapport (Sake). 2019 July 21; p. 2.
  90. Hunter Q. Cyril backs China on Huawei. Sunday Times. 2019 June 30; pp. 1, 4.
  91. Goading the US to please China hardly seems the way for SA to grow trade. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 July 7; p. 16.
  92. Naki E. Cyril nets US support. Saturday Star (News). 2019 Sept. 28; p. 6.
  93. Gibson D. ANC is a liability. The Star (News). 2019 June 11; p. 19.
  94. Schuitema J. Crisis: Being a nation of ‘takers’ to blame. The Citizen (Business). 2019 Aug. 13; p. 24.
  95. Jones C. Democracy still rules – for now. Mail & Guardian. 2019 June 21 to 27; p. 30.
  96. Marrian N. Fight against Magashule builds steam. Mail & Guardian (News). 2019 June 14 to 20; p. 6.
  97. Sokutu B. Cyril’s double-edged sword. The Citizen (Opinion). 2019 June 27; p. 12.
  98. Munusamy R. A bare-knuckle fight rather than fanciful philosophies is what we need now to secure the future of our country. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 18; p. 18.
  99. Taylor T. Instead of politics we have endless attempts to manipulate political reality. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Aug. 18; p. 18.
  100. Cronjé F. Met Mugabe-lof wys ANC hy is inherent boos. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 Sept. 22; p. 6.

PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

 

Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (11: Introduction)

Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (11: Introduction)

Gabriel P Louw

iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093

Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Keywords: Capability, desperate, evaluation, electorate, expropriation, journalism, marginalised, populist, probation, scenario, violence.

Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 2

1. Background

During the post-May-2019-to-2024 parliamentary term of the ANC, certain political tendencies may be expected to emerge which would have a profound effect upon South Africa. Some may be described as positive, while others may be characterised as extremely negative with the inclination to produce unrest, anarchy and revolution. Post-May 2019 will not necessarily mean the beginning of a golden age in the South African republic, but neither does it mean that it would be impossible for the ANC to be rehabilitated. The installation of the new regime on 9 May 2019 portends two future periods under the ANC with clear outcomes that may bring dramatic changes in its policies and actions: the 2019-to-2022 period (from May 2019 until the national conference of the ANC in 2020), as well as the 2022-to-2024 period (national conference in 2020 until the next national elections in 2024).

The post-May 2019 period may turn out to be a kind of continuation of the pre-2019 system during which the ANC will again be the ruler with the same failures and misdemeanours of the pre-May-2019 period. But, there is the possibility of an emerging post-May political radicalism, such as land grabbing under the ANC (that may be effected together with the other radical parties like the EFF), which transform South Africa at last into the long-expected autocratic and failed country (which is far worst than a failed state) prophesied by conservative commentators. The period from 2019 to 2022 may be full of political intrigues, chaos and of power struggles between splinter groups of the ANC, further aggravated by radical small parties of the EFF calibre. Included herein would be the ongoing economic and social failures, problems with water and electricity, etc. And if this period does not have the potential to bring enough upheaval, unrest and revolution, there will follow the critical period from 2022 to 2024 during which new factions and political groupings may be formed inside and outside the ANC, which may vary from ultra-radicalism to ultra-conservatism. All of this may play out if the main problems of South Africa, such as comprehensive land reform, are not dealt with during the pre-2022 phase. Both these two periods and timeframes have their own uniqueness and may be intertwined, but, as mentioned, may also be seen as distinct and independent from each other. The denouement of each may steer South Africa into incapacity or success.

The line in South Africa between chaos, stability and order is thin. Justice Malala, a writer and commentator, tries hard to comfort South Africans in some way when he writes:

Politics is toxic everywhere in the world right now. The Democrats in the US are moving to impeach President Donald Trump. The UK is run by a buffoon whose ham-handed actions on Brexit continue to imperil Europe. Across the globe, politics are failing the citizenry. Nigerians do not trust President Muhammadu Buhari or the system he represents. South Africans are not the first people to be failed by politics and politicians and won’t be the last.1: 21

The successful execution of the post-2019 land-reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and implementation by a so-called “good” government, together with a “good” leadership in whom integrity and Solomon’s wisdom are essential characteristics. This means a regime that is not blindly on a path of “reaching the goal at any cost” but to effectively achieving an end-result regarding the matter, which would be a success. This requires a regime honestly serving the interests of all its people by following a well-drawn-up roadmap for an orderly land-reform initiative, and steering it into reality.

The essential question here is thus whether the ANC can be theoretically deemed a candidate or may be shortlisted and thus be considered to have the leadership potential to ensure the successful implementation and completion of the post-2019 plan on land expropriation.

The evaluation guidelines for political parties are:

  1.  Its general policies as well as specific positions on aspects such as respect for law and order, and the fighting of corruption, state capture, delinquent behaviour by its MPs and MPLs, including its top brass, as well as the party’s and its leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put forward in its manifesto for the 2019 election;
  2. Public criticism for the period 1994 to 2019 in newspapers, etc., evaluated and expressed by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the party as a political organisation, its members’ and leaders’ behaviours and actions such as corruption, state capture, as well as the delinquency of MPs and MPLs, the leaders, their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the party’s internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions.

1.1. Introduction

This study is a continuation of the previous article (Article 10, titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2—The DA in perspective (10)”.

The focus of Article 11 is on the ANC as the elected present-day regime. The article is part of a series of articles on the ANC, published under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3 —The ANC in perspective”. It purports to analyse and further discuss the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the ANC to effect land expropriation successfully as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.

1.2. Aims of article 11

The primary intention of the publications on the ANC is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by specifically describing the profile of the ANC on the same basis as was done in Article 9 on the EFF and Article 10 on the DA.

The aim is to evaluate the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of its empowerment as ruler received during the election of 8 May 2019. The focus will be on the party’s leadership to detect poor personal and political integrity. The intention of the researcher is thus to see if the ANC as a political party and the ANC’s MPS and MPLs, its top brass and chief executive, as well as other officials at state enterprises have the ability to successfully execute comprehensive land reform.

1.2.1. The exclusive use of newspaper articles and direct quotations in article 11

It must be noted that the emphasis in information collection for this research was on the use of mostly recent South African newspaper reports, seeing that the information was offered daily in describing (with analyses, comments, investigations and discussions) the prominent political, economic and social events. In totality these reports reflect a very comprehensive and in-depth picture of present-day South Africa’s political, judicial and economic life. On how South Africans trust, read and share news, research published by Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019, together with Isabella Maake and Graphics24, shows that printed newspapers are being used by 40% of the South African population to obtain information and insight. Most of the newspapers used in the research as references, may be described, for instance, in terms of their weekly percentage usage by the total population as follows:

Sunday Times: 25%;
Daily Sun: 21%;
Sowetan: 13%;
The Citizen: 12%;
City Press: 12%;
The Star: 10%.

In addition, local newspapers were also used (21%), while other newspapers (Afrikaans) like Beeld and Rapport (of which the percentage usage is unknown) were also consulted as they are being comprehensively used by the Afrikaans-speakers.2:14

On the extensive use in this research of South African journalistic reporting, it is important to note the following comment in the City Press of 23 June 2019, defining the absolute need for critical journalism to fight crime and political delinquency in South Africa. It reads3:13:

Going deep into the belly of governing circles in countries [African] where the majority of citizens are desperately poor, we discovered how local and international business partners assist presidents, ministers and governing party bureaucrats to convert political power, often via access to natural resources, into personal financial reserves and assets.

And:

Support for African investigative journalists as they continue to expose wrongdoing is once again noted as an important need.

That the country’s journalists are under immense strain, as well as physical and emotional attacks by delinquent politicians without any safeguard such as bodyguards, is reflected by the recent (but failed) action of the South African National Editors’ Forum (Sanef) and five journalists to go to the Equality Court for an interdict to stop a specific political party from intimidating and threatening journalists and inciting violence against them. Munusamy4:18 writes:

And this matter goes beyond the realm of individual safety. Our industry is increasingly on the retreat as political attacks and vilifications intensify. Journalists and editors are already self-censoring to avoid being harangued by politicians and denigrated online. Social media is a toxic space where people can direct violent and misogynistic attacks, either themselves or through troll armies, without consequences.

She continues4:18:

The focus of the attacks is now shifting to the judiciary… Our society cannot claim not to see the warning signs of our democracy under attack. The challenge is whether we respond or watch impassively.

Any public utterance or writing by a civil person, another politician or an author pinpointing alleged wrongdoings by controversial politicians or state officials, are fast being taken to court as instances of slander and libel whereby amounts from R500 000 up to R35-million are being claimed as compensation! It must be noted that most of these public utterances and writings occurred with reference to the alleged state capture under the ANC regime, and are often anchored in the testimonies offered to the judicial commissions such as the Zondo one. In perspective, it seems to be many previously deeply-in-love ANC comrades and other cronies that are calling each other names such as liars, fraudsters, apartheid spies, known enemy agents, charlatans, EFF-sleepers, even “extraordinary k****r”. These “calling out” actions have also been observed between the ANC leaders and churches, as well as other parties’ politicians who try the court seemingly as a “money-spinner”. Most of the lawsuits are plain nonsense, juvenile and sorely reflect the poor quality of our law-makers. Furthermore, these revenge actions are wasting the valuable time of the court, while some seem indeed to generate money for the claimants. Critically observed, most of these civil actions seeking revenge or compensation for so-called libel and slander claims, are also attempts at outright distraction from the spotlight on the guilt of the claimants and threats towards those exposing them, in order to stop their investigations and writing on the culprits’ wrongdoing.5-17

It is clear that most of these cases of libel and slender are purely because the SAPS (South African Police Service) has so far done nothing to investigate the alleged law-breaking and the NPA (National Prosecuting Authority) has not prosecuted, leaving crooks many times over untouchable and free in society to continue their crimes.

This research is not investigative, but purely to use existing newspaper articles that were already published and accepted as correct by the general public and critics, given that the persons named or alleged to have committed crimes or corruption, never objected to the articles’ contents nor did  they take action against the newspaper or its investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts. As a researcher I am very thankful to the mass of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts for their information which formed the backbone of my research project on the ANC. It must further be noted that very little of the enormous reporting on testimonies before the various judicial commissions, like the Zondo one, were used in this research. It was just too much to include into the research. I am considering making it part of a future publication, namely: The phantom of the South African Parliament: the ANC 1994 to 2019.

My publications on the ANC are thus in principle a collation of published information and reflections from this gathered or archived information, on the ANC’s activities. Firstly, the preference for this “reflecting” approach follows from the immense amount of available information, just waiting to be collected and currently underused. Secondly, this published information has already been tested and published according to the criteria of “true news”, or as truth which has not been legally challenged as defamation or falsehoods. The publications quoted in this research were thus operating from within the ethics of good journalism, meaning right, trustworthy and credible, with which editors allowed journalists and authors to publish the information in their newspapers. Many of the cases reported on are still awaiting investigation by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and possible prosecution by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). For this reason the terms “alleged” and “alluded”, as used throughout in newspaper articles, are also used as here. The term alleged is applicable to every case reported here: even in cases were culprits were prosecuted and sentenced, these outcomes are treated as “alleged”, seeing that there can be still appeals to the courts. Directly reflecting the allegations made by political analysts, political commentators and investigative and crime journalists, compelled the large-scale use of quotations. This approach brings the reader directly into the picture of the ANC’s politics, while at the same time giving appropriate acknowledgment to the various authors for their hard work. These quotations tell an intimate story which is frequently lost through indirect references, descriptions and paraphrasing. The guideline of Ngwenya12 on good journalism occupies a central position throughout this research project. He writes12:8:

The reflective call in these tricky, dicey, trying times for journalists is to be independent. Sharpen no knives, grind no axes and dig no graves. If journalism is right, trustworthy and credible the dishonourable will feel the weight of public censure to fall on their sword in a grave they dug for themselves.

The descriptions of this subdivision, titled: 1.2.1.The exclusive use of newspaper articles and direct quotations in articles 11, is also fully applicable to all the articles which are following as part of this project on the ANC. Thus, they will not be repeated.

2. Method

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern politico-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to effect successful land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources have been consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in making an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to achieve successful land reform as from 2019.

The research findings have been presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1 Absence of an Electorate-Parliamentarian-Employment Act and an Electorate-Parliamentarian Ethics Code

The serious question that is prominently being asked by political analysts is: how did South Africa end up in its present mess? Various answers are proffered, varying from it being the end-result of Apartheid, to the end-result of the ANC as a failed revolutionary party. Looking at the utter failure and constant economic decline, failed human uplifting and impoverishment of the mass of the people, the fact is clear that the ANC is the main culprit as a revolutionary that never creates, but takes only from the rich without giving—as the good thief Robin Hood would do—to the poor. Moreover, South Africa’s political setup of pre-1994 and its much-praised but in some ways failed Constitution, offered the ANC the opportunity to successfully establish its revolutionary culture of crookedness, mismanagement, state capture and autocracy, unobstructed over 25 years. Central to this power structure is the incapable ANC elite with their sole intention of self-enrichment and utmost power hunger. But the question remains: how was it possible for the ANC to be able to hijack the mass of poor Blacks’ votes and use the South African Parliament exclusively, from one administration to the other, to benefit them solely? One of the answers lies in the fact that there was the lack of a Basic Conditions Electorate-Parliamentarian-Employment Act [equal to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCOEA)] to describe and enforce a mandate between voters and a regime, obliging the regime to govern a country and its people only with justice and rectitude.18,19

3.2 Chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng’s sincere warning and prayer for good governance

To assess and control an elected party during its term of five years (like the ANC again for the period 2019 to 2024, after it had already been ruling for 25 years since 1994), certain basic guidelines should be in place before the election and inauguration of a government (as an employee in service of the people.) There should be basic guidelines, such as to act all of the time while governing solely in terms of its promises made before the election to the voters (the employer, who takes the government as an employee in service). In South Africa such an act or code is absent. It is thus important to outline it here: firstly, to understand how good governance could have been attained from 1994 until now; and secondly, the absolute present need to promulgate such legislation to get rid of corrupted and failed governments. If such a piece of legislation were in place we would not be shamed by the need of the Chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng, when he swore in ministers and their deputies at the Sefako Makgatho presidential guesthouse in Pretoria recently at the start of South Africa’s sixth Parliament, to give them a clear warning. In this context Hunter18:4 shows how Mogoeng digressed significantly from his traditional swearing-in speech to say to these public figures (mostly from the ANC) that “they should shiver if they even think of misspending public funds in their care, while he also warned elected public representatives to take their oath of office seriously and not to act as if the public owe them something”.

In this context he had undoubtedly referred to the totally failed government of the ANC since 1994. His warning was an attempt by him as a last resort to inculcate good employee habits into the mindsets of law-makers in the new Parliament after so many years of failure. Chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng, specifically pointed to the status of law-makers as plain “public employees” and not, as some seemed to have been thinking and doing since 1994, as high-level mighty “employers” in charge of the voters and the public. Mogoeng said that he wanted to ensure that those who took the oath or affirmation know that18:4: “…power doesn’t belong to you, and the resources that come with that office don’t belong to you. You are a servant of the South African public and this is what you are promising those who have employed you. For you to suddenly begin to treat those who have privileged you with an opportunity to serve – especially at a high level – as if they owe you something and be insensitive, almost, to the dire circumstances they find themselves in [is wrong].”

In the context of Mogoeng Mogoeng’s “preaching”, he further read the so-called Riot Act to the law-makers (who in present-day South Africa seem more and more to be acting as schoolchildren going on a picnic), and emphasised that public officers must realise that people suffer the consequences of bad decisions18:4: “So we never forget, just the thought of giving somebody millions that they ought not to get, that are supposed to help elsewhere, should make you shiver. Just the thought of it should make you shiver.”

But it seems as if there was doubt in the Chief Justice’s heart that his verbal and written warning alone was not going to have an effect on the Ramaphosa cabinet and its officials. This is confirmed by the fact that the honourable justice had also included a prayer to those being sworn in, seemingly hoping in this way to impress his prescribed virtue on the minds of the ANC elite.18

From a practical and judicial viewpoint, as spelt out clearly by the Chief Justice above, the business of government and its proper execution, represents a mandate received by a regime to do certain work for the people in exchange for compensation. This means that the appointed ruler (employee) received his mandate from the voters (employers) in exchange for the pre-election promises, meaning that they will execute these agreed-upon actions and policies—neither more nor less. Looking back to the period 1994 to 2019, very few of the ruling party’s officials—from presidents to their most junior officials—had ever respected the voters or had “shivered” in Mogoeng’s sense when diverting funds to their own pockets. Jacob Zuma and the Parliament under the ANC laughed at both the judiciary and the public. Looking at Cyril Ramaphosa and his cronies, since coming to power in 2017, the alleged Phantom of the Parliament has not changed much of its act.

It is thus important to offer a guideline of what should be in position to assure good government for the sixth Parliament during the period 2019 to 2024.

3.1.2. The unborn Electorate-Parliamentarian Act
3.1.2.1. Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCOEA)

Regarding the ANC‘s many failed promises and wrongdoing, nearly bringing the South African state to a fall (thereby failing in its mandate as na employee), there is only one clear guideline to be used in order to fully understand and describe the ANC’s actions as a failed employee within a legal employee-employer relation, namely the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCOEA). A similar Electorate-Parliamentarian Act to the BCOEA should have be promulgated in 1994 to guide the rights of the employee (ANC-government) in its actions and those of the employer (voters) who want certain and specific work done via Parliament. Central to the BCOEA stands the legal concept of probation that needs to be highlighted and which the ANC regime failed to respect in its job contract via Parliament with the people of South Africa.18,20

To illustrate the need for an Electorate-Parliamentarian Act and the clause of probation for a party as a government and its law-makers as parliamentarians, the BCOEA will be made applicable as a voters-and-government agreement, equal to an employer-and-employee agreement and be discussed theoretically, to illustrate the ANC’s utter failure over 25 years and to show how a failed regime can be stopped dead in its tracks with the correct legislation. The basis will thus be to encapsulate the concept of good governance and the use of probation as a means to end the various ANC regimes’ mischief. This comparative discussion clearly shows what is missing with the present mandate of the government and why the ANC-government (the supposed subordinate employee to the voters) had spun out of control from 1994 to 2019, to engage in unobstructed state capture, failing to activate good services as to education and health, ignoring the Constitution, etc. It will also bear out how the voters were sidelined immediately after every new election of the Parliament, and how the MPs and MPLs became an untouchable force of employees after their election, leaving the employer (voters) powerless until the next election. In reality, it reflects a coup d’état by the law-makers, the moment after they were sworn in.20

Michael Bagraim20, a labour expert, writes excellently in The Star of 12 June 2019 on the matter of a failed employee versus the right of an employer to punish such an employee by requiring him to better himself, as opposed to being able to fire him with immediate effect. His clear writing makes it easy to adapt and compare the rules of the BCOEA to politics. Such a comparision enables one to characterise the ANC regime as a failed employee who should be kicked out and its contract terminated very early in its period of probation. It also makes it possible to obtain insight into the rights that would be awarded to the voters should such a voters’ regime agreement become a legal reality and had to have been thoroughly applied since 1994 to the regime and the law-makers of the South African Parliament. It also shows the specific legal obligations of the regime in terms of which the voters could and should have booked it in order to get rid of the regime when it failed. This would mean terminating the employment contract of the regime (employee), cancelling its stay in Parliament for the full term of five years if such a legal agreement existed.20

Bagraim20 writes that in terms of the BCOEA every employment relationship must have a written letter of appointment or contract of employment. (This agreement goes far further legally than the oath of office that law-makers pledged before the Chief Justice: the oath is essentially a plain promise that may, but does not need, to be respected as was born out by the Zuma regime.) One of the conditions of service is a probationary clause in writing which is prescribed for both the employer and the employee to know and understand that there would be an assessment period before the contract became permanent. Probation is a vehicle to assist an employer to possibly terminate the employment relationship if the employer feels the employment relationship is not a perfect fit or the employee is not performing in accordance with the contract of employment, posits Bagraim.20 In this context it means that if the probationary employee’s work does not meet the standards required by the employer, then the dismissal should be able to seen to be fair. The position of a probationary employee is different from that of a permanent employee and both the procedure and merits of that dismissal will be less onerous on the employer. In this context of the probationary period versus the permanent period, is it important to bear in mind that, besides that the probation clause may differ from employer to employer, the duration of the probation period may also differ in time: it will be longer if the position is one of a senior nature. Prominent in this context are the positions of MPs and MPLs on senior level that warrant a lengthy period of assessment. This reference clearly reflects two aspects relating to the status of a regime as an employee: firstly it needs a lengthy period of assessment stretching fully over the five years as elected representatives to Parliament. Secondly the employment of parliamentarians as employees of the people in terms of this constant assessment is limited to five years in duration which makes the employees’ right to permanent appointment zero (no reappointment of a party as regime without a new election). Implicitly, parliamentarians as representatives are supposed to be “permanently on probation” for their full term.20

The BCOEA has an inscribed clause that a probation period may be extended to erase short-comings and better the employees. In the case of law-makers their probationary period, as said, is supposed to be running for a full five years, excluding any shortening of the probation time. Any legal extension of the five years term is not allowed without another election. It means the re-election of a failed regime and its law-makers can indeed be seen as a willing extension of the probation by the voters, as was done for the ANC over six elections notwithstanding a poor record and performance by the regime.20

The BCOEA requires that the standards set by the employer must be fair and reasonable. The probationary clause provision is also intended to protect the employee who might wish to leave the employer because the position was not as the employee envisaged. Further, the standards set by the employer must be fair and reasonable. In the case of law-makers the writing and execution of these standards are totally handed over to Parliament in governing for the period of five years after the election, during which the law-makers are free to rewrite and set their own standards, totally ignoring the people’s wishes after their election.20

Looking at the fine print of the aim of assessment of the BCOEA, when you see it equal to a law-maker-voter agreement, one sees probation’s function of assessing the new employee (meaning in politics the two entities, namely Parliament and its law-makers) and his capacity for fitting into the organisation (meaning in politics the people’s/voters’ interests) and whether that employee is compatible with fellow employees and the immediate management of the employer. Probation is not only a period granted to the employer to assess the employee, but also to give feedback to the employee in order to ensure better performance and better compatibility which may include training and guidance. Firstly, parliamentarians are expected to be well trained, skilled, seasoned and experienced before they move into Parliament because it was during the pre-election exercise that they were selected and elected by the people for their ability to handle their mandate effectively. Secondly, the only feedback in response to parliamentarians and the ruling party’s performance (good or bad) at present available to the people/voters is to vote for the law-makers and the ruling party or to vote them out in the next election.20

Probation in contracts under the BCOEA is not compulsory. Often appointments are not subjected to probation because both parties are aware of the abilities of the employee. This erasure of the probationary period is presently built-in to the law-makers’ contacts because it is traditionally believed that they are highly qualified and of high integrity before making themselves available to stand for Parliament and thus do not need oversight and monitoring from outside by the voters. The only opportunity to moan about or to reject elected law-makers and a regime is, as mentioned, to not vote for them in the next election.20

The BCOEA further states that an employer must constantly monitor a probationary employee, keeping a record for feedback, keeping minutes of discussions and to see to it that the employee receive the necessary development, support and guidance for improvement. In the voters-versus-law-makers relationship the law-makers obtained the sole right to oversee themselves regarding the development and bettering of their training, experience and behaviour. The present setup regarding public oversight of the regime of the day and law-makers, reflects a process whereby there is very little monitoring of the quality and integrity of law-makers during their period of five years in Parliament, as became evident during the so-called Zupta saga.20

In light of the above, it is clear that Parliament’s management, with specific reference to the party which is also the regime in power, as well as the law-makers elected to Parliament, is totally uncontrolled. The Parliament and the mandated regime become independent powers to do as it and the law-makers “see fit”, leaving the individual citizen stripped of his citizen’s rights. The fact that the ANC received only 28% of the eligible voters’ support in the past election and that only 49% of the total eligible voters participated in the May 2019 election, render the ANC in post-2019 South Africa in practice a non-representative ruler, bordering on self-empowered autocracy. This kind of dangerous ruler-empowerment explains why and how the ANC as a regime has become an irresponsible autocratic ruler since 1994, ignoring the concerns of the majority (51%) of South Africans. Corruption, crookedness, state capture and mismanagement became the normal form of rule. In the end the criminal justice system had to deal with the depths of corruption and misrule, with courts and commissions of enquiry bringing to light the delinquent actions of Parliament and a number of its law-makers.19-21

However, thanks to ANC misrule, the criminal justice system is in itself broken, supporting the crooked law-makers, as was recently well illustrated by various testimonies before the Zondo commission. The ex-head of the KwaZulu-Natal Hawks, Johan Booysen22, testified that there existed a web of alleged corruption in the police, the Hawks and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and pointed out that such corruption culminated in those institutions “being subverted to ensure the shielding of certain individuals from criminal sanction”. A submission of 70 pages by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS,) dealing with the crooked relationship between the national executive and the criminal justice leadership, contains the following sentence22:13:

There can be no doubt that the abuse of executive authority in respect of criminal justice agencies has been central in allowing the current proliferation of corruption.

Gareth Newham, the head of justice and violence prevention at ISS said22:13:

There has to be a much broader political project to uncapture these institutions.

The overwhelming evidence of political and criminal-justice delinquency forced the chair of the Zondo commission, Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, to declare22:13:

If we do not have a proper law enforcement agency then we don’t have a country.

To curb the massive delinquency in the South African Parliament, it urgently needs an Electoral-Parliamentarian Act to be promulgated as a priority before the end of 2020. If the BCOEA had applied to Parliament’s law-makers and the ANC-regime specifically, all would have been fired long ago due to poor performance, incompatibility, poor training and experience, as well as misconduct. Moreover, looking at the way in which they are aggressively handling the land-reform matter by threatening the 30 million poor Blacks (a significant part of the population and in reality the ANC’s employer), the ANC regime is indeed victimising its own employer. Their dismissal would be justified in terms of all the criteria of dismissal.19-21

3.1.3. The  central roles of the ANC’s democratic-centralism and the electoral system in parliamentary abuse
3.1.3.1. The ANC’s democratic-centralism ideology

The ANC’s so-called democratic-centralism plays a prominent role in the failed political outcomes of their five post-1994 administrations and portends similar manifestations to be repeated during their sixth administration under Ramaphosa. This uniqueness of the ANC’s party organisation and its steering of the thinking, planning and actions of every one of its members, from the ordinary to its president, are overlooked by many, even political analysts, commentators and journalists.19-21

This ANC’s democratic-centralism and the established power structure of the ANC as a party, nullifies the claim that a specific ANC member, like its president, is the sole empowered person to act and decide on ANC matters (also making his/her authority as President of South Africa subordinate to the ANC’s power). The implication is thus that the interests of the ANC as a party are determined by its national conferences and must be strictly adhered to and be executed by every member. But this also means that the interests of the country, whether inside or outside Parliament, are subordinate to the interests of the ANC. It does not matter if these ANC interests are crooked deals, state capture, corruption, etc.19-21

The principle of the ANC’s interests first and the subordination of every one of its members to the decisions of its national conferences, is well described and acknowledged by Bishop Hangwai Maumela23 of the Lazarus Maumela Foundation. In his defence of the ANC’s so-called “democracy” and the ANC’s so-called “servicing the needs and right of every citizen”, when he swankily writes in the City Press of 30 June 2019 as follows23:4:“…members of the ANC who are in Parliament have been deployed by the ANC. There’s no member who is superior to another. They pay the same affiliation fee to the ANC. They have been allocated various portfolios – some as ministers, deputy ministers, chief whips and chairpersons of portfolio committees. All of them account to the ANC…”

Mthombothi24 also writes on the corrupt democratic-centralism of the ANC which makes all ANCs subordinate to the interests and decisions of the ANC and absolutely not subordinate to the country’s interests, together with the contaminated intertwining of the country’s direct and indirect appointments of parliamentary law-makers and a Parliament only accountable to itself in the Sunday Times24:15:

The men and women who’ll rock up after the elections to be sworn in as our “public representatives” in parliament play absolutely no role in this campaign. They’re insignificant and invisible. They will get their seats as a reward for loyalty to their party, not for their service to the voters or the community. And it has stench of bribery about it. Which is why all the skelms have made it into their party lists – to buy their silence. Choice, the basis of any democracy, is next to nonexistent. The sum total of what passes foe an election campaign is a smiling face on a poster hanging on every pole throughout the country. It’s almost as if the country has been reduced to a single village or community with the same needs, grievances and aspirations.”

Munusamy25, in this context, writes25:20:

Many people lined up by the main political parties to be our public representatives are an insult to our nation. They would not even be able to run a cake sale without eating the cake themselves- or peddling the backing process to their patronage networks.

If an individual has not come to a firm conclusion about the election, that individual will do more for their country/community by not voting, rather than making a mistake.

The clincher: “Supporting the lesser of two evils is still supporting evil”.

The Zondo commission has made me realise how farcical the political system is when corrupt business people are able to control the state by simply buying off politicians and key officials.

The reason there are so many hopeless people vying to be our public representatives is because the political system is closed off to credible, capable leaders who have the potential to modernise and reimaging our future.

We have to revert to the goals of the Freedom Charter, written in 1955, because nobody can think of fresh solutions to society’s current problems.

SA has many great minds who opt to remain on the sidelines or choose to look after their own financial wellbeing rather than the good of society. So it is difficult to invest in a system that is never going to attract or shape good leaders.

Democratic-centralism makes, as said, all the ANC members (from the Number One to the lowest ranked ones) subordinated to the ANC national conference’s decisions. These decisions are again based on the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist political ideology. The outcomes of these decisions are and must be overseen at all time by the top brass of the ANC, as mandated by its politburo as represented by its Top Six executives and NEC (National Executive Committee) of eighty members. Inside this practice of blanket democratic-centralism by the ANC, there is evidence that it has allowed the development of a strong top brass (its so-called Top Six), but that it has limited to some extent the development of an extreme African-leadership syndrome (until Jacob Zuma arrived in the presidency and became the ANC’s and South Africa’s untouchable paramount chief for a while).24,26

Mthombothi24 writes in this respect regarding the paramount chief of the ANC as being associated with the Nazis and the Fascists as well as South Africa’s tribal system24:15:

Everything is centred on the party leader. He’s the fount of all wisdom. This practice has engendered the sort of behaviour or attitude that’s been prevalent in Africa for so many years, of the leader as all-knowing and omnipotent — the so-called Big Man syndrome, often corrupt and autocratic. The Big Men stay too long in power and when they are done, choose their successor, often a member of the family. Which is what Jacob Zuma almost succeeded in doing.

There is more than enough evidence that all the ANC presidents — from Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, up to Cyril Ramaphosa — had challenged as far as their powers allowed according to the ANC’s principle of democratic-centralism in their pursuit of ambitions to become the paramount chief or the “emperor Julius Caesar”, but were politically destroyed in the end. It was specifically Jacob Zuma, through his open and well-planned corrupted self-empowerment, who had neutralised to a great extent and temporarily the ANC’s democratic-centralism and its exclusive parliamentary functioning and statutory empowerment through the ANC’s politburo (consisting of the ANC’s Top Six and NEC). As a result of Zuma’s internal party coup, it has made Parliament and the executive politics of the country extreme dysfunctional, continuing to this day under Ramaphosa. Moreover, it has created in some way the idea of a true democracy framed in a Constitution of excellence, driven and managed by an effective executive team and Parliament, all under an executive-empowered President who has been totally freed by the ANC’s politburo to do his own will: meaning to take independent decisions and actions and to steer the country as he alone thinks suitable. It seems as if the false belief of the ANC’s absolute “democracy” has become overwhelmingly rooted in most of the media and public’s mindsets too.24,29

The above is only theory as long as the ANC stays in power. The ANC’s own constitution — that became the mandated constitution for the president of the ANC and thus also of the State of South Africa since 1994 — essentially nullifies Sections 84(1) and 85(1) of the South African Constitution. It makes the ANC’s politburo directly and indirectly the “head of state and head of the national executive”, nominating their elected ANC president as South African state president while the secretary-general of the ANC in the background remains the real Number One who might “recall” the state president at any time, as happened to Mbeki. Although such secretarial power did not always exist in the past in the same manner and was not as openly exercised by previous secretaries-general such as Alfred Nzo, Kgalema Motlanthe or Gwede Mantashe, we now have a new contender in the form of Ace Magashule, whose strong hands in the politburo is ever-present in the management of the ANC’s appointed state president. The relationship between Ramaphosa and Magashule may be compared to that between Mandela and Mbeki, immediately after 1994. Nelson Mandela was at best a ceremonial president and his deputy Mbeki teh “unofficial” executive president, while both were subject to direct management by the politburo. The rogue rule is: the ANC comes first and South Africa second. This type of pseudo-democratic political culture has characterised the ANC’s modus operandi in the past and will also in future be part and parcel of the ANC’s radical way of governing, as cemented in its Marxist-Leninist ideology and conditioned by its so-called false “democratic-centralism” (which in reality means autocratic-centralism).26-29

A prominent side-stepping of the law by the post-Mandela ANC leaders and followers, when the ANC brass ran into trouble as during the present crisis of integrity in the ANC — mainly created by its democratic-centralism based on Marxist-Leninist ideology — is just to continue with delinquency, while calling at the same time on the late Mandela for forgiveness and salvation. Meaningless clichés are echoed by the pro-ANCs, absolving them from the bad consequences because they have not ruled the country with integrity. Dugmore30 formulates it thus30:20: “The democratic system in our country, so hard fought for by Mandela and his generation, and which involves all our political parties, is at risk if we do not address these urgent needs.” However, never is the question postulated as to what kind democracy is referred to and why democracy is now suddenly at risk while there was essentially an autocracy in place already back in 1994.

To understand how much subjectivity is present in today’s South African politics and the existence of the misconception of the ANC as “democratic” (including its leaders) with the intention to serve every citizen, it is again important to read Mthombothi’s31 claim that the nationalist-militant’s abandonment of democratic liberties leads to fascism, which may be associated with the EFF (otherwise, he once also referred to the ANC regime since 1994 as fascistic due to its “autocratic-centralism”).

Mthombothi31 writes in this context31:19:

There are as many definitions of fascism as there are experts on the subject, but a few characteristics stand out: intolerance, racism (including anti- Semitism), misogyny, militarism, a predilection for violence, with a cult of charismatic leadership which often demands blind and unquestioned loyalty.

The EFF exhibits almost all these traits in its behaviour. The organisation is obviously not yet in power and it is therefore impossible to know how it would behave if it were to hold the levers of power. But on current evidence, the signs aren’t very good. It is aggressively intolerant towards those who disagree with it both within and outside the party.

Mthombothi31 enlightened us further on fascism in profiling the EFF by quoting Robert Paxton’s31 The Anatomy of Fascism. Mthombothi describes31:19: “…fascism as ‘a form of political behaviour marked by obsessive preoccupation with the community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants…abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion’.”

The above view by Mthombothi31 may be true for the EFF and its leaders, but all of those elements are clearly associated with the politics of the ANC before and after 1994: all the traits and characteristics of fascism are emblematic of the traditional ANC. In addition, every one of its leaders as presidents have displayed those traits so far and not only Jacob Zuma. Its fascism became in some way latent immediately after the ANC took power in 1994 because the New Dispensation had forced them to “behave” until they were ready to fully assume political and economic power, which we have seen emerging since 2017 by openly adopting their “autocratic-centralism”. Land grabbing and the nationalisation of the Reserve and Land Banks, Apartheid victimhood, radicalised BEE and cadre deployment are only a few concrete examples of the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist politics awaiting South Africa from 2019 if it stays in power.31,32

The ANC’s unbreakable pre-1994 radical politics (which is now being well-directed by both Ramaphosa and Magashule, notwithstanding that they are locked in a leadership-ambition struggle inside the greater ANC), which the media seems to regard as something of the past, must be specifically compared to the rather meek advent of the fascists and the Nazis via so-called “good people or labour parties”, only to capture Italy and Germany in the end through autocratic-centralism. The two blueprints are being expertly used in post-2019 South Africa. Mthombothi31:19posits:

But of course fascism as an ideology cannot be wiped of the face of the earth. Only its manifestations can be curbed or conquered. But it continues to emerge in different guises and in different countries. Although fascism is identified as a right-wing ideology, there’s no doubt that the Left has contributed to its origin. Mussolini himself, however, was unconcerned about whether fascism was located on the right or the left of the political spectrum. “We don’t give a damn about these empty terminologies and we despise those who are terrorised by these words”, he said. But just as Mussolini, who founded fascism, is a child of the Left, so is Nazism. The Nazi Party is short for National Socialist German Workers’ Party: its precursor was the German Workers’ Party. The intention was to attract workers from left-wing parties. Nazism is short for National Socialism, which became opposed to – and hostile to – international socialism or any other creed of the Left.

The absolute striving towards self-centredness and empowerment of the ANC over South Africans (Black as well as Whites) is well described by Chilenga-Butao33 when he refers to the ANC national executive committee (NEC) lekgotla at the beginning of June 2019 where there was an effort to revive the democratic-centralist habit of the ANC’s politburo power structure against the onslaught by the “Big Man” Ramaphosa who may alone think, plan and do for the ANC. Referring to the ANC’s democratic-centralist framework, Chilenga-Butao33 pointed out that the ANC policy and resolutions, which are taken during conferences, are applicable to all its members, including the presently serving President of the country, Cyril Ramaphosa, as an ANC member.24,33

On the conflicting statements between Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule, the secretary general of the ANC and seemingly the Number One of the ANC in enforcing the post-May 2019 ANC politics directed by democratic-centralism, for example on the change of the Reserve Bank’s mandate as prescribed by its national conference in December 2017, Chilenga-Butao33:30 writes:

Thus democratic-centralism has dissipated and it has happened because the party is not putting South Africa first. The fact that these contradictory statements emerge shows that there are parts of the ANC that are trying to re-establish a form of democratic centralism by saying what they want to see happening in the country and in so doing, arm-wrestle the president into following suit. If they cannot secure democratic centralism in the party, they are hoping to turn their statements into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

But these party members are also using issues such as the Reserve Bank as small battles in the ongoing war to secure their interests and power in the party and over the country. In this way democratic centralism could be used as a tactic in a much larger scheme.

Chilenga-Butao33:30continues: “…the secretary general’s statement contained the bold declaration that the ANC remains the centre of the country and policymaking” and: “This shows that the ANC comes first, especially if that means leading South Africans down the garden path of false hope”.

This ANC comes first was also confirmed when Ace Magashule contradicted Fikile Mbalula who credited Ramaphosa with the ANC’s election win by saying that the electorate did not vote for an individual like Ramaphosa but solely for the party.34,35

The above remarks by Chilenga-Butao33 and Magashule35 confirm our suspicion that the ANC comes first and the country and its people always second. This also brings the focus on the ANC’s capture of the ownership of Parliament since 1994 with its majority of votes obtained in the national elections which does not necessarily mean that the majority of eligible voters had voted for it. With the ANC’s eighty NECs and ANC Top Six’s placing of the ANC as a party and regime always first, Parliament became once more, after having been voted into government on 8 May 2019, their sole property to do with what they want, including its executive powers. The party’s interests come first with the ANC’s application of its democratic-centralism in the selection of its own MPs and MPLs and these law-makers’ sole responsibility to the ANC’s National Conference policies, even apart from the evil it wreaks via Parliament most of the time. There is no role or empowerment — or even the slightest say — for the country’s voters outside the Parliament where the ANC enjoys a vast majority. Or, in terms of the BCOEA, there is not the slightest trace of a kind of employer-employee contract to curb the ANC’s powers.33,35

Our electoral system — which as mentioned, determines that only a political party via the indirect mandate it received at the ballet box, decides and selects the persons who are going to Parliament to represent the party — fits perfectly into the ANC’s democratic-centralist style of government. This entwining of the faulty electoral system with the autocratic democratic-centralism of the ANC government, led directly to South Africa lapsing into a stupor of criminality, criminality and state capture due to the ANC system of cadre and crony-empowerment being employed, since 1994, but especially from 2009 onwards.24,36

In conclusion on the autocracy of the ANC’s democratic-centralism, it can be postulated with utter safety that it has given the ANC a monopoly on political power for 25 years, but at the same has made the ANC a failed regime and South Africa a failed state with the State President merely a figurehead inside its democratic-centralism, captured and controlled by the ANC’s Politburo.23,34

3.1.3.2. South Africa’s faulty electoral system

In the context of receiving a mandate by a political party (as the ANC has managed continuously since 1994) to rule South Africa, it must be noted that South African voters have been caught in an undemocratic voting system. It is a setup of which the ANC has taken full advantage. Ramaphosa himself seems reluctant to part from it and with good reason, because it enables the ANC through the imbalanced proportional system the power of directly selecting and appointing law-makers, without the voters or constituents having a say in who is to represent them, thereby opening the door of government to all of the ruling party’s crooked candidates. There is no opportunity for the ordinary voting public veto them except by waiting another five years and voting against them at the party level. Thus, the present proportional representation system means that MPs and MPLs are only accountable to party bosses (and are being appointed by party bosses on the party’s list) instead of by the electorate.37-40,42 Notable here is Mthombothi’s39 excellent description39:19: “…our MPs and MPLs are plain party representatives and not public representatives”.

The current system creates a total lack of public accountability by the MPs and MPLs, as evidenced many times over by the ANC’s delinquent MPS, MPLs, ministers and even a past President. This chaos, especially pronounced during the Zuma regime, seems to be a process that is going to continue under Ramaphosa.38-42

A private legal action was started in 2019 to reform the election system and to end the present skewed empowerment of the ANC through the electoral system through a court application of the New Nation Movement (NNM), a KhoiSan organisation, to change the Electoral Act (Act 73 of 1998) to make provision for the direct election of MPs and MPLs by voters. This court application was heard initially on 17 April 2019 by Judge Siraj Desai, but was rejected as not urgent. The appeal by the New Nation Movement, Chantal Revelle and the Mediation Foundation for Peace and Justice to the ConCourt was also unsuccessful. In this case Chantall Revelle of the Mediation Foundation said that at present the country was being ruled by a very small minority. Voters do not even know who are representing them in Parliament. Judge Edwin Cameron of the Concourt said on May 8, 2019 that the application was not urgent. For Cameron it was an important and prominent fact that it could take up to August 2019 to run the election if the court agreed with the applicants’ opinion and that already R36-million had been spent on the organisation of the May 8 election. The ConCourt heard the application on 15 August 2019. It must, to bring greater clarity regarding the case, also be stated that the ConCourt had already decided in terms of the financing of political parties, that every adult citizen had the right to stand as an independent candidate for municipal, provincial and national councils but that the present legislation forbade it.38-46

If legislation is promulgated to reform the Electorate Act it would mean the end of favouring the ANC in its ability to manipulate the voters and to continue its spree of looting by crooked candidates without the ordinary people having a say. Moreover, the indication is that this could bring the ANC down in the next election, if it would not have fallen in its own sword already in its governmental term from 2019 to 2024.38-46

In the context of our faulty electoral system, coming from before 1994, there is no doubt that it is keeping the autocratic ANC directly and indirectly in power. The country’s imbalanced and undemocratic electoral system, rooted in the ANC’s corrupt principle of “party interests first”, can, if not immediately corrected, benefit and advantage the Zuma-Magashule clan after 2024 and damage the Ramaphosa clan’s ascendancy immensely. It can play a primary role in the disorderly implementation of land grabbing and the activation of revolution. Our faulty electoral system of public representatives via Parliament is nothing less than the practice of autocracy inside democracy par excellence. This faulty system, together with the ANC’s revolutionary decision-making via mass opinion, had ensured that Mandela, up to Ramaphosa, and now possibly also Ace Magashule, had obtained the ability to maintain their corrupt political power via the “innocent” ballot box. It must be remembered that the controversial Faith Muthambi, Mosebenzi Zwane and Bathabile Dlamini and so on, prominent ANCs who are still in the post-May 2019 Ramaphosa regime because they have not so far been prosecuted for alleged wrongdoing (notwithstanding testimonies before the Zondo and Mpati commissions against them). They have so far avoided legal repercussions because of a well-planned avoidance scheme by the ANC’s top brass for its tainted officials to escape prosecution. Such corrupt figures are not just the face of the present-day ANC: they are, with Jacob Zuma, David Mabuza and Ace Magashule, the soul of the ANC. Democratic parties would not put the names of many of the tainted ANCs anywhere on a list, besides “wanted”. The listing of alleged crooks by the ANC for the May 2019 election and their reappointment as MPs and MPLs as well as in high-ranking parliamentary positions by the ANC, is an excellent example of how the South African political space, especially Parliament, has become toxic and dominated by the same unrepresentative and elderly politicians within the ANC elite and top brass, giving imbalanced dominance to it as a political party, writes Munusamy. It is also significant that the ruling party has less than one million members while there are as many as 37 million eligible voters outside the ANC members’ circle.23,33,34,38-42,47

Mothombothi’s39 writing is clear on the fact that if the people of South Africa could choose themselves their MPs and MPLs directly — as well as their vice-president and president — the ANC would not return to power after the May 2019 election. He writes39:19:

What would astound a visitor from Mars, for instance, would be to hear that the party responsible for these crimes and misdemeanours is set to be returned to power with a thumping majority. That doesn’t square with what democracy is supposed to be. In any other place, a party with that sort of record, especially one that blatantly steals from its people, would be consigned to the political wilderness, never to be returned in power again. And yet, instead of wearing sackcloth and covering himself in ashes as a mark of repentance, President Cyril Ramaphosa, we are told, is almost as popular as Nelson Mandela was at the top of his powers. Instead of embarking on an apology campaign, he’s already on what looks suspiciously like a lap of honour, certain that he’ll be given a mandate to rebuild what his party has wilfully destroyed.

To illustrate once more the imbalance of the Electoral Act, excluding the individual aspirant MP and MPL from becoming independent law-makers but favouring only a political party that fulfils certain prescribed regulations, we may quote the worrying remark of Judge Desai on his rejection of the initial application on 17 April 2019. Marx reports44:6: “Desai het die aansoek verwerp dat die Kieswet gewysig word om onafhanklike kandidate in te sluit en het gesê Revelle kan by ‘n politieke party aansluit of haar eie stig.”

The above remark can undoubtedly leave the view that Desai as a judge does not take an objective stance in relation to the imbalanced political advantage enjoyed by the present-day government by means of what many see as a defective electoral system out. It was and is still indeed the rejection by Revelle of the ongoing prescribed rule to be a member of a political party and to obtain a seat in Parliament through the proportional system that motivated his court application to Desai. Desai’s opinion and conclusion can in a certain context be seen as a confirmation of the constitutional correctness of the present Electoral Act. It can even be interpreted by some critics of the ANC regime and their abuse of the Electoral Act as supporting the ANC regime and Ramaphosa as president who had opposed the application by Revelle and others.38-46

For many antagonists of the current Electoral Act and the ANC’s parliamentary power, Desai’s remarks46:6: “Revelle kan by ‘n politieke party aansluit of haar eie stig”, revive memories of the old Apartheid ways of the judiciary where there was often a profound irritation with the will of the people, as well as fear by the judiciary that they could overreach by siding with the people against the politicians, risking a rejection of any judgement they did not like. Desai’s remarks could even be seen, rightly or wrongly, as a form of oppression. The individual KhoiSan and Kora citizen, who is at present without a direct say in the law-making of the country because the Electoral Act is not correctly phrased and the Constitution is incorrectly executed, may see the functioning of the electoral system and the insistance by the judiciary in defending the present Act, as political and even human oppression.38-46

Many persons, especially the minorities, who feel victimised and penalised by court verdicts, start to observe the statutory and judicial models of their country as incomplete or as a failure, paralysed by a weak chain of justice. Such outcomes can become engraved on the minds of these “physically and emotionally injured” citizens that their country’s law enforcement agencies are subjective and not fit to safeguard their citizen and group rights. Even pristine, good legal verdicts can sometimes have very bad consequences for the judicial system, essentially because they may seem to lack empathy and an insight independent from the regime’s politics.38-46 The “verdict” by Desai can set off such negative attitudes with his interpretation and order of46:6: “Revelle kan by ‘n politieke party aansluit of haar eie stig”. Revelle’s case — for her undoubtedly a case which should not be a legal failure at all — needs to be tested by the ConCourt as being correct or wrong (as the court is now in the process of doing). In South Africa’s confused politics such cardinal issues cannot be left to a single judge’s sole discretion. If Revelle’s appeal is successful, it will signal the end of a system favouring the ANC’s manipulation of the voters and their corruption spree by crooked candidates without the ordinary people having a say in who gets nominated.38-46 It seems as if the judiciary has forgotten what had happened in the past in South Africa (pre- and post-1994) when the judicial system failed to address issues affecting ordinary citizens. The editorial of the Sunday Times, dated 8 September 2019, appositely describes the ongoing series of failures since 1994, during which almost every state institution was grabbed and steered by the crooks for their sole benefit, casting even a cloud of suspicion over the judicial system’s integrity48:18:

The Zondo commission has become a permanent fixture in our lives – entertaining up to a point, but something of a pointless charade. The National Prosecuting Authority seems especially dormant at a time when we would have expected it to be in overdrive. And through all this, promises, fine words, ringing declarations. But little action.

As the situation now stands, our electoral system is a failure. It allowed a dishonest collection of MPs inside the Parliament and and time and again their crooked party managed to rule Parliament as the outcome of the May 2019 national election confirms. The words of Mthombothi49 must ring daily in eligible voters’ ears — as well as those of Desai — when he posits49:21:

Whichever way one looks at this matter, it is hard not to arrive at one conclusion: our system of government lacks proper and effective accountability. It is past time that our electoral system is reformed so that politicians are answerable directly to voters and not their parties.

It is indeed the duty of the judicial system to see to it that this happens.

3.1.4. The lack of Kantian enlightenment in a chaotic South Africa

To accuse Parliament and the rulers of 1994 to 2019 alone of being “political thieves and rapists of the statutory rights” belonging to individual South Africans is incorrect. Most of the individual South Africans were willing participants in this political orgy by shying away from applicable decision-making during elections, as the past 8 May elections confirm wherein 51% of the eligible voters stayed away from the ballot box. Moreover, they failed to vote out the ANC and enforcing the much-needed Electoral-Parliament Act. Pithouse19 relates this citizen’s passivity to Immanuel Kant’s thinking on the waking up versus the failure of self-thinking in the 1780s when Europe had been equally mesmerised.

It seems to a certain extent that in South Africa the “Kantian enlightenment” of human virtue and political empowerment that the 1994 democracy should have brought to the mass of poor and landless Blacks never emerged. Political immaturity, resulting from the so-called “laziness and cowardice” that prevent people from thinking for themselves and from engaging in constructive deeds under less favourable circumstances, prevailed for six parliamentary elections up to May 2019. It is plunging more and more of the Black supporters of the ANC deeper into anarchy, but more precisely, it is thrusting 72% of the voters outside the ANC-supporting voting population into an equal amount of chaos. This is a negative phenomenon, whereby the emergence of a newly-enfranchised class has very little effect on quality of life or levels op development but is rather exploited to further the interests of a new, revolutionary elite. This has been the case in the 1890s in Europe. The shift in power creates and strengthens the poverty, inequality and joblessness of the masses in favour of a small ruling class and group whose interests become paramount. In contemporary South Africa it manifests as well-nigh irreparable chaos.19 This condition was appositely defined by Kant when he said that the19:27: “…lack of property and the estate of direct labour, of concrete labour, form not so much an estate of civil society as the ground upon which its circles rest and move.”

The South African scenario plays out exactly as the European one did centuries ago in form of delinquent acts by the then European capitalists and their corrupt rule. The ANC elite’s organised effort to dominate the masses of poor people with its hijacking of Parliament as an exclusive ANC kingdom has parallels in bygone European class structures. Pithouse19, more precisely, writes19:27: “In other words, the bourgeois public sphere depends, materially, on the impoverishment of the people that it excludes from participation.” The European Enlightenment and its liberal idea that regards all human beings as fully or equally human, is absent in 2019 in the mindset of the ANC leadership. Pithouse19 indirectly brings Kant’s description into focus here regarding the so-called “right of the ANC to mismanage and misuse the mass of poor Blacks at the voting box and in Parliament” because the ANC alone (which is false) freed the people from Apartheid, when he writes further19:27: “In an essay published in 1793 he [Kant] insisted that property was a qualification for citizenship, and that the “domestic servant, the shop assistant, the labourer…are…unqualified to be citizens”.

To break the ANC’s so-called “anti-Kant politics of curtailment of the poor Blacks” does not seem easy. The ANC and its left-bourgeois mentality has been cemented into Parliament, something which will not be erased overnight. The ANC will not allow it, even if they need to carry out a coup d’état to stay in power. Here in South Africa – where the resistance that had led to the fall of the NP was strongly activated by the trade union movement with their Durban strikes in 1973, the community struggles that mobilised millions of people by the 1980s and their building of democracy from below in their focussed dismantling of White supremacy – that political power was hijacked from them in a deliberate way in 1994 by the already crooked ANC elite returning into the mainstream of politics. Shamelessly the ANC elite sent the true and original 1970s and 1980s fighters for democracy “back to the caves” as Pitman19:27 put it. From 1994 the ANC elite (politburo) started to exercise its dominant power “from above”, continuously via Parliament and the ballot box with false promises. This led to the maintenance of ANC political power through the misuse of its electoral vote, writes Pithouse. For Pithouse19, to reverse the present political contradictions brought about by ANC rule from 1994 to 2019, will require an immense counter-input, similarly to the one between 1973 and 1994 by the masses of Black poor. What is needed firstly, is breaking down the ANC’s power which has silenced the impoverished majority of poor Blacks for 25 years. Secondly, the ANC’s so-called legitimacy via Parliament needs to be erased, together with its many well-established cancerous roots in politics, economics and society. Only this will and can erase the ANC’s present-day misuse of Parliament.19

The lawlessness, corruption and dominance, freely appropriated by the ANC regime via Parliament over 25 years in the absence of an Electoral-Parliament Act, together with the lack of a Parliamentary Ethics Code included in the Act, thus forces three immediate questions upon us:

1) Does the ANC under Cyril Ramaphosa hav the ability to reform and to cleanse itself to serve the people of South Africa, their employer, who has appointed them?

2) May any of the promises in the ANC’s May 2019 manifesto be trusted?

3) Is the ANC able to successfully effect land expropriation with or without compensation between 2019 and 2024?

The 51% voters who stay away from the ballot box in May 2019 and the 28% of voters voting for the ANC in those same elections were willing partners in this political orgy by standing aloof from applicable decision-making during the May 2019 elections. The 72% of voters failed also, by choice, in enforcing or promoting anything like the much-needed Electoral-Parliament Act. Pithouse19 compares this passivity and failure with Immanuel Kant’s thinking on the awakening of self-thinking versus the failure of self-thinking in the 1780s. Pithouse writes19:27:

In 1784, Immanuel Kant argued that enlightenment is the emergence from the immaturity that results from the laziness and cowardice that prevents people from thinking for themselves. He asserted, against forces in the state and church, the imperative to respect ‘the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters’.

Kant’s enlightenment sorely escaped the attention of the mass of 30 million poor Blacks. They are strangers to the concept of freedom and individual self-determination: they are strangers because they are delinquently kept there by the ANC elite’s cunning and devious actions. Looking at the ANC’s continuous strengthening of their grip on power over 25 years, it seems the electorate is going to remain captured for many years to come. Given the absence of political reasoning and constructive public debate by the masses outside Parliament and their blind support for a hard-core ANC regime over six elections, one may have serious misgivings about the future of South African democracy. Voter apathy and blind support for the ANC will ensure the continuation of corrupt politics post-May 2019, together with the shameless misuse of Parliament.19,23

3.1.5. The much-needed “sifting mechanism” for political leaders

Kant’s enlightenment not only escaped the attention of the mass of 30 million poor Blacks, but seemingly also that of educated South Africans. What specicially stands out regarding the more learned section of the population, is their fixation with the Constitution as the only means of law-enforcement as regards political practice in country and how the President is selected and elected. The implications and impact of the Electoral Act on politics are disregarded. This Act and the Constitution of the ANC display a totally undemocratic process in the selection and election of the President, which goes against the grain of liberal democracy. It is not a new trend but a custom and policy that has been followed since 1994. It indeed shows that the Electoral Act must dramatically be revised together with the Constitution to make provision for a much-needed sifting mechanism in the selection and election of executive political leaders, meaning the process. The current politically-laden, undemocratic system in the selection of the President was well-illustrated by the tainted Jacob Zuma’s election in 2009 via the ANC’s national conference system which excluded the say of the majority of South Africa’s voters. The lack of understanding of the indirect, non-voters’ election of the President and the skewed process of his selection as leader, may be seen in the recent opinion by Taylor50 in which he defends the election of the President solely “in terms of our so-called liberal democracy as gestalt by the Constitution”. This postulation of Taylor50 is far from the truth and an utmost misunderstanding and a misleading view of our real politics. [The practice of the election in the selection of law-makers of the Parliament, as well as that of the vice-President and the President, was already fully described in the previous two subsections: ANC’s democratic-centralism ideology (See: 3.1.3.1.) and the South Africa’s faulty electoral system (See 3.1.3.2.) and will only shortly be referred to again].

On his so-called “direct democratic selection and election by the voters of the President in terms of their so-called assumed liberal democracy and Constitution”, Taylor50 writes as follows50:20:

The essence of a democracy is that political power flows from the people (the demos) and the people alone. We and no-one else get to decide who will be our president. Every five years parties give us their lists of candidates, we go to the polls and we elect our representatives on the basis of proportional representation. Any of us can put up our hands to be a representative, to be the president, and the demos will vote on our candidacies; there can be no other criteria, no other sifting mechanism. Anything else isn’t democratic.

The constitution has two primary philosophical functions. The first is that it provides the rules for how the temporary transfer of power from the people to representatives works: in other words elections, the structure of parliament, separation of powers and how, for example, the will of the people is realised in the choosing of a chief justice.

The second function is to place restrictions and obligations on how our representatives operate during their five years tenures. Traditionally, human rights serve as barriers against repressive state action. They are lines in the political sand: the state cannot restrict our speech, it cannot deprive us of life, deny our religious beliefs or force religious beliefs upon us, and it cannot prevent us from organising ourselves in unions, associations and political parties. We can hit the the streets and insult our “leaders”. Moreover, human rights ensure equality in law: that none of us is superior to another.

Looking critically at the last (third) paragraph of Taylor’s50 postulation, it is a pile of unrelated philosophical rhetoric which has nothing to do with obtaining and maintaining good executive political leadership. It must be ignored, together with the philosophical postulations of paragraph two. Only then may we focus on Taylor’s resistance to a sifting mechanism to select and elect the President, which boils down to the notion who sees himself fit for office may stand to be elected as President. Paragraph one contains a contradictory element where he praises the proportional representation system of the present Electoral Act, while he seems to be oblivious to the ANC’s policy of democratic-centralism. In the current setup the ANC’s delegates/representatives of less than 4 000 at its national conference select and elect the ANC leader who at the same time becomes the President of the RSA. Furthermore, it must be noted that the ANC has less than 1 million inscribed members out of a ±57 million population (representing less than a 2% ANC impact) and out of a ±35 million eligible-voters population (representing less than a 3% ANC impact). In the May 2019 elections, only 49% of the total eligible-voters population actually voted. Of this 49% only 28% voted ANC. What Taylor50 further missed, is that in many of the modern liberal democracies, as inscribed in their Constitutions, it is compulsory for all their eligible citizens to register and to vote in elections. This statutory shortcoming in our so-called “excellent” Constitution contributed to the fact that 51% of the eligible voters did not take part in the May elections. This absence of an established liberal democracy is part of the conundrum which has contributed to the ANC having been the sole ruling party since 1994 at the national level. The current President, Cyril Ramaphosa, cannot claim to be elected democratically, neither can the ANC pride themselves on being a democratically elected regime representing the total population.50

South Africa needs a sifting mechanism in the choosing of its executive political leaders on all levels written into the Constitution which states certain clear pre-requirements, for instance a minimum educational qualification and a clean integrity certification. The last-mentioned should include any alleged crimes and misdemeanours under investigation and of course a life-style audit. At the moment the ANC “clearing” rests on its so-called “integrity” committee’s decisions as well as the “approvals” of the Top Six and the NEC of the ANC (the so-called ANC politburo). The lists of candidates to which Taylor refers and where for instance the ANC put up their eligible candidates, were tainted by alleged criminals and even murderers. As many as 22 candidates were alleged to have been tainted and many went back to Parliament, not only to be law-makers, but were promoted into senior parliamentary positions. Jacob Zuma would not have qualified if an official sifting mechanism had been in place when he ousted Thabo Mbeki in 2009 to become President. Likewise, Cyril Ramaphosa would not stay a day on as President after the Public Protector’s finding that he misled Parliament about the R500 000 “gift to his election campaign” from the corrupt company, Bosasa. Central its policy of launching crooks into high-level political executive positions — at least for the ANC as a party and regime — is its “declaration” that “no-one is guilty before having been prosecuted and sentenced by a court of law”. The secretary-general of the ANC, Ace Magashule, via the decisions of the ANC Caucus’s Political Committee, the ANC’s General Council and the ANC’s Integrity Committee, made this standpoint clear in the ANC’s reappointments of tainted ANC-leaders in senior positions in the post-May 2019 government. Integrity only counts for the ANC top brass when they are locked up, an outcome that is not easily reachable when it comes to the ANC’s top leadership in post-1994 South Africa. The ANC’s top brass knows it well and rides the crooked judicial system. How crooked the leadership of the ANC has become but still qualifies today in terms of the proportional representation to be included on its tainted lists of parliamentary candidates, has been the subject of multifarious comments by various political analysts and commentators.50-53

Gumede51 identifies ten untouchable groups that must first be tackled before the rule of law and good politics may be restored. Such groups should be eliminated from the regime’s inner circle and positions of power and influence, which they owe precisely to the ANC’s democratic-centralism and our faulty electoral system that lacks a leadership-sifting mechanism. Here he identifies as the primary untouchable group the ANC’s own corrupt but senior politicians at national, provincial and local level, who flaunt their power and corruptly acquired assets and live ostentatiously on public resources.51

But this ideal outcome propagated by Gumede51 is easier said than done, because the ANC’s democratic-centralism and our faulty official electoral system has been rooted in the ANC’s politics and has been expertly used since 1994. It allows someone such as Ace Magashule to evade the law for his alleged delinquencies. Munusamy writes52:20:

ANC secretary-general ACE Magashule can claim to be a victim of a “fake news media conspiracy” because the National Prosecuting Authority has not been able to formulate a case against him despite myriad illegal activities during his term as Free State premier. The line between wrong and right is indistinct.

Gordhan57, referring to the crooked outcomes between 1994 and 2019 resulting from the ANC regime’s veto of any merit system when it comes to leadership appointments, posits57:19:

The past decade has been characterised by the paralysis of law enforcement agencies to act against corruption, the looting of state coffers, the catastrophic dismantling at the South African Revenue Service (Sars), and rise of a parallel security state targeting political opponents of the state capture project.

Gumede51 similarly comments on the state of lawlessness resulting from ANC cronyism and the lack of any mechanisms to select leaders of integrity by saying51:20:

Allowing political, criminal and business gangsters to remain seemingly untouchable, strutting around arrogantly while ordinary citizens live in fear and poverty gives the sense that SA is out of control, lawless and leaderless.

On 28 June 2019 Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng50 saw fit to allude to the anarchy surrounding so-called “state capture” and its concomitant corruption, as revealed by the Zondo and Mpati Commissions. In a speech to corporate South Africa at the Sunday Times Directors Event in Sandton, he posed the following pertinent questions50:20:

How do we choose leaders? Who qualifies to be a leader? Is there a sifting mechanism of sorts? Isn’t it desirable that, for starters, before you can become a president there are very stringent requirements to be met before you can even begin to run?

It is significant that Mogoeng50 too, is proposing the establishment of some kind of sifting mechanism for political leaders, not only internally by the political parties themselves, but also officially by the state. The power of politicians and rulers to shape the fate of the country is simply too great to leave to mere chance, and requires them to be at least morally “fit for office”. It is clear that South Africa’s so-called “liberal democracy” and its Constitution are not foolproof and is open for exploitation by dishonest politicians.50

Taylor’s50 subsequent reaction to the above questions by Mogoeng50 may be seen as not only inapplicable, but inappropriate. It borders on bad faith when he writes50:20: “What is a problem is that chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng doesn’t like our democracy.” In the same breath he continues his attack by addressing justice Mogoeng directly in an open letter as follows50:20:

Chief justice Mogoeng, you are a functionary of the people, not a paramount leader. Your function is to ensure that political power remains with the demos and that means, at the very least, that we are the “sifting mechanism”. We choose our representatives through the electoral process and they rule at our pleasure. Our vote is the most stringent criterion because, ultimately, political power belongs to us.

Looking critically at Taylor’s50 criticism of Mogoeng, it was exactly because of Mogoeng’s position as functionary of the people that he as a justice had put the questions. Taylor50 uncritically places his faith in the act of voting itself, forgetting that in many totalitarian states voters have for years voted in corrupt dictators, whether coerced or not.

Not anyone of us should have the automatic right to stand for political office: every aspirant candidate needs to be scrutinised for a lack of integrity and education. Without such a pre-selection, democracy is absent and freedom misused. It is important to note that for all statutory professions there are pre-requirements in terms of training and integrity to be able to register and practise for instance as a doctor, an attorney, etc. These registrations are further subject to compulsory renewal yearly as long as the practitioner wants to stay on the roll. Negligence and personal deviances/delinquencies may mean the removal of the professional practitioner’s name from the roll and the end of his ability to practise. In comparison, the careers of philosophers, etc. are not seen as statutory professions and anyone, without the slightest training, may practise it. The status of the self-styled philosopher or the well-learned philosopher does not differ very much from the status of the postdoctoral philosopher. Politicians, especially political leaders, are appointed to high-level positions as law-makers, which make them nothing less than statutory professionals. This makes an official sifting mechanism for politicians urgently needed in a future South African political system. If such a system had been in place since 1994, the Zondo and Mpati Commissions would not have been needed today.50

The above also has a direct bearing on Munusamy’s54 absolute need for lifestyle audits to expose corruption among those whom she called our all-too-easily-tempted-politicians [to which may be added: all-too-easily-elected-politicians]. The argument here is that there are always some politicians who want to live above their means and are therefore amenable to corruption, as well as narcissism, writes Munusamy54. More precisely, there are undoubtedly people directly and indirectly in politics using their positions to access additional sources of income, varying from crooked contracts, bribes, up to donations for election campaigns and the corruption around it, in order to enrich themselves, as well as to ensure their selection to positions of great political power. The best means of applying checks and balances to politicians is through official and rigorous lifestyle audits. It must be comprehensively applied not only to an aspirant politician, but also all of his/her associates such as for instance the companies, trusts and his/her secret donors who are giving to his/her election. The so-called Act on Privacy must not play a role in safeguarding crooked politicians from investigation and the state agency evaluating a candidate must have the right to use all means available, from the SAPS to the NPA and SSA, etc., to gather information in detail. The ANC itself has promised since 2016 to introduce lifestyle audits for ministers, government officials and leaders of public enterprises. Indeed, last year Cyril Ramaphosa pledged that everyone in the government including himself, would undergo them, reports Munusamy54.

Featuring prominently in Munusamy’s54 proposal, is the strict requirement that all MPs and MPLs should also be audited. So far, regarding the ANC’s talking the talk but not walking the walk, nothing has realised. Indeed, as previously said, if these law-makers’ audits had been done since 1994 (when persons with serious criminal records were allowed into Parliament because of their exoneration from doing “evil” as result of “Apartheid’s evil”), South Africa would have been saved the current need for running commissions on state capture and crooked VIPs. It would also have saved Ramaphosa the unnecessary and embarrassing attention of the Public Protector concerning his 2017 Nasrec election campaign. Moreover, it would have set in motion the much-needed evolution of the ANC’s economic policies, cemented as they have been in democratic-centralism which emanates from its pre-1994 years and its communist past. As a result of its iron grip on power in South Africa, 86 members serve in the ANC’s autocratic politburo (representing only 2% of the ANC-members) who have never had a lifestyle audit so far and of whom some are even regarded by the ANC’s Integrity Commission as seriously tainted.54,55

Regarding the findings of the ANC’s own integrity committee, these are often rejected in favour of keeping corrupt politicians in office. Commenting on this tendency, the political commentator Justice Malala writes96:

These leaders of the ANC past and present don’t believe they and a large chunk of the electorate are bound by the laws passed by its parliament and enforced by the organs of state: the police, the prosecutorial services and the judiciary.

It’s not just at national level. It cascades down through the entire ANC. Two weeks ago it was reported that the ANC in Gauteng had rejected its own integrity commission’s recommendations to remove several members, including two who are linked to the VBS Mutual Bank scandal.

The integrity commission in Gauteng, headed by Trevor Fowler, recommended that the mayors of Merafong and the West Rand be fired for their complicity in taking ratepayers’ money and unlawfully, despite clear legal advice, depositing it into VBS. They broke the law and they did so knowingly. Yet the ANC in Gauteng, which for the past 10 years many of us gullible fools have been calling “the enlightened ANC”, chose to defend them. As Mbete said, they see things differently in this ANC. They do not see the rule of law.

The above absence of an official sifting mechanism of politicians before being allowed into executive positions, such as lifestyle audits for the ANC politicians seeking parliamentary positions (besides the utter failure of the party’s integrity commission described by Malala), is deeply rooted in its strong democratic-centralism. Its primary aim and intention is the gobbling up of any challenger or opposition to its well established Marxist-Leninist model of power maximisation and permanent rule. As Feketha56, Munusamy54, Gordhan57 and Padayachee et al.55, already showed in some way, Professor William Gumede58 of the School of Governance at Wits takes further, in depth. Besides the ANC’s adherence to and continuing practice of its rigid pre-1994 revolutionary ideology to maintain undisturbed democratic-centralism, Gumede also points to the use by the ANC’s top leadership of racism and “Black victimhood” to secure their position of political power over the last 25 years. The intertwining of three insidious elements led directly to an ANC-sanctioned culture of state capture, corruption and mismanagement while constant, internalised malfeasance created a culture of unaccountability and irresponsibility. In fact, irresponsibility and unaccountability might be described as an insouciant “lifestyle” in its own right. This in turn makes the implementation of lifestyle audits impossible and the 2016 intention of Ramaphosa to introduce it, tantamount to hypocrisy: On the contrary, it became a topic for the top brass to avoid, because it endangers the established democratic-centralism (autocracy) of the ANC and thus will nullify the top brass’s autocratic rule over the greater party, Parliament and the country. Such autocracy is a revolutionary tradition, habit and custom, which has been internalised in the ANC mindset since its terrorist days. It is a system that Mandela, up to Ramaphosa, brilliantly uses when their power is endangered from within the ANC as well as from outside. The same strategy is applicable to Jacob Zuma, Ace Magashule and David Mabuza fighting at present in the ANC for the autocratic soul of the party.54-58

Gumede58 elaborates further on the functioning of the power structure within the current ANC58:16:

The ANC is guided by democratic centralism, where every member has to obey central decisions and where leaders vet even the lowest-level appointments. These are among the reasons why corruption flourished in a system where everyone must support the party leadership, no matter whether it is wrong, incompetent or corrupt. “Deployment” to government or to the private sector is based on loyalty and struggle “credentials”, rather than ability and competence.

There is the belief that the party laws are above those of the country, even above individual conscience. Many ANC members and supporters would rather follow the party line. They uncritically support party leaders. When corruption is exposed, the party faithful close ranks.

In a centralised party system, a small group can capture the party and wield power over life, careers and public resources.

They made centralised decisions that were accepted as edicts. They appointed loyalists to every level of the party and government. They were uncritically supported by the rank and file, under the rubric of loyalty.

The deputy-general of the SACP, Solly Mapaila, has argued that the use by the ANC’s politburo of democratic-centralism-cum-autocracy to develop a predatory state, has been well hidden inside their pretended implementation of Black economic empowerment over the years. This has led to disadvantage the Black majority while propping up a few politically connected politicians.56

On the intention of the ANC politburo to maintain at all times its policy of democratic centralism, rendering the introduction of an honest lifestyle audit, independent of the ANC’s corrupt party politics, impossible, Gumede58 shows how White racism (citing Apartheid going all the way back to 1652) is seen by the politburo as a danger to Black nationalism. He writes58:18:

Many ANC supporters often still back leaders, issues and politics almost exclusively on the basis of race. US scholar of race Cornel West, in a differing setting, warned about reducing every issue to “racial reasoning”. When an individual is corrupt, all one has to do is to claim racism, and people rally emotionally to that person. Misplaced black solidarity often demands closing ranks behind dubious personalities.

If a white person rightly criticises a corrupt black person, the corrupt person is embraced. Misplaced struggle solidarity has the same effect. If a non-ANC person, or an opposition party member or supporter criticises a corrupt ANC leader, the corrupt ANC leader is protected. If a black person is doing the criticism, he or she is a “puppet” of whites as “white monopoly capital” and “selling out” their race.

This organised racial politics of the ANC in assuring its corruption, etc., but most of all its’ politburo’s absolute autocracy, also streamed since 1994 out of its so-called democratic centralism into the cognition of “black victimhood”, sanctioned further the ANC’s politburo’s right to can do anything wrong because it “services the Black-nation”.

Gumede further enlightens us58:18:

Black victimhood also encourages corruption. It appears that almost every wrong government decision, failure and poor policy made by current leaders is blamed on apartheid, colonialism or conspiracies by the white elite or hostile Western countries.

Black leaders in government and the private sector are increasingly using colonialism, apartheid and Western “imperialism” to cover their incompetence, mismanagement and corruption. Many African leaders and government have cynically promoted the idea of Africans being victims. This easy option numbs creative thinking. It means that leaders and governments can shrink their responsibility to voters. It has also made it difficult to hold leaders and governments accountable for wrongdoing, lack of delivery of delivery and corruption.

The introduction of the much-needed “sifting mechanism” in the selection of ANC political leaders and the doing of a lifestyle audit on them as “preached” by Cyril Ramaphosa in 2016, will and can never be executed in terms of uncontaminated and responsible international evaluation criteria. When looking at the many tainted top ANC members in the present Ramaphosa regime “because they have not yet been found guilty in a court of law”, Ramaphosa’s own inexplicable and seemingly desperate efforts to keep the donors to his 2017 Nasrec leadership campaign secret at all costs via the court provides a prominent example. His use of the permanent, age-old, ingrained trick of “stretched values” in the selection of the ANC’s leaders, makes it clear that the testing of the concepts of goodness, integrity, honesty, responsibility and accountability has never been internalised in ANC political culture and will probably never be internalised in the future. They refuse to face accusations in public to prove their innocence. The abuse of the South African courts for civil cases to silence accusations has become the order of the day for many ANC leaders to ride out accusations and allegations. Prominent here is the court order obtained by the suspended chief financial officer (CFO) of the Sol Plaatje municipality, Lydia Mahloko, who had interdicted the Northern Cape’s local governance executive committee members (MEC) from tabling a damning investigation report which recommends that she be criminally charged for flouting supply-chain management processes during the procurement of a fleet, including the purchase of the mayoral vehicle. The mindset of the ANC politiburo is saturated with autocracy as guided and practised by means of democratic-centralism, racism and Black victimhood. Magashule, Zuma, Mabuza and Ramaphosa’s political activities reflect all the manifestations of these syndromes. If Ramaphosa already has a problem with the Public Protector’s elementary investigation of the donors and the “movement and end-allocation” of their so-called “sincere gift money” for his 2017 Nasrec election, what will his counter-attack look like when she launches a full lifestyle audit on him, starting in 1980, and scrutinising every cent he generated as well as from whom, for which service delivered?54,58,59

3.2. Evaluation guidelines for political parties

3.2.1. Overview

The successful execution of the post-2019 land-reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and implementation by a so-called “good” government, together with a “good” leadership in whom integrity and Solomon’s wisdom are essential characteristics. This means a regime that is not blindly on a path of “reaching the goal at any cost” but to effectively achieving an end-result regarding the matter, which would be a success. This requires a regime honestly serving the interests of all its people by following a well-drawn-up roadmap for an orderly land-reform initiative, and steering it into reality.

The essential question here is thus whether the ANC can be theoretically deemed a candidate or may be shortlisted and thus be considered to have the leadership potential to ensure the successful implementation and completion of the post-2019 plan on land expropriation.

The evaluation guidelines for political parties, as already used in the previous Articles 9 (EFF) and 10 (DA) will precisely be re-used to evaluate the ANC as national, provincial and municipal rulers. These guidelines on the ANC are:

  1. Its general policies as well as specific standpoints on issues such as respect for law and order, as well as the fighting of corruption, state capture, the behavioral delinquency of its MPs and MPLs, as well as its top leaders, in addition to the party’s and its leaders’ views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as evidenced by its manifesto for the 2019 election;
  2. Public criticism for the period 1994 to 2019 in newspapers, etc., evaluated and reflected by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the party as a political organisation, its members’ and leaders’ behaviours and actions such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behaviour-delinquency of MPs and MPLs, top brass leaders, their views on land     expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the party’s internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinion.
3.2.1.1. The Louw Appraisal Checklist

For the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC, the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018 will again be used.60 The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was again applied to all information collated in the literature review of the party’s manifesto and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees applicable. For guiding the gathering of the information on the ANC, the approach used with the EFF and DA, is again set out as follows for better understanding, namely:

1) The Curriculum Vitae (CV) to obtain insight into the candidates’ qualifications, experience, extraordinary skills, etc; and

2) The letters of the referees, the Attestations, to offer, firstly, further insight into the qualifications, experience, etc. of the candidate; and secondly, at the same time give us confidential insight into the good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate, that are well-masked in, or absent from the CV. This referee-data mostly informs us well regarding the “goodness” or “badness” of a candidate, which can make him in the end a failure or a success in the handling of the responsibilities of the post.

In this research the manifesto and self-description offered by the ANC and its leaders will be seen as their CVs. Hereto the public reporting by journalists and other sources will be seen as the letters of referees/references or attestations. The account or verdict awarded to the ANC as a capable and skilled ruler able to successfully execute land reform, will only be calculated in terms of the Louw Appraisal Checklist60 at the end of the final article in the series (article 20).

3.3. African National Congress

3.3.1. Overview

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF: Part 1) and the Democratic Alliance (DA: Part 2) have already been published in the previous two articles (9 and 10) under the title: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa”.

The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the African National Congress (ANC: Part 3) will be published next, also under the above general title.

It is an open question if the ANC, “mandated” by the voters as the post-2019 government of South Africa, can truly drive the intended land expropriation as an enterprise with honesty and integrity, to bring it to a successful end? Issues that immediately come to mind are the skills, abilities, integrity and capabilities of the ANC as a regime and as a party, together with the skills, abilities, integrity and capabilities of its elite and leaders. Primary among these is the important question of integrity and whether they might be trusted by voters to exercise their mandate. Integrity is not limited to a single plane: it is comprehensive, including social, economic, personal and political trustworthiness and honesty. Looking at the ANC’s pre-2019 regime record, when comparing it with the prerequisites of Patricia De Lille’s61 list of the seven conditions (which she formulated in her Good Party manifesto for the 8 May elections) which a so-called good government must fulfil too, it clearly fails all of these seven conditions. (Notwithstanding this failure, De Lille joined as minister in Ramaphosa’s cabinet!) The problem here is that the ANC’s election manifesto and its 1994 to 2019 behaviour as a regime did not adhere to the cognitive mindset, the psyche, the culture, customs, traditions and habits or the ability to distinguish between good and bad government. It means that if pre-2019 ANC behaviour is repeated in post-2019 South Africa, good governance will stay an unattainable dream within ANC politics. A successful land expropriation plan thus equally unattainable.61-63

The general ANC manifesto can give us some clue as to what positive or negative elements may be expected from the regime for the period 2019 to 2024.

3.3.2. The general ANC manifesto

Regarding the ANC’s general manifesto for the May 2019 election, launched in January 2019, Derby62, Hunter64 and Kgosana63 point out that it was again saturated with a mass of empty promises of more and better work, better health and education, and contaminated with populism. Missing, however, was prudence. The manifesto further reflects some conflicting views, opinions and mostly, hostile commitments: a Ramaphosa version and a Magashule-Zuma–version, contrasting with each other on issues of cardinal importance such as nationalisation, etc. The coexistence of these two versions and a seemingly growing split in the ANC’s general as well as specific politics (which seems to be purely a leadership struggle rather than a true fight around political principles according to many analysts) are still continuing at the close of this article on 31 October 2019.62-64

Kgosana63 described the ANC’s general manifesto, after an in-depth analysis of it, together with a history of the regime as from 1994, as follows63:17:

The manifest failures of the ANC’s manifesto are all around us: The same bright, shiny, shameless promises are repeated each election, never to be actually met.

More specifically on the ANC’s manifesto, Kgosana writes63:17:

Yes, the ANC has done a lot since 1994. Building infrastructure, electrifying homes, connecting people to clean water, ensuring near universal access to basic education. But these achievements are negated by a bloated and uncaring bureaucratic system, corruption, incompetence and indifference. After the nightmare of the Zuma years, the ANC has to do a lot more than repeat empty promises.

Derby62 takes us closer to the “political darkness” inside the ANC soul, as reflected by its manifesto, when he comments62:2:

In a still-precarious position, there’s simply no room for the ANC — or, I’d add, any party looking to lead after this year’s polls — to veer far off a script that speaks of fiscal prudence. The party has blown the surplus position it had more than a decade ago; it has hired all the public servants it can hire and doled out all the political favours it possibly can. On the last one, we can only hope, right?

It will be interesting see what the manifestos still to come will offer as solutions to what’s now a stale tale of woe. And thereafter we‘ll have to wait for the “Naas Botha” commentary that follows to drum up uncertainty. A state, I am starting to believe, that is inescapable for any functional democracy.

Built into the ANC general manifesto for the May 2019 elections must be read the party’s poor track record coming from 1994, writes the editor of the Sunday Times on 10 February 2019. Specific stands here as reference President Ramaphosa’s Nation Address (Sona) in February 2019. Putting into perspective the many promises of Ramaphosa (which had seemingly become a habit with him still nearly six months after the elections) to improve education, accelerate the economy and return the country to the rule of law, etc., it was clear that neither Ramaphosa as a leader, nor the ANC as a party and regime, have what it takes to deliver from 2019 to 2024 what it has promised. South Africans have heard many promises from the ANC’s executive leaders from the same podium as the one that Ramaphosa used in February 2019. The editor of the Sunday Times in this context writes65:16:

Who can forget Zuma’s first promise in 2009 after his election as state president a few weeks earlier? At the heart of our worst recession, Zuma stood in front of the nation promising to create 500,000 jobs every year. He never delivered, despite repeating this promise of creating jobs every year of his nine years in office.

Ramaphosa’s reign has so far echoed Zuma’s failed actions, however much his clan wants to manipulate the truth in their stand-off with the Magashule-Zuma clan, which has now become a daily cry from the Ramaphosa camp to the public to take these myths and lies for the truth.65

Note what Jacob Zuma himself said in April 2019 around the hypocritical “virtue” of the ANC after 1994 — seemingly “anointed” and innocent as an angel just descended from Heaven — in his ANC May election roadshow promoting the ANC’s general manifesto by describing all the post-1994 wrongs under the ANC (wherein the ANC and its elite was the sole governing party) to be simply the after-effects of Apartheid. Cele66, in this context, reports66:8:

He lauds the party for being honest; admits that there had been some difficulties in fixing the wrongs made by the oppressors, saying that it cannot happen overnight. When you vote for the ANC, you vote for a car that is already en route, you don’t vote for a car whose road worthiness you are unsure of. There is no one who can say that the ANC has not worked for its people.

Zuma is not alone in this cloud of empty promises and dreams. The political figure Cyril Ramaphosa also stands out in his empty pre-election promises and undertakings, writes the labour-relations journalist Terry Bell67. Bell refers to these many promises as outlandishness, which he defines as meaning: looking or sounding bizarre. Specifically on the political, emotional and spoken manifestations, Bell writes67:2:

Extravagant – outlandish – promises are the stock of the political elite as they seek the votes to install them at the parliament trough.

Take the guarantee by President Cyril Ramaphosa that the ANC would build 1 million new houses in Johannesburg‘s Alexandra township within five years.

One million houses? For a population of anything up to 500 000 people living on 800 hectares of land, which, government admits, has the infrastructure to only cater for 70 000 residents? The mind boggles.

And older residents, among them trade unionists who were part of the militant Alex anti-apartheid resistance of the 1980s, have heard it all before.

As recently as 2001, former president Thabo Mbeki announced a R1.6 billion Alexandra renewal project that promised between 50 000 and 66 000 new homes within seven years. What happened to the money and the project is still being investigated.

This outright misleading and false information can already give us an indication of what to expect from 2019 to 2024 from the ANC in most of its endeavours of which addressing land ownership will be the most important. In this context the question is how can any person mislead himself so immensely as to accept his own lies as the truth? Political manipulation and empty promises may be part of the politician’s stock-in-trade, but the ANC has take it to a new level, comparable to some of the more outlandish, to use Bell’s term, promises and predictions made by African dictators such as Idi Amin or Mobutu Sese Seko.

Looking critically at the content of the ANC’s manifesto for the May 2019 election, much of it consisted of the recycling of old ideas, as well as failed outcomes disguised as doubtful successes: it says really nothing of constructing a future and bringing value to the people of South Africa. Looking more broadly at what the text of the manifesto tried to address — such as, for example, the erasing of poverty, inequality, unemployment and the maintenance of a capable state, etc. — these are indeed hackneyed themes during ANC rule from 1994 to 2019. These problems were mostly exacerbated by the ANC itself through its immense mismanagement, such as the theft of state money belonging to the poor by the ANC’s cronies. It was only repackaged for ANC propaganda during the May 2019 elections, not so much as to bring healing, but to present their failures as the results of Apartheid, deflecting from ANC wrongdoing. The political researcher, Thokozani Chilenga-Buta33, also sees the endless repetition of the ANC’s populist themes in the run-up to the May elections, when he writes33:30:

Though these are nice ideas, they are not new. They were punted in the National Development plan (NDP) which was endorsed by Parliament in 2013. At the time the ANC had the full support of Parliament, including opposition parties, to implement the ideals of the NDP.

These problems and failures created by the ANC regime, lacking as always a constructive effort to address and solve them at least in some way, were also reflected by the lekgotla of the ANC’s national executive committee (NEC) at the beginning of June 2019. Chilenga-Butao states33:30:

“That in 2019 the NEC lekgotla is propagating the same old rhetoric — without saying why it thought these ideas had failed to be implemented since 2013 — is a major deception.”

3.3.3. The Ramaphosa manifesto

Ostensibly in an effort to imprint his own powerful status upon the minds of both the ANC and the public, Cyril Ramaphosa also published his own pre-May 2019 manifesto. (This was clearly seen by some analysts, firstly as an attempt to undermine the ANC’s democratic-centralism wherein every member, including the President of the South African state, is subordinate to policy and resolutions taken during its conference, and secondly as a direct effort at that time by Ramaphosa to call attention to his saviour-status in his leadership conflict with Ace Magashule, the secretary general of the ANC).

The best reflection of a self-description (and of a CV) of the present-day ANC’s intentions to shamelessly mislead  the public and dishonestly recruit of voters after 25 years of corruption and failed governance, were the nine paragraphs below containing the ANC’s general political manifesto and its president’s seemingly politically confused mindset.33,72.73

This manifesto, emanating directly from Cyril Ramaphosa’s belief-system and political mindset, does not sound different from that of Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa’s message to South Africans to vote for him and the ANC was published on 17 March 2019 in both the Rapport and the Sunday Times respectively. It reads72:9 and 73:2:

Mede-Suid-Afrikane/ Fellow South Africans

Die toekoms van ons land is in die hande van diegene wat die meeste daarvoor omgee. Jy, die stemgeregtigde/ The future of our country is in the hands of those who care about it the most. You, the Voter.

‘n Hernude gevoel van trots – en ‘n nasie vol verwagtinge – berus op die punt van die pen wat jy op 8 Mei 2019 sal gebruik om jou stem uit te bring/ A renewed sense of pride – and a nation bursting with expectations – sits squarely at the tip of the pen that will be using to make your mark on the 8th of May 2019.

Bring dus jou stem uit vir die party wat met dieselfde passie as jy in hernuwing glo/ So, make your mark for the party that believes in renewal with the same passion that you do.

Die party wat ons nasie se toekoms vooropstel in sy hart en ‘n regering wat ‘n gespesialiseerde teen korrupsie-eenheid gestig het/The party that has our nation’s future foremost in its heart and a government that has put in place a specialised anti-corruption unit.

Die party wat daarop aangedring het om die Zondo-kommissie te stig om staatsopname bloot te lê en te vernietig/ The party that insisted on setting up the Zondo Commission to expose and destroy state capture.

Die party wat die proses gelei het om weereens die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens (SARS) gekry het om volgens wêreldgehalte te funksioneer/The party that has led the process of once again getting SARS working at its world class best.

Die party onder wie se leierskap, ‘n nuwe leierskap van die National Prosecuting Authority, daargestel het/The party under whose leadership, a new leadership of the National Prosecuting Authority has been put in place.

Die party wat die vermoë van die regering herstel het om dienste billik aan almal te verskaf./ The party that is restoring the ability of government to provide services fairly to all

Op 8 Mei 2019, maak ‘n onuitwisbare merk vir die toekoms van vernuwing wat Suid-Afrika verdien/. On the 8th of May 2019, make an indelible mark for the future of renewal that South Africa deserves.

Maak jou merk/ Make your mark.

Stem ANC/ Vote ANC.

Saam Sal Ons Suid-Afrika Laat Groei/ Let’s Grow South Africa Together.

[Signed] Cyril Ramaphosa

President van die ANC/ President of the ANC

3.3.3.1. Analysis of the Ramaphosa manifesto

The above message firstly needs to be analysed before the ANC may be considered as a potential ruler (an employee), mandated by the voters (as the employer within our scheme) effect land expropriation with or without compensation. The above nine paragraphs consist of at least eleven misleading items and untruths: it seems to be clear here that in Ramaphosa’s political mind, as  in that of most of the ANC’s top brass, myths have become truths after their 25 years of unfettered rule and extreme power.72:9

The use of the words “renewed, renewal and restoring” is striking, confirming that the ANC itself has recognised that its political integrity, actions and deliveries from 1994 to 2019 have been sorely lacking, apart from its corruption, negligence and mismanagement.72:9

Referring to a renewed feeling of pride, the “renewed” and “restoring” confirm that the period 1994 to 2019 was undoubtedly a period of constant despair and of loss, experienced by the nation exclusively at the hands of the ANC regime. His specific reference to the renewing of the ANC is an acknowledgement by him of his outright failure, as well as that of his party between 1994 and 2019 to fulfil their mandate of providing good government. Pertinent here is the literature which confirms that the ANC’s mindset and behaviour became totally focussed on internal matters with serious wrongdoing and a culture of delinquency.72:9

Ramaphosa’s reference to the repair of the ANC is again an admission of guilt that the ANC was in 2019 a failed party and a failed regime, overseen by equally failed leaders since 1994: A party that would not be trusted or allowed again as the post-2019 government if a sifting mechanism existed. Ramaphosa’s pleading for the rehabilitation of the ANC above reminds one of the empty words of a confirmed psychopathic criminal, asking for forgiveness for his bad actions to society and to be allowed back amongst them, knowing well he is just going to continue with his serious delinquencies, being conscious that his bad character cannot be changed for the better. To speak like Ramaphosa of his party who had put the nation first/foremost from 1994 to 2019, is an utter lie and a hoax. Firstly, the chaos in our economics, the extreme poverty of 30 million Blacks, criminality and corruption, etc., by the ANC elite and their cronies have long ago erased the concept of nation from most South Africans’ minds. The promise to restore the ability of the government to provide services to the citizens, who are the people (employer) who had appointed them, is nothing else than the acknowledgement that never after Apartheid had there again been any services of average standard offered by the ANC, or when sometimes offered, limited to short periods after 1994 and limited to the ANC’s favourites. Secondly, when Ramaphosa speaks of the concept of a nation, he, for vote-gathering, clearly deviated from his party’s previous classification of Whites as non-Africans and as colonists respectively and thus not part of the ANC’s nation concept.72:9

Ramaphosa’s bragging as to the establishment of a specialised corruption unit must let him feel giddy: Who was the ruler from 1994 to 2019 and who was vice-president under Jacob Zuma when the immense corruption, which Ramaphosa now “promises to erase”, started to develop and to reach a climax: the ANC and Cyril Ramaphosa. The founding of the specialised corruption unit is indeed meant to catch the ANC’s elite (although the prosecuting outcome is far from that). Ramaphosa’s specialised corruption unit failed so far at the closing of this research on 31October 2019 to bring to book a single one of the ANC’s top elite who had been identified by the Zondo or the Mpati commissions. With the establishment of the Zondo commission, notwithstanding the fact that it was conducted under the chair of an excellent justice with high integrity, Ramaphosa knows well that is toothless and a masked instrument to strengthen his position against the Zuma-Magashule clan in the hope of underminging their power in the ANC and within the party’s NEC after 2019. It is about his own power struggle and not improving the lot of the voters or that of the country.72:9

For instance, his so-called renewing of SARS means one thing: SARS (the South African Revenue Service) collapsed solely under ANC rule and is still struggling post-May 2019. Evidence suggests that SARS is miles away from rehabilitation and a positive restart. Also Ramaphosa’s stumbling with the NPA as renewed by the appointment of a new leader who has bettered it, is far from the truth: there is a new leader but so far no real high-ranking culprits identified by the Zondo and Mpati commissions, have been arrested.72:9

A further element in the above, is an effort to rehabilitate the ANC and its elite, after their disastrous rule of 25 years, through Ramaphosa’s plea of “please forgive the ANC top brass their failings”, a hint of despondency in Ramaphosa’s message, without saying it directly, that there had been an immense collapse in the ANC from 2009 onwards. The investigative literature offered by many journalists and political analysts prominently point to Jacob Zuma as the so-called “culprit”. This misleading thinking was also confirmed and promoted by the ANC’s head of elections, Fikile Mbalula74 (a prominent Ramaphosa fan), when he notably said74:4:

We have baggage from an era of a president who was not providing leadership but was associated with all the bad things. Literally everyone influential in the republic never believed in the leadership of former president Zuma,

and74:4:

Zuma affected our image because he was viewed in relation to state capture as the president of the country and the ANC, and that caused damage to the ANC”, as well as: “But now we have a new head of state who is doing good things because it is the new dawn, a strategic era that we are in.

Mbalula, as well as Ramaphosa know well it is not true: both Mbalula and Ramaphosa were prominent ANC leaders during the Zuma administration and did nothing constructive to stop Zuma and his cronies.72,74

In reaction to Mbalula and the Ramaphosa clan’s above political folly, all that can be said is that it seems as if Ramaphosa and the ANC were misleading the public with the Ramaphosa manifesto. Just read what Danny Titus75 writes about the ANC circus of fools and crooks — and possibly indirectly reflecting also on the Ramaphosa manifesto — when he posits75:19:

Die politici skud hul vere reg om straat toe te gaan met hul basuine: “Stem vir my, daai ander ouns is net ‘n klomp robbiese!” Enige erkenning oor korrupsie of hoe om dit op te los? Bloedweinig. Enige verwysings na korrupsie en die impak daarvan op doodgewone mense, die kiesers? Vergeet maar daarvan.

Titus75 refers to “election talk” and suggests that there are lies and subterfuge involved in propping up the ANC’s charade of a “free and democratic South Africa”75:19:

Konstrateer daarmee die vetgesmeerde katte van die politiek en die bedryfslewe, luister na die verkiesingspraatjies en dan sien ons die daaglikse leuens waarin in die vrye en demokratiese Suid-Afrika gelewe word.

It seems, reading the Ramaphosa manifesto (as well as the general ANC manifesto), as if even the President of the ANC and President of South Africa, does not understand the meaning of Titus’s specific pinpointing of the serious consequences of the ANC’s corruption between 1994 and 2019 and how the ANC regime cold-bloodedly crooked the innocent and most vulnerable citizens of South Africa over 25 years of their rule. Titus refers in this context to a United Nations report on the impact of corruption on basic human rights (which undoubtedly includes South African) that shows up the many contradictions in the Ramaphosa manifeste and the general ANC manifesto, as well as the illogical thinking of the ANC top brass on good governance. Titus75 states, regarding the devastating effects of corruption under ANC rule75:19:

Korrupsie is ‘n skending van menseregte, ‘n skending van ons Grondwet. Die reg op voedsel, huivesting, gesondheidsorg, die reg op lewe – dit word daagliks geskend deur munisipalteite, provinsiale en nationale regerings. Nie deur onbevoegdheid nie. Die skending vind daagliks plaas deur korrupsie wat ons land soos dryfsand ingesuig het. “Poorest of the poor; inequality; poverty and unemployment” – dié rympie hoor ons nou al jare. Deur volksverteenwoordigers wat willens en wetens hul kiesers belieg en bedreig.

How much the promises of the election manifestos of Ramaphosa and the ANC on the eve of the 8 May 2019 election were devoid of truth, was at last confirmed by Ramaphosa himself when he responded in June 2019 (after his inauguration as President) on the criticism levelled against his Third Sona and his unrealistic dreams by admitting that neither he nor the ANC regime could fix the country’s problems, mostly created by the ANC themselves, in the next five years, or even in ten or more years. He want so far as to admit that there were no shortcuts or quick fixes to solve the problems he had promised in his election manifesto to fix fast.76

Ramaphosa’s manifesto message is not worth the paper it is printed on: it is built on myths and deception. Contradicting the exclusive guilt of Jacob Zuma since 2009, is all the evidence that the ANC has been a failure from 1994 to this day during which Zuma was only one of a mass of corrupt ANC leaders. It is time that Ramaphosa obtained better insight into his “virtuous ANC”, as well as himself as a so-called beloved, good paramount-chief and as an extraordinary saviour to make post-2019 South Africa a success. Looking at his part in the Zuma regime, up to his present actions in the ANC, it is doubtful if he could ever obtain that insight.72

Ex-President Kgalema Motlanthe77 (who had served as interim president from September 2008 to May 2009 and who had also been secretary general from 1997 to 2007 and the party’s deputy president from 2007 to 2012), warned Ramaphosa in public on his foolish election campaign — specifically his promises, but seemingly without impact before the May elections. Firstly, he tells Ramaphosa that he is not the anointed politico-messiah to save the dying ANC, or to save the post-May 2019 South Africa. What Motlanthe77 apparently tried to say was that the ANC is terminally sick. Until the ANC will be finally deceased, the ANC and its leaders pose great dangers for post-May 2019 South Africa’s democracy, economics and the rights of its people. The ANC stayed an opportunistic revolutionary party to this day. The Ramaphosa manifesto confirms it in an exemplary way.77

3.3.4. The extravagance, outlandishness and bizarreness characteristic of some ANC politicians’ mindsets

The seeming extravagance, outlandishness and bizarreness characteristic of some politicians’ mindsets, which were reflected in the run-up to the May 2019 elections by some of the parties’ manifestos and which spell danger for the South African community post-May 2019, became in some way at last understandable when Siyahleba68 introduces us to the weird world of politics with his description of the origin of the naked ambition of politicians. Siyahleba writes68:2:

Delusion of grandeur is the fixed, false belief that one possesses superior qualities, such as genius, fame, omnipotence or wealth. It is most often a symptom of schizophrenia, but can also be a symptom found in psychotic or bipolar disorders, as well as dementia.

Then Siyahleba68 goes on to describe a certain person in the ANC. But looking critically at the ANC’s elite’s delinquent actions in general, it seems as if Siyahleba’s68 formulation is also applicable to some of the ANC’s other leaders, as evidenced not only by their false promises to the voters, but also by their false behaviour in politics over the period 1994 to 2019.

These bizarre promises in reality extend wider as regards the ANC’s elite. Knowing for instance all too well that their Alexandra Renewal Project was a failure, primarily because of their maladministration as ruling party, intertwined with their corruption and theft of state funds. Moreover, the despair created by the ANC regime, commencing in 2006 as a result of their failed Alexandra Renewal Project, is in the process of being steered into serious and comprehensive civil unrests.69 It signifies an identity struggle inside the soul of the ANC. When evaluated in-depth, the ANC leader’s psyche reflects the confusion of a soul in peril, resulting from decades of changes and exposures to new constructive elements, far away from the old, unstable liberation and revolutionary elements. It seems to fit into Siyahleba’s68 theory of schizophrenia, psychotic or bipolar disorders, and dementia. The ANC top brass display more and more delusions of grandeur and faith in a make-believe world where their false promises become realities, good outcomes that are going to realise, that they are geniuses, and that they are the only anointed persons who can save the country and its people. The so-called “big man syndrome” but then in the form of elect saviours.70

The above shows how the strong or “big” men of the ANC have received the entitlement to rule, unobstructed as “anointed” leaders of the liberation party (“…and in a Zuma way, until Jesus comes back to the earth”, according to his famous dictum), cognitively unaware that they are not political geniuses and did not receive mandates for autocratic rule in terms of the extreme and dangerous mood-swings of their minds. These leaders see themselves as “keepers of the liberation heritage”, which they used first and foremost to ensure their own self-preservation as the party’s elites. The whole approach to stay in power is done by means of false propaganda to members, supporters, voters. They became messiahs whose false words and integrities no-one may dare to doubt, as the many political fallacies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and now apparently Cyril Ramaphosa adhere to in their self-confident belief in their own “good” leadership and their so-called “sincere love” for the population, reflect very well.70

Makhanya71 further unmasked this false liberation ideology offered by the ANC leadership in their political manifestos going as far back as 1994. Hereto the promises from pre-and post-May 2019 of the present ANC leader Ramaphosa are central – namely, as a good leader and still a keeper of the ANC’s liberation heritage, he could make promises in the May elections to voters notwithstanding the failure of the ANC’s liberation after 1994. Regarding the fallacious promises of the ANC and thus also Ramaphosa’s promises as its leader which will and cannot be realised after 8 May 2019, Makhanya informs us71:2:

…those who are drunk on Ramaphoria must wake up from the stupor and recognise that the work that must be done is arduous and that the messiah is someone who watched passively from inside the cockpit as Zuma willingly navigated the ship into stormy waters. The man may be our leader for the next five years but he will not be our saviour [especially not through his promises].

How the ANC’s leadership has projected itself during the May 2019 elections to its supporters and voters as “good” and assured the voters that in the past they have only been doing good and that they are going to do only good in the future for them, as well as being the keepers of the future democracy while at the same time in the ANC backroom contradictory thinking and corrupt actions were going on, is pointed out by Bell regarding the ANC’s silent promulgation of their “Bantustan Bill”. Here, in an effort to keep their rural supporters for at the expense of the poor rural Blacks, the ANC’s Traditional and Khoisan Leadership Bill as well as the Traditional Courts Bill (which were for obvious reasons were not a public part of the ANC’s “election promises” in their manifestos) are on the verge of being signed into law, writes Bell67. On the dangers that these two Bills are holding for the innocent and uniformed voters if they become laws – and thus after the ANC leadership’s glowing promises before 8 May, Bell reports67:2:

“Together, they reinforce the Bantustan Balkanisation of the country and remove from the general rule of law some 17 million people who live in what the apartheid state called ‘tribal homelands’.”

3.3.5. Past, present and future South African scenarios

Looking back critically at the 1994 to 2019 political history of the ANC, there are certain signs of growths, developments and actions which show constancy and which form the basis for being able to offer generalisations on the actions to be expected from the ANC post-May 2019. The outcomes flowing from these generalisations may be positive or negative in the end. But, as history’s Joker often does, he can make the post-May 2019 political scenario suddenly and unexpectedly look totally different from the pre-May 2019 scenario. Such an outcome may disturb South African politics dramatically and drastically. To a certain extent we must note it and make preparations for the future, even for “political joking” or unexpected developments in post-2019 South Africa. In the next subdivision a summary of past, present and future scenarios, offered by political analysts, is presented.

3.3.5.1. Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection’s Indlulamithi Scenarios for 2018 to 2030

Makhanya71 reports on the indicators of the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection’s Indlulamithi Scenarios for 2018 to 2030. These scenarios envisage three primary paths for what Makhanya in summary calls the post-Zuma-South-Africa. He writes71:2:

One was when the inequality grows and resentment spills into unprecedented protests and even a mini revolution.

The other envisaged a prospering ‘nation in step with itself’ where we returned to our core values of a caring and pro-poor constitutional state that could even achieve a 4.5% growth rate.

The third was the ‘floundering false dawn’ scenario, in which the promise of renewal in 2018/2019 becomes a mirage, leading to lost hope, social upheaval and state repression in the new decade.

Makhanya71 continues (and warns) on the above-mentioned third scenario’s outcome as follows71:2:

This scenario imagines that whatever new optimism you might find now turns out to be false optimism and instead what we discover is that the extent of corruption, mismanagement, nepotism and cronyism is deeply embedded at provincial and municipal level, further extending far beyond the echelons of government or the private sector.

Unless we act and stop looking for messiahs, this is the scenario that is scariest. Dashed hopes are ingredients for toxic recipes.

3.3.5.2. Bloomberg Misery Index

In line with the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection’s Indlulamithi Scenarios for 2018 to 2030 are the findings of the Bloomberg Misery Index also with a negative classification of South Africa.78

Focussing on the pre-2019 versus the post-2019 South Africa, according to the Bloomberg Misery Index (calculated as the sum of a country’s inflation and unemployment rates with its forecast as of 11 April 2019), South Africa joined Venezuela, Argentina, Turkey, Greece and Ukraine as the most miserable countries out of 62 countries worldwide. This marker shows that South Africa, with its high (negative) index of 32.4 against Thailand’s low (positive) index of 2.1 and Switzerland’s index of 3.1, displays the presence of intense economic stress and scant progress in taming price-growth and getting people back to work. Moreover, it confirms the chaotic politics of the country, which characterises unstable regimes such as those of Venezuela and Argentina where corruption, nepotism and dishonest are prominent daily phenomena.79

3.3.5.3. International Risk Report of the World Economical Forum (WEF)

The International Risk Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF) identified at its meeting in January 2019 in Davos ten possible negative outcomes (in line with Makhanya’s high political risks for South Africa after May 2019). Theo Venter78, a political analyst of the North West University, defined the following 10 negative attribues of sub-Saharan Africa78:17:

  1.     Werkloosheid;
  2.     Mislukking van nasionale regerings;
  3.     Energie-prysskokke;
  4.     Verval van kritieke infrastruktuur;
  5.     Fiskale krisse;
  6.     Mislukking van finansiële meganismes of instellings;
  7.     Mislukking van streekstrukture of instellings;
  8.     Waterkrisisse;
  9.     Voedselkrisisse; en
  10.     Onbeheerbare inflasie.

Essentially the ANC regime, up to 8 May 2019, had failed to get a clean audit on any one of the above ten markers. Venter shows that the biggest risks for South Africa post-2019, in terms of the International Risk Report, are the following: The failure to maintain the national, provincial and local government structures and the undermining of their functioning by ongoing state capture, nepotism, corruption, politicking, etc., meaning outright poor governance and a lack of political integrity. Confirming Venter’s78 warnings is the fact that only 18 metro (local) authorities, out of 257, received unqualified Treasury audits in 2019. Relevant here are the constant failures of the SAPS/NPA for a decade or more to curb corruption — forget about removing it from society and from the lifestyle of the ANC regime. Hand on hand with these, also goes the failure of the ANC regime’s police force to eliminate crime from daily life.78.80

The above analysis by Venter, done in terms of the findings of the International Risk Report, reflects the extreme social instability and the increasing collapse of critical infrastructure which are absolute needed on a daily basis for especially the poor and landless community to live and survive (such as the provision of water, electricity, roads, basic healthcare, basic education, etc.). There are indications of dissatisfaction turning into a possible physical reaction against the ANC regime. Prominent here is the countrywide evidence of unrest, acute anarchy and at times behaviour bordering on acute revolution. This present social chaos, that seems to grow instead of diminishing, confirms the status of a well-established, chronically dysfunctional regime that may trigger outright revolution.78

For example, confirming Venter’s78 analysis, is the evidence of how chaotic the provincial government of the ANC all over the country has become, failing the people who voted them into government. To cite but one instance: after the May 2019 election, storms tore through KwaZulu-Natal so that many villages in the southern-most part of the province still do not have access to clean water today. In response to this chaos, the DA’s councillor for Ward 2 in the Ugu area described this failure of delivery and maintenance to 175 000 inhabitants by the ANC-associated municipality as follows81:14-15:

We have a water crisis here but we don’t have a shortage of water. There is no drought. Other than this current crisis the production of water is fine. The real problem is a dereliction of maintenance and last-mile reticulation: getting water to people’s houses. This is a threat to our society and the people to blame for it are the Ugu council. It’s a failed entity — you can’t bleed R10-million a month and claim you are a going concern.

Reflecting this kind of in-depth failure under the ANC government oversight and rule, and the immense misuse of tax-payers’ money, is the fact that the Ugu municipality received a qualified audit from the auditor general for 2018-2019 over unauthorised expenditure amounting to R243 billion. For 2017-2018 the auditor gave Ugu a similarly negative rating because of the municipality’s inability to account for property and equipment valued at R4 billion. Harper and Verasamy81, as well as Harper82 consider this disaster as just one example of the many failures of the country’s ANC-ruled municipalities to get water to the people.81,82

Venter78, Harper and Verasamy81 further debunks the ANC’s claims when it comes to municipal government and providing “services to the people”81:14-15:

Government says that about 95% of people in South Africa have “access” to water. But, in the Ugu district, access only means that there is infrastructure. It does not mean that water flows out of taps and brings life. By its own admission, the national water department says that about a third of households don’t have regular clean water. That’s 20 million people.

Noting the fact that out of a total population of 57 million as many as 30 million South Africans are utterly poor, more or less 30 million of them are jobless, and more than 15 million are living solely on monthly social grants, the Ugu district chaos speaks volumes about the path of disaster onto which the 28% of the eligible voters, who thoughtlessly voted for the ANC in the May 2019 elections, had willingly placed themselves from 2019 to 2024, together with the other 72% of non-ANC and passive voters83-86.

3.3.5.4. Bawa reference

Khadija Bawa87, a researcher at the Social Justice Coalition in Khayelitsha, Cape Town points out the failure of effective policing in the country and the lack of policing to ensure the personal safety of the individual citizen. Her critical analysis shows that such conditions are often created by the ANC’s poor and failing management at the national level of essential services such as the South African Police Services, which spiral downwards into local mismanagement, thereby creating chaotic living and housing conditions in informal settlements. She recently stated87:8:

South Africa is one of the most violent countries in the world. That violence, however, is not experienced at the same level across the country. Year in and year out South Africa’s statistics reveal that poor, working-class, urban and semi-urban, and predominantly black police precincts carry the greatest burden of violent crime.

Why is it the case that in historically demarcated, still predominantly white areas police patrols are visible while in historically demarcated coloured and black areas they aren’t?

Bawa87 describes the siege of Coloured and Black living areas by crime further by showing the role of poverty and landlessness which had forced jobless Coloured and Black people to live in these informal crime-ridden settlements. The lay-out of these areas, lacking any national governmental support and infrastructure, further exacerbates the already sub-standard policing in such poor settlements. Again the failure of the pre-20019 ANC regime stands out, extending over a period of 25 years, to supply stable living spaces for these unfortunate poor and landless people and to ensure a permanent income for them as promised before elections. She writes87:8:

Even though the lack of visible policing can be blamed on the police service and local law enforcement, other governmental departments are failing these communities, and the police, by not delivering services. The lack of built environment interventions in areas of high informality, have a direct impact on the safety and security of residents.

3.3.5.5. Harvey reference

The political commentator and analyst, Ebrahim Harvey88, reflects specifically on the context of the present-day badly neglected mass of poor Black people in the country — going as far back as the then young people whose role in the so-called Black student uprising of 1976, together with the Black workers in the trade unions and members of various Black communities country-wide, had, through their anti-Apartheid actions, made a decisive impact on the liberation politics of pre-1994 South African and brought the ANC to power in 1994. However, after 1994 these groups were immediately sidelined by the ANC elite and are still today being excluded by the ANC inner circle from being uplifted in a supposedly bettered South Africa. Harvey writes as follows88:8:

Unfortunately, both these major constituencies of the ANC suffered most from the neoliberal policy regime the ANC adopted after 1994.

Harvey88 further elaborates on this post-1994 failure of the ANC — correctly described as “Black-on-Black discrimination and exploitation” — when he posits88:8:

We can see the negative effects of those policies in many areas of our society, but most notably in the very high unemployment rate among the black youth, the protracted problems in all spheres of education, and the serious lack of infrastructure and social justice in townships where by far most still reside.

A walk through most black townships in the country shows starkly the horrific extent of these problems.

Any study of the reasons why youth face these serious problems point to the effects of neoliberal policies, a related serious lack of funds, the incompetence of ANC members deployed to various sites of education, and an increasing corruption within all levels of government.

On the educational failure of the mass of poor Blacks by the ANC regime, specifically during the pre-2019 period and which is going hand-in-hand with the above suppressing and “crashing” of the development and empowerment of poor Blacks that have been advertised by the ANC regime since 1994, Harvey88 sees the role being played by some of the governing party’s affiliates88:8:

There is no doubt that the South African Democratic Teachers Union, strongly linked to the ANC, has in many respects done the youth at schools a huge disservice. Incompetence, corruption and irresponsibility in its ranks have had a blistering effect on our schools and learners.

Harvey investigates this contaminated political environment further and deeper in his writing when he hints that this failure has the potential to activate in these youths’ minds in the post-2019 politics of South Africa a vicious circle of mass obstruction, unrest, anarchy and passive revolution. The existence of dissatisfied, hostile and aggressive youth makes them potential candidates for recruitment by radical groups in South African politics, such as the EFF.

He refers specifically to th EFF’s hostility to racial minorities and its support for a radical land grab. The EFF seems to regard minorities as so powerless and numerically insignificant that they may be insulted or provoked at will. According to Harvey,

People from these “minorities”, which EFF leader Julius Malema in particular likes to attack in his speeches, are not going to always sit back and allow the EFF to attack and walk over them.88

However, there are radicals in the ANC too who share the Afro-Marxist ideology of the EFF. The same radicalism is openly reflected by the left-wing of the ANC, as evidenced by the Magashule-faction (in which the Zuma clan features prominently). Their use of racialised demographic statistics in inviting confrontation with minorities is similar. The possibility therefore exists that in post-2019 South Africa both the EFF and a faction within the ANC could unleash markedly racial confrontations in various social settings. Harvey writes88:8:

I often feel that this distinct danger is steadily gathering pace in many political and social settings. This country, given an immensely violent history and many unresolved social issues, is deep down a tinder box which can explode in their own hands at any time.

The reaction of the minorities may be much more severe in relation to the ANC as opposed to the EFF, given that the ANC is the sole ruler of the land, notwithstanding that it seems to be a very divided party. A blueprint has been laid since 1994 for anarchy and revolution. Anarchy and revolution are waiting to explode in post-2019 South Africa and this may be laid at the door of the ANC’s corrupted elite politics.88,89

3.3.5.6. Mohale reference

Bonang Mohale90 is the chief executive of Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA). He claims that post-2019 South Africa is politically and economically grinding to a political and economic halt. Positive growth seems to be absent, while transgression has become the rule of the country’s politics. He formulates it thus:

There is no doubt that collectively, we have not succeeded in eradicating the legacy of apartheid and the 350 years of colonialism; the economy is on its knees; young black graduates roam the streets hopelessly; inequality has widened; racism is at an all-time high; public schooling is broken; public schooling is broken; public hospitals fail the poor and vulnerable; crucial infrastructure is in decay; lawlessness is rife.90

The rhetorical question is: Why would the ANC change its delinquent and corrupt habits if has managed to obtain parliamentary majorities six times in a row while getting front-page cover for its succession of financial and other scandals from 1994 until now?

The alleged pervasive corruption of the ANC as a political party and as a regime, including many of its leaders, making them gangsters and serious delinquents, has become a feature of South African life. Closely associated with this is the imminent land grabbing, defined as “land expropriation without compensation”.89,90

3.3.5.7. Andrew reference

Andrew91 draws attention to the ANC’s chronic delinquency and corruption, starting from 1994. Similarly to many other political analysts, Ken Andrew, who also happens to be a seasoned politician, puts it clearly that the ANC’s rot did not start with Zuma: the country become mired in a culture of immense corruption, even post-1994, especially on the level of the ANC’s top leaders, which Zuma merely made bigger. The ANC’s rottenness is clearly identifiable from 1994 when it became the ruling party with its many delinquent actions such as theft, corruption and mismanagement around issues like Sarafina, the arms deal, the improper enrichment of the ANC’s front company, Chancellor House, and the dismantling of the Scorpions long before Zuma’s presidency.

The economy went into decline long before Zuma, directly because of poor policies and failed profile building with foreign countries, etc. Andrew also points out that the Eskom debacle was born before Zuma because the ANC lacked even back then a constructive electricity policy. The implementation of inappropriate affirmative action policies at Eskom by the ANC forced out able technical staff. State capture started officially in 1997 with the ANC National Conference’s decision in favour of the deployment of ANC cadres in all spheres of government and state institutions, including the judiciary. Other ANC actions undermining good governance, identified by Andrew91, are the introduction of bad educational policies such as outcomes-based education, the closing of teachers’ training colleges, the voluntary severance packages given to educationists in the late 1990s and the kowtowing to the South African Teachers Union via Cosatu as a partner in the ANC’s corruption and mismanagement.91

3.3.5.8. The Mthombothi view of an ANC permanently drunk from the alcohol of corruption

Mthombothi92 writes in July 2018 that the “ANC is drunk from the alcohol of corruption”. One outcome of chronic alcoholism is causing extreme mental confusion. In the ANC’s case it has clearly has severed its contact with political, social and personal decency and justice. But the ANC’s habitual corruption has not stopped after 8 May 2019. Mthombothi92 predicts that the ANC’s deviant behaviour, extending back to 1994, is going to spill over to post-2019 South Africa with serious consequences.92

The best evidence for the ANC’s condition as a failure and a drunkard through corruption, crooking and political mismanagement is the testimony in March 2019 on the contemporary ANC psyche by ex-President Kgalema Motlanthe77. For Motlanthe, the present-day political integrity of the ANC is the lowest it has ever been since it took power in 1994 and the leader Ramaphosa is unable to effect rehabilitation.74,77,93,94

Motlanthe77 traces the immense inability of the ANC to act as a competent and qualified ruler of post-May 2019 South Africa, back to its clear record of delinquency which stretches over 25 years of misgoverning and utter corruption. More damning on the ANC’s inability do good at any level of government in future after May 2019 and the immediate need for the ANC to disband in order to end its wrongdoing, Hunter77 conveys Motlanthe’s77 opinion on the chaos in the ANC as follows77:4:

[Motlanthe had said that]…he believed that the ANC could only change if it died in its current form and was reborn as a grassroots movement.

Fikile Mbalula, one of the current politburo members of the ANC and at present a minister in the Ramaphosa cabinet, himself admitted the immense mental and political pathology inside the ANC. On this deep-rooted crookedness in his own ANC, which Mbalula describes as an in-depth cancerous infection which needs an equally in-depth treatment, he said95:4: “… you can’t clean a sore without going deep into it — just dressing the wound won’t help”.

The ANC’s infected sore goes to the bottom. To be honest: it is advanced cancer; it is in its brain, body, stomach, its heart, its psyche, its soul. Many political analysts, together with Mbalula and Motlanthe, have put forward the question if the ANC can be rehabilitated, or if it has the potential to “rescue” itself from its own immense wrongdoing, let alone its promises to rescue South Africa! The evidence suggests there is no hope of rehabilitation for the ANC. The ANC became more than a habitual drunkard guility of serious delinquent behaviour; it became a habitual criminal.74,77,92-95

Note: The evaluation and discussion of this division (3.3 African National Congress) will be continued in article 12 under the subdivision: 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019.

4. Conclusions

It is clear that the current South African political system, continuously run by the ANC regime for 25 years, has been captured by an autocratic ideology in which the party’s Marxist-Leninist leanings maintain and steer its democratic-centralism. The right of the individual voter counts minimally while the ANC politburo has consolidated most available power, making the ANC’s constitution more applicable to governing the country than the South African Constitution.

The pre-May 2019 election promises of the ANC, specifically those of Cyril Ramaphosa, to rectify all South Africa’s ills quickly and completely, more and more seem to be lies and myths. The scenarios, reflecting the immediate present, as well as the future awaiting South Africans, are coming across as very problematic, mostly portending a decline in economics, politics and social cohesion. It seems as if the fallacious belief in the ANC’s absolute “democracy” is overwhelming rooted in most of the media’s and public’s mindsets too.

The Code of Ethical Conduct and Disclosure of Members’ Interests to regulate dishonest conduct by law-makers is insufficient. Prominent is also the faulty Electoral Act, as well as the absence of an Electoral-Parliamentarian Employment Act and an Electoral-Parliamentarian Ethics Code as contributors to the establishment of the ANC as the sole regime over 25 years. These legal short-comings seem to be the primary causes of the ANC’s national election victory in May 2019 during which only 49% of the total eligible voters participated and the winning party received only 28% support of those eligible voters. The ANC’s re-election as ruler for a sixth term of another five years (2019 to 2024) was an immense error. It was tantamount to political fraud in the first class.

In the next (Article 12), titled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity)” the ability of the ANC to take care of the land expropriation matter in terms of its empowerment as ruler it received after the election of 8 May 2019, will be further evaluated.

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  51. Gumede W. Time to tackle the 10 groups of untouchables. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 July 14; p. 20.
  52. Munusamy R. Hold on to reality as Zuma and his legal team do everything they can to lead Zondo down the rabbit hole. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 July 14; p. 20.
  53. Ou gesigte. Beeld. 2019 June 22; p. 16.
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  55. Padayachee V, Valodia I, Van Niekerk R. Evolution of ANC economic policy sheds light on row over central bank. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 July 7; p. 18.
  56. Feketha S. BEE ‘led to state capture’. The Star (Nation). 2019 June 27; p. 26.
  57. Gordhan P. Dirty politics are behind the public protector’s attempt to have me fired. Sunday Times. 2019 July 14; p. 19.
  58. Gumede W. Easy option of ‘black victimhood’ covers multiple sins. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 July 7; p. 16.
  59. Ntsaluba G. Interdict to stop report Saturday Citizen (News), 2019 July 9; p. 7.
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  61. De Lille P. Seven steps that a Good government will take to make for a better SA. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March 3; p. 20.
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  64. Hunter Q. Ace’s Reserve Bank ‘edit’ puts ANC in spin. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Jan. 20; p. 1.
  65. The cynics have a point, but let’s hope the president’s pledges come true. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Febr. 10; p. 16.
  66. Cele A. ANC is a car that is already en route – Zuma. City Press (News). 2019 April 21; p. 8.
  67. Bell T. Hold our parties to their promises. City Press (Business). 2019 April 21; p. 2.
  68. Siyahleba B. The weird world of politics. Naked ambition. City Press (Voices). 2019 April 21; p. 2.
  69. Wicks J. Politics fuels despair and rage in Alex. Sunday Times (News). 2019 April 14; p. 6.
  70. Maxon C. ANC’s soul in peril. City Press. 2019 April 21; p. 3.
  71. Makhanya M. Dashed hopes = disaster. City Press (Voices). 2019 April 21; p. 2.
  72. ANC. A better life for all. #GrowSouthAfrica #Vote ANC. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 9.
  73. ANC. A better life for all. #GrowSouthAfrica #Vote ANC. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March 17; p. 2.
  74. Mvumvu Z. Cyril more popular than ANC – poll. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Feb. 24; p. 4.
  75. Titus D. Korrupsie skend ons regte. Beeld (Middelblad). 2019 Jan. 30; p. 19.
  76. Naki E. SA has no quick fixes – president. The Citizen (News). 2019 June 27; p. 2.
  77. Hunter Q. ANC ‘worse than before Ramaphosa”. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March 31; p 4.
  78. Venter T. Risiko’s vir SA in 2019. Beeld (Middelblad). 2019 Jan. 31; p. 17.
  79. Ed- Miserable, yes, but not as bad as Venezuela. City Press. 2019 April 21; p. 3.
  80. Ramphosa must act on local government. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 June 30; p. 9.]
  81. Harper P, Verasamy D. Water supply is restored to some, the rest has to forage for theirs. Guardian & Mail. 2019 June 14 to June 20; pp. 14-15.
  82. Harper P. Thirst and rage on the South Coast. Mail & Guardian. 2019 June 14-20; p. 29.
  83. Election results announced. [Cited 2018 Apr. 10]. Available from  https://rekordeast.co.za/election-results-announced/
  84. Bigalke L. Twee ‘groot’ verloorders. Beeld (Middelblad). 2019 May 17; p. 11.
  85. Quick read of South Africa’s 2019 election numbers [Cited 2018 Apr. 10]. Available from https://Africacheck.org/reportd/quick-read-south-africas-2019-election-in     numbers/
  86. 2019 versus 2014: What the numbers tell us about the general elections. [Cited 2018 Apr. 10]. Available from https://www.news24com/elections/news/2019-vs-2014-what-the-numbers-tell-us-about-the-general-elections-2019512     /
  87. Bawa K. Visible policing marred by conditions. The Star (Opinion). 2019 June 11; p. 8.
  88. Harvey E. Black youth badly neglected. The Star (Opinion). 2019 June 11; p. 8.
  89. Ka’Nkosi S. When ignorance turns into a disruptor of policy modernisation. The Star (Focus). 2019 June 12; p. 16.
  90. Mohale B. SA is politically and economically grinding to a halt. The Star (Focus). 2019 June 12; p. 16.
  91. Andrew K. The rot didn’t start with Zuma — and giving the ANC your vote will only make it worse. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March 31; p. 20.
  92. Mthombothi B. The ANC is drunk from the alcohol of corruption, and its growing support is bad news for South Africa. Sunday Times. 2018 July 22; p. 3.
  93. ANC’s tenure at top under threat. Saturday Citizen (Opinion).. 2019 March 16; p. 12.
  94. Mirriam N. List scandal will haunt Ramaphosa. Mail & Guardian. 2019 March 15-21; p. 4.
  95. Hunter Q, Shoba S. Cyril ‘should apologise’ before Zondo. Sunday Times (News). 2018 Dec. 9; p. 4.
  96. Justice Malala. Why the ANC is so corrupt. Business Day. 2019. November 17. https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/opinion/home-and-abroad/2019-11-07-justice-malala-why-the-anc-is-so-corrupt/

 

PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.

UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS

Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.

Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe a century away? Part 7: 2017 is the time for thinking, planning, and deeds

Gabriel Louw

 

Research Associate, Focus Area: Social Transformation, Faculty of Arts,

Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

 

RESEARCH

 

Corresponding Author:

Prof Dr GP Louw

Focus Area Social Transformation

Faculty of Arts

Potchefstroom Campus

North-West University

South Africa

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

 

Ensovoort volume 37(2017), number 11:3

 

ABSTRACT

 

Keywords

Alliance, apartheid, conflict, discrimination, dissolution, ethnicity, genocide, Herodotus curse, doctrine, minority, miscegenation, monopoly, myth, parent stock, proto-Afrikaner, race, racism, security, self-actualisation, strong-arm tactics, violence.

_____________________________________________________________________________

 

 

  • Background

 

 

“One might argue that there is almost a symbiotic interdependence between Black and White in South Africa, which makes for minority security. On the other hand, the relatively large size of the White majority gives it a substantial capacity for the fomenting dissidence, which could lead a predominantly Black government either to handle it with care so as to avoid provocation; or to use strong-arm tactics to neutralise this potential. Much would depend, of course, on how the process of sharing power had occurred and the extent to which Whites (or a majority of them) felt themselves included in the new government”, writes Welsh1, p.110 in 1988. This political view on the possible future outcomes of a Black regime’s comprehensive attitude and actions against the Whites, including Afrikaners, was not only accurately portrayed by Professor David Welsh, but become a reality 29 years later.1

 

Now, looking back after 23 years of Black rule in South Africa, it is clear that both of the outcomes were realized by the ANC-regime. Although, during the initial period after 1994 when the National Party (NP) led by FW de Klerk stayed on in the government of reconciliation, Afrikaners were treated with care to avoid provocation. But after the NP left the ANC-NP alliance, this intention of the ANC regime started to change gradually into a hostile one. This mild hostility against Whites was initially reflected by BEE, EE, etc., well masked under the pretext of equalizing opportunities between Blacks and Whites and promoting the mass of disadvantaged Blacks. No doubt exists that some sectors inside the Afrikaner population began to show dissidence to Black rule, although this was mostly limited to public protests and legal action, mostly via the various private enterprises which had assigned themselves as “caretakers” of Afrikaner interests.1-16

 

With the Zupta shenanigans and state capture gaining prominence and Jacob Zuma’s efforts to mask his dictatorial, duplicitous regime of self-enrichment, the focus was once again shifted to the Afrikaner. Ignoring the poor Black masses and the civil rights of individual Blacks, Zuma and his ilk diverted the heat to Whites as past and present oppressors of the Blacks. Afrikaners’ self-enrichment through their alleged exploitation of Blacks and the consequent “unlawful possession” of Black capital and land – which had been “stolen” from the rightful Black owners by White colonialists – was the popular refrain. The South African public were reminded of the racial division between Black and White with apartheid, colonialism, Afrikanerism, and the like wedged into the collective consciousness. Zuma and his intimate cadres utilised this momentum to promote Radical Economic Transformation (RET), which focused on nationalizing White capital (banks, property, land, pension funds, etc) and would tip the economic scales in favour of the previously disenfranchised. Disregarding Afrikaners’ civil and political rights in the work environment, crime-fighting, the murder of White farmers, parliamentarian debating, and political decision-making, are further excellent examples of the start-up of strong-arm tactics to neutralize the Whites as a political grouping as well as an indigenous South African population [The more recently emphasis also on Radical Social Transformation (RST) to equal social status between Blacks and Whites is a further example of these tactics].1-16

 

Mthombothi17, p.17writes that the truth behind RET and “White monopoly capital” is that it is just a cloak to cover up Zuma and the Guptas’ nefarious deeds of enduring damage by their cynical exploitation of racism and repeated regurgitation of the apartheid past. The two terms are thus not as innocent as they sound. He writes17, p. 17: “It’s got nothing to do with any desire to help or uplift the black masses, especially not on the part of a family [Guptas] who have shown no love for black people. These words have a sinister motive. They are deliberately designed to pull the wool over our eyes, to set us up against each other, to incite racial hatred. And so we fight among ourselves as they get on with the business of looting the country. We have fallen for it. Their plan is working. They have poisoned the well”. It is excellent example of “divide and rule” used worldwide by sly rulers to stay in power and to distract attention from their own wrongdoing.

 

Clearly the Afrikaner has become, through Zuma, the sole “enemy of the people” again as in the 1960s with the ANC’s policy of revolution and an effective method to distract especially the poor Black classes’ from the truth. This tried-and-tested trick has always been successful at obtaining votes from the poor masses: by frightening them with the return of White apartheid, the repositioning of the “racist” Afrikaners as a political power, and the theft of new-found Black richness.1,3,4,7,11,12,15,16,18-21 This RET policy does not differ from the established corrective economic policies that have been pursued since 1994. Fuelling the fire of Black-White conflict can ultimately – socially and economically – destabilize South Africa. It is in this subjective but overwhelming anti-White hostility that Afrikaners are trying to make the best of their indigenous identity and to live in the new South Africa.17

 

While Welsh1, p. 101postulated in 1988 that “it is perhaps not ‘inevitable’ that in fifty years’ time [2038] White control over South Africa will have disappeared…”, it took the ANC regime only 23 years to reach that goal successfully through the intensifying of well-planned strong-arm tactics. These kinds of tactics by Zuma and his supporters will strongly increase in their efforts to draw the attention away from their growing political wrongdoings as more and more Black dissenters from the middle and higher classes turn their backs on the “Zupta-ANC”.

 

The abovementioned propaganda and political rhetoric is exactly how the ZANU-PF regime of Robert Mugabe “won” Zimbabwe from the Whites. ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe himself recently provided an apt description of the dangerous implications, especially for Afrikaners, of Jacob Zuma’s populist RET policy of grabbing White-monopoly capital and land when he says22, p. 4:

As ‘n revolusionêre beweging agteruitgaan en goedkoop populariteit soek, raak dit avontuurlik en populisties.

 

Zanu-PF was ‘n revolusionêre party, maar om goedkoop steun te kry, het Zanu-PF grond gegryp en uitgedeel en só kosproduksievernietig. Dit was dalk gewild, maar Zimbabwe is nou ‘n voedselinvoerder.

 

Dit is waarheen ons ook neig. Die beweging [ANC] sal nie gered word deur kitsoplossings nie, maar deur diep besinning.

 

Die debat oor radikale transformasie en witmonopoliekapitaal word deur Gupta-gesinde ANC-lede gestook om ‘n voorsprong te kry met die oog op die party se nasionale konferensie in Desember.

 

If the secretary general of the ANC feels obligated to warn against his own party’s failing future political integrity and behaviour (which is already a reality), there can be no doubt of the seriousness of these anti-White tactics and the possibly devastating consequences awaiting Afrikaners. The plight of the Whites in Zimbabwe is well recorded and well published.

 

Although the South African Constitution, the Constitutional Court and other courts of law have thusfar managed to shield the Afrikaner from the ANC’s extreme strong-arm tactics, these bodies might be rendered powerless in the long run if a total ANC-takeover (67%) results in changes to the independence of the courts and the security services. Dramatic action against the Afrikaner could follow, which may even lead to genocide. The present-day cry by ultra-hot-headed ANCs and other radical Blacks for a “second revolution” via RET and RST seems more and more imminent. This revolution’s intention is far from innocent, despite claims by the present-day ANC leadership that its only aim is to obtain “economic” freedom by ending the “first revolution” of 1994 by means of RET and RST to bring “political freedom” to Blacks.1,7,11,12,15,16,20,22,23

 

The aggressive and militant movement known as Black First Land First (BLF), have already started putting their demands in writing and publically vocalising threats and intimidating any opponents of this “second revolution” with their anti-White motto, “to defend black people, the Guptas, from racist, land-thieving white monopoly capitalist scum,” as the journalist Peter Bruce24, p. 20summarised it. This already reflects that the presence of a “…culture of intolerance and bullying and disregard for the basic principles of free speech in our society in the new smash and grab milieu is such that lives are being put at risk”.25, p. 20 This spells disaster for Afrikaners. There is overwhelming evidence of a comprehensive readjustment around Afrikaners and their position as citizens of South Africa, and one cannot help fearing for the worst.1,7,11,12,15,16,20,22,24-26

 

Vilakazi warning of this extreme political, social, economic, and personal upheaval in the future of Afrikaners if they did not take the time to safeguard them against Black revenge and annulment, was already well profiled and spelled out nearly 30 years ago  when he writes 15,p. 40:

 

The essence of revolution is the direct, active intervention of the oppressed masses of society in public affairs, in an effort to speed up and bring about long overdue changes in the fundamental structures of society. These changes are above all in the possession and control of power, first political, and, following on its heels, economic power. Revolution consists of the shifting of this power from the hands of one class to the hands of the hitherto oppressed classes. The issue in any revolution is the possession and control of the power of the State, and possession and control of property; in other words, political power, and economic power.

 

But what Vilakazi also failed15 to say then, but which Gwede Mantashe22 now warns us of, is that any revolution is not a bed of roses: not only for the loser, but also for the winner at the end, spelling total chaos at the end.28 (Remember the vicious cycle of the Herodotus Curse on wrongdoing that history repeats itself and that contravening the rules of justice creates→ injustice hate→ revenge →contra-revenge, with sometimes a fast, sudden, surprising, and deadly counter revenge).22,27,28

 

The present day as well as potential future abuse and crushing of Afrikaners by the ANC regime and other radical Blacks are clearly pinpointed in the above remark of 30 years ago by Vilakazi’s15,p. 40: “…long overdue changes in the fundamental structures of society…”. This was a dire warning of an unavoidable South African indigenous reality of disaster to come in their near future, which the ordinary Afrikaners missed to read on the lips of F W de Klerk when he mesmerized the 1993 referendum and the post-1994 utopian South Africa into their mindsets.14,29,30

 

The basic aim of this article was to inform the Afrikaner of his present and future role as a citizen of the new South Africa. This contemplation should motivate the Afrikaner to do self- introspection. Afrikaners should answer the question: Have we reached self-actualisation and an optimal personal happiness in the new South Africa? Have we left our worries and fears behind so that we can participate in a good life here? If Afrikaners fail to offer a positive answer on the question, then it is time that they reread this article to see how they can address their upcoming Afrikaner dissolution the best, and how they can obtain and assure at present and in future psychological and political wellbeing for themselves. The options are there, but only they alone can make a choice. Remember: at this stage Afrikaner dissolution is a fact, not a myth.

 

The aim of the study is to describe 2017 as the time for thinking, planning, and deeds. The focus is on the various options and routes available for the Afrikaner to plan his immediate future and to delay or to avoid dissolution in a century’s time.

  • This article is the last in a series of seven. The seven articles represent the following research topics: 1) who is the Afrikaner; 2) the historical determinants and role-players in the establishment and maintenance of racial and ethnic discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 3) present and past negative determinants and role-players in the establishment and upkeep of injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 4) the Afrikaner’s failure to understand, accept and intertwine the indigenous realities of South Africa; 5) the vicious cycle of revenge and counter- revenge around apartheid;  6) The preparedness of Afrikaners to deal with the threats and challenges of the new South Africa; 7) 2017 is the time for thinking, planning, and deeds.

 

  • The overarching intention of the entire study is to determine the position of the Afrikaner in the year 2117.

 

 

  • Method

 

 

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the ground up, from evidence as it emerges over the course of the research. This approach is used in modern-day historical research where an established library is lacking, for instance in the case of the topic of the present and future position of the Afrikaner in South Africa. The databases used were EBSCO, Sabinet online as well as articles from 2016 to 2017, books for the period 1944 to 2016, and newspapers covering the period 2012 to 2017. This was done to reflect on the Afrikaner and to place thoughts, views, and opinions on the Afrikaner in perspective.60-62

 

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

 

 

  • Results

 

 

Prominent to the background provided are the questions: Is it justified that Afrikaners at this stage of the New South Africa are still exposed to discriminative behaviours and maltreatment by the ANC regime?; and, What can Afrikaners do to secure a future for themselves and their descendants in or outside of South Africa?

 

In this context it is important to know if the ANC regime understands the concept of indigenousness of the various tribes of South Africa outside a Black-only ethnicity, as well as if they have any knowledge of the prescribed principles and rules to be followed in nation-building? Does the ANC regime really take notice of the Afrikaners’ sincere and willing efforts to become successful members of the new South Africa? There is no doubt that if the ANC regime can answer these three questions positively and practice them accordingly there will be no need for Afrikaners to reconsider their present and future positions in South Africa. So far, all hope seems to be in vain.

 

In the following four subdivisions the ANC’s under standing of and respect for South African peoples’ indigenousness, nation-building, as well as the ordinary Afrikaner’s sincerity and willingness to accept South African indigenous realities and to move on to greater South Africa, will be described.

 

3.1 South African indigenous realities missed by the ANC

 

For some Blacks, especially those in ANC politics, it was just too difficult after 1994 to accept that the White minority had legitimate interests in view of what, historically, had been the ‘illegitimate’ exercise of minority power over “them” as Blacks. This bitterness about their treatment as human beings during apartheid (and during colonialism, in the same breath) and outright rejection of the “illegitimate” NP-regime by the Blacks, has led to today’s hostile actions against Afrikaners. Also, the Afrikaner’s substantial dissidence to Black rule, specifically with the ANC as former revolutionary organization, aggravated the situation. The end result was the ANC regime’s disregard and disrespect of the rights of Afrikaners, despite the safeguarding of minority groups by the Constitution. The ANC regime’s obvious efforts to undo the privileged political and socio-economic position the Afrikaner previously held [and considered guaranteed after 1994 by virtue of the NP and the 1993 referendum agreement] reinforced this view.1,3.4.15.31-35

 

What these Blacks and the ANC have forgotten is that internalized customs, habits, and traditions do not just disappear when a new regime takes over. Rights, privileges, benefits and favours, written or unwritten, official or unofficial, also do not suddenly disappear (the present behaviour of the ANC as an ex-terrorist, ex-revolutionary organization plainly reflects these internalized dispositions). South Africa as a country developed over more than three hundred years of war and peace, good and bad. At the moment the differences between the classes, between Black and White, as well as Black and Black, are just too significant to erase overnight. The same can be said of the chasm between the “haves” and the “have-nots”. Unfortunately, targeting Whites out of racial hatred and jealousy and forcing them out of their homeland and seizing their capital and property will not solve the problem. At the end it is the country and its Black people that suffer the most. After independence, Samora Machel of Mozambique attempted (but failed) to rectify inequalities in one fell swoop by focussing exclusively on Whites as the wringers. Despite Machel’s reputed warning to Mugabe not to repeat this mistake, Mugabe blindly implemented radical racial reform measures by kicking Whites off their farms and out of Zimbabwe, but failed as Machel did and today continues to mutilate the tattered remains of his once-thriving country. The ANC has been trying to do the same in South Africa since 1994, but instead is creating more long-term problems than solving present short-term problems. It is against devastating costs to the country that Mantashe and a few wise ANC stalwarts and veterans are – seemingly in vain – warning the Zupta-led ANC elite.1,22,25,37,38

 

In a “peaceful transfer” from one political regime to another, like that of the NP to the ANC (a peaceful development of revolution which very seldom takes place in history), the peace of such a transfer is  sometimes very short-lived. Basically, because the initial solutions to problems were often insufficient, leaving many of the role-players from both sides unfulfilled and frustrated in terms of compensation or punishment for wrongdoings (as evidenced by the hunger for revenge by victims of apartheid). To steer a regime change peacefully through its growing pains requires extraordinary leadership, characterized by foresight, courage, a sense of morality and conciliation, and the ability to act fast in times of crisis. The ANC leadership after Nelson Mandela lacks all of these. This has led to a misrepresentation in the minds of some Afrikaners that ill discipline, corruption, lethargy, unproductiveness, inefficiency, and incompetence are characteristics of Black culture in general. These traits of the current leadership and the departments under them are the primary motivation behind the commonplace reference to the new South Africa as a “banana republic”.32This is a very sad generalisation as the greater part of most Black societies do not harbour particular ill will towards their fellow South Africans, including Afrikaners. They are merely getting on with life as best they can, and suffer under the same inefficiency and incompetence of the ruling party; they are not governed by hatred or an urge for revenge.13-15, 39-45

 

This “African culture” which has characterized life in post-1994 South Africa is actually a “deviant ANC culture” originating from its origin as a terrorist and revolutionary organization. It is far removed from the true African culture of South Africa and shaped by outdated political thought and the actions of anti-Afrikaner Black politicians and activists with their own agendas (maintained and driven by the MKs of the late 1960s and 1970s). At present, it is aggravated by the Zuptas and their supporters. Many ANC leaders and members are nothing more than spectators, lacking wisdom or insight, who gained front seats to the political game in the post-1994 democratic elections. And then there are the many “takers” who will do anything just to satisfy their personal greed and ambitions. The reality is that these opportunistic people are in charge of the ANC and are steering its policies and actions. Any positivity on the Afrikaner’s side is blindly ignored; the same can be said about their civil rights. It seems that Afrikaners are increasingly falling prey to this system.12,32,33,39,46-52

 

3.2 Requirements for South African Nationhood

 

A lot of the present-day hostility of the ANC-regime is a direct outcome of the political immaturity of the South African Constitution and South Africa’s history as a nation, although the judges of the Constitutional and Appeal Courts act with wisdom, sincerity, and sound legal principles. South Africa as a member of BRICS can learn a lot from India’s colonial past and the successful manner in which this new nation (but old civilisation) is handling its different cultures, peoples, and tribes since obtaining independence in 1947. Whereas India was never a unified political entity, the Proclamation of Queen Victoria in 1853 unified into one country, one nation; when independence came on August 14, 1947, a democracy was created that has remained unified. What makes this achievement so great is that it brought nearly a 1 000 million people (of various cultures, tribes and levels of education, some in extreme poverty, other extreme rich) together as one political entity under conditions of freedom. “Never before in history, and nowhere else in the world today, has one-sixth of the human race existed as a single free nation. This unity of people is more than the combined population of Africa and South America”.53, p. 3

 

This achievement goes much further – all 12 of the great living religions in the world are flourishing in India, 16 major languages written in different alphabets and derived from different roots, while Indians express themselves in 250 dialects. Although English (the language of colonialism) is not included in the major languages listed in the Constitution, it remained the only language for the whole country. Furthermore, English is the only language in which South India is prepared to communicate with North India. British jurisprudence is the matrix of India’s non-personal laws.53, p. 3

 

India’s independence is based on a sound Constitution which is respected by all the role-players. Even in states of the Indian Republic where the Communist Party governs, human rights are fully respected because of the Bill of Rights being firmly ingrained in the Indian Constitution (the substance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations on December 10, 1948, is embodied as Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution). What drives this democracy, freedom, and unity in India, fighting of communal hatred, linguistic fanaticism, terrorism, professional hooliganism, caste, and clan fanaticism, corruption, and creed, is India’s national integration, and integrity. The eminent Indian writer, lawyer and academic, Nani Palkhivala53, defined this totality very well (the ANC leadership and anti-Afrikaner Blacks would do well with a daily dose) when writing53 p. 11:

 

The most crying need of India today is to undergo catharsis, a course of emotional cleansing. We must not allow the moral bedrock of our society to turn to lava.

 

National integration is born in the hearts of the citizens. When it dies there, no army, no government, no constitution, can save it. States of mind precede states. Inter-faith harmony and consciousness of the essential unity of all religions is the very heart of our national integration.

 

The soul of India aspires to integration and assimilation. Down the ages, Indian culture – a tremendous force of power and beauty – has been made richer and deeper as a result of absorbing what is best in outside influences and integrating those various influences to grace and enrich its own identity.

 

Regarding Palkhivala’s reference53, p. 11 to “absorbing what is best in outside influences and then integrating those influences” (which brings us back to the ANC leadership’s distaste and hatred of British colonialism and Afrikanerism and their rejection of good influences as bad simply because it does not fit their revolutionary dogma), he writes specific about the “accidental” impact of British colonialism of 200 years on India as follows53, p. 15:

 

There seems to be a mystical bond which holds us together in real understanding and goodwill. There is something special, in fact providential, in the relationship between Britain and India. The crucial test is this: if the last two hundred years in India’s history were to be relived, how many thinking Indians would prefer to have them without British rule? I venture to say no one, who is not ignorant, or partial, would wish the past to be redrawn effacing all traces of the raj.

 

There was much that was ugly and exploitative in those years. But, on the balance, the good far outweighed the evil. The British took enormous wealth out of India, but they left behind legacies which no money could buy.

 

Where the Indians accepted the British as part of their future life after Indian rule, incorporated the positive of British colonialism and imperialism into their daily lives and created a brotherhood with the British that still exists today, the ANC elite did just the opposite with Afrikaners. Five years into Black rule they started to oust Afrikaners from all terrains of South African life on the basis of their association with “imperial and colonial rule”. Afrikaans as a language came under siege, work limitations followed, political isolation became prominent, White murders intensified and White bashing became a daily rhetoric, while the capture of White capital  now seems to enter its final stage. It must, however, be said that, although India is a young nation (74 years), it is a country with an ancient history (5 000 years). New South Africa is not only a very young nation (23 years), but it lacks a comprehensive history: there are existing White and Afrikaner histories but a true Black history is missing. History and nationhood still come, but notwithstanding this, it is worrying that after 23 years of the existence of the new South Africa, the ANC – driven by greed and revenge – seems to be focussing on national disintegration, fighting its own past, and instigating Black-White conflict and hate, instead of following a course of action to bring about positive growth in nation-building.3,4,8,17,24,32,34,39,47,50,53,54 Palkhivala53 warns well of personal and political mischievousness that destroys nation-building.

 

Palkhivala’s remark that53, p.15: “…no one, who is not ignorant or partial…” points to the ANC’s political and personal immaturity as the reason for their failure, as ruling party, to think strategically and constructively about the country’s future. Or is their thinking so overrun by their negative emotional state after apartheid that it has neutralized all sound cognitive functioning? It took the Afrikaner nearly 400 years to develop from European, Black, Indian, and other indigenous people to the proto-Afrikaner and to the Afrikaner, with the latter still an identity in the process of becoming another. Possible are the present-day peoples of South Africa, including Afrikaners, in a great haste to become true South Africans. To obtain this status, it is necessary for them to live through the present political, social, economical, and personal upheavals for at least another 300 years before the ordinary South Africans can say, as the Indians after 5 000 years of growth: WE ARE A NATION. The ANC as a political party, its tailstock leaders and the hot-headed guild of anti-Afrikaners, are seemingly only a temporary nuisance in this long process of nation-building in which the Afrikaner has unfortunately become an innocent victim.8,14,53,55,56

 

Apartheid, driven by Afrikanerism from 1910, was – like British colonialism in India –ugly and exploitative until 1994. But, on the balance – as with colonialism in India and most African countries – the good of apartheid far outweighed the evil. Afrikaners enriched themselves at the cost of Blacks and degraded them, but they brought and left behind legacies for Black South Africa which no money could buy. As in India with British colonialism, apartheid and British colonialism was needed to bring South Africa and all its populations to its present stage of Black rule. Many Black South Africans reject the legacies of apartheid, although the positive evidence is all over the country and in Black present-day lifestyles.32,53 The arguments against the Europeans/colonists in South Africa, Africa, and worldwide – that they grew rich and powerful by robbing their colonies,– do not hold true because there was not much to take, writes D’Souza57, p. 60 in response to the often heard retort: “The Europeans stole the raw material to build their civilization, they stole rubber from Malaya, and cocoa from West Africa, and tea from India”. D’Souza points out that before British colonialism57, p. 60: “…there were no rubber trees in Malaya, nor cocoa trees in West Africa, nor tea in India. The British brought the rubber tree to Malaya from South America, they brought tea to India from China. And they taught the Africans to grow cocoa, a crop the native people had previously never heard of ”. There was a total lack of infrastructure and to make the countries effective, the British built roads, shipping docks, railway tracks, irrigation systems, government buildings, introduced education and healthcare, and introduced them to new words and new ideas unknown to their ancestral culture, like “liberty”, “sovereignty”, “rights”, etc., concepts that still affect their present-day thoughts and actions.57 “Despite the corrupt and self-serving motives of their practitioners, the institutions of colonialism and slavery proved to be the mechanism that brought millions of non-White people into the orbit of Western freedom”, D’Souza57, p. 60 continues. The doctrine of oppression ignores these facts and goes on to fuel anti-Western resentment around the world and in nations of the West. D’Souza concludes57, p.67: “I think we can now conclude that the doctrine is false, and the animus that is based on it is misplaced”. In fact, the ANC elite have adopted many of the actions condemned as evil habits of Afrikanerism and apartheid. Apartheid and Afrikanerism are, together with Afrikaners, a permanent part of Black history and South African history.32,53

 

Black insecurity about an own identity, masked behind their false bravado and arrogance of “self-made” and “independence” as well as their focused aggression towards Afrikaners, confirms the cemented impact of the positivity of apartheid and Afrikanerism in their psyche. This “inferiority complex” as the result of under-development in a complex and dynamic world easily gets a grip on people. (This also happened to the poorer proto-Afrikaners and later Afrikaners under British colonialism and was strongly reflected in their behaviour in the Union). Blacks reference to themselves as32, p.2: “verbeeldinglose primitiewe barbare”, supported by: “… kolonialiste ‘het ons sommige van die ergste leuens laat glo.’ Deur brute krag, deur ons hulpbronne te plunder en deur ons verstand en liggaam gevange te hou, (is) Afrikane van hul menslikheid en waardigheid ontneem”, are excellent examples of this illusion and underestimation, not only of themselves as full citizens, but also of the roles of Afrikaners in their lives during apartheid. Rationalization and projection are lifestyle-mechanisms often used for the wrong reasons, to relay attention from own much deeper personal-shortcomings, dysfunctions, and needs. Afrikaners are part of the South African nation-building process and have a valuable contribution to make.

 

If the ANC leadership and its members doubt the wise words of Palkhivala53on nation-building and the importance of every piece of history because it is related from an Indian context, they may turn to the writings of South African entrepreneur and White African, Mike Boon39 in The African Way: The power of interactive leadership. Maybe Boon’s simple guidelines on the South African peoples and their leaders will appeal to the palate of the ANC leadership (and change their present failure to succeed as leaders). Boon writes39, p. 15:

 

Africa is a place of many peoples, many tribes, and many beliefs. It is a place of terrible horror and great compassion; one of foolishness and great wisdom. But there is a vision of Africa, based on the nobility, and tragedy of the past. This is a land of strong cultures that survive and grow together with the ever-increasing education of proud people, secure in the knowledge that they are the future mentors of the world. The world is beginning to realize that happiness is a state of being and not something we work towards or buy. It is a vision of harmony, prosperity, and success; of productive, powerful work teams; of true democracy; of cooperation and interdependence; and of trust and pride in humanity and in each other.

 

We are different people with different cultures. We have our own ways, our own languages, customs, philosophies, and beliefs. We have our own history and our own heroes. More importantly, we have our African humanity and our noble cultures. Woe to the world if we all pursue a singular, grey, and boring sameness. Our differences and traditions make us interesting and proud.

 

The ANC regime of today, as the NP-AB (Afrikaner-Broederbond) alliance of the past, is misjudging the South African diversity of cultures and peoples and their stubborn will to survive under immense hardship. It seems that the ANC of today are destined to suffer the same humiliating failure the NP and ordinary nationalist Afrikaners suffered after 46 years of rule (1948 –1994); although it may be after the relatively short time of 25 years in government (1994 – 2019). Both failures were as a result of unwise, racist, authoritarian, and greedy leaderships. Not only did the leaders of both dispensations abuse their positions for their own gains, but they lacked insight into the needs of individual citizens on grassroots level.

 

3.3 The Afrikaner is an identity in becoming another▼

The opportunistic and authorial leaders of the nationalist Afrikaners doctrine into their mindset the belief of themselves as the anointed Afrikaner nation, sent to Africa by God to convert the Blacks and make them better people. A group granted “everlasting supremacy” over Blacks and the right to be “forever the rulers” of South Africa, as established by Verwoerd and his First Republic. Under the sly leadership of the NP and the AB, ordinary Afrikaners were somehow pacified into believing that the political rule of the Afrikaner in South Africa – with its immense military and political might – was infallible. When the unholy alliance between the NP and the AB suddenly collapsed in 1994, ordinary Afrikaners were still too naive to understand that they, with the approval of a newly combined leadership, were going to be gradually sacrificed within ten years: the proverbial lamb to the slaughter on the ANC’s altar of revenge from 2017 and onwards. From the beginning of 1994, ordinary Afrikaners were naive about what to expect in the new South Africa. They were unprepared for the immense political, social, economic, and personal changes awaiting them. They were totally confused about what their positions in the new dispensation were and the appropriate behaviour required in this new environment.8,14,29,41,55,56,58,59

 

It is not a surprise that this confusion and loss of identity suffered by the ordinary Afrikaner after 1994 culminated in total desolation, and in the words of Breytenbach55, p. 83:

Actually I’d ceased being an Afrikaner. My sense of that entity, and even the language, was but nostalgia encapsulated in an irrevocable lost past. Maybe I’d made up that past, coloring it in the glowing tones of innocence, contextualizing its dark and bleeding violence to make it seem part of the woof of being human”, and, ‘“I?” What “I?” The language, if I still used it, had become private and personal. Some words were left, moving like maggots through the dead meat of redundant arguments. But now I am no longer identified in any way. What am I saying? It is already dead. I was talking to dead people. I am talking of a passed away “self”.

 

Thankfully, the Afrikaner is not yet “ceased,” neither is he dead in the new South Africa, but the smell of death is present in his existence and he must know it. What is indeed true, is that the basic issue of an all-over political empowerment of a specific group in South Africa, namely who is going to rule South Africa from now on1, p.108: “‘them’ or ‘us?’” has been successfully phased out of the mindsets of most Afrikaners after 1994. The final acceptance is clear: the Blacks are ruling and that is absolute and final in 2017. What is also clear is that the new rulers are going to apply more and more pressure to impoverish, isolate, and – where possible – nullify the Afrikaner as citizen.

 

It does not matter today whether the55, p. 78: “…Afrikaner is only an identity in becoming another,” or if he is “rightfully still a legitimate member of an independent indigenous South African tribe been stripped of his previous ruler’s status”. The hard fact is that he still exists as a South African reality and the new rulers should mark that he is a human being with legitimate civil rights as a citizen. It is thus of utmost importance for Afrikaners to find solutions to secure their existence to avoid the danger of dissolution in the future. However, there is evidence that Afrikaners have already begun to think outside their doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism and are starting to try out solutions to adapt to their political dilemmas in the new South Africa.

 

▲Cross-references: see Part 5, subdivision 4.2.7 and Part 6, subdivision 4.1.6.

 

3.4 Afrikaner Sincerity and Willingness to Political Change

 

To change political and cultural mindsets to fit into the South African indigenous realities – the cake of customs as the historian J M Roberts14, p. 986describes it – formed sometimes by almost unrecognized assumptions and attitudes over long stretches of time – is no easy feat. But it can be done, as in 1994 when Afrikaners were forced to accept a Black regime and the ANC as ruling party. Although this change was initially seen as a conditional transfer by the outsider, it turned out to be unconditional, leading to today’s serious consequences for the continued existence of Afrikaners in this country. At the time, very few Afrikaners saw the “end … coming”, also because they were never warned of such a possibility by their leaders.

 

Afrikaner leaders showed their sincerity and willingness by releasing Nelson Mandela from jail, and repealing the various apartheid laws in 1991. In 1994, the South African government was technically handed over to an immature, inexperienced, and unprepared ANC regime driven by revolutionary ideas. It already seemed at the time that the same political willingness and sincerity was lacking on the Black side. The ANC and other Black political parties showed an inability to control some of their more radical followers from the beginning and signs of anti-White sentiment were clear from day one of Mandela’s era. These were some of the signs of the stormy path that lay ahead for post-1994 South Africa. It is this stormy path that Afrikaners are now travelling, exposed to the ANC’s deviant politics. Most of Afrikaners still harbour the spirit of sincerity and willingness to make South Africa a better place for themselves as well as the Blacks. All it requires is an equally sincere and willing ANC regime.14

 

  1. Discussion

 

4.1 Possible escape and survival routes for the Afrikaner to survive the next century as an individual, subgroup or tribe

 

Both Boon39 and Palkhivala53illustrated that rigid customs can be changed, although it could take time; also, that South Africa is not a country with “grey people”, but a rainbow nation of many cultures and peoples requiring wise and effective leaders to respect and steer them into the future as a true nation. If Afrikaners could willingly and freely resign their political rule and become subordinate to an ANC government after 46 years of political power, the ANC regime should also show at least the same sincerity towards nation-building. It was under the pretence of democracy for all South Africans, something they argued Afrikaners had failed to institute, that they came into power. If they had stayed true to their political promises and guarantees of 1994, it would have been unnecessary for Afrikaners to seek safeguards and rescue in the new South Africa.

 

Thus far, sadly, the ANC leadership has failed to make a significant positive contribution to better South Africa for its citizens, black or white. There were no reasons or grounds for the ANC to have allowed the hotheads and extremists in its leadership to change the accepted policy of 1994 – to handle Afrikaners with care – to the present-day strong-arm tactics, which seems to have gained momentum in the last two years. The only logical explanation is that the ANC is still locked in its revolution stage of the 1960s, driven by a “cake of customs” which is cemented in outdated and inappropriate assumptions, attitudes, traditions, and beliefs. It seems that they still do not understand, 23 years after demilitarization as freedom fighters, the differences between democratic or authoritarian governing, or how to promote the greater society without discriminating on the basis of race or creed, self-enrichment versus uplifting the poor, and the simple difference between naked hatred from the past versus present-day forgiveness for injustices done. With this the unfortunate status quo, Afrikaners in 2017 are left with no other choice than to prepare themselves for surviving the growing onslaught against them.

 

There are four main options available for the present-day Afrikaner to survive another century as individual, subgroup, or tribe. They are:

 

  • An armed struggle to obtain an independent or autonomous Afrikaner state inside the greater South African region;
  • Extensive migration to Europe and other white-dominated friendly countries;
  • Self-isolation and withdrawal as a tribe in a semi-dependent Afrikaner homeland in the new South Africa;
  • Full social integration and miscegenation with the rest of the South African population.

 

All of these alternatives have been tried and tested, with various outcomes, across the world and throughout history. Of particular interest here are events that occurred in the 1900s, up to the 1950s, in Central, Eastern, and Western Europe as well as in Asia and in the Middle East. These outcomes are well-documented and could guide the Afrikaner in terms of a decision. What must be taken into consideration is that every situation is unique: what could fail in one case could prove successful in another. The Afrikaner’s future lies in this context.14,63

 

4.1.1 An armed struggle to obtain an independent or autonomous Afrikaner state inside the greater South African region

 

The Afrikaner’s history is littered with efforts to obtain independent territories; there was the short-lived earlier Republics of Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet in the Cape Colony, the doomed Natal, Free State, and Transvaal Republics, the failed 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion, the Union of South Africa from 1902 until 1961 and the nationalist Afrikaner Republic of South Africa from 1961 to 1994; all of them came to an end. Those up to the early 1900s were military crushed. South Africa of 1961 to 1994 seems to be the last Afrikaner sovereignty in its history.59,64,65

 

The Afrikaner’s drive to create a mini empire of multinations (Union of South Africa with various provinces), followed by his mini empire of multination-states (South African Republic with various semi-independent Black homelands under a central White homeland), had all failed for various obvious reasons, like the Afrikaner political and financial incompetence after 1990, an underestimation of the ANC’s political and thinking power, and a Black majority as upcoming political role-players, etc.8,68

 

The 1994 political dispensation in South Africa was a reorientation, specifically in terms of redressing the imbalance between Whites and non-Whites that had existed for nearly 350 years, since the official establishment of White rule in the Cape of Good Hope. It is common for such reorientation to be accompanied by severe conflict and loss of lives, as evidenced in various multination states, like Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. Fortunately, South Africa was spared this bloodshed in 1994 due to a sudden and a full collapse of the NP government and their surrender of the leadership without military resistance (or as it is seen today by some as a well-planed bloodless coup d’ état orchestrated by insiders of the nationalist Afrikaners’ leadership). This collapse was swiftly followed by a successful capture of the government in five years by the ANC. The occupation of an initial mini empire of multinations in South Africa between 1910 and 1961, a political system once again changed to a mini empire with multiple states by the NP between 1961 and 1994, shifted into the hands of the ANC without a shot being fired by the Afrikaner tribe to attempt to reclaim leadership of South Africa.63,67

 

This annulment of Afrikaner-power afforded the ANC regime the opportunity to undo a number of decisions implemented by the “Afrikaner executive empire” by dissolving and collapsing the various independent “Bantu-homelands” back into the new South Africa. Through this return to a “mini-empire of multinations” for South Africa, the ANC obtained total military and security power, nipping any possible large-scale revolt by nationalist Afrikaners in the bud. This new ANC state also had a strong inclination to decolonize from day one, with the primary aim of preventing further Afrikaner political aspirations of independence or autonomy.8,15

 

The establishment of a totally independent homeland, like the Jews did in Palestine to create a New Israel, is out in South Africa. The price of this present-day Jewish state was extreme bloodshed, war, and embitterment in the minds of the Arabs. The daily existence and functioning of Israel today still requires massive military overruling and suppressing of the Arabs in the occupied areas, with outcomes of conflict so atrocious it is considered crimes against humanity, and even genocide. Running Israel is an expensive and complicated exercise, and its maintenance is possible only by the backing of Western powers (especially the USA) in money and arms; this is not viable in the Afrikaner context. And then there is the extraordinary Jewish unity and belief system that equally motivates Israelis and Jews; a nation-component that is sorely missing with Afrikaners after 1994.68-71

 

Also, there would be no place for the Afrikaner’s political aspirations (even less for revolt) in an Afrikaner homeland (a nation-state, or even just an ethnic society) inside the ANC and Black majority’s mini-empire of multi-nations of the new South Africa, is. Thus any notion of a future “Afrikaner autonomy” or even of “Afrikaner self-reliance” is wishful thinking and is as nonsensical as offering the modern-day Khoi-San an independent state in the new South Africa. This propaganda is only maintained by a small nationalist-Afrikaner portion of society with very little support from ordinary Afrikaners.63,72

 

Even if the Afrikaner had tried in 1994 to hang on to full political and military power, he would have failed the ruler test: his resources and security for maintaining power were overstretched and the NP was basically bankrupt in 1994: peaceful capitulation was unavoidable. The fact that its population had decreased over the years from more than 4 million to less than 3 million in 2016, emphasizes this dilemma of a declined empowerment. This “cruel” reality has at last been recognized by some of the hard-line nationalist Afrikaners in South Africa, who acknowledged that an own independent state was no longer viable, but that an Afrikaner (ethnic) society inside the new South Africa might still be possible. However, this option is also nothing but a pipe dream.73-79

 

In the end, multi-ethnic mini-empires of multi-nations, together with multi-empires of multi-states that overruled their citizens like the Union government, and later the NP government, had only a shadowy concept of what they were doing and what the outcome of their empowerment or planning would one day be. They mostly collapsed in a short amount of time. Their shelf-life is indeed limited, as confirmed by the various Empire states of the 20th century: the duration of the Bolsheviks’ Social Union lasted from 1922 to 1991 (69 years); Bismarck’s German Reich 1871 to 1918 (47 years); Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich 1938 to 1944 (12 years); Japan’s Colonial Empire 1905 to 1945 (40 years). The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 and is still functioning in 2017, but is only 58 years old. For these five states, the average is 45 years.14,63

 

It is thus not a surprise that the NP and its nationalist Afrikaner style mini-empire of multi-nations (or the unofficial managed “NP Union”) only lasted from 1948 to 1961 (13 years), and its mini-empire for multi-states (Republic) only from 1961 to 1994 (33 years), while the Union of South Africa (exclusively British-oriented) under strong British influence lasted from 1910 to 1948 (38 years). This reflects an average of 24 years for the three regimes.56,58,64

 

The ambition of Afrikaners up to 1994 (with a population of less than 3 million) to rule a majority of Blacks (approximately 40 million) displayed the same flawed thinking as that of 66 million Germans in the 1940s to rule over more than 300 million other Europeans in an area stretching from the Channel Islands to the Caucasus, or 70 million Japanese to rule over 400 million other Asians in Greater East Asia from Manchuria to Mandalay. This kind of rule is and was impossible to maintain indefinitely.63

 

In terms of a military takeover it should also be borne in mind that Afrikaners don’t have a capable defence force at their disposal. The well-oiled army of the 1990s made up of well-trained White soldiers was phased out. The training of new White soldiers had stopped in the 1990s and the 18-year-olds of 1994 are now middle-aged men of 40 years and over. Undoubtedly not the preferred combat troops to win a war!

 

Strive among different groups of Afrikaners since 1902 also makes the possibility of a unified front less. Afrikaners, old and young, are currently grappling with their individual futures to find and map such futures in their thoughts. The Afrikaner’s powerful hyper-Nationalism of 1994 had been replaced by an undefined hypo-Nationalism 20 years later; a nationalism that is still further dwindling.80-83

History also shows that support for hard-core terrorist-oriented Afrikaner and other politically obstructive groups like the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and the Boeremag (BM), is zero amongst present-day Afrikaners. These revolutionary influences faded out in the early 2000s. It also seems as if the Afrikaner has just lost interest in ruling South Africa after centuries of struggling to do so. The lessons Afrikaners have learned about the devastating effects of revolts and uprisings by minorities to themselves clearly stopped any notions of planning organized armed action against the ANC government.68-71They know very well that such action would give the government sound justification to annul them in a racial war without any hope of rescue from Europe or the USA. The treacherous Dingaan and his Hloma Amabutho are still not forgotten by many Afrikaners.59Also, the ANC partners in BRICS will not allow military intervention from the West if such outside assistance were available. The African Union’s support of the ANC in resisting any Afrikaner uprising or outside military support for them would also make any such initiative very unwise indeed.

 

■A well-organized armed struggle is out forever. Even their deep belief (and trust) in the prophet Siener van Rensburg’s vague predictions that the ANC and the Black rulers are going to collapse, putting Afrikaners back in power, is only a small memory of the past in the present-day Afrikaner’s bewildered mindset.84,85

 

Armed responses to secure his survival as a nation, is clearly the last option for the Afrikaner. Other, more constructive, and less risky options must thus be considered.

 

4.1.2 Extensive migration to Europe and other white-dominated friendly countries

 

Since 1994, migration has become a popular option for Afrikaners; apparently to retain their identity, language, freedom, and rights; as much as 1.2 million people have already left, with a further 1.5 thinking or planning to do so the next decade or two. The most popular destinations at present are Australia and New Zealand.73-79

 

Migration is a worldwide manifestation in times of political unrest, racial, and ethnic discrimination as well as economical hardship. Aspects that drove people to migration in the past have been limitated or lack of employment, high criminality, poor governance, and lack of national identity and threats/acts of genocide by the local population. Aggravating circumstances worldwide were that these types of pervasive grievances had grown on a daily basis and had gone unaddressed by the authorities in charge. There was also a constant rise in expectations of a better and a secure lifestyle and living conditions worldwide, especially promoted by the opportunities that globalization had brought since the 1900s.There is also no disloyalty in migration; that is how the ancestors of the Whites and the Blacks of South Africa arrived here. The fact that between 1850 and 1914 nearly 34 million, and between 1901, and 1910 nearly 12 million Europeans emigrated, confirms this as an acceptable and normal process of economical, personal, and social survival.63

 

Most of such worldwide migration was geographical, basically because of economic, social, and ethnic discrimination and not so much a social transplant into a same-nation setup. It happened for instance during the Irish famine, which the English authorities in London totally ignored in an effort to annul the “Irish Problem”. This led to a massive migration to the United States of America. Also, no less than 6 million Germans moved to South America in the 1900s, fleeing from negative political and economical circumstances at home.63

 

This kind of migration also happened in Britain between 1891 and 1900 when no fewer than 726 000 citizens emigrated from the UK, with a 72% of them moving to the foreign USA (geographical migration) in contrast to a mere 28% to other British regions (social/nation-migration).63

 

In the 1900s as many as 5 million Germans emigrated to the American mid-West; at the time, there were already 13 million Germans living beyond the Bismarck-Reich Eastern frontier, a further 9 million Germans in Austria, and another 4 million Germans in Eastern Europe in places like Hungary, Romania, and Russia. There were also substantial numbers of Germans in Poland, Galicia, Bukovina, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Transylvania, and in Russian territory, seeking better life-conditions.63

 

But, these German migrants did not always find a better life and secure German nationhood in Greater Europe. As their economic position improved and they became prosperous, ethnic hostility born from masked economical jealousy led to intense discrimination from nationals in their adopted countries, deportation, and even mass murder of migrant Germans during World War Two (WW2). This was one of Hitler’s reasons for not only occupying some of these countries for the German people, but to wipe out their indigenous populations to make living space.14,63

 

It was not only the Germans who migrated to other countries – fleeing political, economical, racial, or discriminative circumstances in their own homeland – that fell prey to new discrimination and murder in their adopted homelands; it also happened to Blacks in South Africa in the early 1800s and Jews, Greeks, Hungarians, and Turks in the 1900s.63

 

It was especially the Jews who fall prey: of the 10.6 million Jews living in Europe up to Russian territory in the 1930s, 6 million were murdered in their new adopted homelands before 1948. In South Africa, between one and two million people from the tribes that had moved here from Central Africa were murdered by other tribes, like the Zulus and the Matabele, also settlers from Central Africa, between 1810 and 1840.39,63

 

It is evident that migration to a new homeland is not always a guarantee of a better life; in the long term (even in 50 years and more after migration), the outcome can be the tragic opposite. However, for the impoverished and landless Jews moving to the New Israel and the Zulus and Matabele moving to South Africa from Central Africa, migration was worthwhile.39

 

Where could Afrikaners go as a group? This was the same question the Jews were asking themselves in the 1940s in Europe when the tide turned against them. Most of the European and Western countries already had quotas on Jews in place: from South Africa, the UK, all the way to the USA, where other discriminative legislation against them barred them from entering. There was a new Israeli homeland in Palestine, but only for those who could afford the travelling costs. The British authorities further limited the entrance of Jewish settlers so as not to offend the Palestinians.56,63,64

 

For the Afrikaner, as the last White colonist in Africa to be pushed out, it seems that not only political but also economic asylum is urgently needed if the negative politics of the ANC continues.

 

Europe seems a viable choice for the Afrikaner, but for the average Afrikaner the language barriers of Germany, France, etc, could pose severe obstacles. Also, the costs of migrating to and living in Europe are just too steep for the average Afrikaner (initially, poverty also stunted the migration of Jews to Israel). The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, and the UK seem to be the only applicable destinations for a large-scale transplant, but these countries are clearly not financially or politically geared for such a large influx of Afrikaners.67,86,87

 

The present chaos in Europe, created by the massive inflow of Islamic migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, would act as additional deterrent against mass migration of Afrikaners to Europe. Firstly, these countries are already bursting at the seams with the additional demand on existing employment and living space; secondly, the racial and ethnic differences between Europeans and Muslim migrants have already given rise to conflict. This situation leaves very little space for a large influx of Afrikaners to any country in Greater Europe. In light of deteriorating global political scenarios in Greater Europe, the Middle East, and Russia and its surrounding countries, migration northwards could cause more trauma then relief.86,87

 

Although it is a very attractive new homeland, the United States of America (USA) has not been immune to financial, racial, and political upheavals, which renders it far from ideal for a massive migration. Poverty in South Africa is colour-blind, which means that the number of Whites affected by this scourge is also increasing, which automatically bars them from emigrating anywhere, including the US.88-91

 

To put the Afrikaners’ future  for instance in the USA (and in all European countries) in perspective, it must be remembered that pre- as well as post-1994 South Africa was and is still a small power (and its people also) in the international society. The most obvious fact about small powers is that their interests and lots are governed by the policy of the great powers. In the pre-1994 South African governing it was mostly by Europe, Britain and the USA, while in post-1994 the chief-masters are China and Russia. Inside this belittled setup the Afrikaners were in the past and are at present never regard as important by international powers. This includes migration, especially on a large scale.91 In 1965 (more than 50 years ago) Spence writes about the doomed view of the USA of the Afrikaners91, p. 24: “…in the American view ‘the cultural and spiritual interests of a paltry 21/2million whites…or even their vital interests and survival…count for very little. In the pattern of post-war world politics, the truth [is that] the survival and the rights of the small Afrikaner people have no place’”. Today, with still only a population of nearly 2.5 million, but financially and politically in a far more diminished position as in 1965, large scale migration opportunities for the Afrikaners to the USA and a warm welcome there, seems zero. The present US racial developments around the “Federal Statues Must Fall” and so called “New Black-liberation” give a further good indication that the “White”-Afrikaners, still saddled with apartheid, are not welcome. (This zero stand on future mass migration of Afrikaners to Europe seems the same, as the present refugees from “small” countries, like Syria, Iraqi and Libya, to Europe and the USA, confirm it well).

 

The Afrikaner should also remember that a new country poses challenges in terms of lifestyles, customs, habits, and traditions: there will be no Afrikaans at work, and if it is not deliberately spoken at home, the language of the adopted country will become the new home language. Afrikaners who migrated to Argentina and the USA after the Anglo-Boer War were fully assimilated and intermixed with the locals within two generations. They surrendered their Afrikaner identity and today their descendants are Argentineans and Americans, not Afrikaners.59

 

South Africans seem to prefer Australia and New Zealand as peaceful and secure countries to expatriate to. But are these countries really the best calls? It is important to note the Chinese factor of growing imperialism and world domination, especially with their focus on Australia and New Zealand.

 

4.1.2.1 Australia, New Zealand and the Chinese Dragon

 

The ambition of some countries to achieve global empire status is still relevant today as it was before WW2. China’s development as a world power with should not be ignored, especially not with the period after 2030 in mind; China is not only looking to expand its economy, but the living space of its population. The Western World’s present concern over China’s gradual dominance of world trade is missing the point; Chinese citizens are the main export product. By gradually populating politically and economically unstable and vulnerable countries with Chinese people, China is winning the war without firing a single shot. Australia and New Zealand are centrally situated, economically valuable, relatively isolated from Europe and the USA, incapable of defending themselves against a world power like China. From the Chinese perspective, these countries are obvious targets for takeover in the next 20 to 40 years. (Chinas’ annually population growth is equal to the total population of Australia. It’s thus understandable that Australia’s and New Zealand’s inherent potentials in space and richness make them very attractive future destinies of expansion for the over-populated China).63

 

It would be myopic for the Afrikaner to downplay these possibilities in considering a permanent relocation to Australia and New Zealand. In Japan’s Global Policy of the 1940s, aspirations to occupy Australia and New Zealand were clearly articulated. The main aim was to establish a Japanese Empire up to Japanese Asia, with the Yamato Race as nucleus, consisting of 2 million permanent Japanese settlers in Australia and New Zealand.63

 

Regarding China’s possible military entrance to Australia and New Zealand as enclaves for Chinese settlers, the numbers can be phenomenal calculated in terms of the Japanese planning of 1940. Of a total Japanese population of 70 million (in 1940), 2 million Japanese settlers equate to 46 million Chinese settlers in terms of the modern-day Chinese population of 1 600 million. With China’s notorious human rights record, this spells trauma for the democracies of Australia and New Zealand. Who could forget Deng Xiaoping of China or Pol Pot of Cambodia and their murderous gangs who killed thousands upon thousands of other Chinese? Also the cold-blooded annexation of Tibet by China and the diminishing of the indigenous Tibetans in the 1960s is a clear warning for Australia and New Zealand in waiting. Surely these are fates could very well be awaiting Afrikaner migrants in Australia and New Zealand. 63,86,92

 

Above possible negative future outcomes internationally for Afrikaner migrants are well-reflected on by Friedman86, p. 79 when he writes: “The First World War was essentially European [with more than 16 million deaths]. The Second World War was truly global, with the Pacific as well as the Atlantic basin involved. But most important, the war was more intense. No one can be certain of exactly how many died in Europe in World War II, but a reasonable number is 51 million soldiers and civilians, from genocide, bombing, and the normal cost of war. In 1939, Europeans numbered about 550 million, including neutral countries. A staggering 10 percent of all Europeans perished during the six years from 1939 to 1945”. But Friedman86shows the global war-death-outcome for the period 1914 to 1945 was much more devastating, leaving approximately 71 million Europeans dead in general warfare and when  adding the 20 million killed under Stalin, the number rises to 91 million. “Add in the Russian and Spanish civil wars, and sundry other conflicts hardly worth mentioning, such as Turkey’s war with Greece and Armenia, and the number of 100 million is conservative”, states Friedman86, p. 81further. Theoretically did approximately 3 million people died globally per annum in war-related outcomes for the period 1914 to 1945; this is 300 000 more than the total present-day Afrikaner-population. The warfare of the period 1946 up too today, with the seemingly fast incoming Third Wold War III, are going to take not less than 500 million lives and can devastating permanently much more life space, freedom and richness than ever.86, p. 81

 

■Migration seems a very attractive solution for wealthy Afrikaners and the younger generation of Afrikaners away from of their seemingly present financial-, political, racial- and ethnic-problems in South Africa, but there are many unpredictable, unexpected and negative outcomes that can await them in any promising new homeland.  Migration as a choice needs thus a well-thought-through.

 

4.1.3 Self-isolation and withdrawal as a tribe in a semi-dependent Afrikaner homeland in the new South Africa▼

 

The Afrikaner is used to self-isolation, starting in the early days of the European settlers at the Cape of Good Hope, far away from their motherland without family, friends, or the comforts of Europe. This isolated state was exacerbated by negative political and personal treatment by the authorities at the Cape, forcing them to live in the undeveloped and the isolated country-side.58,59,64,93

 

Their later involvement in the Great Trek, founding themselves in the thinly populated Free State and Transvaal further cemented the lifestyle of self-isolation. It was only after the founding of the Union of South Africa and the impoverishment of the Transvaal and Free State burghers (Afrikaners), that they were forced to earn a living away from the farm and amongst other people. The Afrikaner slowly moved into urban areas and became exposed again to the foreign world of his European ancestors. But isolation still exists: the events leading up to and the dawn of apartheid led to many countries, including the Europeans, distancing themselves even today from the South African  great-grandchildren of the original European settlers.56,59,64,93,94

 

The Afrikaner’s longing for an own, exclusive homeland was a constant companion for centuries. The NP government under the FW de Klerk did not see this as practical solution; factors like economic interdependence between the different races, the lack of a suitable region to allocate legally to Afrikaners, and an absence of national unity among Afrikaners were some of the arguments against such a move. Most of these arguments were true. Afrikaners relinquished the notion, also because in 1994 the ANC had made it clear that it objected to any Afrikaner homelands. This set in motion moves to nullify any separate Afrikaner identity, action, or organization even vaguely reminiscent of apartheid or Afrikanerism, including schools, universities, businesses, political organizations, etc.72,95-112

 

There was strong call by Afrikaner nationalists of the 1930s for an independent republic with clear borders and unique Afrikaner character in South Africa, but as a result of infighting between themselves and their short-term political opportunism in terms of obtaining power at the time, the whole effort faded away until 1960. By that time it was too late for such an Afrikaner homeland, especially in view of the economic interdependence of all South Africans and their scattering to all corners of the country.56,58,64

 

This immense failure by nationalist Afrikaner leaders to establish a nationalist Afrikaner republic on their homeland model was because they lacked understanding and acceptance of global changes in thought regarding African and Black Nationalism and Uhuru, as well as the development and protection of human rights by populations and individuals in general. Also, there were insufficient numbers of Afrikaners on the African continent and their geographic isolation from Europe and the USA to support their rights as a White group, disempowered them as a role-player. Afrikaners also underestimated the strength of the ANC in 1994 and put too much faith in a future conciliation between Afrikaners and the ANC. It not only left Afrikaners ill-prepared for the consequences of 1994, but cost them political credibility and respect. This result of poor planning and strategic thinking left them paralyzed, as was the case with the two conquered Boer republics after the Second Anglo-Boer War.67,94

 

Efforts today by Afrikaner leaders to locate Afrikaners within a greater African context by arguing that Afrikaners are also “Africans” and “South Africans”, but with a unique Afrikaner identity, is considered foolish by the Black majority. It is seen as a disregard for the indigenous realities of South Africa. The ANC considers any attempts of Afrikaners to isolate themselves as a parallel government, to polarize the races and call into being a “Boer volkstaat”, as hostile and outside the indigenous unity of a nation18,30,72,113,114

 

The failure of Orania is a good illustration of why an Afrikaner homeland is not a viable solution. This enclave could not attract the massive amount of Afrikaners as expected, neither does it have the infrastructure to make it a viable or sustainable state for 100 000 Afrikaners, let alone 3 million! The same can be said of the other dubious enclaves that had sprung up over time.73,101,107,110,112,115-117

 

A similar kind of separate state in the 1920s for Russian-Jews, the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan in Siberia, failed for a number of reasons, mostly the same associated with the failure of Orania as a true homeland. It serves as a good example as warning of the failure in waiting of an Afrikaner homeland. It must be noted.

 

4.1.3.1 The failed Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan in Siberia

 

The pogroms, the chaos of the Civil War in Russia and the breakup of the Pale, made Russian Jews a thorn in the side of Russia. In the 1920s it became so chronic that a quick solution was needed. For the Russian authorities in Moscow it offered the opportunity to force communism on its Jewish subordinates through its model of nominal autonomy and to deal a blow to Zionism in Russia. On the other hand the Russian authorities believed that a Jewish homeland would attract Jewish capital from the West and at the same time relegate jobless and unskilled Jews of European Russia as farmers in a conventional Soviet cast.118

Both the Ukraine and the Crimea were mooted as Jewish homelands, but the initiatives were dropped as result of resistance by the local people. As a solution, the area of Birobidzhan in the Siberia wilderness along the borders of China was allocated as a Jewish homeland in 1928. It was a derelict land of mosquito-plagued marshes, wild forests, and mud tracks. Government support for establishing the Jewish enclave was minimal; often nothing was prepared for them and implements, livestock, and houses were absent. The area was run on Leninist principles from start and not religious ones, and the first settlers held their prayer meetings in secret. The promises of a rich and waiting land drew only a trickle of Jewish settlers. Religious and integrated Jews distrusted it and it was seen as just another ghetto. From 1928 to 1938 only 43 000 Jews, including outsiders from America, Europe, Argentina, and even Palestine, immigrated. Many of the immigrants were urban artisans with no experience of planting crops or draining soil. More than half of the initial immigrants returned home or moved back into their old occupations in Siberian cities. Notwithstanding all the obstacles in the beginning, the rest of Jews went on to establish the city of Birobidzhan and in 1934 their province became the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan. The income of the area moved from agriculture to industry. Textile factories sprung up, furniture cartels, Jewish newspapers, and schools followed. At this stage the Jewish population had already declined drastically and the Russians were the majority, with the Jews making up only 23%. In the 1936 Stalin purges, which affected the whole Soviet Union, the leaders of Birobidzhan and its committees were also liquidated. Despite the negative events of 1936, the post-war years brought a revival with the arrival of another 10 000 Jews from the Ukraine. This positive turn was dashed by the persecutions in 1948, and the majority of the Jews left the region for good. One by one the Jewish leaders disappeared, accused of obscure conspiracies. All Jewish institutes, schools, theatres and newspapers were closed down.118

 

The only Jews coming in after 1948 were convicted exiles and only Stalin’s death prevented the region from becoming a zone of mass deportation and even mass murder. A tentative synagogue was burned down in 1956 and the region was left without a rabbi permanently. Migration out of the area escalated from there onwards, especially to the USA. In 1990 less than 10 000 Jews were still living in Birobidzhan (representing 6% of the total inhabitants) and Yiddish had disappeared from the streets. Very few true Jews remain today apart from the few who became Russians, while the last poor Jews are being assisted by Israel to move there. Today the businesses are monopolized by the Chinese and Jewish faces are missing from the streets. Even the older street facades show no trace of the early Jewish immigrants. All that remains of the Jewish state of Birobidzhan is a bizarre dream.118

 

The above reflects well what is taking place in the new, integrated South Africa with the Afrikaner population: the loss of their schools, universities, street and city names, jobs, etc. and their out-numbering in traditional (although not by law) Afrikaner areas. Further can RET and RST change dramatically in future the Afrikaners’ position in South Africa for the worst. But these are all realities that are comprehensive in their destroying which the Afrikaner homeland-dreamers must take serious note of –the discrimination and crushing of the Jews took place outside in motherland Russia as well as inside their Russian homeland Birobidzhan. There was no difference at the end, making Birobidzhan as a bizarre dream. It reflects well that to survive as a separate state, even as a subordinate homeland is difficult, even impossible. An Afrikaner homeland in greater South Africa means just another failed Birobidzhan.

 

4.1.3.2 Its time for republic-minded Afrikaners to face the failures of Orania, Kleinfontein and Birobidzhan as true homelands

 

One of the main requirements for the establishment and upkeep of a new state is the availability of motivated young people to develop and to promote it. The young Afrikaners are currently grappling with their own identity in a multi-racial and cultural milieu. At the moment Afrikaners can perhaps only rely on middle age and older people to steer its agendas and interests.83,119 There is today much more cooperation between the urban White youth and urban Black youth than between the urban White youth and the rural White youth. This outcome not only undermines the Afrikaner brotherhood doctrine and volk’s ideology, but also nullifies strong youth support for the exclusive White homeland dream. Today many Afrikaners, in their disorientation and desperation, knowing the Afrikaner homeland idea is something of the past, are instead trying to absorb the “Afrikaanses” (Coloured or Brown Afrikaners and other Afrikaans speakers, including Blacks) as members into their group as part of greater South Africa’s variety of many groups. This kind of overall disintegration of Afrikaners as a tribe and their open acknowledge of this fact, is on the increase.119,120

 

Viewing the aims and intentions of Afrikaner enclaves like Orania and Kleinfontein as the same as that of modern-day Israel is foolished, short-sighted and irresponsible. They are totally different and opposing entities. Israel is supported by world powers like the USA and financially by many rich Jews from all over the world. Also the European/White support element is prominent. There is consensus among the Israelis about their future and being a Jew. The villagers of Orania and Kleinfontein are not like that.

Very few Jews believed initially that they would be better off by establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. In the 1930s about 82 000 Polish Jews immigrated to Palestine. The majority of Jews in Poland and other European countries were initially more interested in what could be achieved in their motherlands. It was only after Hitler, Stalin, the Polish and other European peoples started to murder Jews and the genocide of as many as 6 million Jews followed, mostly Ashkenazim Jews, that the Jews were forced to change their minds in favour of emigration to an independent Israel. However, in the case of the Jews, there was a secure territory awaiting them. 115,116,121-124

 

However, Afrikaners do not have an identified piece of land that they can emigrate to, neither are they welcome to establish such a state inside the new South African territory and under the ANC authority. There is no global support for such an endeavour either. Orania and Kleinfontein are far from secure. In addition to the above, an Afrikaner state would be too small to be a trade partner of Europe and the USA. China and many African countries will be reluctant to trade with the Afrikaners as their sympathies lie with the Blacks and the ANC. As such a state would not form part of South Africa as a financial hub they will struggle to generate income. The infrastructure of South Africa is crucial. Ultimately, such a state would be forced to join South Africa again under Black rule.

 

The overall position of the Afrikaner is also significantly different from the genocide of the Jews in the 1940s and their need to escape from Europe to a homeland. There is no genocide of Afrikaners. The financial and living circumstances of Afrikaners in the new South Africa are still favourable and far better than in the 1830s in the Cape Colony or in the Union after the 1930s, even in the 1960s under Afrikaner rule. Yes, there are immense political problems for Afrikaners as a tribe, but South Africa has not yet declined beyond redemption and can only be described as a partially failed state, although there is some red lights.121-123

 

■H F Verwoerd’s political power play in 1960 to establish again an “Afrikaner/Boer” republic after the two failures of the 1900s and his obtaining then of a strong mandate for this impossible NP dream from the Afrikaner electorate on the “Black-danger” issue, when he said 91, p. 34: “Your choice is more sharply defined than at any previous election, namely between a White republic, with non-white neighbours, and a multi-racial fatherland with, first a multi-racial and, later, a Black government”, is today only a vague memory in the minds of the elderly nationalist Afrikaners. Afrikaner power plays and -visions on future “Boers states” can still be reflected in talks, but the physical establishment again of a “White republic” is only a dream in the illogical mindset of some Afrikaners. This is a South African indigenous reality that all Afrikaners must make peace with.

 

Cross-references: see Part 6, subdivision 4.1.5, as well as subdivision 4.1.1 of this Part.

 

4.1.4 Full social assimilation and racial miscegenation with the other races of South Africa

 

Assimilation and miscegenation between different races and ethnic groups is a global phenomenon. The Afrikaner’s own mixed heredity from early horizontal miscegenation between other races and the White matrilineal family stock, confirms this.

 

Intensive and large-scale assimilation and miscegenation between Afrikaners and Blacks and other races to root out ethnic and racial discrimination in South Africa, is one practical approach to the problem. The questions are:

 

  • Has such assimilation and miscegenation really worked elsewhere in the world? and
  • Can the Afrikaners change their resistance to large-scale assimilation and miscegenation with Black South Africans?

 

The first question is answered by analysing the outcomes on assimilation and miscegenation between different races and ethnic groups in Greater Europe for the period 1900 to 1950 as a guideline for the Afrikaner. Strong focus is on the experiences and treatment of the Jews who were assimilated and married non-Jews in adopted countries.

 

4.1.4.1 Examples of assimilation and miscegenation worldwide▼

 

The Jews, driven from their homeland in Palestine as early as 300 AC, spread over the Greater Europe to countries like Germany, Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Prussia, Russia, Romania, Poland, Estonia, Czechoslovakia and Austria. In 1901, 70% (7.42million) of the world’s total Jewish population of 10.6 million were Ashkenazim in Eastern and Central Europe. Of this 7.42 million Jews, as much as 30% (2.23 million) were living in Russian territory.14,63

 

The process of assimilation of the Jews with the Germans and other nationals was well advanced by the start of the 1900s, leading to the establishment of mixed communities and settlements. In Germany, the various legal obstacles to marriages between Jews and non-Jews were removed in 1875, aligning them with the legislation of Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the USA. It was still illegal in Russia. This assimilation led to miscegenation with the local peoples. In 1876 5% of the Prussian Jews were already married to non-Jews. These marriages rose to 8.5% in the 1890s. In Germany the 7.8% of mixed marriages in 1870s rose to 20.4% in 1914.14,63

 

Racial integration, assimilation and miscegenation of Jews with the citizens of their adopted homelands were thus quite well advanced in Central and Eastern Europe by the 1920s. The rates of intermarriage across ethnic barriers for Jews rose to new heights from 1920. In the late 1920s, nearly one in every three marriages involving a German Jew was to a Gentile, while the rate rose as high as two out of three in some German cities. This trend was more or less similar in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia.63,86

 

This assimilation was so normal in the Jewish community that the Jews did not hesitate to be active in the political landscape of their adopted homelands, especially in the revolutionary politics of the 1900s. Jews like Trotsky and others were part of the various left-wing parties and revolutionary organizations that spearheaded the 1905 revolution in Russia. Their numbers accounted for 11% of the Bolshevik delegates and 23% of the Menshevik delegates at the fifth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party in 1907. Together with other parties attending the Congress, as much as 29% of the delegates were Jews.63

 

This assimilation and miscegenation are also evident from by the acceptance of the Jews into the financial systems of their adopted homelands and the extraordinary economical contribution of the Jewish population to the economies of their homelands. By the 1900s some Jews living under Russian and other rulers had already had great financial success: in 1897 Jews accounted for 73% of all merchants and manufacturers in Poland. In Kiev specifically they accounted for 44% of the city’s merchants and handled more than 66% of the city’s commerce while making up only 13% of the city’s population.63

 

Despite this positive state of affairs, it was precisely in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia, all regions with established mixed settlements, some of the worst ethnic violence and mass murders of Jews (and of other foreigners who had intermixed with the locals) occurred during WW2 in the 1940s.63,86,118

 

In Auschwitz the Nazis killed 1.8 million Jews and the further 4.4 million were murdered at places like Majdanek, Belzec, Chelmno, Sobibor and Treblinka. Assimilation and miscegenation did not save mixed villages and settlements from genocide, sometimes death came by the hands of their own half-brothers and -sisters.14,63,118

 

The German occupation of Poland resulted in the seizing of Jewish property, the closure of their schools, expulsion of Jewish professionals like medical doctors and professors, the closing of Jewish organizations, followed by a well-managed genocide. The result was that of the more than 9 million Jews living in Greater Europe in 1938, only 3 million still remained by the end of 1948.63,86

 

This genocide by the Germans was not limited to the Jews, but was applied to the citizens of Poland during the German occupation – a country where the Germans and the Polish intermixed freely for many years. As many as 6 million people died in Poland under Hitler’s occupation. Here, it was especially the Polish intelligentsia and leadership, like priests, lawyers, businessmen, teachers, doctors, mostly people with strong intermixed relations with the locals who were murdered.14,63

 

In Czechoslovakia, where there was assimilation and miscegenation between Jews, Germans and the Polish in the 1920s, the state capture of Jewish and German property with wide-spread economical reform and land reform by the government (better known as the “selective expropriation and redistribution of German and Jewish property”), as well as the nationalization of their industries and the closing of their schools, followed.63

 

The same processes of racial and ethnic discrimination followed against Ukrainians in Poland, Hungary and Romania, also well-established regions of mixed settlements. Romanian authorities drove German-speaking teachers and lecturers at universities out of the country. Even in Italy did discrimination, especially against German and Jewish organizations, follow.63

 

The Turkish treatment of Armenians also proves that genocide can occur in well-functioning mixed settlements with high rates of intermarriage between races and ethnic groups and mixed descendants. It is often regarded as the first modern genocide, dated 1915-1918, as it led to the extermination of 1.8 million Armenians. (The methods of the Turks were later used in the mass executions of the Jews in the 1930s to 1940s by the Nazis at Auschwitz and other murder camps).14,63,86,125

 

The persecution of Greeks in Turkey in 1923, also in well-functioning mixed settlements with intermarriages between ethnic groups and mixed descendants,  also led to mass murdering and more than 1.2 million Greeks being forced from their ancestral homes.14,63,125

 

The staggering scale of murder of other races, ethnic groups and even dissident Russians by Stalin in his Siberian murder camps – all people who lived in harmony with strong assimilation and miscegenation over long periods – become evident when considering that there were at least 25 million Soviet deaths during WW2. Of these 25 million, only 7.8 million were military deaths, the other 13.7 million deaths were victims of the German occupation. About 7.4 million were executed. The rest was Stalin’s work.14,63,118

 

Although the Germans played the dominant role in the genocide of the Jews, the atrocities during WW2 were not limited to Germany alone, but genocide was committed in many other European countries. It was a general phenomenon, mainly committed by the “superior, developed, intellectually and cultured Caucasian.” Genocide was not led by “a few local ruffians” in these European countries. It was executed on Jews by their neighbours of good standing and personal friends; all people with whom the Jews had lived together within stable mixed settlements. They were often people with the same mixed blood as the Jews.14,63,118

 

As much as roughly half of the male population in certain towns in Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Italy, Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, and France were involved in murdering people based on ethnicity.63,118

 

The above clearly shows that assimilation, even intermixed marriages, is not enough to safeguard a specific racial or an ethnic group’s future in a mixed settlement or in an assumed stable, cultural and educated new homeland against crimes of humanity and genocide. Afrikaner numbers are significantly less that the Jewish numbers before the start up of the genocide, making them much more identifiable and targetable.

 

Genocide is also not always committed by the uneducated and pre-modern human, but also by well-educated people. The Germans’ behaviour towards the Jews (and others) confirms this. Up to 1933 Germany had by far the best universities in the world, more than a quarter of all Nobel prizes awarded in sciences between 1901 and 1940 were awarded to Germans, compared to only 11% to the USA. It had one of most advanced educational system in the world and a political system that brought to power Adolf Hitler primarily by democratic means. Still, they failed the test of humanity.63,86

 

▲Cross-references: see subdivision 4.1.2 of this Part.

 

4.1.4.2 Afrikaners acceptance and willingness to assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks

 

Regarding the second question on the Afrikaner’s resistance to assimilation, it important to mention that assimilation between Whites and Blacks occurred by the 1830s, if not earlier. Some miscegenation surely took place at the Cape between settlers and Black slave women from Madagascar. Assimilation and miscegenation with the Malayans and Coloured People already started in 1652.8,30,41,57,58,59,64,87

Many Afrikaners still think of the differences between the different races as enormous, even though 90% of the country’s population share Christianity. Differences centre on class, customs, habits, traditions. These differences between Afrikaners and Blacks slowly start to diminish. The post-1994 political dispensation very successfully helped to erase it.4,126-129

 

A true hegemony of a United Rainbow Nation for the RSA, how tactfully we are ignoring and side-stepping a discussion of this daring issue is absent. Intensive racial assimilation or miscegenation by the Afrikaner with non-Whites, notwithstanding the Afrikaner’s own “contaminated blood-line” by his non-White parent stock, was just not reachable before 1994 and will not, it seems,  depending on certain positive political outcomes, be obtained easily for many decades to come. Especially the present-day older Afrikaners are not acceptable for it; their indoctrination by the NP, AB and DRC was just too long and too successful to make their mindsets changeable and acceptable. The South African History, starting in 1652, confirms this rigidity.42,86,127-129

 

On the other side is racial discrimination against the Whites by Blacks also prominent in the RSA and is been up-kept and is strength by certain prominent Blacks. Indeed, it is restarted every time before an election or when the ANC-regime fails the test of a responsible and trustworthy government. The end-result is the blocking of better relations between Afrikaners and Blacks.42,86,127-129

 

The present-day financial insecurity which the Afrikaners are experiencing in new South Africa is seen many times exclusively as a direct result of Black aggression and their alleged dislike and hatred for Afrikaners. It is argued that it activates counter-revenge from Afrikaners, resulting in the obstructing since 1994 of their assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks. This is not always a correct observation.  Afrikaners experienced similar, if not more extreme, financial insecurity after the Second Anglo Boer War and during their Anglisation immediatedly after 1910 in the Union. Poverty characterised the Afrikaners existence for a long time in the Union. The Poor White Problem in South Africa: Report by the Carnegie Commission in 1929/30 shows roughly 300 000 (16%) Afrikaners out of a total White South African population of 1.8 million were classified as “very poor”.130These outcomes were totally unrelated to Blacks actions (Indeed, the Black population suffered at that time three to for times more under “very poverty”). Blacks are surely not the primary reason for the financial insecurity of Afrikaner before or after 1994 and thus far not contributed to the Afrikaners reluctance to assimilate and misgenenate with Blacks. This reluctance seems to be must deeper seated in the psyche of the Afrikaners.130

 

The present-day political, social and personal insecurities which the Afrikaners are experiencing in new South Africa is also attributed many times to be the outcome of Black dislike and hatred for Afrikaners which are steered as planned hostile actions against Afrikaners. This alleged behaviour by Blacks, as with the Afrikaners financial insecurity, is argued to activate counter hostility in the mindsets of Afrikaners, leading to  their withdrawing from direct informal Black contact and cooperation. The end-result is argued, is the absence of assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks.  Again, this is not always the full truth. In the past, as with the Afrikaners’ financial suffering, there were many non-Black determinants also as primary role-players contributing to the political, social and personal insecurities of Afrikaners, coming over many years up to 1994, like the internalised disposition of racial discrimination and White supremacy in the mindsets of Afrikaners. On the other side it must be acknowledged that Black hatred and dislike for Afrikaners can play a role in some cases. Hostilities are undoubtedly driven and executed sometimes by ANC political delinquents. But this seemingly racial overture not seated in a general dislike or hatred for Afrikaners: it is a direct outcome of the ANC’s present-day internal power struggles and its slow dismantling as a liberation movement cum political party. This phenomenon of conflict is not new for Afrikaners and is indeed part of their own history. The Afrikaners’ internal politics in the 1930s and 1940s, especially when H F Verwoerd arrived on the scene and contaminated even the internal relations of pro-Nazi Afrikaners, reflected the same extreme instable characteristics inside the leadership of the Afrikaners for as a  certain time before calming down. This 1940s internal hostile energy as reflected by Afrikaners, spilled over not only to the Afrikaners in general, but also unasked to the other ethnic groups (Jews) as well as the Blacks, doing serious harm to racial relations. The Second World War strengthened the nationalist Afrikaners internal conflicts (precisely as conflict and hostility are now manifested inside the ANC by its instability as movement for all Blacks). As with the internal conflicts  now inside the ANC, the Afrikaners  hostile conflicts were not driven by political ideological differences but purely by Afrikaner leaders’ personal ambitions, corruptions and strive for self-empowerment,  turning on each other. This was especially extra-activated in the 1940s by the founding of extreme pro-Nazi Afrikaner groups like the Grey Shirts, the New Order, the Ossewabrandwag (OB) and the Stormjaers (A phenomenon in line with the actions of many in-house groups fighting, even murdering each other, in the present-day ANC). Verwoerd’s conflict with the pro-Nazi groups (notwithstanding his juridical declared status by Judge P A Mullin of the Supreme Court in 1941 as a propagandist for Nazism and thus partner to the same pro-Nazi thinking as the radical Stormjaers and other pro-Nazis groups) even led to two attempts to kidnap him (with the possibility to kill him) in 1941 and 1944 by his radical comrades.130 As said, these in-house Afrikaner conflicts in the 1940s generated hostile energy, comprehensive enough, to negatively effected at that time on a broad base racial relations. The ANC’s present hostile energy towards them is not a new experience for many of the older nationalist Afrikaners, it is much less serious than the Afrikaner press tries to portray it and is temporary..

 

The ANC, after 23 years of reign, shows serious signs of collapsing. This collapse and insecurity are not only presently prominent reflected in their extreme internal political behaviour by in fights around leadership and members, but is to a great extent also responsible for the temporary over spilling of this extraordinary hostile energy to the Afrikaners, making their social assimilation and racial miscegenation with Blacks undoubtedly very difficult. However, after the 2019 General Election, the selecting of new ANC leaders in harmony with each other and possible constructive new Black political directions on government, the situation can normalised, neutralising this hostile energy, as had happened with the Afrikaners in 1940s. To assume thus that the present-day political, social and personal insecurity which the Afrikaners are experiencing in new South Africa is a new experience for them or is a direct Black dislike and hate for Afrikaners and is of a permanent kind, is not always correct. This insecurity is much related to the nationalists Afrikaners loss of their bullying rights of Blacks before 1994.The Black public has very much goodwill towards Afrikaners and most of the hostility against Afrikaners is activated by a small group of extremists inside the ANC who lost very fast their position as soon as the ANC’s internal politics stabilised and common sense triumph. In such a case the opportunity for better relations between the ANC’s elite and the Afrikaners will surely follows. Depending of the 2019 General Election’s outcomes can the general political, personal and financial circumstances of Afrikaners dramatically bettered from 2020 , helping to activate the long overdue social assimilation and racial miscegenation between Blacks and Afrikaners.130

 

■Assimilation as well as miscegenation took place at the Cape between White settlers and Black slave women from Madagascar, Malayans and Coloured People and is ongoing till today, although sometimes on a  reserved level. The 1994 dispensation and the freeing of Blacks and Afrikaners from the apartheid’s shackles gives immense support to much deeper assimilation between the South African races while miscegenation seems also to gain field. With the Afrikaner’s growth in independence from his previous nationalist volks capturing and “pure White blood” ideology, as well as his today’s more willingness to accept South African indigenous realities, it can be expected that his assimilation and miscegenation with Blacks will undoubtedly increase. How much it can be denied by the NP-AB inner circle today, were assimilation and miscegenation not two of the main intentions of their  1994 bloodless coup d’ état ?8,30,4144,,57,58,59,64,87,126-129

In Brazil, the majority of the population was Black and still in slavery at the time of independence (To a certain extent very much in line with the suppression of the apartheid system). As citizens socialized, racial classification diminished fast. Intermarriage was not frowned upon Today the result is a Brazilian population that may well be the most successfully integrated ethnic mix in the world.14,126-129

 

The same path of success as in Brazil can follows in South Africa. It is possible that full assimilation and miscegenation of Afrikaners with Blacks may occur in 100 years or less. But in this assimilation and miscegenation there are many risks for the Afrikaners if the country decays politically and financially. Fast and dramatic changes in ethnic and racial tolerance, as happened with the Jews in Europe in the 1940s, can bring immense suffering to the Afrikaner’s mixed-race descendants, notwithstanding that they are natives of South Africa.

 

  1.  Conclusion

 

For the political scientist interested in the Afrikaner as a human being, especially his thinking and entrenched ideas on apartheid, is it important to look at both their past and present. The eminent historian, JM Roberts, says14, p.xi: “Historical inertia is easily under-rated. This is not just a matter of what we see. Ruins and beefeaters are picturesque, but for the most part less important than much mental and institutional history lost to sight in the welter of day-to-day events”. The aim of the series of seven articles was to offer an overview of that part of Afrikaner history that is hidden from plain sight.

 

This study reveals that many Afrikaners have shown much goodwill and have sincerely attempted to accept Black rule since 1994. These Afrikaners show great willingness to become part of the greater indigenous South Africa, leaving behind racial discrimination. Although most Black citizens have been willing to forgive the Afrikaners for apartheid, the ANC elite clearly intends to implement a policy of discrimination against Afrikaners. This has started to intensify in the last few years, possibly with grave consequences for Afrikaners as citizens.

 

Efforts at reconciliation in 1994 failed all South Africans, reawakening racial conflict with Afrikaners as the focal point. At the moment, Afrikaners being targeted for revenge. Central to this is the Afrikaner’s unforgiveable history: “The past hangs around longer and is more difficult to keep peacefully buried, even by strenuous efforts, than we believe”, warns Roberts14,p.1109 with respect to this hidden danger. Afrikaners are not free from a negative memory of their experiences with Blacks, pre-1994 and post-1994. A re-emerging of a negative Afrikaner-memory spells disaster for Afrikaners as well as Blacks, especially in the activating of revenge and counter-revenge.  

 

The Afrikaner has insufficient knowledge of his own past. The doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism left very little space for the recognition of the many faults in their past. It is time for the Afrikaner to confront the good as well as the bad in their history, not only to understand their past and present behaviour, but also as guideline for the future. Good can come from knowing the bad of the past, but this requires an honest and comprehensive analysis and valuation of history. Only a true and objective evaluation of their history can reveal their identity and place in the future South Africa.8,27,94

 

The “Afrikaner question” is a complex issue that rests on fact as much as on myth, hidden determinants and dark dispositions. Anti-Afrikaners offer many over-simplifications of these determinants and dispositions. It is a “problem” as complex as that of the Jewish Palestinian. No one scholar, historian, sociologist, theologian or politician can give a simple and final summary or solution. Opinions on the Afrikaner matter must be treated with a good measure of scepticism. The ANC elite is tragically relying on spreading misinformation on Afrikaners, while treating them the same as the Palestinians are being treated and the Jews were treated.63,68-71

 

Statistics show that in 30 to 60 years there may only be between 100 000 and one million “pure” Afrikaners left in South Africa and in 2117 possible less than 20 000. The small number of 20 000 will not be the result of genocide or even migration, but of the normal process of natural extinction.

 

Will the descendants of today’s Afrikaners really care about being Afrikaners two to three generations from now? Would they perhaps preferred to be happy Australian-, Chinese-Creole-, half-caste-, hybrid, mulatto-, or simply South African bastards? Are the constant political efforts and fights for rights and existence and the worries and fears about Afrikaners and their future in South Africa really justified and worthwhile? Will the Afrikaners of 2117 know what a “koeksister” or “volkspele” are or will they hear about it for the first time when they read of it in an old article of the year 2017?There seems  to be an overall doubt, meaning  the answer is an undisputed NO. Very few of the Afrikaner’s descendants are going to care about their Afrikaner heredity.

 

Afrikaners must urgently consider how they want to address their present personal and political threats, dangers and challenges under the ANC regime and as citizens of South Africa. Several options are available. Constructive and wise individually thought and action are pertinent. Some Afrikaners will find the selection of an option easy, for other it will be difficult, while some will never decide in their lifetimes. Every Afrikaner’s needs and visions are unique: each individual has to journey into the future. Time is running out. As reflected from this study the year 2017 is the time for thinking, planning, and deeds for Afrikaners, but their actions must be extraordinary and correct. There have been too many mistakes in their past to expect leniency or a chance if they fail again. Palkhivala53, p.129 warns: “In the affairs of nations, as in the affairs of men, there is a providential margin of error; you may take wrong turns at the crossroads, misuse time, take gold for dross and dross for gold, and yet somehow stumble along to your destination. But the margin and period of permissible error need to be carefully watched. You overstep them at your peril”.

 

The human rights author Raoul Martinez131, p.381 emphasises that South African Blacks and Afrikaners must remember that social and personal changes are not: “… something that we get done ‘out there’ simply by changing laws and procedures. Whatever rights are granted whatever procedures are in place, social systems are brought to life by the people who participate in them. The attempt to increase control over our lives and produce outcomes we value is inextricable from the attempt to deepen our understanding and develop our character. Ultimately, this is a moral challenge. We are the timber from which the future will be constructed – the stronger the timber, the more solid the construction.” Martinez131, pp. 381-382brings Blacks and Afrikaners before an easily challenge in this context: “Every human being inevitably suffers hardship, loses loved ones and, some day, passes away. Life is rare, delicate and short. Given all this, why would we not join together to do what we can, for the brief time we have air in our lungs and strength in our bodies, to transform this world into a place of joy and wonder for all those passing through – a place where all can flourish, contribute and create? After all, it is only through the creation of what we deeply value that we find the fullest expression of our freedom. And what could be more valuable than that?”

 

Every Afrikaner should decide on their own an immediate path as an individual. Each must decide on lifestyle changes and strategies, but to postpone a final decision can be fatal. No one else can take this decision. The author of this article can only point out the various options and risks, nothing more.

 

The only consolation for Afrikaners in their present visitation is that if dissolution sweeps away the last Afrikaner, the Herodotus curse on the Afrikaner will also be broken. It will then be time for their conquerors and executors to inherit the curse and to be ravaged. Only time will tell if the ill fate of dissolution awaits the Afrikaner.

 

The year 2017 is the time for options, deeds and more deeds by the Afrikaners about their future. But they must remember that the virtue of deeds lies in completing them (Arabian Proverb).

 

 

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  114. Zuma’s quicker than Ruperts to riches. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2016 Apr.10; p. 20.
  115. Enoch N. [2013/05/6]. Welcome to Orania….as long as you’re White: Remote town in South Africa where Afrikaners dream of building their own state. [Internet]. [Cited 2016 Dec. 20]. Available from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2321236/Orania-Whites-town-South-Africa-Afrikaners-dream-building-state.html
  116. Welcome to Kleinfontein, lingering outpost of Apartheid South Africa. Aspiring Afrikaner-only enclave highlight how race still shapes the nation’s landscape. [Internet]. [Cited 2016 Dec. 15]. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/30/south-africa-kleinfontein-apartheid-afrikanernsformation
  117. R3.5 billion plan to make it safer for Afrikaners in South Africa. [Internet]. [Cited 2016 July 27]. Available from http://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/100266/r3-5-billiion-plan-to-make-it-safer-for-afrikaners-in-south-africa/
  118. Thubron C. In Siberia. London: Chatto & Windus; 1999.
  119. Louw GP. Juvenile misconduct among Coloureds: A psychological investigation. Doctoral thesis. Potchefstroom: North-West University; 1984.
  120. Carstens W. Olifant in die vertrek. Afrikaans en sy mense: Waarheen? Beeld. 2016 May 18; p. 25.
  121. Masilela J. Ons het Trump nie nodig. Rapport (Weekliks). 2017 Jan. 22; p. 7.
  122. Swanepoel E. Wit bevolking ouer as 60 leef nog gemaklik. Rapport (Nuus). 2017 Apr. 2; p. 6.
  123. Tabane R. Moenie onttrek na enclaves nie. Beeld. 2016 Nov. 11; p. 12.
  124. Mbeki M, Rossouw J. SA steeds in ‘n koloniale wurggreep. Rapport (Weekliks). 2016 Sep. 11; pp. 4-5.
  125. Dalrymple W. From the Holy Mountain. London: Harper Perennial; 2005.
  126. Demographics of South Africa. [Internet]. [Cited 2016 Dec. 15]. Available from http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Demographics_of_South_Africa
  127. Boshomane P. Want us to ‘get over it?’ Send them to jail. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2016 Apr. 10; p. 18.
  128. Lesufi P. Racism isn’t making a comeback: it never quit. Sunday Times. 2016 July 10; p. 17.
  129. Zulu P. The politics of internal resistance groupings. In: PL Berger, B Godsell. A future South Africa. Visions, Strategies, and Realities. Cape Town: Human & Rousseau; 1988.
  1.  Kenney H. Verwoerd: Architect of Apartheid. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball; 2016.
  2.   Martinez R. Creating Freedom.London: Canongate; 2016.

 

PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned. Externally peer reviewed.

 

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

 

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Arts, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa.

Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner tribe only a century away? Part 3: Present and past determinants and role players in the establishment and continuation of perceptions of injustice in the mindsets of Afrikaners

Gabriel Louw

 

Research Associate, Focus Area Transformation, Faculty of Arts,

Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

 

                                                                     RESEARCH

 

Corresponding Author:

Prof Dr GP Louw

Focus Area Social Transformation

Faculty of Arts

Potchefstroom Campus

North-West University

South Africa

Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

 

Ensovoort volume 37(2017), number 10:1

 

                                                                    ABSTRACT

 

Keywords:

Apartheid, Afrikaanse, Afrikaner, ANC regime, assimilation, Boer, Burgher, Calvinistic, Cape Dutch, civilisation, conflict, discrimination, dissolution, ethnicity, genocide, Herodotus curse, doctrine, internalize, miscegenation, non-White, parent stock, proto-Afrikaner, Protestantism, race, racism, violence, White.

 

 

Background

 

 

Schlemmer relates the following incident that aptly captures the problem addressed in this article1, p. 7: “At a press conference held in Dakar, Senegal during the July 1987 visit by a number of South Africans to meet the ANC (African National Congress) representatives, a senior ANC member took exception to a remark by a South African academic that ‘apartheid’ had developed over centuries of South African history. Whether this was true or not, the ANC member retorted, one should not let the apartheid government ‘off the hook’ ”.

 

The Schlemmer1 quotation illustrates two things, namely who the culprits were that created apartheid and the fact that there was a history that resulted in apartheid. First, no-one in South Africa, not even the ‘culprits’ who created apartheid, the Afrikaners, deny that the Whites in South Africa for many years dominated and discriminated against the Blacks: politically, economically, socially and culturally. Apartheid at its height was sustained by a certain class of Afrikaners and the connections they had among them. Its structure was upheld by political, economical, social and cultural institutions and bureaucracies that were controlled and run by Afrikaner men and women from this social class. Even during apartheid, not all Afrikaners dominated and discriminated against Blacks to them same extent, although they were all complicit. Vilakazi explains this poignantly when he says2, p. 43: “Some Afrikaners exercise domination directly and harshly; other exercise it still directly, but more ‘pleasantly’ and ‘kindly’; some exercise it indirectly, but still harshly; while still others exercise it indirectly, with sophistication and even ‘friendship’ for Blacks. All this depends on the class backgrounds of the Whites concerned, and the institutions within which they make their living within the huge edifice of racial domination. The distinctions later give rise to differences in political orientations – to conservatives, liberals, radicals, etc.”

 

It is clear from the above that apartheid was practice by all “social classes” in the Afrikaner grouping, with the emphasis on the leadership and the ordinary citizens who identified as nationalist Afrikaners as represented by their membership of the National Party (NP), the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) and the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC).3-8

 

The last part of the 1987 comment of the ANC senior member, as quoted by Schlemmer, namely that1, p. 7: “one should not let the apartheid government ‘off the hook’”, is completely justified. This remark should have added “one should not let the apartheid government, and all the ordinary nationalist Afrikaners and members of the NP-AB-DRC off the hook.” All the various social groups within the larger Afrikaner grouping are guilty of the practice of apartheid, as Vilakatzi2 also argues. They all benefited, either directly or indirectly, and they were all role players in this system, however much some try to hide behind an array of excuses. This collective responsibility is a fact and is accepted by the majority of Afrikaners today. It is within this broad context of collective responsibility that Blacks today tend to label all Afrikaners as participants in apartheid and as the people at whom they direct their revenge for apartheid since 1994 (successfully one might add). This outcome of “collective guilt” shared by all Afrikaners has been used since 1994 to drive the ANC regime’s unspoken policy of revenge on Afrikaners for apartheid specifically and for all the ANC’s own governmental failures in general. This revenge has an immense impact on the way Afrikaners think about the Blacks’ political behaviour, views and intentions. It only serves to strengthen their entrenched feelings about injustices done to them through racial and ethnic discrimination and domination in the past. There are now new added experiences of injustices done to them by the Blacks.1,2,9,10

 

The dynamic described above re-activates a set of behaviours that was instilled and entrenched in proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners over many years, namely discrimination against Blacks based on colour. [Part 2 of this series discusses how this negative racial behaviour was instilled in Afrikaners and strengthening as “appropriate” and “correct” due to negative examples and experiences]. The immediate question at this stage is: what motivates and drives this sort of behaviour? In this context it seems that the cause of this learned and internalized behaviour is the perception of injustices done to him. This idea can stay passive and can be ignored, but it leads to counter-actions to revenge or defence in the form of various forms and levels of discriminative racial behaviour. The intention of this study is to research and describe the determinants and role players in the establishment and continuation of a perception of injustice in the mindset of the Afrikaner.

 

The second important point to note in Schlemmer’s1 quote is the reference to the history of Apartheid. Was the South African academic correct to remark at the Dakar meeting of 1987 that “‘apartheid’ had developed over centuries of South African history,” 1, p. 7 or is this a myth without any facts to prove it? In the post-1994 political rhetoric, very little attention is given to this controversy and to the possible negative impact of long-term exposure to undesirable behaviour and experiences on the development of the Afrikaner’s propensity to discriminate. Schlemmer makes the following comment1, p. 8: “Archetypal apartheid was developed to its epitome in the period under Verwoerd. It represented a brutal, massive but almost heroic attempt on the part of the then ethnically solidary National Party of the time to secure a correspondence between nation and territory for whites by imposing an order much more incisive than race segregation,” Such statements have led to a denial of an earlier history. Schlemmer’s1 focuses exclusively on 1960 to 1994. Discussions like this completely ignore the immense negative impact of the history before apartheid on the racist behaviours of the, sometimes unwilling, proto-Afrikaner and later Afrikaner as participants in the system. This point of view is used selectively by some subjective researchers and poorly informed politicians to justify the new South Africa’s over-emphasis on political correctness. It has led to superficial arguments and myths that apartheid is a recent phenomenon created only by nationalist Afrikaners. It also brings to the foreground allegations that the Afrikaners’ racial attitudes are pathological and set, ignoring the effect of external influences on behaviour learning and the reinforcement of problematic behaviour. Research that denies a history that culminated in apartheid fits well with the post-1994 political and emotional rhetoric, especially since any consideration or discussion of history by Black politicians seem to be fixated on the period of Grand Apartheid (1960–1994) for obvious political gain. This “conscious” amnesia is understandable and is also reflected in the “selective” amnesia of Black politicians about their catastrophic and barbarous “Black apartheid” and “Black genocide” between 1810 and 1840 in South Africa.1,2,10,11

The fact is that White racial domination and discrimination against Blacks have a long history, dating from the early Cape Colonists up to the proto-Afrikaners and culminating in the modern-day Afrikaner’s history. Historically, social-cum-racial class differentiation already took shape in 1671 at the Cape Settlement. Whites were favoured and the other races were subjected to discrimination. This differentiation and resulting discrimination continued throughout the centuries, creating a generally unfavourable position for all darker races in the broader society. It started in 1671 and sometimes had the same devastating consequences for non-Whites, if not more, than grand apartheid. However, apartheid can comfortably be criticized in the modern idiom of human rights violations and it is very easily pinpointed as the root of all evil in South Africa. The proto-Afrikaners were and the Afrikaners are still part of this ongoing history of apartheid that started in 1671. A focused study is needed to understand the ordinary Afrikaner’s ideas on race and the reasons why they supported, subscribed to, and practiced apartheid for so many years. Such a study should steer clear of the current political and emotional rhetoric. Such a study will also open the door for insight into and an evaluation of the Afrikaner’s perception that many kinds of injustices have been and are being committed against him (and this leads to their inclination to racial discrimination). 3-8

 

Although this article does not delve into the history of apartheid, specific and direct historical causes are noted. (The history was already fully described in Part 2 of the series: Historical determinants and role players in the establishment and maintenance of racial discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners. Its subdivision 3.1.1: Negative ethnic and racial influences of the Early Cape authorities, is relevant to this article). From this history it is clear that apartheid has a long historical development in which the proto-Afrikaner, and even to a certain extent also the Afrikaner, were not initially volunteers, but victims themselves. They too were subjected to a bad and inappropriate socio-political system that was forced on them involuntary. The proto-Afrikaner and Afrikaner were not only exposed to bad racial examples that became entrenched in Afrikaners over time, but that they also experienced immensely negative consequences as a direct outcome of infringements perpetrated against them. These negative experiences became entrenched as an obsession with the injustices they suffered. Not only did these ideas lead to racist behaviours, but they also reinforced established racism and behaviours of revenge. Part 2 concludes that Afrikaners hold the specific belief that injustices were not only done to them in the past, but are being done to them today. It is therefore important to know how this perception of injustices took root in the mindset of Afrikaners.3-8, 12

 

The intention of this article is to study and analyse the present and past negative determinants and role players in the establishment and reinforcement of a perception of injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners.

  • This article is the third in a series of seven. The seven articles represent the following research topics:1) Who is the Afrikaner? 2) Historical determinants and role players in the establishment and maintenance of racial discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 3) Present and past  determinant and role players in the establishment and continuation of perceptions of injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 4) The Afrikaners’ failure to understand, accept and become intertwined in the indigenous realities of South Africa; 5) The vicious cycle of revenge and counter-revenge around apartheid; 6) Preparedness and comprehensiveness of post-1994 rescue actions; 7) 2017 is the year for thinking, planning and action.

 

  • The overarching aim of the study is to determine the position of the Afrikaner in the year 2117.

 

 

  • Method

 

 

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method aims to build a viewpoint based on evidence as the evidence becomes clearer throughout the research. This approach is used in modern historical research where there is a lack of an established library, as is the case with the topic of the Afrikaner’s current and future position in South Africa. The databases used were EBSCOHost, Sabinet Online. Sources included articles from 2016 to 2017, books for the period 1944 to 2017, and newspapers for the period 2016 to 2017. These sources were used to reflect on the Afrikaners and to put thought trends, views and opinions on the Afrikaners in perspective.13-15

 

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

 

  1. Results and discussion

 

3.1 General perspective

 

Many Afrikaners argue that their living standard is deteriorating in the new South Africa due to job discrimination and unemployment resulting from Affirmative Action (AA), Employment Equity (EE) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Afrikaners are experiencing more general poverty. There are frequent murders, especially of farmers. This comes in addition to various other social, economical and political discriminations. Political rhetoric, public objections and court cases to protect Afrikaner interests are common. This discriminative Black behaviour has two decisive effects on the Afrikaners’ racial attitudes and inclinations: the reinforcement of established racism and the development of new negative racial attitudes. Fundamental to both these developments is the belief that an injustice is being done to them at present, as was the case in the past. They are experiencing hostile and hurtful behaviour that they believe is undeserved and inappropriate. The perception of injustice is in turn founded on a belief that revenge is an appropriate action.16-24

 

What is shocking about the post-1994 Afrikaner thought pattern is the lack of insight into the enormous social, economical, political and personal backlash for the Afrikaner in the new South Africa. The anti-Afrikaner attitudes of the ANC regime is nothing else than Black apartheid. It is to be expected when considering history. This reaction by Blacks must be understood in terms of the cruel legacy of White apartheid. Blacks had to endure an extremely negative political environment and lifestyle, not for decades, but for centuries. It was an inhumane setup that Schlemmer1, p. 8describes as a “brutal, massive order much more incisive than race segregation.” The pseudo-peace and the seemingly normal continuation of life immediately after 1994 faded fast with the NP and AB losing power and the increasingly aggressive ANC government. A significant sector of Blacks feels that the dispensation that started in 1994 did not punish the Afrikaners adequately for their mistakes.  Initially the retreating leadership of the NP and AB promised a new and happy South Africa forever. This was an effort to appease the Afrikaners for the moment. Enormous changes awaited the Afrikaners, unbeknownst to them. For many years the NP-AB-DRC leaders concealed the fact that Afrikaners will face an unfriendly environment where they are stripped of their previous White apartheid empowerments and benefits. Some Afrikaners miss the fact that they are now dependent on themselves and on forming small groups. The formal guiding patrons have all disappeared. They are in this “alone” and they are in a hostile environment where they are subjected to “Black Discrimination,” more and more, making any appeal on their rights very difficult. The new and serious injustices against them seem to be gathering momentum.

 

The Afrikaners at present simply do not have the political power to stand up to the more dominant ANC at any level to ensure their future. The general attitude of the Black society is becoming more hostile. First, the current Afrikaner population of less than 3 million and the negative annual growth of approximately -0.1% from 1960 to 2011 shows that they are indeed a much less influential racial, ethnic and political pressure group than they would admit, especially compared to a Black population of more than 55 million and an approximate annual growth of +1.5% for 2009 to 2014. The decline in the is becoming more rapid, so much so that experts, supported by statistics, predict that the Afrikaners can disappear from the South African scene in 30 to 60 years. The disproportionate racial distribution and accompanying lack of political power largely explain the growing disrespect and discriminatory attitude of the ANC and their followers towards the Afrikaners since 1994. This is an attitude that can intensify in the future, bringing more injustice to the door of the Afrikaners.23,25-29

 

Second, it would be incorrect to see the attitude and behaviour of the ANC and the Blacks in general towards the Afrikaners as based only on the Afrikaners’ diminished political position as a White minority, which makes them an easy target. It goes much deeper: an age-old hatred has been activated after extreme suffering due to racial discrimination and apartheid. Blacks and other racial groups in South Africa suffered psychologically, politically and economically at the hand of proto-Afrikaners and Afrikaners. The negative reactions to and behaviours towards the Afrikaners from the side of the ANC and the other racial groups in South Africa originate from the Herodotus Rules that guide good governance. Afrikaners as rulers blindly and arrogantly ignored these rules in the heyday of apartheid.6,19,30,31

 

An understanding of these rules will aid in an understanding of today’s “Black Apartheid,” as practiced by the ANC through policies such as AA, EE and BEE [knowing in the USA as Minority Procurement, which in South African implies Majority Procurement or Majority Affirmative Action] and through other racial discriminations against the Afrikaners. It will also provide Afrikaners with some insight into how counter-productive and fatal it is to see these Black discriminative actions against them as justifying counter racial discrimination and actions to balance out the injustices.

 

Modern Afrikaners only became victims of “Black apartheid” after 1994. They are exposed to experiences that make them feel as if injustices are being committed against them. In actual fact, they got off scot-free after the Black discrimination between 1948 and 1994. However, it is important to note that the proto-Afrikaners from the early 1700s up to 1902 and the Afrikaners from 1902 up to 1948 experienced numerous forms of domination and discrimination against them. This instilled a mentality of being subject to injustice. These current and past experiences of injustices are and were strong determinants in inspiring new and reinforcing old negative racial attitudes amongst Afrikaners, leading to further racial discrimination in the new South Africa.3-8

 

3.1.1 The Herodotus Rules for good governance and respect

 

More than 2 500 years ago, the ancient historian Herodotus formulated six rules for good governance. In his view, these rules guarantee a revenge-free country of peace for current and future generations. These six rules provide an excellent explanation of the attitudes of the ANC towards the Afrikaners since 1994.30,31

 

Herodotus reasoned that any ruler should adhere to six rules to stay in power, to lead a long and happy life as a ruler and to prevent reprisals and retaliation against him and his descendants and followers from aggrieved subordinates or conquered groups and their descendants. The six rules that a ruler should underwrites, practices and respect are31:

 

  1. Always act with fairness and wisdom towards one’s subjects;
  2. Empower each individual politically, legally, socially, and economically;
  3. Do not favour or put certain individuals or oneself above others;
  4. Act with self-control at all times;
  5. Do not be self-enriching at the expense of one’s subjects, and
  6. Given the power of a ruler, avoid and be free of power mismanagement and emotional and physical exploitation, abuse and misuse of one’s subjects.

 

In practice, these six rules come down to the following: 1). history repeats itself; and 2). that the contraventions of these rules create hatred that spells tragedy for culprits, even after many centuries had passed.31

 

The Herodotus Rules acknowledges that the innocent are sometimes punished for the failures and shortcomings of their ancestors (much in line with the Mafia of Sicily’s habit to take revenge on families even after many generations have passed, whether the new generation is guilty or not). A poignant example is the genocide of the Jews in Europe during WW2 because their ancestors were falsely identified as financial and political exploiters by the local citizens of the countries to which they had migrated. In reality, these locals merely failed to be competitive, trained and skilled so that they could be successful in their businesses and professional lives.31,33

 

The various Afrikaner regimes since 1910, especially those between 1948 and 1994, transgressed all six the Herodotus rules. The current inaccessibility and hostility of the ANC and the Blacks are predictable political, psychological and pathological responses within the framework of the Herodotus philosophy of 1) misrule by the ruler and 2) undeserved punishment for the innocent victim, 3) injustice done to the victim and 4) revenge by the victim for the misruling of the ruler and injustice done.31 The Afrikaner has in the minds of the Blacks been sentenced to long-term political and personal, social and economical “imprisonment” in South Africa for contravening the Herodotus rules, whether the individual Afrikaner is guilty or not. This is the result of the proto-Afrikaner and Afrikaner’s political, socio-economical and inhumane misconduct as a ruler over many years. 31

 

The Afrikaner should blame themselves and the failed Afrikaner leadership that they elected to act on their behalf for this penalty. The tragedy is that this “sentence” is a logical and expected historically outcome the Afrikaner seems not to understand, to have expected, or to know how to counter. The retaliation according to the Herodotus rules affects all modern Afrikaners and its youth, even though many of them were not part of the practice of apartheid. Many Blacks feel that they may take revenge for apartheid, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the current generation. This, in terms of the Herodotus rules, starts a new cycle where Afrikaners experience their society as unjust, triggering further negative attitudes towards Blacks.3-8

 

3.2 Current injustices committed against Afrikaners

 

3.2.1 The long-term punitive intentions of the ANC and the continuation of injustices

 

The ANC’s revenge clearly entails more than just a short-term punishment of the Afrikaners for apartheid in terms of the Herodotus Rules. It is aimed at the total expulsion, psychologically and physically, of the Afrikaner (although hidden and mostly denied publically) from the country as an ethnic racial group or at totally isolating them from the educational, economic and cultural mainstream. (This is a properly orchestrated exercise and reminds one of the Afrikaner’s own expulsion of Blacks from central South Africa to various Bantu homelands under the Malan/Strydom/Verwoerd regimes. These actions show the negative effect of the Herodotus Rules in justified revenge). 3-8,31

 

Several factors favour the ANC in its adventure of a long-term punishment for the Afrikaner. These negative factors include the negative population growth of the Afrikaner, the Afrikaner’s fear of residential and farm murders, increasing White poverty and job discrimination, fear of radical economical transformation and White capital and land capture, the closing down of Afrikaner institutions like schools and universities, disrespect for Afrikaans as a national language, political confusion and a loss of sovereignty that is casting many Afrikaners out of the governing system. This ongoing racial and ethnic victimization and discrimination against the Afrikaners, especially as a “colonial” minority group, influence many to eventually leave their birth and/or adopted homeland. This is evident from the fact that nearly 1.2 million (30%) Afrikaners left South Africa in the last 20 years since 1995, while a further 35% (1.35 million) also wish to emigrate in the near future.25-27

 

The punitive intentions of the ANC regime was and is exacerbated by the fact that most Afrikaners decided to radically oppose the ANC after 1994, openly showing their distrust, hostility and aggression against Black rule and a Black majority government. This negativism was not only exhibited towards the ANC as a political party, but frequently towards the Black majority in general. In retrospect this decision seems to have been a fatal error in terms of planning their future, as was the introduction of apartheid. It seems as if the proto-Afrikaners and the Afrikaners are inclined to saddle the “wrong political horses” over and over. This fatal decision in 1994 terminated all possible sympathy and support for the Afrikaners by the Black majority and any hope of a future intimate partnership with and support of the ANC or one of the other Black political parties. The fear of and reaction against Blacks and Black rule, entrenched in Afrikaners over many centuries, and the actions to counter-act any endangerment of their interests, only strengthened the resolve of the ANC and the Blacks. They are themselves driven by the injustices done to them by the Afrikaners. They want to apply the Rules of Herodotus to the Afrikaners.30,31

 

The ancient historical work of John Moschos34 (The Spiritual Meadow) and the modern historical works of William Dalrymple30 (A Journey in the Shadow of Byzantium), Ryszard Kapuściński31(Travel with Herodotus) and that of Niall Ferguson33(The World at War), illustrate how these counter-discriminations as revenge for injustices and wrong-doings (and much in line with the current revenges of the ANC on the Afrikaners) take the form of expulsions and deadly annihilations globally from ancient times to modern times.

 

Good examples of such expulsions and annihilations are those of the Christian Armenians and Suniani in Islamic Turkey and the Christian Greeks in Islamic Egypt between 1900 and today. It is also echoed in the destruction of 210 Armenian monasteries, 700 convents and churches and 1 639 parish churches from 1914 in Eastern Turkey (total: 2 549 buildings). Sixty years later, in 1974, only 449 (18%) of the buildings were still in use by active members. The Suniani tribe in Eastern Turkey decreased from nearly 200 000 in the 1900s, to 70 000 in 1920, 4 000 in 1990 and only 900 in 1998. The expulsion also happened to the Greeks in Egypt. In the 1900s they were 200 000, in 1988 they were 5 000 and in 1998, only 500.30,31

 

The eradication of the Armenian identity started in Turkey with the replacement of the names of their towns and streets with Turkish names. This was followed by the destruction of Armenian cemeteries, even tombstones, and the conversion of their churches into mosques. The Armenians who did not move house, were forced to adopt Turkish and Islam names for survival.30,31

.

The Afrikaners have also experienced 1994 similar punitive actions against them. They are losing traditional work opportunities in the civil services, at tertiary institutions and business enterprises. The policies of AA, BEE and EE are intensified almost on a daily basis, while their educational institutions are being “Africanised”. The boundaries of their personal, political, economical and social environments are deliberately transgressed. They are threatened with the capture of capital and land without compensation. There is a growing rhetoric to take arms against Whites who resist the radical transformation, the names of traditional Afrikaner villages, towns and cities have been replaced with Black names. The same is happening with the names of streets and public buildings with Afrikaner names. They are also targeted in terms of criminality in their daily lives.21,22,35,36

 

The above injustices to Afrikaners are growing, putting them in conflict with the ANC and the Black population more and more. However, their political and military empowerment is zero, making it impossible for them to do anything constructive. These threats (and powerlessness of Afrikaners) create a vicious circle of constant experiences of abuses and maltreatments in many different areas of their lives. Afrikaners experience these actions as injustices. An important development that Afrikaners seem to deny is the reality that the intensity and number of assumed injustices will increase fast from 2017. The other point that Afrikaners seem to miss is that these injustices they are experiencing at the hand of the ANC are equal to the injustices that they measured out indiscriminately to Blacks over many years. This leaves the question if they can claim that these injustices are wrong and whether they are not “justified” revenge in terms of the Herodotus Rules. Is the Afrikaner not just over-sensitive and selfish about upholding their assumed Afrikaner rights and their false belief in their racial supremacy, thing that do not really fit into a modern democracy? 21,22,35,36

 

Ignoring the possible merits of revenge as a point of discussion, it is clear that these assumed maltreatments by the ANC government and politicians have an immensely negative impact on Afrikaners, specifically on their perception of the integrity and trustworthiness of Blacks as a race and the feeling that it is impossible to live side by side in a civilized manner in South Africa. The direct outcome is that the Afrikaners entrenched ideas of racial discrimination and injustices are strengthened, instead of fading away. The foundation is being laid for new negative racial cognitions and new injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners.10,21,22,35,36

 

3.2.2 The future dilemmas of the Afrikaner in South Africa in terms of citizenship

 

In South Africa, apart from the shocking farm murders, extreme radical and massive ethnic and racial aggressions and unrests have thankfully been avoided thus far. If the increasing xenophobic behaviour against foreign fellow-Africans, the recent unrests at Coligny and Lichtenburg against Afrikaners’ property and lives, the increasingly radical speeches of the ANC regime and other Black political leaders and political parties and the open disregard for the Constitution and the judicial authority and system are taken into account, the Afrikaners can expect radical aggression in the near future. The official calls by the ANC and other Black role players for radical economical transformation and the capture of White capital, land and property especially sound warning bells. The consequences can be massive injustices to the Afrikaners in the near future, leading to an escalation in negative racial attitudes and reactive behaviour by the Afrikaners to counter the growing injustices against them. This can even end in physical conflict, an outcome that will spell genocide for the disempowered Afrikaners. What is clear at this stage is that the Afrikaners are certainly not exempt from more emotional and physical aggression in the future, a fact that they must seriously consider.16,18,22,36-41

 

The growing need for basic resources and the intense competition for it to counter dire poverty among South African Blacks is being ignored by politicians. It is a possible stimulus for conflict with and the maltreatment of the Afrikaners and could result in further negative experiences that they can see as injustices to them. Up to 1994 the Blacks, as competitors of the Afrikaners, were comprehensively nullified on all levels by the rules of the apartheid. The immense poverty of Blacks and their dire life circumstances was psycho-pathologically ignored by the Afrikaner regime. With specific racially discriminative planning, it was even intentionally aggravated. After 1994, the Afrikaners, stripped of their many privileges and economical manipulation, became equal competitors with the impoverish masses of Blacks. In the new South Africa the ANC’s AA, EE and BEE did not at all help the approximately 70% of the total Black population out of their tragic poverty. This situation is making the competition for sources and support systems extraordinary intense, especially when the race factor comes into play. 16,18,22,36-41

 

The dire state of need in which many Blacks in South Africa still live can possibly lead to further disempowerment of Afrikaners in an effort to eliminate the competition. The continuous poverty of the mass of Black can at the same time lead to physical aggression and genocide of the Afrikaners. This kind of scapegoat behaviour had tragic consequences for the Jews in Europe in the 1930s and the Belgium population in the Congo in the 1960s, basically because of the large-scale poverty of the indigenous people and their inability to escape from it immediately. On the other hand the mob oratories and instigations by German and Belgium Black politicians and leaders respectively to act against Jews and Congolese Whites to rectify alleged injustices of the past through the capture of Jewish and White capital and property undoubtedly drove the impoverished Germans and Africans of Belgium to murder and genocide. A critical perspective shows that the impoverished position of South African Blacks do not differ much from the Germans of the 1930s or the Belgium Blacks of 1960 in the Congo.33,42,43

 

The current estimated 350 000 to 400 000 poor Whites in South Africa and up to 150 000 Afrikaners struggling for survival (when evaluated in terms of the present value of the South Africa rand and the immense constant increases in the prices of foodstuffs and living costs in 2016, this can even be an underestimation), is of secondary importance in conflict activation. It is no comparison to the masses of non-Whites living below the poverty line. The extreme poverty of non-White groups in South Africa can stimulate direct conflict between Blacks and Whites to such a degree that it can result genocide. In this regard it is estimated (which is an underestimation) that as many as 29 236 632 Blacks (73.0%), 2 175 417 Coloureds (48.1%) and 150 409 (11.8%) Indians live in poverty. The official statistics, which reflects that only 26.6% of the population is unemployed, is misleading when one considers that only 42.8% of the total population is employed in some way and that the youth unemployment is 53.7%, of whom most are Blacks (this means that 57.2% of the total South African population are not in employment and as much as only 46.3% of the youths are employed). To expect that only 6 million middle class Blacks and their new-found wealth would counter future revolt and anarchy is wishful thinking. Any strategist who specializes in political and social conflict, revolution and genocide would confirm that these statics describe a huge time bomb waiting to explode. It is a recipe for human disaster that would overshadow all the current moans of injustice against the Afrikaners.3,4,42,44-48

 

A prominent question at this stage for the less than 3 million Afrikaners who are struggling at present to get political, social, economical and ethnic recognition and to maintain their unique culture and ways of living, is what will happen 100 years from now in 2117 to a very insignificant minority group of Afrikaners under an authoritarian ANC or other Black regime or an otherwise overwhelming, totally impoverished Black majority in South Africa?

 

If the expulsions of the Greeks and Suniani from their adopted homelands over 100 years are taken as guidelines, there will only between 10 000 and 20 000 “pure” Afrikaners left in South Africa in 2117, as opposed to an estimated 100 plus million Black people with their own political, economic and cultural attitudes and lifestyles. If the constant population decline among Afrikaners is used as another guideline, the chance is good that there will be between 300 000 and 1 million Afrikaners left in 2047 and fewer than 10 000 “pure” Afrikaners in South Africa in 2117.30,49

 

Afrikaners should realize that the injustices – true or false, justified or unjustified – done by the ANC government and its Black partners, will increase and become more complex and directed. To revenge or to rectify these injustices through direct military, public or private actions, will be impossible for the declining Afrikaners. The end result can be terrorist actions, a path followed by minority groups worldwide, like in Northern Ireland, Syria and Turkey, sometimes with tragic outcomes.

 

3.3 Past injustices to the Afrikaner▼

 

To see the 1994 dispensation and its current negative outcomes as the second “Slagtersnek” in Afrikaner history and as a doomsday in their lives, is wrong. The proto-Afrikaners and the later Afrikaners went through at least two other “Slagternek” incidents before, challenging their future as a population in South Africa. Over many years they have became very familiar with the abuse of power by hostile authorities and what it means to stay upright in such a constant struggle where injustices becomes absolutely overwhelming. They know the enormous psychological and financial efforts and dedication needed to outlive such an ordeal.6, 8-10, 19

 

Cross-references: see Part 2, subdivision 3.1.3.

 

3.3.1 Fifty years of British Rule: 1806 to 1854

 

Although all the stages of the proto-Afrikaner development were characterized by conflicts and constant onslaughts on his existence since 1652, it seems to be the British Rule of 1806 to 1854 that first brought him in open revolt, culminating in the Great Trek to escape many unsolved injustices. One clear fact that stands out here was the British intent to apply British enculturation to the proto-Afrikaners to suppress their political and personal identity. In 1811 there was the “Black Circuit” (Swarte Ommegang), a period during which court cases were opened against 50 farmers and their families based on various allegations of serious crimes, including murder. The allegations were brought by the Hottentotte and other non-Whites. Although the cases were mostly found to be false, the intentions of the British authority and of the missionaries creating these allegations, brought bitterness into the minds of the proto-Afrikaners. The existing racism and ethnocentrism in the Afrikaners were not only strengthened, but broadened to include the British and the other racial groups. The Afrikaners experienced vivid emotions of injustice and transgression. It was also the start of public resistance by small sectors of proto-Afrikaners, like the Frederik Bezuidenhout revolt and conflict, which not only led to death, but also to the hanging of four Boers at Slagtersnek, Graaff-Reinet in 1815.6, 8-10, 19,32,50

This extraordinary abuse of judicial and political power by the British authorities created negative memories that made reconciliation with the British impossible as early as 1815. The British wanted to issue a warning and make an example so that the proto-Afrikaners would behave in the British system, without allowing them to have a say or to make an impact on the political system of the Cape. It created strong fears of injustices in their belief system, especially around their personal identity and safety. It cemented in the mindsets of Afrikaners the growing perception of wide-spread, intense and focused injustices done to them: injustices that they were not empowered to rectify with direct action against the British, but that they rectified indirectly with the Great Trek. The Voortrekkers carried this negative attitude of hate and the perception of injustices directed at the British and the non-Whites, who were directly responsible for their unhappy and unstable lives at the Cape, into Natal, Transvaal, and the Free State. The Slagtersnek incident stands out even today as a the first sign of the later crimes against humanity to be committed in the Second Anglo-Boer War by the British Empire in Transvaal and the Free State against the Boers and their families. These were injustices that brought great division between the Northern and the Southern Afrikaners.6, 8-10, 19,32,50

 

The many other autocratic and anti-Boer actions of the British authority at the Cape between 1806 and 1836 were aimed at subduing the proto-Afrikaners. They especially wanted to phase out all Dutch influences. They wanted to Anglicized the proto-Afrikaners, starting in 1813 with the civil services, the introduction English into the Afrikaner churches in 1826 by forcing them to accept Scottish Presbyterian ministers, forcing them to accept English-speaking teachers and the establishment of free English Schools in 1822. In 1825, English became the court language, while in 1827 a legal charter was published to replace the Dutch legal system that was in use since 1652 at the Cape. A further act to minimize the Afrikaner cultural and their numbers was the 1820 migration of British Settlers to South Africa.7,10, 19,32

 

In 1816 the British started with a process to emancipate the slaves, first by formally registering them and then by regulating workdays by 1823. This was followed by the appointment of a Slave Protector and an assistant to oversee that the proto-Afrikaners behaved towards their slaves. In 1836 slavery was ended. The outcome of the emancipation of the slaves financially ruined many farmers, especially those in the country side. The proto-Afrikaners was at this time already split into subgroups like the Grensboers and the Trekboers, showing clear ethno-cultural and racial differences with the more British-orientated and liberal Cape Dutch. For the rural proto-Afrikaners the consequences were immense: not only was the rural proto-Afrikaners financially ruined by the little compensation for their freed slaves by the British, but they were also suddenly a White minority in a region populated by a majority of non-Whites outside their control and equal in status. Their opportunities to prosper in this environment and to establish their identity was blocked. Most of all, their clear differentiation of Christian versus heathen, as well as White versus Coloured, were suddenly shattered. Large numbers of unemployed and landless freed slaves started roaming the country side, make rural areas dangerous. 7,9,10, 19,32

This outcome further complicated the government’s failed attempts at managing the “Black- and Hottentot-questions” and to guarantee the future safety to the proto-Afrikaners on their farms. The proto-Afrikaner’s opinions, personal, political and economical interests, safety and future existence as citizens were also totally ignored. The proto-Afrikaner became a stranger in a new British colony, making the fear of a next Slagtersnek and of their dissolution as a population, acute. Life in the country side became very difficult, making the proto-Afrikaners more desperate by the day. The racial confrontations that highlighted the immense cultural and lifestyle differences between the races also laid the foundation for the Grensboers’ and Trekboers’ perception of deliberate injustices against them. This resulted in apartheid later on. The proto-Afrikaners felt that the injustices against them were mounting, and they had no voice or power as long as they were under British authority.7,9,10,19,32

 

To uphold their identity, culture, language and freedom in the face of the constant growing hostility and insensitive liberal race policy of the British authority, whose sole intention was to subdue the Afrikaners and the growing “black danger”, the proto-Afrikaners needed an escape route. In the end they were left with only one solution: the Great Trek northwards to vast unpopulated areas without an oppressive British government. In this context it is understandable why the new republics of Natal, Transvaal and Free State were established with three clear characteristics: total self-rule and a total distaste for the British Empire and racial integration. The basis for all these outcomes was the Afrikaners’ perception of enormous injustices done to them; injustices that took the backseat for a while in the republics.6-10,32

 

3.3.2 British government policy in the Transvaal and Free State between 1902 and 1906

 

The immediate post-1902 period after the Anglo Boer War brought immense hardships for the Boers of the disbanded Republics of Transvaal and the Free State. Suddenly they were forced to be British citizens inside a domain of the British Empire and thus under the Union Jack and a king, namely Eduard VII. This was precisely what they had fled so eagerly from the Cape Colony in the 1830s, but in the end all in vain.6-10, 32

 

However, a hell of injustices was still waiting for the Boers in the new British Transvaal and Free State. The worst happened after the reconfiguration of the old republics as British Colonies: the heartless and the intolerant Lord Alfred Milner, who was the instigator of the whole war and the main cause of the Boers’ suffering, downfall and disgrace, became the chief leader in charge of rebuilding the old republics. It was clear from day one that only British interests would be served, especially when considering the repatriation and the compensation for the Boers and his negative public views on the Boers. British mine owners were promoted and supported, while the numbers of the Black workers at Johannesburg mines were accelerated, ignoring the impoverished Boers’ views on race and keeping them from work opportunities. Milner had one main focus and interest, namely the total Anglicization of the Boers and the influx of British immigrants to outnumber the Boers and Afrikaners in South Africa as fast as possible.6-10, 32

 

Milner’s intent to Anglicize the Afrikaners is evident from his correspondents to the British government on 8 November 1901 where he reflects that there were 368 000 English Whites in South Africa compared to 496 000 Afrikaans Whites. His intention was to boost British numbers to 615 000 against 544 000 Afrikaners in five years to obtain a ratio of three British against two Afrikaners to assure a permanent British majority in South Africa. He wanted to do this through immigration from Britain and the placement of British soldiers and others who had fought in the war into the Civil Service, industries and on farms. The situation for the Boers in Transvaal under Milner became such chaos and so unbearable that JC Smuts referred to the period 1902 to 1906 as “the darkest time in the history of Transvaal, much worse than the bloodshed of the War itself”.6,32

 

It is undoubtedly true that the Boers and their families of the old Republics of Transvaal and Free State were totally devastated after the war, not only financial but also psychologically. Husbands had to start their lives without their wives, mourning their children lost in the concentration camps. Even General Smuts said himself in 1902 that “South Africa was demolished and that he had seen no light for the future.” It was clear to him that very few Afrikaners still believed in law and justice after their ordeal at the hands of the British. Even the Lord Milner, the brain behind the British war effort, confessed when visiting Western Transvaal after the war that the country had “become a total wreck, a heart-broken sight to see.” The treatment that the Boers received from the British after the war on various terrains only served to strengthen their psychological political dislike for the British Empire and for non-Whites. It was an all-out policy of injustice against them, one that drove the Afrikaners’ racial attitudes in an extreme direction, basically up to 1994. For the Boers this became a direct motivation for more and new kinds of racial discriminations as ways to safeguard their future political and social rights in a hostile South Africa.6-10, 32

 

The disgraced and demolished Afrikaners were by no means uplifted after 1906. They only overcame this third Slagtersnek because of a unique and dynamic Afrikaner leadership with vision and integrity. These leaders took up the plight of the Afrikaners and steered them back to self-respect by means of psychological and financial upliftment. Prominent leaders were Louis Botha, Koos de la Rey, Barry Hertzog, Christiaan de Wet, Jan Smuts, Christiaan Beyers, Schalk Burger, Abraham Fisher and others. However, the early injustices of 1902 to 1906 remained in the psyche of Afrikaners, driving their racial inclinations, attitudes and behaviour for many years to come, ending in grand apartheid.6,10, 32

 

3.3.3 The 1994 dispensation of unity

 

While their second Slagtersnek was avoided by the trek out of the Cape Colony and the founding of independent republics and the Boers of Transvaal and the Free State fought and mastered their third 1902-Slagtersnek guided by a wise Afrikaner leadership, the 1994 dispensation was brought on by a total lack of a sound Afrikaner leadership, a degrading morale and a political process that started in the 1970s and reached a climax in the late1980s. Where they had manifested vision, wise thinking, integrity, planning, and honesty in overcoming successfully their second and third Slagtersneks, most of the nationalist Afrikaners entrusted their political and personal future from the 1950s to 1994 to persons not always worthy of being called Afrikaners or Afrikaner leaders at all; persons totally incapable of leading a tribe through a new Slagtersnek, as the Afrikaner’s history after 1994 confirmed very well. No provision was made to accommodate and to steer the manifold new injustices against Afrikaners, as the present bitterness, insecurity and lack of direction of the Afrikaner’s shows.

 

The question is: can the Afrikaner again fight off his fourth Slagtersnek, notwithstanding the failed 1994 and present leadership? In this regard it must be noted that world politics, South African politics and human rights have changed dramatically in the last 20 years. Technology, science, lifestyles, habits, beliefs, socio-economics, future-thinking, traditions, group values, family life and demographic limitations have also changed dramatically; not only freeing the individual from group conformity, but also making it less necessary for people to be accommodated in close groups and to be guided by “sacred” leaders to survive in the future. Thankfully, most individual Afrikaners have started to make these changes of modernization; the collapse of the NP, the diminished role of the AB and the vague role of the DRC in the Afrikaner’s life confirms the process of Afrikaners departing from these three dominant, useless and most of all, aimless and racially contaminated groups. This new self-orientation and individuality increases the chances that the individual Afrikaner would be able to fight off his fourth Slagtersnek in new South Africa successfully. However, history tends to repeat not only the good of the past, but also the bad. Traumatic experiences are not easily erased from the human memory. Wrongdoings and injustices are entrenched over many years of suffering, exploitation, abuse and misuse. It is not only the Blacks who can rightly claim that they suffered discrimination and injustices at the hands of the Afrikaners via Afrikaner apartheid, the Afrikaners can also rightly claim that they suffer discrimination and injustices from the side of the Blacks via Black apartheid and in the past at the hand of the Dutch via Dutch colonial apartheid and by the British via British imperial apartheid. The experiences that Afrikaners had over the course of 300 years and the ideas this perpetuated blindly drove apartheid from 1948 to 1994. Racial injustices, etched into the memories of Afrikaners as well as Blacks, will still drive racism for many generations to come in South Africa. Any doubt? There is the Herodotus Rules to back this postulation.

 

  1. Conclusion

 

It is clear that the proto-Afrikaner and later the Afrikaner were both exposed to serious life traumas, sometimes experienced over a short and extremely dramatic period, while other times gradually over the long-term. This has caused negative thought patterns to become established in the Afrikaner. For the Afrikaner these traumatic experiences stretched specifically from 1899 to 1902 through the Second Anglo Boer War and to a certain extent also from 1902 to 1948 again under British Imperialism, while for the proto-Afrikaner from 1671 to 1806 under authoritarian Dutch rule and from 1806 to 1902 under authoritarian British rule. It seems, in terms of a negative psychological impact, as if the discrimination in the period 1806 to 1902 is responsible for the most damage to the Afrikaner’s long-term psychological health. It became the breeding-ground for later extreme racial discrimination. The constant, long-term negative experiences of ethnic and racial discrimination and the lack of political power to defend themselves in this imbalanced set-up, clearly created a perception of being the victim of perpetual injustice in the psyche of the Afrikaner. Their reaction to this situation was to find an effective action to counter these daily and growing injustices and for their enemies’ intentions to annihilate them. There was only one way out, and that was to selfishly place themselves first in their daily behaviour, promoting their own interests and rights at all times, ignoring the consequences that such behaviour can have for other persons outside their group; specifically people from other racial groups and non-Afrikaner Whites. The apartheid to which he was exposed by the early Cape authorities was internalized as “good and acceptable” behaviour, but it also became the “correct” direct strategy to obtain and maintain their rights, integrity and most of all their identity. The Afrikaner’s apartheid was born, and the injustices that were done to them became the motivating power and the justification for the pursuit and maintenance of modern-day apartheid. There is no doubt that any injustice done to Afrikaners up to today is still steering their racial attitudes and behaviours.

The historical and political facts of the proto-Afrikaners and later Afrikaners, read together with the historical indicators focusing on the safekeeping of tribes and nations over many centuries, make it clear that the modern Afrikaners is in a crisis: politically, economically, sociologically, personally and psychologically. The powers of hostility against them are immense, overwhelming and overpowering. There is also, it seems, the unbreakable Herodotus curse on them. It seems as if the Afrikaner tribe is heading for dissolution within a century. The primary need at the moment for the Afrikaners, seen specifically from a psychological and political perspective, is to make their dissolution as painless and trauma-free as possible. For such an outcome, specific personal changes and strategies are needed, which are at present outside the Afrikaners frame of reference.

 

Be that as it may, one can ask if the Afrikaners could not perhaps, as the proto-Afrikaners successfully did three times before, overcome their 1994 Slagtersnek? Why not? Their emancipation from the NP-AB-DRC alliance and their new-found individuality offers them an escape route to overcome this 1994 trauma. This ideal can only be reached if they can lay to rest their obsession with the injustices done and being done to them. They have to clean their collective psyche of contaminated race attitudes and start anew as independent, freed South Africans.

 

Reaching the above outcome is not so easy and it would need extraordinary cleansing. As Palkhivala cautions51, p. 40: “Unfortunately, enmity and hatred persist among nations even after the root cause has been relegated to the limbo of forgotten past”. Speaking of the Schleswig-Holstein question of the 19th century and the forgotten reasons for the war around it, Lord Palmerston observed, “Only three people had ever understood it. One was dead. The other was in a lunatic asylum. I am the third and I have forgotten it.”

 

Although it seems best for individual Afrikaners not to know the real future brought on by their past, they may have no other choice in 2017 than to take a peek into the glass ball of hope in a last effort to prevent their obsession with the many injustices done to them to  gobble up their future. Only in this way can Afrikaners hope to postpone their eminent demise as individuals and as a group. But do they, after so many years of exposure to negative political doctrines and the unlearning of independent thinking, still know how to take a peek?

 

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PEER REVIEW

Not commissioned. Externally peer-reviewed.

 

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that he has no competing interest.

 

FUNDING

The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Arts, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa.

Is the dissolution of the Afrikaner-tribe only a century away? Part 1: Who is the Afrikaner?

Gabriel Louw

Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Arts,
Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa

Corresponding Author:
Prof Dr GP Louw
Focus Area Social Transformation
Faculty of Arts
Potchefstroom Campus
North-West University
South Africa
Email: profgplouw@gmail.com

Ensovoort volume 37(2017), number 9:1

1. Background

“The world on September 11, 1901, was not a bad place for a healthy white man with a decent education and some money in the bank when the class to which he belonged had enjoyed ‘at a low cost and with the least trouble, conveniences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages’”, writes Niall Ferguson.1, p.3 What was most important, added Ferguson1, p. 4, was that this White man of 1901 saw “this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable”.

This world of 1901 was the oyster of the White man, but for the critical observer, like the economist John Maynard Keynes, it was not without toxic impurities that could devour the White man and the false and superficial utopia over time. Indeed, two cruel and devastating World Wars, various other regional wars, two world-wide financial depressions, internationally ethnic and racial reprisals by the suppressed non-Whites, worldwide radical regime changes and many other calamities ensued from 1901 to 1950. This unexpectedly, unasked and unavoidably changed the White man’s belief in his unshakable “permanent and normal privileged lifestyle,” concludes Ferguson.1, p. 4

For nationalist Afrikaners, especially those living between 1948 and the late 1980s, South Africa was not a bad place to live in either; an oyster of Apartheid-privileged lifestyle that Afrikaners undoubtedly believed was normal and permanent and that could only be improved with time. However, the post-1994 democratic dispensation arrived virtually overnight: unexpected, unasked, unwelcome and unthinkable, and most of all, unavoidable for Afrikaners if they wanted a future existence in South Africa and on the African continent. This socio-economical, political and humanitarian correction of the economical, psychological, political and social wrongs created by the nationalist Afrikaners with their racial discrimination against non-Whites, brought tremendous aberrant and unforeseen negative changes to their good lifestyles, psychological functioning, religious, social-economical and political powers, individual and human rights, even citizen privileges. It also terminated the nationalist Afrikaner’s self-belief with one stroke of the pen. This self-belief was inculcated in Afrikaners since 1652 and it held that the Afrikaners have an “inherited ability” as Europeans to rule forever the indigenous peoples of South Africa.1,2,3

The favourable socio-economical political set-up described above was statutorily erased in 1994 as the political tide turned on the Afrikaner. As the fortune of Ferguson’s (2007) White man of 1901 changed dramatically during the first 50 years of the century, so did the Afrikaner’s fortune change dramatically, but in just 23 years. The Afrikaner is now inextricably linked to the birth pains of political, economical, social and personal modernization in the new South Africa. The Afrikaner brought this on himself during the 1970s without realising the consequences. The future life of the Afrikaner seems to be a totally different one from the one that he and his ancestors experienced or envisioned. When 1994 arrived, the Afrikaner was not only isolated from his fellow South Africans, there was no one left in the world to help him with this fate. 1, 4-10

In light of the above historical overview, the general question is thus prominent: Who is the Afrikaner?
Answering this question has become unavoidable. In 2017 this question needs immediate attention to ensure the Afrikaner’s present-day and future psychological, political, social, financial, emotional and physical well-being.

The lack of an in-depth self-investigation and analysis of who he is has undoubtedly led to a situation where the nationalist Afrikaner and every individual inside the so-called greater Afrikaner grouping carries many unsolved psychological and political traumas and other dispositions with him over many years. This troubles the Afrikaner’s adjustment to the new, greater multi-racial society of South Africa. Many parts of Afrikaner history can possibly be traced back to the Afrikaner’s insufficient knowledge and lack of insight into his history. This includes the political malfunctioning of proto-Afrikaners in the Boer republics after 1902; the transformation of various proto-Afrikaner groups into Afrikaners and later to nationalist Afrikaners and super Afrikaners in the Union and in the Republic of South Africa. The history of the Afrikaner has contributed greatly to the robustness and roughness that Afrikaners display in their daily behaviour and their thinking on racism and ethnicity. It is time for the Afrikaner to confront the good and the bad in their history, but this necessitates an honest and a comprehensive valuation of Afrikaner history and who the Afrikaner is. Only then can the identity of the present-day Afrikaner be understood and the group’s possible future been mapped. Only through such a true and objective re-evaluation of history can the Afrikaner’s real identity and place in the new and future South Africa be revealed; his dark fate as a result of the ill-treatment of non-Whites be made bearable; and the tragic meaning of his possible dissolution become understandable.11-16

Once the Afrikaner knows his own history and who he is, he will much more easily evaluate the role of cognitive thinking and life experiences in the past racial and ethnic domination and discrimination, and he would be able to decide how to handle the present-day environment in an effort to outlive dissolution.

The aim of this article is to research and to reflect on who the Afrikaner is.

The focus is on the Afrikaners’ European heritage, their identification as ‘Afrikaner’, their present-day population numbers, the assumed uniqueness of the Afrikaans language and Afrikaner culture, as well as their position inside the Afrikaanses group and their assumed ‘European blood-purity’.

This article is the first in a series of seven. The seven articles represent the following research topics: 1) Who is the Afrikaner?; 2) Historical determinants and role players in the establishment and maintenance of racial discrimination in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 3) Present and past negative determinants and role players in the establishment and upkeep of injustices in the mindsets of Afrikaners; 4) The Afrikaner’s failure to understand, accept and integrate the indigenous realities of South Africa; 5) The vicious cycle of revenge and contra-revenge around apartheid; 6) The preparedness of and comprehensiveness with which Afrikaners deal with the treats and challenges of the new South Africa; 7) 2017 is the time for thinking, planning and action.

The overarching intention of the total study is determine the future position of the Afrikaner in the year 2117.

2. Method

The research was done by means of a literature review. This method has the aim of building a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach is used in modern-day historical research where there is a lack of an established body of research, like the Afrikaner’s present-day and future position in South Africa. The databases used were EBSCOHost and Sabinet online, and sources included articles from 2007 to 2017, books for the period 1944 to 2017, government documents covering the period 1955 and newspapers for the period 2016 to 2017. These sources were consulted to reflect on the Afrikaners and to the put thought, views and opinions on the Afrikaners in perspective. 17-19

The research findings are presented in narrative format.

3. Results

3.1 Role of ethnicity and race in discrimination

Most of the social domination and discrimination that has ravaged societies over the centuries was primary activated by ethnicity and race. Ethnicity is the combination of the language, habits, customs, and rituals practiced in the house, the school and the religious life of a person or group. Ethnic differences do not necessary include racial differences. Indeed, one single determinant, like language, is sometimes enough to distinguish two ethnic groups within the same racial group. Such a small difference can start discrimination, violence and even genocide. Race, hereto, is seen as inherited physical characteristics, transmitted from parents to children in their DNA. Racism is a doctrine of innate or biological superiority, which, in its classical form, leads to discrimination that deprives members of victimized groups of equal protection under the laws and of a proper lifestyle. Race per se is one of the most devastating determinants in racial discrimination and genocide worldwide, especially from the middle-1800s to the middle-1900s. Although race and ethnicity are mostly seen and discussed as two separate entities, they are seldom active separately. Usually they form a sole determinant in genocide together, or even in the common discriminations of daily life.1,20-22

In contrast to above outcomes in the thinking and the behaviour of men on race and ethnic differences, the science of modern genetics reveals that human beings are remarkably alike and that all humans belong to one species in terms of DNA. The origin of this one species can be traced back to Africa between 100 000 and 200 000 years ago. This species only started to spread to the new continents as late as 60 000 years ago. Also, it must be noted that the differences used to denote racial identities in South Africa, like for instance an Afrikaner or a Zulu, are superficial. The distinctions were and are still the basis of racial and ethnic discrimination. The darker pigmentation in the melanocytes of peoples whose ancestors lived close to the equator, and the physiognomy which makes eyes narrower and noses shorter at the eastern end of the great Eurasian landmass, as well as hair types, are of secondary importance. Geographical dispersion led to humans forming groups that became physically quite distinct over time, but below the skin, peoples are quite similar. Furthermore, despite outward differences; great distances between groups and mutual incomprehension, these so-called “unique races” of the earth have intermingled.1

Notwithstanding the above biological similarity many people, including the Afrikaner specifically, have thought and acted as if the so-called physically distinctive races were separate species, especially during the 20th century. Specific individuals and groups who are different were classified as somehow ‘subhuman’. 1,21-23

It seems in this context as if humans, notwithstanding our intelligence and cognitive insight, and thus a logical awareness that genetic racial differences may indeed be insignificant; have to a certain extent, been driven by an inherent psych-biological disposition that is designed to attach importance to racial differences . These differences have led to intense discrimination and even the murder of people based on their race and class.1

The inclination to discriminate against other racial groups and against people of the same race simply on cultural, religious and political grounds is not unique to the Afrikaner, even though it is a behaviour that is sometimes be seen by psychologists as a psycho-pathology.3,24-26

Various situations, like the Nazi genocide of the Jews and the ongoing modern-day human tragedies in Israel and Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and less prominent racial and ethnic conflicts in modern-day USA and Europe, illustrate this world-wide inclination. 1,4,27-30

Research shows that most of the Y-chromosomes found in Jewish males are the same as those found in other Middle Eastern men, meaning that notwithstanding their bitter hate and pathological murdering of each other, Israelis and Palestinians are genetically very close. Their inter-racial discrimination orientation is therefore rather based on an ethnic life style: religious differences, socio-economical classes and social behaviours. These differences play the dominant role, rather than pure racial content.1

As another example, it seems as racial and ethnic prejudices (based on physical and cultural differences) are practiced in combination in the USA to create and maintain White-on-Black discrimination. Although an American study shows that between 20% and 25% of the DNA of most African Americans can be traced back to Europe, they are still treated as “European-different” by the so-called White Americans based on the physical differences. In addition, a lower social class and income classification is associated with Blacks in the USA, supporting and strengthening further racial discrimination.1,31,32

This illustrates the fact that visible physical features, like skin colour, hair type and facial features are undoubtedly still powerfully drivers in discrimination, regardless of the actual genetic closeness of the groups in question. Such external features can be much stronger role players than cultural determinants.

When racial and ethnic discrimination functions in combination, the outcome can have serious consequences for the victim. This negative outcome seems to be in line with the Afrikaners’ discriminatory attitude towards people of different colour and class. 33-35

In South Africa, the White Afrikaner discriminated against Blacks and mixed races for centuries by means of ethnic and racial domination of the political, economic, social and cultural spheres. Domination was structured, managed and executed primarily by means of class. Vilakazi36, p.43 aptly describes the machine-like precision with which the Afrikaner elite managed Apartheid discrimination when he writes:

The structure of racial domination is kept up by pillars of political, economic, social and cultural institutions, above all, bureaucracies, controlled and run by men and women from specific social classes. We should also keep in mind the crucial fact that, in our age of elections for State offices, particular parties and politicians find support and favour from, and arise out of, particular social classes; these parties and politicians may therefore champion the causes and pander to the prejudices of particular social classes, no matter what the racial group may be.

In day-to-day, practical terms, Whites, therefore, do not all dominate Blacks alike. Some exercise the domination directly and harshly; others exercise it still indirectly, but more ‘pleasantly’ and ‘kindly’; some exercise it indirectly, but still harshly; while still others exercise it indirectly, with sophistication and even ‘friendship’ for Blacks. All this depends on the class background of the Whites concerned, and the institutions within which they make their living within the huge edifice of racial domination.

In this context, Vilakazi36, p. 44 furthermore writes:

Blacks also do not experience racial domination in exactly similar ways, for there are growing class differentiations within the Black population. For the vast majority, however, domination is still direct, harsh and sharp-edged: this is true for farm workers, peasants and the working classes in industries, cities and White homes.

In addition to the clear class distinction between Whites and non-Whites, the Apartheid regime grouped all Blacks together as one ethnic group to fit the political domination and institutionalised discrimination.

The Afrikaner unfortunately wears the same “stained cloak” of serious racial and ethnic discriminations as the German, Jew, Palestinian, Briton, the American and many other nationalities and races worldwide, guilty or not guilty. This “dark past” of the Afrikaner must therefore be addressed in a study on the future of the Afrikaner as an individual, group or tribe. This includes addressing who he is, how he was formed and where he comes from. This is a historical issue with an immense impact on today’s Afrikaners and their psychological experience of the new South Africa. The issue has thus far deliberately been avoided by the Afrikaner himself. However, avoiding the past out of a sense of shame is unnecessary. The Afrikaner’s history is no more shocking and tragical than that of the Zulu or the Xhosa tribes or the Scots or Ukrainians, and it must be thoroughly understood to understand the present day and future inclinations and intentions of this group of people.

An understanding of the Afrikaners’ history will hopefully shed light on why they practiced racial discrimination to such an extreme and for so long. The unavoidable questions are: Were these discriminatory beliefs driven by a need to keep their assumed pure European bloodline, which makes them “better” than non-Whites, pure at all times? Was it driven by a psycho-pathological mindset on race and White supremacy? Was it shaped by unhappy life experiences during their development that became learned and internalised ideas that drove their thinking and actions? Was it driven by inborn psychopathic inclinations in their psyche, making them selfish and conscienceless so that they put their interests first at the cost of others’ interests and lives?

3.2 The concepts Afrikaner nation, Afrikaans language, Afrikaanses, Afrikaner naming, Afrikaners in numbers, Afrikaner culture and the Afrikaners’ European blood purity

It is of utmost importance to understand the above concepts related to Afrikaner history to determine and to describe the role of race and ethnicity in the discriminatory inclinations of the Afrikaner. The following questions are prominent in this regard:

Do Afrikaners as Whites from the Afrikaner ethnic group and the Blacks in South Africa truly differ so much that these differences could have led to the Afrikaner’s negative attitudes towards other races and to the resulting discrimination?

Are the seemingly unique features of the Afrikaner, like their status as a people, their exclusive Afrikaans language, the name “Afrikaner”, their significance in terms of numbers, the Afrikaner culture and their “pure” White bloodline true reflections of who Afrikaners are?

These features are described and evaluated in the following sub-divisions.

3.2.1 The Afrikaner people

Over the years, a vast body of literature on the proto-Afrikaners and later the nationalist Afrikaners has come to reflect them as members of the exclusive Afrikaner people. This group identity was foregrounded after 1948 with the Malan-Strydom-Verwoerd doctrine of the Afrikaners as a unique European-race that developed over many years in the Cape and who is permanently established in Africa. This idea of the Afrikaner resulted from the political and social domination of civil society by the National Party (NP), the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) and various Dutch Calvinist Protestant churches, especially the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). These forces undoubtedly influenced people to internalise this Afrikaner mindset and lifestyle.3,37-39

For many reasons this trend could not be successfully challenged before the early 1990s. There was great political force behind this mindset. Many dissident Afrikaners, English-speaking Whites and of course all the Blacks endured it in silence. The power behind this indoctrination started to lose steam after 1994 with the constant decline of the Afrikaner numbers and their political disempowerment. The Black majority also embraced the new politically free and democratic environment and started to look at the Afrikaners critically. They regarded the Afrikaner as a group that lacks any direct association with or support from Europe. They are merely a minority group of South Africa. This threw suspicion on the status of the Afrikaner as a people. During the Apartheid regime, most Blacks groups were restricted to certain territories and areas and classified in terms of tribes. In the new South Africa, all the tribes were collected to form the total population of South Africa and a new South African nation. In a certain sense, this diminished the status of the Afrikaner as the South African people to one of many tribes that together constitute a nation. 7,36,40

With reference to the concept Afrikaner nation, the Anglo Boer War veteran and later South African nationalist politician, JBM Hertzog, reflected that the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910 seemingly created a new White nation in the minds of White liberals. This new nation was a South African nation, styled according to the thinking and doctrines of the British Empire. This nation was set to replace ideas of an Afrikaner identity and nation as it existed before 1910. Hertzog rejected any such ideas and nipped them in the bud. He acknowledged only the Afrikaner nation when he stated that the Afrikaner developed in South Africa, complete with the language of Afrikaans, as a new nation that had incorporated Dutch, French and German cultural and biological elements. Hertzog hailed the existence of an Afrikaner nation as early as the 1910s.3

At the same time, Hertzog admitted that to be called a nation, a strong nationalism is needed. This necessitated a comprehensive unity that required more than the existence of a shared religious, own language, culture, shared life values and racial nationalism. According to Hertzog, the Afrikaans people still lacked in this area by the 1910s. Indeed, the Afrikaner nation, later presented as a fact by the South African nationalist Afrikaner prime-ministers DF Malan and JG Strydom, also failed with regard to these requirements. The mono-ethnic NP and their leader Verwoerd’s efforts to establish a territory for Afrikaners and other Whites by means of Apartheid failed the test of time after the decline in the power base of the Afrikaners.37

What was seen at the time and is still constantly propagated today as an Afrikaner nation, was nothing more than and emotional and political rhetoric to motivate a subgroup of nationalist Afrikaners to support the Apartheid ideologies of leaders such as Malan, Strydom and Verwoerd (three persons seen by the opposition of Apartheid as Nazi-orientated). This subgroup stands separate from the total Afrikaner population. Many members of this group of nationalist Afrikaners who belonged to the NP, AB and the DRC (and whom Giliomee41, p. 11describes as NP-Broederbonder-Afrikaners) remains caught in this way of thinking and doing. They stuck to this notion of the Afrikaner nation after the founding of the Verwoerd republic in 1961 and its collapse and they stick to it even today. The NP-AB-DRC-classification of people who upheld the concepts Afrikaner nation and Afrikaner identity, is distinct from the so-called “SAP-Afrikaners”, followers of the Smuts group, with their less comprehensive Afrikaner identification and nation status3,39,41,42 . This conclusion is in line with various other historical and political researchers.7,37,43

Giliomee7 reflects that Afrikaner nationalism has dominated South Africa for so long that it has come to look like a fixed feature in the history. In this context of contradictions, his states that in the 1890s there was no conscious Afrikaner nationalism or movement. In fact, there was no recognisable Afrikaner or Afrikaner nation, no agreement about the term Afrikaner, while the Afrikaans language was a despised “kitchen” or “Hottentot” language. Giliomee7, p. 7 writes:

Contemporary observers in the 1870s and 1880s identified a distinct ethnic segment within the White population of southern Africa. They were people from Dutch, German or French descent, with a considerable sprinkling of Black ancestors who had merged into a group in the course of the eighteenth century. With few exceptions, members married inside the group, belonged to the one of the three Reformed Churches, spoke Dutch or Afrikaans at home, and had a largely shared history”.

It is important to note that the issues around nation status and nationalism are much more complicated and comprehensive than the propagandists of an Afrikaner nation or an Afrikaner identity seem to understand. While the Afrikaners pride themselves in the fact that they originate from age-old nations like the Dutch, Germans and French, it seems that these nations themselves are not that old. Giliomee7 shows in this regard that studies of ethnic movements in Eastern Europe and the Third World indicate that the ethnic and national identity that forms a nation is not natural, but artificial inventions driven by political, economic and social alliances of distinct classes to empower them to face the everyday and long-term challenges of life. As such, many nations are not as old as generally believed and accepted. Sometimes a situation requires a group to have more than a vague idea about the race of groups, their culture and history. They are forced to invent a national identity and to become a political nation for the sake of empowerment. This development path, as with that of many European nations and thus the Afrikaners’ European fore-bearers, repeated itself with the development of the Afrikaner identity and nation concept, although it seems to be less successful than the creations of their fore-bearers.

The Afrikaner only became prominent in South African history as a so-called nation because of their early political and military power and dominance of other groups in the Cape, not because they were by any means sacred. The South African Coloureds show the same dynamics and uniqueness as the Afrikaners, but they were stigmatised and side-lined from the start simply because they are not “pure Europeans” and because they lacked social, economic, political and military power from 1652 onwards to position themselves as a significant racial group. The same is goes for the Griquas. This group formed before permanent settlement at the Cape from contact between Portuguese sailors visiting the Cape and Khoi women. Later, after 1652, this new ethnic group was strengthened by further miscegenation between White colonists at the Cape and Khoi women. Adam Kok (born circa 1710) grouped them together as a people in the 18th century. Initially known as “Basters” (Bastards), their name was changed to Griqua in 1813 under influence of a London missionary because of the stigma surrounding the word “bastard” in Europe. They became, just like the pro-Afrikaners, established as a “nation”, although much fewer in numbers than the Cape Coloureds. They settled on Kok’s farm Klaarwater, later to be known as Griekwastad in the region known as Griekwaland-Wes. The same political, economic and military disempowerment that the Coloureds experienced from early on became their fate. They were side-lined from the social, economic and political mainstream and were denied a prominent role as a “nation” equal to the Afrikaners.41,44,45

Within the ranks of the NP leadership, it was only in 1981 that a minister in a NP cabinet, Dr PGJ Koornhof, showed the courage to admit that the Afrikaners are only one population group among 14 other groups in South Africa.42 This opinion was later supported by president PW Botha in 1986 when he said that the peoples of South Africa form one nation. This served as a clear indication of how the various minority and majority groups inside the borders of the country were encircling Afrikaners, and the Afrikaner was only one of the groups in the country. Although this statement was part of the opportunistic neo-Apartheid (liberal) thinking that entered the mindset of the leadership of the NP during the 1980s, it was a clear admission that there is and has never been an Afrikaner nation.40 Koornhof and Botha’s viewpoints, although a century later, do not differ from what Paul Kruger said in 188346, p. 356: “Evenzo zal ik steeds mijn hartelike ondersteuning schenken aan elke poging ener nauwere verbinding tussen de staten en kolonieën van Zuid-Afrika ter kweking van een Zuid-Afrikaanse natie…”. In Kruger’s view, there was no Afrikaner nation in the 1880s or in view future at the time.

It is doubtful that one could say that the Afrikaner was a true nation in the 1910s or in 2017. The opportunistic and misleading political rhetoric common from the 1940s to the early 1980s, is seldom heard in public or reflected in literature these days.

3.2.2 Afrikaans language

The Afrikaans language has been and is still one of the prominent reasons why Afrikaners aim to maintain exclusively Afrikaans public universities, schools and business entities and to identify villages, townships and cities that date from before 1994 with Afrikaner names. Discrimination against Afrikaans in social life and the formally phasing out of the language at public institutions has led to various court cases and other formal protests. Indeed, its conservation, together with the Afrikaner identity and name, is one of the main reasons why some aspire to an independent Afrikaner state in South Africa. For the majority of Afrikaners, Afrikaans is undoubtedly a personal heirloom, a unique ethno-language, covered in their believed ethnic and racial heretage.47-59

The present official and unofficial attitude of the ANC government towards Afrikaans is most negative, discriminatory and driven by the single intention to demolish Afrikaans as a commonly used public language, basically because it is still seen as the language of the oppressor. These discriminative actions are reflected more and more in the judicial system, at universities and schools and public services of South Africa. This is also seen as a focused and planned effort to diminish the Afrikaners legal, political, economic, personal and civil rights and positions. Afrikaners have reactions to these official and unofficial conducts. The reactions are becoming more and more aggressive and negative towards the government, with fierce court cases, public publications and comments, and various other agitations.60-69

Is this idea that the Afrikaans language belongs solely to the present-day Afrikaners correct?

It is important to study the history of and the development of the language Afrikaans to find an answer to this question.

Afrikaans, currently the third most widely spoken home language in South Africa, evolved from the Dutch vernacular of South Holland. It was initially spoken as a Dutch dialect (with some varieties) by the proto-Afrikaner settlers on the Cape frontier during the eighteenth century. These people were socially and culturally isolated and less educated than the Cape Dutch living in Cape Town and its immediate environment. In this isolation and in the muddle of various races and classes living and working together – Europeans, Hottentots, the Khoi-San, Negro and Indian-Malaysian slaves – and the dialect already different from the original Dutch, it became a way of daily communication between the groups. From there the early reference to it as the “taal” (language), but something of doubtful quality and inferior status. It can with right be said that various racial groups – the French, German, British, Portuguese, the European free burghers, as well as slaves from Southeast Asia like Malaysia, Madagascar and native Africans, Khoikhoi and people of mixed descent – all contributed to this emerging language (initially described as “Kitchen” or “Hottentot” Afrikaans) by adding some of their own vocabulary and cultural practices.7,71-73

From the late 17th century onwards, the Dutch spoken at the Cape started to develop differences from the original Dutch with respect to morphology, pronunciation, accent, and to a certain extent, also in syntax and vocabulary. The language spoken in the Cape start to assimilate influences from the already established new dialect often described with names such as “Cape Dutch”, “African Dutch”, “Kitchen (Kombuis) Dutch”, “Hottentot Dutch” and “Taal” (meaning: language). This proto-Afrikaans only started to develop into a separate language by the 19th century.7,74

Afrikaans initially developed slowly. The first print of proto-Afrikaans only appeared during the early 19th century. Much of the work to develop Afrikaans into a separate language was initially done by the “Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners”.7,39

Pure Dutch remained the official language at the Cape for a long time. This formal use of Dutch continued even after the establishment of the Union of South Africa. In fact, much objection was raised against efforts to legalise Afrikaans as a new language until the 1900s, mostly from Afrikaners themselves. One reason for the official pleas to recognise Afrikaans was the fact that it was already the language used at universities, courts and schools from as early as 1915. It was only in 1925 that Afrikaans was given equal status to Dutch by an act passed by parliament. It became one of the two official languages (with English the second) of the Union of South Africa. As a legal entity, Afrikaans is not yet a century old in 2017. In the new South Africa, Afrikaans has lost its early primary status and is recognised today as one of the eleven official languages and as an African language. Notwithstanding this “African uniqueness” and its remaining independent status as a language, the South African Dutch dialect, known today as Afrikaans, and the Dutch spoken in The Netherlands are still very similar, so much that it is mutually intelligible. This makes it less of an exclusive and independent language than what Afrikaners many times argue.39,48,58,68,74

Second, regarding the initial creators and speakers of Afrikaans at the Cape, there is, as already indicated, no doubt that the early Dutch-speaking White settlers were the main creators of Afrikaans and that they initially guided its development. As also already indicated, other ethnic and racial groups, especially those who were living in the countryside, also contributed to the formation of Afrikaans with vocabulary from their mother tongues. These inputs were limited to contributions to the Dutch dialect. However, newcomers to the colony such as German and French settlers, Cape slaves and non-White groups, usually reverted to the use of Dutch and the later to the various dialects of Dutch and proto-Afrikaans. They used proto-Afrikaans in their communication with their owners, other slaves and non-Whites. In this way, the language was maintained and expanded by the non-Whites as well. Indeed, the inclusive labelling of the “Taal” as “Kombuis” and “Hottentot” Afrikaans aptly illustrates the impact and involvement of household workers (slaves) and other free workers and other indigenous peoples in the forming of the language. It is not the “elite” of the Cape Dutch (Whites) who should be honoured as the sole fathers of Afrikaans. The prefixes “kombuis” and “Hottentot” indicates an early stigma associated with the language because it was widely used by the lower socio-economical classes and lower level working classes (which included mostly non-Whites and slaves) in their mutual communication away from the more complicated Dutch language that was used by the educated Whites at the Cape.39,48,49,75-77

The influence of slaves and non-Whites on Afrikaans was greatly affected by the fact that by 1754 there were only 6 000 Whites in the Cape, but they already far outnumbered by the imported slaves. This means that in comparison with the proto-Afrikaners (Whites), an equal, if not larger proportion of these non-Whites was already speaking “Kombuis” and “Hottentot” Afrikaans by the late-1700s. In 1806, the proto-Afrikaners numbered 26 720 or 36% of the colony’s population, meaning that there were already 74 222 other people (mostly non-Afrikaners or non-Whites) at the Cape, of whom most spoke a kind of proto-Afrikaans or a Dutch dialect. “Kombuis” or “Hottentot” Afrikaans” was most probably forced on workers, but it was nurtured by the non-Whites as their only medium of communication with the proto-Afrikaners.7,39,78

Afrikaans is indeed a multicultural and multiracial language, developed and established to a certain extent by the various races of South Africa, starting in 1652. Ownership of the language rests with all South Africa people. Its survival as an official language is strongly steered and guarded by the so-called Bruin (Brown) Afrikaners or Coloureds. This group is starting to claim more and more ownership of the language and its various dialects. It seems as if they regard the use of Afrikaans as their main communication medium in schools, universities, at work, and in their personal and social lives as absolutely essential and not a matter open for discussion or negotiation for the future. The fact that this group represents more than 3.6 million people and that they are constantly growing in numbers, makes them a factor that the ANC should take into account in its discrimination against Afrikaans. The ANC think of the Brown population as grouped with the Blacks who they freed from oppression, from the Afrikaner. It seems that this group, together with Black Afrikaans speakers (making up a group of more or less 6 million persons in total) will be the rescuers of the language, and not the Afrikaner.41,48,49,75,77,79-81

3.2. Afrikaanses

The term “Afrikaanses” is a new group name that sprouted by the late 2000s. It is used by some nationalist Afrikaners in their efforts to include other racial and ethnic Afrikaans speakers into the Afrikaner-grouping, like the Cape Coloureds, solely to strengthen the Afrikaners’ fading political empowerment and to obtain numbers in an effort to avoid the dissolution awaiting the Afrikaner in a century’s time. Nationalist Afrikaners are now also making an effort to involve other Afrikaans speakers of non-White status to assure the existence of the name Afrikaner, its identity as a group and the conservation of the Afrikaans language in the near future by their offering to “redefine” the name and entity “Afrikaner”. It is a very vague and an undefined offer on the one hand, and a very opportunistic offer on the other. It is too little too late, and totally inappropriate and irrelevant within the political context of modern-day South Africa. “Afrikaanses” have been existing for a long time apart from the Afrikaners and they are not as a group in need of mercy and incorporation to be saved or to be helped as a group. This effort to redefine the name Afrikaner and to make it more comprehensive so that it includes other ethnicities and races, seems to be nothing more than a masked wish to depart from the name “Afrikaner” to get away from the exclusivity of the nationalist Afrikaners who were mostly members and supporters of the NP, AB and DRC. This implies that the proponents of the redefinition of the name “Afrikaner” do not really themselves understand the concept and entity that is the Afrikaner tribe, its position in relation to the other South African tribes and its future in the new South Africa. In 2017, nationalist Afrikaners find themselves in doubt about the Afrikaner’s identity and the Afrikaans language, asking: “whereto from now for us?”. The Afrikaanses, on the other hand, can answer with confidence “we are here and ready for the future”.13,50,59,82

As already indicated, the name “Afrikaanse” is not a new front name or a new front entity or group that has been fabricated to suit the Afrikaner’s frame of reference or to give him an escape route. To the contrary, this group (even tribe) has been in existence from 1652 (as evidenced in their contribution to the development of the Dutch dialect “Kombuis” and “Hottentot” Afrikaans), although mostly as an unspecified background role player up to the late 1990s and the end of Apartheid. They are now, in terms of the present-day political, social and economical empowerment, free and strong enough to move out of the shadow of the nationalist Afrikaners and their Apartheid dominance. Indeed, the Afrikaanses are more than ready to incorporate and to steer the growing number of aimless Afrikaners as individuals, but stripped from their stigmatised past. There is no need for the Afrikaanses to join the Afrikaners, as some nationalist Afrikaners shamelessly try to do. As said, it is just the opposite: the Afrikaanses have become the present-day parents and safe house for the Afrikaners in a future South Africa.48-50,59,77,83

There have been various developing stages after the early Cape Settlement and the later Cape Colony. The identity of the “Afrikaner” grew from “Dutch” to “Cape Dutch” to “proto-Afrikaner” to “Afrikaner”. This Afrikaner identity is now in an end stage. A new entity is now starting to awake, the “Afrikaanse” of today and tomorrow.75,76,83

Who are the Afrikaanses?

All South Africans who speak Afrikaans at home can be defined as “Afrikaanses”. Ethnic features, like religious beliefs and practices, schooling and political orientation and racial features are not role players in inclusion at all. These characteristics take second place. Members are identified by only one thing: they are “Bruin” or Coloured Afrikaanses, Afrikaner Afrikaanses, Black Afrikaanses, etc. There are surely great similarities between some “Afrikaanses”, like adhering to Christianity, but this feature is also contradicted by the inclusion of some Islam “Afrikaanses”. The groups includes different political orientations or membership of different political groupings and it includes members from the Black, White, Coloured and Indian communities and various other mixed races.49,75,80,83-86

The “Afrikaanses” is an open non-racial and non-ethnic social group defined as a group by only a single linguistic factor, Afrikaans as mother tongue. As with all developing cultural groups, uniformity in political, religious and other behaviours can follow in time, but it will surely be free from the comprehensive and extreme Afrikaner dogma, developed and nurtured by the nationalist Afrikaners for over a century and more.

The first foundations for public approval for the classification “Afrikaanses” was laid by the AB in 1998 when this nationalist Afrikaner group tried in vain to grow their dwindling numbers by declaring that all those who show a broad inclination towards the nationalistic Afrikaner values and lifestyle should be accepted as Afrikaners.82

When one looks at the number of non-Afrikaners who qualify as Afrikaanses based on the criterion of using Afrikaans in their daily lives, the numbers are strong. It is important to note in this regard that in 2011, many of the 13.5% of the total South African population who spoke Afrikaans at home were Blacks, Coloureds and Indians and not Whites. The ration of non-Afrikaners to Afrikaanses who speak Afrikaans at home is 60:40. To be more precise, of the approximately 7.5 million South Africans whose mother tongue is Afrikaans, only more or less 2.7 million were White, compared to the 3.6 million Coloureds and 1.2 million other non-White Afrikaans speakers at home. The Coloured population shows a constant growth as the majority Afrikaans speakers. In total is it estimated that 20 million South Africans speak Afrikaans every day in some form during their communication at work or in their social life, a number that completely overshadows the present-day Afrikaners’ input.74,75,80,86-88

There is also evidence that the number of non-Whites whose mother tongue is Afrikaans is increasing: in 2001 they were 5.98 million, compared to 6.9 million in 2011, representing a rise of nearly one million in ten years. The Northern Cape (53.8%) and the Western Cape (49.7%) have the highest percentages of Afrikaans speakers of all the South African provinces. These numbers include a strong non-Whites element, already making regional establishments or enclaves of Afrikaanses possible.74,75,80,86

It is clear that the “Afrikaanses” has become an important non-racial- and non-ethnic cluster that can play a dynamic role in the new South Africa. The group is borderless in terms of culture, ethnicity and race, seasoned and schooled in assimilation and miscegenation over more than three centuries. They have lived both inside and outside the restrictions and stigmas of Apartheid, their unbounded interrelationships offer them the opportunity to eradicate the racial and ethnic discrimination so inherent to the nationalist Afrikaners and which led them to the immense disrespect for Afrikaans as the language of the oppressor. The Afrikaanses, it seems, have the ability to secure a better future citizen’s place for themselves and their descendants in new South Africa. This differs from the insecure Afrikaners. Only one determinant plays a role in their minds, to differentiate them from the rest of the South African population with their adaptable and politics-free Afrikaans language.13,59,89,90

The question left at this stage is: can every Afrikaner become an Afrikaanse? To a certain extent, the Afrikaner’s transformation to new political affiliations from die-hard NP-Broederbonders already started after 1994 after the collapsed of the NP. Many repositioned to the DA and smaller Afrikaner-orientated parties, a small group even joined the ANC. But, for most of these Afrikaners the political focus was on finding a political organisation that they believe can serve their needs as the NP did. The Afrikaanses, on the other hand, stand cultural and politically apart from the interests of the nationalist Afrikaner identity. There are two big obstacles that the nationalist Afrikaner has to overcome to become an “Afrikaanse”. First, he would have change as an individual to a person without the collective baggage of the nationalist Afrikaner culture that he supported for many years and was born into. Secondly, he would have to denounce in all honesty all the racial and ethnic attitudes so inherently part of the nationalist Afrikaner regime before 1994. This change seems to be a small step for a suppressed slave or an individual used to discrimination for his whole life, but a giant and difficult step for a rigid nationalist Afrikaner.

3.2.4 The name of the Afrikaner

The naming and positioning of the “Afrikaner” within the South African society and in the international context as a specific entity followed the same path that his main ancestors, the Dutch, Germans and the French, embarked on centuries ago. Groups identify themselves by fronting a specific identifying name, a clear racial and ethnic orientation and entity, a unique language ability and preference, a well-defined and comprehensive economical system, a geographic region and specific cultural habits, customs and traditions. This includes unique folklore, religious and political beliefs, education and principles. This complex is jealously guarded, and any negative influences or intruders that can endanger its continuation, are fearlessly attacked, either verbally or physically in the form of wars. In addition, its growth and spread other non-related groups and subordinates are scrumptiously promoted and sometimes shamelessly forced to subordinate them and sometimes incorporate them into the group. In South Africa this was done through Apartheid and its strict discriminative laws imposed by the nationalist Afrikaners.21,22,27,36,38,39,42,91

In South Africa the early White political dispensation starting in 1652 and especially the later Afrikaner political dispensation starting in 1902, strictly adhered to the above methods. Here, the name “Afrikaner”, as if truly stretching from 1652, the perceived uniqueness of the language “Afrikaans” as something developed by and belonging solely to the Afrikaner from the beginning, and the exclusiveness of the Afrikaner’s race orientation, labelled as “pure” White, European and Caucasian, became prominent determinants and drivers in the Afrikaner’s racial and ethnic thinking and planning. But did these assumed successes and achievements of the Afrikaner really meet the criteria of fact and truth?3,26,38,39,92

It seems that the name “Afrikaner” is clouded by controversy and contradictions. It is clear that the Whites at the Cape saw themselves as a part of Europe and as citizens of their various European homelands during the early colonial period, even up to the late 1800s, instead of a new race or ethnic population or citizen at the Cape. The fact is that the name “Afrikaner” did not denote a group identity for many years after 1652. The early Cape ancestors of the today’s Afrikaners were simply described as “Christians”, “colonists”, “emigrants”, “inhabitants” or “ingezeetenens”, “free citizens” or “vrijburgers” and “burghers” for a long time. Even the name “Boer” is a late-comer on the scene.26,39,92-94
.
The Cape Colony resident, Hendrik Biebouw’s reference to himself as an “Afrikaander” (“Africander”) in 1707 can not been seen as irrefutable evidence that the “Afrikaner” was already a specific name of an identifiable White group at the Cape. To the contrary, Biebouw’s “Afrikaander” identity or classification seems more applicable to the numerous half-castes, Coloureds and other mixed groups at the Cape at that time. These mixed groups often had the same White and non-White ancestors as today’s Afrikaners, but even at that point they had already begun to develop biologically and culturally away from the Whites as an early branch of the existing Cape Coloured people.95,96

Above finding is in line with that of Giliomee7, p. 8 when he states:

In the eighteenth century the term Africander (Afrikaner) was used primarily for the offspring of slaves born in Africa, usually out of liaisons with ex-slaves, Khoisan or Whites. This usage continued until little more than a century ago [more or less 1890]. An official list of Cape Town prostitutes, taken in 1868, was headed by ‘Africanders’, referring to people of mixed descent. By 1880 the designation Afrikaner was also claimed by some Africans in the Eastern Cape. After a branch of the Afrikaner Bond was established in Cradock an African organisation, the Imbubwe, was formed. Its members claimed that their organisation was the true Afrikaner Bond while the White organisation was merely the Boeren Bond.▼

A community of approximately 100 families, descendants of the freed slaves who accompanied the Voortrekkers to Transvaal in the middle 1800s and settled in 1886 at Onverwacht near the town Cullinan after receiving land from Paul Kruger. They also identify themselves as “Afrikaners” and proudly called themselves “Boer” to this day. They speak Afrikaans as first language and follow Afrikaner traditions, making the exclusive name “Afrikaner” more complex, undefined and multi-racial. This non-White group identification, together with the claims of the Eastern Cape Blacks that they are Afrikaners, foregrounds Biebouw’s remark in 1707 on being an “Afrikaner/Afrikaander/Africander” and that of the Cape prostitutes of mixed descent who called themselves “Afrikaner/Africander” as early as 1890. It was clearly a more non-White than White group in the beginning.97,98

History resulted in three kinds of divisions among the early Dutch-Afrikaner grouping: urban/rural, regional and a class division, each with clear cultural overtones. The urban/rural division was particular salient – those considered the better-educated and more civilised Cape Dutch of the Western Cape or interior towns versus those considered to be ignorant, illiterate and backward Boers living on farms beyond the Western Cape. Regional differences brought a division between the Western Cape Afrikaners and the later Transvaal Boer Afrikaners, especially based on their economical differences. The class differences contained a further difference within the rural Dutch-Afrikaner Boer society with the wealthy land-holding farmers versus the marginalised, poor farmers, many of them bywoners without any land. Many of these poor Dutch-Afrikaners were abused by the rich Boer (Dutch)-Afrikaners and they were not financially and physically supported by the governments of the Boer republics. They were forced out of work on farms where cheaper Black tenants provided the rich Boers with cheaper labour, leading to further unemployment, illiteracy and poverty. During the Anglo Boer War these Boer bywoners formed the bulk of the ‘joiners’ who sided with the British, not only splitting a uniform Afrikaner nation and Afrikaner identity even further, but also delaying the establishment of the culture for many years to come.7

It is therefore clear that by the early 1800s two distinct White groups had developed under the umbrella of the proto-Afrikaner in the Cape Colony, namely the “Cape Dutch” and the “Boers”. These two broad groups in time not only became culturally and economically different from each other, but to a certain extent stood at opposite ends of the continuum of political and socio-religious thinking and doing. The Cape Dutch group, living in and around Cape Town, was generally comprised of a better educated and socially developed society, compared to the Boers who were living in isolation in the country-side with a total lack of educational and cultural facilities. Most of the Cape Dutch (who only adopted and promoted the name “Afrikaner” after the 1900s) of the Cape Colony were pro-British and initially sided with the DRC against the Great Trek of approximate 10 000 Boers [the “Voortrekkers” (First Movers or Pioneers)] who migrated to what became Natal, the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Northern Cape in 1830 to 1840. These cultural and other differences between the Cape Dutch and the Boers and their separate development as two different proto-Afrikaner peoples, are reflected in the Cape Dutch hostility towards the Boers. Some of the Cape Dutch even fought on the side of the British against the Boers. This intimate Cape Dutch-Briton association found expression the many marriages and social and business relations between the Cape Dutch and the British in the early Cape. Many of today’s well-known Afrikaner families supplied the British with food stock for their fighting soldiers in Transvaal and the Free State and were strong British-orientated Cape politicians in line with Cecil John Rhodes’ thinking.3,26,38,39,92,99

The name “Boer” was initially used to refer to the occupation of the “Trek Boers” (travelling farmers) on the Eastern Cape frontier of the Colony around the early 1700s. This group gradually moved northwards to form the “Grens Boers” (border farmers). They later became the vast majority of the “Voortrekkers”. In this way “Boer” became a name for most of the proto-Afrikaners who permanently lived north of the Cape’s eastern border and later north of the Orange River. This group was openly anti-British and anti-colonialist and they had clear ethnic and racial discriminatory tendencies based on their religion. Their lifestyle grew out of their pioneer circumstances and their exposure to a pre-modern environment. These “Boers” were mostly involved in agriculture, living in isolation and lacking basic facilities like schools and career training facilities, hospitals, religious institutions, civil services and the government structures that the Cape Dutch enjoyed and promoted. The Boers’ homes, travelling facilities and amenities seemed to be of a much lower quality and standard as that of the Cape Dutch. Their more rugged lifestyle was necessitated by the undeveloped and rough regions where they farmed. It contrasted their ancestors from Europe and the Cape Dutch in Cape Town and the Cape Colony’s way of living. Eventually this lifestyle spread gradually over the whole eastern border area. This more elementary culture was transferred to the first generation of Boers [now also named “burgers” (burghers)] of the Transvaal and the Free State by the “Voortrekkers”.38,39,82,93,94,100,101

The two groups of proto-Afrikaners, namely the Cape Dutch and the Boers, also differed in their use of the proto-Afrikaans dialect up to the late 1800s all over the Cape. The cultural and socio-economic differences became rooted in the name Boer, and this group started using the name Boer instead of Cape Dutch to identify them as a specific group. These differences later became political and socio-cultural characteristics with the founding of the two anti-British and outright racially discriminative Boer Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The differences that highlighted the Boer and Burgher identification as distinct from Cape Dutch, were further strengthening by the two Anglo Boer Wars that followed. It left many of the Boers hostile and embittered towards the British and the Cape Dutch.39,82,101

The literature preceding the establishment of the Union of South Africa referred to the Transvaal and Free State Afrikaans-speaking citizens as “Boers” and not “Afrikaners.” People like general Smuts, who was initially from the Cape Colony, referred to himself as an “Afrikaner,” but this was at a much later stage during and after the establishment of the Union where new political opportunism played a role. His earlier references to himself, just after the Second Anglo Boer War was to an “old Cape colonialist” (“Kaapkolonialer”) and an old Capetonian (“Kapenaar”), simply meaning a citizen of the Cape Colony.92

It is important to note that three Afrikaner organisations were formed from the 1870s onwards to promote proto-Afrikaans and the Dutch Afrikaners’ interests in terms of an informal nationalism, which undoubtedly included the name “Afrikaner.” The first was the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners, followed by the establishment of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Boere Beschermingsvereniging (BBV) by Jan Hofmeyr in 1878 (representing capitalist farmers and businessmen, the pro-British capitalist Afrikaner nationalism). This was followed by the establishment of the Afrikaner Broederbond in 1879 by the reverend SJ du Toit (for a while it was called the Cape South African Party, but it changed back to Afrikaner Broederbond), representing a radical Afrikaner nationalism away from British domination. These three organisations all aimed to take care of the poor Afrikaans-speaking people’s interests in the Cape.3,7,26

This split into nationalism and a pro-British attitude strengthened a deep Afrikaner class divide and the divide into various opposing and competing sub-groups based on precise economic, social, educational and cultural lines in the Dutch-Afrikaner community. This kind of divide (a negative characteristic of the Afrikaners’ lifestyle and thinking) created conflict in Afrikaner ranks. They split their interests, which interfered with the development of a uniform Afrikaner nationalism. This conflict was further intensified when Hofmeyr captured control of the AB, steering it towards liberal politics and interests, away from the less educated and poor Afrikaners’ immediate politics and interests.7, 102

In the Orange Free State and Transvaal early Afrikaner nationalism was mainly fuelled by the Boer community’s input. It was driven by their hostility and hate of British imperialism and the British aggression against them during the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902). It stood in direct opposition to the pro-British nationalism of the Cape Dutch. A uniformed Afrikaner identity and nationalism was impossible in the Cape in the 1880s and after the outcome of the Anglo Boer War in Transvaal and Orange Free State after 1902. This made unity with the Cape Dutch immediately after 1910 impossible, slowing the development of the Afrikaner as a unified group. This development only continued with the political actions of DF Malan and the NP after 1913 and after 1910 with the intervention of Louis Botha and Jan Smuts to bring about Afrikaner–English reconciliation and reconciliation between the Southern Afrikaners with the Northern Afrikaners. This slowly brought about the unification of subgroups of Afrikaners towards the founding of an Afrikaner entity.7

It took the early Afrikaner architects of Afrikaner nationalism (later hijacked by the NP-AB-DRC Afrikaner nationalists) over a century, starting in 1880s, to establish the term Afrikaner and the Afrikaner “nation”, a dogma based on the “idea of an indigenous people occupying a common territory, having a common language, vigorous culture and proud history, identified by a common name and sharing consciousness of kind”, writes Giliomee.7, p. 13 Central to this is the deliberate transformation of proto-Afrikaans from a “kitchen” or “Hottentot” language to a language in its own right. It ultimately became a modern language with a proper body of literature, spoken by a specific group, namely the Afrikaner.7

Giliomee7, p. 12 writes:

They projected it as White man’s language which set the Afrikaners off from White English-speakers and Brown Afrikaans-speakers. The ethnic project also included the rewriting of history along nationalist lines. Prominent in this were the accounts of Afrikaner heroism and suffering, in particular the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War, and the efforts of the Afrikaners to maintain themselves as a distinct people among ‘savage’ and ‘heathen’ nations. A new nationalist ideology was also constructed. Derived ideas of more abstract nature were grafted upon long-standing beliefs about the need to maintain White supremacy and reject racial intercourse. Prominent among the derived ideas was Calvinism which was strongly propagated by Malan and his followers in the South and the Doppers of Potchefstroom in the North. This Calvinism, or rather neo-Calvinism, argued that God had ordained separate nations, each with a unique destiny, which charged the Afrikaners to maintain themselves in separate cultural, religious and political institutions”.

The main intention, said Giliomee7, was to give meaning to the rather amorphous concept of “Afrikaner,” yet a degree of ambivalence remained around the name for a long time, and it is still there today. The dictionary description of “Afrikander” in the in 1910s was still that it is a person ‘born of White parents in South Africa,” far removed from the political claim of some Cape Dutch as their exclusive name.7

The evidence shows that the name “Afrikaner” was possibly used in a rather non-descriptive way by the middle to late 1800s in the Cape Colony, especially around Cape Town, but not as an exclusive, identifiable and uniform name as it is used by today’s Afrikaners. The name “Afrikaner” to describe a uniform group only took hold after the Second Anglo Boer War when the “Boers” (also commonly identified and referred to as “Transvaal Burgers” or “Transvaal Boers” and “Vrystaat Burgers” or “Vrystaat Boers” respectively) of the two old Republics were left financially devastated and destitute as a result of their War efforts and many were forced to move to the cities for work and a living. In this new and alien environment, they were forced as individuals to adapt to a totally new social and political lifestyle and thinking. This political and economic new dawn, activated by the liberal Cape Dutch and the British authorities governing Southern Africa, affected the mindset of the Burghers of the old Transvaal and Free State. The masked Anglicisation efforts of the authorities promoted the new identity and name “Afrikaner,” which was at the time used to start the political reconciliation between the Cape Colony and the two old Republics. This name was also in line with the blanket name “Southern African” to activate the new South African citizenship created by the Union. In supporting this new “Afrikaner” identity and name, many of the old political leaders of the Transvaal and Free State who joined the new post-1902 South African political dispensation, started to echo more and more Afrikaner nationalism, and from there the use of the name “Afrikaner” for political opportunism.3,26,39,92,95,96,103

In addition, the political climate surrounding the formation of the Union of South Africa did not leave space for the incorporation of the name “Boer” into the new political context and process. This was especially sensitive for the Cape-based Cape Dutch Afrikaners. Leaders promoted the general term “Afrikaner” that was until then mostly associated with the Cape Dutch Afrikaner.3,26,39,82,103-105

It is clear that the name “Afrikaner” to describe the Afrikaners as a specific ethno-cultural group – so frequently used today in public and political literature – slowly emerged all over South Africa only after 1902 with the collapse of the two Boer republics. In 1902 the English author, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, also referred to the Boers who moved eastwards from the Cape Colony in the middle 1800s as “Africanders.” It is unknown if this reference was affected by the new “status” of the Boers after 1902, or if it was a name already in use in the Cape, although not widely in the late 1800s. In retrospect, it seems to have been the new, uniformed and politically promoted name in use from 1902 onwards that influenced Doyle to refer to the trekkers in this way in his writing. It was a referral to these trekkers as early proto-Afrikaners. Even references to the name Afrikaner in public by prominent leaders like General Hertzog after 1902, do not confirmed the existence of an official and uniform group of “Afrikaners” before 1900. People like Hertzog and others offer no confirmation that the name “Afrikaner” was commonly used in the five political and governmental regions of South Africa before 1902 and thus automatically transferred to the Union. It must instead be seen also as a retro-perspective used by Hertzog and other old Boer leaders to describe the new South African scenario. Also, the new common use of the name Afrikaner and the popular descriptions of the history of the Afrikaner nation, offered political power to politicians after 1910 as they could mobilise political support and unity for their own future careers.3,7,26

A good example of this kind of political rhetoric is specifically revealed by Hertzog himself in 1911 when he defined the concepts of “Afrikaner” and “Afrikaner nation” as follows3, p. 301: “In die laaste tyd het mense hulle baie druk gemaak oor die benaming Afrikaner. Hulle het self so ver gegaan om ‘n ander term te soek om daarvoor in die plek te stel. Natuurlik te vergeefs. Dit word gedoen has uitsluitelik omrede van jaloesie. Die Hollandssprekendes was die eerste Afrikaner. Hy kon dit nie help nie. Reeds 150 jaar voor die oordrag van die Kaap aan die Britse Regering was hy hier gehuisves vir goed…Die so geminagtigte Afrikaner het die baanbreker geword van die Suid-Afrikaanse beskawing”.

Hertzog often contradicted himself when speaking about the identification of the Afrikaner. Even by 1921 Hertzog still used names like “Dutch/Afrikaans” versus “English-speaking Afrikaners” and “white and black Afrikander”. Politicians like Hertzog used the more inclusive variant when it suited their political purpose, rather than to be guided by true historical facts. John Vorster also used this kind of political rhetoric in the 1960s with the same short-sighted claim that the NP created the entity Afrikaner and the Afrikaans language.7

As can been seen, most of the political and emotional rhetoric used by Hertzog and later Vorster, failed to offer sound evidence to confirm their claims about the Afrikaner. At most, these terms serve as superficial retro-perspectives on the historical development of the Afrikaner.

Even now after a century, there is some evidence of resistance to the name “Afrikaner” and its broad ethnic and racial classification and stigma. This resistance comes from a small minority of White Boers. Some descendants of the “Boers” in certain geographical parts of South Africa still see themselves as a unique cultural minority that is separate from the larger “Afrikaner”-group, its culture and the name. They do not want to be associated with Afrikaner nationalism. Sub-group and regional names, like “kolonianer” “Boesmanlander”, “Bokveller”, “Bolander”, “Namakwalander”, “Kapenaar”, “Transvaler”, “Vrystater”, “Dopper-Afrikaner” and “Karoo-boer”, etc., are still used by remnants of these minorities to introduce and to identify themselves. In most of these cases, their status as South Africans takes second place, while they ignore the Afrikaner identity. Even the epithets of “joiner”, “hendsopper”, “traitor” and “National Scout” stuck in the minds of certain Afrikaner groups as more important identifications than the broad name “Afrikaner”. The strong “Boer” mentality still, after many years, lingers just below the surface. This is reflected in the use of the term by non-Whites as a name to identify abusive and racially prejudiced Afrikaans-speaking Whites.11,50,75,80,82,87,93,94,100,105-108

The inclination to differentiate between different sub-groups of Afrikaners and to split into factions can gain momentum in the future as the forced and to a certain extent artificial unity of the Afrikaners during the 1900s, starts to disintegrate. The empowerment of the Afrikaanses can disintegrate it further, if not totally over time.3,7,26,39,78,101,109,110

3.2.5 Afrikaners in numbers

Identifying the “true” Afrikaners as a specific group by looking at numbers is a very complex and controversial issue. The traditional classification of Afrikaners as all Whites who speak Afrikaans at home is also controversial and could have led to an over-estimation of their numbers for many years, offering them power as a political pressure group. The inclusion of Coloureds who go through as Whites in statistical research can be a confounding factor. Afrikaners who live outside South Africa permanently but still reflect as South African citizens can also lead to an enormous over-estimation. If the traditional classification is used, the numbers of the Afrikaners have declined dramatically since 1960 compared to the total population of South Africa. In 1960 they made up 10%, compared to only 5.7% of the total population in 2001, reflecting a 0.1% annual decline over 40 years. In 2011, this percentage dropped to 5.2%, reflecting a 0.05% annual decline over 10 years. This placed them below the Coloureds, whose numbers were 4 615 401 in 2011. The total number of Afrikaners living in South Africa in 2001 was estimated at 2 576 184, compared to 2 710 461 in 2011 (an estimated total of between 3.3 to 3.5 million when the Afrikaners living outside the borders are included). It is estimated that between 1994 and 2004, between 1 and 1.5 million Afrikaners left South Africa permanently. This emigration number was conservatively estimated for 2006 to 2011 at 112 046 and for 2011 to 2015 at 95 158.95,96,111-115

It seems that it is specifically the number of Afrikaners in the age group 15 to 34 years that is declining: in 2009 their number was 1 245 000, compared to 1 193 000 in 2014 (a decline of 52 000). For 2009 to 2014, the decline in the number of Afrikaners in the age group 15 to 24 years was 5.2% and for the age group 25 to 34 it was 3%.75,80,87,95,96,111,115

The White segment of the population, of which the Afrikaners formed approximately 58% in 2011, declined with 4.2% between 2009 and 2014, while the Black population increased with 7.3%. The statistics for 2011 to 2016 confirmed the declining trend in the White segment numbers: the age group 0 to 4 years declined from 268 267 to 253 035; the age group 20 to 24 declined from 313 616 to 303 257; the age group 25 to 29 declined from 336 355 to 287 792; the age group 30 to 34 declined from 318 329 to 279 475; and the age group 35 to 39 declined from 342 316 to 278 789. The White segment’s decline in total for the period 2011 to 2016 was from 4 586 838 to 4 516 691 (a decline of 70 147 or -1.5% in five years). 75,80,87,95,96,111,115

What is shocking about the 2017 findings of Statistics South Africa (SSA) is the dramatic aging of the White population over the past 20 years. This is the result of the emigration of younger people, the decline in White births and the fact that people are living longer. Where the ratio of people 16 years and older to children younger than 16 years is 20 above 16 years per 100 children for Blacks, it has become 130 above 16 years per 100 children for Whites. If this trend continues, only a small pocket of Whites will be left in South Africa in years to come. Brand-Jonker 117 estimates the total South African White population at only 3% (compared to the present 8%) in 60 years. Cronje is even more pessimistic and he thinks that the White population can decline to between 1% and 3% in less than 40 years. This negative population profile of Whites is fully applicable to the Afrikaners.109,117,118

The Afrikaner doctrine of the NP-AB-DRC leadership that they have a “chosen role as a nation in Africa by God” and as “the bearers of the European culture in South Africa,” made them blind to the dramatic changes in their status in Africa, “with or without God’s will”. This hard reality has now arrived in 2017.37,119,120

Afrikaners have never taken a hard look at themselves in the mirror. They have a shocking lack of insight into the country’s present and future political and racial environment. They therefore pay no individual attention to their dwindling numbers and diminishing political and military power base, which could be devastating in long run for their existence. This lack of basic insight to read population warnings is illustrated well by Ginsberg121, p. 21 when he writes: “Back in 1989 there was one black child born every 28 seconds, and one white child born every 12 minutes”. Nearly 30 years ago Afrikaners knew what was awaiting them, but they failed to act constructively.

It is clear that it is not only the Afrikaner numbers that are declining, but the broader White segment as well. This implies a decline in political empowerment, not only for the Afrikaners, but for all Whites.75,80,87,95,96,111,115

3.2.6 Afrikaner culture

The Afrikaners’ unique ethno-cultural identity has always been intricately linked to the name “Afrikaner” and their numbers as a tribe. Of the main components of the Afrikaner culture are the Afrikaans language, religion, cultural heritage, education, family life, employment, sports and recreation, and folklore. This unique Afrikaner culture was nurtured and maintained in isolation by means of a system of separate development in which the non-White cultures, especially that of the Blacks, were seen as inferior to that of the Afrikaner. It was even sometimes regarded as non-Christian.37-39,119

This early unique Afrikaner culture and the strict isolation from the rest of South African cultures in an effort to conserve it, circled out to all spheres of South African social life. This resulted in separate sport and recreation activities, residential areas and health, school and training facilities; as well as legal prohibitions on miscegenation. The foundation was Christian nationalism. The basic intention was not only to preserve the Afrikaner identity, but to maintain the fundamentals of Afrikaner culture and to limit it to the Afrikaner-milieu alone. In terms of the doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism, the principle was to promote and to reserve Afrikaner culture at all cost; and to cleanse it from foreign, especially Black cultural influences. Foundational to this doctrine was the belief that the Afrikaner and White civilisations would disappear if it became contaminated by the Black culture. This disappearance of the White and Afrikaner civilisation would automatically result in the disappearance of the Afrikaner as a person.26,37,39,119

Religion was always a strong role player in the Afrikaners’ behaviour and their political thinking and indoctrination, which took the form of a Christian nationalism. Socialism and communism were feared, not because of their implications for the economy, but due to the threat to the Afrikaners’ religion and to their privileges and favoured lifestyles. The Afrikaners’ religious beliefs and traditions were founded on the Protestant practices of the Reformed Church of Holland in the 17th century and were later influenced by English-speaking ministers of the UK. Of all these early role players, it seems that the French Huguenots’ racial-religious influence on the political mindsets of the proto-Afrikaner was immense and has been under-estimated in evaluations of the Afrikaners’ later racism. These French settlers, arriving at the Cape in 1688 at a time when the White population lacked a strong unified political mindset, strongly underwrote the Swiss church reformer John Calvin’s ideas that the church should influence the government and that races should remain pure and separate. This new racial-religious doctrine was quickly incorporated into to Cape’s religious system, which was up until that time influenced by the Goske agreement of 1671. French Calvinism quickly became part of the proto-Afrikaner and the doctrine of the Cape Reformed Church, leading to a unique kind of Calvinistic Protestantism among the proto-Afrikaners and later Afrikaners. By 1985, as many as 92% of Afrikaners were still members of the various Afrikaner Reformed Churches, showing the lasting influence of Calvinist Protestantism on Afrikaners after 300 years.37,38,95,96

The Cape French Huguenots, known for their extreme religious-political views on race, can therefore be regarded as one of the main causes of the later racial discrimination in South Africa. In fact, the Huguenots’ racial attitude was one of the reasons for their persecution and expulsion from France that brought them to the Cape.95,96

The above early blueprint of religious-racial thinking in time led to a specific social-cultural lifestyle among the proto-Afrikaners of the Cape Settlement, Cape Colony and the Boer Republics and later especially the Afrikaners of the Union and the Republic of South Africa. Central to this particular lifestyle and inclination were European, Western and Christian values, standards and life views; community cohesion; a familiar and recognisable environment; a specific way of life; a sense of origin and identity; the psychological satisfaction of an in-group community life; standards of public order, behaviour and respectability; traditions and prescriptions; financial well-being and political-empowerment; and so-called “white culture,” mythical or not. This blueprint became a driver and guideline for their daily doings, decision making, beliefs, customs, traditions and education, even outside the racial and class context. It became so recognisable that literature refers to it as the “unique culture” of the Afrikaners.7,37,38,119

Although this “European Afrikaner culture” of the Afrikaner lacked reference to any European society, Afrikaners believed that they are the bearers of a superior, “African-free” European system that required the imposition of pervasive controls and management of Blacks.37,119

This cultural-religion-political inclination affected all of the Afrikaner’s life to such an extent that major Christian religious holidays like Christmas, Good Friday, Ascension Day were reserved next to political holidays like Founder’s Day, Republic Day, Kruger Day, Day of the Vow. These days became “holy days” that all Afrikaners strictly adhered to and respected. Belonging to one of the Afrikaner Reformed churches was a priority and essential for social mobility. Sunday became a day of rest, reserved for attending church services, with shops, movie theatres and the practice of organised sport being forbidden. This Calvinist Protestantism was intertwined with certain church activities like baptism, catechism and Bible instruction, and specific marriage and burial traditions and customs that reminds one of 17th century Protestant practices.95,96

Afrikaners children were educated within a framework of a strict and punitive Protestant religio-political worldview. Children were required to think, develop and behave within the confines of this conservative mindset. Even a strict clothing protocol was prescribed at Afrikaner schools and churches. In line with their Calvinist Protestantism, children were required to receive a good school training from the age of six to 18 years, and where possible, to attend tertiary institutions.95,96

The Afrikaners’ Calvinist Protestantism rites of passage were inculcated into their folklore, public and personal relationships, family life, dress, traditions, lifestyle rules and prescriptions, sport and recreational activities and employment traditions and styles. Boer music (“Boeremusiek”), folk dance (“Volkspele”), social dancing (“sokkie”) and “Boeresport” (a range of games like tug of war, three-legged races, jukskei and other games) became traditions unique to the Afrikaner.37,95,96

There have been changes to the Afrikaner’s culture, some recent and swift after 1994, while others have been happening gradually over many years. First, there has been a gradual religious mindshift with regard to Black people in the Afrikaner, but it ultimately resulted in immense changes to and the Afrikaner culture, basically obliterating it. This left many deviating from political and moral prescriptions, making them more pragmatic and materialistic. Although the DRC kept Afrikaners from church integration, the Calvinist Protestantism of the proto-Afrikaner was also taught to the Cape slaves and the Cape Coloureds. The various missionary institutes also transferred Christianity to the Blacks. The effect of the early Christianisation efforts on the lifestyles of non-Whites is well illustrated in research. Christianity in time spread to the rest of the South African population, to such an extent that 87.9% of the Blacks and 90% of the total South African population adhere to Christianity today. This outcome was one of the reasons why the doctrine of separate development from the early 1700s onwards (institutionalised as Apartheid in the 20th century) with its belief that the Blacks were non-Christians or heathens in terms of Grand Apartheid, gradually became obsolete. The religious and cultural uniformity among Afrikaners weakened immensely after the fall of Apartheid. The solidarity and group unity on race and the “Black question”, faded. The improvement of religious ties and increased socialisation between Whites and Blacks bettered personal and work relations between some sectors of the Afrikaners and Blacks. Renewed post-1994 socialisation between Whites and Blacks further weakened the stereotypes held among Afrikaners that Blacks are primitive and that there are true racial differences that make Blacks culturally and psychologically inferior as humans and that keeps them from developing according to the standards of Western civilisation.78,119,122-125

The impact of the new South Africa also influenced the religious and cultural context of the present-day Afrikaner, changing it dramatically since 1994. Afrikaners have moved far away from the Huguenot doctrine of their grandfathers and their fathers. This is reflected in a decline in their adherence to Christianity, where as much as 82% Afrikaners belonged to the Dutch Reformed Churches in 1982, this membership has declined to only 1 450 861 out of a 2 576 184 possible Afrikaner members by 2001, representing 56%. In 2013 it was also reported that just more than 30% of Afrikaners still read the Bible at home, while as much as 62% Afrikaners said in 2015 that they no longer attend church on a weekly base.95,96

This “unofficial” split between the “old” and “present-day” doctrines, habits, customs and traditions of the DRC churches is clearly reflected by their members’ public rejection of firmly established church rituals, practices and even management. The position of women as ministers, gays in church life, etc. and various other controversial issues became burning issues, leading to direct confrontation between members and church leaders. Many members have come to reject the pre-1994 doctrines of the NP and AB. The Afrikaners, especially the younger generation, do not hesitate to take the church to court if they feel that the church has failed them and their new liberal religious perspectives. Subjects like atheism, communist Christianity and homosexuality are now openly discussed and even practiced or underwritten by Afrikaners without the pre-1994 fear of being completely rejected by the Afrikaner community. Religious radicalism and blind trust in the right-wing church culture has drastically declined. This new religious thinking among Afrikaners resulted in a large egression from the traditional Afrikaner churches to charismatic churches. These changes have resulted in the DRC threatening to split into two and it is no longer the church of choice among all Afrikaners.52-54,125-139

The only thing Afrikaner churches can still offer their often-conservative members is a White Christianity that is still guarded from a Brown and Black Christianity. Since 2000, many of the Afrikaners, especially the younger generation, have turned away from extreme religious practices and fundamentalism, lessening the dominance of the Calvinist component over their culture, social and political life.101,129,139

The diminishing role of the DRC in public life is indicative of a slow death in progress, as happened with the NP and AB. As with the NP during its dying years, the DRC fails to offer moral leadership to its members on their future in the new South Africa and to modernise its religious system.129,140

Of course the end of Apartheid contributed to the transformation in the Afrikaner’s religious mindset. This change has been supported by changes to the education system since 1994. This includes the exclusion of religious beliefs from schools, phasing out exclusively White public schools and higher education institutions with Afrikaans as medium of instruction. The newly established academic, work-related and social relationships between the younger Whites and Blacks, both generations born outside of the Apartheid contamination of hate and conflict, has hastened this change.58,141,142

Clearly, the sentiment around the traditional Afrikaner church, its powers and influences, has started to crumble fast, freeing the Afrikaner more and more from religious and cultural isolation, making them independent from a formal church association. This outcome, driven by new democratic and free thinking, has also started to shape the Afrikaner’s unique culture. Afrikaners’ personal and social views on education, childrearing, marriage and racism, including Afrikaner nationalism, have undergone a metamorphosis to something that is quite the opposite of the views that characterised the culture of twenty to thirty years ago. The maintenance of old traditions, views, opinions and values have weakened and seems to be in a process of diminishing. Political and social changes and reforms are gruelling processes, sparing not even that which has been regarded as sacred for many centuries. The Afrikaners culture bears evidence of this gruelling process of the last 20 years, steering more and more into an unblemished South African culture.7,37,119

3.2.7 Afrikaners’ White blood purity

A direct and primary co-determinant that activated and drove the Afrikaner to racial domination and discrimination was his fear that open racial societies would promote miscegenation, leading to a contamination of their Caucasian blood by non-White blood. Sexual contact between different races therefore had to be avoided, during Apartheid by means of legal prohibitions. It is the same fear that led the Nazis to the “Jewry question” and the Holocaust as an end result.1,26,39

Added to this, there was the widely accepted and propagated view that the “Afrikaner” is a unique and “pure” White, European and Caucasian race that had its biological and cultural origins in 1652 at the Cape Settlement. This was far from the truth and an incorrect idea. The proof in literature of a more than 6% non-White component in the bloodline of the earlier White Cape settlers in the immediate period after 1652 through miscegenation, was tactfully avoided by researchers and the nationalist Afrikaner himself from 1902 onwards. This denial became even stronger from the 1940s onwards with the development of Afrikaner nationalism.3,7,39

The estimated 6% blood from other races in the Afrikaner’s bloodline is, in fact, far too low. Some research puts it at 7.2%, while other research reflects a 10.7% Indian influence on the Afrikaners’ matrilineal gene pool from Malaysian and other slave women (up to the early 1800s, 80% of the slaves came from India. It was only from 1730 onwards that the import of slaves from Madagascar was intensified).73,143

There is also an erroneous view that this early intermingling was limited to few and certain White families, and that these 6% to 10.7% mixed Afrikaner descendants were pushed from White society to form the new Coloured population at the Cape. This vertical biological development of a closed and outcast group of mixed people, mostly excluded from the White nucleus that formed modern Afrikaners, is surely true as evidenced by the South African Coloureds and other mixed people of today. The politician and former premier of the Cape Province, Peter Marais, describes this “schizophrenic” split between people of the same bloodline well49, p. 7: “Ons (wit en bruin mense) is een volk. Een pa, maar twee ma’s”. The superficiality of this split is confirmed by historical evidence of an immense horizontal biological impact of “Coloured blood” on Afrikaners’ genes, contradicting the 6% to 10.7% of mixed Afrikaner descendants and of an exclusive separate vertical development of the Coloureds as a separate ethnic group.

The sited numbers (6% to 10.7%) selectively masked the true historical fact of a free social and sexual horizontal biological association between the races in the Cape, especially immediately after the introduction of the free burghers in 1657 up to 1671. The fact is, many of the children born to European fathers between 1650 and the late 1600s had slave mothers. Indeed, three out of four children born to slave mothers during 1650 to 1670 had White fathers (meaning that the direct, first line infusion of “non-White blood” into the White parent stock can even as high as 75%). The fact is that between 1657 1671, these early male “Afrikaner” ancestors took Black, Hottentot and Malay women. They were accepted into the White community, either as concubines or wives. They, together with some White women, became the parent stock of the Whites and the Afrikaners. These non-White women’s children, especially the females, were mostly assimilated into society directly and horizontally to make up for the shortage of women, without any discrimination or stigmatisation.7,38,73

This multiracial component that was incorporated into the White bloodline, a fact that is mostly hushed, had a profound effect on the gene pool of the later Afrikaners, seeing that no remarkable effort was made immediately after 1691 to bring more White colonist families or White women. Between 1657 and 1806, the total number of White women who arrived was 454 compared to 1 590 White male colonists. This comes to one female for every four males. In 1688 the White population consisted of 573 persons: 254 men, 88 women and 231 children, in other words one woman for every three men. The above White population (including the contingent of women from other races incorporated into the White family tree) of the late 1600s became the matrilineal Afrikaner parent stock and gene pool. These women who came to the early Cape married early and had large families. There was a high incidence of inter-family marriages as result of the shortage of females. These earlier proto-Afrikaner-families, founded on various racial and ethnic bloodlines, formed the trunk (nucleus) of the Afrikaner family tree that branched out to today’s Afrikaners.39

The 6% to 10.7% influence of other races on the earlier White colonists spread out horizontally since 1652. Within two generations, these genes formed part of all or most of the matrilineal White families at the Cape. This 6% to 10.7% is therefore misleading. The Afrikaner bloodline is far more inclusive of other races, and this intermingling affected most of the Whites at the Cape by 1754, when the census of Cape governor Ryk Tulbagh showed that White free burghers totalled only about 6 000. They were already outnumbered by more than 6 000 slaves (this was already apparent by 1710). Statistically speaking, the infusion of “blood” from other races to the early matrilineal White society at the Cape could results in a 100% “contamination” of the Afrikaner blood of “old” Afrikaner families by bloodlines from other races. This occurred due to repeated intermarriages between proto-Afrikaner families between 1652 and 1806.. This paints a picture that is totally different from the 6% to 10.7% reflected in literature.38,39,73,143

Literature sites the early horizontal European blood infusion to the matrilineal Afrikaner parent stock as 66.67% Dutch, 16.67% French, 14.29% German and 2.37% Scandinavian, Belgian, Scottish and Irish “bloodlines” at the Cape in the late 1600s and the early 1700s. These estimations change a little bit when the period is taken between 1657 and 1867. The numbers change as follows: 35.5% Dutch, 13.9% French, 34.4% German, 2.6% British, 2.8% Other European, 3.6% Unknown and 7.2% non-European. These numbers bluntly and blindly ignore the fact that the French impact of between 13.9% and 16.67% from 1688 constitutes another non-White horizontal blood contamination of the gene pool of the matrilineal Afrikaner parent stock at the Cape. This is due to the earlier Afro-Arab blood contamination of Europeans like the French, Portuguese and Spanish as a result of the early Moorish occupation of Europe and the miscegenation between the Europeans and the Afro-Arabs for many years. This French blood contamination was further transferred to the English through widespread intermarriages between the English and the French after the Battle of Hastings in 1066 and the French reign of England until 1366, to such an extent that 25% of the English forefathers are French. This multiracial bloodline was transferred to the proto-Afrikaners from the 1800s through intermarriages with the British at the Cape. The same is true of the blood contamination of proto-Afrikaners through their intermarriages with Portuguese and Spaniards at the Cape.72,73,91,144,145

The slow growth of the Cape White population since 1754 and the shortage of European newcomers, especially women, to contribute to pureness of their European bloodline, is confirmed by the fact that in 1806 (52 years after the Tulbagh census) the Cape’s White population was still very small, only 26 720. This reflected an average annual growth of only 502 White people. This confirms the branching out (downwards) of the multiracial genetic component through the matrilineal White parent stock due to constant and unavoidable inter-family marriages.95,96,143

This horizontal inter-family bloodline among Afrikaners that goes hand-in-hand with a multiracial component is further confirmed by various family illnesses prevalent in Coloured and Afrikaner families over many years and generations. Huntington’s disease is such an example. The South African mixed-race population contracted this illness from their Dutch and British ancestry, which they share with the Afrikaners. These symptomatic illnesses were undoubtedly further aggravated by the later horizontal intermarriages within Afrikaner families, especially in the late 1800s and early 1900s.73,146,147

By the late 1800’s there were more or less 46 000 Whites at the Cape. They were so interconnected through intermarriage that they were a great interrelated family rather than a new polyglot community. In the later stages of the intermarriage effect, non-White mothers formed a nucleus. Since there was a shortage of women up to the early 1800s, this led to further inter-family marriages between first and second nephews and nieces. In this way, a multiracial bloodline spread horizontally too many, if not most, of the branches of the Afrikaner family tree. This phenomenon was indeed much higher than the conservative and traditionally accepted 6% to 10.7% reflected in the general genealogical literature on the Afrikaner. It is not a case that only 6% to 10.7% of the Afrikaners are from other races; a case can rather be made that more than 6% to 10.7% of the initial gene pool of the Afrikaner is multiracial. This means that far more that 6% to 10.7% of today’s Afrikaners are are not purely White.72,73,144

The shortage of women at the Cape resulted in the mixed or Coloured females from the first miscegenation becoming concubines and wives to male newcomers. It was only by the middle 1800s that the gender ratio of 1:4 females to males improved. This highlights the comprehensive pathway of “blood contamination” that follows when the trunk of a family tree is horizontally penetrated by various bloodlines at an early stage and spreads out downwards over centuries to affect many, if not all, of the descendants. The later “whiteness” of these “contaminated” Whites did not come from the “blood purity” of the Whites at the Cape or their later abstinence from miscegenation with other races. It was simply the direct result of the “whitening” of their mixed race offspring with further miscegenation with Whites until they became indistinguishable from the White settlers themselves. However, genetically they are more or less the same as their mixed nephews and nieces.73,146

The argument that an initially “contaminated” White bloodline has been purified through generations of only procreating within the White gene pool, especially by means of the unofficial and official Apartheid policies that excluded other races from the Afrikaner’s society and family life to prevent mixing, carries little weight. Though racial segregation was practiced from the 1850s to the 1990s, this period of abstinence from racial miscegenation was too short to “purify” a large contingent of Afrikaners of mixed-race blood from their non-White ancestors, dating especially from 1652 to 1670 and immediate thereafter. Indeed, their skins became more white but their gene pool is not white to the same extent. No wonder that this inclusion of “black blood” now inspire proponents of the “Afrikaners-are-Africans”-view to declare the Afrikaner as “Black”.70-72,144,146

The present-day Afrikaner can pride himself in being “purely White” in terms of various definitions used worldwide. However, the term “White person” has since 1924 been defined in the State of Virginia, USA as “such a person has no trace whatsoever of any blood other than Caucasian or one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and no other non-Caucasia blood.” If this definition is used, many Afrikaners would not have passed the pure White test. Using the Nazi annulment definition where a single Jew in the family tree meant that a person was a Jew, the outcome would have been catastrophic. The chances of an Afrikaner to survive a Holocaust would have been zero. In South Africa, the Afrikaner has come to understand the dilemma of his mixed bloodline very well. In some cases, there is a sudden manifestation of a Coloured or Black child from White parents. The “White classification” of 1948 was amended in 1966 so that the child of two White parents were classified as “White”, notwithstanding the contrary physical appearances to be Black or mixed of their offspring.1,148,149

The South African human rights activist, Rhoda Kadalie, herself a descendant from White, Malaysian and Coloured fore-fathers, previously married to a White South African and the mother of children born out of this so called “mixed” marriage, rejected the Afrikaner’s insistence on his White blood purity when she said with pride about her family150, p.11: “Ons is ‘n regte basterfamilie”. This can surely also be said by many Afrikaners with the same pride as Kadalie, if they have courage enough and are honest with themselves about their heritage.

It is important to note that the South African Blacks also carry the genes of various races through their miscegenation with other races in South Africa. South African Black tribes are physically the end product of a racial mingling of the Negros of Africa and the Hamite people. South African Blacks can today be classified into four clear and separate Black groups in terms of language and culture. This is notwithstanding the ANC and the Marxist intentions and efforts to declare all South Africans “grey people” and the Blacks a uniform Black group for the sake of political rights. The four groups are the Nguni group, the Sotho-Tswana group, the Venda group and the Shangana-Tsonga group. These four main Black groups can further be divided into ten Black ethnic groups, each with their own culture, life values, language, and customs and characteristics that are conserved. They also inbred with Whites, Coloureds, Asians as well as other smaller groups like the Khoi-Khoi and Hottentot. This multi-racial inbreeding between Afrikaners, Coloureds and Blacks is still active and ongoing today as reflected by many mixed marriages and the birth of “mixed-race” children.42,50,113,142,150,151

One example of this racial intermingling is the marriage of the Democratic Alliance (DA) leader, Mmusi Maimane, to a White woman.15 This continuation of racial miscegenation that started in 1652 and the resulting new generation of intermixed Blacks and Whites is excellently described by Tambo Dali, a prominent Black South African married to a White South African, when he says142, p. 23: “In my family there are three colours: black, white and my four golden brown children.”

History has the inclination to repeat itself, also regarding natural racial mingling and miscegenation. South Africa is an excellent example where even the Immorality Act of the Apartheid regime could not stop it. Racial intermingling between Blacks and Whites is going to increase in the future, not decrease.

Ultimately, the colour of a person’s skin can contribute very little to the physical classification of a person into a specific South African race group. To call South African Blacks “pure Blacks” is also an error, just as the Afrikaners are not “pure Whites”: South Africans are to a great extent ethnically and racially much more “Creole” than they themselves know or want to know.42,78,113-115

4. Discussion

The view of the Afrikaner as a nation was clearly inapplicable and erroneous. The same can be said about the political and emotionally laden classifications of people as part of the “White nation”, the “Zulu nation”, or the “Xhosa nation”. Today, “nation” refers to the South African nation, including all the races, tribes and peoples inside the borders of the country under one legal definition and classification. The Afrikaners can at most be seen as a South African tribe, more specifically a group among which specific racial features and various cultural similarities are identifiable, based on a predominately mixed European origin.

Arguing that Afrikaans is an old language is wrong. Although it does have roots in the remote past, it is not yet a century old in 2017 as an official language. In addition, to argue that it was exclusively developed by the Afrikaner or that it is a sole Afrikaner possession is also wrong. Afrikaans developed into an independent language from European Dutch as its initial basis. This process was driven by South Africa’s “old” populations, starting in 1652. It was definitely not a language spoken exclusively by the proto-Afrikaners away from the other racial and ethnic groups. To the contrary, it was a mutual language, unsophisticated for a long time, spoken, written and used by the country’s various racial and ethnic groups in their communication with each other. Indeed, one of the first works in written Afrikaans was “Bayaan-ud-djyn”, an Islamic tract written in Arabic script by Abu Bakr in 1845.74,76,83,152-154

There are still various Afrikaans dialects that could be regarded as “Kombuis” Afrikaans. Examples include the varieties spoken in certain parts of the country by the various Afrikaans subgroups, like “Afri-kaaps” of the Cape Flats, “Cape Afrikaans” of Western Cape and the “Orange River Afrikaans” in the Northern-Cape. These dialects can with good reason be seen as public protests against the gold standard of Afrikaans that some academic purists with Afrikaner-nationalist sentiments see as the correct and only Afrikaans, belonging exclusively to the nationalist Afrikaners.73,89,107

This means the Afrikaans language is still in a process of development and it will certainly change considerably as time goes on, especially with the input of the Afrikaanses. The language will not only survive, like the Icelandic and Welsh languages did, it will grow through its use in primary communications between the Afrikaanses as their numbers grow.52-54,67,76,77,152,155-158

It is not wrong to say that Afrikaans also belongs to the “Afrikaanses”, a group that is much more comprehensive in numbers than the Afrikaner grouping, but free from the exclusive contaminated race and ethnicity connection of the Afrikaners. The presence of the Afrikaanses in the South African greater society indeed nullifies the nationalist Afrikaner argument that the Afrikaners are the sole creators or keepers and guardians of the Afrikaans language: there are many more role players. The future of Afrikaans, it seems, is much safer in the hands of the politically uncontaminated “Afrikaanses” than in those of the Afrikaner.7

The name “Afrikaner” in certain circles refers to an exclusive Afrikaner identity that entails political rights and that is regarded as centuries old and endangered by other races and even outsiders from his own White racial group if he allows miscegenation. This identity served as a justification for his discriminatory behaviour against persons from other races. The though construct surrounding this identity was clearly erroneous.

The research shows that the Afrikaners are indeed a very small group in the greater South African population. They are decreasing in number every year, and seeing the controversy around the name “Afrikaner” as an established identity that conserves Afrikaner unity and exclusiveness, the Afrikaner is already en route to dissolution of the group’s coherence as a natural course of events. If the declining numbers (5.2% to 10%) of the Afrikaners from 1960 to 2011 (50 years) are taken as a guideline for future predictions, and the emigration numbers of 1994 to 2017 continue, the Afrikaner as a group would be dissolved by 2117.75,80,87

The belief that the present-day Afrikaner’s Christian religion is unique is also an untruth. The same can be said about the Afrikaner’s culture of today: it has very little in common with the Afrikaner culture of his father and his grandfather. Present Afrikaner culture is much more culturally integrated with the other ethnic groups, like the Coloureds and to some extent even the Blacks. These various cultural changes, some slight while others are significant, are notable in Afrikaner family life, work ethic, the customs and traditions they underwrite and practice, as well as his educational and social preferences. The Afrikaner in general has become an individual, not very different from any other South African.

The idea that the Afrikaner is “lily” white is inaccurate. The strict prohibition of miscegenation between Afrikaners and Blacks because of the Afrikaner’s White blood purity was therefore pointless. The process of intermingling was activated in 1652 and is indeed on-going. The Afrikaner’s discrimination on the basis of “pure blood” reflects a lack of knowledge about his own racial origin. The Afrikaner seems to lack insight and wise reasoning in this regard.

When considering the above information, it is clear that Apartheid was in essence designed by the NP, the AB and the DRC, especially during the period under Verwoerd, in an attempt to secure a correspondence between nation status and territory for Afrikaners. The only principle was refusal to share political power in South Africa. This was done by imposing a political order with creative procrastination and manipulation, much more incisive than just pure racial segregation. It was a period of grand Apartheid with brutal and numerous well thought through legislative, economic, political and administrative policies. It ignored and disregarded the interests and aspirations of the subjugated citizens of South Africa in a blind belief that the Afrikaners, at that stage the most developed of all the South African groups, deserved the lion’s share of all the country’s benefits and rights and that this situation will be permanent. Although there were a number of policy reforms and adaptations by the NP since the late 1970s to uplift Blacks, was it exclusively aimed at keeping the Afrikaner regime in power and to reserve Afrikaner and White rights and benefits.7,37,159

There is no doubt that the masterminds behind Apartheid during the peak of Apartheid were the members of the Afrikaner Broederbond. It consisted of a nucleus of approximately 20 000 nationalist Afrikaners, referred to as the Super Afrikaners. Their powerful cultural, economical, political and military tentacles reached all nationalist Afrikaners, especially the Afrikaners belonging to the NP and the DRC. It form an immense circle and powerful group of approximately three million members, what Giliomee called the NP-Broederbonder-Afrikaners.41, p. 11 Many Afrikaners were not nationalist Afrikaners and experienced discrimination and domination to some extent, like the Blacks. However, they still benefited directly and indirectly from Apartheid and, notwithstanding their distaste for Apartheid, they mostly remained silent on Apartheid’s wrong-doings. Collectively, these side-lined Afrikaners cannot escape responsibility for Apartheid, whatever their arguments and excuses are. They are, with the Super-Afrikaners and nationalist Afrikaners, culprits. Although it is argued that Afrikaners born after 1994 are been freed from this burden they too cannot plead not guilty. They are still benefitting from what their forefathers gained over many years during Apartheid. This outcome makes all of these individuals part of the entity “Afrikaners” to which this article refers.7,36,37,41

5. Conclusion

The aim of this first article in the series of seven was to inform the Afrikaner on who he is and to reflect on the Afrikaner and the Afrikaner’s past roles as citizens of South Africa. The article begs of Afrikaners in-depth introspection. Afrikaners should answer the question whether they had already reached self-actualisation and an optimal personal happiness in the new South Africa. Has the Afrikaner left his worries and fears behind to commit to a good life here, or is he considering other options for happiness in the future.

It is an open question whether the proto-Afrikaner of 1910 on the founding of the Union, would have supported racism, especially the Afrikaner nationalism of the NP-AB-DRC-alliance (Grand Apartheid) from 1948 onwards, had they been thoroughly educated on who they are and where they truly come from. Would the mess the Afrikaners find themselves in today have been their real choice? If Afrikaners knew the facts, would they not perhaps have acted differently? Instead of selecting to obstruct Black voting from 1910 to1948, would they not have had selected not to obstruct one-man-one-vote. Would they not have parted with the “Boer” and “Cape Dutch” identities in 1910 to choose the ANC as his preferred party by the 1960s? Would they not perhaps have become Afrikaanse and Black South Africans because they are Black?3,11,26,92,96,

Was the Afrikaner’s immense psychological fear in 1994 to be rejected as a “traitor”, “joiner” and “hendsopper” (“hand-upper) if he became an ANC supporter or made another radical political change-over stronger than the fear that their culture will dissolve within a century? Are these two fears, now in combination, paralysing today the Afrikaners so that they cannot make sound decisions about their present and future role in the RSA?3,11,26,92,96

Was the cause of Apartheid perhaps the Afrikaner’s dark disposition and inclination to racial and ethnic discrimination? If so, it has resulted in many negative political and life consequences that the Afrikaner must face as they face the personal confusion in the new South Africa.

Two crucial questions emerge from the above:

▼Was the Afrikaner’s racial and ethnic discrimination learned from and embedded as part of their mindset by the bad examples of racist governance and other social, religious, cultural and political institutions and groups into which they were born and grew up? or

▼Do Afrikaners regard their racial behaviours as justified acts of revenge for personal, political, social and economic injustices perpetrated against them by other races and ethnic groups?

Evaluating your own history and wrongdoings of the past is not easy. “We find ourselves living in an indignant world, one intolerant of complexity when viewing our history and eager for simple characterisations of good and bad”, writes the writer Kalim Rajab160, p. 18. He concludes160, p. 18: “…we ultimately need room for greater magnanimity and to allow greater space for graciousness in our understanding of the past”. These words are very much applicable to the Afrikaners when they have to look at themselves: they are caught up in indoctrination that taught that they are a superior race that does only the ethically correct and good, versus the inferior Black subordinates whose doings were infected with unethical and bad behaviour and an inferior disposition. The nationalist Afrikaner regime’s doctrine of Afrikaner supremacy was supported by the idea of a “completeness and perfection” as part of a superior mindset and lifestyle. This started in in 1652 at the Cape of Good Hope. It was internalised by many ordinary Afrikaners: Afrikaners are only good versus Blacks are always bad. Most Afrikaners are too frightened to acknowledge the bad in their past, avoiding consciously and unconsciously their incompleteness, imperfection and failures, which so greatly characterise all humans. This study informed the Afrikaners of their true past, who they are: they are just ordinary humans, indigenous people of the same bloodline as their previous subordinates, characterised by the same incompleteness, imperfections and failures.

The advice of Palkhivala159 is valuable for Afrikaners in their effort to unshackle and cleanse themselves from the dark secrets of their past and to move successfully into the new South Africa with its manifold indigenous realities. He writes159, p. 77: “Every country must learn to live with its past history and to cherish it instead of trying to rewrite it. Chaos would be the only result of trying to undertake ‘correction of history’, or to undo the past, or to seek to remedy past wrongs”. The Afrikaners tried all these wrong venues in the past and failed. They have hopefully at last learned from the past.

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PEER REVIEW
Not commissioned. Externally peer-reviewed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The author declares that he has no competing interest.

FUNDING
The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Arts, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa.